Chapter 1
Appointment and Removal of Trustees

35-1-101. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 1, §§ 35-1-10135-1-120 (Code 1858, §§ 3648-3664 (deriv. Acts, 1831, ch. 107, §§ 1, 2; 1845-1846, ch. 194, § 2; 1853-1854, ch. 74, § 1; 1855-1856, ch. 113, §§ 11, 15); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 34, § 1; Act Jan. 14, 1868, §§ 1, 2 (published in Acts 1868-1869, p. 80); Acts 1917, ch. 137, §§ 1-3; Shan., §§ 3530a1-3530a3, 5414-5432; Code 1932, §§ 9573-9595; modified; Code Supp. 1950, § 9593; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 35-101 — 35-122), concerning appointment and removal of trustees, was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1.

35-1-102. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-102 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1; 1995, ch. 351, § 1), concerning the venue, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-103. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-103 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1), concerning trustees and successor trustees, appointment by court, accounting, bonds, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-104. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-104 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1), concerning the successor trustees, their appointment by petition and multiple trustees, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-105. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-105 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1), concerning the resignation of trustees, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-106. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-106 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1; 2002, ch. 735, §§ 10-12), concerning the removal of trustees, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-107. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-107 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1), concerning the examination of accounts and deficiencies, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-108. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-108 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1), concerning the acceptance and finality of resignation or removal and divesting and vesting of title, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-109. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-109 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1), concerning bond instead of removal, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-110. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-110 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1), concerning the liability of new trustee, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

35-1-111. Real property — Documents to be recorded — Trust property.

  1. When real estate is held as a part of the trust property, the court order accepting the resignation or ordering the removal of a trustee and appointing a successor, or an acknowledged memorandum of the order, shall be recorded in the county where any real estate is located, identifying each parcel of real estate held by the trust.
    1. When real estate is held as part of the trust property and a trustee has resigned or been removed without order of a court, the resigning or removed trustee shall execute and record an instrument that:
      1. Recites the resignation or removal of the trustee;
      2. Gives the name and address of the successor trustee, if any; and
      3. Identifies each parcel of real estate held by the trust.
    2. A successor trustee, or a remaining trustee if there is no successor, shall execute and record the instrument described in subdivision (b)(1) if the resigning or removed trustee fails to record the required instrument within thirty (30) days after resigning or being removed.

Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1; 1992, ch. 951, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 1, §§ 35-1-10135-1-120 (Code 1858, §§ 3648-3664 (deriv. Acts, 1831, ch. 107, §§ 1, 2; 1845-1846, ch. 194, § 2; 1853-1854, ch. 74, § 1; 1855-1856, ch. 113, §§ 11, 15); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 34, § 1; Act Jan. 14, 1868, §§ 1, 2 (published in Acts 1868-1869, p. 80); Acts 1917, ch. 137, §§ 1-3; Shan., §§ 3530a1-3530a3, 5414-5432; Code 1932, §§ 9573-9595; modified; Code Supp. 1950, § 9593; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 35-101 — 35-122), concerning appointment and removal of trustees, was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 24 Tenn. Juris., Trusts and Trustees, §§ 43, 45.

35-1-112. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former §§ 35-1-10135-1-110 and 35-1-11235-1-114 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1; 1988, ch. 854, § 12; 1995, ch. 351, § 1; 1995, ch. 352, § 1; 2002, ch. 735, §§ 10-12), concerning the appointment and removal of trustees, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004

35-1-113. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former §§ 35-1-10135-1-110 and 35-1-11235-1-114 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1; 1988, ch. 854, § 12; 1995, ch. 351, § 1; 1995, ch. 352, § 1; 2002, ch. 735, §§ 10-12), concerning the appointment and removal of trustees, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004

Acts 2004, ch. 866, § 6, purported to amend § 35-1-113; however, that section was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537.

35-1-114. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former §§ 35-1-10135-1-110 and 35-1-11235-1-114 (Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1; 1988, ch. 854, § 12; 1995, ch. 351, § 1; 1995, ch. 352, § 1; 2002, ch. 735, §§ 10-12), concerning the appointment and removal of trustees, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004

35-1-115 — 35-1-120. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 1, §§ 35-1-10135-1-120 (Code 1858, §§ 3648-3664 (deriv. Acts, 1831, ch. 107, §§ 1, 2; 1845-1846, ch. 194, § 2; 1853-1854, ch. 74, § 1; 1855-1856, ch. 113, §§ 11, 15); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 34, § 1; Act Jan. 14, 1868, §§ 1, 2 (published in Acts 1868-1869, p. 80); Acts 1917, ch. 137, §§ 1-3; Shan., §§ 3530a1-3530a3, 5414-5432; Code 1932, §§ 9573-9595; modified; Code Supp. 1950, § 9593; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 35-101 — 35-122), concerning appointment and removal of trustees, was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 566, § 1.

35-1-121. Appointment of public trustee.

In addition to the other provisions for the appointment of trustees in this chapter, a public trustee may be appointed by the court pursuant to title 30, chapter 1, part 4.

Acts 1987, ch. 322, § 19.

35-1-122. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-1-122 (Acts 1997, ch. 354, § 1), concerning the change of situs of trust and venues, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 97, effective July 1, 2004.

Chapter 2
Uniform Fiduciaries Act

35-2-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Fiduciaries Act.”

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 14 (Williams, § 9596.31); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-201.

Cross-References. Bonds of fiduciaries, §§ 8-19-307, 35-50-111.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 737, 740.

Law Reviews.

Some Aspects of Estate Planning in Tennessee (Alec Brock Stevenson), 2 Vand. L. Rev. 265 (1949).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: A Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1741 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1931 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Is Federalization of Charity Law All Bad? What States Can Learn from the Internal Revenue Code, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1621 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Pro and Con (Law): Considering the Irrevocable Nongrantor Trust Technique, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1999 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, The Stored Communications Act and Digital Assets, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1729 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1665 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1871 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1835 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: In Search of the Probate Exception, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1533 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer:  Introduction, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1531 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Probate Law Meets the Digital Age, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1697 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution, Out-of-State Nongrantor Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of State Income Taxation, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1945 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: The Creeping Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1635  (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769 (2014).

Collateral References.

Enforceability of contractual right, in which fiduciary has interest, to purchase property of estate or trust. 6 A.L.R.4th 786.

Payment or distribution under invalid instruction as breach of trustee's duty. 6 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Uniform Fiduciaries Act, construction and application of provisions of, affecting rights and obligations arising from payment of personal obligations with trust funds. 114 A.L.R. 1088.

35-2-102. Chapter definitions.

  1. In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Bank” includes any person or association of persons, whether incorporated or not, carrying on the business of banking;
    2. “Fiduciary” includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied, resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public officer, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust or estate;
    3. “Person” includes a corporation, partnership, or other association, or two (2) or more persons having a joint or common interest;
    4. “Principal” includes any person to whom a fiduciary as such owes an obligation; and
    5. “Savings institution” includes a federal or state savings and loan association or savings bank.
  2. A thing is done “in good faith,” within the meaning of this chapter, when it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 1 (Williams, § 9596.18); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-202; Acts 1985, ch. 167, § 1; 1988, ch. 854, § 13.

Law Reviews.

Ethics — Petty v. Privette: Exclusion of Attorney Liability in the Area of Estate Administration, 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 687 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Relation to Other Statutes.

Limitations on liability contained in T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c) applied to a bank, as defined by T.C.A. § 35-2-102(a)(1) to include any association “carrying on the business of banking.” McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

2. Bad Faith.

Considering the definition of good faith in T.C.A. § 35-2-102(b), the obvious implication is that a bad-faith act is done dishonestly. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

35-2-103. Application of payments made to fiduciaries — Validity of right or title acquired.

A person who in good faith pays or transfers to a fiduciary any money or other property, which the fiduciary as such is authorized to receive, is not responsible for the proper application thereof by the fiduciary, and any right or title acquired from the fiduciary in consideration of such payment or transfer is not invalid in consequence of a misapplication by the fiduciary.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 2 (Williams, § 9596.19); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-203.

35-2-104. Transfer of negotiable instrument by fiduciary.

If any negotiable instrument payable or endorsed to a fiduciary as such is endorsed by the fiduciary, or if any negotiable instrument payable or endorsed to the principal is endorsed by a fiduciary empowered to endorse such instrument on behalf of the principal, the endorsee is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of the fiduciary's obligation as fiduciary in endorsing or delivering the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach of the obligation as fiduciary unless the endorsee takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of such facts that the action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith. If, however, such instrument is transferred by the fiduciary in payment of or as security for a personal debt of the fiduciary to the actual knowledge of the creditor, or is transferred in any transaction known by the transferee to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, the creditor or other transferee is liable to the principal if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of the obligation as fiduciary in transferring the instrument.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 4 (Williams, § 9596.21); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-205.

35-2-105. Check drawn by fiduciary payable to third person.

If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such, or in the name of the principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name of the principal, the payee is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of the fiduciary's obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach of the obligation as fiduciary unless the payee takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of such facts that the action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith. If, however, such instrument is payable to a personal creditor of the fiduciary and delivered to the creditor in payment of or as security for a personal debt of the fiduciary to the actual knowledge of the creditor, or is drawn and delivered in any transaction known by the payee to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, the creditor or other payee is liable to the principal if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of the obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 5 (Williams, § 9596.22); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-206.

35-2-106. Check drawn by and payable to fiduciary — Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act unaffected.

  1. If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such or in the name of the principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name of the principal, payable to the fiduciary personally, or payable to a third person and by the third person transferred to the fiduciary, and is thereafter transferred by the fiduciary, whether in payment of a personal debt of the fiduciary or otherwise, the transferee is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of the fiduciary's obligation as fiduciary in transferring the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach of the obligation as fiduciary unless the transferee takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of such facts that the action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith, except and provided that title 34, chapter 5, being the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, is not by this chapter amended.
  2. This chapter shall not apply in any situation governed by the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 6 (Williams, § 9596.23); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-207.

35-2-107. Deposit in name of fiduciary as such — Drawing check.

If a deposit is made in a bank or savings institution to the credit of a fiduciary as such, the bank or savings institution is authorized to pay the amount of the deposit or any part thereof upon the check of the fiduciary, signed with the name in which such deposit is entered, without being liable to the principal, unless the bank or savings institution pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of the fiduciary's obligation as fiduciary in drawing the check or with knowledge of such facts that its action in paying the check amounts to bad faith. If, however, such a check is payable to the drawee bank or savings institution and is delivered to it in payment of or as security for a personal debt of the fiduciary to it, the bank or savings institution is liable to the principal if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of the obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the check except as provided in § 35-2-106.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 7 (Williams, § 9596.24); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-208; Acts 1985, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Fiduciaries.

T.C.A. § 35-2-107 governs withdrawals by a fiduciary from a bank account containing fiduciary funds. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

Provisions of T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109 are bolstered by T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c)(1)-(2), which clarifies that a bank does not acquire any duty simply because it knows that a depositor is a fiduciary. Furthermore, a bank generally has no duty to limit a fiduciary's transactions. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

After finding that Tennessee's Uniform Fiduciaries Act (UFA) displaced plaintiffs'  negligence claims and shielded the bank from liability arising from the actions of a fiduciary depositor, only plaintiffs'  allegations of “knowing” or “bad faith” conduct survived and those claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as the bank merely held the funds on deposit and custody of plan assets alone could not establish control sufficient to confer fiduciary status; thus the bank was not subject to liability as an ERISA fiduciary. McLemore v. Regions Bank, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

2. Relation to Other Laws.

Exemption in the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, T.C.A. § 47-18-101 et seq., for acts or transactions specifically authorized under the laws of Tennessee, as set forth in T.C.A. § 47-18-111(a)(1), applied to a bank's actions because the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, T.C.A. § 35-2-101 et seq., specifically authorized the bank to effectuate a fiduciary depositor's transfers, without being liable to the principal, as long as the bank was acting in good faith and without actual knowledge of the fiduciary's breach of duty, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107, and 35-2-109. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

3. Liability.

Nothing in T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c)(1) forecloses liability if a bank has actual knowledge that a fiduciary is breaching his or her duty. Because the statute does not speak to situations where a bank has acted in bad faith or with knowledge of a fiduciary's wrongdoing, T.C.A. § 35-2-111 can be reconciled with T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109, a bank is liable to a principal for a fiduciary's illegal withdrawal or transfer of funds if, and only if, the bank had actual knowledge that the fiduciary was breaching his or her fiduciary duty or had knowledge of such facts that its action amounts to bad faith. Anything less is insufficient to support liability. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

To show that defendant bank had knowledge of such facts that its action amounted to bad faith, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109, plaintiffs were required to show that the circumstances surrounding a fiduciary's transactions so clearly suggested a breach of fiduciary duty that the bank's failure to investigate was a conscious effort to avoid knowledge of wrongdoing. Plaintiffs could not merely show that the bank was negligent in not discovering a third party's fraud or not undertaking reasonable efforts to monitor its depositors. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

Collateral References.

Revocation of tentative “Totten” trusts of savings bank account by inter vivos declaration or will. 46 A.L.R.3d 487.

35-2-108. Deposit in name of principal — Drawing checks.

If a check is drawn upon the account of the principal in a bank or savings institution by a fiduciary who is empowered to draw checks upon the principal's account, the bank or savings institution is authorized to pay such check without being liable to the principal, unless the bank or savings institution pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of the fiduciary's obligation as fiduciary in drawing such check, or with knowledge of such facts that its action in paying the check amounts to bad faith. If, however, such a check is payable to the drawee bank or savings institution and is delivered to it in payment of or as security for a personal debt of the fiduciary to it, the bank or savings institution is liable to the principal if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of the obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the check.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 8 (Williams, § 9596.25); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-209; Acts 1985, ch. 167, § 2.

35-2-109. Deposit in fiduciary's personal account — Drawing checks.

If a fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank or savings institution to the fiduciary's personal credit of checks drawn by the fiduciary upon an account in the fiduciary's own name as fiduciary, or of checks payable to the fiduciary as fiduciary, or of checks drawn by the fiduciary upon an account in the name of the principal if the fiduciary is empowered to draw checks thereon, or of checks payable to the principal and endorsed by the fiduciary, if the fiduciary is empowered to endorse such checks, or if the fiduciary otherwise makes a deposit of funds held by the fiduciary as fiduciary, the bank or savings institution receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of the obligation as fiduciary. The bank or savings institution is authorized to pay the amount of the deposit or any part thereof upon the personal check of the fiduciary without being liable to the principal unless the bank or savings institution receives the deposit or pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of the obligation as fiduciary in making such deposit or in drawing such check or with knowledge of such facts that its action in receiving the deposit or paying the check amounts to bad faith.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 9 (Williams, § 9596.26); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-210; Acts 1985, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Fiduciaries.

T.C.A. § 35-2-109 explains the contours of a bank's liability to a fiduciary's principals when the fiduciary transfers funds to his or her own personal account. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

Provisions of T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109 are bolstered by T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c)(1)-(2), which clarifies that a bank does not acquire any duty simply because it knows that a depositor is a fiduciary. Furthermore, a bank generally has no duty to limit a fiduciary's transactions. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

2. Relation to Other Laws.

Exemption in the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, T.C.A. § 47-18-101 et seq., for acts or transactions specifically authorized under the laws of Tennessee, as set forth in T.C.A. § 47-18-111(a)(1), applied to a bank's actions because the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, T.C.A. 35-2-101 et seq., specifically authorized the bank to effectuate a fiduciary depositor's transfers, without being liable to the principal, as long as the bank was acting in good faith and without actual knowledge of the fiduciary's breach of duty, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107, and 35-2-109. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

3. Liability.

Nothing in T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c)(1) forecloses liability if a bank has actual knowledge that a fiduciary is breaching his or her duty. Because the statute does not speak to situations where a bank has acted in bad faith or with knowledge of a fiduciary's wrongdoing, T.C.A. § 35-2-111 can be reconciled with T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109, a bank is liable to a principal for a fiduciary's illegal withdrawal or transfer of funds if, and only if, the bank had actual knowledge that the fiduciary was breaching his or her fiduciary duty or had knowledge of such facts that its action amounts to bad faith. Anything less is insufficient to support liability. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

To show that defendant bank had knowledge of such facts that its action amounted to bad faith, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109, plaintiffs were required to show that the circumstances surrounding a fiduciary's transactions so clearly suggested a breach of fiduciary duty that the bank's failure to investigate was a conscious effort to avoid knowledge of wrongdoing. Plaintiffs could not merely show that the bank was negligent in not discovering a third party's fraud or not undertaking reasonable efforts to monitor its depositors. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

35-2-110. Deposit in names of two or more trustees — Drawing checks.

When a deposit is made in a bank or savings institution in the name of two (2) or more persons as fiduciaries and a check is drawn upon the fiduciary account by any fiduciary or fiduciaries authorized by the other fiduciary or fiduciaries to draw checks upon the fiduciary account, neither the payee nor other holder nor the bank or savings institution is bound to inquire whether it is a breach of trust to authorize such fiduciary or fiduciaries to draw checks upon the fiduciary account, and is not liable unless the circumstances be such that the action of the payee or other holder or the bank or savings institution amounts to bad faith.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 10 (Williams, § 9596.27); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-211; Acts 1985, ch. 167, § 2; 1988, ch. 854, § 14.

35-2-111. Applicability of chapter — Cases not provided for.

  1. This chapter is applicable to state and federal savings and loan associations and savings banks. In the event of a conflict between this chapter and a law on the same subject relating specifically to state or federal savings and loan associations or savings banks, the specific law shall be controlling.
  2. In any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant and those rules of law and equity relating to trusts, agency, negotiable instruments and banking, shall continue to apply.
    1. Knowledge on the part of the bank or savings institution of the existence of a fiduciary relationship or the terms of the relationship shall not impose any duty or liability on the bank or savings institution for any action of the fiduciary.
    2. A bank or savings institution has no duty to establish an account for a fiduciary or to limit transactions in an account so established unless, in its discretion, it contracts in writing with the fiduciary to establish or limit transactions with respect to such an account; provided, that this shall not preclude a court from temporarily enjoining or restraining the removal of funds from an existing account by a bank or savings institution over which the court exercises personal jurisdiction.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 12 (Williams, § 9596.29); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-213; Acts 1985, ch. 168, § 1; 1993, ch. 175, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Fiduciaries.

Provisions of T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109 are bolstered by T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c)(1)-(2), which clarifies that a bank does not acquire any duty simply because it knows that a depositor is a fiduciary. Furthermore, a bank generally has no duty to limit a fiduciary's transactions. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

2. Banks.

Limitations on liability contained in T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c) applied to a bank, as defined by T.C.A. § 35-2-102(a)(1) to include any association “carrying on the business of banking.” McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

3. Liability.

Nothing in T.C.A. § 35-2-111(c)(1) forecloses liability if a bank has actual knowledge that a fiduciary is breaching his or her duty. Because the statute does not speak to situations where a bank has acted in bad faith or with knowledge of a fiduciary's wrongdoing, T.C.A. § 35-2-111 can be reconciled with T.C.A. §§ 35-2-107 and 35-2-109. McLemore v. Regions Bank, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff'd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11600, 2012 FED App. 172P (6th Cir.), 2012 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.).

35-2-112. Uniformity of interpretation.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

Acts 1953, ch. 82, § 13 (Williams, § 9596.30); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-214.

Chapter 3
Investment of Trust Funds

35-3-101. Authority of court.

The court is authorized to have the money and funds in the hands of clerks and receivers, or trustees, in litigation or under the control of the court, invested under such rules and orders in each case as may be legal and just.

Acts 1865, ch. 19, § 1; Shan., § 5433; mod. Code 1932, § 9592; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-301.

Cross-References. Investment of funds of minors and incompetents, § 18-5-105.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 737.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 21; 14 Tenn. Juris., Guardian and Ward, §§ 8, 9; 24 Tenn. Juris., Trusts and Trustees, § 58.

Law Reviews.

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: A Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1741 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

The phrase “hereby authorized” as used in Shannon's Code § 5433, meant that authority or power to do the thing contemplated was conferred rather than that it must be done; thus this section was not mandatory. Steinberg v. Cox, 24 Tenn. App. 340, 144 S.W.2d 12, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

2. Administration of Estates.

To exercise the power conferred by this section, in administration of estates, it must be before the time for the payment of debts or distribution expires. After that time, §§ 5-8-4015-8-403 are applicable. Head v. Barry, 69 Tenn. 753, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 174 (1878).

3. Investment of Funds by Trustee.

4. —Diversion of Funds.

Where a trustee diverts the proceeds of trust property to the purchase of land, taking title in his own name, the cestuis que trustent may pursue their remedy against him and the land unaffected by the statute of limitation. Kaphan v. Toney, 58 S.W. 909, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 184 (1899).

5. —Purchase of Corporate Stock.

A testamentary trustee's estate cannot be held liable for loss to the trust funds by the purchase of certain corporate stock with a portion of the trust funds, in view of the provisions of the will creating the trust fund, empowering the trustee to make reinvestments of trust property as he may see fit, “looking always to the safety of the investment rather than to a high rate of interest.” Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

Collateral References.

Authorization by trust instrument of investment of trust funds in nonlegal investments. 78 A.L.R.2d 7.

Authorization or approval by court of investments by trustees which are “nonlegal” or contrary to terms of the trust instrument. 170 A.L.R. 1219.

Beneficiary's consent to, acquiescence in, or ratification of, improper investments or loans (including failure to invest) trustee, effect of. 128 A.L.R. 4.

Care required of trustee with respect to retaining securities coming into his hands as assets of the estate. 77 A.L.R. 505, 112 A.L.R. 355.

Conflict of laws as to investment of fund of testamentary trust. 115 A.L.R. 805.

Corporate trustee's right to invest in or retain its own stock. 134 A.L.R. 1324, 157 A.L.R. 1429.

Corporation of which trustee is an officer or stockholder, purchase from, as voidable or as ground for surcharging his account. 105 A.L.R. 449.

Diversification investments, duty and liability of trustee as to. 24 A.L.R.3d 730.

Duty of trustee to diversify investments, and liability of failure to do so. 24 A.L.R.3d 730.

Investment of trust funds in share or part of single security or group or pool of securities. 103 A.L.R. 1192, 110 A.L.R. 1166, 125 A.L.R. 669.

Measure of trustee's liability for breach of trust in selling investment property, or changing investments, in good faith. 58 A.L.R.2d 674.

Nonlegal investments, when will may be deemed to authorize investment of trust fund in. 78 A.L.R.2d 7.

Private corporation, right of trustee to invest trust funds in stock of. 12 A.L.R. 574, 122 A.L.R. 657, 78 A.L.R.2d 7.

Protection of investment in stocks by submitting to voluntary assessment, power and duty of trustee as to. 104 A.L.R. 979.

Retaining unauthorized securities held by testator or creator of trust. 37 A.L.R. 559, 122 A.L.R. 801, 135 A.L.R. 1528.

35-3-102. Authorized investments.

All trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries in this state, unless prohibited, or another mode of investment is prescribed by the will or deed of the testator or other person establishing the trust, may invest all funds in their hands in securities specified in §§ 35-3-10335-3-111, and may also invest funds in income-producing commercial or residential property.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-302; Acts 2016, ch. 640, § 3.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment added “, and may also invest funds in income-producing commercial or residential property.” at the end.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 640, § 4. March 23, 2016.

Law Reviews.

Non-Tax Aspects of Estate Planning (Ronald Lee Gilman), 2 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 41 (1972).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

2. —Provisions Directory.

This chapter is not mandatory, but intended to authorize by specific reference thereto the investment of the trust funds in certain property or securities listed or named, and is therefore permissive. Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

3. Construction with Other Acts.

4. —Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.

This statute includes most securities which are safest and most desirable for investment of trust funds and the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, prior to amendment of 1935, did not confer authority on guardian to invest ward's funds in other securities, without first obtaining the approval of court. McCuiston v. Haggard, 21 Tenn. App. 277, 109 S.W.2d 413, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

5. Investment of Trust Funds.

6. —Duty to Invest.

Where trust money cannot be applied either immediately or within a short time to the purposes of the trust, it is the duty of the trustee to make the fund productive to the cestuis que trust by investment of it in some proper security. Linder v. Officer, 175 Tenn. 402, 135 S.W.2d 445, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1940).

7. —Legalizing Unauthorized Investments.

The rule that a trustee is not liable for loss on investment unauthorized at the time which it was made but which by subsequent events becomes a legal investment is only applicable where the depreciation occurs after the investment becomes legal. Humphries v. Manhattan Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 174 Tenn. 17, 122 S.W.2d 446, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1938).

8. —Mortgage.

Notwithstanding effect of statute conferring upon guardians authority to invest in existing real estate bonds and notes, the purchase of an existing mortgage constituted waste and was sufficient in itself to authorize removal of minor's guardian. Monteverde v. Christie, 23 Tenn. App. 514, 134 S.W.2d 905, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

9. —Loan by Guardian from Trust.

If it could be conceded that this chapter may be given a curative effect, insofar as the illegality grounded on the investment of the ward's funds in an existing and outstanding mortgage loan is concerned, it can hardly be reasonably contended that anything in the chapter covers or cures the fundamental illegality of an investment of a ward's funds in a loan owned by the guardian — a purchase from itself. Meloy v. Nashville Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 340, 149 S.W.2d 73, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1941).

10. —Will Provisions — Effect.

A testamentary trustee's estate cannot be held liable for loss to the trust funds by the purchase of certain corporate stock with a portion of the trust funds, in view of provisions of the will creating the trust fund, empowering the trustee to make reinvestments of trust property “as he may see fit, looking always to the safety of the investment rather than to a high rate of interest.” Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

11. —Rule of Prudence.

Losses suffered by the trust corpus due to bad investments cannot be recovered from the trustee personally if he acted in good faith and as a prudent businessman would in the conduct of his own affairs even though the investments are other than permitted by statute since the statutory authorizations are permissive only. Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

35-3-103. Federal and state securities.

  1. Investments may be made in bonds, notes and stock of the United States and any state and territory of the United States.
  2. In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, if an indenture or other governing instrument directs, requires, authorizes or permits investment in United States government obligations, a bank, trust company, trust department or other fiduciary may invest in the obligations, either directly or in the form of securities or other interests in any open end or closed end management type investment company or investment trust registered under the federal Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.), if the portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is limited to United States government obligations and to repurchase agreements fully collateralized by the obligations and if the investment company or investment trust actually takes delivery of the collateral, either directly or through an authorized custodian.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(a); C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(A); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-303; Acts 1987, ch. 89, § 1; 2008, ch. 672, § 1.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-104. Securities of foreign governments.

Investments may be made in bonds, notes and stock issued or guaranteed by any foreign government with which the United States is at the time of sale or offer of sale of the bonds, notes or stock maintaining diplomatic relations and which foreign government has not, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the making of the investment, defaulted for more than thirty (30) days in the payment of any part either of principal or interest of any bond, note, stock or other evidence of indebtedness issued by it; provided, that if the foreign government has not been in existence for as much as thirty (30) years, but has been in existence for not less than ten (10) years, then the investment may be made in securities issued or guaranteed by it, if it has not defaulted in the payment of any part either of principal or interest of any bond, note, stock or other evidence of indebtedness issued by it since it has been in existence.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(b); C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(B); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-304.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-105. Bonds of counties.

  1. Investments may be made in bonds of any county in the state and bonds of any city or town in the state having a population of not less than two thousand (2,000) by the last federal census preceding the investment, regardless of whether the bonds are payable from taxes levied on property in the county, city or town, or are payable solely from revenues of the waterworks system, electric distribution system or both owned and operated by the issuing county, city or town, or are payable from both taxes and revenues; provided, that the county, city or town has not defaulted within fifteen (15) years preceding the investment, for more than ninety (90) days, in the payment of any part of either principal or interest on any bond, note or other evidence of valid indebtedness.
  2. Before any funds may be invested in bonds payable solely from waterworks, electric revenue or both, there shall be furnished with the bonds a certified copy of an operating statement issued by the official in charge of the operations of the waterworks or electric distribution systems, showing that the net revenue from the system or systems pledged to and available for the principal of and interest on all outstanding bonds payable from that revenue, covering a period of twelve (12) consecutive months out of the fifteen (15) months preceding the investment, have been at least one and one-third (11/3) times the highest combined principal and interest requirements for any one (1) year on all bonds then outstanding that are payable from the pledged revenues of the system or systems.
  3. “Net revenue” means total revenue less operating expenses incurred in connection with the operation of the system or systems.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(c); 1939, ch. 143, § 1; 1949, ch. 275, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(C); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-305.

Compiler's Notes. For table of population of Tennessee municipalities, and for U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-106. Municipal bonds.

Investments may be made in bonds and notes of any county, city or town in any state or territory of the United States that has a population, as shown by the last federal census next preceding the investment, of not less than forty-five thousand (45,000) and has not defaulted within twenty-five (25) years next preceding the investment, for more than thirty (30) days, in the payment of any part of either principal or interest of any bond, note or other evidence of indebtedness.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(e); C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(D); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-306.

Compiler's Notes. For table of population of Tennessee municipalities, and for U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-107. Real estate bonds and notes.

Investments may be made in bonds and notes secured by first mortgage or deed of trust on real estate located in this state; provided, that:

  1. The face or principal amount of the bonds or notes does not exceed one half (½) the actual value of the real estate as appraised by one (1) or more licensed real estate dealers acting for unincorporated trustees, guardians or other fiduciaries, and in case of incorporated trustees, guardians or other fiduciaries, the appraisal shall be made by an agent or committee composed of or selected by the board of directors or executive committee of the incorporated trustee, guardian or other fiduciary;
  2. The trustee, guardian or other fiduciary or any institution controlled by that entity or person has not received any commission from the borrower or issuer in the making of the mortgage or deed of trust or the underwriting of the securities secured by the mortgage or deed of trust, unless the commission charged the borrower or issuer does not exceed one percent (1%) per annum of the aggregate principal amount of the bonds or notes; and
  3. Any probate or chancery court of the county where the fiduciary is located, upon the application of any beneficiary of the trust or of any person connected with any beneficiary, by consanguinity or affinity, within the sixth degree as computed by the civil law, may, at any time, either restrain the making of any such proposed investment, if the investment is not consummated, or if consummated, require the fiduciary promptly to dispose of the bonds or notes at the best price then obtainable and otherwise reinvest the funds, and the court may exercise such power to restrain or compel disposal in all cases in which the court may find that action to be necessary to protect the interest of any beneficiary.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(f); C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(E); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-307.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee and the Installment Land Contract: A Viable Alternative to the Deed of Trust, 21 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 551 (1991).

35-3-108. Railroad obligations.

  1. Investments may be made in the following railroad obligations:
    1. Obligations issued, assumed or guaranteed as to principal and interest by endorsement, or so guaranteed, which guaranty has been assumed;
    2. Obligations for the payment of the principal and interest of which a railroad corporation such as is described in this section is obligated under the terms of a lease made or assumed; or
    3. Equipment trust obligations in respect of which liability has been incurred by a railroad corporation incorporated under the laws of the United States, or any state of the United States, and owning and operating within the United States not less than five hundred (500) miles of standard-gauge railroad line, exclusive of sidings, or if the mileage so owned is less than five hundred (500) miles, the railroad operating revenues from the operation of all railroads operated by it, including the revenues from the operation of all railroads controlled through ownership of all, except directors' qualifying shares, of the voting stock of the owning corporation, was not less than ten million dollars ($10,000,000) each year for at least five (5) of the six (6) fiscal years next preceding the investment.
  2. Provided, that:
    1. In each year for at least five (5) of the six (6) fiscal years and in the last fiscal year next preceding the investment, the amount of income of such railroad corporation available for its fixed charges, as defined in subsection (c), was not less than one and one-half (1½) times its fixed charges, as defined in subsection (c);
    2. In each year for at least five (5) of the six (6) fiscal years next preceding the investment, the railroad corporation has paid dividends in cash upon its capital stock equivalent to at least one fourth (¼) of its fixed charges, or if the railroad corporation has not paid such dividends, that the amount of income available for its fixed charges was not less than one and one half (1½) times its fixed charges for at least nine (9) of the ten (10) fiscal years and in the last fiscal year next preceding the investment;
    3. At no time within the period of six (6) years has the railroad corporation failed regularly and punctually to pay the matured principal and interest of all its mortgage indebtedness; and
    4. The security, if any, for the obligations shall be property wholly or in part within the United States and the obligations shall be:
      1. Fixed interest-bearing bonds secured by direct mortgage on railroad owned or operated by the railroad corporation;
      2. Bonds secured by first mortgage upon terminal, depot or tunnel property, including lands, buildings and appurtenances, used in the service of transportation by one (1) or more railroad corporations; provided, that the bonds are the direct obligation of, or that payment of principal and interest of the bonds are guaranteed by, endorsement by or guaranteed by endorsement, which guaranty has been assumed by, one (1) or more railroad corporations;
      3. Equipment trust obligations, comprising bonds, notes and certificates, issued in connection with the purchase for use on railroads of new standard-gauge rolling stock through the medium of an equipment trust agreement, and which obligations, so long as any of them are outstanding and unpaid or unprovided for, shall be secured by an instrument:
        1. Vesting title to the equipment in a trustee free of encumbrance; or
        2. Creating a first lien on the equipment, or, pending the vesting of title, by the deposit of cash in trust to an amount equal to the face amount of the obligations issued in respect of the equipment, title to which is not yet so vested; provided, that the maximum amount of the obligations so issuable shall not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the cost of the equipment; and provided further, that the owner, purchaser or lessee, or the owners, purchasers or lessees, of the equipment shall be obligated by the terms of the obligations or of the instrument to:
          1. Maintain the equipment in proper repair;
          2. Replace any of the equipment that may be destroyed or released with other equipment of equal value, or, if released in connection with a sale of the equipment, to deposit the proceeds of the sale in trust for the benefit of the holders of the obligations pending replacement of the equipment;
          3. Pay any and all taxes or other governmental charges that may be required by law to be paid upon the equipment;
          4. Pay, in accordance with the provisions of the obligations or of the instrument, to holders, or to the trustee for the benefit of holders, of the obligations the amount of interest due on the obligations or of the dividends payable in respect of the obligations; and
          5. Pay the amount of the entire issue of the obligations in annual or semiannual installments each year throughout a period of not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the first date of issue of any of the obligations that the amount of the respective unmatured installments at any time outstanding shall be approximately equal; provided, that unless the owner, purchaser or lessee of the equipment, or one (1) or more of the owners, purchasers or lessees shall be a railroad corporation as is described in and meets the requirements of this section preceding subdivision (b)(4)(A), the obligations shall be guaranteed by endorsements as to principal and as to interest or dividends by the railroad corporation;
      4. Bonds of the railroad corporation secured by irrevocable pledge as collateral under a trust agreement of other railroad bonds that are legal investment for fiduciaries under this section, have a maturity not earlier than the bonds that they secure and of a total face amount not less than the total face amount of the bonds that they secure; or
      5. Fixed interest-bearing mortgage bonds other than those described in subdivisions (b)(4)(A) and (B), income mortgage bonds, collateral trust bonds or obligations other than those described in subdivision (b)(4)(D), or unsecured bonds or obligations, issued, assumed or guaranteed as to principal and interest by endorsement by, or so guaranteed, which guaranty has been assumed by, the railroad corporation; provided, that in each year for at least five (5) of the six (6) fiscal years and in the last fiscal year next preceding the investment:
        1. The amount of income of the railroad corporation available for its fixed charges, as defined in subsection (c), was not less than twice the sum of:
          1. Its fixed charges, as defined in subsection (c); and
          2. Full interest on the income mortgage bonds, if any;
        2. The net income of which after deductions was not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000); and
        3. The railroad corporation has made the dividend and principal and interest payments required  by subdivisions (b)(4)(C)(ii)(d ) and (e ).
  3. The amount of income available for fixed charges shall be the amount obtained by deducting from gross income all items deductible in ascertaining net income other than contingent income interest and those constituting fixed charges. Fixed charges shall be rent for leased roads, miscellaneous rents, fixed interest on funded debt, interest on unfunded debt and amortization of discount on funded debt.
  4. Accounting terms used in this section shall be deemed to refer to those used in the accounting reports prescribed by the accounting regulations for common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act (U.S.C. Title 49). If the interstate commerce commission prescribes accounting regulations in which are defined the terms “income available for fixed charges” and “fixed charges,” the definitions of those terms as so prescribed shall be taken and used in lieu of the definitions set forth in subsection (c) for all purposes.
  5. For purposes of this section, the revenues, earnings, income and fixed charges of, and dividends paid by, any railroad corporation, all or substantially all of the railroad lines of which have been acquired through merger, consolidations, conveyance or lease by another railroad corporation and remain in its possession, shall be deemed to be revenues, earnings, income and fixed charges of, and dividends paid by, the latter corporation.
  6. Not more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the assets of any trust shall be loaned or invested in the bonds, notes and certificates in this section defined, and not more than ten percent (10%) of the assets shall be invested in such bonds, notes and certificates for which any one (1) railroad corporation shall be obligated.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(g); C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(F); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-308.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-109. Public utility bonds.

  1. Investments may be made in the bonds of any corporation that at the time of the investment is incorporated under the laws of the United States or any state of the United States, or the District of Columbia, and transacting the business of supplying electrical energy or artificial gas or both for light, heat, power and other purposes; provided, that at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the gross operating revenues of any such corporation are derived from that business, and not more than fifteen percent (15%) of the gross operating revenues, are derived from any one (1) kind of business other than supplying electricity and gas; and provided further, that corporation is subject to regulation by the Tennessee public utility commission or a public utility commission, or other similar regulatory body duly established by the laws of the United States or the states in which such corporation operates, subject to the following conditions:
    1. The corporation has all franchises necessary to operate in territory in which at least seventy-five percent (75%) of its gross income is earned, which franchises shall either be indeterminate permits or agreements with or subject to the jurisdiction of the Tennessee public utility commission, or other duly constituted regulatory body, or extend at least five (5) years beyond the maturity of the bonds;
    2. The outstanding full paid capital stock of the corporation is equal to at least two thirds (2/3) of the total debt secured by mortgage lien on any part or all of its property; provided, that in case of a corporation having nonpar value shares, the amount of capital that such shares represent is the capital as shown by the books of the corporation;
    3. The corporation has been in existence for a period of not less than eight (8) fiscal years and at no time within the period of eight (8) fiscal years next preceding the date of the investment has the corporation failed to pay promptly and regularly the matured principal and interest of all its indebtedness direct, assumed or guaranteed, but the period of life of the corporation, together with the period of life of any predecessor corporation or corporations from which a major portion of its property was acquired by consolidation, merger or purchase shall be considered together in determining the required period;
    4. For a period of five (5) fiscal years next preceding the investment the net earnings of the corporation have averaged per year not less than twice the average annual interest charges on its total funded debt applicable to that period, and for the last fiscal year preceding the investment its net earnings have been not less than twice the interest charges for a full year on its total funded debt outstanding at the time of the investment, and for that period the gross operating revenues of any such corporation have averaged per year not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000), and the corporation has for each year either earned an amount available for dividends or paid in dividends an amount equal to four percent (4%) upon a sum equivalent to two thirds (2/3) of its funded debt;
    5. The bonds must be part of an issue of not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000) and must be mortgage bonds secured by a first or refunding mortgage secured by property owned and operated by the corporation issuing or assuming them, or must be underlying mortgage bonds secured by property owned and operated by the corporations issuing or assuming them. The bonds are to be refunded by a junior mortgage providing for their retirement; provided, that the bonds under the junior mortgage comply with the requirements of this section and that the underlying mortgage is either a closed mortgage or remains open solely for the issue of additional bonds which are to be pledged under the junior mortgage. The aggregate principal amount of bonds secured by the first or refunding mortgage plus the principal amount of all the underlying outstanding bonds shall not exceed sixty percent (60%) of the value of the physical property owned as shown by the books of the corporation and subject to the lien of the mortgage or mortgages securing the total mortgage debt; and provided further, that, if a refunding mortgage, it must provide for the retirement on or before the date of their maturity of all bonds secured by prior liens on the property; and
    6. Not more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the assets of any trust shall be loaned on or invested in bonds of electric and gas corporations, and not more than ten percent (10%) of the assets of any trust shall be invested in the bonds of any one such corporation, as authorized by this section.
  2. In determining the qualifications of any bond under this section where a corporation has acquired its property or any substantial part thereof within five (5) years immediately preceding the date of the investment by consolidation or merger, or by the purchase of all or a substantial portion of the property of any other corporation or corporations, the gross operating revenues, net earnings and interest charges of the several predecessor or constituent corporations shall be consolidated and adjusted so as to ascertain whether there has been compliance with the requirements of subdivision (a)(4).
    1. The gross operating revenues and expenses of a corporation, for the purposes of this section, shall be, respectively, the total amount earned from the operation of, and the total expense of maintaining and operating all property owned and operated by or leased and operated by the corporation, as determined by the system of accounts prescribed by the Tennessee public utility commission, public utility commission or other similar regulatory body having jurisdiction in the matter. The gross operating revenues and expenses, as defined in this subdivision (c)(1), of subsidiary companies may be included; provided, that all the mortgage bonds and a controlling interest in stock or stocks of the subsidiary companies are pledged as part security for the mortgage debt of the principal company; and
    2. The net earnings of any corporation, for the purpose of this section, shall be the balance obtained by deducting from its gross operating revenues, its operating and maintenance expenses, taxes other than federal and state income taxes, rentals and provision for renewals and retirements of the physical assets of the corporation, and by adding to the balance its income from securities and miscellaneous sources, but not, however, to exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the balance;

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(h); C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(G); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-309; Acts 1995, ch. 305, § 100; 2017, ch. 94, § 34.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “Tennessee public utility commission” for “Tennessee regulatory authority” in (a), (a)(1), and (c)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 94, § 83. April 4, 2017.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-110. Telephone corporation bonds.

  1. Investments may be made in the bonds of any corporation that at the time of the investment is incorporated under the laws of the United States or any state of the United States, or the District of Columbia, and is authorized to engage and is engaging in the business of furnishing telephone service in the United States, and provided the corporation is subject to regulation by the interstate commerce commission or a regulatory authority, or public utility commission or other similar federal or state regulatory body duly established by the laws of the United States or the states in which the corporation operates, subject to the following conditions:
    1. The corporation has been in existence for a period of not less than eight (8) fiscal years and at no time within that period of eight (8) fiscal years next preceding the date of the investment has the corporation failed to pay promptly and regularly the matured principal and interest of all its indebtedness direct, assumed or guaranteed, but the period of life of the corporation, together with the period of life of any predecessor corporation or corporations from which a major portion of its property was acquired by consolidation, merger or purchase, shall be considered together in determining the required period;
    2. The outstanding full paid capital stock of the corporation is at the time of the investment equal to at least two thirds (2/3) of the total debt secured by all mortgage liens on any part or all of its property;
    3. For a period of five (5) fiscal years next preceding the investment, the net earnings of the corporation have averaged per year not less than twice the average annual interest charges on its total funded debt applicable to that period, and for the last fiscal year preceding the investment, the net earnings have been not less than twice the interest charges for a full year on its total funded debt outstanding at the time of the investment, and for that period, the gross operating revenues of the corporation have averaged per year not less than five million dollars ($5,000,000), and the corporation has for each of those years either earned an amount available for dividends or paid in dividends an amount equal to four percent (4%) upon all of its outstanding capital stock; and
    4. The bonds must be part of an issue of not less than five million dollars ($5,000,000) and must be secured by a first or refunding mortgage, and the aggregate principal amount of bonds secured by the first or refunding mortgage, plus the principal amount of all underlying outstanding bonds, shall not exceed sixty percent (60%) of the value of the property, real and personal, owned absolutely and subject to the lien of the mortgage; provided, that, if a refunding mortgage, it must provide for the retirement of all bonds secured by prior liens on the property. Not more than thirty-three and one third percent (331/3%) of the property constituting the specific security for the bonds may consist of stock or unsecured obligations of affiliated or other telephone companies, or both.
  2. In determining the qualification of any bond under this section, where a corporation has acquired its property or any substantial part of its property within five (5) years immediately preceding the date of the investment by consolidation or merger or by the purchase of all or a substantial portion of the property of any other corporation or corporations, the gross operating revenues, net earnings and interest charges of the several predecessor or constituent corporations shall be consolidated and adjusted so as to ascertain whether there has been compliance with the requirements of subdivision (a)(3).
  3. The gross operating revenues and expenses of a corporation, for the purpose of this section, shall be respectively the total amount earned from the operation of, and the total expense of maintaining and operating, all property owned and operated by or leased and operated by the corporation, as determined by the system of accounts prescribed by the interstate commerce commission or the Tennessee public utility commission, or public utility commission, or other similar federal or state regulatory body having jurisdiction in the matter.
  4. The net earnings of any corporation, for the purpose of this section, shall be the balance obtained by deducting from its gross operating revenues its operating and maintenance expenses, provision for depreciation of the physical assets of the corporation, taxes other than federal and state income taxes, rentals and miscellaneous charges, and by adding to the balance its income from securities and miscellaneous sources, but not, however, to exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the balance. “Funded debt” means all interest bearing debts maturing more than one (1) year from date of issue.
  5. Not more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the assets of any trust shall be loaned on or invested in bonds of telephone corporations, and not more than ten percent (10%) of the assets of any trust shall be invested in the bonds of any one (1) telephone corporation, as authorized by this section.

Acts 1931, ch. 100, § 1(i); C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(H); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-310; Acts 1995, ch. 305, § 101; 2017, ch. 94, § 35.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “Tennessee public utility commission” for “Tennessee regulatory authority” in (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 94, § 83. April 4, 2017.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-111. Obligations of certain federal agencies.

Trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries may also invest in or lend on the following obligations issued by the following authorized federal agencies:

  1. Bonds and/or debentures issued by a federal home loan bank organized under the “Federal Home Loan Bank Act” (47 Stat. 725, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq.);
  2. Stock of federal savings and loan associations organized under the “Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933” (48 Stat. 128, 12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.), and amendments to that act, and/or building and loan associations, licensed to do business in Tennessee, where the stock of the associations is insured by the federal savings and loan insurance corporation;
  3. Notes, bonds, debentures or other obligations issued under title IV of the act of congress of the United States entitled “National Housing Act,” approved June 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 1246, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.), and any amendments thereto; and
  4. Mortgages guaranteed or insured under title III of the act of congress of the United States, entitled “Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944,” approved June 22, 1944 (58 Stat. 284, 38 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. [repealed]), and any amendments thereto.

Acts 1935 (E.S.), ch. 36, § 1; 1939, ch. 73, § 1; 1949, ch. 175, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.1(I); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-311.

Compiler's Notes. Some of the provisions in (2) may be obsolete. The federal savings and loan insurance corporation no longer exists.

Title III of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, referred to in subdivision (4), was repealed by Act Sept. 2, 1958, P.L. 85-857, § 14(87), 72 Stat. 1273. For present law, see 38 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq.

Cross-References. See notes to § 35-3-102.

35-3-112. State and federal bond issues — Reports.

Guardians, executors, administrators and trustees shall also be authorized and empowered to invest money and funds in their hands in the bonds of the state, of the United States, or obligations issued separately or collectively by or for federal land banks, federal intermediate credit banks and banks for cooperatives under the act of congress known as the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (85 Stat. 583, 12 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq.) and amendments to that act, or in obligations issued under the Home Owner's Loan Act of congress (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.), or notes or bonds secured by mortgage or trust deed insured by the federal housing administrator, or bonds and/or debentures issued by national mortgage associations; also to lend on the security of any such bonds to the extent of eighty-five percent (85%) of their face value; and, in either case, make report thereof to the court where the guardian, executor, administrator or trustee is qualified, unless another mode of investment is required by will or deed of the testator or another person who has established the funds.

Acts 1865, ch. 19, § 2; Shan., § 4281; Acts 1925, ch. 9, § 1; Shan. Supp., § 4281a4; mod. Code 1932, § 8497; Acts 1935, ch. 136, § 1; 1935, ch. 187, § 1; 1937, ch. 75, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 8497; Acts 1976, ch. 585, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-312.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application of Section.

This section by its own terms does not apply to the clerk and master of the chancery court. Steinberg v. Cox, 24 Tenn. App. 340, 144 S.W.2d 12, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

2. Provisions not Mandatory.

This section is not mandatory, but is intended to authorize by specific reference thereto the investment of the trust funds in certain property or securities listed or named, and is therefore permissive. Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

3. Rule of Prudent Investment.

Losses suffered by the trust corpus due to bad investments cannot be recovered from the trustee personally if he acted in good faith and as a prudent businessman would in the conduct of his own affairs even though the investments are other than permitted by statute since the statutory authorizations are permissive only. Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

35-3-113. Life, endowment or annuity contracts of life insurance companies.

  1. Executors, trustees and guardians are authorized, with the approval of a probate court or other court of competent jurisdiction, to invest out of income or principal of funds in their custody, in single or annual premium life, endowment or annuity contracts of legal reserve life insurance companies duly licensed and qualified to transact business within the state.
  2. Such contracts may be issued on the life or lives of any beneficiary, cestui que trust or ward, who may have a vested or contingent interest in the estate, or on the life or lives of any parent, trustor or other person in whom any beneficiary, cestui que trust or ward may have an insurable interest, and shall such be so drawn that the legal title of the policy or contract shall be in and the proceeds or avails of the proceeds payable to and in the control of the fiduciary making the investment, and may be retained and shall be subject to transfer, assignment and conveyance by the fiduciary as other personal property held in the account.

Acts 1939, ch. 133, §§ 1-3; 1945, ch. 150, § 1; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-313; Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 22.

Law Reviews.

Some Aspects of Estate Planning in Tennessee (Alec Brock Stevenson), 2 Vand. L. Rev. 265 (1949).

35-3-114. Certificates of deposit and savings accounts.

All trustees and guardians in this state, unless prohibited, or another mode of investment is prescribed, by the will or deed of the testator or other person establishing the trust, may invest trust funds in their hands, in addition to the investments heretofore authorized, in certificates of deposit of, and savings accounts in, any national or state bank in the United States, including itself if such trustee or guardian is a national or state bank in the United States otherwise qualified, whose deposits are insured by the federal deposit insurance corporation, at the prevailing rate of interest of such certificates or savings accounts. No trustee or guardian shall invest in such certificates of deposit of, or savings accounts in any one (1) bank, an amount from any one (1) fund in the trustee's or guardian's care in excess of such amount as is fully insured as a deposit in the bank by the federal deposit insurance corporation, unless the investment is first approved by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Acts 1939, ch. 170, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.3 (Williams, § 9596.7); Acts 1975, ch. 331, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-314; Acts 1989, ch. 288, § 1.

35-3-115. Public housing authority obligations.

Notwithstanding any restrictions on investments contained in any laws of this state, the state and all public officers, municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and public bodies, all banks, bankers, trust companies, savings banks and institutions, building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, investment companies, and other persons carrying on a banking business, all insurance companies, insurance associations and other persons carrying on an insurance business, and all executors, administrators, guardians, trustees and other fiduciaries may legally invest any sinking funds, moneys or other funds belonging to them or within their control in any bonds or other obligations issued by a housing authority pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law, compiled in title 13, chapter 20, and any amendments to that law, or issued pursuant to the Memphis Housing Authority Law, chapter 615 of the Private Acts of 1935, as amended by chapter 900 of the Private Acts of 1937, and any amendments to that law, or issued by any public housing authority or agency in the United States, when the bonds or other obligations are secured by a pledge of annual contributions to be paid by the United States government or any agency of the United States government. The bonds and other obligations shall be authorized security for all public deposits, it being the purpose of this section to authorize any persons, firms, corporations, associations, political subdivisions, bodies and officers, public or private, to use any funds owned or controlled by them, including, but not limited to, sinking, insurance, investment, retirement, compensation, pension and trust funds, and funds held on deposit, for the purchase of any such bonds or other obligations; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving any person, firm or corporation from any duty of exercising reasonable care in selecting securities.

Acts 1939, ch. 155, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 9596.4 (Williams, § 9596.8); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-315.

35-3-116. Courts empowered to authorize retention of original investments.

  1. Any guardian, personal representative, trustee or other fiduciary may make, in the county in which appointed, application to the chancery court, or to any other court therein having concurrent jurisdiction, for permission to retain and hold in unchanged form any security or investment originally forming a part of the estate, and the court shall have the authority and power to authorize the guardian, personal representative, trustee or other fiduciary, to retain and hold in unchanged form any security or investment originally forming a part of the estate, upon it being made to appear to the court that retention of the security or investment is to the manifest interest of the estate. The authority to retain securities or investments, when granted to the fiduciary by the instrument under which the fiduciary is acting, is not affected by the foregoing provisions.
  2. The application in every such case shall be made by bill or petition, and the beneficiaries be made the defendants and served with process, and the cause shall be conducted and heard in the same manner as other suits in chancery.
  3. A guardian ad litem shall be appointed for all defendants under disability, and the decree of the court authorizing the retention of the securities or investments shall set out fully the reasons and object moving the court in granting to the fiduciary the authority so to do.
  4. It is not intended to impose upon a fiduciary any duty or obligation in addition to those arising under previously existing law, nor is it intended to change, modify or alter any investment statute of the state, except insofar as variations from those statutes may be made through proceedings authorized by this section.

Acts 1945, ch. 53, §§ 1-4; mod. C. Supp. 1950, §§ 9596.5-9596.7 (Williams, §§ 9596.9-9596.11); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 35-316 — 35-318.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 740.

Law Reviews.

Wills and Fiduciary Powers (Robert L. McMurray), 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 191 (1964).

Collateral References.

Absences of market therefor as justifying trustee's retention of unauthorized or nonlegal securities received from creator of trust. 88 A.L.R.3d 894.

35-3-117. Investment in securities of management investment company or investment trust by bank or trust company — Fiduciary liability — Abuse of fiduciary discretion.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law, a bank or trust company, to the extent it acts at the direction of another person authorized to direct investment of funds held by the bank or trust company, or to the extent that it exercises investment discretion as a fiduciary, custodian, managing agent, or otherwise with respect to the investment and reinvestment of assets that it maintains in its trust department, may invest and reinvest the assets, subject to the standard contained in this section, in the securities of any open-end or closed-end management investment company or investment trust registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 — 80a-64). The fact that the bank or trust company, or any affiliate of the bank or trust company, is providing services to the investment company or trust as investment advisor, sponsor, distributor, custodian, transfer agent, registrar or otherwise, and receiving reasonable remuneration for the services, does not preclude the bank or trust company from investing in the securities of the investment company or trust.
  2. In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in the governing instrument, a fiduciary will not be liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust with respect to a decision regarding the allocation and nature of investments of trust assets unless the court determines that the decision was an abuse of the fiduciary's discretion. A court shall not determine that a fiduciary abused its discretion merely because the court would not have exercised the discretion in the same manner.
  3. If a court determines that a fiduciary has abused its discretion regarding the allocation and nature of investments of trust assets, the remedy is to restore the income and remainder beneficiaries to the positions they would have occupied if the fiduciary had not abused its discretion, according to the following rules:
    1. To the extent that the abuse of discretion has resulted in no distribution to a beneficiary or a distribution that is too small, the court shall require a distribution from the trust to the beneficiary in an amount that the court determines will restore the beneficiary, in whole or in part, to the beneficiary's appropriate position, taking into account all prior distributions to the beneficiary.
    2. To the extent that the abuse of discretion has resulted in a distribution to a beneficiary that is too large, the court shall restore the beneficiaries, the trust, or both, in whole or in part, to their appropriate positions, taking into account all prior distributions, by requiring the fiduciary to withhold an amount from one (1) or more future distributions to the beneficiary who received the distribution that was too large or requiring that beneficiary to return some or all of the distribution to the trust.
    3. To the extent that the court is unable, after applying subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2), to restore the beneficiaries, the trust, or both, to the position they would have occupied if the fiduciary had not abused its discretion, the court may require the fiduciary to pay an appropriate amount from its own funds to one (1) or more of the beneficiaries or the trust or both.
  4. Upon a petition by the fiduciary, the court having jurisdiction over the trust or agency account shall determine whether a proposed plan of investment by the fiduciary will result in an abuse of the fiduciary's discretion. If the position describes the proposed plan of investment and contains sufficient information to inform the beneficiaries of the reasons for the proposal, the facts upon which the fiduciary relies, and an explanation of how the income and remainder beneficiaries will be affected by the proposed plan of investment, a beneficiary who challenges the proposed plan of investment has the burden of establishing that it will result in an abuse of discretion.

Acts 1951, ch. 125, §§ 1-6 (Williams, §§ 9596.12-9596.17); Acts 1968, ch. 518, § 1; 1971, ch. 61, § 1; 1974, ch. 634, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 35-319 — 35-324; Acts 1989, ch. 288, § 2; 1991, ch. 386, § 1; 2001, ch. 57, §§ 1, 2; 2002, ch. 696, § 15.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 1018.

Law Reviews.

Selection and Removal of Fiduciaries (Robert L. McMurray), 26 No. 3 Tenn. B.J. 22 (1990).

Where There's a Will: “Total return trusts” come to Tennessee (Dan W. Holbrook), 37 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 33 (2001).

35-3-118. Stocks or bonds held by fiduciary in nominee's name.

  1. Trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries owning stocks or registered bonds may hold them in the name of a nominee without mention of the fiduciary relationship in the stock certificates, stock registration books, or registered bond or bond registry; provided, that:
    1. The records and all reports and accounts rendered by the fiduciary clearly show the ownership of the stock or bond by the fiduciary, and the facts regarding its holding; and
    2. The nominee deposits with the fiduciary a signed statement showing the fiduciary ownership, either endorses the stock certificate or registered bond in blank, or signs a transfer power in blank, and attach it to the certificate or bond, and does not have possession of or access to the stock certificate or bond, except under the immediate supervision of the fiduciary.
  2. The fiduciary shall be personally liable for any loss resulting from any act of the nominee in connection with the securities so held.
  3. This section shall apply to all such fiduciary relationships.

Acts 1953, ch. 165, §§ 1, 3 (Williams, § 9596.8b); 1957, ch. 49, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-325.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 1018.

Law Reviews.

Wills, Estates and Trusts (William J. Bowe), 6 Vand. L. Rev. 1126 (1953).

35-3-119. Tennessee valley authority obligations.

Notwithstanding any restrictions on investments contained in any laws of this state, the state and all public officers, municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and public bodies, all banks, bankers, trust companies, savings banks and institutions, building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, investment companies, and other persons carrying on a banking business, all insurance companies, insurance associations and other persons carrying on an insurance business, and all executors, administrators, guardians, trustees and other fiduciaries may legally invest any sinking funds, moneys or other funds belonging to them or within their control in any bonds or other obligations issued by the Tennessee valley authority pursuant to the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 (16 U.S.C. § 831), and any amendment to that act, and the bonds and other obligations shall be authorized security for all public deposits, it being the purpose of this section to authorize any persons, firms, corporations, associations, political subdivisions, bodies and officers, public or private, to use any funds owned or controlled by them, including, but not limited to, sinking, insurance, investment, retirement, compensation, pension and trust funds, and funds held on deposit, for the purchase of any such bonds or other obligations. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving any person, firm or corporation from any duty of exercising reasonable care in selecting securities.

Acts 1961, ch. 128, § 1; T.C.A., § 35-326.

Law Reviews.

The Right to Counsel for the Indigent Defendant in Tennessee (Charles H. Miller), 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 300 (1964).

35-3-120. Federally guaranteed loans and investments.

  1. Banks, trust companies, insurance companies, building and loan associations, credit unions, trustees and others acting in a fiduciary capacity, trust funds, pension and profit-sharing funds, real estate investment trusts, and other financial institutions, originating mortgagee institutions, and other institutions approved as mortgagees and otherwise meeting the requirements of the federal housing administration or veterans administration to act as mortgagees under the programs of these agencies may:
    1. Make loans and advances of credit and purchases of obligations representing loans and advances of credit that are eligible for credit insurance by the federal housing commissioner, and may obtain that insurance;
    2. Make loans secured by real property or leasehold, that the federal housing commissioner insures or makes a commitment to insure, and may obtain that insurance;
    3. Invest their funds, eligible for investment, in notes or bonds secured by mortgage or trust deed insured by the federal housing commissioner, and in debentures issued by the federal housing commissioner, and also in securities issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association; and
    4. Make any loans and advances of credit and purchases of obligations representing loans and advances of credit that are eligible to be guaranteed or insured in whole or in part by the veterans administration or administrator of veterans affairs, or secured by real property or leasehold as the administrator of veterans affairs makes a commitment to guarantee or insure.
  2. No law of this state, requiring security upon which loans or investments may be made, or prescribing the nature, amount or form of the security, or prescribing or limiting interest rates upon loans or investments, or limiting investments of capital or deposits, or prescribing or limiting the period for which loans or investments may be made, shall apply to loans or investments made pursuant to this section.

Acts 1961, ch. 43, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A., §§ 35-327, 35-328.

35-3-121. Investments in securities by banks or trust companies.

Unless the governing instrument, court order, or a statute specifically directs otherwise, a bank or trust company serving as trustee, guardian, agent, or in any other fiduciary capacity may invest in any security authorized by this chapter even if that fiduciary or an affiliate of that fiduciary, as defined in former § 35-3-117(d) [repealed], participates or has participated as a member of a syndicate underwriting the security, if:

  1. The fiduciary does not purchase the security from itself or its affiliate; and
  2. The fiduciary does not purchase the security from another syndicate member or an affiliate, pursuant to an implied or express agreement between the fiduciary or its affiliate and a selling member or its affiliate, to purchase all or part of each other's underwriting commitments.

Acts 1983, ch. 60, § 1; T.C.A., § 35-329.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-3-117(d), referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 15, effective July 1, 2002.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1983 (N. L. Resener, J. A. Whitson, K. J. Miller), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 785 (1983).

35-3-122. Liability of fiduciaries for losses.

Whenever an instrument under which a fiduciary is acting reserves to the settlor or vests an advisory or investment committee or in any other person or persons including one (1) or more other fiduciaries, to the exclusion of the fiduciary or to the exclusion of one (1) or more of several fiduciaries, authority to direct the making or retention of any investment, or to perform any other act in the management or administration of the fiduciary account, the excluded fiduciary or fiduciaries shall not be liable, either individually or as a fiduciary, for any loss resulting from the making or retention of any investment or other act pursuant to that direction.

Acts 1987, ch. 89, § 2.

35-3-123. Trustee liability — Action upon written directions.

  1. A trustee of a revocable, irrevocable or testamentary trust is not liable to any beneficiary for any act performed or omitted pursuant to written directions from the person holding the power to revoke, terminate or amend the trust.
  2. A trustee of a revocable, irrevocable or testamentary trust is not liable for any investment action performed or omitted pursuant to written directions from the person to whom the power to direct the investment or management of the account is delegated by the trustor.

Acts 1989, ch. 288, § 3.

35-3-124. Investment in tuition units.

Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, trustees and others acting in a fiduciary capacity, including governmental agencies such as court clerks, may invest funds held in trust for a minor through the purchase of tuition units on behalf of the minor under the Tennessee College Savings Trust Act, compiled in title 49, chapter 7, part 8.

Acts 1997, ch. 64, § 1; 2017, ch. 400, § 2.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “Tennessee College Savings Trust Act” for “Tennessee Baccalaureate Education System Trust Act” .

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 400, § 20. July 1, 2017.

Chapter 4
Uniform Common Trust Fund Act

35-4-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Common Trust Fund Act.”

Acts 1953, ch. 148, § 4 (Williams, § 9596.35); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-401.

Law Reviews.

Wills and Fiduciary Powers (Robert L. McMurray), 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 191 (1964).

Collateral References.

Construction of the Uniform Common Trust Fund Act. 64 A.L.R.2d 268.

35-4-102. Bank or trust company establishing common trust funds — Investing in trust funds.

Any bank or trust company qualified to act as fiduciary in this state may establish common trust funds for the purpose of furnishing investments to itself as fiduciary, or to itself and others as cofiduciaries, or to another bank or trust company which may, as such fiduciary or cofiduciary, invest funds that it lawfully holds for investment in interests in the common trust funds, if this investment is not prohibited by the instrument, judgment, decree or order creating the fiduciary relationship, and if, in the case of cofiduciaries, the bank or trust company procures the consent of its cofiduciaries to the investment.

Acts 1953, ch. 148, § 1 (Williams, § 9596.32); 1973, ch. 378, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-402.

35-4-103. Accounting for trust funds — Chancery court approval.

  1. Unless ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the bank or trust company operating the common trust funds is not required to render a court accounting with regard to the funds, but it may, by application to the chancery court, secure approval of such an accounting on such conditions as the court may establish.
  2. When an accounting of a common trust fund is presented to a court for approval, the court shall assign a date and place for hearing and order notice thereof by:
    1. Publication once a week for three (3) weeks, the first publication to be not less than twenty (20) days prior to the date of hearing, of a notice in a newspaper having a circulation in the county in which the bank or trust company or branch thereof operating the common trust fund is located;
    2. Mailing not less than fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the hearing a copy of the notice to all beneficiaries of the trusts participating in the common trust fund whose names are known to the bank or trust company from the records kept by it in the regular course of business in the administration of the trusts, directed to them at the addresses shown by those records; and
    3. Such further notice if any as the court may order.

Acts 1953, ch. 148, § 2 (Williams, § 9596.33); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-403.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281 (1978).

35-4-104. Uniformity of construction and interpretation.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.

Acts 1953, ch. 148, § 3 (Williams § 9596.34); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-404.

35-4-105. Fiduciary relationships to which chapter applicable.

This chapter applies to fiduciary relationships in existence on April 8, 1953, or established after that date.

Acts 1953, ch. 148, § 7; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-405.

Chapter 5
Judicial or Trust Sales

35-5-101. Twenty days' notice by publication.

  1. In any sale of land to foreclose a deed of trust, mortgage or other lien securing the payment of money or other thing of value or under judicial orders or process, advertisement of the sale shall be made at least three (3) different times in some newspaper published in the county where the sale is to be made.
  2. The first publication shall be at least twenty (20) days previous to the sale.
  3. This section shall not apply where the amount of indebtedness for the payment of which the property being sold does not amount to more than two hundred dollars ($200), in which event the owner of the property may order that advertisement be made by written notices posted as provided in § 35-5-103, instead of by notices published in a newspaper.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed as applying to any notice published in accordance with any contract entered into heretofore, and expressed in a mortgage, deed of trust or other legal instruments.
  5. In any sale of land to foreclose a deed of trust, mortgage, or other lien securing the payment of money or other thing of value or under judicial orders of process, the trustee or other party that sells the property shall send to the debtor and any co-debtor a copy of the notice required in § 35-5-104. The notice shall be sent on or before the first date of publication provided in subsection (b) by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice shall be sent to the following:
    1. If to the debtor, addressed to the debtor at:
      1. The mailing address of the property, if any; and
      2. The last known mailing address of the debtor or any other mailing address of the debtor specifically designated for purposes of receiving notices provided at least thirty (30) days prior to the first publication date in written correspondence or written notice in accordance with the loan agreement from the debtor to the creditor, but only if the last known mailing address of the debtor or other mailing address designated by the debtor is different from the mailing address of the property; and
    2. If to a co-debtor, addressed to the co-debtor at the last known mailing address of the co-debtor or any other mailing address of the co-debtor specifically designated for purposes of receiving notices provided at least thirty (30) days prior to the first publication date in written correspondence or written notice in accordance with the loan agreement from the co-debtor to the creditor, but only if the last known mailing address of the co-debtor or other mailing address designated by the co-debtor is both different from the mailing address of the property and different from the mailing address of the debtor determined as provided in subdivision (e)(1)(B).
  6. Unless postponement or adjournment is contractually prohibited, any sale hereunder may be adjourned and rescheduled one (1) or more times without additional newspaper publication, upon compliance with the following provisions:
    1. The sale must be held within one (1) year of the originally scheduled date;
    2. Each postponement or adjournment must be to a specified date and time, and must be announced at the date, time and location of each scheduled sale date;
    3. If the postponement or adjournment is for more than thirty (30) days, notice of the new date, time, and location must be mailed no less than (10) calendar days prior to the sale date via regular mail to the debtor and co-debtor; and
    4. Notice of the right to postpone or adjourn without additional newspaper publication shall not be required to be published in any newspaper publication.

Code 1858, § 2145 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 83, § 1); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 60; Shan., § 3838; mod. Code 1932, § 7793; Acts 1943, ch. 123, § 1; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 7793; Acts 1957, ch. 41, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-501; Acts 2006, ch. 801, § 10; 2008, ch. 743, § 1; 2011, ch. 505, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2006, ch. 801,  § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Home Loan Protection Act of 2006.”

Cross-References. Advertising sales of land by execution, § 26-5-101.

Application to enjoin sale, title 29, ch. 23, part 2.

Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

Court officer purchasing property sold through court, § 39-16-405.

Officer purchasing at own sale, misdemeanor, § 39-16-405.

Power of court to sell land, § 16-1-107.

Registration of decree, § 16-1-109.

Sales on execution, §§ 26-5-10126-5-114.

Sheriff's duty to advertise, § 8-8-201.

Vesting of title by decree, § 16-1-108.

Warranty of title and covenant of seizin, § 16-1-110.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 282.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 895.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, §§ 8, 13; 19 Tenn. Juris., Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, § 52.

Law Reviews.

Simple Real Estate Foreclosures Made Complex: The Byzantine Tennessee Process (John A. Walker, Jr.), 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 231 (1995).

Tennessee and the Installment Land Contract: A Viable Alternative to the Deed of Trust, 21 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 551 (1991).

Attorney General Opinions. Minimum requirements for publication and notice to be given to the owner of real property during a foreclosure, OAG 05-095 (6/14/05), 2005 Tenn. AG LEXIS 97.

The provisions of T.C.A. § 35-5-501 do not apply to delinquent tax sales, OAG 07-135 (9/12/07), 2007 Tenn. AG LEXIS 135.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

2. —Conduct of Sale.

This section does not apply where trustee sells land without following defendant's plan, since section does not apply to conduct of sale, but only as to statutory method of advertising sale. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Tenn. 496, 89 S.W.2d 337, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1936), rehearing denied, 169 Tenn. 496, 90 S.W.2d 527 (1936).

3. Sufficiency of Publication.

Three successive weekly publications of the advertisement of the sale of land is a compliance with the statute, though there may be more publications. Allen v. Kerr, 81 Tenn. 256, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1884).

4. —Provisions of Trust Deed — Effect.

Under provision of a trust deed for public sale after “advertising three weeks,” publication of the sale for three weeks is sufficient. Potts v. Coffman, 146 Tenn. 282, 240 S.W. 783, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1922).

Assignee was entitled to summary judgment granting it possession of property because under T.C.A. § 24-5-101, the recitations in the deed of trust provided prima facie evidence that the sale was properly advertised in the newspaper as required by T.C.A. § 35-5-101; thus, the assignee shifted the burden to the borrower to come forward with evidence that the sale was not properly advertised, but the borrower did not. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Drake, 410 S.W.3d 797, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2013).

5. —Statutory Provisions — Effect.

The foreclosure of a trust deed was properly set aside where the trust deed did not contain any provisions relative to advertisement in foreclosure proceedings and the statutory provisions of this section were not followed. Clack v. Standefer, 24 Tenn. App. 556, 147 S.W.2d 764, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

Because a newspaper was a paper of general circulation, the circulation of that newspaper in the county where a foreclosure was held bearing a notice of the foreclosure complied with the requirement in T.C.A. § 35-5-101(a) that the notice of the sale be made known in that county by publication. Thacker v. Shapiro & Kirsch, LLP, 354 S.W.3d 733, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011), appeal denied, Thacker v. Shapiro & Kirsch, LLP, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1038 (Tenn. Oct. 18, 2011).

Pre-petition, a Chapter 13 debtor received 30-days notice as required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, advising her that she had 30 days from date of letter to dispute debt. Notice of foreclosure was sufficient under Tennessee law, as she was notified by letter and told when and where advertisement of trustee's sale pertaining to her residence would appear, and publication was made in county where property was located. In re Comer, — B.R. —, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 907 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014).

6. Delegation of Trustee's Authority.

Authority may not be delegated to a constable to select the time and place of sale and make the sale without the supervision of the mortgagee or trustee. Such ignores protection of interests of the mortgagor. This does not mean that a trustee may not appoint an agent to make sale. Green v. Stevenson, 54 S.W. 1011, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 138 (1899).

7. Foreclosure.

Because 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A) prohibited taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property, and foreclosure in some states was carried out in through “nonjudicial action,” the result of which was to “effect dispossession” of the secured property—including pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 600.3204 and T.C.A. § 35-5-101—the example's presence within a provision that prohibited unfair means to “collect or attempt to collect any debt” suggested that mortgage foreclosure was a “means” to collect a debt. Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 2013 FED App. 0016P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 845 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2013).

Trial court correctly determined that a borrower's counterclaim, which challenged the constitutionality of the private foreclosure process, did not state a prima facie constitutional violation because the borrower was free to assert wrongful foreclosure as a defense to the unlawful detainer action and raise her constitutional issues in circuit court. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Drake, 410 S.W.3d 797, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2013).

8. —Sales under Mortgage.

Foreclosure sale under mortgage, decreed by chancery, will be directed to be advertised as sales under executions. Humes v. Heirs of Shelly, 1 Tenn. 79, 1804 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1804); Hord v. James, 1 Tenn. 201, 1805 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1805).

It is assumed that the rule in Tennessee is that a strict foreclosure is valid only if fully supported by every specified condition, when there is no provision for personal service and no redemption is permitted. Higbee v. Chadwick, 220 F. 873, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 2538 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1915).

Homeowner did not state a claim for failure to receive notice of the foreclosure sale because there was no requirement under the deed of trust that she receive notice of the foreclosure; there is no statutory requirement that the notice be received by the debtor. Davis v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

9. —Contingent Remainder Interest.

A contingent remainder interest is not subject to execution and sale by a judgment creditor. Harris v. Bittikofer, 562 S.W.2d 815, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. 1978).

10. —Several Creditors — Demand by One or More.

Generally speaking, any one of two or more creditors secured can demand foreclosure of the lien of a trust deed which secures several separate obligations. Foster v. Harle, 166 Tenn. 576, 64 S.W.2d 21, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1933).

11. —Foreclosure on Trustee's Own Motion.

A trustee, under a trust deed providing that on default he shall proceed to sell, may do so on his own motion, in the absence of a stipulation for creditor's demand. Foster v. Harle, 166 Tenn. 576, 64 S.W.2d 21, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1933).

12. —Place of Sale.

Where through mistake combination deed and trust deed provided for sale in county other than where the land lay and foreclosure sale in front of locked doors of courthouse in such county resulted in $60,000 worth of land being sold for $32,000, evidence supported action of chancellor in setting aside sale as unfair and inequitable. Pugh v. Richmond, 58 Tenn. App. 62, 425 S.W.2d 789, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Foreclosure sale under trust deed would not be illegal because it was conducted in county other than where the land lay if the parties so contracted. Pugh v. Richmond, 58 Tenn. App. 62, 425 S.W.2d 789, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Collateral References.

Propriety of accepting check or promissory note in satisfaction of bid at execution or judicial sale had for cash. 86 A.L.R.2d 292.

35-5-102. Notice in newspaper not required.

If no newspaper is published in the county in which the land is to be sold, the advertisement in a newspaper is dispensed with, unless ordered by court.

Code 1858, § 2147 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 83, § 2); Shan., § 3840; Code 1932, § 7795; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-502.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

35-5-103. Posting written notices.

Whenever the advertisement cannot be made in a newspaper, the officer shall make publication of the sale for thirty (30) days by written notices posted in at least five (5) of the most public places in the county, one (1) of which shall be the courthouse door, and another in the neighborhood of the defendant; if of realty, in the civil district where the land lies.

Code 1858, § 2148 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 83, § 3); Shan., § 3841; Code 1932, § 7796; Acts 1943, ch. 123, § 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 7796; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-503.

Cross-References. Notice of execution sale, §§ 26-5-10126-5-103.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 895.

Tennessee Jurisprudence,  12 Tenn. Juris., Executions, § 36; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, §§ 8, 13; 19 Tenn. Juris., Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, § 52.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Advertising Sufficiency.

2. —Several Executions for Same Party on Same Land.

Where there is more than one execution in favor of the same party levied on the same land, or where there is more than one order of sale of the same land, and all in favor of the same party, one advertisement is sufficient to authorize a sale at the same time under all of the executions, or orders of sale, and the printer's fees, over and above the proper amount for one such advertisement, on motion to retax costs, will be struck out and disallowed the sheriff. Arnold v. Dinsmore, 43 Tenn. 235, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1866).

3. —Advertisement under Writ, and Sale under Alias.

Where the day designated in the required advertisement for the sale of land is subsequent to the return day of the venditioni exponas, the writ may be returned, and another (an alias writ) issued, which will authorize the sale without a new advertisement. Luther v. McMichael, 25 Tenn. 298, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1845).

4. —Presumptions from Recital in Sheriff's Return or Deed.

The recital in the sheriff's deed that, “having legally advertised and made known” the time and place of sale, according to law, he made the sale is prima facie evidence of the fact of advertising as required by law, and otherwise making known the sale by notice to the judgment debtor in actual possession as required by § 26-5-103. Rogers v. Jennings' Lessee, 11 Tenn. 307, 11 Tenn. 308, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1832); Downing v. Stephens, 60 Tenn. 454, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (1873).

A sheriff's return stating that he had given “due notice by written advertisement, as required by law,” does not imply the notice to the owner in actual possession required by § 26-5-103. Downing v. Stephens, 60 Tenn. 454, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (1873).

5. —Insufficient Advertising.

Although sale of land not advertised according to statute is not invalid, appellate court can consider fact of insufficient advertisement in connection with other facts of case in determining why land did not bring adequate price. Napier v. Stone, 21 Tenn. App. 626, 114 S.W.2d 57, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

Sale of land, for which mortgagor had paid $450, was set aside where sale was unadvertised and consideration was only $117. Napier v. Stone, 21 Tenn. App. 626, 114 S.W.2d 57, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

6. —Provisions of Instrument — Effect.

Where deed of trust did not recite number of posters that should have been put in public places to advertise sale, same should have been advertised as required by statute. Napier v. Stone, 21 Tenn. App. 626, 114 S.W.2d 57, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

Where time, place and terms of sale are set out in mortgage or deed of trust, such instrument controls and full compliance therewith is necessary to render sale valid, but if time, place and terms of sale are not set out, same are governed by statute. Napier v. Stone, 21 Tenn. App. 626, 114 S.W.2d 57, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

7. Objections to Written Notice.

8. —Mode of Making.

Where there is objection to written notice, the proper practice is to file a petition upon which an issue may be made and proof can be taken to sustain the grounds alleged; but treating the exceptions as an informal proceeding equivalent to a petition, making an issue, it must be determined upon the proof taken; and the burden of proof rests upon the party filing exceptions. Childress v. Harrison, 60 Tenn. 410, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 523 (1873); Goddard v. Cox, 69 Tenn. 112, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1878); Myers v. James, 72 Tenn. 370, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1880).

Objection to the report of the sale by the clerk, because the sale was advertised by written notices instead of the publication in a newspaper, cannot be taken by a speaking exception not sustained by anything in the record, where the advertisement conforms to the provisions of the statute, it not appearing in the record that a newspaper was published in the county at the time, or that the printer would make the publication for the price fixed by law, and there being no negativing of “any other reason” which induced the clerk to adopt the mode of advertising by written and posted notices, especially where the advertisement is not in conflict with the decree under which the sale was made. Goddard v. Cox, 69 Tenn. 112, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1878).

9. —When Newspaper Published in City.

Upon proper exception to a master's report, the record should disclose that during the time involved a newspaper was published in the county. Goddard v. Cox, 69 Tenn. 112, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1878).

35-5-104. Contents of advertisement or notice — Contents of deed memorializing sale.

  1. The advertisement or notice shall:
    1. Give the names of the plaintiff and defendant, or parties interested;
    2. Give a concise description of the land; such description shall include a legal description, which means a reference to the deed book and page that contains the complete legal description of the property, and common description, which means, if available, the street address and map and parcel number of the property. In the event no street address exists, a subdivision, lot or tract number may be used. A metes and bounds description may be, but is not required to be, included in the description of the land;
    3. Mention the time and place of sale;
      1. Identify each and every lien or claimed lien of the United States with respect to which 26 U.S.C. § 7425(b) requires notice to be given to the United States in order for the sale of the land thus advertised not to be subject to the lien or claim of lien of the United States;
      2. For every lien or claim of lien of the United States so identified, affirmatively state that the notice required by 26 U.S.C. § 7425(b) to be given to the United States has been timely given;
      3. For every lien or claim of lien of the United States so identified, state that the sale of the land thus advertised will be subject to the right of the United States to redeem the land as provided for in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(d)(1);
      1. Identify each and every lien or claimed lien of the state with respect to which § 67-1-1433(b)(1) requires notice to be given to the state in order for the sale of the land thus advertised not to be subject to the lien or claim of lien of the state;
      2. For every lien or claim of lien of the state so identified, affirmatively state that the notice required by § 67-1-1433(b)(1) to be given to the state has been timely given; and
      3. For every lien or claim of lien of the state so identified, state that the sale of the land thus advertised will be subject to the right of the state to redeem the land as provided for in § 67-1-1433(c)(1); and
    4. For each concise description of land, provide the corresponding names of the parties interested.
  2. The deed memorializing the sale shall, in addition to any other requirements as may now or hereafter exist under the laws of the state with respect to the proper form of deeds, in order that they might qualify for recording in the various offices of registers of counties in this state, whenever subsection (a) has required notice to be given to the United States and/or to this state, state that the land described therein is conveyed subject to the rights of the United States to redeem the land as provided for in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(d)(1) and/or is subject to the right of this state to redeem the land as provided for in § 67-1-1433(c)(1), as appropriate, shall have attached to it, as exhibits, a copy of the notice thus provided to the United States, a copy of the written response of the United States to the notice thus provided, if any, a copy of the notice thus provided to the state, and a copy of the written response of the state to the notice thus provided, if any, as appropriate.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require inclusion of a street address if it does not exist or is not in common use. Also, utilization of the street address, if any, which appears in the records of the assessor of property with respect to the property involved shall be conclusively presumed to be in compliance with this section.
  4. For the purposes of this section, “parties interested” includes, without limitation, the record holders of any mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien that will be extinguished or adversely affected by the sale and which mortgage, deed of trust, or lien, or notice or evidence thereof, was recorded more than ten (10) days prior to the first advertisement or notice in the register's office of the county in which the real property is located. “Parties interested” also includes a person or entity named as nominee or agent of the owner of the obligation that is secured by the deed of trust and that is identifiable from information provided in the deed of trust, which shall include a mailing address or post office box of the nominee or agent.

Code 1858, § 2149 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 83, § 1); Shan., § 3842; Code 1932, § 7797; Acts 1982, ch. 801, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-504; Acts 1992, ch. 621, § 1; 1994, ch. 618, § 1; 1999, ch. 66, § 1; 2011, ch. 505, § 1; 2015, ch. 213, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment added (a)(6) and added the second sentence of (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 213, § 4. July 1, 2015.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 277, 282.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Because bankruptcy debtor did not argue that the United States or Tennessee had or asserted liens in debtor's residence, the validity of the successor trustee deed was not subject to the requirements of subsection (b). In re Williams, 247 B.R. 449, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 410 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).

2. Compliance with Statute — Sufficiency.

The statute prescribes all that is required to appear is the advertisement of the sale, though ordinarily, under our practice, the proceedings, under which the sale is ordered are briefly mentioned in the advertisement, which mention is proper enough, but not absolutely demanded. Arnold v. Dinsmore, 43 Tenn. 235, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1866); State use of Herald Pub. Co. v. Whitworth, 98 Tenn. 263, 39 S.W. 10, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 220 (1897).

3. Objections to Advertising.

In suit to recover land purchased at sheriff's sale by virtue of an execution the defendant is entitled to introduce evidence that advertisement was not according to law. Loyd v. Anglin's Lessee, 15 Tenn. 427, 15 Tenn. 428, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1835).

35-5-105. Notice in writing if printer refuses.

If the printer will not make the publication for the rates provided in § 8-21-1301, the officer or person conducting the sale shall make publication by written notices as provided in §§ 35-5-103 and 35-5-104.

Code 1858, § 2151 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 83, § 3); Shan., § 3844; Code 1932, § 7799; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-506.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Judicial Sales, § 8.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

35-5-106. Sale without advertisement is not void.

Should the officer, or other person making the sale, proceed to sell without pursuing the provisions of this chapter, the sale shall not, on that account, be either void or voidable.

Code 1858, § 2152 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 83, § 4); Shan., § 3845; Code 1932, § 7800; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-507.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 282.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 741, 895.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, §§ 8, 13.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Advertise — Effect on Validity of Sale.

The want of the prescribed advertisement does not render the sale void or voidable, for the provisions for the advertisement are merely directory, so far as the validity of the sale is concerned. Howell v. Donaldson, 54 Tenn. 206, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1872); Childress v. Harrison, 60 Tenn. 410, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 523 (1873); Downing v. Stephens, 60 Tenn. 454, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (1873); Goddard v. Cox, 69 Tenn. 112, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1878).

Chancery court does not have jurisdiction to set aside sale by trustee under trust deed where trustee fails to sell pursuant to defendant's plan, since sale is neither void nor voidable, and defendant's only remedy is to sue trustee for damages. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Tenn. 496, 89 S.W.2d 337, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1936), rehearing denied, 169 Tenn. 496, 90 S.W.2d 527 (1936).

A failure to comply with §§ 35-5-10135-5-106 does not render a sale void. Williams v. Williams, 25 Tenn. App. 290, 156 S.W.2d 363, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

2. Fiduciary Relation between Purchasers and Grantor.

It makes little difference whether trustee's deed is void, voidable or not on account of failure to advertise where the purchasers had assumed the grantor's note secured by the deed of trust under which they purchased, the assumption having been undertaken in consideration of other matters. Clack v. Standefer, 24 Tenn. App. 556, 147 S.W.2d 764, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

35-5-107. Effect of noncompliance with chapter.

Any officer, or other person, referenced in § 35-5-106 who fails to comply with this chapter commits a Class C misdemeanor and is, moreover, liable to the party injured by the noncompliance, for all damages resulting from the failure.

Code 1858, § 2153 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 83, § 5); Shan., § 3846; Code 1932, § 7801; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-508; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 113.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 19 Tenn. Juris., Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, § 59.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Advertise — Remedies.

Chancery court does not have jurisdiction to set aside sale by trustee under trust deed where trustee fails to sell pursuant to defendant's plan, since sale is neither void nor voidable, and defendant's only remedy is to sue trustee for damages. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Tenn. 496, 89 S.W.2d 337, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1936), rehearing denied, 169 Tenn. 496, 90 S.W.2d 527 (1936).

2. Limitations.

A suit under the provision of this section authorizing damages for failure of an officer or other person to comply with § 35-5-108 in sale of lands at foreclosure is not an action to recover a statutory penalty so as to be governed by the one year statute of limitations set out in § 28-3-104 but falls within the ten year limitation of § 28-3-110. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 173 Tenn. 140, 114 S.W.2d 953, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1938).

35-5-108. Plan of division of land — Sale of portion of land.

At any time before ten o'clock a.m. (10:00 a.m.) on the day of sale, the defendant or other person whose property is to be sold may deliver to the officer or person making the sale, a plan of division of the lands to be sold, subscribed by the defendant or other person, bearing a date subsequent to the date of advertisement, in which case so much of the land as may be necessary to satisfy the debt and costs, and no more, shall be sold according to the plan furnished. If no such plan is furnished, the land may be sold without division.

Code 1858, § 2154 (deriv. Acts 1799, ch. 14, § 3); Shan., § 3847; Code 1932, § 7802; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-509.

Cross-References. Defendant dividing lands in execution sales, § 26-5-105.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 463.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 19 Tenn. Juris., Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, § 59.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

2. —Application to Sale Under Trust Deed.

This section providing for sale of defendant's property by plan applies to sale of land under trust deed as well as sales under execution. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Tenn. 496, 89 S.W.2d 337, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1936), rehearing denied, 169 Tenn. 496, 90 S.W.2d 527 (1936).

3. —History of Section.

This section, though based on Acts 1779, ch. 14, § 3, is a literal reproduction of § 2154 of the Code of 1858. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Tenn. 496, 89 S.W.2d 337, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1936), rehearing denied, 169 Tenn. 496, 90 S.W.2d 527 (1936).

4. Construction with Other Acts.

5. —Advertising for Sale.

Section 35-5-101 does not apply where trustee sells land without following defendant's plan, since it does not apply to conduct of sale but only as to statutory method of advertising sale. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Tenn. 496, 89 S.W.2d 337, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1936), rehearing denied, 169 Tenn. 496, 90 S.W.2d 527 (1936).

6. Division of Land.

7. —Persons Entitled to Object.

Mere strangers, who had no claim whatever to be enforced against the land, will not be permitted to interpose the objection that the sale was void for sale of separate lots in gross, where the debtor whose land had been so sold himself acquiesced in it. Cooke, Settle & Co. v. Walters, 70 Tenn. 116, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (1878); Prigmore v. Shelton, 77 Tenn. 563, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1882).

8. —Duty to Furnish Division Plan.

In a sale of land under execution, where it is levied on as one entire tract, it is not the duty of the sheriff, nor has he the right himself, to divide the land and sell it in parcels, though it be susceptible of division by well defined natural and artificial boundaries. This rule is not affected by the smallness of the debt as compared to the value of the land levied upon. Jones v. Townsend, 2 Shan. 167 (1876); Lucas v. Moore, 70 Tenn. 1, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (1878).

Where complainants' two tracts of land were sold as one in order to satisfy the debts of complainants but the complainants did not object or offer a plan as provided by this section, the sale was approved. Hawkins v. Spicer, 20 Tenn. App. 528, 101 S.W.2d 151, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

It is the duty of the defendants whose land is to be sold to furnish a plan of the division of the land, otherwise it will be sold without division. Williams v. Williams, 25 Tenn. App. 290, 156 S.W.2d 363, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

9. —Determination by Deed Description.

The title papers of the judgment debtor must determine the fact whether, for the purpose of execution sale, the realty therein described shall be treated as one or several lots, and if his deed describes it as one lot or piece of land, it will be so treated. Ament v. Brennan, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 431 (1873).

10. —Valid Sale Without Division.

Upon a resale of land ordered by the chancery court to enforce the lien reserved for the purchase-money, it is no ground of exception to the sale that the land was not divided and sold in lots, the decree not directing it and the owner of the land not offering any plan of division, or requesting a sale in lots. Lucas v. Moore, 70 Tenn. 1, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (1878).

11. —Contiguous Tracts.

Where several tracts of land once belonged to different owners, which, when levied on, belonged to the execution debtor, and lay contiguous to or adjoining each other, and constituted but one body of land, held and known as such, and was so levied on, a sale of the whole would not be a fraud on anybody. Cooke, Settle & Co. v. Walters, 70 Tenn. 116, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (1878); Stephens v. Taylor, 74 Tenn. 307, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 253 (1880).

12. —Decree Authorizing Sale Separately or as Whole.

In the foreclosure sale of a mortgage trust deed on a three fourths undivided interest in land, where the purchasers of an undivided one fourth interest from the mortgagor assumed and paid a corresponding proportional part of the mortgage debt, and for that reason requested a separate sale in one fourths, and the holders of the secured notes objected upon the alleged ground that such sale would probably produce less than a sale of the three fourths undivided interest as an entirety, it was decreed to be proper to advertise and cry the sale on both bases, and to adopt the one which produced the larger result. Merrimon v. Parkey, 136 Tenn. 645, 191 S.W. 327, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 169 (1916).

Where decree directing sale of land for satisfaction of judgment by foreclosure of mortgage provided that a sale of the land as a whole be made only in the event that prior sale of the land in smaller tracts should bring amount insufficient to satisfy judgment and costs, such provision obviated objection that in the interest of the debtors a sale should be made only of the small tracts separately for the reason that persons interested in purchasing small tracts would be deterred by a prospect of a sale as a whole. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 19 Tenn. App. 67, 83 S.W.2d 279, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

Decree directing sale of land for satisfaction of judgment by foreclosure of mortgage was not in error by virtue of direction that clerk and master shall first sell the land in tracts, and that a sale of it as a whole shall be made only in the event that the sale in tracts shall fail to bring the amount necessary to pay judgment and costs. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 19 Tenn. App. 67, 83 S.W.2d 279, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

13. —Relief in Chancery.

Chancery court does not have jurisdiction to set aside sale by trustee under trust deed where trustee fails to sell pursuant to defendant's plan, since sale is neither void or voidable, and defendant's only remedy is to sue trustee for damages. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Tenn. 496, 89 S.W.2d 337, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1936), rehearing denied, 169 Tenn. 496, 90 S.W.2d 527 (1936).

14. —Remedy in Damages.

Where complainants, having executed deed of trust, proffered plan of subdivision of land to be sold as required by statute, refusal of trustee's agent to abide by plan did not invalidate or render sale voidable, but the remedy would be an action for damages. Miller v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., 21 Tenn. App. 289, 109 S.W.2d 421, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

15. Conduct of Sale.

Mortgagee cannot delegate to constable the time and place, and conduct of sale, although he may employ agent to perform ministerial duties. Green v. Stevenson, 54 S.W. 1011, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 138 (1899).

Crying of sale by sheriff for trustee proper when trustee was present and sheriff merely acted as auctioneer. Hawkins v. Spicer, 20 Tenn. App. 528, 101 S.W.2d 151, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

35-5-109. Published ending time and published start time for auctions.

The published ending time for auctions conducted under this chapter on an internet-based bidding platform and the published start time for an in-person auction must be between the hours of nine o'clock a.m. (9:00 a.m.) and seven o'clock p.m. (7:00 p.m.) of the day fixed in the notice or advertisement. The day fixed may be any day Monday through Saturday, but must not be fixed on a state or federal legal holiday. However, this section does not apply to sales of parcels pursuant to title 67, chapter 5.

Code 1858, § 2155 (deriv. Acts 1807, ch. 99, § 1); Shan., § 3848; Code 1932, § 7803; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-510; Acts 2014, ch. 912, § 3; 2015, ch. 414, § 1; 2017, ch. 187, § 2; 2019, ch. 471, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment added the third sentence.

The 2017 amendment substituted “between the hours of nine o'clock a.m. (9:00 a.m.) and seven o'clock p.m. (7:00 p.m.)” for “between the hours of ten o'clock a.m. (10:00 a.m.) and four o'clock p.m. (4:00 p.m.)” in the first sentence.

The 2019 amendment rewrote the section which read: “The sale in all these cases shall be made between the hours of nine o'clock a.m. (9:00 a.m.) and seven o'clock p.m. (7:00 p.m.) of the day fixed in the notice or advertisement. The day fixed may be any day Monday through Saturday, but shall not be fixed on a state or federal legal holiday. However, this requirement shall not be applicable to sales of parcels pursuant to title 67, chapter 5.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 414, § 29. May 8, 2015.

Acts 2017, ch. 187, § 3. April 19, 2017.

Acts 2019, ch. 471, § 21. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Hours of sale, § 26-5-104.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 895.

35-5-110. Bidding on land sales may be reopened by clerks — Court's power not abridged.

In all sales of land made under orders, and decrees of the circuit, probate, chancery, appeals and supreme courts where an advance bid of as much as ten percent (10%) of the original bid is made, the clerk, or clerk and master, of the court is empowered, at no additional fee, commission or cost, to accept the advance bid and reopen the biddings on the sale, and to receive additional bids, and to hold the sale open for advance bids to some day by the officer designated, and give the purchaser and the parties, or their attorneys of record, notice of the reopening of the biddings, and to report this action to the court for confirmation without any order or decree of the court authorizing the reopening first being had, unless the court's order or decree for the sale of the land specifically prohibits the acceptance of an advance bid; provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed as abridging the rights and jurisdiction of the court to reopen the biddings on such terms as the court may deem right.

Acts 1899, ch. 37, § 1; Shan., § 3848a1; mod. Code 1932, § 7804; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-511; Acts 2014, ch. 930, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, § 29.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Amount of Tender.

Where land of persons under disability are sold for reinvestment or division, the chancellor may set aside a sale publicly made, upon tender of a sum less than 10 percent of the amount for which the clerk and master had sold the land. Robertson v. Bush, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 154 (1912).

2. Setting Aside Foreclosure Sales.

The conscience-shocking inadequacy-of-price test for setting aside foreclosure sales is impractical and should be abandoned. Holt v. Citizens Cent. Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. 1984).

If a foreclosure sale is legally held, conducted and consummated, there must be some evidence of irregularity, misconduct, fraud, or unfairness on the part of the trustee or the mortgagee that caused or contributed to an inadequate price, for a court of equity to set aside the sale. Holt v. Citizens Cent. Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. 1984).

35-5-111. State may bid at execution or judicial sales.

Whenever the state is interested in the proceeds of any execution sale or any judicial sale, to any extent whatsoever, the state, acting through its attorney general and reporter, may bid on and buy in property either real or personal, at that sale, to the same extent as any natural person might do. Any sums due and payable on behalf of the state, as costs of sale or as a part of the purchase price of the property so bid in and paid by the state, shall be paid out of the general fund of the state treasury upon the warrant of the governor.

Acts 1943, ch. 11, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 7804.1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-512.

35-5-112. Auctioneer services and fee — Manner and method of sale of real property at discretion of court.

  1. Whenever real or personal property is to be sold at public sale under any order or decree of any court in this state, the court, judge or chancellor under whose jurisdiction the sale is to be made has the discretionary authority to secure the services of an auctioneer licensed in this state to conduct the public sale and to fix the auctioneer's fee, the fee to be not more than eight percent (8%) of the sale price on sales of real property and not more than ten percent (10%) of the sale price on sales of personal property, these fees not to include the expenses of sales, and to order the fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale.
  2. Whenever real property is sold at a public sale conducted by an auctioneer, the manner and method of sale is at the discretion of the court. As used in this section, “public sale” includes auctions on internet-based bidding platforms, in-person, on-site, or off-site auctions, and other accepted auction methods, so long as the auctions are open for participation by the public at large. The court, in its discretion, may impose additional conditions or procedures upon the sale of property as are reasonably necessary.
  3. If the clerk of the court or clerk and master is also a licensed auctioneer, then the clerk or clerk and master shall receive fees in that person's capacity as clerk, or clerk and master, or special commissioner, and shall not receive any extra fee as a licensed auctioneer.

Acts 1975, ch. 334, §§ 1, 2; 1976, ch. 772, § 1; 1978, ch. 769, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-513, 35-514; Acts 2011, ch. 320, § 1; 2015, ch. 414, § 2; 2019, ch. 471, § 2.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment added the second sentence of (b).

The 2019 amendment rewrote (b) which read: “Whenever real property is sold at a public sale conducted by an auctioneer, the sale shall be conducted on the real property to be sold. This subsection (b) shall not be applicable to sales of parcels pursuant to title 67, chapter 5.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 414, § 29. May 8, 2015.

Acts 2019, ch. 471, § 21. July 1, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Payment of Fee from Common Fund.

Sale for partition benefitted all parties, including the lender, such that under such circumstances, it was appropriate to order auctioneer fees to be paid out of the common fund, so that they were paid on a pro rata basis, proportionately to the amount of benefit a party derived from the sale; therefore, the chancery court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that the auctioneer's fee be paid out of the common fund. Fossett v. Gray, 173 S.W.3d 742, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005).

35-5-113. Auction sales in divorce proceedings.

The provisions and procedures of this chapter apply to all auction sales of property ordered by a court pursuant to § 36-4-121, to accomplish the equitable division of property in divorce cases. The court, in its discretion, may impose any additional conditions or procedures upon the sale of property in divorce cases as are reasonably designed to ensure that the property is sold for its fair market value.

Acts 1986, ch. 722, § 1.

35-5-114. Trustee's attendance at foreclosure — Successor trustee.

  1. In any sale of land to foreclose a deed of trust, mortgage, or other lien securing the payment of money or other thing of value, the trustee or person or entity holding a similar position may attend the foreclosure either in person or by an agent. If the trustee attends by an agent, the agent may receive bids and conduct the sale on behalf of the trustee. The trustee shall execute any applicable trustee's deed or similar conveyance instrument. The appointment of an agent by a trustee need not be by written instrument, nor is there any recording required relative to the appointment.
    1. The beneficiary may, unless the deed of trust contains specific language to the contrary, appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing a substitution of trustee for record with the register of deeds of the county in which the property is situated.
    2. The substitute trustee or its delegate shall succeed to all the power, duties, authority and title of the original trustee and any previous successor trustee or delegatee.
      1. In the event the substitution of trustee is not recorded prior to the first date of publication by the substitute trustee, the beneficiary shall include in the substitution of trustee instrument, which shall be recorded prior to the deed evidencing sale, the following statement:

        Beneficiary has appointed the substitute trustee prior to the first notice of publication as required by T.C.A. § 35-5-101 and ratifies and confirms all actions taken by the substitute trustee subsequent to the date of substitution and prior to the recording of this substitution.

      2. Once a substitution of trustee instrument containing the statement set forth in subdivision (b)(3)(A) is timely recorded, it shall act as conclusive proof as a matter of law that the substitute trustee has been timely appointed and has acted with authority of the beneficiary.
  2. A substitution of trustee shall be recorded prior to any sale, and no action may be instituted against any person who, acting in good faith without knowledge to the contrary, relies upon the validity of the substitution of trustee or written statements by the beneficiary or substitute trustee as to the authority of the substitute trustee.
  3. If the name of the substitute trustee is not included in the first publication, then, not less than ten (10) business days prior to the sale date, the substitute trustee shall send notice by registered or certified mail to the debtor or any co-debtor, as provided in § 35-5-101, and to any interested parties, giving the name and address of the substitute trustee. If the trustee is not a resident of this state, the notice shall include the name and address of a registered agent of the substitute trustee who is located in the state. Record notice of the mailing provided in this subsection (d) shall be evidenced by the substitute trustee's recordation of an affidavit recorded prior to the deed evidencing the sale or by recitation on the substitute trustee's deed.

Acts 1993, ch. 415, § 1; 2006, ch. 951, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. This section was originally designated as § 35-5-124, but has been redesignated as § 35-5-114.

Cross-References. Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

35-5-115. Discovery proceedings for nonresidents.

    1. IF a nonresident creditor holds indebtedness secured by residential real property that is located in this state and owned by a state resident, OR
    2. IF a nonresident trustee or agent is involved in foreclosure proceedings relative to residential real property that is located in this state and owned by a resident,
    3. THEN all discovery proceedings, including, but not limited to, the production of requested documents and the deposition of witnesses, shall be conducted in the county in which the residential real estate is located or in which the litigation is pending.
  1. The court in which such litigation is pending may make orders consistent with the purposes of this section to prevent undue burden on any party.

Acts 2003, ch. 174, § 1.

35-5-116. Trustee as necessary party.

  1. Any trustee named in a suit or proceeding, as related to a sale of real property under a trust deed or mortgage, may plead in the answer that the trustee is not a necessary party by a verified denial, stating the basis for the trustee's reasonable belief that the trustee was named as a party solely in the capacity as a trustee under a deed of trust, contract lien, or security instrument.
  2. Within thirty (30) days after the filing of the trustee's verified denial, a verified response is due from all parties to the suit or proceeding setting forth all matters, whether in law or fact, that rebut the trustee's verified denial.
  3. If a party has no objection or fails to file a timely verified response to the trustee's verified denial, the trustee shall be dismissed from the suit or proceeding without prejudice.
  4. If a respondent files a timely verified response to the trustee's verified denial, the matter shall be set for hearing. The court shall dismiss the trustee from the suit or proceeding without prejudice, if the court determines that the trustee is not a necessary party.
  5. A dismissal of the trustee pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) shall not prejudice a party's right to seek injunctive relief to prevent the trustee from proceeding with a foreclosure sale.
  6. A trustee shall not be liable for any good faith error resulting from reliance on any information in law or fact provided by the borrower or secured party or their respective attorney, agent, or representative or other third party.

Acts 2006, ch. 811, § 1.

35-5-117. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 834, § 1; 2011, ch. 122, §§ 1-4; repealed by Acts 2011, ch. 122, § 4, effective January 1, 2013.

Compiler's Notes. Former section 35-5-117, concerned legal notices of foreclosure.

35-5-118. Deficiency judgment sufficient to fully satisfy indebtedness on real property after trustee's or foreclosure sale.

  1. In an action brought by a creditor to recover a balance still owing on an indebtedness after a trustee's or foreclosure sale of real property secured by a deed of trust or mortgage, the creditor shall be entitled to a deficiency judgment in an amount sufficient to satisfy fully the indebtedness.
  2. In all such actions, absent a showing of fraud, collusion, misconduct, or irregularity in the sale process, the deficiency judgment shall be for the total amount of indebtedness prior to the sale plus the costs of the foreclosure and sale, less the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale. The creditor shall be entitled to a rebuttable prima facie presumption that the sale price of the property is equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale.
  3. To overcome the presumption set forth in subsection (b), the debtor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property sold for an amount materially less than the fair market value of property at the time of the foreclosure sale. If the debtor overcomes the presumption, the deficiency shall be the total amount of the indebtedness prior to the sale plus the costs of the foreclosure and sale, less the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale as determined by the court.
    1. Any action for a deficiency judgment under this section shall be brought not later than the earlier of:
      1. Two (2) years after the date of the trustee's or foreclosure sale, exclusive of any period of time in which a petition for bankruptcy is pending; or
      2. The time for enforcing the indebtedness as provided for under §§ 28-1-102 and 28-2-111.
    2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as limiting a person entitled to bring such action from electing to sue on an indebtedness in lieu of, prior to, or contemporaneously with enforcement of a deed of trust or mortgage.

Acts 2010, ch. 1001, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 1001, § 1 purported to enact new § 35-5-117; however, § 35-5-117 was previously enacted by Acts 2010, ch. 834, and the section was redesignated as § 35-5-118 by the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1001, § 2 provided that the act, which enacted § 35-5-118, shall apply to all trustee or foreclosure sales of real property secured by a deed of trust for which the first foreclosure publication is given on or after September 1, 2010.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Rebuttable Presumption.

Mortgagee's summary judgment for a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale was proper as the mortgagor did not rebut the presumption that the price attained at the foreclosure sale was the fair market value of the property under T.C.A. § 35-5-118(b) where the mortgagor's attorney waived the issue; the claims raised in the mortgagor's affidavit and response to the summary judgment motion were immaterial as the mortgagor failed to pay the promissory notes, and there was no dispute as to the sale price attained at the foreclosure sale. Commercial Bank, Inc. v. Lacy, 371 S.W.3d 121, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2012), appeal denied, Commercial Bank v. Lacy, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

2. Taxes Properly Included.

Mortgagee was properly awarded a summary judgment for the deficiency remaining after a foreclosure sale of the property under T.C.A. § 35-5-118(a) as under even though the trustee's deed provided that the property was conveyed subject to any unpaid property taxes, the loan documents provided that the mortgagee was entitled to be reimbursed for the unpaid taxes it paid to protect its collateral. Commercial Bank, Inc. v. Lacy, 371 S.W.3d 121, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2012), appeal denied, Commercial Bank v. Lacy, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

3. Fair Market Value.

Bank that purchased real property that was owned by Chapter 13 debtors at a foreclosure sale was entitled to summary judgment on its claim that it had a claim in the amount of $47,081 against the debtors'  bankruptcy estate because the amount it paid for the property was less than the debtors owed on a note they signed; the debtors did not rebut the presumption established by T.C.A. § 35-5-118 that the sale price of the property was equal to the fair market value of the property by introducing a tax appraisal that valued the property at $502,900, and the bank's bid of $387,000 was not materially less than the fair market value of $425,000 established by an appraisal, given anticipated expenses of preparing the property for resale. In re Radewald, — B.R. —, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 984 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2015).

Borrowers claimed the trial court erred by considering the listed sale price two years after foreclosure as evidence of fair market value, but there was no merit to this contention because the only value evidence the trial court relied upon was the value opinions of two experts; consideration of the listed sale price aided the trial court in its assessment of the experts'  appraisals and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that one expert's valuation of the property was credible. Commerce Union Bank v. Bush, 512 S.W.3d 217, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Trial court correctly determined that the foreclosure sale price was not materially less than the fair market value; the presumptive fair market value of the property was $ 1,050,000, and this value was corroborated by one expert's two appraisals of the same value, and what the borrowers probably could have gotten eventually was inconsequential, as the issue was the fair market value at the time of the foreclosure sale. Commerce Union Bank v. Bush, 512 S.W.3d 217, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

5. Fraud.

Bank followed proper procedures in selecting an appraiser and did not influence the value of the appraisal for which it relied upon in placing its bid at the foreclosure sale; the bank was not afforded an opportunity to evaluate one certain appraisal prior to the foreclosure sale because it never received a copy of the appraisal and thus the bank was justified in relying on the appraisal in its possession, and there was no fraud, collusion, misconduct, or irregularity in connection with the foreclosure process. Commerce Union Bank v. Bush, 512 S.W.3d 217, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

35-5-119. Applicability of §§ 35-5-101(e), 35-5-104(a)(4) and (5), and 35-5-104(b).

The requirements of §§ 35-5-101(e), 35-5-104(a)(4) and (5), and 35-5-104(b) shall not be applicable to sales of parcels pursuant to title 67, chapter 5.

Acts 2015, ch. 414, § 3.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 414, § 29. May 8, 2015.

Chapter 6
Uniform Principal and Income Act

Part 1
Definitions and Fiduciary Duties

35-6-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Principal and Income Act”.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 6, §§ 35-6-10135-6-115 (Acts 1955, ch. 81, §§ 1-15; 1965, ch. 360, § 1; Acts 1986, ch. 591, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A., §§ 35-701 — 35-715), a former version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1, eff. July 1, 2000. For current provisions, see this chapter.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 443, 1018.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1986, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 457 (1987).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: A Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1741 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769 (2014).

Where There's a Will: “Total return trusts” come to Tennessee (Dan W. Holbrook), 37 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 33 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application of Law.

This act can have no application to litigation which was instigated prior to its enactment. McFadden v. Blair, 42 Tenn. App. 434, 304 S.W.2d 93, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Collateral References.

Allocation, as between income and principal, of income on property used in paying legacies, debts, and expenses. 2 A.L.R.3d 1061.

Constitutionality of retrospective application of Uniform Principal and Income Act or other statutes relating to ascertainment of principal and income and apportionment of receipts and expenses among life tenants and remaindermen. 69 A.L.R.2d 1137.

35-6-102. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Accounting period” means a calendar year unless another twelve-month period is selected by a fiduciary. The term includes a portion of a calendar year or other twelve-month period that begins when an income interest begins or ends when an income interest ends.
  2. “Beneficiary” includes, in the case of a decedent's estate, an heir, legatee, and devisee and, in the case of a trust, an income beneficiary and a remainder beneficiary.
  3. “Fiduciary” means a personal representative or a trustee. The term includes an executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, and a person performing substantially the same function.
  4. “Income” means money or property that a fiduciary receives as current return from a principal asset. The term includes a portion of receipts from a sale, exchange, or liquidation of a principal asset, to the extent provided in part 4 of this chapter.
  5. “Income beneficiary” means a person to whom net income of a trust is or may be payable.
  6. “Income interest” means the right of an income beneficiary to receive all or part of net income, whether the terms of the trust require it to be distributed or authorize it to be distributed in the trustee's discretion.
  7. “Mandatory income interest” means the right of an income beneficiary to receive net income that the terms of the trust require the fiduciary to distribute.
  8. “Net income” means the total receipts allocated to income during an accounting period minus the disbursements made from income during the period, plus or minus transfers under this chapter to or from income during the period.
  9. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  10. “Principal” means property held in trust for distribution to a remainder beneficiary when the trust terminates.
  11. “Remainder beneficiary” means a person entitled to receive principal when an income interest ends.
  12. “Terms of a trust” means the manifestation of the intent of a settlor or decedent with respect to the trust, expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in a judicial proceeding, whether by written or spoken words or by conduct.
  13. “Trustee” includes an original, additional, or successor trustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by a court.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Intent to Modify Trust.

Holographic document did not reference the trust in question, and thus the document did not manifest clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent to amend the trust. Miller v. Maples, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

“Income beneficiary.”

The definitions of income beneficiary (Section 102(5)) and income interest (Section 102(6)[§ 35-6-102(5)]) cover both mandatory and discretionary beneficiaries and interests. There are no definitions for “discretionary income beneficiary” or “discretionary income interest” because those terms are not used in the Act.

Inventory value.

There is no definition for inventory value in this Act because the provisions in which that term was used in the 1962 Act have either been eliminated (in the case of the underproductive property provision) or changed in a way that eliminates the need for the term (in the case of bonds and other money obligations, property subject to depletion, and the method for determining entitlement to income distributed from a probate estate).

“Net income.”

The reference to “transfers under this Act to or from income” means transfers made under Sections 104(a), 412(b), 502(b), 503(b), 504(a), and 506 [§§ 36-5-104(a), 35-6-412(b), 35-6-502(b), 35-6-503(b), 35-6-504(a), and 35-6-506].

“Terms of a trust.”

This term was chosen in preference to “terms of the trust instrument” (the phrase used in the 1962 Act) to make it clear that the Act applies to oral trusts as well as those whose terms are expressed in written documents. The definition is based on the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4 (1959) and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1996). Constructional preferences or rules would also apply, if necessary, to determine the terms of the trust.

35-6-103. Fiduciary duties — General principles.

  1. In allocating receipts and disbursements to or between principal and income, and with respect to any matter within the scope of title 35, chapter 6, a fiduciary:
    1. Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with the terms of the trust or the will, even if there is a different provision in this chapter;
    2. May administer a trust or estate by the exercise of a discretionary power of administration given to the fiduciary by the terms of the trust or the will, even if the exercise of the power produces a result different from a result required or permitted by this chapter;
    3. Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with this chapter if the terms of the trust or the will do not contain a different provision or do not give the fiduciary a discretionary power of administration; and
    4. Shall add a receipt or charge a disbursement to principal to the extent that the terms of the trust and this chapter do not provide a rule for allocating the receipt or disbursement to or between principal and income.
  2. In exercising the power to adjust under § 35-6-104(a) or a discretionary power of administration regarding a matter within the scope of this chapter, whether granted by the terms of a trust, or will or this chapter, a fiduciary shall administer a trust or estate impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries, considering any terms of the trust or the will manifesting the trustors' or testators' intention that the fiduciary shall or may favor one (1) or more of the beneficiaries. A determination in accordance with this chapter is presumed to be fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

Law Reviews.

The Unitrust in Estate Planning: A Partial Panacea, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 1023 (1968).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Fiduciary Discretion.

In a trust dispute between a beneficiary and trustees, the trustees were entitled to summary judgment because, inter alia, the meaning of “net income” was a legal issue under T.C.A. § 35-6-103(a)(3), allocating capital gains to principal, under T.C.A. § 35-6-404, in the trustees'  discretion, not a fact issue. Cartwright v. Jackson Capital Partners, Ltd. P'ship, 478 S.W.3d 596, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 884 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2015).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Act.

The rule in Section 2(a) of the 1962 Act is restated in Section 103(a) [§ 35-6-103(a)], without changing its substance, to emphasize that the Act contains only default rules and that provisions in the terms of the trust are paramount. However, Section 2(a) of the 1962 Act applies only to the allocation of receipts and disbursements to or between principal and income. In this Act, the first sentence of Section 103(a) [§ 35-6-103(a)] states that it also applies to matters within the scope of Articles 2 and 3. Section 103(a)(2) [§ 35-6-103(a)(2)] incorporates the rule in Section 2(b) of the 1962 Act that a discretionary allocation made by the trustee that is contrary to a rule in the Act should not give rise to an inference of imprudence or partiality by the trustee.

The Act deletes the language that appears at the end of 1962 Act Section 2(a)(3) — “and in view of the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, discretion and judgment would act in the management of their affairs” — because persons of ordinary prudence, discretion and judgment, acting in the management of their own affairs do not normally think in terms of the interests of successive beneficiaries. If there is an analogy to an individual's decision-making process, it is probably the individual's decision to spend or to save, but this is not a useful guideline for trust administration. No case has been found in which a court has relied on the “prudent man” rule of the 1962 Act.

Fiduciary discretion.

The general rule is that if a discretionary power is conferred upon a trustee, the exercise of that power is not subject to control by a court except to prevent an abuse of discretion. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187. The situations in which a court will control the exercise of a trustee's discretion are discussed in the comments to § 187. See also id. § 233 Comment p.

Questions for which there is no provision.

Section 103(a)(4) [§ 35-6-103(a)(4)] allocates receipts and disbursements to principal when there is no provision for a different allocation in the terms of the trust, the will, or the Act. This may occur because money is received from a financial instrument not available at the present time (inflation-indexed bonds might have fallen into this category had they been announced after this Act was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) or because a transaction is of a type or occurs in a manner not anticipated by the Drafting Committee for this Act or the drafter of the trust instrument.

Allocating to principal a disbursement for which there is no provision in the Act or the terms of the trust preserves the income beneficiary's level of income in the year it is allocated to principal, but thereafter will reduce the amount of income produced by the principal. Allocating to principal a receipt for which there is no provision will increase the income received by the income beneficiary in subsequent years, and will eventually, upon termination of the trust, also favor the remainder beneficiary. Allocating these items to principal implements the rule that requires a trustee to administer the trust impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to both income and remainder beneficiaries. However, if the trustee decides that an adjustment between principal and income is needed to enable the trustee to comply with Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)], after considering the return from the portfolio as a whole, the trustee may make an appropriate adjustment under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)].

Duty of impartiality.

Whenever there are two or more beneficiaries, a trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them. Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 183 (1992). This rule applies whether the beneficiaries' interests in the trust are concurrent or successive. If the terms of the trust give the trustee discretion to favor one beneficiary over another, a court will not control the exercise of such discretion except to prevent the trustee from abusing it. Id. § 183, Comment a. “The precise meaning of the trustee's duty of impartiality and the balancing of competing interests and objectives inevitably are matters of judgment and interpretation. Thus, the duty and balancing are affected by the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust, not only at the outset but as they may change from time to time.” Id. § 232, Comment c.

The terms of a trust may provide that the trustee, or an accountant engaged by the trustee, or a committee of persons who may be family members or business associates, shall have the power to determine what is income and what is principal. If the terms of a trust provide that this Act specifically or principal and income legislation in general does not apply to the trust but fail to provide a rule to deal with a matter provided for in this Act, the trustee has an implied grant of discretion to decide the question. Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)] provides that the rule of impartiality applies in the exercise of such a discretionary power to the extent that the terms of the trust do not provide that one or more of the beneficiaries are to be favored. The fact that a person is named an income beneficiary or a remainder beneficiary is not by itself an indication of partiality for that beneficiary.

35-6-104. Trustee's power to adjust.

  1. A trustee may adjust between principal and income to the extent the trustee considers necessary if:
    1. The trustee invests and manages trust assets as a prudent investor;
    2. The terms of the trust describe the amount that may or must be distributed to a beneficiary by referring to the trust's income; and
    3. The trustee determines, after applying the rules in § 35-6-103(a), that the trustee is unable to comply with § 35-6-103(b).
  2. In deciding whether and to what extent to exercise the power to make adjustments under this section, the trustee may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following:
    1. The nature, purpose, and expected duration of the trust;
    2. The intent of the settlor;
    3. The identity and circumstances of the beneficiaries;
    4. The needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation and appreciation of capital;
    5. The assets held in the trust; the extent to which they consist of financial assets, interests in closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, or real property; the extent to which an asset is used by a beneficiary; and whether an asset was purchased by the trustee or received from the settlor;
    6. The net amount allocated to income under the other sections of this chapter and the increase or decrease in the value of the principal assets, which the trustee may estimate as to assets for which market values are not readily available;
    7. Whether and to what extent the terms of the trust give the trustee the power to invade principal or accumulate income or prohibit the trustee from invading principal or accumulating income, and the extent to which the trustee has exercised a power from time to time to invade principal or accumulate income;
    8. The actual and anticipated effect of economic conditions on principal and income and effects of inflation and deflation; and
    9. The anticipated tax consequences of an adjustment.
  3. A trustee may not make an adjustment:
    1. That disqualifies the trust for an estate tax or gift tax marital or charitable deduction that would be allowed, in whole or in part, if the trustee did not have the power to make the adjustment;
    2. That reduces the actuarial value of the income interest in a trust to which a person transfers property with the intent to qualify for a gift tax exclusion;
    3. That changes the amount payable to a beneficiary as a fixed annuity or a fixed fraction of the value of the trust assets;
    4. From any amount that is permanently set aside for charitable purposes under a will or the terms of a trust unless both income and principal are so set aside;
    5. If possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes an individual to be treated as the owner of all or part of the trust for income tax purposes, and the individual would not be treated as the owner if the trustee did not possess the power to make an adjustment;
    6. If possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes all or part of the trust assets to be included for estate tax purposes in the estate of an individual who has the power to remove a trustee or appoint a trustee, or both, and the assets would not be included in the estate of the individual if the trustee did not possess the power to make an adjustment;
    7. If the trustee is a beneficiary of the trust; or
    8. If the trustee is not a beneficiary, but the adjustment would benefit the trustee directly or indirectly.
  4. If subdivision (c)(5), (6), (7), or (8) applies to a trustee and there is more than one (1) trustee, a cotrustee to whom the provision does not apply may make the adjustment unless the exercise of the power by the remaining trustee or trustees is not permitted by the terms of the trust.
  5. A trustee may release the entire power conferred by subsection (a) or may release only the power to adjust from income to principal or the power to adjust from principal to income if the trustee is uncertain about whether possessing or exercising the power will cause a result described in subdivision (c)(1)-(6) or (c)(8), or if the trustee determines that possessing or exercising the power will or may deprive the trust of a tax benefit or impose a tax burden not described in subsection (c). The release may be permanent or for a specified period, including a period measured by the life of an individual.
  6. Terms of a trust that limit the power of a trustee to make an adjustment between principal and income do not affect the application of this section unless it is clear from the terms of the trust that the terms are intended to deny the trustee the power of adjustment conferred by subsection (a).
  7. Nothing in this section or in this chapter is intended to create or imply a duty to make an adjustment, and a trustee is not liable for not considering whether to make an adjustment or for choosing not to make an adjustment.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1; 2004, ch. 866, § 7.

Law Reviews.

Where There's a Will: “Total return trusts” come to Tennessee (Dan W. Holbrook), 37 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 33 (2001).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Purpose and Scope of Provision.

The purpose of Section 104 [§ 35-6-104] is to enable a trustee to select investments using the standards of a prudent investor without having to realize a particular portion of the portfolio's total return in the form of traditional trust accounting income such as interest, dividends, and rents. Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] authorizes a trustee to make adjustments between principal and income if three conditions are met: (1) the trustee must be managing the trust assets under the prudent investor rule; (2) the terms of the trust must express the income beneficiary's distribution rights in terms of the right to receive “income” in the sense of traditional trust accounting income; and (3) the trustee must determine, after applying the rules in Section 103(a) [§ 35-6-103(a)], that he is unable to comply with Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)]. In deciding whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust, the trustee is required to consider the factors described in Section 104(b) [§ 35-6-104(b)], but the trustee may not make an adjustment in circumstances described in Section 104(c) [§ 35-6-104(c)].

Section 104 [§ 35-6-104] does not empower a trustee to increase or decrease the degree of beneficial enjoyment to which a beneficiary is entitled under the terms of the trust; rather, it authorizes the trustee to make adjustments between principal and income that may be necessary if the income component of a portfolio's total return is too small or too large because of investment decisions made by the trustee under the prudent investor rule. The paramount consideration in applying Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] is the requirement in Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)] that “a fiduciary must administer a trust or estate impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries, except to the extent that the terms of the trust or the will clearly manifest an intention that the fiduciary shall or may favor one or more of the beneficiaries.” The power to adjust is subject to control by the court to prevent an abuse of discretion. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959). See also id. §§ 183, 232, 233, Comment p (1959).

Section 104 [§ 35-6-104] will be important for trusts that are irrevocable when a State adopts the prudent investor rule by statute or judicial approval of the rule in Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule. Wills and trust instruments executed after the rule is adopted can be drafted to describe a beneficiary's distribution rights in terms that do not depend upon the amount of trust accounting income, but to the extent that drafters of trust documents continue to describe an income beneficiary's distribution rights by referring to trust accounting income, Section 104 [§ 35-6-104] will be an important tool in trust administration.

Power to Adjust.

The exercise of the power to adjust is governed by a trustee's duty of impartiality, which requires the trustee to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of the income and remainder beneficiaries. Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)] expresses this duty by requiring the trustee to “administer a trust or estate impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries, except to the extent that the terms of the trust or the will clearly manifest an intention that the fiduciary shall or may favor one or more of the beneficiaries.” Because this involves the exercise of judgment in circumstances rarely capable of perfect resolution, trustees are not expected to achieve perfection; they are, however, required to make conscious decisions in good faith and with proper motives.

In seeking the proper balance between the interests of the beneficiaries in matters involving principal and income, a trustee's traditional approach has been to determine the settlor's objectives from the terms of the trust, gather the information needed to ascertain the financial circumstances of the beneficiaries, determine the extent to which the settlor's objectives can be achieved with the resources available in the trust, and then allocate the trust's assets between stocks and fixed-income securities in a way that will produce a particular level or range of income for the income beneficiary. The key element in this process has been to determine the appropriate level or range of income for the income beneficiary, and that will continue to be the key element in deciding whether and to what extent to exercise the discretionary power conferred by Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)]. If it becomes necessary for a court to determine whether an abuse of the discretionary power to adjust between principal and income has occurred, the criteria should be the same as those that courts have used in the past to determine whether a trustee has abused its discretion in allocating the trust's assets between stocks and fixed-income securities.

A fiduciary has broad latitude in choosing the methods and criteria to use in deciding whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust in order to achieve impartiality between income beneficiaries and remainder beneficiaries or the degree of partiality for one or the other that is provided for by the terms of the trust or the will. For example, in deciding what the appropriate level or range of income should be for the income beneficiary and whether to exercise the power, a trustee may use the methods employed prior to the adoption of the 1997 Act in deciding how to allocate trust assets between stocks and fixed-income securities; or may consider the amount that would be distributed each year based on a percentage of the portfolio's value at the beginning or end of an accounting period, portfolio orthe average portfolio value for several accounting periods, in a manner similar to a unitrust, and may select a percentage that the trustee believes is appropriate for this purpose and use the same percentage or different percentages in subsequent years. The trustee may also use hypothetical portfolios of marketable securities to determine an appropriate level or range of income within which a distribution might fall.

An adjustment may be made prospectively at the beginning of an accounting period, based on a projected return or range of returns for a trust's portfolio, or retrospectively after the fiduciary knows the total realized or unrealized return for the period; and instead of an annual adjustment, the trustee may distribute a fixed dollar amount for several years, in a manner similar to an annuity, and may change the fixed dollar amount periodically. No inference of abuse is to be drawn if a fiduciary uses different methods or criteria for the same trust from time to time, or uses different methods or criteria for different trusts for the same accounting period.

While a trustee must consider the portfolio as a whole in deciding whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust, a trustee may apply different criteria in considering the portion of the portfolio that is composed of marketable securities and the portion whose market value cannot be determined readily, and may take into account a beneficiary's use or possession of a trust asset.

Under the prudent investor rule, a trustee is to incur costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets and the purposes of the trust, and the same consideration applies in determining whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust. In making investment decisions under the prudent investor rule, the trustee will have considered the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust for the purpose of adopting an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust. A trustee is not required to duplicate that work for principal and income purposes, and in many cases the decision about whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust may be made at the same time as the investment decisions. To help achieve the objective of reasonable investment costs, a trustee may also adopt policies that apply to all trusts or to individual trusts or classes of trusts, based on their size or other criteria, stating whether and under what circumstances the power to adjust will be exercised and the method of making adjustments; no inference of abuse is to be drawn if a trustee adopts such policies.

Three conditions to the exercise of the power to adjust.

The first of the three conditions that must be met before a trustee can exercise the power to adjust — that the trustee invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor — is expressed in this Act by language derived from the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, but the condition will be met whether the prudent investor rule applies because the Uniform Act or other prudent investor legislation has been enacted, the prudent investor rule has been approved by the courts, or the terms of the trust require it. Even if a State's legislature or courts have not formally adopted the rule, the Restatement establishes the prudent investor rule as an authoritative interpretation of the common law prudent man rule, referring to the prudent investor rule as a “modest reformulation of the Harvard College dictum and the basic rule of prior Restatements.” Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule, Introduction, at 5. As a result, there is a basis for concluding that the first condition is satisfied in virtually all States except those in which a trustee is permitted to invest only in assets set forth in a statutory “legal list.”

The second condition will be met when the terms of the trust require all of the “income” to be distributed at regular intervals; or when the terms of the trust require a trustee to distribute all of the income, but permit the trustee to decide how much to distribute to each member of a class of beneficiaries; or when the terms of a trust provide that the beneficiary shall receive the greater of the trust accounting income and a fixed dollar amount (an annuity), or of trust accounting income and a fractional share of the value of the trust assets (a unitrust amount). If the trust authorizes the trustee in its discretion to distribute the trust's income to the beneficiary or to accumulate some or all of the income, the condition will be met because the terms of the trust do not permit the trustee to distribute more than the trust accounting income.

To meet the third condition, the trustee must first meet the requirements of Section 103(a) [§ 35-6-103(a)], i.e., she must apply the terms of the trust, decide whether to exercise the discretionary powers given to the trustee under the terms of the trust, and must apply the provisions of the Act if the terms of the trust do not contain a different provision or give the trustee discretion. Second, the trustee must determine the extent to which the terms of the trust clearly manifest an intention by the settlor that the trustee may or must favor one or more of the beneficiaries. To the extent that the terms of the trust do not require partiality, the trustee must conclude that she is unable to comply with the duty to administer the trust impartially. To the extent that the terms of the trust do require or permit the trustee to favor the income beneficiary or the remainder beneficiary, the trustee must conclude that she is unable to achieve the degree of partiality required or permitted. If the trustee comes to either conclusion — that she is unable to administer the trust impartially or that she is unable to achieve the degree of partiality required or permitted — she may exercise the power to adjust under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104].

Impartiality and productivity of income.

The duty of impartiality between income and remainder beneficiaries is linked to the trustee's duty to make the portfolio productive of trust accounting income whenever the distribution requirements are expressed in terms of distributing the trust's “income.” The 1962 Act implies that the duty to produce income applies on an asset by asset basis because the right of an income beneficiary to receive “delayed income” from the sale proceeds of underproductive property under Section 12 of that Act arises if “any part of principal … has not produced an average net income of a least 1% per year of its inventory value for more than a year ….” Under the prudent investor rule, “[t]o whatever extent a requirement of income productivity exists,… the requirement applies not investment by investment but to the portfolio as a whole.” Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, Comment i, at 34. The power to adjust under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104] is also to be exercised by considering net income from the portfolio as a whole and not investment by investment. Section 413(b) of this Act [§ 35-6-413(b)] eliminates the underproductive property rule in all cases other than trusts for which a marital deduction is allowed, and it applies to a marital deduction trust if the trust's assets “consist substantially of property that does not provide the surviving spouse with sufficient income from or use of the trust assets …” — in other words, the section applies by reference to the portfolio as a whole.

While the purpose of the power to adjust in Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] is to eliminate the need for a trustee who operates under the prudent investor rule to be concerned about the income component of the portfolio's total return, the trustee must still determine the extent to which a distribution must be made to an income beneficiary and the adequacy of the portfolio's liquidity as a whole to make that distribution.

For a discussion of investment considerations involving specific investments and techniques under the prudent investor rule, see Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, Comments k-p.

Factors to consider in exercising the power to adjust.

Section 104(b) [§ 35-6-104(b)] requires a trustee to consider factors relevant to the trust and its beneficiaries in deciding whether and to what extent the power to adjust should be exercised. Section 2(c) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act sets forth circumstances that a trustee is to consider in investing and managing trust assets. The circumstances in Section 2(c) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act are the source of the factors in paragraphs (3) through (6) and (8) of Section 104(b) [§ 35-6-104(b)(3)-(6), (8)] (modified where necessary to adapt them to the purposes of this Act) so that, to the extent possible, comparable factors will apply to investment decisions and decisions involving the power to adjust. If a trustee who is operating under the prudent investor rule decides that the portfolio should be composed of financial assets whose total return will result primarily from capital appreciation rather than dividends, interest, and rents, the trustee can decide at the same time the extent to which an adjustment from principal to income may be necessary under Section 104 [§ 35-6-104]. On the other hand, if a trustee decides that the risk and return objectives for the trust are best achieved by a portfolio whose total return includes interest and dividend income that is sufficient to provide the income beneficiary with the beneficial interest to which the beneficiary is entitled under the terms of the trust, the trustee can decide that it is unnecessary to exercise the power to adjust.

Assets received from the settlor.

Section 3 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act provides that “[a] trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying.” The special circumstances may include the wish to retain a family business, the benefit derived from deferring liquidation of the asset in order to defer payment of income taxes, or the anticipated capital appreciation from retaining an asset such as undeveloped real estate for a long period. To the extent the trustee retains assets received from the settlor because of special circumstances that overcome the duty to diversify, the trustee may take these circumstances into account in determining whether and to what extent the power to adjust should be exercised to change the results produced by other provisions of this Act that apply to the retained assets. See Section 104(b)(5) [§ 35-6-104(b)(5)]; Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 3, Comment, 7B U.L.A. 18, at 25-26 (Supp. 1997); Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 229 and Comments a-e.

Limitations on the power to adjust.

The purpose of subsections (c)(1) through (4) is to preserve tax benefits that may have been an important purpose for creating the trust. Subsections (c)(5), (6), and (8) deny the power to adjust in the circumstances described in those subsections in order to prevent adverse tax consequences, and subsection (c)(7) denies the power to adjust to any beneficiary, whether or not possession of the power may have adverse tax consequences.

Under subsection (c)(1), a trustee cannot make an adjustment that diminishes the income interest in a trust that requires all of the income to be paid at least annually to a surviving spouse and for which an estate tax or gift tax marital deduction is allowed; but this subsection does not prevent the trustee from making an adjustment that increases the amount of income paid from a marital deduction trust to the surviving spouse. Subsection (c)(1) applies to a trust that qualifies for the marital deduction because the surviving spouse has a general power of appointment over the trust, but it applies to a qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) trust only if and to the extent that the fiduciary makes the election required to obtain the tax deduction. Subsection (c)(1) does not apply to a so-called “estate” trust. This type of trust qualifies for the marital deduction because the terms of the trust require the principal and undistributed income to be paid to the surviving spouse's estate when the spouse dies; it is not necessary for the terms of an estate trust to require the income to be distributed annually. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1)(iii).

Subsection (c)(3) applies to annuity trusts and unitrusts with no charitable beneficiaries as well as to trusts with charitable income or remainder beneficiaries; its purpose is to make it clear that a beneficiary's right to receive a fixed annuity or a fixed fraction of the value of a trust's assets is not subject to adjustment under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)]. Subsection (c)(3) does not apply to any additional amount to which the beneficiary may be entitled that is expressed in terms of a right to receive income from the trust. For example, if a beneficiary is to receive a fixed annuity or the trust's income, whichever is greater, subsection (c)(3) does not prevent a trustee from making an adjustment under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] in determining the amount of the trust's income.

If subsection (c)(5), (6), (7), or (8), prevents a trustee from exercising the power to adjust, subsection (d) permits a cotrustee who is not subject to the provision to exercise the power unless the terms of the trust do not permit the cotrustee to do so.

Release of the power to adjust.

Section 104(e) [§ 35-6-104(e)] permits a trustee to release all or part of the power to adjust in circumstances in which the possession or exercise of the power might deprive the trust of a tax benefit or impose a tax burden. For example, if possessing the power would diminish the actuarial value of the income interest in a trust for which the income beneficiary's estate may be eligible to claim a credit for property previously taxed if the beneficiary dies within ten years after the death of the person creating the trust, the trustee is permitted under subsection (e) to release just the power to adjust from income to principal.

Trust terms that limit a power to adjust.

Section 104(f) [§ 35-6-104(f)] applies to trust provisions that limit a trustee's power to adjust. Since the power is intended to enable trustees to employ the prudent investor rule without being constrained by traditional principal and income rules, an instrument executed before the adoption of this Act whose terms describe the amount that may or must be distributed to a beneficiary by referring to the trust's income or that prohibit the invasion of principal or that prohibit equitable adjustments in general should not be construed as forbidding the use of the power to adjust under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] if the need for adjustment arises because the trustee is operating under the prudent investor rule. Instruments containing such provisions that are executed after the adoption of this Act should specifically refer to the power to adjust if the settlor intends to forbid its use. See generally, Joel C. Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment in Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1981).

Examples.

The following examples illustrate the application of Section 104 [§ 35-6-104]:

Example (1) — T is the successor trustee of a trust that provides income to A for life, remainder to B. T has received from the prior trustee a portfolio of financial assets invested 20% in stocks and 80% in bonds. Following the prudent investor rule, T determines that a strategy of investing the portfolio 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds has risk and return objectives that are reasonably suited to the trust, but T also determines that adopting this approach will cause the trust to receive a smaller amount of dividend and interest income. After considering the factors in Section 104(b) [§ 35-6-104(b)], T may transfer cash from principal to income to the extent T considers it necessary to increase the amount distributed to the income beneficiary.

Example (2) — T is the trustee of a trust that requires the income to be paid to the settlor's son C for life, remainder to C's daughter D. In a period of very high inflation, T purchases bonds that pay double-digit interest and determines that a portion of the interest, which is allocated to income under Section 406 of this Act [§ 35-6-406], is a return of capital. In consideration of the loss of value of principal due to inflation and other factors that T considers relevant, T may transfer part of the interest to principal.

Example (3) — T is the trustee of a trust that requires the income to be paid to the settlor's sister E for life, remainder to charity F. E is a retired schoolteacher who is single and has no children. E's income from her social security, pension, and savings exceeds the amount required to provide for her accustomed standard of living. The terms of the trust permit T to invade principal to provide for E's health and to support her in her accustomed manner of living, but do not otherwise indicate that T should favor E or F. Applying the prudent investor rule, T determines that the trust assets should be invested entirely in growth stocks that produce very little dividend income. Even though it is not necessary to invade principal to maintain E's accustomed standard of living, she is entitled to receive from the trust the degree of beneficial enjoyment normally accorded a person who is the sole income beneficiary of a trust, and T may transfer cash from principal to income to provide her with that degree of enjoyment.

Example (4) — T is the trustee of a trust that is governed by the law of State X. The trust became irrevocable before State X adopted the prudent investor rule. The terms of the trust require all of the income to be paid to G for life, remainder to H, and also give T the power to invade principal for the benefit of G for “dire emergencies only.” The terms of the trust limit the aggregate amount that T can distribute to G from principal during G's life to 6% of the trust's value at its inception. The trust's portfolio is invested initially 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds, but after State X adopts the prudent investor rule T determines that, to achieve suitable risk and return objectives for the trust, the assets should be invested 90% in stocks and 10% in bonds. This change increases the total return from the portfolio and decreases the dividend and interest income. Thereafter, even though G does not experience a dire emergency, T may exercise the power to adjust under Section 104(a) to the extent that T determines that the adjustment is from only the capital appreciation resulting from the change in the portfolio's asset allocation. If T is unable to determine the extent to which capital appreciation resulted from the change in asset allocation or is unable to maintain adequate records to determine the extent to which principal distributions to G for dire emergencies do not exceed the 6% limitation, T may not exercise the power to adjust. See Joel C. Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment in Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1981).

Example (5) — T is the trustee of a trust for the settlor's child. The trust owns a diversified portfolio of marketable financial assets with a value of $600,000, and is also the sole beneficiary of the settlor's IRA, which holds a diversified portfolio of marketable financial assets with a value of $900,000. The trust receives a distribution from the IRA that is the minimum amount required to be distributed under the Internal Revenue Code, and T allocates 10% of the distribution to income under Section 409(c) of this Act [§ 35-6-409(c)]. The total return on the IRA's assets exceeds the amount distributed to the trust, and the value of the IRA at the end of the year is more than its value at the beginning of the year. Relevant factors that T may consider in determining whether to exercise the power to adjust and the extent to which an adjustment should be made to comply with Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)] include the total return from all of the trust's assets, those owned directly as well as its interest in the IRA, the extent to which the trust will be subject to income tax on the portion of the IRA distribution that is allocated to principal, and the extent to which the income beneficiary will be subject to income tax on the amount that T distributes to the income beneficiary.

Example (6) — T is the trustee of a trust whose portfolio includes a large parcel of undeveloped real estate. T pays real property taxes on the undeveloped parcel from income each year pursuant to Section 501(3) [§ 35-6-501(3)]. After considering the return from the trust's portfolio as a whole and other relevant factors described in Section 104(b) [§ 35-6-104(b)], T may exercise the power to adjust under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] to transfer cash from principal to income in order to distribute to the income beneficiary an amount that T considers necessary to comply with Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)].

Example (7) — T is the trustee of a trust whose portfolio includes an interest in a mutual fund that is sponsored by T. As the manager of the mutual fund, T charges the fund a management fee that reduces the amount available to distribute to the trust by $2,000. If the fee had been paid directly by the trust, one-half of the fee would have been paid from income under Section 501(1) [§ 35-6-501(1)] and the other one-half would have been paid from principal under Section 502(a)(1) [§ 35-6-502(a)(1)]. After considering the total return from the portfolio as a whole and other relevant factors described in Section 104(b) [§ 35-6-104(b)], T may exercise its power to adjust under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] by transferring $1,000, or half of the trust's proportionate share of the fee, from principal to income.

35-6-105. Optional notice.

  1. A trustee may, but is not required to, give a notice of proposed action regarding a matter governed by this chapter as provided in this section. For the purpose of this section, a proposed action includes:
    1. An individual action;
    2. A course of action; or
    3. A decision not to take action.
  2. If the trustee decides to give notice, the trustee shall mail notice of the proposed action to all adult beneficiaries who are receiving, or are entitled to receive, income under the trust or to receive a distribution of principal if the trust were terminated at the time the notice is given.
  3. Notice of proposed action need not be given to any person who consents in writing to the proposed action. The consent may be executed at any time before or after the proposed action is taken.
  4. The notice of proposed action shall state that it is given pursuant to this section and shall state all of the following:
    1. The name and mailing address of the trustee;
    2. The name and telephone number of a person who may be contacted for additional information;
    3. A description of the action proposed to be taken and an explanation of the reasons for the action;
    4. The time within which objections to the proposed action can be made, which shall be at least sixty (60) days from the mailing of the notice of proposed action; and
    5. The date on or after which the proposed action may be taken or is effective.
  5. A beneficiary may object to the proposed action by mailing a written objection to the trustee at the address stated in the notice of proposed action within the time period specified in the notice of proposed action.
  6. A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for an action regarding a matter governed by this chapter if the trustee does not receive a written objection to the proposed action from the beneficiary within the applicable period and the other requirements of this section are satisfied. If no beneficiary entitled to notice objects under this section, the trustee is not liable to any current or future beneficiary with respect to the proposed action.
  7. If the trustee receives a written objection within the applicable period, either the trustee or a beneficiary may petition the court to have the proposed action taken as proposed, taken with modifications, or denied. In the proceeding, a beneficiary objecting to the proposed action has the burden of proving that the trustee's proposed action should not be taken. A beneficiary who has not objected is not estopped from opposing the proposed action in the proceeding. If the trustee decides not to implement the proposed action, the trustee shall notify the beneficiaries of the decision not to take the action and the reasons for the decision, and the trustee's decision not to implement the proposed action does not itself give rise to liability to any current or future beneficiary. A beneficiary may petition the court to have the action taken, and has the burden of proving that it should be taken.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

Collateral References.

Modern status of rules governing allocations of stock dividends or splits between principal and income. 81 A.L.R.3d 876.

35-6-106. Remedy.

With respect to a trustee's exercise or nonexercise of the power to make an adjustment under § 35-5-104, the sole remedy is to direct, deny, or revise an adjustment between principal and income.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Conversions of Nonprofit Hospitals to For-Profit Status: The Tennessee Experience, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1077 (1998).

Stock Dividends and Trusts Created Prior to March 1, 1955: Should the Uniform Principal And Income Act Apply?, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 688 (1971).

Collateral References.

Modern status of rules governing allocations of stock dividends or splits between principal and income. 81 A.L.R.3d 876.

35-6-107. Records.

A trustee who elects to exercise any power or not to exercise any power under this chapter shall maintain only such records that may be necessary or appropriate in the discretion of the trustee to support such determination at the time the determination is made and shall not be required to maintain records not necessary for the administration of the trust.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

35-6-108. Total return unitrusts.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Disinterested person” means a person who is not a “related or subordinate party,” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 672(c), with respect to the person then acting as trustee of the trust and excludes the trustor of the trust and any interested trustee;
    2. “Income trust” means a trust, created by either an inter vivos or a testamentary instrument, which directs or permits the trustee to distribute the net income of the trust to one (1) or more persons, either in fixed proportions or in amounts or proportions determined by the trustee and regardless of whether the trust directs or permits the trustee to distribute the principal of the trust to one (1) or more such persons;
    3. “Interested distributee” means a person to whom distributions of income or principal can currently be made who has the power to remove the existing trustee and designate as successor a person who may be a “related or subordinate party,” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 672(c), with respect to such distributee;
    4. “Interested trustee” means an individual trustee who is a qualified beneficiary or any trustee who may be removed and replaced by an interested distributee, or an individual trustee whose legal obligation to support a beneficiary may be satisfied by distributions of income and principal of the trust;
    5. “Internal Revenue Code” refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended from time to time, and any references to a section of such shall include any successor, substituted, or amended section of the Internal Revenue Code;
    6. “Total return unitrust” means an income trust that has been converted under this section or the laws of any other jurisdiction that permits an income trust to be converted to a trust in which a unitrust amount is treated as the net income of the trust;
    7. “Trustee” means all persons acting as trustee of the trust, except where expressly noted otherwise, whether acting in their discretion or on the direction of one (1) or more persons acting in a fiduciary capacity;
    8. “Trustor” means an individual who created an inter vivos or a testamentary trust;
    9. “Qualified beneficiaries” means those beneficiaries of a trust specified in § 35-15-103(24); and
    10. “Unitrust amount” means an amount computed as a percentage of the fair market value of the trust.
  2. A trustee, other than an interested trustee, or where two (2) or more persons are acting as trustee, a majority of the trustees who are not an interested trustee, in either case hereafter “trustee”, may, in its sole discretion and without court approval:
    1. Convert an income trust to a total return unitrust;
    2. In the case of a total return unitrust converted under this section or the laws of any other jurisdiction, reconvert a total return unitrust to an income trust; or
    3. In the case of a total return unitrust converted under this section or the laws of any other jurisdiction, change the percentage used to calculate the unitrust amount or the method used to determine the fair market value of the trust if all of the following apply:
      1. The trustee adopts a written policy for the trust providing:
        1. In the case of a trust being administered as an income trust, that future distributions from the trust will be unitrust amounts rather than net income;
        2. In the case of a trust being administered as a total return unitrust, that future distributions from the trust will be net income rather than unitrust amounts; or
        3. That the percentage used to calculate the unitrust amount or the method used to determine the fair market value of the trust will be changed as stated in the policy;
      2. The trustee sends written notice of its intention to take such action, along with copies of such written policy and this section, to the trustor of the trust, if living, and to all qualified beneficiaries of the trust;
      3. At least one (1) person receiving notice under subdivision (b)(3)(B) is legally competent; and
      4. No person receiving such notice objects, by written instrument delivered to the trustee, to the proposed action of the trustee within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice.
  3. If there is no trustee of the trust other than an interested trustee, the interested trustee or, where two (2) or more persons are acting as trustee and are interested trustees, a majority of such interested trustees may, in its sole discretion and without court approval:
    1. Convert an income trust to a total return unitrust;
    2. Reconvert a total return unitrust to an income trust; or
    3. Change the percentage used to calculate the unitrust amount or the method used to determine the fair market value of the trust if all of the following apply:
      1. The trustee adopts a written policy for the trust providing:
        1. In the case of a trust being administered as an income trust, that future distributions from the trust will be unitrust amounts rather than net income;
        2. In the case of a trust being administered as a total return unitrust, that future distributions from the trust will be net income rather than unitrust amounts; or
        3. That the percentage used to calculate the unitrust amount or the method used to determine the fair market value of the trust will be changed as stated in the policy;
      2. The trustee appoints a disinterested person who, in its sole discretion but acting in a fiduciary capacity, determines for the trustee:
        1. The percentage to be used to calculate the unitrust amount;
        2. The method to be used in determining the fair market value of the trust; and
        3. Which assets, if any, are to be excluded in determining the unitrust amount;
      3. The trustee sends written notice of its intention to take such action, along with copies of such written policy and this section, and the determinations of the disinterested person to the trustor of the trust, if living, and to all qualified beneficiaries of the trust;
      4. At least one (1) person receiving notice under subdivision (c)(3)(C), of this section is legally competent; and
      5. No person receiving such notice objects, by written instrument delivered to the trustee, to the proposed action or the determinations of the disinterested person within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice.
  4. If any trustee desires to convert an income trust to a total return unitrust, reconvert a total return unitrust to an income trust, or change the percentage used to calculate the unitrust amount or the method used to determine the fair market value of the trust but does not have the ability to or elects not to do it under subsection (b) or (c), the trustee may petition the court for such order as the trustee deems appropriate. In the event, however, there is only one (1) trustee of such trust and such trustee is an interested trustee or in the event there are two (2) or more trustees of such trust and a majority of them are interested trustees, the court, in its own discretion or on the petition of such trustee or trustees or any person interested in the trust, may appoint a disinterested person who, acting in a fiduciary capacity, shall present such information to the court as shall be necessary to enable the court to make its determinations hereunder.
  5. The fair market value of the trust shall be determined at least annually, using such valuation date or dates or averages of valuation dates as are deemed appropriate. Assets for which a fair market value cannot be readily ascertained shall be valued using such valuation methods as are deemed reasonable and appropriate. Assets used by a trust beneficiary, such as a residence property or tangible personal property, may be excluded from fair market value for computing the unitrust amount.
  6. The percentage to be used in determining the unitrust amount shall be a reasonable current return from the trust, in any event not less than three percent (3%) nor more than five percent (5%), taking into account the intentions of the trustor of the trust as expressed in the governing instrument, the needs of the beneficiaries, general economic conditions, projected current earnings and appreciation for the trust, and projected inflation and its impact on the trust.
  7. Following the conversion of an income trust to a total return unitrust, the trustee:
    1. Shall consider the unitrust amount as paid from net accounting income determined as if the trust were not a unitrust;
    2. Shall then consider the unitrust amount as paid from ordinary income not allocable to net accounting income;
    3. After calculating the trust's capital gain net income described in 26 U.S.C. § 1222(9), may consider the unitrust amount as paid from net short-term capital gain described in 26 U.S.C. § 1222(5) and then from net long-term capital gain described in 26 U.S.C. § 1222(7); and
    4. Shall then consider the unitrust amount as coming from the principal of the trust.
  8. In administering a total return unitrust, the trustee may, in its sole discretion but subject to the governing instrument, determine:
    1. The effective date of the conversion;
    2. The timing of distributions, including, but not limited to, provisions for prorating a distribution for a short year in which a beneficiary's right to payments commences or ceases;
    3. Whether distributions are to be made in cash or in kind or partly in cash and partly in kind;
    4. If the trust is reconverted to an income trust, the effective date of such reconversion; and
    5. Such other administrative issues as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.
  9. Conversion to a total return unitrust under this section shall not affect any other provision of the governing instrument, if any, regarding distributions of principal.
  10. In the case of a trust for which a marital deduction has been taken for federal tax purposes under 26 U.S.C. § 2056 or § 2523, the spouse otherwise entitled to receive the net income of the trust shall have the right, by written instrument delivered to the trustee, to compel the reconversion during that spouse's lifetime of the trust from a total return unitrust to an income trust, notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary.
    1. This section shall be construed as pertaining to the administration of a trust and shall be available to any trust including a trust initially converted to a total return unitrust under the laws of another jurisdiction that is administered in Tennessee under Tennessee law or to any trust, regardless of its place of administration, whose governing instrument provides that Tennessee law governs matters of construction or administration unless:
      1. The governing instrument reflects an intention that the current beneficiary or beneficiaries are to receive an amount other than a reasonable current return from the trust;
      2. The trust is a pooled income fund described in 26 U.S.C. § 642(c)(5) or a charitable-remainder trust described in 26 U.S.C. § 664(d); and
      3. The governing instrument expressly prohibits use of this section by specific reference to the section or expressly states the trustor's intent that net income not be calculated as a unitrust amount.
    2. Any of the following statements in the governing instrument, or words similar to such statements, shall be sufficient to preclude the use of this section:

      The provisions of § 35-6-109, as amended, or any corresponding provision of future law, shall not be used in the administration of this trust; or

      My trustee shall not determine the distributions to the income beneficiary as a unitrust amount.

  11. Any trustee or disinterested person who in good faith takes or fails to take any action under this section shall not be liable to any person affected by such action or inaction, regardless of whether such person received written notice as provided in this section and regardless of whether such person was under a legal disability at the time of the delivery of such notice. Such person's exclusive remedy shall be to obtain an order of the court directing the trustee to convert an income trust to a total return unitrust, to reconvert from a total return unitrust to an income trust or to change the percentage used to calculate the unitrust amount.
  12. This section shall be available to trusts in existence on July 1, 2010, or created thereafter.

Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21; 2018, ch. 887, § 1; 2019, ch. 197, § 3.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 purported to enact §§ 35-17-101 and 35-17-102. In comments jointly proposed by the Estate and Probate Section of the Tennessee Bar Association, the Probate Study Committee of the Tennessee Bar Association, and the Trust Committee of the Tennessee Bankers Association, as authorized by 725, Acts of 2010, ch. 725, § 24, it was recommended that the enactments by Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 be enacted as §§ 35-6-108 and 35-6-109, respectively.

Compiler's Notes. The Internal Revenue Code, referred to in this section, is compiled in title 26 U.S.C.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added “, or gives the trustee no discretion to distribute any trust principal to the income beneficiary under any circumstances” at the end of (k)(1)(A); deleted “; described in 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)” at the end of (k)(1)(B); and added “Except for testamenatry trusts established prior to July 1, 2010,” at the beginning of (k)(1)(C).

The 2019 amendment, in (k)(1), deleted “, or gives the trustee no discretion to distribute any trust principal to the income beneficiary under any circumstances” at the end of (A); inserted “described in 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)” at the end of (B); and deleted “Except for testamentary trusts established prior to July 1, 2010,” at the beginning of (C).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 887, § 2. May 3, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 197, § 8.  April 25, 2019.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section, which was added in 2010, allows a trustee to convert a mandatory income trust to a unitrust with an annual payment between 3% and 5% of the value of the trust corpus.

35-6-109. Express total return unitrusts.

  1. This section shall apply to a trust that, by its governing instrument, requires or permits the distribution, at least annually, of a unitrust amount equal to a fixed percentage of not less than three percent (3%) nor more than five percent (5%) per year of the fair market value of the trust's assets, valued at least annually, such trust to be referred to in this section as an “express total return unitrust”.
  2. The unitrust amount for an express total return unitrust may be determined by reference to the fair market value of the trust's assets in one (1) year or more than one (1) year.
  3. Distribution of such a fixed percentage unitrust amount is considered a distribution of all of the income of the express total return unitrust.
  4. An express total return unitrust may or may not provide a mechanism for changing the unitrust percentage similar to the mechanism provided under § 35-6-108, based upon the factors noted therein, and may or may not provide for a conversion from a unitrust to an income trust and/or a reconversion of an income trust to a unitrust similar to the mechanism under § 35-6-108.
  5. If an express total return unitrust does not specifically or by reference to § 35-6-108 deny a power to change the unitrust percentage or to convert to an income trust, then the trustee shall have such power and the express total return unitrust shall be deemed to be a “total return unitrust” within the meaning of § 35-6-108 for purposes of applying § 35-6-108 to the trust.
  6. The distribution of a fixed percentage of not less than three percent (3%) nor more than five percent (5%) reasonably apportions the total return of an express total return unitrust.
  7. The trust instrument may grant discretion to the trustee to adopt a consistent practice of treating capital gains as part of the unitrust distribution, to the extent that the unitrust distribution exceeds the net accounting income, or it may specify the ordering of such classes of income.
  8. Unless the terms of the trust specifically provide otherwise, a distribution of the unitrust amount from an express total return unitrust shall be considered to have been made from the following sources in order of priority:
    1. From net accounting income determined as if the trust were not a unitrust;
    2. From ordinary income not allocable to net accounting income;
    3. After calculating the trust's capital gain net income as described in 26 U.S.C. § 1222(9), from net realized short-term capital gain as described in 26 U.S.C. § 1222(5) and then from net realized long-term capital gain described in 26 U.S.C. § 1222(7); and
    4. From the principal of the trust.
  9. The trust instrument may provide that assets:
    1. For which a fair market value cannot be readily ascertained shall be valued using such valuation methods as are deemed reasonable and appropriate; and
    2. Used by a trust beneficiary, such as a residence property or tangible personal property, may be excluded from the net fair market value for computing the unitrust amount.
  10. In this section, “Internal Revenue Code” refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (U.S.C. title 26), and any references to a section thereof shall include any successor, substituted, or amended section of the Internal Revenue Code.

Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 purported to enact §§ 35-17-101 and 35-17-102. In comments jointly proposed by the Estate and Probate Section of the Tennessee Bar Association, the Probate Study Committee of the Tennessee Bar Association, and the Trust Committee of the Tennessee Bankers Association, as authorized by 725, Acts of 2010, ch. 725, § 24, it was recommended that the enactments by Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 be enacted as §§ 35-6-108 and 35-6-109, respectively.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section, which was added in 2010, allows a new trust to be established as a unitrust with an annual payment between 3% and 5% of the value of the trust corpus.

Part 2
Decedent's Estate or Terminating Income Interest

35-6-201. Determination and distribution of net income.

After a decedent dies, in the case of an estate, or after an income interest in a trust ends, the following rules apply:

  1. A fiduciary of an estate or of a terminating income interest shall determine the amount of net income and net principal receipts received from property specifically given to a beneficiary under the rules in parts 3-5 of this chapter which apply to trustees and the rules in subdivision (5). The fiduciary shall distribute the net income and net principal receipts to the beneficiary who is to receive the specific property.
  2. A fiduciary shall determine the remaining net income of a decedent's estate or a terminating income interest under the rules in parts 3-5 of this chapter which apply to trustees and by:
    1. Including in net income all income from property used to discharge liabilities;
    2. Paying from income or principal, in the fiduciary's discretion, fees of attorneys, accountants, and fiduciaries; court costs and other expenses of administration; and interest on death taxes; but the fiduciary may pay those expenses from income of property passing to a trust for which the fiduciary claims an estate tax marital or charitable deduction only to the extent that the payment of those expenses from income will not cause the reduction or loss of the deduction; and
    3. Paying from principal all other disbursements made or incurred in connection with the settlement of a decedent's estate or the winding up of a terminating income interest, including debts, funeral expenses, disposition of remains, family allowances, and death taxes and related penalties that are apportioned to the estate or terminating income interest by the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law.
  3. A fiduciary shall distribute to a beneficiary who receives a pecuniary amount outright the interest or any other amount provided by the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law from net income determined under subdivision (2) or from principal to the extent that net income is insufficient. If a beneficiary is to receive a pecuniary amount outright from a trust after an income interest ends and no interest or other amount is provided for by the terms of the trust or applicable law, the fiduciary shall distribute the interest or other amount to which the beneficiary would be entitled under applicable law if the pecuniary amount were required to be paid under a will.
  4. A fiduciary shall distribute the net income remaining after distributions required by subdivision (3) of this section in the manner described in § 35-6-202 to all other beneficiaries, including a beneficiary who receives a pecuniary amount in trust, even if the beneficiary holds an unqualified power to withdraw assets from the trust or other presently exercisable general power of appointment over the trust.
  5. A fiduciary may not reduce principal or income receipts from property described in subdivision (1) of this section because of a payment described in §§ 35-6-501 or 35-6-502 to the extent that the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law requires the fiduciary to make the payment from assets other than the property or to the extent that the fiduciary recovers or expects to recover the payment from a third party. The net income and principal receipts from the property are determined by including all of the amounts the fiduciary receives or pays with respect to the property, whether those amounts accrued or became due before, on, or after the date of a decedent's death or an income interest's terminating event, and by making a reasonable provision for amounts that the fiduciary believes the estate or terminating income interest may become obligated to pay after the property is distributed.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

Law Reviews.

The Case of the Disappearing Inheritance Tax (Dan W. Holbrook), 36 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 22 (2000).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Terminating income interests and successive income interests.

A trust that provides for a single income beneficiary and an outright distribution of the remainder ends when the income interest ends. A more complex trust may have a number of income interests, either concurrent or successive, and the trust will not necessarily end when one of the income interests ends. For that reason, the Act speaks in terms of income interests ending and beginning rather than trusts ending and beginning. When an income interest in a trust ends, the trustee's powers continue during the winding up period required to complete its administration. A terminating income interest is one that has ended but whose administration is not complete.

If two or more people are given the right to receive specified percentages or fractions of the income from a trust concurrently and one of the concurrent interests ends, e.g., when a beneficiary dies, the beneficiary's income interest ends but the trust does not. Similarly, when a trust with only one income beneficiary ends upon the beneficiary's death, the trust instrument may provide that part or all of the trust assets shall continue in trust for another income beneficiary. While it is common to think and speak of this (and even to characterize it in a trust instrument) as a “new” trust, it is a continuation of the original trust for a remainder beneficiary who has an income interest in the trust assets instead of the right to receive them outright. For purposes of this Act, this is a successive income interest in the same trust. The fact that a trust may or may not end when an income interest ends is not significant for purposes of this Act.

If the assets that are subject to a terminating income interest pass to another trust because the income beneficiary exercises a general power of appointment over the trust assets, the recipient trust would be a new trust; and if they pass to another trust because the beneficiary exercises a nongeneral power of appointment over the trust assets, the recipient trust might be a new trust in some States (see 5A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 640, at 483 (4th ed. 1989)); but for purposes of this Act a new trust created in these circumstances is also a successive income interest.

Gift of a pecuniary amount.

Section 201(3) and (4) [§ 35-6-201(3) and (4)] provide different rules for an outright gift of a pecuniary amount and a gift in trust of a pecuniary amount; this is the same approach used in Section 5(b)(2) of the 1962 Act.

Interest on pecuniary amounts.

Section 201(3) [§ 35-6-201(3)] provides that the beneficiary of an outright pecuniary amount is to receive the interest or other amount provided by applicable law if there is no provision in the will or the terms of the trust. Many States have no applicable law that provides for interest or some other amount to be paid on an outright pecuniary gift under an inter vivos trust; this section provides that in such a case the interest or other amount to be paid shall be the same as the interest or other amount required to be paid on testamentary pecuniary gifts. This provision is intended to accord gifts under inter vivos instruments the same treatment as testamentary gifts. The various state authorities that provide for the amount that a beneficiary of an outright pecuniary amount is entitled to receive are collected in Richard B. Covey, Marital Deduction and Credit Shelter Dispositions and the Use of Formula Provisions, App. B (Supp. 1997).

Administration expenses and interest on death taxes.

Under Section 201(2)(B) [§ 35-6-201(2)(B)] a fiduciary may pay administration expenses and interest on death taxes from either income or principal. An advantage of permitting the fiduciary to choose the source of the payment is that, if the fiduciary's decision is consistent with the decision to deduct these expenses for income tax purposes or estate tax purposes, it eliminates the need to adjust between principal and income that may arise when, for example, an expense that is paid from principal is deducted for income tax purposes or an expense that is paid from income is deducted for estate tax purposes.

The United States Supreme Court has considered the question of whether an estate tax marital deduction or charitable deduction should be reduced when administration expenses are paid from income produced by property passing in trust for a surviving spouse or for charity and deducted for income tax purposes. The Court rejected the IRS position that administration expenses properly paid from income under the terms of the trust or state law must reduce the amount of a marital or charitable transfer, and held that the value of the transferred property is not reduced for estate tax purposes unless the administration expenses are material in light of the income the trust corpus could have been expected to generate. Commissioner v. Estate of Otis C. Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124 (1997). The provision in Section 201(2)(B) [§ 35-6-201(2)(B)] permits a fiduciary to pay and deduct administration expenses from income only to the extent that it will not cause the reduction or loss of an estate tax marital or charitable contributions deduction, which means that the limit on the amount payable from income will be established eventually by Treasury Regulations.

Interest on estate taxes.

The IRS agrees that interest on estate and inheritance taxes may be deducted for income tax purposes without having to reduce the estate tax deduction for amounts passing to a charity or surviving spouse, whether the interest is paid from principal or income. Rev. Rul. 93-48, 93-2 C.B. 270. For estates of persons who died before 1998, a fiduciary may not want to deduct for income tax purposes interest on estate tax that is deferred under Section 6166 or 6163 because deducting that interest for estate tax purposes may produce more beneficial results, especially if the estate has little or no income or the income tax bracket is significantly lower than the estate tax bracket. For estates of persons who die after 1997, no estate tax or income tax deduction will be allowed for interest paid on estate tax that is deferred under Section 6166. However, interest on estate tax deferred under Section 6163 will continue to be deductible for both purposes, and interest on estate tax deficiencies will continue to be deductible for estate tax purposes if an election under Section 6166 is not in effect.

Under the 1962 Act, Section 13(c)(5) charges interest on estate and inheritance taxes to principal. The 1931 Act has no provision. Section 501(3) of this Act [§ 35-6-501(3)] provides that, except to the extent provided in Section 201(2)(B) or (C) [§ 35-6-201(2)(B), (C)], all interest must be paid from income.

35-6-202. Distribution to residuary and remainder beneficiaries.

  1. Each beneficiary described in § 35-6-201(4) is entitled to receive a portion of the net income equal to the beneficiary's fractional interest in undistributed principal assets, using values as of the distribution date. If a fiduciary makes more than one (1) distribution of assets to beneficiaries to whom this section applies, each beneficiary, including one who does not receive part of the distribution, is entitled, as of each distribution date, to the net income the fiduciary has received after the date of death or terminating event or earlier distribution date but has not distributed as of the current distribution date.
  2. In determining a beneficiary's share of net income, the following rules apply:
    1. The beneficiary is entitled to receive a portion of the net income equal to the beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed principal assets immediately before the distribution date, including assets that later may be sold to meet principal obligations.
    2. The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed principal assets must be calculated without regard to property specifically given to a beneficiary and property required to pay pecuniary amounts not in trust.
    3. The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed principal assets must be calculated on the basis of the aggregate value of those assets as of the distribution date without reducing the value by any unpaid principal obligation.
    4. The distribution date for purposes of this section may be the date as of which the fiduciary calculates the value of the assets if that date is reasonably near the date on which assets are actually distributed.
  3. If a fiduciary does not distribute all of the collected but undistributed net income to each person as of a distribution date, the fiduciary shall maintain appropriate records showing the interest of each beneficiary in that net income.
  4. A fiduciary may apply the rules in this section, to the extent that the fiduciary considers it appropriate, to net gain or loss realized after the date of death or terminating event or earlier distribution date from the disposition of a principal asset if this section applies to the income from the asset.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Relationship to prior Acts.   Section 202 [§ 35-6-202] retains the concept in Section 5(b)(2) of the 1962 Act that the residuary legatees of estates are to receive net income earned during the period of administration on the basis of their proportionate interests in the undistributed assets when distributions are made. It changes the basis for determining their proportionate interests by using asset values as of a date reasonably near the time of distribution instead of inventory values; it extends the application of these rules to distributions from terminating trusts; and it extends these rules to gain or loss realized from the disposition of assets during administration, an omission in the 1962 Act that has been noted by several commentators. See, e.g., Richard B. Covey, Marital Deduction and Credit Shelter Dispositions and the Use of Formula Provisions 80 (1984 & Supp. 1997); Thomas H. Cantrill, Fractional or Percentage Residuary Bequests: Allocation of Postmortem Income, Gain and Unrealized Appreciation, 10 Prob. Notes 322, 327 (1985).

Part 3
Apportionment at Beginning and End of Income Interest

35-6-301. When right to income begins and ends.

  1. An income beneficiary is entitled to net income from the date on which the income interest begins. An income interest begins on the date specified in the terms of the trust or, if no date is specified, on the date an asset becomes subject to a trust or successive income interest.
  2. An asset becomes subject to a trust:
    1. On the date it is transferred to the trust in the case of an asset that is transferred to a trust during the transferor's life;
    2. On the date of a testator's death in the case of an asset that becomes subject to a trust by reason of a will, even if there is an intervening period of administration of the testator's estate; or
    3. On the date of an individual's death in the case of an asset that is transferred to a fiduciary by a third party because of the individual's death.
  3. An asset becomes subject to a successive income interest on the day after the preceding income interest ends, as determined under subsection (d), even if there is an intervening period of administration to wind up the preceding income interest.
  4. An income interest ends on the day before an income beneficiary dies or another terminating event occurs, or on the last day of a period during which there is no beneficiary to whom a trustee may distribute income.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Period during which there is no beneficiary.   The purpose of the second part of subsection (d) is to provide that, at the end of a period during which there is no beneficiary to whom a trustee may distribute income, the trustee must apply the same apportionment rules that apply when a mandatory income interest ends. This provision would apply, for example, if a settlor creates a trust for grandchildren before any grandchildren are born. When the first grandchild is born, the period preceding the date of birth is treated as having ended, followed by a successive income interest, and the apportionment rules in Sections 302 and 303 [§§ 35-6-302 and 35-6-303] apply accordingly if the terms of the trust do not contain different provisions.

35-6-302. Apportionment of receipts and disbursements when decedent dies or income interest begins.

  1. A trustee shall allocate an income receipt or disbursement other than one to which § 35-6-201(1) applies to principal if its due date occurs before a decedent dies in the case of an estate or before an income interest begins in the case of a trust or successive income interest.
  2. A trustee shall allocate an income receipt or disbursement to income if its due date occurs on or after the date on which a decedent dies or an income interest begins and it is a periodic due date. An income receipt or disbursement must be treated as accruing from day to day if its due date is not periodic or it has no due date. The portion of the receipt or disbursement accruing before the date on which a decedent dies or an income interest begins must be allocated to principal and the balance must be allocated to income.
  3. An item of income or an obligation is due on the date the payer is required to make a payment. If a payment date is not stated, there is no due date for the purposes of this chapter. Distributions to shareholders or other owners from an entity to which § 35-6-401 applies are deemed to be due on the date fixed by the entity for determining who is entitled to receive the distribution or, if no date is fixed, on the declaration date for the distribution. A due date is periodic for receipts or disbursements that must be paid at regular intervals under a lease or an obligation to pay interest or if an entity customarily makes distributions at regular intervals.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Acts.

Professor Bogert stated that “Section 4 of the [1962] Act makes a change with respect to the apportionment of the income of trust property not due until after the trust began but which accrued in part before the commencement of the trust. It treats such income as to be credited entirely to the income account in the case of a living trust, but to be apportioned between capital and income in the case of a testamentary trust. The [1931] Act apportions such income in the case of both types of trusts, except in the case of corporate dividends.” George G. Bogert, The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 38 Notre Dame Law. 50, 52 (1962). The 1962 Act also provides that an asset passing to an inter vivos trust by a bequest in the settlor's will is governed by the rule that applies to a testamentary trust, so that different rules apply to assets passing to an inter vivos trust depending upon whether they were transferred to the trust during the settlor's life or by his will.

Having several different rules that apply to similar transactions is confusing. In order to simplify administration, Section 302 [§ 35-6-302] applies the same rule to inter vivos trusts (revocable and irrevocable), testamentary trusts, and assets that become subject to an inter vivos trust by a testamentary bequest.

Periodic payments.

Under Section 302 [§ 35-6-302], a periodic payment is principal if it is due but unpaid before a decedent dies or before an asset becomes subject to a trust, but the next payment is allocated entirely to income and is not apportioned. Thus, periodic receipts such as rents, dividends, interest, and annuities, and disbursements such as the interest portion of a mortgage payment, are not apportioned. This is the original common law rule. Edwin A. Howes, Jr., The American Law Relating to Income and Principal 70 (1905). In trusts in which a surviving spouse is dependent upon a regular flow of cash from the decedent's securities portfolio, this rule will help to maintain payments to the spouse at the same level as before the settlor's death. Under the 1962 Act, the pre-death portion of the first periodic payment due after death is apportioned to principal in the case of a testamentary trust or securities bequeathed by will to an inter vivos trust.

Nonperiodic payments.

Under the second sentence of Section 302(b) [§ 35-6-302(b)], interest on an obligation that does not provide a due date for the interest payment, such as interest on an income tax refund, would be apportioned to principal to the extent it accrues before a person dies or an income interest begins unless the obligation is specifically given to a devisee or remainder beneficiary, in which case all of the accrued interest passes under Section 201(1) [§ 35-6-201(1)] to the person who receives the obligation. The same rule applies to interest on an obligation that has a due date but does not provide for periodic payments. If there is no stated interest on the obligation, such as a zero coupon bond, and the proceeds from the obligation are received more than one year after it is purchased or acquired by the trustee, the entire amount received is principal under Section 406 [§ 35-6-406].

35-6-303. Apportionment when income interest ends.

  1. In this section, “undistributed income” means net income received before the date on which an income interest ends. Undistributed income does not include an item of income or expense that is due or accrued or net income that has been added or is required to be added to principal under the terms of the trust.
  2. When a mandatory income interest ends, the trustee shall pay to a mandatory income beneficiary who survives that date, or the estate of a deceased mandatory income beneficiary whose death causes the interest to end, the beneficiary's share of the undistributed income that is not disposed of under the terms of the trust unless the beneficiary has an unqualified power to revoke more than five percent (5%) of the trust immediately before the income interest ends. In the latter case, the undistributed income from the portion of the trust that may be revoked must be added to principal.
  3. When a trustee's obligation to pay a fixed annuity or a fixed fraction of the value of the trust's assets ends, the trustee shall prorate the final payment if and to the extent required by applicable law to accomplish a purpose of the trust or its settlor relating to income, gift, estate, or other tax requirements.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Acts.

Both the 1931 Act (Section 4) and the 1962 Act (Section 4(d)) provide that a deceased income beneficiary's estate is entitled to the undistributed income. The Drafting Committee concluded that this is probably not what most settlors would want, and that, with respect to undistributed income, most settlors would favor the income beneficiary first, the remainder beneficiaries second, and the income beneficiary's heirs last, if at all. However, it decided not to eliminate this provision to avoid causing disputes about whether the trustee should have distributed collected cash before the income beneficiary died.

Accrued periodic payments.

Under the prior Acts, an income beneficiary or his estate is entitled to receive a portion of any payments, other than dividends, that are due or that have accrued when the income interest terminates. The last sentence of subsection (a) changes that rule by providing that such items are not included in undistributed income. The items affected include periodic payments of interest, rent, and dividends, as well as items of income that accrue over a longer period of time; the rule also applies to expenses that are due or accrued.

Example — accrued periodic payments. The rules in Section 302 [§ 35-6-302] and Section 303 [§ 35-6-303] work in the following manner: Assume that a periodic payment of rent that is due on July 20 has not been paid when an income interest ends on July 30; the successive income interest begins on July 31, and the rent payment that was due on July 20 is paid on August 3. Under Section 302(a) [§ 35-6-302(a)], the July 20 payment is added to the principal of the successive income interest when received. Under Section 302(b) [§ 35-6-302(b)], the entire periodic payment of rent that is due on August 20 is income when received by the successive income interest. Under Section 303 [§ 35-6-303], neither the income beneficiary of the terminated income interest nor the beneficiary's estate is entitled to any part of either the July 20 or the August 20 payments because neither one was received before the income interest ended on July 30. The same principles apply to expenses of the trust.

Beneficiary with an unqualified power to revoke.

The requirement in subsection (b) to pay undistributed income to a mandatory income beneficiary or her estate does not apply to the extent the beneficiary has an unqualified power to revoke more than five percent of the trust immediately before the income interest ends. Without this exception, subsection (b) would apply to a revocable living trust whose settlor is the mandatory income beneficiary during her lifetime, even if her will provides that all of the assets in the probate estate are to be distributed to the trust.

If a trust permits the beneficiary to withdraw all or a part of the trust principal after attaining a specified age and the beneficiary attains that age but fails to withdraw all of the principal that she is permitted to withdraw, a trustee is not required to pay her or her estate the undistributed income attributable to the portion of the principal that she left in the trust. The assumption underlying this rule is that the beneficiary has either provided for the disposition of the trust assets (including the undistributed income) by exercising a power of appointment that she has been given or has not withdrawn the assets because she is willing to have the principal and undistributed income be distributed under the terms of the trust. If the beneficiary has the power to withdraw 25% of the trust principal, the trustee must pay to her or her estate the undistributed income from the 75% that she cannot withdraw.

Part 4
Allocation of Receipts During Administration of Trust

35-6-401. Character of receipts.

  1. In this section, “entity” means a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, regulated investment company, real estate investment trust, common trust fund, or any other organization in which a trustee has an interest other than a trust or estate to which § 35-6-402 applies, a business or activity to which § 35-6-403 applies, or an asset-backed security to which § 35-6-415 applies.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a trustee shall allocate to income money received from an entity.
  3. A trustee shall allocate the following receipts from an entity to principal:
    1. Property other than money;
    2. Money received in one (1) distribution or a series of related distributions in exchange for part or all of a trust's interest in the entity;
    3. Money received in total or partial liquidation of the entity; and
    4. Money received from an entity that is a regulated investment company or a real estate investment trust if the money distributed is a capital gain dividend for federal income tax purposes.
  4. Money is received in partial liquidation:
    1. To the extent that the entity, at or near the time of a distribution, indicates that it is a distribution in partial liquidation; or
    2. If the total amount of money and property received in a distribution or series of related distributions is greater than twenty percent (20%) of the entity's gross assets, as shown by the entity's year-end financial statements immediately preceding the initial receipt.
  5. Money is not received in partial liquidation, nor may it be taken into account under subdivision (d)(2), to the extent that it does not exceed the amount of income tax that a trustee or beneficiary must pay on taxable income of the entity that distributes the money.
  6. A trustee may rely upon a statement made by an entity about the source or character of a distribution if the statement is made at or near the time of distribution by the entity's board of directors or other person or group of persons authorized to exercise powers to pay money or transfer property comparable to those of a corporation's board of directors.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Got Microsoft? Trustees Should Expect a Fight (Dan W. Holbrook), 41 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 36 (2005).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Entities to which Section 401 [§ 35-6-401] applies.

The reference to partnerships in Section 401(a) [§ 35-6-401(a)] is intended to include all forms of partnerships, including limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and variants that have slightly different names and characteristics from State to State. The section does not apply, however, to receipts from an interest in property that a trust owns as a tenant in common with one or more co-owners, nor would it apply to an interest in a joint venture if, under applicable law, the trust's interest is regarded as that of a tenant in common.

Capital gain dividends.

Under the Internal Revenue Code and the Income Tax Regulations, a “capital gain dividend” from a mutual fund or real estate investment trust is the excess of the fund's or trust's net long-term capital gain over its net short-term capital loss. As a result, a capital gain dividend does not include any net short-term capital gain, and cash received by a trust because of a net short-term capital gain is income under this Act.

Reinvested dividends.

If a trustee elects (or continues an election made by its predecessor) to reinvest dividends in shares of stock of a distributing corporation or fund, whether evidenced by new certificates or entries on the books of the distributing entity, the new shares would be principal, but the trustee may determine, after considering the return from the portfolio as a whole, whether an adjustment under Section 104 [§ 35-6-104] is necessary as a result.

Distribution of property.

The 1962 Act describes a number of types of property that would be principal if distributed by a corporation. This becomes unwieldy in a section that applies to both corporations and all other entities. By stating that principal includes the distribution of any property other than money, Section 401 [§ 35-6-401] embraces all of the items enumerated in Section 6 of the 1962 Act as well as any other form of nonmonetary distribution not specifically mentioned in that Act.

Partial liquidations.

Under subsection (d)(1), any distribution designated by the entity as a partial liquidating distribution is principal regardless of the percentage of total assets that it represents. If a distribution exceeds 20% of the entity's gross assets, the entire distribution is a partial liquidation under subsection (d)(2) whether or not the entity describes it as a partial liquidation. In determining whether a distribution is greater than 20% of the gross assets, the portion of the distribution that does not exceed the amount of income tax that the trustee or a beneficiary must pay on the entity's taxable income is ignored.

Other large distributions.

A cash distribution may be quite large (for example, more than 10% but not more than 20% of the entity's gross assets) and have characteristics that suggest it should be treated as principal rather than income. For example, an entity may have received cash from a source other than the conduct of its normal business operations because it sold an investment asset; or because it sold a business asset other than one held for sale to customers in the normal course of its business and did not replace it; or it borrowed a large sum of money and secured the repayment of the loan with a substantial asset; or a principal source of its cash was from assets such as mineral interests, 90% of which would have been allocated to principal if the trust had owned the assets directly. In such a case the trustee, after considering the total return from the portfolio as a whole and the income component of that return, may decide to exercise the power under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] to make an adjustment between income and principal, subject to the limitations in Section 104(c) [§ 35-6-104(c)].

35-6-402. Distribution from trust or estate.

A trustee shall allocate to income an amount received as a distribution of income from a trust or an estate in which the trust has an interest other than a purchased interest, and shall allocate to principal an amount received as a distribution of principal from such a trust or estate. If a trustee purchases an interest in a trust that is an investment entity, or a decedent or donor transfers an interest in such a trust to a trustee, § 35-6-401 or § 35-6-415 applies to a receipt from the trust.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Terms of the distributing trust or estate.

Under Section 103(a) [§ 35-6-103(a)], a trustee is to allocate receipts in accordance with the terms of the recipient trust or, if there is no provision, in accordance with this Act. However, in determining whether a distribution from another trust or an estate is income or principal, the trustee should also determine what the terms of the distributing trust or estate say about the distribution — for example, whether they direct that the distribution, even though made from the income of the distributing trust or estate, is to be added to principal of the recipient trust. Such a provision should override the terms of this Act, but if the terms of the recipient trust contain a provision requiring such a distribution to be allocated to income, the trustee may have to obtain a judicial resolution of the conflict between the terms of the two documents.

Investment trusts.

An investment entity to which the second sentence of this section applies includes a mutual fund, a common trust fund, a business trust or other entity organized as a trust for the purpose of receiving capital contributed by investors, investing that capital, and managing investment assets, including asset-backed security arrangements to which Section 415 [§ 35-6-415] applies. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165 (1997).

35-6-403. Business and other activities conducted by trustee.

  1. If a trustee who conducts a business or other activity determines that it is in the best interest of all the beneficiaries to account separately for the business or activity instead of accounting for it as part of the trust's general accounting records, the trustee may maintain separate accounting records for its transactions, whether or not its assets are segregated from other trust assets.
  2. A trustee who accounts separately for a business or other activity may determine the extent to which its net cash receipts must be retained for working capital, the acquisition or replacement of fixed assets, and other reasonably foreseeable needs of the business or activity, and the extent to which the remaining net cash receipts are accounted for as principal or income in the trust's general accounting records. If a trustee sells assets of the business or other activity, other than in the ordinary course of the business or activity, the trustee shall account for the net amount received as principal in the trust's general accounting records to the extent the trustee determines that the amount received is no longer required in the conduct of the business.
  3. Activities for which a trustee may maintain separate accounting records include:
    1. Retail, manufacturing, service, and other traditional business activities;
    2. Farming;
    3. Raising and selling livestock and other animals;
    4. Management of rental properties;
    5. Extraction of minerals and other natural resources;
    6. Timber operations; and
    7. Activities to which § 35-6-414 applies.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Purpose and scope.

The provisions in Section 403 [§ 35-6-403] are intended to give greater flexibility to a trustee who operates a business or other activity in proprietorship form rather than in a wholly-owned corporation (or, where permitted by state law, a single-member limited liability company), and to facilitate the trustee's ability to decide the extent to which the net receipts from the activity should be allocated to income, just as the board of directors of a corporation owned entirely by the trust would decide the amount of the annual dividend to be paid to the trust. It permits a trustee to account for farming or livestock operations, rental properties, oil and gas properties, timber operations, and activities in derivatives and options as though they were held by a separate entity. It is not intended, however, to permit a trustee to account separately for a traditional securities portfolio to avoid the provisions of this Act that apply to such securities.

Section 403 [§ 35-6-403] permits the trustee to account separately for each business or activity for which the trustee determines separate accounting is appropriate. A trustee with a computerized accounting system may account for these activities in a “subtrust”; an individual trustee may continue to use the business and record-keeping methods employed by the decedent or transferor who may have conducted the business under an assumed name. The intent of this section is to give the trustee broad authority to select business record-keeping methods that best suit the activity in which the trustee is engaged.

If a fiduciary liquidates a sole proprietorship or other activity to which Section 403 [§ 35-6-403] applies, the proceeds would be added to principal, even though derived from the liquidation of accounts receivable, because the proceeds would no longer be needed in the conduct of the business. If the liquidation occurs during probate or during an income interest's winding up period, none of the proceeds would be income for purposes of Section 201 [§ 35-6-201].

Separate accounts.

A trustee may or may not maintain separate bank accounts for business activities that are accounted for under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403]. A professional trustee may decide not to maintain separate bank accounts, but an individual trustee, especially one who has continued a decedent's business practices, may continue the same banking arrangements that were used during the decedent's lifetime. In either case, the trustee is authorized to decide to what extent cash is to be retained as part of the business assets and to what extent it is to be transferred to the trust's general accounts, either as income or principal.

35-6-404. Principal receipts.

A trustee shall allocate to principal:

  1. To the extent not allocated to income under this chapter, assets received from a transferor during the transferor's lifetime, a decedent's estate, a trust with a terminating income interest, or a payer under a contract naming the trust or its trustee as beneficiary;
  2. Money or other property received from the sale, exchange, liquidation, or change in form of a principal asset, including realized profit, subject to this chapter;
  3. Amounts recovered from third parties to reimburse the trust because of disbursements described in § 35-6-502(a)(7) or for other reasons to the extent not based on the loss of income;
  4. Proceeds of property taken by eminent domain, but a separate award made for the loss of income with respect to an accounting period during which a current income beneficiary had a mandatory income interest is income;
  5. Net income received in an accounting period during which there is no beneficiary to whom a trustee may or must distribute income; and
  6. Other receipts as provided in Part 4C, §§ 35-6-408 — 35-6-415.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Allocation of Capital Gains to Principal.

In a trust dispute between a beneficiary and trustees, the trustees were entitled to summary judgment because, inter alia, the meaning of “net income” was a legal issue under T.C.A. § 35-6-103(a)(3), allocating capital gains to principal, under T.C.A. § 35-6-404, in the trustees'  discretion, not a fact issue. Cartwright v. Jackson Capital Partners, Ltd. P'ship, 478 S.W.3d 596, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 884 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2015).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Eminent domain awards.   Even though the award in an eminent domain proceeding may include an amount for the loss of future rent on a lease, if that amount is not separately stated the entire award is principal. The rule is the same in the 1931 and 1962 Acts.

35-6-405. Rental property.

To the extent that a trustee accounts for receipts from rental property pursuant to this section, the trustee shall allocate to income an amount received as rent of real or personal property, including an amount received for cancellation or renewal of a lease. An amount received as a refundable deposit, including a security deposit or a deposit that is to be applied as rent for future periods, must be added to principal and held subject to the terms of the lease and is not available for distribution to a beneficiary until the trustee's contractual obligations have been satisfied with respect to that amount.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Application of Section 403 [§ 35-6-403].

This section applies to the extent that the trustee does not account separately under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403] for the management of rental properties owned by the trust.

Receipts that are capital in nature.

A portion of the payment under a lease may be a reimbursement of principal expenditures for improvements to the leased property that is characterized as rent for purposes of invoking contractual or statutory remedies for nonpayment. If the trustee is accounting for rental income under Section 405 [§ 35-6-405], a transfer from income to reimburse principal may be appropriate under Section 504 [§ 35-6-405] to the extent that some of the “rent” is really a reimbursement for improvements. This set of facts could also be a relevant factor for a trustee to consider under Section 104(b) [§ 35-6-104(b)] in deciding whether and to what extent to make an adjustment between principal and income under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] after considering the return from the portfolio as a whole.

35-6-406. Obligation to pay money.

  1. An amount received as interest, whether determined at a fixed, variable, or floating rate, on an obligation to pay money to the trustee, including an amount received as consideration for prepaying principal, must be allocated to income without any provision for amortization of premium.
  2. A trustee shall allocate to principal an amount received from the sale, redemption, or other disposition of an obligation to pay money to the trustee more than one (1) year after it is purchased or acquired by the trustee, including an obligation whose purchase price or value when it is acquired is less than its value at maturity. If the obligation matures within one (1) year after it is purchased or acquired by the trustee, an amount received in excess of its purchase price or its value when acquired by the trust must be allocated to income.
  3. This section does not apply to an obligation to which § 35-6-409, § 35-6-410, § 35-6-411, § 35-6-412, § 35-6-414, or § 35-6-415 applies.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Variable or floating interest rates.

The reference in subsection (a) to variable or floating interest rate obligations is intended to clarify that, even though an obligation's interest rate may change from time to time based upon changes in an index or other market indicator, an obligation to pay money containing a variable or floating rate provision is subject to this section and is not to be treated as a derivative financial instrument under Section 414 [§ 35-6-414].

Discount obligations.

Subsection (b) applies to all obligations acquired at a discount, including short-term obligations such as U.S. Treasury Bills, long-term obligations such as U.S. Savings Bonds, zero-coupon bonds, and discount bonds that pay interest during part, but not all, of the period before maturity. Under subsection (b), the entire increase in value of these obligations is principal when the trustee receives the proceeds from the disposition unless the obligation, when acquired, has a maturity of less than one year. In order to have one rule that applies to all discount obligations, the Act eliminates the provision in the 1962 Act for the payment from principal of an amount equal to the increase in the value of U.S. Series E bonds. The provision for bonds that mature within one year after acquisition by the trustee is derived from the Illinois act. 760 ILCS 1½ (1996).

Subsection (b) also applies to inflation-indexed bonds — any increase in principal due to inflation after issuance is principal upon redemption if the bond matures more than one year after the trustee acquires it; if it matures within one year, all of the increase, including any attributable to an inflation adjustment, is income.

Effect of Section 104 [§ 35-6-104].

In deciding whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust between principal and income granted by Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)], a relevant factor for the trustee to consider is the effect on the portfolio as a whole of having a portion of the assets invested in bonds that do not pay interest currently.

35-6-407. Insurance policies and similar contracts.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a trustee shall allocate to principal the proceeds of a life insurance policy or other contract in which the trust or its trustee is named as beneficiary, including a contract that insures the trust or its trustee against loss for damage to, destruction of, or loss of title to a trust asset. The trustee shall allocate dividends on an insurance policy to income if the premiums on the policy are paid from income, and to principal if the premiums are paid from principal.
  2. A trustee shall allocate to income proceeds of a contract that insures the trustee against loss of occupancy or other use by an income beneficiary, loss of income, or, subject to § 35-6-403, loss of profits from a business.
  3. This section does not apply to a contract to which § 35-6-409 applies.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

35-6-408. Insubstantial allocations not required.

If a trustee determines that an allocation between principal and income required by § 35-6-409, § 35-6-410, § 35-6-411, § 35-6-412, or § 35-6-415 is insubstantial, the trustee may allocate the entire amount to principal unless one (1) of the circumstances described in § 35-6-104(c) applies to the allocation. This power may be exercised by a cotrustee in the circumstances described in § 35-6-104(d) and may be released for the reasons and in the manner described in § 35-6-104(e). An allocation is presumed to be insubstantial if:

  1. The amount of the allocation would increase or decrease net income in an accounting period, as determined before the allocation, by less than ten percent (10%); or
  2. The value of the asset producing the receipt for which the allocation would be made is less than ten percent (10%) of the total value of the trust's assets at the beginning of the accounting period.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is intended to relieve a trustee from making relatively small allocations while preserving the trustee's right to do so if an allocation is large in terms of absolute dollars.

For example, assume that a trust's assets, which include a working interest in an oil well, have a value of $1,000,000; the net income from the assets other than the working interest is $40,000; and the net receipts from the working interest are $400. The trustee may allocate all of the net receipts from the working interest to principal instead of allocating 10%, or $40, to income under Section 411 [§ 35-6-411]. If the net receipts from the working interest are $35,000, so that the amount allocated to income under Section 411 [§ 35-6-411] would be $3,500, the trustee may decide that this amount is sufficiently significant to the income beneficiary that the allocation provided for by Section 411 [§ 35-6-411] should be made, even though the trustee is still permitted under Section 408 [§ 35-6-408] to allocate all of the net receipts to principal because the $3,500 would increase the net income of $40,000, as determined before making an allocation under Section 411 [§ 35-6-411], by less than 10%. Section 408 [§ 35-6-408] will also relieve a trustee from having to allocate net receipts from the sale of trees in a small woodlot between principal and income.

While the allocation to principal of small amounts under this section should not be a cause for concern for tax purposes, allocations are not permitted under this section in circumstances described in Section 104(c) [§ 35-6-104(c)] to eliminate claims that the power in this section has adverse tax consequences.

35-6-409. Deferred compensation, annuities, and similar payments.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Payment” means a payment that a trustee may receive over a fixed number of years or during the life of one (1) or more individuals because of services rendered or property transferred to the payer in exchange for future payments. The term includes a payment made in money or property from the payer's general assets or from a separate fund created by the payer. For purposes of subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), the term also includes any payment from any separate fund, regardless of the reason for the payment; and
    2. “Separate fund” includes, without limitation, a private or commercial annuity, an individual retirement account, and a pension, profit-sharing, stock-bonus, or stock-ownership plan.
  2. To the extent that a payment is characterized as interest, a dividend, or a payment made in lieu of interest or a dividend, a trustee shall allocate the payment to income. The trustee shall allocate to principal the balance of the payment and any other payment received in the same accounting period that is not characterized as interest, a dividend, or an equivalent payment.
  3. If no part of a payment is characterized as interest, a dividend, or an equivalent payment, and all or part of the payment is required to be made, a trustee shall allocate to income ten percent (10%) of the part that is required to be made during the accounting period and the balance to principal. If no part of a payment is required to be made or the payment received is the entire amount to which the trustee is entitled, the trustee shall allocate the entire payment to principal. For purposes of this subsection (c), a payment is not “required to be made” to the extent that it is made because the trustee exercises a right of withdrawal.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), subsections (f) and (g) apply, and subsections (b) and (c) do not apply, in determining the allocation of a payment made from a separate fund to:
    1. A trust to which an election to qualify for a marital deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(7) or § 67-8-315(a)(6); or
    2. A trust that qualifies for the marital deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(5).
  5. Subsections (d), (f), and (g) do not apply if and to the extent that the series of payments would, without the application of subsection (d), qualify for the marital deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(7)(C).
  6. A trustee shall determine the internal income, without regard to its receipt by the trustee, of each separate fund for the accounting period as if the separate fund were a trust subject to this chapter. Upon request of the surviving spouse, the trustee shall demand that the person administering the separate fund distribute the internal income to the trust. The trustee shall allocate a payment from the separate fund to income to the extent of the internal income of the separate fund and distribute that amount to the surviving spouse. The trustee shall allocate the balance of the payment to principal. Upon request of the surviving spouse, the trustee shall allocate principal to income to the extent the internal income of the separate fund exceeds payments made from the separate fund to the trust during the accounting period.
  7. If a trustee cannot determine the internal income of a separate fund but can determine the value of the separate fund, the internal income of the separate fund is deemed to equal at least three percent (3%) of the fund's value, according to the most recent statement of value preceding the beginning of the accounting period. If the trustee can determine neither the internal income of the separate fund nor the fund's value, the internal income of the fund is deemed to equal the product of the interest rate and the present value of the expected future payments, as determined under 26 U.S.C. § 7520, for the month preceding the accounting period for which the computation is made.
  8. This section does not apply to a payment to which § 35-6-410 applies.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1; 2010, ch. 725, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Scope.

Section 409 [T.C.A. § 35-6-409] applies to amounts received under contractual arrangements that provide for payments to a third party beneficiary as a result of services rendered or property transferred to the payer. While the right to receive such payments is a liquidating asset of the kind described in Section 410 [T.C.A. § 35-6-410] (i.e., “an asset whose value will diminish or terminate because the asset is expected to produce receipts for a period of limited duration”), these payment rights are covered separately in Section 409 [T.C.A. § 35-6-409] because of their special characteristics.

Section 409 [T.C.A. § 35-6-409] applies to receipts from all forms of annuities and deferred compensation arrangements, whether the payment will be received by the trust in a lump sum or in installments over a period of years. It applies to bonuses that may be received over two or three years and payments that may last for much longer periods, including payments from an individual retirement account (IRA), deferred compensation plan (whether qualified or not qualified for special federal income tax treatment), and insurance renewal commissions. It applies to a retirement plan to which the settlor has made contributions, just as it applies to an annuity policy that the settlor may have purchased individually, and it applies to variable annuities, deferred annuities, annuities issued by commercial insurance companies, and “private annuities” arising from the sale of property to another individual or entity in exchange for payments that are to be made for the life of one or more individuals. The section applies whether the payments begin when the payment right becomes subject to the trust or are deferred until a future date, and it applies whether payments are made in cash or in kind, such as employer stock (in-kind payments usually will be made in a single distribution that will be allocated to principal under the second sentence of subsection (c)).

The 1962 Act.

Under Section 12 of the 1962 Act, receipts from “rights to receive payments on a contract for deferred compensation” are allocated to income each year in an amount “not in excess of 5% per year” of the property's inventory value. While “not in excess of 5%” suggests that the annual allocation may range from zero to 5% of the inventory value, in practice the rule is usually treated as prescribing a 5% allocation. The inventory value is usually the present value of all the future payments, and since the inventory value is determined as of the date on which the payment right becomes subject to the trust, the inventory value, and thus the amount of the annual income allocation, depends significantly on the applicable interest rate on the decedent's date of death. That rate may be much higher or lower than the average long-term interest rate. The amount determined under the 5% formula tends to become fixed and remain unchanged even though the amount received by the trust increases or decreases.

Allocations Under Section 409(b) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(b)].

Section 409(b) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(b)] applies to plans whose terms characterize payments made under the plan as dividends, interest, or payments in lieu of dividends or interest. For example, some deferred compensation plans that hold debt obligations or stock of the plan's sponsor in an account for future delivery to the person rendering the services provide for the annual payment to that person of dividends received on the stock or interest received on the debt obligations. Other plans provide that the account of the person rendering the services shall be credited with “phantom” shares of stock and require an annual payment that is equivalent to the dividends that would be received on that number of shares if they were actually issued; or a plan may entitle the person rendering the services to receive a fixed dollar amount in the future and provide for the annual payment of interest on the deferred amount during the period prior to its payment. Under Section 409(b) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(b)], payments of dividends, interest or payments in lieu of dividends or interest under plans of this type are allocated to income; all other payments received under these plans are allocated to principal.

Section 409(b) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(b)] does not apply to an IRA or an arrangement with payment provisions similar to an IRA. IRAs and similar arrangements are subject to the provisions in Section 409(c) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(c)].

Allocations Under Section 409(c) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(c)].

The focus of Section 409 [T.C.A. § 35-6-409], for purposes of allocating payments received by a trust to or between principal and income, is on the payment right rather than on assets that may be held in a fund from which the payments are made. Thus, if an IRA holds a portfolio of marketable stocks and bonds, the amount received by the IRA as dividends and interest is not taken into account in determining the principal and income allocation except to the extent that the Internal Revenue Service may require them to be taken into account when the payment is received by a trust that qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction (a situation that is provided for in Section 409(d) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(d)]). An IRA is subject to federal income tax rules that require payments to begin by a particular date and be made over a specific number of years or a period measured by the lives of one or more persons. The payment right of a trust that is named as a beneficiary of an IRA is not a right to receive particular items that are paid to the IRA, but is instead the right to receive an amount determined by dividing the value of the IRA by the remaining number of years in the payment period. This payment right is similar to the right to receive a unitrust amount, which is normally expressed as an amount equal to a percentage of the value of the unitrust assets without regard to dividends or interest that may be received by the unitrust.

An amount received from an IRA or a plan with a payment provision similar to that of an IRA is allocated under Section 409(c) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(c)], which differentiates between payments that are required to be made and all other payments. To the extent that a payment is required to be made (either under federal income tax rules or, in the case of a plan that is not subject to those rules, under the terms of the plan), 10% of the amount received is allocated to income and the balance is allocated to principal. All other payments are allocated to principal because they represent a change in the form of a principal asset; Section 409 [T.C.A. § 35-6-409] follows the rule in Section 404(2) [T.C.A. § 35-6-404(2)], which provides that money or property received from a change in the form of a principal asset be allocated to principal.

Section 409(c) [T.C.A. § 35-6-409(c)] produces an allocation to income that is similar to the allocation under the 1962 Act formula if the annual payments are the same throughout the payment period, and it is simpler to administer. The amount allocated to income under Section 409 [T.C.A. § 35-6-409] is not dependent upon the interest rate that is used for valuation purposes when the decedent dies, and if the payments received by the trust increase or decrease from year to year because the fund from which the payment is made increases or decreases in value, the amount allocated to income will also increase or decrease.

Marital deduction requirements.

When an IRA or other retirement arrangement (a “plan”) is payable to a marital deduction trust, the IRS treats the plan as a separate property interest that itself must qualify for the marital deduction.  IRS Revenue Ruling 2006-26 said that, as written, Section 409 does not cause a trust to qualify for the IRS’ safe harbors.  Revenue Ruling 2006-26 was limited in scope to certain situations involving IRAs and defined contribution retirement plans.  Without necessarily agreeing with the IRS’ position in that ruling, the revision to this section is designed to satisfy the IRS’ safe harbor and to address concerns that might be raised for similar assets.  No IRS pronouncements have addressed the scope of Code § 2056(b)(7)(C).

Subsection (f) requires the trustee to demand certain distributions if the surviving spouse so requests.  The safe harbor of Revenue Ruling 2006-26 requires that the surviving spouse be separately entitled to demand the fund’s income (without regard to the income from the trust’s other assets) and the income from the other assets (without regard to the fund’s income).  In any event, the surviving spouse is not required to demand that the trustee distribute all of the fund’s income from the fund or from other trust assets.  Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(8).

Subsection (f) also recognizes that the trustee might not control the payments that the trustee receives and provides a remedy to the surviving spouse if the distributions under subsection (d)(1) are insufficient.

Subsection (g) addresses situations where, due to lack of information provided by the fund’s administrator, the trustee is unable to determine the fund’s actual income. The bracketed language is the range approved for unitrust payments by Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1.  In determining the value for purposes of applying the unitrust percentage, the trustee would seek to obtain the value of the assets as of the most recent statement of value immediately preceding the beginning of the year.  For example, suppose a trust’s accounting period is January 1 through December 31.  If a retirement plan administrator furnishes information annually each September 30 and declines to provide information as of December 31, then the trustee may rely on the September 30 value to determine the distribution for the following year.  For funds whose values are not readily available, subsection (g) relies on Code section 7520 valuation methods because many funds described in Section 409 are annuities, and one consistent set of valuation principles should apply whether or not the fund is, in fact, an annuity.

Application of Section 104 [T.C.A. § 35-6-104].

Section 104(a) [T.C.A. § 35-6-104(a)] of this Act gives a trustee who is acting under the prudent investor rule the power to adjust from principal to income if, considering the portfolio as a whole and not just receipts from deferred compensation, the trustee determines that an adjustment is necessary. See Example (5) in the Comment following Section 104 [T.C.A. § 35-6-104].

35-6-410. Liquidating asset.

  1. In this section, “liquidating asset” means an asset whose value will diminish or terminate because the asset is expected to produce receipts for a period of limited duration. Liquidating asset includes a leasehold, patent, copyright, royalty right, and right to receive payments during a period of more than one (1) year under an arrangement that does not provide for the payment of interest on the unpaid balance. Liquidating asset does not include a payment subject to § 35-6-409, resources subject to § 35-6-411, timber subject to § 35-6-412, an activity subject to § 35-6-414, an asset subject to § 35-6-415, or any asset for which the trustee establishes a reserve for depreciation under § 35-6-503.
  2. A trustee shall allocate to income ten percent (10%) of the receipts from a liquidating asset and the balance to principal.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Acts.

Section 11 of the 1962 Act allocates receipts from “property subject to depletion” to income in an amount “not in excess of 5%” of the asset's inventory value. The 1931 Act has a similar 5% rule that applies when the trustee is under a duty to change the form of the investment. The 5% rule imposes on a trust the obligation to pay a fixed annuity to the income beneficiary until the asset is exhausted. Under both the 1931 and 1962 Acts the balance of each year's receipts is added to principal. A fixed payment can produce unfair results. The remainder beneficiary receives all of the receipts from unexpected growth in the asset, e.g., if royalties on a patent or copyright increase significantly. Conversely, if the receipts diminish more rapidly than expected, most of the amount received by the trust will be allocated to income and little to principal. Moreover, if the annual payments remain the same for the life of the asset, the amount allocated to principal will usually be less than the original inventory value. For these reasons, Section 410 [§ 35-6-410] abandons the annuity approach under the 5% rule.

Lottery payments.

The reference in subsection (a) to rights to receive payments under an arrangement that does not provide for the payment of interest includes state lottery prizes and similar fixed amounts payable over time that are not deferred compensation arrangements covered by Section 409 [§ 35-6-409].

35-6-411. Minerals, water, and other natural resources.

  1. To the extent that a trustee accounts for receipts from an interest in minerals or other natural resources pursuant to this section, the trustee shall allocate them as follows:
    1. If received as nominal delay rental or nominal annual rent on a lease, a receipt must be allocated to income;
    2. If received from a production payment, a receipt must be allocated to income if and to the extent that the agreement creating the production payment provides a factor for interest or its equivalent. The balance must be allocated to principal;
    3. If an amount received as a royalty, shut-in-well payment, take-or-pay payment, bonus, or delay rental is more than nominal, ninety percent (90%) must be allocated to principal and the balance to income; and
    4. If an amount is received from a working interest or any other interest not provided for in subdivision (1), (2), or (3), ninety percent (90%) of the net amount received must be allocated to principal and the balance to income.
  2. An amount received on account of an interest in water that is renewable must be allocated to income. If the water is not renewable, ninety percent (90%) of the amount must be allocated to principal and the balance to income.
  3. This chapter applies whether or not a decedent or donor was extracting minerals, water, or other natural resources before the interest became subject to the trust.
  4. If a trust owns an interest in minerals, water, or other natural resources on June 30, 1999, the trustee may allocate receipts from the interest as provided in this chapter or in the manner used by the trustee before July 1, 1999. If the trust acquires an interest in minerals, water, or other natural resources on or after July 1, 1999, the trustee shall allocate receipts from the interest as provided in this chapter.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Acts.

The 1962 Act allocates to principal as a depletion allowance, 27-½% of the gross receipts, but not more than 50% of the net receipts after paying expenses. The Internal Revenue Code no longer provides for a 27-½% depletion allowance, although the major oil-producing States have retained the 27-½% provision in their principal and income acts (Texas amended its Act in 1993, but did not change the depletion provision). Section 9 of the 1931 Act allocates all of the net proceeds received as consideration for the “permanent severance of natural resources from the lands” to principal.

Section 411 [§ 35-6-411] allocates 90% of the net receipts to principal and 10% to income. A depletion provision that is tied to past or present Code provisions is undesirable because it causes a large portion of the oil and gas receipts to be paid out as income. As wells are depleted, the amount received by the income beneficiary falls drastically. Allocating a larger portion of the receipts to principal enables the trustee to acquire other income producing assets that will continue to produce income when the mineral reserves are exhausted.

Application of Sections 403 and 408 [§§ 35-6-403 and 35-6-408].

This section applies to the extent that the trustee does not account separately for receipts from minerals and other natural resources under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403] or allocate all of the receipts to principal under Section 408 [§ 35-6-408].

Open mine doctrine.

The purpose of Section 411(c) [§ 35-6-411(c)] is to abolish the “open mine doctrine” as it may apply to the rights of an income beneficiary and a remainder beneficiary in receipts from the production of minerals from land owned or leased by a trust. Instead, such receipts are to be allocated to or between principal and income in accordance with the provisions of this Act. For a discussion of the open mine doctrine, see generally 3A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 239.3 (4th ed. 1988), and Nutter v. Stockton, 626 P.2d 861 (Okla. 1981).

Effective date provision.

Section 9(b) of the 1962 Act provides that the natural resources provision does not apply to property interests held by the trust on the effective date of the Act, which reflects concerns about the constitutionality of applying a retroactive administrative provision to interests in real estate, based on the opinion in the Oklahoma case of Franklin v. Margay Oil Corporation, 153 P.2d 486, 501 (Okla. 1944). Section 411(d) [§ 35-6-411(d)] permits a trustee to use either the method provided for in this Act or the method used before the Act takes effect. Lawyers in jurisdictions other than Oklahoma may conclude that retroactivity is not a problem as to property situated in their States, and this provision permits trustees to decide, based on advice from counsel in States whose law may be different from that of Oklahoma, whether they may apply this provision retroactively if they conclude that to do so is in the best interests of the beneficiaries.

If the property is in a State other than the State where the trust is administered, the trustee must be aware that the law of the property's situs may control this question. The outcome turns on a variety of questions: whether the terms of the trust specify that the law of a State other than the situs of the property shall govern the administration of the trust, and whether the courts will follow the terms of the trust; whether the trust's asset is the land itself or a leasehold interest in the land (as it frequently is with oil and gas property); whether a leasehold interest or its proceeds should be classified as real property or personal property, and if as personal property, whether applicable state law treats it as a movable or an immovable for conflict of laws purposes. See 5A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts §§ 648, at 531, 533-534; § 657, at 600 (4th ed. 1989).

35-6-412. Timber.

  1. To the extent that a trustee accounts for receipts from the sale of timber and related products pursuant to this section, the trustee shall allocate the net receipts to:
    1. Income to the extent that the amount of timber removed from the land does not exceed the rate of growth of the timber during the accounting periods in which a beneficiary has a mandatory income interest;
    2. Principal to the extent that the amount of timber removed from the land exceeds the rate of growth of the timber or the net receipts are from the sale of standing timber;
    3. Between income and principal if the net receipts are from the lease of timberland or from a contract to cut timber from land owned by a trust, by determining the amount of timber removed from the land under the lease or contract and applying the rules in subdivisions (1) and (2); or
    4. Principal to the extent that advance payments, bonuses, and other payments are not allocated pursuant to subdivision (1), (2), or (3).
  2. In determining net receipts to be allocated pursuant to subsection (a), a trustee shall deduct and transfer to principal a reasonable amount for depletion.
  3. This chapter applies whether or not a decedent or transferor was harvesting timber from the property before it became subject to the trust.
  4. If a trust owns an interest in timberland on June 30, 1999, the trustee may allocate net receipts from the sale of timber and related products as provided in this chapter or in the manner used by the trustee before July 1, 1999. If the trust acquires an interest in timberland on or after July 1, 1999, the trustee shall allocate net receipts from the sale of timber and related products as provided in this chapter.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Scope of section.

The rules in Section 412 [§ 35-6-412] are intended to apply to net receipts from the sale of trees and by-products from harvesting and processing trees without regard to the kind of trees that are cut or whether the trees are cut before or after a particular number of years of growth. The rules apply to the sale of trees that are expected to produce lumber for building purposes, trees sold as pulpwood, and Christmas and other ornamental trees. Subsection (a) applies to net receipts from property owned by the trustee and property leased by the trustee. The Act is not intended to prevent a tenant in possession of the property from using wood that he cuts on the property for personal, noncommercial purposes, such as a Christmas tree, firewood, mending old fences or building new fences, or making repairs to structures on the property.

Under subsection (a), the amount of net receipts allocated to income depends upon whether the amount of timber removed is more or less than the rate of growth. The method of determining the amount of timber removed and the rate of growth is up to the trustee, based on methods customarily used for the kind of timber involved.

Application of Sections 403 and 408 [§§ 35-6-403 and 35-6-408].

This section applies to the extent that the trustee does not account separately for net receipts from the sale of timber and related products under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403] or allocate all of the receipts to principal under Section 408 [§ 35-6-408]. The option to account for net receipts separately under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403] takes into consideration the possibility that timber harvesting operations may have been conducted before the timber property became subject to the trust, and that it may make sense to continue using accounting methods previously established for the property. It also permits a trustee to use customary accounting practices for timber operations even if no harvesting occurred on the property before it became subject to the trust.

35-6-413. Property not productive of income.

  1. If a marital deduction is allowed for all or part of a trust whose assets consist substantially of property that does not provide the spouse with sufficient income from or use of the trust assets, and if the amounts that the trustee transfers from principal to income under § 35-6-104 and distributes to the spouse from principal pursuant to the terms of the trust are insufficient to provide the spouse with the beneficial enjoyment required to obtain the marital deduction, the spouse may require the trustee to make property productive of income, convert property within a reasonable time, or exercise the power conferred by § 35-6-104(a). The trustee may decide which action or combination of actions to take.
  2. In cases not governed by subsection (a), proceeds from the sale or other disposition of an asset are principal without regard to the amount of income the asset produces during any accounting period.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Acts' Conflict with Uniform Prudent Investor Act.

Section 2(b) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act provides that “[a] trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole ….” The underproductive property provisions in Section 12 of the 1962 Act and Section 11 of the 1931 Act give the income beneficiary a right to receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of underproductive property as “delayed income.” In each Act the provision applies on an asset by asset basis and not by taking into consideration the trust portfolio as a whole, which conflicts with the basic precept in Section 2(b) of the Prudent Investor Act. Moreover, in determining the amount of delayed income, the prior Acts do not permit a trustee to take into account the extent to which the trustee may have distributed principal to the income beneficiary, under principal invasion provisions in the terms of the trust, to compensate for insufficient income from the unproductive asset. Under Section 104(b)(7) of this Act [§ 35-6-104(b)(7)], a trustee must consider prior distributions of principal to the income beneficiary in deciding whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust conferred by Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)].

Duty to make property productive of income. In order to implement the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, this Act abolishes the right to receive delayed income from the sale proceeds of an asset that produces little or no income, but it does not alter existing state law regarding the income beneficiary's right to compel the trustee to make property productive of income. As the law continues to develop in this area, the duty to make property productive of current income in a particular situation should be determined by taking into consideration the performance of the portfolio as a whole and the extent to which a trustee makes principal distributions to the income beneficiary under the terms of the trust and adjustments between principal and income under Section 104 of this Act [§ 35-6-104].

Trusts for which the value of the right to receive income is important for tax reasons may be affected by Reg. § 1.7520-3(b)(2)(v) Example (1), § 20.7520-3(b)(2)(v) Examples (1) and (2), and § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(v) Examples (1) and (2), which provide that if the income beneficiary does not have the right to compel the trustee to make the property productive, the income interest is considered unproductive and may not be valued actuarially under those sections.

Marital deduction trusts.

Subsection (a) draws on language in Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) and (5) to enable a trust for a surviving spouse to qualify for a marital deduction if applicable state law is unclear about the surviving spouse's right to compel the trustee to make property productive of income. The trustee should also consider the application of Section 104 of this Act [§ 35-6-104] and the provisions of Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 240, at 186, app. § 240, at 252 (1992). Example (6) in the Comment to Section 104 [§ 35-6-104] describes a situation involving the payment from income of carrying charges on unproductive real estate in which Section 104 [§ 35-6-104] may apply.

Once the two conditions have occurred — insufficient beneficial enjoyment from the property and the spouse's demand that the trustee take action under this section — the trustee must act; but instead of the formulaic approach of the 1962 Act, which is triggered only if the trustee sells the property, this Act permits the trustee to decide whether to make the property productive of income, convert it, transfer funds from principal to income, or to take some combination of those actions. The trustee may rely on the power conferred by Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] to adjust from principal to income if the trustee decides that it is not feasible or appropriate to make the property productive of income or to convert the property. Given the purpose of Section 413 [§ 35-6-413], the power under Section 104(a) [§ 35-6-104(a)] would be exercised to transfer principal to income and not to transfer income to principal.

Section 413 [§ 35-6-413] does not apply to a so-called “estate” trust, which will qualify for the marital deduction, even though the income may be accumulated for a term of years or for the life of the surviving spouse, if the terms of the trust require the principal and undistributed income to be paid to the surviving spouse's estate when the spouse dies. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1)(iii).

35-6-414. Derivatives and options.

  1. In this section, “derivative” means a contract or financial instrument or a combination of contracts and financial instruments which gives a trust the right or obligation to participate in some or all changes in the price of a tangible or intangible asset or group of assets, or changes in a rate, an index of prices or rates, or other market indicator for an asset or a group of assets.
  2. To the extent that a trustee does not account under § 35-6-403 for transactions in derivatives, the trustee shall allocate to principal receipts from and disbursements made in connection with those transactions.
  3. If a trustee grants an option to buy property from the trust, whether or not the trust owns the property when the option is granted, grants an option that permits another person to sell property to the trust, or acquires an option to buy property for the trust or an option to sell an asset owned by the trust, and the trustee or other owner of the asset is required to deliver the asset if the option is exercised, an amount received for granting the option must be allocated to principal. An amount paid to acquire the option must be paid from principal. A gain or loss realized upon the exercise of an option, including an option granted to a settlor of the trust for services rendered, must be allocated to principal.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Scope and application.

It is difficult to predict how frequently and to what extent trustees will invest directly in derivative financial instruments rather than participating indirectly through investment entities that may utilize these instruments in varying degrees. If the trust participates in derivatives indirectly through an entity, an amount received from the entity will be allocated under Section 401 [§ 35-6-401] and not Section 414 [§ 35-6-414]. If a trustee invests directly in derivatives to a significant extent, the expectation is that receipts and disbursements related to derivatives will be accounted for under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403]; if a trustee chooses not to account under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403], Section 414(b) [§ 35-6-414(b)] provides the default rule. Certain types of option transactions in which trustees may engage are dealt with in subsection (c) to distinguish those transactions from ones involving options that are embedded in derivative financial instruments.

Definition of “derivative.”

“Derivative” is a difficult term to define because new derivatives are invented daily as dealers tailor their terms to achieve specific financial objectives for particular clients. Since derivatives are typically contract-based, a derivative can probably be devised for almost any set of objectives if another party can be found who is willing to assume the obligations required to meet those objectives.

The most comprehensive definition of derivative is in the Exposure Draft of a Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Standards titled “Accounting for Derivative and Similar Financial Instruments and for Hedging Activities,” which was released by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) on June 20, 1996 (No. 162-B). The definition in Section 414(a) [§ 35-6-414(a)] is derived in part from the FASB definition. The purpose of the definition in subsection (a) is to implement the substantive rule in subsection (b) that provides for all receipts and disbursements to be allocated to principal to the extent the trustee elects not to account for transactions in derivatives under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403]. As a result, it is much shorter than the FASB definition, which serves much more ambitious objectives.

A derivative is frequently described as including futures, forwards, swaps and options, terms that also require definition, and the definition in this Act avoids these terms. FASB used the same approach, explaining in paragraph 65 of the Exposure Draft:

The definition of derivative financial instrument in this Statement includes those financial instruments generally considered to be derivatives, such as forwards, futures, swaps, options, and similar instruments. The Board considered defining a derivative financial instrument by merely referencing those commonly understood instruments, similar to paragraph 5 of Statement 119, which says that “… a derivative financial instrument is a futures, forward, swap, or option contract, or other financial instrument with similar characteristics.” However, the continued development of financial markets and innovative financial instruments could ultimately render a definition based on examples inadequate and obsolete. The Board, therefore, decided to base the definition of a derivative financial instrument on a description of the common characteristics of those instruments in order to accommodate the accounting for newly developed derivatives. (Footnote omitted.)

Marking to market.

A gain or loss that occurs because the trustee marks securities to market or to another value during an accounting period is not a transaction in a derivative financial instrument that is income or principal under the Act — only cash receipts and disbursements, and the receipt of property in exchange for a principal asset, affect a trust's principal and income accounts.

Receipt of property other than cash.

If a trustee receives property other than cash upon the settlement of a derivatives transaction, that property would be principal under Section 404(2) [§ 35-6-404(2)].

Options.

Options to which subsection (c) applies include an option to purchase real estate owned by the trustee and a put option purchased by a trustee to guard against a drop in value of a large block of marketable stock that must be liquidated to pay estate taxes. Subsection (c) would also apply to a continuing and regular practice of selling call options on securities owned by the trust if the terms of the option require delivery of the securities. It does not apply if the consideration received or given for the option is something other than cash or property, such as cross-options granted in a buy-sell agreement between owners of an entity.

35-6-415. Asset-backed securities.

  1. In this section, “asset-backed security” means an asset whose value is based upon the right it gives the owner to receive distributions from the proceeds of financial assets that provide collateral for the security. Asset-backed securities includes an asset that gives the owner the right to receive from the collateral financial assets only the interest or other current return or only the proceeds other than interest or current return. Asset-backed securities does not include an asset to which § 35-6-401 or § 35-6-409 applies.
  2. If a trust receives a payment from interest or other current return and from other proceeds of the collateral financial assets, the trustee shall allocate to income the portion of the payment which the payer identifies as being from interest or other current return and shall allocate the balance of the payment to principal.
  3. If a trust receives one (1) or more payments in exchange for the trust's entire interest in an asset-backed security in one (1) accounting period, the trustee shall allocate the payments to principal. If a payment is one (1) of a series of payments that will result in the liquidation of the trust's interest in the security over more than one (1) accounting period, the trustee shall allocate ten percent (10%) of the payment to income and the balance to principal.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Scope of section.    Typical asset-backed securities include arrangements in which debt obligations such as real estate mortgages, credit card receivables and auto loans are acquired by an investment trust and interests in the trust are sold to investors. The source for payments to an investor is the money received from principal and interest payments on the underlying debt. An asset-backed security includes an “interest only” or a “principal only” security that permits the investor to receive only the interest payments received from the bonds, mortgages or other assets that are the collateral for the asset-backed security, or only the principal payments made on those collateral assets. An asset-backed security also includes a security that permits the investor to participate in either the capital appreciation of an underlying security or in the interest or dividend return from such a security, such as the “Primes” and “Scores” issued by Americus Trust. An asset-backed security does not include an interest in a corporation, partnership, or an investment trust described in the Comment to Section 402 [§ 35-6-402], whose assets consist significantly or entirely of investment assets. Receipts from an instrument that do not come within the scope of this section or any other section of the Act would be allocated entirely to principal under the rule in Section 103(a)(4) [§ 35-6-103(a)(4)], and the trustee may then consider whether and to what extent to exercise the power to adjust in Section 104 [§ 35-6-104], taking into account the return from the portfolio as whole and other relevant factors.

Part 5
Allocation of Disbursements During Administration of Trust

35-6-501. Disbursements from income.

A trustee shall make the following disbursements from income to the extent that they are not disbursements to which § 35-6-201(2)(B) or (C) applies:

  1. One half (½) of the regular compensation of the trustee and of any person providing investment advisory or custodial services to the trustee;
  2. One half (½) of all expenses for accountings, judicial proceedings, or other matters that involve both the income and remainder interests;
  3. All of the other ordinary expenses incurred in connection with the administration, management, or preservation of trust property and the distribution of income, including interest, ordinary repairs, regularly recurring taxes assessed against principal, and expenses of a proceeding or other matter that concerns primarily the income interest; and
  4. Recurring premiums on insurance covering the loss of a principal asset or the loss of income from or use of the asset.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Trustee fees.

The regular compensation of a trustee or the trustee's agent includes compensation based on a percentage of either principal or income or both.

Insurance premiums.

The reference in paragraph (4) to “recurring” premiums is intended to distinguish premiums paid annually for fire insurance from premiums on title insurance, each of which covers the loss of a principal asset. Title insurance premiums would be a principal disbursement under Section 502(a)(5) [§ 35-6-502(a)(5)].

Regularly recurring taxes.

The reference to “regularly recurring taxes assessed against principal” includes all taxes regularly imposed on real property and tangible and intangible personal property.

35-6-502. Disbursements from principal.

  1. A trustee shall make the following disbursements from principal:
    1. The remaining one half (½) of the disbursements described in § 35-6-501(1) and (2);
    2. All of the trustee's compensation calculated on principal as a fee for acceptance, distribution, or termination, and disbursements made to prepare property for sale;
    3. Payments on the principal of a trust debt;
    4. Expenses of a proceeding that concerns primarily principal, including a proceeding to construe the trust or to protect the trust or its property;
    5. Premiums paid on a policy of insurance not described in § 35-6-501(4) of which the trust is the owner and beneficiary;
    6. Estate, inheritance, and other transfer taxes, including penalties, apportioned to the trust; and
    7. Disbursements related to environmental matters, including reclamation, assessing environmental conditions, remedying and removing environmental contamination, monitoring remedial activities and the release of substances, preventing future releases of substances, collecting amounts from persons liable or potentially liable for the costs of those activities, penalties imposed under environmental laws or regulations and other payments made to comply with those laws or regulations, statutory or common law claims by third parties, and defending claims based on environmental matters.
  2. If a principal asset is encumbered with an obligation that requires income from that asset to be paid directly to the creditor, the trustee shall transfer from principal to income an amount equal to the income paid to the creditor in reduction of the principal balance of the obligation.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Environmental expenses.

All environmental expenses are payable from principal, subject to the power of the trustee to transfer funds to principal from income under Section 504 [§ 35-6-504]. However, the Drafting Committee decided that it was not necessary to broaden this provision to cover other expenditures made under compulsion of governmental authority. See generally the annotation at 43 A.L.R.4th 1012 (Duty as Between Life Tenant and Remainderman with Respect to Cost of Improvements or Repairs Made Under Compulsion of Governmental Authority).

Environmental expenses paid by a trust are to be paid from principal under Section 502(a)(7) [§ 35-6-502(a)(7)] on the assumption that they will usually be extraordinary in nature. Environmental expenses might be paid from income if the trustee is carrying on a business that uses or sells toxic substances, in which case environmental cleanup costs would be a normal cost of doing business and would be accounted for under Section 403 [§ 35-6-403]. In accounting under that Section, environmental costs will be a factor in determining how much of the net receipts from the business is trust income. Paying all other environmental expenses from principal is consistent with this Act's approach regarding receipts — when a receipt is not clearly a current return on a principal asset, it should be added to principal because over time both the income and remainder beneficiaries benefit from this treatment. Here, allocating payments required by environmental laws to principal imposes the detriment of those payments over time on both the income and remainder beneficiaries.

Under Sections 504(a) and 504(b)(5) [§ 35-6-504(a), (b)(5)], a trustee who makes or expects to make a principal disbursement for an environmental expense described in Section 502(a)(7) [§ 35-6-502(a)(7)] is authorized to transfer an appropriate amount from income to principal to reimburse principal for disbursements made or to provide a reserve for future principal disbursements.

The first part of Section 502(a)(7) [§ 35-6-502(a)(7)] is based upon the definition of an “environmental remediation trust” in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(e) (as amended in 1996). This is not because the Act applies to an environmental remediation trust, but because the definition is a useful and thoroughly vetted description of the kinds of expenses that a trustee owning contaminated property might incur. Expenses incurred to comply with environmental laws include the cost of environmental consultants, administrative proceedings and burdens of every kind imposed as the result of an administrative or judicial proceeding, even though the burden is not formally characterized as a penalty.

Title proceedings.

Disbursements that are made to protect a trust's property, referred to in Section 502(a)(4) [§ 35-6-502(a)(4)], include an “action to assure title” that is mentioned in Section 13(c)(2) of the 1962 Act.

Insurance premiums.

Insurance premiums referred to in Section 502(a)(5) [§ 35-6-502(a)(5)] include title insurance premiums. They also include premiums on life insurance policies owned by the trust, which represent the trust's periodic investment in the insurance policy. There is no provision in the 1962 Act for life insurance premiums.

Taxes.

Generation-skipping transfer taxes are payable from principal under subsection (a)(6).

35-6-503. Transfers from income to principal for depreciation.

  1. In this section, “depreciation” means a reduction in value due to wear, tear, decay, corrosion, or gradual obsolescence of a fixed asset having a useful life of more than one (1) year.
  2. A trustee may transfer to principal a reasonable amount of the net cash receipts from a principal asset that is subject to depreciation, but may not transfer any amount for depreciation:
    1. Of that portion of real property used or available for use by a beneficiary as a residence or of tangible personal property held or made available for the personal use or enjoyment of a beneficiary;
    2. During the administration of a decedent's estate; or
    3. Under this section if the trustee is accounting under § 35-6-403 for the business or activity in which the asset is used.
  3. An amount transferred to principal need not be held as a separate fund.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Acts.    The 1931 Act has no provision for depreciation. Section 13(a)(2) of the 1962 Act provides that a charge shall be made against income for “… a reasonable allowance for depreciation on property subject to depreciation under generally accepted accounting principles ….” That provision has been resisted by many trustees, who do not provide for any depreciation for a variety of reasons. One reason relied upon is that a charge for depreciation is not needed to protect the remainder beneficiaries if the value of the land is increasing; another is that generally accepted accounting principles may not require depreciation to be taken if the property is not part of a business. The Drafting Committee concluded that the decision to provide for depreciation should be discretionary with the trustee. The power to transfer funds from income to principal that is granted by this section is a discretionary power of administration referred to in Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)], and in exercising the power a trustee must comply with Section 103(b) [§ 35-6-103(b)].

One purpose served by transferring cash from income to principal for depreciation is to provide funds to pay the principal of an indebtedness secured by the depreciable property. Section 504(b)(4) [§ 35-6-504(b)(4)] permits the trustee to transfer additional cash from income to principal for this purpose to the extent that the amount transferred from income to principal for depreciation is less than the amount of the principal payments.

35-6-504. Transfers from income to reimburse principal.

  1. If a trustee makes or expects to make a principal disbursement described in this section, the trustee may transfer an appropriate amount from income to principal in one (1) or more accounting periods to reimburse principal or to provide a reserve for future principal disbursements.
  2. Principal disbursements to which subsection (a) applies include the following, but only to the extent that the trustee has not been and does not expect to be reimbursed by a third party:
    1. An amount chargeable to income but paid from principal because it is unusually large, including extraordinary repairs;
    2. A capital improvement to a principal asset, whether in the form of changes to an existing asset or the construction of a new asset, including special assessments;
    3. Disbursements made to prepare property for rental, including tenant allowances, leasehold improvements, and broker's commissions;
    4. Periodic payments on an obligation secured by a principal asset to the extent that the amount transferred from income to principal for depreciation is less than the periodic payments; and
    5. Disbursements described in § 35-6-502(a)(7).
  3. If the asset whose ownership gives rise to the disbursements becomes subject to a successive income interest after an income interest ends, a trustee may continue to transfer amounts from income to principal as provided in subsection (a).

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prior Acts.   The sources of Section 504 [§ 35-6-504] are Section 13(b) of the 1962 Act, which permits a trustee to “regularize distributions,” if charges against income are unusually large, by using “reserves or other reasonable means” to withhold sums from income distributions; Section 13(c)(3) of the 1962 Act, which authorizes a trustee to establish an allowance for depreciation out of income if principal is used for extraordinary repairs, capital improvements and special assessments; and Section 12(3) of the 1931 Act, which permits the trustee to spread income expenses of unusual amount “throughout a series of years.” Section 504 [§ 35-6-504] contains a more detailed enumeration of the circumstances in which this authority may be used, and includes in subsection (b)(4) the express authority to use income to make principal payments on a mortgage if the depreciation charge against income is less than the principal payments on the mortgage.

35-6-505. Income taxes.

  1. A tax required to be paid by a trustee based on receipts allocated to income must be paid from income.
  2. A tax required to be paid by a trustee based on receipts allocated to principal must be paid from principal, even if the tax is called an income tax by the taxing authority.
  3. A tax required to be paid by a trustee on the trust's share of an entity's taxable income must be paid:
    1. From income to the extent that receipts from the entity are allocated only to income;
    2. From principal to the extent that receipts from the entity are allocated only to principal;
    3. Proportionately from principal and income to the extent that receipts from the entity are allocated to both income and principal; and
    4. From principal to the extent that the tax exceeds the total receipts from the entity.
  4. After applying subsections (a)-(c), the trustee shall adjust income or principal receipts to the extent that the trust's taxes are reduced because the trust receives a deduction for payments made to a beneficiary.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1; 2010, ch. 725, § 2.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Taxes on Undistributed Entity Taxable Income.    When a trust owns an interest in a pass-through entity, such as a partnership or S corporation, it must report its share of the entity’s taxable income regardless of how much the entity distributes to the trust. Whether the entity distributes more or less than the trust’s tax on its share of the entity’s taxable income, the trust must pay the taxes and allocate them between income and principal.

Subsection (c) requires the trust to pay the taxes on its share of an entity’s taxable income from income or principal receipts to the extent that receipts from the entity are allocable to each. This assures the trust a source of cash to pay some or all of the taxes on its share of the entity’s taxable income. Subsection (d) recognizes that, except in the case of an Electing Small Business Trust (ESBT), a trust normally receives a deduction for amounts distributed to a beneficiary. Accordingly, subsection (d) requires the trust to increase receipts payable to a beneficiary as determined under subsection (c) to the extent the trust’s taxes are reduced by distributing those receipts to the beneficiary.

Because the trust’s taxes and amounts distributed to a beneficiary are interrelated, the trust may be required to apply a formula to determine the correct amount payable to a beneficiary.  This formula should take into account that each time a distribution is made to a beneficiary, the trust taxes are reduced and amounts distributable to a beneficiary are increased.  The formula assures that after deducting distributions to a beneficiary, the trust has enough to satisfy its taxes on its share of the entity’s taxable income as reduced by distributions to beneficiaries.

Example (1)  –  Trust T receives a Schedule K-1 from Partnership P reflecting taxable income of $1 million. Partnership P distributes $100,000 to T, which allocates the receipts to income. Both Trust T and income Beneficiary B are in the 35 percent tax bracket. Trust T’s tax on $1 million of taxable income if $350,000. Under Subsection (c) T’s tax must be paid from income receipts because receipts from the entity are allocated only to income. Therefore, T must apply the entire $100,000 of income receipts to pay its tax.  In this case, Beneficiary B receives nothing.

Example (2)  –  Trust T receives a Schedule K-1 from Partnership P reflecting taxable income of $1 million. Partnership P distributes $500,000 to T, which allocates the receipts to income. Both Trust T and income Beneficiary B are in the 35 percent tax bracket. Trust T’s tax on $1 million of taxable income is $350,000. Under Subsection (c), T’s tax must be paid from income receipts because receipts from P are allocated only to income. Therefore, T uses $350,000 of the $500,000 to pay its taxes and distributes the remaining $150,000 to B. The $150,000 payment to B reduces T’s taxes by $52,500, which it must pay to B. But the $52,500 further reduces T’s taxes by $18,375, which it also must pay to B. In fact, each time T makes a distribution to B, its taxes are further reduced, causing another payment to be due B.

Alternatively, T can apply the following algebraic formula to determine the amount payable to B:

D = (C-R*K)/(1-R)

D = Distribution to income beneficiary

C = Cash paid by the entity to the trust

R = tax rate on income

K = entity’s K-1 taxable income

Applying the formula to Example (2) above, Trust T must pay $230,769 to B so that after deducting the payment, T has exactly enough to pay its tax on the remaining taxable income from P.

Taxable Income per K-1  $1,000,000

[1]

Payment to beneficiary  $230,769

Trust Taxable Income  $769,231

35 percent tax  $269,231

Partnership Distribution  $ 500,000

Fiduciary’s Tax Liability  (269,231)

Payable to the Beneficiary  $ 230,769

In addition, B will report $230,769 on his or her own personal income tax return, paying taxes of $80,769. Because Trust T withheld $269,231 to pay its taxes and B paid $80,769 taxes of its own, B bore the entire $350,000 tax burden on the $1 million of entity taxable income, including the $500,000 that the entity retained that presumably increased the value of the trust’s investment entity.

If a trustee determines that it is appropriate to do so, it should consider exercising the discretion granted in T.C.A. Section 35-6-506 to adjust between income and principal. Alternatively, the trustee may exercise the power to adjust under T.C.A. Section 35-6-104 to the extent it is available and appropriate under the circumstances, including whether a future distribution from the entity that would be allocated to principal should be reallocated to income because the income beneficiary already bore the burden of taxes on the reinvested income. In exercising the power, the trust should consider the impact that future distributions will have on any current adjustments.

35-6-506. Adjustments between principal and income because of taxes.

  1. A fiduciary may make adjustments between principal and income to offset the shifting of economic interests or tax benefits between income beneficiaries and remainder beneficiaries which arise from:
    1. Elections and decisions, other than those described in subsection (b), that the fiduciary makes from time to time regarding tax matters;
    2. An income tax or any other tax that is imposed upon the fiduciary or a beneficiary as a result of a transaction involving or a distribution from the estate or trust; or
    3. The ownership by an estate or trust of an interest in an entity whose taxable income, whether or not distributed, is includable in the taxable income of the estate, trust, or a beneficiary.
  2. If the amount of an estate tax marital deduction or charitable contribution deduction is reduced because a fiduciary deducts an amount paid from principal for income tax purposes instead of deducting it for estate tax purposes, and as a result estate taxes paid from principal are increased and income taxes paid by an estate, trust, or beneficiary are decreased, each estate, trust, or beneficiary that benefits from the decrease in income tax shall reimburse the principal from which the increase in estate tax is paid. The total reimbursement must equal the increase in the estate tax to the extent that the principal used to pay the increase would have qualified for a marital deduction or charitable contribution deduction but for the payment. The proportionate share of the reimbursement for each estate, trust, or beneficiary whose income taxes are reduced must be the same as its proportionate share of the total decrease in income tax. An estate or trust shall reimburse principal from income.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Discretionary adjustments.

Section 506(a) [§ 35-6-506(a)] permits the fiduciary to make adjustments between income and principal because of tax law provisions. It would permit discretionary adjustments in situations like these: (1) A fiduciary elects to deduct administration expenses that are paid from principal on an income tax return instead of on the estate tax return; (2) a distribution of a principal asset to a trust or other beneficiary causes the taxable income of an estate or trust to be carried out to the distributee and relieves the persons who receive the income of any obligation to pay income tax on the income; or (3) a trustee realizes a capital gain on the sale of a principal asset and pays a large state income tax on the gain, but under applicable federal income tax rules the trustee may not deduct the state income tax payment from the capital gain in calculating the trust's federal capital gain tax, and the income beneficiary receives the benefit of the deduction for state income tax paid on the capital gain. See generally Joel C. Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment in Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1981).

Section 506(a)(3) [§ 35-6-506(a)(3)] applies to a qualified Subchapter S trust (QSST) whose income beneficiary is required to include a pro rata share of the S corporation's taxable income in his return. If the QSST does not receive a cash distribution from the corporation that is large enough to cover the income beneficiary's tax liability, the trustee may distribute additional cash from principal to the income beneficiary. In this case the retention of cash by the corporation benefits the trust principal. This situation could occur if the corporation's taxable income includes capital gain from the sale of a business asset and the sale proceeds are reinvested in the business instead of being distributed to shareholders.

Mandatory adjustment.

Subsection (b) provides for a mandatory adjustment from income to principal to the extent needed to preserve an estate tax marital deduction or charitable contributions deduction. It is derived from New York's EPTL § 11-1.2 (A), which requires principal to be reimbursed by those who benefit when a fiduciary elects to deduct administration expenses on an income tax return instead of the estate tax return. Unlike the New York provision, subsection (b) limits a mandatory reimbursement to cases in which a marital deduction or a charitable contributions deduction is reduced by the payment of additional estate taxes because of the fiduciary's income tax election. It is intended to preserve the result reached in Estate of Britenstool v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 711 (1966), in which the Tax Court held that a reimbursement required by the predecessor of EPTL § 11-1.2(A) resulted in the estate receiving the same charitable contributions deduction it would have received if the administration expenses had been deducted for estate tax purposes instead of for income tax purposes. Because a fiduciary will elect to deduct administration expenses for income tax purposes only when the income tax reduction exceeds the estate tax reduction, the effect of this adjustment is that the principal is placed in the same position it would have occupied if the fiduciary had deducted the expenses for estate tax purposes, but the income beneficiaries receive an additional benefit. For example, if the income tax benefit from the deduction is $30,000 and the estate tax benefit would have been $20,000, principal will be reimbursed $20,000 and the net benefit to the income beneficiaries will be $10,000.

Irrevocable grantor trusts.

Under Sections 671-679 of the Internal Revenue Code [26 U.S.C. §§ 671-679] (the “grantor trust” provisions), a person who creates an irrevocable trust for the benefit of another person may be subject to tax on the trust's income or capital gains, or both, even though the settlor is not entitled to receive any income or principal from the trust. Because this is now a well-known tax result, many trusts have been created to produce this result, but there are also trusts that are unintentionally subject to this rule. The Act does not require or authorize a trustee to distribute funds from the trust to the settlor in these cases because it is difficult to establish a rule that applies only to trusts where this tax result is unintended and does not apply to trusts where the tax result is intended. Settlors who intend this tax result rarely state it as an objective in the terms of the trust, but instead rely on the operation of the tax law to produce the desired result. As a result it may not be possible to determine from the terms of the trust if the result was intentional or unintentional. If the drafter of such a trust wants the trustee to have the authority to distribute principal or income to the settlor to reimburse the settlor for taxes paid on the trust's income or capital gains, such a provision should be placed in the terms of the trust. In some situations the Internal Revenue Service may require that such a provision be placed in the terms of the trust as a condition to issuing a private letter ruling.

Part 6
Miscellaneous Provisions

35-6-601. Application and construction of chapter 6.

Section 35-15-1101 controls all application and construction of chapter 6.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1; 2013, ch. 390, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act. (c) If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before such effective date, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

35-6-602. Application of act to existing trusts and estates.

This act applies to every trust or decedent's estate existing on or after July 1, 2000, except as otherwise expressly provided in the will or terms of the trust or in this act.

Acts 2000, ch. 829, § 1.

Chapter 7
Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act

35-7-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.”

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-201.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

Cross-References. Gift tax, title 67, ch. 8, part 1.

Persons 18 years of age or older have the same rights, duties and responsibilities as a person of 21 years of age or older, § 1-3-113.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 1026.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 4-614.

Tennessee Jurisprudence.  18 Tenn. Juris., Minors, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Confused by tax reforms? Follow these 10 key rules for better estate planning in Tennessee (Dan W. Holbrook), 37 No. 8 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2001).

The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act: A Patent Ambiguity (Margaret M. Mahoney), 34 Vand. L. Rev. 495 (1981).

Where There's a Will: The 95% family-owned test for family limited partnerships (Dan Holbrook), 37 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 31 (2001).

Collateral References.

Construction and Effect of Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. 50 A.L.R.3d 528.

35-7-102. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Adult” means an individual who has attained twenty-one (21) years of age;
  2. “Benefit plan” means an employer's plan for the benefit of an employee or partner;
  3. “Broker” means a person lawfully engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities or commodities for the person's own account or for the account of others;
  4. “Court” means the chancery, probate and juvenile courts and other courts having probate jurisdiction, which shall have concurrent jurisdiction under this chapter;
  5. “Custodial property” means:
    1. Any interest in property transferred to a custodian under this chapter; and
    2. The income from and proceeds of that interest in property;
  6. “Custodian” means a person so designated, including a person designated as a joint custodian pursuant to § 35-7-111, or a successor or substitute custodian designated according to this chapter;
  7. “Financial institution” means a bank, trust company, savings institution, or credit union, chartered and supervised under state or federal law;
  8. “Guardian” means a person appointed by or qualified in a court to act as a general, limited, or temporary guardian or conservator of a minor's property or person or a person legally authorized to perform substantially the same functions;
  9. “Legal representative” means an individual's personal representative, guardian or conservator;
  10. “Member of the minor's family” means the minor's parent, stepparent, spouse, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, or aunt, whether of the whole or half blood or by adoption;
  11. “Minor” means an individual who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age, although the minor may already be of legal age;
  12. “Person” means an individual, corporation, organization, or other legal entity;
  13. “Personal representative” means an executor, administrator, successor personal representative, or special administrator of a decedent's estate or a person legally authorized to perform substantially the same functions;
  14. “Qualified minor’s trust” means any trust, including a trust created by the custodian, that satisfies the requirements of federal Internal Revenue Code § 2503(c) (26 U.S.C. § 2503(c)), and the regulations implementing that section;
  15. “State” includes any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession subject to the legislative authority of the United States;
  16. “Transfer” means a transaction that creates custodial property under this chapter;
  17. “Transferor” means a person who makes a transfer under this chapter; and
  18. “Trust company” means a financial institution, corporation, or other legal entity, authorized to exercise general trust powers.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; 1996, ch. 593, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-202; Acts 2007, ch. 8, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-103. Scope and jurisdiction.

  1. This chapter applies to a transfer made on or after October 1, 1992, that refers to this chapter in the designation by which the transfer is made, if at the time of the transfer, the transferor, the minor, or the custodian is a resident of this state or the custodial property is located in this state. The custodianship so created remains subject to this chapter despite a subsequent change in residence of a transferor, the minor, or the custodian, or the removal of custodial property from this state.
  2. A person designated as custodian under this chapter is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state with respect to any matter relating to the custodianship.
  3. A transfer that purports to be made and that is valid under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, or substantially similar act, of another state is governed by the law of the designated state and may be executed and is enforceable in this state, if at the time of the transfer, the transferor, the minor, or the custodian is a resident of the designated state or the custodial property is located in the designated state.
  4. This chapter shall not be construed as an exclusive method for making gifts or other transfers to minors.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-203.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-104. Nomination of custodian.

  1. A person having the right to designate the recipient of property transferable upon the occurrence of a future event may revocably nominate a custodian to receive the property for a minor beneficiary upon the occurrence of the event by naming the custodian followed in substance by the words “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.” The nomination may name one (1) or more persons as substitute custodians to whom the property must be transferred, in the order named, if the first nominated custodian dies before the transfer or is unable, declines, or is ineligible to serve. The nomination may be made in a will, a trust, a deed, an instrument exercising a power of appointment, or in a writing designating a beneficiary of contractual rights which is registered with or delivered to the payor, issuer, or other obligor of the contractual rights.
  2. A custodian nominated under this section must be a person to whom a transfer of property of that kind may be made under § 35-7-110(a).
  3. The nomination of a custodian under this section does not create custodial property until the nominating instrument becomes irrevocable or a transfer to the nominated custodian is completed. Unless the nomination of a custodian has been revoked, upon the occurrence of the future event, the custodianship becomes effective and the custodian shall enforce a transfer of the custodial property pursuant to § 35-7-110.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-204.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-105. Transfer by gift or exercise of power of appointment.

A person may make a transfer by irrevocable gift to, or the irrevocable exercise of a power of appointment in favor of, a custodian for the benefit of a minor pursuant to § 35-7-110.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-205.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-106. Transfer authorized by will or trust.

  1. A personal representative or trustee may make an irrevocable transfer pursuant to § 35-7-110, to a custodian for the benefit of a minor as authorized in the governing will or trust or by a judicial order.
  2. If the testator or settlor has nominated a custodian under § 35-7-104, to receive the custodial property, the transfer must be made to that person.
  3. If the testator or settlor has not nominated a custodian or all persons so nominated as custodian die before the transfer or are unable, decline, or are ineligible to serve, the personal representative or the trustee, as the case may be, shall designate the custodian from among those eligible to serve as custodian for property of that kind under § 35-7-110(a).

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-206.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-107. Other transfer by fiduciary.

  1. Subject to subsection (c), a personal representative or trustee may make an irrevocable transfer to another adult or trust company as custodian for the benefit of a minor pursuant to § 35-7-110, in the absence of a will or under a will or trust that does not contain an authorization to do so.
  2. Subject to subsection (c), a guardian may make an irrevocable transfer to another adult or trust company as custodian for the benefit of the minor pursuant to § 35-7-110.
  3. A transfer under subsection (a) or (b) may be made only if:
    1. The personal representative, trustee, or guardian considers the transfer to be in the best interest of the minor;
    2. The transfer is not prohibited by or inconsistent with provisions of the applicable will, trust agreement, or other governing instrument; and
    3. The transfer is authorized by the court if it exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) in value.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-207.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-108. Transfer by obligor.

  1. Subject to subsections (b) and (c), a person not subject to § 35-7-106 or § 35-7-107, who holds property of, or owes a liquidated debt or judgment to, a minor not having a guardian may make an irrevocable transfer to a custodian for the benefit of the minor pursuant to § 35-7-110.
  2. If a person having the right to do so under § 35-7-104 has nominated a custodian under this chapter to receive the custodial property, the transfer must be made to that person.
  3. If no custodian has been nominated, or all persons so nominated as custodian die before the transfer or are unable, decline, or are ineligible to serve, a transfer under this section may be made to an adult member of the minor's family or to a trust company unless the property exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) in value. If the transfer exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) in value, it may be made only if it is authorized by the court.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-208.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-109. Receipt for custodial property.

A written acknowledgment of delivery by a custodian constitutes a sufficient receipt and discharge for custodial property transferred to the custodian pursuant to this chapter.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-209.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-110. Manner of creating custodial property and effecting transfer — Designation of initial custodian — Control.

  1. Custodial property is created and a transfer is made whenever:
    1. An uncertificated security or a certificated security in registered form is either:
      1. Registered in the name of the transferor, an adult other than the transferor, or a trust company, followed in substance by the words “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”; or
      2. Delivered if in certificated form, or any document necessary for the transfer of an uncertificated security is delivered, together with any necessary endorsement to an adult other than the transferor or to a trust company as custodian, accompanied by an instrument in substantially the form set forth in subsection (b);
    2. Money is paid or delivered, or a security held in the name of a broker, financial institution, or its nominee is transferred, to a broker or financial institution for credit to an account in the name of the transferor, an adult other than the transferor, or a trust company, followed in substance by the words: “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”;
    3. The ownership of a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract is either:
      1. Registered with the issuer in the name of the transferor, an adult other than the transferor, or a trust company, followed in substance by the words: “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”; or
      2. Assigned in a writing delivered to an adult other than the transferor or to a trust company whose name in the assignment is followed in substance by the words: “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”;
    4. An irrevocable exercise of a power of appointment or an irrevocable present right to future payment under a contract is the subject of a written notification delivered to the payor, issuer, or other obligor that the right is transferred to the transferor, an adult other than the transferor, or a trust company, whose name in the notification is followed in substance by the words: “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”;
    5. A deed for an interest in real property is recorded in the name of the transferor, an adult other than the transferor, or a trust company, followed in substance by the words: “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”;
    6. A certificate of title issued by a department or agency of a state or of the United States which evidences title to tangible personal property is either:
      1. Issued in the name of the transferor, an adult other than the transferor, or a trust company followed in substance by the words “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”; or
      2. Delivered to an adult other than the transferor or to a trust company, endorsed to that person followed in substance by the words “as custodian for  (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”; or
    7. An interest in any property not described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(6) is transferred to an adult other than the transferor or to a trust company by a written instrument in substantially the form set forth in subsection (b).
  2. An instrument in the following form satisfies the requirements of subdivisions (a)(1)(B) and (7):

    TRANSFER UNDER THE TENNESSEE UNIFORM TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT I,   (name of transferor or name and representative capacity if a fiduciary) hereby transfer to  (name of custodian) , as custodian for  (name of minor) , under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, the following:  (insert a description of the custodial property sufficient to identify it). Dated  (Signature) (name of custodian)  acknowledges receipt of the property described above as custodian for the minor named above under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Dated  (Signature of Custodian)

    Click to view form.

  3. As an alternative to the form of transfer set out in subdivisions (a)(1)-(6), custodial property may be registered, held, recorded or otherwise created in the name of the minor, followed in substance by the words “minor, by  (name of custodian or custodians) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act”.
  4. A transferor shall place the custodian in control of the custodial property as soon as practicable.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; 1996, ch. 593, § 2; T.C.A. § 35-7-210.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-111. Transfers — Single and joint custodians.

A transfer may be made only for one (1) minor, and up to two (2) persons may be the custodians. All custodial property held under this chapter by the same custodian or custodians for the benefit of the same minor constitutes a single custodianship. If more than one (1) person is appointed a custodian, such persons shall act as joint custodians under this chapter and, unless specified in any document creating the custodial property, each joint custodian shall have full power and authority to act alone with respect to the custodial property. If either joint custodian resigns, dies, becomes incapacitated or is removed, then the remaining one (1) of them may serve as sole custodian without the necessity of appointing a successor joint custodian.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; 1996, ch. 593, § 3; T.C.A. § 35-7-211.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-112. Validity and effect of transfer.

  1. The validity of a transfer made in a manner prescribed in this chapter is not affected by:
    1. Failure of the transferor to comply with sections hereof concerning possession and control;
    2. Designation of an ineligible custodian, except designation of the transferor in the case of property for which the transferor is ineligible to serve as custodian under this chapter; or
    3. Death or incapacity of a person nominated or designated as custodian or the written disclaimer of the office by that person.
  2. A transfer made pursuant to this chapter is irrevocable, and the custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the minor, but the custodian has all the rights, powers, duties, and authority provided in this chapter, and neither the minor nor the minor's legal representative has any right, power, duty, or authority with respect to the custodial property except as provided in this chapter.
  3. By making a transfer, the transferor incorporates in the disposition all the provisions of this chapter and grants to the custodian, and to any third person dealing with a person designated as custodian, the respective powers, rights, and immunities provided in this chapter.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-212.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-113. Care of custodial property.

  1. A custodian shall:
    1. Take control of custodial property;
    2. Register or record title to custodial property, except tangible personal property of a type for which registration or recording of title is not required under Tennessee law; and
    3. Collect, hold, manage, invest, and reinvest custodial property.
  2. In dealing with custodial property, a custodian shall observe the standard of care that would be observed by a prudent person dealing with property of another and is not limited by any other statute restricting investments by fiduciaries. If a custodian has a special skill or expertise or is named custodian on the basis of representations of a special skill or expertise, the custodian shall use that skill or expertise. However, a custodian, in the custodian's discretion and without liability to the minor or the minor's estate, may retain any custodial property received from a transferor.
  3. A custodian may invest in or pay premiums on life insurance or endowment policies on:
    1. The life of the minor only if the minor or the minor's estate is the sole beneficiary; or
    2. The life of another person in whom the minor has an insurable interest;

      only to the extent that the minor, the minor's estate, or the custodian in the capacity of custodian, is the irrevocable beneficiary.

  4. A custodian at all times shall keep custodial property separate and distinct from all other property in a manner sufficient to identify it clearly as custodial property of the minor. Custodial property consisting of an undivided interest is so identified if the minor's interest is held as a tenant in common and is fixed. Custodial property subject to recordation is so identified if it is recorded, and custodial property subject to registration is so identified if it is either registered or held in an account designated in the name of the custodian, followed in substance by the words “as a custodian for (name of minor) under the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.”
  5. A custodian shall keep records of all transactions with respect to custodial property, including information necessary for the preparation of the minor's tax returns, and shall make them available for inspection at reasonable intervals by a parent or legal representative of the minor or by the minor if the minor has attained fourteen (14) years of age.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-213.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-114. Powers of custodian.

  1. A custodian, acting in a custodial capacity, has all the rights, powers, and authority over custodial property that unmarried adult owners have over their own property, but a custodian may exercise those rights, powers, and authority in that capacity only.
  2. This section does not relieve a custodian from liability for breach of duties of care under § 35-7-113.
  3. The custodian is authorized to invest some or all of the custodial property in the Internal Revenue Code Section 529 plan, if the custodian determines the investment to be in the best interest of the minor.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; 2005, ch. 99, § 7; T.C.A. § 35-7-214.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

The full citation for Internal Revenue Code Section 529, referred to in this section, is 26 U.S.C. § 529.

35-7-115. Use of custodial property.

  1. A custodian may deliver or pay to the minor or expend for the minor's benefit so much of the custodial property as the custodian considers advisable for the use and benefit of the minor, without court order and without regard to:
    1. The duty or ability of the custodian personally or of any other person to support the minor; or
    2. Any other income or property of the minor which may be applicable or available for that purpose.
  2. On petition of an interested person or the minor, if the minor has attained fourteen (14) years of age, the court may order the custodian to deliver or pay to the minor or expend for the minor's benefit so much of the custodial property as the court considers advisable for the use and benefit of the minor.
  3. A delivery, payment, or expenditure under this section is in addition to, not in substitution for, and does not affect any obligation of a person to support the minor.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1;; T.C.A. § 35-7-215.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-116. Custodian's expenses, compensation, and bond.

  1. A custodian is entitled to reimbursement from custodial property for reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of the custodian's duties.
  2. Except for one who is a transferor under § 35-7-105, a custodian has a non-cumulative election during each calendar year to charge reasonable compensation for services performed during that year.
  3. Except as provided in § 35-7-119(f), a custodian need not give a bond.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-216.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-117. Exemption of third person from liability.

A third person in good faith and without court order may act on the instructions of or otherwise deal with any person purporting to make a transfer or purporting to act in the capacity of a custodian and, in the absence of knowledge, is not responsible for determining:

  1. The validity of the purported custodian's designation;
  2. The propriety of, or the authority under this chapter for, any act of the purported custodian;
  3. The validity or propriety under this chapter of any instrument or instructions executed or given either by the person purporting to make a transfer or by the purported custodian; or
  4. The propriety of the application of any property of the minor delivered to the purported custodian.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-217.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-118. Liability to third persons.

  1. A claim based on:
    1. A contract entered into by a custodian acting in a custodial capacity;
    2. An obligation arising from the ownership or control of custodial property; or
    3. A tort committed during the custodianship;

      may be asserted against the custodial property by proceeding against the custodian in the custodial capacity, whether or not the custodian or the minor is personally liable therefor.

  2. A custodian is not personally liable:
    1. On a contract properly entered into in the custodial capacity unless the custodian fails to reveal that capacity and to identify the custodianship in the contract; or
    2. For an obligation arising from control of custodial property or for a tort committed during the custodianship unless the custodian is personally at fault.
  3. A minor is not personally liable for an obligation arising from ownership of custodial property or for a tort committed during the custodianship unless the minor is personally at fault.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-218.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-119. Renunciation, resignation, death, or removal of custodian — Designation of successor custodian.

  1. A person nominated under § 35-7-104, or designated under § 35-7-110, as custodian may decline to serve by delivering a written disclaimer to the person who made the nomination or to the transferor or the transferor's legal representative. If the event giving rise to a transfer has not occurred and no substitute custodian able, willing and eligible to serve was nominated, the person who made the nomination may nominate a substitute custodian; otherwise, the transferor or the transferor's legal representative shall designate a substitute custodian at the time of the transfer, in either case from among the persons eligible to serve as custodian for that kind of property. The custodian so designated has the rights of a successor custodian.
  2. A custodian at any time may designate a trust company or an adult other than a transferor under this chapter as successor custodian by executing and dating an instrument of designation before a subscribing witness other than the successor. If the instrument of designation does not contain or is not accompanied by the resignation of the custodian, the designation of the successor does not take effect until the custodian resigns, dies, becomes incapacitated, or is removed.
  3. A custodian may resign at any time by delivering written notice to the minor if the minor has attained fourteen (14) years of age and to the successor custodian and by delivering the custodial property to the successor custodian.
  4. If a custodian is ineligible, dies, or becomes incapacitated without having effectively designated a successor and the minor has attained fourteen (14) years of age, the minor may designate as a successor custodian, in the manner prescribed in subsection (b), an adult member of the minor's family, a guardian or conservator of the minor, or a trust company. If the minor has not attained fourteen (14) years of age or fails to act within sixty (60) days after the ineligibility, death, or incapacity, the guardian of the minor becomes successor custodian. If the minor has no guardian or the guardian declines to act, the transferor, the legal representative of the transferor or of the custodian, an adult member of the minor's family, or any other interested person may petition the court to designate a successor custodian.
  5. A custodian who declines to serve under subsection (a) or resigns under subsection (c), or the legal representative of a deceased or incapacitated custodian, as soon as practicable, shall put the custodial property and records in the possession and control of the successor custodian. The successor custodian by action may enforce the obligation to deliver custodial property and records and becomes responsible for each item as received.
  6. A transferor, the legal representative of a transferor, an adult member of the minor's family, a guardian or conservator of the person or property of the minor, or the minor if the minor has attained fourteen (14) years of age may petition the court to remove the custodian for cause and to designate a successor custodian other than a transferor under § 35-7-105, or to require the custodian to give appropriate bond.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-219.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-120. Accounting by and determination of liability of custodian.

  1. A minor who has attained fourteen (14) years of age, the minor's guardian or conservator of the person or legal representative, an adult member of the minor's family, a transferor, or a transferor's legal representative may petition the court:
    1. For an accounting by the custodian or the custodian's legal representative; or
    2. For a determination of responsibility, as between the custodial property and the custodian personally, for claims against the custodial property unless the responsibility has been adjudicated in an action under § 35-7-118, to which the minor or the minor's legal representative was a party.
  2. A successor custodian may petition the court for an accounting by the predecessor custodian.
  3. The court, in a proceeding under this chapter or in any other proceeding, may require or permit the custodian or the custodian's legal representative to account.
  4. If a custodian is removed under § 35-7-119(f), the court shall require an accounting and order delivery of the custodial property and records to the successor custodian and the execution of all instruments required for transfer of the custodial property.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-220.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-121. Termination of custodianship.

  1. The custodian shall transfer in an appropriate manner the custodial property to the minor or to the minor's estate upon the earlier of:
    1. The minor's attainment of twenty-one (21) years of age; provided, that this transfer can be withheld until the minor's attainment of up to twenty-five (25) years of age if the instrument so provides, and if the gift is an inter vivos gift, the instrument further expressly states that deferring termination of custodianship beyond the minor's attainment of twenty-one (21) years of age will cause the transfer to be a gift of a future interest which may have adverse federal and state gift tax consequences; or
    2. The minor's death.
  2. At any time a custodian may transfer part or all of the custodial property to a qualified minor’s trust without court order. The transfer terminates the custodianship to the extent of the transfer.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; 1995, ch. 513, § 1; 1999, ch. 491, § 8; T.C.A. § 35-7-221; Acts 2007, ch. 8, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-122. Applicability.

This chapter also applies to a transfer made on or after October 1, 1992, if:

  1. The transfer purports to have been made under the Tennessee Uniform Gifts to Minors Act; or
  2. The instrument by which the transfer purports to have been made uses in substance the designation “as custodian under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act” or “as custodian under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act” of any other state, and the application of this chapter is necessary to validate the transfer.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-222.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-123. Effect on existing custodianships.

  1. Any transfer of custodial property as now defined in this chapter, including transfers of real property, made before October 1, 1992, is validated, notwithstanding that there was no specific authority in the Tennessee Uniform Gifts to Minors Act for the coverage of custodial property of that kind or for a transfer from that source at the time the transfer was made.
  2. This chapter applies to all transfers made before October 1, 1992, in a manner and form prescribed in the Tennessee Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, except insofar as the application impairs constitutionally vested rights or extends the duration of custodianships beyond eighteen (18) years of age of the minor which were in existence on October 1, 1992.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-223.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-124. Uniformity of application and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-224.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-125. Repeals prior act.

The Tennessee Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, formerly compiled in this chapter, is repealed. To the extent that this chapter, by virtue of § 35-7-123, does not apply to transfers made in a manner prescribed in the Tennessee Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or to the powers, duties and immunities conferred by transfers in that manner upon custodians and persons dealing with custodians, the repeal of the Tennessee Uniform Gifts to Minors Act does not affect those transfers or those powers, duties and immunities.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-225.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

35-7-126. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1; T.C.A. § 35-7-226.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 35-7-10135-7-110 (Acts 1957, ch. 112, §§ 1-10; 1961, ch. 232, § 1; 1963, ch. 65, §§ 1-9; 1968, ch. 600, §§ 1-10; 1972, ch. 612, § 6; 1973, ch. 190, § 1; 1975, ch. 294, § 1; 1976, ch. 393, § 1; 1983, ch. 336, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 35-801 — 35-810), concerning the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 1 effective October 1, 1992. See present § 35-7-125. For present law see this chapter.

Chapter 8
Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act

35-8-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act.”

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 2.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 8, §§ 35-8-10135-8-111 (Acts 1959, ch. 246, §§ 1-11; T.C.A., §§ 35-901 — 35-911), the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, was repealed by Acts 1997, ch. 79, § 20, effective January 1, 1998.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-102. Chapter definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Account” means an arrangement under a terms-of-service agreement in which a custodian carries, maintains, processes, receives, or stores a digital asset of the user or provides goods or services to the user;
  2. “Agent” means an attorney-in-fact granted authority under a durable or nondurable power of attorney;
  3. “Carries” means engages in the transmission of an electronic communication;
  4. “Catalogue of electronic communications” means information that identifies each person with which a user has had an electronic communication, the time and date of the communication, and the electronic address of the person;
  5. “Conservator” means a person appointed by a court to manage the estate of a person with a disability. “Conservator” includes a limited conservator;
  6. “Content of an electronic communication” means information concerning the substance or meaning of the communication which:
    1. Has been sent or received by a user;
    2. Is in electronic storage by a custodian providing an electronic communication service to the public or is carried or maintained by a custodian providing a remote-computing service to the public; and
    3. Is not readily accessible to the public;
  7. “Court” means any court of record that has jurisdiction to hear matters concerning personal representatives, conservators, guardians, agents acting pursuant to a power of attorney, or trustees;
  8. “Custodian” means a person who carries, maintains, processes, receives, or stores a digital asset of a user;
  9. “Designated recipient” means a person chosen by a user using an online tool to administer digital assets of the user;
  10. “Digital asset” means an electronic record in which an individual has a right or interest. “Digital asset” does not include an underlying asset or liability unless the asset or liability is itself an electronic record;
  11. “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities;
  12. “Electronic communication” has the same meaning as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12);
  13. “Electronic communication service” means a custodian that provides to a user the ability to send or receive an electronic communication;
  14. “Fiduciary” means an original, additional, or successor personal representative, conservator, guardian, agent, or trustee;
  15. “Guardian” means a person appointed by a court to manage the estate of a minor. “Guardian” includes a limited guardian;
  16. “Information” means data, text, images, videos, sounds, codes, computer programs, software, databases, or the like;
  17. “Limited conservator” means a conservator with partial, restricted, or temporary powers;
  18. “Limited guardian” means a guardian with partial, restricted, or temporary powers;
  19. “Minor” means an unemancipated individual who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age and who has not otherwise been emancipated, and for whom a guardian has been appointed. “Minor” includes an individual for whom an application for the appointment of a guardian is pending;
  20. “Online tool” means an electronic service provided by a custodian that allows the user, in an agreement distinct from the terms-of-service agreement between the custodian and user, to provide directions for disclosure or nondisclosure of digital assets to a third person;
  21. “Person” means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity; public corporation; government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; or other legal entity;
  22. “Person with a disability” means an individual eighteen (18) years of age or older determined by a court to be in need of partial or full supervision, protection, and assistance by reason of mental illness, physical illness or injury, developmental disability, or other mental or physical incapacity, and for whom a conservator has been appointed. “Person with a disability” includes an individual for whom an application for the appointment of a conservator is pending;
  23. “Personal representative” means an executor, administrator, special administrator, or person that performs substantially the same function under law of this state other than this chapter;
  24. “Power of attorney” means an instrument that grants an agent authority to act in the place of a principal;
  25. “Principal” means an individual who grants authority to an agent in a power of attorney;
  26. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form;
  27. “Remote-computing service” means a custodian that provides to a user computer-processing services or the storage of digital assets by means of an electronic communications system, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14);
  28. “Terms-of-service agreement” means an agreement that controls the relationship between a user and a custodian;
  29. “Trustee” means a fiduciary with legal title to property under an agreement or declaration that creates a beneficial interest in another. “Trustee” includes a successor trustee;
  30. “User” means a person who has an account with a custodian; and
  31. “Will” includes a codicil, testamentary instrument that only appoints an executor, and instrument that revokes or revises a testamentary instrument.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 3.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-103. Applicability of chapter.

  1. This chapter applies to:
    1. A fiduciary or agent acting under a will or power of attorney executed before, on, or after July 1, 2016;
    2. A personal representative acting for a decedent who died before, on, or after July 1, 2016;
    3. A conservatorship or guardianship proceeding, whether pending in a court or commenced before, on, or after July 1, 2016; and
    4. A trustee acting under a trust created before, on, or after July 1, 2016.
  2. This chapter applies to a custodian if the user resides in this state or resided in this state at the time of the user's death.
  3. This chapter does not apply to a digital asset of an employer used by an employee in the ordinary course of the employer's business.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 4.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-104. User direction for disclosure of digital assets.

  1. A user may use an online tool to direct the custodian to disclose to a designated recipient or not to disclose some or all of the user's digital assets, including the content of electronic communications. If the online tool allows the user to modify or delete a direction at all times, a direction regarding disclosure using an online tool overrides a contrary direction by the user in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other dispositive or nominative instrument.
  2. If a user has not used an online tool to give direction under subsection (a) or if the custodian has not provided an online tool, the user may allow or prohibit in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other dispositive or nominative instrument, disclosure to a fiduciary of some or all of the user's digital assets, including the content of electronic communications sent or received by the user.
  3. A user's direction under subsection (a) or (b) overrides a contrary provision in a terms-of-service agreement that does not require the user to act affirmatively and distinctly from the user's assent to the terms of service.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 5.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-105. Rights of custodian or user.

  1. This chapter does not change or impair a right of a custodian or a user under a terms-of-service agreement to access and use digital assets of the user.
  2. This chapter does not give a fiduciary or designated recipient any new or expanded rights other than those held by the user for whom, or for whose estate, the fiduciary or designated recipient acts or represents.
  3. A fiduciary's or designated recipient's access to digital assets may be modified or eliminated by a user, by federal law, or by a terms-of-service agreement if the user has not provided direction under § 35-8-104.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 6.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-106. Disclosure of digital assets — Powers of custodian — Administrative fee.

  1. When disclosing digital assets of a user under this chapter, the custodian may at its sole discretion:
    1. Grant a fiduciary or designated recipient full access to the user's account;
    2. Grant a fiduciary or designated recipient partial access to the user's account sufficient to perform the tasks with which the fiduciary or designated recipient is charged; or
    3. Provide a fiduciary or designated recipient a copy in a record of any digital asset that, on the date the custodian received the request for disclosure, the user could have accessed if the user were alive and had full capacity and access to the account.
  2. A custodian may assess a reasonable administrative charge for the cost of disclosing digital assets under this chapter.
  3. A custodian need not disclose under this chapter a digital asset deleted by a user.
  4. If a user directs or a fiduciary requests a custodian to disclose under this chapter some, but not all, of the user's digital assets, the custodian need not disclose the assets if segregation of the assets would impose an undue burden on the custodian. If the custodian believes the direction or request imposes an undue burden, the custodian or fiduciary may seek an order from the court to disclose:
    1. A subset limited by date of the user's digital assets;
    2. All of the user's digital assets to the fiduciary or designated recipient;
    3. None of the user's digital assets; or
    4. All of the user's digital assets to the court for review in camera.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 7.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-107. Disclosure of content of electronic communications of deceased user.

If a deceased user consented or a court directs disclosure of the contents of electronic communications of the user, the custodian shall disclose to the personal representative of the estate of the user the content of an electronic communication sent or received by the user if the representative gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the death certificate of the user;
  3. A certified copy of any of the following: the letters of administration or letters testamentary appointing the personal representative; a small-estate affidavit under title 30, chapter 4; or a court order;
  4. Unless the user provided direction using an online tool, a copy of the user's will, trust, power of attorney, or other dispositive or nominative instrument evidencing the user's consent to disclosure of the content of electronic communications; and
  5. If requested by the custodian:
    1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user's account;
    2. Evidence linking the account to the user; or
    3. A finding by the court that:
      1. The user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by the information specified in subdivision (5)(A);
      2. Disclosure of the content of electronic communications of the user would not violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., 47 U.S.C. § 222, or other applicable law;
      3. Unless the user provided direction using an online tool, the user consented to disclosure of the content of electronic communications; or
      4. Disclosure of the content of electronic communications of the user is reasonably necessary for administration of the estate.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 8.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-108. Disclosure of other digital assets of deceased user.

Unless the user prohibited disclosure of digital assets or the court directs otherwise, a custodian shall disclose to the personal representative of the estate of a deceased user a catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by the user and digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications, of the user, if the representative gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the death certificate of the user;
  3. A certified copy of any of the following: the letters of administration or letters testamentary appointing the personal representative; a small-estate affidavit under title 30, chapter 4; or a court order; and
  4. If requested by the custodian:
    1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user's account;
    2. Evidence linking the account to the user;
    3. An affidavit stating that disclosure of the user's digital assets is reasonably necessary for administration of the estate; or
    4. A finding by the court that:
      1. The user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by the information specified in subdivision (4)(A); or
      2. Disclosure of the user's digital assets is reasonably necessary for administration of the estate.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 9.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-109. Disclosure of content of electronic communications to principal.

To the extent a power of attorney expressly grants an agent authority over the content of electronic communications sent or received by the principal and unless directed otherwise by the principal or the court, a custodian shall disclose to the agent the content if the agent gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. An original or a copy of the power of attorney expressly granting the agent authority over the content of electronic communications of the principal;
  3. A certification by the agent, under penalty of perjury, that the power of attorney is in effect; and
  4. If requested by the custodian:
    1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the principal's account; or
    2. Evidence linking the account to the principal.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 10.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-110. Disclosure of other digital assets of principal.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the principal, or provided by a power of attorney, a custodian shall disclose to an agent with specific authority over digital assets or general authority to act on behalf of a principal a catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by the principal and digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications, of the principal if the agent gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. An original or a copy of the power of attorney that gives the agent specific authority over digital assets or general authority to act on behalf of the principal;
  3. A certification by the agent, under penalty of perjury, that the power of attorney is in effect; and
  4. If requested by the custodian:
    1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the principal's account; or
    2. Evidence linking the account to the principal.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 11.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-111. Disclosure of digital assets held in trust when trustee is original user.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose to a trustee that is an original user of an account any digital asset of the account held in trust, including a catalogue of electronic communications of the trustee and the content of electronic communications.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 12.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-112. Disclosure of digital assets held in trust when trustee is not original user.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the user, or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose to a trustee that is not an original user of an account the content of an electronic communication sent or received by an original or successor user and carried, maintained, processed, received, or stored by the custodian in the account of the trust if the trustee gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the trust instrument or a certification of the trust under § 35-15-1013, that includes consent to disclosure of the content of electronic communications to the trustee;
  3. A certification by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, that the trust exists and the trustee is a currently acting trustee of the trust; and
  4. If requested by the custodian:
    1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the trust's account; or
    2. Evidence linking the account to the trust.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 13.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-113. Disclosure of other digital assets held in trust when trustee is original user.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the user, or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose, to a trustee that is not an original user of an account, a catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by an original or successor user and stored, carried, or maintained by the custodian in an account of the trust and any digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications, in which the trust has a right or interest if the trustee gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the trust instrument or a certification of the trust under § 35-15-1013;
  3. A certification by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, that the trust exists and the trustee is a currently acting trustee of the trust; and
  4. If requested by the custodian:
    1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the trust's account; or
    2. Evidence linking the account to the trust.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 14.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-114. Disclosure of other digital assets held in trust when trustee is not original user.

  1. After an opportunity for a hearing under title 34, chapter 1, the court may grant a guardian or conservator access to the digital assets of a minor or person with a disability.
  2. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or directed by the user, a custodian shall disclose to a guardian or conservator the catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by a minor or person with a disability and any digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications, in which the minor or person with a disability has a right or interest if the guardian or conservator gives the custodian:
    1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
    2. A certified copy of the court order that gives the guardian or conservator authority over the digital assets of the minor or person with a disability; and
    3. If requested by the custodian:
      1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the account of the minor or person with a disability; or
      2. Evidence linking the account to the minor or person with a disability.
  3. A guardian or conservator with general authority to manage the assets of a minor or person with a disability may request a custodian of the digital assets of the minor or person with a disability to suspend or terminate an account of the minor or person with a disability for good cause. A request made under this section must be accompanied by a certified copy of the court order giving the guardian or conservator authority over the property of the minor or person with a disability.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 15.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-115. Disclosure of digital assets to guardian or conservator.

  1. The legal duties imposed on a fiduciary charged with managing tangible property apply to the management of digital assets, including:
    1. The duty of care;
    2. The duty of loyalty; and
    3. The duty of confidentiality.
  2. A fiduciary's or designated recipient's authority with respect to a digital asset of a user:
    1. Except as otherwise provided in § 35-8-104, is subject to the applicable terms of service;
    2. Is subject to other applicable law, including copyright law;
    3. In the case of a fiduciary, is limited by the scope of the fiduciary's duties; and
    4. May not be used to impersonate the user.
  3. A fiduciary with authority over the property of a decedent, minor, person with a disability, principal, or settlor has the right to access any digital asset in which the decedent, minor, person with a disability, principal, or settlor had a right or interest and that is not held by a custodian or subject to a terms-of-service agreement.
  4. A fiduciary acting within the scope of the fiduciary's duties is an authorized user of the property of the decedent, minor, person with a disability, principal, or settlor for the purpose of applicable computer-fraud and unauthorized-computer-access laws, including the Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003, compiled in title 39, chapter 14, part 6.
  5. A fiduciary with authority over the tangible personal property of a decedent, minor, person with a disability, principal, or settlor:
    1. Has the right to access the property and any digital asset stored in it; and
    2. Is an authorized user for the purpose of applicable computer-fraud and unauthorized-computer-access laws, including title 39, chapter 14, part 6.
  6. A custodian may disclose information in an account to a fiduciary of the user when the information is required to terminate an account used to access digital assets licensed to the user.
  7. A fiduciary of a user may request a custodian to terminate the user's account. A request for termination must be in writing, in either physical or electronic form, and accompanied by:
    1. If the user is deceased, a certified copy of the death certificate of the user;
    2. A certified copy of the letters of administration or letters testamentary appointing the personal representative; a certified copy of the small-estate affidavit under title 30, chapter 4; a certified copy of a court order; an original or a copy of a power of attorney; or a certified copy of the trust instrument or a certification of the trust under § 35-15-1013, giving the fiduciary authority over the account; and
    3. If requested by the custodian:
      1. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user's account;
      2. Evidence linking the account to the user; or
      3. A finding by the court that the user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by the information specified in subdivision (g)(3)(A).

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 16.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-116. Fiduciary duty.

  1. Not later than sixty (60) days after receipt of the information required under §§ 35-8-107 — 35-8-115, a custodian shall comply with a request under this chapter from a fiduciary or designated recipient to disclose digital assets or terminate an account. If the custodian fails to comply, the fiduciary or designated recipient may apply to the court for an order directing compliance.
  2. An order under subsection (a) directing compliance must contain a finding that compliance is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702.
  3. A custodian may notify the user that a request for disclosure or to terminate an account was made under this chapter.
  4. A custodian may deny a request under this chapter from a fiduciary or designated recipient for disclosure of digital assets or to terminate an account if the custodian is aware of any lawful access to the account following the receipt of the fiduciary's request.
  5. This chapter does not limit a custodian's ability to obtain or require a fiduciary or designated recipient requesting disclosure or termination under this chapter to obtain a court order which:
    1. Specifies that an account belongs to the minor, person with a disability, principal, or settlor;
    2. Specifies that there is sufficient consent from the minor, person with a disability, principal, or settlor to support the requested disclosure; and
    3. Contains a finding required by law other than this chapter.
  6. A custodian and the custodian's officers, employees, and agents are immune from liability for an act or omission done in good faith in compliance with this chapter.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 17.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-117. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this chapter, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 18.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

35-8-118. Electronic signatures — Global and National Commerce Act.

This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 et seq.), but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c), Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b), Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. § 7003(b)).

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 19.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 1 enacted this chapter as chapter 51 of Title 35, but the chapter has been redesignated as chapter 8 by authority of the Code Commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 570, § 24. July 1, 2016.

Chapter 9
Administration of Private Foundations, Charitable Trusts or Split-Interest Trusts

35-9-101. Prohibited acts.

In the administration of any trust that is a “private foundation,” as defined in § 509 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  509), a “charitable trust,” as defined in § 4947(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4947(a)(1)), or a “split-interest trust,” as defined in § 4947(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954  (26 U.S.C. §  4947(a)(2)), the following acts are prohibited:

  1. Engaging in any act of self-dealing, as defined in § 4941(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954  (26 U.S.C. §  4941(d)), that would give rise to any liability for the tax imposed by § 4941(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4941(a));
  2. Retaining any excess business holdings (as defined in § 4943(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 26 U.S.C. §  4943(c)),  that would give rise to any liability for the tax imposed by § 4943(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4943(a));
  3. Making any investments that would jeopardize the carrying out of any of the exempt purposes of the trust, within the meaning of § 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4944), so as to give rise to any liability for the tax imposed by § 4944(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4944(a)); or
  4. Making any taxable expenditures (as defined in § 4945(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4945(d)), that would give rise to any liability for the tax imposed by § 4945(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4945(a)); provided, that this section does not apply either to those split-interest trusts or to amounts of those split-interest trusts that are not subject to the prohibitions applicable to private foundations by reason of § 4947 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4947).

Acts 1971, ch. 3, § 1; T.C.A., § 35-1001.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions of charitable trust providing for accumulation of income. 6 A.L.R.4th 903.

35-9-102. Distribution of amounts to avoid tax liability.

In the administration of any trust that is a private foundation or that is a charitable trust, there shall be distributed, for the purposes specified in the trust instrument, for each taxable year, amounts at least sufficient to avoid liability for the tax imposed by § 4942(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4942(a)).

Acts 1971, ch. 3, § 2; T.C.A., § 35-1002.

35-9-103. Applicability of §§ 35-9-101 and 35-9-102.

Sections 35-9-101 and 35-9-102 do not apply to any trust to the extent that a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the application would be contrary to the terms of the instrument governing the trust and that the same may not properly be changed to conform to those sections.

Acts 1971, ch. 3, § 3; T.C.A., § 35-1003.

35-9-104. Powers of courts and attorney general and reporter unimpaired.

Nothing in this chapter shall impair the rights and powers of the courts or the attorney general and reporter of this state with respect to any trust.

Acts 1971, ch. 3, § 4; T.C.A., § 35-1004.

35-9-105. References to Internal Revenue Code.

All references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (U.S.C. title 26), include future amendments to those sections and corresponding provisions of future internal revenue laws.

Acts 1971, ch. 3, § 5; T.C.A., § 35-1005.

35-9-106. Authority to amend trust for tax benefits.

  1. It is the purpose of this section to preserve the intent of testators and grantors of testamentary and inter vivos charitable remainder trusts created prior to and after August 31, 1972, by minimizing the imposition of federal income and excise taxes, imposed upon the assets of such trusts, and thereby preserving the maximum amount of the trust assets for the charitable, educational, religious and benevolent purposes for which their remainders were intended. The attorney general and reporter shall perform such acts as, in the attorney general and reporter's opinion, will result in the effectuation of this declaration of purpose.
    1. Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in the governing instrument or in any other law of this state, the trustee of any split-interest trust as defined in § 4947(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. §  4947(a)(2)), with the consent of all the beneficiaries under the governing instrument, may, without application to any court and either before or after the funding of the trust, amend the governing instrument to conform to §§ 170(f), 642(c)(5), 664, 2055(e), and 2522(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954  (26 U.S.C. §§  170(f), 642(c)(5), 664, 2055(e), and 2522(c)), to the extent applicable, by executing a written amendment to the trust for that purpose. Consent shall not be required as to individual beneficiaries not living at the time of amendment or as to charitable beneficiaries not named or not in existence at the time of amendment. The possibility of beneficial interests arising after the amendment of the governing instruments shall not defeat the ability to amend. In the case of an individual beneficiary not competent to give consent, the consent of the beneficiary's guardian or conservator, if any, or the consent of a guardian ad litem appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be treated as the consent of the beneficiary. A copy of the proposed amendment, executed by the trustee and consented to by all beneficiaries whose consent is required under this subdivision (b)(1), shall be delivered in person or by registered mail to the attorney general and reporter. The attorney general and reporter may, within sixty (60) days after receipt of the proposed amendment, indicate by registered mail to the trustee any specific objections to the proposed amendment, in which event subdivision (b)(2) shall apply if the attorney general and reporter does not withdraw the objections. In the case of any amendment to a trust created by will or to a trust created by inter vivos instrument, unless otherwise provided, the amendment shall be deemed to apply as of the date of death of the decedent or as of the date of gift.
    2. In the event that all of the trustees and beneficiaries under the governing instrument do not consent to the amendment, or in the event there are no named beneficiaries, any court of competent jurisdiction shall have the power to amend the governing instrument in accordance with subdivision (b)(1) upon petition of the trustee or any beneficiary and upon a subsequent finding by the court that the testator's or the grantor's intention would not be defeated by the amendment. A copy of the petition shall be delivered in person or by registered mail to the attorney general and reporter.
    3. Unless otherwise expressly provided in the governing instrument, any devise, bequest or transfer in a testamentary or inter vivos trust for religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses to be determined by the trustee or any other person shall be made only to organizations and for purposes within the meaning of §§ 170(c), 2055(a), and 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954  (26 U.S.C. §§  170(c), 2055(a), and 2522(a)).
    4. This section also applies to executors and administrators of estates of decedents whose wills create trusts described in subdivision (b)(1).
  2. All references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as it exists on August 31, 1972. All references to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in subdivisions (b)(1) and (3) refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as it exists on June 4, 1975.
  3. This section applies in the case of all decedents dying after December 31, 1969, and in the case of all irrevocable inter vivos trusts created after July 31, 1969.

Acts 1975, ch. 329, § 1; T.C.A., § 35-1006.

Cross-References. Certified mail instead of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

Law Reviews.

Charitable Bequests: Delegating Discretion to Choose the Objects of the Testator's Beneficence (Denise Caffrey), 44 Tenn. L. Rev.  307 (1977).

35-9-107. Reformation of trusts to comply with tax regulations.

  1. It is the purpose of this section to permit and authorize the reformation of certain inter vivos and testamentary charitable remainder trusts created prior to and after December 10, 1998, to comply with applicable federal tax regulations regarding qualifying payments to noncharitable beneficiaries. Such reformations shall be permitted and authorized upon the unanimous written consent of all living individual grantors, living individual beneficiaries, charitable remainder beneficiaries named or otherwise provided for in the trust agreement, and the trustee, with the concurrence of the attorney general and reporter. The attorney general and reporter shall perform such acts as, in the attorney general and reporter's opinion, will effectuate this declaration of purpose.
    1. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the governing instrument or in any other law of this state, the trustee of any charitable remainder trust described in § 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(b) of the Internal Revenue Code Regulations, (26 CFR 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(b)), as currently adopted, or as may be subsequently amended, may, without application to any court and either before or after the funding of such trust, reform the trust to meet the definition of a charitable remainder unitrust described in § 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(c) of the Internal Revenue Code Regulations, (26 CFR 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(c)), as currently adopted, or as may be subsequently amended. In order to effectuate this reformation, the trustee shall obtain the written consent of all living grantors, living beneficiaries, charitable beneficiaries named or otherwise provided for in the trust agreement, and the trustee, together with the written concurrence of the attorney general and reporter. If the charitable beneficiary is to be determined by a person having discretion to select or name the charitable beneficiary at the time the trust terminates, the consent of that person shall be required. Consent shall not be required as to individual beneficiaries or grantors not living at the time of reformation or as to charitable remainder beneficiaries not named or not in existence at the time of reformation.
    2. The possibility of beneficial interests arising after the reformation of the trust instrument shall not defeat the ability to reform the trust pursuant to this section. In the case of an individual beneficiary or grantor not competent to give consent, the consent of that beneficiary's or grantor's guardian or conservator, if any, or the consent of a guardian ad litem appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be treated as the consent of the beneficiary or grantor. A copy of the proposed reformation, executed by the trustee and consented to by all living grantors, living beneficiaries, and charitable beneficiaries named or otherwise provided for in the trust agreement, shall be delivered to the attorney general and reporter. The attorney general and reporter shall, within thirty (30) days after receipt, either concur with the proposed reformation or state any specific objections to the proposed reformation in writing and delivered to the trustee by registered mail. If the attorney general and reporter state objections and those objections are not resolved to the attorney general's and reporter's satisfaction or the attorney general and reporter does not withdraw the objections, subdivision (b)(3) shall apply.
    3. In the event that all of the living grantors, living beneficiaries, and charitable remainder beneficiaries do not consent to the reformation, any court of competent jurisdiction shall have the power to reform the governing instrument in accordance with subdivision (b)(1) upon petition by the trustee or any beneficiary. A copy of the petition shall be delivered in person or by registered mail to the attorney general and reporter.

Acts 2000, ch. 600, § 1.

Cross-References. Certified mail instead of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

35-9-108. Information or actions that cannot be required.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “private foundation” has the same meaning ascribed to “private foundation” in § 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. §  509(a)), as amended.
  2. No private foundation shall be required by a department, agency, board, or other entity of state or local government to:
    1. Disclose the race, religion, gender, national origin, socioeconomic status, age, ethnicity, disability, marital status, or sexual orientation of:
      1. The foundation's employees, officers, directors, trustees, or contributors, without the prior written consent of the individual or individuals in question; or
      2. Any individual, or of the employees, officers, directors, trustees, members, or owners of any entity, that has received monetary or in-kind contributions or grants from, or contracted with, the foundation, without the prior written consent of the individual or individuals in question;
    2. Hire, appoint, or elect an individual of any particular race, religion, gender, national origin, socioeconomic status, age, ethnicity, disability, marital status, or sexual orientation as an employee, officer, director, or trustee of the foundation;
    3. Disqualify, remove, or prohibit service of an individual as an officer, director, or trustee of the foundation based upon such individual's familial relationship to other officers, directors, or trustees of the foundation or a contributor to the foundation;
    4. Hire, appoint, or elect an individual as an officer, director, or trustee of the foundation who does not share a familial relationship with the other officers, directors, or trustees of the foundation or with a contributor to the foundation; or
    5. Except as a lawful condition or requirement on the expenditure of particular funds imposed by the contributor or grantor of such funds, distribute the foundation's funds to, or contract with, any individual or entity based upon the:
      1. Race, religion, gender, national origin, socioeconomic status, age, ethnicity, disability, marital status, or sexual orientation of the individual or of the employees, officers, directors, trustees, members, or owners of the entity; or
      2. Populations, locales, or communities served by the individual or entity.

Acts 2013, ch. 193, § 1.

Chapter 10
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act

Part 1
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973 [Repealed]

35-10-101. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-102. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-103. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-104. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-105. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-106. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-107. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-108. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

35-10-109. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 1, §§ 35-10-10135-10-109 (Acts 1973, ch. 177, §§ 1-8, 10; T.C.A., §§ 35-1101 — 35-1109), concerning the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act of 1973, was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 186, §  11(a), effective July 1, 2007.

Part 2
Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prefatory Note

Reasons for Revision.

The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) replaces the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA).  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved UMIFA in 1972, and 47 jurisdictions have enacted the act.  UMIFA provided guidance and authority to charitable organizations within its scope concerning the management and investment of funds held by those organizations, UMIFA provided endowment spending rules that did not depend on trust accounting principles of income and principal, and UMIFA permitted the release of restrictions on the use or management of funds under certain circumstances.  The changes UMIFA made to the law permitted charitable organizations to use modern investment techniques such as total-return investing and to determine endowment fund spending based on spending rates rather than on determinations of “income” and “principal.”

UMIFA was drafted almost 35 years ago, and portions of it are now out of date.  The prudence standards in UMIFA have provided useful guidance, but prudence norms evolve over time.  The new Act provides modern articulations of the prudence standards for the management and investment of charitable funds and for endowment spending.  The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA), an Act promulgated in 1994 and already enacted in 43 jurisdictions, served as a model for many of the revisions.  UPIA updates rules on investment decision making for trusts, including charitable trusts, and imposes additional duties on trustees for the protection of beneficiaries.  UPMIFA applies these rules and duties to charities organized as nonprofit corporations.  UPMIFA does not apply to trusts managed by corporate and other fiduciaries that are not charities, because UPIA provides management and investment standards for those trusts.

In applying principles based on UPIA to charities organized as nonprofit corporations, UPMIFA combines the approaches taken by UPIA and by the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA).  UPMIFA reflects the fact that standards for managing and investing institutional funds are and should be the same regardless of whether a charitable organization is organized as a trust, a nonprofit corporation, or some other entity.  See  Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule 7 (1986) (stating “[t]he modern paradigm of prudence applies to all fiduciaries who are subject to some version of the prudent man rule, whether under ERISA, the private foundation provisions of the Code, UMIFA, other state statutes, or the common law.”); Harvey P. Dale, Nonprofit Directors and Officers — Duties and Liabilities for Investment Decisions,  1994 N.Y.U. Conf. Tax Plan. 501(c)(3) Org’s. Ch. 4.

UPMIFA provides guidance and authority to charitable organizations concerning the management and investment of funds held by those organizations, and UPMIFA imposes additional duties on those who manage and invest charitable funds.  These duties provide additional protections for charities and also protect the interests of donors who want to see their contributions used wisely.

UPMIFA modernizes the rules governing expenditures from endowment funds, both to provide stricter guidelines on spending from endowment funds and to give institutions the ability to cope more easily with fluctuations in the value of the endowment.

Finally, UPMIFA updates the provisions governing the release and modification of restrictions on charitable funds to permit more efficient management of these funds. These provisions derive from the approach taken in the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) for modifying charitable trusts.  Like the UTC provisions, UPMIFA’s modification rules preserve the historic position of the attorneys general in most states as the overseers of charities.

As under UMIFA, the new Act applies to charities organized as charitable trusts, as nonprofit corporations, or in some other manner, but the rules do not apply to funds managed by trustees that are not charities.  Thus, the Act does not apply to trusts managed by corporate or individual trustees, but the Act does apply to trusts managed by charities.

Prudent Management and Investment.

UMIFA applied the 1972 prudence standard to investment decision making.  In contrast, UPMIFA will give charities updated and more useful guidance by incorporating language from UPIA, modified to fit the special needs of charities.  The revised Act spells out more of the factors a charity should consider in making investment decisions, thereby imposing a modern, well accepted, prudence standard based on UPIA.

Among the expressly enumerated prudence factors in UPMIFA is “the preservation of the endowment fund,” a standard not articulated in UMIFA.

In addition to identifying factors that a charity must consider in making management and investment decisions, UPMIFA requires a charity and those who manage and invest its funds to:

1. Give primary consideration to donor intent as expressed in a gift instrument,

2. Act in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent person would exercise,

3. Incur only reasonable costs in investing and managing charitable funds,

4. Make a reasonable effort to verify relevant facts,

5. Make decisions about each asset in the context of the portfolio of investments, as part of an overall investment strategy,

6. Diversify investments unless due to special circumstances, the purposes of the fund are better served without diversification,

7. Dispose of unsuitable assets, and

8. In general, develop an investment strategy appropriate for the fund and the charity.

UMIFA did not articulate these requirements.

Thus, UPMIFA strengthens the rules governing management and investment decision making by charities and provides more guidance for those who manage and invest the funds.

Donor Intent with Respect to Endowments.

UPMIFA improves the protection of donor intent with respect to expenditures from endowments.   When a donor expresses intent clearly in a written gift instrument, the Act requires that the charity follow the donor’s instructions.  When a donor’s intent is not so expressed, UPMIFA directs the charity to spend an amount that is prudent, consistent with the purposes of the fund, relevant economic factors, and the donor’s intent that the fund continue in perpetuity.  This approach allows the charity to give effect to donor intent, protect its endowment, assure generational equity, and use the endowment to support the purposes for which the endowment was created.

Retroactivity.

Like UMIFA, UPIA, the Uniform Principal and Income Act of 1961, and the Uniform Principal and Income Act of 1997, UPMIFA applies retroactively to institutional funds created before and prospectively to institutional funds created after enactment of the statute.  Regarding the considerations motivating this treatment of the issues, see the comment to Section 4 [§ 35-10-204].

Endowment Spending.

UPMIFA improves the endowment spending rule by eliminating the concept of historic dollar value and providing better guidance regarding the operation of the prudence standard.  Under UMIFA a charity can spend amounts above historic dollar value that the charity determines to be prudent.  The Act directs the charity to focus on the purposes and needs of the charity rather than on the purposes and perpetual nature of the fund.  Amounts below historic dollar value cannot be spent.  The Drafting Committee concluded that this endowment spending rule created numerous problems and that restructuring the rule would benefit charities, their donors, and the public.  The problems include:

1. Historic dollar value fixes valuation at a moment in time, and that moment is arbitrary.  If a donor provides for a gift in the donor’s will, the date of valuation for the gift will likely be the donor’s date of death.  (UMIFA left uncertain what the appropriate date for valuing a testamentary gift was.)  The determination of historic dollar value can vary significantly depending upon when in the market cycle the donor dies.  In addition, the fund may be below historic dollar value at the time the charity receives the gift if the value of the asset declines between the date of the donor’s death and the date the asset is actually distributed to the charity from the estate.

2. After a fund has been in existence for a number of years, historic dollar value may become meaningless.  Assuming reasonable long term investment success, the value of the typical fund will be well above historic dollar value, and historic dollar value will no longer represent the purchasing power of the original gift.  Without better guidance on spending the increase in value of the fund, historic dollar value does not provide adequate protection for the fund.  If a charity views the restriction on spending simply as a direction to preserve historic dollar value, the charity may spend more than it should.

3. The Act does not provide clear answers to questions a charity faces when the value of an endowment fund drops below historic dollar value.  A fund that is so encumbered is commonly called an “underwater” fund. Conflicting advice regarding whether an organization could spend from an underwater fund has led to difficulties for those managing charities.  If a charity concluded that it could continue to spend trust accounting income until a fund regained its historic dollar value, the charity might invest for income rather than on a total-return basis.  Thus, the historic dollar value rule can cause inappropriate distortions in investment policy and can ultimately lead to a decline in a fund’s real value.  If, instead, a charity with an underwater fund continues to invest for growth, the charity may be unable to spend anything from an underwater endowment fund for several years.  The inability of a charity to spend anything from an endowment is likely to be contrary to donor intent, which is to provide current benefits to the charity.

The Drafting Committee concluded that providing clearly articulated guidance on the prudence rule for spending from an endowment fund, with emphasis on the permanent nature of the fund, would provide the best protection of the purchasing power of endowment funds.

Presumption of Imprudence.

UPMIFA includes as an optional provision a presumption of imprudence if a charity spends more than seven percent of an endowment fund in any one year.  The presumption is meant to protect against spending an endowment too quickly.  Although the Drafting Committee believes that the prudence standard of UPMIFA provides appropriate and adequate protection for endowments, the Committee provided the option for states that want to include a mechanical guideline in the statute.  A major drawback to any statutory percentage is that it is unresponsive to changes in the rate of inflation or deflation.

Modification of Restrictions on Charitable Funds.

UPMIFA clarifies that the doctrines of cy pres and deviation apply to funds held by nonprofit corporations as well as to funds held by charitable trusts.  Courts have applied trust law rules to nonprofit corporations in the past, but the Drafting Committee believed that statutory authority for applying these principles to nonprofit corporations would be helpful.  UMIFA permitted release of restrictions but left the application of cy pres uncertain.  Under UPMIFA, as under trust law, the court will determine whether and how to apply cy pres or deviation and the attorney general will receive notice and have the opportunity to participate in the proceeding.  The one addition to existing law is that UPMIFA gives a charity the authority to modify a restriction on a fund that is both old and small.  For these funds, the expense of a trip to court will often be prohibitive.  By permitting a charity to make an appropriate modification, money is saved for the charitable purposes of the charity.  Even with respect to small, old funds, however, the charity must notify the attorney general of the charity’s intended action.  Of course, if the attorney general has concerns, he or she can seek the agreement of the charity to change or abandon the modification, and if that fails, can commence a court action to enjoin it.  Thus, in all types of modification the attorney general continues to be the protector both of the donor’s intent and of the public’s interest in charitable funds.

Other Organizational Law.

For matters not governed by UPMIFA, a charitable organization will continue to be governed by rules applicable to charitable trusts, if it is organized as a trust, or rules applicable to nonprofit corporations, if it is organized as a nonprofit corporation.

Relation to Trust Law.

Although UPMIFA applies a number of rules from trust law to institutions organized as nonprofit corporations, in two respects UPMIFA creates rules that do not exist under the common law applicable to trusts.  The endowment spending rule of Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] and the provision for modifying a small, old fund in subsection (d) of Section 6 [§ 35-10-206] have no counterparts in the common law or the UTC.  The Drafting Committee believes that these rules could be useful to charities organized as trusts, and the Committee recommends conforming amendments to the UTC and the Principal and Income Act to incorporate these changes into trust law.

35-10-201. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act.”

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution, Out-of-State Nongrantor Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of State Income Taxation, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1945 (2014).

35-10-202. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Charitable purpose” means the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health, the promotion of a governmental purpose, or any other purpose the achievement of which is beneficial to the community;
  2. “Endowment fund” means an institutional fund or part thereof that, under the terms of a gift instrument, is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis. The term does not include assets that an institution designates as an endowment fund for its own use;
  3. “Gift instrument” means a record or records, including an institutional solicitation, under which property is granted to, transferred to, or held by an institution as an institutional fund;
  4. “Institution” means:
    1. A person, other than an individual, organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes;
    2. A government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, to the extent that it holds funds exclusively for a charitable purpose; and
    3. A trust that had both charitable and noncharitable interests, after all noncharitable interests have terminated;
  5. “Institutional fund” means a fund held by an institution exclusively for charitable purposes. “Institutional fund”  does not include:
    1. Program-related assets;
    2. A fund held for an institution by a trustee that is not an institution; or
    3. A fund in which a beneficiary that is not an institution has an interest, other than an interest that could arise upon violation or failure of the purposes of the fund;
  6. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity;
  7. “Program-related asset” means an asset held by an institution primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution and not primarily for investment; and
  8. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1931 (2014).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (1). Charitable Purpose.

The definition of charitable purpose follows that of UTC § 405 and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 (2003). This long-familiar standard derives from the English Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601.

Some 17 states have created statutory definitions of charitable purpose for various purposes.  See, e.g.,  10 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 162.3 (2005) (defining charitable purpose within the Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes Act to include “humane,” “patriotic,” social welfare and advocacy,” and “civic” purposes).  The definition in subsection (1) applies for purposes of this Act and does not affect other definitions of charitable purpose.

Subsection (2). Endowment Fund.

An endowment fund is an institutional fund or a part of an institutional fund that is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis. A restriction that makes a fund an endowment fund arises from the terms of a gift instrument.  If an institution has more than one endowment fund, under Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] the institution can manage and invest some or all endowment funds together.  Section 4 and Section 6 [§§ 35-10-204 and 35-10-206] must be applied to individual funds and cannot be applied to a group of funds that may be managed collectively for investment purposes.

Board-designated funds are institutional funds but not endowment funds. The rules on expenditures and modification of restrictions in this Act do not apply to restrictions that an institution places on an otherwise unrestricted fund that the institution holds for its own benefit. The institution may be able to change these restrictions itself, subject to internal rules and to the fiduciary duties that apply to those that manage the institution.

If an institution transfers assets to another institution, subject to the restriction that the other institution hold the assets as an endowment, then the second institution will hold the assets as an endowment fund.

Subsection (3). Gift Instrument.

The term gift instrument refers to the records that establish the terms of a gift and may consist of more than one document.  The definition clarifies that the only legally binding restrictions on a gift are the terms set forth in writing.

As used in this definition, “record” is an expansive concept and means a writing in any form, including electronic. The term includes a will, deed, grant, conveyance, agreement, or memorandum, and also includes writings that do not have a donative purpose. For example, under some circumstances the bylaws of the institution, minutes of the board of directors, or canceled checks could be a gift instrument or be one of several records constituting a gift instrument.  Although the term can include any of these records, a record will only become a gift instrument if both the donor and the institution were or should have been aware of its terms when the donor made the gift.  For example, if a donor sends a contribution to an institution for its general purposes, then the articles of incorporation may be used to clarify those purposes.  If, in contrast, the donor sends a letter explaining that the institution should use the contribution for its “educational projects concerning teenage depression,” then any funds received in response must be used for that purpose and not for broader purposes otherwise permissible under the articles of incorporation.

Solicitation materials may constitute a gift instrument. For example, a solicitation that suggests in writing that any gifts received pursuant to the solicitation will be held as an endowment may be integrated with other writings and may be considered part of the gift instrument. Whether the terms of the solicitation become part of the gift instrument will depend upon the circumstances, including whether a subsequent writing superseded the terms of the solicitation.  Each gift received in response to a solicitation will be subject to any restrictions indicated in the gift instrument pertaining to that gift.  For example, if an initial gift establishes an endowment fund, and the charity then solicits additional gifts “to be held as part of the Charity X Endowment Fund,” those additional gifts will each be subject to the restriction that the gifts be held as part of that endowment fund.

The term gift instrument includes matching funds provided by an employer or some other person.  Whether matching funds are treated as part of the endowment fund or otherwise will depend on the terms of the matching gift.

The term gift instrument also includes an appropriation by a legislature or other public or governmental body for the benefit of an institution.

Subsection (4). Institution.

The Act applies generally to institutions organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. The term includes charitable organizations created as nonprofit corporations, unincorporated associations, governmental subdivisions or agencies, or any form of entity, however organized, that is organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. The term includes a trust organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, but only if a charity acts as trustee.  This approach leaves unchanged the coverage of UMIFA.  The exclusion of “individual” from the definition of institution is not intended to exclude a corporation sole.

Although UPMIFA does not apply to all charitable trusts, many of UPMIFA’s provisions derive from trust law.  Prudent investor standards apply to trustees of charitable trusts in states that have adopted UPIA.  Trustees of charitable trusts can use the doctrines of cy pres and deviation to modify trust provisions, and the UTC includes a number of modification provisions.  The Uniform Principal and Income Act permits allocation between principal and income to facilitate total-return investing.  Charitable trusts not included in UPMIFA, primarily those managed by corporate trustees and individuals, will lose the benefits of UPMIFA’s endowment spending rule and the provision permitting a charity to apply cy pres, without court supervision, for modifications to a small, old fund.  Enacting jurisdictions may choose to incorporate these rules into existing trust statutes to provide the benefits to charitable funds managed by corporate trustees.

The definition of institution includes governmental organizations that hold funds exclusively for the purposes listed in the definition. A governmental entity created by state law  may fall outside the definition on account of the form of organization under which the state created it. Because state arrangements are so varied, creating a definition that encompasses all charitable entities created by states is not feasible. States should consider applying the core principles of UPMIFA to such governmental institutions. For example, the control over a state university may be held by a State Board of Regents. In that situation, the state may have created a governing structure by statute or in the state constitution so that the university is, in effect, privately chartered. The Drafting Committee does not intend to exclude these universities from the definition of institution, but additional state legislation may be necessary to address particular situations.

Subsection (5). Institutional Fund.

The term institutional fund includes any fund held by an institution for charitable purposes, whether the fund is expendable currently or subject to restrictions. The term does not include a fund held by a trustee that is not an institution.

Some institutions combine assets from multiple funds for investment purposes, and some institutions invest funds from different institutions in a common fund.  Typically each fund is assigned units representing the share value of the individual fund.  The assets are invested collectively, permitting more efficient investment and improved diversification of the overall portfolio.  The collective fund makes annual distributions to the individual funds based on the units held by each fund.  For purposes of Section 3 [and Section 5] [§§ 35-10-203 and 35-10-205], the collective fund is considered one institutional fund.  Section 4 and Section 6 [§§ 35-10-204 and 35-10-206] apply to each fund individually and not to the collective fund.

Assets held by an institution primarily for program-related purposes rather than exclusively for investment are not subject to UPMIFA.  For example, a university may purchase land adjacent to its campus for future development.  The purchase might not meet prudent investor standards for commercial real estate, but the purchase may be appropriate because the university needs to build a new dormitory.  The classroom buildings, administration buildings, and dormitories held by the university all have value as property, but the university does not hold those buildings as financial assets for investment purposes.  The Act excludes from the prudent investor norms those assets that a charity uses to conduct its charitable activities, but does not exclude assets that have a tangential tie to the charitable purpose of the institution but are held primarily for investment purposes.

A fund held by an institution is not an institutional fund if any beneficiary of the fund is not an institution. For example, a charitable remainder trust held by a charity as trustee for the benefit of the donor during the donor’s lifetime, with the remainder interest held by the charity, is not an institutional fund. However, this subsection treats as an institution a charitable remainder trust that continues to operate for charitable purposes after the termination of the noncharitable interests. The Act will have only a limited effect on a charitable remainder trust that terminates after the noncharitable interest ends.  During the period required to complete the distribution of the trust’s property, the prudence norm will apply to the actions of the trustee, but the short timeframe will affect investment decision making.

Subsection (6). Person.

The Act uses as the definition of person the definition approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  The definition of institution uses the term person, but to be an institution a person must be organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes.  A person with a commercial purpose cannot be an institution.  Thus, although the definition of person includes “business trust” and “any other . . . commercial entity,” the Act does not apply to an entity organized for business purposes and not exclusively for charitable purposes. Further, the definition of person includes trusts, but only trusts managed by charities can be institutional funds.  UPMIFA does not apply to trusts managed by corporate trustees or by individual trustees.

If a governing instrument provides that a fund will revert to the donor if, and only if, the institution ceases to exist or the purposes of the fund fail, then the fund will be considered an institutional fund until such contingency occurs.

Subsection (7). Program-Related Asset.

Although UPMIFA does not apply to program-related assets, if program-related assets serve, in part, as investments for an institution, then the institution should identify categories for reporting those investments and should establish investment criteria for the investments that are reasonably related to achieving the institution’s charitable purposes.  For example, a program providing below-market loans to inner-city businesses may be “primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution” but also can be considered, in part, an investment.  The institution should create reasonable credit standards and other guidelines for the program to increase the likelihood that the loans will be repaid.

Subsection (8). Record.

This definition was added to clarify that the definition of instrument includes electronic records as defined in Section 2(8) of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (1999) [§ 47-10-102(7)].

35-10-203. Standard of conduct in managing and investing institutional fund.

  1. Subject to the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument, an institution, in managing and investing an institutional fund, shall consider the charitable purposes of the institution and the purposes of the institutional fund.
  2. In addition to complying with the duty of loyalty imposed by law other than this part, each person responsible for managing and investing an institutional fund shall manage and invest the fund in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.
  3. In managing and investing an institutional fund, an institution:
    1. May incur only costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the institution, and the skills available to the institution; and
    2. Shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the management and investment of the fund.
  4. An institution may pool two (2) or more institutional funds for purposes of management and investment.
  5. Except as otherwise provided by a gift instrument, the following rules apply:
    1. In managing and investing an institutional fund, the following factors, if relevant, must be considered:
      1. General economic conditions;
      2. The possible effect of inflation or deflation;
      3. The expected tax consequences, if any, of investment decisions or strategies;
      4. The role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall investment portfolio of the fund;
      5. The expected total return from income and the appreciation of investments;
      6. Other resources of the institution;
      7. The needs of the institution and the fund to make distributions and to preserve capital; and
      8. An asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the charitable purposes of the institution;
    2. Management and investment decisions about an individual asset must be made not in isolation but rather in the context of the institutional fund's portfolio of investments as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the fund and to the institution;
    3. Except as otherwise provided by law other than this part, an institution may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent with this section;
    4. An institution shall diversify the investments of an institutional fund unless the institution reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the fund are better served without diversification;
    5. Within a reasonable time after receiving property, an institution shall make and carry out decisions concerning the retention or disposition of the property or to rebalance a portfolio, in order to bring the institutional fund into compliance with the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the institution and the requirements of this part; and
    6. A person that has special skills or expertise, or is selected in reliance upon the person's representation that the person has special skills or expertise, has a duty to use those skills or that expertise in managing and investing institutional funds.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 3.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Purpose and Scope of Revisions.

This section adopts the prudence standard for investment decision making. The section directs directors or others responsible for managing and investing the funds of an institution to act as a prudent investor would, using a portfolio approach in making investments and considering the risk and return objectives of the fund. The section lists the factors that commonly bear on decisions in fiduciary investing and incorporates the duty to diversify investments absent a conclusion that special circumstances make a decision not to diversify reasonable. Thus, the section follows modern portfolio theory for investment decision making. Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] applies to all funds held by an institution, regardless of whether the institution obtained the funds by gift or otherwise and regardless of whether the funds are restricted.

The Drafting Committee discussed extensively the standard that should govern nonprofit managers. UMIFA states the standard as “ordinary business care and prudence under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision.” Since the decision in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (1974), the trend has been to hold directors of nonprofit corporations to a standard nominally similar to the corporate standard but with the recognition that the facts and circumstances considered include the fact that the entity is a charity and not a business corporation.

The language of the prudence standard adopted in UPMIFA is derived from the RMNCA and from the prudent investor rule of UPIA. The standard is consistent with the business judgment standard under corporate law, as applied to charitable institutions. That is, a manager operating a charitable organization under the business judgment rule would look to the same factors as those identified by the prudent investor rule. The standard for prudent investment set forth in Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] first states the duty of care as articulated in the RMNCA, but provides more specific guidance for those managing and investing institutional funds by incorporating language from UPIA.  The criteria derived from UPIA are consistent with good practice under current law applicable to nonprofit corporations.

Trust law norms already inform managers of nonprofit corporations.  The Preamble to UPIA explains:  “Although the Uniform Prudent Investor Act by its terms applies to trusts and not to charitable corporations, the standards of the Act can be expected to inform the investment responsibilities of directors and officers of charitable corporations.”  See also, Restatement (Third) of Trusts:  Prudent Investor Rule § 379, Comment b, at 190 (1992) (stating that “absent a contrary statute or other provision, the prudent investor rule applies to investment of funds held for charitable corporations.”).  Trust precedents have routinely been found to be helpful but not binding authority in corporate cases.

The Drafting Committee decided that by adopting language from both the RMNCA and UPIA, UPMIFA could clarify that common standards of prudent investing apply to all charitable institutions.  Although the principal trust authorities, UPIA § (2)(a), Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 337, UTC § 804, and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (prudent administration) use the phrase “care, skill and caution,” the Drafting Committee decided to use the more familiar corporate formulation as found in RMNCA.  The standard also appears in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of UPMIFA [§§ 35-10-203 - 35-10-205].  The Drafting Committee does not intend any substantive change to the UPIA standard and believes that “reasonable care, skill, and caution” are implicit in the term “care” as used in the RMNCA.  The Drafting Committee included the detailed provisions from UPIA, because the Committee believed that the greater precision of the prudence norms of the Restatement and UPIA, as compared with UMIFA, could helpfully inform managers of charitable institutions.  For an explanation of the Prudent Investor Act, see  John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing , 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641 (1996), and for a discussion of the effect UPIA has had on investment decision making, see  Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation? , 50 J. L. & Econ. (forthcoming 2007).

Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] has incorporated the provisions of UPIA with only a few exceptions.  UPIA applies to private trusts and is entirely default law.  The settlor of a private trust has complete control over virtually all trust provisions.  See UTC § 105.  Because UPMIFA applies to charitable organizations, UPMIFA  makes the duty of care, the duty to minimize costs, and the duty to investigate mandatory.  The duty of loyalty is mandatory under applicable organization law, corporate or trust.  Other than these duties, the provisions of Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] are default rules. A gift instrument or the governing instruments of an institution can modify these duties, but the charitable purpose doctrine limits the extent to which an institution or a donor can restrict these duties.  In addition, subsection (a) of Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] reminds the decision maker that the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument will control decision making.  Further, the decision maker must consider the charitable purposes of the institution and the purposes of the institutional fund for which decisions are being made.  These factors are specific to charitable organizations; UPIA § 2(a) states the duty to consider similar factors in the private trust context.

UPMIFA does not include the duty of impartiality, stated in UPIA § 6, because nonprofit corporations do not confront the multiple beneficiaries problem to which the duty is addressed.  Under UPIA, a trustee must treat the current beneficiaries and the remainder beneficiaries with due regard to their respective interests, subject to alternative direction from the trust document.  A nonprofit corporation typically creates one charity.  The institution may serve multiple beneficiaries, but those beneficiaries do not have enforceable rights in the institution in the same way that beneficiaries of a private trust do.  Of course, if a charitable trust is created to benefit more than one charity, rather than being created to carry out a charitable purpose, then UPIA will apply the duty of impartiality to that trust.

In other respects, the Drafting Committee made changes to language from UPIA only where necessary to adapt the language for charitable institutions.  No material differences are intended.  Subsection (e)(1)(D) of Section 3 of UPMIFA [§ 35-10-203] does not include a clause that appears at the end of UPIA § 2(c)(4) (“which may include financial assets, interest in closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property.”).  The Drafting Committee deemed this clause unnecessary for charitable institutions.  The language of subsection (e)(1)(G) reflects a modification of the language of UPIA § (2)(c)(7).  Other minor modifications to the UPIA provisions make the language more appropriate for charitable institutions.

The duties imposed by this section apply to those who govern an institution, including directors and trustees, and to those to whom the directors or managers delegate responsibility for investment and management of institutional funds.  The standard applies to officers and employees of an institution and to agents who invest and manage institutional funds. Volunteers who work with an institution will be subject to the duties imposed here, but state and federal statutes may provide reduced liability for persons who act without compensation.  UPMIFA does not affect the application of those shield statutes.

Subsection (a). Donor Intent and Charitable Purposes.

Subsection (a) states the overarching duty to comply with donor intent as expressed in the terms of the gift instrument.  The emphasis in the Act on giving effect to donor intent does not mean that the donor can or should control the management of the institution.  The other fundamental duty is the duty to consider the charitable purposes of the institution and of the institutional fund in making management and investment decisions.  UPIA § 2(a) states a similar duty to consider the purposes of a trust in investing and managing assets of a trust.

Subsection (b).  Duty of Loyalty.

Subsection (b) reminds those managing and investing institutional funds that the duty of loyalty will apply to their actions, but Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] does not state the loyalty standard that applies.  The Drafting Committee was concerned, at least nominally, that different standards of loyalty may apply to directors of nonprofit corporations and to trustees of charitable trusts.  The RMNCA provides that under the duty of loyalty a director of a nonprofit corporation should act “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”  RMNCA § 8.30.  The trust law articulation of the loyalty standard uses “sole interests” rather than “best interests.”  As the Restatement of Trusts explains, “[t]he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1).  Although the standards for loyalty, like the standard of care, are merging, see  Evelyn Brody, Charitable Governance:  What’s Trust Law Got to do With It?  Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (2005); John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest , 114 Yale L.J. 929 (2005), the Drafting Committee concluded that formulating a duty of loyalty provision for UPMIFA was unnecessary.  Thus the duty of loyalty under nonprofit corporation law will apply to charities organized as nonprofit corporations, and the duty of loyalty under trust law will apply to charitable trusts.

Subsection (b). Duty of Care.

Subsection (b) also applies the duty of care to performance of investment duties. The language derives from § 8.30 of the RMNCA.  This subsection states the duty to act in good faith, “with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”  Although the language in the RMNCA and in UPMIFA is similar to that of § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act (3d ed. 2002), the standard as applied to persons making decisions for charities is informed by the fact that the institution is a charity and not a business corporation.  Thus, in UPMIFA the references to “like position” and “similar circumstances” mean that the charitable nature of the institution affects the decision making of a prudent person acting under the standard set forth in subsection (b).  The duty of care involves considering the factors set forth in subsection (e)(1).

Subsection (c)(1). Duty to Minimize Costs.

Subsection (c)(1) tracks the language of UPIA § 7 and requires an institution to minimize costs. An institution may prudently incur costs by hiring an investment advisor, but the costs incurred should be appropriate under the circumstances. See UPIA § 7 cmt; Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, cmt. M, at 58 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959). The duty is consistent with the duty to act prudently under § 8.30 of the RMNCA.

Subsection (c)(2). Duty to Investigate.

This subsection incorporates the traditional fiduciary duty to investigate, using language from UPIA § 2(d). The subsection requires persons who make investment and management decisions to investigate the accuracy of the information used in making decisions.

Subsection (d). Pooling Funds.

An institution holding more than one institutional fund may find that pooling its funds for investment and management purposes will be economically beneficial.  The Act permits pooling for these purposes.  The prohibition against commingling no longer prevents pooling funds for investment and management purposes.  See UPIA § 3, cmt. (duty to diversify aided by pooling); UPIA § 7, cmt. (pooling to minimize costs); Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Duty to Segregate and Identify Trust Property § 84 (T.D. No. 4 2005).  Funds will be considered individually for other purposes of the Act, including for the spending rule for endowment funds of Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] and the modification rules of Section 6 [§ 35-10-206].

Subsection (e)(1). Prudent Decision Making.

Subsection (e)(1) takes much of its language from UPIA § 2(c). In making decisions about whether to acquire or retain an asset, the institution should consider the institution’s mission, its current programs, and the desire to cultivate additional donations from a donor, in addition to factors related more directly to the asset’s potential as an investment.

Subsection (e)(1)(C) reflects the fact that some organizations will invest in taxable investments that may generate unrelated business taxable income for income tax purposes.

Assets held primarily for program-related purposes are not subject to UPMIFA. The management of those assets will continue to be governed by other laws applicable to the institution. Other assets may not be held primarily for program-related purposes but may have both investment purposes and program-related purposes. Subsections (a) and (e)(1)(H) indicate that a prudent decision maker can take into consideration the relationship between an investment and the purposes of the institution and of the institutional fund in making an investment that may have a program-related purpose but not be primarily program-related. The degree to which an institution uses an asset to accomplish a charitable purpose will affect the weight given that factor in a decision to acquire or retain the asset.

Subsection (e)(2). Portfolio Approach.

This subsection reflects the use of portfolio theory in modern investment practice. The language comes from UPIA § 2(b), which follows the articulation of the prudent investor standard in Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(a) (1992).

Subsection (e)(3). Broad Investment Authority.

Consistent with the portfolio theory of investment, this subsection permits a broad range of investments.  The language derives from UPIA § 2(e).

Section 4 of UMIFA indicated that an institution could invest “without restriction to investments a fiduciary may make.”  The committee removed this language from subsection (e)(3) as unnecessary, because states no longer have legal lists restricting fiduciary investing to the specific types of investments identified in statutory lists.

Subsection (e)(3) also provides that other law may limit the authority under this subsection.  In addition, all of subsection (e) is subject to contrary provisions in a gift instrument, and a gift instrument may restrict the ability to invest in particular assets.  For example, the gift instrument for a particular institutional fund might preclude the institution from investing the assets of the fund in companies that produce tobacco products.

In her book, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation 434 (Harv. Univ. Press 2004), Marion R. Fremont-Smith reports that some large charities pledge their endowment funds as security for loans.  Subsection (e)(3) permits this sort of debt financing, subject to the guidelines of subsection (e)(1).

Subsection (e)(4). Duty to Diversify.

This subsection assumes that prudence requires diversification but permits an institution to determine that nondiversification is appropriate under exceptional circumstances.  A decision not to diversify must be based on the needs of the charity and not solely for the benefit of a donor.  A decision to retain property in the hope of obtaining additional contributions from the same donor may be considered made for the benefit of the charity, but the appropriateness of that decision will depend on the circumstances.  This subsection derives its language from UPIA § 3. See  UPIA § 3 cmt. (discussing the rationale for diversification); Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).

Subsection (e)(5). Disposing of Unsuitable Assets.

This subsection imposes a duty on an institution to review the suitability of retaining property contributed to the institution within a reasonable period of time after the institution receives the property.  Subsection (e)(5) requires the institution to make a decision but does not require a particular outcome.  The institution may consider a variety of factors in making its decision, and a decision to retain the property either for a period of time or indefinitely may be a prudent decision.

Section 4(2) of UMIFA specifically authorized an institution to retain property contributed by a donor.  The comment explained that an institution might retain property in the hope of obtaining additional contributions from the donor.  Under UPMIFA the potential for developing additional contributions by retaining property contributed to the institution would be among the “other circumstances” that the institution might consider in deciding whether to retain or dispose of the property.  The institution must weigh the potential for obtaining additional contributions with all other factors that affect the suitability of retaining the property in the investment portfolio.

The language of subsection (e)(5) comes from UPIA § 4, which restates Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 229 (1992), which adopted language from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 231 (1959). See  UPIA § 4 cmt.

Subsection (e)(6). Special Skills or Expertise.

Subsection (e)(6) states the rule provided in UPIA § 2(f) requiring a trustee to use the trustee’s own skills and expertise in carrying out the trustee’s fiduciary duties. The comment to RMNCA § 8.30 describes the existence of a similar rule under the law of nonprofit corporations.  Section 8.30(a)(2) provides that in discharging duties a director must act “with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. . . .”  The comment explains that”[t]he concept of ‘under similar circumstances’ relates not only to the circumstances of the corporation but to the special background, qualifications, and management experience of the individual director and the role the director plays in the corporation.”  After describing directors chosen for their ability to raise money, the comment notes that “[n]o special skill or expertise should be expected from such directors unless their background or knowledge evidences some special ability.”

The intent of subsection (e)(6) is that a person managing or investing institutional funds must use the person’s own judgment and experience, including any particular skills or expertise, in carrying out the management or investment duties.  For example, if a charity names a person as a director in part because the person is a lawyer, the lawyer’s background may allow the lawyer to recognize legal issues in connection with funds held by the charity.  The lawyer should identify the issues for the board, but the lawyer is not expected to provide legal advice.  A lawyer is not expected to be able to recognize every legal issue, particularly issues outside the lawyer’s area of expertise, simply because the board member is lawyer.  See  ALI Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, Preliminary Draft No. 3 (May 12, 2005) § 315 (Duty of Care), cmt. c.

UMIFA contained two provisions that authorized investments in pooled or common investment funds. UMIFA §§ 4(3), 4(4). The Drafting Committee concluded that Section 3(e)(3) of UPMIFA [§ 35-10-203(e)(3)] authorizes these investments. The decision not to include the two provisions in UPMIFA implies no disapproval of such investments.

35-10-204. Appropriation for expenditure or accumulation of endowment fund — Rules of construction.

  1. Subject to the intent of a donor expressed in the gift instrument and to subsection (d), an institution may appropriate for expenditure or accumulate so much of an endowment fund as the institution determines is prudent for the uses, benefits, purposes, and duration for which the endowment fund is established. Unless stated otherwise in the gift instrument, the assets in an endowment fund are donor-restricted assets until appropriated for expenditure by the institution. In making a determination to appropriate or accumulate, the institution shall act in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and shall consider, if relevant, the following factors:
    1. The duration and preservation of the endowment fund;
    2. The purposes of the institution and the endowment fund;
    3. General economic conditions;
    4. The possible effect of inflation or deflation;
    5. The expected total return from income and the appreciation of investments;
    6. Other resources of the institution; and
    7. The investment policy of the institution.
  2. To limit the authority to appropriate for expenditure or accumulate under subsection (a), a gift instrument must specifically state the limitation.
  3. Terms in a gift instrument designating a gift as an endowment, or a direction or authorization in the gift instrument to use only “income”, “interest”, “dividends”, or “rents, issues, or profits”, or “to preserve the principal intact”, or words of similar import:
    1. Create an endowment fund of permanent duration unless other language in the gift instrument limits the duration or purpose of the fund; and
    2. Do not otherwise limit the authority to appropriate for expenditure or accumulate under subsection (a).
    1. The appropriation for expenditure in any year of an amount greater than seven percent (7%) of the fair market value of an endowment fund, calculated on the basis of market values determined at least quarterly and averaged over a period of not less than three (3) years immediately preceding the year in which the appropriation for expenditure was made, creates a rebuttable presumption of imprudence.
    2. For an endowment fund in existence for fewer than three (3) years, the fair market value of the endowment fund must be calculated for the period the endowment fund has been in existence.
    3. This subsection (d) does not:
      1. Apply to an appropriation for expenditure permitted under law other than this part or by the gift instrument; or
      2. Create a presumption of prudence for an appropriation for expenditure of an amount less than or equal to seven (7%) percent of the fair market value of the endowment fund.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 4.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Purpose and Scope of Revisions.

This section revises the provision in UMIFA that permitted the expenditure of appreciation of an endowment fund to the extent the fund had appreciated in value above the fund’s historic dollar value. UMIFA defined historic dollar value to mean all contributions to the fund, valued at the time of contribution. Instead of using historic dollar value as a limitation, UPMIFA applies a more carefully articulated prudence standard to the process of making decisions about expenditures from an endowment fund.  The expenditure rule of Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] applies only to the extent that a donor and an institution have not reached some other agreement about spending from an endowment.  If a gift instrument sets forth specific requirements for spending, then the charity must comply with those requirements.  However, if the gift instrument uses more general language, for example directing the charity to “hold the fund as an endowment” or “retain principal and spend income,” then Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] provides a rule of construction to guide the charity.

Prior to the promulgation of UMIFA, “income” for trust accounting purposes meant interest and dividends but not capital gains, whether or not realized.  Many institutions assumed that trust accounting principles applied to charities organized as nonprofit corporations, and the rules limited the institutions’ ability to invest their endowment funds effectively.  UMIFA addressed this problem by construing “income” in gift instruments to include a prudent amount of capital gains, both realized and unrealized.  Under UMIFA an institution could spend appreciation in addition to spending income determined under trust accounting rules.  This rule of construction likely carried out the intent of the donor better than a rule limiting spending to trust accounting income, while permitting the charity to invest in a manner that could generate better returns for the fund.

UPMIFA also applies a rule of construction to terms like “income” or “endowment.”  The assumption in the Act is that a donor who uses one of these terms intends to create a fund that will generate sufficient gains to be able to make ongoing distributions from the fund while at the same time preserving the purchasing power of the fund.  Because historic dollar value under UMIFA was a number fixed in time, the use of that approach may not have adequately captured the intent of a donor who wanted the endowment fund to continue to maintain its value in current dollars.  UPMIFA takes a different approach, directing the institution to determine spending based on the total assets of the endowment fund rather than determining spending by adding a prudent amount of appreciation to trust accounting income.

UPMIFA requires the persons making spending decisions for an endowment fund to focus on the purposes of the endowment fund as opposed to the purposes of the institution more generally, as was the case under UMIFA.  When the institution considers the purposes and duration of the fund, the institution will give priority to the donor’s general intent that the fund be maintained permanently.  Although the Act does not require that a specific amount be set aside as “principal,” the Act assumes that the charity will act to preserve “principal” (i.e., to maintain the purchasing power of the amounts contributed to the fund) while spending “income” (i.e. making a distribution each year that represents a reasonable spending rate, given investment performance and general economic conditions).  Thus, an institution should monitor principal in an accounting sense, identifying the original value of the fund (the historic dollar value) and the increases in value necessary to maintain the purchasing power of the fund.

Subsection (a).  Expenditure of Endowment Funds.

Subsection (a) uses the RMNCA articulation of the standard of care for decision making under Section 4 [§ 35-10-204].  The change in language does not reflect a substantive change.  The comment to Section 3 [§ 35-10-203] more fully describes that standard of care.

Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] permits expenditures from an endowment fund to the extent the institution determines that the expenditures are prudent after considering the factors listed in subsection (a).  These factors emphasize the importance of the intent of the donor, as expressed in a gift instrument.  Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] looks to written documents as evidence of donor’s intent and does not require an institution to rely on oral expressions of intent.  By requiring written evidence of intent, the Act protects reliance by the donor and the institution on the written terms of a donative agreement. Informal conversations may be misremembered and may be subject to multiple interpretations.  Of course, oral expressions of intent may guide an institution in further carrying out a donor’s wishes and in understanding a donor’s intent.

The factors in subsection (a) require attention to the purposes of the institution and the endowment fund, economic conditions, and present and reasonably anticipated resources of the institution. As under UMIFA, determinations under Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] do not depend on the characterization of assets as income or principal and are not limited to the amount of income and unrealized appreciation.  The authority in Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] is permissive, however, and an institution organized as a trust may continue to make spending decisions under trust accounting principles so long as doing so is prudent.

Institutions have operated effectively under UMIFA and have operated more conservatively than the historic dollar value rule would have permitted. Institutions have little incentive to maximize allowable spending.  Good practice has been to provide for modest expenditures while maintaining the purchasing power of a fund. Institutions have followed this practice even though UMIFA (1) does not require an institution to maintain a fund’s purchasing power and (2) does allow an institution to spend any amounts in a fund above historic dollar value, subject to the prudence standard.  The Drafting Committee concluded that eliminating historic dollar value and providing institutions with more discretion would not lead to depletion of endowment funds. Instead, UPMIFA should encourage institutions to establish a spending policy that will be responsive to short-term fluctuations in the value of the fund. Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] allows an institution to maintain appropriate levels of expenditures in times of economic downturn or economic strength. In some years, accumulation rather than spending will be prudent, and in other years an institution may appropriately make expenditures even if a fund has not generated investment return that year.

Several levels of safeguard exist to prevent an institution from depleting an endowment fund or diverting assets from the purposes for which the fund was created.  In comparison with UMIFA, UPMIFA provides greater direction to the institution with respect to making a prudent determination about spending from an endowment. UMIFA told the decision maker to consider “long and short term needs of the institution in carrying out its educational, religious, charitable, or other eleemosynary purposes, its present and anticipated financial requirements, expected total return on its investments, price level trends, and general economic conditions.”  UPMIFA clarifies that in making spending decisions the institution should attempt to ensure that the value of the fund endures while still providing that some amounts be spent for the purposes of the endowment fund.  In UPMIFA prudent decision making emphasizes the endowment aspect of the fund, rather than the overall purposes or needs of the institution.

In addition to the guidance provided by Section 4 [§ 35-10-204], other safeguards exist.  Donors can restrict gifts and can provide specific instructions to donee institutions regarding appropriate uses for assets contributed. Within institutions, fiduciary duties govern the persons making decisions on expenditures. Those persons must operate both with the best interests of the institution in mind and in keeping with the intent of donors. If an institution diverts an institutional fund from the charitable purposes of the institution, the state attorney general can enforce the charitable interests of the public. By relying on these safeguards while providing institutions with adequate discretion to make appropriate expenditures, the Act creates a standard that takes into consideration the diversity of the charitable sector. The committee expects that accumulated experience with such spending formulas will continue to inform institutional practice under the Act.

Distinguishing Legal and Accounting Standards.

Deleting historic dollar value does not transform any portion of an endowment fund into unrestricted assets from a legal standpoint.  An endowment fund is restricted because of the donor’s intent that the fund be restricted by the prudent spending rule, that the fund not be spent in the current year, and that the fund continue to maintain its value for a long time.  Regardless of the treatment of endowment fund from an accounting standpoint, legally an endowment fund should not be considered unrestricted.  Subsection (a) states that endowment funds will be legally restricted until the institution appropriates funds for expenditure.  The UMIFA statutes in Utah and Maine contain similar language. 13 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 4106 (West 2005); Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 13-29-3 (2005).   See, also,  advisory published by Mass. Attorney General, “The Attorney General's Position on FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 117, ¶ 22 and Related G.L.C. 180A Issues” (January 2004) http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/fasb.pdf (last visited May 22, 2006) (concerning the treatment of endowments as legally restricted assets).

The term “endowment fund” includes funds that may last in perpetuity but also funds that are created to last for a fixed term of years or until the institution achieves a specified objective. Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] requires the institution to consider the intended duration of the fund in making determinations about spending. For example, if a donor directs that a fund be spent over 20 years, Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] will guide the institution in making distribution decisions. The institution would amortize the fund over 20 years rather than try to maintain the fund in perpetuity.  For an endowment fund of limited duration, spending at a rate higher than rates typically used for endowment spending will be both necessary and prudent.

Subsection (c).  Rule of Construction.

Donor’s intent must be respected in the process of making decisions to expend endowment funds. Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] does not allow an institution to convert an endowment fund into a non-endowment fund nor does the section allow the institution to ignore a donor’s intent that a fund be maintained as an endowment. Rather, subsection (c) provides rules of construction to assist institutions in interpreting donor’s intent. Subsection (c) assumes that if a donor wants an institution to spend “only the income” from a fund, the donor intends that the fund both support current expenditures and be preserved permanently.  The donor is unlikely to be concerned about designation of particular returns as “income” or “principal” under accounting principles. Rather the donor is more likely to assume that the institution will use modern total-return investing techniques to generate enough funds to distribute while maintaining the long-term viability of the fund. Subsection (c) is an intent effectuating provision that provides default rules to construe donor’s intent.

As subsection (b) explains, a donor who wants to specify particular spending guidelines can do so.  For example, a donor might require that a charity spend between three and five percent of an endowed gift each year, regardless of investment performance or other factors.  Because the charity agrees to the restriction in accepting the gift, the restriction will govern spending decisions by the charity.  Another donor might want to limit expenditures to trust accounting income and not want the institution to be able to expend appreciation.  An instruction to “pay only the income” will not be specific enough, but an instruction to “pay only interest and dividend income earned by the fund and not to make other distributions of the kind authorized by Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] of UPMIFA” should be sufficient.  If a donor indicates that the rules on investing or expenditures under Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] do not apply to a particular fund, then as a practical matter the institution will probably invest the fund separately. Thus, a decision by a donor to require fund specific expenditure rules will likely also have consequences in the way the institution invests the fund.

Retroactive Application of the Rule of Construction.

A constructional rule resolves an ambiguity, in this case, because donors use words like endowment or income without specific directions regarding the intended meaning.  Changing a statutory constructional rule does not change the underlying intent, and instead changes the way an ambiguity is resolved, in an attempt to increase the likelihood of giving effect to the intent of most donors.

If a donor has stated in a gift instrument specific directions as to spending, then the institution must respect those wishes, but many donors do not give precise instructions about how to spend endowment funds.  In Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] UPMIFA provides guidance for giving effect to a donor’s intent when the donor has not been specific. Like Section 3 of UMIFA, Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] of UPMIFA is a rule of construction, so it does not violate either donor intent or the Constitution.

The issue of whether to apply a rule of construction retroactively was considered in connection with UMIFA.  When the New Hampshire legislature considered UMIFA, the Senate asked the New Hampshire Supreme Court for an opinion regarding whether UMIFA, if adopted, would violate a provision of the state constitution prohibiting retrospective laws, and also whether the statute would encroach on the functions of the judicial branch.  The opinion answered no to both questions.  Opinion of the Justices, Request of the Senate No. 6667, 113 N.H. 287, 306 A.2d 55 (1973).

More recently the Colorado Supreme Court considered the retroactive application of another constructional statute, one that deems the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy to be revoked in a case in which the marriage was dissolved after the naming of the spouse as beneficiary.  In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P. 3d 849 (Colo. 2002). In holding that retroactive application of the statute did not violate the Contracts Clause, the court cited approvingly from a statement prepared by the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts (JEB). JEB Statement Regarding the Constitutionality of Changes in Default Rules as Applied to PreExisting Documents, 17 Am. Coll. Tr. & Est. Couns. Notes 184 app. II (1991).

The JEB Statement explains that the purpose of the anti-retroactivity norm is to protect a transferor who relies on existing rules of law.  By definition, however, rules of construction apply only in situations in which a transferor did not spell out his or her intent and hence did not rely on the then-current rule of construction.   See also In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 132, 123 N.W. 2d 69, 73 (1963) (“[I]t is doubtful whether the testatrix had any clear intention in mind at the time the will was executed.  It is equally plausible that if she had thought about it at all she would have desired to have the dividends go where the law required them to go at the time they were received by the trustee.”) (Uniform Principal and Income Act).

Non-retroactivity would produce serious practical problems:  If the Act were not retroactive, a charity would need to keep two sets of books for each endowment fund created before the enactment of UPMIFA, if new funds were added after the enactment.  The burden that such a rule would impose is out of proportion to the benefit sought.

Subsection (d).  Rebuttable Presumption of Imprudence.

The Drafting Committee debated at length whether to include a presumption of imprudence for spending above a fixed percentage of the value of the fund.  The Drafting Committee decided to include a presumption in the Act in brackets, as an option for states to consider, and to include in these Comments a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of including a presumption in the Act.

Some who commented on the Act viewed the presumption as linked to the retroactive application of the rule of construction of subsection (c).  A donor who contributed to an endowment fund under UMIFA may have assumed that the historic dollar value of the gift would be subject to a no-spending rule under the statute.  Because UPMIFA removes the concept of historic dollar value, the bracketed presumption of imprudence would assure the donor that spending from an endowment fund will be so limited.

Those in favor of the presumption of imprudence argued that the presumption would curb the temptation that a charity might have to spend endowment assets too rapidly.  Although the presumption would be rebuttable, and spending above the identified percentage might, in some years and for some charities, be prudent, institutions would likely be reluctant to authorize spending above seven percent.  In addition, the presumption would give the attorney general a benchmark of sorts.

A variety of considerations cut against including a presumption of imprudence in the statute.  A fixed percentage in the statute might be perceived as a safe harbor that could lead institutions to spend more than is prudent.  Although the provision should not be read to imply that spending below seven percent will be considered prudent, some charities might interpret the statute in that way.  Decision makers might be pressured to spend up to the percentage, and in doing so spend more than is prudent, without adequate review of the prudence factors as required under the Act.

Perhaps the biggest problem with including a presumption in the statute is the difficulty of picking a number that will be appropriate in view of the range of institutions and charitable purposes and the fact that economic conditions will change over time.  Under recent economic conditions, a spending rate of seven percent is too high for most funds, but in a period of high inflation, seven percent might be too low.  In making a prudent decision regarding how much to spend from an endowment fund, each institution must consider a variety of factors, including the particular purposes of the fund, the wishes of the donors, changing economic factors, and whether the fund will receive future donations.

Whether or not a statute includes the presumption, institutions must remember that prudence controls decision making. Each institution must make decisions on expenditures based on the circumstances of the particular charity.

Application of Presumption.

For a state wishing to adopt a presumption of imprudence, subsection (d) provides language.  Under subsection (d), a rebuttable presumption of imprudence will arise if expenditures in one year exceed seven percent of the assets of an endowment fund.  The subsection applies a rolling average of three or more years in determining the value of the fund for purposes of calculating the seven-percent amount.  An institution can rebut the presumption of imprudence if circumstances in a particular year make expenditures above that amount prudent.  The concept and the language for the presumption of imprudence comes from Mass. Gen. L. ch. 180A, § 2 (2004).  Massachusetts enacted this rule in 1975 as part of its UMIFA statute.  New Mexico adopted the same presumption in 1978. N.M.S.A. § 46-9-2 (C) (2004).  New Hampshire has a similar provision.  N.H. Rev. Stat. § 292-B:6.

The period that a charity uses to calculate the presumption (three or more years) and the frequency of valuation (at least quarterly) will be binding in any determination of whether the presumption applies.  For example, if a charity values an endowment fund on a quarterly basis and averages the quarterly values over three years to determine the fair market value of the fund for purposes calculating seven percent of the fund, the charity’s choices of three years as a smoothing period and quarterly as a valuation period cannot be challenged.  If the charity makes an appropriation that is less than seven percent of this value, then the presumption of imprudence does not arise even if the appropriation would exceed seven percent of the value of the fund calculated based on monthly valuations averaged over five years.

If sufficient evidence establishes, by the preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to raise the presumption of imprudence, then the institution will have to carry the burden of production of (i.e., the burden of going forward with) other evidence that would tend to demonstrate that its decision was prudent.  The existence of the presumption does not shift the burden of persuasion to the charity.

Expenditures from an endowment fund may include distributions for charitable purposes and amounts used for the management and administration of the fund, including annual charges for fundraising. The value of a fund, as calculated for purposes of determining the seven percent amount, will reflect increases due to contributions and investment gains and decreases due to distributions and investment losses.  The seven percent figure includes charges for fundraising and administrative expenses other than investment management expenses.  All costs or fees associated with an endowment fund are factors that prudent decision makers consider.  High costs or fees of investment management could be considered imprudent regardless of whether spending exceeds seven percent of the fund’s value.

The presumption of imprudence does not create an automatic safe harbor. Expenditures at six percent might well be imprudently high.  See  James P. Garland, The Fecundity of Endowments and Long-Duration Trusts , The Journal of Portfolio Management (2005). Evidence reviewed by the Drafting Committee suggests that at present few funds can sustain spending at a rate above five percent.  See  Roger G. Ibbotson & Rex A. Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: Historical Returns (1926-1987) (Research Foundation of the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts, 1989).  Indeed, under current conditions five percent can be too high.  See  Joel C. Dobris, Why Five? The Strange, Magnetic, and Mesmerizing Affect of the Five Percent Unitrust and Spending Rate on Settlors, Their Advisers, and Retirees , 40 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 39 (2005).  Further, spending at a lower rate, particularly in the early years of an endowment, may result in greater distributions over time.  See  DeMarche Associates, Inc, Spending Policies and Investment Planning for Foundations: A Structure for Determining a Foundation’s Asset Mix (Council on Foundations: 3d ed. 1999).  A presumption of imprudence can serve as a reminder that spending at too high a rate will jeopardize the long-term nature of an endowment fund.  If an endowment fund is intended to continue permanently, the institution should take special care to limit annual spending to a level that protects the purchasing power of the fund.

Subsection (d) provides that the terms of the gift instrument can provide additional spending authority.  For example, if a gift instrument directs that an institution expend a fund over a ten-year period, exhausting the fund after ten years, spending at a rate higher than seven percent will be necessary.

Subsection (d) does not require an institution to spend a minimum amount each year.  The prudence standard and the needs of the institution will supply sufficient guidance regarding whether to accumulate rather than to spend in a particular year.

Spending above seven percent in any one year will not necessarily be imprudent.  For some endowment funds fluctuating spending rates may be appropriate.  Although the Act does not apply the percentage for the presumption on a rolling basis (e.g., 21 percent over three years), some endowment funds may prudently spend little or nothing in some years and more than seven percent in other years.  For example, a charity planning a construction project might decide to spend nothing from an endowment for three years and then in the fourth year might spend 20 percent of the value of the fund for construction costs.  The decision to accumulate in years one through three and then to spend 20 percent in the fourth year might be prudent for the charity, depending on the other factors.  The charity should maintain adequate records during the accumulation period and should document the decision-making process in the fourth year to be able to meet the burden of production associated with the presumption.  Another charity might prudently spend 20 percent in year one and nothing for the following three years.  That charity would also need to document the decision-making process through which the decision to spend occurred and maintain records explaining why the decision was prudent under the circumstances.

A charity might establish a “capital replacement fund” designed to provide funds to the institution for repair or replacement of major items of equipment.  Disbursements from such a fund will likely fluctuate, with limited expenditures in some years and big expenditures in others. The fund would not exhibit a uniform spending rate.  Indeed, an advantage of a capital replacement fund is the ability to absorb a significant capital expenditure in a single year without a negative impact on the operating budget of the institution.  Disbursements might average five percent per year but would vary, with spending in some years more and in some years less.  Even if this fund is an endowment fund subject to Section 4 [§ 35-10-204], spending above seven percent in a particular year could well be prudent.  Subsection (d) does not preclude spending above seven percent.

A charity creating a capital replacement fund or a building fund might chose to adopt spending rules for the fund that would not be subject to UPMIFA.  Specific donor intent can supersede the rules of UPMIFA.  If the charity creates a gift instrument that establishes appropriate rules on spending for the fund, and if donors agree to those restrictions, then the UPMIFA rules on spending, including the bracketed presumption, will not apply.

Institutions with Limited Investment and Spending Experience.

Several attorneys general and other charity officials raised concerns about whether small institutions would be able to adjust to a spending rule based solely on prudence, without the bright-line guidance of historic dollar value.  Some charity regulators who spoke with the Drafting Committee noted that large institutions have sophisticated investment strategies, access to good investment advisors, and experience with spending rules that maintain purchasing power for endowment funds.  For these institutions, the rules of UPMIFA should work well.  For smaller institutions, however, the state regulators thought that additional guidance could be helpful.  After discussing strategies to address this concern, the Drafting Committee decided to include in these comments an additional optional provision that a state could choose to include in its UPMIFA statute.

The optional provision focuses on institutions with endowment funds valued, in the aggregate, at less than $2,000,000.  The number is in brackets to indicate that it could be set higher or lower.  The number was chosen to address the concern of the state regulators that some small charities might be more likely to spend imprudently than large charities.  The Drafting Committee selected $2,000,000 as the value that might include most unsophisticated institutions but would not be overinclusive.

The optional provision creates a notification requirement for an institution with a small endowment that plans to spend below historic dollar value.  If an institution subject to the provision decides to appropriate an amount that would cause the value of its endowment funds to drop below the aggregate historic dollar value for all of its endowment funds, then the institution will have to notify the attorney general before proceeding with the expenditure.  The provision does not require that the institution obtain the approval of the attorney general before making the distribution.  Rather, the notification requirement gives the attorney general the opportunity to take a closer look at the institution and its spending decision, to educate the institution on prudent decision making for endowment funds, and to intervene if the attorney general determines that the spending would be imprudent for the institution.  Although the Drafting Committee thinks that the prudence standard in UPMIFA provides adequate guidance to all institutions within the scope of the Act, if a state chooses to adopt a notification provision for institutions with small endowments, the Drafting Committee recommends the following language:

(-) If an institution has endowment funds with an aggregate value of less than [$2,000,000], the institution shall notify the [Attorney General] at least [60 days] prior to an appropriation for expenditure of an amount that would cause the value of the institution’s endowment funds to fall below the aggregate historic dollar value of the institution’s endowment funds, unless the expenditure is permitted or required under law other than this [act] or in the gift instrument.  For purposes of this subsection, “historic dollar value” means the aggregate value in dollars of (i) each endowment fund at the time it became an endowment fund, (ii) each subsequent donation to the fund at the time the donation is made, and (iii) each accumulation made pursuant to a direction in the applicable gift instrument at the time the accumulation is added to the fund.  The institution’s determination of historic dollar value made in good faith is conclusive.

35-10-205. Delegation of management and investment functions.

  1. Subject to any specific limitation set forth in a gift instrument or in law other than this part, an institution may delegate to an external agent the management and investment of an institutional fund to the extent that an institution could prudently delegate under the circumstances. An institution shall act in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, in:
    1. Selecting an agent;
    2. Establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes of the institution and the institutional fund; and
    3. Periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the agent's performance and compliance with the scope and terms of the delegation.
  2. In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the institution to exercise reasonable care to comply with the scope and terms of the delegation.
  3. An institution that complies with subsection (a) is not liable for the decisions or actions of an agent to which the function was delegated.
  4. By accepting delegation of a management or investment function from an institution that is subject to the laws of this state, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in all proceedings arising from or related to the delegation or the performance of the delegated function.
  5. An institution may delegate management and investment functions to its committees, officers, or employees as authorized by law of this state other than this part.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 5.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The prudent investor standard in Section 4 [§ 35-10-204] presupposes the power to delegate.  For some types of investment, prudence requires diversification, and diversification may best be accomplished through the use of pooled investment vehicles that entail delegation.  The Drafting Committee decided to put Section 5 [§ 35-10-205] in brackets because many states already provide sufficient authority to delegate authority through other statutes.  If such authority exists, then an enacting state should enact UPMIFA without Section 5 [§ 35-10-205].  Enacting delegation rules that duplicate existing rules could be confusing and might create conflicts.  For charitable trusts, UPIA provides the same delegation rules as those in Section 5 [§ 35-10-205].  For nonprofit corporations, nonprofit corporation statutes often provide comparable rules.  A state enacting UPMIFA must be certain that its laws authorize delegation, either through other statutes or by enacting Section 5 [§ 35-10-205].

Section 5 [§ 35-10-205] incorporates the delegation rule found in UPIA § 9, updating the delegation rules in UMIFA § 5. Section 5 [§ 35-10-205] permits the decision makers in an institution to delegate management and investment functions to external agents if the decision makers exercise reasonable skill, care, and caution in selecting the agent, defining the scope of the delegation and reviewing the performance of the agent.  In some circumstances, the scope of the delegation may include redelegation.  For example, an institution may select an investment manager to assist with investment decisions.  The delegation may include the authority to redelegate to investment managers with expertise in particular investment areas.  All decisions to delegate require the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution in selecting, instructing, and monitoring agents.  Further, decision makers cannot delegate the authority to make decisions concerning expenditures and can only delegate management and investment functions. Subsection (c) protects decision makers who comply with the requirement for proper delegation from liability for actions or decisions of the agents.  In making decisions concerning delegation, the institution must be mindful of Section 3(c)(1) [§ 35-10-203(c)(1)] of UPMIFA, the provision that directs the institution  to incur only reasonable costs in managing and investing an institutional fund.

Section 5 [§ 35-10-205] does not address issues of internal delegation and potential liability for internal delegation, and subsection (c) does not affect laws that govern personal liability of directors or trustees for matters outside the scope of Section 5 [§ 35-10-205]. Directors will look to nonprofit corporation laws for these rules, while trustees will look to trust law. See , e.g., RMNCA, § 8.30(b) (permitting directors to rely on information prepared by an officer or employee of the institution if the director reasonably believes the officer or employee to be reliable and competent in the matters presented).

The language of subsection (c) is similar to that of UPIA § 9(c) and RMNCA § 8.30(d).  The decision not to include the terms “beneficiaries” or “members” in subsection (c) does not indicate a decision that this section does not create immunity from claims brought by beneficiaries or members. Instead, a decision maker who complies with section 5 will be protected from any liability resulting from actions or decisions made by an external agent.

Subsection (d) creates personal jurisdiction over the agent. This subsection is not a choice of law rule.

Subsection (e) notes that law other than this Act governs internal delegation.  Section 5 of UMIFA included internal delegation as well as external delegation, due to a concern at that time that trust law concepts might govern internal delegation in nonprofit corporations. With the widespread adoption of nonprofit corporation statutes, that concern no longer exists. The decision not to address internal delegation in UPMIFA does not suggest that a governing board of a nonprofit corporation cannot delegate to committees, officers, or employees.  Rather, a nonprofit corporation must look to other law, typically a nonprofit corporation statute, for the rules governing internal delegation.

35-10-206. Release or modification of restrictions on management, investment, or purpose.

  1. If the donor consents in a record, an institution may release or modify, in whole or in part, a restriction contained in a gift instrument on the management, investment, or purpose of an institutional fund. A release or modification may not allow a fund to be used for a purpose other than a charitable purpose of the institution.
  2. The court, upon application of an institution, may modify a restriction contained in a gift instrument regarding the management or investment of an institutional fund if the restriction has become impracticable or wasteful, if it impairs the management or investment of the fund, or if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the donor, a modification of a restriction will further the purposes of the fund. The institution shall notify the attorney general and reporter of the application, and the attorney general and reporter must be given an opportunity to be heard. To the extent practicable, any modification must be made in accordance with the donor's probable intention.
  3. If a particular charitable purpose or a restriction contained in a gift instrument on the use of an institutional fund becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful, the court, upon application of an institution, may modify the purpose of the fund or the restriction on the use of the fund in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument. The institution shall notify the attorney general and reporter of the application, and the attorney general and reporter must be given an opportunity to be heard.
  4. If an institution determines that a restriction contained in a gift instrument on the management, investment, or purpose of an institutional fund is unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful, the institution, sixty (60) days after notification to the attorney general and reporter, may release or modify the restriction, in whole or part, if:
    1. The institutional fund subject to the restriction has a total value of less than one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000). This dollar limit shall increase by an amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) on July 1, 2011, and on each July 1 in subsequent years;
    2. More than twenty (20) years have elapsed since the fund was established; and
    3. The institution uses the property in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 6; 2010, ch. 639, § 1.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section 6 [§ 35-10-206] expands the rules on releasing or modifying restrictions that are found in Section 7 of UMIFA. Subsection (a) restates the rule from UMIFA allowing the release of a restriction with donor consent.  Subsections (b) and (c) make clear that an institution can always ask a court to apply equitable deviation or cy pres to modify or release a restriction, under appropriate circumstances.  Subsection (d), a new provision, permits an institution to apply cy pres on its own for small funds that have existed for a substantial period of time, after giving notice to the state attorney general.

Although UMIFA stated that it did not “limit the application of the doctrine of cy pres ”, UMIFA § 7(d), what that statement meant under the Act was unclear.  UMIFA itself appeared to permit only a release of a restriction and not a modification.  That all-or-nothing approach did not adequately protect donor intent.  See  Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304 (Conn. 1993).  By expressly including deviation and cy pres, UPMIFA requires an institution to seek modifications that are “in accordance with the donor’s probable intention” for deviation and “in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument” for cy pres.

Individual Funds.

The rules on modification require that the institution, or a court applying a court-ordered doctrine, review each institutional fund separately.  Although an institution may manage institutional funds collectively, for purposes of this Section [§ 35-10-206] each fund must be considered individually.

Subsection (a).  Donor Release.

Subsection (a) permits the release of a restriction if the donor consents. A release with donor consent cannot change the charitable beneficiary of the fund. Although the donor has the power to consent to a release of a restriction, this section does not create a power in the donor that will cause a federal tax problem for the donor. The gift to the institution is a completed gift for tax purposes, the property cannot be diverted from the charitable beneficiary, and the donor cannot redirect the property to another use by the charity.  The donor has no retained interest in the fund.

Subsection (b).  Equitable Deviation.

Subsection (b) applies the rule of equitable deviation, adapting the language of UTC § 412 to this section.  See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 (2003).  Under the deviation doctrine, a court may modify restrictions on the way an institution manages or administers a fund in a manner that furthers the purposes of the fund.  Deviation implements the donor’s intent.  A donor commonly has a predominating purpose for a gift and, secondarily, an intent that the purpose be carried out in a particular manner.  Deviation does not alter the purpose but rather modifies the means in order to carry out the purpose.

Sometimes deviation is needed on account of circumstances unanticipated when the donor created the restriction.  In other situations the restriction may impair the management or investment of the fund.  Modification of the restriction may permit the institution to carry out the donor’s purposes in a more effective manner.  A court applying deviation should attempt to follow the donor’s probable intention in deciding how to modify the restriction.  Consistent with the doctrine of equitable deviation in trust law, subsection (b) does not require an institution to notify donors of the proposed modification.  Good practice dictates notifying any donors who are alive and can be located with a reasonable expenditure of time and money.  Consistent with the doctrine of deviation under trust law, the institution must notify the attorney general who may choose to participate in the court proceeding.  The attorney general protects donor intent as well as the public’s interest in charitable assets.  Attorney general is in brackets in the Act because in some states another official enforces the law of charities.

Subsection (c).  Cy Pres.

Subsection (c) applies the rule of cy pres from trust law,  authorizing the court to modify the purpose of an institutional fund.  The term “modify” encompasses the release of a restriction as well as an alteration of a restriction and also permits a court to order that the fund be paid to another institution.  A court can apply the doctrine of cy pres only if the restriction in question has become unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful.  This standard, which comes from UTC § 413, updates the circumstances under which cy pres may be applied by adding “wasteful” to the usual common law articulation of the doctrine.  Any change must be made in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.  See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (2003).  Consistent with the doctrine of cy pres, subsection (c) does not require an institution seeking cy pres to notify donors.  Good practice will be to notify donors whenever possible.  As with deviation, the institution must notify the attorney general who must have the opportunity to be heard in the proceeding.

Subsection (d).  Modification of Small, Old Funds.

Subsection (d) permits an institution to release or modify a restriction according to cy pres principles but without court approval if the amount of the institutional fund involved is small and if the institutional fund has been in existence for more than 20 years. The rationale is that under some circumstances a restriction may no longer make sense but the cost of a judicial cy pres proceeding will be too great to warrant a change in the restriction. The Drafting Committee discussed at length the parameters for allowing an institution to apply cy pres without court supervision. The Committee drafted subsection (d) to balance the needs of an institution to serve its charitable purposes efficiently with the policy of enforcing donor intent. The Committee concluded that an institutional fund with a value of $25,000 [now $150,000] or less is sufficiently small that the cost of a judicial proceeding will be out of proportion to its protective purpose. The Committee included a requirement that the institutional fund be in existence at least 20 years ,as a further safeguard for fidelity to donor intent.  The 20-year period begins to run from the date of inception of the fund and not from the date of each gift to the fund. The amount and the number of years have been placed in brackets to signal to an enacting jurisdiction that it may wish to designate a higher or lower figure.  Because the amount should reflect the cost of a judicial proceeding to obtain a modification, the number may be higher in some states and lower in others.

As under judicial cy pres, an institution acting under subsection (d) must change the restriction in a manner that is in keeping with the intent of the donor and the purpose of the fund. For example, if the value of a fund is too small to justify the cost of administration of the fund as a separate fund, the term “wasteful” would allow the institution to combine the fund with another fund with similar purposes. If a fund has been created for nursing scholarships and the institution closes its nursing school, the institution might appropriately decide to use the fund for other scholarships at the institution. In using the authority granted under subsection (d), the institution must determine which alternative use for the fund reasonably approximates the original intent of the donor. The institution cannot divert the fund to an entirely different use. For example, the fund for nursing scholarships could not be used to build a football stadium.

An institution seeking to modify a provision under subsection (d) must notify the attorney general of the planned modification.  The institution must wait 60 days before proceeding; the attorney general may take action if the proposed modification appears inappropriate.

Notice to Donors.

The Drafting Committee decided not to require notification of donors under subsections (b), (c), and (d).  The trust law rules of equitable deviation and cy pres do not require donor notification and instead depend on the court and the attorney general to protect donor intent and the public’s interest in charitable assets.

With regard to subsection (d), the Drafting Committee concluded that an institution should not be required to give notice to donors.  Subsection (d) can only be used for an old and small fund.  Locating a donor who contributed to the fund more than 20 years earlier may be difficult and expensive.  If multiple donors each gave a small amount to create a fund 20 years earlier, the task of locating all of those donors would be harder still.  The Drafting Committee concluded that an institution’s concern for donor relations would serve as a sufficient incentive for notifying donors when donors can be located.

35-10-207. Reviewing compliance.

Compliance with this part is determined in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time a decision is made or action is taken, and not by hindsight.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 7.

35-10-208. Application to existing institutional funds.

This part applies to institutional funds existing on or established after July 1, 2007. As applied to institutional funds existing on July 1, 2007, this part governs only decisions made or actions taken on or after July 1, 2007.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 8.

35-10-209. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This part modifies, limits, and supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.), but does not modify, limit, or supersede § 101 of that act (15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in § 103 of that act (15 U.S.C. § 7003(b)).

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 9.

35-10-210. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing the uniform act set out in this part, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Acts 2007, ch. 186, § 10.

Chapter 11
Fundraising for Catastrophic Illnesses

35-11-101. Funds placed in trust — Trustee.

  1. All funds raised to meet the medical or related expenses of a named individual suffering from a catastrophic illness shall be placed in trust with a bank or trust company organized and doing business under the laws of any state or territory of the United States, including the District of Columbia, and authorized to do business in this state. The trustee of this trust shall be either an individual, or a bank or trust company. The funds placed with a bank or trust company shall be considered to be held in trust, and the bank or trust company considered a trustee, as those terms are used in this chapter, if the bank or trust company maintains the funds in its name as custodian for the benefit of the injured individual, and limits disbursements to those for which the funds are raised or that are permitted by §§ 35-11-103 and 35-11-105.
  2. As used in this chapter, “catastrophic illness” includes organ transplants.

Acts 1989, ch. 386, § 1; 2007, ch. 430, § 2.

Cross-References. Certain fundraising deemed unlawful, § 35-11-111.

Charitable trusts, title 35, ch. 9.

35-11-102. Trust relationship prerequisite to accepting contributions — Beneficiaries.

  1. Before accepting any contributions for such fundraising activities, the organizer or promoter shall enter into a trust relationship with a bank or trust company or shall establish a trust in the name of an individual, “  [name of beneficiary] trust,  trustee”, or words to the same effect; provided, that if in violation of this chapter contributions are accepted prior to entering into the trust relationship, then those contributions shall be placed in trust immediately upon establishment of the required trust relationship.
  2. The beneficiary of the trust shall be the named individual for whom the funds are being raised.
  3. Contingent beneficiaries shall be selected as provided in § 35-11-103.
  4. On the establishment of a trust for purposes regulated by this chapter, the trustee shall file written notice of the establishment of the trust on forms prescribed by the secretary of state with the division of charitable solicitation in the office of the secretary of state. No person or entity may solicit funds on behalf of an individual with a catastrophic illness that is subject to this chapter prior to the filing of this notice with the division. For any trust regulated under this chapter on July 1, 2007, the notice shall be filed on or before August 1, 2007.
  5. A trustee, other than a bank or trust company acting as trustee, shall file an accounting of the trust with the division of charitable solicitations each year on the anniversary of the establishment of the trust.

Acts 1989, ch. 386, § 1; 2007, ch. 430, §§ 3, 6.

Cross-References. Certain fundraising deemed unlawful, § 35-11-111.

35-11-103. Transfer of remaining funds — Contingent beneficiaries.

  1. If the expenses of the illness of the beneficiary are less than the funds held in trust or the beneficiary dies before the funds held in trust are depleted, any remaining balance shall be transferred to the contingent beneficiary.
  2. When the trust is established, the named beneficiary shall select the manner in which a contingent beneficiary shall be named. If the named beneficiary is a minor or is incompetent, the parent or guardian shall select the manner in which a contingent beneficiary shall be named. The selection of the contingent beneficiary shall be made as follows:
    1. An institution involved in research to find a cure for a catastrophic illness shall be named;
    2. An individual, if known, who suffers from a catastrophic illness and is in need of financial help for valid reimbursable medical expenses, as defined in § 35-11-105, shall be named; or
    3. The trustee shall be authorized to select:
      1. An institution involved in research to find a cure for a catastrophic illness; or
      2. An individual who suffers from a catastrophic illness whether the name of such individual is known at the death of the named beneficiary or comes to the attention of the trustee within one (1) year after the death of the named beneficiary. The selection of this individual by the trustee is not limited to an individual for whom a trust has been established at the bank or trust company. If an individual beneficiary cannot be named within one (1) year, the option in subdivision (b)(3)(A) shall automatically occur.
  3. Modification of the selection of the contingent beneficiary may be made before the death of the named beneficiary or before the disbursement of funds to the selected contingent beneficiary.
  4. The transfer to a contingent beneficiary shall occur as quickly as is reasonably feasible.

Acts 1989, ch. 386, § 2.

35-11-104. Payment and deposit of contributions.

  1. All contributions for funds raised in accordance with this chapter made by check shall be made payable to the bank or trust company or the trust established by this chapter.
  2. All cash contributions shall be deposited as quickly as is reasonably feasible to the trust.

Acts 1989, ch. 386, § 3; 2007, ch. 430, § 4.

35-11-105. Disbursement of funds — Valid reimbursable medical expenses.

  1. Funds shall be disbursed by the trustee upon the presentation of a statement for valid reimbursable medical expenses incurred by the named individual for the treatment of the catastrophic illness and for the payment of reasonable solicitation costs and expenses, when appropriate, incurred by the organizer, promoter or solicitor.
  2. “Valid reimbursable medical expenses” are those deductible medical expenses described in the Internal Revenue Code (U.S.C. title 26).

Acts 1989, ch. 386, § 3; 2007, ch. 430, § 5.

35-11-106. Powers of institutions apply to trusts.

All powers and authority that are conferred on banks and trust companies in the administration and maintenance of trust funds in those institutions shall also apply to trusts created by this chapter.

Acts 1989, ch. 386, § 3.

35-11-107. Civil penalties — Appeal.

In addition to any other penalty or remedy available under law, the secretary of state or the designee of the secretary may assess a civil penalty, pursuant to § 48-101-514, against any person or entity that violates a provision of this chapter. The person or entity against whom the penalty is assessed shall have appeal rights pursuant to § 48-101-514.

Acts 2007, ch. 430, § 7.

35-11-108. Right to inspect records for trusts.

The secretary of state or the secretary's designee shall have the right to inspect the records for trusts established under this part, subject to title 45, chapter 10 and the Federal Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.)

Acts 2007, ch. 430, § 8.

35-11-109. Subpoena power.

The secretary of state or the secretary's designee shall have the right to issue subpoenas to obtain records relevant to a solicitation or a trust established under this part, subject to title 45, chapter 10 and the Federal Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.)

Acts 2007, ch. 430, § 9.

35-11-110. Rules and regulations.

The secretary of state may adopt rules and regulations to carry out this chapter in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Acts 2007, ch. 430, § 10.

35-11-111. Unlawful fundraising.

  1. It is an offense for any fundraising to occur for the purposes described in §§ 35-11-101 and 35-11-102 in violation of this chapter.
  2. It is an offense for trust funds raised for the purposes described in §§ 35-11-101 and 35-11-102 to be distributed in violation of this chapter.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 386, § 4; 2007, ch. 430, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

35-11-112. Exemptions.

    1. This chapter shall not apply to any nonprofit corporation that is:
      1. Incorporated under the laws of Tennessee;
      2. Exempt from federal income taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); and
      3. Requested by a patient or a patient's family to raise funds for an organ transplant for a specific individual.
    2. Any funds remaining in a particular account shall revert to the general fund of the corporation to be used to assist other similarly situated persons.
    1. This chapter shall not apply to any nonprofit corporation that:
      1. Is incorporated under the laws of Tennessee and is exempt from federal income taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); and
      2. Solicits and accepts contributions of funds for the purpose of providing minors suffering from a catastrophic illness with nonmedical gifts or benefits to fulfill a desire or wish of the minor.
    2. A portion of such funds may be used to provide appropriate adult supervision if required by the gift.
    3. Any such funds raised for a particular minor and unexpended shall revert to the general fund of the corporation to be used to provide gifts or benefits for a similar minor.

Acts 1989, ch. 386, §§ 5, 6.

Chapter 12
Uniform Transfer on Death Security Registration

35-12-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Transfer on Death Security Registration Act.”

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-102. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Beneficiary form” means a registration of a security which indicates the present owner of the security and the intention of the owner regarding the person who will become the owner of the security upon the death of the owner;
  2. “Devisee” means any person designated in a will to receive a disposition of real or personal property;
  3. “Heirs” means those persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a decedent;
  4. “Person” means an individual, a corporation, an organization, or other legal entity;
  5. “Personal representative” includes executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law governing their status;
  6. “Property” includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that may be the subject of ownership;
  7. “Register,” including its derivatives, means to issue a certificate showing the ownership of a certificated security or, in the case of an uncertificated security, to initiate or transfer an account showing ownership of securities;
  8. “Registering entity” means a person who originates or transfers a security title by registration, and includes a broker maintaining security accounts for customers and a transfer agent or other person acting for or as an issuer of securities;
  9. “Security” means a share, participation, or other interest in property, in a business, or in an obligation of an enterprise or other issuer, and includes a certificated security, an uncertificated security, and a security account;
  10. “Security account” means a:
    1. Reinvestment account associated with a security, a securities account with a broker, a cash balance in a brokerage account, cash, interest, earnings, or dividends earned or declared on a security in an account, a reinvestment account, or a brokerage account, whether or not credited to the account before the owner's death;
    2. Custody account or an investment management account with a trust company or a trust division of a bank with trust powers, including the securities in the account, a cash balance in the account, cash, cash equivalents, interest, earnings, or dividends earned or declared on a security in the account, whether or not credited to the account before the owner's death; or
    3. Cash balance or other property held for or due to the owner of a security as a replacement for or product of an account security, whether or not credited to the account before the owner's death; and
  11. “State” includes any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession subject to the legislative authority of the United States.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1; 2012, ch. 562, § 1.

35-12-103. Who may obtain beneficiary form — Owners hold as joint tenants.

Only individuals whose registration of a security shows sole ownership by one (1) individual or multiple ownership by two (2) or more with right of survivorship, rather than as tenants in common, may obtain registration in beneficiary form. Multiple owners of a security registered in beneficiary form hold as joint tenants with right of survivorship, as tenants by the entireties, or as owners of community property held in survivorship form, and not as tenants in common.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-104. Authorization.

A security may be registered in beneficiary form if the form is authorized by this or a similar statute of the state of organization of the issuer or registering entity, the location of the registering entity's principal office, the office of its transfer agent or its office making the registration, or by this or a similar statute of the law of the state listed as the owner's address at the time of registration. A registration governed by the law of a jurisdiction in which this or similar legislation is not in force or was not in force when a registration in beneficiary form was made is nevertheless presumed to be valid and authorized as a matter of contract law.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-105. Designation.

A security, whether evidenced by certificate or account, is registered in beneficiary form when the registration includes a designation of a beneficiary to take the ownership at the death of the owner or the deaths of all multiple owners.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-106. Evidence of beneficiary form.

Registration in beneficiary form may be shown by the words “transfer on death” or the abbreviation “TOD,” or by the words “pay on death” or the abbreviation “POD,” after the name of the registered owner and before the name of a beneficiary.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-107. No effect until death.

The designation of a TOD beneficiary on a registration in beneficiary form has no effect on ownership until the owner's death. A registration of a security in beneficiary form may be cancelled or changed at any time by the sole owner or all then surviving owners without the consent of the beneficiary.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-108. Effect upon death.

On death of a sole owner or the last to die of all multiple owners, ownership of securities registered in beneficiary form passes to the beneficiary or beneficiaries who survive all owners. On proof of death of all owners, compliance with any applicable requirements of the registering entity, and procurement of any inheritance tax waiver as required by § 67-8-417, a security registered in beneficiary form may be reregistered in the name of the beneficiary or beneficiaries who survived the death of all owners. Until division of the security after the death of all owners, multiple beneficiaries surviving the death of all owners hold their interests as tenants in common. If no beneficiary survives the death of all owners, the security belongs to the estate of the deceased sole owner or the estate of the last to die of all multiple owners.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-109. Registration.

  1. A registering entity is not required to offer or to accept a request for security registration in beneficiary form. If a registration in beneficiary form is offered by a registering entity, the owner requesting registration in beneficiary form assents to the protections given to the registering entity by this chapter.
  2. By accepting a request for registration of a security in beneficiary form, the registering entity agrees that the registration will be implemented on death of the deceased owner as provided in this chapter.
  3. A registering entity is discharged from all claims to a security by the estate, creditors, heirs, or devisees of a deceased owner if it registers a transfer of the security in accordance with § 35-12-108 and does so in good faith reliance on the registration, on this chapter, and on information provided to it by affidavit of the personal representative of the deceased owner, or by the surviving beneficiary or by the surviving beneficiary's representatives, or other information available to the registering entity. The protections of this chapter do not extend to a reregistration or payment made after a registering entity has received written notice from any claimant to any interest in the security objecting to implementation of a registration in beneficiary form. No other notice or other information available to the registering entity affects its right to protection under this chapter.
  4. The protection provided by this chapter to the registering entity of a security does not affect the rights of beneficiaries in disputes between themselves and other claimants to ownership of the security transferred or its value or proceeds.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-110. Transfer.

  1. A transfer on death resulting from a registration in beneficiary form is effective by reason of the contract regarding the registration between the owner and the registering entity and this chapter and is not testamentary.
  2. This chapter does not limit the rights of creditors of security owners against beneficiaries and other transferees under other laws of this state.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-111. Establishment of terms and conditions.

  1. A registering entity offering to accept registrations in beneficiary form may establish the terms and conditions under which it will receive requests for registrations in beneficiary form, and for implementation of registrations in beneficiary form, including requests for cancellation of previously registered TOD beneficiary designations and requests for reregistration to effect a change of beneficiary. The terms and conditions so established may provide for proving death, avoiding or resolving any problems concerning fractional shares, designating primary and contingent beneficiaries, and substituting a named beneficiary's descendants to take in the place of the named beneficiary in the event of the beneficiary's death. Substitution may be indicated by appending to the name of the primary beneficiary the letters LDPS, standing for “lineal descendants per stirpes.” This designation substitutes a deceased beneficiary's descendants who survive the owner for a beneficiary who fails to so survive, the descendants to be identified and to share in accordance with the law of the beneficiary's domicile at the owner's death governing inheritance by descendants of an intestate. Other forms of identifying beneficiaries who are to take on one (1) or more contingencies, and rules for providing proofs and assurances needed to satisfy reasonable concerns by registering entities regarding conditions and identities relevant to accurate implementation of registrations in beneficiary form, may be contained in a registering entity's terms and conditions.
  2. The following are illustrations of registrations in beneficiary form which a registering entity may authorize:
    1. Sole owner-sole beneficiary: John S. Brown TOD (or POD) John S. Brown Jr.
    2. Multiple owners-sole beneficiary: John S. Brown, Mary B Brown JT TEN TOD John S. Brown Jr.
    3. Multiple owners-primary and secondary (substituted) beneficiaries: John S. Brown, Mary B. Brown JT TEN TOD, John S. Brown Jr. SUB BENE, Peter Q. Brown or John S. Brown, Mary B. Brown JT TEN TOD, John S. Brown Jr. LDPS.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-112. Construction.

  1. This chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policy and to make uniform the laws with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
  2. Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter, the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

35-12-113. Application.

This chapter applies to registrations of securities in beneficiary form made before or after July 1, 1995, by decedents dying on or after July 1, 1995.

Acts 1995, ch. 471, § 1.

Chapter 13
Charitable Beneficiaries

35-13-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Charitable Beneficiaries Act of 1997.”

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 2, provides that this chapter shall take effect upon becoming law as to all estates or trusts under administration or other entities administering a charitable gift or discretionary charitable gift, regardless of the date of the gift instrument or when administration began, the public welfare requiring it.

Cross-References. Charitable Gift Annuity Act, title 56, ch. 52.

Law Reviews.

Conversions of Nonprofit Hospitals to For-Profit Status: The Tennessee Experience, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1077 (1998).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Is Federalization of Charity Law All Bad? What States Can Learn from the Internal Revenue Code, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1621 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: In Search of the Probate Exception, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1533 (2014).

35-13-102. Purpose — Chapter definitions.

  1. This chapter declares that the public policy of this state, as declared in its cases and statutes, favors gifts to charity that improve the general welfare through acts of philanthropy.
  2. As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Attorney general and reporter” means the attorney general and reporter of Tennessee or the attorney general and reporter's designee;
    2. “Charitable beneficiary” means the United States, any state that is part of the United States, or any political subdivision of a state, the District of Columbia, any corporation, trust, fraternal society or other organization described in §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a) and 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a) and 2522(a)), that is exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a) and 2522(a)), or any church, synagogue, other religious organization, or any other organization, entity or association to which a gift would be deductible under §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a) and 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code;
    3. “Charitable gift” means any gift clearly intended for charitable purposes;
    4. “Charitable purpose” means any purpose generally considered charitable at common law, or for any charitable purpose under any section of Tennessee Code Annotated, or for any purpose described in §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a) and 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. A reference to the applicable section or sections of Tennessee Code Annotated or the Internal Revenue Code sufficiently describes the charitable purposes of the gift;
    5. “Court” means the chancery court or other court exercising equity jurisdiction or a probate court of record;
    6. “Discretionary charitable gift” means a charitable gift that has indefinite beneficiaries, objects, purposes or subjects;
    7. “Donor” means the person making the lifetime or testamentary charitable gift;
    8. “Gift instrument” means a will, deed, grant, conveyance, trust agreement, memorandum, writing or other governing document that creates the charitable gift;
    9. “Internal Revenue Code” means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (U.S.C. title 26); and
    10. “Tax-exempt” means that the organization, trust or beneficiary referred to is one that is described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
  3. The words “humane,” “beneficial,” “beneficent,” “worthy,” “philanthropic,” “humanitarian” or their derivatives or similar language in the gift instrument shall be presumed to be synonyms for “charitable” as used in this chapter, unless expressly indicated not to be charitable by the context in which they are used.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conditional Gift.

Where conditional gift agreements between an organization and a college did not specify the duration of the conditions, as in the name of a dormitory, and the court concluded that the conditions were limited to the life of the building itself, because the college's predecessor to the agreements presented no legal basis for permitting it to keep the gift while refusing to honor the conditions attached to it, defendant must either return the present value of the gift to plaintiff or abide by the conditions originally placed on the gift. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

35-13-103. Gift instrument to control disposition of gift.

A gift instrument that specifies the charitable beneficiaries, objects, purposes or subjects of the charitable gift controls the disposition or administration of the charitable gift, except as provided in §§ 35-13-114 and 35-13-107.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conditional Gift.

Where conditional gift agreements between an organization and a college did not specify the duration of the conditions, as in the name of a dormitory, and the court concluded that the conditions were limited to the life of the building itself, because the college's predecessor to the agreements presented no legal basis for permitting it to keep the gift while refusing to honor the conditions attached to it, defendant must either return the present value of the gift to plaintiff or abide by the conditions originally placed on the gift. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

35-13-104. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-13-104 (Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1), concerning the definiteness of gift a instrument, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 98, effective July 1, 2004.

35-13-105. Discretionary charitable gifts.

When the donor makes a discretionary charitable gift the following provisions apply:

  1. The person to whom discretion is given shall choose the charitable beneficiaries and charitable purposes within a reasonable time after having accepted the duty to select the beneficiaries or purposes of the discretionary charitable gift.
  2. If a donor makes a testamentary discretionary charitable gift not in trust and does not expressly designate the person to select the charitable beneficiaries or the charitable purposes, the personal representative of the donor's estate shall select the beneficiaries or the charitable purposes, or both, of the gift.
  3. If a donor makes a testamentary discretionary charitable gift in trust and does not expressly designate the person to select the charitable beneficiaries or the charitable purposes, the trustee shall select the charitable beneficiaries or the charitable purposes, or both, of the gift and, if appropriate, shall establish a trust or charitable corporation or other legal entity to implement the discretionary charitable gift.
  4. If the court receives notice that the person having the discretion is not ready, willing or able to perform the selection duties within a reasonable time or to establish the trust or other organization, the court shall select the person to exercise the discretion. If the discretionary gift is in trust, the court may exercise the power granted under the Uniform Trust Code, compiled in chapter 15 of this title.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

35-13-106. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-13-106 (Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1), concerning the illegality, impossibility, or impracticability of gifts, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 99, effective July 1, 2004.

35-13-107. Change in tax-exempt status of beneficiary.

IF:

  1. a gift made to a trust is to take effect at a date later than the date of the gift instrument; and
  2. when the gift instrument is executed, the gift to the trust would qualify for a charitable deduction under the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), if the gift were then effective; and
  3. the trust, or beneficiary of the trust, loses its tax-exempt status before the gift takes effect; THEN

    the donor shall be presumed to have intended that the trust should be tax-exempt when the gift was to take effect, unless the donor clearly indicated in the gift instrument that the designated beneficiary should receive the gift even if the gift is not eligible for the charitable deduction. The court has jurisdiction to reform the trust by selecting another tax-exempt beneficiary, or to select another tax-exempt trust, and to select one (1) or more charitable purposes of the gift.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

35-13-108. Validity under rules of remoteness or rule against perpetuities.

No charitable gift shall fail for remoteness of vesting or for any violation of the rule against perpetuities.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Perpetuities and the Genius of a Free State, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1823 (2014).

35-13-109. Validity where no trustee.

No trust to which a charitable gift or a discretionary charitable gift is or has been made shall fail for lack of a trustee. If there is no trustee, the title to any trust property intended for a charitable purpose shall vest in the clerk of the court that has jurisdiction and venue of the trust as determined under § 35-13-110 until the court either appoints a trustee or orders distribution of the gift.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

35-13-110. Attorney general and reporter to be party to court actions affecting gifts — Court approval of disposition.

  1. In all court actions directly affecting the amount, administration or disposition of a charitable gift or a discretionary charitable gift, the court may require that the attorney general and reporter be made a party to represent the charitable beneficiaries, potential charitable beneficiaries and all citizens of the state in all legal matters pertaining to the amount, administration and disposition of a charitable gift or discretionary charitable gift. The attorney general and reporter may sue and be sued, and, insofar as the suit against the attorney general and reporter is against the state, the state expressly consents to be sued. The attorney general and reporter may designate a district attorney general to prosecute or defend any court action.
  2. It is unlawful to settle any litigation concerning the validity of a charitable gift or discretionary charitable gift without first obtaining the approval of the court. The court shall approve a settlement only after determining that the interest of the people of the state, as true beneficiaries of any charitable gift, has been served.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Right to Intervene.

Where charitable gifts of 101 pieces of art were given to a university subject to a restriction that the pieces could not be sold, the university filed an ex parte declaratory judgment action seeking permission to sell two valuable pieces of the collection. The Attorney General and Reporter of Tennessee sought to intervene to represent the interests of the charitable beneficiaries, the potential charitable beneficiaries, and the people of Tennessee pursuant to the Charitable Beneficiaries Act of 1997, T.C.A. § 35-13-110, and the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-110; the Attorney General's initial motion to intervene was denied. Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009), appeal denied, Ga. O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).

35-13-111. Venue of court action.

  1. If the gift instrument is a will and the estate is in administration, or if the gift under a will is not in trust, the venue of any court action is in the county in which the donor's will was or is being administered.
  2. If the gift instrument is an inter-vivos trust or a testamentary trust under a fully administered will, venue of any court action shall be in any county in which a trustee resides, or is located if not an individual, or in which a majority of the beneficiaries, or potential beneficiaries, reside or are located.
  3. If neither subsection (a) nor (b) applies, venue is in Davidson County, in a court of competent jurisdiction; provided, that the court may transfer the court action to a more convenient forum.
  4. With the consent of the court in which an action is pending, the parties may waive the venue provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c).

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

35-13-112. Trust in violation of state or federal law.

If the department of revenue makes a written determination that the operation of a charitable trust violates § 35-9-101 or if the Internal Revenue Service makes such a written determination with respect to the corresponding provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), and provides the written determination to the trustee, the trustee shall furnish a copy of the determination to the attorney general and reporter, and any other person may notify the attorney general and reporter of the determination. The attorney general and reporter may take any action that is deemed necessary to protect the interest of the people of the state.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

35-13-113. Construction with other laws.

This chapter is deemed cumulative to any equitable doctrine or remedy or statute having for its object the same or similar purposes of this chapter.

Acts 1997, ch. 300, § 1.

35-13-114. Cy pres.

Section 35-15-413 shall also apply to charitable gifts, as defined in § 35-13-102, whether given before or after April 12, 2007, on the same basis as charitable trusts.

Acts 2007, ch. 24, § 34.

Chapter 14
Uniform Prudent Investor Act

35-14-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002.”

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 17 provided that the Tennessee code commission is requested to include the official comments of the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in any publication containing the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act.

Law Reviews.

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Pro and Con (Law): Considering the Irrevocable Nongrantor Trust Technique, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1999 (2014).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Prefatory Note:  Over the quarter century from the late 1960's the investment practices of fiduciaries experienced significant change. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) undertakes to update trust investment law in recognition of the alterations that have occurred in investment practice. These changes have occurred under the influence of a large and broadly accepted body of empirical and theoretical knowledge about the behavior of capital markets, often described as “modern portfolio theory.”

This Act draws upon the revised standards for prudent trust investment promulgated by the American Law Institute in its Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1992) [hereinafter Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule; also referred to as 1992 Restatement].

Objectives of the Act:  UPIA makes five fundamental alterations in the former criteria for prudent investing. All are to be found in the Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule.

  1. The standard of prudence is applied to any investment as part of the total portfolio, rather than to individual investments. In the trust setting the term “portfolio” embraces all the trust's assets. UPIA § 2(b)[§ 35-14-104(b)].
  2. The tradeoff in all investing between risk and return is identified as the fiduciary's central consideration. UPIA § 2(b)[§ 35-14-104(b)].
  3. All categoric restrictions on types of investments have been abrogated; the trustee can invest in anything that plays an appropriate role in achieving the risk/return objectives of the trust and that meets the other requirements of prudent investing. UPIA § 2(e)[§ 35-14-104(e)].
  4. The long familiar requirement that fiduciaries diversify their investments has been integrated into the definition of prudent investing. UPIA § 3 [§ 35-14-105].
  5. The much criticized former rule of trust law forbidding the trustee to delegate investment and management functions has been reversed. Delegation is now permitted, subject to safeguards. UPIA § 9 [§ 35-14-111].

    Literature:  These changes in trust investment law have been presaged in an extensive body of practical and scholarly writing. See especially the discussion and reporter's notes by Edward C. Halbach, Jr., in Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule (1992); see also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 Real Property, Probate & Trust J. 407 (1992); Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (1986); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 52 (1987); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, The Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 887 (1976); Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 Harvard L. Rev. 603 (1970). A succinct account of the main findings of modern portfolio theory, written for lawyers, is Jonathan R. Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory (1991) (American College of Trust & Estate Counsel Foundation). A leading introductory text on modern portfolio theory is R.A. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks (2d ed. 1983).

    Legislation:  Most states have legislation governing trust-investment law. This Act promotes uniformity of state law on the basis of the new consensus reflected in the Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule. Some states have already acted. California, Delaware, Georgia, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Washington revised their prudent investor legislation to emphasize the total-portfolio standard of care in advance of the 1992 Restatement. These statutes are extracted and discussed in Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, reporter's note, at 60-66 (1992).

    Drafters in Illinois in 1991 worked from the April 1990 “Proposed Final Draft” of the Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule and enacted legislation that is closely modeled on the new Restatement. 760 ILCS § 5/5 (prudent investing); and § 5/5.1 (delegation) (1992). As the Comments to this Uniform Prudent Investor Act reflect, the Act draws upon the Illinois statute in several sections. Virginia revised its prudent investor act in a similar vein in 1992. Virginia Code § 26-45.1 (prudent investing) (1992). Florida revised its statute in 1993. Florida Laws, ch. 93-257, amending Florida Statutes § 518.11 (prudent investing) and creating § 518.112 (delegation). New York legislation drawing on the new Restatement and on a preliminary version of this Uniform Prudent Investor Act was enacted in 1994. N.Y. Assembly Bill 11683-B, Ch. 609 (1994), adding Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 11-2.3 (Prudent Investor Act).

    Remedies:  This Act does not undertake to address issues of remedy law or the computation of damages in trust matters. Remedies are the subject of a reasonably distinct body of doctrine. See generally Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 197-226A (1959) [hereinafter cited as Restatement of Trusts 2d; also referred to as 1959 Restatement].

    Implications for Charitable and Pension Trusts:  This Act is centrally concerned with the investment responsibilities arising under the private gratuitous trust, which is the common vehicle for conditioned wealth transfer within the family. Nevertheless, the prudent investor rule also bears on charitable and pension trusts, among others. “In making investments of trust funds the trustee of a charitable trust is under a duty similar to that of the trustee of a private trust.” Restatement of Trusts 2d § 389 (1959). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the federal regulatory scheme for pension trusts enacted in 1974, absorbs trust-investment law through the prudence standard of ERISA § 404(a) (1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). The Supreme Court has said: “ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions ‘codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.’” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch

    Other Fiduciary Relationships:  The Uniform Prudent Investor Act regulates the investment responsibilities of trustees. Other fiduciaries — such as executors, conservators, and guardians of the property — sometimes have responsibilities over assets that are governed by the standards of prudent investment. It will often be appropriate for states to adapt the law governing investment by trustees under this Act to these other fiduciary regimes, taking account of such changed circumstances as the relatively short duration of most executorships and the intensity of court supervision of conservators and guardians in some jurisdictions. The present Act does not undertake to adjust trust-investment law to the special circumstances of the state schemes for administering decedents' estates or conducting the affairs of protected persons.

    Although the Uniform Prudent Investor Act by its terms applies to trusts and not to charitable corporations, the standards of the Act can be expected to inform the investment responsibilities of directors and officers of charitable corporations. As the 1992 Restatement observes, “the duties of the members of the governing board of a charitable corporation are generally similar to the duties of the trustee of a charitable trust.” Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 379, Comment b , at 190 (1992). See also id. § 389, Comment b , at 190-91 (absent contrary statute or other provision, prudent investor rule applies to investment of funds held for charitable corporations).

35-14-102. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Governing instrument” means:
    1. A will, deed, trust instrument or agency agreement;
    2. For purposes of subdivision (1)(A), an agency agreement includes but is not limited to, any agreement under which any delegation is made, either pursuant to § 35-15-807 or by anyone holding a power or duty pursuant to chapter 15, part 12;
  2. “Trust” means any fiduciary relationship created by a governing instrument; and
  3. “Trustee” means any fiduciary as defined in § 35-15-103.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 2; 2013, ch. 390, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

35-14-103. Prudent investor rule.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a trustee who invests and manages trust assets owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to comply with the prudent investor rule set forth in this chapter.
  2. The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust. A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in reliance on the provisions of the trust.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 3.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section imposes the obligation of prudence in the conduct of investment functions and identifies further sections of the Act that specify the attributes of prudent conduct.

Origins:  The prudence standard for trust investing traces back to Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). Trustees should “observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.” Id. at 461.

Prior Legislation:  The Model Prudent Man Rule Statute (1942), sponsored by the American Bankers Association, undertook to codify the language of the Amory  case. See Mayo A. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Ohio State L.J. 491, at 501 (1951); for the text of the model act, which inspired many state statutes, see id. at 508-09. Another prominent codification of the Amory  standard is Uniform Probate Code § 7-302 (1969), which provides that “the trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another…”

Congress has imposed a comparable prudence standard for the administration of pension and employee benefit trusts in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), enacted in 1974. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a), provides that “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and … with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims….”

Prior Restatement:  The Restatement of Trusts 2d (1959) also tracked the language of the Amory  case: “In making investments of trust funds the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary … to make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be derived…” Restatement of Trusts 2d § 227 (1959).

Objective Standard:  The concept of prudence in the judicial opinions and legislation is essentially relational or comparative. It resembles in this respect the “reasonable person” rule of tort law. A prudent trustee behaves as other trustees similarly situated would behave. The standard is, therefore, objective rather than subjective. Sections 2 through 9 of this Act [§§ 35-14-10435-14-111] identify the main factors that bear on prudent investment behavior.

Variation:  Almost all of the rules of trust law are default rules, that is, rules that the settlor may alter or abrogate. Subsection (b) carries forward this traditional attribute of trust law. Traditional trust law also allows the beneficiaries of the trust to excuse its performance, when they are all capable and not misinformed. Restatement of Trusts 2d § 216 (1959).

35-14-104. Standard of care — Portfolio strategy — Risk and return objectives.

  1. A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.
  2. A trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust.
  3. Among circumstances that a trustee may consider in investing and managing trust assets the following are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries:
    1. General economic conditions;
    2. The possible effect of inflation or deflation;
    3. The expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies;
    4. The role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall trust portfolio, which may include financial assets, interests in closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property;
    5. The expected total return from income and the appreciation of capital;
    6. Other resources of the beneficiaries;
    7. Needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital; and
    8. An asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one (1) or more of the beneficiaries.
  4. A trustee shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the investment and management of trust assets.
  5. In addition to the permissible investments listed in §§ 35-3-102 — 35-3-111, a trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent with the standards of this chapter.
  6. A trustee who has special skills or expertise, or is named trustee in reliance upon the trustee's representation that the trustee has special skills or expertise, has a duty to use those special skills or expertise.
  7. The powers granted by this section to trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries shall be in addition to the powers existing under other provisions of this code authorizing investments by fiduciaries.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Breach.

There was no breach of duty on the part of a trustee based on a lack of diversification because written documentation had been executed electing an in-kind distribution of the stocks in the estate and which acknowledged that the trustee would continue to hold “these securities” for a son's benefit; moreover, a family had owned these stocks for years, and they continued to pay large dividends to the trust during the administration period. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section 2 [§ 35-14-104] is the heart of the Act. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) are patterned loosely on the language of the Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992), and on the 1991 Illinois statute, 760 § ILCS 5/5a (1992). Subsection (f) is derived from Uniform Probate Code § 7-302 (1969).

Objective Standard:  Subsection (a) of this Act [§ 35-14-104(a)] carries forward the relational and objective standard made familiar in the Amory  case, in earlier prudent investor legislation, and in the Restatements. Early formulations of the prudent person rule were sometimes troubled by the effort to distinguish between the standard of a prudent person investing for another and investing on his or her own account. The language of subsection (a), by relating the trustee's duty to “the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust,” should put such questions to rest. The standard is the standard of the prudent investor similarly situated.

Portfolio Standard:  Subsection (b) emphasizes the consolidated portfolio standard for evaluating investment decisions. An investment that might be imprudent standing alone can become prudent if undertaken in sensible relation to other trust assets, or to other nontrust assets. In the trust setting the term “portfolio” embraces the entire trust estate.

Risk and Return:  Subsection (b) also sounds the main theme of modern investment practice, sensitivity to the risk/return curve. See generally the works cited in the Prefatory Note to this Act, under “Literature.” Returns correlate strongly with risk, but tolerance for risk varies greatly with the financial and other circumstances of the investor, or in the case of a trust, with the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of the beneficiaries. A trust whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of modest means will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth.

Subsection (b) of this Act [§ 35-14-104(b)] follows Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(a), which provides that the standard of prudent investing “requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.”

Factors Affecting Investment:  Subsection (c) points to certain of the factors that commonly bear on risk/return preferences in fiduciary investing. This listing is nonexclusive. Tax considerations, such as preserving the stepped up basis on death under Internal Revenue Code § 1014 [26 U.S.C. § 1014] for low-basis assets, have traditionally been exceptionally important in estate planning for affluent persons. Under the present recognition rules of the federal income tax, taxable investors, including trust beneficiaries, are in general best served by an investment strategy that minimizes the taxation incident to portfolio turnover. See generally Robert H. Jeffrey & Robert D. Arnott, Is Your Alpha Big Enough to Cover Its Taxes?, Journal of Portfolio Management 15 (Spring 1993).

Another familiar example of how tax considerations bear upon trust investing: In a regime of pass-through taxation, it may be prudent for the trust to buy lower yielding tax-exempt securities for high-bracket taxpayers, whereas it would ordinarily be imprudent for the trustees of a charitable trust, whose income is tax exempt, to accept the lowered yields associated with tax-exempt securities.

When tax considerations affect beneficiaries differently, the trustee's duty of impartiality requires attention to the competing interests of each of them.

Subsection (c)(8), allowing the trustee to take into account any preferences of the beneficiaries respecting heirlooms or other prized assets, derives from the Illinois act, 760 ILCS § 5/5(a)(4) (1992).

Duty To Monitor:  Subsections (a) through (d) apply both to investing and managing trust assets. “Managing” embraces monitoring, that is, the trustee's continuing responsibility for oversight of the suitability of investments already made as well as the trustee's decisions respecting new investments.

Duty To Investigate:  Subsection (d) carries forward the traditional responsibility of the fiduciary investor to examine information likely to bear importantly on the value or the security of an investment — for example, audit reports or records of title. E.g., Estate of Collins, 72 Cal. App. 3d 663, 139 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1977) (trustees lent on a junior mortgage on unimproved real estate, failed to have land appraised, and accepted an unaudited financial statement; held liable for losses).

Abrogating Categoric Restrictions:  Subsection 2(e) [§ 35-14-104(e)] clarifies that no particular kind of property or type of investment is inherently imprudent. Traditional trust law was encumbered with a variety of categoric exclusions, such as prohibitions on junior mortgages or new ventures. In some states legislation created so-called “legal lists” of approved trust investments. The universe of investment products changes incessantly. Investments that were at one time thought too risky, such as equities, or more recently, futures, are now used in fiduciary portfolios. By contrast, the investment that was at one time thought ideal for trusts, the long-term bond, has been discovered to import a level of risk and volatility — in this case, inflation risk — that had not been anticipated. Accordingly, section 2(e) of this Act [§ 35-14-104(e)] follows Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule in abrogating categoric restrictions. The Restatement says: “Specific investments or techniques are not per se prudent or imprudent. The riskiness of a specific property, and thus the propriety of its inclusion in the trust estate, is not judged in the abstract but in terms of its anticipated effect on the particular trust's portfolio.” Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, Comment f, at 24 (1992). The premise of subsection 2(e) [§ 35-14-104(e)] is that trust beneficiaries are better protected by the Act's emphasis on close attention to risk/return objectives as prescribed in subsection 2(b) [§ 35-14-104(b)] than in attempts to identify categories of investment that are per se prudent or imprudent.

The Act impliedly disavows the emphasis in older law on avoiding “speculative” or “risky” investments. Low levels of risk may be appropriate in some trust settings but inappropriate in others. It is the trustee's task to invest at a risk level that is suitable to the purposes of the trust.

The abolition of categoric restrictions against types of investment in no way alters the trustee's conventional duty of loyalty, which is reiterated for the purposes of this Act in Section 5 [§ 35-14-107]. For example, were the trustee to invest in a second mortgage on a piece of real property owned by the trustee, the investment would be wrongful on account of the trustee's breach of the duty to abstain from self-dealing, even though the investment would no longer automatically offend the former categoric restriction against fiduciary investments in junior mortgages.

Professional Fiduciaries:  The distinction taken in subsection (f) between amateur and professional trustees is familiar law. The prudent investor standard applies to a range of fiduciaries, from the most sophisticated professional investment management firms and corporate fiduciaries, to family members of minimal experience. Because the standard of prudence is relational, it follows that the standard for professional trustees is the standard of prudent professionals; for amateurs, it is the standard of prudent amateurs. Restatement of Trusts 2d § 174 (1959) provides: “The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill.” Case law strongly supports the concept of the higher standard of care for the trustee representing itself to be expert or professional. See Annot., Standard of Care Required of Trustee Representing Itself to Have Expert Knowledge or Skill, 91 A.L.R. 3d 904 (1979) & 1992 Supp. at 48-49.

The Drafting Committee declined the suggestion that the Act should create an exception to the prudent investor rule (or to the diversification requirement of Section 3 [§ 35-14-105]) in the case of smaller trusts. The Committee believes that subsections (b) and (c) of the Act emphasize factors that are sensitive to the traits of small trusts; and that subsection (f) adjusts helpfully for the distinction between professional and amateur trusteeship. Furthermore, it is always open to the settlor of a trust under Section 1(b) of the Act [§ 35-14-103(b)] to reduce the trustee's standard of care if the settlor deems such a step appropriate. The official comments to the 1992 Restatement observe that pooled investments, such as mutual funds and bank common trust funds, are especially suitable for small trusts. Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, Comments h , m , at 28, 51; reporter's note to Comment g , id. at 83.

Matters of Proof:  Although virtually all express trusts are created by written instrument, oral trusts are known, and accordingly, this Act presupposes no formal requirement that trust terms be in writing. When there is a written trust instrument, modern authority strongly favors allowing evidence extrinsic to the instrument to be consulted for the purpose of ascertaining the settlor's intent. See Uniform Probate Code § 2-601 (1990), Comment; Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers (Preliminary Draft No. 2, ch. 11, Sept. 11, 1992).

35-14-105. Diversification.

  1. A trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust:
    1. Unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying, or
    2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b).
    1. In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in the governing instrument, a fiduciary may without liability continue to hold property received into a trust at its inception or subsequently added to it or acquired pursuant to proper authority if and as long as the fiduciary, in the exercise of good faith and reasonable prudence, discretion and intelligence, may consider that retention is in the best interest of the trust and its beneficiaries or in furtherance of the goals of the trustor as determined from that instrument. Such property may include capital stock in the corporate fiduciary and stock in any corporation controlling, controlled by or under common control with such fiduciary; and the fiduciary may acquire additional shares of such stock by stock dividends, stock splits, exchanges and conversions for other stock or debentures and exercise of rights to acquire stock of the corporation or another corporation acquiring the stock of the corporation by merger, consolidation or reorganization.
    2. In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in the governing instrument, a deposit of trust funds at interest in any bank, savings and loan association or other financial institution (including the fiduciary and an affiliated depository institution) shall be a qualified investment to the extent that such deposit is insured under any present or future law of the United States. The fiduciary may also hold deposits in such institutions without interest in reasonable amounts and for reasonable times for operating expenses, anticipated distributions and pending investments.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, and except as otherwise provided in the governing instrument, the duties of a trustee regarding the acquisition, retention or ownership of a contract of insurance on the life of the grantor of the trust, or on the lives of the grantor and the grantor's spouse, children, grandchildren, or parents, do not include a duty to:
      1. Determine whether any contract of life insurance in the trust, or to be acquired by the trust, is or remains a proper investment;
        1. As to the type of insurance contract;
        2. As to the quality of the insurance company;
        3. Or otherwise.
      2. Diversify the investment; or
      3. Exercise any policy options, rights, or privileges available under any contract of life insurance in the trust, including any right to borrow the cash value or reserve of the policy, acquire a paid-up policy, or convert to a different policy.
    2. The trustee is not liable to the beneficiaries of the contract of insurance or to any other party for loss arising from the absence of these duties regarding insurance contracts under this subsection (c).

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Breach.

There was no breach of duty on the part of a trustee based on a lack of diversification because written documentation had been executed electing an in-kind distribution of the stocks in the estate and which acknowledged that the trustee would continue to hold “these securities” for a son's benefit; moreover, a family had owned these stocks for years, and they continued to pay large dividends to the trust during the administration period. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The language of this section derives from Restatement of Trusts 2d § 228 (1959). ERISA insists upon a comparable rule for pension trusts. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C). Case law overwhelmingly supports the duty to diversify. See Annot., Duty of Trustee to Diversify Investments, and Liability for Failure to Do So, 24 A.L.R. 3d 730 (1969) & 1992 Supp. at 78-79.

The 1992 Restatement of Trusts takes the significant step of integrating the diversification requirement into the concept of prudent investing. Section 227(b) of the 1992 Restatement treats diversification as one of the fundamental elements of prudent investing, replacing the separate section 228 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d. The message of the 1992 Restatement, carried forward in Section 3 of this Act [§ 35-14-105], is that prudent investing ordinarily requires diversification.

Circumstances can, however, overcome the duty to diversify. For example, if a tax-sensitive trust owns an underdiversified block of low-basis securities, the tax costs of recognizing the gain may outweigh the advantages of diversifying the holding. The wish to retain a family business is another situation in which the purposes of the trust sometimes override the conventional duty to diversify.

Rationale for Diversification:  “Diversification reduces risk.… [because] stock price movements are not uniform. They are imperfectly correlated. This means that if one holds a well diversified portfolio, the gains in one investment will cancel out the losses in another.” Jonathan R. Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory 20 (American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Foundation, 1991). For example, during the Arab oil embargo of 1973, international oil stocks suffered declines, but the shares of domestic oil producers and coal companies benefitted. Holding a broad enough portfolio allowed the investor to set off, to some extent, the losses associated with the embargo.

Modern portfolio theory divides risk into the categories of “compensated” and “uncompensated” risk. The risk of owning shares in a mature and well-managed company in a settled industry is less than the risk of owning shares in a start-up high-technology venture. The investor requires a higher expected return to induce the investor to bear the greater risk of disappointment associated with the start-up firm. This is compensated risk — the firm pays the investor for bearing the risk. By contrast, nobody pays the investor for owning too few stocks. The investor who owned only international oils in 1973 was running a risk that could have been reduced by having configured the portfolio differently — to include investments in different industries. This is uncompensated risk — nobody pays the investor for owning shares in too few industries and too few companies. Risk that can be eliminated by adding different stocks (or bonds) is uncompensated risk. The object of diversification is to minimize this uncompensated risk of having too few investments. “As long as stock prices do not move exactly together, the risk of a diversified portfolio will be less than the average risk of the separate holdings.” R.A. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks 103 (2d ed. 1983).

There is no automatic rule for identifying how much diversification is enough. The 1992 Restatement says: “Significant diversification advantages can be achieved with a small number of well-selected securities representing different industries … Broader diversification is usually to be preferred in trust investing,” and pooled investment vehicles “make thorough diversification practical for most trustees.” Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, General Note on Comments e-h , at 77 (1992). See also  Macey, supra, at 23-24;  Brealey, supra, at 111-13.

Diversifying by Pooling:  It is difficult for a small trust fund to diversify thoroughly by constructing its own portfolio of individually selected investments. Transaction costs such as the round-lot (100 share) trading economies make it relatively expensive for a small investor to assemble a broad enough portfolio to minimize uncompensated risk. For this reason, pooled investment vehicles have become the main mechanism for facilitating diversification for the investment needs of smaller trusts.

Most states have legislation authorizing common trust funds; see 3 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 227.9, at 463-65 n.26 (4th ed. 1988) (collecting citations to state statutes). As of 1992, 35 states and the District of Columbia had enacted the Uniform Common Trust Fund Act (UCTFA) (1938), overcoming the rule against commingling trust assets and expressly enabling banks and trust companies to establish common trust funds. 7 Uniform Laws Ann. 1992 Supp. at 130 (schedule of adopting states). The Prefatory Note to the UCTFA explains: “The purposes of such a common or joint investment fund are to diversify the investment of the several trusts and thus spread the risk of loss, and to make it easy to invest any amount of trust funds quickly and with a small amount of trouble.” 7 Uniform Laws Ann. 402 (1985).

Fiduciary Investing in Mutual Funds:  Trusts can also achieve diversification by investing in mutual funds. See Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule, § 227, Comment m, at 99-100 (1992) (endorsing trust investment in mutual funds). ERISA § 401(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1), expressly authorizes pension trusts to invest in mutual funds, identified as securities “issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940…”

35-14-106. Duties at inception of trusteeship.

Within a reasonable time after accepting a trusteeship or receiving trust assets, a trustee shall review the trust assets and make and implement decisions concerning the retention and disposition of assets, in order to bring the trust portfolio into compliance with the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust, and with the requirements of this chapter.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. When Duty Arises.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank in the decedent's daughter's action against it was appropriate because the bank's duty to assert control over the assets in question did not surface until a reasonable time after receiving trust assets. Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section 4 [§ 35-14-106], requiring the trustee to dispose of unsuitable assets within a reasonable time, is old law, codified in Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 229 (1992), lightly revising Restatement of Trusts 2d § 230 (1959). The duty extends as well to investments that were proper when purchased but subsequently become improper. Restatement of Trusts 2d § 231 (1959). The same standards apply to successor trustees, see Restatement of Trusts 2d § 196 (1959).

The question of what period of time is reasonable turns on the totality of factors affecting the asset and the trust. The 1959 Restatement took the view that “[o]rdinarily any time within a year is reasonable, but under some circumstances a year may be too long a time and under other circumstances a trustee is not liable although he fails to effect the conversion for more than a year.” Restatement of Trusts 2d § 230, comment b (1959). The 1992 Restatement retreated from this rule of thumb, saying, “No positive rule can be stated with respect to what constitutes a reasonable time for the sale or exchange of securities.” Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 229, comment b  (1992).

The criteria and circumstances identified in Section 2 of this Act [§ 35-14-104] as bearing upon the prudence of decisions to invest and manage trust assets also pertain to the prudence of decisions to retain or dispose of inception assets under this section.

35-14-107. Loyalty.

A trustee shall invest and manage the trust assets solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 7.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The duty of loyalty is perhaps the most characteristic rule of trust law, requiring the trustee to act exclusively for the beneficiaries, as opposed to acting for the trustee's own interest or that of third parties. The language of Section 4 of this Act [§ 35-14-106] derives from Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 170 (1992), which makes minute changes in Restatement of Trusts 2d § 170 (1959).

The concept that the duty of prudence in trust administration, especially in investing and managing trust assets, entails adherence to the duty of loyalty is familiar. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B), extracted in the Comment to Section 1 of this Act [§ 35-14-103], effectively merges the requirements of prudence and loyalty. A fiduciary cannot be prudent in the conduct of investment functions if the fiduciary is sacrificing the interests of the beneficiaries.

The duty of loyalty is not limited to settings entailing self-dealing or conflict of interest in which the trustee would benefit personally from the trust. “The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust not to be guided by the interest of any third person. Thus, it is improper for the trustee to sell trust property to a third person for the purpose of benefitting the third person rather than the trust.” Restatement of Trusts 2d § 170, comment q , at 371 (1959).

No form of so-called “social investing” is consistent with the duty of loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrificing the interests of trust beneficiaries — for example, by accepting below-market returns — in favor of the interests of the persons supposedly benefitted by pursuing the particular social cause. See, e.g., John H. Langbein & Richard Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 Michigan L. Rev. 72, 96-97 (1980) (collecting authority). For pension trust assets, see generally Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May it Be Done Lawfully under ERISA?, 31 Labor L.J. 387 (1980). Commentators supporting social investing tend to concede the overriding force of the duty of loyalty. They argue instead that particular schemes of social investing may not result in below-market returns. See, e.g., Marcia O'Brien Hylton, “Socially Responsible” Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 American U.L. Rev. 1 (1992). In 1994 the Department of Labor issued an Interpretive Bulletin reviewing its prior analysis of social investing questions and reiterating that pension trust fiduciaries may invest only in conformity with the prudence and loyalty standards of ERISA §§ 403-404. Interpretive Bulletin 94-1, 59 Fed. Regis. 32606 (Jun. 22, 1994), to be codified as 29 CFR § 2509.94-1. The Bulletin reminds fiduciary investors that they are prohibited from “subordinat[ing] the interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives.”

35-14-108. Impartiality.

If a trust has two (2) or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing and managing the trust assets, taking into account any differing interests of the beneficiaries.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 8.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The duty of impartiality derives from the duty of loyalty. When the trustee owes duties to more than one beneficiary, loyalty requires the trustee to respect the interests of all the beneficiaries. Prudence in investing and administration requires the trustee to take account of the interests of all the beneficiaries for whom the trustee is acting, especially the conflicts between the interests of beneficiaries interested in income and those interested in principal.

The language of Section 6 [§ 35-14-108] derives from Restatement of Trusts 2d § 183 (1959); see also id., § 232. Multiple beneficiaries may be beneficiaries in succession (such as life and remainder interests) or beneficiaries with simultaneous interests (as when the income interest in a trust is being divided among several beneficiaries).

The trustee's duty of impartiality commonly affects the conduct of investment and management functions in the sphere of principal and income allocations. This Act prescribes no regime for allocating receipts and expenses. The details of such allocations are commonly handled under specialized legislation, such as the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act (1962) (which is presently under study by the Uniform Law Commission with a view toward further revision).

35-14-109. Investment costs.

In investing and managing trust assets, a trustee may only incur costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 9.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Wasting beneficiaries' money is imprudent. In devising and implementing strategies for the investment and management of trust assets, trustees are obliged to minimize costs.

The language of Section 7 [§ 35-14-109] derives from Restatement of Trusts 2d § 188 (1959). The Restatement of Trusts 3d says: “Concerns over compensation and other charges are not an obstacle to a reasonable course of action using mutual funds and other pooling arrangements, but they do require special attention by a trustee… [I]t is important for trustees to make careful cost comparisons, particularly among similar products of a specific type being considered for a trust portfolio.” Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, comment m  , at 58 (1992).

35-14-110. Reviewing compliance.

Compliance with the prudent investor rule is determined in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of a trustee's decision or action and not by hindsight.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 10.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section derives from the 1991 Illinois act, 760 ILCS 5/5(a)(2) (1992), which draws upon Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, comment b  , at 11 (1992). Trustees are not insurers. Not every investment or management decision will turn out in the light of hindsight to have been successful. Hindsight is not the relevant standard. In the language of law and economics, the standard is ex ante, not ex post.

35-14-111. Delegation of investment and management functions.

  1. A trustee may delegate investment and management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:
    1. Selecting an agent;
    2. Establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of the trust; and
    3. Periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.
  2. In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
  3. A trustee who complies with the requirements of subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function was delegated.
  4. By accepting the delegation of a trust function from the trustee of a trust that is subject to the law of this state, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 11.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section of the Act reverses the much-criticized rule that forbad trustees to delegate investment and management functions. The language of this section is derived from Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 171 (1992), discussed infra, and from the 1991 Illinois act, 760 ILCS § 5/5.1(b), (c) (1992).

Former Law:  The former nondelegation rule survived into the 1959 Restatement: “The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform.” The rule put a premium on the frequently arbitrary task of distinguishing discretionary functions that were thought to be nondelegable from supposedly ministerial functions that the trustee was allowed to delegate. Restatement of Trusts 2d § 171 (1959).

The Restatement of Trusts 2d admitted in a comment that “There is not a clear-cut line dividing the acts which a trustee can properly delegate from those which he cannot properly delegate.” Instead, the comment directed attention to a list of factors that “may be of importance: (1) the amount of discretion involved; (2) the value and character of the property involved; (3) whether the property is principal or income; (4) the proximity or remoteness of the subject matter of the trust; (5) the character of the act as one involving professional skill or facilities possessed or not possessed by the trustee himself.” Restatement of Trusts 2d § 171, comment d  (1959). The 1959 Restatement further said: “A trustee cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments.” Restatement of Trusts 2d § 171, comment h  (1959).

For discussion and criticism of the former rule see William L. Cary & Craig B. Bright, The Delegation of Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds, 74 Columbia L. Rev. 207 (1974); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 American Bar Foundation Research J. 1, 18-24.

The Modern Trend To Favor Delegation:  The trend of subsequent legislation, culminating in the Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule, has been strongly hostile to the nondelegation rule. See John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 Missouri L. Rev. 105 (1994).

The Delegation Rule of the Uniform Trustee Powers Act:  The Uniform Trustee Powers Act (1964) effectively abrogates the nondelegation rule. It authorizes trustees “to employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors, or agents, even if they are associated with the trustee, to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of his administrative duties; to act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; and instead of acting personally, to employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary…” Uniform Trustee Powers Act § 3(24), 7B Uniform Laws Ann. 743 (1985). The Act has been enacted in 16 states, see “Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of September 30, 1993,” 1993-94 Reference Book of Uniform Law Commissioners (unpaginated, following page 111) (1993).

UMIFA's Delegation Rule:  The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (1972) (UMIFA), authorizes the governing boards of eleemosynary institutions, who are trustee-like fiduciaries, to delegate investment matters either to a committee of the board or to outside investment advisors, investment counsel, managers, banks, or trust companies. UMIFA § 5, 7A Uniform Laws Ann. 705 (1985). UMIFA has been enacted in 38 states, see “Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of September 30, 1993,” 1993-94 Reference Book of Uniform Law Commissioners (unpaginated, following page 111) (1993).

ERISA's Delegation Rule:  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the federal statute that prescribes fiduciary standards for investing the assets of pension and employee benefit plans, allows a pension or employee benefit plan to provide that “authority to manage, acquire or dispose of assets of the plan is delegated to one or more investment managers.…” ERISA § 403(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2). Commentators have explained the rationale for ERISA's encouragement of delegation:

ERISA … Invites the dissolution of unitary trusteeship … ERISA's fractionation of traditional trusteeship reflects the complexity of the modern pension trust. Because millions, even billions of dollars can be involved, great care is required in investing and safekeeping plan assets. Administering such plans-computing and honoring benefit entitlements across decades of employment and retirement-is also a complex business … Since, however, neither the sponsor nor any other single entity has a comparative advantage in performing all these functions, the tendency has been for pension plans to use a variety of specialized providers. A consulting actuary, a plan administration firm, or an insurance company may oversee the design of a plan and arrange for processing benefit claims. Investment industry professionals manage the portfolio (the largest plans spread their pension investments among dozens of money management firms).John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 496 (1990).

The Delegation Rule of the 1992 Restatement:  The Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule (1992) repeals the nondelegation rule of Restatement of Trusts 2d § 171 (1959), extracted supra, and replaces it with substitute text that reads:

§ 171. Duty with Respect to Delegation. A trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of trusteeship except as a prudent person might delegate those responsibilities to others. In deciding whether, to whom, and in what manner to delegate fiduciary authority in the administration of a trust, and thereafter in supervising agents, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to exercise fiduciary discretion and to act as a prudent person would act in similar circumstances.

Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 171 (1992). The 1992 Restatement integrates this delegation standard into the prudent investor rule of section 227, providing that “the trustee must … act with prudence in deciding whether and how to delegate to others … Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(c) (1992).

Protecting the Beneficiary Against Unreasonable Delegation:  There is an intrinsic tension in trust law between granting trustees broad powers that facilitate flexible and efficient trust administration, on the one hand, and protecting trust beneficiaries from the misuse of such powers on the other hand. A broad set of trustees' powers, such as those found in most lawyer-drafted instruments and exemplified in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, permits the trustee to act vigorously and expeditiously to maximize the interests of the beneficiaries in a variety of transactions and administrative settings. Trust law relies upon the duties of loyalty and prudent administration, and upon procedural safeguards such as periodic accounting and the availability of judicial oversight, to prevent the misuse of these powers. Delegation, which is a species of trustee power, raises the same tension. If the trustee delegates effectively, the beneficiaries obtain the advantage of the agent's specialized investment skills or whatever other attributes induced the trustee to delegate. But if the trustee delegates to a knave or an incompetent, the delegation can work harm upon the beneficiaries.

Section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act [§ 35-14-111] is designed to strike the appropriate balance between the advantages and the hazards of delegation. Section 9 [§ 35-14-111] authorizes delegation under the limitations of subsections (a) and (b). Section 9(a) [§ 35-14-111(a)] imposes duties of care, skill, and caution on the trustee in selecting the agent, in establishing the terms of the delegation, and in reviewing the agent's compliance.

The trustee's duties of care, skill, and caution in framing the terms of the delegation should protect the beneficiary against overbroad delegation. For example, a trustee could not prudently agree to an investment management agreement containing an exculpation clause that leaves the trust without recourse against reckless mismanagement. Leaving one's beneficiaries remediless against willful wrongdoing is inconsistent with the duty to use care and caution in formulating the terms of the delegation. This sense that it is imprudent to expose beneficiaries to broad exculpation clauses underlies both federal and state legislation restricting exculpation clauses, e.g., ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(D), 410(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(D), 1110(a); New York Est. Powers Trusts Law § 11-1.7 (McKinney 1967).

Although subsection (c) of the Act [§ 35-4-111(c)] exonerates the trustee from personal responsibility for the agent's conduct when the delegation satisfies the standards of subsection 9(a) [§ 35-14-111(a)], subsection 9(b) [§ 35-14-111(a)] makes the agent responsible to the trust. The beneficiaries of the trust can, therefore, rely upon the trustee to enforce the terms of the delegation.

Costs:  The duty to minimize costs that is articulated in Section 7 [§ 35-14-109] of this Act applies to delegation as well as to other aspects of fiduciary investing. In deciding whether to delegate, the trustee must balance the projected benefits against the likely costs. Similarly, in deciding how to delegate, the trustee must take costs into account. The trustee must be alert to protect the beneficiary from “double dipping.” If, for example, the trustee's regular compensation schedule presupposes that the trustee will conduct the investment management function, it should ordinarily follow that the trustee will lower its fee when delegating the investment function to an outside manager.

35-14-112. Language invoking standard of act.

The following terms or comparable language in the provisions of a trust, unless otherwise limited or modified, authorizes any investment or strategy permitted under this chapter: “investments permissible by law for investment of trust funds,” “legal investments,” “authorized investments,” “using the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing that persons of prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital,” “prudent man rule,” “prudent trustee rule,” “prudent person rule,” and “prudent investor rule.”

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 12.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This provision is taken from the Illinois act, 760 ILCS § 5/5(d) (1992), and is meant to facilitate incorporation of the Act by means of the formulaic language commonly used in trust instruments.

35-14-113. Application to existing trusts.

  1. This chapter applies to trusts existing on and created after July 1, 2002. As applied to trusts existing on July 1, 2002, this chapter governs only decisions or actions occurring after that date.
  2. This section shall not apply in any situation governed by the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act, compiled in title 34, chapter 5.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 13.

35-14-114. Court authority.

Nothing in this chapter abrogates or restricts the power of an appropriate court in proper cases to direct or permit the fiduciary to deviate from the terms of the governing instrument or restrains a fiduciary from taking any action regarding the making or retention of investments.

Acts 2002, ch. 696, § 14.

Chapter 15
Tennessee Uniform Trust Code

Part 1
General Provisions and Definitions

35-15-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.”

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 95 provided that the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to publish in the Tennessee Code Annotated the revised official comments that are filed with the executive secretary of the Tennessee Code Commission within 30 days of July 1, 2004.

The 2013 Restated Comments to Official Text reflect the input of various groups as well as the comments provided by the Uniform Law Commission.

Law Reviews.

Can't Trust a Trust? Decant (Dan W. Holbrook), 40 No. 8 Tenn. B.J. 20 (2004).

Exploring the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code (C. Shawn O'Donnell), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 489 (2008).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: A Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1741 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1931 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Pro and Con (Law): Considering the Irrevocable Nongrantor Trust Technique, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1999 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution, Out-of-State Nongrantor Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of State Income Taxation, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1945 (2014).

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769 (2014).

Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: New Formulation for a Trusty Tool (Marshall H. Peterson), 41 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2005).

Where There's a Will: The Report of My Practice's Death Was an Exaggeration: The Healthy Prognosis for Estate Planning in Tennessee (Eddy R. Smith), 48 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2012).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Use of Terms — Controlling Law and Comments

Throughout these comments, whether in upper or lower case, the following terms apply:

“Comments,” when not preceded by or otherwise containing a reference to the comments of some matter other than these comments, mean these comments.

“Title,” “Chapter” and “Part” respectively mean: a title of the Tennessee Code; a chapter of its relevant title therein; and a part of its relevant chapter therein.

“Title 35” means title 35 of the Tennessee Code.

“Tennessee Trust Statutes” mean any statute, together with the comments thereto, found in title 35, including but not limited to: Chapter 6, Tennessee’s adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act (“Tennessee Uniform Principal and Income Act”); Chapter 14, the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002 (“Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act”); Chapter 15, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code (“Tennessee Uniform Trust Code”); Chapter 16, the Tennessee Investment Services Trust Act of 2007 (Tennessee Investment Services Trust Act”); and Chapter 17, the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (“Tennessee Community Property Trust Act”).

“Tennessee law,” individually and collectively, means any code, act, statute or law (together with any comments to such) of the state of Tennessee; or the holding or ruling of any court, judicial or administrative body of the state of Tennessee.

“Uniform law,” “uniform code,” “uniform act” or “uniform legislation,” individually and collectively, mean any uniform code, act, law or other legislation (together with any amendments and comments to such) proposed for adoption by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC,” also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or “NCCUSL,” both nomenclatures being included in the acronym “ULC – NCCUSL,” sometimes referred to in these comments as “commission” and the members of which sometimes referred to in the these comments as “commissioners”). Regardless of whether or not any of the Tennessee trust statutes were or are based on any uniform law, code or act, such Tennessee trust statutes are not included within the meaning of any of the terms uniform law, uniform code or uniform act; the Tennessee trust statutes being a distinct and integrated set of trust laws, separate therefrom.

“Uniform trust code” means the Uniform Trust Code (together with any amendments and comments to such) pro-posed for adoption by ULC – NCCUSL.

“Section,” as well as any other subdivision of any matter, when not preceded by or otherwise containing a reference to the terms “Tennessee,” “Tennessee Code” or “T.C.A.,” means a section or other subdivision of legislation (or any other matter compiled by number), other than the sections and subdivisions thereof contained in the Tennessee Code. When the word section is followed by a number between 101 and 1106 and contains no other words modifying it or otherwise referencing it to a specific matter compiled by numbers, section means a section of the Uniform Trust Code as proposed for adoption by ULC – NCCUSL.

“Restatement” means one or more restatements of the law (together with any comments thereto), individually and collectively, as such are published by the American Law Institute.

“Foreign jurisdiction” means the same as does such term in T.C.A. § 35-15-103.

“Foreign law,” individually and collectively, means any code, act, statute or law (together with any comments to such) of any foreign jurisdiction; or the holding or ruling of any court, judicial or administrative body of any foreign jurisdiction.

“Other law,” individually and collectively, means any foreign law; any uniform law, code or act; and any restatement.

Throughout these comments any reference to a code, act, statute, law or other holding, when not preceded by or otherwise containing a reference to the word “Tennessee,” an abbreviation relative to such reference including the letters “T.C.A.” or a citation to the ruling of any court, judicial or administrative body of the state of Tennessee, refers to other law and not to Tennessee law.

Controlling Law and Controlling Comments

As originally adopted, numerous provisions of title 35, chapters 6, 14 and 15 were modified and diverge, in some cases significantly, from their respective uniform codes as well as related restatements. Moreover, there are no uniform code provisions addressing the subjects covered by title 35, chapters 16 and 17. Finally, since their initial adoption, various amendments to the Tennessee trust statutes have also been enacted. For example since its initial adoption in 2004, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code underwent amendment in 2005, substantial amendment in 2007, further amendment in 2010 and substantial amendment in 2013. This has resulted in further divergence from uniform law and related restatements, such divergence sometimes being significant. This divergence was undertaken deliberately and after significant consideration. Taken as a whole, the Tennessee trust statutes are a distinct and integrated set of trust laws.

It is for this reason that the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 reverse those of section 1101 of the Uniform Trust Code and expressly state that in applying and construing title 35 no consideration shall be given to any need to promote uniformity with respect to its subject matter among states, including relative to the laws of any foreign jurisdiction that has enacted versions of the various uniform codes, laws or acts. Moreover, T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 provides that unless specifically provided otherwise in title 35, chapters 6, 14, 15, 16 and 17, courts shall not consult or give any persuasive value to any such uniform acts or any foreign jurisdiction’s acts based on or similar to them; or to the comments of any of them; none of which have any force or effect relative to trusts governed by the laws of Tennessee.

Accordingly, regardless of the fact that throughout these comments references are made to other law, including various uniform acts and restatements, as well as to foreign law, none of such are controlling to the extent they conflict with Tennessee law. While attempts have been made throughout these comments to identify other law (e.g., by use of words such as “according to ULC - NCCUSL”), the fact that any such other law is not so identified does not alter the above.

Finally, relative to any other law, any cross reference to Tennessee law (e.g., by inclusion of a given section from the Tennessee Code or the changing of nomenclature of various parts of codification from that used in foreign law to that used in the Tennessee Code; such as “article” to “part;” or “section” to “subsection” or “subdivision”) does not in itself signify the Tennessee law so cross-referenced is in accord with such other law, and to the extent such other law is in conflict with the cross-referenced Tennessee law, the Tennessee law controls.

Default Rule

According to ULC - NCCUSL, most of the Uniform Trust Code consists of default rules that apply only if the terms of the trust fail to address or insufficiently cover a particular issue. Pursuant to section 105 [T.C.A. § 35-15-105 ], a drafter is free to override a substantial majority of the Code’s provisions. The relatively limited number of exceptions (called “mandatory rules”) are scheduled in subsection 105(b) [T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) ].

It is a primary objective of the Tennessee trust statutes that a settlor’s intent be the lodestar by which a trust is interpreted, that such intent be carried out and that settlors have the freedom to dispose of their assets to whom and in the manner they wish, all to the greatest extent constitutionally allowable. Therefore, the number of mandatory rules under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code are fewer than those found in the Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a) specifically provides that the rule that states that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed has no application to T.C.A. § 35-15-105. Finally, such section provides that, except as restricted by T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b), courts shall give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of disposition and to the enforceability of trust instruments.

Innovative Provisions

According to ULC - NCCUSL, much of the Uniform Trust Code is a codification of the common law of trusts. But the Code does contain a number of innovative provisions. Among the more significant are specification of the rules of trust law that are not subject to override in the trust's terms (section 105) [T.C.A. § 35-15-105 ], the inclusion of a comprehensive part on representation of beneficiaries (part 3) [T.C.A. §§  35-15-30135-15-305 ], rules on trust modification and termination that will enhance flexibility (sections 410-417) [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-417 ], and the inclusion of a part collecting the special rules pertaining to revocable trusts (part 6) [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-60135-15-604 ].

Existing Uniform Laws on Trust Law Subjects

According to UCL – NCCUSL, certain older uniform acts are incorporated into the Uniform Trust Code, while other uniform acts, addressing more specialized topics, continue to be available for enactment in free-standing form. As mentioned above certain portions of the Tennessee trust statutes diverge, in some cases significantly, from the Uniform Trust Code, as well as from other uniform acts and restatements, in all cases intentionally and after significant consideration.

According to UCL – NCCUSL, the following uniform acts are incorporated into or otherwise superseded by the Uniform Trust Code:

Uniform Probate Code (UPC) Article VII. Originally approved in 1969, Article VII has been enacted in about fifteen (15) jurisdictions. Article VII, although titled ‘Trust Administration,’ is a modest statute, addressing only a limited number of topics. Except for its provisions on trust registration, Article VII is superseded by the Uniform Trust Code. Its provisions on jurisdiction are incorporated into part 2 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-20135-15-204 ] of the Code, and its provision on trustee liability to persons other than beneficiaries are replaced by section 1010 [T.C.A. § 35-15-1010 ].

Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994) [T.C.A. §§ 35-14-101  et seq.]. This Act has been enacted in thirty-five (35) jurisdictions. This Act, and variant forms enacted in a number of other states, has displaced the older ‘prudent man’ standard, bringing trust law into line with modern investment practice. States that have enacted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act are encouraged to recodify it as part of their enactment of the Uniform Trust Code. The Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002 is codified at title 35, chapter 14 and is incorporated by reference in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code at T.C.A. § 35-15-901.

Uniform Trustee Powers Act (1964). This Act has been enacted in sixteen (16) states. The Act contains a list of specific trustee powers and deals with other selected issues, particularly relations of a trustee with persons other than beneficiaries. The Uniform Trustee Powers Act is outdated and is entirely superseded by the Uniform Trust Code, principally at sections 815, 816, and 1012 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-815, 35-15-816,  and 35-15-1012 ]. States enacting the Uniform Trust Code should repeal their existing trustee powers legislation.

Uniform Trusts Act (1937). This largely overlooked Act of similar name was enacted in only six (6) states, none within the past several decades. Despite a title suggesting comprehensive coverage of its topic, this Act, like Article VII of the UPC, addresses only a limited number of topics. These include the duty of loyalty, the registration and voting of securities, and trustee liability to persons other than beneficiaries. States enacting the Uniform Trust Code should repeal this earlier namesake.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, the following uniform acts are not affected by enactment of the Uniform Trust Code and do not need to be amended or repealed:

Uniform Common Trust Fund Act [T.C.A. §§ 35-4-101  et seq.]. Originally approved in 1938, this Act has been en-acted in thirty-four (34) jurisdictions. The Uniform Trust Code does not address the subject of common trust funds. In recent years, many banks have replaced their common trust funds with mutual funds that may also be available to non-trust customers. The Code addresses investment in mutual funds at subsection 802(f) [T.C.A. § 35-15-802(f)  now repealed].

Uniform Custodial Trust Act (1987). This Act has been enacted in fourteen (14) jurisdictions. This Act allows standard trust provisions to be automatically incorporated into the terms of a trust simply by referring to the Act. This Act is not displaced by the Uniform Trust Code but complements it.

Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (1972) [T.C.A. § 35-10-101  et seq.]. This Act has been enacted in forty-seven (47) jurisdictions. It governs the administration of endowment funds held by charitable, religious, and other eleemosynary institutions. The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act establishes a standard of prudence for use of appreciation on assets, provides specific authority for the making of investments, authorizes the delegation of this authority, and specifies a procedure, through either donor consent or court approval, for removing restrictions on the use of donated funds.

Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997) [T.C.A. § 35-6-101  et seq.]. The 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act is a major revision of the widely enacted uniform act of the same name approved in 1962. Because this Act addresses issues with respect both to decedent’s estates and trusts, a jurisdiction enacting the revised Uniform Principal and In-come Act may wish to include it either as part of the Uniform Trust Code or as part of its probate laws. The Tennessee version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act is as title 35, chapter 6 and has been incorporated by reference into the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code at T.C.A. § 35-15-901.

Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. Originally approved in 1986, this Act has been enacted in twenty-seven (27) jurisdictions. The Act reforms the durational limit on when property interests, including interests created under trusts, must vest or fail. The Uniform Trust Code does not limit the duration of trusts or alter the time when interests must otherwise vest, but leaves this issue to other state law. The Code may be enacted without change regardless of the status of the perpetuities law in the enacting jurisdiction. Tennessee has adopted a modified version of this uniform act as the Tennessee Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities at T.C.A. § 66-1-201 et seq. The Tennessee Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities differs from the uniform act in two major respects. Unlike the uniform act, the Tennessee legislation, which was effective July 1, 1994, has always generally applied retroactively as well as prospectively, while the uniform act only applies prospectively. Moreover, as to any trust created after June 30, 2007, or that becomes irrevocable after June 30, 2007, the Tennessee legislation extends the ninety (90) year term found in the uniform act to three hundred sixty (360) years. On a related note, at T.C.A. § 35-15-106(b)(1) the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code specifically abolishes the common law prohibition against accumulations of income and provides that no provision in a trust directing or authorizing accumulation of trust income is invalid.

Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act (1954) - This Act, which has been enacted in four States, is limited to mechanisms for monitoring the actions of charitable trustees. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act does not address the substantive law of charitable trusts.

Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act. This Act is available in two versions: the 1960 Act, with twenty four (24) enactments; and the 1991 Act, with twenty (20) enactments through 1999. As its name suggests, this Act validates pourover devises to trusts. Because it validates provisions in wills, it is incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code, not into the Uniform Trust Code.

Role of Restatement of Trusts: According to ULC - NCCUSL, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts was approved by the American Law Institute in 1957. Work on the Restatement Third began in the late 1980s. The portion of Restatement Third relating to the prudent investor rule and other investment topics was completed and approved in 1990. A tentative draft of the portion of Restatement Third relating to the rules on the creation and validity of trusts was approved in 1996, and the portion relating to the office of trustee, trust purposes, spendthrift provisions and the rights of creditors was approved in 1999. The Uniform Trust Code was drafted in close coordination with the writing of the Restatement Third.

The Tennessee trust statutes concur that much of the Uniform Trust Code’s coordination with, and citation in its comments to, the Restatements of Trusts is appropriate. Notwithstanding such, in certain cases the Tennessee trust statutes and comments thereto, diverge, sometimes significantly, from the provisions contained in both these Restatements of Trust, as well as in restatements covering fields of law that are related to, or impact upon, trusts. This divergence was undertaken deliberately and after significant consideration.

For example, T.C.A. § 35-15-106 provides that, generally, courts shall not consult, rely on or give any persuasive value to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 50, 56, 58, 59 or 60, nor any of their related comments because none of such have any force or effect relative to trusts governed by the laws of Tennessee.

As a result, the Tennessee trust statutes’ retain the traditional view regarding distinctive treatment of spendthrift, mandatory, support and discretionary trusts. That view controls a number of things regarding a trust, including the Tennessee trust statutes’ retention of the traditional standard by which a trustee’s exercise or refusal to exercise discretion is judged in general, as well as regarding distributions, specifically. Therefore, the Tennessee trust statutes reject the existence of any duty of reasonableness in exercising a trustee’s discretion that is or may be implied by the Restatement (Third) of Trusts or the Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, under the Tennessee trust statutes, a beneficiary (or that beneficiary's creditors) cannot generally force a trustee to make a distribution.

Similarly, under the Tennessee trust statutes, a beneficiary’s interest in a discretionary trust is protected from anticipation or alienation by that beneficiary or that beneficiary’s creditors, even if the trust does not contain spendthrift protection language. Additionally, the Tennessee trust statutes provide that discretionary, support and most remainder interests are not property interests, but only expectancies, thereby facilitating stronger creditor protection, as well as the use of advanced transfer tax planning techniques.

Overview of Uniform Trust Code and Tennessee Uniform Trust Code Differences.

While the Uniform Trust Code consists of eleven (11) articles, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is comprised of twelve (12) parts. The first eleven (11) track in general format and coverage the similar articles of the Uniform Trust Code, but in some cases diverge significantly from the uniform code. Moreover, unlike in the Uniform Trust Code, part 11 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains substantive as well as transitional and effective date provisions. Part twelve (12) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains detailed provisions not found in the Uniform Trust Code that provide for true directed trusts (sometimes called multi-participant or reserved powers trusts). Although Tennessee has had statutes fully providing for true directed trusts since the late 1980s, such provisions being contained in title 35, chapter 3, they were initially only addressed in the other Tennessee trust statutes by reference. Part twelve (12) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains significantly more detailed provisions governing the operation of directed trusts than do Tennessee’s original 1980s directed trust statutes. Finally, many modifications to various other provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and certain other provisions of the Tennessee trust statutes have been made to coordinate those provisions with such part twelve (12).

Part 1. General Provisions and Definitions.

According to UCL – NCCUSL, in addition to definitions, this part addresses miscellaneous but important topics. The Uniform Trust Code is primarily default law and can generally be modified by the provisions of a trust instrument.

This also applies to part one (1) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. However, as stated above the Tennessee trust statutes stand for the principles that a settlor’s intent is paramount and that one should have the broadest freedom to dispose of assets as that person sees fit. Therefore, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides settlors with significantly more freedom to draft trust terms departing from its default provisions than does the Uniform Trust Code. While certain limitations regarding that freedom still remain in T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b), those limitations are fewer in number and in certain cases, less restrictive, than in section 105 of the Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, unlike the Uniform Trust Code and Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code explicitly states that any purpose of a trust that is stated by a settlor in a trust instrument to be material is to be treated as material for all purposes under the Tennessee trust statutes.

Another goal of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is to provide significantly more certainty than does the Uniform Trust Code over the law that will control a trust and its administration. This is in accordance with Tennessee’s emphasis on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition. Therefore, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows any person having the requisite nexus (such being defined therein) with a jurisdiction to choose that jurisdiction’s law as controlling over a trust. A settlor can then designate that controlling law by including a state jurisdiction provision in a trust. When such provision designates that Tennessee law controls, Tennessee obtains jurisdiction over the trust and its law controls the validity, construction and administration of a trust (or any part thereof, as a settlor desires). In the absence of such a state jurisdiction provision, the laws of the jurisdiction where the trust was executed determine its validity and the laws of descent, while the laws of the trust’s principal place of administration determine its administration. Except as otherwise expressly provided by the terms of a governing instrument, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides that such place of administration is Tennessee if all or part of such administration takes place in Tennessee. Nevertheless, by following a relatively simple procedure, the trustee (or appropriate fiduciary) of a trust may transfer the principal place of administration to another jurisdiction within or without the United States. Moreover, unlike the Uniform Trust Code under which such power can be blocked by a single qualified beneficiary, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code requires that timely objection to the transfer be made by a majority of the qualified beneficiaries or the transfer will proceed.

Furthermore and notwithstanding provisions contained in the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, in keeping with the policy of the state of Tennessee and its overriding emphasis on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code rejects the concept that any law governing a trust is in any way controlled by a jurisdiction's public policy or dependent upon which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to a matter at issue.

Finally, when a state jurisdiction provision designates that Tennessee law controls, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code explicitly provides that no foreign country has any jurisdiction, power or effect over that trust or any disposition under it. Moreover, in such case no foreign country has any power to set the trust or any of its provisions aside, or at-tempt to do so. Therefore, a foreign country’s failure to recognize trusts, or the fact a trust avoids a foreign country’s laws granting rights to some person relative to property in the trust; such rights being based on a personal relationship to a settlor of, a party to, or beneficiary of, the trust; are irrelevant and are not respected by Tennessee. Any laws of a foreign country relative to forced heirship, legitime, forced share or similar rights are rejected and are unenforceable under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Therefore, no judgment of any foreign country will be recognized or enforced by Tennessee to the extent such judgment concerns a trust having a state jurisdiction provision designating the law of Tennessee as controlling.

According to UCL – NCCUSL, in order to encourage nonjudicial resolution of disputes, the Uniform Trust Code provides more certainty for when such settlements are binding. While the Code does not prescribe the exact rules to be applied to the construction of trusts, it does extend to trusts whatever rules the enacting jurisdiction has on the construction of wills. The Uniform Trust Code, although comprehensive, does not legislate on every issue. Its provisions are supplemented by the common law of trusts and principles of equity.

While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code generally follows this model, such code contains provisions that more easily facilitate nonjudicial resolution than does the Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, as noted above there are various provisions in the Tennessee trust statutes that specifically diverge from and override what some foreign jurisdictions perceive to be appropriate “common law or principles of equity.” A few examples of such overriding Tennessee provisions include: i) the invalidity of any common law restrictions on accumulations of income; and ii) the law relative to what constitutes a discretionary trust, the construction and interpretation of same, as well as how discretion under same should be exercised. As described above, the Tennessee trust statutes’ position on the latter issue is intentionally not in accord with the common law as such is interpreted in §§ 50, 56, 58, 59 and 60 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and such sections’ comments.

Part 2. Judicial Proceedings.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part addresses selected issues involving judicial proceedings concerning trusts, particularly trusts having contacts with more than one (1) state or country. The courts in the trust’s principal place of administration have jurisdiction over both the trustee and the beneficiaries as to any matter relating to the trust. Optional provisions on subject matter jurisdiction and venue are provided. The minimal coverage of this part was deliberate. The drafting committee concluded that most issues related to jurisdiction and procedure are not appropriate to a trust code, but are best left to other bodies of law.

In light of the fact that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides greater certainty regarding controlling law and principal place of administration than does the Uniform Trust Code, the former likewise gives more certainty regarding appropriate subject matter jurisdiction and venue.

Part 3. Representation.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part deals with the representation of beneficiaries and other interested persons, both by fiduciaries (personal representatives, guardians and conservators), and through what is known as virtual representation. The representation principles of the part apply to settlement of disputes, whether by a court or nonjudicially. They apply for the giving of required notices. They apply for the giving of consents to certain actions. The part also authorizes a court to appoint a representative if the court concludes that representation of a person might otherwise be inadequate. The court may appoint a representative to represent and approve a settlement on behalf of a minor, incapacitated, or unborn person or person whose identity or location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable.

While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code generally follows this model, such code contains provisions that more easily facilitate virtual representation and more classes of persons can be so represented than under the Uniform Trust Code. For example, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires that there be no material  conflict of interest be-tween the representative and the person(s) represented. On the other hand the Uniform Trust Code has no such materiality threshold, thereby more often precluding virtual representation. Also under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, remote descendants can be so represented and those who are subject to any  power of appointment may be represented by the power holder. Finally a settlor or the beneficiaries can designate in writing a person or persons who can represent and bind beneficiaries.

Part 4. Creation, Validity, Modification and Termination of Trust.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part specifies the requirements for creating, modifying and terminating trusts. Most of the requirements relating to creation of trusts (sections 401 through 409 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-40135-15-409 ]) track traditional doctrine, including requirements of intent, capacity, property, and valid trust purpose. The Uniform Trust Code articulates a three-part classification system for trusts: noncharitable, charitable, and honorary. Noncharitable trusts, the most common type, require an ascertainable beneficiary and a valid purpose. Charitable trusts, on the other hand, by their very nature are created to benefit the public at large. The so called honorary or purposes trust, although unenforceable at common law, is valid and enforceable under the Uniform Trust Code despite the absence of an ascertainable beneficiary. The most common example is a trust for the care of an animal.

Sections 410 through 417 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-417 ] provide a series of interrelated rules on when a trust may be terminated or modified other than by its express terms. The overall objective of these sections is to enhance flexibility consistent with the principle that preserving the settlor’s intent is paramount. Termination or modification may be allowed upon beneficiary consent if the court concludes that the trust or a particular provision no longer serves a material purpose or if the settlor concurs; by the court in response to unanticipated circumstances or to remedy ineffective administrative terms; or by the court or trustee if the trust is of insufficient size to justify continued administration under its existing terms. Trusts may be reformed to correct a mistake of law or fact, or modified to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives. Trusts may be combined or divided. Charitable trusts may be modified or terminated under cy pres to better achieve the settlor’s charitable purposes.

While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code generally follows this model, such code contains provisions that, relative to the Uniform Trust Code: allow broader trust purposes; better facilitate the assurance of settlor’s intent; extend the enforceable periods of purpose trusts and trusts for the care of animals; as well as better facilitate the modification, termination combination or division of trusts.

Part 5. Creditor’s Claims; Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part addresses the validity of a spendthrift provision and other issues relating to the rights of creditors to reach the trust to collect a debt. To the extent a trust is protected by a spendthrift provision, a beneficiary’s creditor may not reach the beneficiary’s interest until distribution is made by the trustee. To the extent not protected by a spendthrift provision, a creditor can reach the beneficiary’s interest, subject to the court’s power to limit the award. Certain categories of claims are exempt from a spendthrift restriction, including certain governmental claims and claims for child support or alimony. Other issues addressed in this part include creditor claims against discretionary trusts; creditor claims against a settlor, whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable; and the rights of creditors when a trustee fails to make a required distribution within a reasonable time.

The provisions of part five (5) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverge, in many cases significantly, from the provisions contained in Uniform Trust Code, as well as from the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, on which much of part 5 of the Uniform Trust Code was based.

Part five (5) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code offers far more creditor protection to trusts and their beneficiaries than does the Uniform Trust Code or the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. This is achieved in a number of ways, some of which are enumerated hereafter.

Relative to spendthrift trusts, T.C.A. § 35-15-503 contains no exception creditors other than the state of Tennessee, and then only to the extent that a statute of the state of Tennessee so provides. The protection given by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to discretionary trusts is far broader than that provided by the Uniform Trust Code and, unlike under the latter, there are no exception creditors relative to an interest held in a discretionary trust.

When combined with the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s definition of what constitutes a discretionary trust, only a limited number of the types of trusts typically used for donative purposes do not obtain the benefit of such creditor protection. This is in keeping with the objective of the Tennessee trust statutes that a settlor should have the broadest freedom to dispose of their assets to whom, and in the manner, they wish (and to only those persons, and in only such manner, as a settlor wishes). Such creditor protection respects that the assets in the trust initially belonged to the settlor and not the beneficiary. When those assets are put in a discretionary trust, the beneficiary obtained only beneficial rights that do not rise to the status of a property interest and, therefore, cannot be reached by creditors. Under the Tennessee trust statutes, an irrevocable special needs trust is shielded from claims by creditors of the settlor regardless of whether or not such trust complies with the provisions of chapter 16, the Tennessee Investment Services Trust Act. Finally, any interest of a beneficiary under a support trust likewise does not rise to the status of a property interest and is therefore protected from creditors, even absent a spendthrift provision. Notwithstanding the above, the Tennessee trust statutes still respect the right of beneficiaries of support and mandatory interests to obtain redress for a trustee’s failure to respect such interests due such beneficiaries under them. However, no creditor of any such beneficiary has such right and can only reach a distribution made from such interests after the distribution is made and then in only specified circumstances.

Part 6. Revocable Trusts.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this short part deals with issues of significance not totally settled under current law. The basic policy of this part and of the Uniform Trust Code in general is to treat the revocable trust as the functional equivalent of a will. The part specifies a standard of capacity, provides that a trust is presumed revocable unless its terms provide otherwise, prescribes the procedure for revocation or amendment of a revocable trust, addresses the rights of beneficiaries during the settlor's lifetime, and provides a statute of limitations on contests.

Part 6 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code generally follows this model. However, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code makes it clear that no inter vivos trust need be executed with the formalities of a will and, relative to the Uniform Trust Code, has a shorter statute of limitation on contests. Part 6 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code also contains certain other differences relative to the Uniform Trust Code, such differences being in conformity with the spirit of the overall objectives of the Tennessee trust statutes.

Part 7. Office of Trustee.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part contains a series of default rules dealing with the office of trustee, all of which may be modified in the terms of the trust. Rules are provided on acceptance of office and bonding. The role of the cotrustee is addressed, including the extent that one cotrustee may delegate to another, and the extent to which one (1) cotrustee can be held liable for actions of another trustee. Also covered are changes in trusteeship, including the circumstances when a vacancy must be filled, the procedure for resignation, the grounds for removal, and the process for appointing a successor trustee. Finally, standards are provided for trustee compensation and reimbursement for expenses.

Part 7 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code generally follows this model. However, such part is augmented by numerous provisions to provide default rules that are substantially equivalent to those dealing with the office of a trustee, but that apply to other fiduciaries that exist in the case of a directed trust governed by Part 12. Moreover, all fiduciaries have a statutory duty to keep all other fiduciaries reasonably informed about the administration of the trust to the extent such other fiduciaries do not have such knowledge. This is to assure that all such fiduciaries have the material information necessary to perform their respective duties.

Part 8. Duties and Powers of Trustee.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part states the fundamental duties of a trustee and enumerates the trustee’s powers. The duties listed are not new, although some of the particulars have changed over the years. This part was drafted where possible to conform to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act prescribes a trustee’s responsibilities with respect to the management and investment of trust property. This part also addresses a trustee’s duties regarding distributions to beneficiaries.

Part 8 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code generally follows this model. However, such part is augmented by numerous provisions to: add flexibility; conform to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s extensive directed trust provisions; allow for “quiet” trusts under certain circumstances; require any beneficiary who is eligible to receive information concerning the trust to agree in writing to keep confidential any such information that is confidential before receiving same; and require the various fiduciaries to keep each other reasonably informed with the information necessary for them to respectively carry out their duties.

Moreover, due to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s view on the distinctions among mandatory, support and discretionary interests, this part of such code contains significant variances from the Uniform Trust Code relative to the exercise of powers over such interests.

Finally, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains a detailed but flexible statutory provision expressly authorizing a trustee having a power to invade principal to do so by appointing such principal in trust; i.e., a “decanting” power.

Part 9. Uniform Prudent Investor Act — Uniform Principal and Income Act.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part provides a place for a jurisdiction to enact, reenact or codify its version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act [ULC - NCCUSL does not mention the Uniform Principal and Income Act relative to its part 9]. States adopting the Uniform Trust Code which have previously enacted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act are encouraged to reenact their version of the Prudent Investor Act in this part.

Both the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002, title 35, part 14, T.C.A. § 35-14-101 et seq., and Tennessee's version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, title 35, part 6, T.C.A. § 35-6-101 et seq., were adopted prior to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. As with the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, both have been amended since their respective enactments and in certain cases, both diverge, sometimes significantly, from their respective uniform codes, as well as from various restatements. Instead of “reenacting” the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002 in part 9, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code incorporates therein by reference such act, codified at title 35, part 14, as well as Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, codified at title 35, part 6.

Part 10. Liability of Trustees and Rights of Persons Dealing With Trustees.

According to ULC - NCCUSL, sections 1001 through 1009 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-100135-15-1009 ] list the remedies for breach of trust, describe how money damages are to be determined, provide a statute of limitations on claims against a trustee, and specify other defenses, including consent of a beneficiary and recognition of and limitations on the effect of an exculpatory clause. Sections 1010 through 1013 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-101035-15-1013 ] address trustee relations with persons other than beneficiaries. The objective is to encourage third parties to engage in commercial transactions with trustees to the same extent as if the property were not held in trust.

In the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-100135-15-1009 track in general format and coverage Uniform Trust Code sections 1001 through 1009. However, T.C.A. § 35-15-1003 reverses the rule of Uniform Trust Code section 1003 and provides that absent a breach of trust, a trustee is not liable for a loss or depreciation in the value of trust property or for not having made a profit. T.C.A. § 35-15-1004 allows trustees to use trust funds to pay fees, as well as reasonable costs and expenses incurred in a nonjudicial proceeding when the parties to the proceeding agree to such in writing. Such section also provides for an award made by mediators or arbitrators of fees, costs and expenses, relative to a proceeding involving trust administration to be paid from the trust. T.C.A. § 35-15-1005 provides: for more flexibility regarding the adequacy of disclosure of facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust; does not require a trustee to inform a beneficiary of the time after such disclosure by which any proceeding must be commenced; and shortens in other situations the statute of limitations relative to the Uniform Trust Code from five (5) years to three (3). Such section also provides similar limitations periods for actions against a trustee for breach of trust brought by the various other fiduciaries that can exist in a directed trust or similar setting and provides that if a claim is barred against all beneficiaries, such other fiduciary is likewise barred from making a claim against a trustee.

Likewise, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-101035-15-1013 track in general format and coverage Uniform Trust Code sections 1010 through 1013. However, T.C.A. §§  35-15-1010 and 35-15-1011 provide a trustee with significantly greater protection from personal liability than does the Uniform Trust Code. T.C.A. § 35-15-1013, regarding certifications of trust, diverges significantly from Uniform Trust Code section 1013.

Finally in keeping with the Tennessee trust statutes’ emphasis on freedom of disposition and settlor’s intent, T.C.A. § 35-15-1014 expressly provides for the enforceability of no-contest, in terrorem and forfeiture provisions contained in trust instruments. However, such provisions will not be enforced if the beneficiary bringing the action triggering same had probable cause to do so under grounds specified in such section. Such section also contains exceptions to enforceability of such provisions in the case of actions brought for certain other reasons, some of which include: to challenge the actions of a fiduciary to the extent that fiduciary has breached his duties; for construction or interpretation; or an agreement among persons in resolution of a matter relating to the trust.

Part 11. Miscellaneous Provisions.

According to ULC – NCCUSL, part 11 of the Uniform Trust Code is primarily an effective date provision. Moreover, the Uniform Trust Code is intended to have the widest possible application, consistent with constitutional limitations The Code applies not only to trusts created on or after the effective date, but also to trusts in existence on the date of enactment.

While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, as well as the Tennessee trust statutes in general, are intended to have the widest possible application, consistent with constitutional limitations, various provisions in the Tennessee trust statutes should better assure such application.

Moreover, part 11 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains multiple substantive provisions and is far more than “an effective date provision.” As covered in detail above, T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 reverses the provisions of section 1101 of the Uniform Trust Code and expressly states that, relative to the subject matter of title 35, no consideration shall be given to any need to promote uniformity among states and that such other states’ acts. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains no severability clause, it being intended that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, as well as the Tennessee trust statutes in general, be fully applicable as written.

Finally, in keeping with the Tennessee trust statutes’ emphasis on freedom of disposition and settlor’s intent, part 11 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains two sections having no corresponding provision in the Uniform Trust Code. One makes it very difficult for a settlor of a trust to be deemed an alter ego of the trustee of such trust, while the other makes it exceedingly difficult to sustain that the a settlor’s or beneficiary’s influence over a trust gives either do-minion and control over such trust.

Part 12. Miscellaneous Provisions.

As stated above, the Uniform Trust Code does not contain a part 12, nor does it contain similar provisions to those provided in part 12 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Part 12 (12) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains comprehensive and detailed provisions governing the operation of true directed trusts not found in the nominal coverage of “powers to direct” under section 808 of the Uniform Trust Code. Such Part 12 (12) also provides significantly more detailed provisions governing the operation of true directed trusts than do Tennessee’s original 1980s directed trust statutes. Finally, many modifications to various other provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and certain other provisions of the Tennessee trust statutes have been made to coordinate those provisions with such part twelve (12).

35-15-102. Scope.

This chapter applies to express trusts, charitable or noncharitable, and trusts created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or decree that requires the trust to be administered in the manner of an express trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

In a dispute over lottery winnings, T.C.A. § 35-15-1005 did not apply to equitable claims of constructive and resulting trusts because the complaint did not refer to an express trust or trust created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or decree. Findley v. Hubbard, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2018).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, while comprehensive, applies only to express trusts. Excluded from the Code’s coverage are resulting and constructive trusts, which are not express trusts but remedial devices imposed by law. For the requirements for creating an express trust and the methods by which express trusts are created, see sections 401-402 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-401  and 35-15-402 ]. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not attempt to distinguish express trusts from other legal relationships with respect to property, such as agencies and contracts for the benefit of third parties. For the distinctions, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 2 , 5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 2 , 5-16C (1959).

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is directed primarily at trusts that arise in an estate planning or other donative context, but express trusts can arise in other contexts. For example, a trust created pursuant to a divorce action would be included, even though such a trust is not donative but is created pursuant to a bargained-for exchange.

Moreover, an express trust can be created by an entity, including but not limited to a corporation, partnership, limited liability company or any other entity of similar type to any of such (under the laws of any state, the United States of America or any foreign country, all as such terms are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103). An express trust can also be created by a trust (governed under the laws of any state, the United States of America or any foreign country, all as such terms are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103). This could happen in a number of situations. Among other ways, a trust can create another trust due to the exercise of a trustee’s power of appointment (i.e., through a decanting), or through a power holder’s exercise of any other power of appointment. Regardless, such express trusts are covered by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Commercial trusts come in numerous forms, including trusts created pursuant to a state business trust act and trusts created to administer specified funds, such as to pay a pension or to manage pooled investments. Commercial trusts are often subject to special-purpose legislation and case law, which in some respects displace the usual rules stated in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. See  John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165 (1997) .

Express trusts also may be created by means of court judgment or decree. Examples include trusts created to hold the proceeds of personal injury recoveries and trusts created to hold the assets of a protected person in a conservatorship proceeding. See , e.g., Uniform Probate Code § 5-411(a)(4).

35-15-103. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Action” with respect to an act of a trustee, includes a failure to act;
  2. “Another state” or “other state” means any state other than this state;
  3. “Ascertainable standard” means a standard relating to an individual’s health, education, support or maintenance within the meaning of § 2041(b)(1)(A) or § 2514(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (U.S.C. §   2041(b)(1)(A) and § 2514(c)(1)), as in effect on July 1, 2004, or as later amended;
  4. “Beneficial interest” means a distribution interest or a remainder interest; provided, however, that a beneficial interest specifically excludes a power of appointment or a power reserved by a settlor;
  5. “Beneficiary” means a person that has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent;
  6. “Charitable trust” means a trust, or portion of a trust, created for a charitable purpose described in § 35-15-405(a);
  7. “Conservator” has the same meaning as in § 34-1-101;
  8. “Directed trust” means a trust where either through the terms of the trust, an  agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or a court order, one or more persons are given the  authority to direct or consent to a fiduciary's actual or proposed investment decision,  distribution decision, or any other decision of the fiduciary;
  9. “Distribution beneficiary” means a beneficiary who is an eligible distributee or permissible distributee of the income or principal of a trust;
  10. “Distribution interest” means:
    1. An interest, other than a remainder interest, held by a distribution beneficiary under a trust and may be a current distribution interest or a future distribution interest;
    2. Relative to a distribution interest:
      1. Neither the existence of a distribution interest or the provision of services by a spouse in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust creating the distribution interest is relevant in the equitable division of marital property;
      2. None of the factors in subdivision (10)(B)(i) or the exercise or non-exercise of any power or discretion by a spouse in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust creating the distribution interest (even if that spouse is also a beneficiary of the trust creating the distribution interest) are relevant to, indicative of or effect the transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property;
      3. The expending of any community funds by a spouse in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust creating the distribution interest relative to the operation or maintenance of property related to a distribution interest is not relevant to or indicative of, and does not effect a transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property;
      4. Any funds expended pursuant to subdivision (10)(B)(iii) shall be valid debts of the trust and shall be repaid to the community with appropriate interest;
    3. A distribution interest is classified as either a mandatory interest, a support interest or a discretionary interest; and although not the exclusive means to create each such respective distribution interest, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, use of the example language accompanying the following definitions of each such respective distribution interest results in the indicated classification of distribution interest:
      1. A mandatory interest means a distribution interest in which the timing of any distribution must occur within one (1) year from the date the right to the distribution arises and the trustee has no discretion in determining whether a distribution shall be made or the amount of such distribution; example distribution language indicating a mandatory interest includes, but is not limited to:
  1. All income shall be distributed to a named beneficiary; or
  2. One hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) a year shall be distributed to a named beneficiary;
  3. The trustee may make distributions for health, education, maintenance, and support;
  4. The trustee shall make distributions for health, education, maintenance, and support; provided, however, that the trustee may exclude any of the beneficiaries or may make unequal distributions among them; or
  5. The trustee may make distributions for health, education, maintenance, support, comfort, and general welfare;
  6. A discretionary interest may also be evidenced by:
    1. Permissive distribution language such as “may make distributions”;
    2. Mandatory distribution language that is negated by the discretionary distribution language contained in the trust such as “the trustee shall make distributions in the trustee’s sole and absolute discretion”;
  7. An interest that includes mandatory distribution language such as “shall” but is subsequently qualified by discretionary distribution language shall be classified as a discretionary interest and not as a support or a mandatory interest;

    are predeceased or are otherwise not in existence at the time all or any part of the trust terminates;

A support interest means a distribution interest that is not a mandatory interest but still contains mandatory language such as “shall make distributions” and is coupled with a standard capable of judicial interpretation; example distribution language indicating a support interest includes, but is not limited to:

The trustee shall make distributions for health, education, maintenance, and support;

Notwithstanding the distribution language used, if a trust instrument containing such distribution language specifically provides that the trustee exercise discretion in a reasonable manner with regard to a discretionary interest, then notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision (10) defining distribution interests, the distribution interest shall be classified as a support interest;

A discretionary interest means any interest that is not a mandatory or a support interest and is any distribution interest where a trustee has any discretion to make or withhold a distribution; example distribution language indicating a discretionary interest includes, but is not limited to:

The trustee may, in the trustee's sole and absolute discretion, make distributions for health, education, maintenance, and support;

The trustee, in the trustee’s sole and absolute discretion, shall make distributions for health, education, maintenance, and support;

(i)  To the extent a trust contains distribution language indicating the existence of any combination of a mandatory, support and discretionary interest, that combined interest of the trust shall be divided and treated separately as follows:

The trust shall be a mandatory interest only to the extent of the mandatory distribution language;

The trust shall be a support interest only to the extent of such support distribution language; and

The remaining trust property shall be held as a discretionary interest;

For purposes of this subdivision (10)(D), a support interest that includes mandatory distribution language such as “shall” but is subsequently qualified by discretionary distribution language, shall be classified as a discretionary interest and not as a support interest;

“Environmental law” means a federal, state, or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance relating to protection of the environment;

“Excluded fiduciary” means any trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector to the extent that, under the terms of a trust, an agreement of the qualified beneficiaries, or court order:

The trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector is excluded from exercising a power, or is relieved of a duty; and

The power or duty is granted or reserved to another person;

“Fiduciary” means:

A trustee, conservator, guardian, agent under any agency agreement or other instrument, an executor, personal representative or administrator of a decedent’s estate, or any other party, including a trust advisor or a trust protector, who is acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust, or estate;

Fiduciary also means a trustee as defined in § 35-14-102;

For purposes of subdivision (13)(A), an agency agreement includes but is not limited to, any agreement under which any delegation is made, either pursuant to § 35-15-807 or by anyone holding a power or duty pursuant to part 12;

For purposes of the definition of fiduciary in this subdivision (13), fiduciary does not mean any person who is an excluded fiduciary as such is defined in this section;

“Foreign” or “foreign country” means any jurisdiction, subdivision, territory or possession thereof, other than that of the United States of America or of a state;

“Foreign jurisdiction” means any jurisdiction, subdivision, territory or possession thereof, other than this state;

“Guardian” has the same meaning as in § 34-1-101. The term does not include a guardian ad litem;

“Interests of the beneficiaries” means the beneficial interests provided in the terms of the trust;

“Internal Revenue Code” means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.), as in effect on July 1, 2004, or as later amended;

“Jurisdiction” with respect to a geographic area, includes a state or country;

“Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity;

“Power of appointment” means:

An inter vivos or testamentary power to direct the disposition of trust property, other than a distribution decision made by a trustee or other fiduciary to a beneficiary;

Powers of appointment are held by the person to whom such power has been given, and not by a settlor in that person’s capacity as settlor;

“Power of withdrawal” means a presently exercisable general power of appointment other than a power:

Exercisable by a trustee and limited by an ascertainable standard; or

Exercisable by another person only upon consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest;

“Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership, whether real or personal, legal or equitable, or any interest therein;

“Qualified beneficiary” means a beneficiary who, assuming the nonexercise of all powers of appointment and the nonoccurrence of any event not reasonably expected to occur, on the date the beneficiary’s qualification is determined:

Is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal;

Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the interests of the distributees described in subdivision (24)(A) terminated on that date; or

Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that date;

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subdivision (24), no ultimate beneficiary or potential ultimate beneficiary shall be a qualified beneficiary;

In determining who is or may be an ultimate beneficiary, all of the following shall be taken into consideration:

The terms of the trust naming any ultimate beneficiary or potential ultimate beneficiary and the intention of the settlor relative to any such beneficiary as expressed in such terms; and

Any terms or provisions related to the exercise of any power by any person naming any ultimate beneficiary or potential ultimate beneficiary and the intention of the person exercising such power relative to any such beneficiary as expressed in such terms or provisions;

Determined as provided in subdivision (24)(D)(i), an ultimate beneficiary or potential ultimate beneficiary is any beneficiary who the settlor or power holder did not reasonably anticipate would take any interest upon termination of all or any part of a trust absent all other beneficiaries or members of classes of beneficiaries named in the trust instrument or in the exercise of the power, respectively, predeceasing or otherwise not being in existence at the time at which such trust or part thereof terminates;

By way of example and not in limitation of this subdivision (24)(D), an ultimate beneficiary is a person or persons often included in a trust instrument or under the exercise of a power to take an interest in a trust at the time all or any part of such trust terminates only in a case where all other named beneficiaries or classes of beneficiaries that have or had an affinity through either familial connection or friendship with any of:

The settlor;

The person holding any power; or

Any prior beneficiary or potential beneficiary of the trust;

“Reach” means, with respect to a distribution interest or any power held by anyone relative to a trust, to subject such distribution interest or such power to a judgment, decree, garnishment, attachment, execution, levy, creditor’s bill or other legal, equitable, or administrative process, relief, or control of any court, tribunal, agency, or other entity that, by power of law, is provided with powers or jurisdiction similar to those described in this subdivision (25);

“Remainder interest” means an interest under which a trust beneficiary will receive property held by a trust outright at some time during the future; relative to a remainder interest:

Neither the existence of a remainder interest or the provision of services by a spouse in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust creating the remainder interest is relevant in the equitable division of marital property;

None of the factors in subdivision (26)(A) or the exercise or non-exercise of any power or discretion by a spouse in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust creating the remainder interest (even if that spouse is also a beneficiary of the trust creating the remainder interest) are relevant to, indicative of or effect the transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property;

The expending of any community funds by a spouse in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust creating the remainder interest relative to the operation or maintenance of property related to a remainder interest is not relevant to or indicative of, and does not effect a transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property;

Any funds expended pursuant to subdivision (26)(C) shall be valid debts of the trust and shall be repaid to the community with appropriate interest;

“Reserved power” means a power held by a settlor;

“Revocable” as applied to a trust, means revocable by the settlor without the consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest;

“Settlor” means a person, including a testator, who creates, or contributes property to, a trust. If more than one (1) person creates or contributes property to a trust, each person is a settlor of the portion of the trust property attributable to that person’s contribution except to the extent another person has the power to revoke or withdraw that portion;

“Spendthrift provision” means a term of a trust which restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest;

“State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state;

“Successors in interest” means the beneficiaries under the settlor’s will, if the settlor has a will, or in the absence of an effective will provision, the settlor’s heirs at law;

“Terms of a trust” means the manifestation of the settlor’s intent regarding a trust’s provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding;

“This state” means the state of Tennessee;

“Trust advisor” means any person described in § 35-15-1201(a);

“Trust instrument” means an instrument executed by the settlor that contains terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto;

“Trust protector” means any person described in § 35-15-1201(a); and

“Trustee” includes an original, additional, and successor trustee, and a cotrustee.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 4; 2007, ch. 24, §§ 1-3; 2007, ch. 477, § 1; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 3, 49; 2014, ch. 829, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    1. Interest of Beneficiaries.

    Trustee did not breach a duty under this statute by failing to convey personal assets to a trust in order to avoid probate administration and expenses; it was not shown that the trustee administered the trust in a manner that was inconsistent with the beneficial interest of the beneficiaries. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

    Section Comment.

    “Action.” A definition of “action” is included for drafting convenience, to avoid having to clarify in the numerous places in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code where reference is made to an “action” by the trustee that the term includes a failure to act.

    “Another state or “other state” The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code has always had a definition of “state.” A definition of “another state” or “other state,” along with definitions of “foreign” or “foreign country, “foreign jurisdiction” and “this state” were added by the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Throughout the Tennessee trust statutes and comments thereto, all of such terms have the meaning ascribed to them respectively in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Statutory definitions of these terms are included for multiple reasons, including but not limited to:

    Having such statutorily defined terms provides drafting convenience and avoids having to clarify in a document any subject covered by such terms.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains detailed provisions regarding governing law. Under such provisions, neither the laws of any foreign country nor any judgment or similar holding of any foreign country’s tribunals are recognized or enforceable by this state. Therefore, such foreign law and holdings have no force or effect over a trust (or distribution therefrom) when that trust is governed by Tennessee law.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code also has detailed provisions governing place of administration of a trust and the nexus required to determine such principal place of administration. These provisions regarding nexus also impact the ability for one to make a state jurisdiction provision in a trust. Including the above statutorily defined terms facilitates all such above provisions, as well as other provisions throughout the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    From time to time the parties to or that have an interest in a trust, the transactions and other matters pertaining to a trust, as well as the provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in general, touch more than one domestic jurisdiction or both domestic and foreign jurisdictions. In such cases, having such statutorily defined terms facilitates determination of whether Tennessee law alone applies, or due to constitutional limitations the law of another state or of the United States must be considered. Such statutorily defined terms also facilitate a clear demarcation between limitations or requirements of the U.S. constitution and the chimera and nonbinding nature of comity relative to the laws and holdings of a foreign country.

    Finally, the comments under “foreign” or “foreign country,” under “foreign jurisdiction,” as well as under “this state,” are incorporated herein by reference. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code

    “Ascertainable standard.” The 2007 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code added a definition of “ascertainable standard,” thereby making it apply generally throughout the Code.

    “Beneficial interest.” Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, a beneficial interest must either be a distribution interest or a remainder interest as such are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. The Tennessee trust statutes do not provide for any other form or type of beneficial interest. See below for comments regarding distribution interests and remainder interests.

    A beneficial interest does not include either: a power of appointment or a reserved power as such are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. See below for comments regarding powers of appointment and reserved powers. For this reason, under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the holder of a power of appointment is not a beneficiary, such being a divergence from the Uniform Trust Code. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Beneficiary.” This term refers only to a beneficiary of a trust as such is defined in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. In addition to living and ascertained individuals, beneficiaries may be unborn or unascertained. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-402 a trust must have a beneficiary unless the trust is: a charitable trust; for the care of an animal; or for a noncharitable purpose. Moreover, under T.C.A. § 35-15-402, a trust that requires a beneficiary is valid only if a beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the future. The term “beneficiary” includes not only beneficiaries who received their interests under the terms of the trust but also beneficiaries who received their interests by other means, including by assignment, exercise of a power of appointment, resulting trust upon the failure of an interest, gap in a disposition, operation of an antilapse statute upon the predecease of a named beneficiary, or upon termination of the trust. The fact that a person incidentally benefits from the trust does not mean that the person is a beneficiary. For example, neither a trustee nor persons hired by the trustee become beneficiaries merely because they receive compensation from the trust. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 48 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 126  cmt. c (1959).

    Tennessee law is consistent with the common law of trusts that the holder of a power of appointment is not considered a trust beneficiary. Contrastingly, ULC - NCCUSL’s position in the Uniform Trust Code, which provides that the holder of a power of appointment is classified as a beneficiary, is in conflict with both Tennessee law and common law in general.

    The definition of “beneficiary” includes only those who hold beneficial interests in the trust. Because a charitable trust is not created to benefit ascertainable beneficiaries but to benefit the community at large (See section 405(a) [T.C.A. § 35-15-405(a) ]), persons receiving distributions from a charitable trust are not beneficiaries as that term is de-fined in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Notwithstanding the above, a charitable organization expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of a charitable trust are granted the rights of a qualified beneficiary under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, but only if such charitable organization otherwise holds beneficial interests sufficient to satisfy the requirements set forth in T.C.A. § 35-15-110.

    For reasons similar to those applying to charitable trusts, neither any animal under a trust for the care of an animal as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-408, nor anyone (person, entity or otherwise) benefiting from or having an interest in the purpose for which a trust is established under T.C.A. § 35-15-409 are beneficiaries as that term is defined in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, relative to trusts controlled by T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 and 35-15-409, there are no qualified beneficiaries. Nevertheless, both such Tennessee statutes provide mechanisms under which one or more persons, or a court, can enforce such types of trusts.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code leaves certain issues concerning beneficiaries to the common law. Any person with capacity to take and hold legal title to intended trust property has capacity to be a beneficiary. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 43 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 116 -119 (1959). Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the extent of a beneficiary's interest is determined solely by the settlor's intent to the greatest extent constitutionally allowable. Unlike in the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not require that such intent be limited by public policy. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 49 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 127 -128 (1959); but to the extent either of such restatements are in conflict with Tennessee law, the latter controls. While most beneficial interests terminate upon a beneficiary's death, the interest of a beneficiary may devolve by will or intestate succession the same as a corresponding legal interest. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 55(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 140 , 142 (1959).

    “Charitable trust.” Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, when a trust has both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries only the charitable portion qualifies as a “charitable trust.” The great majority of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s provisions apply to both charitable and noncharitable trusts without distinction. The distinctions between the two types of trusts are found in the requirements relating to trust creation and modification. Pursuant to sections 405 and 413 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-405  and 35-15-413 ], a charitable trust must have a charitable purpose and charitable trusts may be modified or terminated under the doctrine of cy pres. Also, section 411 [T.C.A. § 35-15-411 ] allows a noncharitable trust to in certain instances be terminated by its beneficiaries while charitable trusts do not have beneficiaries in the usual sense. To the extent of these distinctions, a split-interest trust is subject to two sets of provisions, one applicable to the charitable interests, the other the noncharitable.

    “Conservator.” See the comments below under “guardian,” which include comments relative to a conservator.

    “Directed trust.” This term refers to true directed trusts as provided for in T.C.A. § 35-15-808 as opposed to a delegation of a fiduciary’s duties as provided for in T.C.A. §  35-15-807. Under a true directed trust, certain powers and duties that were historically and traditionally bundled in a single trustee, or in cotrustees, are removed from such and directed to other fiduciaries. Alternatively, certain other trust advisors or trust protectors are given various powers and duties relative to other fiduciaries (including trustees and cotrustees). To the extent a power or duty is removed from one fiduciary and given to another, the fiduciary from which the power or duty was removed is called an excluded fiduciary. An excluded fiduciary generally has no liability for the powers or duties so removed.

    Other names for directed trusts include “multi-participant trusts” and “reserved power trusts.” Tennessee has had statutes fully providing for true directed trusts since the late 1980s, such provisions being contained in T.C.A. §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123. However, such statutes were initially only addressed in the other Tennessee trust statutes by reference. As used here, the term directed trust includes trusts controlled by T.C.A. §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123 to the extent provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-808, as well as to other trusts as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-808, including those subject to part 12. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Distribution beneficiary.” One who holds a distribution interest under a trust. A distribution beneficiary is a beneficiary who is an eligible or permissible distributee of income or principal under such distribution interest. A distribution beneficiary, in their capacity as a distribution beneficiary, does not hold a remainder interest. This is true regardless of whether such beneficiary holds a remainder interest in some capacity other than as a distribution beneficiary. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Distribution interest.” Before discussing the term distribution interest in detail, it is beneficial to consider why the concept of distribution interest; together with the related concepts expressed by the terms beneficial interest, distribution beneficiary, reach, remainder interest, and to a lesser extent power of appointment and reserved power; are crucial to understanding Tennessee law as it relates to trusts.

    All of the above terms are in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 and are discussed in these comments. Such terms are essential elements of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Together with other provisions in the Tennessee trust statutes, the concepts behind these terms are designed to assure traditional Tennessee law concepts are preserved regarding spend-thrift, mandatory, support and discretionary trusts, together with their concomitant rights, benefits, creditor and other protections. They are also essential elements of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s emphasis on settlor’s intent, freedom of disposition and certainty of construction and interpretation. Finally, these concepts determine whether an inter-est under a trust does or does not rise to the status of a property interest. Of course, that issue, in itself, has a significant bearing on implementing settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition, as well as on creditor and other protections.

    Established and traditional common law made clear distinctions among the treatment of spendthrift, mandatory, discretionary and support trusts. Tennessee courts have traditionally followed that traditional, established common law, which is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. Some of the effects of these distinctions are noted in the comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-101, near the end of the section entitled, “Existing Uniform Laws on Trust Law Subjects.” Therein it discusses the effect of T.C.A. § 35-15-106, which rejects the Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 50, 56, 58, 59 or 60, and such sections’ comments. Other effects of these distinctions, including when a distribution interest does or does not rise to the status of a property interest and the effect of same, are noted in the comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-101 in the last paragraph under the heading, “Part 5. Creditor's Claims; Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts.”

    The Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts do not make these clear distinctions, leaving settlors without certainty as to the meaning and effect of language used relative to spendthrift, mandatory, support and discretionary trust provisions. Moreover, language in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts indicates that even if the terms of a trust specifically give a trustee “absolute, sole and unfettered” discretion, such Restatement infers a “reasonableness” standard relative to the exercise (or non-exercise) of that discretion. Uniform Trust Code section 814(a), and the comments thereunder (but not T.C.A. § 35-15-814), refer one to section 50 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. The comments under that section include the “reasonableness” standard mentioned above, thereby infusing the Uniform Trust Code with the Restatement’s “reasonableness” standard. A number of legal authors believe such provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code virtually always give any beneficiary an enforceable right to a distribution, thereby eviscerating the meaning of the word “discretionary.” Regardless of how clear and obvious a drafter is regarding a settlor’s intent to create a purely and absolutely discretionary trust, these authors believe such provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code result in nothing other than a vague “continuum” of rights and discretion that only lead to uncertainty and needless litigation. Moreover, it would not be illegitimate for one to be concerned that this “continuum” puts one on a slippery slope that could lead to a creditor of a beneficiary being able to reach that beneficiary’s now (under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts) and Uniform Trust Code, potentially enforceable right to a distribution. Of course this significantly reduces the creditor protection traditionally afforded to beneficiaries of third-party discretionary trusts.

    These are just a few of the reasons that Tennessee law relative to trusts rejects certain portions of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code, and in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code codifies the prior, established and traditional common law.

    In its broadest terms, a distribution interest is a beneficial interest, other than a remainder interest, held by a distribution beneficiary under a trust. Distribution interests may be current distribution interests or future distribution interests. The fact that a beneficial interest is a distribution interest controls many things relative to that interest.

    Distribution interests are separate as opposed to marital property for the purposes of an equitable division of marital property and therefore, are not relevant to such division. The fact that a spouse provides services in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust that created the distribution interest (or to such distribution interest) does not change the above and the provision of such services or the results from or effects of such provision do not give rise to marital property. Therefore, neither the provision of such services, nor the results from or effects of such provision of services, are relevant to such division.

    For the purposes of determining separate versus community property in a jurisdiction recognizing community property as the applicable marital property regime in that jurisdiction:

    Distribution interests are likewise separate property. Similarly, the fact that a spouse provides services in that spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of the trust that created the distribution interest (or to such distribution interest) does not change the above and the provision of such services or the results from or effects of such provision do not give rise to marital or community property, nor is any of the above relevant to, indicative of, or does such effect, the transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property . Moreover, in cases where a spouse is serving in such capacity as trustee of such trust, neither the exercise or non-exercise of any power or discretion by such spouse in such capacity as trustee give rise to marital or community property, nor is such relevant to, indicative of, or does such effect, the transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property. This remains true even if the spouse is also a beneficiary of the trust that created the distribution interest (or of the distribution interest).

    Finally, the expending of any community funds by a spouse in such spouse’s capacity as a fiduciary of such trust that created the distribution interest, relative to the operation or maintenance of property related to such distribution interest, is not relevant to or indicative of, and does not effect, a transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property. Instead any such expending of funds simultaneously creates a correspondingly equal and valid debt of the trust to the community and such debt shall be repaid to the community with appropriate interest from the assets of the trust.

    Distribution interests can be classified in one of three ways.

    The first classification is a mandatory interest. At least as to principal, it is also the least likely type of interest one normally encounters under the Tennessee trust statutes. In order to be a mandatory interest, a distribution interest must require distribution within one year of the date the right to the distribution arises and the trustee must have no discretion, whatsoever, relative to the making of or the amount of this distribution. The most common form of mandatory interest occurs when a trust directs that all the income or a specified dollar amount be distributed every year. Even where such mandatory interests exist under a trust, all non-mandatory distribution interests under such trust are either support or discretionary interests.

    The second classification is a support interest. In order to be a support interest, a distribution interest, though not a mandatory interest, must either contain: mandatory language such as “shall make,” (and as stated below, such mandatory language is not otherwise negated) and be coupled with a standard capable of judicial determination; or must contain specific language that a trustee’s discretion be exercised in a “reasonable” manner. While more common, these are likely not that prevalent either, especially as such relate to principal.

    The third classification is a discretionary interest. All distribution interests that are not either a mandatory or support distributions, and under which a trustee has any discretion to make or withhold a distribution, are discretionary interests. The fact that a standard, even one referring to “support,” is included in the distribution language will not convert a discretionary interest to a support interest unless the standard is coupled with mandatory language such as “shall make.” Moreover, even where such mandatory language is used, if such is negated (e.g., “shall make in the trustee’s discretion”) or subsequently qualified by discretionary language, the distribution interest is a discretionary interest and not a support or mandatory interest.

    Finally, should distribution language indicate any combination of a mandatory, support and discretionary interest, the combined interest is to be divided, with each distribution interest treated as the relevant type of distribution interest only to the extent of the respective different distribution language used.

    For all these reasons, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code gravitates toward creation of discretionary interests versus support or mandatory interests.

    Under the definition of distribution interest in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 there are a number of examples of distribution language, which while not exclusive, indicates one of the three types of distribution interests. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Environmental law.” To encourage trustees to accept and administer trusts containing real property, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains several provisions designed to limit exposure to possible liability for violation of environmental law. Section 701(c)(2) [T.C.A. § 35-15-701(c)(2) ] authorizes a nominated trustee to investigate trust property to determine potential liability for violation of environmental law or other law without accepting the trusteeship. Section 816(13) [T.C.A. § 35-15-816(b)(13) ] grants a trustee comprehensive and detailed powers to deal with property involving environmental risks. Finally, unlike Uniform Trust Code section 1010(b), T.C.A. § 35-15-1010 immunizes a trustee from personal liability for violation of environmental law arising from the ownership and control of trust property.

    “Excluded fiduciary.” This term is included to define any person who would otherwise meet the definition of fiduciary, but who is relieved in one of the prescribed manners from any power or duty normally held by such relevant fiduciary and that power or duty is granted or reserved to another person.

    Although T.C.A. § 35-15-103 only specifically includes any “trustee,” “trust advisor” or “trust protector” as being potential excluded fiduciaries, such section of the Tennessee Code should be read to include anyone who would otherwise meet the definition of fiduciary contained in T.C.A. §  35-15-103, but who is relieved in one of the prescribed manners from any power or duty normally held by such relevant fiduciary and that power or duty is granted or reserved to another person. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Fiduciary.” This term is included for several reasons, including but not limited to:

    To facilitate drafting by providing an all-inclusive word meaning any person having fiduciary powers and duties under the Tennessee trust statutes.

    To cover trust advisors and trust protectors under part 12, or otherwise, if any of such are serving in a fiduciary capacity as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-1202 or elsewhere under the Tennessee trust statutes.

    To assure that any person, regardless of the nomenclature by which that person is called, when holding powers and carrying out duties that are normally fiduciary in nature is a fiduciary, unless that person is an excluded fiduciary. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Foreign” or “foreign country.” The comments under “another state” or “other state” are incorporated herein by reference.

    The distinctive statutory definition of the word “foreign,” either by itself or followed by the word “country” is included to demarcate the different meaning of those words, particularly “foreign,” in the Tennessee trust statutes from the meaning generally ascribed to the term foreign in state statutes (including the Tennessee Code in places other than under the Tennessee trust statutes) and in state court holdings and similar rulings. Outside the Tennessee trust statutes, the word “foreign” is often used simply to denote another state of the United States. However, the appropriate term for such under the Tennessee trust statutes is “another state” or “other state,” while “foreign” either by itself or followed by “country” means a jurisdiction other than the United States or a state (as such is defined in T.C.A. §  35-15-103). Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Foreign jurisdiction.” The comments under “another state” or “other state,” under “foreign” or “foreign country,” as well as under “this state,” are incorporated herein by reference.

    By combining the word “foreign” with “jurisdiction,” the latter word being the generalized term for an area or matter under some domestic or foreign governmental control or authority, this statutory definition includes any jurisdiction (governmental authority) other than that of this state, the state of Tennessee.

    It is included for similar reasons as those set forth under “foreign” or “foreign country,” above. It is also included for drafting convenience. By simply stating “foreign jurisdiction” a drafter can mean any other jurisdiction than that of this state, Tennessee. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    “Guardian.” Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, both the term “guardian” and the term “conservator” have the same meaning as they respectfully do in T.C.A. § 34-1-101. Under such section; guardian means a person or persons appointed by the court to provide partial or full supervision, protection and assistance of the person or property, or both, of a minor; while conservator means a person or persons appointed by the court to provide partial or full supervision, protection and assistance of the person or property, or both, of a disabled person.

    “Interests of the beneficiaries.” The phrase “interests of the beneficiaries” (subdivision (8)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-103(17) ] is used with some frequency in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. The definition clarifies that the interests are as provided in the terms of the trust and not as determined by the beneficiaries. Absent authority to do so in the terms of the trust, section 108 [T.C.A. § 35-15-108 ] prohibits a trustee from changing a trust's principal place of administration if the transfer would violate the trustee's duty to administer the trust at a place appropriate to the interests of the beneficiaries. Section 706(b) [T.C.A. § 35-15-706(b) ] conditions certain of the grounds for removing a trustee on the court's finding that removal of the trustee will best serve the interests of the beneficiaries. Section 801 [T.C.A. § 35-15-801 ] requires the trustee to administer the trust in the interests of the beneficiaries, and section 802 [T.C.A. § 35-15-802 ] makes clear that a trustee may not place its own interests above those of the beneficiaries. Section 808(d) [T.C.A. § 35-15-808(d) ] requires the holder of a power to direct who is subject to a fiduciary obligation to act with regard to the interests of the beneficiaries. T.C.A. § 35-15-1202 provides likewise. Section 1002(b) [T.C.A. §  35-15-1002(b) ] may impose greater liability on a cotrustee who commits a breach of trust with reckless indifference to the interests of the beneficiaries. Section 1008 [T.C.A. § 35-15-1008 ] invalidates an exculpatory term to the extent it relieves a trustee of liability for breach of trust committed with reckless indifference to the interests of the beneficiaries.

    “Internal Revenue Code.” The definition of “internal revenue code” was added to T.C.A. § 35-15-103 with the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. The term as now defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 appeared in certain sections throughout the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, while in certain other places in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and its comments it was referred to generically as “Internal Revenue Code,” or by similar words or abbreviations therefor. The 2013 amendments included the term’s definition in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 to make it consistently applicable throughout the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Nevertheless, it is still appropriate to refer to the Internal Revenue Code by its initials “I.R.C.” or through a full citation to title 26 of the United States Code or an abbreviation thereof. Moreover, a citation to “Treas. Reg. §” is an appropriate way to cite to the regulations under the Internal Revenue Code, as is a full citation to title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations or an abbreviation thereof.

    “Jurisdiction.” (subdivision (9) [T.C.A. 35-5-103(19) ], when used with reference to a geographic area, includes a state or country but is not necessarily so limited. Its precise scope will depend on the context in which it is used. “Jurisdiction” is used in sections 107 and 403 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-107  and 35-15-403 ] to refer to the place whose law will govern the trust. The term is used in section 108 [T.C.A. § 35-15-108 ] to refer to the trust’s principal place of administration. The term is used in section 816 [T.C.A. § 35-15-816 ] to refer to the place where the trustee may appoint an ancillary trustee and to the place in whose courts the trustee can bring and defend legal proceedings.

    “Person.” The definition in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 is self sufficiently clear and needs no further explanation.

    “Power of appointment.” A power of appointment as defined in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is a matter of state property law and not federal tax law; although there is considerable overlap between the two definitions.

    A power of appointment is authority to designate the recipients of beneficial interests in property. See Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 11.1  (1986). A power is either general or nongeneral (such sometimes being called “special”) and either presently exercisable or not presently exercisable. A general power of appointment is a power exercisable in favor of the holder of the power, the power holder’s creditors, the power holder’s estate, or the creditors of the power holder’s estate. See Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 11.4  (1986). All other powers are nongeneral (such sometimes being called “special powers of appointment”). A power is presently exercisable if the power holder can currently create an interest, present or future, in an object of the power. A power of appointment is not presently exercisable if exercisable only by the power holder's will or if its exercise is not effective for a specified period of time or until occurrence of some event. See Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 11.5  (1986). Powers of appointment may be held in either a fiduciary or nonfiduciary capacity.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code makes distinctions among types of powers. Under T.C.A. § 35-15-302 the holder of any type of power of appointment may represent and bind persons whose interests are subject to the power. A “power of withdrawal” is defined as a presently exercisable general power of appointment other than a power exercisable by a trustee and limited by an ascertainable standard, or a power which is exercisable by another person only upon consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest.

    Finally, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code makes two things crystal clear: A power of appointment, even when held by a trustee or other fiduciary, is different and distinct from any trustee’s or other fiduciary’s power to make decisions regarding distributions. Moreover, powers of appointment are held by the person to whom such power has been given in the distinct and singular capacity of a power holder. Therefore, if a settlor is given a power of appointment, such settlor holds that power of appointment as a power holder and not in that person’s capacity as settlor. Portions of the above (appropriately amended) were moved from the comment pertaining to beneficiary, while other portion of the above were added, both such types of changes were done to conform with the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, which added a separate definition for “power of appointment.”

    “Power of withdrawal.” The definition of “power of withdrawal,” was amended in 2007 to exclude a possible inference that the term includes a discretionary power in a trustee to make distributions for the trustee’s own benefit which is limited by an ascertainable standard. This was done to clarify that if a beneficiary is serving as trustee or co-trustee and has discretion to make a distribution to himself or for his own benefit pursuant to an ascertainable standard, then the creditor cannot reach or compel a distribution except to the extent the interest would be subject to a creditor's claim if the beneficiary were not acting as trustee or co-trustee.

    “Property.” The definition of “property” (subdivision (12)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-103(23) ] is intended to be as expansive as possible and to encompass anything that may be the subject of ownership. Included are choses in action, claims, and interests created by beneficiary designations under policies of insurance, financial instruments, and deferred compensation and other retirement arrangements, whether revocable or irrevocable. Any such property interest is sufficient to support creation of a trust. See section 401 Section Comment [T.C.A. § 35-15-401 ].

    “Qualified beneficiary.” Due to the difficulty of identifying beneficiaries whose interests are remote and contingent, and because such beneficiaries are not likely to have much interest in the day-to-day affairs of the trust, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code uses the concept of “qualified beneficiary” (subdivision (12) [§ T.C.A. 35-15-103(24) ]) to limit the class of beneficiaries to whom certain notices must be given or consents received. The definition of qualified beneficiaries is used in section 705 [T.C.A. § 35-15-705 ] to define the class to whom notice must be given of a trustee resignation. The term is used in section 813 [T.C.A. § 35-15-813 ] to define the class that generally has the right to request from a trustee information regarding the trust’s administration. Section 417 [T.C.A. § 35-15-417 ] requires that notice be given to the qualified beneficiaries before a trust may be combined or divided. Actions which may be accomplished by the consent of the qualified beneficiaries include the appointment of a successor trustee as provided in section 704 [T.C.A. § 35-15-704 ], as well as the appointment of successor trust advisors and trust protectors. Prior to transferring a trust’s principal place of administration, T.C.A. § 35-15-108 requires that the trustee give at least 60 days notice to the qualified beneficiaries.

    According to ULC - NCCUSL, the qualified beneficiaries consist of the beneficiaries currently eligible to receive a distribution from the trust together with those who might be termed the first-line remaindermen. These are the beneficiaries who would become eligible to receive distributions were the event triggering the termination of a beneficiary’s interest or of the trust itself to occur on the date in question. Such a terminating event will typically be the death or deaths of the beneficiaries currently eligible to receive the income. Should a qualified beneficiary be a minor, incapacitated, or unknown, or a beneficiary whose identity or location is not reasonably ascertainable, the representation and virtual representation principles of part 3 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-30135-15-305 ] may be employed, including the possible appointment by the court of a representative to represent the beneficiary’s interest.

    According to ULC - NCCUSL, the qualified beneficiaries who take upon termination of the beneficiary’s interest or of the trust can include takers in default of the exercise of a power of appointment. The term can also include the persons entitled to receive the trust property pursuant to the exercise of a power of appointment. Because the exercise of a testamentary power of appointment is not effective until the testator’s death and probate of the will, the qualified beneficiaries do not include appointees under the will of a living person. Nor would the term include the objects of an unexercised inter vivos power.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code generally follows ULC - NCCUSL’s position as expressed in the prior two paragraphs. However, the group of persons who potentially qualify as qualified beneficiaries under Tennessee law is meaningfully smaller. Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, as of any (and as of each) point in time at which it is necessary to determine which beneficiaries are qualified beneficiaries you do so assuming the following two things (neither of which are required by the Uniform Trust Code): any and all then existing powers of appointment will not be exercised; and any event then not reasonably expected to occur will not occur.

    Moreover, under its definition of “qualified beneficiary” the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides that no ultimate beneficiary or potential ultimate beneficiary can ever be a qualified beneficiary or have the rights thereof. Additionally, no ultimate beneficiary or potential ultimate beneficiary has the standing to petition to remedy a breach of trust or to enforce a trust; the interests of such beneficiary being too remote. Notwithstanding the preceding portion of this paragraph, if and when the interests of any ultimate, or potential ultimate, beneficiary have ripened to the point that such beneficiary is eligible to receive, or have paid for their benefit, current distributions of income or principal, at such time they will no longer be an “ultimate beneficiary” or “potential ultimate beneficiary.” At such time such beneficiary has all the rights of any other current beneficiary of the same type, charitable or non-charitable. Similarly if a trust for animals or a trust for a noncharitable purpose (individually and collectively, “purpose trust”) is an ultimate, or potential ultimate, beneficiary, the rights of any person provided in [either] T.C.A. § 35-15-408 or § 35-15-409 to enforce the trust under which such purpose trust is an ultimate, or potential ultimate beneficiary will not ripen until such purpose trust is eligible to receive from the trust under which it was previously an ultimate, or potential ultimate, beneficiary, current distributions of income or principal.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Interest of Beneficiaries.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

T.C.A. § 35-15-103 contains a detailed definition of who is included in the meaning of the term “ultimate beneficiary.” Such section then goes on to give the following example of one type of person or group of persons who meet the definition of such term:

“[A] person or persons often included in a trust instrument or under the exercise of a power to take an interest in a trust at the time all or any part of such trust terminates only in a case where all other named beneficiaries or classes of beneficiaries that have or had an affinity through either familial connection or friendship with any of: the settlor; the person holding any power; or any prior beneficiary or potential beneficiary of the trust; are predeceased or are otherwise not in existence at the time all or any part of the trust terminates.” Also by way of example, one may describe an ultimate beneficiary as that person or persons who take an interest if all of the natural objects (close or remote) of the relevant person’s bounty predecease the termination of all or part of a trust.

Charitable trusts do not have beneficiaries in the usual sense. However, certain persons, while not technically beneficiaries, do have an interest in seeing that the trust is enforced. Therefore, T.C.A. § 35-15-110 grants the rights of qualified beneficiaries to charitable organizations expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of a charitable trust and whose beneficial interests are sufficient to satisfy the definition of qualified beneficiary if the trust were not a charitable trust. Finally, T.C.A. § 35-15-110 grants the rights of a qualified beneficiary with respect to a charitable trust to the attorney general of Tennessee.

“Reach.” This term describes in the broadest manner possible, any means by which any judicial process, or any other process by power of law, may subject a distribution interest or any power held by anyone relative to a trust, to such process; usually, but not always, for the purpose of satisfying a claim, judgment or similar obligation with assets of a trust, or otherwise obtaining assets either from a trust or that were in a trust in the past. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

“Remainder interest.” A remainder interest is the interest by which a beneficiary receives property held by a trust outright at some time in the future. All other beneficial interests are distribution interests.

Whether a remainder interest is separate or marital property for purposes of, or is otherwise relevant to, an equitable division of property; and whether a remainder interest remains separate property or is in any way relevant to, indicative of or effects, any transmutation or other conversion of separate property to community property; is controlled by standards that are equivalent to those that apply to distribution interests. Moreover provisions equivalent to those pertaining to a distribution interest regarding the use of community funds relative to the operation or maintenance of property subject to such distribution interest likewise control remainder interests in similar situations. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

“Reserved power.” This term literally includes any power held by a settlor, so long as that power was retained or kept by the settlor at the inception of the trust. A reserved power is not a beneficial interest. Moreover, a power given to a settlor by someone other than the settlor is not a reserved power, nor is it a beneficial interest. If a power is so given by another to a settlor and that power includes the power to direct the disposition of trust property, other than as a distribution decision made by a trustee or other fiduciary to a beneficiary, then such power is a power of appointment for all purposes under the Tennessee trust statutes.

The term reserved power was added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to clarify the above. Trusts with reserved powers are common throughout the various jurisdictions within the United States. A revocable trust (or revocable living trust) is perhaps the penultimate example of a trust with reserved powers (or a reserved power trust). Moreover, one often encounters the use of the terms “reserved power” or “reserved power trust” outside the United States in Commonwealth jurisdictions. Therefore, this term was also included in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in order to assure that persons more familiar with trusts created under the laws of Commonwealth jurisdictions would understand similar reserved power trusts were likewise fully available in Tennessee.

“Revocable.” The definition of “revocable” (subdivision (13)) [T.C.A. 35-15-103(28) ] clarifies that revocable trusts include only trusts whose revocation is substantially within the settlor’s control. The fact that the settlor becomes incapacitated does not convert a revocable trust into an irrevocable trust. The trust remains revocable until the settlor’s death or the power of revocation is released. The consequences of classifying a trust as revocable are many. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains provisions relating to liability of a revocable trust for payment of the settlor’s debts (section 505) [T.C.A. § 35-15-505 ], the standard of capacity for creating a revocable trust (section 601) [T.C.A. § 35-15-601], the procedure for revocation (section 602) [T.C.A. § 35-15-602 ], the subjecting of the beneficiaries’ rights to the settlor’s control (section 603) [T.C.A. § 35-15-603 ], the period for contesting a revocable trust (section 604) [T.C.A. § 35-15-604 ], the power of the settlor of a revocable trust to direct the actions of a trustee (section 808(a)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-808(a) ], notice to certain beneficiaries and other persons upon the trust becoming irrevocable (section 813(b)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-813 (b) ], and the liability of a trustee of a revocable trust for the obligations of a partnership of which the trustee is a general partner (section 1011 (d)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-1011(d) ].

Because under section 603(c) [T.C.A. § 35-15-603(c) ] the holder of a power of withdrawal has the rights of a settlor of a revocable trust, the definition of “power of withdrawal” and “revocable” under T.C.A. § 35-15-103 are similar. Both exclude individuals who can exercise their power only with the consent of the trustee or person having an adverse interest although the definition of “power of withdrawal” excludes powers subject to an ascertainable standard, a limitation which is not present in the definition of “revocable.”

“Settlor.” The definition of “settlor” (subdivision (14)) [T.C.A. 35-15-103(29) ] refers to the person who creates, or contributes property to, a trust, whether by will, self-declaration, transfer of property to another person as trustee, or exercise of a power of appointment. For the requirements for creating a trust, see section 401 [T.C.A. § 35-15-401 ]. Determining the identity of the “settlor” is usually not an issue. The same person will both sign the trust instrument and fund the trust. Ascertaining the identity of the settlor becomes more difficult when more than one person signs the trust instrument or funds the trust. The fact that a person is designated as the “settlor” by the terms of the trust is not necessarily determinative. For example, the person who executes the trust instrument may be acting as the agent for the person who will be funding the trust. In that case, the person funding the trust, and not the person signing the trust instrument, will be the settlor. Should more than one person contribute to a trust, all of the contributors will ordinarily be treated as settlors in proportion to their respective contributions, regardless of which one signed the trust instrument. See  section 602(b) [T.C.A. § 35-15-602(b) ].

In the case of a revocable trust employed as a will substitute, gifts to the trust’s creator are sometimes made by placing the gifted property directly into the trust. To recognize that such a donor is not intended to be treated as a settlor, the definition of “settlor” excludes a contributor to a trust that is revocable by another person or over which another person has a power of withdrawal. Thus, a parent who contributes to a child’s revocable trust would not be treated as one of the trust’s settlors. The definition of settlor would treat the child as the sole settlor of the trust to the extent of the child’s proportionate contribution. Pursuant to section 603(c) [T.C.A. § 35-15-603(c) ], the child’s power of withdrawal over the trust would also result in the child being treated as the settlor with respect to the portion of the trust attributable to the parent’s contribution.

According to ULC – NCCUSL, ascertaining the identity of the settlor is important for a variety of reasons. It is important for determining rights in revocable trusts. See  subdivisions 505(a)(1), (3) [T.C.A. § 35-15-505(a)(1), (6) ] (creditor claims against settlor of revocable trust), section 602 [T.C.A. § 35-15-602 ] (revocation or modification of revocable trust), and section 604 [T.C.A. § 35-15-604 ] (limitation on contest of revocable trust). It is also important for determining rights of creditors in irrevocable trusts. See  subdivision 505(a)(2) [T.C.A. § 35-15-505(a)(2) ] (creditors of settlor can reach maximum amount trustee can distribute to settlor). While the settlor of an irrevocable trust traditionally has no continuing rights over the trust except for the right under section 411 [T.C.A. § 35-15-411 ] to terminate the trust with the beneficiaries’ consent, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code also authorizes the settlor of an irrevocable trust to petition for removal of the trustee and to enforce or modify a charitable trust. See  subsection 405(c) [T.C.A. § 35-15-405(c) ] (standing to enforce charitable trust), section 413 [T.C.A. § 35-15-413 ] (doctrine of cy pres), and section 706 [T.C.A. § 35-15-706 ] (removal of trustee).

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code general would agree with ULC - NCCUSL’s position as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph. However the TUTC diverges from the Uniform Trust Code in several ways relative to the matter discussed in such paragraph, including the following:

Regarding the comments in such paragraph relative to Uniform Trust Code section 411, under T.C.A. § 35-15-411, a settlor need not consent in advance to a modification or termination of an irrevocable trust. Instead, upon consent of all qualified beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust, such proposed action may be taken if a settlor does not object to same within sixty (60) days (or a greater number of days if the proposal to modify or terminate so provides) of being provided notice of the proposed action by the trustee. Such notice has certain requirements as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-411.

Regarding the comments in such paragraph relative to Uniform Trust Code section 505, under T.C.A. § 35-15-505, relative to irrevocable trusts there are certain exceptions to ULC - NCCUSL’s statement that “creditors of settlor can reach maximum amount trustee can distribute to settlor.” First Tennessee does grant creditor protection under prescribed conditions to a settlor of a Tennessee Investment Services Trust created under title 35, chapter 16. Second, an irrevocable special needs trust is shielded from claims by creditors of the settlor regardless of whether or not such trust complies with the provisions of title 35, chapter 16. Third, no person holding a power of withdrawal is considered a settlor by failing to exercise such power or letting it lapse. Therefore, because such person is not a settlor, the provisions regarding creditors’ ability to reach maximum amount trustee can distribute to settlor simply are not applicable. Fourth, a power of appointment is held by the person to whom such power has been given as a power holder not by a settlor in that person’s capacity as a settlor. Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, neither a power of appointment nor a power reserved by a settlor is a beneficial interest. Therefore, a holder of either, in their capacity holding either, is not a beneficiary. For this reason, a creditor of a settlor cannot reach the rights incident to a power of appointment held by a settlor to appoint to persons other than the settlor, nor can they reach a reserved power at the level of the holder to the extent that reserved power is not equivalent to a power to revoke a trust. Fifth, a person who becomes a beneficiary of a trust due to the exercise of a power of appointment by someone other than such person is not considered under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to be a settlor of a trust. This is true even if the person who so became the beneficiary created and funded the trust and granted the power of appointment to another. Therefore, if the settlor did not otherwise retain a beneficial interest in the trust that was otherwise reachable (e.g., the settlor did not name himself as a beneficiary of the trust at the time it was created) the mere fact that some other person exercises a power of appointment to later make the settlor a beneficiary will not create an interest that is reachable by the settlor’s creditors.

“Spendthrift provision.” (subdivision (15)) [T.C.A. 35-15-103(30) ] means a term of a trust which restrains the transfer of a beneficiary’s interest, whether by a voluntary act of the beneficiary or by an action of a beneficiary’s creditor or assignee, which at least as far as the beneficiary is concerned, would be involuntary. A spendthrift provision is valid under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer. For a discussion of this requirement and the effect of a spendthrift provision in general, see section 502 [T.C.A. § 35-15-502 ].

Note regarding prior language contained in these comments relative to spendthrift provision.

Upon the original adoption of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in 2004, T.C.A. § 35-15-411 omitted language similar to or in accord with Uniform Trust Code section 411(c), as well as language similar to or in accord with the ULC – NCCUSL comments to such section of the Uniform Trust Code. Such language of Uniform Trust Code section 411(c) so omitted reads as follows:

“A spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust.”

Such language of the comments to Uniform Trust Code section 411(c) so omitted reads as follows:

“Subsection (c) of this section deals with the effect of a spendthrift provision on the right of a beneficiary to concur in a trust termination or modification. Spendthrift terms have sometimes been construed to constitute a material purpose without inquiry into the intention of the particular settlor. For examples, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 337 (1959); George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees Section 1008 (Rev. 2d ed. 1983); and 4 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts Section 337 (4th ed. 1989). This result is troublesome because spendthrift provisions are often added to instruments with little thought. Subsection (c), similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 65 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), does not negate the possibility that continuation of a trust to assure spendthrift protection might have been a material purpose of the particular settlor. The question of whether that was the intent of a particular settlor is instead a matter of fact to be determined on the totality of the circumstances.”

The language of Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 65 cmt. e., citied by ULC - NCCUSL above is more dismissive of spendthrift provisions and their protective nature. It is also dismissive of the protective nature of discretionary.

Despite omitting from T.C.A. § 35-15-411 such language above from Uniform Trust Code section 411(c), the original Tennessee Uniform Trust Code failed to omit the concordant ULC - NCCUSL commentary language from these comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-103, which state:

“The insertion of a spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust may also constitute a material purpose sufficient to prevent termination of the trust by agreement of the beneficiaries under section 411 [T.C.A § 35-15-411 ], although the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not presume this result.”

This left such comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-103 in conflict with the statutory language of (as well as the comments to) T.C.A. § 35-15-411. For that reason, the 2013 amendments to the TUTC strike from the comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-103 relative to spendthrift provisions the immediately preceding paragraph contained in quotation marks. After the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such code is silent on this issue.

Nevertheless, in furtherance of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s overriding goals of respecting settlor’s in-tent and freedom of disposition, the 2013 amendments add the following language to T.C.A. § 35-15-105:

“Any purpose enunciated as a material purpose of a trust in that trust’s trust instrument shall be treated as a material purpose of that trust for all purposes of this chapter and chapter 16.” As stated in the comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-105, such results in a settlor also having the power to so enumerate that a purpose of a trust is not a material purpose of a trust for all purposes of this chapter and chapter 16.

Therefore, a settlor can, with greater certainty through drafting, control understanding of that settlor’s intent as to what is or is not a material purpose as to any purpose of a trust, including that of a spendthrift provision.

“State.” The definition in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 is self sufficiently clear and needs no further explanation.

“Successors in interest.” The definition in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 is self sufficiently clear and needs no further explanation. However, one reason for including it is to facilitate drafting.

“Terms of a trust.” (subdivision (18)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-103(33) ] is a defined term used frequently in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. While the wording of a written trust instrument is almost always the most important determinant of a trust’s terms, the definition is not so limited. Oral statements, the situation of the beneficiaries, the purposes of the trust, the circumstances under which the trust is to be administered, and, to the extent the settlor was otherwise silent, rules of construction, all may have a bearing on determining a trust’s meaning. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4  cmt. a (1959). If a trust established by order of court is to be administered as an express trust, the terms of the trust are determined from the court order as interpreted in light of the general rules governing interpretation of judgments. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996).

A manifestation of a settlor’s intention does not constitute evidence of a trust’s terms if it would be inadmissible in a judicial proceeding in which the trust’s terms are in question. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4  cmt. b (1959). See  also Restatement (Third) Property: Donative Transfers §§ 10.2, 11.1-11.3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995). For example, in many states a trust of real property is unenforceable unless evidenced by a writing, although section 407 [T.C.A. § 35-15-407 ] of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code internally does not so require. Evidence otherwise relevant to determining the terms of a trust may also be excluded under other principles of law, such as the parol evidence rule.

“This state.” The comments under “another state” or “other state, under “foreign” or “foreign country,” as well as under “foreign jurisdiction” are incorporated herein by reference. This statutory definition was primarily included for drafting convenience and to assure clarity. By using the term “this state” in a trust governed by the law of Tennessee, a drafter knows Tennessee will be the term’s resulting meaning. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

“Trust advisor.” This term was added to provide for the directed trust provisions of part 12. T.C.A. § 35-15-1201(a) contains a description of the meaning of this term along with an extensive listing of powers and duties with respect to a trust such person may hold. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

“Trust instrument.” (subdivision (19)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-103(36)] is a subset of the definition of “terms of a trust” (subdivision (18)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-103(33) ], referring to only such terms as are found in an instrument executed by the settlor. Section 403 [T.C.A. § 35-15-403 ] provides that a trust is validly created if created in compliance with the law of the place where the trust instrument was executed. Pursuant to subdivision 604(a)(2) [T.C.A. § 35-15-604(a)(2) ], the contest period for a revocable trust can be shortened by providing the potential contestant with a copy of the trust instrument plus other information. T.C.A. § 35-15-813 requires that the trustee furnish certain beneficiaries and certain holders of power of appointment with a copy of the trust instrument or an abstract thereof, in the trustee’s discretion. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, T.C.A. § 35-15-813 allows: the terms of the trust; as well as the settlor in any event, or any trust advisor or trust protector that holds the power to so direct, to direct otherwise in writing to the trustee. In other words, unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows “quiet” trusts. To allow a trustee to administer a trust with some dispatch without concern about liability if the terms of a trust instrument are contradicted by evidence outside of the instrument, section 1006 [T.C.A. § 35-15-1006 ] protects a trustee from liability to the extent a breach of trust resulted from reasonable reliance on those terms. Section 1013 [T.C.A. § 35-15-1013 ] allows a trustee to substitute a certification of trust in lieu of providing a third person with a copy of the trust instrument. T.C.A. § 35-15-1103 provides that unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent, rules of construction and presumptions provided in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code apply to trust instruments executed before the effective date of such Code.

“Trust protector.” See trust advisor, above. Added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

“Trustee.” The definition of “trustee” (subdivision (19)) [T.C.A. § 35-15-103(38) ] includes not only the original trustee but also an additional and successor trustee as well as a cotrustee. Because the definition of trustee includes trustees of all types, any trustee, whether original or succeeding, single or cotrustee, has the powers of a trustee and is subject to the duties imposed on trustees under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Any natural person, including a settlor or beneficiary, has capacity to act as trustee if the person has capacity to hold title to property free of trust. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 32 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 89  (1959). State banking statutes normally impose additional requirements before an entity can act as trustee.

35-15-104. Knowledge.

  1. Subject to subsection (b), a person has knowledge of a fact if the person:
    1. Has actual knowledge of it;
    2. Has received a notice or notification of it; or
    3. From all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in question, has reason to know it.
  2. An organization that conducts activities through employees has notice or knowledge of a fact involving a trust only from the time the information was received by an employee having responsibility to act for the trust, or would have been brought to the employee's attention if the organization had exercised reasonable diligence. An organization exercises reasonable diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the employee having responsibility to act for the trust and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Reasonable diligence does not require an employee of the organization to communicate information unless the communication is part of the individual's regular duties or the individual knows a matter involving the trust would be materially affected by the information.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 5.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

This section specifies when a person is deemed to know a fact. Subsection (a) states the general rule. Subsection (b) provides a special rule dealing with notice to organizations. Pursuant to subsection (a), a fact is known to a person if the person had actual knowledge of the fact, received notification of it, or had reason to know of the fact’s existence based on all of the circumstances and other facts known to the person at the time. Under subsection (b), notice to an organization is not necessarily achieved by giving notice to a branch office. Nor does the organization necessarily acquire knowledge at the moment the notice arrives in the organization’s mailroom. Rather, the organization has notice or knowledge of a fact only when the information is received by an employee having responsibility to act for the trust, or would have been brought to the employee’s attention had the organization exercised reasonable diligence.

“Know” is used in its defined sense in sections 109 [T.C.A. § 35-15-109 ] (methods and waiver of notice), section 305 [T.C.A. § 35-15-305 ] (appointment of representative), subsection 604(b) [T.C.A. § 35-15-604(b) ] (limitation on contest of revocable trust), section 812 [T.C.A. § 35-15-812 ] (collecting trust property), section 1009 [T.C.A. § 35-15-1009 ] (nonliability of trustee upon beneficiary’s consent, release, or ratification), and section 1012 [T.C.A. § 35-15-1012 ] (protection of person dealing with trustee). But as to certain actions, a person is charged with knowledge of facts the person would have discovered upon reasonable inquiry. See  section 1005 [T.C.A. § 35-15-1005 ] (limitation of action against trustee following report of trustee). In addition, for purposes of T.C.A. § 35-15-1005, a person will be deemed to have received adequate disclosure of facts thereunder if they had sufficient knowledge to be presumed to know them or to be put on notice to inquire into their existence.

This section is based on Uniform Commercial Code § 1-202  [T.C.A. § 47-1-201 ] (2000 Annual Meeting Draft).

35-15-105. Default and mandatory rules.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this chapter governs the duties and powers of a trustee or any other fiduciary under this chapter, relations among trustees and such other fiduciaries, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary. The terms of a trust may expand, restrict, eliminate, or otherwise vary the duties and powers of a trustee, any such other fiduciary, relations among any of them, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary; provided, however, that nothing contained in this subsection (a) shall be construed to override or nullify the provisions of subsection (b). The rule of statutory construction that states that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this section. Except as restricted by subsection (b), pursuant to this section, courts shall give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of disposition and to the enforceability of trust instruments.
  2. The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this chapter except:
    1. The requirements for creating a trust;
    2. The duty of a trustee to act in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries;
    3. The requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust, and that the trust has a purpose that is lawful and possible to achieve;
    4. The power to modify or terminate a trust under §§ 35-15-410 — 35-15-416;
    5. The effect of a spendthrift provision and the rights of certain creditors and assignees to reach a trust as provided in part 5 of this chapter;
    6. The power of the court under § 35-15-702 to require, dispense with, or modify or terminate a bond;
    7. The power of the court under § 35-15-708(b) to adjust a trustee's compensation specified in the terms of the trust which is unreasonably low or high;
    8. The effect of an exculpatory term under § 35-15-1008;
    9. The rights under §§ 35-15-1010 — 35-15-1013 of a person other than a trustee or beneficiary;
    10. Periods of limitation for commencing a judicial proceeding;
    11. The power of the court to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction as may be necessary in the interests of justice; and
    12. The subject matter jurisdiction of the court and venue for commencing a proceeding as provided in §§ 35-15-203 and 35-15-204.
  3. Any purpose enunciated as a material purpose of a trust in that trust's trust instrument shall be treated as a material purpose of that trust for all purposes of this chapter and chapter 16.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 6; 2007, ch. 24, §§ 4, 5; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 4-6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Law Reviews.

    Agents in Secrecy: The Use of Information Surrogates in Trust Administration (Lauren Z. Curry), 64 Vand. L. Rev. 925 (2011).

    1. Bad Faith Or Reckless Indifference. 2. Mandatory Obligation.

    Grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank in the decedent's daughter's action against it was appropriate pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(8) and T.C.A. § 35-15-1008(a)(1) because nothing in the record indicated that the bank acted in bad faith or with reckless indifference; therefore, the terms of the will exonerating the bank, as trustee, prevailed in the case and the trial court was correct in so holding. Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

    Trustees were under a mandatory obligation to distribute the remaining principal of such child's separate trust to such child, when the terminating event or events occurred, and because the trust did not provide otherwise, the trustees were to perform this task expeditiously, which they failed to do; because the trustees failed to take the appropriate actions for two years following the termination of the trust, the trial court was justified in ordering the clerk to prepare a deed to transfer the real estate to the beneficiaries. In re Farmer Family Trust, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    It is the policy of the state of Tennessee, as well as the overriding objective of the Tennessee trust statutes: that a settlor’s intent be the lodestar by which a trust is interpreted; that such intent be carried out; and that settlors have the freedom to dispose of their assets to whom and in the manner they wish; all to the greatest extent constitutionally allowable.

    Significantly more strongly than does the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a) emphasizes that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is primarily a default statute. While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides numerous procedural rules on which a settlor may wish to rely, the settlor is generally free to override these rules and to prescribe the conditions under which the trust is to be administered. Subject to only the limited exceptions contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) (which are fewer in number and in certain cases, less restrictive, than in section 105 of the Uniform Trust Code), the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary are as specified in the terms of the trust. Moreover, in certain cases there need be no specific reference to the intent to override such default rules. One example of the myriad ways in which a settlor can override the default rules contained in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is that a settlor may override an otherwise applicable duty of loyalty in the terms of the trust. Sometimes such override is implied. For example, the grant to a trustee of authority to make a discretionary distribution to a class of beneficiaries that includes the trustee implicitly authorizes the trustee to make distributions for the trustee’s own benefit. Another way a settlor can override the default rules is such settlor can relieve a fiduciary from acting in good faith (such not being included in T.C.A. § 35-15-(b)(2).

    In order to do its utmost to assure all of the above, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code rejects the rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.

    The subdivisions contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) (referred to hereafter in the comment to this section as “subdivision”) list the items not subject to override in the terms of the trust:

    Subdivision (b)(1) confirms that the requirements for a trust’s creation, such as the necessary level of capacity and the requirement that a trust have a legal purpose, are controlled by statute and common law, not by the settlor. For the requirements for creating a trust, see T.C.A. §§ 35-15-40135-15-409. Nevertheless, unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains no references to any impact of public policy on the purposes of a trust as such relates to the requirements for creating a trust under subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(3).

    Subdivision (b)(2) provides that the terms may not eliminate a trustee’s duty to act in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains no reference to good faith in subdivision (b)(2). Therefore, a settlor may provide a standard other than good faith, (e.g., the Trustee's sole and absolute discretion, which standard under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains no implied good faith or reasonableness standard) to govern the Trustee's actions. See T.C.A. § 35-15-814 for the standard by which a trustee’s exercise of discretion relative to a discretionary interest may be judicially reviewed or a distribution judicially forced.

    Moreover, absent some other restriction, a settlor is always free to specify the trust’s terms and the interests of the beneficiaries, to both of which the trustee must comply. Subdivision (b)(3) emphasizes that the “interests of the beneficiaries” are to be judged by such terms “as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust.” The Uniform Trust Code does not contain language similar to that contained in the last set of quotation marks above. Such language was added to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code due to its overriding emphasis on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition. Therefore, throughout the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, whenever one encounters the phrase “that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries” (or a similar phrase), one should automatically add to such phrase the remaining portion subdivision (b)(3), “as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust.”

    Under subdivision (b)(4), the power of the court to modify or terminate a trust under T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-416 is not subject to variation in the terms of the trust. However, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-416 involve situations which the settlor could have addressed had the settlor had sufficient foresight. These include situations where the purpose of the trust has been achieved, a mistake was made in the trust’s creation, or circumstances have arisen that were not anticipated by the settlor.

    Subdivision (b)(5) clarifies that a settlor may not restrict the rights of a beneficiary’s creditors to a greater ex-tent than is allowed as provided in part 5.

    In conformity with traditional doctrine, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code limits the ability of a settlor to exculpate a trustee from liability for breach of trust. The limits are specified in T.C.A. § 35-15-1008. Subdivision (b)(8) provides a cross-reference. Similarly, subdivision (b)(7) provides a cross-reference to section T.C.A. § 35-15-708(b), which limits the binding effect of a provision specifying a trustee’s, as well as a trust advisor’s or trust protector’s compensation.

    Subdivision (b)(9) clarifies that a settlor is not free to limit the rights of third persons, such as purchasers of trust property.

    Subdivision (b)(10) makes clear that the settlor may not reduce any otherwise applicable period of limitations for commencing a judicial proceeding. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-604 (period of limitations for contesting validity of revocable trust), and T.C.A. § 35-15-1005 (period of limitation on action for breach of trust), as well as similar provisions regarding limitations periods applicable to trust advisors, trust protectors and other fiduciaries. Similarly, a settlor may not so negate the responsibilities of a trustee that the trustee would no longer be acting in a fiduciary capacity. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in a directed trust one or more fiduciary powers and duties can be removed from a trustee and given to another fiduciary, in which case relative to the powers and duties so removed, that trustee will be an excluded fiduciary.

    The terms of a trust may not deny a court authority to take such action as necessary in the interests of justice, including requiring that a trustee furnish bond, which are acknowledged by subdivisions (b)(11) and (b)(6), respectively. Additionally, subdivision (b)(12) similarly provides that provisions on subject matter jurisdiction and venue cannot be altered in the terms of the trust.

    Finally, Tennessee allows “quiet” trusts, under which information regarding a trust and its operations may, if certain requirements are met, be withheld from beneficiaries and holders of powers of appointment. Because of this, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code has no provision corresponding with Uniform Trust Code subsections (b)(8) and (b)(9).

    To assure the overriding objectives of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code as stated in the third paragraph of these section comments to this section, T.C.A. § 35-15-105(c) makes it clear that the materiality of any purpose of the trust can be controlled simply by stating such in a trust instrument. While the language of such subsection (c) is written in the positive, (i.e., “Any purpose enunciated as a material purpose… shall be treated as a material purpose…”), such necessarily implies that a settlor also has the power to so enumerate that a purpose of a trust is not a material purpose of a trust for all purposes of this chapter and chapter 16.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bad Faith Or Reckless Indifference.

2. Mandatory Obligation.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-106. Law supplemental to chapter — Applicability of certain sections of Restatement of Trusts.

  1. The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this chapter, except to the extent modified by this chapter or another statute of this state.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a):
    1. No provision in a trust directing or authorizing accumulation of trust income shall be invalid; and
    2. The traditional common law distinction between a discretionary trust and a support trust and the dual judicial review standards related to this distinction shall be maintained. Unless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter, courts shall not consult, rely on or give any persuasive value to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 50, 56, 58, 59 or 60, nor any of the comments under such sections or related thereto, none of which have any force or effect relative to trusts governed by the laws of this state.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 7; 2013, ch. 390, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    According to ULC – NCCUSL, the Uniform Trust Code codifies those portions of the law of express trusts that are most amenable to codification.

    While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code would agree that no code can cover all portions of the law of express trusts, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code codifies meaningfully more of such portions than does the Uniform Trust Code. The additional codification of the law of express trusts in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is intentional and is designed to provide significantly more certainty than does the Uniform Trust Code over the law that will control a trust and its administration. This is in accordance with Tennessee’s emphasis on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition.

    Nevertheless, because it is impossible to codify all portions of the law of express trust, to the extent such are not codified in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such code is supplemented by the common law of trusts, including principles of equity. To determine the common law and principles of equity, a court or other body adjudicating or mediating a matter is instructed to look first to other portions of the Tennessee trust statutes, then to prior and contemporaneous Tennessee law. If a court or other body adjudicating or mediating a matter cannot resolve the matter using Tennessee law, it may then look to other law (excluding the law of any foreign country), including the various applicable restatements. Regardless, to the extent any other law is in conflict with Tennessee law, Tennessee law controls. The common law of trusts also includes the traditional and broad equitable jurisdiction of the court, which the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in no way restricts.

    Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, when considering law other than Tennessee law, courts and other bodies adjudicating or mediating a matter are instructed to be mindful of the following:

    Numerous provisions of title 35, chapters 6, 14 and 15 were modified and diverge, in some cases significantly, from their respective uniform codes and the Restatements of Trust, as well as from restatements covering fields of law that are related to, or impact upon, trusts. Moreover, there are no uniform code provisions addressing the subjects covered by title 35, chapters 16 and 17. Such resulting divergence was undertaken deliberately and after significant consideration. Taken as a whole, the Tennessee trust statutes are a distinct and integrated set of trust laws.

    It is for this reason that the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 reverse those of section 1101 of the Uniform Trust Code and expressly state that in applying and construing title 35 no consideration shall be given to any need to promote uniformity with respect to its subject matter among states, including relative to the laws of any foreign jurisdiction that has enacted versions of the various uniform codes, laws or acts. Moreover, T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 provides that unless specifically provided otherwise in title 35, chapters 6, 14, 15, 16 and 17, courts shall not consult or give any persuasive value to any such uniform acts or any foreign jurisdiction’s acts based on or similar to them; or to the comments of any of them; none of which have any force or effect relative to trusts governed by the laws of Tennessee.

    The statutory text of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is also supplemented by these Comments, which, like the Comments to any uniform act, may be relied on as a guide for interpretation. See Acierno v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline Corp., 656 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Del. 1995)  (interpreting Uniform Commercial Code); Yale University v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn. 1993)  (interpreting Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act); 2 Norman Singer, Statutory Construction Section 52.05 (6th ed. 2000); Jack Davies, Legislative Law and Process in a Nutshell Section 55-4 (2d ed. 1986).

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-107. Governing law.

  1. The validity, construction and administration of a trust are determined by the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms of the trust instrument, which is called a state jurisdiction provision.
  2. When a state jurisdiction provision designates that the law of this state controls:
    1. This state and its courts have jurisdiction over a trust created in a foreign jurisdiction;
    2. The validity, construction, and administration of a trust are determined by the laws of this state, including but not limited to:
      1. The capacity of the settlor;
      2. The powers, obligations, liabilities, and rights of the trustees and other fiduciaries;
      3. The appointment and removal of the trustees and other fiduciaries;
      4. The existence and extent of all powers conferred on a trustee or other fiduciary, including but not limited to, any trustee's or other fiduciary's discretionary powers, as well as the existence and extent of all powers retained by a settlor and the validity of the exercise of any such power, whether conferred on a trustee or other fiduciary or retained by a settlor;
      1. Neither a trust nor any disposition made subject to the terms of such trust is subject to the laws of any foreign country, nor is any such trust or such disposition void, voidable, liable to be set aside or defective in any manner for any reason including but not limited to:
        1. The law of any foreign country prohibits or does not recognize the concept of a trust; or
        2. The trust or disposition avoids or defeats any right, claim, or interest conferred by the law of a foreign country upon any person by reason of a personal relationship to the settlor or by way of heirship rights or contravenes any rule or law of a foreign country or any foreign country's judicial or administrative order or action intended to recognize, protect, enforce, or give effect to such right, claim, or interest;
      2. Relative to any foreign country or any interest in property arising or originating under the laws of any foreign country:
        1. No form of forced heirship, legitime, forced share or any similar heirship rights or form of transmission or transfer of property from a decedent or from a living person, or any restrictions on transmission or transfer of property from a decedent or a living person is recognized by this state; or
        2. No heirship rights described in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i) conferred under the law of a foreign country shall constitute an obligation or liability, the transfer, conveyance or devise of which, would violate title 66, chapter 3; and
      3. Subdivision (b)(3) shall apply to all realty or other forms of immovable property physically in this state, as well as to all personal or movable property wherever situated if owned by a trust containing a state jurisdiction provision designating that the law of this state controls such trust;
    3. No judgment or other holding of any judicial body of any foreign country, including but not limited to, any court, administrative body or other entity or organization purportedly having the power to make judicial or administrative decisions of any foreign country, shall be recognized or enforced or give rise to any equitable forms of relief, including but not limited to, estoppel, to the extent such judgment or other holding concerns a trust containing a state jurisdiction provision designating that the law of this state controls such trust or to the extent such judgment or other holding concerns property held by such trust;
    4. If, in any action brought against a trustee or other fiduciary of a trust, any judicial body of any foreign country, including but not limited to, any court, administrative body or other entity or organization purportedly having the power to make judicial or administrative decisions of any foreign country, takes any action whereby such judicial body declines to apply the law of this state in determining the validity, construction, or administration of a trust, or the effect of a spendthrift provision or discretionary interest of a trust, the trustee or other fiduciary, as applicable, shall immediately upon the action of the judicial body of the foreign country and without the further order of any court of this state, cease in all respects to be trustee or other fiduciary, as applicable, of the trust and a vacancy in the office of trustee or other fiduciary, as applicable, shall immediately exist:
      1. Upon the existence of such vacancy, the trustee or other fiduciary, as applicable, has no power or authority other than to convey the trust property to the successor trustee or other fiduciary who fills such vacancy as provided in subdivision (b)(5)(B);
      2. Such vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as would a vacancy in trusteeship that is required to be filled, either as provided by § 35-15-704(c) if the trust is a noncharitable trust, or as provided by § 35-15-704(d) if the trust is a charitable trust; and
      3. Section 35-15-704(e) shall also apply relative to such trustee or other fiduciary, as applicable, in the same manner as § 35-15-704(e) applies to trustees and vacancies in trusteeship in general; provided, however, that when exercising its power provided by § 35-15-704(e), the court shall consider the purposes of this subsection (b) and make any such appointments pursuant to § 35-15-704(e) in a manner designed to give full force and effect to this subsection (b) to the maximum extent allowed by the laws of this state or of the United States.
  3. In the absence of the existence of a state jurisdiction provision, the laws of the jurisdiction where the trust was executed determine the validity of the trust and the laws of descent, while the laws of the principal place of administration determine the administration of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 8; 2013, ch. 390, § 8.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    The 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code completely and significantly rewrote this section, leaving the former version inoperative as provided in the enacting and transitional language of Section 55, Pub. Act. 2013, Pub. Ch. 390, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn., 2013). Such amendment also made section 107 of the Uniform Trust Code, as well as the comments thereunder, irrelevant to the current T.C.A. § 35-15-107.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is designed to provide significantly more certainty than does the Uniform Trust Code over the law that will control a trust and its administration. This is in accordance with Tennessee’s emphasis on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition. Therefore, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows any person having the requisite nexus (defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-108) with a jurisdiction to choose that jurisdiction’s law as controlling over a trust. A settlor can then designate that controlling law by including a state jurisdiction provision in a trust. The jurisdiction selected need not have any other connection to the trust. Moreover, a settlor is free to select the governing law regardless of where the trust property may be physically located, whether it consists of real or personal property, and whether the trust was created by will or during the settlor’s lifetime.

    Furthermore and notwithstanding certain provisions contained in the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, in keeping with the policy of the state of Tennessee and its overriding emphasis on settlor’s intent and of freedom of disposition, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code rejects the concept that any law governing a trust is in any way controlled by another jurisdiction’s public policy or dependent upon which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to a matter at issue.

    Relative to specific provisions of such Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws (excluding the comments thereto, such having been disregarded by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code unless provided otherwise herein):

    § 268. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: is in accord with subsections (1) and (2)(a); but rejects subsection (2)(b) due to such code’s preference for certainty and such code’s provision that in the absence of a state jurisdiction provision, place of execution, and not “the state which the testator or settlor would probably have desired to be applicable,” controls.

    § 269. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: is in accord with clause (a), but only as such clause applies to this state or another state and not to any foreign country; rejects the provisions of clause (b) to the extent they conflict with such code; and specifically rejects all references in clause (b) to “public policy of the state of the testator’s domicile at death,” as well as to references requiring that a state jurisdiction provision have a “substantial relation to the trust,” the necessary nexus for a state jurisdiction provision being provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-108.

    § 270. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code expressly rejects the concept in clause (a) that a state designated in a state jurisdiction provision need have “a substantial relation to the trust,” the necessary nexus for a state jurisdiction provision being provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-108. Moreover, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code expressly rejects the requirement in clause (a) that application of the law of the state designated in a state jurisdiction provision “not violate a strong public policy of the state with which, as to the matter at issue, the trust has is most significant relationship.” Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code neither the public policy of, nor the relationship of a trust to, another state has any impact on a trust having a state jurisdiction provision. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code rejects dependence in clause (b) on the “local law of the state with which, as to the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant relation-ship,” a trust’s validity in cases covered by § 270(b) being determined by the laws of the jurisdiction where the trust was executed pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-107(c). Finally, no public policy of, nor the relationship of a trust to, any foreign country is relevant under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    § 271. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is generally in accord with clause (a), but would strike from such clause the words “as to matters which can be controlled by the terms of the trust,” all matters of administration being subject to the law of the jurisdiction designated in a state jurisdiction provision under such code. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code rejects clause (b) to the extent such clause provides that, absent a state jurisdiction provision, administration is controlled by any law other than that of the state in which the trust is being principally administered.

    § 272. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is generally in accord with clause (a), but would strike from such clause the words “as to matters which can be controlled by the terms of the trust,” all matters of administration being subject to the law of the jurisdiction designated in a state jurisdiction provision under such code. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code rejects clause (b) to the extent such clause provides that, absent a state jurisdiction provision, administration is controlled by any law other than that of the state in which the trust is being principally administered.

    § 273. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: is generally in accord with clause (a), but only as it applies to this state or another state and not to any foreign country; rejects the provisions of clause (b) to the extent they conflict with such code; and in cases of trusts not containing a state jurisdiction provision providing for such trust’s place of administration, specifically rejects all references in clause (b) to “the local law of the state to which the administration of the trust is most substantially related,” the place of a trust’s administration being provided for in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-108 and 35-15-107(c).

    § 274. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code rejects all references in this section relative to “the strong public policy of the testator’s domicil at death.” Notwithstanding any provisions of § 274, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code confirms that a power of appointment: is not a property interest nor a beneficial interest; is held by the person to whom such power has been given, and not by a settler in that person’s capacity as settler; may not be judicially foreclosed; is not reachable by a creditor or assignee at the trust level; and the fact a beneficiary holds a power of appointment is not indicative or determinative of whether a settlor or beneficiary has dominion and control over a trust. To the extent § 274 of such Restatement is in conflict with the immediately preceding sentence, such § 274 is expressly rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    When a state jurisdiction provision designates that Tennessee law controls, Tennessee obtains jurisdiction over the trust and its law controls the validity, construction and administration of a trust (or any part thereof, as a settlor desires). In the absence of such a state jurisdiction provision, the laws of the jurisdiction where the trust was executed determine its validity and the laws of descent, while the laws of the trust’s principal place of administration determine its administration.

    Additionally, when a state jurisdiction provision designates that Tennessee law controls, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code explicitly provides that no foreign country has any jurisdiction, power or effect over that trust or any disposition under it. Moreover, in such case no foreign country has any power to set the trust or any of its provisions aside, or attempt to do so. Therefore, a foreign country’s failure to recognize trusts, or the fact a trust avoids a foreign country’s laws granting rights to some person relative to property in the trust; such rights being based on a personal relationship to a settlor of, a party to, or beneficiary of, the trust; are irrelevant and are not respected by Tennessee. Any laws of a foreign country relative to forced heirship, legitime, forced share or similar rights are rejected and are unenforceable under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. No judgment of any foreign country will be recognized or enforced by Tennessee to the extent such judgment concerns a trust having a state jurisdiction provision designating the law of Tennessee as controlling.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “subsection” or “subdivision” means such portion of T.C.A. § 35-15-107.

    Subsection (a) defines a state jurisdiction provision and provides that, when such is included in a trust instrument, it controls validity, construction and administration of that trust.

    Subsection (b) provides that when a state jurisdiction provision designates that the law of Tennessee controls:

    Tennessee and its courts have jurisdiction over the trust, even if such trust was created in a foreign jurisdiction.

    The validity, construction and administration of the trust is determined by the laws of Tennessee. Such laws control items including but not limited to: settlor’s capacity; powers and duties of all fiduciaries; appointment and removal of all fiduciaries; the existence, validity and extent of powers conferred on any fiduciary or retained by a settlor.

    No law of a foreign country has any force or effect on the trust, regardless of whether such country does or does not recognize the concept of a trust.

    Tennessee does not in any way recognize any laws of a foreign country granting rights to some person relative to property in the trust; including any rights based on a personal relationship to a settlor of, a party to, or beneficiary of, the trust. Therefore, any laws of a foreign country relative to forced heirship, legitime, forced share or similar rights are rejected and are unenforceable.

    Relative to any realty or immovable property physically in Tennessee and relative to any personal or movable property regardless of the location of such, foreign law has no force or effect on the trust and such property.

    No judgment or other holding of any adjudicative body of a foreign country will be recognized, nor will such be enforced or otherwise be granted relief.

    Should any action be brought against any fiduciary of a trust by any adjudicative body of a foreign country under which action such adjudicative body declines to apply the law of Tennessee to such trust or any provision or interest under such trust, applicable fiduciaries of such trust shall by operation of law immediately cease being such fiduciary and have no further power other than to convey trust property to a successor fiduciary. Such successor fiduciary can be named in the trust instrument, in absence of such will be appointed to office under a statutorily provided mechanism. This provision thwarts a foreign country from obtaining or attempting to obtain jurisdiction over the trust, as well as over any trust property other than immovable property physically present in such foreign country.

    Subsection (c) provides for fallback governing law in the absence of a state jurisdiction provision. Such fallback governing law is clear, concise and concrete. Moreover, it is in no way dependent on the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue. For all these reasons, it provides certainty.

    Regarding the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. According to ULC – NCCUSL, Uniform Trust Code section 107 (made irrelevant by the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code) is consistent with and was partially based on the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, signed on July 1, 1985. Despite such section of the Uniform Trust Code being irrelevant, it is important to note that the United States has not (as of May 2013) ratified such convention. Therefore, such convention has no force and effect on the United States, any state or this state (as such terms are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103). To the extent such convention is in conflict with the Tennessee trust statutes or Tennessee law in general, Tennessee law controls or absence of Tennessee law, the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-106 and the comments thereunder control.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

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35-15-108. Place of administration — Sufficient nexus for a state jurisdiction provision — Transfer of place of administration.

  1. Without limiting or precluding other means for establishing a sufficient connection with a jurisdiction, the terms of a trust designating that jurisdiction's laws in a state jurisdiction provision are valid and controlling if:
    1. A trustee's principal place of business is located in or a trustee is a resident of the designated jurisdiction; or
    2. All or part of the administration occurs in the designated jurisdiction; which such administration, includes but is not limited to:
      1. Maintenance of some trust records physically in the designated jurisdiction; and
      2. Wholly or partly preparing or arranging for the preparation, either on an exclusive or a nonexclusive basis, in the designated jurisdiction of an income tax return that must be filed by the trust; or
    3. Some or all of the trust assets are deposited in the designated jurisdiction or physical evidence of such assets is held in the designated jurisdiction and the trust is being administered by a person defined in subdivision (a)(1). For purposes of this subdivision (a)(3), “deposited in the designated jurisdiction,” includes assets being held in any of a checking account, time deposit, certificate of deposit, brokerage account, trust company fiduciary account, or other similar account or deposit that is located in the designated jurisdiction.
  2. Except as otherwise expressly provided by the terms of a governing instrument specifically addressing the governing law for trust administration or by court order, the laws of this state shall govern the administration of a trust while the trust is administered in this state. Without precluding other means for establishing that a trust is administered in this state, if any of the activities described in subsection (a) occur in this state, the trust is administered in this state.
  3. A trustee is under a continuing duty to administer the trust at a place appropriate to its purposes, its administration, and the interests of the beneficiaries.
  4. Without precluding the right of the court to order, approve, or disapprove a transfer, the trustee, in furtherance of the duty prescribed by subsection (c), may transfer the trust's principal place of administration to another state or to a jurisdiction outside of the United States.
  5. The trustee shall notify the qualified beneficiaries of a proposed transfer of a trust's principal place of administration not less than sixty (60) days before initiating the transfer. The notice of proposed transfer must include:
    1. The name of the jurisdiction to which the principal place of administration is to be transferred;
    2. The address and telephone number at the new location at which the trustee can be contacted;
    3. An explanation of the reasons for the proposed transfer;
    4. The date on which the proposed transfer is anticipated to occur; and
    5. The date, not less than sixty (60) days after the giving of the notice, by which the qualified beneficiary must notify the trustee of an objection to the proposed transfer.
  6. The authority of a trustee under this section to transfer a trust's principal place of administration terminates if a majority of those qualified beneficiaries described in § 35-15-103 notify the trustee of an objection to the proposed transfer on or before the date specified in the notice.
  7. In connection with a transfer of the trust's principal place of administration, the trustee may transfer some or all of the trust property to a successor trustee designated in the terms of the trust or appointed pursuant to § 35-15-704.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 9; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 9, 10.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    The 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code substantially rewrote the previous subsection (a) of this section, leaving the former version inoperative as provided in the enacting and transitional language of Section 55, Pub. Act. 2013, Pub. Ch. 390, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn., 2013). Such amendment also made section 107(a) of the Uniform Trust Code, as well as the comments thereunder, irrelevant to the current T.C.A. § 35-15-108.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows any person having the requisite nexus with a jurisdiction to choose that jurisdiction’s law as controlling over a trust. Such requisite nexus is provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-108(a) and is defined in the broadest and most flexible terms.

    Relative to a state jurisdiction provision, designating the principal place of administration should be distinguished from designating the law to determine the meaning and effect of the trust's terms. A settlor is free in a state jurisdiction provision to designate one jurisdiction as the principal place of administration and another to govern the meaning and effect of the trust's provisions.

    Moreover, to the extent not otherwise provided in a state jurisdiction provision and to the greatest extent possible, T.C.A. § 35-15-108(b) provides that the principal place of administration of a trust is Tennessee if all or part of such administration takes place in Tennessee.

    Locating a trust’s principal place of administration may also be important for other matters, such as payment of state income tax. The fixing of a trust's principal place of administration will also determine where the trustee and beneficiaries have consented to suit under T.C.A. §§ 35-15-107 and 35-15-202, as well as the rules for locating venue under T.C.A. § 35-15-204.

    Notwithstanding the above, the remainder of T.C.A. § 35-15-108 provides that a trustee has a continuing duty to administer the trust in a jurisdiction that is appropriate. Moreover, such section provides a relatively simple procedure by which the trustee (or appropriate fiduciary) of a trust may transfer its principal place of administration to another jurisdiction within or without the United States. Use of this procedure is more readily available under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code than under the Uniform Trust Code. Under the latter, the power to so transfer can be blocked by the objection of a single qualified beneficiary. On the contrary, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code requires that a majority of the qualified beneficiaries object to such transfer or it will proceed.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “subsection” or “subdivision” means such portion of T.C.A. § 35-15-108.

    Subsection (a) provides a non-exclusive list of factors containing the requisite nexus with a jurisdiction to choose that jurisdiction’s law as controlling over a trust. Having chosen such jurisdiction, a settlor can then designate that juris-diction law control law by including a state jurisdiction provision in a trust per T.C.A. § 35-15-107.

    Subsection (b) provides that unless expressly specified otherwise in a trust instrument or by court order, Tennessee law governs the administration of a trust while such trust is administered in this state. Without precluding other means to establish that a trust is being administered in this state, the occurrence in Tennessee of any of the factors listed in subsection (a) causes the trust to be administered in Tennessee.

    Subsection (c) provides that a trustee is under a continuing duty to administer the trust at a place appropriate to its purposes, its administration, and the interests of the beneficiaries. “Interests of the beneficiaries,” defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103, means the beneficial interests provided in the terms of the trust. Ordinarily, absent a substantial change or circumstances, the trustee may assume that the original place of administration is also the appropriate place of administration. The duty to administer the trust at an appropriate place may also dictate that the trustee not move the trust.

    Subsections (d)-(g) provide a procedure for changing the principal place of administration to another state or country. Such changes are often beneficial. A change may be desirable for any number of reasons, the following of which is a non-exhaustive list: to secure a lower state income tax rate; to obtain more favorable creditor protection; to extend any applicable rule against perpetuities; to avoid any prohibition on trust accumulations; to obtain or maintain the traditional common law distinction among mandatory, support and discretionary interests and trusts; to avoid any laws granting rights to some person relative to property in the trust; such rights being based on a personal relationship to a settlor of, a party to, or beneficiary of, the trust (e.g., forced heirship); because of relocation of the trustee or beneficiaries; the appointment of a new trustee; or a change in the location of the trust investments. The procedure for transfer specified in this section applies only in the absence of a contrary provision in the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. To facilitate transfer in the typical case, where there is general concurrence that a transfer is either desirable or is at least not harmful, a transfer can be accomplished without court approval unless a majority of qualified beneficiary objects. To allow the qualified beneficiaries described in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 sufficient time to review a proposed transfer, the trustee must give such qualified beneficiaries at least 60 days prior notice of the transfer. Notice must be given not only to qualified beneficiaries as defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 but also to those granted the rights of qualified beneficiaries under T.C.A. § 35-15-110. To assure that those receiving notice have sufficient information upon which to make a decision, minimum contents of the notice are specified. If a majority of the qualified beneficiary described in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 objects, a trustee wishing to proceed with the transfer must seek court approval.

    In connection with a transfer of the principal place of administration, the trustee may transfer some or all of the trust property to a new trustee located outside of this state. The appointment of a new trustee may also be essential if the current trustee is ineligible to administer the trust in the new jurisdiction. Subsection (g) clarifies that the appointment of the new trustee must comply with the provisions on appointment of successor trustees as provided in the terms of the trust or under T.C.A. § 35-15-704. Absent an order of succession in the terms of the trust, T.C.A. § 35-15-704 contains separate procedures for appointment of a successor trustee of a noncharitable trust and for appointment of a successor trustee of a charitable trust.

    While transfer of the principal place of administration will normally change the governing law with respect to administrative matters, a transfer does not normally alter the controlling law with respect to the validity of the trust and the construction of its dispositive provisions. See  5A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 615 (4th ed. 1989) as well as 7 A. W. Scott, W. F. Fratcher & M. L. Ascher, Scott and Ascher on Trusts  § 45.5.3.2 (5th ed. 2010).

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-109. Methods and waiver of notice.

  1. Notice to a person under this chapter or the sending of a document to a person under this chapter must be accomplished in a manner reasonably suitable under the circumstances and likely to result in receipt of the notice or document. Permissible methods of notice or for sending a document include first-class mail, personal delivery, delivery to the person's last known place of residence or place of business, or a properly directed electronic message.
  2. Notice otherwise required under this chapter or a document otherwise required to be sent under this chapter need not be provided to a person whose identity or location is unknown to and not reasonably ascertainable by the trustee.
  3. Notice under this chapter or the sending of a document under this chapter may be waived by the person to be notified or sent the document.
  4. Notice of a judicial proceeding must be given as provided in the applicable rules of civil procedure.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 10.

35-15-110. Others treated as qualified beneficiaries.

  1. A charitable organization expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of a charitable trust has the rights of a qualified beneficiary under this chapter, if the charitable organization, on the date the charitable organization's qualification is being determined, would be a qualified beneficiary under this chapter if such charitable organization were an individual beneficiary.
  2. The attorney general and reporter has the rights of a qualified beneficiary with respect to a charitable trust having its principal place of administration in this state if all of the interests in the trust that are for a charitable purpose, in the aggregate, on the date the attorney general and reporter's qualification is being determined, would cause an individual beneficiary to be a qualified beneficiary under this chapter if all of such interests were for the benefit of an individual beneficiary instead of for charitable purposes.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 11; 2007, ch. 24, § 6; 2019, ch. 340, § 8.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote the section which read: “(a)  A charitable organization expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of a charitable trust has the rights of a qualified beneficiary under this chapter, if the charitable organization, on the date the charitable organization's qualification is being determined:“(1)  Is a distributee or a permissible distributee of trust income or principal;“(2)  Would be a distributee or a permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the interests of other distributees or permissible distributees then receiving or eligible to receive distributions terminated on that date without causing the trust to terminate; or“(3)  Would be a distributee or a permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that date.“(b)  The attorney general and reporter of this state has the rights of a qualified beneficiary with respect to a charitable trust having its principal place of administration in this state.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Intervention.

Where charitable gifts of 101 pieces of art were given to a university subject to a restriction that the pieces could not be sold, the university filed an ex parte declaratory judgment action seeking permission to sell two valuable pieces of the collection. The Attorney General and Reporter of Tennessee sought to intervene to represent the interests of the charitable beneficiaries, the potential charitable beneficiaries, and the people of Tennessee pursuant to the Charitable Beneficiaries Act of 1997, T.C.A. § 35-13-110, and the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-110; the Attorney General's initial motion to intervene was denied. Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009), appeal denied, Ga. O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).

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Section Comment.

The definition of “beneficiary” includes only those who hold beneficial interests in the trust. Because a charitable trust is not created to benefit ascertainable beneficiaries but to benefit the community at large (See  T.C.A. § 35-15-405(a)), persons receiving distributions from a charitable trust are not beneficiaries as that term is defined in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

However, certain persons do have an interest in seeing that a charitable trust is enforced. Under T.C.A. § 35-15-110, such persons include this state’s attorney general and certain charitable organizations expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of the trust.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “subsection” or “subdivision” means such portion of T.C.A. § 35-15-110.

Under subsection (a), charitable organizations expressly designated in the terms of the trust to receive distributions and that would qualify as a qualified beneficiary were the trust noncharitable are granted the rights of qualified beneficiaries under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code despite not being beneficiaries under T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Because the charitable organization must be expressly named in the terms of the trust and must be designated to receive distributions, excluded are organizations that might receive distributions in the trustee’s discretion even though not expressly mentioned in the trust’s terms. Requiring that the organization have an interest similar to that of a beneficiary of a private trust also denies the rights of a qualified beneficiary to organizations holding more remote interests. Finally, requiring that only such charitable organizations that would qualify as a qualified beneficiary were the trust noncharitable are granted the rights of qualified beneficiaries also precludes such organizations from being qualified beneficiaries if they an ultimate beneficiary or potential ultimate beneficiary. For further discussion of the definition of “qualified beneficiary” and “ultimate beneficiary” see § 35-15-103.

This section does not limit other means by which the attorney general or other designated official can enforce a charitable trust.

35-15-111. Nonjudicial settlement agreements.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the trustee and the qualified beneficiaries may enter into a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement with respect to any matter involving a trust.
  2. A nonjudicial settlement agreement is valid only to the extent it does not violate a material purpose of the trust and includes terms and conditions that could be properly approved by the court under this chapter or other applicable law.
  3. Matters that may be resolved by a nonjudicial settlement agreement include, but are not limited to:
    1. The interpretation or construction of the terms of the trust;
    2. The approval of a trustee's report or accounting;
    3. Direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a particular act or the grant to a trustee of any necessary or desirable power;
    4. The resignation or appointment of a trustee and the determination of a trustee's compensation;
    5. Transfer of a trust's principal place of administration;
    6. Liability of a trustee for an action relating to the trust;
    7. The extent or waiver of bond of a trustee;
    8. The governing law of the trust; and
    9. The criteria for distribution to a beneficiary where the trustee is given discretion.
  4. Any qualified beneficiary or trustee may request the court to approve a nonjudicial settlement agreement, to determine whether the representation as provided in part 3 of this chapter was adequate, and to determine whether the agreement contains terms and conditions the court could have properly approved.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 12; 2007, ch. 24, §§ 7-9.

Law Reviews.

Where There's a Will: The Report of My Practice's Death Was an Exaggeration: The Healthy Prognosis for Estate Planning in Tennessee (Eddy R. Smith), 48 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2012).

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Section Comment.

While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code recognizes that a court may intervene in the administration of a trust to the extent its jurisdiction is invoked by interested persons or otherwise provided by law See  T.C.A. § 35-15-201), resolution of disputes by nonjudicial means is encouraged. This section facilitates the making of such agreements by giving them the same effect as if approved by the court. To achieve such certainty, however, subsection (b) requires that the nonjudicial settlement must contain terms and conditions that a court could properly approve. Under this section, a nonjudicial settlement cannot be used to produce a result not authorized by law, such as to terminate a trust in an impermissible manner.

Trusts ordinarily have beneficiaries who are minors, incapacitated, unborn or unascertained. Because such beneficiaries cannot signify their consent to an agreement, binding settlements can ordinarily be achieved only through the application of doctrines such as virtual representation or appointment of a guardian ad litem, doctrines traditionally available only in the case of judicial settlements. The effect of this section and the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code more generally is to allow for such binding representation even if the agreement is not submitted for approval to a court. For the rules on representation, including appointments of representatives by the court to approve particular settlements, see title 35, part 3.

Under the Uniform Trust Code, all “interested persons” (as defined in section 111(a) thereof) were required to enter into a nonjudicial settlement in order for it to be binding.

Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code “the trustee and qualified beneficiaries” are the parties necessary to enter into and conclude a nonjudicial settlement agreement. Qualified beneficiary is defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires the agreement of trustee and qualified beneficiaries to effectuate a nonjudicial settlement agreement in order to avoid the required involvement of potential (or even unborn) beneficiaries whose interests are remote and who previously may have required the appointment of a representative by the court or otherwise obtaining representation virtually, thus limiting the objectives of having, as well as the access to, a nonjudicial settlement agreement process.

Though broader then the similar list in the Uniform Trust Code, the items enumerated in T.C.A. § 35-15-111(c) regarding matters to which a nonjudicial settlement may pertain are still nonexclusive. Other matters which may be made the subject of a nonjudicial settlement are discussed in the General Comment to part 3 contained at T.C.A. § 35-15-301. The fact that the trustee and beneficiaries may resolve a matter nonjudicially does not mean that beneficiary approval is required. For example, a trustee may resign pursuant to section T.C.A. § 35-15-705 solely by giving notice to the qualified beneficiaries, a living settlor, and any cotrustees. But a nonjudicial settlement between the trustee and beneficiaries will frequently prove helpful in working out the terms of the resignation.

35-15-112. Rules of construction.

The rules of construction that apply in this state to the interpretation of and disposition of property by will also apply as appropriate to the interpretation of the terms of a trust and the disposition of the trust property.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 13.

Law Reviews.

Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1931 (2014).

Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: New Formulation for a Trusty Tool (Marshall H. Peterson), 41 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2005).

The Revocation-Upon-Divorce Doctrine: Tennessee's Need to Adopt the Broader Uniform Probate Code Approach (Hailey H. David), 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 383 (2009).

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-110.

This section is patterned after Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25(2) and comment e (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996). Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, unlike the Restatement, the section fully and generally applies to irrevocable, as well as revocable, trusts unless specifically provided otherwise herein. Moreover, a general reference to the nature, use or purpose of either such type of trust does not imply inapplicability of this section to the other of such types of trusts.

The revocable trust is used primarily as a will substitute, with its key provision being the determination of the per-sons to receive the trust property upon the settlor’s death. Given this functional equivalence between the revocable trust and a will, the rules for interpreting the disposition of property at death should be the same whether the individual has chosen a will or revocable trust as the individual’s primary estate planning instrument. Over the years, the legislatures of the states and the courts have developed a series of rules of construction reflecting the legislative or judicial understanding of how the average testator would wish to dispose of property in cases where the will is silent or insufficiently clear. Few legislatures have yet to extend these rules of construction to revocable trusts, and even fewer to irrevocable trusts, although a number of courts have done so as a matter of judicial construction. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 , Reporter's Notes to cmt. d and e (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996).

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not attempt to prescribe the exact rules to be applied to trusts but instead adopts the philosophy that the rules applicable to trusts generally should be the same as the rules applicable to wills, whatever those rules might be.

Rules of construction are not the same as constructional preferences. A constructional preference is general in nature, providing general guidance for resolving a wide variety of ambiguities. An example is a preference for a construction that results in a complete disposition and avoid illegality. Rules of construction, on the other hand, are specific in nature, providing guidance for resolving specific situations or construing specific terms. Unlike a constructional preference, a rule of construction, when applicable, can lead to only one result. See  Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 11.3 and cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995).

Rules of construction attribute intention to individual donors based on assumptions of common intention. Rules of construction are found both in enacted statutes and in judicial decisions. Rules of construction can involve the meaning to be given to particular language in the document, such as the meaning to be given to “heirs” or “issue.” Rules of construction also address situations the donor failed to anticipate. These include but are not limited to the following:

The required time period for surviving the settlor provided for in T.C.A. Section 31-3-120;

The failure to anticipate the predecease of a beneficiary;

The failure to specify the source from which expenses are to be paid.

Rules of construction can also concern assumptions as to how a donor would have revised donative documents in light of certain events occurring after execution. These include but are not limited to the following:

Rules dealing with whether a specific devisee will receive a substitute gift if the subject matter of the devise is disposed of during the settlor’s lifetime; and

The provisions of T.C.A. § 32-1-202 prescribing the effect of a divorce on bequests made to a former spouse pursuant to a trust executed during the marriage to such spouse. However, such provisions of such section will only apply to a trust with respect to which the settlor retained a power of revocation, a power to revest all the assets of the trust in such settlor or a power to change the beneficiaries of the trust.

Part 2
Judicial Proceedings

35-15-201. Role of court in administration of trust.

  1. The court may intervene in the administration of a trust to the extent its jurisdiction is invoked by an interested person or as provided by law.
  2. A trust is not subject to continuing judicial supervision unless ordered by the court.
  3. A judicial proceeding involving a trust may relate to any matter involving the trust's administration, including a request for instructions and an action to declare rights.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 14.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, § 17.

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General Comment.

This part, this general comment thereto and the other section comments under such part are subject to any rules or restrictions on jurisdiction or venue provided for directly or indirectly in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-107 and 35-15-108, together with the comments to the latter two such sections. Such latter two sections and their comments are controlling. This includes, but is not limited to, the preclusion of any adjudicative body of a foreign country obtaining jurisdiction or venue of a trust, any of its fiduciaries or any of its trustees when such trust contains a state jurisdiction provision designating the law of a jurisdiction other than such foreign country.

This part addresses selected issues involving judicial proceedings concerning trusts, particularly trusts with contacts in more than one state or country. This part is not intended to provide comprehensive coverage of court jurisdiction or procedure with respect to trusts. These issues are better addressed elsewhere, for example in the state's rules of civil procedure or as provided by court rule.

T.C.A. § 35-15-201 makes clear that the jurisdiction of the court is available as invoked by interested persons or as otherwise provided by law. Proceedings involving the administration of a trust normally will be brought in the court at the trust’s principal place of administration. T.C.A. § 35-15-202 provides that the trustee and beneficiaries are deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the court at the principal place of administration as to any matter relating to the trust. T.C.A. §§ 35-15-203 and 35-15-204 contain provisions relating to subject matter jurisdiction and venue.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-201.

While the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code encourages the resolution of disputes without resort to the courts by providing such options as the nonjudicial settlement authorized by section T.C.A. § 35-15-111, the court is always available to the extent its jurisdiction is invoked by interested persons. The jurisdiction of the court with respect to trust matters is inherent and historical and also includes the ability to act on its own initiative, to appoint a special master to investigate the facts of a case, and to provide a trustee with instructions even in the absence of an actual dispute.

Contrary to the trust statutes in some states, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not create a system of routine or mandatory court supervision. While subsection (b) authorizes a court to direct that a particular trust be subject to continuing court supervision, the court's intervention will normally be confined to the particular matter brought before it.

Subsection (c) makes clear that the court’s jurisdiction may be invoked even absent an actual dispute. Traditionally, courts in equity have heard petitions for instructions and have issued declaratory judgments if there is a reasonable doubt as to the extent of the trustee’s powers or duties. The court will not ordinarily instruct trustees on how to exercise discretion, however. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 187 , 259 (1959). Moreover, in furtherance of the rule of Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959), T.C.A. § 35-15-814 provides that the court may only exercise jurisdiction in limited circumstances to review a trustee’s discretion or force a distribution. Other than as specifically provided otherwise in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, this section does not limit the court’s equity jurisdiction. Beyond mentioning petitions for instructions and actions to declare rights, subsection (c) does not attempt to list the types of judicial proceedings involving trust administration that might be brought by a trustee or beneficiary.

According to ULC – NCCUSL, such an effort is made in California Probate Code § 17200 . Further according to ULC – NCCUSL, excluding matters not germane to the Uniform Trust Code, the California statute lists the following as items relating to the “internal affairs” of a trust: determining questions of construction; determining the existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, privilege, duty, or right; determining the validity of a trust provision; ascertaining beneficiaries and determining to whom property will pass upon final or partial termination of the trust; settling accounts and passing upon the acts of a trustee, including the exercise of discretionary powers (such jurisdiction being limited by T.C.A. § 35-15-814); instructing the trustee; compelling the trustee to report information about the trust or account to the beneficiary; granting powers to the trustee; fixing or allowing payment of the trustee’s compensation or reviewing the reasonableness of the compensation; appointing or removing a trustee; accepting the resignation of a trustee; compelling redress of a breach of trust by any available remedy; approving or directing the modification or termination of a trust; approving or directing the combination or division of trusts; and authorizing or directing transfer of a trust or trust property to or from another jurisdiction. In light of this paragraph being other law as such is defined in the comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-101, such is not controlling to the extent it is in conflict with the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee trust statutes or Tennessee law in general.

35-15-202. Jurisdiction over trustee and beneficiary.

  1. By accepting the trusteeship of a trust having its principal place of administration in this state or by moving the principal place of administration to this state, the trustee submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state regarding any matter involving the trust.
  2. With respect to their interests in the trust, the beneficiaries of a trust having its principal place of administration in this state are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state regarding any matter involving the trust. By accepting a distribution from such a trust, the recipient submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state regarding any matter involving the trust.
  3. This section does not preclude other methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a trustee, beneficiary, or other person receiving property from the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 15.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, § 17.

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Section Comment.

T.C.A. § 35-15-202 and these comments thereto are subject to any rules or restrictions on jurisdiction provided for directly or indirectly in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-107 and 35-15-108, together with the comments to the latter two such sections. Such latter two sections and their comments are controlling. This includes, but is not limited to, the preclusion of any adjudicative body of a foreign country obtaining jurisdiction of a trust, any of its fiduciaries or any of its trustees when such trust contains a state jurisdiction provision designating the law of a jurisdiction other than such foreign country.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-202.

This section clarifies that the courts of the principal place of administration have jurisdiction to enter orders relating to the trust that will be binding on both the trustee and beneficiaries. Consent to jurisdiction does not dispense with any required notice, however. With respect to jurisdiction over a beneficiary, the Comment to Uniform Probate Code § 7-103, upon which portions of this section are based, is instructive:

It also seems reasonable to require beneficiaries to go to the seat of the trust when litigation has been instituted there concerning a trust in which they claim beneficial interests, much as the rights of shareholders of a corporation can be determined at a corporate seat. The settlor has indicated a principal place of administration by its selection of a trustee or otherwise, and it is reasonable to subject rights under the trust to the jurisdiction of the Court where the trust is properly administered.

The jurisdiction conferred over the trustee and beneficiaries by this section does not preclude jurisdiction by courts elsewhere on some other basis. Furthermore, the fact that the courts in a new state acquire jurisdiction under this section following a change in a trust’s principal place of administration does not necessarily mean that the courts of the former principal place of administration lose jurisdiction, particularly as to matters involving events occurring prior to the transfer.

The jurisdiction conferred by this section is limited. Pursuant to subsection (b), until a distribution is made, jurisdiction over a beneficiary is limited to the beneficiary’s beneficial interests in the trust. Personal jurisdiction over a beneficiary is conferred only upon the making of a distribution. Subsection (b) also gives the court jurisdiction over other recipients of distributions. This would include individuals who receive distributions in the mistaken belief they are beneficiaries.

For a discussion of jurisdictional issues concerning trusts, see 5A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts §§ 556-573 (4th ed. 1989).

35-15-203. Subject matter jurisdiction.

Chancery courts and other courts of record having probate jurisdiction:

  1. To the exclusion of all other courts, have concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings in this state brought by a trustee or beneficiary concerning the administration of a trust; and
  2. Have concurrent jurisdiction with other courts of record in this state over other proceedings involving a trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 16; 2012, ch. 886, § 10.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2012, ch. 886, § 13 provided that § 10 of the act, which amended this section, shall apply to any proceeding occurring on or after July 1, 2004, because the section clarifies existing law as enacted by chapter 537, § 16 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 2004.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, § 17.

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Section Comment.

This section provides a means for distinguishing the jurisdiction of the court having primary jurisdiction for trust matters from other courts in this state that may on occasion resolve disputes concerning trusts. For an explanation of types of proceedings which may be brought concerning the administration of a trust, see the Section Comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-201.

35-15-204. Venue.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), venue for a judicial proceeding involving a trust is in the county of this state in which the trust's principal place of administration is or will be located and, if the trust is created by will and the estate is not yet closed, in the county in which the decedent's estate is being administered.
  2. If a trust has no trustee, venue for a judicial proceeding for the appointment of a trustee is in a county of this state in which a beneficiary resides, in a county in which any trust property is located, and if the trust is created by will, in the county in which the decedent's estate was or is being administered.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Continuous Jurisdiction.

While the trustees'  transfer of the situs of a trust from Tennessee to Mississippi in 1999 was invalid because the trustees did not obtain court approval as required by former T.C.A. § 35-1-122 (repealed), and under T.C.A. § 35-15-204(a), the state of Tennessee retained jurisdiction over the trust without interruption, the ruling that the ineffective transfer resulted in voiding all transactions after the attempted transfer was inappropriate. State Ex Rel. Tommye Maddox Working, 216 S.W.3d 758, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006), appeal denied,  State ex rel. Working v. Costa, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1151 (Tenn. 2006).

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Section Comment.

T.C.A. § 35-15-204 and these comments thereto are subject to any rules or restrictions on venue provided for directly or indirectly in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-107 and 35-15-108, together with the comments to the latter two such sections. Such latter two sections and their comments are controlling. This includes, but is not limited to, the preclusion of any adjudicative body of a foreign country obtaining venue of a trust, any of its fiduciaries or any of its trustees when such trust contains a state jurisdiction provision designating the law of a jurisdiction other than such foreign country.

General rules governing venue continue to apply in cases not covered by this section. This includes most proceedings where jurisdiction over a trust, trust property, or parties to a trust is based on a factor other than the validity, construction or administration of a trust. The general rules governing venue also apply when the principal place of administration of a trust is in another locale, but jurisdiction is proper in this state.

35-15-205. Petition for final accounting upon resignation or removal of trustee or termination of trust.

  1. If the trustee resigns, is removed, or upon the full or partial termination of the trust, a qualified beneficiary or successor trustee may petition the court to require the trustee transferring or distributing the trust to appear before the court for a final accounting. However, a successor trustee shall not have any obligation to petition the court to require the final accounting. The trustee transferring or distributing the trust may also petition the court to approve a final accounting relieving the trustee from liability for the period of its administration. The final accounting period shall begin from the latest of:
    1. The date of acceptance of the trusteeship by the trustee; or
    2. The end of the period since an accounting was last approved by the court.
  2. The petition shall set forth:
    1. The name and address of the trustee;
    2. The qualified beneficiaries of the trust; and
    3. The period that the accounting covers.
  3. The petition shall be served on each qualified beneficiary or their representative under part 3 of this chapter to the extent there is no material conflict of interest or on the trustee.
  4. Upon review of the trustee's final accounting and after considering any objections thereto and any evidence presented, the court may approve the final accounting or enter judgment granting appropriate relief. If no objection to the petition is filed within the time allowed by law after service, or if the parties consent, the petition may be approved without notice, hearing, or further proceedings. The final judgment of the court shall be binding on all parties.
  5. Upon approval of the petition, the trustee shall be relieved from liability for the period covered by the final accounting.
  6. Costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees of the trustee, shall be taxed against the trust, unless otherwise directed by the court.

Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 9.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

Part 3
Representation

35-15-301. Representation — Basic effect.

  1. Notice to a person who may represent and bind another person under this chapter has the same effect as if notice were given directly to the other person.
  2. The consent of a person who may represent and bind another person under this chapter is binding on the person represented unless the person represented objects to the representation before the consent would otherwise have become effective.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in §§ 35-15-411 and 35-15-602, a person who under this chapter may represent a settlor who lacks capacity may receive notice and give a binding consent on the settlor's behalf.
  4. A settlor may not represent and bind a beneficiary under this chapter with respect to the termination or modification of a trust under § 35-15-411(a).

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 18; 2007, ch. 24, § 10.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: New Formulation for a Trusty Tool (Marshall H. Peterson), 41 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2005).

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General Comment.

The provisions of this part in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this part is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Representation under this part is allowed except to the extent there is a material  conflict of interest with respect to the particular matter or dispute. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverges from the Uniform Trust Code in that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires that there be no material conflict of interest (as opposed to requiring no conflict of interest) between the one representing and one represented. Therefore, it is not necessary that no conflict, whatsoever, exist in order to avail oneself of representation, only that no material conflict exist. This divergence from the Uniform Trust Code makes representation and virtual representation available in far more cases under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, thereby adding flexibility.

This part deals with representation of beneficiaries, both representation by fiduciaries (personal representatives, trustees, guardians, and conservators) and in some cases by their ancestors, as well as what is known as virtual representation. Representation is a topic not adequately addressed under the trust law of most states. Representation is addressed in the Restatement (First) of Property §§ 180 -186 (1936), but the coverage of this part is more complete. Notwithstanding, the preceding reference to such restatement, in light of the divergence of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in this area, to the extent the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is contra to such restatement, such restatement is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

T.C.A. § 35-15-301 is the introductory section, laying out the scope of the part. The representation principles of this part have numerous applications under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Such representation principles of this part apply in numerous circumstances, including but not limited to: for purposes of settlement of disputes, whether by a court or nonjudicially; for the giving of required notices; and for the giving of consents to certain actions.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-30235-15-305 cover the different types of representation. T.C.A. § 35-15-302 deals with representation by the holder of a general testamentary power of appointment. (Revocable trusts and presently exercisable general powers of appointment are covered by T.C.A. § 35-15-603, which grant the settlor or holder of the power all rights of the beneficiaries or persons whose interests are subject to the power). T.C.A. § 35-15-303 deals with representation by a fiduciary, whether of an estate, trust, conservatorship, or guardianship. The section also allows a person without a material conflict of interest to represent and bind a minor or unborn descendant. T.C.A. § 35-15-303 grants broader powers of representation than does Uniform Trust Code section 303, as follows:

Under the Uniform Trust Code, only a “parent” (as opposed to a “person”) can represent only that parent’s minor or unborn “child” (as opposed to that person’s minor or unborn “descendant”).

T.C.A. § 35-15-303 (unlike the Uniform Trust Code) also allows a settlor or the beneficiaries to designate a person to represent such beneficiaries.

T.C.A. § 35-15-304 is the virtual representation provision. It provides for representation of and the giving of a binding consent by another person having a substantially identical interest with respect to the particular issue. T.C.A. § 35-15-305 authorizes the court to appoint a representative to represent the interests of unrepresented persons or persons for whom the court concludes the other available representation might be inadequate.

The provisions of this part are subject to modification in the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. Settlors are free to specify their own methods for providing substituted notice and obtaining substituted consent. Moreover, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s robust provisions for trust advisors and trust protectors further the methods for providing such notice and obtaining such consent.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-301.

This section is general and introductory, laying out the scope of the part.

Subsection (a) validates substitute notice to a person who may represent and bind another person as provided in the succeeding sections of this part. Notice to the substitute has the same effect as if given directly to the other person. Subsection (a) does not apply to notice of a judicial proceeding. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-109, notice of a judicial proceeding must be given as provided in the applicable rules of civil procedure, which may require that notice not only be given to the representative but also to the person represented. Subsection (a) may be used to facilitate the giving of notice to the requisite beneficiaries in many circumstances, including but not limited to: of a proposed transfer of principal place of administration under T.C.A. § 35-15-108; of a proposed trust combination or division under T.C.A. § 35-15-417; of a temporary assumption of duties without accepting trusteeship directly by a trustee, or the same by a trust advisor or trust protector indirectly, under T.C.A. § 35-15-701; of a trustee’s resignation directly, or the same by a trust advisor or trust protector indirectly,  under T.C.A. § 35-15-705; and of a trustee’s report under T.C.A. § 35-15-813.

Subsection (b) deals with the effect of a consent, whether by actual or virtual representation. Subsection (b) may be used to facilitate consent of the requisite beneficiaries in many circumstances, including but not limited to: to modification or termination of a trust under T.C.A. § 35-15-411;  agreement of the requisite beneficiaries on appointment of a successor trustee of a noncharitable trust T.C.A. § 35-15-704 (or of a trust advisor or trust protector under T.C.A. § 35-15-713); and a beneficiary’s consent to or release or affirmance of the actions of a trustee T.C.A. § 35-15-1009. A consent by a representative bars a later objection by the person represented, but a consent is not binding if the person represented raises an objection prior to the date the consent would otherwise become effective. The possibility that a beneficiary might object to a consent given on the beneficiary’s behalf will not be germane in many cases because the person represented will be unborn or unascertained. However, the representation principles of this part will sometimes apply to adult and competent beneficiaries. For example, while the trustee of a revocable trust entitled to a pourover devise has authority under T.C.A. § 35-15-303 to approve the personal representative’s account on behalf of the trust beneficiaries, such consent would not be binding on a trust beneficiary who registers an objection.

Subsection (c) implements the policy of T.C.A. §§ 35-15-411 and 35-15-602 requiring express authority in the power of attorney or approval of court before the settlor’s agent, conservator or guardian may consent on behalf of the settlor to the termination or revocation of the settlor’s revocable trust.

Subsection (d) is a tax-savings provision. Because of the ability of a settlor under T.C.A. § 35-15-301 to represent and bind a beneficiary with respect to a termination or modification of an irrevocable trust, T.C.A. § 35-15-411(a) might result in inclusion of the trust in the settlor’s gross estate. Subsection (d) eliminates the possibility of such representation.

35-15-302. Representation by holder of power of appointment — “General power of appointment” defined.

    1. To the extent there is no material conflict of interest between the holder of a power of appointment and the persons represented with respect to the particular question or dispute, the holder may represent and bind persons whose interests, as permissible appointees, takers in default, or otherwise, are subject to the power. Notwithstanding this section to the contrary, the holder of any general power of appointment may, regardless of whether there is a material conflict of interest between the holder of such general power of appointment and the persons represented with respect to the particular question or dispute, represent and bind persons whose interests, as permissible appointees, takers in default, or otherwise, are subject to such power.
    2. As used in this section, “general power of appointment” means a power, regardless of when exercisable, to appoint in favor of any one (1) or more of the following: such power holder, such power holder's creditors, such power holder's estate, and the creditors of the estate of such power holder.
  1. Notwithstanding subsection (a) to the contrary, if the holder, under the terms of the governing instrument, may only exercise such general power of appointment with the consent of another person, then the written consent of such other person is required in order for the holder of the general power of appointment to represent and bind persons whose interests, as permissible appointees, takers in default, or otherwise, are subject to the power.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 19; 2010, ch. 725, § 3; 2012, ch. 886, § 11; 2019, ch. 340, § 13.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the second sentence in (a)(1), and added (a)(2) and (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-302.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Representation under this section is allowed except to the extent there is a material  conflict of interest with respect to the particular matter or dispute. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverges from the Uniform Trust Code in that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires that there be no material conflict of interest (as opposed to requiring no conflict of interest) between the one representing and one represented. Therefore, it is not necessary that no conflict, whatsoever, exist in order to avail oneself of representation, only that no material conflict exist. This divergence from the Uniform Trust Code makes representation and virtual representation available in far more cases under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, thereby adding flexibility.

This section specifies the circumstances under which a holder of a general testamentary power of appointment may receive notices on behalf of and otherwise represent and bind persons whose interests are subject to the power, whether as permissible appointees, takers in default, or otherwise.

Typically, the holder of a general testamentary power of appointment is also a life income beneficiary of the trust, oftentimes of a trust intended to qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) [26 U.S.C. 2056 (b)(5)]. Without the exception for material conflict of interest, the holder of the power could act in a way that could enhance the holder’s income interests to the detriment of the appointees or takers in default, whoever they may be (taking such action would likely rise to the level of the creation of a conflict of interest that was material).

In determining whether the representative has a material conflict with the person sought to be represented, the following may be indicia of such conflict:

The action to be approved may cause the trustee or co-trustee to operate the trust in a manner that would generally be considered imprudent;

The action to be approved if submitted to a court would generally not be approved; and

The action to be approved if subject to review by a court appointed guardian ad litem, would not generally be recommended for approval;

All of the above to be determined under T.C.A. § 35-15-105, which diverges significantly from the Uniform Trust Code.

If any of these or other indicia of a material conflict exists, the representative seeking to exercise a representative position has the burden to demonstrate that notwithstanding the indicia of a material conflict, the proposed action is in the best interest of the represented beneficiary.

35-15-303. Representation by fiduciaries and parents.

To the extent there is no material conflict of interest between the representative and the person represented or among those being represented with respect to a particular question or dispute:

  1. A conservator may represent and bind the estate that the conservator controls;
  2. A guardian may represent and bind the ward if a conservator of the ward's estate has not been appointed;
  3. An agent having authority to act with respect to the particular question or dispute may represent and bind the principal;
  4. A trustee may represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust;
  5. A personal representative of a decedent's estate may represent and bind persons interested in the estate;
  6. A person may represent and bind the person's minor or unborn descendant if a guardian for the descendant has not been appointed;
  7. A person designated by the settlor in the trust instrument or in a writing delivered to the trustee to represent the beneficiaries of the trust may represent and bind such beneficiaries; and
  8. A person designated by the beneficiaries of the trust to represent them may represent and bind such beneficiaries.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 20; 2007, ch. 24, §§ 11, 12; 2010, ch. 725, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Agents in Secrecy: The Use of Information Surrogates in Trust Administration (Lauren Z. Curry), 64 Vand. L. Rev. 925 (2011).

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-303.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Representation under this section is allowed except to the extent there is a material  conflict of interest with respect to the particular matter or dispute. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverges from the Uniform Trust Code in that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires that there be no material conflict of interest (as opposed to requiring no conflict of interest) between the one representing and one represented. Therefore, it is not necessary that no conflict, whatsoever, exist in order to avail oneself of representation, only that no material conflict exist. This divergence from the Uniform Trust Code makes representation and virtual representation available in far more cases under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, thereby adding flexibility.

This section allows for representation of persons by their fiduciaries (conservators, guardians, agents, trustees, and personal representatives), a principle that has long been part of the law. Subdivision (6) allows a person to represent his or her descendant. This includes the person’s child, as under the Uniform Trust Code, but unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code extends this ability to the representation of other descendants as well. Note that this section is not limited to representation of beneficiaries. It also applies to representation of the settlor. Representation is not available if the fiduciary or parent is in a material conflict position with respect to the particular matter or dispute, however. A typical material conflict could exist in cases where the fiduciary or parent seeking to represent the beneficiary is either the trustee or holds an adverse beneficial interest.

Subdivision (2) authorizes a guardian to bind and represent a ward if a conservator of the ward’s estate has not been appointed. Granting a guardian authority to represent the ward with respect to interests in the trust can avoid the need to seek appointment of a conservator. This grant of authority to act with respect to the ward’s trust interest may broaden the authority of a guardian. Under the Tennessee law, a “conservator” is appointed by the court to manage the ward’s property and to make decisions with respect to a ward’s personal affairs. The reference to a “guardian” was left in the statute because Tennessee does have provisions for the appointment of Veterans guardians which guardians speak for adult wards.

Subdivision (3) authorizes an agent to represent a principal only to the extent the agent has authority to act with respect to the particular question or dispute. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-602, an agent may represent a settlor with respect to the amendment, revocation or termination of a revocable trust only to the extent this authority is expressly granted either in the trust or the power. Otherwise, depending on the particular question or dispute, a general grant of authority in the power may be sufficient to confer the necessary authority.

Subdivisions (7) and (8) deal with situation where a settlor or one or more beneficiaries appoint a trust advisor, trust protector or other person to exercise certain powers on behalf of a beneficiary.

Subdivisions (7) and (8) clarify that such persons may designate a person or persons to represent beneficiaries; in the case of the settlor, in the trust instrument, and in the case of all such person provided for in subdivisions (7) and (8), in a separate written document that is delivered to the trustee. A written designation of a representative by a settler or a beneficiary may occur subsequent to the execution of the trust instrument. If the designated representative is an individual, the settlor would be wise to designate a successor or establish a procedure for selecting a successor. The designated representative should be given specific duties that might include receipt of any required notice under T.C.A. § 35-15-813 (a) or (b) or under any other section of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

In all cases regarding representation, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires that no material conflict of interest exist between the person representing and the person represented.

In determining whether the representative has a material conflict with the person sought to be represented, the following may be indicia of such conflict:

The action to be approved may cause the trustee or co-trustee to operate the trust in a manner that would generally be considered imprudent;

The action to be approved if submitted to a court would generally not be approved; and

The action to be approved if subject to review by a court appointed guardian ad litem, would not generally be recommended for approval;

All of the above to be determined under T.C.A. § 35-15-105, which diverges significantly from the Uniform Trust Code.

If any of these or other indicia of a material conflict exists, the representative seeking to exercise a representative position has the burden to demonstrate that notwithstanding the indicia of a material conflict, the proposed action is in the best interest of the represented beneficiary.

35-15-304. Representation by person having substantially identical interest.

Unless otherwise represented, a minor, incapacitated, or unborn individual, or a person whose identity or location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable, may be represented by and bound by another having a substantially identical interest with respect to the particular question or dispute, but only to the extent there is no material conflict of interest between the representative and the person represented.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 21; 2010, ch. 725, § 5.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-304.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Representation under this section is allowed except to the extent there is a material  conflict of interest with respect to the particular matter or dispute. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverges from the Uniform Trust Code in that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires that there be no material conflict of interest (as opposed to requiring no conflict of interest) between the one representing and one represented. Therefore, it is not necessary that no conflict, whatsoever, exist in order to avail oneself of representation, only that no material conflict exist. This divergence from the Uniform Trust Code makes representation and virtual representation available in far more cases under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, thereby adding flexibility.

This section authorizes a person with a substantially identically interest with respect to a particular question or dispute to represent and bind an otherwise unrepresented minor, incapacitated or unborn individual, or person whose location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable. This section is derived from section 1-403(2)(iii) of the Uniform Probate Code, but with several modifications. Unlike the UPC, this section does not expressly require that the representation be adequate. Furthermore, this section extends the doctrine of virtual representation to representation of minors and incapacitated individuals. Finally, this section does not apply to the extent there is a material conflict of interest between the representative and the person represented.

Restatement (First) of Property §§ 181  and 185 (1936) provide that virtual representation is inapplicable if the interest represented was not sufficiently protected. Representation is deemed sufficiently protective as long as it does not appear that the representative acted in hostility to the interest of the person represented. Restatement (First) of Property § 185  (1936). Evidence of inactivity or lack of skill is material only to the extent it establishes such hostility. Restatement (First) of Property § 185  cmt. b (1936). To the extent the fact that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only re-quires that no material conflict of interest exist between the person representing and the person represented is contra with the views of such restatement, such restatement is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Typically, the interests of the representative and the person represented will be identical. A common example would be a trust providing for distribution to the settlor’s children as a class, with an adult child being able to represent the interests of children who are either minors or unborn. Exact identity of interests is not required, only substantial identity with respect to the particular question or dispute. Whether such identity is present may depend on the nature of the interest. For example, a presumptive remaindermen may be able to represent alternative remaindermen with respect to approval of a trustee’s report but not with respect to interpretation of the remainder provision or termination of the trust. Even if the beneficial interests of the representative and person represented are identical, representation is not allowed in the event of material conflict of interest. The representative may have interests outside of the trust that are adverse to the interest of the person represented, such as a prior relationship with the trustee or other beneficiaries. See Restatement (First) of Property § 185  cmt. d (1936). Relative to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s requirement of materiality regarding conflicts of interest and the effect such may have on the above expressed view of the restatement versus Tennessee law, see the immediately preceding paragraph.

In all cases regarding representation, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires that no material conflict of interest exist between the person representing and the person represented.

In determining whether the representative has a material conflict with the person sought to be represented, the following may be indicia of such conflict:

The action to be approved may cause the trustee or co-trustee to operate the trust in a manner that would generally be considered imprudent;

The action to be approved if submitted to a court would generally not be approved; and

The action to be approved if subject to review by a court appointed guardian ad litem, would not generally be recommended for approval;

All of the above to be determined under T.C.A. § 35-15-105, which diverges significantly from the Uniform Trust Code.

If any of these or other indicia of a material conflict exists, the representative seeking to exercise a representative position has the burden to demonstrate that notwithstanding the indicia of a material conflict, the proposed action is in the best interest of the represented beneficiary.

35-15-305. Appointment of representative.

  1. If the court determines that an interest is not represented under this chapter, or that the otherwise available representation might be inadequate, the court may appoint a representative to receive notice, give consent, and otherwise represent, bind, and act on behalf of a minor, incapacitated, or unborn individual, or a person whose identity or location is unknown. A representative may be appointed to represent several persons or interests.
  2. A representative may act on behalf of the individual represented with respect to any matter arising under this chapter, whether or not a judicial proceeding concerning the trust is pending.
  3. In making decisions, a representative may consider general benefit accruing to the living members of the individual's family.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 22.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-305.

This section is derived from section 1-403(4) of the Uniform Probate Code. However, this section substitutes “representative” for “guardian ad litem” to signal that a representative under this Code serves a different role. Unlike a guardian ad litem, under this section a representative can be appointed to act with respect to a nonjudicial settlement or to receive a notice on a beneficiary’s behalf. Furthermore, in making decisions, a representative may consider general benefit accruing to living members of the family. The court may appoint a representative to act for a person even if the person could be represented under another section of this part.

Part 4
Creation, Validity, Modification, and Termination of Trust

35-15-401. Methods of creating trust.

A trust may be created by:

  1. The transfer of property to another person as trustee during the settlor's lifetime or by will or other disposition taking effect upon the settlor's death;
  2. The declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds identifiable property as trustee;
  3. The exercise of a power of appointment in favor of a trustee; or
  4. A court pursuant to its statutory or equitable powers.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 23.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Comment.

The provisions of this chapter in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-40135-15-409, which specify the requirements for the creation of a trust, largely codify traditional doctrine, though arguably the net effect or these sections is to provide more flexibility regarding such creation.

T.C.A. § 35-15-401 specifies the methods by which trusts are created, that is, by transfer of property, self-declaration, exercise of a power of appointment or by a court pursuant to its statutory or equitable powers. Whatever method may have been employed, other requirements, including intention, capacity and, for certain types of trusts, an ascertainable beneficiary, also must be satisfied before a trust is created. These requirements are listed in T.C.A. § 35-15-402, which unlike the laws of certain states (e.g., Florida) do not require either a revocable or irrevocable trust with testamentary provisions be made with the formalities of a will.

T.C.A. § 35-15-403 addresses the validity in the enacting jurisdiction of trusts created in other jurisdictions. A trust not created by will is validly created if its creation complied with the law of specified jurisdictions in which the settlor or trustee had the requisite contact.

T.C.A. § 35-15-404 forbids trusts for illegal or impossible purposes, but unlike the Uniform Trust Code, does not require that a trust purpose “not be contrary to public policy.” Moreover, T.C.A. § 35-15-404 requires that a trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries and pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-105, requires the “benefit of the beneficiaries to be determined solely considering how such interests “are defined in the terms of the trust.” This is designed to further enforcement of settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition, both of which are overriding goals of the Tennessee trust statutes.

T.C.A. § 35-15-405 recites the permitted purposes of a charitable trust. As under T.C.A. § 35-15-404, there is no prohibition against purposes contrary to public policy. Moreover, when exercising cy pres under T.C.A. § 35-15-413, the court is required to fulfill as nearly as possible the settlor’s charitable intent (as such were defined in the terms of the trust).

T.C.A. § 35-15-406 lists some of the grounds for contesting a trust. T.C.A. § 35-15-407 validates oral trusts.

The remaining sections address what are often referred to as “honorary” (sometimes called “purpose”) trusts. Such trusts are valid and enforceable under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. T.C.A. § 35-15-408 covers a trust for the care of an animal and unlike under the Uniform Trust Code, such can last up to 90 years. T.C.A. § 35-15-409 allows creation of a trust for another noncharitable purpose (a “purpose” trust) for any valid non-charitable purpose. Again unlike the Uniform Trust Code, purpose trusts can last up to ninety (90) years under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, in the case of special types of trusts for which a perpetual purpose exists, such as maintenance of a cemetery lot, there is no time limit on such trust.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-417 provide a series of interrelated rules on when a trust may be terminated or modified other than by its express terms. The overall objective of these sections is to enhance flexibility consistent with the principle that preserving the settlor’s intent as such is defined under the terms of the trust is paramount. This provisions covered by these sections in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements.

Note that a trust advisor or trust protector may have the power to directly or indirectly modify a trust without being subject to T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-412 and 35-15-414.

Also note that, in cases where the existence or non-existence of a material purpose of a trust is relevant to the power to terminate or modify a trust, it is far easier for a purpose of a trust to rise to “material” status under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code than under the Uniform Trust Code. This is due to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(c), differences between the language to the section comment of T.C.A. § 35-15-103 relative to the definition of “spendthrift provision” and the comment to the definition of “spendthrift provision” in Uniform Trust Code section 103(16), as well as the omission of a provision similar to Uniform Trust Code section 411(c) and the comments thereunder in T.C.A. § 35-15-411 and the comments thereto. Notwithstanding the preceding portions of this paragraph, it is beneficial to state that Tennessee desires the flexibility provided by T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-417. However under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code such flexibility must be balanced with the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s goals of assuring settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition.

The methodology for termination or modification of a noncharitable irrevocable trust by consent under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is significantly different than such methodology under the Uniform Trust Code and readers are directed to T.C.A. § 35-15-411 and the section comment thereunder for those differences, as well as an explanation of them.

Although the language in T.C.A. § 35-15-412, concerning modification or termination because of unanticipated circumstances or inability to administer trust effectively, is virtually identical to that contained in Uniform Trust Code section 412, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s view of the meaning and effect of such language diverges, in some cases significantly, from that of the Uniform Trust Code. Readers are directed to the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-412 for a discussion of such divergence and the reasoning behind it.

Relative to T.C.A. § 35-15-414, concerning modification or termination of uneconomic trusts, both the language and the intent of such diverges from that of the Uniform Trust Code section 414. Readers are directed to the language contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-414, as well as to its section comment for a discussion of such divergence and the reasoning behind it.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-415 and 35-15-416 (concerning reformation to correct mistakes and modification to achieve settlor’s tax objectives), together with the section comments thereunder, generally follow Uniform Trust Code sections 415 and 416 and their comments. However, the section comments to both Tennessee sections stress the emphasis of interpreting to the extent possible, the interests of beneficiaries “as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust” as required by T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(3).

Although containing somewhat different language, under both T.C.A. § 35-15-417 and Uniform Trust Code section 417, trusts may be combined or divided. However, see the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-417 for reasons why additional language contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-417 provides more flexibility.

Under T.C.A. § 35-15-410, a trustee or beneficiary has standing to petition the court with respect to the actions described in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41135-15-416 and 35-15-417.

T.C.A. § 35-15-413 codifies and at the same time modifies the doctrine of cy pres, at least as such is applied in most states. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code authorizes the court to apply cy pres not only if the original means becomes impossible or unlawful but also if the means become impracticable obsolete or ineffective (rejecting the Uniform Trust Code language of “wasteful,” such believed to be too vague and subject to too broad of interpretation). T.C.A. § 35-15-413 also creates a presumption of general charitable intent. Upon failure of the settlor’s original plan, the court cannot divert the trust property to a noncharity unless the terms of the trust expressly so provide. Again deviating from the Uniform Trust Code, when modifying or terminating a charitable trust in favor of a charitable interest, such must be done in a manner “that fulfills as nearly as possible the settlor’s intent and purposes.” Furthermore, absent a contrary provision in the terms of the trust, limits are placed on when a gift over to a noncharity can take effect upon failure or impracticality of the original charitable purpose. The gift over is effective only if, when the provision takes effect, the trust property is to revert to the settlor and the settlor is still living, or fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the date of the trust's creation. A reader is directed to the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-413 to determine the extent of such section’s deviation from Uniform Trust Code section 413 and the comments thereunder. In addition to the persons listed in the Uniform Trust Code, under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, a trust advisor or trust protector holding the power to do so may maintain an action to enforce a charitable trust or to apply cy pres.

The requirements for a trust’s creation, such as the necessary level of capacity and the requirement that a trust have a legal purpose, are controlled by statute and common law, not by the settlor. But note that Tennessee has no requirement that a trust not have a purpose contrary to public policy or that a trustee need be required to act in good faith. Moreover, note the stricter standard by which a settlor’s intent relative to the interests for the benefit of beneficiaries is to be determined. T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(1)35-15-105(b)(3) and T.C.A. § 35-15-404. A settlor may not negate the court’s ability to modify or terminate a trust to the extent provided for in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-416. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(4). However, a settlor is free to restrict or modify the trustee’s power to terminate an uneconomic trust as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-414, and the trustee’s power to combine and divide trusts as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-417.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-401.

This section is based on Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 17  (1959). Under the methods specified for creating a trust in this section, a trust is not created until it receives property. For what constitutes an adequate property interest, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 40-41 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 74 -86 (1959). The property interest necessary to fund and create a trust need not be substantial. A revocable designation of the trustee as beneficiary of a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan has long been understood to be a property interest sufficient to create a trust. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-103 for the definition of “property.” Furthermore, the property interest need not be transferred contemporaneously with the signing of the trust instrument. A trust instrument signed during the settlor’s lifetime is not rendered invalid simply because the trust was not created until property was transferred to the trustee at a much later date, including by contract after the settlor’s death. A pourover devise to a previously unfunded trust is also valid and may constitute the property interest creating the trust. See  Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act § 1 (1991), codified at  Uniform Probate Code § 2-511 (pourover devise to trust valid regardless of existence, size, or character of trust corpus). See also  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 19 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996).

While this section refers to transfer of property to a trustee, a trust can be created even though for a period of time no trustee is in office. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2  cmt. i (1959). A trust can also be created without notice to or acceptance by a trustee or beneficiary. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 14 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 35 -36 (1959).

Though the list of methods specified in this section is not an exclusive list, it is more exhaustive than that contained in section 401 of the Uniform Trust Code in that this section also specifically provides for the creation of a trust by a court pursuant to its statutory or equitable powers in accord with T.C.A. § 35-15-102. For methods of creating a trust in general, see  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Uniform Probate Code § 2-212 (elective share of incapacitated surviving spouse to be held in trust on terms specified in statute); Uniform Probate Code § 5-411(a)(4) (conservator may create trust with court approval); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 17  cmt. i (1959) (trusts created by statutory right to bring wrongful death action).

A trust can also be created by a promise that creates enforceable rights in a person who immediately or later holds these rights as trustee. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 10(e) (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996). A trust thus created is valid notwithstanding that the trustee may resign or die before the promise is fulfilled. Unless expressly made personal, the promise can be enforced by a successor trustee. For examples of trusts created by means of promises enforceable by the trustee, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 10 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 14  cmt. h, 26 cmt. n (1959).

A trust created by self-declaration is best created by reregistering each of the assets that comprise the trust into the settlor’s name as trustee. However, such reregistration is not necessary to create the trust. See , Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 10 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 17  cmt. a (1959). A declaration of trust can be funded merely by attaching a schedule listing the assets that are to be subject to the trust without executing separate instruments of transfer. But such practice can make it difficult to later confirm title with third party transferees and for this reason is not recommended.

While a trust created by will may come into existence immediately at the testator’s death and not necessarily only upon the later transfer of title from the personal representative, T.C.A. § 35-15-701 makes clear that the nominated trustee does not have a duty to act until there is an acceptance of the trusteeship, express or implied. Moreover, T.C.A. § 35-15-701 makes it clear that a unless accepted, a nominated trustee has a reasonable time after knowing both  that they have been designated as a trustee, as well as the nature of the assets that comprise the trust to reject such appointment. To avoid an implied acceptance, a nominated testamentary trustee who is monitoring the actions of the personal representative but who has not yet made a final decision on acceptance should inform the beneficiaries that the nominated trustee has assumed only a limited role. The failure so to inform the beneficiaries could result in liability if misleading conduct by the nominated trustee causes harm to the trust beneficiaries. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 35 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999).

While this subsection (c) of this section confirms the familiar principle that a trust may be created by means of the exercise of a power of appointment the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not legislate comprehensively on the subject of powers of appointment but addresses only selected issues. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-302 (representation by holder of any  power of appointment and not just a general testamentary power of appointment as in the Uniform Trust Code) and T.C.A. § 35-15-603 concerning the rights of holder of power of withdrawal. For the law on powers of appointment generally, see Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers §§ 11.1 -24.4 (1986); Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (in progress). Notwithstanding the references to the respective restatements, The provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code relative to powers of appointment diverge significantly from such restatements. To the extent the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is in conflict with any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

35-15-402. Requirements for creation.

  1. A trust is created only if:
    1. The settlor has capacity to create a trust;
    2. The settlor indicates an intention to create the trust;
    3. The trust has a definite beneficiary or is:
      1. A charitable trust;
      2. A trust for the care of an animal, as provided in § 35-15-408; or
      3. A trust for a noncharitable purpose, as provided in § 35-15-409;
    4. The trustee has duties to perform; and
    5. The same person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary.
  2. A beneficiary is definite if the beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the future, subject to any applicable rule against perpetuities.
  3. A power in a trustee to select a beneficiary from an indefinite class is valid. If the power is not exercised within a reasonable time, the power fails and the property subject to the power passes to the persons who would have taken the property had the power not been conferred.
  4. A lifetime trust is valid as to any assets held by the trust to the extent the assets have been transferred to the trust. For purposes of this subsection (d):
    1. Assets capable of registration, such as real estate, stocks, bonds, bank and brokerage accounts, and the like, are transferred to the trust through the recording of the deed or the completion of registration of the asset in the name of the trust or trustee. Assets that are capable of registration are not transferred to the trust through only a recital of assignment, holding, or receipt in the trust instrument; and
    2. Assets not capable of registration, are transferred to the trust through a recital of assignment describing the asset with particularity in the trust instrument.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 24; 2017, ch. 290, § 13.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 290, § 16. July 1, 2017.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Trust Intent.

Where an organization did not claim that it intended to create a revocable charitable trust under T.C.A. § 35-15-402(a)(2) when it entered into agreements with a college, and no evidence was presented suggesting a trust intent on the part of the organization, the contracts reflected a charitable gift subject to conditions rather than the creation of a revocable charitable trust. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-402.

Subsection (a) codifies the basic requirements for the creation of a trust. To create a valid trust, the settlor must indicate an intention to create a trust. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 13 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 23  (1959). But only such manifestations of intent as are admissible as proof in a judicial proceeding may be considered. See  section T.C.A. § 35-15-103 for the definition of “terms of a trust.”

To create a trust, a settlor must have the requisite mental capacity. To create a revocable or testamentary trust, the settlor must have the capacity to make a will. To create an irrevocable trust, the settlor must have capacity during life-time to transfer the property free of trust. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-601 (capacity of settlor to create revocable trust), and See generally  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 11 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 18 -22 (1959); and Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.1 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).

Note that under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and unlike under the law of some states (e.g., Florida), neither a revocable or irrevocable trust (pour-over or non-pour-over), even one containing testamentary dispositions, need be made with the formalities of a will. T.C.A. § 35-15-601.

Subdivision (a)(3) requires that a trust, other than a charitable trust, a trust for the care of an animal, or a trust for another valid noncharitable purpose, have a definite beneficiary. While some beneficiaries will be definitely ascertained as of the trust’s creation, subsection (b) recognizes that others may be ascertained in the future as long as this occurs within the applicable perpetuities period. The definite beneficiary requirement does not prevent a settlor from making a disposition in favor of a class of persons. Class designations are valid as long as the membership of the class will be finally determined within the applicable perpetuities period. For background on the definite beneficiary requirement, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 44-46 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 112 -122 (1959).

Subdivision (a)(4) recites standard doctrine that a trust is created only if the trustee has duties to perform. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2  (1959). Trustee duties are usually active, but a validating duty may also be passive, implying only that the trustee has an obligation not to interfere with the trustee’s enjoyment of the trust property. Such passive trusts, while valid under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, may be terminable if this state recognizes the common law Statute of Uses. Whether Tennessee ever recognized such statute is not clear and different compendiums of older Tennessee law disagree, see The Encyclopedic Digest of Tennessee Reports : Being a Complete Encyclopedia and Digest of All the Tennessee Case Law Up to and Including Vol. 115 Tennessee Reports, Cooper’s Chancery Reports, Shannon’s Tennessee Cases, and the Tennessee Chancery Appeals Reports, Volume 12, Michie Company (1908) at 125 (now only available by Google eBook) and A Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees,  7th Ed., Vol. 1., by Jairus Ware Perry, revised and enlarged by Raymond C. Baldes (1929) at 529 (available by Google eBooks). In the latter publication it states “In Tennessee, the statute of uses seems to be in force.” Citing: Hughes v. Farmers’ Sav. & Bldg. & Loan Ass’n,  46 S.W. 362 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897); Temple v. Ferguson , 110 Tenn. 84 (Tenn. 1903); Hart v. Bayliss , 97 Tenn. 72 (Tenn. 1896). See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 67 -72 (1959).

Subdivision (a)(5) addresses the doctrine of merger, which, as traditionally stated, provides that a trust is not created if the settlor is the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of all beneficial interests. The doctrine of merger has been inappropriately applied by the courts in some jurisdictions to invalidate self-declarations of trust in which the settlor is the sole life beneficiary but other persons are designated as beneficiaries of the remainder. The doctrine of merger is properly applicable only if all beneficial interests, both life interests and remainders, are vested in the same person, whether in the settlor or someone else. An example of a trust to which the doctrine of merger would apply is a trust of which the settlor is sole trustee, sole beneficiary for life, and with the remainder payable to the settlor’s probate estate. On the doctrine of merger generally, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 69 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 341  (1959).

Subsection (c) allows a settlor to empower the trustee to select the beneficiaries even if the class from whom the selection may be made cannot be ascertained. Such a provision would fail under traditional doctrine; it is an imperative power with no designated beneficiary capable of enforcement. Such a provision is valid, however, under both the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and the restatement, if there is at least one person who can meet the description. If the trustee does not exercise the power within a reasonable time, the power fails and the property will pass by resulting trust. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 122  (1959); Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.1  cmt. e (1986).

35-15-403. Trusts created in other jurisdictions.

A trust not created by will is validly created if its creation complies with the law of the jurisdiction in which the trust instrument was executed, or the law of the jurisdiction in which, at the time of creation:

  1. The settlor was domiciled, had a place of abode, or was a national;
  2. A trustee was domiciled or had a place of business; or
  3. Any trust property was located.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 25.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-403.

The validity of a trust created by will is ordinarily determined by the law of the decedent’s domicile. No such certainty exists with respect to determining the law governing the validity of inter vivos trusts. Generally, at common law a trust was created if it complied with the law of the state having the most significant contacts to the trust. Contacts for making this determination include the domicile of the trustee, the domicile of the settlor at the time of trust creation, the location of the trust property, the place where the trust instrument was executed, and the domicile of the beneficiary. See  5A Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts §§ 597, 599 (4th ed. 1987). Furthermore, if the trust has contacts with two or more states, one of which would validate the trust’s creation and the other of which would deny the trust’s validity, the tendency is to select the law upholding the validity of the trust. See  5A Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts 600 (4th ed. 1987).

This section extends the common law rule by validating a trust if its creation complies with the law of any of a variety of states in which the settlor or trustee had the requisite contacts. Pursuant to this section, a trust not created by will is validly created if its creation complies with the law of the jurisdiction in which the trust instrument was executed, or the law of the jurisdiction in which, at the time of creation the settlor was domiciled, had a place of abode, or was a national; the trustee was domiciled or had a place of business; or any trust property was located.

This section is somewhat comparable to section 2-506 of the Uniform Probate Code, which validates wills executed in compliance with the law of a variety of places in which the testator had a significant contact. Unlike the Uniform Probate Code, however, this section is not limited to execution of the instrument but applies to the entire process of a trust’s creation, including compliance with the requirement that there be trust property. In addition, unlike the Uniform Probate Code, this section validates a trust valid under the law of the domicile or place of business of the designated trustee, or if valid under the law of the place where any of the trust property is located.

The section does not supersede any requirements of this state relative to the valid transfer of real property.

35-15-404. Trust purposes.

A trust may be created only to the extent its purposes are lawful and possible to achieve. A trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 26; 2013, ch. 390, § 50.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-404.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section requires that the purposes of a trust be lawful and possible to achieve. It also requires that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.

    Unlike the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements, this section does not contain a prohibition of purposes “contrary to public policy.” The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code recognizes that some purposes may be so noxious as to truly offend public policy. However, the existence of an offense rising to such level should not be easily found, and under the Tennessee trust statutes such existence is likely more difficult to find than under the Uniform Trust Code, some other jurisdictions’ laws and the various restatements. This view is in keeping with primary objectives of the Tennessee trust statutes that a settlor’s intent be the lodestar by which a trust is interpreted, that such intent be carried out and that settlors have the freedom to dispose of their assets to whom and in the manner they wish, all to the greatest extent constitutionally allowable, as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

    Moreover, unlike under the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-105 requires that a determination of whether a trust and its terms are “for the benefit of its beneficiaries,” be made solely considering how such “interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust .” [emphasis added]

    Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-402, a trust must have an identifiable beneficiary unless the trust is of a type that does not have beneficiaries in the usual sense, such as a charitable trust or, as provided in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 and 35-15-409, trusts for the care of an animal or other valid noncharitable purpose. The general purpose of trusts having identifiable beneficiaries is to benefit those beneficiaries in accordance with their interests as such interest is defined in the terms of the trust.

    While a settlor has considerable latitude in specifying how a particular trust purpose is to be pursued, the administrative and other nondispositive trust terms must reasonably relate to this purpose and not divert the trust property to achieve a trust purpose that is invalid, such as one which is frivolous or capricious.

    The provision of T.C.A. § 35-15-412 that allows the court to modify administrative terms that are impracticable, wasteful (but relative to the use in this section of the word “wasteful,” see the interpretation given to such word in the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-412, resulting in such word being interpreted to mean “obsolete or ineffective,” such interpretation arguably being applicable to this section as well), or impair the trust’s administration, is a specific application of the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of the beneficiaries as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined in the terms of the trust. The fact that it is determined that a settlor suggests or directs an unlawful or other inappropriate means for performing a trust does not invalidate the trust if the trust has a substantial purpose that can be achieved by other methods. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999).

    Persons interpreting T.C.A. §§ 35-15-412 and 35-15-413 to examine if the terms meet the standards therein for modification or termination are directed to this section, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-105, as well as the overriding emphasis of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition. In all of the above ways, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverges significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and from certain portions of the restatements. In all such cases of divergence, Tennessee law controls.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-405. Charitable purposes — Enforcement.

  1. A charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.
  2. If the terms of a charitable trust do not indicate a particular charitable purpose or beneficiary, the court may select one (1) or more charitable purposes or beneficiaries. The selection must be consistent with the settlor's intention to the extent it can be ascertained.
  3. The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 27.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, §§ 11, 22.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-405.

Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the law relative to charitable trusts diverges somewhat from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section or other provisions of the law concerning charitable trusts under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

The required purposes of a charitable trust specified in subsection (a) restate the well-established categories of charitable purposes listed in Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368  (1959), which ultimately derive from the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. I, c.4 (1601). The directive to the courts to validate purposes the achievement of which are beneficial to the community has proved to be remarkably adaptable over the centuries.

Charitable trusts are subject to the restriction in T.C.A. § 35-15-404 that a charitable trust purpose must be legal. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-404 does not require that a trust purpose not be contrary to public policy. See  the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-404 for the effect of this under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Under subsection (b), a trust that states a general charitable purpose does not fail if the settlor neglected to specify a particular charitable purpose or organization to receive distributions. The court may instead validate the trust by specifying particular charitable purposes or recipients, or delegate to the trustee the framing of an appropriate scheme. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 397  cmt. d (1959). Subsection (b) of this section is a corollary to T.C.A. § 35-15-413, which states the doctrine of cy pres. But note that, a courts ability to apply cy pres under T.C.A. § 35-15-413 is subject to a stricter standard that that afforded by the Uniform Trust Code. Under T.C.A. § 35-15-413, a trust failing to state a general charitable purpose does not fail upon failure of the particular means specified in the terms of the trust. However, the court must instead apply the trust property in a manner that fulfills as nearly as possible the settlor’s charitable intent and purposes  to the extent they can be ascertained. On the other hand, the Uniform Trust Code only requires that the court apply the trust property in a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes  to the extent they can be ascertained. The language of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-413 is designed to restrict, to the greatest extent possible, the likelihood that application of trust property strays far from a settlor’s intent, to the extent it can be ascertained, and therefore results in an application in favor of some watered down, vague and general charitable purpose. See  section comment T.C.A. § 35-15-413 for a further discussion.

Subsection (b) does not apply to the long-established estate planning technique of delegating to the trustee the selection of the charitable purposes or recipients. In that case, judicial intervention to supply particular terms is not necessary to validate the creation of the trust. The necessary terms instead will be supplied by the trustee. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 396  (1959). Judicial intervention under subsection (b) will become necessary only if the trustee fails to make a selection. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 397  cmt. d (1959). Pursuant to subsection T.C.A. § 35-15-110, the charitable organizations selected by the trustee would not have the rights of qualified beneficiaries under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code because they are not expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of the trust. However, it is possible that a trust advisor or trust protector might have such rights, as well as the right to enforce the trust.

Contrary to Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391  (1959), subsection (c) grants a settlor standing to maintain an action to enforce a charitable trust. The grant of standing to the settlor does not negate the right of the state attorney general to enforce either the trust and relevant interests thereto. For the law on the enforcement of charitable trusts, see Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 593 (1999) .

Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, a trust advisor or trust protector, given the power to do so, may also seek to enforce a charitable trust or for the application of cy pres.

35-15-406. Creation of trust induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence.

A trust is void to the extent its creation was induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 28.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-406.

This section is a specific application of Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 12 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 333  (1959), which provide that a trust can be set aside or reformed on the same grounds as those which apply to a transfer of property not in trust, among which include undue influence, duress, and fraud, and mistake. This section addresses undue influence, duress, and fraud. For reformation of a trust on grounds of mistake, see T.C.A. § 35-15-415. See also Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.3 (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), which closely tracks the language above. Similar to a will, the invalidity of a trust on grounds of undue influence, duress, or fraud may be in whole or in part.

35-15-407. Evidence of oral trust.

Except as required by a statute other than this chapter, a trust need not be evidenced by a trust instrument, but the creation of an oral trust and its terms may be established only by clear and convincing evidence.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 29.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-407.

While it is always advisable for a settlor to reduce a trust to writing, this section of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code follows established law in recognizing oral trusts. Such trusts are viewed with caution, however. The requirement of this section that an oral trust can be established only by clear and convincing evidence is a higher standard than is in effect in many states. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 20  Reporter’s Notes (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996).

Absent some other specific statutory provision of this state, including but limited to such provisions requiring that transfers of real property be in writing, a trust need not be evidenced by a writing.

For a discussion of the general law concerning the Statute of Frauds, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 40 -52 (1959). For a description of what the writing must contain, assuming that a writing is required, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 22 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§  46 -49 (1959). For a discussion of when the writing must be signed, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 23 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§  41 -42 (1959). For the law of oral trusts, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 20 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 43 -45 (1959).

35-15-408. Trust for care of animal.

  1. A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one (1) animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. The trust may not be enforced for more than ninety (90) years.
  2. A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by any of the following who are appointed under the terms of a trust: a trustee, trust advisor, trust protector or other person or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court. In addition, a person having an interest in the welfare of the animal may request the court to appoint a person to enforce the trust or to remove a person appointed.
  3. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property not required for the intended use must be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor's successors in interest.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 30; 2007, ch. 24, § 13; 2013, ch. 390, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, §§ 5, 8, 11.

    Section Comment.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

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T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 and 35-15-409 validate so called honorary trusts. Unlike honorary trusts created pursuant to the common law of trusts, which are arguably no more than powers of appointment, the trusts created by such two sections are valid and enforceable as trusts for a period of up to ninety (90) years. For a discussion of the common law doctrine, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 47 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 124  (1959).

T.C.A. § 35-15-408 addresses a particular type of honorary trust, the trust for the care of an animal. T.C.A. § 35-15-409 specifies the requirements for trusts without ascertainable beneficiaries that are created for other noncharitable purposes, often called “purpose trusts.”

A trust for the care of an animal may last for the life of the animal. While the animal will ordinarily be alive on the date the trust is created, an animal may be added as a beneficiary after that date as long as the addition is made prior to the settlor’s death. Animals in gestation but not yet born at the time of the trust's creation may also be covered by its terms. A trust authorized by this section may be created to benefit one designated animal or several designated animals. Subsection (a) provides that, regardless of the length of the life or lives of the animal(s), a trust for the care of an animal can only be enforced for a period of ninety (90) years.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408(b) and 35-15-409(2) address enforcement. Noncharitable trusts ordinarily may be enforced by their beneficiaries. However, for reasons similar to those applying to charitable trusts, no animal under a trust for the care of an animal as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-408, nor anyone (person, entity or otherwise) benefiting from or having an interest in the purpose for which a trust is established under T.C.A. § 35-15-409 are beneficiaries as that term is defined in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, relative to trusts controlled by T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 and 35-15-409, there are no qualified beneficiaries under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

At common law, a trust for the care of an animal or a trust without an ascertainable beneficiary created for a non-charitable purpose was unenforceable because there was no person authorized to enforce the trustee’s obligations. T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 and 35-15-409 close this gap. The intended use of a trust authorized by either section may be enforced by a person designated in the terms of the trust, which under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code (but arguably not under the Uniform Trust Code, such not providing specifically for same) can include a trust advisor or trust protector. If no such person exists, a trust created under either section can be enforced by a person appointed by the court. Notwithstanding the above, in either case, such person, due solely to holding such enforcement power, is not a qualified beneficiary under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

If the trust is created for the care of an animal, a person with an interest in the welfare of the animal also has standing to petition for an appointment to the court for someone to enforce the trust (and also has standing to so petition, but for removal of any such person). The person appointed by the court to enforce the trust should also be a person who has exhibited an interest in the animal’s welfare. The concept of granting standing to a person with a demonstrated interest in the animal’s welfare is derived from the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, which allows a person interested in the welfare of a ward or protected person to file petitions on behalf of the ward or protected person. See, e.g ., Uniform Probate Code §§ 5-210(b), 5-414(a).

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408(c) and 35-15-409(3) address the problem of excess funds. If the court determines that the trust property exceeds the amount needed for the intended purpose and that the terms of the trust do not direct the disposition, a resulting trust is ordinarily created in the settlor or settlor’s successors in interest. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 47 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 124  (1959). Successors in interest include the beneficiaries under the settlor’s will, if the settlor has a will, or in the absence of an effective will provision, the settlor’s heirs. The settlor may also anticipate the problem of excess funds by directing their disposition in the terms of the trust. The disposition of excess funds is within the settlor’s control. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a). While a trust for an animal or for a noncharitable trust without ascertainable beneficiary is often not created until the settlor’s death, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408(a) and 35-15-409(1) allow either such type of trust to be created during the settlor's lifetime. Accordingly, if the settlor is still living, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408(c) and 35-15-409(3) provide for distribution of excess funds to the settlor, and not to the settlor’s successors in interest.

Should the means chosen not be particularly efficient, a trust created for the care of an animal can also be terminated by the trustee or court under T.C.A. § 35-15-414. Due to the nature of a trust for the care of an animal and the fact such trust has no beneficiaries, it is not possible to distribute the trust property “to the or for the benefit of the beneficiaries…” as provided in such section. Therefore, termination of a trust under such section, requires that the trustee or court develop an alternative means for carrying out the trust purposes in a manner that conforms as nearly as possible to the intention of the settlor.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 and 35-15-409 are suggested by section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate Code, but much of such enumerated sections is new.

35-15-409. Noncharitable trust without ascertainable beneficiary.

Except as otherwise provided in § 35-15-408 or by another statute, the following rules apply:

  1. A trust may be created for a noncharitable purpose without a definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary or for a noncharitable but otherwise valid purpose to be selected by the trustee. The trust may not be enforced for more than ninety (90) years;
  2. A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by any of the following who are appointed under the terms of a trust: a trustee, trust advisor, trust protector or other person; or if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court; and
  3. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property not required for the intended use must be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor's successors in interest.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 31; 2007, ch. 24, § 14; 2013, ch. 390, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

T.C.A. § 35-15-409 authorizes two types of trusts without ascertainable beneficiaries; trusts for general but non-charitable purposes, and trusts for a specific noncharitable purpose other than the care of an animal, the latter of which is controlled by T.C.A. § 35-15-408.

Such trusts are often referred to as “purpose trusts.”

Examples of trusts for general noncharitable purposes include a bequest of money to be distributed to such objects of benevolence as the trustee might select. Unless such attempted disposition was interpreted as charitable, at common law the disposition was honorary only and did not create a trust.

Under T.C.A. § 35-15-409, however, the disposition under this form of purpose trust is enforceable as a trust for a period of up to ninety (90) years, which is significantly longer than the Uniform Trust Code default of twenty-one (21) years.

Although there are numerous types of trusts for specific noncharitable purposes, such purposes being virtually unlimited, a common example of a such type of trust is a trust for the care of a cemetery plot. The lead-in language to the section recognizes that some special purpose trusts, particularly those for care of cemetery plots, are subject to other statutes. Such legislation will typically endeavor to facilitate perpetual care as opposed to care limited to ninety (90) years as under this section

For the requirement that a trust, particularly the type of trust authorized by this section, must have a purpose that is not capricious, see T.C.A. § 35-15-404 and the comments thereunder. However, note that unlike under the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-404 and the comments thereunder contain no requirement that the purpose of a trust “not be contrary to public policy.”

For examples of the types of trusts authorized by this section, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 47 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 62  cmt. w and § 124 (1959). The case law on capricious purposes is collected in 2 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 124.7 (4th ed. 1987).

T.C.A. § 35-15-409 is similar to section T.C.A. § 35-15-408, although the comments under the former section are less detailed than those under the latter section. Much comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-408 also applies to this section and in many cases the comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-408 specifically refer their application to T.C.A. § 35-15-409.

It should be noted that a noncharitable trust without ascertainable beneficiary is a type of trust that can likely be benefitted greatly by the appointment of a trust advisor or trust protector pursuant to part 12 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

35-15-410. Modification or termination of trust — Proceedings for approval or disapproval.

  1. In addition to the methods of termination prescribed by §§ 35-15-411 — 35-15-414, a trust terminates to the extent the trust is revoked or expires pursuant to its terms, no purpose of the trust remains to be achieved, or the purposes of the trust have become unlawful or impossible to achieve.
  2. A proceeding to approve or disapprove a proposed modification or termination under §§ 35-15-411 — 35-15-416, or trust combination or division under § 35-15-417, may be commenced by a trustee or beneficiary. The settlor of a charitable trust may maintain a proceeding to modify the trust under § 35-15-413.
  3. Nothing in this section or this chapter is intended to create or imply a duty for a trustee to make or seek approval of a modification, termination, combination or division, and a trustee is not liable for not making or seeking approval of a modification, termination, combination or division.
  4. No modification, termination, combination or division may be made pursuant to §§ 35-15-411 — 35-15-417 that:
    1. Results in the trust not qualifying for the federal or state marital or charitable income, gift, estate or inheritance tax deduction if the trust would qualify but for the modification, termination, combination or division;
    2. Results in the trust being subject to the federal or state generation-skipping transfer tax if the trust would not be subject to the generation-skipping transfer tax but for the modification, termination, combination or division; or
    3. Results in an overall increase in federal or state estate, inheritance, gift or generation-skipping transfer taxes.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 32; 2013, ch. 390, § 51.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Law Reviews.

    Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: New Formulation for a Trusty Tool (Marshall H. Peterson), 41 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2005).

    1. Suit to Disapprove Proposal. 2. Trustee Duties.

    Co-trustee sought a declaration that the settlement, which sought termination of the trust, violated the Tennessee Uniform Trust Act and, as such, should not be enforced; in short, the co-trustee filed a suit to disapprove a proposed termination of the trust. Miller v. Maples, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

    Tennessee Uniform Trust Act contains no requirement that the trustee specifically request approval of termination or modification of the trust; rather, the trustee need only commence a proceeding to approve or disapprove a proposed modification or termination. Miller v. Maples, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-410.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Terminations under subsection (a) may be in either in whole or in part.

    Note that unlike Uniform Trust Code section 410:

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Suit to Disapprove Proposal.

2. Trustee Duties.

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T.C.A. § 35-15-410 contains no provision that a trust terminates to the extent the purposes of the trust have become contrary to public policy. For a discussion of the reason for this, as well as the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s view regarding “public policy,” see the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-404.

It is far easier for a purpose of a trust to rise to being “material” under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code than under the Uniform Trust Code. This is due to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(c), differences between the language to the section comment of T.C.A. § 35-15-103 relative to the definition of “spendthrift provision” and the comment to the definition of “spendthrift provision” in Uniform Trust Code section 103(16), as well as the omission of a provision similar to Uniform Trust Code section 411(c) in T.C.A. § 35-15-411 and differences in the comments under such respective versions of such section.

Other types of terminations, all of which require action by a court, trustee, or beneficiaries, are covered in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41135-15-414, which also address trust modification. Of these sections, all but T.C.A. § 35-15-411 apply to charitable trusts and all but T.C.A. § 35-15-413 apply to noncharitable trusts.

Withdrawal of the trust property is not an event terminating a trust. The trust remains in existence although the trustee has no duties to perform unless and until property is later contributed to the trust.

Subsection (b) specifies the persons who have standing to seek court approval or disapproval of proposed trust modifications, terminations, combinations, or divisions. An approval or disapproval may be sought for an action that does not require court permission, including a petition questioning the trustee’s distribution upon termination of a trust under one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) under T.C.A. § 35-15-414, and a petition to approve or disapprove a proposed trust division or consolidation under T.C.A. § 35-15-417. Unlike under the Uniform Trust Code, under this subsection (b) a settlor has no right or power to commence a judicial proceeding to approve or disapprove a proposed modification or termination of a noncharitable irrevocable trust under T.C.A. § 35-15-411. Contrary to Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391  (1959), subsection (b) grants a settlor standing to petition the court under T.C.A. § 35-15-413 to apply cy pres to modify the settlor’s charitable trust.

Subsection (c) does not have a Uniform Trust Code equivalent and clarifies that a trustee has no duty to make or seek approval of any modification, termination, combination, or division of any trust and cannot be held liable for failing to do so.

Subsection (d) does not have a Uniform Trust Code equivalent and prohibits a modification, termination, combination, or division that would cause adverse tax consequences.

Note that under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, a trust advisor or trust protector may have the power to directly or indirectly modify a trust without being subject to T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-412 and 35-15-414.

35-15-411. Modification or termination of noncharitable irrevocable trust by consent.

  1. During the settlor's lifetime, a noncharitable irrevocable trust may be modified or terminated by the trustee upon consent of all qualified beneficiaries, even if the modification or termination is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust if the settlor does not object to the proposed modification or termination. The trustee shall notify the settlor of the proposed modification or termination not less than sixty (60) days before initiating the modification or termination. The notice of modification or termination must include:
    1. An explanation of the reasons for the proposed modification or termination;
    2. The date on which the proposed modification or termination is anticipated to occur; and
    3. The date, not less than sixty (60) days after the giving of the notice, by which the settlor must notify the trustee of an objection to the proposed modification or termination.
  2. Following the settlor's death, a noncharitable irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent of all of the qualified beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust.
  3. Following the settlor's death, a noncharitable irrevocable trust may be modified upon the unanimous agreement of the trustee and all qualified beneficiaries as provided under § 35-15-111 if such modification does not violate a material purpose of the trust. Additionally, a noncharitable irrevocable trust may be modified upon consent of all of the qualified beneficiaries if the court concludes that modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.
  4. Modification of a trust as authorized in this section is not prohibited by a spendthrift clause or by a provision in the trust instrument that prohibits amendment or revocation of the trust.
  5. An agreement to modify a trust as authorized by this section is binding on a beneficiary whose interest is represented by another person under part 3 of this chapter.
  6. Upon termination of a trust under subsection (a) or (b), the trustee shall distribute the trust property as agreed by the qualified beneficiaries.
  7. If not all of the qualified beneficiaries consent to a proposed modification or termination of the trust under subsection (a), (b), or (c), as applicable, the modification or termination may be approved by the court if the court is satisfied that:
    1. If all of the qualified beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modified or terminated under this section; and
    2. The interests of a qualified beneficiary who does not consent will be adequately protected.
  8. As used in this section, “noncharitable irrevocable trust” refers to a trust that is not revocable by the settlor with respect to which:
    1. No federal or state income, gift, estate, or inheritance tax charitable deduction was allowed upon transfers to the trust; and
    2. The value of all interests in the trust owned by charitable organizations does not exceed five percent (5%) of the value of the trust.
  9. Notwithstanding subsection (a), (b), or (c), the trustee may seek court approval of a modification or termination.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 33; 2007, ch. 24, §§ 15-19; 2019, ch. 340, § 14.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment redesignated the former second sentence of (b) as present (c), added present (d) and (e) and redesignated former (c)-(f) as present (f)-(i); in present (c), added the first sentence and added “Additionally,” at the beginning of the second sentence; substituted “subsection (a), (b), or (c), as applicable,” for “subsection (a) or (b)” in the introductory language of present (g); substituted “As used in this section” for “Solely for purposes of this section, the term” at the beginning of present (h); and substituted “subsection (a), (b), or (c), “ for “subsection (a)” in present (i).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

Law Reviews.

Where There's a Will: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Estate Planning Tools Married To New Realities (Eddy R. Smith), 49 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2013).

Where There's a Will: The Report of My Practice's Death Was an Exaggeration: The Healthy Prognosis for Estate Planning in Tennessee (Eddy R. Smith), 48 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Protection of Interests.

Brothers'  interest in the trust was protected when their mother, through whom their interest vested, received the full measure of her portion of the trust's assets. Miller v. Maples, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

2. Enforceability.

Settlement was not enforceable until such time as it was approved by the trial court, and at the earliest, that date would have been when the trial court entered its order enforcing the settlement; however, as that decision was appealed, the settlement was not enforceable until such time as the appellate process was concluded, and thus the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under the settlement for fees accrued prior to the ruling that the settlement was enforceable. Miller v. Maples, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-411.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

This section describes the circumstances in which termination or modification of a noncharitable irrevocable trust may be compelled by the qualified beneficiaries, with or without the objection of the settlor. For provisions governing modification or termination of trusts without the need to seek beneficiary consent, see T.C.A. § 35-15-412 (modification or termination due to unanticipated circumstances or inability to administer trust effectively), T.C.A. § 35-15-414 (termination or modification of uneconomic noncharitable trust), and T.C.A. § 35-15-416 (modification to achieve settlor's tax objectives). If the trust is revocable by the settlor, the method of revocation specified in T.C.A. § 35-15-602 applies.

Subsection (a) states the requirements under this section for termination or modification by consent of the trustee and all qualified beneficiaries during the settlor's life. Note that the procedure under subsection (a) is significantly different than under either option contained in Uniform Trust Code section 411(a). First the action to modify or terminate cannot be brought by the settlor and does not require the settlors pre-consent thereto. Likewise it does not require court intervention or approval. Moreover, it does not require consent of all beneficiaries. Under this subsection (a), upon the agreement of the trustee and all qualified beneficiaries such trust can be terminated or modified, even if such action is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. The settlor’s interests are protected by requiring specified notice be given to the settlor sixty (60) days prior to the effective date of the action. The settlor must notify the trustee of an objection to the action within such sixty (60) days or such action is effective. Should the settlor file such objection, such action will not take place. There is no alternative method under T.C.A. § 35-15-411 to effect such modification or termination during a settlor’s life if the settlor so objects (though such may be available under other sections of part 4 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and a trust advisor or trust protector, if such holds the power to do so, may effect such action regardless of the requirements of subsection (a)).

Subsection (b) states the requirements under this section for termination or modification upon consent of all qualified beneficiaries by the court following the settlor's death. Note that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires consent of all qualified  beneficiaries and not of all beneficiaries  as under Uniform Trust Code section 411(b). Moreover, unlike Uniform Trust Code section 411(b), such subsection (b) only applies after the settlor’s death. Uniform Trust Code section 411(b) applies whether or not a settlor is alive.

Under subsection (b), a trust may be modified or terminated over a trustee's objection (but unlike under Uniform Trust Code section 411(b), not over the objection of a settlor while the settlor is living). Regardless, pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-410, a trustee has standing to object to a proposed termination or modification under subsection (b).

Although, concurrent with the 2007 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code consideration was given to allowing the trustee and qualified beneficiaries to consent to modification or termination after the settlor's death, the consensus of the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code was that requiring court approval was a beneficial protection.

Any requirement by this section of court approval does not apply to matters specifically authorized to be handled by nonjudicial settlement under T.C.A. § 35-15-111. The actions authorized under T.C.A. § 35-15-111 are not an exclusive list. Nonjudicial settlement agreements between the trustee and the qualified beneficiaries should be applicable to the resolution of any matter of an administrative nature that does not alter a beneficiary's income or principal interest in the trust. Any proposed change that alters a beneficiary's income or principal interest in the trust must be submitted for court approval. A proposal to extend the term of a trust or to convert the trust to a total return trust in compliance with T.C.A. § 35-6-101 et seq. is not an alteration of a beneficiary's income or principal interest in the trust.

Subsection (c) directs how the trust property is to be distributed following a termination under either subsection (a) or (b). Note that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code only requires agreement as to distribution by all qualified  beneficiaries and not by all beneficiaries , as is required by Uniform Trust Code section 411(c).

The provisions of part 3 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-30135-15-305 ] on representation, virtual representation and the appointment and approval of representatives appointed by the court apply to the determination of whether the required beneficiaries have signified consent under this section. The authority to consent on behalf of another person, however, does not include authority to consent over the other person's objection. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-301(b). Regarding the per-sons who may consent on behalf of a beneficiary, see T.C.A. §§ 35-15-30235-15-305. Note that unlike under the Uniform Trust Code, a consent given by a representative is invalid only to the extent there is a material  conflict of interest between the representative and the person represented. The Uniform Trust Code requires no conflict of interest . Due to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s “materiality” requirement regarding conflicts of interest and the availability of representation, virtual representation of a beneficiary's interest by another beneficiary pursuant to section T.C.A. § 35-15-304 should be much more readily available in a trust termination case than under Uniform Trust Code section 304 (to which the comments thereto state such representation is “rarely” available in a trust termination case). It should likewise be routinely available in cases involving trust modification, such as a grant to the trustee of additional powers. If virtual or other form of representation is unavailable (such being much less likely under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code than under the Uniform Trust Code), T.C.A. § 35-15-305 permits the court to appoint a representative who may give the necessary consent to the proposed modification or termination on behalf of the minor, incapacitated, unborn, or unascertained beneficiary. The ability to use virtual and other forms of representation to consent on a beneficiary's behalf to a trust termination or modification has not traditionally been part of the law, although there are some notable exceptions. Compare  Restatement (Second) § 337(1) (1959) (beneficiary must not be under incapacity), with Hatch v. Riggs National Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966)  (guardian ad litem authorized to consent on beneficiary's behalf).

Termination under subsection (a) does not require a finding that the trust no longer serves a material purpose.

On the other hand, subsection (b) does require that a court conclude that no material purpose exists that requires the trust to continue, the finding of such, therefore, blocking termination. Moreover, it is far easier for a purpose of a trust to rise to “material” status under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code than under the Uniform Trust Code. This is due to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(c), differences between the language to the section comment of T.C.A. § 35-15-103 relative to the definition of “spendthrift provision” and the comment to the definition of “spendthrift provision” in Uniform Trust Code section 103(16), as well as the omission of a provision similar to Uniform Trust Code section 411(c), as well as the language relevant thereto, in T.C.A. § 35-15-411 and the comments thereunder.

Notwithstanding the previous paragraph, subsection (b) will still allow the qualified beneficiaries to compel termination of a trust that still serves a material purpose if the reasons for termination outweigh the continuing material pur-pose.

Moreover, subject to the potentially higher likelihood that a material trust purpose exists as discussed in the para-graph above, subsection (b), similar to Restatement Third but not Restatement Second, allows modification by the qualified beneficiaries of any term of the trust if the court concludes that modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. Restatement Third, though, goes further than the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in also allowing the qualified beneficiaries to use trust modification as a basis for removing the trustee if removal would not be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. Such is not the case under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, This is because T.C.A. § 35-15-706 is the exclusive provision regarding removal of trustees. T.C.A. § 35-15-706(b)(4) recognizes that a request for removal upon unanimous agreement of the qualified beneficiaries is a factor for the court to consider, but before removing the trustee the court must also find that such action best serves the interests of all the beneficiaries, that removal is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and that a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available. Compare  T.C.A. § 35-15-706(b)(4), with  Restatement (Third) Section 65 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001).

The requirement that the trust no longer serve a material purpose before it can be terminated by the beneficiaries does not mean that the trust must have no remaining function. In order to be material, the purpose remaining to be performed must be of some significance.

Subsection (c) recognizes that the qualified beneficiaries' power to compel termination of the trust includes the right to direct how the trust property is to be distributed. Once termination has been approved, how the trust property is to be distributed is solely subject to the agreement of the qualified beneficiaries.

Note that while no gift tax consequences result from a termination as long as the beneficiaries agree to distribute the trust property in accordance with the value of the beneficiary’s respective proportionate interests, significant gift taxes can occur if such beneficiaries do not so agree, or in any event distribute the property in a manner not so in accordance.

Subsection (d) creates a procedure for judicial approval of a proposed termination or modification during the settlor’s life when, although the settlor did not object after being provided with the requisite notice , less than all of the qualified beneficiaries consented to such termination or modification.

Subsection (d) also, similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 338(2)  & 340(2) (1959), addresses situations after the settlor’s death in which a termination or modification is requested by less than all the qualified beneficiaries, either because a qualified beneficiary objects, the consent of a qualified beneficiary cannot be obtained, or representation is either unavailable or its application uncertain.

In either case, subsection (d) allows the court to fashion an appropriate order protecting the interests of the nonconsenting qualified beneficiaries while at the same time permitting the remainder of the trust property to be distributed without restriction. The order of protection for the nonconsenting qualified beneficiaries might include partial continuation of the trust, the purchase of an annuity, or the valuation and cashout of the interest.

Note that relative to all the provisions of subsection (d), only the qualified  beneficiaries and their interests are subject to consideration. This is unlike Uniform Trust Code section 411(e) (the corresponding provision in the Uniform Trust Code), under which the all  beneficiaries and their interests are subject to consideration.

Subsection (e) is not contained in the Uniform Trust Code. It is a tax savings provision and clarifies that this section applies to trusts with a small charitable interest if no charitable tax deduction was allowed with respect to the funding of the trust.

Subsection (f) is not contained in the Uniform Trust Code. It gives a trustee the right to always seek court approval of a modification or termination under subsection (a), even though such is not otherwise required.

Note that under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code a trust advisor or trust protector may have the power to directly or indirectly modify a trust without being subject to T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-412 and 35-15-414.

35-15-412. Modification or termination because of unanticipated circumstances or inability to administer trust effectively.

  1. The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or terminate the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination will further the purposes of the trust. To the extent practicable, the modification must be made in accordance with the settlor's probable intention.
  2. The court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust's administration.
  3. Upon termination of a trust under this section, the trustee shall distribute the trust property in a manner consistent with the purposes of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 34.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-412.

This section broadens the court's ability to apply equitable deviation to terminate or modify a trust. Subsection (a) allows a court to modify the dispositive provisions of the trust as well as its administrative terms. For example, modification of the dispositive provisions to increase support of a beneficiary might be appropriate if the beneficiary has be-come unable to provide for support due to poor health or serious injury. Subsection (a) is similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), except that this section, unlike the Restatement, does not impose a duty on the trustee to petition the court if the trustee is aware of circumstances justifying judicial modification. The purpose of the “equitable deviation” authorized by subsection (a) is not to disregard the settlor's intent but to modify inopportune details to effectuate better the settlor's broader purposes. Nevertheless, in light of T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(3) and other portions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code that repeatedly stress the importance of settlor’s intent, when exercising its equitable powers under subsection (a), a court should deviate in a manner that fills as nearly as possible the settlor’s intent and purposes.

Among other things, equitable deviation may be used to modify administrative or dispositive terms due to the failure to anticipate economic change or the incapacity of a beneficiary. For numerous illustrations, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001). While it is necessary that there be circumstances not anticipated by the settlor before the court may grant relief under subsection (a), the circumstances may have been in existence when the trust was created. This section thus complements T.C.A. § 35-15-415, which allows for reformation of a trust based on mistake of fact or law at the creation of the trust.

Subsection (b) broadens the court's ability to modify the administrative terms of a trust. The standard under subsection (b) is similar to the standard for applying cy pres to a charitable trust. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-413(a).

Note that, relative to applying cy pres, unlike in the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, T.C.A. § 35-15-413(a) does not does not contain the word “wasteful,” and substitutes the words “obsolete or ineffective” as grounds for modification or termination because the word “wasteful” is believed to be too vague and subject to too broad of interpretation.

Although the literal language of subsection (b) uses the Uniform Trust Code word “wasteful,” it is the opinion of the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, that the proper way to interpret the word “wasteful” in this section is to mean “obsolete or ineffective.” Such drafters state this for several reasons. First, the purposes of subsection (b) and of T.C.A. § 35-15-413(a) are virtually identical, with the former applying to non-charitable trusts and the latter to charitable trusts and therefore should be subject to the same standard. The most recent legislative expression of that standard is contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-413(a), such having been amended in 2013 while subsection (b) has not ever been amended since the original adoption of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Finally, while recognizing that at times trusts need modification, the Tennessee trust statutes have a very high regard to settlor’s intent. This last sentence would indicate the exercise of judicial restraint throughout the interpretation and implementation of this section.

Subsections (a) and (b) are not mutually exclusive. Many situations justifying modification of administrative terms under subsection (a) will also justify modification under subsection (b). Subsection (b) is also an application of the requirement in T.C.A. § 35-15-404 that a trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries augmented pursuant to the standard required by the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) that such “benefit of its beneficiaries” must be interpreted “as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust.” Such provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) are controlling throughout the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and should, therefore, always be deemed to modify the phrase “that a trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries,” regardless of where such phrase is found in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. See section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(3).

In general, due to its overriding emphasis on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code greatly limits, and to a significant extent, rejects, the views contained in the comment to Uniform Trust Code section 412, referencing the restatements, that are contained in the immediately following paragraph. It is the view of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code that such following comment of the Uniform Trust Code is overly broad. For a few examples of how the view of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverge from that of the Uniform Trust Code (and the restatements) see  T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a) and (c) and the section comments thereto; T.C.A. § 35-15-404 and the section comment thereto; as well as the entire comments to T.C.A. § 35-15-101.

Such divergent views held by the comment to Uniform Trust Code section 412 are as follows:

“See also , Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 27(2) & cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). Although the settlor is granted considerable latitude in defining the purposes of the trust, the principle that a trust have a purpose which is for the benefit of its beneficiaries precludes unreasonable restrictions on the use of trust property. An owner's freedom to be capricious about the use of the owner's own property ends when the property is impressed with a trust for the benefit of others. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 124  cmt. g (1959). Thus, attempts to impose unreasonable restrictions on the use of trust property will fail. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 27  Reporter's Notes to cmt. b (Ten-tative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). Subsection (b), unlike subsection (a), does not have a direct precedent in the common law.”

While Tennessee desires the flexibility provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-412, such flexibility must be balanced with settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition.

Upon termination of a trust under this section, subsection (c) requires that the trust be distributed in a manner consistent with the purposes of the trust, as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust. As under the doctrine of cy pres, effectuating a distribution consistent with the purposes of the trust, as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust, requires an examination of what will fulfill as nearly as possible the settlor’s intent and purposes had the settlor been aware of the unanticipated circumstances. Typically, such terminating distributions will be made to the qualified beneficiaries, often in proportion to the actuarial value of their interests, although the section does not so prescribe. For the definition of qualified beneficiary, see T.C.A. § 35-15-103.

Modification under this section, because it does not require beneficiary action, is not necessarily precluded by a spendthrift provision. However, the court is urged to consider whether a spendthrift (or any other) provision is a material purpose of the trust and if it finds such purpose should be reluctant to terminate the trust, balancing the benefit of any such material purpose with the perceived need to terminate the trust. Moreover, under T.C.A. § 35-15-105(c), “Any purpose enunciated as a material purpose of a trust in that trust's trust instrument shall be treated as a material purpose of that trust for all purposes of this chapter and chapter 16.”

Note that under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code a trust advisor or trust protector may have the power to directly or indirectly modify a trust without being subject to T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-412 and 35-15-414.

35-15-413. Cy pres.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, obsolete or ineffective:
    1. The trust does not fail, in whole or in part;
    2. The trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor’s successors in interest; and
    3. The court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner that fulfills as nearly as possible the settlor’s charitable intent and purposes.
  2. A provision in the terms of a charitable trust that would result in distribution of the trust property to a noncharitable beneficiary prevails over the power of the court under subsection (a) to apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust only if, when the provision takes effect:
    1. The trust property is to revert to the settlor and the settlor is still living; or
    2. Fewer than twenty-one (21) years have elapsed since the date of the trust’s creation.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 35; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 13, 14.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, §§ 4, 5.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-413.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the ex-tent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subsection (a) codifies the court's inherent authority to apply cy pres. The power may be applied to modify an administrative or dispositive term. The court may order the trust terminated and distributed to other charitable entities. Partial termination may also be ordered if the trust property is more than sufficient to satisfy the trust's current purposes. Subsection (a), which is similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), modifies the doctrine of cy pres by presuming that the settlor had a general charitable intent when a particular charitable purpose becomes impossible or impracticable to achieve. Traditional doctrine did not supply that presumption, leaving it to the courts to determine whether the settlor had a general charitable intent. If such an intent is found, the trust property is applied to other charitable purposes. If not, the charitable trust fails. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399  (1959). In the great majority of cases the settlor would prefer that the property be used for other charitable purposes. Courts are usually able to find an appropriate charitable purpose to which to apply the property, no matter how vaguely such purpose may have been expressed by the settlor.

    In keeping with the primary objectives of the Tennessee trust statutes that a settlor’s intent be the lodestar by which a trust is interpreted, that such intent be carried out and that settlors have the freedom to dispose of their assets to whom and in the manner they wish, all to the greatest extent constitutionally allowable, subsection (a) states if the particular purpose for which the trust was created becomes impracticable, unlawful, impossible to achieve, obsolete or ineffective, the trust does not fail. The court instead must either: (a) modify the terms of the trust; or (b) distribute the property of the trust; in either case in a manner that fulfills as nearly as possible the settlor's charitable intent and purposes.

    Unlike in the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, subsection (a) of this section does not contain the word “wasteful,” and substitutes the words “obsolete or ineffective” as grounds for modification or termination because the word “wasteful” is believed to be too vague and subject to too broad of interpretation.

    Also unlike the Uniform Trust Code, which only requires that the manner of any modification or termination be “consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes,” subsection (a) requires that any such modification or termination be effected in a manner “that fulfills as nearly as possible the settlor’s intent and purposes.” The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code believes that such requirement of subsection (a) is far less likely to effect a modification or termination that strays from a settlor’s intent and purposes and therefore results in favoring some watered down, vague and general, charitable purpose.

    The settlor, with one exception, may mandate that the trust property pass to a noncharitable beneficiary upon failure of a particular charitable purpose (as such is defined in subsection (a) of this section). Responding to concerns about the clogging of title and other administrative problems caused by remote default provisions upon failure of a charitable purpose (as such is defined in subsection (a) of this section), subsection (b) invalidates a gift over to a noncharitable beneficiary upon such failure unless the trust property is to revert to a still living settlor or fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the trust's creation. Subsection (b) will not apply to a charitable lead trust, under which a charity receives payments for a term certain with a remainder to a noncharity. In the case of a charitable lead trust, the settlor's particular charitable purpose does not fail upon completion of the specified trust term and distribution of the remainder to the noncharity. Upon completion of the specified trust term, the settlor's particular charitable purpose has instead been fulfilled. For a discussion of the reasons for a provision such as subsection (b), see Ronald Chester, Cy Pres of Gift Over: The Search for Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 41 (1989).

    The doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to trusts, but also to other types of charitable dispositions, including those to charitable corporations. This section does not control dispositions made in nontrust form. However, in formulating rules for such dispositions, the courts often refer to the principles governing charitable trusts, which would include the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    For the definition of charitable purpose, see T.C.A. § 35-15-405.

    Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 35-15-405 and 35-15-410, a petition requesting a court to enforce a charitable trust or to apply cy pres may be maintained by a settlor. Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such action can also be maintained by a cotrustee, the Tennessee attorney general, or by a person having a special interest in the charitable disposition. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391  (1959). Moreover, under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such action can also be maintained by a trust advisor or trust protector, if either holds the power to do so.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-414. Modification or termination of uneconomic trust.

  1. After notice to the qualified beneficiaries, the trustee of a trust consisting of trust property having either a total value less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or for which the trustee's annual fee for administering the trust, as set forth in the trustee's published fee schedule, is five percent (5%) or more of the market value of the principal assets of the trust as of the last day of the preceding trust accounting year or the present market value of the principal assets of the trust if there is no applicable trust accounting for a preceding year may terminate the trust if the trustee concludes that the value of the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of administration.
  2. The court may modify or terminate a trust or remove the trustee and appoint a different trustee if it determines that the value of the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of administration.
  3. Upon the termination of a trust under this section, the trustee shall distribute the trust property to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries, in such shares as the trustee, or the court if a court proceeding, determines, after taking into account the interests of income and remainder beneficiaries so as to conform as nearly as possible to the intention of the settlor, but a trust that qualified for the marital deduction for tax purposes shall only be distributed to the spouse of the settlor for whom the trust was created.
  4. This section does not apply to an easement for conservation or preservation.
  5. This section shall not limit the right of a trustee, acting alone, to terminate a trust in accordance with applicable provisions of the governing instrument.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 36; 2019, ch. 340, § 15.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote (a) which read: “After notice to the qualified beneficiaries, the trustee of a trust consisting of trust property having a total value less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) may terminate the trust if the trustee concludes that the value of the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of administration.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, §§ 5, 17.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-414.

The provisions of subsection (c) of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Subsection (a) assumes that a trust with a value of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or less is sufficiently likely to be inefficient to administer that a trustee should be able to terminate it without the expense of a judicial termination proceeding. Because subsection (a) is a default rule, a settlor is free to set a higher or lower figure or to specify different procedures or to prohibit termination without a court order. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-105 and the general comment to chapter 4 at T.C.A. § 35-15-401.

Subsection (b) allows the court to modify or terminate a trust if the costs of administration would otherwise be excessive in relation to the size of the trust. The court may terminate a trust under this section even if the settlor has for-bidden it. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(4). Judicial termination under this subsection may be used whether or not the trust is larger or smaller than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).

When considering whether to terminate a trust under either subsection (a) or (b), the trustee or court should consider the purposes of the trust and whether any material purposes exist relative to the trust. Termination under this section is not always wise. Even if administrative costs may seem excessive in relation to the size of the trust, protection of the assets from beneficiary mismanagement or from a beneficiary’s creditors may indicate that the trust be continued. The court may be able to reduce the costs of administering the trust by appointing a new trustee.

Upon termination of a trust under this section, subsection (c) requires that the trust property be distributed in a manner that conforms as nearly as possible to the intention of the settlor. Often, distribution under this section will be made to the qualified beneficiaries in proportion to the actuarial value of their interests. However, subsection (c) states that a trust that qualified for the marital deduction for tax purposes shall only be distributed to the spouse of the settlor for whom the trust was created. Overall the provisions of subsection (c) are stricter than those in the Uniform Trust Code and such provisions are designed to further settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition.

In addition to outright distribution to the beneficiaries, T.C.A. § 35-15-816(21) authorizes payment may be made to a variety of alternate payees.

Even though not accompanied by the usual trappings of a trust, the creation and transfer of an easement for conservation or preservation will frequently create a charitable trust. The organization to whom the easement was conveyed will be deemed to be acting as trustee of what will ostensibly appear to be a contractual or property arrangement. Because of the fiduciary obligation imposed, the termination or substantial modification of the easement by the “trustee” could constitute a breach of trust. The drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code concluded that easements for conservation or preservation are sufficiently different from the typical cash and securities found in small trusts that they should be excluded from this section, and subsection (d) so provides. Most creators of such easements, it was surmised, would prefer that the easement be continued unchanged even if the easement, and hence the trust, has a relatively low market value. For the law of conservation easements, see Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.6  (2000).

Subsection (e) is not contained in the Uniform Trust Code. It reinforces a trustee’s power, acting alone, to terminate a trust in accordance with the terms contained in a trust instrument.

While this section is not directed principally at honorary or purpose trusts, it may be so applied. See  T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 and 35-15-409.

Because termination of a trust under this section is initiated by the trustee or ordered by the court, it is not necessarily precluded by a spendthrift provision. However, the court is urged to consider whether a spendthrift (or any other) provision is a material purpose of the trust and if it finds such purpose should be reluctant to terminate the trust, balancing the benefit of any such material purpose with the perceived need to terminate the trust. Moreover, under T.C.A. § 35-15-105(c), “Any purpose enunciated as a material purpose of a trust in that trust's trust instrument shall be treated as a material purpose of that trust for all purposes of this chapter and chapter 16.”

Note that under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code a trust advisor or trust protector may have the power to directly or indirectly modify a trust without being subject to T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-412 and 35-15-414.

35-15-415. Reformation to correct mistakes.

The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 37.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-415.

Reformation of inter vivos instruments to correct a mistake of law or fact is a long-established remedy. Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995), which this section copies, clarifies that this doctrine also applies to wills.

This section applies whether the mistake is one of expression or one of inducement. A mistake of expression occurs when the terms of the trust misstate the settlor's intention, fail to include a term that was intended to be included, or include a term that was not intended to be included. A mistake in the inducement occurs when the terms of the trust accurately reflect what the settlor intended to be included or excluded but this intention was based on a mistake of fact or law. See  Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.1 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995). Mistakes of expression are frequently caused by scriveners' errors while mistakes of inducement often trace to errors of the settlor.

Reformation is different from resolving an ambiguity. Resolving an ambiguity involves the interpretation of language already in the instrument. Reformation, on the other hand, may involve the addition of language not originally in the instrument, or the deletion of language originally included by mistake, if necessary to conform the instrument to the settlor's intent. Because reformation may involve the addition of language to the instrument, or the deletion of language that may appear clear on its face, reliance on extrinsic evidence is essential. To guard against the possibility of unreliable or contrived evidence in such circumstance, the higher standard of clear and convincing proof is required. See  Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.1 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995).

In determining the settlor's original intent, the court may consider evidence relevant to the settlor's intention even though it contradicts an apparent plain meaning of the text. The objective of the plain meaning rule, to protect against fraudulent testimony, is satisfied by the requirement of clear and convincing proof. See  Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.1 cmt. d and Reporter's Notes (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995). See also  John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 521 (1982) .

For further discussion of the rule of this section and its application to illustrative cases, see Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.1 cmts. and Reporter's Notes (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995).

Notwithstanding the language above in this comment, a court considering reformation should be mindful of and balance the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s emphasis on interpreting the interests of beneficiaries using the standard, “as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust,” which is provided for in T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(3).

35-15-416. Modification to achieve settlor's tax objectives.

To achieve the settlor's tax objectives, the court may modify the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the settlor's probable intention. The court may provide that the modification has retroactive effect.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 38.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-416.

This section is copied from Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995). “Modification” under this section is to be distinguished from the “reformation” authorized by T.C.A. § 35-15-415. Reformation under T.C.A. § 35-15-415 is available when the terms of a trust fail to reflect the donor's original, particularized intention. The mistaken terms are then reformed to conform to this specific intent. The modification authorized here allows the terms of the trust to be changed to meet the settlor's tax-saving objective as long as the resulting terms, particularly the dispositive provisions, are not inconsistent with the settlor's probable intent. The modification allowed by this subsection is similar in concept to the cy pres doctrine for charitable trusts (see  T.C.A. § 35-15-413), and the deviation doctrine for unanticipated circumstances T.C.A. § 35-15-412). Therefore the comments to such sections of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code regarding honoring settlor’s intent and effecting any necessary modification in a manner “that fulfills as nearly as possible the settlor’s intent and purposes” are applicable to this section as well.

Whether a modification made by the court under this section will be recognized under federal tax law is a matter of federal law. Absent specific statutory or regulatory authority, binding recognition is normally given only to modifications made prior to the taxing event, for example, the death of the testator or settlor in the case of the federal estate tax. See Rev. Rul. 73-142, 1973-1 C.B. 405 . Among the specific modifications authorized by the Internal Revenue Code or Service include the revision of split-interest trusts to qualify for the charitable deduction, modification of a trust for a noncitizen spouse to become eligible as a qualified domestic trust, and the splitting of a trust to utilize better the exemption from generation-skipping tax.

For further discussion of the rule of this section and the relevant case law, see Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers § 12.2 cmts. and Reporter's Notes (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1995).

Notwithstanding the language above in this comment, a court considering reformation should be mindful of and balance the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s emphasis on interpreting the interests of beneficiaries using the standard, “as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust,” which is provided for in T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(3).

35-15-417. Combination and division of trusts.

After notice to the qualified beneficiaries, a trustee may combine two (2) or more trusts into a single trust or divide a trust into two (2) or more separate trusts, if the result does not impair rights of any beneficiary or adversely affect the achievement of the purposes of the trust. If the trusts to be combined or divided have different trustees, the trustees may negotiate the terms of the combined or divided trusts, including which trust or trusts will be the surviving trust or trusts, who will be the trustee or trustees of the surviving trust or trusts and any other matter relating to the operation of the surviving trust or trusts.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 39; 2007, ch. 24, § 20.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-417.

This section, which authorizes the combination or division of trusts, is subject to contrary provision in the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105 and the general comment to chapter 4 contained at T.C.A. § 35-15-401. Many trust instruments and standardized estate planning forms include comprehensive provisions governing combination and division of trusts. Except for the requirement that the qualified beneficiaries receive advance notice of a proposed combination or division, this section is similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 68 (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001).

This section allows a trustee to combine two or more trusts even though their terms are not identical. Typically the trusts to be combined will have been created by different members of the same family and will vary on only insignificant details, such as the presence of different perpetuities savings periods. The more the dispositive provisions of the trusts to be combined differ from each other the more likely it is that a combination would impair some beneficiary's interest, hence the less likely that the combination will not be objected to by one of the beneficiaries. Combining trusts may prompt more efficient trust administration and is sometimes an alternative to terminating an uneconomic trust as authorized by T.C.A. § 35-15-414. Administrative economies promoted by combining trusts include a potential reduction in trustees' fees, particularly if the trustee charges a minimum fee per trust, the ability to file one trust income tax return instead of multiple returns, and the ability to invest a larger pool of capital more effectively. Particularly if the terms of the trust are identical, available administrative economies may suggest that the trustee should consider pursuing a combination. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-805 (duty to incur only reasonable costs).

Notwithstanding the above, T.C.A. § 35-15-410(c), which does not have a Uniform Trust Code equivalent, makes it clear that, under the Uniform Trust Code, no trustee has a duty to make or seek approval of any modification or termination, including any combination or division, of any trust and cannot be held liable for failing to do so.

Division of trusts is often beneficial and, in certain circumstances, almost routine. Division of trusts is frequently undertaken due to a desire to obtain maximum advantage of exemptions available under the federal generation-skipping tax. While the terms of the trusts which result from such a division are identical, the division will permit differing investment objectives to be pursued and allow for discretionary distributions to be made from one trust and not the other. Given the substantial tax benefits often involved, a failure by the trustee to pursue a division might in certain cases be a breach of fiduciary duty. However, see the language from T.C.A. § 35-15-410(c) above, which tends to override the previous sentence, such previous sentence coming from the comments to Uniform Trust Code section 417, and as such is not controlling over contrary provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. The opposite could also be true if the division is undertaken to increase fees or to fit within the small trust termination provision. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-414.

This section authorizes a trustee to divide a trust even if the trusts that result are dissimilar. Conflicts among beneficiaries, including differing investment objectives, often invite such a division, although as in the case with a proposed combination of trusts, the more the terms of the divided trusts diverge from the original plan, the less likely it is that the settlor's purposes would be achieved and that the division could be approved.

This section does not require that a combination or division be approved either by the court or by the beneficiaries. Prudence may dictate, however, that court approval under T.C.A. § 35-15-410 be sought and beneficiary consent obtained whenever the terms of the trusts to be combined or the trusts that will result from a division differ substantially one from the other. For the provisions relating to beneficiary consent or ratification of a transaction, or release of trustee from liability, see T.C.A. § 35-15-1009.

While the consent of the beneficiaries is not necessary before a trustee may combine or divide trusts under this section, advance notice to the qualified beneficiaries of the proposed combination or division is required. This is consistent with T.C.A. § 35-15-813, to the extent such section requires that the trustee keep certain beneficiaries reasonably in-formed of trust administration or that the trustee give advance notice to certain required beneficiaries of several speci-fied actions that may have a major impact on their interests.

For a provision authorizing a trustee, in distributing the assets of the divided trust, to make non-pro-rata distributions, see T.C.A. § 35-15-816(b)(22).

Finally, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides more flexibility than does the Uniform Trust Code regarding the mechanics with which an actual combination or division will be carried out. Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, in cases where such trusts have or will have different trustees, the two trustees may negotiate the terms of the trust relative to such combination or division.

Part 5
Creditor's Claims — Mandatory, Support and Discretionary Interests — Effect of Spendthrift Provision

35-15-501. Application; rights of beneficiary's creditor or assignee.

This part applies to a creditor's or assignee's claims and ability to reach mandatory, support and discretionary interests regardless of whether such interests are subject to a spendthrift provision. To the extent not otherwise prohibited by this part, the court may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary's distribution interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary or other means. The court may limit the award to such relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 40; 2007, ch. 24, § 21; 2013, ch. 390, § 15.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 12 Tenn. Juris., Executions, § 56; 22 Tenn. Juris., Spendthrift Trusts, § 1.

    Law Reviews.

    Symposium: The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer: Comment, Pro and Con (Law): Considering the Irrevocable Nongrantor Trust Technique, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1999 (2014).

    1. Spendthrift Provision.

    Appellate court construed trust as restraining the voluntary and involuntary transfer of farm property itself, but also as allowing a beneficiary to voluntarily transfer a year's worth of income from the property; thus, that portion of the spendthrift provision pertaining to voluntary alienation of farm income was invalid, and debtor's interest in that income was subject to execution. Atkins v. Marks, 288 S.W.3d 356, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 2008), rehearing denied, 288 S.W.3d 356, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2008).

    General Comment.

    The provisions of part five (5) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverge, in many cases significantly, from the provisions contained in Uniform Trust Code, as well as from the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, on which much of part 5 of the Uniform Trust Code was based. To the extent part 5 is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Part five (5) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code offers far more creditor protection to trusts and their beneficiaries than does the Uniform Trust Code or the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. This is achieved in a number of ways, some of which are enumerated hereafter.

    Relative to spendthrift trusts, T.C.A. § 35-15-503 contains no exception creditors other than the state of Tennessee, and then only to the extent that a statute of the state of Tennessee so provides. The protection given by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to discretionary trusts is far broader than that provided by the Uniform Trust Code and, unlike under the latter, there are no exception creditors relative to an interest held in a discretionary trust.

    Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, a discretionary interest held in a trust (a “discretionary trust”) does not require a spendthrift provision in order to gain the protective benefits or attributes of a discretionary interest. Such protective benefits an attributes are inherent in such interest.

    When combined with the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s definition of what constitutes a discretionary trust, only a limited number of the types of trusts typically used for donative purposes do not obtain the benefit of such creditor protection. This is in keeping with the objective of the Tennessee trust statutes that a settlor should have the broadest freedom to dispose of their assets to whom, and in the manner, they wish (and to only those persons, and in only such manner, as a settlor wishes). Such creditor protection respects that the assets in the trust initially belonged to the settlor and not the beneficiary. When those assets are put in a discretionary trust, the beneficiary obtained only beneficial rights that do not rise to the status of a property interest and, therefore, cannot be reached by creditors, even absent a spendthrift provision. Under the Tennessee trust statutes, an irrevocable special needs trust is shielded from claims by creditors of the settlor regardless of whether or not such trust complies with the provisions of chapter 16, the Tennessee Investment Services Trust Act. Finally, any interest of a beneficiary under a support trust likewise does not rise to the status of a property interest and is therefore protected from creditors, even absent a spendthrift provision.

    Notwithstanding the above, the Tennessee trust statutes still respect the right of beneficiaries of support and mandatory interests to obtain redress for a trustee’s failure to respect such interests due such beneficiaries under them. However, no creditor of any such beneficiary has such right and can only reach a distribution made from such interests after the distribution is made and then in only specified circumstances.

    The provisions of this part relating to the validity and effect of a spendthrift provision, as well as the rights of certain creditors and assignees to reach a spendthrift trust, or a mandatory, support or discretionary interest, may not be modified by the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b).

    This part does not generally supersede this state’s exemption statutes nor this state’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, T.C.A. title 66, chapter 3, part 3. Nevertheless, certain provisions of this part modify certain provisions of such act.

    Section Comment.

    The section generally describes the overall application of title 35, part 5.

    It also states that, to the extent not otherwise prohibited by such part 5, a court may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s distribution interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary or other means.

    Finally, it grants such court the discretion to limit any such award to any such creditor or assignee to such relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Spendthrift Provision.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-502. Spendthrift provision.

  1. A spendthrift provision is valid only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest.
  2. A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary is held subject to a “spendthrift trust,” or words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's interest.
  3. A spendthrift provision applies to all beneficial interests, including distribution interests and remainder interests.
  4. A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in violation of a valid spendthrift provision and a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach any of, the interest, or a present, future or prospective distribution at the trust level. Similarly, no creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may force any distribution from the trust. This subsection (d) remains applicable regardless of the beneficiary's potential right to force a distribution under § 35-15-814.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, regardless of whether a beneficiary has any outstanding creditor, a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary of a trust subject to a spendthrift provision may directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary and may exhaust the income and principal of the trust for the benefit of such beneficiary. No trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary is liable to any creditor for paying the expenses of a beneficiary under a trust subject to a spendthrift provision. This subsection (e) remains applicable regardless of whether the beneficiary for whom such direct payment was made held a mandatory, support, discretionary or remainder interest.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 41; 2013, ch. 390, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 12 Tenn. Juris., Executions, § 56; 22 Tenn. Juris., Spendthrift Trusts, § 1.

    1. Validity.

    Appellate court construed trust as restraining the voluntary and involuntary transfer of farm property itself, but also as allowing a beneficiary to voluntarily transfer a year's worth of income from the property; thus, that portion of the spendthrift provision pertaining to voluntary alienation of farm income was invalid, and debtor's interest in that income was subject to execution. Atkins v. Marks, 288 S.W.3d 356, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 2008), rehearing denied, 288 S.W.3d 356, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2008).

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-502.

    This section addresses the effects of a spendthrift provision as such is defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103, on any type of trust and on any type of beneficial interest under such trust.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Spendthrift provisions and the effects thereof are also discussed in other places throughout the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and its comments. Two notable places a reader is directed are; the section comments related to the term “spendthrift provision” in T.C.A. § 35-15-103; and the comments under the heading “Part 5. Creditor’s Claims; Spend-thrift and Discretionary Trusts.” in T.C.A. § 35-15-101.

    Subsection (a) provides that for a spendthrift provision to be effective under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, it must prohibit both the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest. That is to say, a settlor may not allow a beneficiary to assign while prohibiting a beneficiary’s creditor from collecting, and vice versa. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 152(2)  (1959). A spendthrift provision valid under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code will also be recognized as valid in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2).

    Subsection (b) allows a settlor to provide maximum spendthrift protection simply by stating in the instrument that all interests are held subject to a “spendthrift trust” or words of similar effect.

    Subsection (c) provides that a settlor has the power to restrain the transfer of a beneficiary’s interest, regardless of whether the beneficiary has a beneficial interest in income, in principal, or in both and regardless of whether such interest is or derives from any type of distribution interest (mandatory, support or discretionary) or is a remainder interest. A creditor of the beneficiary is prohibited from attaching a protected interest and may only attempt to collect directly from the beneficiary after payment is made.

    Subsection (d) provides that a spendthrift provision blocks any creditor or assignee (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “creditor”) of a beneficiary from reaching any interest of such beneficiary, as well as any present, future or prospective distribution at the trust level. Likewise, no creditor can force any distribution from the trust. This remains true despite the fact that a beneficiary under mandatory and support interests may potentially force a distribution under T.C.A. § 35-15-814.

    Subsection (e) provides that the existence of any creditor of any beneficiary of a trust with a spendthrift provision in no way impacts any trustee’s, cotrustee’s or other fiduciary’s (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “fiduciary”) right or ability to directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary; and such fiduciary may exhaust a trust for the benefit of such beneficiary. In other words a fiduciary need not make a distribution from a trust subject to a spendthrift provision directly to a beneficiary. Instead such fiduciary has the power to directly pay to a third party any expense for the benefit of such beneficiary and no creditor may reach such payment. If a fiduciary makes such a direct payment, it is not possible for such fiduciary to incur liability to any creditor for so doing. This remains true regardless of the beneficiary for which such payment was made held a mandatory, support, discretionary or remainder interest.

    A disclaimer, because it is a refusal to accept ownership of an interest and not a transfer of an interest already owned, is not affected by the presence or absence of a spendthrift provision. Most disclaimer statutes expressly provide that the validity of a disclaimer is not affected by a spendthrift protection. See, e.g ., Uniform Probate Code § 2-801(a). Releases and exercises of powers of appointment are also not affected because they are not transfers of property. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999).

    Except as otherwise provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-505, a spendthrift provision is ineffective against a beneficial interest retained by a settlor up to the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for such settlor’s benefit.

    A valid spendthrift provision makes it impossible for a beneficiary to make a legally binding assignment or transfer, but the appropriate fiduciary may voluntarily choose to honor such beneficiary’s purported assignment or transfer, such being in reality a revocable direction or request to the trustee to pay amounts otherwise distributable to the beneficiary to the purported assignee. Note that under the immediately preceding sentence a beneficiary’s purported assignment relative to a discretionary interest may have little if any practical effect. That is because the amounts “otherwise distributable to the beneficiary” are subject to the trustee’s discretion. An appropriate fiduciary is protected, and is under no liability for, honoring such beneficiary’s request, but must cease doing so upon instruction from such beneficiary. Should an appropriate fiduciary decide to honor such beneficiary’s request, such fiduciary can decide to cease to so honor it and may recommence distributions to the beneficiary at anytime. Moreover, because the beneficiary has not made a binding transfer, such beneficiary can withdraw the beneficiary’s direction but only as to future payments. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 152  cmt. i (1959), but the extent such restatements are in conflict with this paragraph, this paragraph and the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code controls.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-503. Exceptions to spendthift provision.

A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against a claim of this state to the extent a statute of this state so provides.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 42.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 22 Tenn. Juris., Spendthrift Trusts, § 1.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section exempts the claims of this state from the effects of a spendthrift provision, but only to the extent a statute of this state so allows. The claims of no other person are exempt from the effects of a spendthrift provision under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

35-15-504. Discretionary interests — Effect thereof.

  1. A discretionary interest is neither a property interest nor an enforceable right; it is a mere expectancy.
  2. Relative to a discretionary interest, whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
    1. No creditor or assignee shall force or otherwise reach a distribution with regard to a discretionary interest;
    2. No creditor or assignee shall require a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary to exercise the trustee's, cotrustee's or other fiduciary's discretion to make a distribution with regard to a discretionary interest;
    3. Regardless of whether a beneficiary has any outstanding creditors or assignees, a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary of a discretionary interest may directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary and may exhaust the income and principal of the trust for the benefit of such beneficiary;
    4. No trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary is liable to any creditor or assignee for paying the expenses of a beneficiary of a discretionary interest;
      1. Regardless of whether a beneficiary holding a discretionary interest is also a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary, subdivisions (b)(1)-(4) remain applicable if:
        1. The beneficiary-fiduciary does not have the discretion to make or participate in making distributions to such beneficiary-fiduciary;
        2. The beneficiary-fiduciary's discretion to make or participate in making distributions to such beneficiary-fiduciary is limited by an ascertainable standard; or
        3. The beneficiary-fiduciary's discretion to make or participate in making distributions to such beneficiary-fiduciary is exercisable only with the consent of a cotrustee or another person holding an adverse interest.
      2. A creditor or assignee may compel or otherwise reach a distribution only to the extent the creditor or assignee may compel or otherwise reach a distribution if the beneficiary was not acting as a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 43; 2007, ch. 24, § 22; 2013, ch. 390, § 17.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 22 Tenn. Juris., Spendthrift Trusts, § 1.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-504.

    The provisions of this section diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the ex-tent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section addresses the effect of a trust (a “discretionary trust”) containing a distribution interest that is a discretionary interest. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code and Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code maintains the traditional common law distinction between a trust having a discretionary interest (a “discretionary trust”) and a trust having a support interest (a “support trust”).

    These distinctions and the general effects thereof are also discussed in other places throughout the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and its comments. Two notable places a reader is directed are; the section comments related to the term “discretionary interest” in T.C.A. § 35-15-103; and the comments under the heading “Part 5. Creditor’s Claims; Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts.” in T.C.A. § 35-15-101.

    Subsection (a) expresses the traditional common law rule that a discretionary interest under a trust is not  a property interest. Therefore it is not an enforceable right, but only a mere expectancy. Because a discretionary interest is only an unenforceable expectancy and not a property interest, such can in no way “belong” to any beneficiary in their capacity as a beneficiary. The provisions of subsection (a) diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the subsection (a) is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subsection (b) expresses both the traditional common law view regarding the effects of, as well as what is simply the logical outcome of, the fact a discretionary interest is not a property interest, is not an enforceable right and is only an expectancy. The provisions of subsection (b) diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the subsection (b) is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    The traditional common law view regarding the effects of, as well as what is simply the logical outcome of, the fact a discretionary interest is not a property interest, is not an enforceable right and is only an expectancy follow Relative to a discretionary interest:

    A spendthrift provision is not required in order to gain any protective benefits or attributes of a discretionary interest. Such protective benefits and attributes are inherent in such interest.

    No creditor or assignee (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “creditor”) has the ability to force or otherwise reach a distribution.

    No creditor has the ability to force a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “fiduciary”) to exercise discretion relative to such interest.

    The existence of any creditor of any beneficiary in no way impacts a fiduciary’s right or ability to directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary; and such fiduciary may exhaust a trust for the benefit of such beneficiary. In other words a fiduciary need not make a discretionary distribution to a beneficiary. Instead such fiduciary has the power to directly pay to a third party any expense for the benefit of such beneficiary and no creditor may reach such payment. If a fiduciary makes such a direct payment, it is not possible for such fiduciary to incur liability to any creditor for so doing.

    Despite a beneficiary also being a fiduciary, all of the above holds trust so long as:

    the beneficiary-fiduciary has no discretion to make or participate in making any distribution to such beneficiary-fiduciary; or

    the beneficiary-fiduciary has discretion to make or participate in making any distribution to such beneficiary-fiduciary, but such discretion is limited by an ascertainable standard; or

    the beneficiary-fiduciary has discretion to make or participate in making any distribution to such beneficiary-fiduciary, but such discretion is only exercisable with the consent of another fiduciary or another person having an interest adverse to such beneficiary-fiduciary.

    In any event, a creditor of a beneficiary-fiduciary cannot compel or otherwise reach a distribution to a greater extent than could such creditor compel or otherwise reach a distribution if the beneficiary was not also acting as a fiduciary.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-505. Creditor's claims against settlor.

  1. Whether or not the terms of a trust contain a spendthrift provision, the following rules apply:
    1. During the lifetime of the settlor, the property of a revocable trust is subject to claims of the settlor's creditors.
    2. Except as provided in chapter 16 of this title regarding investment services trusts and subdivisions (a)(3)-(5) regarding an irrevocable special needs trust, a creditor or assignee of the settlor of an irrevocable trust may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit. If a trust has more than one (1) settlor, the amount the creditor or assignee of a particular settlor may reach may not exceed the settlor's interest in the portion of the trust attributable to that settlor's contribution;
    3. For the purposes of this section, “irrevocable special needs trust” means an irrevocable trust established for the benefit of one or more disabled persons, which includes, but is not limited to, any individual who is disabled pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a), as well as any individual who is disabled pursuant to any similar federal, state or other jurisdictional law or regulation, or has a condition that is substantially equivalent to one that qualifies them to be so disabled in accordance with any of the above even if not officially found to be so disabled by a governmental body if one of the purposes of the trust, expressed in the trust instrument or implied from the trust instrument, is to allow the disabled person to qualify or continue to qualify for public, charitable or private benefits that might otherwise be available to the disabled person. The existence of one or more nondisabled remainder beneficiaries of the trust shall not disqualify it as an irrevocable special needs trust for the purposes of this section;
    4. No creditor or assignee of the settlor of an irrevocable special needs trust, as defined in subdivision (a)(3), may reach or compel distributions from such special needs trust, to or for the benefit of the settlor of such special needs trust, or otherwise, regardless of whether or not such irrevocable special needs trust complies with, and irrespective of the requirements of, chapter 16 of this title; and
    5. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, neither a creditor nor any other person shall have any claim or cause of action against the trustee or other fiduciary, or an advisor of an irrevocable special needs trust. For purposes of this subdivision (a)(5), an advisor of an irrevocable special needs trust includes any person involved in the counseling, drafting, preparation, execution or funding of an irrevocable special needs trust.
    6. After the death of a settlor, and subject to the settlor's right to direct the source from which liabilities will be paid, the property of a trust that was revocable immediately preceding the settlor's death is subject to claims of the settlor's creditors, costs of administration of the settlor's estate and the expenses of the settlor's funeral and disposal of remains. With respect to claims, expenses, and taxes in connection with the settlement of the settlor's estate, any claim of a creditor that would be barred against the fiduciary of a settlor's estate, the estate of the settlor, or any creditor or beneficiary of the settlor's estate shall be barred against the trust property of a trust that was revocable at the settlor's death, the trustee of the revocable trust, and the creditors and beneficiaries of the trust. The provisions of § 30-2-317(a) detailing the priority of payment of claims, expenses, and taxes from the probate estate of a decedent shall apply to a revocable trust to the extent the assets of the settlor's probate estate are inadequate and the personal representative or creditor or taxing authority of the settlor's estate has perfected its right to collect from the settlor's revocable trust.
  2. For purposes of this section during the period a power of withdrawal may be exercised or upon the lapse, release, or waiver of the power, the holder is treated as the settlor of the trust only to the extent the value of the property affected by the lapse, release, or waiver exceeds the greater of the amount specified in § 2041(b)(2) or 2514(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(2) and § 2514(e)), or § 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 2503(b)), in each case as in effect on July 1, 2004, or as later amended.
  3. For purposes of subdivision (a)(2), the power of a trustee of an irrevocable trust, whether arising under the trust agreement or any other provision of the law, to make a distribution to or for the benefit of a settlor for the purpose of reimbursing the settlor in an amount equal to any income taxes payable on any portion of the trust principal and income that are includable in the settlor's personal income under applicable law, as well as distributions made by the trustee pursuant to such authority, shall not be considered an amount that may be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit.
  4. With respect to an irrevocable trust for which the settlor made a qualified election pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 2523(f), the power of a trustee, and any benefit resulting to the settlor from any exercise of such power, whether arising under the trust agreement or any other provision of the law, to make a distribution to or for the benefit of a settlor or to otherwise permit the settlor to use or benefit from trust property following the death of the settlor's spouse, shall not be considered an amount that may be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit for purposes of subdivision (a)(2). This subsection (d) shall not limit a creditor's remedies under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, compiled in title 66, chapter 3, part 3, regarding the settlor's transfers to such trust.
  5. For purposes of subdivision (a)(2) and subsection (g), a person who is the holder of a power of withdrawal is not considered a settlor of the trust by failing to exercise that power of withdrawal or letting that power of withdrawal lapse.
  6. For purposes of subdivision (a)(2) and subsection (g), a person who becomes a beneficiary of a trust due to the exercise of a power of appointment by someone other than such person shall not be considered a settlor of the trust.
    1. Notwithstanding § 66-3-310, no person shall bring an action with respect to a transfer of property to a spendthrift trust:
      1. If the person is a creditor when the transfer is made, unless the action is commenced within the later of two (2) years after the transfer is made or six (6) months after the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered the transfer; or
      2. If the person becomes a creditor after the transfer is made, unless the action is commenced within two (2) years after the transfer is made; and
    2. If subdivision (g)(1) applies:
      1. A person shall be deemed to have discovered the existence of a transfer at the time any public record is made of the transfer, including but not limited to, a conveyance of real property that is recorded in the office of the county register of deeds of the county in which the property is located or the filing of a financing statement under title 47, chapter 9, or the equivalent recording or filing of either with the appropriate person or official under the laws of a jurisdiction other than this state;
      2. No creditor shall bring an action with respect to a transfer of property to a spendthrift trust unless that creditor proves by clear and convincing evidence that the settlor's transfer to the trust was made with the intent to defraud that specific creditor; and
        1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, neither a creditor nor any other person shall have any claim or cause of action against the trustee or other fiduciary or an advisor of a spendthrift trust if that claim or cause of action is based in any way on any person availing themselves of the benefits of this subsection (g);
        2. For purposes of subdivision (g)(2)(B), an advisor of a spendthrift trust includes, but is not limited to, any person involved in the counseling, drafting, preparation, execution or funding of a spendthrift trust;
        3. For purposes of subdivision (g)(2)(B)(i), counseling, drafting, preparation, execution or funding of a spendthrift trust includes the counseling, drafting, preparation, execution and funding of a limited partnership, a limited liability company or any other type of entity if interests in the limited partnership, limited liability company or other entity are subsequently transferred to a spendthrift trust;
    3. Notwithstanding subdivision (g)(2)(B), in the same manner as provided other than by this section to trusts in general, a beneficiary, settlor, cotrustee, trust advisor or trust protector retains the right to bring a claim against a trustee or against another cotrustee, trust advisor, trust protector or any of their predecessors; however, no such claim shall arise solely because a person availed themselves, or attempted to avail themselves, of the benefits of this subsection (g);
    4. If more than one transfer of property is made to a spendthrift trust, the subsequent transfer of property to the spendthrift trust shall be disregarded for the purpose of determining whether a person may bring an action pursuant to this subsection (g) with respect to a prior transfer of property to the spendthrift trust; and any distribution to a beneficiary from the spendthrift trust shall be deemed to have been made from the most recent transfer made to the spendthrift trust;
    5. With the exception of any claim brought pursuant to subdivision (g)(3), notwithstanding any other law, no action of any kind, including, without limitation, an action to enforce a judgment entered by a court or other body having adjudicative authority, shall be brought at law or in equity against the trustee, other fiduciary or advisor of a spendthrift trust if, as of the date such action is brought, an action by a creditor with respect to a transfer of property to the spendthrift trust would be barred pursuant to this subsection (g); and
    6. This subsection (g) shall not abridge the rights of a creditor, to the extent otherwise provided by this section, to reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit under a spendthrift trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 44; 2007, ch. 24, §§ 23, 24; 2007, ch. 144, § 13; 2010, ch. 725, §§ 6, 7; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 18-21; 2019, ch. 340, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “subdivision (g)(2)(B)” for subdivision (g)(2)(C)” in (g)(2)(B)(ii) and (g)(3); and substituted “subdivision (g)(2)(B)(i)” for “subdivision (g)(2)(C)(i)” in (g)(2)(B)(iii).

    Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 22 Tenn. Juris., Spendthrift Trusts, § 1.

    Law Reviews.

    TennCare: Expanded Estate Recovery - Recover at ALL Cost, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 711 (2015).

    Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

    1. Bureau of TennCare Reimbursement.

    Chancery court properly concluded the Bureau of TennCare was entitled to use real property in a decedent's revocable trust to satisfy a claim against the estate for medical benefits, T.C.A. § 71-5-116(c)(1), because any property that could be reached by the personal representative pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-505 for the payment of the debts of an insolvent estate could be reached by the probate court for the purpose of reimbursing the Bureau. In re Estate of Stidham, 438 S.W.3d 535, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 910 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2012).

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-505.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subdivision (a)(1) states what is now a well accepted conclusion, that a revocable trust is subject to the claims of the settlor's creditors while the settlor is living. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25  cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996). Such claims were not allowed at common law, however. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330  cmt. o (1959).

    Subdivision (a)(2), provides that a settlor who is also a beneficiary may not use the trust under which they have both capacities as a shield against the settlor's creditors, unless:

    The settlor establishes an Investment Services Trust pursuant to title 35, chapter 16; or

    The trust qualifies as an irrevocable special needs trust under subdivisions (a)(3) through (a)(5).

    Outside of these two exceptions, a creditor of a settlor may reach the maximum amount that the trustee could have paid to the settlor-beneficiary, subject to adjustment should there be more than one (1) settlor. For the general definition of “settlor,” see T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Regardless of such general definition of “settlor,” subsections (e) and (f) of this section modify such general definition and expressly provide that persons described in subsections (e) and (f) are not “settlors” for the purposes of subdivision (a)(2), as well as for the purposes of subsection (g).

    This section does not generally address possible rights against a settlor who was insolvent at the time of the trust's creation or was rendered insolvent by the transfer of property to the trust. This subject is instead left to this state's other applicable laws on fraudulent transfers. Notwithstanding the preceding two sentences, section (g) hereof modifies certain effects of T.C.A. § 66-3-310 relative to transfers of property to a spendthrift trust and T.C.A. § 35-16-104 modifies certain effects of T.C.A. § 66-3-310 relative to transfers of property to a Tennessee Investment Services Trust. Depending on the facts, a transfer to the trust by an insolvent settlor might also constitute a voidable preference under federal bankruptcy law.

    Subdivisions (a)(3) — (a)(5) govern the ability of creditors to reach irrevocable special needs trusts, as well the liability of trustees, other fiduciaries and the advisors of irrevocable special needs trusts. Under these subdivisions an irrevocable special needs trust is shielded from claims by creditors of the settlor regardless of whether or not such trust complies with the provisions of chapter 16, the Tennessee Investment Services Trust Act. Moreover, the trustees, other fiduciaries and the advisors of irrevocable special needs trusts are shielded from liability.

    Subdivision (a)(6) recognizes that a revocable trust is usually employed as a will substitute. As such, the trust assets, following the death of the settlor, should be subject to the settlor's debts and other charges. However, in accordance with traditional doctrine, the assets of the settlor's probate estate must normally first be exhausted before the assets of the revocable trust can be reached. This section does not attempt to address the procedural issues raised by the need first to exhaust the decedent's probate estate before reaching the assets of the revocable trust. Subdivision (a)(6), however, does ratify the typical pourover will, revocable trust plan. As long as the rights of the creditor are not impaired, the settlor is free to shift liability from the probate estate to the revocable trust. This section clarifies that claims against revocable trusts are subject to the same time limitations, and are subject to the same order of priority among creditors as are imposed on claims against probate estates. Regarding other issues associated with potential liability of nonprobate assets for unpaid claims, see section 6-102 of the Uniform Probate Code, which was added to that Code in 1998.

    Subsection (b) deals with powers of withdrawal. As currently contained in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code such subsection is the version originally adopted in 2004 and remains unamended. Notwithstanding the preceding two sentences, see subsection (e) and the comments to same below. Subsection (e) was adopted with the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, and it overrides the provisions of subsection (b) (for several reasons, including being adopted later in time) as such applies to either subdivision (a)(2) or to subsection (g).

    On a related note, under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code all powers of ap-pointment, regardless of type, are held by the person to whom such power has been given solely in the capacity of a power holder and not by such power holder in a capacity as settlor. See the definition of “power of appointment” in T.C.A. § 35-15-103, as well as the section comments thereunder. Moreover, unlike the Uniform Trust Code, under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code one holding a power of appointment is not a beneficiary. Contrast the definition of “beneficiary” in T.C.A. § 35-15-103, as well as the section comments thereunder, with the definition of “beneficiary” in Uniform Trust Code section 103, and the comments thereunder. Under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, definitionally, one holding a power of appointment is neither a settlor nor a beneficiary. They are merely a power holder. Therefore, property held subject to a power of appointment cannot be subject to the claims of the power holder’s creditors. Moreover, in the case of a power of appointment subject to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such power is held under the terms of a trust. Therefore, re-gardless of any allusion or reference thereto in the Restatement (Property) Second: Donative Transfers § 13.2 (1986), powers of appointment that are governed by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code are not subject to T.C.A. § 66-1-106. Such section of the Tennessee Code requires that, in order to be subject to such section, any power of appointment must “not be accompanied by any trust,” and any power of appointment under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is so accompanied by a trust. To the extent that any of the above is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such are not precedential or controlling and are rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, which shall control.

    Subsection (c) provides another exception to the general rule that creditors can reach the settlor's interest under an irrevocable trust to the extent it can be used for the settlor's benefit. Such exception provides that the payment of income taxes on behalf of the settlor of an irrevocable grantor trust will not make the trust available to creditors of the settlor.

    Subsection (d) provides that the donor spouse's successor interests in an inter vivos QTIP trust do not cause the trust to lose spendthrift trust protection as to the donor spouse. Thus, if the donee spouse predeceases the donor spouse, the trust will continue to be a spendthrift trust after the donor spouse becomes a successor beneficiary of the trust.

    Subsection (e) provides another exception to the general rule that creditors can reach the settlor's interest under an irrevocable trust to the extent it can be used for the settlor's benefit. Such exception provides this by modifying the general definition of “settlor” found in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Subsection(e) expressly provides that a person holding a power of withdrawal is not considered a settlor of a trust by failing to exercise that power or by letting such power lapse. This subsection was added by the 2013 amendments to Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. It overrides the provisions of subsection (b) (for several reasons, including being adopted later in time) as such applies to either subdivision (a)(2) or to subsection (g), discussed below.

    Subsection (f) likewise by modifies the general definition of “settlor” found in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Subsection (f) provides that a person who becomes a beneficiary of a trust due to the exercise of a power of appointment by someone other than such person is not considered under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to be a settlor of a trust. This is true even if the person who so became the beneficiary created and funded the trust and granted the power of appointment to another. The provisions of subsection (f) apply to subdivision (a)(2). Such subdivision provides the general rule that creditors can reach the settlor's interest under an irrevocable trust to the extent it can be used for the settlor's benefit. Therefore, a person who becomes a beneficiary of a trust due to the exercise of a power of appointment by someone other than such person is not subject to such general rule. Accordingly, if a person who becomes a beneficiary of a trust due to the exercise of a power of appointment by someone other than such person did not otherwise retain a beneficial interest in the trust that was otherwise reachable (e.g., the settlor did not name himself as a beneficiary of the trust at the time it was created), the mere fact that some other person exercises a power of appointment to later make such person a beneficiary will not create an interest that is reachable by the settlor’s creditors. Subsection (f) also applies to subsection (g), discussed below.

    In general, subsection (g) creates a limitations period relative to contesting the validity of transfers to spendthrift trusts, and is designed to bring certainty to transfers to third party trusts, such certainty being an overriding objective of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Such subsection does not abridge the rights of a creditor to reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit to the extent otherwise provided by this section.

    Similarly, it does not abridge the ordinary rights of a beneficiary, settlor, cotrustee, trust advisor or trust protector to bring a claim against a trustee or against another cotrustee, trust advisor, trust protector or any of their predecessors relative to trust matters.

    2007 Amendment.

    The section was amended to recognize that a settler-beneficiary of an Investment Services Trust is entitled to spendthrift protection under certain circumstances.  The section was amended to further clarify that claims against revocable trusts are subject to the same time limitations, and are subject to the same order of priority among creditors as are imposed on claims against probate estates.  Subdivision (c) provides another exception to the general rule that creditors can reach the settlor’s interest under an irrevocable trust to the extent it can be used for the settlor’s benefit.   The exception provides that the payment of income taxes on behalf of the settlor of an irrevocable grantor trust will not make the trust available to creditors of the settlor.

    2010 Amendment.

    This section was amended to recognize that disabled persons who are beneficiaries of certain special needs trusts are entitled to spendthrift trust protection.

    Subsection (d) was added in 2010. This subsection provides that the donor spouse’s successor interests in an inter vivos qtip trust do not cause the trust to lose spendthrift trust protection as to the donor spouse.  Thus, if the donee spouse predeceases the donor spouse, the trust will continue to be a spendthrift trust after the donor spouse becomes a successor beneficiary of the trust.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bureau of TennCare Reimbursement.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-506. Distributions relative to support, mandatory and certain remainder interests.

  1. Relative to a support interest, whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
    1. Although a beneficiary of a support interest has enforceable rights under § 35-15-814, those rights do not raise the beneficiary's support interest to the level of a property interest;
    2. No creditor or assignee shall reach that support interest until a distribution from the support interest is actually made to the beneficiary;
    3. After all or a portion of a support interest is distributed to the beneficiary, no portion of the distribution made from the support interest shall be reached by a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary except to the extent that the distribution made from the support interest exceeds the amount necessary for the health, education, maintenance and support of the beneficiary who received the distribution made from the support interest;
    4. In the case of a beneficiary who holds a support interest, the use or enjoyment of property belonging to the trust by that beneficiary shall not be transferred and shall not be reached by creditors or assignees of that beneficiary;
    5. Regardless of whether a beneficiary has any outstanding creditors or assignees, a trustee or other fiduciary of a support interest may directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary and may exhaust the income and principal of the trust for the benefit of such beneficiary; and
    6. No trustee or other fiduciary is liable to any creditor or assignee for paying the expenses of a beneficiary of a support interest.
  2. Relative to a mandatory interest, whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
    1. While a court may order a trustee or other fiduciary to distribute a past due mandatory distribution to its beneficiary, no court shall order a trustee or other fiduciary to distribute such past due mandatory distribution directly to a creditor or assignee;
    2. Regardless of whether a beneficiary has any outstanding creditors or assignees, a trustee or other fiduciary of a mandatory interest may directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary and may exhaust the income and principal of the trust for the benefit of such beneficiary;
    3. No trustee or other fiduciary is liable to any creditor or assignee for paying the expenses of a beneficiary of a mandatory interest.
  3. Although a remainder interest may be an enforceable right, where it is not absolutely certain based on the language of the trust that the remainder interest will be distributed within one (1) year, it shall not be classified as a property interest. This subsection (c) does not affect eligibility for any public assistance program administered by the department of human services.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 45; 2007, ch. 24, § 25; 2013, ch. 390, § 22.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 22 Tenn. Juris., Spendthrift Trusts, § 1.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-506.

    This section addresses the respective rights of creditors and beneficiaries relative to distributions from support, mandatory and certain remainder interests.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subsection (a) only applies to support interests, and it applies to such interests regardless of whether or not the trust creating such interests contains a spendthrift provision. Relative to a support interest:

    Such support interest is not  a property interest. This is true even though a beneficiary of a support interest has certain enforceable rights as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-814.

    A spendthrift provision is not required in order to gain any protective benefits or attributes of a support interest. Such protective benefits an attributes are inherent in such interest.

    No creditor or assignee (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “creditor”) has the ability to force or otherwise reach a support interest until a distribution from such interest is actually made to a beneficiary.

    Even after such distribution from a support interest is made to a beneficiary, a creditor can only reach that portion of such distribution that exceeds the amount necessary for the health, education, maintenance and support of such beneficiary who received such distribution.

    No beneficiary holding a support interest can transfer the use or enjoyment of property belonging to the trust. Moreover, no such use or enjoyment of property may be reached the creditors of such beneficiary.

    The existence of any creditor of any beneficiary in no way impacts the right or ability of a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “fiduciary”) of a support interest to directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary; and such fiduciary may exhaust a trust for the benefit of such beneficiary. In other words a fiduciary need not make a distribution under a support interest to a beneficiary. Instead such fiduciary has the power to directly pay to a third party for any expense for the benefit of such beneficiary and no creditor may reach such payment. If a fiduciary makes such a direct payment, it is not possible for such fiduciary to incur liability to any creditor for so doing.

    Subsection (b) only applies to mandatory interests, and it applies to such interests regardless of whether or not the trust creating such interests contains a spendthrift provision. Relative to a mandatory interest:

    A court can only order a fiduciary to distribute any past due mandatory distribution to the beneficiary of that mandatory distribution.

    A court cannot order a fiduciary to distribute such past due mandatory distribution directly to a creditor.

    The existence of any creditor of any beneficiary in no way impacts the right or ability of a fiduciary of a mandatory interest to directly pay any expense on behalf of such beneficiary; and such fiduciary may exhaust a trust for the benefit of such beneficiary. In other words a fiduciary need not make a distribution under a mandatory interest to a beneficiary. Instead such fiduciary has the power to directly pay to a third party for any expense for the benefit of such beneficiary and no creditor may reach such payment. If a fiduciary makes such a direct payment, it is not possible for such fiduciary to incur liability to any creditor for so doing.

    Subsection (c) only applies to remainder interests. Relative to a mandatory interest:

    Although a remainder interest may be an enforceable right, unless it is absolutely certain based on the language of the trust that such interest will be distributed within one (1) year, it is not a property interest.

    Regardless, subsection (c) does not affect eligibility for any public assistance program administered by the department of human services.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

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35-15-507. Personal obligations of trustee.

Trust property is not subject to personal obligations of the trustee, even if the trustee becomes insolvent or bankrupt.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 46.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 22 Tenn. Juris., Spendthrift Trusts, § 1.

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Section Comment.

Because the beneficiaries of the trust hold the beneficial interest in the trust property and the trustee holds only legal title without the benefits of ownership, the creditors of the trustee have only a personal claim against the trustee. See Restatement (Third) § 5 cmt. k (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 12  cmt. a (1959). Similarly, a personal creditor of the trustee who attaches trust property to satisfy the debt does not acquire title as a bona fide purchaser even if the creditor is unaware of the trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 308  (1959). The protection afforded by this section is consistent with that provided by the Bankruptcy Code. Property in which the trustee holds legal title as trustee is not part of the trustee’s bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (d).

The exemption of the trust property from the personal obligations of the trustee is the most significant feature of Anglo-American trust law by comparison with the devices (e.g., fideicomisos, private foundations) available in civil law countries. A principal objective of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition is to protect the Anglo-American trust with respect to transactions in civil law countries. See  Hague Convention art. 11. See also  Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 434 (1998) ; John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165, 179-80 (1997) . Notwithstanding the above, it is important to note that the United States has not (as of May 2013) ratified such convention. Therefore, although such convention may be binding on the member-states who have ratified it, such convention has no force and effect on the United States, any state or this state (as such terms are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103).

Notwithstanding that the United States has not ratified this treaty, (as of May 2013) such convention has been fully or partially entered into force by the following member-states whose legal systems are based all or in part on civil law: Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, San Marino and Switzerland. Therefore these countries are highly likely to be influenced by the treaty relative to their respective honoring of trusts.

35-15-508. Removal or replacement power over trustee or other fiduciary not reachable by holder's creditors — Interests of beneficiary who is also a trustee or other fiduciary not reachable.

  1. No creditor or assignee of a beneficiary shall have the power to reach an interest of a beneficiary or any other person who holds an unconditional or conditional removal or replacement power over a trustee or other fiduciary. Such power over a trustee or other fiduciary is personal to the holder and shall not be exercised by the holder's creditors. No court shall direct a holder to exercise the power.
  2. Subject to § 35-15-504(b)(3):
    1. No creditor or assignee of a beneficiary may reach an interest of a beneficiary who is also a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary, or otherwise compel a distribution because the beneficiary is then serving as a trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary; and
    2. No court may foreclose against a beneficiary's interest described in subdivision (b)(1).

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 23.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-508.

    This section adds further creditor protection to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in two cases covered in subsections (a) and (b), respectively.

    This section has no similar provision in the Uniform Trust Code. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subsection (a) provides that No creditor or assignee (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “creditor”) of a beneficiary can reach the interest of any beneficiary or other person who holds any power to remove or replace any trustee, cotrustee or other fiduciary (hereinafter in the comments to this section, individually and collectively, simply “fiduciary”). Such power is personal to the holder solely in their capacity as its holder and not as a beneficiary or other person having a relationship to the trust. The preceding also has the effect that no court can force any such holder to exercise such power.

    Subsection (b) provides that, subject to the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-504(b)(5) (regarding beneficiaries under discretionary interests also serving as a fiduciary), the fact that a beneficiary is also serving as a fiduciary in no way lessens the creditor protection offered by the various provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, even to the extent that no court may foreclose on any such beneficiary-fiduciary’s interest.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

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35-15-509. Judicial foreclosure of beneficial interests, powers of appointment, and reserved powers prohibited — Certain reaches prohibited.

Regardless of whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision:

  1. No beneficial interest, power of appointment, or reserved power in a trust shall be judicially foreclosed;
  2. No creditor or assignee shall reach a power of appointment or a remainder interest at the trust level and such creditor or assignee shall wait until any funds are distributed relative to such power of appointment or remainder interest before such creditor or assignee may reach such funds; and
  3. No power of appointment is a property interest.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 24.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-509.

    This section adds further creditor protection to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section has no similar provision in the Uniform Trust Code. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    The provisions of this section are not dependent on whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision and applies in both cases.

    Subdivision (1) precludes a court from judicially foreclosing on any beneficial interest, power of appointment or reserved power contained in a trust.

    Subdivision (2) precludes any creditor or assignee from reaching a power of appointment or a remainder interest at the trust level. Such creditor or assignee must wait until any funds are distributed relative to the power of appointment or remainder interest before reaching such funds.

    Subdivision (3) precludes the possibility that any power of appointment is deemed in any way to be a property interest.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

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35-15-510. Immunity from claims of separate creditors of trust property conveyed to trustee by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.

  1. As used in this section, “proceeds” means:
    1. Property acquired by the trustee upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of property originally conveyed by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety to a trustee or trustees;
    2. Property collected by the trustee on, or distributed on account of, property originally conveyed by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety to a trustee or trustees;
    3. Rights arising out of property originally conveyed by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety to a trustee;
    4. Claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, property originally conveyed by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety to a trustee;
    5. Insurance payable by reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, property originally conveyed by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety to a trustee; or
    6. Property held by the trustee that is otherwise traceable to property originally conveyed by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety to a trustee or the property proceeds described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(5).
  2. Any property of a husband and wife that was held by them as tenants by the entirety and subsequently conveyed as tenants by the entirety to the trustee or trustees of one (1) or more trusts, and the proceeds of that property, shall have the same immunity from the claims of their separate creditors as would exist if the husband and wife had continued to hold the property or its proceeds as tenants by the entirety, so long as:
    1. The husband and wife remain married;
    2. The property or its proceeds continues to be held in trust by the trustee or trustees or their successors in trust;
    3. The trust or trusts are, while both settlors are living, revocable by either settlor or both settlors, acting together;
    4. Both the husband and the wife are permissible current beneficiaries of the trust or trusts while living; and
    5. The trust instrument, deed, or other instrument of conveyance provides that this section shall apply to the property or its proceeds.
  3. After the death of the first of the husband and wife to die, all property held in trust that was immune from the claims of their separate creditors under subsection (b) immediately prior to the individual's death shall continue to have the same immunity from the claims of the decedent's separate creditors as would have existed if the husband and wife had continued while both were alive to hold the property conveyed in trust, or its proceeds, as tenants by the entirety. To the extent that the surviving spouse remains a beneficiary of the trust and has the power, exercisable in the individual capacity of the surviving spouse, to vest in the surviving spouse individually title to the property that was immune from the claims of the separate creditors of the decedent under subsection (b), the property shall be subject to the claims of the separate creditors of the surviving spouse.
  4. The immunity from the claims of separate creditors under subsections (b) and (c) may be waived as to any specific creditor or any specifically described trust property, including all separate creditors of a husband and wife or all former tenancy by the entirety property conveyed to the trustee or trustees, by the express provisions of a trust instrument, deed, or other instrument of conveyance, or by the written consent of both the husband and the wife.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (e)(2), immunity from the claims of separate creditors under subsections (b) and (c) shall be waived if a trustee executes and delivers a financial statement for the trust that fails to disclose the requested identity of property held in trust that is immune from the claims of separate creditors.
    2. Immunity is not waived under this subsection (e) if the identity of the property that is immune from the claims of separate creditors and the fact of such immunity is otherwise reasonably disclosed by:
      1. A publicly recorded deed or other instrument of conveyance by the husband and wife to the trustee;
      2. A written memorandum by the husband and wife, or by a trustee, that is recorded among the land records or other public records in the county or other jurisdiction where the records of the trust are regularly maintained; or
      3. The terms of the trust instrument, including any schedule or exhibit attached to the trust instrument, if a copy of the trust instrument is provided with the financial statement.
    3. A waiver under this subsection (e) shall be effective only as to:
      1. The person to whom the financial statement is delivered by the trustee;
      2. The particular trust property held in trust for which the immunity from the claims of separate creditors is insufficiently disclosed on the financial statement; and
      3. The transaction for which the disclosure was sought.
  5. In any dispute relating to the immunity of trust property from the claims of a separate creditor of a husband or wife, the trustee has the burden of proving the immunity of the trust property from the creditor's claims.
  6. In the event that any transfer of real property held in tenancy by the entirety to a trustee of a trust as provided under subsection (b) is held invalid by any court of proper jurisdiction, or if the trust is revoked or dissolved by a court decree or operation of law, while both spouses are living, then immediately upon the occurrence of either event, absent a contrary provision in a court decree, all real property held in the trust automatically shall be deemed for all purposes to be held by both spouses as tenants by the entirety.
  7. No transfer by a husband and wife described in subsection (b) shall affect or change either settlor's marital property rights to the transferred property or interest therein immediately prior to such transfer in the event of dissolution of marriage of the spouses, unless both spouses otherwise expressly agree otherwise in writing. Upon entry of a decree granting divorce or annulment between the spouses, the immunity from the claims of separate creditors under subsection (b) shall terminate immediately.
  8. After a conveyance to a trustee described in subsection (b), the property transferred shall no longer be held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.
  9. This section may not be construed to affect existing state law with respect to tenancies by the entirety. This section applies only to tenancy by the entirety property conveyed to a trustee or trustees on or after July 1, 2014.

Acts 2014, ch. 829, § 6.

Cross-References. Tenancies by the entirety, § 66-1-109.

Law Reviews.

Where There's a Will: New Tennessee Trusts Map Route to Better Estate Planning for Married Clients, 50 Tenn. B.J. 28 (2014).

Part 6
Revocable Trusts

35-15-601. Capacity of settlor of revocable trust — Form of execution for post-death disposition.

The capacity required to create, amend, revoke, or add property to a revocable trust, or to direct the actions of the trustee of a revocable trust, is the same as that required to make a will. To be effective as a post death disposition of property transferred during the transferor's life or by the transferor's will to a trust of which the transferor is the settlor or deemed to be the settlor, neither a revocable nor irrevocable trust existing on or executed after July 1, 2004, has to be executed with the formalities of a will.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 47; 2005, ch. 99, § 8.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Comment.

The provisions of this part in some ways diverge from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this part is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

This part deals with issues of significance not totally settled under prior law. Because of the widespread use in re-cent years of the revocable trust as an alternative to a will, this short part is one of the more important parts of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. This part and the other parts of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code treat the revocable trust as the functional equivalent of a will. T.C.A. § 35-15-601 provides that the capacity standard for wills applies in deter-mining whether the settlor had capacity to create a revocable trust. T.C.A. § 35-15-602, after providing that a trust is presumed revocable unless stated otherwise, prescribes the procedure for revocation or amendment, whether the trust contains one or several settlors. T.C.A. § 35-15-603 provides that while a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity, the rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the settlor's control. T.C.A. § 35-15-604 prescribes a statute of limitations on contest of revocable trusts.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-601 and 35-15-604, because they respectively address requirements relating to creation of trusts and limitations of action, is not subject to alteration or restriction in the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. Notwithstanding the above, unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides that a no-contest (or similar) provision will generally be enforced according to its terms. See T.C.A. § 35-15-1014.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-602 and 35-15-603 are fully subject to the settlor's control.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-601.

This section is patterned after Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 11(1) (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996). The revocable trust is used primarily as a will substitute, with its key provision being the determination of the persons to receive the trust property upon the settlor's death. To solidify the use of the revocable trust as a device for transferring property at death, the settlor usually also executes a pourover will. The use of a pourover will assures that property not transferred to the trust during life will be combined with the property the settlor did manage to convey. Given this primary use of the revocable trust as a device for disposing of property at death, the capacity standard for wills rather than that for lifetime gifts should apply. The application of the capacity standard for wills does not mean that the revocable trust must be executed with the formalities of a will. Moreover, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code (unlike the law of some states, e.g., Florida), statutorily states in this section that neither a revocable or irrevocable trust (pour-over or non-pour-over), even one containing testamentary dispositions, need be made with the formalities of a will.

There are no execution requirements under this Code for a trust not created by will, and a trust not containing real property may be created by an oral statement. See T.C.A. § 35-15-407.

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not explicitly spell out the standard of capacity necessary to create other types of trusts, although T.C.A. § 35-15-402 does require that the settlor have capacity. This section includes a capacity standard for creation of a revocable trust because of the uncertainty in the case law and the importance of the issue in modern estate planning. No such uncertainty exists with respect to the capacity standard for other types of trusts. To create a testamentary trust, the settlor must have the capacity to make a will. To create an irrevocable trust, the settlor must have the capacity that would be needed to transfer the property free of trust. See generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 11 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.1 (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001).

35-15-602. Revocation or amendment of revocable trust.

  1. Unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the trust is irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or amend the trust. This subsection (a) does not apply to a trust created under an instrument executed before July 1, 2004.
  2. If a revocable trust is created or funded by more than one (1) settlor:
    1. To the extent the trust consists of community property, the trust may be revoked by either spouse acting alone but may be amended only by joint action of both spouses;
    2. To the extent the trust consists of property other than community property, each settlor may revoke or amend the trust with regard to the portion of the trust property attributable to that settlor's contribution; and
    3. At the death of one (1) settlor, each surviving settlor shall have the right to revoke the trust as to that surviving settlor's portion of the trust as determined by the type of property in accordance with subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2).
  3. The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
    1. By substantial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the trust; or
    2. If the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by:
      1. A later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed according to the terms of the trust; or
      2. Any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent.
  4. Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall deliver the trust property as the settlor directs. However, with respect to community property under subdivision (b)(1), the trustee shall deliver the property one-half (½) to each spouse unless the governing instrument specifically states otherwise.
  5. A settlor's powers with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution of trust property may be exercised by an agent under a power of attorney only to the extent expressly authorized by the terms of the trust or the power.
  6. A conservator of the settlor or, if no conservator has been appointed, a guardian of the settlor may exercise a settlor's powers with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution of trust property only if the trust instrument specifically grants to the conservator or guardian the power to revoke or amend the trust or distribute trust property.
  7. A trustee who does not know that a trust has been revoked or amended is not liable to the settlor or settlor's successors in interest for distributions made and other actions taken on the assumption that the trust had not been amended or revoked.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 48.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: New Formulation for a Trusty Tool (Marshall H. Peterson), 41 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2005).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

2. Substantial Compliance.

Fifth codicil to a will was not substantially in compliance with the specified method for revocation or amendment, as required by T.C.A. § 35-15-602(c)(1), where the codicil did not refer to either of the trusts, the decedent had not signed the written instrument as the grantor or the trustee as the trusts expressly mandated, the codicil expressly stated the decedent's intent to amend his will, not a trust, and although the decedent had executed four prior codicils to his will, he had never attempted to amend any of the terms of the trusts by means of a codicil. In re Estate of Hunter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-602.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Subsection (a), which provides that a settlor may revoke or modify a trust unless the terms of the trust expressly state that the trust is irrevocable, changes the common law. After its effective date of July 1, 2004, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code reverses the traditional common law rule that a trust is presumed irrevocable absent evidence of contrary intent. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330  (1959). The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code presumes irrevocability when the instrument is silent because the instrument was likely drafted by a nonprofessional, who intended the trust as a will substitute. The most recent revision of the Restatement of Trusts similarly reverses the former approach. A trust is presumed revocable if the settlor has retained a beneficial interest. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001). Because professional drafters habitually spell out whether or not a trust is revocable, subsection (a) will have limited application.

A power of revocation includes the power to amend. An unrestricted power to amend may also include the power to revoke a trust. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331  cmt. g & h (1959).

Subsection (b), differs from the Uniform Trust Code regarding default rules for revocation or amendment of a trust having several settlors. The settlor's authority to revoke or modify the trust depends on whether the trust contains community property. To the extent the trust contains community property, the trust may be revoked by either spouse acting alone but may be amended only by joint action of both spouses. The purpose of this provision, and the reason for the use of joint trusts in community property states, is to preserve the community character of property transferred to the trust. While Tennessee is not a community property, contributions of community property to trusts created in noncommunity property states do occur. This is due to the mobility of settlors, and the fact that community property retains its community character when a couple moves from a community to a noncommunity state.

With respect to separate property contributed to the trust, or all property of the trust if none of the trust property consists of community property, subsection (b) provides that each settlor may revoke or amend the trust as to the por-tion of the trust contributed by that settlor. The rule is included because of the increasing use of joint trusts in noncom-munity property states in recent years.

Subsection (b) does not address the many technical issues that can arise in determining the settlors' proportionate contribution to a joint trust. Most problematic are contributions of jointly-owned property. In the case of joint tenancies in real estate, each spouse would presumably be treated as having made an equal contribution because of the right to sever the interest and convert it into a tenancy in common. This is in contrast to joint accounts in financial institutions, ownership of which in most states is based not on fractional interest but on actual dollar contribution. See, e.g. , Uniform Probate Code § 6-211. Most difficult may be determining a contribution rule for entireties property.

Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, subdivision (b)(3) does not explicitly require that the other settlor or settlors be notified if a joint trust is revoked by less than all of the settlors., but such notice would be required pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-603. While a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity, T.C.A. § 35-15-603(a) provides that the duties of the trustee, including the duty to keep the beneficiaries informed of administrative developments, are owed exclusively to the settlor. With respect to trusts having several settlors, T.C.A. § 35-15-603(b) clarifies that the trustee's duties, including the duty to keep the certain beneficiaries informed of developments, are owed to all settlors having capacity. Notifying the other settlor or settlors of the revocation or amendment will place them in a better position to protect their interests. If the revocation or amendment by less than all of the settlors breaches an implied agreement not to revoke or amend the trust, those harmed by the action can sue for breach of contract. If the trustee fails to notify the other settlor or settlors of the revocation or amendment, the parties aggrieved by the trustee's failure can sue the trustee for breach of trust.

Subsection (c), which is similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63  cmt. h & i (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), specifies the method of revocation and amendment. Revocation of a trust differs fundamentally from revocation of a will. Revocation of a will, because a will is not effective until death, cannot affect an existing fiduciary relationship. With a trust, however, because a revocation will terminate an already existing fiduciary relationship, there is a need to protect a trustee who might act without knowledge that the trust has been revoked. There is also a need to protect trustees against the risk that they will misperceive the settlor's intent and mistakenly assume that an informal document or communication constitutes a revocation when that was not in fact the settlor's intent. To protect trustees against these risks, drafters habitually insert provisions providing that a revocable trust may be revoked only by delivery to the trustee of a formal revoking document. Some courts require strict compliance with the stated formalities. Other courts, recognizing that the formalities were inserted primarily for the trustee's and not the settlor's benefit, will accept other methods of revocation as long as the settlor's intent is clear. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63  Reporter's Notes to cmt. h-j (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001).

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code tries to effectuate the settlor's intent to the maximum extent possible while at the same time protecting a trustee against inadvertent liability. While notice to the trustee of a revocation is good practice, this section does not make the giving of such notice a prerequisite to a trust's revocation. To protect a trustee who has not been notified of a revocation or amendment, subsection (g) provides that a trustee who does not know that a trust has been revoked or amended is not liable to the settlor or settlor's successors in interest for distributions made and other actions taken on the assumption that the trust, as unamended, was still in effect. However, to honor the settlor's intent, subsection (c) generally honors a settlor's clear expression of intent even if inconsistent with stated formalities in the terms of the trust.

Under subsection (c), the settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust by substantial compliance with the method specified in the terms of the trust or by a later will or codicil or any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent. Only if the method specified in the terms of the trust is made exclusive is use of the other methods prohibited. Even then, a failure to comply with a technical requirement, such as required notarization, may be excused as long as compliance with the method specified in the terms of the trust is otherwise substantial.

While revocation of a trust will ordinarily continue to be accomplished by signing and delivering a written document to the trustee, other methods, such as a physical act or an oral statement coupled with a withdrawal of the property, might also demonstrate the necessary intent. These less formal methods, because they provide less reliable indicia of intent, will often be insufficient, however. The method specified in the terms of the trust is a reliable safe harbor and should be followed whenever possible.

Revocation or amendment by will is mentioned in subsection (c) not to encourage the practice but to make clear that it is not precluded by omission. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Will and Other Donative Transfers § 7.2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), which validates revocation or amendment of will substitutes by later will. Situations do arise, particularly in death-bed cases, where revocation by will may be the only practicable method. In such cases, a will, a solemn document executed with a high level of formality, may be the most reliable method for expressing intent. A revocation in a will ordinarily becomes effective only upon probate of the will following the testator's death. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63  Reporter's Notes to cmt. h-i (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001).

A residuary clause in a will disposing of the estate differently than the trust is alone insufficient to revoke or amend a trust. The provision in the will must either be express or the will must dispose of specific assets contrary to the terms of the trust. The substantial body of law on revocation of Totten trusts by will offers helpful guidance. The authority is collected in William H. Danne, Jr., Revocation of Tentative (“Totten”) Trust of Savings Bank Account by Inter Vivos Declaration or Will, 46 A.L.R. 3d 487 (1972) .

Subsection (c) does not require that a trustee concur in the revocation or amendment of a trust. Such a concurrence would be necessary only if required by the terms of the trust. If the trustee concludes that an amendment unacceptably changes the trustee's duties, the trustee may resign as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-705.

Subsection (d), providing that upon revocation the trust property is to be distributed as the settlor directs, codifies a provision commonly included in revocable trust instruments. If the trust contains community property, the trustee is required on revocation to distribute the property one-half (1/2) to each spouse unless the instrument directs otherwise.

A settlor's power to revoke is not terminated by the settlor's incapacity. The power to revoke may instead be exercised by an agent under a power of attorney as authorized in subsection (e), by a conservator or guardian as authorized in subsection (f), or by the settlor personally if the settlor regains capacity.

Subsection (e), which is similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63 cmt. l (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001), authorizes an agent under a power of attorney to revoke or modify a revocable trust only to the extent the terms of the trust or power of attorney expressly so permit. An express provision is required because most settlors usually intend that the revocable trust, and not the power of attorney, to function as the settlor's principal property management device. The power of attorney is usually intended as a backup for assets not transferred to the revocable trust or to ad-dress specific topics, such as the power to sign tax returns or apply for government benefits, which may be beyond the authority of a trustee or are not customarily granted to a trustee.

Subsection (f) addresses the authority of a conservator to revoke or amend a revocable trust. Under Tennessee law a “conservator” is appointed by the court to manage the ward's party and to make decisions with respect to the ward's personal affairs. See T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Consequently, subsection (f) authorizes a conservator to exercise a settlor's power to revoke or amend a trust only if the instrument authorizes a conservator to have that power.

Steps a conservator can take to stem possible abuse is not limited to petitioning to revoke the trust. The conservator could petition for removal of the trustee under T.C.A. § 35-15-706. The conservator, acting on the settlor-beneficiary's behalf, could also bring an action to enforce the trust according to its terms. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-303, a conservator may act on behalf of the beneficiary whose estate the conservator controls whenever a consent or other action by the beneficiary is required or may be given under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

35-15-603. Settlor's powers — Powers of withdrawal.

  1. While a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor.
  2. If a revocable trust has more than one (1) settlor, the duties of the trustee are owed to all of the settlors having capacity to revoke the trust.
  3. During the period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of withdrawal has the rights of a settlor of a revocable trust under this section to the extent of the property subject to the power.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 49.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-603.

This section has the effect of postponing enforcement of the rights of the beneficiaries of a revocable trust until the death or incapacity of the settlor or other person holding the power to revoke the trust. This section thus recognizes that the settlor of a revocable trust is in control of the trust and should have the right to enforce the trust.

Pursuant to this section, the duty under T.C.A. § 35-15-813 to inform and report to beneficiaries is owed to the settlor of a revocable trust as long as the settlor has capacity. In the case of a trust having several settlors, subsection (b) clarifies that this duty extends to all settlors having capacity. Should fewer than all settlors revoke or modify their pportionof the trust, the trustee must notify the other settlor or settlors of the action. See the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-602.

If the settlor loses capacity, subsection (a) no longer applies, with the consequence that the rights of the beneficiaries are no longer subject to the settlor's control. Certain beneficiaries are entitled to request information concerning the trust and the trustee must provide the beneficiaries with such information as may be required under T.C.A. § 35-15-813. However, because this section (and unlike under the Uniform Trust Code, significant portions of T.C.A. § 35-15-813) may be freely overridden in the terms of the trust (and relative to T.C.A. § 35-15-813 also by a writing of a settlor, a trust advisor or trust protector), a settlor is (and in some cases others are) free to deny the beneficiaries these rights, even to the point of directing the trustee not to inform them of the existence of the trust. Also, should an incapacitated settlor later regain capacity, the beneficiaries' rights will again be subject to the settlor's control. The cessation of the settlor's control upon the settlor's incapacity or death does not mean that the beneficiaries may reopen transactions the settlor approved while having capacity.

Typically, the settlor of a revocable trust will also be the sole or primary beneficiary of the trust. Upon the settlor's incapacity, any right of action the settlor-trustee may have against the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty will pass to the settlor's agent or conservator.

Subsection (c) makes clear that a holder of a power of withdrawal has the same powers over the trust as the settlor of a revocable trust. Equal treatment is warranted due to the holder's equivalent power to control the trust. For the definition of power of withdrawal, see T.C.A. § 35-15-103.

35-15-604. Limitation on action contesting validity of revocable trust — Distribution of trust property.

  1. A person may commence a judicial proceeding to contest the validity of a trust that was revocable immediately preceding the settlor's death within the earlier of:
    1. Two (2) years after the settlor's death; or
    2. One hundred twenty (120) days after the trustee sent the person a copy of the trust instrument and a notice informing the person of the trust's existence, of the trustee's name and address, and of the time allowed for commencing a proceeding.
  2. Upon the death of the settlor of a trust that was revocable immediately preceding the settlor's death, the trustee may proceed to distribute the trust property in accordance with the terms of the trust. The trustee is subject to liability for doing so if:
    1. The trustee knows of a pending judicial proceeding contesting the validity of the trust; or
    2. A potential contestant has notified the trustee of a possible judicial proceeding to contest the trust and a judicial proceeding is commenced within sixty (60) days after the contestant sent the notification.
  3. A beneficiary of a trust that is determined by a court proceeding to be invalid is liable to return to the court any distribution received for proper distribution. If the beneficiary refuses to return the distribution after being ordered by the court, the beneficiary shall be liable for all costs incurred for recovery of the distribution.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 50.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Timeliness.

Dismissal of lawsuit to set aside a decedent's trust was inappropriate because the trial court erred in applying the statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty as the complainant alleged lack of capacity and undue influence, but did not allege that the trustees were acting in a fiduciary capacity at the time of signing. Furthermore, the lawsuit was timely filed under the correct statute of limitations within two years after decedent's death, as there was no indication that the complainant was provided a copy of the trust instrument. In re Eleanor Chappell Revocable Living Trust, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2018), review denied and ordered not published, In re Chappell Revocable Living Trust, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2019).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-604.

This section provides finality to the question of when a contest of a revocable trust may be brought. The section is designed to allow an adequate time in which to bring a contest while at the same time permitting the expeditious distribution of the trust property following the settlor's death. The two (2) years is the same statute of limitations on contesting a will admitted to probate in common form.

Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provides that a no-contest (or similar) provision will generally be enforced according to its terms. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-1014. Subject to such section, a trust can be contested on a variety of grounds. For example, the contestant may allege that no trust was created due to lack of intent to create a trust or lack of capacity (see T.C.A. § 35-15-402), that undue influence, duress, or fraud was involved in the trust's creation (see T.C.A. § 35-15-406), or that the trust had been revoked or modified (see T.C.A. § 35-15-602). A “contest” is an action to invalidate all or part of the terms of the trust or of property transfers to the trustee. An action against a beneficiary or other person for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift, not being a contest, is not subject to this section. For the law on intentional interference, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B  (1979). Nor does this section preclude an action to determine the validity of a trust that is brought during the settlor's lifetime, such as a petition for a declaratory judgment, if such action is authorized by other law. See T.C.A. § 35-15-106 (Tennessee Uniform Trust Code supplemented by common law of trusts and principles of equity, subject to the exceptions contained in such section).

This section applies only to a revocable trust that becomes irrevocable by reason of the settlor's death. A trust that became irrevocable by reason of the settlor's lifetime release of the power to revoke is outside its scope. A revocable trust does not become irrevocable upon a settlor's loss of capacity. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-602, the power to revoke may be exercised by the settlor's agent, conservator, or guardian, or personally by the settlor if the settlor regains capacity.

Subsection (a) specifies a time limit on when a contest can be brought. A contest is barred upon the first to occur of two possible events. The maximum possible time for bringing a contest is two (2) years from the settlor's death. This should provide potential contestants with ample time in which to determine whether they have an interest that will be affected by the trust, even if formal notice of the trust is lacking. A trustee who wishes to shorten the contest period may do so by giving notice. Subdivision (a)(2) bars a contest by a potential contestant one hundred twenty (120) days after the date the trustee sent that person a copy of the trust instrument and informed the person of the trust's existence, of the trustee's name and address, and of the time allowed for commencing a contest. The one hundred twenty (120) day period in subdivision (a)(2) is subordinate to the two-year bar in subdivision (a)(1). A contest is automatically barred two (2) years after the settlor's death even if notice is sent by the trustee less than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the end of that period.

Because only a small minority of trusts are actually contested, trustees should not be restrained from making distributions because of concern about possible liability should a contest later be filed. Absent a protective statute, a trustee is ordinarily absolutely liable for misdelivery of the trust assets, even if the trustee reasonably believed that the distribution was proper. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 226 (1959). Subsection (b) addresses liability concerns by allowing the trustee, upon the settlor's death, to proceed expeditiously to distribute the trust property. The trustee may distribute the trust property in accordance with the terms of the trust until and unless the trustee receives notice of a pending judicial proceeding contesting the validity of the trust, or until notified by a potential contestant of a possible contest, followed by its filing within sixty (60) days.

Even though a distribution in compliance with subsection (b) discharges the trustee from potential liability, subsection (c) makes the beneficiaries of what later turns out to have been an invalid trust liable to return any distribution received. Issues as to whether the distribution must be returned with interest, or with income earned or profit made are not addressed in this section but are left to the law of restitution.

For purposes of notices under this section, the substitute representation principles of part 3 [T.C.A. § 35-15-301 -- 35-15-305] are applicable. The notice by the trustee under subdivision (a)(2) or by a potential contestant under subdivision (b)(2) must be given in a manner reasonably suitable under the circumstances and likely to result in its receipt. See T.C.A. § 35-15-109.

This section does not address possible liability for the debts of the deceased settlor or a trustee's possible liability to creditors for distributing trust assets. For possible liability of the trust, see T.C.A. § 35-15-505 and its Section Comment.

35-15-605. Written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property.

    1. A revocable (living) trust that becomes irrevocable upon the death of its settlor may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the revocable trust, other than money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of title, securities, and property used in a trade or business.
    2. To be effective under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing:
      1. Must:
        1. Be either in the handwriting of the settlor or signed by the settlor;
        2. Be dated; and
        3. Describe the items and the beneficiaries with reasonable certainty;
      2. May be prepared before or after the execution of the revocable trust;
      3. May be altered by the settlor after its preparation, provided that the settlor signs and dates the alteration; and
      4. May be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect upon the dispositions made by the revocable trust.
    3. If more than one (1) otherwise effective writings exist or a single writing contains properly signed and dated alterations, the provisions of the most recent writing or alteration revoke any inconsistent provisions of all prior writings.
  1. A trustee is not liable for any distribution of tangible personal property to the apparent beneficiary under the settlor's revocable trust without actual knowledge of the written statement or list, as described in subsection (a), and the trustee has no duty to recover property distributed without knowledge of the written statement or list.

Acts 2019, ch. 197, § 4.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 197, § 8.  April 25, 2019.

Part 7
Office of Trustee

35-15-701. Accepting or declining trusteeship.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a person designated as trustee accepts the trusteeship:
    1. By substantially complying with a method of acceptance provided in the terms of the trust; or
    2. If the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by accepting delivery of the trust property, exercising powers or performing duties as trustee, or otherwise indicating acceptance of the trusteeship.
  2. A person designated as trustee who has not yet accepted the trusteeship may reject the trusteeship. A designated trustee who does not accept the trusteeship within a reasonable time after knowing of the designation and the assets comprising the trust is deemed to have rejected the trusteeship.
  3. A person designated as trustee, without accepting the trusteeship, may:
    1. Act to preserve the trust property if, within a reasonable time after acting, the person sends a rejection of the trusteeship to the settlor or, if the settlor is dead or lacks capacity, to a qualified beneficiary; and
    2. Inspect or investigate trust property to determine potential liability under environmental or other law or for any other purpose.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 51.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence., 6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, §§  2, 9, 17.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Comment.

This part contains a series of default rules dealing with the office of trustee. T.C.A. §§ 35-15-701 and 35-15-702 address the process for getting a trustee into office, including the procedures for indicating an acceptance and whether bond will be required. T.C.A. § 35-15-703 addresses cotrustees, permitting the cotrustees to act by majority action, specifying the extent to which one trustee may delegate to another and requiring that any trustee keep all other fiduciaries reasonably informed with information necessary for such other fiduciary to perform their respective duties. T.C.A. §§ 35-15-704 -- 35-15-707 address changes in the office of trustee, specifying the circumstances when a vacancy must be filled, the procedure for resignation, the grounds for removal, and the process for appointing a successor. T.C.A. § 35-15-708 and 35-15-709 prescribe the standards for determining fiduciary compensation and reimbursement for expenses advanced.

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains six (6) additional sections at T.C.A. §§ 35-15-71035-15-715 not found in the Uniform Trust Code. These sections all relate to trustees and other fiduciaries serving under directed trusts as such are defined in T.C.A. 35-15-103 and as provided for in T.C.A. § 35-15-808. Each of the following govern fiduciaries other than a trustee or cotrustee when such other fiduciaries are serving:

T.C.A. § 35-15-710 details when a fiduciary will be an excluded fiduciary as such is defined in 35-15-103.

T.C.A. § 35-15-711, which deals with accepting or declining fiduciary appointments is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-701

T.C.A. § 35-15-712, which deals with fiduciary’s bond is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-702

T.C.A. § 35-15-713, which deals with fiduciary vacancies is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-704

T.C.A. § 35-15-714, which deals with resignation of fiduciary is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-705

T.C.A. § 35-15-715, which deals with removal of fiduciary is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-706.

Except for

the court's authority to require, dispense with, modify or terminate a bond under T.C.A. §§ 35-15-702 or 35-15-712; and

the power of a court to adjust a fiduciary’s compensation specified in the terms of the trust which is unreasonably low or high under T.C.A. § 35-15-708; all of the provisions of this chapter are subject to modification in the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-701.

This section, which specifies the requirements for a valid acceptance of the trusteeship, implicates many of the same issues that arise in determining whether a trust has been revoked. Consequently, the two provisions track each other closely. Compare subsection 701(a), with T.C.A. § 35-15-602(c) (procedure for revoking or modifying trust). Procedures specified in the terms of the trust are recognized, but only substantial, not literal compliance is required. A failure to meet technical requirements, such as notarization of the trustee's signature, does not result in a failure to accept. Ordinarily, the trustee will indicate acceptance by signing the trust instrument or signing a separate written instrument. However, this section validates any other method demonstrating the necessary intent, such as by knowingly exercising trustee powers, unless the terms of the trust make the specified method exclusive. This section also does not preclude an acceptance by estoppel. For general background on issues relating to trustee acceptance and rejection, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 35 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 102 (1959). Consistent with T.C.A. § 35-15-201(b), which emphasizes that continuing judicial supervision of a trust is the rare exception, not the rule, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not require that a trustee qualify in court.

To avoid the inaction that can result if the person designated as trustee fails to communicate a decision either to accept or to reject the trusteeship, subsection (b) provides that a failure to accept within a reasonable time constitutes a rejection of the trusteeship. What will constitute a reasonable time depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code considers such facts and circumstances to include knowledge by the person designated trustee of both such designation and of the assets comprising the trust.

A major consideration is possible harm that might occur if a vacancy in a trusteeship is not filled in a timely manner. A trustee's rejection normally precludes a later acceptance but does not cause the trust to fail. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 35 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). Regarding the filling of a vacancy in the event of a rejection, see T.C.A. § 35-15-704.

A person designated as trustee who decides not to accept the trusteeship need not provide a formal rejection, but a clear and early communication is recommended. The appropriate recipient of the rejection depends upon the circumstances. Ordinarily, it would be appropriate to communicate the rejection to the person who informed the designee of the proposed trusteeship. If judicial proceedings involving the trust are pending, the rejection could be filed with the court. In the case of a person named as trustee of a revocable trust, it would be appropriate to communicate the rejection to the settlor. In any event, it would be best to inform a beneficiary with a significant interest in the trust because that beneficiary might be more motivated than others to seek appointment of a new trustee.

Subdivision (c)(1) makes clear that a nominated trustee may act expeditiously to protect the trust property without being considered to have accepted the trusteeship. However, upon conclusion of the intervention, the nominated trustee must send a rejection of office to the settlor, if living and competent, otherwise to a qualified beneficiary.

Because of the potential liability that can inhere in trusteeship, subdivision (c)(2) allows a person designated as trustee to inspect the trust property without accepting the trusteeship. The condition of real property is a particular concern, including possible tort liability for the condition of the premises or liability for violation of state or federal environmental laws such as CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. For a provision limiting a trustee's personal liability for obligations arising from ownership or control of trust property, see T.C.A. § 35-15-1010.

35-15-702. Trustee's bond.

  1. A trustee shall give bond to secure performance of the trustee's duties only if the court finds that a bond is needed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries or is required by the terms of the trust and the court has not dispensed with the requirement.
  2. The court may specify the amount of a bond, its liabilities, and whether sureties are necessary. The court may modify or terminate a bond at any time.
  3. A state or national bank, savings institution, or trust company authorized to exercise fiduciary powers and regulated by the office of the comptroller of the currency, office of thrift supervision, the department of financial institutions or equivalent state banking supervisors need not give bond, even if required by the terms of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 52.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

This provision is consistent with the Restatement Third and with the bonding provisions of the Uniform Probate Code. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34(3) and cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Uniform Probate Code §§ 3-604 (personal representatives), 5-415 (conservators), and 7-304 (trustees). Because a bond is required only if the terms of the trust require bond or a bond is found by the court to be necessary to protect the interests of beneficiaries, bond should rarely be required under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Despite the ability of the court pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) to override a term of the trust waiving bond, the court should order bond in such cases only for good reasons. Similarly, the court should rarely dispense with bond if the settlor directed that the trustee give bond.

This section does not attempt to detail all of the technical bonding requirements that the court may impose. Typical requirements are listed in the Uniform Probate Code sections cited above. The amount of a bond otherwise required may be reduced by the value of trust property deposited in a manner that prevents its unauthorized disposition, and by the value of real property which the trustee, by express limitation of power, lacks power to convey without court authorization. The amount of bond otherwise required of a trustee acting as such in a directed trust setting may also depend on the extent to which such trustee is an excluded fiduciary relative to any such trustee’s powers and duties. Similarly a court is mandated to consider such matters when considering the requirements of bonds for all fiduciaries other than a trustee. See T.C.A. § 35-15-712. Also, the court may excuse or otherwise modify a requirement of a bond, reduce or increase the amount of a bond, release a surety, or permit the substitution of another bond with the same or different sureties.

T.C.A. § 35-15-702(c) clarifies that a state or nationally regulated bank, savings institution or trust company authorized to exercise fiduciary powers need not provide bond for individual trusts. Such institutions must meet detailed financial responsibility requirements in order to do trust business in the state, thereby obviating the need to post bonds in individual trusts.

35-15-703. Cotrustees.

  1. Cotrustees who are unable to reach a unanimous decision may act by majority decision.
  2. If a vacancy occurs in a cotrusteeship, the remaining cotrustees may act for the trust.
  3. A cotrustee must participate in the performance of a trustee's function unless the cotrustee is unavailable to perform the function because of absence, illness, disqualification under other law, or other temporary incapacity or the cotrustee has properly delegated the performance of the function to another trustee.
  4. If a cotrustee is unavailable to perform duties because of absence, illness, disqualification under other law, or other temporary incapacity, and prompt action is necessary to achieve the purposes of the trust or to avoid injury to the trust property, the remaining cotrustee or a majority of the remaining cotrustees may act for the trust.
  5. A trustee may not delegate to a cotrustee the performance of a function the settlor reasonably expected the trustees to perform jointly. Unless a delegation was irrevocable, a trustee may revoke a delegation previously made.
  6. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a trustee who does not join in an action of another trustee is not liable for the action.
  7. Each trustee shall exercise reasonable care to:
    1. Prevent a cotrustee from committing a serious breach of trust; and
    2. Compel a cotrustee to redress a serious breach of trust.
  8. A dissenting trustee who joins in an action at the direction of the majority of the trustees and who notified any cotrustee of the dissent at or before the time of the action is not liable for the action unless the action is a serious breach of trust.
  9. A trustee shall keep each cotrustee and any other fiduciary reasonably informed about the administration of the trust, to the extent the trustee has knowledge that each such cotrustee or other fiduciary does not have such knowledge of the trustee's actions, or regarding other material information or the availability of such information, related to the administration of the trust that would be reasonably necessary for each such cotrustee or other fiduciary to perform such person's duties as a trustee or other fiduciary of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 53; 2013, ch. 390, § 26.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    This section contains most but not all of the Code's provisions on cotrustees. Other provisions relevant to cotrustees include sections T.C.A. § 35-15-704 (vacancy in trusteeship need not be filled if cotrustee remains in office), T.C.A. § 35-15-705 (notice of resignation must be given to cotrustee), T.C.A. § 35-15-706 (lack of cooperation among cotrustees as ground for removal), T.C.A. § 35-15-707 (obligations of resigning or removed trustee), , and T.C.A. § 35-15-1013 (whether all or less than all trustees are required to exercise signature authority to exercise various powers).

    Cotrustees are appointed for a variety of reasons. Having multiple decision makers can serve as a safeguard against eccentricity or misconduct. Cotrustees are often appointed to gain the advantage of differing skills, perhaps a financial institution for its permanence and professional skills, and a family member to maintain a personal connection with the beneficiaries. On other occasions, cotrustees are appointed to make certain that all family lines are represented in the trust's management.

    Cotrusteeship should not be called for without careful reflection. Division of responsibility among cotrustees is of-ten confused, the accountability of any individual trustee is uncertain, obtaining consent of all trustees can be burden-some, and unless an odd number of trustees is named deadlocks requiring court resolution can occur. Potential problems can be reduced by addressing division of responsibilities in the terms of the trust. Like the other sections of this chapter, this section is freely subject to modification in the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

    Much of this section is based on comparable provisions of the Restatement of Trusts, although with extensive modifications. Reference should also be made to ERISA section 405 ( 29 U.S.C. § 1105), which in recent years has been the statutory base for the most significant case law on the powers and duties of cotrustees.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-703.

    Subsection (a) is in accord with Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), which rejects the common law rule, followed in earlier Restatements, requiring unanimity among the trustees of a private trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 194 (1959). This section is consistent with the prior Restatement rule applicable to charitable trusts, which allowed for action by a majority of trustees. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 383 (1959).

    Under subsection (b), a majority of the remaining trustees may act for the trust when a vacancy occurs in a cotrusteeship. T.C.A. § 35-15-704 provides that a vacancy in a cotrusteeship need be filled only if there is no trustee remaining in office.

    Pursuant to subsection (c), a cotrustee must participate in the performance of a trustee function unless the cotrustee has properly delegated performance to another cotrustee, or the cotrustee is unable to participate due to temporary incapacity or disqualification under other law. Other laws under which a cotrustee might be disqualified include federal securities law and the ERISA prohibited transactions rules. Subsection (d) authorizes a cotrustee to assume some or all of the functions of another trustee who is unavailable to perform duties as provided in subsection (c).

    Subsection (e) addresses the extent to which a trustee may delegate the performance of functions to a cotrustee. The standard differs from the standard for delegation to an agent as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-807 because the two situations are different. T.C.A. § 35-15-807, which is substantially similar to T.C.A. § 35-14-111 of the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002, recognizes that many trustees are not professionals. Consequently, trustees should be encouraged to delegate functions they are not competent to perform. Subsection (e) is premised on the assumption that the settlor selected cotrustees for a specific reason and that this reason ought to control the scope of a permitted delegation to a cotrustee. Subsection (e) prohibits a trustee from delegating to another trustee functions the settlor reasonably expected the trustees to perform jointly. The exact extent to which a trustee may delegate functions to another trustee in a particular case will vary depending on the reasons the settlor decided to appoint cotrustees. The better practice is to address the division of functions in the terms of the trust, as allowed by T.C.A. § 35-15-105. Subsection (e) is based on language derived from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 (1959). This section of the Restatement Second, which applied to delegations to both agents and cotrustees, was superseded, as to delegation to agents, by Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 171 (1992).

    By permitting the trustees to act by a majority, this section contemplates that there may be a trustee or trustees who might dissent. Trustees who dissent from the acts of a cotrustee are in general protected from liability. Subsection (f) protects trustees who refused to join in the action. Subsection (h) protects a dissenting trustee who joined the action at the direction of the majority, such as to satisfy a demand of the other side to a transaction, if the trustee expressed the dissent to a cotrustee at or before the time of the action in question. However, the protections provided by subsections (f) and (h) no longer apply if the action constitutes a serious breach of trust. In that event, subsection (g) may impose liability against a dissenting trustee for failing to take reasonable steps to rectify the improper conduct. The responsibility to take action against a breaching cotrustee codifies the substance of sections 184 and 224 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959).

    A cotrustee can always seek declaratory relief under T.C.A. § 29-14-105 when a deadlock exists among trustees or when a dissenting cotrustee fears that an action or omission of the majority could result in potential liability to the co-trustee.

    A provision similar to T.C.A. § 35-15-703(i) is not contained in the Uniform Trust Code. Subsection (i) requires all trustees to keep all other fiduciaries reasonably informed about the administration of the trust to the extent such other fiduciaries do not have such knowledge. This requirement assures that all such fiduciaries have the material information necessary to perform their respective duties.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-704. Vacancy in trusteeship — Appointment of successor.

  1. A vacancy in a trusteeship occurs if:
    1. A person designated as trustee rejects the trusteeship;
    2. A person designated as trustee cannot be identified or does not exist;
    3. A trustee resigns;
    4. A trustee is disqualified or removed;
    5. A trustee dies; or
    6. A conservator is appointed for an individual serving as trustee.
  2. If one (1) or more cotrustees remain in office, a vacancy in a trusteeship need not be filled. A vacancy in a trusteeship must be filled if the trust has no remaining trustee.
  3. A vacancy in a trusteeship of a noncharitable trust that is required to be filled must be filled in the following order of priority:
    1. By a person designated in the terms of the trust to act as successor trustee;
    2. By a person appointed by unanimous agreement of the qualified beneficiaries; or
    3. By a person appointed by the court.
  4. A vacancy in a trusteeship of a charitable trust that is required to be filled must be filled in the following order of priority:
    1. By a person designated in the terms of the trust to act as successor trustee;
    2. By a person selected by the charitable organizations expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of the trust if the attorney general does not affirmatively object within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice of the person selected; or
    3. By a person appointed by the court.
  5. Whether or not a vacancy in a trusteeship exists or is required to be filled, the court may appoint an additional trustee or special fiduciary whenever the court considers the appointment necessary for the administration of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 54; 2007, ch. 24, § 26.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence., 6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, §§  5, 9.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-704.

This section lists the ways in which a trusteeship becomes vacant and the rules on filling the vacancy. See also T.C.A. § 35-15-701 (accepting or declining trusteeship), T.C.A. § 35-15-705 (resignation), and T.C.A. § 35-15-706 (removal). Good drafting practice suggests that the terms of the trust deal expressly with the problem of vacancies, naming successors and specifying the procedure for filling vacancies. This section applies only if the terms of the trust fail to specify a procedure.

The disqualification of a trustee referred to in subdivision (a)(4) would include a financial institution whose right to engage in trust business has been revoked or removed. Such disqualification might also occur if the trust's principal place of administration is transferred to a jurisdiction in which the trustee, whether an individual or institution, is not qualified to act.

Subsection (b) provides that a vacancy in the cotrusteeship must be filled only if the trust has no remaining trustee. If a vacancy in the cotrusteeship is not filled, T.C.A. § 35-15-703 authorizes the remaining cotrustees to continue to administer the trust. However, as provided in subsection (e), the court, exercising its inherent equity authority, may al-ways appoint additional trustees if the appointment would promote better administration of the trust. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 108 cmt. e (1959).

Subsection (c) provides a procedure for filling a vacancy in the trusteeship of a noncharitable trust. Absent an effective provision in the terms of the trust, subdivision (c)(2) permits a vacancy in the trusteeship to be filled, without the need for court approval, by a person selected by unanimous agreement of the qualified beneficiaries. An effective provision in the terms of the trust for the designation of a successor trustee includes a procedure under which the successor trustee is selected by a person designated in those terms. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-705, the qualified beneficiaries may also receive the trustee's resignation. If a trustee resigns following notice as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-705, the trust may be transferred to a successor appointed pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) of this section, all without court involvement. Unlike with the Uniform Trust Code, only a qualified (and not any nonqualified) beneficiary who is displeased with the choice of the qualified beneficiaries may petition the court for removal of the trustee under T.C.A. § 35-15-706. Under such section, a settlor or cotrustee may also so petition for removal

If the qualified beneficiaries fail to make an appointment, subdivision (c)(3) authorizes the court to fill the vacancy. In making the appointment, the court should consider the objectives and probable intention of the settlor, the promotion of the proper administration of the trust, and the interests and wishes of the beneficiaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 108 cmt. d (1959).

Subsection (d) specifies a procedure for filling a vacancy in the trusteeship of a charitable trust. Absent an effective designation in the terms of the trusts, a successor trustee may be selected by the charitable organizations expressly designated to receive distributions in the terms of the trusts if the attorney general does not affirmatively object within thirty days of receipt of the notice of the person selected. This is a different procedure than under the Uniform Trust Code, which requires the attorney general to actively concur. If the attorney general objects within the specified time frame, or if the trust does not designate a charitable organization to receive distributions, the vacancy may be filled only by a court.

In the case of a revocable trust, the appointment of a successor will normally be made directly by the settlor. As to the duties of a successor trustee with respect to the actions of a predecessor, see T.C.A. § 35-15-812.

35-15-705. Resignation of trustee.

  1. A trustee may resign:
    1. Upon at least thirty (30) days' notice to the qualified beneficiaries, the settlor, if living, and all cotrustees; or
    2. With the approval of the court.
  2. In approving a resignation, the court may issue orders and impose conditions reasonably necessary for the protection of the trust property.
  3. Any liability of a resigning trustee or of any sureties on the trustee's bond for acts or omissions of the trustee is not discharged or affected by the trustee's resignation.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 55.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence., 6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, § 9.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

This section rejects the common law rule that a trustee may resign only with permission of the court, and goes further than the Restatements, which allow a trustee to resign with the consent of the beneficiaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 36 (Tentative Draft No.2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 106 (1959). Concluding that the default rule ought to approximate standard drafting practice, the drafting committee provided in subsection (a) that a trustee may resign by giving notice to the qualified beneficiaries, a living settlor, and any cotrustee. A resigning trustee may also follow the traditional method and resign with approval of the court.

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 36 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 106 cmt. b (1959), provide, similar to subsection (c), that a resignation does not release the resigning trustee from potential liabilities for acts or omissions while in office. The act of resignation can give rise to liability if the trustee resigns for the purpose of facilitating a breach of trust by a cotrustee. See Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147 (3rd Cir. 1997).

Regarding the residual responsibilities of a resigning trustee until the trust property is delivered to a successor trustee, see T.C.A. § 35-15-707.

In the case of a revocable trust of which the settlor has the capacity to revoke, because the rights of the qualified beneficiaries are subject to the settlor's control (see T.C.A. § 35-15-603), resignation of the trustee is accomplished by giving notice to the settlor (instead of any qualified beneficiaries) and all cotrustees. In the case of a revocable trust of which the settlor does not currently have the capacity to revoke due to incapacity, resignation of the trustee is accomplished by giving notice to all cotrustees and to: the person or persons who are appointed as successor trustee(s) under the trust instrument; or if none, to any person holding a power under the trust instrument to appoint a successor trustee; or if none, to any agent under any durable power of attorney for such incapacitated settlor if such durable power of attorney grants the agent the power to accept same or to appoint successor trustees; or if note to the conservator or guardian of the property of the settlor. Should there be none of the above such persons, either the resigning trustee, a qualified beneficiary or a cotrustee can petition the court to approve such trustee’s resignation.

35-15-706. Removal of trustee.

  1. The settlor, a cotrustee, or a qualified beneficiary may request the court to remove a trustee, or a trustee may be removed by the court on its own initiative.
  2. The court may remove a trustee if:
    1. The trustee has committed a serious breach of trust;
    2. Lack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially impairs the administration of the trust;
    3. Because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to administer the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of the beneficiaries; or
    4. There has been a substantial change of circumstances or removal is requested by all of the qualified beneficiaries, the court finds that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.
  3. Pending a final decision on a request to remove a trustee, or in lieu of or in addition to removing a trustee, the court may order such appropriate relief under § 35-15-1001(b) as may be necessary to protect the trust property or the interests of the beneficiaries.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 56.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, §§  2, 9, 17; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Removal.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the mother be removed either for unfitness under T.C.A. § 35-15-706(b)(3) or simply because she was improvidently appointed; the guardian of the decedent's daughter was an individual with priority willing to administer the estate, and thus the mother was improvidently appointed personal representative of the decedent's estate and subject to removal. In re Estate of Edmonds, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2019).

Language of the statutes indicates that the trial court “may” remove the administrator based on the enumerated factors; given the permissive language used in the statutes, it appears that the trial court retains discretion with regard to its removal decisions. In re Estate of Edmonds, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2019).

Person improvidently named administrator of an estate may be unfit to serve under T.C.A. § 35-15-706(b)(3), and to hold otherwise would allow the T.C.A. § 30-1-106' s preference requirements to be defeated by a proverbial race to the courthouse by a stranger to the estate. In re Estate of Edmonds, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2019).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-706.

Subsection (a), contrary to the common law, grants the settlor of an irrevocable trust the right to petition for removal of a trustee. The right to petition for removal does not give the settlor of an irrevocable trust any other rights, such as the right to an annual report or to receive other information concerning administration of the trust. The right of a qualified beneficiary to petition for removal does not apply to a revocable trust while the settlor has capacity. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-603, while a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity, the rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the settlor's exclusive control.

Subsection (a) differs from Uniform Trust Code section 706(a) in that under such subsection, only a qualified (and not any nonqualified) beneficiary who is displeased with the choice of the qualified beneficiaries may petition the court for removal of the trustee. Under T.C.A. § 35-15-706, a settlor or cotrustee may also so petition for removal.

Trustee removal may be regulated by the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. In fashioning a removal provision for an irrevocable trust, the drafter should be cognizant of the danger that the trust may be included in the settlor's federal gross estate if the settlor retains the power to be appointed as trustee or to appoint someone who is not independent. See Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191.

Subsection (b) lists the grounds for removal of the trustee. The grounds for removal are similar to those found in Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). A trustee may be removed for unto-ward action, such as for a serious breach of trust, but the section is not so limited. A trustee may also be removed under a variety of circumstances in which the court concludes that the trustee is not best serving the interests of the beneficiaries. The term “interests of the beneficiaries” means the beneficial interests as provided in the terms of the trust, not as defined by the beneficiaries. See T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Removal for conduct detrimental to the interests of the beneficiaries is a well-established standard for removal of a trustee. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmt. a (1959).

Subdivision (b)(1), consistent with Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. e and g (Tentative Draft No, 2, approved 1999), makes clear that not every breach of trust justifies removal of the trustee. The breach must be “serious.” A serious breach of trust may consist of a single act that causes significant harm or involves flagrant misconduct. A serious breach of trust may also consist of a series of smaller breaches, none of which individually justify removal when considered alone, but which do so when considered together. A particularly appropriate circumstance justifying removal of the trustee is a serious breach of the trustee's duty to keep the beneficiaries reasonably informed of the administration of the trust or to comply with a beneficiary's request for information to the extent required by T.C.A. § 35-15-813. Notwithstanding the immediately preceding sentence, unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows “quiet” trusts. If a trustee is not keeping the beneficiaries reasonably informed of the administration of the trust or does not comply with a beneficiary's request for information because T.C.A. § 35-15-813(e) or (f) applies, or a beneficiary or other person has failed or refused to comply with the requirements of T.C.A. § 35-15-813(g), then the trustee’s action in not keeping a beneficiary, person, beneficiaries or persons so informed does not constitute any breach of trust whatsoever.

The lack of cooperation among trustees justifying removal under subdivision (b)(2) need not involve a breach of trust. The key factor is whether the administration of the trust is significantly impaired by the trustees' failure to agree. Removal is particularly appropriate if the naming of an even number of trustees, combined with their failure to agree, has resulted in deadlock requiring court resolution. The court may remove one or more or all of the trustees. If a cotrustee remains in office following the removal, under T.C.A. § 35-15-704 appointment of a successor trustee is not re-quired.

Subdivision (b)(2) deals only with lack of cooperation among cotrustees, not with friction between the trustee and beneficiaries. Friction between the trustee and beneficiaries is ordinarily not a basis for removal. However, removal might be justified if a communications breakdown is caused by the trustee or appears to be incurable. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999).

Subdivision (b)(3) authorizes removal for a variety of grounds, including unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure to administer the trust effectively. Removal in any of these cases is allowed only if it best serves the interests of the beneficiaries. The term “interests of the beneficiaries” means the beneficial interests as provided in the terms of the trust, not as defined by the beneficiaries. See T.C.A. § 35-15-103. “Unfitness” may include not only mental incapacity but also lack of basic ability to administer the trust. Before removing a trustee for unfitness the court should consider:

the extent to which the problem might be cured by a delegation of functions the trustee is personally incapable of performing; and

if the trustee is serving under a directed trust, the nature of the powers and duties held by the trustee, as well as the extent to which such trustee is an excluded fiduciary relative to other powers and duties.

“Unwillingness” includes not only cases where the trustee refuses to act but also a pattern of indifference to some or all of the beneficiaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). A “persistent failure to administer the trust effectively” might include a long-term pattern of mediocre performance, such as consistently poor investment results when compared to comparable trusts.

It has traditionally been more difficult to remove a trustee named by the settlor than a trustee named by the court, particularly if the settlor at the time of the appointment was aware of the trustee's failings. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No.2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmt. f-g (1959). Be-cause of the discretion normally granted to a trustee, the settlor's confidence in the judgment of the particular person whom the settlor selected to act as trustee is entitled to considerable weight. This deference to the settlor's choice can weaken or dissolve if a substantial change in the trustee's circumstances occurs. To honor a settlor's reasonable expectations, subdivision (b)(4) lists a substantial change of circumstances as a possible basis for removal of the trustee. Changed circumstances justifying removal of a trustee might include a substantial change in the character of the service or location of the trustee. A corporate reorganization of an institutional trustee is not itself a change of circumstances if it does not affect the service provided the individual trust account. Before removing a trustee on account of changed circumstances, the court must also conclude that removal is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, that it will best serve the interests of the beneficiaries, and that a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.

Subdivision (b)(4) also contains a specific but more limited application of T.C.A. § 35-15-411. T.C.A. § 35-15-411 allows the qualified beneficiaries, by unanimous agreement of such qualified beneficiaries, to compel modification of a trust if the court concludes that the particular modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. T.C.A. § 35-15-706(b)(4) similarly allows the qualified beneficiaries to request removal of the trustee if the designation of the trustee was not a material purpose of the trust. Before removing the trustee the court must also find that removal will best serve the interests of the beneficiaries and that a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.

Subsection (c) authorizes the court to intervene pending a final decision on a request to remove a trustee. Among the relief that the court may order under subsection T.C.A. § 35-15-1001 is an injunction prohibiting the trustee from performing certain acts and the appointment of a special fiduciary to perform some or all of the trustee's functions. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-1004, the court may also award attorney's fees as justice and equity may require.

35-15-707. Delivery of property by former trustee — Petition for approval of accountings and release and discharge from liability.

  1. Unless a cotrustee remains in office or the court otherwise orders, and until the trust property is delivered to a successor trustee or other person entitled to it, a trustee who has resigned or been removed has the duties of a trustee and the powers necessary to protect the trust property.
  2. A trustee who has resigned or been removed shall, within a reasonable time, deliver the trust property within the trustee's possession to the cotrustee, successor trustee, or other person entitled to it.
  3. Prior to delivering the trust property within the trustee's possession to the co-trustee, successor trustee, or other person entitled to it, a trustee who has resigned or been removed shall have the right and authority to petition the court for approval of its accountings and a release and discharge from all liability related to such trust as allowed under § 35-15-205.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 57; 2007, ch. 24, § 27; 2019, ch. 340, § 10.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

This section addresses the continuing authority and duty of a resigning or removed trustee. Subject to the power of the court to make other arrangements or unless a cotrustee remains in office, a resigning or removed trustee has continuing authority until the trust property is delivered to a successor. If a cotrustee remains in office, there is no reason to grant a resigning or removed trustee any continuing authority, and none is granted under this section.

There is ample authority in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code for the appointment of a special fiduciary, an appointment which can avoid the need for a resigning or removed trustee to exercise residual powers until a successor can take office. See T.C.A. § 35-15-704(e) (court may appoint additional trustee or special fiduciary whenever court considers appointment necessary for administration of trust), T.C.A. § 35-15-705(b) (in approving resignation, court may impose conditions necessary for protection of trust property), T.C.A. § 35-15-706(c) (pending decision on petition for removal, court may order appropriate relief), and T.C.A. § 35-15-1001(b)(5) (to remedy breach of trust, court may appoint special fiduciary as necessary to protect trust property or interests of beneficiary).

If the former trustee has died, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not require that the trustee's personal representative windup the deceased trustee's administration. Nor is a trustee's conservator or guardian required to complete the former trustee's administration if the trustee's authority terminated due to an adjudication of incapacity. However, to limit the former trustee's liability, the personal representative, conservator or guardian may submit a trustee's report on the former trustee's behalf. Otherwise, the former trustee remains liable for actions taken during the trustee's term of office until liability is otherwise barred.

T.C.A. § 35-15-707(b) recognizes that the process of changing trustees does not take place overnight. The resigning or removed trustee may have to sell proprietary mutual funds whose sale is limited to certain times each month; it may have to wait for a court order to become final; it may wish to have in hand releases from beneficiaries; and it may have to wait on the preparation and filing of deeds or other instruments of conveyance before transferring the trust property in its possession or under its control.

35-15-708. Compensation of trustees, trust advisors and trust protectors.

  1. If the terms of a trust do not specify a trustee's, trust advisor's or trust protector's compensation, and if the settlor, if living, or otherwise a majority of the qualified beneficiaries as defined in §  35-15-103(24)(A), have not otherwise agreed, a trustee, trust advisor or trust protector is entitled to compensation that is reasonable under the circumstances.
  2. If the terms of a trust specify a trustee's, trust advisor's or trust protector's compensation, the trustee, trust advisor or trust protector is entitled to be compensated as specified in the trust, but the court may allow more or less compensation if:
    1. The duties of the trustee, trust advisor or trust protector are substantially different from those contemplated when the trust was created; or
    2. The compensation specified by the terms of the trust would be unreasonably low or high.
  3. Factors for the court to consider in deciding upon a trustee's, trust advisor's or trust protector's compensation shall include the size of the trust, the nature and number of the assets, the income produced, the time and responsibility required, the expertise required, any management or sale of real property or closely held business interests, any involvement in litigation to protect trust property, and other relevant factors.
  4. Subject to the court's authority as provided in subsection (b), regardless of its form of entity, the fees set forth in the published fee schedule of a trustee, trust advisor or trust protector that is regulated by the department of financial institutions, the equivalent regulatory agency of another state, the office of the comptroller of the currency or the office of thrift supervision shall be presumed to be reasonable, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 58; 2013, ch. 390, § 27.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, § 9.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-708.

    Subsection (a) establishes a standard of reasonable compensation. Such standard applies to the extent that the terms of a trust, or a settlor if living, or otherwise a majority of the qualified beneficiaries as defined in T.C.A. 35-15-103 have not otherwise agreed.

    Relevant factors in determining the standard of reasonable compensation, as specified in the Restatement, include the custom of the community; the trustee's skill, experience, and facilities; the time devoted to trust duties; the amount and character of the trust property; the degree of difficulty, responsibility and risk assumed in administering the trust, including in making discretionary distributions; the nature and costs of services rendered by others; and the quality of the trustee's performance. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Re-statement (Second) of Trusts § 242 cmt. b (1959).

    Because “trustee” as defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 includes not only an individual trustee but also cotrustees, each trustee, including a cotrustee, is entitled to reasonable compensation under the circumstances. The fact that a trust has more than one trustee does not mean that the trustees together are entitled to more compensation than had either acted alone. Nor does the appointment of more than one (1) trustee mean that the trustees are eligible to receive the compensation in equal shares. The total amount of the compensation to be paid and how it will be divided depend on the totality of the circumstances. Factors to be considered include the settlor's reasons for naming more than one (1) trustee and the level of responsibility assumed and exact services performed by each trustee. Often the fees of cotrustees will be in the aggregate higher than the fees for a single trustee because of the duty of each trustee to participate in administration and not delegate to a cotrustee duties the settlor expected the trustees to perform jointly. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). The trust may benefit in such cases from the enhanced quality of decision-making resulting from the collective deliberations of the trustees.

    The same standard of reasonable compensation that applies to trustees and to cotrustees applies to trust protectors, trust advisors and any other fiduciary.

    In setting compensation, the services actually performed and responsibilities assumed by the trustee should be closely examined. A downward adjustment of fees may be appropriate if a trustee has delegated significant duties to agents, such as the delegation of investment authority to outside managers. See T.C.A. § 35-15-807 (delegation by trustee). On the other hand, a trustee with special skills, such as those of a real estate agent, may be entitled to extra compensation for performing services that would ordinarily be delegated. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 242 cmt. d (1959).

    Similarly, in setting compensation for any fiduciary serving under a directed trust, the powers held and duties owed, the services actually performed and responsibilities assumed by any fiduciary, as well as the extent to which such fiduciary is an excluded fiduciary should be closely examined and adjusted accordingly.

    Financial institution trustees normally base their fees on published fee schedules. Published fee schedules are subject to the same standard of reasonableness under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code as are other methods for computing fees. The courts have generally upheld published fee schedules but this is not automatic. Among the more litigated topics is the issue of termination fees. Termination fees are charged upon termination of the trust and sometimes upon transfer of the trust to a successor trustee. Factors relevant to whether the fee is appropriate include the actual work performed; whether a termination fee was authorized in the terms of the trust; whether the fee schedule specified the circumstances in which a termination fee would be charged; whether the trustee's overall fees for administering the trust from the date of the trust's creation, including the termination fee, were reasonable; and the general practice in the community regarding termination fees. Because significantly less work is normally involved, termination fees are less appropriate upon transfer to a successor trustee than upon termination of the trust. For representative cases, see Cleveland Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 258 A.2d 58 (Del. 1969); In re Trusts Under Will of Dwan, 371 N.W. 2d 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Mercer v. Merchants National Bank, 298 A.2d 736 (N.H. 1972); In re Estate of Payson, 562 N.Y.S. 2d 329 (Surr. Ct. 1990); In re Indenture Agreement of Lawson, 607 A. 2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); In re Estate of Ischy, 415 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980); Memphis Memorial Park v. Planters National Bank, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2978 (May 7, 1986); In re Trust of Sensenbrenner, 252 N.W. 2d 47 (Wis. 1977).

    This Code does not take a specific position on whether dual fees may be charged when a trustee hires its own law firm to represent the trust. The trend is to authorize dual compensation as long as the overall fees are reasonable. For a discussion, see Ronald C. Link, Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration Lawyer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 22-38 (1991).

    Subsection (b) permits the terms of the trust to override the reasonable compensation standard, subject to the court's inherent equity power to make adjustments downward or upward in appropriate circumstances. Compensation provisions should be drafted with care. Common questions include whether a provision in the terms of the trust setting the amount of the trustee's compensation is binding on a successor trustee, whether a dispositive provision for the trustee in the terms of the trust is in addition to or in lieu of the trustee's regular compensation, and whether a dispositive provision for the trustee is conditional on the person performing services as trustee. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No.2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 242 cmt. f (1959).

    The preceding paragraph also applies to any fiduciary serving under a directed trust.

    Compensation may be set by agreement. A trustee may enter into an agreement with the settlor or a majority of the qualified beneficiaries for lesser or increased compensation, although an agreement increasing compensation is not binding on a nonconsenting beneficiary. See T.C.A. § 35-15-111 (matters that may be the resolved by nonjudicial settlement). See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 242 cmt. i (1959). A trustee may also agree to waive compensation and should do so prior to rendering significant services if concerned about possible gift and income taxation of the compensation accrued prior to the waiver. See Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 C.B. 20. See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 242 cmt. j (1959).

    The preceding paragraph also applies to any fiduciary serving under a directed trust.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

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T.C.A. § 35-15-816 grants the trustee authority to fix and pay its compensation without the necessity of prior court review, subject to the right of a beneficiary to object to the compensation in a later judicial proceeding. Allowing the trustee to pay its compensation without prior court approval promotes efficient trust administration but does place a significant burden on a beneficiary who believes the compensation is unreasonable. Unlike with the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not require a trustee to provide the qualified beneficiaries with advance notice of any change in the method or rate of the trustee's compensation.

Under T.C.A. §§ 35-6-501 and 35-6-502 of the Tennessee Uniform Principal and Income Act, one half (1/2) of a trustee's regular compensation is charged to income and the other half (1/2) to principal. Chargeable to principal are fees calculated on principal for acceptance, distribution, or termination of the trust, and fees charged on disbursements made to prepare property for sale. However, several other sections of such act may modify this. T.C.A. § 35-6-104 provides a trustee the power to adjust between income and principal in certain cases. Moreover, under T.C.A. §§ 35-6-108 and 35-6-109, a trustee can respectively, convert a traditional trust to a unitrust and manage an express unitrust created in a trust instrument. In both cases, such types of trusts often require adjustments between income and principal.

35-15-709. Reimbursement of expenses.

  1. A trustee, trust advisor or trust protector is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property, with interest as appropriate, for:
    1. Expenses that were properly incurred in the administration of the trust; and
    2. To the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust, expenses that were not properly incurred in the administration of the trust.
  2. An advance, either by the trustee, trust advisor or trust protector or by a person named in § 35-15-701(c)(1), of money for the protection of the trust gives rise to a lien against trust property to secure reimbursement with reasonable interest.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 59; 2013, ch. 390, § 28.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-709.

    A trustee has the authority to expend trust funds as necessary in the administration of the trust, including expenses incurred in the hiring of agents. See T.C.A. § 35-15-807 (delegation by trustee) and T.C.A. § 35-15-816 (trustee to pay expenses of administration from trust).

    Subsection (a)(1) clarifies that a trustee is entitled to reimbursement from the trust for incurring expenses within the trustee's authority. The trustee may also withhold appropriate reimbursement for expenses before making distributions to the beneficiaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 244 cmt. b (1959). A trustee is ordinarily not entitled to reimbursement for incurring unauthorized expenses. Such expenses are normally the personal responsibility of the trustee.

    As provided in subdivision (a)(2), a trustee is entitled to reimbursement for unauthorized expenses only if the unauthorized expenditures benefitted the trust The purpose of this provision, which is derived from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 245 (1959), is not to ratify the unauthorized conduct of the trustee, but to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust. Given this purpose, a court, on appropriate grounds, may delay or even deny reimbursement for expenses which benefitted the trust. Appropriate grounds include: (1) whether the trustee acted in bad faith in incurring the expense; (2) whether the trustee knew that the expense was inappropriate; (3) whether the trustee reasonably believed the expense was necessary for the preservation of the trust estate; (4) whether the expense has resulted in a benefit; and (5) whether indemnity can be allowed without defeating or impairing the purposes of the trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 245 cmt. g (1959).

    Subsection (b) implements T.C.A. § 35-15-802(k)(5), which creates an exception to the duty of loyalty for advances by the trustee for the protection of the trust if the transaction is fair to the beneficiaries.

    Reimbursement under this section may include attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the trustee in defending an action. However, a trustee is not ordinarily entitled to attorney's fees and expenses if it is determined that the trustee breached the trust. See 3A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 245 (4th ed. 1988).

    All of the above provisions also apply to trust advisors, trust protectors and other fiduciaries serving under a directed trust.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

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35-15-710. Directed trusts.

If the terms of the trust, an agreement of the qualified beneficiaries, or a court order requires a trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector to follow the direction of a trust advisor or trust protector, and the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector acts in accordance with such direction, then the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector so directed shall be treated as an excluded fiduciary.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 29.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    This section details when a fiduciary serving under a directed trust will be an excluded fiduciary as such is defined in 35-15-103.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-711. Directed trusts; accepting or declining fiduciary appointment.

  1. A trust advisor, trust protector or other fiduciary other than a cotrustee, such cotrustee already being provided for in § 35-15-701(a), may accept its appointment as such respective fiduciary in a like manner as provided for a trustee under § 35-15-701(a).
  2. A trust advisor, trust protector or other fiduciary other than a cotrustee, such cotrustee already being provided for in § 35-15-701(b), may reject its appointment as such respective fiduciary in a like manner as provided for a trustee under § 35-15-701(b).
  3. A trust advisor, trust protector or other fiduciary other than a cotrustee, such cotrustee already being provided for in § 35-15-701(c), may, without accepting its appointment as such respective fiduciary, carry out the appropriate activities relative to such respective fiduciary as are provided for a trustee under § 35-15-701(c).

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 29.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    This section deals with accepting or declining fiduciary appointments when such fiduciary is serving under a directed trust. It is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-701.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-712. Directed trusts; fiduciary's bond.

  1. Section 35-15-702 applies to trust advisors, trust protectors or other fiduciaries other than cotrustees, such cotrustees already being provided for in § 35-15-702.
  2. When exercising its powers under this section, the court shall consider the powers, duties and liabilities relative to such respective fiduciaries other than a cotrustee and whether any of such respective fiduciaries are excluded fiduciaries.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 29.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    This section deals with a fiduciary’s bond when such fiduciary is serving under a directed trust. It is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-702. It directs a court to consider the respective powers and duties held by a fiduciary, as well as the extent to which such fiduciary is a excluded fiduciary, when determining matters related to fiduciary bonds.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-713. Vacancy; directed trusts.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust upon obtaining knowledge of a vacancy in the office of trust advisor or trust protector, the trustee shall be vested with any fiduciary power or duty that otherwise would be vested in the trustee but that by the terms of the trust was vested in the trust advisor or trust protector, until such time that the vacancy in the office of trust advisor or trust protector, as applicable is filled.
  2. Such vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as would a vacancy in trusteeship that is required to be filled, either as provided by § 35-15-704(c) if the trust is a noncharitable trust, or as provided by § 35-15-704(d) if the trust is a charitable trust. Section 35-15-704(e) shall also apply relative to trust advisors and trust protectors in the same manner as that subsection does to trustees and vacancies in trusteeship.
  3. Notwithstanding subsection (a), a trustee shall not be liable for failing to exercise or assume any power or duty held by a trust advisor or trust protector and conferred upon the trustee by subsection (a) for the sixty-day period immediately following the date the trustee obtains knowledge of such vacancy.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 29.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    This section deals with fiduciary vacancies when such fiduciary is serving under a directed trust. It is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-704.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-714. Directed trusts; resignation of fiduciary.

  1. A trust advisor, trust protector or other fiduciary other than a cotrustee, such cotrustee's resignation already being provided for in § 35-15-705, may resign its appointment as such respective fiduciary in a like manner as provided for a trustee under § 35-15-705.
  2. When exercising its powers under this section relative to resignation, the court shall consider the powers, duties and liabilities relative to such respective fiduciaries other than a cotrustee and whether any of such respective fiduciaries are excluded fiduciaries.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 29.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    This section deals with resignation of a fiduciary when such fiduciary is serving under a directed trust. It is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-705. It directs a court to consider the respective powers and duties held by a fiduciary, as well as the extent to which such fiduciary is a excluded fiduciary, when exercising its powers relative to resignation.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-715. Directed trusts; removal of fiduciary.

  1. A trust advisor, trust protector or other fiduciary other than a cotrustee, such cotrustee's removal already being provided for in § 35-15-706, may be removed as such respective fiduciary in a like manner as provided for a trustee under § 35-15-706.
  2. When exercising its powers under this section relative to removal of such respective fiduciary, the court shall consider the powers, duties and liabilities relative to such respective fiduciaries other than a cotrustee and whether any of such respective fiduciaries are excluded fiduciaries.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 29.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;

    “3) The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;

    Section Comment.

    This section deals with removal of a fiduciary when such fiduciary is serving under a directed trust. It is analogous to T.C.A. § 35-15-706. It directs a court to consider the respective powers and duties held by a fiduciary, as well as the extent to which such fiduciary is a excluded fiduciary, when exercising its powers relative to removal of any such fiduciary.

Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and

An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-801. Duty to administer trust.

Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall administer the trust until such time as the trust terminates or a successor trustee is appointed and all assets are delivered in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with this chapter.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 60.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Comment.

The provisions of part 8 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent such part is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Part 8 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code states the fundamental duties of a trustee and lists the trustee's powers. Under T.C.A. § 35-15-808 and part 12 such powers may be removed from a trustee and directed to others, in which case the fiduciary from whom such powers were removed shall be an excluded fiduciary as such is defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Part 8 also provides for how certain of such powers may be exercised and the judicial standards by which certain of those powers may be reviewed. The duties listed are not new, but how the particular duties are formulated and applied has changed over the years. Moreover, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows far greater latitude than does the Uniform Trust Code in the exercise of discretion relative to certain of such duties, as well as who can and does hold such duties. This part was drafted where possible to conform with the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act prescribes a trustee's responsibilities with respect to the management and investment of trust property. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code also addresses a trustee's duties with respect to distribution to beneficiaries and is far more flexible than is the Uniform Trust Code relative to such.

The Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002, codified at title 35, part 14, has been incorporated by reference into the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code by T.C.A. § 35-15-901. Certain sections of this part 8 overlap with the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act. Those sections are T.C.A. § 35-15-802 (duty of loyalty), T.C.A. § 35-15-803 (impartiality), T.C.A. § 35-15-805 (costs of administration), T.C.A. § 35-15-806 (trustee's skills) and T.C.A. § 35-15-807 (delegation).

Unlike with the Uniform Trust Code, all of the provisions of this part of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code may be overridden in the terms of the trust except for the trustee's fundamental obligation to act in accordance with the purposes of the trust, and for the benefit of the beneficiaries as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust. (See T.C.A. § 35-15-105).

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-801.

In furtherance of the policy of the state of Tennessee and its overriding emphasis on settlor’s intent and freedom of disposition, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code governs a trustee’s (or other fiduciary’s) duties only to the extent such terms of a trust are silent or for some reason invalid on a particular issue. This section provides for the following default rules, which are only applicable to the extent of such silence or to the extent of such invalidity.

This section confirms that a primary duty of a trustee is to follow the terms and purposes of the trust and to do so in good faith. However, unlike with the Uniform Trust Code, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows the terms of a trust to remove from a trustee or other fiduciary the duty to act in good faith, see T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

In administering the trust, the trustee must not only comply with this section but also with the other duties specified in this part, particularly the obligation not to place the interests of others above those of the beneficiaries as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-802 (but such section allows far more latitude than does section 802 of the Uniform Trust Code to deal with affiliates or in affiliated investments), the duty to act with prudence as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-804, and the duty to keep certain beneficiaries and holders of powers of appointment reasonably informed about the administration of the trust as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-813 (but under such section a fiduciary owes such duty to far fewer beneficiaries than under section 813 of the Uniform Trust Code, and unlike the latter, allows such duty to be re-moved either in the trust instrument or by any of a settlor, trust advisor or trust protector in a writing delivered to the trustee).

While a trustee generally must administer a trust in accordance with its terms and purposes, the purposes and particular terms of the trust can on occasion conflict. If such a conflict occurs because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, it may be appropriate for the trustee to petition under T.C.A. § 35-15-412 to modify or terminate the trust. Pursuant to section T.C.A. § 35-15-404, a trustee is not required to perform a duty prescribed by the terms of the trust if performance would be impossible or illegal. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-404 contains no mention of public policy.

For background on the trustee's duty to administer the trust, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 164-169 (1959).

Certain of the above-cited sections of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent any of such cited sections are in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

This section also confirms that a trustee does not have a duty to act until the trustee has accepted the trusteeship. Such duty continues until the trust either terminates or a successor trustee is appointed and all assets of the trust are delivered to such successor trustee. For the procedure for accepting a trusteeship, see T.C.A. § 35-15-701. For the procedures relative to appointment of a successor trustee and delivery of property by a former trustee, see T.C.A. §§ 35-15-704 and 35-15-707, respectively. For procedures relative to trust advisors, trust protectors and other fiduciaries accepting such offices and providing for successors to such offices, see T.C.A. §§ 35-15-711 and 35-15-713, respectively.

35-15-802. Duty of loyalty.

  1. A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.
  2. Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided in § 35-15-1012 or as may otherwise be allowed under Tennessee law, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee's own personal account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless:
    1. The transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust;
    2. The transaction was approved by the court;
    3. The beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding within the time allowed by § 35-15-1005;
    4. The beneficiary consented to the trustee's conduct, ratified the transaction, or released the trustee in compliance with § 35-15-1009; or
    5. The transaction involves a contract entered into or claim acquired by the trustee before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee.
  3. A sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests of the trustee if it is entered into by the trustee with:
    1. The trustee's spouse;
    2. The trustee's descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses;
    3. An agent or attorney of the trustee; or
    4. A corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee, or a person that owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee's best judgment.
  4. A transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary that does not concern trust property but that occurs during the existence of the trust or while the trustee retains significant influence over the beneficiary and from which the trustee obtains an advantage is voidable by the beneficiary unless the trustee establishes that the transaction was fair to the beneficiary.
  5. A transaction not concerning trust property in which the trustee engages in the trustee's individual capacity involves a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests of the trustee if the transaction concerns an opportunity properly belonging to the trust.
  6. In addition to all other permissible investments and delegatable duties listed in this title, so long as they are fairly priced and in accordance with the interest of the beneficiaries and the interests of the fiduciary's appointment and otherwise comply with chapter 14 of this title, a fiduciary may purchase, sell, hold or otherwise deal with an affiliate or an interest in an affiliated investment, as well as delegate to an affiliate or other agent associated with the fiduciary and, upon satisfaction of the conditions stated in subsection (h), such fiduciary may receive fiduciary compensation from such account at the same rate as the fiduciary would otherwise be entitled to be compensated. Such activities shall occur without any presumption of a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests of the trustee or other fiduciary.
  7. As used in this section:
    1. “Affiliate” means any corporation or other entity that directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries controls, is controlled by or is under common control with the fiduciary;
    2. “Affiliated investment” means an investment for which the fiduciary or an affiliate of the fiduciary acts as adviser, administrator, distributor, placement agent, underwriter, broker or in any other capacity for which it receives or has received a fee or commission from such investment or an investment acquired or disposed of in a transaction for which the fiduciary or an affiliate of the fiduciary receives or has received a fee or commission. “Affiliated investment” also means an investment in an insurance contract purchased from an insurance agency owned by, or affiliated with, the fiduciary, or any of its affiliates;
    3. “Delegate to an affiliate or associated agent” means a proper delegation of any duty of the fiduciary to any person or entity that is affiliated with, or associated with, the fiduciary. The action of doing any of the above shall be known as a “delegation to an affiliate or associated agent”;
    4. “Fee or commission” means compensation paid to a fiduciary or an affiliate thereof on account of its services to or on behalf of an investment;
    5. For purposes of this section, “fiduciary” means any fiduciary as defined in § 35-15-103, as well as any other fiduciary; and
    6. “Investment” means any security as defined in § 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §  77b(a)(1)), any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery within the meaning of § 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. §  2(i)), or any other asset permitted for fiduciary accounts pursuant to the terms of chapter 14 of this title or by the terms of the governing instrument, including by way of illustration and not limitation: shares or interests in a public or private investment fund, which shall include, but not be limited to, a public or private investment fund organized as a limited partnership, limited liability company, statutory or common law business trust, real estate investment trust, joint venture or other general or limited partnership; or an open-end or closed-end management type investment company or investment trust registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. §  80a-1 et seq.).
  8. A fiduciary seeking compensation pursuant to subsection (f) shall, as is applicable relative to the fiduciary's particular appointment, disclose either: to those persons entitled to be kept informed about the administration of a trust under § 35-15-813(a)(1), subject to the provisions of § 35-15-813(d) and (e); to each principal in an agency relationship; or to all current recipients of statements of any other fiduciary account not described above; all fees or commissions paid or to be paid by the account, or received or to be received by an affiliate arising from such affiliated investment or delegation to an affiliate or associated agent. The disclosure required under this subsection (h) may be given either in a copy of the prospectus or any other disclosure document prepared for the affiliated investment under federal or state securities laws or in a written summary that includes all fees or commissions received or to be received by the fiduciary or any affiliate of the fiduciary and an explanation of the manner in which such fees or commissions are calculated, either as a percentage of the assets invested or by some other method. Such disclosure shall be made at least annually unless there has been no increase in the rate at which such fees or commissions are calculated since the most recent disclosure. Notwithstanding this subsection (h), no such disclosure is required if the governing instrument or a court order expressly authorizes the fiduciary to invest the fiduciary account in affiliated investments or to perform the delegation to an affiliate or associated agent.
  9. A fiduciary that has complied with subsection (h), whether by making the applicable disclosure or by relying on the terms of a governing instrument or court order, shall have full authority to administer an affiliated investment, including the authority to vote proxies thereon, without regard to the affiliation between the fiduciary and the investment or the fiduciary and delegatee, as the case may be.
  10. In voting shares of stock or in exercising powers of control over similar interests in other forms of enterprise, the trustee shall act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. If the trust is the sole owner of a corporation or other form of enterprise, the trustee shall elect or appoint directors or other managers who will manage the corporation or enterprise in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
  11. This section does not preclude the following transactions, if fair to the beneficiaries:
    1. An agreement between a trustee and a beneficiary relating to the appointment or compensation of the trustee;
    2. Payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee;
    3. A transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent's estate, or conservatorship of which the trustee is a fiduciary or in which a beneficiary has an interest;
    4. A deposit of trust money in a regulated financial-service institution operated by the trustee; or
    5. An advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust.
  12. The court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision with respect to any proposed transaction that might violate this section if entered into by the trustee.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 61; 2010, ch. 725, § 8; 2013, ch. 390, § 30.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    1. No Breach.

    Trustee's decision relating to a farm lease did not violate three statutory duties within the Uniform Trust Code because it exercised reasonable care, skill, and caution in its decision regarding the farm lease, and it kept a son reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and the farm lease. The son failed to demonstrate that the trustee administered the trust in a manner that was adverse to his beneficial interest as that interest was defined under the terms of the trust. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-802.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section addresses the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most fundamental duty of the trustee. Subsection (a) states the general principle, which is copied from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959). A trustee owes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries, a principle which is sometimes expressed as the obligation of the trustee not to place the trustee's own interests over those of the beneficiaries. Most but not all violations of the duty of loyalty concern transactions involving the trust property, but breaches of the duty can take other forms. For a discussion of the different types of violations, see George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 543 (Rev. 2d ed. 1993); and 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts §§ 170-170.24 (4th ed. 1987). The “interests of the beneficiaries” to which the trustee must be loyal are the beneficial interests as provided in the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-103.

    The duty of loyalty applies to both charitable and noncharitable trusts, even though the beneficiaries of charitable trusts are indefinite. In the case of a charitable trust, the trustee must administer the trust solely in the interests of effectuating the trust's charitable purposes, as the purposes are defined under the terms of the trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 379 cmt. a (1959).

    Duty of loyalty issues often arise in connection with the settlor's designation of the trustee. For example, it is not uncommon that the trustee will also be a beneficiary. Or the settlor will name a friend or family member who is an officer of a company in which the settlor owns stock. In such cases, settlors should be advised to consider addressing in the terms of the trust how such conflicts are to be handled. T.C.A. § 35-15-105 authorizes a settlor to override an other-wise applicable duty of loyalty in the terms of the trust. Sometimes the override is implied. The grant to a trustee of authority to make a discretionary distribution to a class of beneficiaries that includes the trustee implicitly authorizes the trustee to make distributions for the trustee's own benefit.

    Subsection (b) states the general rule with respect to transactions involving trust property that are affected by a conflict of interest. A transaction affected by a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary who is affected by the transaction. Subsection (b) carries out the “no further inquiry” rule by making transactions involving trust property entered into by a trustee for the trustee's own personal account voidable without further proof. Such transactions are irrebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests. It is immaterial whether the trustee acts in good faith or pays a fair consideration. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959). Note that subsection (b) varies from section 802(b) of the Uniform Trust Code in that such subsection is subject not only to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-1012, but is also subject to any other right allowed under Tennessee law.

    The rule is less severe with respect to transactions involving trust property entered into with persons who have close business or personal ties with the trustee. Under subsection (c), a transaction between a trustee and certain relatives and business associates is presumptively voidable, not void. Also presumptively voidable are transactions with corporations or other enterprises in which the trustee, or a person who owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee's best judgment. The presumption is rebutted if the trustee establishes that the transaction was not affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests. Among the factors tending to rebut the presumption are whether the consideration was fair and whether the other terms of the transaction are similar to those that would be transacted with an independent party

    Even where the presumption under subsection (c) does not apply, a transaction may still be voided by a beneficiary if the beneficiary proves that a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests existed and that the transaction was affected by the conflict. The right of a beneficiary to void a transaction affected by a conflict of interest is optional. If the transaction proves profitable to the trust and unprofitable to the trustee, the beneficiary will likely allow the transaction to stand. For a comparable provision regulating fiduciary investments by national banks, see 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(a).

    As provided in subsection (b), no breach of the duty of loyalty occurs if the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust or approved by the court, or if the beneficiary failed to commence a judicial proceeding against the appropriate fiduciary within the time allowed or chose to ratify the transaction, either prior to or subsequent to its occurrence. In determining whether a beneficiary has consented to a transaction, the principles of representation from title 35, chapter 3 may be applied.

    Subdivision (b)(5), which is derived from section 3-713(1) of the Uniform Probate Code, allows a trustee to implement a contract or pursue a claim that the trustee entered into or acquired before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee. While this subsection allows the transaction to proceed without automatically being voidable by a beneficiary, the transaction is not necessarily free from scrutiny. In implementing the contract or pursuing the claim, the trustee must still complete the transaction in a way that avoids a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests. Because avoiding such a conflict will frequently be difficult, the trustee should consider petitioning the court to appoint a special fiduciary, as authorized by subsection (l) of this section, to work out the details and complete the transaction.

    Subsection (d) does not apply to a corporate trustee that makes a loan to or sells a financial product to a beneficiary in the ordinary course of business. Otherwise, subsection (d) creates a presumption that a transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary not involving trust property is an abuse by the trustee of a confidential relationship with the beneficiary. This subsection has limited scope. If the trust has terminated, there must be proof that the trustee's influence with the beneficiary remained. Furthermore, whether or not the trust has terminated, there must be proof that the trustee obtained an advantage from the relationship. The fact the trustee profited is insufficient to show an abuse if a third party would have similarly profited in an arm's length transaction. See 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher § 170.25 (4th ed. 1987), which states the same principle in a slightly different form: “Where he deals directly with the beneficiaries, the transaction may stand, but only if the trustee makes full disclosure and takes no advantage of his position and the transaction is in all respects fair and reasonable.”

    Subsection (e), which allows a beneficiary to void a transaction entered into by the trustee that involved an opportunity belonging to the trust, is based on Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. k (1959). While normally associated with corporations and with their directors and officers, what is usually referred to as the corporate opportunity doctrine also applies to other types of fiduciary. The doctrine prohibits the trustee's pursuit of certain business activities, such as entering into a business in direct competition with a business owned by the trust, or the purchasing of an investment that the facts suggest the trustee was expected to purchase for the trust. For discussion of the corporate opportunity doctrine, see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Corporate Opportunity and Comparative Advantage, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 211 (1999); and Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 5 (1996). See also Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 5.05 (American Law Inst. 1994).

    Subsections (f) through (i) diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. Subsections (f) through (i) clearly grant the express authority to use affiliates and related parties or affiliated delegatees to manage assets and perform administrative functions. This increases flexibility and grants fiduciaries the ability to leverage expertise inside their broad organization. Versus the common law, the restatements, the Uniform Trust Code and Uniform Prudent Investor Act (as such uniform acts are proposed by ULC – NCCUSL), these provisions grant exceptions to the no further inquiry rule relative to conflicts of interests for investments and other transactions between affiliates so long as these transactions are fairly priced, are in accordance with the interests of the beneficiaries and the interests of the fiduciary appointment and otherwise comply with the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act. Under most circumstances, a fiduciary must disclose, at least annually (unless there has been no change) to the beneficiaries entitled to receive a copy of the trustee's annual report, the rate and method by which any additional compensation paid, earned or received from or by any affiliate was determined.

    In furtherance of its overriding emphasis on settlor’s intent and of freedom of disposition, under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, subsection (j) can be completely overridden by the terms of the trust. Moreover, under such code, the power to vote shares of stock or in exercising control over similar interests in other forms of enterprise may be removed from any trustee and placed in the hands of any other fiduciary as such is defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. When such occurs any fiduciary from which such powers were so removed is an excluded fiduciary as such is defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103

    Absent the terms of a trust overriding subsection (j) as discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph, such sub-section addresses an overlap between trust and corporate law. It is based on Restatement of Trusts (Second) § 193 cmt. a (1959), which provides that “[i]t is the duty of the trustee in voting shares of stock to use proper care to promote the interest of the beneficiary,” and that the fiduciary responsibility of a trustee in voting a control block “is heavier than where he holds only a small fraction of the shares.” Similarly, the department of labor construes ERISA's duty of loyalty to make share voting a fiduciary function. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2. When the trust owns the entirety of the shares of a corporation, the corporate assets are in effect trust assets that the trustee determines to hold in corporate form. The trustee may not use the corporate form to escape the fiduciary duties of trust law. Thus, for example, a trustee whose duty of impartiality would require the trustee to make current distributions for the support of current beneficiaries may not evade that duty by holding assets in corporate form and pleading the discretion of corporate directors to determine dividend policy. Rather, the trustee must vote for corporate directors who will follow a dividend policy consistent with the trustee's trust-law duty of impartiality.

    Subsection (k) contains several exceptions to the general duty of loyalty, which apply if the transaction was fair to the beneficiaries. Subdivisions (k)(1) and (k)(2) clarify that a trustee is free to contract about the terms of appointment and rate of compensation. Consistent with Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. r (1959), subdivision (k)(3) authorizes a trustee to engage in a transaction involving another trust of which the trustee is also trustee, a transaction with a decedent's estate or a conservatorship estate of which the trustee is personal representative or conservator, or a transaction with another trust or other fiduciary relationship in which a beneficiary of the trust has an interest. The authority of a trustee to deposit funds in a financial institution operated by the trustee, as provided in subdivision (k)(4), is recognized in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. m (1959). The power to deposit funds in its own institution does not negate the trustee's responsibility to invest prudently, including the obligation to earn a reasonable rate of interest on deposits. Subdivision (k)(5) authorizes a trustee to advance money for the protection of the trust. Such advances usually are of small amounts and are made in emergencies or as a matter of convenience. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-709, the trustee has a lien against the trust property for any advances made.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Breach.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-803. Impartiality.

If a trust has two (2) or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 62.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-803.

The duty of impartiality is an important aspect of the duty of loyalty. This section is very similar to T.C.A. § 35-14-108, except that this section also applies to all aspects of trust administration and to decisions by a trustee with respect to distributions. The Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act Investor Act, in title 35, chapter 14, is limited to duties with respect to the investment and management of trust property. The differing beneficial interests for which the trustee must act impartially include those of the current beneficiaries versus those of beneficiaries holding interests in the remainder; and among those currently eligible to receive distributions. In fulfilling the duty to act impartially, the trustee should be particularly sensitive to allocation of receipts and disbursements between income and principal and should consider, in an appropriate case, a reallocation of income to the principal account and vice versa, as is allowable under the Tennessee Uniform Principal and Income Act in title 35, chapter 6.

The duty to act impartially does not mean that the trustee must treat the beneficiaries equally. Rather, the trustee must treat the beneficiaries equitably in light of the purposes and terms of the trust as such purposes and terms are stated therein. A settlor who prefers that the trustee, when making decisions, generally favor the interests of one beneficiary over those of others should provide appropriate guidance in the terms of the trust and is completely free to do so under the Tennessee trust statutes. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 cmt. a (1959).

35-15-804. Prudent administration.

A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and caution.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 60.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Unreasonable Actions Or Reckless Indifference.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank in the decedent's daughter's action against it was appropriate because there was nothing in the record indicating that the bank acted either unreasonably or with reckless indifference in carrying out its duties as trustee. Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

2. Actions Reasonable.

Trustee's decision relating to a farm lease did not violate three statutory duties within the Uniform Trust Code because it exercised reasonable care, skill, and caution in its decision regarding the farm lease, and it kept a son reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and the farm lease. The son failed to demonstrate that the trustee administered the trust in a manner that was adverse to his beneficial interest as that interest was defined under the terms of the trust. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-804.

The duty to administer a trust with prudence is a fundamental duty of the trustee. This duty does not depend on whether the trustee receives compensation. The duty may be freely altered by the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. This section is similar to language contained in T.C.A. § 35-14-104 and Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).

The language of this section diverges from the language of the previous Restatement. The prior Restatement can be read as applying the same standard -- “man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property”-- regardless of the type or purposes of the trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 cmt. a (1959). This section appropriately bases the standard on the purposes and other circumstances of the particular trust.

Notwithstanding the references to restatements in the preceding two paragraph. to the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or con-trolling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Moreover, the duties imposed by this section may be freely altered or removed by the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. Nevertheless, any such alteration is subject to the prohibition in T.C.A. § 35-15-1008 regarding exculpation of trustees.

35-15-805. Costs of administration.

In administering a trust, the trustee may incur only costs that are reasonable in relation to the trust property, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 63.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-805.

This section is similar to T.C.A. § 35-14-109 and is consistent with the rules concerning costs in Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(c)(3)(1992). For related rules concerning compensation and reimbursement of trustees, trust advisors or trust protectors, see T.C.A. §§ 35-15-708 and 35-15-709. The duty not to incur unreasonable costs applies when a trustee decides whether and how to delegate to agents, as well as to other aspects of trust administration. In deciding whether and how to delegate, the trustee must be alert to balancing projected benefits against the likely costs. To protect the beneficiary against excessive costs, the trustee should also be alert to adjusting compensation for functions which the trustee has delegated to others. The obligation to incur only necessary or appropriate costs of administration has long been part of the law of trusts. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959). Notwithstanding the above, subject to the restrictions contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-105, the provisions of this section may be freely altered by the terms of the trust.

35-15-806. Trustee's skills.

A trustee who has special skills or expertise, or is named trustee in reliance upon the trustee's representation that the trustee has special skills or expertise, shall use those special skills or expertise.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 64.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-806.

This section is similar to language contained in T.C.A. § 35-14-104, in section 7-302 of the Uniform Probate Code, and in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (1959). Nothing in this section minimizes the rights of a trustee, trust advisor or trust protector contained in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-708 and 35-15-709.

35-15-807. Delegation by trustee.

  1. A trustee may delegate duties and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:
    1. Selecting an agent;
    2. Establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of the trust; and
    3. Periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.
  2. In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
  3. A trustee who complies with subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries for any act performed or omitted pursuant to written directions or to the trust for an action of the agent to whom the function was delegated.
  4. By accepting a delegation of powers or duties from the trustee of a trust that is subject to the law of this state, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 65.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-807.

This section permits trustees to delegate various aspects of trust administration to agents, subject to the standards of the section. The language is derived from T.C.A. § 35-14-111. See also John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1994) (discussing prior law).

This section encourages and protects the trustee in making delegations appropriate to the facts and circumstances of the particular trust. Whether a particular function is delegable is based on whether it is a function that a prudent trustee might delegate under similar circumstances. For example, delegating some administrative and reporting duties might be prudent for a family trustee but unnecessary for a corporate trustee.

Moreover, subsection (c) clearly applies the provisions of this section to fiduciaries, as such are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103, from whom the duties relative to any item so delegated were removed and were placed in the hands of, or the power to so delegate was given to, another fiduciary, the fiduciary from whom such duties were removed being an excluded fiduciary as defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103.

This section applies only to delegation to agents, not to delegation to a cotrustee. For the provision regulating delegation to a cotrustee, see T.C.A. § 35-15-703.

35-15-808. Powers to direct — Transitional provisions.

  1. While a trust is revocable, the trustee may follow a direction of the settlor that is contrary to the terms of the trust or contrary to the normal practice of the trustee in regard to the action requested.
  2. If the terms of a trust, an agreement of the qualified beneficiaries, or a court order, confer upon a person other than the settlor of a revocable trust power to direct certain actions of the trustee, the trustee shall act in accordance with an exercise of the power.
  3. The terms of a trust may confer upon a trustee or other person a power to direct the modification or termination of the trust.
  4. Unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise, if a person holds a power to perform any act in reliance on §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123, and that power holder is other than a beneficiary, that person is a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. The holder of a power to perform any act under this subsection (d) is liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty. In so following the directions of such person the trustee is protected from liability as provided in §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123.
  5. If a person holds a power to direct pursuant to part 12 of this chapter, that person is a trust advisor, trust protector or both. Such power holder is subject to all the provisions of part 12, including any duties prescribed by part 12 and any provisions that make the power holder a fiduciary. Any trustee or other person that under part 12 is relieved of any duty or any liability, or is otherwise protected under part 12, shall be so relieved and otherwise protected.
  6. Transitional provisions applicable to this section shall be as follows:
    1. Powers to direct or perform any act held in reliance on or that are subject to §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123 that are in existence prior to July 1, 2013, remain effective thereafter and remain subject to the provisions of those sections and their protections;
    2. Notwithstanding subdivision (f)(1), should any power that is described in part 12 of this chapter be held under a trust instrument that was in existence or became irrevocable before July 1, 2013, and that power is not held in reliance on nor is it subject to §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123, then from July 1, 2013, all law relative to such power shall be controlled by and subject to part 12 of this chapter, along with any amendments made to this chapter in furtherance of the implementation and effectiveness of such part 12; and
    3. For all trust instruments entered into, that become irrevocable or that are amended relative to any power that is described in part 12 of this chapter on or after July 1, 2013, part 12 of this chapter, along with any amendments made to this chapter in furtherance of the implementation and effectiveness of such part 12, shall be the exclusive method to create a directed trust or a provision regarding such and shall control such. Relative to trusts described in this subdivision (f)(3) and subdivision (f)(2), §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123 shall be of no further force and effect.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 66; 2013, ch. 390, § 31.

Compiler's Notes.. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-808.

    The provisions of this section diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the ex-tent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    The 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code substantially rewrote this section, leaving the former version inoperative as provided in the enacting and transitional language of Section 55, Pub. Act. 2013, Pub. Ch. 390, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn., 2013). Notwithstanding the above, Tennessee has had statutes fully providing for true directed trusts since the late 1980s, such provisions being contained in title 35, chapter 3. Part twelve (12) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, added by such 2013 amendments, contains significantly more detailed provisions governing the operation of directed trusts than do Tennessee’s original 1980s directed trust statutes. Finally, many modifications to various other provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and certain other provisions of the Tennessee trust statutes have been made to coordinate those provisions with such part twelve (12). For all these reasons, in addition to the transitional language of Section 55 of such public chapter, T.C.A. § 35-15-808(f) contains transitional provisions specifically applicable to directed trusts as such are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103.

    Subsection (a) is an application of T.C.A. § 35-15-603, which provides that a revocable trust is subject to the settlor's exclusive control as long as the settlor has capacity. Because of the settlor's degree of control, subsection (a) of this section authorizes a trustee to rely on a direction from the settlor even if it is contrary to the terms of the trust. The direction of the settlor might be regarded as an amendment of the trust. Subsection (a) has limited application upon a settlor's incapacity. An agent, conservator, or guardian has authority to give the trustee instructions contrary to the terms of the trust only if the agent, conservator, or guardian succeeds to the settlor's powers with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-602.

    Subsections (b) -- (e) ratify the use of trust protectors and advisers and make such, except as otherwise provided in the transitional provisions of subsection (f), subject to part twelve (12) of this chapter. Neither T.C.A. § 35-15-103 nor such chapter makes a distinction between the powers and duties that can be held by a fiduciary due to such being referred to as “trust advisor” versus “trust protector.” Traditionally, the former term has been used in the United States, while the latter term is often associated with non-U.S. trust practice. Both terms were included to assure anyone encountering the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code that, regardless of the term by which any such person was referred, such code provided for virtually any conceivable power and duty that could be held by a person referred to by either term. Both trust advisors and trust protectors are also included in the broader term, “fiduciary,” both being such unless provided otherwise in the terms of the trust as allowed by T.C.A. § 35-15-105, or because one or more is an excluded fiduciary as such is defined in T.C.A. § 35-1-103.

    Subsection (b) diverges from the Uniform Trust Code in that the various powers that can be held by either a trust advisor or a trust protector can be conferred in any of the following ways: by the terms of the trust, by an agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or by a court order. Moreover, subject only to a provision in a trust instrument to the contrary, a trustee or other fiduciary shall act in accordance with the exercise of a power held by any trust advisor or trust protector.

    Subsection (c) makes it clear that, regardless of what the power holder is named, such holder can be granted the power to direct modification or termination of a trust

    Numerous powers can be granted to a trust advisor or trust protector under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, including powers to direct and powers to veto. While both affect a trustee’s overall powers and duties, each affects such trustee in a different manner. A power to direct involves action initiated and within the control of a third party. A trustee usually has no responsibility other than to carry out the direction when made. But if a third party holds a veto power, a trustee is usually responsible for initiating the decision, subject to the third party's approval.

    Subsection (d) pertains to powers held in reliance on T.C.A. §§ 35-3-122 and 35-3-123. These were the statutes fully providing for true directed trusts before the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Under such sections, at times, the person holding the power is making directions relative to the holder's own beneficial interest. However at other times, the holder of the power is frequently making directions or other actions on behalf of others. In such latter case and as provided in subsection (d), unless provided otherwise in the terms of the trust, the holder is acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the powers granted and can be held liable if the holder's conduct constitutes a breach of trust, whether through action or inaction. Like a trustee, liability cannot be imposed if the holder has not accepted the grant of the power either expressly or informally through exercise of the power. See T.C.A. § 35-15-711, which applies the provisions of T.C.A. §§ 35-15-701 to trust advisors, trust protectors and other fiduciaries other than a trustee.

    Subsection (e) pertains to powers held under part 12, which was created by the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. It simply directs one to such part 12 to determine the effect of holding such powers. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence and although such part 12 contains the majority of provisions governing trust advisors, trust protectors and any other fiduciaries other than trustees after the 2013 amendments, such amendments necessitated changes to other parts of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to coordinate them with the part 12. Therefore, one is advised to review other parts of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code for sections containing references to part 12 or to trust advisors, trust protectors, other fiduciaries and excluded fiduciaries. In particular, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-71035-15-715 provide for persons holding powers under directed trusts the mechanisms to accept, reject, remove or resign from office that are similar to equivalent provisions applicable to a trustee. Such sections also provide for how to handle vacancies in such offices, as well as any fiduciary’s bond regarding same.

    Subsection (f) contains transitional provisions specifically applicable to directed trusts as such are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 to account for the changes in such trusts made by the 2013 amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    As with the vast majority of other sections under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the provisions of this section may be freely altered by the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. By way of example and not in limitation, a settlor can provide that the trustee must accept the decision of the power holder without question. Alternatively, a settlor could provide that the holder of the power is not to be held to the standards of a fiduciary. A common technique for assuring that a settlor continues to be taxed on all of the income of an irrevocable trust is for the settlor to retain a nonfiduciary power of administration. See I.R.C. § 675.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-809. Control and protection of trust property.

A trustee shall take reasonable steps to take control of and protect the trust property.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 67.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. When Duty Arises.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank in the decedent's daughter's action against it was appropriate because the bank's duty to assert control over the assets in question did not surface until a reasonable time after receiving trust assets. Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-809.

This section codifies the substance of sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959). The duty to take control of and safeguard trust property is an aspect of the trustee's duty of prudent administration as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-804. See also the various subdivisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-816 regarding the power to collect trust property), the power to insure trust property and the power to abandon trust property. The duty to take control normally means that the trustee must take physical possession of tangible personal property and securities belonging to the trust, and must secure payment of any choses in action. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 175 cmt. a, c & d (1959).

This section, like the other sections in this part 8, is subject to alteration by the terms of the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105. By way of example and not in limitation, the settlor may provide that the spouse may occupy the settlor's former residence rent free, in which event the spouse's occupancy would prevent the trustee from taking possession.

35-15-810. Recordkeeping and identification of trust property.

  1. A trustee shall keep adequate records of the administration of the trust.
  2. A trustee shall keep trust property separate from the trustee's own property.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a trustee shall cause the trust property to be designated so that the interest of the trust, to the extent feasible, appears in records maintained by a party other than a trustee or beneficiary.
  4. If the trustee maintains records clearly indicating the respective interests, a trustee may invest as a whole the property of two or more separate trusts.
  5. For all purposes under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, when a trust is apportioned into separate shares for a single beneficiary or related beneficiary group, the apportioned separate share of the trust shall be treated as separate trusts even though such share may be commingled with other separate shares for investment and tax reporting purposes as provided in this section.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 68; 2019, ch. 197, § 5.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (e).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 197, § 8.  April 25, 2019.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-810.

The duty to keep adequate records stated in subsection (a) is implicit in the duty to provide prudent administration under T.C.A. § 35-15-804 and the duty to report to beneficiaries under T.C.A. § 35-15-813, subject to the exceptions to such duty to report as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-813. For an application, see Green v. Lombard, 343 A. 2d 905, 911 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 172, 174 (1959).

The duty to earmark trust assets and the duty of a trustee not to mingle the assets of the trust with the trustee's own are closely related. Subsection (b), which addresses the duty not to mingle, is derived from section 179 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959). Subsection (c) makes the requirement that assets be earmarked more precise than that articulated in Restatement (Second) § 179 by requiring that the interest of the trust must appear in the records of a third party, such as a bank, brokerage firm, or transfer agent. Because of the serious risk of mistake or misappropriation even if disclosure is made to the beneficiaries, showing the interest of the trust solely in the trustee's own internal records is insufficient. The provision of T.C.A. § 35-15-816(b), which allows a trustee to hold securities in nominee form, is not inconsistent with this requirement. While securities held in nominee form are not specifically registered in the name of the trustee, they are properly earmarked because the trustee's holdings are indicated in the records maintained by an independent party, such as in an account at a brokerage firm.

Earmarking is not practical for all types of assets. With respect to assets not subject to registration, such as tangible personal property and bearer securities, arranging for the trust's ownership interest to be reflected on the records of a third-party custodian would not be feasible. For this reason, subsection (c) waives separate recordkeeping for these types of assets. Under subsection (b), however, the duty of the trustee not to mingle these or any other trust assets with the trustee's own remains absolute.

Subsection (d) allows a trustee to use the property of two or more trusts to make joint investments, even though under traditional principles a joint investment would violate the duty to earmark. A joint investment frequently is more economical than attempting to invest the funds of each trust separately. Also, the risk of misappropriation or mistake is less when the trust property is invested jointly with the property of another trust than when pooled with the property of the trustee or other person.

Notwithstanding all of the above, the provisions of this sections are freely alterable by the terms of the trust, subject to T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

35-15-811. Enforcement and defense of claims.

  1. A trustee shall take reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims against the trust.
  2. A trustee may abandon or assign any claim that it believes is unreasonable to enforce to one or more of the beneficiaries of the trust holding the claim.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 69.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-811.

Subsection (a) codifies the substance of Sections 177 and 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959). It may not be reasonable to enforce a claim depending upon the likelihood of recovery and the cost of suit and enforcement. It might also be reasonable to settle an action or suffer a default rather than to defend an action. See also the relevant provision of T.C.A. § 35-15-816(b) regarding the power to pay, contest, settle, or release claims.

Subsection (b) does not have a corresponding provision in the Uniform Trust Code. Such subsection expressly grants a trustee the power to abandon, or to assign, any claim that the trustee believes unreasonable to enforce to one or more beneficiaries of a trust.

35-15-812. Collecting trust property.

A trustee shall take reasonable steps to compel a former trustee or other person to deliver trust property to the trustee, and to redress a breach of trust known to the trustee to have been committed by a former trustee. No successor trustee appointed after the examination of the accounts of a trustee or the waiver of the examination by the beneficiaries shall be responsible for the acts and omissions of the prior trustee.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 70.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. When Duty Arises.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank in the decedent's daughter's action against it was appropriate because the bank's duty to assert control over the assets in question did not surface until a reasonable time after receiving trust assets. Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-812.

This section is a specific application of T.C.A. § 35-15-811 regarding the duty to enforce claims, which includes a claim for trust property held by a former trustee or others, and a claim against a predecessor trustee for breach of trust. The duty imposed by this section is not absolute. Pursuit of a claim is not required if the amount of the claim, costs of suit and enforcement, and likelihood of recovery, make such action uneconomic. Unlike Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 223 (1959), this section only requires a successor trustee to redress breaches of trust “known” to have been committed by the predecessor. For the definition of “know,” see T.C.A. § 35-15-104. Limiting the successor's obligation to known breaches is a common feature of state trust statutes. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.187.2.

The last sentence in this section has no counterpart in the Uniform Trust Code and expressly relieves any successor trustee from liability for acts and omissions of prior trustees if such successor trustee was appointed after the accounts of the prior trustee were examined or such examination was waived by the beneficiaries required under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to so waive.

As authorized by T.C.A. § 35-15-1009, the beneficiaries may relieve the trustee from potential liability for failing to pursue a claim against a predecessor trustee or other person holding trust property. The obligation to pursue a predecessor trustee can also be addressed in and altered by the terms of the trust as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

35-15-813. Duty to inform and report.

    1. A trustee shall keep the beneficiaries of the trust who are current mandatory or permissible distributees of trust income or principal, or both, reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to protect their interests. If a trust is divided into separate shares for the sole benefit of a single beneficiary or a separate group of beneficiaries, the trustee's duty shall apply only to the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the separate share of the trust.
    2. Unless unreasonable under the circumstances, a trustee shall respond in a reasonable amount of time to a qualified beneficiary's request for information related to the administration of the trust. Additionally, a qualified beneficiary shall reimburse the trustee for any reasonable expenses incurred in responding to requests for information.
    3. The requirements of subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) shall also apply to the benefit of anyone who, in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary, as defined by § 35-15-103, holds a power of appointment.
  1. The trustee of an irrevocable or non-grantor trust within sixty (60) days after the acceptance and funding of a trust, excluding nominal funding for the trust to have corpus or the depositing of insurance policies on the life of a living person, shall notify each current income beneficiary, each vested ultimate beneficiary of a remainder interest and anyone who, in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary, as defined by § 35-15-103, holds a power of appointment, that the trust has been established.
    1. The required notice shall:
      1. Be sent by first class mail or personal delivery; and
      2. Consist of either a complete copy of the document establishing the trust together with the trustee's name, address and telephone number or an abstract of the trust, whichever the trustee, in the trustee's absolute discretion, may choose.
    2. The abstract shall contain:
      1. The name, address and telephone number of each trustee; and
      2. If for a current income beneficiary:
        1. The number of other current income beneficiaries;
        2. Whether distributions of income are required or discretionary;
        3. Whether distributions of principal are permitted and, if so, for what purpose or purposes;
        4. An estimate of the value of the trust at the date of the notice from which distributions may be made; and
        5. An estimate of the income that may be distributable to the beneficiary; and
      3. If for a remainder beneficiary:
        1. The number of other remainder beneficiaries;
        2. An estimate of the value of the trust at the date of the notice; and
        3. The conditions which must be met before the beneficiary's share is distributable.
      4. If for anyone who, in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary, as defined by § 35-15-103, holds a power of appointment, all of the information required by subdivisions (b)(2)(A)-(C) necessary or beneficial for that person to effectively determine whether or not to exercise that power of appointment.
  2. Upon the termination of an interest of any one (1) or more of the current income beneficiaries:
    1. The trustee shall similarly notify the income beneficiaries who are takers of the terminated interest of their interest by sending or delivering them the notice required in subsection (b); and
    2. If at that time the period described in subsection (b) has lapsed, the trustee shall similarly notify anyone who, in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary, as defined by § 35-15-103, holds a power of appointment by sending or delivering to such person the notice required in subsection (b).
  3. A beneficiary may waive the right to a trustee's report or other information otherwise required to be furnished under this section. A beneficiary, with respect to future reports and other information, may withdraw a waiver previously given. Anyone who, in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary, as defined by § 35-15-103, holds a power of appointment has the same power as provided a beneficiary in this subsection (d) to waive reports and other information and to withdraw a waiver previously given.
  4. Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to the extent that the terms of the trust provide otherwise or the settlor of the trust, or a trust protector or trust advisor under part 12 that holds the power to so direct, directs otherwise in a writing delivered to the trustee.
  5. Subdivision (a)(1) and subsection (b) do not apply to a trust created under a trust agreement that became irrevocable before July 1, 2004. Trust law in effect prior to July 1, 2004, regarding the subject matter of subdivision (a)(1) and subsection (b) shall continue to apply to those trusts.
  6. If the trustee of a trust is bound by any written confidentiality restrictions with respect to an asset of a trust, a trustee may require that any beneficiary who is eligible to receive information pursuant to this or any other section of this title about such asset shall agree in writing to be bound by the confidentiality restrictions that bind the trustee before receiving such information from the trustee.
  7. A trust advisor, trust protector, or other fiduciary designated by the terms of the trust shall keep each excluded fiduciary designated by the terms of the trust reasonably informed about:
    1. The administration of the trust with respect to any specific duty or function being performed by the trust advisor, trust protector, or other fiduciary to the extent that the duty or function would normally be performed by the excluded fiduciary or to the extent that providing such information to the excluded fiduciary is reasonably necessary for the excluded fiduciary to perform its duties; and
    2. Any other material information that the excluded fiduciary would be required to disclose to the specified beneficiaries under subsection (a) regardless of whether the terms of the trust relieve the excluded fiduciary from providing such information to qualified beneficiaries. Neither the performance nor the failure to perform of a trust advisor, trust protector, or other fiduciary designated by the terms of the trust as provided in this subsection (h) shall affect the limitation on the liability of any excluded fiduciary provided by part 12 of this chapter.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 71; 2007, ch. 24, §§ 28-30; 2010, ch. 725, § 9; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 32-35; 2019, ch. 197, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the last sentence in (a)(1).

    Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 197, § 8.  April 25, 2019.

    Cross-References.  Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

    Law Reviews.

    Agents in Secrecy: The Use of Information Surrogates in Trust Administration (Lauren Z. Curry), 64 Vand. L. Rev. 925 (2011).

    Tennessee Uniform Trust Code: New Formulation for a Trusty Tool (Marshall H. Peterson), 41 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2005).

    1. No Breach. 2. Compliance.

    Trustee's decision relating to a farm lease did not violate three statutory duties within the Uniform Trust Code because it exercised reasonable care, skill, and caution in its decision regarding the farm lease, and it kept a son reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and the farm lease. The son failed to demonstrate that the trustee administered the trust in a manner that was adverse to his beneficial interest as that interest was defined under the terms of the trust. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

    In determining whether a trustee has met this section's reporting requirement, the key factor is whether the report provides the beneficiaries with the information necessary to protect their interests. Meyers v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 503 S.W.3d 365, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-813.

    The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restate-ments. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    The duty to keep appropriate beneficiaries reasonably informed of the administration of the trust is a fundamental duty of a trustee. The term “reasonable” is used several times in this section. This term connotes a sensible and not excessive amount of information. For the common law duty to keep the beneficiaries informed, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 173 (1959). The provisions of this section may diverge from such restatement’s view of the common law, and to the extent such restatement is in conflict with this section, such restatement’s view is rejected.

    In the interest of certainty, subdivision (a)(1) diverges from the Uniform Trust Code and makes the duty to keep the beneficiaries informed more precise by limiting it to only those who are current mandatory or permissible distributees of trust income or principal, or both

    Subdivision (a)(2) provides that a trustee also has a duty to respond to a beneficiary’s request for information, unless such is unreasonable under the circumstances. However, again in the interest of certainty, subdivision (a)(2) diverges from the Uniform Trust Code and makes such duty to respond to a beneficiary’s request for information more precise by limiting such duty to only qualified beneficiaries s such are defined in T.C.A. 35-15-103. The result of this limitation is that the information need not be furnished to beneficiaries with remote remainder interests.

    No limitation in subdivisions (a)(1) nor (a)(2) affects the rights of the any current beneficiary who is designated as one or more primary beneficiaries, explicitly or implicitly, by the trust instrument.

    Nevertheless, unlike the Uniform Trust Code, subdivision (a)(2) requires that a qualified beneficiary reimburse the trustee for any reasonable expenses incurred in responding to requests for information.

    In determining if a beneficiary's request for trust information is reasonable, the trustee may consider any of the fol-lowing factors in determining whether a response is necessary and the extent of the information to be furnished:

    provisions of the trust document or other settlor written instructions concerning the providing of information;

    the relationship between the beneficiary requesting information and the other beneficiaries;

    the nature of the information requested;

    the frequency with which the beneficiary has or is requesting information;

    whether providing any of the requested information would violate any privacy rights of other beneficiaries;

    whether the requesting beneficiary is receiving statements on the trust account;

    the likelihood that the requesting beneficiary will eventually receive an interest in the trust;

    the cost of providing the requested information and whether the requesting beneficiary is willing to pay the cost. The trustee may require a prepayment of a fixed cost as a prerequisite to beginning to accumulate the information

    the availability of the information requested; and

    any other factors the trustee deems appropriate.

    The trustee is under a duty to communicate to a qualified beneficiary information about the administration of the trust that is reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to enforce the beneficiary's rights and to prevent or redress a breach of trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 cmt. c (1959). Ordinarily, the trustee is not under a duty to furnish information to a beneficiary in the absence of a specific request for the information. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 cmt. d (1959). However, special circumstances may require that the trustee provide additional information. For example, if the trustee is dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account, the trustee must communicate material facts relating to the transaction that the trustee knows or should know. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 cmt. d (1959). Furthermore, to enable the beneficiaries to take action to protect their interests, the trustee may be required to provide advance notice of transactions involving real estate, closely-held business interests, and other assets that are difficult to value or to replace. See In re Green Charitable Trust, 431 N.W. 2d 492 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Al-lard v. Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1983). The trustee is justified in not providing such advance disclosure if disclosure is forbidden by other law, as under federal securities laws, or if disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the interests of the beneficiaries, for example, when disclosure would cause the loss of the only serious buyer. Notwithstanding the preceding portions of this paragraph to the extent any of it is in conflict with the Tennessee trust statutes, the latter are controlling.

    Subdivision (a)(3) causes the requirements of subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) to also apply to the benefit of anyone who, in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary holds a power of appointment; with all relevant terms having the meanings as defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Holders of powers of appointment are not beneficiaries (and therefore, cannot be qualified beneficiaries) as such terms are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Nevertheless, in order to determine whether such power holder should not exercise or should exercise such power, as well as the manner in which any such exercise should be made, such power holder needs to be kept reasonably informed of the administration of a trust. Because other sections of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code assure that all fiduciaries are kept appropriately informed of the administration of a trust, there is no need to impose the requirements of subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) relative to a holder of a power of appointment who is also a fiduciary and subdivision (a)(3) does not do so.

    Subsection (b) varies significantly from the Uniform Trust Code. Prior to the effective date of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code on July 1, 2004, Tennessee already had in effect a procedure for providing notification of the creation of a trust and similar matters. That provision can be found at repealed T.C.A. § 35-50-119. The portions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code relative to notification of creation of a trust and similar matters is based on that prior language and not on the Uniform Trust Code. As with such procedure that existed prior to the effective date of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the requirement of providing such notification under subsection (b) can in certain cases be waived, as can the requirements of subsection (a). Thus unlike the Uniform Trust Code, the restatements and other foreign law of many jurisdictions, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code explicitly allows so-called “quiet” or “silent” trusts.

    Absent such a waiver, subsection (b) requires that, in most cases, a trustee of an irrevocable trust that is not a grantor trust under subpart E, part 1, subchapter J, of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e., the “grantor trust rules”) inform the current income and vested ultimate beneficiaries, as well as anyone who, in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary, holds a power of appointment (with all such terms having the meanings as defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103) within sixty (60) days of the trust’s existence. Such notice must include the trustee’s name, address and telephone number and must contain, in the trustee’s discretion, either a complete copy of the document establishing the trust or an abstract containing the information provided in subdivision (b)(2).

    Subsection (c) requires that the same information required in subsection (b) be provided to the income beneficiaries who are takers of a terminated interest upon the termination of such interest of any one or more current income benefi-ciaries. At such time certain holders of power of appointment are likewise required to be given the information required by subsection (b).

    Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) – (c), the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not statutorily take a position on the extent to which a trustee may claim attorney-client privilege against a beneficiary or holder of a power of appointment who has the right under such subsections (a) – (c) seeking discovery of attorney-client communications between the trustee and the trustee's attorney. Nationally, courts are split on this issue and the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code can find no Tennessee case on point.

    Nevertheless, for the following reasons it is believed that overall Tennessee law gravitates toward the view that the fiduciary and not the beneficiary is the client:

    Such is the traditional majority rule in the United States. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (Boltwood), 990 P.2d 591 (Cal. 2000); Huie v. De Shazo, 922 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. 1996); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994); Paskoski v. Johnson, 626 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Ct. App. 4th 1993); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Turney, 824 So. 2d 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Murphy v. Gorman, 271 F.R.D. 296 (D.N.M. 2010). While a more recent Supreme Court case includes dicta that there is an exception regarding attorney-client privilege in fiduciary cases, see United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011); such dicta has been reviewed by the Illinois Court of Appeals, which rejected it and found no such exception.. Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012), Petition for appeal denied, Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 979 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 2012).

    The Tennessee Code contains multiple statutes providing for attorney-client privilege. See T.C.A. §§ 23-3-105, 23-3-106, and 67-1-1710. Moreover, an attorney who violates either of the first two such sections is severely penalized, being guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, and upon conviction stricken from the rolls as a practicing attorney. Finally, the attorney-client privilege is one of the privileges recognized under Tenn. R. Evid. 501 (2013). In response to the above indicated split in opinion, several states have recently explicitly provided by rule or statute that no exception to attorney-client privilege exists in fiduciary cases. See New York Civil Practice: CPLR § 4503; Fl. Stat. 733.212 and 736.0813.

    The overriding emphasis of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is on settlor’s intent and of freedom of disposition. To hold that a beneficiary and not the fiduciary was the “real” client would conflict with the trustee's fiduciary duty to implement the intentions of the settlor, which are sometimes in tension with the wishes of one or more beneficiaries. In order for a trustee to carry out this duty it is sometimes necessary or beneficial for the trustee to seek legal counsel and not being able to assert this privilege might inhibit the trustee from doing so.

    After all as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, “[The purpose of the attorney-client privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” and “The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 and 386 (1981).

    Express donative trusts, such as those primarily provided for under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code differ from ERISA trusts. Such ERISA trusts apply a theory that the beneficiary is the actual client. See, e.g., United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1062-64 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a pension trust differs from express private trusts because the beneficiaries are the settlors of their own trust, such trust being funded with the beneficiaries’ earnings. Accordingly, in ERISA attorney-client cases “[t]here are no competing interests such as other stockholders or the intentions of the Settlor.” Gibbs & Hanson, 21 ACTEC Notes at 238.

    The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code employs the term “report” instead of “accounting” in order to negate any inference that the report must be prepared in any particular format or with a high degree of formality. The reporting requirement might even be satisfied by providing the beneficiaries with copies of the trust's income tax returns and monthly brokerage account statements if the information on those returns and statements is complete and sufficiently clear. The key factor is not the format chosen but whether the report provides the beneficiaries with the information necessary to protect their interests. For model account forms, together with practical advice on how to prepare reports, see Robert Whitman, Fiduciary Accounting Guide (2d ed. 1998).

    Subsection (d) allows trustee reports and other required information to be waived by a beneficiary as well as a holder of a power of appointment entitled to receive same. Such beneficiary or holder of a power of appointment may also withdraw a consent. However, a waiver of a trustee's report or other information does not relieve the trustee from accountability and potential liability for matters that the report or other information would have disclosed.

    Subsection (e) provides the mechanism for “quiet” or “silent” trusts. Subsection (a) and (b) do not apply to the ex-tent that the terms of the trust provide otherwise, nor to the extent that the settlor or a trust protector or trust advisor holding the power to so direct, directs otherwise. Additionally under T.C.A. § 35-15-303 a settlor may designate in writing a representative to receive various notices and represent and bind such beneficiaries. The designation of a representative by a settlor may occur subsequent to the execution of the trust instrument, however, it must meet the notice requirements of this section. If the settlor designates a representative to receive notices, the designation should specify that the representative is to receive any reports from the trustee on behalf of the individual beneficiary. Although sub-section (e) only explicitly states that it should apply to subsections (a) and (b), there is no logical reason it should not apply to subsection (c) as well. Subsection (c) only effectively provides such beneficiaries who were not either current income beneficiaries or vested remainder beneficiaries at the time the trust was established with any additional notice. It is only logical that if a settlor, trust advisor or trust protector can direct the withholding of notice to beneficiaries otherwise entitled thereto upon the creation of the trust under subsection (b), such persons should likewise be able to direct such withholding to those who only become current beneficiaries thereafter.

    Subsection (f) provides the transition rules for the notice and information requirements upon the effective date of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subsection (g) provides that if a trustee is required to keep certain information regarding trust assets confidential the trustee can be assured that he/she can carry out their duty to inform and report to beneficiaries without fear of indirectly breaching the trustee's duty of confidentiality. This is often (but not exclusively) of special importance when a closely held asset is held by a trust.

    In order to allow directed trusts to operate efficiently, subsection (h) requires that trust advisors, trust protectors and other fiduciaries keep each excluded fiduciary, all as such are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103, reasonably informed about the information reasonably necessary for such fiduciaries to carry out their respective duties.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Breach.

2. Compliance.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-814. Exercise of powers over discretionary and other interests; tax savings.

  1. Relative to exercise of powers over discretionary and other interests:
    1. “Improper motive” means to demonstrate action such as the following:
      1. A trustee refusing to make or limiting distributions to beneficiaries other than the trustee due to the trustee's self interest when the trustee also holds a beneficial interest subject to a discretionary interest; or
      2. A trustee making a distribution in excess of an ascertainable standard to such trustee as beneficiary when the trustee is restricted by an ascertainable standard in the trust.
    2. Unless otherwise provided in the trust:
      1. If the settlor's spouse is named as a beneficiary, the settlor's spouse is still living and the trust is classified as a support trust, then the trustee shall consider the resources of the settlor's spouse, including the settlor's obligation of support, prior to making a distribution; and
      2. In all other cases, unless otherwise provided in the trust, the trustee need not consider the beneficiary's resources in determining whether a distribution should be made.
  2. The following provisions apply only to discretionary interests:
    1. A discretionary interest is neither a property interest nor an enforceable right; it is a mere expectancy;
    2. A court may review a trustee's distribution discretion only if the trustee acts dishonestly, acts with an improper motive, or fails to act if under a duty to do so;
    3. A reasonableness standard shall not be applied to the exercise of discretion by the trustee with regard to a discretionary interest;
    4. Other than for the three (3) circumstances listed in subdivision (b)(2) or to enforce the limitations of subsection (d), a court has no jurisdiction to review the trustee's discretion or to force a distribution; and
    5. Absent express language in the trust instrument to the contrary, in the event that the distribution language in a discretionary interest permits unequal distributions between beneficiaries or distributions to the exclusion of other beneficiaries, the trustee may distribute all of the accumulated, accrued, or undistributed income and principal to one beneficiary in the trustee's discretion.
  3. The following provisions apply only to mandatory or support interests:
    1. A beneficiary of a mandatory or a support interest has an enforceable right to a distribution pursuant to a court's review;
    2. A trustee's distribution decision may be reviewed for unreasonableness, dishonesty, improper motivation, or failure to act if under a duty to do so; and
    3. In the case of a support interest, nothing in this section shall raise a beneficiary's support interest to the level of a property interest.
  4. Unless otherwise provided in subsection (f), and unless the terms of the trust expressly indicate that a rule in this subsection (d) does not apply:
    1. A person other than a settlor who is a beneficiary and trustee of a trust that confers on the trustee a power to make discretionary distributions to or for the trustee's personal benefit may exercise the power only in accordance with an ascertainable standard; and
    2. A trustee may not exercise a power to make discretionary distributions to satisfy a legal obligation of support that the trustee personally owes another person.
  5. A power that is limited or prohibited by subsection (d) may be exercised by a majority of the remaining trustees whose exercise of the power is not so limited or prohibited. If the power of all trustees is so limited or prohibited, the court may appoint a special fiduciary with authority to exercise the power.
  6. Subsection (d) shall not apply to:
    1. A power held by the settlor's spouse who is the trustee of a trust for which a marital deduction, as defined in §  2056(b)(5) or §  2523(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §  2056(b)(5) and §  2523(e)), was previously allowed;
    2. Any trust during any period that the trust may be revoked or amended by its settlor; or
    3. A trust if contributions to the trust qualify for the annual exclusion under §  2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §  2503(c)).

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 72; 2007, ch. 24, § 31; 2013, ch. 390, § 36; 2014, ch. 829, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    1. Order to Clerk Proper.

    Trustees were under a mandatory obligation to distribute the remaining principal of such child's separate trust to such child, when the terminating event or events occurred, and because the trust did not provide otherwise, the trustees were to perform this task expeditiously, which they failed to do; because the trustees failed to take the appropriate actions for two years following the termination of the trust, the trial court was justified in ordering the clerk to prepare a deed to transfer the real estate to the beneficiaries. In re Farmer Family Trust, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-814.

    The provisions of this section diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Relative to section 814 of the Uniform Trust Code, according to ULC – NCCUSL:

    Despite the breadth of discretion purportedly granted by the wording of a trust, no grant of discretion to a trustee, whether with respect to management or distribution, is ever absolute. A grant of discretion establishes a range with-in which the trustee may act. Moreover, a trustee’s exercise of discretion must always be in good faith.

    Regarding the standards for exercising discretion, the Uniform Trust Code refers one to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 50.

    Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 50 and the comments thereto contain language that indicates that even if the terms of a trust specifically give a trustee “absolute, sole and unfettered” discretion, a “reasonableness” standard relative to the exercise (or non-exercise) of that discretion must be inferred.

    As discussed elsewhere in these comments, regardless of how clear and obvious a drafter is regarding a settlor’s in-tent to create a purely and absolutely discretionary trust, the above enumerated views of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code result in nothing other than a vague “continuum” of rights and discretion.

    In furtherance of its overriding emphasis on settlor’s intent, freedom of disposition and certainty, as well as for numerous other reasons discussed elsewhere in the comments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such code categorically rejects the above enumerated views of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and of the Uniform Trust Code.

    Section (a) provides a definition of “improper motive” as such relates to a trustee who is considering whether or not to make a distribution from a trust, as well as when such trustee need consider a beneficiary’s resources. Section (a) applies to all discretionary, support and mandatory interests.

    Subsection (b) contains provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code that only apply to exercise of discretion related to, as well as distributions from, discretionary interests:

    Subdivision (b)(1), in the clearest words possible, explicitly state that a discretionary interest is not a right or interest that rises to the level of “property.” Instead such interest is nothing more than a “mere expectancy.”

    Subdivision(b)(2) states the sole and only bases on which a court has any jurisdiction to review a trustee’s distribution discretion made relative to a distribution interest. There are three: (i) if a trustee acts dishonestly; (ii) if a trustee acts with an “improper motive,” as such is defined in section (a); or (iii) if a trustee fails to act if under a duty to do so.

    Subdivision (b)(3) is directly contra to the view of the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts regarding exercise of discretion under a distribution interest. It explicitly states that a reasonableness standard shall not be applied to such discretion.

    Subdivision (b)(4) explicitly states that, other than for the three circumstances listed in subdivision (b)(2), a court has no jurisdiction to review a trustee’s discretion made (or not made) or to force a distribution relative to a discretionary interest.

    Subdivision (b)(5) further assures the statutory intent of subdivisions (b)(1) – (b)(4). It provides that, absent express language in a trust instrument to the contrary, when distribution language in a discretionary interest permits unequal distributions among beneficiaries, or distributions to the exclusion of other beneficiaries, the trustee truly has complete discretion to distribute all income and principal to one (or more) beneficiary and not to the other beneficiaries.

    Subsection (c) contains provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code that only apply to exercise of discretion related to, as well as distributions from, support or mandatory interests:

    Subdivision (c)(1) assures that a beneficiary under either such type of interest has an enforceable right to a distribution pursuant to a courts review of whether or not a trustee made such a distribution.

    Subdivision (c)(2) states the sole and only bases on which a court has any jurisdiction to review a trustee’s distribution discretion made relative to a support or mandatory interest. There are four: (i) if a trustee acts unreasonably; (ii) if a trustee acts dishonestly; (iii) if a trustee acts with an “improper motive,” as such is defined in section (a); or (iv) if a trustee fails to act if under a duty to do so. Other than for such four enumerated circumstances, a court has no juris-diction to review whether a trustee made (or did not make) a distribution relative to a support or mandatory interest.

    Subdivision (c)(3) explicitly states that, although a beneficiary under a support interest has the right to a distribution subject to a court’s review under the four bases contained in (c)(4), such support interest still does not rise to the level of a property right or interest.

    Subsections (d) – (f) rewrite the terms of a trust that might otherwise result in adverse estate and gift tax consequences to a beneficiary who is serving as a trustee or other fiduciary. Subsections (d) – (f) vary from the fact that The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not generally address the subject of tax curative provisions. Tax curative provisions are provisions that automatically rewrite the terms of trusts that might otherwise fail to qualify for probable in-tended tax benefits. Tax curative provisions, because they apply to all trusts using or failing to use specified language, are often overbroad, applying not only to trusts intended to qualify for tax benefits but also to smaller trust situations where taxes are not a concern. Enacting tax curative provisions also requires special diligence by the state legislature to make certain that these provisions are periodically amended to account for the frequent changes in federal tax law. Furthermore, many failures to draft with sufficient care may be correctable by including a tax savings clause in the terms of the trust or by seeking modification of the trust using one or more of the methods authorized by sections T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41135-15-417. Notwithstanding such reasons, the unintended inclusion in a beneficiary’s gross estate of a trust when such beneficiary is also serving as a trustee or other fiduciary is a frequent enough occurrence that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code addresses same herein.

    A tax curative provision differs from a statute such T.C.A. § 35-15-416, which allows a court to modify a trust to achieve an intended tax benefit. Absent Congressional or regulatory authority authorizing the specific modification, a lower court decree in state court modifying a trust is controlling for federal estate tax purposes only if the decree was issued before the taxing event, which in the case of the estate tax would be the decedent’s death. See Rev. Rul. 73-142, 1973-1 C.B. 405. There is specific federal authority authorizing modification of trusts for a number of reasons (see section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-416) but not on the specific issues addressed in this section. Subsections (d) – (f), by interpreting the original language of the trust instrument in a way that qualifies for intended tax benefits, obviates the need to seek a later modification of the trust.

    Subsection (d) is applicable unless otherwise provided in section (f) or unless the terms of the trust expressly indicate that a rule in subsection (d) is not to apply.

    Subdivision (d)(1) states that, subject to such exceptions, the power to make discretionary distributions to a beneficiary who is also serving as a trustee or other fiduciary is automatically limited by the requisite ascertainable standard necessary to avoid inclusion of the trust in the beneficiary’s gross estate or result in a taxable gift upon the beneficiary’s release or exercise of the power. Subdivision (f)(2) provides that trusts of which the trustee-beneficiary is also a settlor are not subject to this subdivision. In such a case, limiting the discretion of a settlor-trustee to an ascertain-able standard would not be sufficient to avoid inclusion of the trust in the settlor’s gross estate. Furthermore, the inadvertent inclusion of a trust in the gross estate of a settlor who is also serving as a trustee or other fiduciary is a far less frequent and generally better understood occurrence than is the inadvertent inclusion of the trust in the estate of a non-settlor beneficiary who is also serving as a trustee or other fiduciary.

    Subdivision (d)(2) addresses a common trap that can occur when a trustee or other fiduciary is not a beneficiary, but such trustee or other fiduciary has the power to make discretionary distributions to those to whom such trustee or other fiduciary owes a legal obligation of support. Discretion to make distributions to those to whom the trustee or other fiduciary owes a legal obligation of support, including but not limited to a fiduciary’s minor children, results in inclusion of the trust in the gross estate of the trustee or other fiduciary even if the power is limited by an ascertainable standard. That is because the language of both I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) and Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) indicate that the ascertainable standard exception to the definition of a general power of appointment applies only to distributions for the benefit of a decedent (i.e., to a beneficiary who is also a trustee or other fiduciary). Such exception language says nothing regarding distributions to those to whom a decedent (i.e., a trustee or other fiduciary) owes a legal obligation of support.

    Subsection (e) deals with cotrustees, trust advisors and trust protectors and adopts the common planning technique of granting the broader discretion only to the independent trustee(s), trust advisor(s) or trust protector(s). Cotrustees or other fiduciaries who are beneficiaries of the trust or who have a legal obligation to support a beneficiary may exercise the power only as limited by subsection (d). If all trustees are so limited, the court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision as to whether a broader exercise is appropriate.

    Subsection (f) excludes certain trusts from the operation of this section. Trusts qualifying for the marital deduction will be includable in the surviving spouse’s gross estate regardless of whether this section applies. Consequently, if the spouse is acting as a trustee or other fiduciary, there is no need to limit the power of such spouse to make discretionary distributions for the spouse’s benefit. Similar reasoning applies to the revocable trust, which, because of the settlor’s power to revoke, is automatically includable in the settlor’s gross estate even if the settlor is not named as a beneficiary.

    QTIP marital trusts are subject to this section, however. QTIP trusts qualify for the marital deduction only if so elected on the federal estate tax return. Excluding a QTIP for which an election has been made from the operation of this section would allow the terms of the trust to be modified after the settlor’s death. By not making the QTIP election, an otherwise unascertainable standard would be limited. By making the QTIP election, the trustee's discretion would not be curtailed. This ability to modify a trust depending on elections made on the federal estate tax return could itself constitute a taxable power of appointment resulting in inclusion of the trust in the surviving spouse’s gross estate.

    The exclusion of an I.R.C. § 2503(c) [26 U.S.C. § 2503(c)]  minors trust is necessary to avoid loss of gift tax bene-fits. While preventing a trustee from distributing trust funds in discharge of a legal obligation of support would keep the trust out of the trustee’s gross estate, such a restriction might result in loss of the gift tax annual exclusion for contributions to the trust, even if the trustee were otherwise granted unlimited discretion. See Rev. Rul. 69-345, 1969-1 C.B. 226.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Order to Clerk Proper.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-815. General powers of trustee.

  1. A trustee, without authorization by the court, may exercise:
    1. Powers conferred by the terms of the trust; and
    2. Except as limited by the terms of the trust:
      1. All powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent owner has over individually owned property;
      2. Any other powers appropriate to achieve the proper investment, management, and distribution of the trust property; and
      3. Any other powers conferred by this chapter.
  2. The exercise of a power is subject to the fiduciary duties prescribed by this part.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 73.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Arbitration Agreements.

Supreme Court of Tennessee agrees with the observation that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-101 et seq. (2015), does not specifically speak to predispute arbitration agreements. Nevertheless, considering the long history that predates the Uniform Trust Code, the reasons for the promulgation of the Uniform Trust Code, the breadth of the powers specifically accorded to trustees under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code provisions, the admonition in the Comments that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code was intended to accord trustees the broadest possible powers, and the Comments indicating the drafters'  approval of arbitration as a means to decide disputes, the Supreme Court concludes that the legislature intended for the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to give trustees the power to enter into predispute arbitration agreements. Harvey ex rel. Gladden v. Cumberland Trust & Inv. Co., 532 S.W.3d 243, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2017).

Supreme Court of Tennessee holds that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-101 et seq. (2015), is intended to give trustees broad authority to fulfill their duties as trustee. The Supreme Court also holds that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code gives trustees the power to enter into predispute arbitration agreements, so long as doing so is not prohibited under the operative trust instrument. Harvey ex rel. Gladden v. Cumberland Trust & Inv. Co., 532 S.W.3d 243, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2017).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-815.

This section is intended to grant trustees the broadest possible powers, but to be exercised always in accordance with the duties of the trustee and any limitations or expansion of such powers or duties as stated in the terms of the trust. This broad authority is denoted by granting the trustee the powers of an unmarried competent owner of individually owned property, unlimited by restrictions that might be placed on it by marriage, disability, or cotenancy.

The powers conferred elsewhere in this Code that are subsumed under this section include all of the specific powers listed in T.C.A. § 35-15-816 as well as other powers described elsewhere in the Tennessee trust statutes. For non-exclusive examples of other such subsumed powers see: the power to transfer principal place of administration as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-108; the power to terminate and uneconomic trust with value less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-414; the power to combine and divide trusts as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-417; the power to delegate to a cotrustee to the extent provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-703; the power to enter into transactions under the exceptions to the duty of loyalty as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-802; the power to delegate to agents powers and duties as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-807; as well as the power to invest trust assets jointly with an-other trust as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-810(d) and the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The powers conferred by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code may be exercised without court approval. If court approval of the exercise of a power is desired, a petition for court approval should be filed.

A power differs from a duty. A duty imposes an obligation or a mandatory prohibition. A power, on the other hand, is a discretion, the exercise of which is not obligatory. The existence of a power, however created or granted, does not speak to the question of whether it is prudent under the circumstances to exercise the power.

35-15-816. Specific powers of trustee.

  1. Any references contained in a will or trust incorporating by reference the powers enumerated in § 35-50-110 as they relate to a trustee will incorporate by reference the powers contained in this section.
  2. Unless the terms of the instrument expressly provide otherwise and without limiting the authority conferred by § 35-15-815, a trustee may:
    1. Collect trust property and accept or reject additions to the trust property from a settlor or any other person;
    2. Acquire or sell property, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale;
    3. Exchange, partition, or otherwise change the character of trust property;
    4. Deposit trust money in an account in a regulated financial-service institution;
    5. Borrow money, with or without security, and mortgage or pledge trust property for a period within or extending beyond the duration of the trust;
    6. With respect to an interest in a proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, business trust, corporation, or other form of business or enterprise, continue the business or other enterprise and take any action that may be taken by shareholders, members, or property owners, including merging, dissolving, or otherwise changing the form of business organization or contributing additional capital;
    7. With respect to stocks or other securities, exercise the rights of an absolute owner, including the right to:
      1. Vote, or give proxies to vote, with or without power of substitution, or enter into or continue a voting trust agreement;
      2. Hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of the trust so that title may pass by delivery;
      3. Pay calls, assessments, and other sums chargeable or accruing against the securities, and sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights; and
      4. Deposit the securities with a depository or other regulated financial service institution;
    8. With respect to an interest in real property, construct, or make ordinary or extraordinary repairs to, alterations to, or improvements in, buildings or other structures, demolish improvements, raze existing or erect new party walls or buildings, subdivide or develop land, dedicate land to public use or grant public or private easements, and make or vacate plats and adjust boundaries;
    9. Enter into a lease for any purpose as lessor or lessee, including a lease or other arrangement for exploration and removal of natural resources, with or without the option to purchase or renew, for a period within or extending beyond the duration of the trust;
    10. Grant an option involving a sale, lease, or other disposition of trust property or acquire an option for the acquisition of property, including an option exercisable beyond the duration of the trust, and exercise an option so acquired;
    11. Insure the property of the trust against damage or loss and insure the trustee, the trustee's agents, and beneficiaries against liability arising from the administration of the trust;
    12. Abandon or decline to administer property of no value or of insufficient value to justify its collection or continued administration;
    13. With respect to possible liability for violation of environmental law:
      1. Inspect or investigate property the trustee holds or has been asked to hold, or property owned or operated by an organization in which the trustee holds or has been asked to hold an interest, for the purpose of determining the application of environmental law with respect to the property;
      2. Take action to prevent, abate, or otherwise remedy any actual or potential violation of any environmental law affecting property held directly or indirectly by the trustee, whether taken before or after the assertion of a claim or the initiation of governmental enforcement;
      3. Decline to accept property into trust or disclaim any power with respect to property that is or may be burdened with liability for violation of environmental law;
      4. Compromise claims against the trust which may be asserted for an alleged violation of environmental law; and
      5. Pay the expense of any inspection, review, abatement, or remedial action to comply with environmental law;
    14. Pay or contest any claim, settle a claim by or against the trust, and release, in whole or in part, a claim belonging to the trust;
    15. Pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee and of employees and agents of the trust, and other expenses incurred in the administration of the trust;
    16. Exercise elections with respect to federal, state, and local taxes;
    17. Select a mode of payment under any employee benefit or retirement plan, annuity, or life insurance payable to the trustee, exercise rights thereunder, including exercise of the right to indemnification for expenses and against liabilities, and take appropriate action to collect the proceeds;
    18. Make loans out of trust property, including loans to a beneficiary on terms and conditions the trustee considers to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances, and the trustee has a lien on future distributions for repayment of those loans;
    19. Pledge trust property to guarantee loans made by others to the beneficiary;
    20. Appoint a trustee to act in another jurisdiction with respect to trust property located in the other jurisdiction, confer upon the appointed trustee all of the powers and duties of the appointing trustee, require that the appointed trustee furnish security, and remove any trustee so appointed;
    21. Pay an amount distributable to a beneficiary who is under a legal disability or who the trustee reasonably believes is incapacitated, by paying it directly to the beneficiary or applying it for the beneficiary's benefit, or by:
      1. Paying it to the beneficiary's conservator or, if the beneficiary does not have a conservator, the beneficiary's guardian;
      2. Paying it to the beneficiary's custodian under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, compiled in title 35, chapter 7, part 2, and, for that purpose, creating a custodianship or custodial trust;
      3. If the trustee does not know of a conservator, guardian, custodian, or custodial trustee, paying it to an adult relative or other person having legal or physical care or custody of the beneficiary, to be expended on the beneficiary's behalf; or
      4. Managing it as a separate fund on the beneficiary's behalf, subject to the beneficiary's continuing right to withdraw the distribution;
    22. On distribution of trust property or the division or termination of a trust, make distributions in divided or undivided interests, allocate particular assets in proportionate or disproportionate shares, value the trust property for those purposes, and adjust for resulting differences in valuation and basis for income tax purposes;
    23. Resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of the trust or its administration by mediation, arbitration, or other procedure for alternative dispute resolution;
    24. Prosecute or defend an action, claim, or judicial proceeding in any jurisdiction to protect trust property and the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties;
    25. Sign and deliver contracts and other instruments that are useful to achieve or facilitate the exercise of the trustee's powers;
    26. On termination of the trust, exercise the powers appropriate to wind up the administration of the trust and distribute the trust property to the persons entitled to it; and
    27. Unless the terms of the instrument expressly provide otherwise:
      1. A trustee who has authority, under the terms of a testamentary instrument or irrevocable inter vivos trust agreement, to invade the principal of a trust to make distributions to, or for the benefit of, one or more proper objects of the exercise of the power, may instead exercise such authority by appointing all or part of the principal of the trust in favor of a trustee of a trust under an instrument other than that under which the power to invade is created or under the same instrument; provided, however, that the exercise of such authority:
        1. Does not reduce any fixed income interest of any income beneficiary of the trust; and
        2. Is in favor of the proper objects of the exercise of the power;
      2. The exercise of the power to invade the principal of the trust under subdivision (b)(27)(A) shall be by an instrument in writing, signed and acknowledged by the trustee and filed with the records of the trust;
      3. The exercise of the power to invade principal of the trust under subdivision (b)(27)(A) shall not extend the permissible period of the rule against perpetuities that applies to the trust;
      4. This section shall not be construed to abridge the right of any trustee who has a power of invasion to appoint property in further trust that arises under any other statute or under common law;
      5. The exercise of the power to appoint principal under subdivision (b)(27)(A) shall be considered an exercise of a power of appointment, other than a power to appoint to the trustee, the trustee's creditors, the trustee's estate, or the creditors of the trustee's estate;
      6. The second trust:
        1. May confer a power of appointment upon a beneficiary of the original trust to whom or for the benefit of whom the trustee has the power to distribute principal of the original trust;
        2. The permissible appointees of the power of appointment conferred upon a beneficiary may include persons who are not beneficiaries of the original or second trust; and
        3. The power of appointment conferred upon a beneficiary must preclude any exercise that would extend the permissible period of the rule against perpetuities that applies to the trust;
      7. If any contribution to the original trust qualified for the annual exclusion under § 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §  2503(b)), the marital deduction under §§ 2056(a) or   2523(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §§  2506(a) or  2523(a)), or the charitable deduction under §§ 170(a), 642(c), 2055(a) or 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §§  170(a), 642(c), 2055(a) or 2522(a)), is a direct skip qualifying for treatment under § 2642(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §  2642(c)), or qualified for any other specific tax benefit that would be lost by the existence of the authorized trustee's authority under subdivision (b)(27)(A) for income, gift, estate, or generation-skipping transfer tax purposes under the Internal Revenue Code, then the authorized trustee shall not have the power to distribute the principal of a trust pursuant to subdivision (b)(27)(A) in a manner that would prevent the contribution to the original trust from qualifying for or would reduce the exclusion, deduction, or other tax benefit that was originally claimed with respect to that contribution;
      8. During any period when the original trust owns stock in a subchapter S corporation as defined in § 1361(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §  1361(a)(1)), an authorized trustee shall not exercise a power authorized by subdivision (b)(27)(A) to distribute part or all of the stock of the S corporation to a second trust that is not a permitted shareholder under § 1361(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §  1361(c)(2));
      9. This section applies to any trust that is administered in this state; and
      10. For purposes of this section, the term “original trust” refers to the trust from which principal is being distributed and the phrase “second trust” refers to the trust to which assets are being distributed from the original trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 74; 2005, ch. 99, § 9; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 37, 38.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 99, § 14 provided that is the intent of the general assembly that, notwithstanding the decision of Arnold v. Davis, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2004), the provisions of § 9 of this act reflects existing law, and all trusts entered into prior to this act remain valid and in full effect.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Law Reviews.

    Can't Trust a Trust? Decant (Dan W. Holbrook), 40 No. 8 Tenn. B.J. 20 (2004).

    Where There's a Will: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Estate Planning Tools Married To New Realities (Eddy R. Smith), 49 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2013).

    Where There's a Will: The Report of My Practice's Death Was an Exaggeration: The Healthy Prognosis for Estate Planning in Tennessee (Eddy R. Smith), 48 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2012).

    2. Capacity of Beneficiaries of Trust.

    Because plaintiffs could not file suit as the beneficiaries of the trust under this statute, their request for leave to amend the complaint to add a second cause of action in which they claimed that the debt at issue was an asset of the decedent's trust was properly denied as plaintiffs still lacked the capacity to file suit. Palmer v. Colvard, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2019).

    Plaintiffs'  claims were properly dismissed with prejudice as plaintiffs lacked the capacity to prosecute their complaint because plaintiffs failed to obtain letters testamentary prior to filing suit as the personal representatives of the decedent's estate; and plaintiffs were not entitled to file suit as the beneficiaries of the trust because only the trustee could prosecute or defend an action, claim, or judicial proceeding. Palmer v. Colvard, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2019).

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-816.

    This section enumerates specific powers commonly included in trust instruments and in trustee powers legislation. All the powers listed are freely subject to alteration, reduction or expansion in the terms of the trust, subject only to T.C.A. § 35-15-105. The powers listed are also subsumed under the general authority granted in T.C.A. § 35-15-815(a) to exercise all powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent owner has over individually owned property, and any other powers appropriate to achieve the proper management, investment, and distribution of the trust property. With the exception of a trustee’s power of appointment under subdivision (b)(27), the powers listed add little of substance not already granted by T.C.A. § 35-15-815 and powers conferred elsewhere in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, including those listed in the Section Comment to section T.C.A. § 35-15-815.

    As provided in subsection T.C.A. § 35-15-815, the exercise of a power is subject to fiduciary duties except as modified, limited or expanded in the terms of the trust. The fact that the trustee has a power does not imply a duty that the power must be exercised.

    Many of the powers listed in this section are similar to the powers listed in Section 3 of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (1964). Several are new, however, and other powers drawn from such act have been updated. The powers enumerated in this section may be divided into categories. Certain powers, such as the powers to acquire or sell property, borrow money, and deal with real estate, securities, and business interests, are powers that any individual can exercise. Other powers, such as the power to collect trust property, are by their very nature only applicable to trustees. Other specific powers, particularly those listed in other sections of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, modify a trustee duty that would otherwise apply. See, e.g ., the exceptions to the duty of loyalty provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-802 and the authorization of a trustee to make joint investments with another trust, which is an exception to earmarking requirement, provided for in T.C.A. § 35-15-810.

    Subsection (a) has no counterpart in the Uniform Trust Code. It was included in this section to assure that instruments written before the original adoption of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in 2004 would obtain the benefits of the provisions of this section as well as those of T.C.A. § 35-50-110, such latter section being the primary section providing a list of powers that could be incorporated into an instrument by reference prior to adoption of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subsection (b) acknowledges the ability of a settlor to freely modify, expand or reduce the powers included therein in its introductory phrase.

    Subdivision (b)(1) authorizes a trustee to collect trust property and collect or decline additions to the trust property. The power to collect trust property is an incident of the trustee’s duty to administer the trust as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-801. The trustee has a duty to enforce claims as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-811, the successful prosecution of which can result in collection of trust property. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-812, the trustee also has a duty to collect trust property from a former trustee or other person holding trust property. For a non-exclusive application of the power to reject additions to the trust property, see the provisions of this subsection that grant a fiduciary the power to decline property with possible environmental liability.

    Subdivision (b)(2) authorizes a trustee to sell trust property, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale. Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 190 (1992), a power of sale is implied unless limited in the terms of the trust. In arranging a sale, a trustee must comply with the duty to act prudently as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-801. This duty may dictate that the sale be made with security.

    Subdivision (b)(4) authorizes a trustee to deposit funds in an account in a regulated financial service institution. This includes the right of a financial institution trustee to deposit funds in its own banking department as authorized by T.C.A. § 35-15-802.

    Subdivision (b)(5) authorizes a trustee to borrow money. Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 191 (1992), the sole limitation on such borrowing is the general obligation to invest prudently. Language clarifying that the loan may extend beyond the duration of the trust was added to negate an older view that the trustee only had power to encumber the trust property for the period that the trust was in existence.

    Subdivision (b)(6) authorizes the trustee to continue, contribute additional capital to, or change the form of a business. Any such decision by the trustee must be made in light of the standards of the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act, but such standards can be fully altered, expanded, reduced or eliminated pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

    Subdivision (b)(7), regarding powers with respect to securities, codifies and amplifies the principles of Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 193  (1959).

    Subdivision (b)(9), authorizing the leasing of property, negates the older view, reflected in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 189  cmt. c (1959), that a trustee could not lease property beyond the duration of the trust. Whether a longer term lease is appropriate is judged by the standards of prudence applicable to all investments.

    Subdivision (b)(10), authorizing a trustee to grant options with respect to sales, leases or other dispositions of property, negates the older view, reflected in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 190  cmt. k (1959), that a trustee could not grant another person an option to purchase trust property. Like any other investment decision, whether the granting of an option is appropriate is a question of prudence under the standards of the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act, but such standards can be fully altered, expanded, reduced or eliminated pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

    Subdivision (b)(11), authorizing a trustee to purchase insurance, empowers a trustee to implement the duty to pro-tect trust property. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-809. The trustee may also insure beneficiaries, agents, and the trustee against liability, including liability for breach of trust.

    Subdivision (b)(13) is one of several provisions in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code designed to address trustee concerns about possible liability for violations of environmental law. This subdivision collects all the powers relating to environmental concerns in one place even though some of the powers, such as the powers to pay expenses, compromise claims, and decline property, overlap with other subdivisions of this section (decline property, subdivision (b)(1); compromise claims, subdivision (b)(14); pay expenses, subdivision (b)(15)). See also  T.C.A. § 35-15-701, which grants a designated trustee the power to inspect property to determine potential violation of environmental or other law or for any purpose, and the fact that under T.C.A. § 35-15-1010 (unlike under the corresponding section of the Uniform Trust Code) a trustee is not personally liable for violation of environmental law arising from ownership or control of trust property.

    Subdivision (b)(14) authorizes a trustee to pay, contest, settle, or release claims. T.C.A. § 35-15-811] requires that a trustee need take only “reasonable” steps to enforce claims, meaning that a trustee may release a claim not only when it is uncollectible, but also when collection would be uneconomic. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 192  (1959) (power to compromise, arbitrate and abandon claims). T.C.A. § 35-15-811 also allows a trustee to abandon or assign a claim such trustee believes unreasonable to enforce to one or more of the beneficiaries of a trust, giving such beneficiary(ies) the ability to attempt enforcement if such beneficiary(ies) so desire(s).

    Subdivision (b)(15), among other things, authorizes a trustee to pay compensation to the trustee and agents without prior approval of court. Regarding the standard for setting trustee compensation and repayment of trustee expenditures, see  T.C.A. §§ 35-15-708 and 35-15-709.

    Subdivision (b)(16) authorizes a trustee to make elections with respect to taxes. It is intended to allow a trustee as well as any other fiduciary (as such term is defined in T.C.A. § 35-5-103) who holds the relevant powers, the broadest possible freedom consistent with overall objectives and provisions of the Tennessee trust statutes to exercise elections concerning taxes so that such fiduciary can provide for the overall efficient administration of a trust. Due to the intent of subdivision (b)(16), it would be illogical to limit its application to only matters that are only directly related to taxation and it application is not so limited. Accordingly, although not specifically enumerated in such subdivision, such subdivision (as well as other portions of the Tennessee trust statutes) grants a fiduciary the powers to make decisions regarding all things and matters that directly or indirectly affect taxation imposed on a trust, any of its property, any parties to the trust and any of its beneficiaries. For similar reasons, it would be illogical to limit the application of subdivision (b)(16) to only “federal, state and local taxes,” and its application is not so limited. Accordingly, although not specifically enumerated in such subdivision, such subdivision grants a fiduciary the power to exercise elections regarding all forms of taxation (regardless of name, as well as how and on what basis imposed) that is imposed on the trust, any of its property, any parties to the trust and any of its beneficiaries. Such power exists regardless of the nature or location (whether within this state, another state, the United States or within a foreign country, as well as within any subdivisions of any such locations) of the authority imposing or interpreting any form of taxation. Although not limited to taxes imposed on income, among other such elections, such subdivision specifically authorizes a trustee to make elections which relate to current, recent and future changes to the definition of “income” (as well as to the definition of any other term bearing on the taxability of any item or matter and the resulting rate or amount of tax, under any type or form of taxation). Several non-exclusive examples of such changes include: a definition of income such as an election to consider the net gains form the sale of capital assets to be part of “distributable net income” (often referred to by the acronym “DNI”) as such is defined in § 643 of the Internal Revenue Code; and any changes to matters affecting any definitions or other provisions contained in subpart D, part 1, subchapter J, of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e., the provisions of such code concerning treatment of excess distributions by trusts, including but not limited to accumulation distributions and undistributed net income, the latter often referred to by the acronym “UNI”). To the extent any provision of title 35, chapter 6, any other provision of the Tennessee trust statutes, any other Tennessee law or any foreign law are in conflict with this subdivision (b)(16), such subdivision (b)(16) controls.

    Subdivision (b)(17) authorizes a trustee to take action with respect to employee benefit or retirement plans, or annuities or life insurance payable to the trustee. Typically, these will be beneficiary designations which the settlor has made payable to the trustee, but the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code also allows the trustee to acquire ownership of annuities or life insurance. Moreover, elections under this subdivision may be made in order to effect the other provisions of this section, including but not limited to subdivision (b)(16).

    Subdivisions (b)(18) and (b)(19) allow a trustee to make loans to a beneficiary or to guarantee loans of a beneficiary upon such terms and conditions as the trustee considers fair and reasonable. The determination of what is fair and reasonable must be made in light of the fiduciary duties of the trustee and the purposes of the trust. Frequently, a trustee will make loans to a beneficiary which might be considered less than prudent in an ordinary commercial sense although of great benefit to the beneficiary and which help carry out the trust purposes. If the trustee requires security for the loan to the beneficiary, adequate security under this subdivision may consist of a charge on the beneficiary’s interest in the trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 255  (1959). It is important to note, that as with the vast majority of provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the provisions of subdivisions (b)(18) and (b)(19) may be modified, expanded, restricted or eliminated, subject only to T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

    Subdivision (b)(20) authorizes the appointment of ancillary trustees in jurisdictions in which the regularly appointed trustee is unable or unwilling to act. Often, but certainly not exclusively, an ancillary trustee will be appointed when there is a need to manage real estate located in another jurisdiction. This subdivision allows the regularly appointed trustee to select the ancillary trustee and to confer on the ancillary trustee such powers and duties as may be necessary. The appointment of ancillary trustees is a topic which a settlor may wish to address in the terms of the trust.

    Subdivision (b)(21) authorizes a trustee to make payments to another person for the use or benefit of a beneficiary who is under a legal disability or who the trustee reasonably believes is incapacitated. Although an adult relative or other person receiving funds is required to spend it on the beneficiary’s behalf, it is preferable that the trustee make the distribution to a person having more formal fiduciary responsibilities. For this reason, payment may be made to an adult relative only if the trustee does not know of a conservator, guardian, custodian, or custodial trustee capable of acting for the beneficiary. Subdivision (b)(21) can also be used in furtherance of the provisions of T.C.A. §§ 35-15-506(a)(5) and 35-15-506(b)(2).

    Subdivision (b)(22) authorizes a trustee to make non-pro-rata distributions and allocate particular assets in proportionate or disproportionate shares. This power provides needed flexibility and lessens the risk that a non-pro-rata distribution will be treated as a taxable sale. The power also provides needed flexibility to effect other provisions of this section, including but not limited to subdivision (b)(16).

    Subdivision (b)(23) authorizes a trustee to resolve disputes through mediation or arbitration. The drafters of this the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code encourage the use of such alternate methods for resolving disputes. Arbitration is a form of nonjudicial settlement agreement authorized by T.C.A. § 35-15-111. In representing beneficiaries and others in connection with arbitration or mediation, the representation principles of title 35, chapter 15, part 3 may be applied. Settlors wishing to encourage use of alternate dispute resolution may draft to provide it. For sample language, see  American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for Wills and Trusts (1995).

    Subdivision (b)(24) authorizes a trustee to prosecute or defend an action. As to the propriety of reimbursement for attorney’s fees and other expenses of an action or judicial proceeding, see  T.C.A. § 35-15-709 and its Section Comment. See also T.C.A. § 35-15-811 relative to a trustee’s duty to defend actions.

    Subdivision(b)(25) authorizes a fiduciary to execute and deliver all forms of instruments that facilitate exercise of that fiduciary’s powers.

    Subdivision (b)(26), which is similar to section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts  (1959), clarifies that even though the trust has terminated, the trustee retains the powers needed to wind up the administration of the trust and distribute the remaining trust property.

    Subdivision (b)(27) authorizes a trustee who possesses a discretionary power to distribute principal outright to trust beneficiaries to exercise that power in further trust. This power, which is commonly referred to as a “decanting” power, is considered a limited power of appointment.

    The power may be exercised with respect to any trust that is administered in Tennessee.

    In order to exercise the power, the Trustee is required to sign a written notarized instrument that is maintained with the records of the original trust as well as the second trust. The Trustee does not have to obtain consent of the beneficiaries or a Court in order to exercise the power.

    The power may only be exercised in favor of the proper objects of the exercise of the discretionary power. This means that new beneficiaries cannot be added to the second trust, though the second trust does not have to benefit all of the beneficiaries of the original trust. The second trust may grant a power of appointment to a beneficiary of the original trust, which power may be exercisable in favor of beneficiaries who were not beneficiaries of the original trust.

    There are several limitations on the exercise of the power that prevent loss of tax benefits:

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

2. Capacity of Beneficiaries of Trust.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

the permissible rule of perpetuities applicable to the original trust may not be extended either by exercise of the decanting power or by the exercise of a power of appointment granted to a beneficiary in the second trust;

if the original trust qualified for the federal gift tax annual exclusion under Code Section 2503(b), the federal gift or estate tax marital or charitable deduction, favorable generation-skipping transfer treatment under Code Section 2642(c), or any other specific tax benefit, the decanting power may not be exercised in a manner that causes the loss of the tax benefit; and

if the original trust owns stock in a Subchapter S corporation, the power may not be exercised in favor of a second trust that is not a qualified shareholder in a Subchapter S corporation.

35-15-817. Distribution upon termination — Petition for accounting.

  1. Upon termination or partial termination of a trust, the trustee may send to the beneficiaries a proposal for distribution. The right of any beneficiary to object to the proposed distribution terminates if the beneficiary does not notify the trustee of an objection within thirty (30) days after the proposal was sent but only if the proposal informed the beneficiary of the right to object and of the time allowed for objection. For the purpose of determining the date a proposed distribution was sent, where exact confirmation is unavailable, it can be assumed it was received five (5) days after the date of mailing.
  2. Upon the occurrence of an event terminating or partially terminating a trust, the trustee shall proceed expeditiously to distribute the trust property to the persons entitled to it, subject to the right of the trustee to retain a reasonable reserve for the payment of debts, expenses, and taxes.
  3. Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), any qualified beneficiary or trustee may petition the court for a final accounting covering a resigning or removed trustee's period of administration or the period since an accounting was last approved by the court as allowed under § 35-15-205.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 75; 2019, ch. 340, § 11.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote (c) which read: “(c)  A release by a beneficiary of a trustee from liability for breach of trust is invalid to the extent:“(1)  It was induced by improper conduct of the trustee; or“(2)  The beneficiary, at the time of the release, did not know of the beneficiary's rights or of the material facts relating to the breach.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Mandatory Obligation.

Trustees were under a mandatory obligation to distribute the remaining principal of such child's separate trust to such child, when the terminating event or events occurred, and because the trust did not provide otherwise, the trustees were to perform this task expeditiously, which they failed to do; because the trustees failed to take the appropriate actions for two years following the termination of the trust, the trial court was justified in ordering the clerk to prepare a deed to transfer the real estate to the beneficiaries. In re Farmer Family Trust, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-817.

This section contains several independent provisions governing distribution upon termination. Certain other provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code relevant to distribution upon termination include the power upon termination of a trust to windup administration and distribution subdivision as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-816(b), and the limitation on actions against trustees as provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-1005.

Subsection (a) is based on section 3-906(b) of the Uniform Probate Code. It addresses the dilemma that sometimes arises when the trustee is reluctant to make distribution until the beneficiary approves but the beneficiary is reluctant to approve until the assets are in hand. The procedure made available under subsection (a) facilitates the making of non-pro-rata distributions. However, whenever practicable it is normally better practice to obtain the advance written con-sent of the beneficiaries to a proposed plan of distribution. Similar to other notices under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, the right of a beneficiary to object may be barred by delivery of the proposal to another person if that other person may represent and bind the beneficiary as provided in title 35, chapter 3.

The last sentence of subsection (a) is not contained in the Uniform Trust Code and provides certainty as to the date on which a proposed distribution, having been sent, was received by the person or persons to whom its delivery was required.

The failure of a beneficiary to object to a plan of distribution pursuant to subsection (a) is not a release as provided in subsection (c) or in T.C.A. § 35-15-1009. A release requires an affirmative act by a beneficiary and is not accomplished upon a mere failure to object. Furthermore, a failure of a beneficiary to object does not preclude the beneficiary from bringing an action with respect to matters not disclosed in the proposal for distribution.

Subsection (b) recognizes that upon an event terminating or partially terminating a trust, expeditious distribution should be encouraged to the extent reasonable under the circumstances. However, a trustee is entitled to retain a reasonable reserve for payment of debts, expenses, and taxes. Sometimes these reserves must be quite large, for example, upon the death of the beneficiary of a QTIP trust that is subject to federal estate tax in the beneficiary’s estate. Not infrequently, a substantial reserve must be retained until the estate tax audit is concluded several years after the beneficiary’s death.

Subsection (c) is an application of T.C.A. § 35-15-1009, which addresses the validity of any type of release that a beneficiary might give. However, subsection (c) is more limited, dealing only with releases given upon termination of the trust. Factors affecting the validity of a release are provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-109, and such release may be obtained through represented under part 3. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216  (1959).

Part 9
“Uniform Principal and Income Act” and “Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002” Incorporated

35-15-901. Uniform Principal and Income Act and Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002 incorporated by reference.

Title 35, chapter 6 and chapter 14 are incorporated in this chapter by reference.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 76; 2013, ch. 390, § 39.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    General Comment.

    According to ULC - NCCUSL, this part provides a place for a jurisdiction to enact, reenact or codify its version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act [ULC - NCCUSL does not mention the Uniform Principal and Income Act relative to its part 9]. States adopting the Uniform Trust Code which have previously enacted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act are encouraged to reenact their version of the Prudent Investor Act in this part.

    Both the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002, title 35, part 14, T.C.A. § 35-14-101 et seq., and Tennessee's version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, title 35, part 6, T.C.A. § 35-6-101 et seq., were adopted prior to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. As with the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, both have been amended since their respective enactments and in certain cases, both diverge, sometimes significantly, from their respective uniform codes, as well as from various restatements. Instead of “reenacting” the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002 in part 9, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code incorporates therein by reference such act, codified at title 35, part 14, as well as Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, codified at title 35, part 6.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Part 10
Liability of Trustees and Rights of Persons Dealing with Trustee

35-15-1001. Remedies for breach of trust.

  1. A violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary is a breach of trust.
  2. To remedy a breach of trust that has occurred or may occur, the court may:
    1. Compel the trustee to perform the trustee's duties;
    2. Enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
    3. Compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying money, restoring property, or other means;
    4. Order a trustee to account;
    5. Appoint a special fiduciary to take possession of the trust property and administer the trust;
    6. Suspend the trustee;
    7. Remove the trustee as provided in § 35-15-706;
    8. Reduce or deny compensation to the trustee;
    9. Subject to § 35-15-1012, void an act of the trustee, impose a lien or a constructive trust on trust property, or trace trust property wrongfully disposed of and recover the property or its proceeds; or
    10. Order any other appropriate relief whether provided elsewhere in this chapter, available at common law or under equity principles.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 77.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 6 Tenn. Juris., Charities, § 17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Breach.

Trustee did not breach a duty under this statute by failing to convey personal assets to a trust in order to avoid probate administration and expenses; it was not shown that the trustee administered the trust in a manner that was inconsistent with the beneficial interest of the beneficiaries. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Comment.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-100135-15-1009 identify the remedies for breach of trust, describe how money damages for breach of trust, as well as in absence of breach of trust, are to be determined, and specify potential defenses. T.C.A. § 35-15-1001 lists the remedies for breach of trust and specifies when a breach of trust occurs. A breach of trust occurs when the trustee breaches one of the duties contained in part 8 [T.C.A. § 35-15-80135-15-817]  or elsewhere in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. The remedies for breach of trust in T.C.A. § 35-15-1001 are broad and flexible. T.C.A. § 35-15-1002 provides how money damages for breach of trust are to be determined. Subject to several exceptions, the standard for determining money damages rests on two principles: (1) the trust should be restored to the position it would have been in had the harm not occurred; and (2) the trustee should not be permitted to profit from the trustee's own wrong. T.C.A. § 35-15-1003 is in contravention to the similarly numbered section of the Uniform Trust Code and holds that a trustee is not liable to a beneficiary in absence of breach of trust for a loss or depreciation of value of trust property or for not making a profit; a trustee not being an insurer. T.C.A. § 35-15-1004 reaffirms the court’s power in equity to award costs and attorney’s fees as justice requires and unlike the Uniform Trust Code, recognizes the need to also allow such payments from trust assets in non-judicial proceedings, arbitrations and mediations.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-100535-15-1009 deal with potential defenses. T.C.A. § 35-15-1005 provides a statute of limitations on actions against a trustee that diverges from that of the Uniform Trust Code. T.C.A. § 35-15-105: (1) makes the benefit of such statute of limitations easier to obtain than under the Uniform Trust Code; and (2) unlike the Uniform Trust Code, contains similar statutes of limitation that apply to actions by a trustee against another or former trustee, as well as to actions by a trust advisor or trust protector against a trustee. T.C.A. § 35-15-1006 protects a trustee who acts in reasonable reliance on the terms of a written trust instrument. T.C.A. § 35-15-1007 protects a trustee who has exercised reasonable care to ascertain the happening of events that might affect distribution, such as a beneficiary’s marriage or death. T.C.A. § 35-15-1008 describes the effect and limits on the use of an exculpatory clause. Unlike under the Uniform Trust Code and despite the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-1008, as discussed in the section comments to such section, the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code believe that when taken as a whole, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code allows enforceability of a provision in a trust instrument that relieves a trustee of liability for breach committed in bad faith. T.C.A. § 35-15-1009 deals with the standards for recognizing beneficiary approval of, or consent to, acts of the trustee that might otherwise constitute a breach of trust.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-1010 – 1013 address trustee relations with persons other than beneficiaries. The emphasis is on encouraging third parties to engage in commercial transactions to the same extent as if the property were not held in trust. T.C.A. § 35-15-1010 negates personal liability on contracts entered into by the trustee if the fiduciary capacity was properly disclosed. The trustee is also relieved from personal liability for torts committed in the course of administration unless the trustee was personally at fault. Unlike the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-1010 requires that in order for such personal liability for tort to arise, the fault of the trustee must be due to the trustee’s own willful misconduct proven by clear and convincing evidence. Also unlike the Uniform Trust Code, T.C.A. § 35-15-1010 does not contain an exception to protection from personal liability relative to environmental law. Therefore, T.C.A. § 35-15-1010 provides a trustee significantly better protection from personal liability than does the Uniform Trust Code. T.C.A. § 35-15-1011 negates personal liability for contracts entered into by partnerships in which the trustee is a general partner as long as the fiduciary capacity was disclosed in the contract or partnership certificate. Such section also provides a trustee protection from entity tort claims based on the same standard as in T.C.A. § 35-15-1010. By analogy, the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code believe such protection extends to a trustee of a trust that is the only member of a single member LLC should the LLC itself not protect the trustee. Such drafters also believe such protection is extended to a trustee of a trust that owns an interest in any entity that normally provides limitation of liability, but which is attacked by any alter ego or veil piercing theory. Overall T.C.A. § 35-15-1011 provides a trustee better protection than does the Uniform Trust Code. T.C.A. § 35-15-1012 protects persons other than beneficiaries who deal with a trustee in good faith and without knowledge that the trustee is exceeding or improperly exercising a power. T.C.A. § 35-15-1013 permits a third party to rely on a certification of trust, thereby reducing the need for a third party to request a copy of the complete trust instrument. However, T.C.A. § 35-15-1013 provides more privacy and more flexibility than does the Uniform Trust Code.

T.C.A. § 35-15-1014 provides for enforceability of no-contest provisions and does not have a counterpart in the Uniform Trust Code. Such section provides in the absence of a specific list of grounds for bringing an action, a no-contest provision is valid and enforceable. Moreover, the good or bad faith of the person contesting is not relevant.

Though much of this part is not subject to override in the terms of the trust, in the interest of enforcing a settlor’s intent and the freedom of disposition of property, more is subject to override than under the Uniform Trust Code. The settlor may not limit the rights of persons other than beneficiaries as provided in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-101035-15-1013, modify the provisions regarding statutes of limitation contained in T.C.A. § 35-15-1005 nor interfere with the court’s ability to take such action to remedy a breach of trust as may be necessary in the interests of justice. See T.C.A. § 35-15-105.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1001.

This section codifies the remedies available to rectify or to prevent a breach of trust for violation of a duty owed to a beneficiary. The duties that a trustee might breach include those contained in part 8 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-80135-15-817 ] in addition to those specified elsewhere in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. In consulting part 8 or other provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, note that certain provisions in part 8 and elsewhere in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. Such divergence may reduce or enlarge a trustee’s duties relative to the duties as defined by the Uniform Trust Code or the restatements. To the extent such divergence is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

While this section identifies the available remedies, it does not attempt to cover the refinements and exceptions developed in case law. The availability of a remedy in a particular circumstance will be determined not only by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, but also by the common law of trusts and principles of equity to the extent provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-106.

Beneficiaries, cotrustees and to the extent they are so authorized, trust advisors and trust protectors, have standing to bring a petition against a trustee or cotrustee to remedy a breach of trust. Similarly such persons have standing to bring a petition to remedy a breach of trust against a relevant trust advisor or trust protector to the extent such trust advisor or trust protector owed a duty giving rise to such petition. Following acceptance of office by a successor trustee or other fiduciary, such successor fiduciary has standing to sue a predecessor for breach of trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200  (1959). A person who may represent a beneficiary’s interest under part 3 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-30135-15-305 ] would have standing to bring a petition on behalf of the person represented. In the case of a charitable trust, those with standing include the state attorney general and a charitable organization expressly designated to receive distributions under the terms of the trust. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-110 & Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391  (1959). A person appointed to enforce a trust for an animal or a trust for a noncharitable purpose would have standing to sue for a breach of trust. See  T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408, and 35-15-409.

Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, during the period in which a beneficiary is an ultimate, or potential ultimate, beneficiary as such is defined in the definition of “qualified beneficiary” at T.C.A. § 35-15-103 and the section comments thereto, such beneficiary shall not have the standing to petition to remedy a breach of trust or to enforce a trust; such beneficiary’s interest being too remote. If and when the interests of any ultimate, or potential ultimate, beneficiary have ripened to the point that such beneficiary is eligible to receive, or have paid for their benefit, current distributions of income or principal, at such time they will no longer be an “ultimate beneficiary” or “potential ultimate beneficiary.” At such time such beneficiary has all the rights of any other current beneficiary of the same type, charitable or non-charitable. Similarly if a trust for animals or a trust for a noncharitable purpose (individually and collectively, “purpose trust”) is an ultimate, or potential ultimate, beneficiary, the rights of any person provided in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-408 or 35-15-409 to enforce the trust under which such purpose trust is an ultimate, or potential ultimate beneficiary will not ripen until such purpose trust is eligible to receive from the trust under which it was previously an ultimate, or potential ultimate, beneficiary, current distributions of income or principal.

Traditionally, remedies for breach of trust at law were limited to suits to enforce unconditional obligations to pay money or deliver chattels. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 198  (1959). Otherwise, remedies for breach of trust were exclusively equitable, and as such, punitive damages were not available and findings of fact were made by the judge and not a jury. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 197  (1959).

The remedies identified in this section are derived from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 199  (1959). The reference to payment of money in subdivision (b)(3) includes liability that might be characterized as damages, restitution, or surcharge. For the measure of liability, see  T.C.A. § 35-15-1002. Subdivision (b)(5) makes explicit the court’s authority to appoint a special fiduciary, also sometimes referred to as a receiver. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 199(d)  (1959). The authority of the court to appoint a special fiduciary is not limited to actions alleging breach of trust but is available whenever the court, exercising its equitable jurisdiction, concludes that an appointment would promote administration of the trust. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-704 (special fiduciary may be appointed whenever court considers such appointment necessary for administration).

Subdivision (b)(8), which allows the court to reduce or deny compensation, is in accord with Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243  (1959). For the factors to consider in setting the compensation of a trustee or other fiduciary absent breach of trust, see T.C.A. § 35-15-708. In deciding whether to reduce or deny a trustee compensation, the court may wish to consider: (1) whether the trustee acted in good faith; (2) whether the breach of trust was intentional; (3) the nature of the breach and the extent of the loss; (4) whether the trustee has restored the loss; and (5) the value of the trustee’s services to the trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243  cmt. c (1959).

The authority under subdivision (b)(9) to set aside wrongful acts of the trustee is a corollary of the power to enjoin a threatened breach as provided in subdivision (b)(2). However, in setting aside the wrongful acts of the trustee the court may not impair the rights of bona fide purchasers protected under T.C.A. § 35-15-1012. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 284  (1959).

35-15-1002. Damages for breach of trust.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 35-3-117(a)-(d) with regard to investment of trust funds or elsewhere in this chapter, a trustee who commits a breach of trust is liable to the beneficiaries affected for the greater of:
    1. The amount required to restore the value of the trust property and trust distributions to what they would have been had the breach not occurred; or
    2. The profit the trustee made by reason of the breach.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection (b), if more than one (1) trustee is liable to the beneficiaries for a breach of trust, a trustee is entitled to contribution from the other trustee or trustees. A trustee is not entitled to contribution if the trustee was substantially more at fault than another trustee or if the trustee committed the breach of trust in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries. A trustee who received a benefit from the breach of trust is not entitled to contribution from another trustee to the extent of the benefit received.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 78.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1002.

The exception language in the clause at the beginning of subsection (a) may result in a divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any re-statement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

Subsection (a) is based on Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 205 (1992). Such subsection states the general rule that if a trustee commits a breach of trust, the beneficiaries may either affirm the transaction or, if a loss has occurred, hold the trustee liable for the amount necessary to compensate fully for the consequences of the breach. This may include recovery of lost income, capital gain, or appreciation that would have resulted from proper administration. Even if a loss has not occurred, the trustee may not benefit from the improper action and is accountable for any profit the trustee made by reason of the breach.

Notwithstanding the above, subsection (a) has two sources of exceptions to the general rule:

Exception number one is the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-3-117(a) – (d), which since 1951 have been part of the Tennessee trust statutes. Such subdivisions provide:

  1. Expressly that a bank or trust company can invest fiduciary assets in any open or closed end, investment company (i.e., a mutual fund), as well as in a collective trust. It is immaterial that such investment company or collective trust is being provided services by an affiliate of the trustee (a similar but broader authorization is provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-802);
  2. In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in a trust instrument, a fiduciary is not liable for with respect to decisions made regarding allocation or nature of investments of fiduciary assets unless the court determines that any such decision was an abuse of the fiduciary’s discretion. Such abuse is not to be found merely because the court would not have exercised the investment discretion in the same manner;
  3. In the case where a fiduciary is found to have abused investment discretion, provides a methodology to determine how a fiduciary is to restore the income and remainder beneficiaries to the same positions such would have occupied had the fiduciary not abused investment discretion.
  4. Provides a mechanism by which a fiduciary can obtain prior court approval for a plan of investment. If the plan provides sufficient information to the beneficiaries such that the beneficiaries are informed about the plan, any beneficiary who wishes to challenge the plan has the burden of establishing the plan will result in an abuse of discretion

    Exception number two is except as provided otherwise in this chapter 15, which by way of incorporation by reference includes chapters 6 and 14, the Tennessee Uniform Principal and Income Act and the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act, respectfully. Because of the flexibility contained in such Tennessee trust statutes (freedom of settlor’s intent, freedom of settlor’s variance from the terms of such Tennessee trust statutes, directed trusts, etc.) it is quite possible that a given trust contains exceptions that apply to the general rule. Such is far more likely under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code than under the Uniform Trust Code or the restatements.

    Relative to the default rule:

    For extensive commentary on the determination of damages, traditionally known as trustee surcharge, with numerous specific applications, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule §§ 205-213 (1992).

    For the use of benchmark portfolios to determine damages, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule Reporter’s Notes to §§ 205 and 208 – 211 (1992).

    On the authority of a court of equity to reduce or excuse damages for breach of trust, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205  cmt. g (1959).

    For purposes of this section and T.C.A. § 35-15-1003, “profit” does not include the trustee’s compensation. A trustee who has committed a breach of trust is entitled to reasonable compensation for administering the trust unless the court reduces or denies the trustee compensation pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-1001(b)(8).

    Subsection (b) is based on Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 258  (1959). Cotrustees are jointly and severally liable for a breach of trust if there was joint participation in the breach. Joint and several liability also is imposed on a nonparticipating cotrustee who, as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-703, failed to exercise reasonable care: (1) to prevent a cotrustee from committing a serious breach of trust, or (2) to compel a cotrustee to redress a serious breach of trust. Joint and several liability normally carries with it a right in any trustee to seek contribution from a cotrustee to the extent the trustee has paid more than the trustee’s proportionate share of the liability. Subsection (b), consistent with Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 258  (1959), creates an exception. A trustee who was substantially more at fault or committed the breach of trust in bad faith (absent being exculpated from same under T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a), see section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-1008) or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries is not entitled to contribution from the other trustees.

    Determining degrees of comparative fault is a question of fact. The fact that one trustee was more culpable or more active than another does not necessarily establish that this trustee was substantially more at fault. Nor is a trustee substantially less at fault because the trustee did not actively participate in the breach. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 258  cmt. e(195). Among the factors to consider: (1) Did the trustee fraudulently induce the other trustee to join in the breach? (2) Did the trustee commit the breach intentionally while the other trustee was at most negligent? (3) Did the trustee, because of greater experience or expertise, control the actions of the other trustee? (4) Did the trustee alone commit the breach with liability imposed on the other trustee only because of an improper delegation or failure to properly monitor the actions of the cotrustee? See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 258  cmt. d (1959).

35-15-1003. Damages in absence of breach.

Absent a breach of trust, a trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for a loss or depreciation in the value of trust property or for not having made a profit.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 79.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Breach.

There was no breach of duty on the part of a trustee based on a lack of diversification because written documentation had been executed electing an in-kind distribution of the stocks in the estate and which acknowledged that the trustee would continue to hold “these securities” for a son's benefit; moreover, a family had owned these stocks for years, and they continued to pay large dividends to the trust during the administration period. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, 523 S.W.3d 61, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1003.

The provisions of this section are in contravention to portions of the equivalent provision contained in the Uniform Trust Code and is controlling over it, the restatements and any foreign law.

A trustee is not an insurer. Similar to Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 204  (1959), this section provides that absent a breach of trust a trustee is not liable for a loss or depreciation in the value of the trust property or for failure to make a profit.

By way of example of such contravention, the Uniform Trust Code (but not the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code) contains two subsections, one of which is in accord with this section, while the other subsection in the Uniform Trust Code (but not in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code) states, “A trustee is accountable to an affected beneficiary for any profit made by the trustee arising from the administration of the trust, even absent a breach of trust.”

35-15-1004. Attorney's fees and costs.

  1. In a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy.
  2. In a nonjudicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the trustee may pay fees, other reasonable costs and expenses from the trust assets where all of the parties to the proceeding agree in writing.
  3. In a mediation or arbitration proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the mediator or arbitrator may award fees, other reasonable costs and expenses against the assets of the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 80.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appellate Attorney's Fees.

Trustee was awarded appellate attorney's fees under T.C.A. § 35-15-1004(a) where an attorney's petition to turn over the remaining trust assets was barred by res judicata. In re Estate of Goza, 397 S.W.3d 564, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2012).

Because this case did not involve a trust and appellee cited no additional support for her request for attorney's fees, the request was denied. In re Estate of Edmonds, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2019).

2. Fees Properly Denied.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney's fees under the statute in light of its existing award under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.03. In re Willard R. Sparks Revocable Trust 2004, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018), appeal denied, In re Willard R. Sparks Trust 2004, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. June 21, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to assess the award of the trustee's attorney's fees and expenses against the estate and the widow because the trustee never introduced proof of the value of either the trust or the estate nor the impact which assessment of fees against either would have on the beneficiaries. In re Estate of Roseman, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2019).

3. Fees Properly Awarded.

Awarding of attorneys'  fees to a trustee and the trustees'  child in a dispute over the conveyance of real property held in a testamentary trust to the child was appropriate because (1) the action involved the administration of the trust; (2) the attorneys'  fees were reasonable, necessary, and properly supported by affidavit of counsel; and (3) justice and equity permitted the award. Furthermore, the estate of the decedent had sufficient funds to incur the attorneys'  fees and expenses. In re Conservatorship of Cross, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2020).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1004.

Subsection (a) codifies the court’s historic authority to award costs and fees, including reasonable attorney’s fees, in judicial proceedings grounded in equity. The court may award a party its own fees and costs from the trust. The court may also charge a party’s costs and fees against another party to the litigation. Generally, litigation expenses were at common law chargeable against another party only in the case of egregious conduct such as bad faith or fraud. With respect to a party’s own fees, T.C.A. § 35-15-709 authorizes a trustee to recover expenditures properly incurred in the administration of the trust. The court may award a beneficiary litigation costs if the litigation is deemed beneficial to the trust. Sometimes, litigation brought by a beneficiary involves an allegation that the trustee has committed a breach of trust. On other occasions, the suit by the beneficiary is brought because of the trustee’s failure to take action against a third party, such as to recover property properly belonging to the trust. For the authority of a beneficiary to bring an action when the trustee fails to take action against a third party, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 281-282 (1959). For the case law on the award of attorney’s fees and other litigation costs, see 3 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 188.4 (4th ed. 1988).

Subsections (b) and (c), for which the Uniform Trust Code has no equivalent, recognizes that there is also a need to allow the payment of fees, expenses and costs from trust assets in non-judicial proceedings, arbitrations and mediations, such being encouraged under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

35-15-1005. Limitation of action for breach of trust against trustee, former trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector.

  1. A beneficiary, trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector shall not commence a proceeding against a trustee, former trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector for breach of trust more than one (1) year after the earlier of:
    1. The date the beneficiary, trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector or a representative of the beneficiary, trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector was sent information that adequately disclosed facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust; or
    2. The date the beneficiary, trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector or a representative of the beneficiary, trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector possessed actual knowledge of facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust.
  2. For purposes of this section, facts indicate the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if the facts provide sufficient information to enable the beneficiary; trustee; trust advisor; trust protector; or the representative of the beneficiary, trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector to have actual knowledge of the potential claim, or have sufficient information to be presumed to know of the potential claim or to know that an additional inquiry is necessary to determine whether there is a potential claim.
  3. If subsection (a) does not apply, a judicial proceeding against a trustee, former trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector for breach of trust must be commenced within three (3) years after the first to occur of:
    1. The removal, resignation, or death of the trustee, former trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector;
    2. The termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or
    3. The termination of the trust.
  4. Notwithstanding subsections (a)-(c), no trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector may commence a proceeding against a trustee or a former trustee if, under subsection (a), (b), or (c), none of the beneficiaries would be entitled to commence a proceeding against a trustee or a former trustee for a breach of trust.
  5. Notwithstanding subsections (a)–(c), no beneficiary, trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector may commence a proceeding against a trustee or former trustee for any matter covered by a final accounting approved by the court under  § 35-15-205.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 81; 2013, ch. 390, § 40; 2017, ch. 290, § 14; 2019, ch. 340, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote the section which read: “(a)  A beneficiary may not commence a proceeding against a trustee for breach of trust more than one (1) year after the date the beneficiary or a representative of the beneficiary was sent a report that adequately disclosed facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust.“(b)  A report adequately discloses facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if it provides sufficient information so that the beneficiary or the beneficiary's representative knows of the potential claim or has sufficient information to be presumed to know of it, or to be put on notice to inquire into its existence.“(c)  If subsection (a) does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a beneficiary against a trustee for breach of trust must be commenced within three (3) years after the first to occur of:“(1)  The removal, resignation, or death of the trustee;“(2)  The termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or“(3)  The termination of the trust.“(d)  A trustee may not commence a proceeding against a cotrustee or a former trustee for breach of trust more than one (1) year after the date the trustee or a representative of the trustee was sent a report that adequately disclosed facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust.“(e)  A report adequately discloses facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if it provides sufficient information so that the trustee or the trustee's representative knows of the potential claim or has sufficient information to be presumed to know of it, or to be put on notice to inquire into its existence.“(f)  If subsection (d) does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a trustee against a cotrustee or former trustee for breach of trust must be commenced within three (3) years after the first to occur of:“(1)  The removal, resignation, or death of the cotrustee or a former trustee;“(2)  The termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or“(3)  The termination of the trust.“(g)  A trust advisor or trust protector may not commence a proceeding against a trustee or a former trustee for breach of trust more than one (1) year after the date the trust advisor or trust protector or the respective representative of each was sent a report that adequately disclosed facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust.“(h)  A report adequately discloses facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if it provides sufficient information so that the trust advisor or trust protector or the respective representative of each knows of the potential claim or has sufficient information to be presumed to know of it, or to be put on notice to inquire into its existence.“(i)  If subsection (g) does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a trust advisor or trust protector against a trustee or former trustee for breach of trust must be commenced within three (3) years after the first to occur of:“(1)  The removal, resignation, or death of the trustee or a former trustee;“(2)  The termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or“(3)  The termination of the trust.“(j)  Notwithstanding subsections (d)-(i), no trustee, trust advisor or trust protector, may commence a proceeding against a trustee or a former trustee if, under § 35-15-1005(a)-(c), none of the beneficiaries may commence a proceeding against the cotrustee or former trustee for such breach of trust.”

    The 2019 amendment added (e).

    Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 290, § 16. July 1, 2017.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statute of Limitations.

Of the events listed in T.C.A. § 35-15-1005(c), the termination of the trust on May 16, 2007, was the first to occur. Since the beneficiaries filed their breach of trust suit against the trustee within three years of that date, the trustee was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the beneficiaries'  claim was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations in § 35-15-1005(c). Meyers v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 503 S.W.3d 365, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Beneficiary's acquisition of actual knowledge of a potential claim for breach of trust does not in and of itself trigger T.C.A. § 35-15-1005(a)' s one-year limitation period. The beneficiary's knowledge of the potential claim is only relevant to trigger the one-year period if that knowledge was acquired through a report, with the required disclosures, sent to the beneficiary. Meyers v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 503 S.W.3d 365, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

One-year period listed in T.C.A. § 35-15-1005(a) is not triggered by a beneficiary being put on notice through any means to inquire into the existence of a breach of trust. Instead, the statute provides that the one-year period begins to run on the date a report is sent to the beneficiary that provides sufficient information to put the beneficiary on notice to inquire into the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust. Meyers v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 503 S.W.3d 365, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

In a dispute over lottery winnings, T.C.A. § 35-15-1005 did not apply to equitable claims of constructive and resulting trusts because the complaint did not refer to an express trust or trust created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or decree. Findley v. Hubbard, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2018).

Probate court properly awarded a trustee summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations in a dispute over the conveyance of real property held in a testamentary trust because the statute of limitations was not tolled as the decedent was of sound mind when the cause of action accrued in that no facts were presented to demonstrate the decedent's incapacity during the relevant time. In re Conservatorship of Cross, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2020).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1005.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

The one-year and three year limitations periods under this section are not the only means for barring an action by a beneficiary. A beneficiary may be foreclosed by consent, release, or ratification as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-1009. Claims may also be barred by principles such as estoppel and laches arising in equity under the common law of trusts. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-106.

The representative referred to in subsection (a) is the person who may represent and bind a beneficiary as provided in part 3 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-30135-15-305 ]. During the time that a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity, the person holding the power to revoke is the one who must receive the report. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-603 (rights of settlor of revocable trust).

This section addresses only the issue of when the clock will start to run for purposes of the statute of limitations. If the trustee wishes to foreclose possible claims immediately, a consent to the report or other information may be obtained pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-1009. For the provisions relating to the duty to report to beneficiaries, see T.C.A. § 35-15-803.

Subsection (a) applies only if the trustee has furnished a report. The one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run against a beneficiary who has waived the furnishing of a report as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-813. Moreover, unlike in the similar provision in the Uniform Trust Code, subsection (a) does not require that the trustee’s report disclose the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust, but only that such report disclose “facts indicating” such existence, nor does subsection (a) require a trustee’s report apprise a beneficiary of the time allowed to commence a proceeding.

Subsection (b) defines what information must be contained in a trustee’s report for such to be adequate disclosure. Such subsection requires less than does the similar provision of the Uniform Trust Code. First, such report need only disclose “facts indicating” the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust (as opposed to the existence…). Second, such report need only contain such information that a beneficiary or the beneficiary’s representative will be presumed to know of, or that puts a beneficiary or the beneficiary’s representative on notice to inquire into, the existence of a potential claim. Under the Uniform Trust Code, there is no “presumption” or “notice to inquire” language.

Subsection (c) is intended to provide some ultimate repose for actions against a trustee. It applies to cases in which the trustee has failed to report to the beneficiaries or the report did not meet the disclosure requirements of subsection (b). It also applies to beneficiaries who did not receive notice of the report, whether personally or through representation. While the three (3) year limitations period will normally begin to run on termination of the trust, it can also begin earlier. If a trustee leaves office prior to the termination of the trust, the limitations period for actions against that particular trustee begins to run on the date the trustee leaves office. If a beneficiary receives a final distribution prior to the date the trust terminates, the limitations period for actions by that particular beneficiary begins to run on the date of final distribution.

If a trusteeship terminates by reason of death, a claim against the trustee’s estate for breach of fiduciary duty would, like other claims against the trustee’s estate, be barred by a probate creditor’s claim statute even though the statutory period prescribed by this section has not yet expired.

Subsections (d) – (j) have no corresponding provisions in the Uniform Trust Code.

Subsections (d) – (f) provide similar statutes of limitations for actions by a trustee against another trustee or former trustee.

Subsections (g) – (i) provide similar statutes of limitations for actions by a trust advisor or trust protector against a trustee or former trustee.

Subsection (j) provides that if the statute of limitations has run against all beneficiaries, then regardless of the existence of a breach or potential breach, no trustee, trust advisor or trust protector may bring an action for such against any trustee or former trustee.

This section does not specifically provide that the statutes of limitations under this section are tolled for fraud or other misdeeds, the drafters preferring to leave the resolution of this question to other law of this state.

35-15-1006. Reliance on trust instrustment.

A trustee who acts in reasonable reliance on the terms of the trust as expressed in the trust instrument is not liable to a beneficiary for a breach of trust to the extent the breach resulted from the reliance.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 82.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1006.

It sometimes happens that the intended terms of the trust differ from the apparent meaning of the trust instrument. This can occur because the court, in determining the terms of the trust, is allowed to consider evidence extrinsic to the trust instrument. See  definition of “terms of a trust” in T.C.A. § 35-15-103. Furthermore, if a trust is reformed on account of mistake of fact or law, as authorized by T.C.A. § 35-15-415, provisions of a trust instrument can be deleted or contradicted and provisions not in the trust instrument may be added. The concept of the “terms of a trust,” both as defined in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and as used in the doctrine of reformation, is intended to effectuate the principle that a trust should be administered and distributed in accordance with the settlor’s intent. However, a trustee should also be able to administer a trust with some dispatch and without concern that a reasonable reliance on the terms of the trust instrument is misplaced. This section protects a trustee who so relies on a trust instrument but only to the extent the breach of trust resulted from such reliance. This section is similar to T.C.A. § 35-14-103(b), in the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which protects a trustee from liability to the extent that the trustee acted in reasonable reliance on the provisions of the trust.

This section protects a trustee only if the trustee’s reliance is reasonable. For example, a trustee’s reliance on the trust instrument would not be justified if the trustee is aware of a prior court decree or binding nonjudicial settlement agreement clarifying or changing the terms of the trust.

35-15-1007. Event affecting administration or distribution.

If the happening of an event, including marriage, divorce, performance of educational requirements, or death, affects the administration or distribution of a trust, a trustee who has exercised reasonable care to ascertain the happening of the event is not liable for a loss resulting from the trustee's lack of knowledge.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 83.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1007.

This section is designed to encourage trustees to administer trusts expeditiously and without undue concern about liability for failure to ascertain external facts, often of a personal nature, that might affect administration or distribution of the trust. The common law, contrary to this section, imposed absolute liability against a trustee for misdelivery regardless of the trustee’s level of care. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 226  (1959). The events listed in this section are not exclusive. A trustee who has exercised reasonable care to ascertain the occurrence of other events, such as the attainment by a beneficiary of a certain age, is also protected from liability.

35-15-1008. Exculpation of trustee.

  1. A provision of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unenforceable to the extent that it:
    1. Relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries; or
    2. Was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential relationship to the settlor.
  2. An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the trustee is invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves that the exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents were adequately communicated to the settlor.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 84.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bad Faith Or Reckless Indifference.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank in the decedent's daughter's action against it was appropriate pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(8) and T.C.A. § 35-15-1008(a)(1) because nothing in the record indicated that the bank acted in bad faith or with reckless indifference; therefore, the terms of the will exonerating the bank, as trustee, prevailed in the case and the trial court was correct in so holding. Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1008.

To the extent subsection (a) forbids exculpation of a trustee in the case of bad faith, such subsection is in conflict with T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a). Under T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a), a settlor can in the terms of a trust override the duty of good faith, such not being a mandatory rule under T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b). Such duty was not included in T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) when the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code was originally adopted and such duty has not been added to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) in any subsequent amendment thereto.

Moreover, it is a primary objective of the Tennessee trust statutes that a settlor’s intent be the lodestar by which a trust is interpreted, that such intent be carried out and that settlors have the freedom to dispose of their assets to whom and in the manner they wish, all to the greatest extent constitutionally allowable.

Also, unlike with the Uniform Trust Code, there is no duty of good faith imposed by default in T.C.A. § 35-15-814, which relates to exercise of discretion. Under such section, the only bases on which a court can review exercise of such discretion relative to a discretionary trust are dishonesty, failure act if under a duty to do so and “improper motive,” which is defined at T.C.A. § 35-15-814(a)(1) to only include two specified acts and does not include “bad faith.” Relative to exercise of distribution discretion under a support and mandatory interests, T.C.A. § 35-15-804(c)(2) stipulates four grounds for judicial review. The three listed above for discretionary interests plus “unreasonableness,” and does not add a general prohibition against exculpating a trustee for acting in bad faith or requiring such trustee to act in “good faith.”

For all the reasons stated above, the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code are of the opinion that a provision of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach is enforceable to the extent such provision relieves the trustee of liability for breach committed in bad faith. Such drafters believe subdivision (a)(1) of this section should read, “Relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries; or”, omitting the words “bad faith.”

Absent such override of the duty of good faith in the terms of a trust pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-105(a), such duty is imposed as a default rule in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-801, 35-15-808(d) and 35-15-1002. Such default rule is likely to be the appropriate one in most circumstances; however, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code honors a settlor’s desire to override such default rule.

Subsection (b) responds to the danger that the insertion of such a clause by the fiduciary or its agent may have been undisclosed or inadequately understood by the settlor. To overcome the presumption of abuse in subsection (b), the trustee must establish that the clause was fair and that its existence and contents were adequately communicated to the settlor. In determining whether the clause was fair, the court may wish to examine: (1) the extent of the prior relationship between the settlor and trustee; (2) whether the settlor received independent advice; (3) the sophistication of the settlor with respect to business and fiduciary matters; (4) the trustee's reasons for inserting the clause; and (5) the scope of the particular provision inserted. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222  cmt. d (1959).

The requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied if the settlor was represented by independent counsel. If the settlor was represented by independent counsel, the settlor’s attorney is considered the drafter of the instrument even if the attorney used the trustee's form. Because the settlor's attorney is an agent of the settlor, disclosure of an exculpatory term to the settlor’s attorney is disclosure to the settlor.

35-15-1009. Beneficiary's consent, release, or ratification.

A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for breach of trust if the beneficiary consented in writing to the conduct or transaction constituting the breach, released the trustee from liability for the breach, or ratified the transaction constituting the breach, unless:

  1. The consent, release, or ratification of the beneficiary was induced by improper conduct of the trustee; or
  2. At the time of the consent, release, or ratification, the beneficiary did not know of the beneficiary's rights or of the material facts relating to the breach.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 85.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1009.

This section is based on, but also varies from, sections 216 through 218 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts  (1959). It also varies from the similar provision in the Uniform Trust Code.

A consent, release, or affirmance under this section may occur either before or after the approved conduct. This section requires an affirmative act by the beneficiary. A failure to object is not sufficient. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216  cmt. a (1959). A consent is binding on a consenting beneficiary although other beneficiaries have not consented. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216  cmt. g (1959). To constitute a valid consent, the beneficiary must know of the beneficiary’s rights and of the material facts relating to the breach. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216  cmt. k (1959). If the beneficiary’s approval involves a self-dealing transaction, the approval is binding only if the transaction was fair and reasonable. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 170(2) , 216(3) & cmt. n (1959).

An approval by the settlor of a revocable trust or by the holder of a presently exercisable power of withdrawal binds all the beneficiaries. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-603. A beneficiary is also bound to the extent an approval is given by a person authorized to represent the beneficiary as provided in part 3 [T.C.A. §§ 35-15-30135-15-305] .

35-15-1010. Limitation on personal liability of trustee.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not personally liable on a contract properly entered into in the trustee's fiduciary capacity in the course of administering the trust if the trustee in the contract disclosed the fiduciary capacity.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a) or (c), the debts, obligations and liabilities incurred by a trustee by reason of the ownership, management or control of trust property in the trustee's fiduciary capacity, shall be enforceable solely against the trust and its property, without any obligation or liability personally being borne by any trustee of such trust.
  3. A trustee is personally liable for torts committed in the course of administering a trust only if the trustee is personally at fault on account of the trustee's own willful misconduct proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  4. A claim based on a contract entered into by a trustee in the trustee's fiduciary capacity, on an obligation arising from ownership or control of trust property, or on a tort committed in the course of administering a trust, may be asserted in a judicial proceeding against the trustee in the trustee's fiduciary capacity, whether or not the trustee is personally liable for the claim.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 86; 2010, ch. 725, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Complaint to set aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award against an irrevocable trust and its trustee alleged the very fact needed to assert jurisdiction over the trust because the complaint alleged that all prior pleadings were filed in the name of the trustee, individually and as trustee of the trust. Khan v. Regions Bank, 572 S.W.3d 189, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2019).

2. Personal Liability.

Dismissal of complaint to set aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award against an irrevocable trust and its trustee was appropriate because personal liability as to the trustee was statutorily precluded. Khan v. Regions Bank, 572 S.W.3d 189, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2019).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1010.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

This section generally provides more protection against personal liability of a trustee than does the Uniform Trust Code.

This section is based on section 7-306 of the Uniform Probate Code. However, unlike the Uniform Probate Code, which requires that the contract both disclose the representative capacity and identify the trust, subsection (a) protects a trustee who reveals the fiduciary relationship either by indicating a signature as trustee or by simply referring to the trust. The protection afforded the trustee by this section applies only to contracts that are properly entered into in the trustee's fiduciary capacity, meaning that the trustee is exercising an available power and is not violating a duty.

While this section does not excuse any liability the trustee may have for breach of trust, subsection (b) provides that, except in rare circumstances, a trustee in not otherwise personally liable by reason of the trustee acting in a fiduciary capacity of a trust and that any obligations undertaken by the trustee in such fiduciary capacity are enforceable solely against the trust and its property.

Subsections (c) addresses when a trustee will be personally liable (other than for breach of trust) relative to the trustee’s acting in administering a trust.

A trustee will be personally liable for torts committed in the course of administering a trust only if the trustee was personally at fault on account of the trustee’s willful misconduct. Such must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. This is contrary to Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 264  (1959), which imposes liability on a trustee regardless of fault, including liability for acts of agents under respondeat superior. It is also contrary to the relevant provision contained in the Uniform Trust Code.

Unlike under the Uniform Trust Code, subsection (c) immunizes a trustee from personal liability for violation of environmental law, such as CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9607)  or its state law counterparts, arising from the ownership and control of trust property. For further protection of a fiduciary relative to environmental claims, see  T.C.A. § 35-15-701 (nominated trustee may investigate trust property to determine potential violation of environmental law without having accepted trusteeship) and T.C.A. § 35-15-816 (trustee powers with respect to possible liability for violation of environmental law). The protections afforded trustees in T.C.A. § 35-15-701 are afforded to trust advisors and trust protectors in T.C.A. § 35-15-711.

Subsection (d) alters the common law rule that a trustee could not be sued in a representative capacity if the trust estate was not liable.

35-15-1011. Interest as general partner.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) or unless personal liability is imposed in the contract, a trustee who holds an interest as a general partner in a general or limited partnership is not personally liable on a contract entered into by the partnership after the trust's acquisition of the interest if the fiduciary capacity was disclosed in the contract or in a statement previously filed pursuant to the Uniform Partnership Act, compiled in title 61, chapter 1, or the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, compiled in title 61, chapter 2.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a trustee who holds an interest as a general partner is not personally liable for torts committed by the partnership or for obligations arising from ownership or control of the interest unless the trustee is personally at fault on account of the trustee's own willful misconduct proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  3. The immunity provided by this section does not apply if an interest in the partnership is held by the trustee in a capacity other than that of trustee.
  4. If the trustee of a revocable trust holds an interest as a general partner, the settlor is personally liable for contracts and other obligations of the partnership as if the settlor were a general partner.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 87; 2010, ch. 725, §§ 11, 12.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1011.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

This section generally provides more protection against personal liability of a trustee than does the Uniform Trust Code.

This section adds protection in addition to that provided by T.C.A. § 35-15-1010, which generally protects a trustee from personal liability on contracts that the trustee enters into on behalf of the trust. This section also protects a trustee from personal liability for contracts entered into or torts committed by a general or limited partnership of which the trustee was a general partner.

Subsection (a) protects the trustee from personal liability for such partnership obligations whether the trustee signed the contract or it was signed by another general partner. Subsection (b) protects a trustee from personal liability for torts committed by the partnership unless the trustee was personally at fault. Unlike with the Uniform Trust Code, such fault must be on account of the trustee’s own willful misconduct and such must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Protection from the partnership’s contractual obligations is available under subsection (a) only if the other party is on notice of the fiduciary relationship, either in the contract itself or in the partnership certificate on file.

By analogy, the above protection is also provided to a trustee serving a trust that is the sole member of an LLC, should the LLC itself not be found to so protect the trustee. By such analogy, and subject to the provisions of this section, it should also protect a trustee relative to any alter ego or veil piercing theory applied to any form of entity that generally provides limitation on liability.

Generally speaking, special protection is not otherwise needed for other business interests that the trustee may own, such as an interest as a limited partner, generally with a membership interest in an LLC, or an interest as a corporate shareholder. In these cases the nature of the entity or the interest owned by the trustee generally carries with it its own limitation on liability. Should such not be the case, then the above analogy should apply to the trustee and the trustee’s position relative to the entity.

Certain exceptions apply. The section is not intended to be used as a device for individuals or their families to shield assets from creditor claims. Consequently, subsection (c) excludes from the protections provided by this section trustees who own an interest in a partnership (or subject to the analogy above, in another type of entity) in a capacity other than as trustee. This exception is narrower than that provided by the Uniform Trust Code, which unlike the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, attributes ownership by certain other persons to the trustee.

Notwithstanding the above, a revocable trust cannot be used as a device for avoiding claims protected by this section. Subsection (d) imposes personal liability on the settlor of a revocable trust for such claims.

35-15-1012. Protection of person dealing with trustee.

  1. A person other than a beneficiary who in “good faith”, as defined in § 47-1-201, assists a trustee, or who in “good faith” and for value deals with a trustee, without knowledge that the trustee is exceeding or improperly exercising the trustee's powers is protected from liability as if the trustee properly exercised the power.
  2. A person other than a beneficiary who in “good faith” deals with a trustee is not required to inquire into the extent of the trustee's powers or the propriety of their exercise.
  3. A person who in “good faith” delivers assets to a trustee need not ensure their proper application.
  4. A person other than a beneficiary who in “good faith” assists a former trustee, or who in “good faith” and for value deals with a former trustee, without knowledge that the trusteeship has terminated is protected from liability as if the former trustee were still a trustee.
  5. Comparable protective provisions of other laws, see §§ 47-8-101 — 47-8-407, relating to commercial transactions or transfer of securities by fiduciaries prevail over the protection provided by this section.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 88.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1012.

This section is derived from section 7 of the Uniform Trustee Powers Act.

Subsection (a) protects two different classes; persons other than beneficiaries who assist a trustee with a transaction, and persons other than beneficiaries who deal with the trustee for value. As long as the assistance was provided or the transaction was entered into in good faith and without knowledge, third persons in either category are protected in the transaction even if the trustee was exceeding or improperly exercising the power. For the definition of “know,” see T.C.A. § 35-15-104. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not define “good faith” for purposes of this and the next section. That term is defined at T.C.A. § 47-1-201. The definition provided there is consistent with the purpose of this section, which is to treat commercial transactions with trustees similar to other commercial transactions.

Subsection (b) confirms that a third party who is acting in good faith is not charged with a duty to inquire into the extent of a trustee’s powers or the propriety of their exercise. The third party may assume that the trustee has the necessary power. Consequently, there is no need to request or examine a copy of the trust instrument. A third party who wishes assurance that the trustee has the necessary authority instead should request a certification of trust as provided in T.C.A. § 35-15-1013. Subsection (b) is intended to negate the rule, followed by some courts, that a third party is charged with constructive notice of the trust instrument and its contents. The cases are collected in George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 897 (Rev. 2d ed. 1995); and 4 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 297 (4th ed. 1989).

Subsection (c) protects any person, including a beneficiary, who in good faith delivers property to a trustee. The standard of protection in the Restatement is phrased differently although the result is similar. Under Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 321  (1959), the person delivering property to a trustee is liable if at the time of the delivery the person had notice that the trustee was misapplying or intending to misapply the property.

Subsection (d) extends the protections afforded by the section to assistance provided to or dealings for value with a former trustee. The third party is protected the same as if the former trustee still held the office.

Subsection (e) clarifies that a statute relating to commercial transactions controls whenever both it and this section could apply to a transaction. Consequently, the protections provided by this section are superseded by T.C.A. §§ 47-8-101 through 47-8-407. The principal statutes in question are the various chapters of the Uniform Commercial Code, including Chapter 8 on the transfer of securities.

35-15-1013. Certification of trust.

  1. Instead of furnishing a copy of the trust instrument to any person to evidence the existence and validity of the trust, the trustee may furnish to such person a certification of trust, signed by the trustee or trustees having signatory authority as identified in subdivision (a)(5) and attested by a notary public and shall contain the following:
    1. An affirmation of the current existence of the trust and the date on which the trust came into existence;
    2. The identity of the settlor or settlors, the currently acting trustee or trustees, and the named successor trustee or trustees of the trust or a statement that no successor is named;
    3. The administrative or managerial powers of the trustee, or both;
    4. The revocability or irrevocability of the trust and the identity of any person holding a power to revoke the trust;
    5. When there are multiple trustees or multiple successor trustees, the signature authority of the trustees indicating whether all or less than all of the currently acting trustees are required to sign in order to exercise various powers of the trustee;
    6. Where there are successor trustees designated, a statement detailing the conditions for their succession or a statement that a third party may rely on the authority of one (1) or more successors without proof of their succession;
    7. The trust's identification number, whether a social security or an employer identification number, but only if the trust's identification number is essential to the transaction for which the request for the trust document was made;
    8. The manner in which trust assets should properly be titled; and
    9. A statement that, to the best of the trustee's knowledge, the trust has not been revoked, modified or amended in any manner that would cause the representations contained in the certification of trust to be incorrect.
  2. The certification of trust shall not be required to contain the dispositive provisions of the trust that set forth the distribution of the trust estate.
  3. The trustee offering the certification of trust may provide copies of all or any part of the trust document and amendments, if any. Nothing in this section is intended to require or imply an obligation to provide dispositive provisions of the trust or a copy of the entire trust document and amendments.
  4. A person who acts in reliance on a certification of trust without actual knowledge that the representations contained therein are incorrect is not liable to any person for so acting. A person who does not have actual knowledge that the facts contained in the certification of trust are incorrect may assume without inquiry the existence of the facts contained in the certification of trust. Actual knowledge shall not be inferred solely from the fact that a copy of all or part of the trust instrument is held by the person relying on the trust certification. Nothing contained in this section shall limit the rights of the beneficiaries of the trust against the trustee. Any person relying on the certification of trust shall be indemnified from the assets of the trust to the extent of the share of the trust attributable to the beneficiary or beneficiaries bringing any action against the person for any costs, damage, attorney fees or other expenses incurred in defending any action against the person arising for the transaction to which a certification of trust related.
  5. A person's failure to request a certification of trust does not affect the protections provided that person in this section. No inference that the person has not acted in good faith or that the person was negligent may be drawn from the failure of the person to request a certification of trust. Nothing in this section is intended to create an implication that a person is liable for acting in reliance on a certification of trust under circumstances where the requirements of this section are not satisfied.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a third party, when presented with a trust certificate, to enter into a contract with a trustee relating to trust assets or obligations, or to preclude a third party from demanding as a precondition to any contract that the trustee provide additional information in order to clarify any ambiguities or inconsistencies in the trust certificate.
  7. This section does not limit the right of a person to obtain a copy of the trust instrument in a judicial proceeding concerning the trust.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 89; 2007, ch. 24, § 32.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1013.

The provisions of this section in some ways diverge significantly from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

In general, T.C.A. § 35-15-1013 provides for more privacy and more flexibility than does the similar provision of the Uniform Trust Code.

In this section, as well as in this section comment, whenever the word “trustee” is used, such word includes any trust advisor or trust protector who holds the power to furnish a certification of trust.

This section is an incorporation of T.C.A. § 35-50-126  [repealed] with the addition of subsection (g) and is designed to protect the privacy of a trust instrument by discouraging requests from persons other than beneficiaries for complete copies of the instrument in order to verify a trustee’s authority. Contrary to section 1013 of the Uniform Trust Code, there is no penalty imposed on the third party for requesting a copy of the full trust instrument in bad faith. Even absent this section, such requests are usually unnecessary. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-1012, a third person proceeding in good faith (as such is defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-1012 and the section comment thereto) is not required to inquire into the extent of the trustee’s powers or the propriety of their exercise. This section adds another layer of protection.

Third persons frequently insist on receiving a copy of the complete trust instrument solely to verify a specific and narrow authority of the trustee to engage in a particular transaction. While a testamentary trust, because it is created under a will, is a matter of public record, an inter vivos trust instrument is private. Such privacy is compromised, however, if the trust instrument must be distributed to third persons. A certification of trust is a document signed by a currently acting trustee that may include excerpts from the trust instrument necessary to facilitate the particular transaction. A certification provides the third party with an assurance of authority without having to disclose the trust’s dispositive provisions. Nor is there a need for third persons who may already have a copy of the instrument to pry into its provisions. Persons acting in reliance on a certification may assume the truth of the certification even if they have a complete copy of the trust instrument in their possession.

Subsection (a) specifies the required contents of a certification. Subsection (b) clarifies that the certification shall not be required to include the trust’s dispositive provisions. A certification, however, normally will contain the administrative terms of the trust relevant to the transaction. Subsections (d), (e) and (f) protect a third party who relies on the certification. The third party may assume that the certification is true, and is not charged with constructive knowledge of the terms of the trust instrument even if the third party has a copy.

35-15-1014. Enforcement of no-contest, in terrorem or forfeiture provisions.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “no-contest provision” includes a “no-contest provision,” “in terrorem provision” or “forfeiture provision” of a trust instrument. A “no-contest provision” means a provision that, if given effect, would reduce or eliminate the interest of any beneficiary of such trust who, directly or indirectly, initiates or otherwise pursues:
    1. Any action to contest the validity of the trust or the terms of the trust;
    2. Any action to set aside or vary the terms of the trust;
    3. Any action to challenge the acts of the trustee or other fiduciary of the trust in the performance of the trustee's or other fiduciary's duties as described in the terms of the trust; or
    4. Any other act or proceedings to frustrate or defeat the settlor's intent as expressed in the terms of the trust.
  2. Regardless of whether or not the beneficiary sought, received or relied upon legal counsel, a no-contest provision shall be enforceable according to the express terms of the no-contest provision without regard to the beneficiary's good or bad faith in taking the action that would justify the complete or partial forfeiture of the beneficiary's interest in the trust under the terms of the no-contest provision unless probable cause exists for the beneficiary taking such action on the grounds of:
    1. Fraud;
    2. Duress;
    3. Revocation;
    4. Lack of testamentary capacity;
    5. Undue influence;
    6. Mistake;
    7. Forgery; or
    8. Irregularity in the execution of the trust instrument.
  3. Subsection (b) shall not apply to:
    1. Any action brought solely to challenge the acts of the trustee or other fiduciary of the trust to the extent that the trustee or other fiduciary has committed a breach of fiduciary duties or breach of trust;
    2. Any action brought by the trustee or any other fiduciary serving under the terms of the trust, unless the trustee or other fiduciary is a beneficiary against whom the no-contest provision is otherwise enforceable;
    3. Any agreement among the beneficiaries and any other interested persons in settlement of a dispute or resolution of any other matter relating to the trust, including without limitation any nonjudicial settlement agreement;
    4. Any action to determine whether a proposed or pending motion, petition, or other proceeding constitutes a contest within the meaning of a no-contest provision;
    5. Any action brought by a beneficiary or on behalf of any such beneficiary for a construction or interpretation of the terms of the trust; or
    6. Any action brought by the attorney general and reporter for a construction or interpretation of a charitable trust or a trust containing a charitable interest if a provision exists in a trust purporting to penalize a charity or charitable interest for contesting the trust if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings.
  4. Pursuant to this section, courts shall enforce the settlor's intent as reflected in a no-contest provision to the greatest extent possible.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 41.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1014.

    There is no similar section in the Uniform Trust Code. Moreover, the provisions of this section diverge from the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section was included in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code in furtherance of its overriding policy and goal of carrying out a settlor’s intent, as well as providing settlors with the freedom to dispose of their assets to whom and in the manner they wish, all to the greatest extent constitutionally allowable.

    Subsection (a) defines “no-contest provision” and states that such term is synonymous with the terms “in terrorem provision” and “forfeiture provision”.

    Subsection (b) states that a no-contest provision is enforceable according to its express terms, without regard to whether a beneficiary is acting in good or bad faith in taking the action triggering the provisions of the no-contest provision unless probable cause exists for such beneficiary taking such action on eight specific grounds. These grounds are basically the same grounds that, if proven true, would cause the trust to be void in general and not just as to the provisions applicable to the beneficiary taking such action.

    Subsection (c) contains an explicit list of actions that if taken will not trigger enforceability of the no contest provision. Those actions are:

    An action brought solely to redress a breach of duty or of trust;

    Any action brought by a fiduciary unless that fiduciary is a beneficiary against whom the no-contest is other-wise enforceable;

    Any agreement among the beneficiaries and any other interested persons in settlement of a dispute or in resolution of another matter (other than the no-contest provision), including any nonjudicial settlement agreement; see  T.C.A. § 35-15-111 for the matters that can be resolved by, as well as the validity of, a nonjudicial settlement agreement;

    Any action taken for the purpose of determining whether a proposed or pending motion, petition or other proceeding qualifies as a contest that will trigger enforcement of the no-contest provision;

    Any action by or on behalf of a beneficiary for construction or interpretation of the terms of the trust; and

    Any action by the attorney general for construction or interpretation of the terms of a trust containing a charitable interest if a provision exists in the trust that would penalize such charitable interest holder for contesting the trust, but only if probable cause exists for instituting such proceedings.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

35-15-1101. No consideration given to need to promote uniformity of application and construction of law.

  1. Numerous provisions of each of the following have been modified extensively relative to their respective uniform acts as such uniform acts were drafted and have been amended by the Uniform Law Commission, also known as the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws:
    1. Chapter 6, the Uniform Principal and Income Act;
    2. Chapter 14, the Tennessee Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 2002; and
    3. Chapter 15, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.
  2. These modifications were undertaken deliberately and after significant consideration:
    1. Therefore, in applying and construing title 35, no consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states, including any other state that has enacted laws covering the same general subject matter as chapters 9, 14 or 15, either by enacting such respective uniform acts as such uniform acts were originally drafted or as such were originally drafted and subsequently have been amended, or by enacting laws based on or similar to such uniform acts as originally drafted or as such have been amended; and
    2. Unless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter, chapter 6 or chapter 14, courts shall not consult, rely on or give any persuasive value to such uniform acts or any respective other state's acts based on or similar to such uniform acts, or any comments accompanying any such uniform acts or any respective other state's acts based on or similar to such uniform acts; none of which have any force or effect relative to trusts governed by the laws of this state.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 90; 2013, ch. 390, § 42.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    General Comment.

    With the exception of the provision for electronic records and signatures and the provision covering application of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code existing relationships (i.e., effective date provisions), T.C.A. §§ 35-15-110135-15-1105 diverge entirely from article 11 of the Uniform Trust Code.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 is directly contrary to the provisions of section 1101 of the Uniform Trust Code, holding that in applying and construing the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, no consideration shall be given to any need for the pro-motion of uniformity of law with respect to its subject matter among states.

T.C.A. § 35-15-1102, providing for electronic records and signatures is equivalent to such provisions contained in the Uniform Trust Code.

Part 11 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, unlike the Uniform Trust Code, does not contain a severability clause. However, T.C.A. §§ 35-15-1103 does contain provisions covering application of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to existing relationships that is in the spirit of the effective date provision of section 1104 of the Uniform Trust Code.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-1004 and 35-15-1005 contain provisions in furtherance of the Tennessee trust statutes’ overriding goal of enforcing settlor’s intent and providing freedom of disposition of property. Such sections respectively limit when a settlor may be deemed to be the alter ego of a trust and limit claims that a settlor’s or beneficiary’s influence over a trust rises to the level of dominion and control over such trust.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1101.

The provisions of this section are directly in contravention to the equivalently numbered provision contained in the Uniform Trust Code and is controlling over it, the restatements and any foreign law.

As originally adopted, numerous provisions of title 35, chapters 6, 14 and 15 were modified and diverge, in some cases significantly, from their respective uniform codes as well as related restatements. Moreover, there are no uniform code provisions addressing the subjects covered by title 35, chapters 16 and 17, as well of various provisions of chapter 15. Finally, since their initial adoption, various amendments to the Tennessee trust statutes have also been enacted. For example since its initial adoption in 2004, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code underwent amendment in 2005, substantial amendment in 2007, further amendment in 2010 and substantial amendment in 2013. This has resulted in further divergence from uniform law and related restatements, such divergence sometimes being significant. This divergence was undertaken deliberately and after significant consideration. Taken as a whole, the Tennessee trust statutes are a distinct and integrated set of trust laws.

It is for this reason that the provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 reverse those of section 1101 of the Uniform Trust Code and expressly state that in applying and construing title 35 no consideration shall be given to any need to promote uniformity with respect to its subject matter among states, including relative to the laws of any foreign jurisdiction (as such is defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103) that has enacted versions of the various uniform codes, laws or acts. Moreover, T.C.A. § 35-15-1101 provides that unless specifically provided otherwise in title 35, chapters 6, 14, 15, 16 and 17, courts shall not consult or give any persuasive value to any such uniform acts or any foreign jurisdiction’s acts based on or similar to them; or to the comments of any of them; none of which have any force or effect relative to trusts governed by the laws of Tennessee.

35-15-1102. Electronic records and signatures.

The provisions of this chapter governing the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of electronic records or electronic signatures, and of contracts formed or performed with the use of such records or signatures, conform to the requirements of section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. § 7002), and supersede, modify, and limit the requirements of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 91.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1102.

This section preempts the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. Subdivision 102(a)(2)(B) of such act provides that the federal law can be preempted by a later statute of a state that specifically refers to the federal law. The effect of this section, when enacted as part of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, is to leave to the law of this state the procedures for obtaining and validating an electronic signature. The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not require that any document be in paper form, allowing all documents under such code to be transmitted in electronic form. A properly directed electronic message is a valid method of notice under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code as long as it is reasonably suitable under the circumstances and likely to result in receipt of the notice or document. See  T.C.A. § 35-15-109.

35-15-1103. Application to existing relationships.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, on July 1, 2004:
    1. This chapter applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2004;
    2. This chapter applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2004;
    3. This chapter applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2004, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of this chapter would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of this chapter does not apply and the superseded law applies;
    4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in this chapter applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2004, unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
    5. An act done before July 1, 2004, is not affected by this chapter.
  2. If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2004, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 94.

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Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1103.

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is intended to have the widest possible effect within constitutional limitations. Specifically, the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code applies to all trusts whenever created, to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after its effective date, and unless the court otherwise orders, to judicial proceedings in progress on the effective date. In addition, any rules of construction or presumption provided in the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code apply to preexisting trusts unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent in the trust’s terms. By applying the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code to preexisting trusts, the need to know two (2) bodies of law will quickly lessen.

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code cannot be fully retroactive, however. Constitutional limitations preclude retroactive application of rules of construction to alter property rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the effective date. Also, rights already barred by a statute of limitation or rule under former law are not revived by a possibly longer statute or more liberal rule under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Nor is an act done before the effective date of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code affected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code’s enactment.

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contains an additional effective date provision. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-15-602(a), prior law will determine whether a trust executed prior to the effective date of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is presumed to be revocable or irrevocable.

Due to the various amendments to the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, as well as to the Tennessee trust statutes in general that have occurred since July 1, 2004, the introductory phrase contained in subsection (a), “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, on July 1, 2004:” should be read to mean, “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or in amendments thereto, regardless of whether such provision was adopted before, on or after July 1, 2004, on July 1, 2004:”.

35-15-1104. Alter ego.

  1. Absent clear and convincing evidence, no settlor of an irrevocable trust may be deemed to be the alter ego of a trustee of such trust.
  2. None of the following factors, by themselves or in combination, may be considered sufficient evidence for a court to conclude that the settlor controls a trustee, or is the alter ego of a trustee of such trust:
    1. Any combination of the factors listed in § 35-15-1105 regarding dominion and control over a trust;
    2. Isolated occurrences where the settlor has signed checks, made disbursements, or executed other documents related to such trust as a trustee, a trust advisor or a trust protector, when in fact the settlor was not such a trustee, trust advisor or trust protector;
    3. Making any requests for distributions on behalf of beneficiaries; or
    4. Making any requests to the trustee to hold, purchase, or sell any trust property.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 52.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 52 provided that: (a) Absent clear and convincing evidence, no settlor of an irrevocable trust may be deemed to be the alter ego of a trustee of such trust.”

None of the following factors, by themselves or in combination, may be considered sufficient evidence for a court to conclude that the settlor controls a trustee, or is the alter ego of a trustee of such trust:

  1. Any combination of the factors listed in § 35-15-1105 regarding dominion and control over a trust;
  2. Isolated occurrences where the settlor has signed checks, made disbursements, or executed other documents related to such trust as a trustee, a trust advisor or a trust protector, when in fact the settlor was not such a trustee, trust advisor or trust protector;
  3. Making any requests for distributions on behalf of beneficiaries; or
  4. Making any requests to the trustee to hold, purchase, or sell any trust property.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1104.

    The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section.

    Deeming that a settlor of a trust is the alter ego of the trustee of such trust can cause multiple significant issues, including but not limited to taxation, as well as a trust’s level of spendthrift and discretionary trust protection and the effect of exercising discretion in general. Therefore, in keeping with the Tennessee trust statutes’ emphasis on freedom of disposition and settlor’s intent, this section makes it exceedingly difficult for a settlor of a trust to be deemed an alter ego of the trustee of such trust.

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35-15-1105. Dominion and control over a trust.

In the event a person challenges a settlor's or a beneficiary's influence over a trust, none of the following factors, alone or in combination, shall enter into a determination that dominion and control over a trust exists:

  1. The settlor or a beneficiary is serving as a trustee, a trust advisor, a trust protector or other fiduciary as described in § 35-15-508;
  2. The settlor or a beneficiary holds an unrestricted power to remove or replace a trustee, a trust advisor, a trust protector or other fiduciary;
  3. The settlor or a beneficiary is a trust administrator, a general partner of a partnership, a manager of a limited liability company, an officer of a corporation, or holds any other managerial function relative to any type of entity specified in this subdivision (3), or relative to any other type of entity not so specified, and part or all of the trust property consists of an interest in such entity;
  4. A person related by blood or adoption to the settlor or a beneficiary is appointed as a trustee, a trust advisor, a trust protector or other fiduciary;
  5. The settlor's or a beneficiary's agent, accountant, attorney, financial advisor, or friend is appointed as a trustee, a trust advisor, a trust protector or other fiduciary;
  6. A business associate is appointed as a trustee, a trust advisor, a trust protector or other fiduciary;
  7. A beneficiary holds any power of appointment over any or all of the trust property;
  8. The settlor holds a power to substitute property of equivalent value for property held by the trust, regardless of whether such power is:
    1. Held in a fiduciary or nonfiduciary capacity;
    2. Exercisable with or without the approval of any person in a fiduciary capacity; or
    3. Exercisable with or without the approval of any person having an interest adverse to such settlor;
  9. A trustee, a trust advisor, a trust protector or other fiduciary has the power to loan trust property to the settlor for less than a full and adequate rate of interest or without adequate security;
  10. Any language relative to the power to make any distribution provides for any discretion relative to such distribution;
  11. The trust has only one beneficiary eligible for current distributions; or
  12. The beneficiary is serving as a cotrustee, or as a trust advisor or trust protector under part 12, or as any other fiduciary.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 52.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 52 provided that: (a) Absent clear and convincing evidence, no settlor of an irrevocable trust may be deemed to be the alter ego of a trustee of such trust.”

None of the following factors, by themselves or in combination, may be considered sufficient evidence for a court to conclude that the settlor controls a trustee, or is the alter ego of a trustee of such trust:

  1. Any combination of the factors listed in § 35-15-1105 regarding dominion and control over a trust;
  2. Isolated occurrences where the settlor has signed checks, made disbursements, or executed other documents related to such trust as a trustee, a trust advisor or a trust protector, when in fact the settlor was not such a trustee, trust advisor or trust protector;
  3. Making any requests for distributions on behalf of beneficiaries; or
  4. Making any requests to the trustee to hold, purchase, or sell any trust property.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1105.

    The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section.

    A finding that the influence of a settlor or a beneficiary of a trust rises to the level of dominion and control over such trust can cause multiple significant issues, including but not limited to taxation, as well as a trust’s level of spendthrift and discretionary trust protection and the effect of exercising discretion in general. Therefore, in keeping with the Tennessee trust statutes’ emphasis on freedom of disposition and settlor’s intent, this section makes it exceedingly difficult to sustain that the a settlor’s or beneficiary’s influence over a trust gives either such person dominion and control over such trust.

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Part 12
Trust Protectors and Trust Advisors

35-15-1201. Powers of trust advisors and trust protectors.

  1. A trust protector or trust advisor is any person, and may be a committee of more than one person, other than a trustee, who under the terms of the trust, an agreement of the qualified beneficiaries, or a court order has a power or duty with respect to a trust, including but not limited to, one or more of the following powers:
    1. The power to modify or amend the trust instrument to achieve favorable tax status or respond to changes in any applicable federal, state, or other tax law affecting the trust, including but not limited to, any rulings, regulations, or other guidance implementing or interpreting such laws;
    2. The power to amend or modify the trust instrument to take advantage of changes in the rule against perpetuities, laws governing restraints on alienation, or other state laws restricting the terms of the trust, the distribution of trust property, or the administration of the trust;
    3. The power to appoint a successor trust protector or trust advisor;
    4. The power to review and approve a trustee's trust reports or accountings;
    5. The power to change the governing law or principal place of administration of the trust;
    6. The power to remove and replace any trust advisor or trust protector for the reasons stated in the trust instrument;
    7. The power to remove a trustee, cotrustee, or successor trustee, for the reasons stated in the trust instrument, and appoint a successor;
    8. The power to consent to a trustee's or cotrustee's action or inaction in making distributions to beneficiaries;
    9. The power to increase or decrease any interest of the beneficiaries in the trust, to grant a power of appointment to one (1) or more trust beneficiaries, or to terminate or amend any power of appointment granted in the trust;
    10. The power to perform a specific duty or function that would normally be required of a trustee or cotrustee;
    11. The power to advise the trustee or cotrustee concerning any beneficiary;
    12. The power to consent to a trustee's or cotrustee's action or inaction relating to investments of trust assets;
    13. The power to direct the acquisition, disposition, or retention of any trust investment;
    14. The power to appoint under § 35-15-816(b)(27);
    15. The power to terminate all or part of a trust;
    16. The power to veto or direct all or part of any trust distribution;
    17. The power to borrow money with or without security, and mortgage or pledge trust property for a period within or extending beyond the duration of the trust;
    18. The power to make loans out of trust property, including but not limited to, loans to a beneficiary on terms and conditions, including without interest, considered to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances;
    19. The power to vote proxies and exercise all other rights of ownership relative to securities and business entities held by the trust;
    20. The power to select one (1) or more investment advisors, managers or counselors, including but not limited to, a trustee and delegate to them any of its powers; and
    21. The power to direct the trustee with respect to any additional powers and discretions over investment and management of trust assets provided in the trust instrument.
  2. The exercise of a power by a trust advisor or a trust protector shall be exercised in the sole and absolute discretion of the trust advisor or trust protector and shall be binding on all other persons.
  3. Any power of a trust advisor or trust protector to directly or indirectly modify a trust may be granted notwithstanding §§ 35-15-410 — 35-15-412 and 35-15-414.
  4. An excluded fiduciary may continue to follow the direction of a trust protector or trust advisor upon the incapacity or death of the grantor of a trust to the extent provided in the trust instrument.
  5. Notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary, no modification, amendment or grant of a power of appointment with respect to a trust all of whose beneficiaries are charitable organizations may authorize a trust protector or trust advisor to grant a beneficial interest in such trust to any non-charitable interest or purpose.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 43.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    General Comment.

    Section 808 of the Uniform Trust Code nominally provides irrevocable trusts with what ULC - NCCUSL calls “powers to direct,” as follows:

    “(b) If the terms of a trust confer upon a person other than the settlor of a revocable trust power to direct certain actions of the trustee, the trustee shall act in accordance with an exercise of the power unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the person holding the power owes to the beneficiaries of the trust.

    “(c) The terms of a trust may confer upon a trustee or other person a power to direct the modification or termination of the trust.

    “(d) A person, other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to direct is presumptively a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. The holder of a power to direct is liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty.”

    Section 808 of the Uniform Trust Code is a significant step toward providing for “powers to direct.” However, it does not contain many of the provisions necessary for:

    certainty regarding the rights and responsibilities of those granting or serving under such “powers to direct;”

    certainly regarding the rights and responsibilities of those from whom certain traditional powers and duties of a trustee were removed through such direction; as well as

    a default set of rules that assure the smooth interaction of the various parties involved in the administration of such trusts.

    This part 12 (along with various other provisions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code) is designed to comprehensively cover directed trusts. Because the Uniform Trust Code does not contain provisions similar to those provided by this part 12, the effects of the provisions of this part 12 may result in significant divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this part 12, as well as other portions of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code designed to facilitate or implement this part 12, are in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    A true directed trust is a trust in which the trustee is directed by a number of other trust participants in implementing the trust's execution. That trustee is referred to as a directed trustee. Examples of other trust participants (those directing the trustee) include an investment committee, a distribution committee, trust advisors, trust protectors and in-vestment advisors. Relative to any duty traditionally held by a party, but directed to another under the terms of a directed trust, that person no longer holding the duty is called an excluded fiduciary. A directed trustee's role is often limited to: following distribution and investment instructions, holding legal title to the trust assets, providing fiduciary and tax accounting, coordinating trust participants and offering dispute resolution among those participants. That directed trustee is otherwise an excluded fiduciary. Typically, these duties and those of the other participants in the trust are defined and governed by the trust document itself (however, under part 12 of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such respective powers and duties can be added after the fact by agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or by a court order).

    Directed trusts are also referred to by several other names:

    “Reserved powers trusts” – Reserved, because someone, typically a settlor reserves to himself or to others, certain powers normally held by a trustee. Although this term is used in the United States, one is more likely to encounter it relative to trusts under the laws of Commonwealth jurisdictions, or that were written by Commonwealth attorneys.

    “Multi-participant trusts” – Perhaps this name best functionally describes a true directed trust. As stated above, such types of trusts operate in a system under which multiple parties hold the diverse powers and duties traditionally vested in a unitary trustee.

    Such latter term is used in several articles to which a reader is directed:

    John P.C. Duncan and Anita M. Sarafa, Multi-Participant Trusts Need a Coordinator , Trusts & Estates, November 2008 at 32, (hereinafter “Duncan and Sarafa—Multi-Participant Trusts ”); and

    John P.C. Duncan and Anita M. Sarafa, Achieve the Promise—and Limit the Risk—of Multi-Participant Trusts , 36 ACTEC Law Journal 769 (2011), (hereinafter “Duncan and Sarafa—Achieve the Promise ”). This latter article contains an especially thorough and detailed discussion of the trend toward “creating ‘multi-participant trusts’ and review[s] the challenges to achieving the promise of this powerful arrangement while limiting its risks.” Duncan and Sarafa—Achieve the Promise  at 769.

    Why would someone want to use a directed (multi-participant) trust? Such trusts are beneficial in a number of situations, including but not limited to the following:

    High net-worth families’ diverse and complex needs often make a directed (multi-participant) trust the optimum structure with which to effect multi-generational wealth planning.

    Directed trusts are also often the optimum (and in many cases, mandatory) multi-generational wealth planning structure for international and cross-border families.

    Perhaps one of the most succinct explanations of the factors contributing to an increase in the use of directed (multi-participant) trusts is as follows:

    “There has been a proliferation of trusts with new participants that are required to act under a trust in addition to or in place of the traditional, plenipotent trustee. These can include co-trustees, directed trustees, trust advisors for investment and other functions, trust protectors, distribution advisors and committees, removers and appointers.

    The primary developments contributing to this trend are dramatic recent changes in trust law, distrust of traditional trustees, a desire to relieve trustees of liability, growing sophistication and complexity in the investment world, growing assertiveness among settlors and families seeking to exercise greater control over certain trust functions, growth in dynasty trusts, special purpose trusts requiring special expertise to administer, federal tax law limits on family involvement in distribution decisions and vigorous competition between several states for trust business. Multi-participant trusts are being fashioned to address each of the foregoing opportunities and challenges.” Duncan and Sarafa—Achieve the Promise  at 774.

    Part 12 and related changes to other parts of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code included in the 2013 amendments thereto significantly expand the detail and clarity with which the subject of directed trusts is covered in the Tennessee trust statutes. However, such types of trusts are not new to Tennessee law or to the Tennessee trust statutes. As mentioned in the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-808, Tennessee has one of the longest histories of having statutes that expressly and fully provide for true directed trusts. Since the late 1980s, they have been specifically provided for in title 35, chapter 3. The applicable sections in such chapter read as follows:

    35-3-122.  Liability of fiduciaries for losses.

    Whenever an instrument under which a fiduciary is acting reserves to the settlor or vests an advisory or in-vestment committee or in any other person or persons including one (1) or more other fiduciaries, to the exclusion of the fiduciary or to the exclusion of one (1) or more of several fiduciaries, authority to direct the making or retention of any investment, or to perform any other act in the management or administration of the fiduciary account, the excluded fiduciary or fiduciaries shall not be liable, either individually or as a fiduciary, for any loss resulting from the making or retention of any investment or other act pursuant to that direction.

    HISTORY: Acts 1987, ch. 89, § 2, effective date unknown, but likely July 1, 1987.

    35-3-123.  Trustee liability — Action upon written directions.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

  1. A trustee of a revocable, irrevocable or testamentary trust is not liable to any beneficiary for any act per-formed or omitted pursuant to written directions from the person holding the power to revoke, terminate or amend the trust.
  2. A trustee of a revocable, irrevocable or testamentary trust is not liable for any investment action performed or omitted pursuant to written directions from the person to whom the power to direct the investment or management of the account is delegated by the trustor.

    HISTORY: Acts 1989, ch. 288, § 3, effective July 1, 1989.

    In fact, Tennessee has one of the longest histories of statutorily providing for directed trusts. To give one an idea of how long, compare those original Tennessee directed trust statute what is believed to be one of the longest (if not the longest) existing directed trust statutes. It is Del. Code. Ann. Tit 12, § 3313. The original version of such Delaware legislation was enacted in Section 9 of 65 Del. Laws and was signed by its governor on July 3, 1986. Therefore, Tennessee’s original statute at T.C.A. § 35-3-122 trails Delaware’s statute by roughly one year, making it one of the oldest directed trust statutes in the United States (and perhaps the second oldest).

    Part 12 generally supersedes T.C.A. §§ 35-3-123 and 35-3-124. Nevertheless, the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code recognize there are likely a number of trusts in existence that rely on such sections. This is especially true in light the fact that, by the time part 12 was adopted, such sections had been part of the Tennessee trust statutes for 24 – 26 years. Therefore, T.C.A. § 35-15-811 contains appropriate transition provisions.

    The 2013 amendments related to directed (multi-participant) trusts seek to provide those settlors who choose that their trusts be governed by Tennessee trust law, a comprehensive framework designed to achieve the promise of this powerful tool. Moreover, because such directed (multi-participant) trust provisions can be added by the agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or by a court order, such settlor’s families, beneficiaries, charities and purposes can also enjoy the benefits of such tool, even if not originally provided for in the trust instrument.

    Although part 12 contains the core provisions of the Tennessee trust statutes that apply to directed (multi-participant) trusts, other parts of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code contain provisions to integrate such trusts into such code and provide for their smooth operation. Some of these other provisions include, but are not limited to:

    A duty among trust advisors, trust protectors and trustees to communicate with each other and keep each other informed. Under T.C.A. § 35-15-813, a trust advisor or trust protector generally has a duty to keep each excluded fiduciary, all as such are defined in T.C.A. § 35-15-103, reasonably informed about the information reasonably necessary for such fiduciaries to carry out their respective duties. Moreover, A trust advisor or trust protector must inform the excluded fiduciary about any material facts that the excluded fiduciary must disclose to the beneficiaries as required by other portions of T.C.A. § 35-15-813. Notwithstanding the above, a trust advisor’s or trust protector’s failure to keep the excluded fiduciary informed does not affect an excluded fiduciary’s limitation of liability. Perhaps more significantly, a trust advisor’s or trust protector’s performance of its duty to keep the excluded fiduciary informed also does not affect an excluded fiduciary’s limitation of liability. This provides certainty relative to the respective potential liabilities held by a given trustee, or by a trust advisor or trust protector.

    The general right of a trust advisor or trust protector to receive reasonable compensation. T.C.A. § 35-15-708 provides that trust advisors and trust protectors are subject to the same rules as are trustees regarding compensation. Therefore, as is the case with a trustee, a trust advisor or trust protector generally is entitled to receive reasonable compensation. The terms of the trust may specify the amount of the trust advisor’s or trust protector’s compensation. If the terms of the trust specify the trust advisor or trust protector’s compensation, then a court may adjust the amount of compensation. A court may also adjust the compensation if the trust advisor’s or trust protector’s duties are substantially different from those contemplated when the trust was created. Finally, a court may adjust the compensation if the compensation is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.

    Similarly, a trust advisor or trust protector is entitled to the same degree as is a trustee to be reimbursed for expenses advanced for the benefit of the trust. A trust advisor or trust protector is similarly entitled to a lien against a trust for any amounts expended to protect the trust. See T.C.A. § 35-15-709.

T.C.A. § 35-15-710, in concordance with T.C.A. § 35-15-103 provides that any trustee, as well as any trust ad-visor or trust protector is an “excluded beneficiary” to the extent any of them is required to follow the direction of an-other and such trustee, trust advisor or trust protector acts in accordance with such direction.

T.C.A. §§ 35-15-71135-15-715 provide that trust advisors and trust protectors are to be treated in a manner similar to trustees relative to accepting or declining appointment, fiduciary’s bonds, vacancies, resignation and removal.

Section Comment.

Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1201.

The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section. The effects of the provisions of this section may result in significant divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or con-trolling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

While contained in the definition section of T.C.A. § 35-15-103, this section flushes out the definitions of the terms “trust advisor” and “trust protector.” Historically (and in the statutes of foreign jurisdictions), there has sometimes been a division in the powers that could be held by an “advisor” versus a “protector.” However under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code these terms are synonymous. Therefore, regardless of the term used, either a trust advisor or trust protector can hold any power provided in this section.

Subsection (a) states that any person can be either a trust advisor or trust protector. In section 35-15-103, “person” is defined to mean “an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.” Therefore it is completely permissible for a trust advisor or trust protector to be an entity, and in some cases using a limited liability entity as such could be beneficial. Also other than in special cases (such as with a Tennessee Investment Services Trust) there is no requirement that a trustee of a Tennessee trust be a resident of or have a place of business in Tennessee. The same is true relative to a trust advisor or trust protector under Tennessee Uniform Trust Code. Notwithstanding the preceding portions of this paragraph, a reader should be mindful that:

adverse federal income and transfer tax consequences can be triggered by certain persons (including trust advisors or trust protectors) holding certain types of powers over a trust; and

although the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code goes to great length to bring certainty to what state’s laws control validity and construction of, as well the principal place of administration of, a trust; the location of trust advisors or trust protectors may in some circumstances cause another jurisdiction to bring a competing claim regarding such issues; or give another jurisdiction a possible claim that it has “interests” in the trust, particularly regarding rights of creditors and the assertion that such other jurisdiction has the ability to assess its income tax on the trust. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Sections I .E and II in Duncan and Sarafa—Achieve the Promise .

Also, note that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code does not take a position on whether naming an entity as a trust advisor or trust protector (particularly if serving in a fiduciary capacity) submits such entity to regulation by the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions or similar regulator in another jurisdiction.

Subsection (a) also clearly states that a trust advisor or trust protector can be comprised of a committee. Indeed, committees are often used for this purpose by larger and more complex trusts, particularly by long lived, or “dynasty” trusts (e.g., investment committee, distribution committee, etc.).

Subsection (a) then goes on to provide an extensive list of 21 powers that a trust advisor or trust protector may hold. While to the knowledge of the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code, such is the most extensive list of powers contained in any U.S. directed trust statute, it is exceedingly important to understand that such list is in no way exclusive. Virtually any power related to a trust can be removed from a trustee and placed in the control of one or more trust advisors or trust protectors.

It is also important to note that, unless the effect of the nature of granting a trust advisor or trust protector a power is such that it violates T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b) (the “mandatory rules” of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code), the provisions of part 12 are otherwise default rules. A settlor, the qualified beneficiaries or a court has the freedom to paint on a virtually blank canvas.

Subsection (b) states that, absent a trust instrument, the agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or a court order providing otherwise:

“The exercise of a power by a trust advisor or a trust protector shall be exercised in the sole and absolute discretion  of the trust advisor or trust protector and shall be binding on all other persons.” [emphasis added] Note that there is no “reasonableness” standard contained in the discretionary language of subsection (b).

This is in keeping with the overriding goals of the Tennessee trust statutes; the furtherance of the principles that a settlor’s intent is paramount and that one should have the broadest freedom to dispose of assets as that person sees fit. Therefore, there is no “reasonableness” standard implied under T.C.A. § 35-15-814 relative to the exercise of discretion over a discretionary interest (which is contra to the provisions of the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts) and there is no “reasonableness” standard contained in the discretionary language of subsection (b).

Subsection (c) grants the freedom to give the power to a trust advisor or trust protector to modify a trust without being subject to the provisions of T.C.A. §§ 35-15-41035-15-412 and 35-15-414. Notwithstanding such freedom, it would seem that in many (if not most) cases, such trust advisor or trust protector should be mindful of not causing untended consequences such as those listed in T.C.A. § 35-15-410(d).

Subsection (d) makes it clear that the power of a trust advisor or trust protector need not die with death of a grantor who vested such trust advisor or trust protector with such power.

Subsection (e) is a savings provision to assure that the charitable nature of a trust cannot be vitiated by the act of a trust advisor or trust protector.

35-15-1202. Trust advisors and trust protectors as fiduciaries.

  1. A trust advisor or trust protector, other than a beneficiary, is a fiduciary with respect to each power granted to such trust advisor or trust protector. In exercising any power or refraining from exercising any power, a trust advisor or trust protector shall act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.
  2. A trust advisor or trust protector is an excluded fiduciary with respect to each power granted or reserved exclusively to any one or more other trustees, trust advisors, or trust protectors.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 43.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1202.

    The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section. The effects of the provisions of this section may result in significant divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or con-trolling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    Subsection (a) contains two default rules:

    The first is that any trust advisor or trust protector other than a beneficiary is a fiduciary with respect to each power held by such trust advisor or trust protector.

    The second is that in in exercising a power, or refraining therefrom, a trust advisor or trust protector must not only act in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries (as such are defined in the terms of the trust per T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b)(3)), such trust advisor or trust protector must also act in good faith

    Such default rules are likely to be the appropriate ones in most circumstances (as are the similar default rules regarding good faith found in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-801, 35-15-808(d) and 35-15-1002).

    Nevertheless, the default rules of subsection (a) relating to the requirement that a trust advisor or trust protector must act in a fiduciary capacity and the duty of a trust advisor or trust protector to act in good faith can be overridden by the terms of a trust, an agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or a court order.

    Moreover relative to a trust in general as well as the powers and duties of a trust advisor or trust protector, the default rules in T.C.A. §§ 35-15-801, 35-15-808(d) and 35-15-1002) can be overridden by the terms of a trust.

    The reasons the above specified default rules can be overridden is that they are not required by the mandatory provisions of T.C.A. § 35-15-105(b).

    Therefore, a trust advisor or trust protector can serve as such in either a fiduciary or non-fiduciary capacity and may or may be subject to a duty of good faith.

    On a related note, it is the opinion of the drafters of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code that, while a trust advisor or trust protector cannot be exculpated form breach of trust committed with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries (as such interests of the beneficiaries are defined in the terms of the trust), so long as such exculpation provision was not inserted in a manner that violates T.C.A. § 35-15-1008(a)(2) or (b), a trust advisor or trust protector can be exculpated from having to act in good faith. See the section comment to T.C.A. § 35-15-1008 for a discussion of why this is so.

    Subsection (b) describes the extent to which a trust advisor or trust protector will be an excluded fiduciary. It follows the definition of “excluded fiduciary” in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 and the concept that those persons who do not have a power or duty over a trust should not be liable for the actions of the other persons who do have such power or duty.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-1203. Trust advisor and trust protector subject to court jurisdiction.

By accepting appointment to serve as a trust advisor or trust protector, the trust advisor or the trust protector submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state even if investment advisory agreements or other related agreements provide otherwise, and the trust advisor or trust protector may be made a party to any action or proceeding relating to a decision, action, or inaction of the trust advisor or trust protector.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 43.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1203.

    The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section. The effects of the provisions of this section may result in significant divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or con-trolling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section states several things regarding court jurisdiction over a trust advisor or trust protector:

    By accepting such appointment, a trust advisor or trust protector submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. (Note that under T.C.A. § 35-15-711, a trust advisor or trust protector has the same rights as does a trustee relative to accepting or rejecting appointment, as well as certain powers before accepting appointment; such powers being spelled out in detail in T.C.A. § 35-15-701, to which T.C.A. § 35-15-711 refers).

    Such trust advisor or trust protector can be made a party to any action or proceeding relating to any decision, action or inaction of such trust advisor or trust protector.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-1204. No duty to review actions of trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector.

  1. Whenever, pursuant to the terms of a trust, an agreement of the qualified beneficiaries, or a court order, an excluded fiduciary is to follow the direction of a trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector with respect to investment decisions, distribution decisions, or other decisions of the non-excluded fiduciary, then, except to the extent that the terms of the trust, the agreement of the qualified beneficiaries, or the court order provide otherwise, the excluded fiduciary shall have no duty to:
    1. Review, evaluate, perform investment reviews, suitability reviews, inquiries, or investigations, or in any other way monitor the conduct of the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector;
    2. Make recommendations or evaluations or in any way provide advice to the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector or consult with the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector; or
    3. Communicate with or warn or apprise any beneficiary or third party concerning instances in which the excluded fiduciary would or might have exercised the excluded fiduciary's own discretion in a manner different from the manner directed by the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector.
  2. Absent provisions in the trust instrument to the contrary, the actions of the excluded fiduciary pertaining to matters within the scope of the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector's authority, including but not limited to, confirming that the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector's directions have been carried out and recording and reporting actions taken at the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector's direction or other information pursuant to § 35-15-813, shall be deemed to be administrative actions taken by the excluded fiduciary solely to allow the excluded fiduciary to perform those duties assigned to the excluded fiduciary under the terms of the trust, the agreement of the qualified beneficiaries, or the court order; such administrative actions, as well as any communications made by the excluded fiduciary to the trust advisor, trust protector or any of their agents or persons they have selected to provide services to the trust, shall not be deemed to constitute an undertaking by the excluded fiduciary to monitor the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector or otherwise participate in actions within the scope of the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector's authority.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 43.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1204.

    The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section. The effects of the provisions of this section may result in significant divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section follows the definition of “excluded fiduciary” in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 and the concept that those persons who do not have a power or duty over a trust should not be liable for the actions of the other persons who do have such power or duty. Therefore, this section states an overriding rule that excluded fiduciaries have no duty to review the actions of a trustee, a trust advisor or trust protector to which any power or duty was granted or reserved, such power or duty having been removed from such excluded fiduciary.

    Subsection (a) states that unless the terms of a trust, the agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or a court order provides otherwise, the general rule above applies and an excluded fiduciary has no duty to:

    Perform any kind of review, evaluation, inquiry or investigation of, or in any other way monitor, the conduct of the non-excluded trustee, trust advisor or trust protector.

    Make evaluations of, recommendations to, or in any way provide advice to, the non-excluded trustee, trust advisor or trust protector.

    Communicate with, warn or apprise any beneficiary or third-party concerning instances in which the excluded fiduciary would or might have exercised such excluded fiduciary’s discretion differently than as exercised by the non-excluded trustee, trust advisor or trust protector.

    Subsection (b) states that any action of an excluded beneficiary relative to any actions of any non-excluded fiduciary shall be deemed to be nothing more than administrative actions taken by the excluded fiduciary to allow such excluded beneficiary to perform those duties assigned to the excluded fiduciary under the terms of the trust, the agreement of the qualified beneficiaries or a court order. Moreover, any such administrative actions; as well as any communications made by the excluded fiduciary to a non-excluded fiduciary, or to any agent or person selected by any non-excluded fiduciary to provide services (through delegation or otherwise) to the trust; does not rise to an undertaking by the excluded fiduciary to monitor or otherwise participate in actions within the scope of the authority of any non-excluded fiduciary. Unlike under subsection (a), subsection (b) can only be overridden by provisions contained in the trust instrument to the contrary.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-1205. Fiduciary's liability for action or inaction of trustee, trust advisor, and trust protector.

An excluded fiduciary is not liable, either individually or as a fiduciary, for:

  1. Any loss resulting from compliance with a direction of a trustee, trust advisor or trust protector, including but not limited to, any loss from the trustee, trust advisor or trust protector breaching fiduciary responsibilities or acting beyond the trustee's, trust advisor's or trust protector's scope of authority;
  2. Any loss resulting from any action or inaction of a trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector; or
  3. Any loss that results from the failure of a trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector to take any action proposed by the excluded fiduciary where such action requires the authorization of the trustee, trust advisor, or trust protector; provided, that an excluded fiduciary who had a duty to propose such action timely sought but failed to obtain the authorization.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 43.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1205.

    The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section. The effects of the provisions of this section may result in significant divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or con-trolling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section follows the definition of “excluded fiduciary in T.C.A. § 35-15-103 and the concept that those persons who do not have a power or duty over a trust should not be liable for the actions of the other persons who do have such power or duty.

    Therefore, this section states the rule that excluded fiduciaries are not liable, either individually or as a fiduciary for any loss:

    resulting from the excluded fiduciary complying with a direction of a non-excluded fiduciary regardless of whether such loss results from a non-excluded fiduciary breaching their respective fiduciary responsibilities, a non-excluded fiduciary acting beyond their respective scope of authority, or otherwise;

    resulting from any action or action of a non-excluded fiduciary; or

    resulting from the failure of a non-excluded fiduciary to take any action proposed by an excluded fiduciary where such action requires authorization of a non-excluded fiduciary; provided that, if the excluded fiduciary had a duty to propose such action, such excluded fiduciary timely sought but failed to obtain such authorization.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-15-1206. Limitation of action against a trust advisor or trust protector.

  1. A beneficiary may not commence a proceeding against a trust advisor or trust protector for breach of trust more than one (1) year after the date the beneficiary or a representative of the beneficiary was sent a report that adequately disclosed facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust.
  2. A report adequately discloses facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if it provides sufficient information so that the beneficiary or the beneficiary's representative knows of the potential claim or has sufficient information to be presumed to know of it, or to be put on notice to inquire into its existence.
  3. If subsection (a) does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a beneficiary against a trust advisor or trust protector for breach of trust must be commenced within three (3) years after the first to occur of:
    1. The removal, resignation, or death of the trust advisor or trust protector;
    2. The termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or
    3. The termination of the trust.
  4. A trustee may not commence a proceeding against a trust advisor or trust protector for breach of trust more than one (1) year after the date the trustee or a representative of the trustee was sent a report that adequately disclosed facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust.
  5. A report adequately discloses facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if it provides sufficient information so that the trustee or the trustee's representative knows of the potential claim or has sufficient information to be presumed to know of it, or to be put on notice to inquire into its existence.
  6. If subsection (d) does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a trustee against a trust advisor or trust protector for breach of trust must be commenced within three (3) years after the first to occur of:
    1. The removal, resignation, or death of the trust advisor or trust protector;
    2. The termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or
    3. The termination of the trust.
  7. A trust advisor or trust protector may not commence a proceeding against another trust advisor or another trust protector for breach of trust more than one (1) year after the date the trust advisor or trust protector or the respective representative of each was sent a report that adequately disclosed facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust.
  8. A report adequately discloses facts indicating the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if it provides sufficient information so that the trust advisor or trust protector or the respective representative of each knows of the potential claim or has sufficient information to be presumed to know of it, or to be put on notice to inquire into its existence.
  9. If subsection (g) does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a trust advisor or trust protector against another trust advisor or another trust protector for breach of trust must be commenced within three (3) years after the first to occur of:
    1. The removal, resignation, or death of the other trust advisor or other trust protector;
    2. The termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or
    3. The termination of the trust.
  10. Notwithstanding subsections (d) — (i), no trustee, trust advisor or trust protector, may commence a proceeding against a trust advisor or trust protector or another trust advisor or another trust protector if, under either subsections (a) — (c) or §  35-15-1005(a) — (c), none of the beneficiaries may commence a proceeding against the trust advisor or trust protector for such breach of trust.

Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 43.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    Unless provided otherwise hereinafter, any reference to “section,” “subsection” or “subdivision” means all, or such portion of, T.C.A. § 35-15-1202.

    The Uniform Trust Code has no similar provision to this section. The effects of the provisions of this section may result in significant divergence from the Uniform Trust Code and the restatements. To the extent this section is in conflict with the Uniform Trust Code, any restatement or any other foreign law, such foreign law is not precedential or controlling and is rejected by the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code.

    This section applies to trust advisors and trust protectors statutes of limitation consistent with that provided to trustees by T.C.A. § 35-15-1005. The requirements under this section for obtaining the benefit of this section’s statutes of limitation, as well as the length of such statutes of limitation, are substantially the same as those provided relative to trustees in T.C.A. § 35-15-1005. Therefore, one is referred to the section comment under T.C.A. § 35-15-1005.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Part 13
Special purpose entity

35-15-1301. Special purpose entity.

  1. As used in this part:
    1. “Corporate trustee” means a Tennessee trust company, a Tennessee bank with trust powers, or a national bank with trust powers and with a physical presence in Tennessee;
    2. “Department” means the department of financial institutions;
    3. “Designated ancestor” means one (1) or more ancestors of the family designated as such in the entity's governing documents. A designated ancestor may be either living or deceased. If two (2) designated ancestors are designated, they must be or have been spouses to each other, and if more than such first two (2) designated ancestors are designated, each such additional designated ancestor must be or have been a spouse of either of the first two (2) designated ancestors;
    4. “Entity” means a corporation or a limited liability company;
      1. “Family member” means a designated ancestor and:
        1. An individual within the twelfth degree of lineal kinship of a designated ancestor;
        2. An individual within the eleventh degree of collateral kinship of a designated ancestor;
        3. A spouse or former spouse of a designated ancestor or of an individual defined as a family member in subdivision (a)(5)(A) or (a)(5)(B); and
        4. An individual who is a relative of a spouse or former spouse specified in subdivision (a)(5)(C) who is within the fifth degree of lineal or collateral kinship of the spouse or former spouse.
      2. For purposes of determining whether a person is a family member as defined in this subdivision (a)(5):
        1. A legally adopted person shall be treated as a natural child of the adoptive parents;
        2. A stepchild shall be treated as a natural child of the individual who is or was the stepparent of that child;
        3. A foster child, or an individual who was a minor when an adult became the individual's legal guardian, shall be treated as a natural child of the adult appointed as foster parent or guardian;
        4. A child of a spouse or former spouse of an individual shall be treated as a natural child of that individual;
        5. Degrees are calculated by adding the number of steps from a relevant designated ancestor through each individual to the family member either directly, in case of lineal kinship, or through a designated ancestor, in the case of collateral kinship; and
        6. A person who was a family member at the time of the special purpose entity's engagement as trust protector or trust advisor shall not cease to be a family member solely due to a death, divorce, or other similar event; and
    5. “Special purpose entity” means an entity that meets the requirements provided under subsection (b).
  2. A special purpose entity shall not be subject to chapters 1 and 2 of title 45 regulating fiduciary activity if:
    1. The entity is established for the exclusive purpose of acting as a trust protector or trust advisor as defined by § 35-15-1201, or any combination of such purposes;
    2. The entity is acting in such capacity solely under the terms of trusts in which the grantor or beneficiary is a family member, and under which a corporate trustee is serving as trustee;
    3. The entity is not engaged in trust company business as a private trust company under title 45, chapter 2, part 20, or with the general public as a public trust company;
    4. The entity does not hold itself out as being in the business of acting as a fiduciary for hire as either a public or private trust company;
    5. The entity files an annual report with the secretary of state and provides a copy to the department;
    6. The entity agrees to be subject to examination by the department at the discretion of the department solely for the purpose of determining whether the entity satisfies all requirements for qualification under this part;
    7. The entity agrees to pay the department the actual expenses of the examination at the time of the examination described in subdivision (b)(6);
    8. The entity does not use the word “trust” or “trustee” in the entity's name in any manner;
    9. The governing documents of the entity, as such governing documents may be amended from time to time, limit the entity's authorized activities to the functions permitted to a trust protector or trust advisor, or any combination of such functions, and limit the performance of those functions with respect to trusts in which a grantor or beneficiary of such trust is a family member with respect to a designated ancestor specifically named in the entity's governing documents;
    10. The entity does not act as a fiduciary other than as provided in this part;
    11. Within thirty (30) days of beginning operations as a trust protector or trust advisor, or any combination thereof, the entity:
      1. Notifies the department of:
        1. Its existence;
        2. Its capacity to act;
        3. The name of the corporate trustee for each separate trust for which such entity is engaged as a trust protector or trust advisor; and
      2. Pays a one-time initial fee of one thousand dollars ($1,000); and
    12. The entity submits annually to the department, no later than April 15 and no earlier than January 1:
      1. An annual fee of one thousand dollars ($1,000);
      2. An updated list of the name of the corporate trustee for each separate trust for which such entity is engaged as a trust protector or trust advisor; and
      3. A certification to the department in which:
        1. The corporate trustee certifies that it is the corporate trustee of the applicable trust; and
        2. The entity certifies that it is acting as a trust protector or trust advisor for the applicable trust, and that such entity's actions are in compliance with this part.

Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 17.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 340, § 20. May 10, 2019.

Chapter 16
Tennessee Investment Services Act of 2007

Compiler's Notes. The 2013 Restated Comments to Official Text reflect the input of various groups as well as the comments provided by the Uniform Law Commission.

35-16-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Investment Services Act of 2007.”

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 1.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Comment.

T.C.A. § 35 15 505 generally allows creditors of the settlor to reach assets transferred by a settlor to a trust of which he or she is a beneficiary. The Tennessee Services Investment Act of 2007 establishes an exception to this rule by authorizing the creation of self-settled trusts that are exempt from the settlor’s creditors if certain conditions are met. A growing number of states authorize the creation of these types of trusts, sometimes referred to as “domestic asset protection trusts.”

Law Reviews.

Where There's a Will: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Estate Planning Tools Married To New Realities (Eddy R. Smith), 49 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2013).

35-16-102. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Claim” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured;
  2. “Creditor” means, with respect to a transferor, a person who has a claim;
  3. “Debt” means liability on a claim;
  4. “Disposition” means a transfer, conveyance or assignment of property, including a change in the legal ownership of property occurring upon the substitution of one (1) trustee for another or the addition of one (1) or more new trustees. “Disposition” also includes the exercise of a power so as to cause a transfer of property to a trustee or trustees, but shall not include the release or relinquishment of an interest in property that, until the release or relinquishment, was the subject of a qualified disposition;
  5. “Investment advisor” means a person given authority by the terms of an investment services trust to direct, consent to or disapprove a transferor's actual or proposed investment decisions, distribution decisions or other decisions of the transferor;
  6. “Investment decision” means the retention, purchase, sale, exchange, tender or other transaction affecting the ownership of or rights in investments;
  7. “Investment services trust” means an instrument appointing a qualified trustee or qualified trustees for the property that is the subject of a disposition, which instrument:
    1. Expressly incorporates the law of this state to govern the validity, construction and administration of the trust;
    2. Is irrevocable; and
    3. Provides that the interest of the transferor or other beneficiary in the trust property or the income from the trust property may not be transferred, assigned, pledged or mortgaged, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before the qualified trustee or qualified trustees actually distribute the property or income from the property to the beneficiary;
  8. “Person” has the meaning ascribed to it in § 1-3-105;
  9. “Property” includes real property, personal property, and interests in real or personal property;
  10. “Qualified affidavit” means a sworn affidavit signed by the transferor before a disposition of assets to an investment services trust that meets the requirements of § 35-16-103. In the event of a disposition by a transferor who is a trustee, the affidavit shall be signed by the transferor who made the original disposition to the trustee, or a predecessor trustee, in a form that meets the requirements of subdivisions (7)(B) and (C) and shall state facts as of the time of the original disposition;
  11. “Qualified disposition” means a disposition by or from a transferor with or without consideration, to an investment services trust after the transferor executes a qualified affidavit;
  12. “Qualified trustee” means a person who:
    1. In the case of a natural person, is a resident of this state, or, in all other cases, is authorized by the law of this state to act as a trustee and whose activities are subject to supervision by the Tennessee department of financial institutions, the federal deposit insurance corporation, the comptroller of the currency, or the office of thrift supervision or any successor to them;
    2. Maintains or arranges for custody in this state of some or all of the property that is the subject of the qualified disposition, maintains records for the investment services trust on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis, prepares or arranges for the preparation of required income tax returns for the investment services trust, or otherwise materially participates in the administration of the investment services trust; and
    3. Is not the transferor;
  13. “Spouse” or “former spouse” means only persons to whom the transferor was legally married at, or before, the time the qualified disposition is made;
  14. “Transferor” means a person who, directly or indirectly, makes a disposition or causes a disposition to be made in such person's capacity:
    1. As an owner of property;
    2. As a holder of a power of appointment that authorizes the holder to appoint in favor of the holder, the holder's creditors, the holder's estate or the creditors of the holder's estate; or
    3. As a trustee; and
  15. Unless the context or a provision contained in this chapter provides otherwise, throughout this chapter, any form of the word “trustee,” whether singular or plural means “trustee, cotrustee or any other fiduciary” as fiduciary is defined at § 35-15-103 relative to any power or duty held by such fiduciary that could otherwise be held by a trustee, to the extent that such fiduciary is holding such a power or duty and is not an excluded fiduciary as defined at § 35-15-103 relative to that power or duty.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 2; 2008, ch. 1010, § 1; 2010, ch. 725, § 13; 2013, ch. 390, § 44.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and (5) An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    1. Bankruptcy.

    Living trust for which debtor served as trustee was not valid and enforceable Tennessee Asset Protection Trust (TAPT) such that its assets were excluded from bankruptcy estate because, while debtor held beneficial interest in trust during his lifetime, trust satisfied none of remaining requirements for valid TAPT, at least with respect to present lifetime trust. In re Erskine, 550 B.R. 362, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1169 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2016).

    Section Comment.

    “Claim” refers to any legal right to a payment, irrespective of the manner in which the right is acquired.

    “Creditor” means any person who has a claim against a Transferor.

    “Debt” means liability on a claim.

    “Disposition” refers to any transfer of property. A change of Trustees is a disposition. However, a change of Trustees of an Investment Services Trust after a Qualified Disposition was previously made does not require the execution of a new Qualified Affidavit to maintain the creditor protection provided by the previous Qualified Disposition. Exercising a general power of appointment to transfer property to a trust benefitting the person exercising the power is also a disposition.

    “Investment advisor” includes persons given authority to veto or approve investment decisions or distribution decisions.

    “Investment decision” means any decision affecting the ownership of or rights in investments owned by an Investment Services Trust.

    In order to be eligible as an “Investment Services Trust,” the trust agreement must be irrevocable, must appoint at least one Qualified Trustee, must incorporate Tennessee law to govern the validity, construction and administration of the trust, and must contain a “spendthrift” provision prohibiting the Transferor or any beneficiary from transferring, assigning, pledging or mortgaging their interest in the trust.

    “Person” includes natural persons as well as entities. Entities are allowed to establish an Investment Services Trust.

    “Property” includes all types of property, real and personal.

    Requiring the Transferor to execute a “Qualified Affidavit” prior to making a transfer of property to an Investment Services Trust reinforces the notion that fraudulent conveyances will not be effective to avoid creditors. The required statements for the affidavit to be qualified are set forth in T.C.A. § 35-16-103.

    In order to take advantage of the creditor protection provided by an Investment Services Trust, the Transferor must make a “Qualified Disposition” to the Trust.  In order to be a Qualified Disposition, the Transferor must execute a Qualified Affidavit prior to making a transfer to the trust.

    The definition of “Qualified Trustee” has both identity and activity components. The Trustee must be either an individual resident of Tennessee or a bank or trust company that is authorized by federal or Tennessee law to serve as a Trustee of a Tennessee trust. The Qualified Trustee must perform at least one of these 4 activities: maintain custody of some trust property in Tennessee, maintain trust records, prepare or arrange for preparation of trust tax returns, or materially participate in the administration of the trust. The Transferor will not qualify as a Qualified Trustee and should not so serve since serving as a trustee is not one of the authorized powers that the Transferor is allowed to retain pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-16-111. Family members of the Transferor can meet the definition of a Qualified Trustee, though that may not the best choice. As long as the trust has at least one Qualified Trustee, there is no limit on the number of non-qualified co-trustees that may serve.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bankruptcy.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

T.C.A. § 35-16-104 allows a “Spouse” or “Former Spouse” of the Transferor to become an “exception creditor” under certain circumstances. The spouse or former spouse may only set aside dispositions made after such person married the Transferor. Funding an Investment Services Trust prior to getting married is an effective method of protecting the Transferor’s assets in the event of a subsequent divorce.

In addition to a person who transfers such person’s assets to a trust, the term “Transferor” includes a person who appoints property to the trust by exercising a general power of appointment, as well as a Trustee who decants property from another trust pursuant to T.C.A. § 35-16-816(27) or merges another trust into an Investment Services Trust. This provision facilitates the transfer of assets from other trusts into an Investment Services Trust.

Attorney General Opinions. Creditors' claims under the Tennessee Investment Services Act of 2007.  OAG 11-79, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 81 (11/17/11).

35-16-103. Qualified affidavit requirements.

A qualified affidavit shall state that:

  1. The transferor has full right, title, and authority to transfer the assets to the trust;
  2. The transfer of the assets to the trust will not render the transferor insolvent;
  3. The transferor does not intend to defraud a creditor by transferring the assets to the trust;
  4. The transferor does not have any pending or threatened court actions against the transferor, except for those court actions identified by the transferor on an attachment to the affidavit;
  5. The transferor is not involved in any administrative proceedings, except for those administrative proceedings identified on an attachment to the affidavit;
  6. The transferor does not contemplate filing for relief under the federal bankruptcy code; and
  7. The assets being transferred to the trust were not derived from unlawful activities.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bankruptcy.

Living trust for which debtor served as trustee was not valid and enforceable Tennessee Asset Protection Trust (TAPT) such that its assets were excluded from bankruptcy estate because, while debtor held beneficial interest in trust during his lifetime, trust satisfied none of remaining requirements for valid TAPT, at least with respect to present lifetime trust. In re Erskine, 550 B.R. 362, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1169 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2016).

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Comment.

One of the requirements for making a Qualified Disposition is that the Transferor must sign a Qualified Affidavit prior to making the transfer to the Investment Services Trust. The purpose of the affidavit is to make sure that the Transferor is not defrauding his or her creditors. The statute lists seven specific statements that need to be addressed in the affidavit. If there are pending or threatened court actions against the Transferor, or if the Transferor is involved in any administrative proceedings, these actions or proceedings should be identified on an attachment to the affidavit. There is no time period set forth for making the transfer to the Investment Services Trust after the affidavit is executed. Nevertheless, no transfer should be made after any of the statements in the affidavit become inaccurate.

35-16-104. Restrictions on actions, remedies and claims.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no action of any kind, including, but not limited to, an action to enforce a judgment entered by a court or other body having adjudicative authority, shall be brought at law or in equity for an attachment or other provisional remedy against property that is the subject of a qualified disposition to an investment services trust or for the avoidance of a qualified disposition to an investment services trust, unless the action is brought pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, compiled in title 66, chapter 3, part 3, and, in the case of a creditor whose claim arose after a qualified disposition, unless the qualified disposition was also made with actual intent to defraud such creditor.
    1. Notwithstanding § 66-3-310, a creditor's claim under subsection (a) shall be extinguished:
      1. If the person is a creditor when the qualified disposition to an investment services trust is made, unless the action is commenced within the later of two (2) years after the qualified disposition is made or six (6) months after the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered the qualified disposition; or
      2. If the person becomes a creditor after the qualified disposition to an investment services trust is made, unless the action is commenced within two (2) years after the qualified disposition is made;
    2. If subdivision (b)(1) applies:
      1. A person shall be deemed to have discovered the existence of a qualified disposition to an investment services trust at the time any public record is made of any transfer of property relative to such qualified disposition, including but not limited to, the conveyance of real property that is recorded in the office of the county register of deeds of the county in which the property is located or the filing of a financing statement under title 47, chapter 9, or the equivalent recording or filing of either with the appropriate person or official under the laws of a jurisdiction other than this state; and
      2. No creditor shall bring an action with respect to property that is the subject of a qualified disposition unless that creditor proves by clear and convincing evidence that the settlor's transfer of such property was made with the intent to defraud that specific creditor.
  2. For purposes of this chapter, a qualified disposition that is made by means of a disposition by a transferor who is a trustee shall be deemed to have been made as of the time, whether before, on or after July 1, 2007, the property that is the subject of the qualified disposition was originally transferred to the transferor acting in the capacity of trustee, or any predecessor trustee, in a form that meets the requirements of § 35-16-102(7)(B) and (C).
  3. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a creditor, including a creditor whose claim arose before or after a qualified disposition, or any other person shall have only the rights with respect to a qualified disposition that are provided in this section and § 35-16-106, and neither a creditor nor any other person shall have any claim or cause of action against the trustee, or an advisor of an investment services trust, or against any person involved in the counseling, drafting, preparation, execution or funding of an investment services trust. For purposes of this section, counseling, drafting, preparation, execution or funding of an investment services trust includes the counseling, drafting, preparation, execution and funding of a limited partnership or a limited liability company if interests in the limited partnership or limited liability company are subsequently transferred to the investment services trust.
  4. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no action of any kind, including, but not limited to, an action to enforce a judgment entered by a court or other body having adjudicative authority, shall be brought at law or in equity against a trustee or an advisor of an investment services trust, or against any person involved in the counseling, drafting, preparation, execution or funding of an investment services trust, if, as of the date such action is brought, an action by a creditor with respect to the investment services trust would be barred under this section.
  5. In circumstances where more than one (1) qualified disposition is made by means of the same investment services trust, then:
    1. The making of a subsequent qualified disposition shall be disregarded in determining whether a creditor's claim with respect to a prior qualified disposition is extinguished as provided in subsection (b); and
    2. Any distribution to a beneficiary shall be deemed to have been made from the latest qualified disposition.
  6. If, in any action brought against an investment services trust, a court takes any action whereby the court declines to apply the law of this state in determining the effect of a spendthrift provision of the trust, the trustee of the trust shall immediately upon the court's action and without the further order of any court, cease in all respects to be trustee of the trust and a successor trustee shall succeed as trustee in accordance with the terms of the trust or, if the trust does not provide for a successor trustee and the trust would otherwise be without a trustee, a court of this state, upon the application of any beneficiary of the trust, shall appoint a successor trustee upon the terms and conditions it determines to be consistent with the purposes of the trust and this chapter. Upon the trustee's ceasing to be trustee, the trustee shall have no power or authority other than to convey the trust property to the successor trustee named in the trust in accordance with this section.
  7. An investment services trust shall be subject to this section whether or not the transferor retains any or all of the powers and rights described in § 35-16-111 or serves as an investment advisor pursuant to § 35-16-109.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (a) or (b) to the contrary, the limitations on actions by creditors in law or equity shall not apply and such creditors' claims shall not be extinguished if the transferor is indebted on account of an agreement, judgment or order of a court for the payment of one (1) of the following:
      1. Past due child support;
      2. Past due alimony in solido of a spouse or former spouse;
      3. Past due alimony or support of a spouse or former spouse; or
      4. A written agreement, judgment or order of a court for division of marital property of a spouse or former spouse, but only to the extent of such debt, legally mandated interest and the reasonable cost of collection.
      1. A claim provided under this subsection (i) shall be asserted against a trustee only:
        1. Upon a final non-appealable determination of a Tennessee court or a fully domesticated, final non-appealable order of a court of another state as defined by § 35-15-103 that such debt is past due; and
        2. After the court has determined that the claimant has made reasonable attempts to collect the debt from any other sources of the transferor or that such attempts would be futile.
      2. Nothing in this subdivision (i)(2) shall be construed to prohibit the court from making the findings required in subdivisions (i)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) in the same proceeding and order.
  8. Subsection (i) shall not apply to any claim for forced heirship, legitime or elective share.
  9. In addition to subsection (j), to the extent subsection (j) applies to the laws of any foreign country:
    1. For all purposes under this chapter, the effect of the laws of any foreign country shall be the same as provided in § 35-15-107(b)(3) and (4); and
    2. Subsection (a) applies in addition to all other provisions of this chapter.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 4; 2008, ch. 1010, § 2; 2010, ch. 725, §§ 14-16; 2013, ch. 390, §§ 45-47.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that: (b) Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and (5) An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Attorney General Opinions. Creditors' claims under the Tennessee Investment Services Act of 2007.  OAG 11-79, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 81 (11/17/11).

    Section Comment.

    Use of Terms    T.C.A. § 35-15-505(a)(2) generally precludes an individual from transferring his or her assets to a trust as a shield against the settlor’s creditors. Investment Services Trusts are an exception to this general rule.

    Subsection (a) specifies that creditors are generally restricted from reaching the assets held in an Investment Services Trust. With certain exceptions, no action of any kind, including enforcement of a judgment, may be brought to attach trust property. Creditors seeking to reach trust property are limited to only those actions available through the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Thus, if a transfer to an Investment Services Trust is found to be a fraudulent transfer, the assets can be reached.

    Subdivision (b)(1) creates two separate statutes of limitations for creditors to bring claims against an Investment Services Trust or a Qualified Disposition of property to an Investment Services Trust. For claims arising before the date of a Qualified Disposition, the claim must be initiated within two years or, if later, within six months after the disposition was or could reasonably have been discovered by the creditor. If the claim arises at the same time or later than the disposition, the limitations period is two years.

    A person shall be deemed to have discovered the existence of a Qualified Disposition when any public record is made regarding the transfer of property to the Investment Services Trust. The statute provides a non-exclusive list of types of public records, including a deed that is recorded in the register of deeds and the filing of a financing statement under the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code.

    Even if a creditor fits within the applicable statute of limitation, the creditor may not bring an action with respect to property that is the subject of a Qualified Disposition unless the creditor proves by clear and convincing evidence that the Transferor’s transfer was made with intent to defraud that specific creditor.

    Subsection (c) contains a tacking rule which provides that the amount of time that trust assets are held in a predecessor trust may be added to the time the assets are considered held in the Investment Services Trust. This tacking provision could be important in cases involving dispositions that are otherwise still within the applicable limitations period but were generated by previous dispositions from another asset protection trust.

    Notwithstanding other provisions of the law, there is a complete bar against actions brought by creditors against a Qualified Trustee or trust advisor. This bar extends to claims against persons who provide counseling, drafting, preparation, execution, or funding of the trust. The same limitations periods applicable for claims against trust assets apply to claims brought against the trustee or trust advisor.

    When multiple Qualified Dispositions are made to an Investment Services Trust, each disposition is tested on its own to see whether it is protected from creditors.  Distributions are deemed to be made from the latest Qualified Disposition to the Investment Services Trust.

    A Trustee of an Investment Services Trust automatically ceases to serve if a court declines to apply Tennessee law in determining the validity, construction, or administration of such trust, or the effect of its spendthrift clause, in a proceeding involving such Trustee. If a trustee ceases to act, any successor trustee designated in the trust will take its place. The trust may have non-Tennessee co-trustees and advisors.

    Two classes of creditors are exempted from the provisions protecting trust assets. Child support obligations and those stemming from alimony or spousal support are outside of the statute’s protections. Importantly, the statute defines “spouse” or “former spouse” as a person to whom the Transferor was married at or before the time of the qualified distribution. Thus, dispositions in trust made before the Transferor’s marriage are protected from spousal claims by the statute. Unlike some domestic asset protection trust statutes, tort claimants are not “exception creditors” in Tennessee.

    In order for an “exception creditor” to reach assets in an Investment Services Trust, there must be final court order that a debt is due for child support, alimony, support, or division of marital property. The court must also determine that the claimant has made reasonable efforts to collect the debt or that such attempts would be futile.

    Creditors may not reach assets of an Investment Services Trust for forced heirship, legitime or elective share.

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

35-16-105. Powers and rights of transferor.

A transferor shall have only the powers and rights conferred by the investment services trust. The powers and rights conferred by the investment services trust upon the transferor are personal powers and rights that may not be exercised by a creditor or any other person, except as expressly permitted by the trust. Except as permitted by §§ 35-16-109 and 35-16-111, the transferor shall have no rights or authority with respect to the corpus of the investment services trust or the income from the trust, and any agreement or understanding purporting to grant or permit the retention of any greater rights or authority shall be void.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 5; 2010, ch. 725, § 17.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

A Transferor may only retain those rights set forth in T.C.A. Sections 35-16-109 and 35-16-111, and will only have such rights to the extent they are set forth in the Investment Services Trust. Any agreement or understanding that purports to give greater rights to the Transferor is void.

35-16-106. Avoidance of qualified dispositions.

  1. A qualified disposition to an investment services trust shall be avoided only to the extent necessary to satisfy the transferor's debt to the creditor at whose instance the disposition had been avoided, together with costs, including attorneys' fees, that the court may allow.
  2. In the event any qualified disposition shall be avoided as provided in subsection (a), then:
    1. If the court is satisfied that a qualified trustee has not acted in bad faith in accepting or administering the property that is the subject of the qualified disposition:
      1. The qualified trustee shall have a first and paramount lien against the property that is the subject of the qualified disposition in an amount equal to the entire cost, including attorneys' fees, properly incurred by the qualified trustee in the defense of the action or proceedings to avoid the qualified disposition;
      2. The qualified disposition shall be avoided subject to the proper fees, costs, preexisting rights, claims and interests of the qualified trustee and of any predecessor qualified trustee that has not acted in bad faith; and
      3. For purposes of this subdivision (b)(1), it shall be presumed that the qualified trustee did not act in bad faith merely by accepting the property; and
    2. If the court is satisfied that a beneficiary of an investment services trust has not acted in bad faith, the avoidance of the qualified disposition shall be subject to the right of the beneficiary to retain any distribution made upon the exercise of a trust power or discretion vested in the qualified trustee or qualified trustees of the investment services trust, which power or discretion was properly exercised prior to the creditor's commencement of an action to avoid the qualified disposition. For purposes of this subdivision (b)(2), it shall be presumed that the beneficiary, including a beneficiary who is also a transferor of the trust, did not act in bad faith merely by creating the trust or by accepting a distribution made in accordance with the terms of the trust.
  3. A disposition by a trustee that is not a qualified trustee to a trustee that is a qualified trustee shall not be treated as other than a qualified disposition solely because the trust instrument fails to meet the requirements of § 35-16-102(7)(A).
  4. In the case of a disposition to more than one (1) trustee, a disposition that is otherwise a qualified disposition shall not be treated as other than a qualified disposition solely because not all of the recipient trustees are qualified trustees.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 6.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Even if a creditor is able to reach trust assets, a Qualified Disposition is avoided only to the extent necessary to satisfy the Transferor’s debt plus costs. If part of the disposition is avoided, a Qualified Trustee has a first lien against the trust property providing the Trustee has not acted in bad faith in accepting trust property. Thus, an “innocent” Trustee is able to use trust assets to pay its costs of litigating a claim before satisfying the claim.

A beneficiary who received a distribution before a creditor brings a successful suit to avoid a Qualified Disposition may keep the distribution unless the beneficiary acted in bad faith.

If the Trustee of a valid asset protection trust formed under the laws of another state is changed to a Qualified Trustee, the trust is eligible to qualify as an Investment Services Trust even though the trust agreement does not incorporate Tennessee law. Prior to the change of Trustee, either the original Transferor or the predecessor Trustee should sign a Qualified Affidavit based on facts as of the date of the original disposition.

35-16-107. Spendthrift provisions.

A spendthrift provision as described in § 35-16-102(7)(C) shall be deemed to be a restriction on the transfer of the transferor's beneficial interest in the trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law within the meaning of § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)), or any successor provision.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 7.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a state law restriction on the transfer of property is enforceable in bankruptcy. This section clarifies that an Investment Services Trust qualifies for this benefit.

35-16-108. Qualified trustees and advisors.

  1. For purposes of this chapter, neither the transferor nor any other natural person who is a nonresident of this state nor an entity that is not authorized by the law of this state to act as a trustee or whose activities are not subject to supervision as provided in § 35-16-102(12)(A) shall be considered a qualified trustee; however, nothing in this chapter shall preclude a transferor from appointing one (1) or more advisors, including, but not limited to:
    1. Advisors who have authority under the terms of the trust instrument to remove and appoint qualified trustees or trust advisors;
    2. Advisors who have authority under the terms of the trust instrument to direct, consent to or disapprove distributions from the trust; and
    3. Investment advisors, whether or not the advisors would meet the requirements imposed by § 35-16-102(12).
  2. For purposes of subsection (a), “advisor” includes a trust “protector” or any other person who, in addition to a qualified trustee, holds one (1) or more trust powers.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 8.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

The Transferor may appoint one or more trust advisors who have the power to: (i) remove and appoint Qualified Trustees and trust advisors; (ii) direct, consent or veto trust distributions; or (iii) make investment decisions for the trust. A trust advisor does not have to be a Tennessee resident. It is permissible for a trust advisor to be an entity, and in some cases using a limited liability entity as such could be beneficial.

35-16-109. Transferor as investment advisor.

A person may serve as an investment advisor notwithstanding that the person is the transferor of the qualified disposition.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 9; 2010, ch. 725, § 18.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

The Transferor may serve as an investment advisor of the Investment Services Trust without endangering the trust’s qualification as an Investment Services Trust. In addition to decisions about investments, the Transferor may retain the right to veto distributions from the Investment Services Trust.

35-16-110. Successor trustees.

In the event that a qualified trustee of an investment services trust ceases to meet the requirements of § 35-16-102(12)(A), and there remains no trustee that meets the requirements, the qualified trustee shall be deemed to have resigned as of the time of that cessation, and thereupon the successor qualified trustee provided for in the investment services trust shall become a qualified trustee of the investment services trust, or in the absence of any successor qualified trustee provided for in the investment services trust, then a court of this state shall, upon application of any interested party, appoint a successor qualified trustee.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 10.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

If the Trustee ceases to meet the requirements of a Qualified Trustee and there is no other Qualified Trustee serving, the Trustee shall be deemed to have resigned. The successor Qualified Trustee will be designated by the trust agreement, or by a court, if the trust agreement does not name a successor or method for appointing a successor Qualified Trustee.

35-16-111. Revocability of trusts.

An investment services trust shall not be deemed revocable on account of its inclusion of one (1) or more of the following:

  1. A transferor's power to veto a distribution from the trust;
  2. A power of appointment, other than a power to appoint to the transferor, the transferor's creditors, the transferor's estate or the creditors of the transferor's estate, either exercisable by written instrument of the transferor during the transferor's life or exercisable by will or other written instrument of the transferor effective upon the transferor's death;
  3. The transferor's potential or actual receipt of income, including rights to the income retained in the trust;
  4. The transferor's potential or actual receipt of income or principal from a charitable remainder unitrust or charitable remainder annuity trust as those terms are defined in § 664 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 664), and any successor provision;
  5. The transferor's receipt each year of an amount specified in the trust, the amount not to exceed five percent (5%) of the initial value of the trust or its value determined from time to time pursuant to the trust;
  6. The transferor's potential or actual receipt or use of principal if the potential or actual receipt or use of principal would be the result of a qualified trustee's or qualified trustees' acting:
    1. In the qualified trustee's or qualified trustees' discretion. For purposes of this section, a qualified trustee is presumed to have discretion with respect to the distribution of principal unless the discretion is expressly denied to the trustee by the terms of the trust;
    2. Pursuant to a standard that governs the distribution of principal and does not confer upon the transferor a power to consume, invade or appropriate property for the benefit of the transferor, unless the power of the transferor is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance within the meaning of § 2041(b)(1)(A) or § 2514(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) or 26 U.S.C. § 2514(c)(1)), as in effect on July 1, 2007, or as later amended; or
    3. At the direction of an advisor described in § 35-16-108 who is acting:
      1. In the advisor's discretion; or
      2. Pursuant to a standard that governs the distribution of principal and does not confer upon the transferor a power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of the transferor, unless the power of the transferor is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance within the meaning of § 2041(b)(1)(A) or § 2514(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) or 26 U.S.C. § 2514(c)(1)), as in effect on July 1, 2007, or as later amended;
  7. The transferor's right to remove a trustee or advisor and to appoint a new trustee or advisor; provided, however, that the right shall not include the appointment of a person who is a related or subordinate party with respect to the transferor within the meaning of § 672(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, (26 U.S.C. § 672(c)), and any successor provision;
  8. The transferor's potential or actual use of real property held under a qualified personal residence trust within the meaning of the term as described in § 2702(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986  (26 U.S.C. § 2702(c)), and any successor provision;
  9. The transferor's potential or actual receipt of income or principal to pay, in whole or in part, income taxes due on income of the trust if such potential or actual receipt of income or principal is pursuant to a provision in the trust instrument that expressly permits a distribution to the transferor as reimbursement for such taxes and if such distribution would be the result of a qualified trustee's or qualified trustees' acting:
    1. In such qualified trustee's or qualified trustees' discretion or pursuant to a mandatory direction in the trust instrument; or
    2. At the direction of an adviser described in § 35-16-108, who is acting in such adviser's discretion;
  10. The ability, whether pursuant to direction in the investment services trust or discretion of a qualified trustee to pay, after the death of the transferor, all or any part of the debts of the transferor outstanding at the time of the transferor's death, the expenses of administering the transferor's estate, or any estate or inheritance tax imposed on or with respect to the transferor's estate; and
  11. A qualified trustee's or qualified trustees' authority to make distributions to pay taxes in lieu of or in addition to the power to make a distribution for taxes pursuant to subdivision (3), (6), (9), or (10) by direct payment to the taxing authorities.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 11; 2010, ch. 725, § 19; 2013, ch. 390, § 53.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 390, § 55 provided that:

Except as otherwise provided in the act, on July 1, 2013:

  1. The act applies to all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2013;
  2. The act applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2013;
  3. The act applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before July 1, 2013, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of the act would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the particular provision of the act does not apply and the superseded law applies;
  4. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in the act applies to trust instruments executed before July 1, 2013, unless there is a clear and express indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
  5. An act done before July 1, 2013, is not affected by the act.

    Section Comment.

    This section sets forth eleven additional rights that the Transferor may retain without endangering the qualification of the trust as an Investment Services Trust. The trust will not be deemed revocable (and thus lose its protective value) if the trust instrument provides that: (1) the Transferor retains a power to veto trust distributions; (2) the Transferor retains a special power of appointment over trust assets. In 2013, the power of appointment in subsection 2 was expanded from a testamentary power of appointment to a power that could also be exercised during the Transferor’s lifetime. The purpose for this change was to allow the creation of a trust that qualifies as a non-grantor trust for federal income tax purposes, yet is not a completed gift for federal gift tax purposes; (3) the Transferor receives trust income or has a right to retained trust income; (4) the Transferor retains a right to income or principal from a charitable remainder unitrust or charitable remainder annuity trust; (5) the Transferor receives annually either an annuity or unitrust interest not in excess of five percent (5%); (6) the Transferor receives trust principal through either the actions of the Qualified Trustee or advisor in his sole discretion or based on an ascertainable standard set forth in the trust instrument; (7) the Transferor retains the right to remove the Trustee and appoint a new one who is not related or subordinate to the Transferor, as such term is defined in Internal Revenue Code Section 672(c); (8) the Transferor uses real property held under a personal residence trust as a personal residence; (9) the Transferor receives trust income or principal to pay income taxes due on income of the trust through either the actions of the Qualified Trustee or advisor in his sole discretion or based on mandatory direction set forth in the trust instrument; (10) the Qualified Trustee uses trust assets to pay the Transferor’s debts outstanding at the time of the Transferor’s death including the expenses of administering the Transferor’s estate, or any estate or inheritance taxes imposed on the Transferor’s estate; or (11) the Qualified Trustee pays certain tax obligations of the Transferor or the Transferor’s estate. Thus, the Transferor can retain significant benefits and control while gaining protection from creditors for trust assets.

    1. Bankruptcy.

    Living trust for which debtor served as trustee was not valid and enforceable Tennessee Asset Protection Trust (TAPT) such that its assets were excluded from bankruptcy estate because debtor was not qualified trustee, which rendered trust not “investment services trust” for purposes of Tennessee law. In re Erskine, 550 B.R. 362, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1169 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2016).

If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before July 1, 2013, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been repealed or superseded.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bankruptcy.

35-16-112. Applicability.

This chapter applies to qualified dispositions to investment services trusts and dispositions by transferors who are trustees made on or after July 1, 2007.

Acts 2007, ch. 144, § 12.

2013 RESTATED COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section Comment.

Even though the original effective date of the Tennessee Services Investment Act of 2007 was July 1, 2007, valid asset protection trusts formed under the laws of another state prior to such date can still qualify as an Investment Services Trust if the requirements of an Investment Services Trust are satisfied after July 1, 2007. The 2013 changes made to the statute of limitations in § 35 16 104 apply to judicial proceedings commenced on or after July 1, 2013. Judicial proceedings commenced prior to July 1, 2013, will be governed by the longer statute of limitations contained in the original Tennessee Services Investment Act of 2007.

Chapter 17
Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010

35-17-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known as the “Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010.”

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 purported to enact §§ 35-17-101 and 35-17-102. In comments jointly proposed by the Estate and Probate Section of the Tennessee Bar Association, the Probate Study Committee of the Tennessee Bar Association, and the Trust Committee of the Tennessee Bankers Association, as authorized by 725, Acts of 2010, ch. 725, § 24, it was recommended that the enactments by Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 be enacted as §§ 35-6-108 and 35-6-109, respectively.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

35-17-102. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Community property” means property owned by a community property trust during the marriage of the settlor spouses;
  2. “Community property trust” means an express trust that complies with § 35-17-103;
  3. “Decree” means a judgment or other order of a court;
  4. “Dissolution” means either:
    1. Termination of a marriage by a decree of dissolution, divorce, annulment or declaration of invalidity; or
    2. Entry of a decree of legal separation maintenance;
  5. “During marriage” means a period that begins at marriage and ends at dissolution or the death of a spouse;
  6. “Qualified trustee” means either:
    1. A natural person who is a resident of this state; or
    2. A company authorized to act as a fiduciary in this state pursuant to § 45-2-1001; and
  7. “Settlor spouses” means a married couple that establishes a community property trust.

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 purported to enact §§ 35-17-101 and 35-17-102. In comments jointly proposed by the Estate and Probate Section of the Tennessee Bar Association, the Probate Study Committee of the Tennessee Bar Association, and the Trust Committee of the Tennessee Bankers Association, as authorized by 725, Acts of 2010, ch. 725, § 24, it was recommended that the enactments by Acts 2010, ch. 725, § 21 be enacted as §§ 35-6-108 and 35-6-109, respectively.

Effective Dates. Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 2. July 1, 2010.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

35-17-103. Requirements for community property trust.

An arrangement is a community property trust if one (1) or both spouses transfer property to a trust, that:

  1. Expressly declares that the trust is a Tennessee community property trust;
  2. Has at least one (1) trustee who is a qualified trustee whose powers include, or are limited to, maintaining records for the trust on an exclusive or a nonexclusive basis and preparing or arranging for the preparation of, on an exclusive or a nonexclusive basis, any income tax returns that must be filed by the trust. Both spouses or either spouse may be a trustee;
  3. Is signed by both spouses; and
  4. Contains the following language in capital letters at the beginning of the trust:

    THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS TRUST MAY BE VERY EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, YOUR RIGHTS WITH YOUR SPOUSE BOTH DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR MARRIAGE AND AT THE TIME OF A DIVORCE. ACCORDINGLY, THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE SIGNED AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE.

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

35-17-104. Agreement establishing community property trust — Amendments and revocation.

  1. In the agreement establishing a community property trust, spouses may agree on:
    1. The rights and obligations in the property transferred to the trust, notwithstanding when and where the property is acquired or located;
    2. The management and control of the property transferred to the trust;
    3. The disposition of the property transferred to the trust on dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of another event;
    4. The choice of law governing the interpretation of the trust; and
    5. Any other matter that affects the property transferred to the trust and does not violate public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.
    1. Either spouse may amend a community property trust regarding the disposition of that spouse's one-half (½) share of the community property in the occurrence of such spouse's death.
    2. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(1), a community property trust may not be amended or revoked unless the agreement itself provides for amendment or revocation.

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

35-17-105. Classification of property as community property — Enforcement — Duration — Management and control — Effect of distributions.

  1. Whether or not both, one or neither is domiciled in this state, spouses may classify any or all of their property as community property by transferring property to a community property trust and providing in the trust that the property is community property.
  2. A community property trust is enforceable without consideration.
  3. All property owned by a community property trust will be community property during marriage.
  4. The right to manage and control property that is transferred to a community property trust is determined by the terms of the trust.
  5. When property is distributed from a community property trust, it shall no longer constitute community property.

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

35-17-106. Satisfaction of obligations.

  1. An obligation incurred by only one (1) spouse before or during marriage may be satisfied from that spouse's one-half (½) share of a community property trust.
  2. An obligation incurred by both spouses during marriage may be satisfied from a community property trust of the spouses.

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

35-17-107. Death of a spouse.

Upon the death of a spouse, one-half (½) of the aggregate value of the property owned by a community property trust established by the spouses reflects the share of the surviving spouse and the other one-half (½) reflects the share of the decedent. Unless provided otherwise in the trust agreement, the trustee has the power to distribute assets of the trust in divided or undivided interests and to adjust resulting differences in valuation. A distribution in kind may be made on the basis of a non pro rata division of the aggregate value of the trust assets, on the basis of a pro rata division of each individual asset, or by using both methods.

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

35-17-108. Dissolution of marriage.

Upon the dissolution of the marriage of the settlor spouses, the community property trust shall terminate and the trustee shall distribute one half (½) of the trust assets to each spouse, with each spouse receiving one half (½) of each asset, unless otherwise agreed to in writing by both spouses.

Acts 2010, ch. 658, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Yes, Virginia, Tax Loopholes Still Exist: An Examination of the Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010 (J. Paul Singleton), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 369 (2011).

Chapters 18 — 49
[Reserved]

Chapter 50
Miscellaneous Provisions

35-50-101. Joint control of deposits by principal and surety is lawful.

It is lawful for any party of whom a bond, undertaking or other obligation is required to agree with the party's surety or sureties for the deposit of any or all moneys and assets for which the party and surety or sureties are or may be held responsible, with a bank, savings bank, safe deposit or trust company, authorized by law to do business as such, or with another depository; provided, that the other depository is approved by the court or a judge of the court, if the deposit is otherwise proper, for the safekeeping of the money or assets and in such manner as to prevent the withdrawal of the money or assets or any part of the money or assets, without the written consent of the surety or sureties, or an order of the court, or a judge of the court, made on such notice to the surety or sureties as the court or judge may direct; and provided further, that the agreement shall not in any manner release from or change the liability of the principal or sureties as established by the terms of the bond.

Acts 1941, ch. 10, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 7806.1 (Williams, § 7810.1); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-601.

Cross-References. Taxation of gifts, title 67, ch. 8, part 1.

35-50-102. Insurance trusts — Creation — Validity.

Any trust previously or subsequently established by the depositing with or transferring to a trustee of any life, accident or health insurance policies with proceeds assigned or otherwise made payable to the trustee, irrespective of whether the designation of policy beneficiary is revocable or irrevocable, or whether the insured reserves loan privileges, the right to receive the cash surrender values under any of the policies, the right to receive dividends, or any other or all benefits under any of the policies and/or avails the insured thereof, and irrespective also of whether or not the creator of the trust reserves to the creator the right to modify the trust or withdraw part or all of the property from the trust, shall be valid and legally effective as to all the property and the disposition of the property, except any that may have been affected by the exercise of any of the reserved rights, and it shall not be necessary to the validity of the trust that the instrument creating the trust be executed according to the formalities prescribed for the execution of wills.

Code 1932, § 9596; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 35-602.

Law Reviews.

Chancery Procedure — Hearing on Bill and Answer, 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 399 (1943).

35-50-103. Life insurance proceeds payable to trustee.

  1. Life insurance may be made payable to a trustee to be named as beneficiary in the policy, and the proceeds of that insurance shall be paid to the trustee and shall be held and disposed of by the trustee as provided in a trust agreement made by the insured during the insured's lifetime. It shall not be necessary to the validity of any such trust agreement or declaration of trust that it have a trust corpus other than the right of the trustee to receive the insurance proceeds as beneficiary.
  2. A policy of life insurance may designate as beneficiary a trustee or trustees named by will, if the designation is made in accordance with the policy and the requirements of the insurance company. Upon probate of the will, the proceeds of such insurance shall be payable to the trustee or trustees to be held and disposed of under the terms of the will as they exist as of the date of the death of the testator and in the same manner as other testamentary trusts are administered; but if no qualified trustee makes claim to the proceeds from the insurance company within eighteen (18) months after the death of the insured, or if satisfactory evidence is furnished to the insurance company within the eighteen-month period showing that there is or will be no trustee to receive the proceeds, payment shall be made by the insurance company to the executors, administrators or assigns of the insured, unless otherwise provided by agreement with the insurance company during the lifetime of the insured.
  3. The proceeds of the insurance as received by the trustee or trustees shall not be subject to debts of the insured.
  4. Insurance proceeds so held in trust shall not be considered part of the insured's estate for administration purposes.
  5. Insurance proceeds so held in trust may be commingled with any other assets that may properly come into the trust.
  6. Nothing in this section shall affect the validity of any life insurance policy beneficiary designation previously made naming trustees of trusts established by living trust or by will.

Acts 1969, ch. 262, § 1; T.C.A., § 35-620.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence.  15 Tenn. Juris., Insurance, § 73.

Law Reviews.

Non-Tax Aspects of Estate Planning (Ronald Lee Gilman), 2 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 41 (1972).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Oral Trusts.

Where life insurance proceeds did not pass under testator's will, the beneficiary named in the policy did not take the proceeds in his capacity as executor of testator's estate, but received the proceeds in trust for testator's son where, in a suit to prove a trust, the pleadings, the evidence, and the beneficiary's counsel admitted the existence of an oral trust. Cook v. Cook, 521 S.W.2d 808, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. 1975).

35-50-104. Purchase of annuity contract.

  1. In order to relieve estates and trusts of the burden of an annuity, the chancery court, on petition of one (1) or more of the beneficiaries in remainder in the estate or trust, or any portion of the estate or trust, is empowered, when not in terms prohibited by the will or trust instrument, to decree the purchase, in behalf of the annuitant, of an annuity contract of some insurance company, or insurer, that will afford the accordant definite income, for the stated term of life, stipulated for the annuitant by the law, or provision of the will or trust.
  2. The cost of the annuity contract shall be paid out of the funds of the estate or trust; provided, that the contract shall be purchased only from a company or insurer admitted to do business in the state; and provided further, that all persons in interest, including the trustee or other fiduciary, complainant or defendant, shall be parties to the petition, and that the annuitant shall consent to the purchase and to the release of the annuitant's claim upon the estate or trust; or the court in the annuitant's behalf, if the annuitant is a minor or incompetent.
  3. The annuity contract shall be one issued by a company or insurer, selected by, or for as aforementioned, the annuitant and approved by the court.
  4. Should any beneficiary of a remainder interest not concur, that person's interest in the estate or trust shall not be distributed until the death of the annuitant or expiration of the term stipulated, nor charged with any part of the cost of the contract. In that event, however, the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the remainder interest concurring shall be entitled to distribution of their respective interests, upon paying the cost of an annuity contract as will be productive of an income to the annuitant proportionate to their interest in the entire remainder estate, and paying all costs of the application.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the acceleration of distribution except where it appears to the court that the payment of an annuity, or its equivalent, is the sole remaining purpose of the trust's continuance.

Acts 1929, ch. 23, §§ 1, 2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 8135-8138; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 35-603 — 35-606.

Collateral References.

Merger of legal and equitable estates where sole trustees are sole beneficiaries. 7 A.L.R.4th 621.

Relinquishment of interest by life beneficiary in possession as accelerating remainder of which there is substitutional gift in case primary remainderman does not survive life beneficiary. 7 A.L.R.4th 1084.

35-50-105. Fiduciaries may effect liability and accident insurance on property.

  1. All guardians, executors, administrators and trustees are authorized to effect liability and accident insurance, in such amount as may be reasonable and proper, on any or all real or personal property under their management and control.
  2. Premiums paid on insurance effected according to subsection (a) shall be a proper charge against the estate under management or control, and shall be allowed as a credit on settlements made.

Acts 1925, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2; Shan. Supp., §§ 3349a3, 3349a4; Code 1932, §§ 6215, 6216; T.C.A. (orig. ed.) §§ 35-607, 35-608.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 738.

35-50-106. Trusts for employees' benefit — Rule against perpetuities.

No trust previously or subsequently created by an employer as a part of a pension, stock bonus, disability, death benefit, profit sharing or similar plan for the exclusive benefit of some or all of the employer's employees or their beneficiaries to which contributions are made by the employer or employees, or both employer and employees, for the purpose of distributing to the employees or their beneficiaries, the earnings or principal or both earnings and principal, of the trust, shall be deemed to be invalid by reason of any existing law or rule against perpetuities or suspension of the power of alienation; but the trust may continue for such time as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it may be created. The income arising from any property held in trust may be permitted to accumulate for the length permitted by the instrument creating the trust, or, if no time is so specified, for the time the trustee or trustees deem necessary to accomplish the purposes of the trust.

Acts 1955, ch. 293, § 1; T.C.A., § 35-609.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 177.

35-50-107. Limitations on appointment of nonresident fiduciary.

    1. Any person who is not a resident of this state or any corporation that is authorized to exercise fiduciary powers, but is not authorized to do business in this state and does not actually maintain an office in this state, shall not be appointed or allowed to serve as trustee of a corporate or personal trust, personal representative of an estate, guardian, conservator for an incompetent person, guardian for a minor or in any other fiduciary capacity, unless there is also appointed as a fiduciary to serve with such nonresident fiduciary, a person resident in this state or corporation authorized to do business in this state and that maintains an office in this state, except as provided  in subdivision (a)(2). In the event the resident cofiduciary ceases for any reason to act, then a new resident cofiduciary shall be appointed.
    2. The following nonresident persons or corporations may serve as fiduciaries, whether the appointment is by will, deed, trust agreement, court order or decree or otherwise:
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2)(C), a bank or trust company organized and doing business under the laws of any state or territory of the United States, including the District of Columbia, other than this state, or a national bank or trust company, duly authorized so to act, may be appointed and may serve in this state as a fiduciary, when and to the extent that the state, territory or District of Columbia in which the bank or trust company is organized or has its principal place of business grants authority to serve in like fiduciary capacities to a bank or trust company organized and doing business under the laws of this state or a national bank or trust company having its principal office in this state;
      2. Any resident or nonresident person may serve as a personal representative of the estate of a decedent;
      3. Any corporation that is authorized to exercise fiduciary powers may serve as trustee of an inter vivos personal or corporate trust, regardless of the residence of the trustee;
      4. Any person may serve as trustee of a trust, regardless of the residence of the trustee;
      5. Any person may serve as the guardian of the person of a minor, regardless of the residence of the guardian;
      6. Any person may serve as the conservator of the person of an incompetent person, regardless of the residence of the conservator;
      7. Any person or corporation authorized to exercise fiduciary powers may serve as agent or attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney, regardless of the residence of the agent or attorney-in-fact; and
      8. A trust company that is organized under the laws of another state as a bank, trust company or savings bank that:
        1. Has an office in this state that is not its principal office, meets the definition of a trust institution under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D), and is a direct or indirect subsidiary of a bank holding company that has a direct or indirect bank, trust company or savings bank subsidiary that has an office in this state in which deposits are accepted; or
        2. Has an office in this state that is not its principal office and accepts deposits at its office in this state.
    1. All fiduciaries appointed and serving under this section who are not residents of this state shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action or claim for relief arising from any estate or trust within this state for which such nonresident person is acting as fiduciary in the manner described in §§ 20-2-214 — 20-2-219 or in any other manner or matter involving an estate or trust being administered in this state.
    2. Any nonresident person, bank or trust company shall not act in any such capacities, until it has appointed in writing the secretary of state as its agent for service of process, upon whom all process in any suit or proceeding against it may be served in any action or proceeding relating to any trust, estate or matter within this state in respect of which such person, bank or trust company is acting in any such fiduciary capacity, and in the writing shall agree that any process against it, which shall be served upon the secretary of state, shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on the person, bank or trust company. The appointment must identify the specific trust, estate, or person for which the fiduciary has been appointed, state the name and street address, including zip code, of the fiduciary and be accompanied by a ten dollar ($10.00) filing fee. This appointment shall continue so long as any liability remains outstanding against the person, bank or trust company pertaining to any such matters. Upon receipt of any such process, it is the duty of the secretary of state forthwith to forward the process by registered or certified mail to the person, bank or trust company at the address furnished in the writing. It shall be the responsibility of the nonresident personal representative to secure appointment of the secretary of state as agent for service of process and to provide the court with a copy of the receipt from the secretary of state.
  1. Unless otherwise provided in the trust agreement or will or by § 30-1-201, the court having jurisdiction shall require the person, bank or trust company to give bond for the performance of the fiduciary relationship, in which case the statute in such cases shall apply. Even if bond is otherwise waived, the court may, in its discretion, require a nonresident person qualifying as personal representative according to subdivision (a)(2)(B) to furnish bond in an amount equal to the value of assets of the personal estate being removed from this state during the period of estate administration. In the case of intestate succession, no nonresident person qualifying as a personal representative according to subdivision (a)(2)(B) shall be eligible to serve in that capacity without giving bond, unless all heirs at law join in a petition authorizing the person to so serve.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall apply to trust agreements executed for the purpose of securing loans and guaranties thereof. No out-of-state or foreign corporate fiduciary shall have any more powers or privileges to conduct business or serve in a fiduciary capacity in this state than the laws of the state in which the foreign corporation is organized confer like powers upon corporations organized and doing business under the laws of this state or having their principal office in this state.
  3. No lack of compliance with this section by any nonresident fiduciary acting as an attorney-in-fact under the power of attorney otherwise executed in accordance with the laws of this state shall be construed to affect the title to any real estate constituting the subject matter of the power of attorney.

Acts 1955, ch. 164, § 1; 1957, ch. 52, § 1; 1977, ch. 416, § 1; T.C.A., § 35-610; Acts 1985, ch. 140, § 32; 1985, ch. 312, § 2; 1988, ch. 854, § 15; 1991, ch. 187, § 1; 1993, ch. 453, § 1; 1995, ch. 177, §§ 4-12; 1996, ch. 768, § 2; 1997, ch. 426, § 21; 2000, ch. 730, § 1; 2005, ch. 99, §§ 10-12; 2016, ch. 809, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 768, which amended this section, is known and may be cited as the Bank Reform Act of 1996.

Acts 1997, ch. 426, § 26 provided that the amendments to this section by that act shall apply to all estates of decedents dying on or after January 1, 1998 and to all wills, other documents and proceedings related thereto.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment added the last sentence in (b)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 809, § 8. April 14, 2016.

Cross-References. Appointment and removal of trustees, title 35, ch. 15, part 7.

Appointment of non-resident executor of real estate under will, § 30-1-116.

Bonds, public administrators, guardians, and trustees, § 30-1-401.

Certified mail instead of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

Executors and administrators, bonds, title 30, ch. 1, part 2.

Service of process upon nonresident representative, § 30-1-104.

Durable power of attorney for health care, title 34, ch. 6, part 2.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 542, 561.

Tennessee Jurisprudence. 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 9, 91.

Law Reviews.

Selection and Removal of Fiduciaries (Robert L. McMurray), 26 No. 3 Tenn. B.J. 22 (1990).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Application.

Capacity of plaintiff guardian to maintain action on behalf of ward in federal district court is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held. Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3692 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964).

Compliance with provision requiring appointment of resident co-guardian to act with nonresident guardian of incompetent ward would deprive the federal district court of jurisdiction by destroying diversity of citizenship; however, the section was not applicable and compliance was unnecessary where the ward was a nonresident and had no estate to be administered in Tennessee. Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3692 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964).

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a nonresident may be appointed guardian of the estate of a resident incompetent. Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3692 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964).

The purpose of this statute was to require appointment of a co-guardian for resident wards so that the co-guardian would be subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Tennessee courts and could be required to respond in personam to orders of court, and it does not apply to a nonresident guardian appointed by the courts of another state to serve as guardian for a ward residing outside the state with no estate to be administered in Tennessee. Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3692 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964).

A nonresident administrator has the capacity to maintain a wrongful death action in federal court on behalf of specific statutory beneficiaries when a resident administrator, unlike this case, has not been appointed, but capacity, nevertheless, is not the test for diversity of citizenship, it is the citizenship of the real parties in interest that controls. Anderson v. Cecil, 407 F. Supp. 1354, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14641 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).

Collateral References.

Judicial resolution of impasse between joint executors or administrators where concurrent action is required. 85 A.L.R.3d 1124.

35-50-108. Designation of beneficiaries of employee pension, stock bonus or investment plans.

  1. If a person, entitled to receive payment in money, securities, or other property under a pension, retirement, death benefit, stock bonus, profit-sharing or employees' savings and investment plan, system or trust, designates, as provided in this section, a payee or beneficiary to receive payment of the money, securities, or other property upon death of the person making the designation or to receive payment of the money, securities, or other property upon the death of any other person, the right of the person or persons so designated to receive payment in accordance with the designation, and the ownership of the money, securities or other property so received, shall not be defeated or impaired by any statute or rule of law governing the transfer of property by will or gift or on intestacy.
  2. This section is applicable to a designation even though it is revocable or subject to change by the person who makes it, and even though the money, securities or other property under the designation are not yet payable at the time the designation is made or the money, securities or other property are subject to withdrawal, collection or assignment by the person making the designation.
  3. A person entitled to receive payment includes:
    1. An employee or participant in a pension, retirement, death benefit, stock bonus, profit-sharing or employees' savings and investment plan, system or trust; and
    2. Any person entitled to receive payment by reason of a payee or beneficiary designation described in this section.
  4. A designation of a beneficiary or payee to receive payment upon death either of the person making the designation or of any other person must be made in writing and signed by the person making the designation, and must be agreed to by the employer or be made in accordance with rules prescribed for the pension, retirement, death benefit, stock bonus, profit-sharing or employees' savings and investment plan, system or trust.
  5. This section shall not alter, abridge or limit title 29, chapter 12; title 31, chapter 1; title 66, chapter 3; or title 67, chapter 8, parts 2-4.

Acts 1961, ch. 133, §§ 1-4; T.C.A., §§ 35-611 — 35-614.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1961, ch. 133, § 5, provided that this section applies to designations made before or after February 27, 1961, by persons who die on or after February 27, 1961, and that it does not invalidate any contract or designation which is valid without regard to the provisions of the section.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 626.

Law Reviews.

Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests — 1961 Tennessee Survey (Herman L. Trautman), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 1253 (1961).

35-50-109. Incorporation of § 35-50-110 in will or trust instrument.

  1. By a clearly expressed intention of the testator or settlor so to do contained in a will, or in an instrument in writing by which a trust estate is created inter vivos, the language contained in the introductory paragraph of § 35-50-110, and in any one (1) or more of subdivisions (1)-(33) of that section, may be, by appropriate reference made to that language, incorporated in the will or other written instrument, to be applicable either to the fiduciary authorized to administer the estate of the testator, or to the fiduciary authorized to administer a trust estate established or to be established pursuant to the terms of the will or other written instrument, or to both types of fiduciaries, with the same effect and subject to the same judicial interpretation and control in appropriate cases as though the language were set forth verbatim in the instrument; provided, that the language contained in § 35-50-110(1)-(4) is appropriate only with respect to powers to be vested in the one (1) or more executors of the estate of a decedent, and is available only for incorporation by reference in a will, as powers of the executor or executors of the will.
    1. “Estate,” as used in any subdivision of § 35-50-110, is construed to mean the estate of the decedent if by reference to the subdivision it has been made applicable to the executor or executors of a will, and is construed to mean the trust estate if by reference to the subdivision it has been made applicable to the trustee or trustees of such an estate.
    2. As used in this section and § 35-50-110, “fiduciary,” and the masculine singular form of the pronoun referring to the fiduciary, are construed to mean the one (1) or more executors, whether male, female or corporate, of the estate of a decedent, or the one (1) or more trustees, whether male, female or corporate, of a testamentary or inter vivos trust estate, whichever in a particular case is appropriate.
  2. Nothing contained in this section and § 35-50-110 shall be construed to limit the power of a court of competent jurisdiction to prohibit a fiduciary from taking any action, or to restrain a fiduciary in the taking of any action, notwithstanding the authorizations or powers vested in the fiduciary by any written instrument in which all or any part of § 35-50-110 is incorporated by reference.

Acts 1963, ch. 110, §§ 1, 2, 4; T.C.A., §§ 35-616, 35-617, 35-619; Acts 1991, ch. 182, § 1.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 737, 755.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 4-612.

Law Reviews.

Wills and Fiduciary Powers (Robert L. McMurray), 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 191 (1964).

Collateral References.

Construction of reference in will to statute where pertinent provisions of statute are subsequently changed by amendment or repeal. 63 A.L.R.3d 603.

35-50-110. Specifically enumerated fiduciary powers that may be incorporated by reference.

Without diminution or restriction of the powers vested in the fiduciary by law, or elsewhere in the instrument, and subject to all other provisions of the instrument, the fiduciary, without the necessity of procuring any judicial authorization, or approval, shall be vested with, and in the application of the fiduciary's best judgment and discretion in behalf of the beneficiaries of the instrument shall be authorized to exercise, the powers specifically enumerated in this section:

  1. In behalf of the estate, to join the testator's or settlor's spouse (if living), or the personal representative of the estate of the testator's or settlor's spouse (if deceased), in the execution and filing of a joint income tax return to the United States, or to the state of Tennessee, or any other governmental taxing authority (or a joint gift tax return, if and when such a joint return is authorized by law), if the fiduciary, in the exercise of the fiduciary's best judgment, believes that action to be for the best interests of the estate, or will result in a benefit to the testator's or settlor's spouse (or the estate of the testator's or settlor's spouse) exceeding in amount any monetary loss to the estate that may be caused by the filing;
  2. To continue, to the extent and so long as in the exercise of the fiduciary's best judgment it is advisable and for the best interests of the estate so to do, the operation or participation in the operation of any farming, manufacturing, mercantile and/or other business activity or enterprise in which at the time of death the testator or settlor is engaged, either alone or in unincorporated association with others;
  3. In behalf of the estate, to perform any and all valid executory contracts to which at the time of the testator's or settlor's death the testator or settlor is a party, and that at the time of the testator's or settlor's death have not been fully performed by the testator or settlor, and to discharge all obligations of the estate arising under or by reason of such contracts;
  4. Pending the administration of the estate, to permit any beneficiary or beneficiaries of the will to have the use, possession and enjoyment, without charge made for the use, possession and enjoyment, (and without the fiduciary thereby relinquishing control of the property), of any real property or tangible personal property of the estate which, upon completion of the administration of the estate, will be distributable to that beneficiary or beneficiaries when, if, and to the extent that, that action will not adversely affect the rights and interests of any creditor of the estate, and in the judgment of the fiduciary it is appropriate that the beneficiary or beneficiaries have the use and enjoyment of the property, notwithstanding that it may be subjected to depreciation in value by reason of the use. The exercise of this power will not constitute a distribution of the property with respect to which it is exercised; and, whether or not exercised, neither the power nor the exercise of the power shall be deemed a constructive or actual distribution of the property to which it relates;
  5. During the fiduciary's administration of the estate, and subject to all the other provisions of the instrument, to receive and receipt for all of the assets of the estate, and to have exclusive possession and control of those assets;
  6. By public or private sale or sales, and for the consideration, on the terms and subject to the conditions, if any, that in the judgment of the fiduciary are for the best interests of the estate and the beneficiaries of the estate, to sell, assign, transfer, convey, or exchange any real or personal property of the estate, or the estate's undivided interest in that property, or any specific part of or interest in that property, including, but not limited to, standing timber, rock, gravel, sand, growing crops, oil, gas and other minerals or mineral rights or interests, and to grant easements on real property of the estate, and to participate in the partition of real or personal property in which the estate has an undivided interest; and to accomplish any such transactions by contracts, endorsements, assignments, bills of sale, deeds or other appropriate written instruments executed and delivered by the fiduciary in behalf of the estate, and to acknowledge the execution of those instruments in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment of the execution of deeds when such acknowledgments are required or appropriate;
  7. For the consideration, on the terms and subject to the conditions, if any, that in the judgment of the fiduciary are for the best interests of the estate and the beneficiaries of the estate, to lease, for terms which may exceed the duration of the estate, any real or tangible personal property of the estate, or any specific parts of that property or interests in that property, including, but not limited to, oil, gas and other mineral leases; and to accomplish those leases by appropriate written instruments executed and delivered by the fiduciary in behalf of the estate, and acknowledge the execution of those instruments in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment of the execution of deeds when such acknowledgments are required or appropriate;
  8. In behalf of the estate, to borrow money; evidence those loans by promissory notes or other evidences of indebtedness signed by the fiduciary in the fiduciary's fiduciary capacity, to be binding upon the assets of the estate but not upon the fiduciary in the fiduciary's individual capacity; secure those loans by assigning or pledging personal property of the estate, or by mortgages or deeds of trust or other appropriate instruments imposing liens upon real property or tangible personal property of the estate; and repay those loans, including principal and interest due thereon;
  9. In behalf of the estate, to borrow money from the fiduciary in the fiduciary's individual capacity and secure those loans in the same manner as though they were made by a third person;
  10. To enter into contracts binding upon the estate, but not upon the fiduciary in the fiduciary's individual capacity, that are reasonably incident to the administration of the estate, and that the fiduciary in the exercise of the fiduciary's best judgment believes to be for the best interests of the estate;
  11. To settle, by compromise or otherwise, claims or demands against the estate, or held in behalf of the estate;
  12. To release and satisfy of record, in whole or in part, and enter of record credits upon, any mortgage or other lien constituting an asset of the estate;
  13. To abandon and charge off as worthless, in whole or in part, claims or demands held by or in behalf of the estate that, in the judgment of the fiduciary, are in whole or in part uncollectible;
  14. To pay taxes and excises lawfully chargeable against the assets of the estate that are in the possession or under the control of the fiduciary, including, but not limited to, ad valorem taxes upon real and personal property of the estate that became due and payable prior to the property coming into the hands of the fiduciary, or that become due and payable while the property remains in the fiduciary's possession or under the fiduciary's control; excluding, however, income taxes payable by distributees, assessed with respect to income that has been distributed by the fiduciary pursuant to the instrument;
  15. To repair and maintain in good condition real and tangible personal property of the estate so long as the property remains in the possession or under the control of the fiduciary;
  16. To invest liquid assets of the estate, and from time to time exchange or liquidate and reinvest such assets, pending distribution thereof, if and when such investments in the judgment of the fiduciary will not impede or delay distribution thereof pursuant to this instrument or as otherwise by law required, and in the judgment of the fiduciary are advisable and for the best interests of the estate and the beneficiaries thereof. In making such investments, the fiduciary shall be guided by the prudent investor rule, as authorized and defined in title 35, chapter 14; and the investments thus authorized shall be understood to include, but not to be limited to, loans secured by mortgages, or liens otherwise imposed, upon real or personal property;
  17. Subject to the making and keeping of appropriate records with respect to the investments, which will at all times clearly identify the equitable rights and interests of the estate in the investments, to invest funds of the estate in undivided interests in negotiable or nonnegotiable securities, or other assets, the remaining undivided interests in which are held by the fiduciary in a fiduciary capacity for the use and benefit of other beneficiaries;
  18. To retain investments that initially come into the hands of the fiduciary among the assets of the estate, without liability for loss or depreciation or diminution in value resulting from the retention, so long as in the judgment of the fiduciary it is not clearly for the best interests of the estate, and the distributees of the estate, that those investments be liquidated, although the investments may not be productive of income or otherwise may not be such as the fiduciary would be authorized to make;
  19. At any time and from time to time, to keep all or any portion of the estate in liquid form, uninvested, for such time as the fiduciary may deem advisable, without liability for any loss of income occasioned by so doing;
  20. To deposit funds of the trust in one (1) or more accounts carried by the fiduciary, in a clearly specified fiduciary capacity, in any one (1) or more banks and/or trust companies whose deposits are insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as now constituted or as that act may be amended; and if the fiduciary is itself a bank or a trust company, and is otherwise qualified, the fiduciary may serve as the depository;
  21. To deposit for safekeeping with any bank or trust company, including the fiduciary itself if the fiduciary is a bank or trust company, any negotiable or nonnegotiable securities or other documents constituting assets or records of the estate;
  22. To bring and prosecute or defend actions at law or in equity for the protection of the assets or interests of the estate or for the protection or enforcement of the instrument;
  23. To employ attorneys, accountants, investment managers and delegate investment authority to them or other persons whose services may be necessary or advisable, in the judgment of the fiduciary, to advise or assist the fiduciary in the discharge of the fiduciary's duties, or in the conduct of any business constituting an asset of the estate, or in the management, maintenance, improvement, preservation or protection of any property of the estate, or otherwise in the exercise of any powers vested in the fiduciary;
  24. To procure and pay premiums on policies of insurance to protect the estate, or any of the assets of the estate, against liability for personal injuries or property damage, or against loss or damage by reason of fire, windstorm, collision, theft, embezzlement or other hazards against which such insurance is normally carried in connection with activities or on properties such as those with respect to which the fiduciary procures such insurance;
  25. To allocate items of receipts or disbursements to either corpus or income of the estate, as the fiduciary in the exercise of the fiduciary's best judgment and discretion deems to be proper, without thereby doing violence to clearly established and generally recognized principles of accounting;
  26. In behalf of the estate, to purchase or otherwise lawfully acquire real or personal property, or undivided interests in property, the ownership of which, in the judgment of the fiduciary, will be advantageous to the estate, and the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the estate;
  27. To construct improvements on real property of the estate, or remove or otherwise dispose of improvements, when that action is in the judgment of the fiduciary advisable and for the best interests of the estate;
  28. To exercise in person or by proxy, with or without a power of substitution vested in the proxy, all voting rights incident to the ownership of corporate stock or the other securities constituting assets of the estate; and exercise all other rights and privileges incident to the ownership of those securities, including, but not limited to, the right to sell, exchange, endorse or otherwise transfer the securities, consent to, or oppose, reorganizations, consolidations, mergers or other proposed corporate actions by the issuer of the securities, exercise or decline to exercise options to purchase additional shares or units of the securities or of related securities, and pay all assessments or other expenses necessary in the judgment of the fiduciary for the protection of the securities or of the value of the securities;
  29. To employ any bank or trust company to serve as custodian of any securities constituting assets of the estate, and cause the securities (if they are nonassessable) to be registered in the name of the custodian or of its nominee, without disclosure that they are held in a fiduciary capacity; authorize the bank or trust company, as agent and in behalf of the fiduciary, to collect, receive and receipt for income derived from the securities, or the proceeds of sales, assignments or exchanges of the securities made by authority and under the direction of the fiduciary, and to remit to the fiduciary such income or other proceeds derived from the securities; and pay to the custodian reasonable and customary charges made by it for the performance of these services; provided, that any such action taken by the fiduciary shall not increase, decrease or otherwise affect the fiduciary's liability, responsibility or accountability with respect to the securities;
  30. To register nonassessable securities constituting assets of the estate in the name of the fiduciary or of the fiduciary's nominee, without disclosure that the securities are held in a fiduciary capacity, or hold the securities unregistered or otherwise in such form that the title thereto will pass by delivery, without, in any such case, increasing, decreasing or otherwise affecting the fiduciary's liability, responsibility or accountability with respect to the securities;
  31. In making distribution of capital assets of the estate to distributees of the estate under the instrument, except when otherwise required by other provisions of the instrument, to make the distribution in kind or in cash, or partially in kind and partially in cash, as the fiduciary finds to be most practicable and for the best interests of the distributees; distribute real property to two (2) or more distributees in division, or to partition real property for the purpose of distribution, as the fiduciary in the exercise of the fiduciary's best judgment finds to be most practicable and for the best interests of the distributees; and determine the value of capital assets for the purpose of making distribution of the assets if and when there is more than one (1) distributee of the assets, which determination shall be binding upon the distributees unless clearly capricious, erroneous and inequitable;
      1. To inspect and monitor property to which the fiduciary takes legal title, including interests in sole proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations and any assets owned by such business enterprises, for the purpose of determining compliance with environmental laws affecting the property, and respond or take any other action necessary to prevent, abate or clean up, on behalf of the trust or estate as is necessary, before or after the initiation of enforcement action by any governmental body, any actual or threatened violation of any environmental laws affecting property held by the fiduciary relating to hazardous substances or environmental laws;
      2. To refuse to accept property in trust if the fiduciary determines that any property to be donated to a trust estate is contaminated by any hazardous substances, or the property is being used or has been used for any activities, directly or indirectly involving hazardous substances, that could result in liability to the trust or estate or otherwise impair the value of the assets held in the trust;
      3. To settle or compromise, at any time, any and all claims against the estate or trust that may be asserted by any governmental body or private party involving the alleged violation of any environmental laws affecting property held in the estate or trust;
      4. To disclaim any power granted by any document or any statute or rule of law that, in the sole discretion of the fiduciary, may cause the fiduciary to incur personal liability under any environmental laws; and
      5. To decline to serve as fiduciary if the fiduciary reasonably believes that there is or may be a conflict of interest between it in its fiduciary capacity and in its individual capacity because of potential claims or liabilities that may be asserted against it on behalf of the estate or trust resulting from the type or condition of assets held therein.
      1. The fiduciary shall be entitled to charge the cost for any inspection, insurance, review, abatement, response or cleanup, or any other remedial action, as authorized in this subdivision (32), against the income or principal of the estate or trust and shall not be personally responsible for that cost. The fiduciary shall not be personally liable to any beneficiary or any other party for any decrease in value or exhaustion of assets in the estate or trust by reason of the fiduciary's compliance with any environmental laws, specifically including any reporting requirements under environmental laws.
      2. While acting in good faith and according to traditional fiduciary standards, the fiduciary shall not be considered an “owner,” “operator” or other party otherwise liable for violation of environmental laws unless the fiduciary has actually caused or contributed to the violation.
    1. For the purposes of this subdivision (32), “hazardous substances” means any substance defined as hazardous or toxic or otherwise regulated by any federal, state or local law, rule or regulation relating to the protection of the environment or human health. Such laws are referred to in this subdivision (32) as “environmental laws”; and
  32. To do any and all other things, not in violation of any other terms of the instrument, that, in the judgment of the fiduciary, are necessary or appropriate for the proper management, investment and distribution of the assets of the estate in accordance with the instrument, and in the fiduciary's judgment are for the best interests of the estate and its beneficiaries.

Acts 1963, ch. 110, § 3; T.C.A., § 35-618; Acts 1991, ch. 182, § 2; 1999, ch. 491, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act referred to in subdivision (20) is compiled generally in 12 U.S.C.

The common law prudent man rule, formerly referred to in this section, is obsolete and was deleted in 2002 when the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, compiled in title 35, chapter 14, was enacted.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 755, 992, 1018, 1019.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), Nos. 4-305 — 4-307, 4-501 — 4-506, 4-612.

Tennessee Jurisprudence. 14 Tenn. Juris., Guardian and Ward, § 9.

Law Reviews.

The Family Trust in Estate Planning in Tennessee (Herman E. Taylor), 16 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 32.

Vesting of Title in Probate Estate: The Curious Meaning of Words (Dan Holbrook), 38 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 26 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction With Other Sections.

While co-conservators could rely on the catch-all provision in subsection (33) in order to exercise the necessary judgment to do what they believe to be in the conservatee's best interest with respect to the powers transferred to them by order, they may not use that provision to expand the powers transferred to them beyond those specifically mentioned in the order in contravention of former§ 34-13-107 (now § 34-3-107). In re Buda, 252 B.R. 125, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 904 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).

2. Actions Inappropriate.

Personal representative improperly assumed the responsibility for environmental remediation on property the estate did not own because no claim was filed against the estate, T.C.A. § 30-2-310, and the decedent never held an ownership interest in the property; even if there had been a valid claim, the will did not expressly, or by incorporation of T.C.A. § 35-50-110, give the personal representative the power to enter into contracts on behalf of the estate, settle or compromise claims or demands, or abate environment hazards on property of the estate. In re Estate of Ledford, 419 S.W.3d 269, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

3. Trustees' Discretion.

Because the trust did not specify the manner of distribution upon termination, the trustees could, in their discretion and in accordance with the statute, sell the real estate and distribute the net proceeds in equal shares to the beneficiaries. In re Farmer Family Trust, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

Collateral References.

Application of cy pres doctrine to trust for promulgation of particular political or philosophical doctrines. 67 A.L.R.3d 417.

Payment or distribution under invalid instruction as breach of trustee's duty. 6 A.L.R.4th 1196.

35-50-111. Fiduciary bond on interest.

Whenever a fiduciary, as defined in § 35-2-102, is required by law to execute a bond for assets placed with a financial institution in the form of a bank, trust company or savings and loan association, and the fiduciary agrees with the institution not to withdraw the principal of the assets, the bond required of the fiduciary shall be for the amount of the interest. No bond adjustment is necessary if the principal, or a portion of the principal, is withdrawn with court approval. The authorization for elimination of bond on the principal so deposited with the financial institution shall not apply unless the agreement by the fiduciary with the institution is approved by the court charged with administering the funds or the estate of the minor, and unless the agreement is filed in and enforced by the court.

Acts 1976, ch. 675, § 2; T.C.A., § 35-621.

35-50-112. Impairment of marital deduction prohibited.

No executor, trustee or other fiduciary may take, or refuse to take, any action, or make or retain any investment, the result of which would defeat an otherwise available marital deduction under the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), or under the laws of this state, if the obvious and expressed intent of the testator or settlor was to take advantage of this deduction. After May 23, 1977, this section applies to all acts or investments, by all executors, trustees or other fiduciaries, as to all wills and trusts, whenever these instruments were executed or created.

Acts 1977, ch. 336, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A., § 35-622; Acts 1985, ch. 140, § 33.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 960, 992.

Law Reviews.

Some Whys and Wherefores of Will-Drafting — Revised (Robert L. McMurray), 15 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 2 (1979).

35-50-113. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-113 (Acts 1983, ch. 87, § 2; T.C.A., § 35-623), concerning transfer of beneficiary's interest and trust, was repealed by Acts 1985, ch. 140, § 1.

35-50-114. Powers exercisable by majority — Liability.

  1. Unless it is otherwise provided by an instrument under which the fiduciaries are acting, or an amendment of the instrument, or by court order, any power vested in three (3) or more fiduciaries, other than the power to remove a fiduciary, may be exercised by a majority of those fiduciaries; but no fiduciary who has not joined in exercising a power shall be liable to the beneficiaries or to others for the consequences of that exercise, nor shall a dissenting fiduciary be liable for the consequences of an act in which that fiduciary joins at the direction of the majority fiduciaries, if the fiduciary expressed the dissent in writing to the cofiduciaries at or before the time of the joinder.
  2. Nothing in this section excuses a cofiduciary from liability for inactivity in the administration of the estate or trust nor for failure to attempt to prevent a breach of trust.
  3. As used in this section, “fiduciary” is construed to mean the one (1) or more personal representatives, whether male, female or corporate, of a testamentary estate.
  4. This section is effective with regard to all estates and trusts under administration on or after April 8, 1985, regardless of the date of the instruments under which administration is being carried out or when administration began.

Acts 1985, ch. 154, § 1; 2004, ch. 537, § 106.

35-50-115. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-115 (Acts 1985, ch. 139, § 4; 1988, ch. 872, § 2) concerning revocation of inter vivos trust agreements by divorce or annulment, was revoked in its entirety by Acts 1992, ch. 951, § 12, effective July 1, 1985.

35-50-116. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-116 (Acts 1987, ch. 322, § 20), concerning the revocation of trust agreement by appointee, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 100, effective July 1, 2004.

35-50-117. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-117 (Acts 1987, ch. 301, § 1), concerning the judicial division or consolidation of trusts, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 101, effective July 1, 2004.

35-50-118. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-118 (Acts 1988, ch. 657, § 1), concerning trusts for care of animals, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 102, effective July 1, 2004.

35-50-119. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-119 (Acts 1988, ch. 854, § 16; 1999, ch. 491, § 10), concerning notification of trust beneficiaries, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 103, effective July 1, 2004.

35-50-120. Blind trust.

  1. A trust shall be considered a “blind trust” if the trust is created to benefit an individual, the individual's spouse or any dependent child and is under the management and control of a trustee who is a bank or trust company authorized to exercise fiduciary powers, a licensed attorney or a broker who:
    1. Is independent of and not associated with any party interested in the trust;
    2. Is not or has not been an employee of any interested party or any organization affiliated with any interested party, and is not a partner of, or involved in any joint venture or other investment with any interested party; and
    3. Is not a relative of any party.
  2. There shall be no communications direct or indirect between the trustee and an interested party with respect to the trust unless the communication is in writing, except for communications that solely consist of requests for distributions of cash or other unspecified assets of the trust. The written communications shall be limited to the general financial interest and needs of the interested party including, but not limited to, an interest in maximizing income or long-term capital gain.
  3. The interested parties shall make no effort to obtain information with respect to the holdings of the trust, including obtaining a copy of any trust tax return filed or any information relating to the trust, except as may be needed by the interested parties in order to file tax returns.
  4. Any trustee of a trust as provided in this section for an interested party that is required to make disclosures under title 8, chapter 50, part 5, shall make to the best of the trustee's knowledge such disclosures as are required or be subject to the penalties provided in § 8-50-505.
  5. This section does not apply to any “blind trust” or other trust or financial arrangement or agreement having the same effect or status as a “blind trust” in existence prior to May 12, 1988. All such trusts, arrangements or agreements shall continue to operate in accordance with the terms and conditions under which they were created.

Acts 1988, ch. 951, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence. 24 Tenn. Juris., Trusts and Trustees, § 2.

35-50-121. Delayed receipt of trust corpus.

Any trust agreement or declaration of trust may be valid even if no corpus is delivered to the trustee at the time of execution of the instrument if the trustee has the right to receive corpus at a later time or times from the trustor, the trustor's estate or other persons or sources.

Acts 1989, ch. 288, § 4.

35-50-122. Generation-skipping tax — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Generation-skipping tax” means the generation-skipping transfer tax imposed by chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §§  2601 et seq.);
    2. “Internal Revenue Code” means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and successor provisions and codifications of that Code;
    3. “Trust” means any express trust, with additions, wherever and however created, or any separate share of a trust, and includes any arrangement, other than an estate, that, although not a trust, has substantially the same effect as a trust; and
    4. “Trustee” means an original, additional or successor trustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by a court, and, in the case of an arrangement that is not a trust but is treated as a trust for purposes of the generation-skipping tax, includes the person in actual or constructive possession of the property subject to the arrangement.
  2. A trustee is authorized, but not required, to divide any trust into two (2) or more separate trusts, of equal or unequal value, in order to create one (1) or more trusts entirely exempt from the generation-skipping tax and one (1) or more trusts entirely subject to the generation-skipping tax. Other terms and provisions of both trusts will remain substantially identical in all respects to the original trust.
  3. The purpose of this section is to authorize a trustee to take appropriate action to preclude or minimize to the extent possible the imposition of the generation-skipping tax, and this section shall be broadly construed to carry out this purpose.
  4. A trustee may exercise the authority granted in this section without prior approval or leave of any court.
  5. Any trustee who in good faith acts or fails to act shall not be liable to any person for taking or failing to take any action authorized by this section.
  6. This section applies to any trust that may be subject to chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Acts 1991, ch. 192, § 1; 1997, ch. 407, § 7; 2004, ch. 866, § 8.

35-50-123. Powers of fiduciaries.

Each fiduciary, as defined in § 35-2-102, has the powers enumerated in § 35-50-110(32).

Acts 1992, ch. 951, § 13.

35-50-124. Limited power of trustee — Beneficiary — Application.

    1. Due to the potential conflict of interest that exists between a trustee who is a beneficiary and other beneficiaries of the trust, any power conferred upon a trustee, other than the settlor of a revocable or amendable trust:
      1. To make discretionary distributions of either principal or income to or for the benefit of the trustee, except to provide for that trustee's health, education, maintenance, or support as described under Internal Revenue Code §§ 2041 and 2514 (26 U.S.C. §§  2401 and 2514);
      2. To make discretionary allocations of receipts or expenses as between principal and income, unless the trustee acts in a fiduciary capacity whereby the trustee has no power to enlarge or shift any beneficial interest except as an incidental consequence of the discharge of the trustee's fiduciary duties;
      3. To make discretionary distributions of either principal or income to satisfy any legal support obligations of the trustee; or
      4. To exercise any other power, including the right to remove or to replace any trustee, so as to cause the powers enumerated in subdivision (a)(1)(A), (B) or (C) to be exercised on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a beneficiary who is also a trustee,

        cannot be exercised by that trustee.

    2. Any of the foregoing proscribed powers that are conferred upon two (2) or more trustees may be exercised by the trustees who are not so disqualified. If there is no trustee qualified to exercise the power and the document creating the trust does not include authority for the appointment of an independent trustee, any party in interest, as defined in subsection (c), may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to appoint an independent trustee and the power may be exercised by the independent trustee appointed by the court.
  1. This section applies to any trust unless application of the statute would cause the loss of a marital or charitable deduction or loss of generation skipping transfer tax exemption or the terms of the trust either:
    1. Refer specifically to this section and provide expressly to the contrary;
    2. Clearly indicate an intent by the settlor of the trust or testator of a will to grant the trustee who is also a beneficiary the power in question to accomplish a particular beneficial tax result; or
    3. Contain language similarly limiting the powers of a trustee who is also a beneficiary.
  2. For the purpose of subsection (a) or (b):
    1. If the trust is revocable or amendable and the settlor is not incapacitated, the party in interest is the settlor.
    2. If the trust is revocable or amendable and the settlor is incapacitated, the party in interest is the settlor's legal representative under applicable law or the settlor's donee under the durable power of attorney that is sufficient to grant such authority.
    3. If the trust is not revocable or amendable, the parties in interest are:
      1. Each trustee then serving;
      2. Each income beneficiary then in existence or, if any such beneficiary has not attained majority or is otherwise incapacitated, the beneficiary's natural guardian or other legal representative under applicable law or the beneficiary's donee under a durable power of attorney that is sufficient to grant such authority; and
      3. Each remainder beneficiary then in existence or, if any such remainder beneficiary has not attained majority or is otherwise incapacitated, the beneficiary's natural guardian or other legal representative under applicable law or the beneficiary's donee under a durable power of attorney that is sufficient to grant such authority.
  3. A person who has the right to remove or replace a trustee does not possess nor may that person be deemed to possess, by virtue of having that right, the powers of the trustee that is subject to removal or to replacement.

Acts 1997, ch. 439, § 1; 2000, ch. 893, §§ 1-4.

35-50-125. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-125 (Acts 1999, ch. 263, § 1; 2000, ch. 893, §§ 5-7), concerning written agreements on provisions of trust or powers and duties of corporate trustee, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 104, effective July 1, 2004.

35-50-126. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 35-50-126 (Acts 2000, ch. 893, § 8), concerning the certification of trust, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 537, § 105, effective July 1, 2004.

35-50-127. Release of personal health information to determine capacity.

Where it is necessary, under the terms of a trust to determine the mental or physical incapacity of a patient, a healthcare provider may release personal health information to a licensed physician or licensed attorney at law if the physician or attorney at law signs and furnishes the healthcare provider with an affidavit that the release of information is necessary to determine the mental or physical incapacity of the patient, or of the settlor, or of the donor, or of the trustee, or of the agent or other fiduciary under a trust that was signed by the patient where incapacity causes the document to come into effect, discontinues its effect or calls for a change in a fiduciary acting under the document.

Acts 2004, ch. 866, § 9.

Cross-References. Release of personal health information to determine capacity, § 34-6-111.