Chapter 1. General Provisions.

§§ 16.1-1 through 16.1-35.1.

Repealed by Acts 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.

Chapter 2. County Courts.

§§ 16.1-36 through 16.1-51.

Repealed by Acts 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.

Chapter 3. Municipal Courts.

§§ 16.1-52 through 16.1-63.

Repealed by Acts 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.

Chapter 4. Joint Operation of Courts.

§§ 16.1-64 through 16.1-69.

Repealed by Acts 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.

Chapter 4.1. District Courts.

Transition Provisions.

Districts; District Courts and Judges.

Administration and Supervision of the District Courts.

Judges and Personnel of the District Courts.

Financing of the District System.

Retention and Disposition of District Court Records.

Article 1. Transition Provisions.

§ 16.1-69.1. Repealing clause.

All acts and parts of acts, all sections of this Code, and all provisions of municipal charters, inconsistent with the provisions of this title, as amended, are, except as herein otherwise provided, repealed to the extent of such inconsistency.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

The numbers of §§ 16.1-69.1 through 16.1-69.52 were assigned by the Virginia Code Commission, the numbers in the 1972 act having been 16.1-1.1 through 16.1-1.52.

Cross references. - For constitutional provision as to authority of General Assembly with regard to courts, see Va. Const., Art. IV, § 14.

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 16. Miscellaneous Proceedings. § 16.05 General District Courts. Bryson.

Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1. Courts. § 1.05 District Courts. Friend.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Courts, §§ 41, 43.

CASE NOTES

Repeal of conflicting provisions of municipal charters. - Repealed § 16.1-1, which was identical to this section, codified a well-established principle of municipal law, in that it provided for the repeal, to the extent necessary, of all provisions of municipal charters inconsistent with State law. Jones v. Kelly, 347 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1972).

§ 16.1-69.2. Effect of repeal of Title 16 and amendment of Title 16.1.

The repeal of Title 16 effective as of July 1, 1956, and amendment of Title 16.1 effective as of July 1, 1973, shall not affect any act or offense done or committed, or any penalty or forfeiture incurred, or any right established, accrued or accruing on or before such day, or any prosecution, suit or action pending on that day. Every such pending prosecution, suit and action shall be proceeded in, tried and determined in the same court, or in the court which succeeds to or has its jurisdiction, and any further action taken therein shall be valid and effective for all purposes, whether taken by the court in its present or former name or by the judge thereof under his present or former judicial title. All further proceedings therein shall conform, as far as practicable, to the provisions of Title 16.1, as amended.

(1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 16.1-69.3. Certain notices, recognizances and processes validated.

Any notice given, recognizance taken, or process or writ issued before July 1, 1973, shall be valid although given, taken or to be returned to a day after such date, or to a court established by this title or the clerk's office thereof, in like manner as if this title, as amended, had been effective before the same was given, taken or issued.

(1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 16.1-69.4. References to former sections, articles or chapters of Title 16 or Title 16.1 as amended.

Whenever in this title any of the conditions, requirements, provisions or contents of any section, article or chapter of Title 16, as such title existed prior to July 1, 1956, or Title 16.1, as such title existed prior to July 1, 1973, are transferred in the same or in modified form to a new section, article or chapter, and whenever such former section, article or chapter is given a new number in this title, all references to any such former section, article or chapter of Title 16 or Title 16.1 appearing elsewhere in this Code other than in this title shall be construed to apply to the new or renumbered section, article or chapter containing such conditions, requirements, provisions or contents or portions thereof.

(1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 16.1-69.5. Meaning of certain terms.

Unless the context should otherwise require, the terms set out in this section shall be construed as follows:

  1. "Courts not of record" shall mean all courts in the Commonwealth below the jurisdictional level of the circuit courts including general district courts and juvenile and domestic relations district courts;
  2. "General district courts" shall mean all courts not of record, except juvenile and domestic relations district courts in counties and cities heretofore designated as county and municipal courts;
  3. "Juvenile and domestic relations district courts" shall mean all courts in counties and cities heretofore designated as juvenile and domestic relations courts or regional juvenile and domestic relations courts;
  4. "District courts" shall mean general district courts and juvenile and domestic relations district courts;
  5. "County courts" and "municipal courts" shall be deemed to refer to general district courts;
  6. "Juvenile and domestic relations courts" and "regional juvenile and domestic relations courts" shall be deemed to refer to juvenile and domestic relations district courts; and
  7. "Chief judge" shall mean that judge so designated for a term to assume primary administrative responsibility for the general district courts or the juvenile and domestic relations district courts in the district served by such judge.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Law review. - For essay, see "Terminating Parental Rights through a Backdoor in the Virginia Code: Adoptions Under section 63.2-1202 (H)," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 371 (2013).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 2A M.J. Attachment and Garnishment, § 24; 5A M.J. Courts, §§ 41, 44.

CASE NOTES

General district court is "court of record" for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a). - The general district court of Virginia is a "court of record" for the purpose of affording a judgment lien creditor the special protections contained in § 6323(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 6323(a)). Air Power, Inc. v. United States, 741 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1984).

A juvenile and domestic relations court is a court of record for purposes of the provision in the Bankruptcy Code exempting from discharge obligations of the debtor arising out of an order of child support issued by a court of record. Croteau v. Croteau (In re Croteau), 246 Bankr. 254, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 302 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).

Subject matter jurisdiction. - Because a juvenile and domestic relations (JDR) district court had no jurisdiction to hear a petition related to consent for adoption that was not a parental placement adoption, a circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction at all to hear the appeal as the circuit court had no more subject matter jurisdiction than the JDR district court had in that court's original proceeding. Knight v. Ottrix, 69 Va. App. 519, 820 S.E.2d 411, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (2018).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Inapplicable to juvenile and domestic relations cases. - That §§ 16.1-106 and 16.1-113 do not apply to appeals from juvenile and domestic relations district courts is made clear by § 16.1-77, which gives general district courts exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases involving claims of $3,000 or less and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of civil cases involving claims above $3,000, and by § 16.1-69.5 (b), which defines "general district courts" as all courts not of record, except juvenile and domestic relations district courts. Commonwealth v. Neal, 58 Va. Cir. 205, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 142 (Richmond 2002).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Demurrer. - A demurrer can be filed in both general district courts and circuit courts to challenge the legal sufficiency of a cause of action. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of Delegates, No. 14-078, 2015 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (2/4/15).

Article 2. Districts; District Courts and Judges.

§ 16.1-69.6. Establishment of districts.

On and after July 1, 1973, the Commonwealth shall be divided into districts encompassing all counties and cities in the Commonwealth to provide a basis for the sound and efficient administration of the courts not of record, as follows:

  1. The City of Chesapeake shall constitute the first district.
  2. The City of Virginia Beach shall constitute the second district.

    (2-A) The Counties of Accomack and Northampton shall constitute district two-A.

  3. The City of Portsmouth shall constitute the third district.
  4. The City of Norfolk shall constitute the fourth district.
  5. The Cities of Franklin and Suffolk and the Counties of Isle of Wight and Southampton shall constitute the fifth district.
  6. The Cities of Emporia and Hopewell and the Counties of Prince George, Surry, Sussex, Greensville and Brunswick shall constitute the sixth district.
  7. The City of Newport News shall constitute the seventh district.
  8. The City of Hampton shall constitute the eighth district.
  9. The Cities of Williamsburg and Poquoson and the Counties of York, James City, Charles City, New Kent, Gloucester, Mathews, Middlesex, King William and King and Queen shall constitute the ninth district.
  10. The Counties of Cumberland, Buckingham, Appomattox, Prince Edward, Charlotte, Lunenburg, Mecklenburg and Halifax shall constitute the tenth district.
  11. The City of Petersburg and the Counties of Dinwiddie, Nottoway, Amelia and Powhatan shall constitute the eleventh district.
  12. The City of Colonial Heights and the County of Chesterfield shall constitute the twelfth district.
  13. The City of Richmond shall constitute the thirteenth district.
  14. The County of Henrico shall constitute the fourteenth district.
  15. The City of Fredericksburg and the Counties of King George, Stafford, Spotsylvania, Caroline, Hanover, Lancaster, Northumberland, Westmoreland, Richmond and Essex shall constitute the fifteenth district.
  16. The City of Charlottesville and the Counties of Madison, Greene, Albemarle, Fluvanna, Goochland, Louisa, Orange and Culpeper shall constitute the sixteenth district.
  17. The County of Arlington and the City of Falls Church shall constitute the seventeenth district.
  18. The City of Alexandria shall constitute the eighteenth district.
  19. The City of Fairfax and the County of Fairfax shall constitute the nineteenth district.
  20. The Counties of Loudoun, Fauquier and Rappahannock shall constitute the twentieth district.
  21. The City of Martinsville and the Counties of Patrick and Henry shall constitute the twenty-first district.
  22. The City of Danville and the Counties of Pittsylvania and Franklin shall constitute the twenty-second district.
  23. The Cities of Roanoke and Salem and the County of Roanoke shall constitute the twenty-third district.
  24. The City of Lynchburg and the Counties of Nelson, Amherst, Campbell and Bedford shall constitute the twenty-fourth district.
  25. The Cities of Covington, Lexington, Staunton, Buena Vista, and Waynesboro and the Counties of Highland, Augusta, Rockbridge, Bath, Alleghany, Botetourt and Craig shall constitute the twenty-fifth district.
  26. The Cities of Harrisonburg and Winchester and the Counties of Frederick, Clarke, Warren, Shenandoah, Page and Rockingham shall constitute the twenty-sixth district.
  27. The Cities of Galax and Radford and the Counties of Pulaski, Wythe, Carroll, Montgomery, Floyd, Giles, Bland and Grayson shall constitute the twenty-seventh district.
  28. The City of Bristol and the Counties of Smyth and Washington shall constitute the twenty-eighth district.
  29. The Counties of Tazewell, Buchanan, Russell and Dickenson shall constitute the twenty-ninth district.
  30. The City of Norton and the Counties of Wise, Scott and Lee shall constitute the thirtieth district.
  31. The Cities of Manassas and Manassas Park, and the County of Prince William shall constitute the thirty-first district.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 297; 1976, c. 126; 1977, c. 5; 1983, c. 149; 1986, c. 405; 1987, c. 624; 1992, c. 744; 2006, c. 861; 2016, cc. 164, 312.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1992, c. 744, which amended this section, provides that the amendment shall be effective at midnight on December 31, 1992, provided that the consolidation of the County of Alleghany and the City of Clifton Forge shall have been ordered by the Circuit Court of Alleghany prior to that date. However, the consolidation proposal failed when it was presented by referendum. Thus, by direction of the Virginia Code Commission, the amendment to this section by Acts 1992, c. 744 was not given effect.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 861 deleted "The City of South Boston and" at the beginning of subdivision (10) and deleted "Clifton Forge" following "Buena Vista" in subdivision (25).

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendments by cc. 164 and 312 are identical, and substituted "City of Lynchburg" for "Cities of Lynchburg and Bedford" in subdivision (24).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 356.

§ 16.1-69.6:1. Number of judges.

For the several judicial districts there shall be full-time general district court judges and juvenile and domestic relations district court judges, the maximum number as hereinafter set forth, who shall during their service reside within their respective districts, except as provided in § 16.1-69.16, and whose compensation and powers shall be the same as now and hereafter prescribed for general district court judges and juvenile and domestic relations district court judges.

The maximum number of judges of the districts shall be as follows:

Juvenile and Domestic General District Court Relations District Judges Court Judges First 4 4 Second 7 6 Two-A 2 1 Third 2 3 Fourth 6 5 Fifth 3 2 Sixth 5 3 Seventh 4 4 Eighth 3 3 Ninth 3 4 Tenth 3 3 Eleventh 3 3 Twelfth 5 6 Thirteenth 6 5 Fourteenth 5 5 Fifteenth 8 9 Sixteenth 4 6 Seventeenth 3 2 Eighteenth 2 2 Nineteenth 12 8 Twentieth 4 3 Twenty-first 2 2 Twenty-second 2 4 Twenty-third 4 5 Twenty-fourth 3 6 Twenty-fifth 4 5 Twenty-sixth 5 7 Twenty-seventh 5 5 Twenty-eighth 3 3 Twenty-ninth 2 3 Thirtieth 2 3 Thirty-first 5 5

The election or appointment of any district judge shall be subject to the provisions of § 16.1-69.9:3.

(1974, c. 1; 1975, c. 41; 1976, c. 56; 1977, c. 5; 1978, c. 2; 1979, c. 7; 1980, c. 93; 1981, c. 26; 1982, c. 4; 1983, c. 1; 1985, c. 44; 1986, c. 75; 1987, c. 16; 1988, c. 22; 1989, c. 44; 1990, c. 112; 1992, c. 91; 1993, cc. 8, 31; 1994, c. 89; 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., cc. 3, 7; 1995, c. 20; 1996, c. 121; 1997, c. 16; 1998, c. 2; 1999, c. 11; 2000, c. 43; 2001, c. 16; 2004, Sp. Sess. I, c. 4; 2005, cc. 189, 228, 951; 2006, cc. 34, 488; 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 2; 2014, cc. 812, 822; 2016, c. 728; 2018, cc. 126, 135; 2020, cc. 343, 586.)

Third Judicial District General District Court judgeships. - Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822 reduced the number of General District judges from 3 to 2. Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the General District Court of the Third Judicial District shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2014, of any judge of that court."

Editor's note.

Acts 1989, c. 44, cl. 2 provides that the portion of Acts 1989, c. 44, relating to the twentieth judicial district is effective April 1, 1989, and that the remainder of the act is effective July 1, 1989.

Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1 and Acts 1996, c. 616, c. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822 reduced the number of General District judges from 3 to 2. Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the General District Court of the Fifth Judicial District shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2014, of any judge of that court." That number was increased to 3 again in 2018 (and 3 judges currently sit on that bench).

Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822 reduced the number of General District judges from 8 to 6. Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the General District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2014, of any judge of that court; except that the number of authorized judgeships in the General District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District shall be reduced to seven on the effective date of this act." Clause 5 refers to the reduction of judges from 8 to 6 in the 13th General District, with the reduction from 8 to 7 being immediate. This clause has been triggered because there are now only six judges on the bench in the 13th General District.

Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822 reduced the number of General District judges from 5 to 3. Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the General District Court of the Twenty-fifth Judicial District shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2014, of any judge of that court; except that the number of authorized judgeships in the General District Court of the Twenty-fifth Judicial District shall be reduced to four on the effective date of this act." Effective July 1, 2018, Acts 2016, c. 728, increases the number of General District judges in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District from "3" to "4." A 4th judge was elected in during the 2019 Session.

Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822 reduced the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District judges from 5 to 4. Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 7 provides: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2014, of any judge of that court." That number was increased to 5 again in 2018, and a 5th judge was elected during the 2019 session.

Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822 reduced the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District judges from 8 to 7. Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 8 provides: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2014, of any judge of that court." Effective July 1, 2018, Acts 2016, c. 728, increases the number of judgeships in the Nineteenth Judicial District from "7" to "8."

Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 10 provides: "That the Chief Justice shall utilize her authority to designate any judge serving in any circuit or district where the number of authorized judgeships is reduced under this act after July 1, 2014, to provide judicial assistance to any circuit or district court, as appropriate."

The 1998 amendment, increased the number of general district court judges in the second district from 6 to 7, increased the number of juvenile and domestic relations district court judges in the third district from 2 to 3, and in the fourth and thirteenth districts from 4 to 5, and deleted the former paragraph following the twelfth district entry which stated: "The juvenile and domestic relations district court judges of the twelfth district shall render assistance on a regular basis to the juvenile and domestic relations court judges of the thirteenth district by appropriate designation."

The 1999 amendment increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges from six to seven in the Second District, increased the number of General District Court Judges from three to four in the Seventh District, increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges from five to six in the Fifteenth District, increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges from three to four in the Sixteenth District, increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges from four to five in the Twenty-fourth District, increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges from three to four in the Twenty-fifth district, and increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges from three to four in the Twenty-sixth district.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 43 increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges in the fourteenth district from three to four; and inserted the paragraph of text between the fourteenth and fifteenth districts.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 16, in the table listing number of judges in a district, under the heading "General District Court Judges" substituted "4" for "3" in the Sixth and Seventeenth district, and under the heading "Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges" substituted "3" for "2" in the Eighth district and "5" for "4" in the Twelfth district; and deleted "The juvenile and domestic relations district court judges of the fourteenth judicial district shall render assistance on a regular basis to the juvenile and domestic relations district court judges of the twelfth judicial district by appropriate designation" preceding the entries for the "Fifteenth District."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 4, as amended by Acts 2005, c. 951, and Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 2, effective July 1, 2004, in the table listing number of judges in a district, under the heading "Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges" substituted "7" for "6" in the Fifteenth district and "4" for "3" in the Twenty-seventh district.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendments by cc. 189 and 228 are identical, and in the table listing number of judges in a district, under the heading "General District Court Judges" substituted "6" for "5" in the Fifteenth district and under the heading "Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges" substituted "3" for "2" in the Twentieth district.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendments by cc. 34 and 488 are identical, and in the table listing number of judges in a district, under the heading "General District Court Judges" substituted "11" for "10" in the Nineteenth district, "4" for "3" in the Twentieth district, and "5" for "4" in the Twenty-seventh district and under the heading "Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judges" substituted "4" for "3" in the Seventh district, "5" for "4" in the Fourteenth district, "8" for "7" in the Nineteenth district, and "5" for "4" in the Twenty-sixth district.

The 2014 amendments. The 2014 amendments by cc. 812 and 822 are identical and inserted "maximum" in the first sentence of the first paragraph and in the second paragraph, and rewrote the table.

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 728, effective July 1, 2018, substituted "8" for "7" in the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District judgeships in the Nineteenth Judicial District and substituted "4" for "3" in the number of General District judgeships in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 126 and 135 are identical, and in the table, increased by one the number of General District Judges in Two-A, fifth, sixth, twenty-first, and twenty-eighth districts, and increased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Judges by one in the sixth, thirteenth, and thirtieth districts, and decreased the number of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Judges by one in the second, tenth, and fifteenth districts.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 343 and 586 are identical, and increased the number of General District Court judges in the Nineteenth district from "11" to "12" in the table.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 356.

§ 16.1-69.7. District courts.

On and after July 1, 1973, in every county and city there shall be one court which shall be called the "................................................... (Name of County .......... General District Court" and one court which shall be called the or City) "............................................................ Juvenile and (Name of County or City)

Domestic Relations District Court," and for each such court there shall be one or more judges who shall be called the judge of such general district court or juvenile and domestic relations district court as appropriate. Unless the General Assembly specifically so provides to the contrary, however, no general district court shall be established in any city in which there is no municipal court with general civil or criminal jurisdiction in operation prior to July 1, 1973, and jurisdiction previously exercised in such city by a county court shall be vested in the general district court of such county.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 356, 372.

§ 16.1-69.7:1. Establishment of certain district courts.

  1. On and after July 1, 1973, there shall be established in the City of Galax, one general district court and one juvenile and domestic relations district court and for each such court there shall be one or more judges who shall be appointed and serve in accordance with Chapter 4.1 (§ 16.1-69.1 et seq.) of Title 16.1. Such courts shall possess all the jurisdiction and exercise all the powers and authority in cases therein granted to district courts according to general law, within the territory which they serve.
  2. Each such judge shall cause to be collected such costs and fees as allowed by law for services performed by judges, clerks, or employees of the district courts. All fines and fees collected shall be accounted for according to general law and city ordinances and paid into the treasury of the city or to the State, whichever may be entitled thereto, pursuant to § 16.1-69.48.

    (1976, c. 319.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 16.1-69.8. Existing courts continued and redesignated; exception.

The present system of courts not of record is continued as follows on and after July 1, 1973:

  1. The county court in each county shall continue as the general district court of such county with the same powers and with territorial jurisdiction over such county and over any city within the county for which a municipal court with general civil or criminal jurisdiction or separate general district court has not been established.
  2. The municipal court or courts in each city, excluding juvenile and domestic relations courts, shall continue as the general district court of the city with the same powers and territorial jurisdiction over such city; provided that in the case of more than one such municipal court in operation in any city, all such courts shall be merged on July 1, 1973, and their powers and territorial jurisdiction merged in the general district court.
  3. The juvenile and domestic relations court of each county and city shall continue as the juvenile and domestic relations district court of the county or city with the same powers and territorial jurisdiction as heretofore provided.
  4. The municipal court of any town and/or other court of any town having general civil and criminal jurisdiction however called shall be abolished and all jurisdiction and power conferred upon any such court shall pass to and be exercised by the district courts having jurisdiction over the county wherein the town is located.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 2018, c. 164.)

Cross references. - For constitutional provision as to authority of General Assembly with regard to courts, see Va. Const., Art. IV, § 14.

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 164, in subsection (b), deleted "courts of limited jurisdiction established pursuant to Chapter 5 ( § 16.1-70 et seq.) of this title and" preceding "juvenile and domestic relations."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal & Error, § 356.

§ 16.1-69.9. Judges in office continued; terms of judges; how elected or appointed.

Every judge or justice and every associate, assistant and substitute judge or justice of a court not of record in office January 1, 1973, shall continue in office as a judge or substitute judge of such court under its designation as a general district court or juvenile and domestic relations district court until the expiration of the term for which he was appointed or elected, or until a vacancy shall occur in his office or until a successor shall be appointed or elected, whichever is the latter.

Upon the expiration of such terms, or when a vacancy occurs, successors shall be elected only as authorized pursuant to §§ 16.1-69.10 and 16.1-69.14 and for the term and in the manner following:

  1. With respect to terms expiring on or after July 1, 1980, successors to judges shall be elected for a term of six years by the General Assembly as provided in subdivision 2.

    Any vacancy in the office of any full-time district court judge shall be filled for a full term of six years in the manner prescribed herein; provided that such vacancy shall not be filled except as provided in § 16.1-69.9:3.

  2. Full-time district court judges shall be elected by the majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly. No person shall be elected or reelected to a subsequent term under this section until he has submitted to a criminal history record search and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received by the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. If the person has not met the requirement of filing in the preceding calendar year a disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 or 30-111, he shall also provide a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 to the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The judges of the circuit court having jurisdiction over the district may nominate a panel of no more than three persons for each judgeship within the district who are deemed qualified to hold the office. The General Assembly may consider such nominations in electing a judge to fill the office but may elect a person not on such panel to fill the office. Nominations shall be forwarded to the clerks of both houses of the General Assembly on or before December 15.
  3. No person with a criminal conviction for a felony shall be appointed as a substitute judge.

    If an appointment is to be made by two or more judges and there is a tie vote, then the senior judge of the circuit court having jurisdiction in the district shall make the appointment.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 5; 1976, c. 374; 1977, c. 536; 1980, c. 194; 2004, c. 452; 2018, c. 578.)

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary” for "House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice” twice in subdivision 2. March 10, 2021.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 inserted the second sentence in subdivision (c); added subdivision (d); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578 redesignated subdivisions throughout; in subdivision 2, substituted "and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and a report of such search has been received" for "and a report of such search has been received" in the second sentence and inserted the third sentence.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on pleading and practice for the year 1972-1973, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1973).

For an article, "Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence," see 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 405 (2000).

§ 16.1-69.9:1. Appointment, terms, etc., of substitute judges.

  1. Substitute judges shall be appointed by the chief judge of the circuit court having jurisdiction within the district for a term of six years.
  2. Each substitute judge shall be appointed to serve every general district court and every juvenile and domestic relations district court within the judicial district for which the appointment is made.
  3. No person shall be appointed under this section until he has submitted his fingerprints to be used for the conduct of a national criminal records search and a Virginia criminal history records search, submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect, and provided a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 . No person with a criminal conviction for a felony shall be appointed as a substitute judge. (1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334; 2004, c. 452; 2018, c. 578.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section and the enactment of § 16.1-69.9:01, by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 added subsection (d).

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578 redesignated subdivisions throughout; added "submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect, and provided a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 " at the end of the first sentence in subsection C.

§ 16.1-69.9:2. Vacancies in office of judges; terms of successor judges; appointment while General Assembly not in session.

Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of a full-time district court judge the successor shall be elected for a full term of six years and upon qualification shall enter at once upon the discharge of the duties of his office. But subject to the provisions of § 16.1-69.9:3, the judges of the circuit having jurisdiction over the district shall have the power while the General Assembly is not in session to fill pro tempore vacancies in the office of full-time district court judges. Appointment to every such vacancy shall be by commission to expire at the end of thirty days after the commencement of the next session of the General Assembly.

(1973, c. 546; 1980, c. 194; 2001, c. 256.)

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 256 substituted "while the General Assembly is not in session" for "during the recess of the General Assembly" in the second sentence, and deleted "Such" at the beginning of the last sentence.

§ 16.1-69.9:3. Investigation and certification of necessity before vacancies filled.

When a vacancy occurs in the office of any judge of any district, the vacancy shall not be filled until, after investigation, the Committee on District Courts certifies that the filling of the vacancy is necessary. The Committee shall publish notice of such certification in a publication of general circulation among attorneys licensed to practice in the Commonwealth. No notice of retirement submitted under § 51.1-305 or § 51.1-307 shall be revoked after certification of the vacancy by the Committee. If the Committee certifies that the filling of the vacancy is not necessary, it shall direct the manner of distributing the work created by the vacancy, and the vacancy shall not be filled if not certified as necessary.

(1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 101; 1999, c. 319; 2004, c. 331.)

The 1999 amendment added the second sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 331 inserted the third sentence.

§ 16.1-69.9:4. Same; election of successor judges.

Whenever a vacancy occurs or exists in the office of a full-time district judge while the General Assembly is in session, or whenever the term of a full-time judge of a district court will expire or the office will be vacated at a date certain between the adjournment of the General Assembly and the commencement of the next session of the General Assembly, a successor judge may be elected at any time during a session preceding the date of such vacancy, by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly, for a full term of six years and, upon qualification, the successor judge shall enter at once upon the discharge of the duties of his office. However, such successor judge shall not enter upon the discharge of his duties prior to the commencement of his term of office. No person shall be elected or reelected to a subsequent term under this section until he has submitted to a criminal history record search and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received by the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. If the person has not met the requirement of filing in the preceding calendar year a disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 or 30-111, he shall also provide a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 to the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

(1973, c. 546; 1993, c. 368; 2004, c. 452; 2018, c. 578.)

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice." March 10, 2021.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 added the last sentence.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578 substituted "and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received" for "and a report of such search has been received" in the third sentence and added the last sentence.

Law review. - For an article, "Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence," see 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 405 (2000).

§ 16.1-69.10. Number of judges.

The number of general district court judges and juvenile and domestic relations district court judges, excluding substitute judges, shall be determined as follows:

  1. Judges in office on January 1, 1973, shall be permitted to complete their terms pursuant to § 16.1-69.9;
  2. [Repealed.]
  3. On and after January 1, 1974, the number of judges authorized in each district shall be determined by the General Assembly based on the requirement that all judges whose terms commence on and after July 1, 1980, serve on a full-time basis; and
  4. On and after July 1, 1980, the number of judges authorized in each district by the General Assembly shall be based on the requirement that no district judge whose term commences on or after July 1, 1980, shall be elected to serve in more than one district or to serve both a general district court and juvenile and domestic relations district court in any district; provided, however, that a judge may serve more than one general district court or more than one juvenile and domestic relations district court in one district. The Committee on District Courts shall make a study and report to the General Assembly on or before December 1 of each year on the number of judges needed and the districts for which they should be authorized. If the Committee recommends the creation of an additional judgeship in any district, it shall publish notice of such recommendation in a publication of general circulation among attorneys licensed to practice in the Commonwealth.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1980, c. 194; 1999, c. 319.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 1999 amendment added the last sentence in subdivision (d).

§ 16.1-69.11. Chief judges; judges; substitute judges.

Judges of the district courts shall be designated as follows:

  1. In each district there shall be one chief general district judge and one chief juvenile and domestic relations district judge who shall serve as such for a term of two years commencing July 1 of the even-numbered years. The chief district judges shall be designated by judges of the district court having jurisdiction in the district. If the designation is to be made by more than one judge and there is a tie vote, then the chief circuit judge having jurisdiction in the district shall make the designation. The incumbent chief judge shall call for an election at the conclusion of the term as chief judge and shall report the results of such election forthwith to the office of the Executive Secretary. The incumbent chief judge may succeed himself;
  2. Each judge, except substitute judges, shall be designated either general district court judge or juvenile and domestic relations district court judge depending on the court he is so designated to serve; the terms "associate judge" and "assistant judge" shall no longer be applicable and wherever such terms appear in the Code of Virginia they shall be deemed to refer to either general district court judges or juvenile and domestic relations court judges as appropriate;
  3. Substitute judges shall continue to be designated as such.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334; 1976, c. 374.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

§ 16.1-69.11:1. Acting chief judge.

If the chief judge of a district court is unable to perform the duties required by law, the chief judge shall notify the other judges of such district court, or if the chief judge is unable to notify the other judges, the judge longest in continuous service who is available shall provide such notice, and the judge longest in continuous service who is available shall be the acting chief judge, and perform such duties during the chief judge's absence. If two or more judges of such district court have served for the same period, the judge most senior in years shall be the acting chief judge. Upon assuming such duties, the acting chief judge shall immediately notify the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court and the other judges of such district court.

When the chief judge is able to resume the duties of chief judge, the chief judge shall immediately notify the Executive Secretary and the other judges of such district court, and thereupon shall resume such duties.

(2010, cc. 560, 596.)

§ 16.1-69.12. Limitations on practice of law by judges.

  1. A general district court judge or juvenile and domestic relations district court judge elected as a full-time judge for a term commencing on or after July 1, 1980, shall be prohibited from engaging in the practice of law.
  2. [Repealed.]
  3. Substitute judges shall not appear as counsel in any civil or criminal case arising out of the circumstances which were involved in any other case brought before them.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1980, c. 194.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

CASE NOTES

Purpose. - This section does not deal only with professional responsibility and matters of ethics. Rather, the enactment has as its dominant purpose the aim to prevent prejudice to members of the public who are litigants and to avert unfairness to persons involved in litigation. Blick v. Marks, Stokes & Harrison, 234 Va. 60 , 360 S.E.2d 345 (1987).

The practice of law by judges of courts not of record was not on its face incompatible with the proper administration of justice. Davis v. Sexton, 211 Va. 410 , 177 S.E.2d 524 (1970) (decided under former § 16.1-10).

When contracts arising from violation of subsection (c) void. - The General Assembly intended that sanctions under § 16.1-69.22 and under lawyer disciplinary procedures constitute adequate penalties for violation of subsection (c) of this section. Therefore, it is manifest the legislature did not intend that contracts arising from a bare violation of subsection (c) of this section be void, unless, however, a litigant has been prejudiced by the violation. Blick v. Marks, Stokes & Harrison, 234 Va. 60 , 360 S.E.2d 345 (1987).

Judge appearing as counsel in criminal case. - Former § 16.1-10 did not forbid a judge of the city of Radford from appearing as counsel in a criminal case in the twenty-second judicial circuit. Davis v. Sexton, 211 Va. 410 , 177 S.E.2d 524 (1970) (decided under former § 16.1-10).

Substitute county judge as defense counsel in state felony prosecution. - The duties of the office of a substitute county judge (now general district court judge) did not dictate an inevitable clash of interest when he acted as defense counsel in a state felony prosecution before a state judge in a court of record, under state law, by state prosecuting attorneys. Kost v. Cox, 317 F. Supp. 884 (W.D. Va. 1970) (decided under former § 16.1-20).

§ 16.1-69.13.

Repealed by Acts 2018, c. 164, cl. 2.

Editor's note. - Former § 16.1-69.13, pertaining to compensation and benefits of judges in office on July 1, 1973, for the duration of his term of office, and for each additional consecutive term thereafter, but not longer than July 1, 1980, was enacted by Acts 1972, c. 708, and amended by Acts 1973, c. 546.

§ 16.1-69.14. Number of substitute judges.

The number of substitute judges shall be determined as follows:

  1. Substitute judges in office on June 30, 1975, shall be permitted to complete their terms;
  2. Subject to the expiration of such terms, the Committee on District Courts shall determine the number of substitute judges for each district which shall be necessary for the effective administration of justice. In determining the total number of substitute judges authorized for each district, the Committee shall consider, among other factors, the number of full-time and part-time judges serving the district.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334.)

§ 16.1-69.15. Qualifications of judges.

On and after July 1, 1973, every full-time judge and substitute judge of a district court shall be at the time of his appointment or election a person licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Law review. - For note, "Limiting Judicial Incompetence: The Due Process Right to a Legally Learned Judge in State Minor Court Criminal Proceedings," see 61 Va. L. Rev. 1454 (1975).

§ 16.1-69.16. Residence requirements.

  1. Every judge or substitute judge of a district court shall, during his term of office, reside within the boundaries of the district in which he serves as set out in § 16.1-69.6; provided, that judges and substitute judges in office on January 1, 1977, or who are otherwise eligible may continue in office and shall be eligible for reappointment or reelection to successive terms in accordance with the provisions of § 16.1-69.10.
  2. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the residency requirement set out herein shall not apply to any judge whose residence prior to July 1, 1977, is outside the boundaries of a new district created by § 16.1-69.6, if such judge is a resident in the geographical area which encompassed the prior district. This provision shall also apply to any subsequent term for which he is elected.
  3. When the boundary of a judicial district is changed to create a new judicial district, any duly elected or appointed judge of the existing judicial district may continue to serve as judge of the new judicial district if he resides therein.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1977, c. 25; 1991, c. 403.)

§ 16.1-69.17. Oath of office of judges, clerks and others.

Every judge, substitute judge, clerk, deputy clerk, and juvenile and domestic relations probation officer of a juvenile and domestic relations district court shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take the oath required by law. The oath of the judge and substitute judge shall be taken before a clerk of a court of record to which appeals from his court lie or any judge, and the oath of the clerk and other officers of the court shall be taken before the judge of the court he serves. Any oath taken before a judge or clerk prior to July 1, 1992, and otherwise conforming with this section is valid.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1992, c. 390; 1992, Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1992, Sp. Sess., c. 1, cl. 2 provides: "That any oath taken before a judge or clerk prior to the effective date of this act [May 11, 1992] and otherwise conforming with this act is valid, and any official acts of the person taking such an oath are also valid."

Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

§ 16.1-69.17:1. Time within which a judge may qualify; failure to do so vacates office.

Any district court judge of this Commonwealth may qualify at any time after receiving his commission and before the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of his term of office; but if he fails to receive his commission until after the commencement of his term of office, he may qualify within thirty days from the date of receiving such commission. If a judge fails to qualify as above provided, his office shall be deemed to be vacant.

(1976, c. 374.)

§ 16.1-69.18. Bonds of judges, clerks, and others handling funds.

Before entering upon the performance of his duties every judge, substitute judge, clerk, deputy clerk or other officer or employee of a district court shall enter into bond before the clerk of a circuit court to which appeals from his court lie, except as hereinafter provided. The bond shall be in a penalty and with corporate surety approved by the judge of such appellate court. No such bond shall be in a penalty of less than $3,000, nor more than $75,000, and all such bonds shall be conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of the principal. The bonds shall be made payable to the Commonwealth and shall be filed with the clerk of such appellate court. Provided, however, that instead of specific bonds being given as stipulated herein, the Committee on District Courts may in their discretion procure faithful performance of duty blanket bonds for any or all of the districts enumerated in § 16.1-69.6 covering the judges, substitute judges, clerks and other personnel of the several district courts included in such districts and within the penalty limits contained in this section, unless in the discretion of the Committee, bonds with a larger maximum penalty should be obtained. Provided further, that in those instances where specific bonds for judges, clerks, deputy clerks or other officers or employees of a district court are in effect, the Committee on District Courts may, whenever they deem it advisable, terminate such specific bonds upon obtaining a blanket bond covering such court personnel with appropriate refund or credit being made for the unearned premiums on the specific bonds being terminated. A copy of any such blanket bond so procured shall be filed with the Division of Risk Management within the Department of Treasury and with the clerk of the respective circuit courts to which appeals from the decisions of the several district courts may lie. The premiums for such bonds shall be paid by the Commonwealth.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 3; 1975, c. 334; 2002, c. 406.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 406 substituted "Division of Risk Management within the Department of Treasury" for "State Comptroller" in the next-to-last sentence.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Clerks of Court, § 2.

§ 16.1-69.19. Incompatible offices.

No person shall at the same time hold the office of judge or substitute judge of a district court and the office of magistrate, clerk of a court, sheriff, treasurer, or commissioner of the revenue, or deputy of either of them. A full-time district court judge may not serve as a commissioner of accounts, commissioner in chancery or a marriage celebrant appointed by the circuit court pursuant to § 20-25 , nor shall such judge, during his continuance in office, seek or accept any nonjudicial elective office, or hold any other office of public trust or engage in any other incompatible activity. If any judge of a district court shall accept any office for which he is ineligible under this section, such acceptance shall vacate his office as judge of such court.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1976, c. 374; 1993, c. 312.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Clerks of Court, § 2.

§ 16.1-69.20.

Repealed by Acts 1973, c. 546.

§ 16.1-69.21. When substitute to serve; his powers and duties.

In the event of the inability of the judge to perform the duties of his office or any of them by reason of sickness, absence, vacation, interest in the proceeding or parties before the court, or otherwise, such judge or a person acting on his behalf shall promptly notify the appropriate chief district judge of such inability. If the chief district judge determines that the provisions of § 16.1-69.35 have been complied with or cannot reasonably be done within the time permitted and that no other full-time or retired judge is reasonably available to serve, the chief district judge may direct a substitute judge to serve as a judge of the court, which substitute may serve concurrently with one or more of the judges of the court or alone. When reasonably necessary, the chief district judge may designate a substitute judge from another district within the Commonwealth. The committee on district courts may adopt policies and procedures governing the utilization of substitute judges. In such event, those policies and procedures will, where applicable, control. While acting as judge, a substitute judge shall perform the same duties, exercise the same power and authority, and be subject to the same obligations as prescribed herein for the judge. A substitute judge shall retain the power to enter a final order in any case heard by such substitute judge for a period of 14 days after the date of a hearing of such case. While serving as judge of the court, the judge or the substitute judge may perform all acts with respect to the proceedings, judgments and acts of any other judge in connection with any action or proceeding then pending or theretofore disposed of in the court except as otherwise provided in this chapter in the same manner and with the same force and effect as if they were his own.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1983, c. 128; 1984, c. 570; 2017, c. 650; 2020, c. 118.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 650 deleted the former third sentence, which read: "In designating a substitute judge to serve, the chief district judge shall, whenever possible, select a substitute judge who does not regularly practice law in the court requiring the substitute"; and substituted "When reasonably necessary" for "Where reasonably available" in the third sentence.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 118 inserted the seventh sentence.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Consent for medical treatment of minor by substitute judge. - Without a specific appointment, a substitute judge is not a sitting judge, and therefore should not be called upon by a hospital seeking judicial consent for medical treatment of a minor. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Charles E. Poston, Judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit, 01-112 (2/28/02).

§ 16.1-69.22. Removal of judges and substitute judges.

Any judge or substitute judge of a district court may be removed from office in the manner and for any of the causes prescribed in Chapter 9 (§ 17.1-900 et seq.) of Title 17.1; provided, that substitute judges may be removed from office under the provisions of §§ 24.2-230 through 24.2-238 .

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Law review. - For proposal for the removal or retirement of unfit judges, see 54 Va. L. Rev. 554 (1968).

CASE NOTES

When contracts arising from violation of subsection (c) of § 16.1-69.12 void. - The General Assembly intended that sanctions under this section and under lawyer disciplinary procedures constitute adequate penalties for violation of subsection (c) of § 16.1-69.12. Therefore, it is manifest the legislature did not intend that contracts arising from a bare violation of subsection (c) of § 16.1-69.12 be void, unless, however, a litigant has been prejudiced by the violation. Blick v. Marks, Stokes & Harrison, 234 Va. 60 , 360 S.E.2d 345 (1987).

§ 16.1-69.22:1. Temporary recall of retired district court judges.

  1. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may call upon and authorize any judge of a district court who is retired under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) to (i) hear a specific case or cases pursuant to the provisions of § 16.1-69.35 with such designation to continue in effect for the duration of the case or cases or (ii) perform, for a period not to exceed ninety days at any one time, such judicial duties in any district court as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall deem in the public interest for the expeditious disposition of the business of such courts.
  2. It shall be the obligation of any retired judge who is recalled to temporary service under this section and who has not attained age seventy to accept the recall and perform the duties assigned. It shall be within the discretion of any judge who has attained age seventy to accept such recall.
  3. Any judge recalled to duty under this section shall have all the powers, duties, and privileges attendant on the position he is recalled to serve.

    (1990, c. 832; 2014, c. 776.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 776, effective April 23, 2014, in subsection A inserted "(i) hear a specific case or cases pursuant to the provisions of § 16.1-69.35 with such designation to continue in effect for the duration of the case or cases or (ii)."

CASE NOTES

Challenge to constitutionality of retirement system held properly dismissed. - Suit brought by four former Virginia judges for a declaration that certain provisions of the Commonwealth's judicial retirement system covering them were unconstitutional, both under the equal protection clause of Amendment Fourteen of the Federal Constitution and under the Virginia Constitution, held properly dismissed. Thompson v. Walker, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Virginia acted reasonably in setting up its recall system, whether it be obligatory or merely discretionary, for retired judges under 70 years of age. Thompson v. Walker, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Purpose of recall/retirement system. - The clear purpose of the recall/retirement system is to insure the availability of a pool of auxiliary judges so that Virginia courts can more effectively address the problem of case backlogs. This system of benefits and burdens is rationally calculated to achieve this legitimate purpose; its general structure is well within any limitations imposed by the equal protection clause. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

This section, by giving retired judges over 70 discretion to refuse recall, strikes a sensible balance between the needs of the recall system, on the one hand, and the realities of aging, on the other. The Constitution does not forbid this eminently reasonable accommodation of conflicting concerns. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Retired judge under 70 must serve if recalled. - The language of subsection D of former § 51-178 is plain and unmistakable. It could not be clearer: A retired judge under 70 must serve if recalled. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Retired judge who both received retirement benefits and appeared in Virginia courts violated former § 51-179 and Canon 8(C) (now 6 C) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, which incorporates and interprets this section. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Applied in Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va. App. 632, 751 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A retired judge may conduct civil commitment hearings when he has been recalled to duty by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia or he has been designated to hear and dispose of an action by a chief district judge. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable S. Lee Morris, Chief Judge, Portsmouth General District Court, 03-103 (12/18/03).

Retired judge. - A retired judge may perform marriages, even if he has voluntarily had his name removed from the Supreme Court's recall list; he is still a "retired judge" so long as he remains in good standing with the Supreme Court of Virginia, and is a "public official" subject to possible recall under §§ 16.1-69.22:1 or 17.1-106 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Colleen K. Killilea, Judge, Williamsburg / James City County General District Court, 15-044, 2016 Va. AG LEXIS 15 (9/1/16).

§ 16.1-69.23. In what cases judge disqualified.

If the judge or substitute judge of any district court:

  1. Be a party to an action;
  2. Be interested in the result of any action, otherwise than as resident or taxpayer of the city or county;
  3. Be related to any party to the action as spouse, grandparent, parent, father-in-law, mother-in-law, child, grandchild, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother, sister, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, first cousin, guardian or ward;
  4. Be a material witness for either party to the action;
  5. Be counsel for any party to the action;

    he shall not take cognizance thereof.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

§ 16.1-69.24. Contempt of court.

  1. A judge of a district court shall have the same powers and jurisdiction as a judge of a circuit court to punish summarily for contempt, but in no case shall the fine exceed $250 and imprisonment exceed 10 days for the same contempt. From any such fine or sentence, there shall be an appeal of right within the period prescribed in this title and to the court or courts designated therein for appeals in other cases, and the proceedings on such appeal shall conform in all respects to the provisions of §§ 18.2-456 through 18.2-459 .
  2. Any person charged with a felony offense, misdemeanor offense, or released on a summons pursuant to § 19.2-73 or 19.2-74 who fails to appear before any court or judicial officer as required shall not be punished for contempt under this provision but may be punished for such contempt under subdivision A 6 of § 18.2-456 . (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 2000, cc. 164, 185; 2019, c. 708.)

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendments by cc. 164 and 185 are identical, and substituted "$250" for "fifty dollars" in the first sentence.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 708 inserted the subsection A designation and added subsection B; and made stylistic changes.

CASE NOTES

No right of confrontation. - Because the provisions of § 16.1-69.24 and § 18.2-459 had to prevail over the more general provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136, a contemnor appealing an adjudication of summary contempt does not receive a trial de novo in the circuit court with attendant Sixth Amendment protections and, thus, does not have a Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in that summary contempt adjudication in the circuit court. Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222 , 657 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Va. LEXIS 23 (2008).

Construction with other laws. - Where the provisions of §§ 16.1-69.24 and 18.2-459 address the specific subject of appeals from summary contempt adjudications in the district courts, and the provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136 address the general subject of appeals from the district courts, to the extent that the more specific provisions of §§ 16.1-69.24 and § 18.2-459 are in conflict with the general provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136, the more specific statutes prevail. Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222 , 657 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Va. LEXIS 23 (2008).

Evidence sufficient to find contempt. - As to the September 1994 order, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that defendant willfully disobeyed that order, where defendant admitted at trial that she knew she was violating the order by removing her daughter from the Presbyterian home before the end of the program. Hanson v. Commonwealth, No. 2899-95-3, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 206 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 1, 1997).

Evidence insufficient to find contempt. - At the time of the circuit court trial de novo, defendant had completed the alcohol abuse treatment and was not shown to have willfully disobeyed the court's order; thus, the evidence was insufficient for the circuit court to find that defendant was in contempt of the juvenile court order. Hanson v. Commonwealth, No. 2899-95-3, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 206 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 1, 1997).

Issue not preserved for appeal. - Consideration of any challenge to the trial court's authority to find appellant in contempt of court or to that portion of the punishment was barred by Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18 where appellant not only failed to timely object to the trial court's authority to find him in contempt or the decision to strike any defenses to the fraudulent conveyance action, but had conceded that a contempt finding and punishment was appropriate. Parasidis v. Karageorge, No. 0714-15-4, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 365 (Dec. 8, 2015).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Construction with other laws. - Sections 16.1-69.24 and 18.2-459 explicitly allow appeals to the circuit courts from summary contempt convictions in the district courts, but not for dismissals; by necessary implication, subsection H of § 16.1-296 allows appeals from findings of civil or criminal contempt in the juvenile and domestic relations district courts for failure to pay support, as the statute establishes bond requirements for appeals. Huck v. Banfield, 94 Va. Cir. 182, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 167 (Norfolk Aug. 25, 2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Verbal direction to sheriff's deputies to take defendant into custody for a specified number of hours, is equivalent to a written order and therefore is binding upon the sheriff's office, and sheriff's deputies carrying out such orders enjoy the same qualified sovereign immunity they have when others are in their custody. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Dennis S. Proffitt, Sheriff, County of Chesterfield, 10-069, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 52 (8/30/10).

Prefiling review. - A district court may, pursuant to § 8.01-271.1 , impose a pre-filing review requirement if such a sanction is appropriate. Further, a district court has the inherent authority to limit or prevent an attorney or a litigant from practicing before it in the event the court determines, after a hearing, that the attorney or litigant has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law or otherwise has engaged in unprofessional or unethical conduct. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Barbara J. Gaden, Judge, Richmond General District Court, 10-068, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 51 (8/30/10).

§ 16.1-69.25. Judge may issue warrants, summons, and subpoenas.

Except as otherwise provided by general law, a judge of a district court may, within the scope of his general jurisdiction, issue warrants, summons, and subpoenas, including subpoenas duces tecum or other process, in civil, traffic and criminal cases, to be returned before his court, and may also issue fugitive warrants and conduct proceedings thereon in accordance with the provisions of §§ 19.2-99 through 19.2-104.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1994, c. 500; 2014, cc. 305, 310.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendments by cc. 305 and 310, are identical, and deleted "within the area which his court serves" following "jurisdiction."

§ 16.1-69.25:1. Judge shall order bill of particulars; time for motion.

Upon request of either party, a judge of a district court may direct the filing of a written bill of particulars at any time before trial and within a period of time specified in the order so requiring. Motions for bills of particulars in criminal cases before general district courts shall be made before a plea is entered and at least seven days before the day fixed for trial.

(1980, c. 338; 1998, cc. 482, 495.)

The 1998 amendments. - The 1998 amendments by cc. 482 and 495 are identical, and added "Upon request of either party" in the first sentence.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Bill of particulars approved. - Due to the unusual nature of the allegations and the sweeping, comprehensive relief that was requested, a motion for a bill of particulars was approved. Wiebel v. Hunt, 68 Va. Cir. 191, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 66 (Greene County 2005).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Commonwealth's Attorney may request a bill of particulars. - A Commonwealth's Attorney is authorized to request that a bill of particulars be ordered in a district court where a motion to suppress evidence has been filed but includes no factual basis for the motion. See opinion of Attorney General to the Honorable Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of Delegates, 13-051, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 69 (8/16/13).

Demurrer. - A demurrer can be filed in both general district courts and circuit courts to challenge the legal sufficiency of a cause of action. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of Delegates, No. 14-078, 2015 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (2/4/15).

§ 16.1-69.26. Judges as conservators of the peace.

The judge of each district court having criminal jurisdiction shall be a conservator of the peace within the limits of the territory in which he serves; and if such court is a city court, the judge thereof shall, except as otherwise provided by general law, also be a conservator of the peace for the area extending for one mile beyond the corporate limits of the city.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Cross references. - For provisions as to the powers and duties of conservators of the peace, see §§ 19.2-18 through 19.2-23.

§ 16.1-69.27. Additional powers of judges.

A judge of a district court may take affidavits and administer oaths and affirmations in all matters and proceedings, may issue all appropriate orders or writs, including orders appointing guardians ad litem in all proper cases, in aid of the jurisdiction conferred upon him, and may certify transcripts of the records and proceedings of the court for use elsewhere. But he shall have no authority to take acknowledgments to deeds or other writings for purposes of recordation.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

CASE NOTES

No authority to order transportation of prisoners in civil cases. - Nowhere in this statute, nor anywhere else in the statutes delineating the limited jurisdiction of the general district courts, is there a specific grant of the authority to order the transportation of prisoners to appear as witnesses in civil cases, while § 8.01-410 specifically grants the authority to issue prisoner transportation orders in civil cases to the circuit courts; as the more specific statute, § 8.01-410 prevails and only circuit courts are granted the authority to order the transportation of prisoners to appear in civil cases. Commonwealth ex rel. Virginia Dep't of Corrections v. Brown, 259 Va. 697 , 529 S.E.2d 96, 2000 Va. LEXIS 73 (2000).

§ 16.1-69.28. Commitment of insane, etc., persons.

A judge of a district court shall have and may exercise, concurrently with special justices appointed for the purpose, the jurisdiction conferred by general law upon justices, and special justices in all matters in connection with the adjudication and commitment of incapacitated persons, including drug-addicted and inebriate persons, and the institution and conduct of proceedings thereof. Such proceedings may be had at any place within the jurisdiction of the court over which such judge presides.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1997, c. 801.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1997, c. 801, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 1998. The powers granted and duties imposed pursuant to this act shall apply prospectively to guardians and conservators appointed by court order entered on or after that date, or modified on or after that date if the court so directs, without regard to when the petition was filed. The procedures specified in this act governing proceedings for appointment of a guardian or conservator or termination or other modification of a guardianship shall apply on and after that date without regard to when the petition therefor was filed or the guardianship or conservatorship created."

The 1997 amendment, effective January 1, 1998, substituted "incapacitated persons, including" for "legally incompetent" near the end of the first sentence.

§ 16.1-69.29. Jurisdiction over certain waters.

Where any river, watercourse or bay lies between any counties or any cities, or any county and city in this Commonwealth, the district courts therein, on each side, respectively, shall have concurrent territorial jurisdiction over so much thereof as shall be opposite to such counties and cities. And such courts for counties or cities lying on the waters bounding the Commonwealth shall have concurrent territorial jurisdiction respectively over such waters opposite such counties and cities, as far as the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth extends. But this section shall not apply to the City of Richmond.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 2005, cc. 45, 114.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendments by cc. 45 and 114 are identical, and substituted "City of Richmond" for "Cities of Richmond and Norfolk" at the end of the section.

Article 3. Administration and Supervision of the District Courts.

§ 16.1-69.30. District system within unified court system.

The district court system shall be within the unified court system of the Commonwealth subordinate to the Supreme Court and subject to the administrative supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

§ 16.1-69.31. The duties of the Judicial Council.

The duties of the Judicial Council with respect to the district court system shall include those set forth in §§ 16.1-69.6 through 16.1-69.12, and such other duties as may be assigned to the Council by law.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 2018, c. 164.)

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 164 substituted "16.1-69.12" for "16.1-69.13."

§ 16.1-69.32. Rules.

The Supreme Court may formulate rules of practice and procedure for the general district courts and juvenile and domestic relations district courts following consultation with the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the executive committee of the Judicial Conference of Virginia for District Courts. Such rules, subject to the strict construction of the provisions of § 8.01-3 , which shall be the only rules of practice and procedure in all the district courts in the Commonwealth, shall be included in the Code of Virginia as provided in § 8.01-3 , subject to revision by the General Assembly.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334; 1976, c. 306.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the Chairmen of the House and Senate Courts of Justice Committees." March 10, 2021.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 2; 11A M.J. Judgments & Decrees, § 119.

§ 16.1-69.32:1. Substitution of counsel.

Except in case of court-appointed counsel, no rule of court shall be made or construed so as to preclude substitution of counsel in civil and criminal cases in the district courts, nor shall any order or appearance in person, be required, to relieve original counsel of his duties in any such case. It shall be sufficient that new counsel represents to the court that the substitution is made pursuant to agreement by the parties represented and original counsel.

(1980, c. 434.)

§ 16.1-69.33. Committee on District Courts.

There is hereby established a Committee on District Courts to be composed of the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Delegates, the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee who shall be a member of the committee, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or his designee who shall be a memer of the committee, two members of the House Committee for Courts of Justice to be appointed by the chairman of the committee, and two members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to be appointed by the chairman of the committee, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia who shall be chair of the Committee, one judge of a circuit court, two general district court judges and two juvenile and domestic relations district court judges. The judicial members of the Committee on District Courts shall be made to give representation insofar as feasible to various geographic areas of the Commonwealth. The judicial members of the Committee on District Courts shall be appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of the Chief Justice.

The Committee shall meet at such times and places as it may from time to time designate for the purposes of authorizing the appointment of substitute judges pursuant to § 16.1-69.14, authorizing the establishment of clerks' offices in counties or cities as may be requisite, and establishing when such offices shall be open for business, authorizing the appointment of personnel for the district courts pursuant to Article 4 (§ 16.1-69.37 et seq.) of this chapter and establishing procedures for administrative review of appeals from personnel actions for district court personnel and magistrates, fixing salary classification schedules of court personnel pursuant to Article 5 (§ 16.1-69.44 et seq.) of this chapter and establishing vacation and sick leave for district court judges, district court personnel and magistrates, and for such other duties or matters as are now, or may hereafter be conferred upon the Committee by law. The Committee may also adopt an official seal and authorize its use by district court clerks and deputy clerks of the district courts. Such salary classification schedules, vacation and sick leave policies shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth.

The Committee on District Courts shall have sole authority and discretion in adjusting salary classification schedules for district court personnel. The Committee shall fix such salaries for the several district court personnel at least annually at such time as it deems it proper and as soon as practicable thereafter certify to the Comptroller and the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court a detailed statement of the salaries fixed by them for the several district courts and the effective date of any salary adjustments.

The Committee on District Courts shall appoint (i) a Clerk's Advisory Committee composed of two clerks from the general district courts and two clerks from the juvenile and domestic relations district courts; such appointments shall be made after giving due consideration to former clerks of county and municipal courts not of record; (ii) a Magistrate's Advisory Committee composed of two magistrates; such advisory committees are to make recommendations to the Committee regarding administrative functions of the district courts.

For the performance of their duties, the Committee shall be reimbursed out of the money appropriated for the adjudication of cases in the district trial courts for their actual expenses incurred in the performance of their duties and in addition, per diem compensation allowed for members of the General Assembly for each day spent in performing such duties; provided, however, that no additional compensation shall be paid to members of the judiciary serving on the Committee.

In the event of the establishment of personal liability of a district court judge or magistrate for the loss of property or money from a district court or magistrate's office by reason of robbery or burglary, the Committee on District Courts shall have the authority, after appropriate investigation and upon its determination that the individual judge or magistrate was not negligent in the performance of his duties, to reimburse such judge or magistrate to the extent of his personal liability on a warrant of the Comptroller issued as provided by law. However, such reimbursement shall not exceed $1,000 per claim. This paragraph shall apply to all claims arising on and after July 1, 1976.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, cc. 546, 547; 1974, cc. 333, 484; 1975, c. 334; 1976, cc. 52, 444; 1978, c. 133; 1984, c. 23; 1992, c. 497; 2001, c. 367; 2004, c. 330; 2008, c. 115; 2015, c. 331.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee who shall be a member of the committee, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or his designee who shall be a memer of the committee, two members of the House Committee for Courts of Justice to be appointed by the chairman of the committee, and two members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to be appointed by the chairman of the committee" for "the chairmen of the House and Senate Courts of Justice Committees or their designees who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees, two members of each of the Committees for Courts of Justice of each house, to be appointed by the chairman of their Committee" in the first paragraph. March 10, 2021.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 367, in the second paragraph, inserted "pursuant to Article 5 ( § 16.1-69.44 et seq.) of this chapter," deleted "pursuant to Article 5 ( § 16.1-69.44 et seq.) of this chapter, and sick leave for other" following "district court judges," deleted "full-time" preceding "magistrates," and added the last sentence; and deleted the former third paragraph, which read: "Every clerk, deputy clerk, bailiff, clerical assistant, other employee of each district court and full-time magistrate shall be allowed an annual vacation period with pay as follows: for the first year of service, one working day for each full calendar month of service, and upon completion of the second year, and each year thereafter, in addition to the one working day per month, one additional day of vacation for each complete year of service after the first, provided that the maximum number of days' vacation earned per year shall be twenty-four, and in no case shall any clerk, deputy clerk, bailiff, clerical assistant or other employee or magistrate be allowed to accumulate more than forty days' vacation time."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 330, in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, inserted "the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia who shall be chair of the Committee" and substituted "two general district court judges and two juvenile and domestic relations district court judges" for "one judge of a general district court and one juvenile and domestic relations district court judge"; and in the fourth paragraph, redsignated former clauses (1) and (2) as clauses (i) and (ii).

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 115 inserted "or their designees who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees" in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 331 added the second sentence of the second paragraph.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11B M.J. Justices and Magistrates, § 32.

§ 16.1-69.34.

Reserved.

§ 16.1-69.35. Administrative duties of chief district judge.

The chief judge of each district shall have the following administrative duties and authority with respect to his district:

  1. When any district court judge is under any disability or for any other cause is unable to hold court and the chief judge determines that assistance is needed:
    1. The chief district judge shall designate a judge within the district or a judge of another district court within the Commonwealth, if one is reasonably available, to hear and dispose of any action or actions properly coming before such district court for disposition;
    2. If unable to designate a judge as provided in subdivision 1 a, the chief district judge may designate a retired district judge eligible for recall pursuant to § 16.1-69.22:1 for such hearing and disposition if such judge consents; or
    3. If unable to assign a retired district court judge, the chief district judge may designate a retired circuit court judge eligible for recall pursuant to § 17.1-106 if such judge consents or the chief district judge may request that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court designate a circuit judge if such judge consents. If no judges are available under subdivision a, b or c, then a substitute judge shall be designated pursuant to § 16.1-69.21. While acting, any judge so designated shall have all the authority and power of the judge of the court, and his order or judgment shall, to all intents and purposes, be the judgment of the court. A general district court judge designated pursuant to subdivision 1 a, may, with his consent, substitute for or replace a juvenile and domestic relations district court judge, and vice versa. The names of the judges designated under subdivisions b and c shall be selected from a list provided by the Executive Secretary and approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
  2. The chief general district court judge of a district may designate any juvenile and domestic relations district court judge of the district, with the judge's consent, for an individual case or to sit and hear cases for a period of not more than one year, in any of the general district courts within the district. The chief juvenile and domestic relations district court judge of a district may designate any general district court judge of the district, with the judge's consent, for an individual case or to sit and hear cases for a period of not more than one year, in any of the juvenile and domestic relations district courts within the district. Every judge so designated shall have the same powers and jurisdiction and be authorized to perform the same duties as any judge of the district for which he is designated to assist, and, while so acting, his order or judgment shall be, for all purposes, the judgment of the court to which he is assigned.
  3. If on account of congestion in the work of any district court or when in his opinion the administration of justice so requires, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may, upon his own initiative or upon written application of the chief district court judge desiring assistance, designate a judge from another district or any circuit court judge, if such circuit court judge consents, or a retired judge eligible for recall, to provide judicial assistance to such district. Every judge so designated shall have the same powers and jurisdiction and be authorized to perform the same duties as any judge of the district for which he is designated to assist and while so acting his order or judgment shall be, to all intents and purposes, the judgment of the court to which he is assigned.
  4. Subject to such rules as may be established pursuant to § 16.1-69.32, the chief judge may establish special divisions of any general district court when the work of the court may be more efficiently handled thereby such as through the establishment of special civil, criminal or traffic divisions, and he may assign the judges of the general district court with respect to serving such special divisions. In the City of Richmond the general district court shall, in addition to any specialized divisions, maintain a separate division of such court in that part of Richmond south of the James River with concurrent jurisdiction over all matters arising in the City of Richmond.
  5. Subject to such rules as may be established pursuant to § 16.1-69.32, the chief judge shall determine when the district courts or divisions of such courts shall be open for the transaction of business. The chief judge or presiding judge of any district court may authorize the clerk's office to close on any date when the chief judge or presiding judge determines that operation of the clerk's office, under prevailing conditions, would constitute a threat to the health or safety of the clerk's office personnel or the general public. Closing of the clerk's office pursuant to this subsection shall have the same effect as provided in subsection B of § 1-210 . In determining whether to close because of a threat to the health or safety of the general public, the chief judge or the presiding judge of the district court shall coordinate with the chief judge or presiding judge of the circuit court so that, where possible and appropriate, both the circuit and district courts take the same action. He shall determine the times each such court shall be held for the trial of civil, criminal or traffic matters and cases. He shall determine whether, in the case of district courts in counties, court shall be held at any place or places in addition to the county seat or other place expressly authorized by statute. He shall determine the office hours and arrange a vacation schedule of the judges within his district, in order to ensure the availability of a judge or judges to the public at normal times of business. A schedule of the times and places at which court is held shall be filed with the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court and kept posted at the courthouse, and in any county also at any such other place or places where court may be held, and the clerk shall make such schedules available to the public upon request. Any matter may, in the discretion of the judge, or by direction of the chief district judge, be removed from any one of such designated places to another, or to or from the county seat or other place expressly authorized by statute, in order to serve the convenience of the parties or to expedite the administration of justice; however, any town having a population of over 15,000 as of July 1, 1972, having court facilities and a court with both general criminal and civil jurisdiction prior to July 1, 1972, shall be designated by the chief judge as a place to hold court.
  6. Subject to the provisions of § 16.1-69.38, the chief judge of a general district court or the chief judge of a juvenile and domestic relations district court may establish a voluntary civil mediation program for the alternate resolution of disputes. The costs of the program shall be paid by the local governing bodies within the district or by the parties who voluntarily participate in the program.

    (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1976, cc. 307, 444; 1978, c. 200; 1984, c. 570; 1987, c. 703; 1989, c. 264; 1991, cc. 177, 392; 1992, c. 387; 1995, c. 57; 2001, c. 494; 2003, c. 102; 2005, cc. 207, 839; 2006, c. 144; 2014, c. 776; 2017, cc. 37, 225; 2019, cc. 240, 321, 526.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 494 added the second, third, and fourth sentences in subdivision 5.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 102 inserted "consents or the chief district judge may request that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court designate a circuit judge if such judge consents" at the end of the first paragraph of subdivision 1 c; twice substituted "90" for "ninety" in subdivision 2; in subdivision 3, deleted "district court" following "designate a," inserted "or any circuit court judge, if such circuit court judge consents" following "another district," and deleted the former last sentence, which read: "If such a designation is made, the Chief Justice shall designate a general district court judge to sit in a general district court and a juvenile and domestic relations district court judge to sit in a juvenile and domestic relations district court"; and deleted former subdivision 7, which read: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the same judge shall be allowed to serve as both a general district judge and a juvenile and domestic relations district judge for the Counties of Accomack and Northampton."

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 207 substituted "one year" for "90 days" in two places in subdivision 2.

The 2005 amendment by c. 839, effective October 1, 2005, substituted "subsection B of § 1-210 " for " § 1-13.3:1" in subdivision 5.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 144 substituted "or when in his opinion the administration of justice so requires" for "there is in his opinion need therefor" in the first sentence of subdivision 3.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 776, effective April 23, 2014, in subdivision 1 b inserted "eligible for recall pursuant to § 16.1-69.22:1"; in subdivision 1 c inserted "eligible for recall pursuant to § 17.1-106 "; and in subdivision 3 inserted "eligible for recall" and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendments by cc. 37 and 225 are identical, and substituted "concurrent jurisdiction over all other criminal matters" for "exclusive jurisdiction over all other criminal matters" near the end of subdivision 4.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 240 inserted "or other place expressly authorized by statute" twice in subdivision 5.

The 2019 amendments by cc. 321 and 526 are identical, and substituted "over all matters arising in the City of Richmond" for "in civil matters whenever one or more of the defendants reside or the cause of action or any part thereof arises in that part of the city, concurrent jurisdiction over all traffic matters arising in that part of the city and concurrent jurisdiction over all other criminal matters arising in that part of the city" in subdivision 4.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia practice and pleading for the year 1975-1976, see 62 Va. L. Rev. 1460 (1976).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Transfer of county seat. - Should Augusta County decide to transfer the county seat to Verona, it would have to provide suitable quarters in Verona not only for the circuit court but for the district courts as well. Augusta Co Bd. of Supervisor v. Augusta Cnty. Courthouse, 90 Va. Cir. 68, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 26 (Augusta County Feb. 25, 2015).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Consent for medical treatment of minor by substitute judge. - Without a specific appointment, a substitute judge is not a sitting judge, and therefore should not be called upon by a hospital seeking judicial consent for medical treatment of a minor. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Charles E. Poston, Judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit, 01-112 (2/28/02).

A retired judge may conduct civil commitment hearings when he has been recalled to duty by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia or he has been designated to hear and dispose of an action by a chief district judge. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable S. Lee Morris, Chief Judge, Portsmouth General District Court, 03-103 (12/18/03).

Retired judge. - A retired judge may perform marriages, even if he has voluntarily had his name removed from the Supreme Court's recall list; he is still a "retired judge" so long as he remains in good standing with the Supreme Court of Virginia, and is a "public official" subject to possible recall under §§ 16.1-69.22:1 or 17.1-106 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Colleen K. Killilea, Judge, Williamsburg / James City County General District Court, 15-044, 2016 Va. AG LEXIS 15 (9/1/16).

§ 16.1-69.35:01. Location of district courts for Albemarle County.

The Albemarle General District Court and the Albemarle Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court may sit in the City of Charlottesville on property immediately across the street from the county courthouse.

(2019, c. 240.)

§ 16.1-69.35:1. Location of district courts for Carroll County.

The General District Court and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for Carroll County shall sit at the Carroll County Courthouse in Hillsville.

(1974, c. 508.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 16.1-69.35:2. Recording of proceedings in district courts.

An audio recording of proceedings in a general district court may be made by a party or his counsel.

(1985, c. 378; 2014, c. 268.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 268, substituted "An audio recording of proceedings" for "Proceedings" and "made" for "tape recorded."

§ 16.1-69.36. Where process returnable and trials held in certain cases.

All process, civil and criminal, returnable before a district court of a county shall, if the defendants or any of them reside in a city or town in which the court is held, be made returnable at the courtroom or place the court is held in such city or town, but if none of the defendants reside therein it shall be made returnable to the county seat, or to one of the other places where the court is held, whichever shall be nearer or more accessible to such defendant or defendants. If the process is made returnable to some other place than the county seat the place to which it is returnable shall be designated therein. For all jurisdictional requirements hereunder the county seat and each and all of the places designated for the holding of the court shall be deemed to be a part of each and every magisterial district in the county.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Transfer of county seat. - Should Augusta County decide to transfer the county seat to Verona, it would have to provide suitable quarters in Verona not only for the circuit court but for the district courts as well. Augusta Co Bd. of Supervisor v. Augusta Cnty. Courthouse, 90 Va. Cir. 68, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 26 (Augusta County Feb. 25, 2015).

Article 4. Judges and Personnel of the District Courts.

§ 16.1-69.37. Personnel continued in office.

The clerks, deputy clerks, referees, bailiffs and other officers and employees of county, municipal and juvenile and domestic relations courts shall continue in office in like positions with the general district courts and juvenile and domestic relations district courts until the expiration of the term, if any, for which elected or appointed. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to effect or authorize any reduction in the compensation of any such officer or employee during such term.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

§ 16.1-69.38. Authorization for substitute judges and personnel.

The Committee on District Courts established in § 16.1-69.33 shall, subject to the provision of § 16.1-69.37, establish guidelines and determine the necessity for the employment of substitute judges, clerks, deputy clerks and all other personnel of the district courts and authorize the employment of such personnel by the courts. For purposes of this chapter, the term "personnel," as related to the courts, shall not include probation officers and other social service officers of a juvenile and domestic relations district court. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall obtain pertinent personnel policies of local units of government as to personnel of courts not of record who become employees of district courts pursuant to this chapter, and he shall assist the Committee in the performance of its duties. The Committee may receive the advice and recommendations of the Executive Secretary with respect to authorization of personnel for the district courts, job classifications, salary scales, vacation and sick leave and related personnel matters.

The Committee may authorize the appointment of any personnel to serve one or more district courts within any district and in addition may authorize the clerk and deputy clerks of the circuit court of a political subdivision to serve as clerk and deputy clerks of one or more district courts within the political subdivision.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

§ 16.1-69.39. Appointment of personnel.

All personnel shall be appointed by, serve at the pleasure of, and be subject to removal by the chief judge of the district court in which they serve. In the event of any personnel authorized to serve in both a general district court and juvenile and domestic relations district court within any district, appointments and removals shall be made by the chief judges of such courts and in the event of a tie vote on any such matter the chief judges of the district shall certify such fact to the Committee on District Courts who shall decide the matter. The provisions of this section shall not be applicable in the event of authorization for any deputy circuit court clerk or deputy clerk to serve any district court. Personnel subject to the provisions of this article shall not be subject to the Virginia Personnel Act (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.).

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Clerks of Court, § 1.

CASE NOTES

No right to hearing prior to discharge. - The children's supervisor of a city juvenile detention home held his position pursuant to the pleasure of the judge of the juvenile court and had no right, either under the city charter or the Fourteenth Amendment, to a hearing prior to discharge. Jones v. Kelly, 347 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1972) ??? (decided under former § 16.1-145, relating to employment of personnel by juvenile court judges).

§ 16.1-69.39:1. Legal service to district court employees and magistrates.

All legal services for personnel of the district courts or magistrates in civil matters, including civil litigation, arising out of the performance of their duties, shall be provided by the office of the Attorney General. If, in the opinion of the Attorney General, it is impractical or uneconomical for such service to be rendered by his office, the Committee on District Courts may employ special counsel for such purpose, whose compensation shall be fixed by the Committee. The compensation for such special counsel shall be paid out of the funds appropriated for the administration of the district courts.

(1977, c. 94; 1980, c. 197.)

§ 16.1-69.40. Powers and duties of clerks; civil liability.

The clerk and deputy clerks shall be conservators of the peace within the territory for which the court has jurisdiction, and may, within such judicial district, issue warrants, detention orders, and other processes, original, mesne and final, both civil and criminal, commit to jail or other detention facility, or admit to bail upon recognizance, persons charged with crimes or before the court on civil petition, subject to the limitations set forth by law, and issue subpoenas for witnesses, writs of fieri facias and writs of possession and eviction, attachments and garnishments and abstracts of judgments. A record made in the performance of the clerk's official duties may be authenticated as a true copy by the clerk or by a deputy clerk without additional authentication by the judge to whom the clerk reports, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection B of § 8.01-391 .

No clerk or deputy clerk shall issue any warrant or process based on complaint of his spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, parent-in-law, child-in-law, brother, sister, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, first cousin, guardian or ward. They may take affidavits and administer oaths and affirmations, take and certify depositions in the same manner as a notary public, perform such other notarial acts as allowed under § 47.1-12 , take acknowledgments to deeds or other writings for purposes of recordation, and issue all other legal processes which may be issued by the judge of such court and exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as are conferred or imposed upon them by law. The clerk may also issue to interested persons informational brochures authorized by a judge of such court explaining the legal rights of such persons.

No clerk or deputy clerk shall be civilly liable for providing information or assistance that is within the scope of his duties.

The clerk shall develop, implement and administer procedures necessary for the efficient operation of the clerk's office, keep the records and accounts of the court, supervise nonjudicial personnel and discharge such other duties as may be prescribed by the judge.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 671; 1978, c. 463; 1983, c. 135; 1985, c. 99; 1989, c. 229; 2001, cc. 488, 499; 2019, cc. 180, 700.)

Cross references. - For provisions as to the powers and duties of conservators of the peace, see §§ 19.2-18 through 19.2-23.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 488 inserted "perform such other notarial acts as allowed under § 47.1-12 " near the middle of the second sentence of the second paragraph.

The 2001 amendment by c. 499 added the third paragraph.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendments by cc. 180 and 700 are identical, and in the first paragraph, inserted "and eviction" following "writs of possession."

CASE NOTES

Clerks not entitled to immunity for not providing assistance. - Where plaintiff estate administrator alleged a court clerk and deputy clerk were negligent and grossly negligent for failing to send a judge's competency restoration order regarding plaintiff's decedent to a mental hospital, the clerks were not entitled to immunity for providing assistance within the scope of their duties because plaintiff alleged that they did not provide any assistance. Adams v. Naphcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 438, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30644 (E.D. Va. 2017).

§ 16.1-69.40:1. Traffic infractions within authority of traffic violations clerk; schedule of fines; prepayment of local ordinances.

  1. The Supreme Court shall by rule, which may from time to time be amended, supplemented or repealed, but which shall be uniform in its application throughout the Commonwealth, designate the traffic infractions for which a pretrial waiver of appearance, plea of guilty and fine payment may be accepted. Such designated infractions shall include violations of §§ 46.2-830.1 , 46.2-878.2 and 46.2-1242 or any parallel local ordinances. Notwithstanding any rule of the Supreme Court, a person charged with a traffic offense that is listed as prepayable in the Uniform Fine Schedule may prepay his fines and costs without court appearance whether or not he was involved in an accident. The prepayable fine amount for a violation of § 46.2-878.2 shall be $200 plus an amount per mile-per-hour in excess of posted speed limits, as authorized in § 46.2-878.3 . Such infractions shall not include:
    1. Indictable offenses;
    2. [Repealed.]
    3. Operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic or habit-producing drug, or permitting another person, who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic or habit-producing drug, to operate a motor vehicle owned by the defendant or in his custody or control;
    4. Reckless driving;
    5. Leaving the scene of an accident;
    6. Driving while under suspension or revocation of driving privileges;
    7. Driving without being licensed to drive.
    8. [Repealed.]
  2. An appearance may be made in person or in writing by mail to a clerk of court or in person before a magistrate, prior to any date fixed for trial in court. Any person so appearing may enter a waiver of trial and a plea of guilty and pay the fine and any civil penalties established for the offense charged, with costs. He shall, prior to the plea, waiver, and payment, be informed of his right to stand trial, that his signature to a plea of guilty will have the same force and effect as a judgment of court, and that the record of conviction will be sent to the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles.
  3. The Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the Committee on District Courts, shall establish a schedule, within the limits prescribed by law, of the amounts of fines and any civil penalties to be imposed, designating each infraction specifically. The schedule, which may from time to time be amended, supplemented or repealed, shall be uniform in its application throughout the Commonwealth. Such schedule shall not be construed or interpreted so as to limit the discretion of any trial judge trying individual cases at the time fixed for trial. The rule of the Supreme Court establishing the schedule shall be prominently posted in the place where the fines are paid. Fines and costs shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code or any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder.
  4. Fines imposed under local traffic infraction ordinances that do not parallel provisions of state law and fulfill the criteria set out in subsection A may be prepayable in the manner set forth in subsection B if such ordinances appear in a schedule entered by order of the local circuit courts. The chief judge of each circuit may establish a schedule of the fines, within the limits prescribed by local ordinances, to be imposed for prepayment of local ordinances designating each offense specifically. Upon the entry of such order it shall be forwarded within 10 days to the Supreme Court of Virginia by the clerk of the local circuit court. The schedule, which from time to time may be amended, supplemented or repealed, shall be uniform in its application throughout the circuit. Such schedule shall not be construed or interpreted so as to limit the discretion of any trial judge trying individual cases at the time fixed for trial. This schedule shall be prominently posted in the place where fines are paid. Fines and costs shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code or any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder.

    (1977, c. 585; 1978, c. 605; 1979, c. 510; 1983, c. 388; 1994, c. 912; 1998, c. 209; 2000, c. 841; 2003, c. 282; 2004, c. 350; 2011, c. 694; 2017, c. 504; 2020, cc. 1227, 1246.)

Cross references. - As to doubling of otherwise applicable fines set forth in Rule 3B:2 in the case of a waiver of appearance and plea of guilty under § 16.1-69.40:1 or § 19.2-254.2 for a violation of Chapter 8 ( § 46.2-800 et seq.) of Title 46.2 in a designated highway safety corridor, see § 46.2-947.

Editor's note. - Acts 2003, c. 282, cl. 2, provides: "That the Supreme Court shall, when it promulgates regulations for prepayment of fines, require a higher prepayment fee for a violation of § 46.2-878.2 than for other infractions."

Acts 2020, cc. 1227 and 1246, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2021."

Acts 2020, cc. 1227 and 1246, cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 854 of the Acts of Assembly of 2019 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

The 1998 amendment added the second sentence in the first paragraph in subsection A.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 841, effective January 1, 2001, in subsection A, added the third sentence of the introductory paragraph and repealed subdivision (b).

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 282 substituted " § 46.2-1242 or any parallel local ordinance" for " § 46.2-1242 or any parallel local ordinances" in subsection A; and substituted "10" for "ten" in subsection D.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 350 added the last sentence in the first paragraph of subsection A.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 694, in subsection A, redesignated the subdivisions numerically; and in subsection D, made minor stylistic changes in the first sentence, and substituted "The chief judge" for "The judges" in the second sentence.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 504 inserted "46.2-830.1" and made related changes in the first paragraph in subsection A.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 1227 and 1246, effective January 1, 2021, are identical, and substituted "driving privileges" for "driver's license" in subdivision A 6; and deleted "or the appropriate offices of the State where he received his license to drive" following "Department of Motor Vehicles" at the end of subsection B.

§ 16.1-69.40:2. Nontraffic offenses for which prepayment authorized; schedules, fines; prepayment of local ordinances.

  1. The Supreme Court shall by rule, which may from time to time be amended, supplemented or repealed, but which shall be uniform in its application throughout the Commonwealth, designate the nontraffic offenses for which a pretrial waiver of appearance, plea of guilty and fine payment may be accepted. Such offenses shall not include:
    1. Indictable offenses;
    2. Class 1 or Class 2 misdemeanors;
    3. Offenses which involve moral turpitude;
    4. Any offenses involving injury to persons;
    5. Any offense punishable by incarceration or by a fine of more than $500.
  2. An appearance may be made in person or in writing by mail to a clerk of court or in person before a magistrate, prior to any date fixed for trial in court. Any person so appearing may enter a waiver of trial and plea of guilty and pay the fine established for the offense charged, with costs. He shall, prior to the plea, waiver and payment, be informed of his right to stand trial and that his signature to a plea of guilty will have the same force and effect as a judgment of court.
  3. The Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the Committee on District Courts, shall establish a schedule, within the limits prescribed by law, of the amounts of fines to be imposed upon prepayment of nontraffic offenses authorized as prepayable under subsection A, designating each offense specifically. The schedule, which may from time to time be amended, supplemented or repealed, shall be uniform in its application throughout the Commonwealth. Such schedule shall not be construed or interpreted so as to limit the discretion of any trial judge trying individual cases at the time fixed for trial. The Rule of the Court establishing the schedule shall be prominently posted in the place where the fines are paid. Fines and costs shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code or any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder.
  4. Local ordinances fulfilling the criteria set out in subsection A may be prepayable in a like manner if such ordinances appear in a schedule entered by order of the local circuit courts. The chief judge of each circuit may establish a schedule of the fines, within the limits prescribed by local ordinances to be imposed for prepayment of local ordinances designating each offense specifically. Upon the entry of such order it shall be forwarded within 10 days to the Supreme Court of Virginia by the clerk of the local circuit court. The schedule, which may from time to time be amended, supplemented or repealed, shall be uniform in its application throughout the circuit. Such schedule shall not be construed or interpreted so as to limit the discretion of any trial judge trying individual cases at the time fixed for trial. This schedule shall be prominently posted in the place where the fines are paid. Fines and costs shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code or any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder.

    (1978, c. 605; 1989, c. 421; 2011, c. 694.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 and 2 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, Item § 3-6.05, as added by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "PROCEDURES FOR PREPAYMENT OF CIVIL PENALTIES IN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Any civil penalty under § 44-146.17(1) shall be prepayable in the amount set by executive order and in accordance with § 16.1- 69.40:2 B of the Code of Virginia. Any civil penalty amount set by executive order shall not be construed or interpreted so as to limit the discretion of any trial judge trying individual cases at the time fixed for trial.”

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 694, in subsections C and D, deleted "of this section" following "subsection A"; in subsection D, substituted "The chief judge" for "The judges" in the second sentence, and made a minor stylistic change in the third sentence.

§ 16.1-69.40:3. Financial responsibilities of judges and clerks.

The judge of each district court shall have management responsibility over the collection and distribution of all funds received by such court; provided, however, that no judge or clerk shall incur personal liability for a shortage in such funds unless such shortage is a result of his negligence, failure to exercise appropriate supervision or intentional misconduct.

(1979, c. 511.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Clerks of Court, § 10.

§ 16.1-69.41.

Repealed by Acts 1974, c. 3.

Cross references. - For present provisions covering the subject matter of the repealed section, see § 16.1-69.18.

§ 16.1-69.42. Clerk when authorized by judge may execute appeal bonds; may make out and attest transcripts.

The clerk of a district court may, when authorized so to do by the judge of the court he serves, execute appeal bonds in appeals from judgment of the court. Any such clerk may make out and attest transcripts of the papers and records of the court for use in evidence elsewhere.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Clerks of Court, § 6.

§ 16.1-69.43. Judge before whom accused was arraigned may hear case on merits; judge who has heard part of case may hear case to conclusion.

No rule shall hereafter be promulgated under the limitations of § 8.01-4 or otherwise, which would avoid or preclude the judge before whom an accused is arraigned in criminal cases from hearing all aspects of the case on its merits, or to avoid or preclude any judge in any case who has heard any part of the case on its merits, from hearing the case to its conclusion; provided, however, another judge may hear portions of a case where a judge is required to disqualify himself, in cases in which a mistrial is declared, or in cases which have been reversed on appeal, or in the event of sickness, disability or vacation of the judge. The parties to any suit, action, cause or prosecution may waive the provisions of this section. Such waiver shall be entered of record.

(1973, c. 546.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 38.

Article 5. Financing of the District System.

§ 16.1-69.44. Salaries of judges.

Each district court judge shall be paid by the Commonwealth an annual salary which shall be fixed in the general appropriation acts and set at an amount equal to ninety percent of the annual salary fixed by state law for judges of the circuit courts.

Each substitute judge of a district court shall receive for his services a per diem compensation of $200 except when such judge sits pursuant to the provisions of Title 37.2, in which case compensation shall be limited to that provided in § 37.2-804 . The judge replaced may certify that the substitute judge is entitled to $100 if the substitute judge acted in his official capacity for less than a full court docket or served less than four hours. A full-time judge elected to an initial term after January 1, 1974, shall also be prohibited from engaging in the practice of law.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 612; 1976, cc. 374, 459, 667; 1979, c. 445; 1980, c. 536; 1984, c. 570; 1993, c. 327; 1999, c. 730.)

The 1999 amendment, in the second paragraph, substituted "$200" for "$150" and substituted "$100" for "seventy-five dollars."

§ 16.1-69.45. Salaries of clerks and personnel.

The Committee on District Courts shall fix the salaries for the clerks and personnel of the district courts. Any county or city may supplement the salaries of the clerks and other personnel of the district court wholly out of local funds. However, no supplements may be paid to full-time district court judges or substitute judges. The Commonwealth shall assume the cost of any supplement being paid to a district court employee on January 1, 1980.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334; 1976, c. 667; 1980, c. 613; 2008, cc. 349, 804; 2012, c. 62.)

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 349 and 804 are identical, and substituted "judges or substitute judges. The Commonwealth" for "judges, substitute judges or district court employees; provided that the Commonwealth" in the second sentence.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 62 inserted the second sentence and inserted "However" in the third sentence.

§ 16.1-69.46. How salaries payable.

All salaries determined according to the provisions of §§ 16.1-69.44 and 16.1-69.45 and any salary payment required by § 16.1-69.37 shall be payable by the Commonwealth, except any supplements paid to district court employees. All annual salaries shall be paid in semimonthly installments within the limits fixed by the Committee.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 2008, cc. 349, 804; 2018, c. 164.)

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 349 and 804 are identical, and inserted "except any supplements paid to district court employees" at the end of the first sentence; deleted "such" preceding "annual salaries" in the second sentence; and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 164 deleted "16.1-69.13 or" preceding "16.1-69.37."

§ 16.1-69.47.

Repealed by Acts 1980, c. 194.

§ 16.1-69.47:1. Travel expenses of judges and clerks; how paid.

Any judge or clerk traveling more than five miles from the courthouse in the city or county in which he resides on court business shall be entitled to reimbursement by the Commonwealth for such of his actual expenses as are necessarily and ordinarily incidental to such travel. If conveyance is by public transportation, reimbursement shall be at the actual cost thereof. If conveyance is by private transportation, reimbursement shall be at the rate established for members of the General Assembly.

(1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334; 1978, c. 404.)

§ 16.1-69.48. Fees and fines.

  1. All fees collected by the judge, substitute judge, clerk or employees, but not including fees belonging to officers other than the judge, clerk or employees, of a general district court or juvenile and domestic relations district court shall be paid promptly to the clerk of the circuit court who shall pay the same into the state treasury. Fees collected for services of the attorney for the Commonwealth shall be paid by the clerk of the circuit court, one-half of such fee shall be paid into the treasury of the county or city in which the offense for which warrant issued was committed, and the other one-half of such fees shall be paid by such clerk on his monthly remittance into the state treasury.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, fines collected for violations of city, town or county ordinances shall be paid promptly to the clerk of the circuit court who shall tender such collected fines on a monthly basis directly to the city, town or county whose ordinance has been violated and not to the state treasury. All fines collected for violations of the laws of the Commonwealth shall be paid promptly to the clerk of the circuit court who shall pay the same into the state treasury.
  3. The word "fees" as used in this section shall include all moneys from every source, exclusive of monthly bank charges, and except collections for child support or support for a spouse or parent, including by way of illustration, but not limited to, the fees collected pursuant to §§ 15.2-1627.3 , 16.1-69.48:1, 18.2-268.1 through 18.2-268.12 , 18.2-271.1 , 19.2-163, 19.2-368.18, 29.1-551 , 46.2-383 , 46.2-1135 , 46.2-1137 and 46.2-1138.1 . (1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1976, c. 465; 1977, c. 385; 1978, c. 611; 2006, c. 305; 2016, c. 244.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2020, c. 1289, Item 39 I, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess, I, c. 552, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of § 16.1-69.48, Code of Virginia, the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall ensure the deposit of all Commonwealth collections directly into the State Treasury for Item 42 General District Courts, Item 43 Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts, Item 44 Combined District Courts, and Item 45 Magistrate System."

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 305 redesignated subsections (a) through (c) as A through C; and inserted "exclusive of monthly bank charges, and" in subsection C.

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 244 rewrote the first sentence of subsection B, which read: "Fines collected for violations of city, town or county ordinances shall be paid promptly to the clerk of the circuit court who shall pay monthly into the treasury of the city, town or county whose ordinance has been violated."

§ 16.1-69.48:1. Fixed fee for misdemeanors, traffic infractions and other violations in district court; additional fees to be added.

  1. Assessment of the fees provided for in this section shall be based on (i) an appearance for court hearing in which there has been a finding of guilty; (ii) a written appearance with waiver of court hearing and entry of guilty plea; (iii) for a defendant failing to appear, a trial in his or her absence resulting in a finding of guilty; (iv) an appearance for court hearing in which the court requires that the defendant successfully complete traffic school, a mature driver motor vehicle crash prevention course, or a driver improvement clinic, in lieu of a finding of guilty; (v) a deferral of proceedings pursuant to § 4.1-305 , 4.1-1120 , 16.1-278.8, 16.1-278.9, 18.2-57.3 , 18.2-251 , 19.2-298.02, 19.2-303.2, or 19.2-303.6; or (vi) proof of compliance with law under §§ 46.2-104 , 46.2-324 , 46.2-613 , 46.2-646 , 46.2-711 , 46.2-715 , 46.2-716 , 46.2-752 , 46.2-1000 , 46.2-1003 , 46.2-1052 , 46.2-1053 , and 46.2-1158.02 . In addition to any other fee prescribed by this section, a fee of $35 shall be taxed as costs whenever a defendant fails to appear, unless, after a hearing requested by such person, good cause is shown for such failure to appear. No defendant with multiple charges arising from a single incident shall be taxed the applicable fixed fee provided in subsection B, C, or D more than once for a single appearance or trial in absence related to that incident. However, when a defendant who has multiple charges arising from the same incident and who has been assessed a fixed fee for one of those charges is later convicted of another charge that arises from that same incident and that has a higher fixed fee, he shall be assessed the difference between the fixed fee earlier assessed and the higher fixed fee. A defendant with charges which arise from separate incidents shall be taxed a fee for each incident even if the charges from the multiple incidents are disposed of in a single appearance or trial in absence. In addition to the fixed fees assessed pursuant to this section, in the appropriate cases, the clerk shall also assess any costs otherwise specifically provided by statute.
  2. In misdemeanors tried in district court, except for those proceedings provided for in subsection C, there shall be assessed as court costs a fixed fee of $61. The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:
    1. Processing fee (General Fund)(.573770);
    2. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund (.049180);
    3. Regional Criminal Justice Training Academies Fund (.016393);
    4. Courthouse Construction/Maintenance Fund (.032787);
    5. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund (.098361);
    6. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund (.065574);
    7. Sentencing/supervision fee (General Fund)(.131148); and
    8. Virginia Sexual and Domestic Violence Victim Fund (.032787).
  3. In criminal actions and proceedings in district court for a violation of any provision of Article 1 (§ 18.2-247 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2, there shall be assessed as court costs a fixed fee of $136. The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:
    1. Processing fee (General Fund)(.257353);
    2. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund (.022059);
    3. Regional Criminal Justice Training Academies Fund (.007353);
    4. Courthouse Construction/Maintenance Fund (.014706);
    5. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund (.044118);
    6. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund (.029412);
    7. Drug Offender Assessment and Treatment Fund (.551471);
    8. Forensic laboratory fee and sentencing/supervision fee (General Fund)(.058824); and
    9. Virginia Sexual and Domestic Violence Victim Fund (.014706).
  4. In traffic infractions tried in district court, there shall be assessed as court costs a fixed fee of $51. The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:
    1. Processing fee (General Fund)(.764706);
    2. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund (.058824);
    3. Regional Criminal Justice Training Academies Fund (.019608);
    4. Courthouse Construction/Maintenance Fund (.039216);
    5. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund (.078431); and
    6. Virginia Sexual and Domestic Violence Victim Fund (.039216).

      (Code 1950, § 14-132; 1956, c. 556; 1956, Ex. Sess., c. 10; 1958, c. 286; 1960, cc. 278, 368; 1962, c. 546; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-123; 1968, c. 639; 1970, c. 553; 1975, c. 591; 1977, c. 585; 1978, c. 605; 1979, cc. 525, 594; 1982, cc. 494, 569; 1983, c. 499; 1989, c. 595; 1990, c. 971; 1992, cc. 555, 558; 1995, c. 371; 1996, cc. 62, 976; 1997, c. 215; 1998, c. 872; 2003, cc. 883, 1039; 2004, cc. 371, 375, 1004; 2005, c. 631; 2006, c. 288; 2009, c. 756; 2010, c. 874; 2011, cc. 283, 890; 2014, c. 282; 2017, c. 670; 2019, cc. 14, 57; 2020, c. 1004; 2020, Sp. Sess. I, c. 21; 2021 Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550, 551.)

Cross references. - As to the Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund, see § 9.1-106 . As to the Virginia Sexual and Domestic Violence Victim Fund, see § 9.1-116.1 . As to the Drug Offender Assessment and Treatment Fund, see § 18.2-251.02 . As to the Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund, see § 19.2-11.3. As to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, see § 19.2-368.18.

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, cl. 7 provides: "That, except for (i) the provisions of Article 29 ( § 2.2-2499.1 et seq.) of Chapter 24 of Title 2.2 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 4.1-600 through 4.1-628 , 4.1-1100 , 4.1-1101 , 4.1-1101.1 , 4.1-1105.1 , 4.1-1107 through 4.1-1110 , 4.1-1112 , 4.1-1120 , 4.1-1121 , and 4.1-1302 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, Chapter 15 ( § 4.1-1500 et seq.) of Title 4.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 15.2-1627 , 16.1-69.48:1, 16.1-228, 16.1-278.8:01, 18.2-251.02 , 18.2-308.09 , 18.2-308.1:5 , 19.2-389.3, 19.2-392.1, 19.2-392.4, and 24.2-233 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, §§ 19.2-392.2:1, 19.2-392.2:2, and 46.2-341.20:7 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, and § 54.1-3442.6 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and (ii) the repeal of § 18.2-250.1 of the Code of Virginia, the provisions of the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eleventh enactments of this act shall not become effective unless reenacted by the 2022 Session of the General Assembly. The provisions of §§ 4.1-1101.1 and 4.1-1105.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall expire on January 1, 2024, if the provisions of the first, third, and fourth enactments of this act are reenacted by the 2022 Session of the General Assembly."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, cl. 8 provides: "That (i) the provisions of the second enactment of this act, (ii) the provisions of Article 29 ( § 2.2-2499.1 et seq.) of Chapter 24 of Title 2.2 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 4.1-600 through 4.1-628 , 4.1-1100 , 4.1-1101 , 4.1-1101.1 , 4.1-1105.1 , 4.1-1107 through 4.1-1110 , 4.1-1112 , 4.1-1120 , 4.1-1121 , and 4.1-1302 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, Chapter 15 ( § 4.1-1500 et seq.) of Title 4.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 15.2-1627 , 16.1-69.48:1, 16.1-228, 16.1-278.8:01, 18.2-251.02 , 18.2-308.09 , and 18.2-308.1:5 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, § 46.2-341.20:7 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, and § 54.1-3442.6 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and (iii) the repeal of § 18.2-250.1 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on July 1, 2021."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, cl. 26 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 1289 of the Acts of Assembly of 2020 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice. The provisions of this enactment shall become effective in due course."

Effective date. - This section became effective October 1, 1998.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, rewrote the section.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 883, in the second paragraph of subsection A, substituted "$20" for "ten dollars"; in subsection B, substituted "$57" for "fifty-seven dollars"; and in subsection D, substituted "$42" for "forty-two dollars."

The 2003 amendment by c. 1039, in the second paragraph of subsection A, substituted "10" for "ten dollars"; in subsection B, substituted "$59" for "fifty-seven dollars" in the first sentence, changed the amounts in subdivisions 1 through 7, added "and" at the end of subdivision 6, and deleted former subdivision 8; in subsection C, substituted "$134" for "$132" in the first sentence, changed the amounts in subdivisions 1 through 8, added "and" at the end of subdivision 7, and deleted former subdivision 9; and in subsection D, substituted "$49" for "forty-two dollars" in the first sentence, and changed the amounts in subdivisions 1 through 5.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 371, in subsection A, transferred the last sentence in the former second paragraph to make a new third paragraph and in the present second paragraph, in the second sentence, inserted "applicable fixed" and "subsection B, C or D of" and added the last sentence.

The 2004 amendment by c. 375, in subsection B, substituted "$61" for "$59" in the first sentence and changed the amounts in subdivisions 1 through 7; added subdivision B 8; in subsection C, substituted "$136" for "$134" in the first sentence and changed the amounts in subdivisions 1 through 8; added subdivision C 9; in subsection D, substituted "$51" for "$49" in the first sentence and changed the amounts in subdivisions 1 through 5; added subdivision D 6; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2004 amendment by c. 1004 inserted "and Treatment" in subdivision C 7.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 631 deleted "18.2-67.2:1" preceding "18.2-251" in subsection A; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 288 inserted "Sexual and" in subdivisions B 8, C 9, and D 6.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 756, in the first paragraph of subsection A, added clause (vi) and made related changes.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 874, cl. 4, as amended by Acts 2011, c. 890, cl. 4, substituted "$35" for "$20" near the beginning of the second paragraph of subsection A.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 283 substituted " §§ 46.2-104 and 46.2-1158.02 " for " §§ 46.2-104 and 46.2-1157 " at the end of clause A (vi).

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 282, effective January 1, 2015, in subsection A inserted "a mature driver motor vehicle crash prevention course" in the first paragraph, deleted "of this section" following "B, C, or D" in the second sentence of the second paragraph, and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 670 inserted "46.2-324, 46.2-613 , 46.2-711 , 46.2-715 , 46.2-716 , 46.2-752 , 46.2-1000 , 46.2-1003 , 46.2-1052 , 46.2-1053 " in clause (vi) of subsection A.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendments by cc. 14 and 57 are identical, and inserted "46.2-646" in subsection A.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1004, in clause (v) of subsection A, substituted "18.2-251, 19.2-303.2, or 19.2-303.6" for "18-2-25 or, 19-2-303.2" and made a stylistic change.

The 2020 Sp. Sess. I amendment. - The 2020 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 21, effective March 1, 2021, inserted "19.2-298.02" in clause (v) in subsection A.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendments by Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and inserted "4.1-1120" in subsection A in the first paragraph.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 10.

§ 16.1-69.48:1.01. Additional fee assessed for conviction of certain offenses.

Beginning May 1, 2003, the clerk shall assess a person, in addition to the fees provided for by § 16.1-69.48:1, a fee of $100 upon conviction of any and each charge of a violation of §§ 18.2-36.1 , 18.2-51.4 , 18.2-266 , 18.2-266.1 , 18.2-268.3 , 46.2-341.24 or § 46.2-341.26:3 , or any similar local ordinance.

(2003, c. 1042, cl. 9.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2003, c. 1042, in cl. 9, which added §§ 16.1-69.48:1.01, 17.1-275.10 , 17.1-275.11 and 46.2-333.1 , provides that the fee prescribed by §§ 16.1-69.48:1.01 and 17.1-275.11 shall not be in addition to the fee prescribed in Items 32, 33, 34 and 35 of the act (Acts 2002, c. 899, as amended by Acts 2003, c. 1042).

Effective date. - This section is effective May 1, 2003.

§ 16.1-69.48:1.02. Additional fee assessed for conviction requiring computer analysis.

In addition to the fees provided for by § 16.1-69.48:1, upon a finding of guilty of any charge or charges in which any computer forensic analysis revealed evidence used at trial of a defendant, the defendant may be assessed costs in an amount equal to the actual cost of the computer forensic analysis not to exceed $100 for each computer analyzed by any state or local law-enforcement agency. Upon motion and submission to the court of an affidavit by the law-enforcement agency setting forth the number of computers analyzed and the total amount of costs requested, the court shall determine the appropriate amount to be assessed and order such amount paid to the law-enforcement agency.

(2011, c. 511.)

§ 16.1-69.48:2. Fees for services of district court judges and clerks and magistrates in civil cases.

Fees in civil cases for services performed by the judges or clerks of general district courts or magistrates in the event any such services are performed by magistrates in civil cases shall be as provided in this section, and, unless otherwise provided, shall be included in the taxed costs and shall not be refundable, except in case of error or as herein provided.

For all court and magistrate services in each distress, detinue, interrogatory summons, unlawful detainer, civil warrant, notice of motion, garnishment, attachment issued, or other civil proceeding, the fee shall be $36. No such fee shall be collected (i) in any tax case instituted by any county, city or town or (ii) in any case instituted by a school board for collection of overdue book rental fees. Of the fees collected under this section, $10 of each such fee collected shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 .

The judge or clerk shall collect the foregoing fee at the time of issuing process. Any magistrate or other issuing officer shall collect the foregoing fee at the time of issuing process, and shall remit the entire fee promptly to the court to which such process is returnable, or to its clerk. When no service of process is had on a defendant named in any civil process other than a notice of motion for judgment, such process may be reissued once by the court or clerk at the court's direction by changing the return day of such process, for which service by the court or clerk there shall be no charge; however, reissuance of such process shall be within three months after the original return day.

The clerk of any district court may charge a fee for making a copy of any paper of record to go out of his office which is not otherwise specifically provided for. The amount of this fee shall be set in the discretion of the clerk but shall not exceed $1 for the first two pages and $.50 for each page thereafter.

The fees prescribed in this section shall be the only fees charged in civil cases for services performed by such judges and clerks, and when the services referred to herein are performed by magistrates such fees shall be the only fees charged by such magistrates for the prescribed services.

(Code 1950, § 14-133; 1954, c. 287; 1956, c. 556; 1958, c. 555; 1960, cc. 17, 106; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-125; 1970, c. 569; 1971, Ex. Sess., cc. 155, 253; 1973, c. 545; 1975, c. 591; 1982, c. 569; 1983, c. 499; 1984, cc. 293, 702; 1990, c. 943; 1991, c. 577; 1992, c. 555; 1997, c. 42; 1998, c. 872; 2003, c. 1039; 2006, cc. 623, 718; 2010, c. 874; 2011, c. 890; 2020, c. 1289; 2020, Sp. Sess. I, c. 56.)

Effective date. - This section became effective October 1, 1998.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039, in the second paragraph, in the first sentence, substituted "$17" for "twelve dollars," and inserted "or if the amount in controversy is $200 or less, then the fee shall be $12" at the end; and in the next-to-last paragraph, substituted "$1" for "one dollar," and "$.50" for "fifty cents."

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendments by cc. 623 and 718 are nearly identical, and in the second paragraph, in the first sentence, substituted "$22 for the period between July 1, 2006, and December 31, 2006, and $27 thereafter" for "$17" and "$22" for "$12" and added the last two sentences.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 874, cl. 4, as amended by Acts 2011, c. 890, cl. 4, rewrote the second paragraph.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1289, cl. 5, as amended by Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 56, substituted "$36" for "$30" in the first sentence in the second paragraph.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Reissuance of service. - Since process can be reissued where service was not found, a warrant in debt is still pending on the docket for that three month period and has not been dismissed, abated or nonsuited, and since the statute specifically applies to the reissuance of process within three months of the return date which is 90 days and all parties agreed that the statute of limitations was tolled for 34 days, that would extend the original statute of limitations by 124 days, when added to May 17, 2011, accrual date, and clearly made July 1, 2013, the refiled date, within the tolled statute of limitations. Samayoa-Bolanos v. Williams, 91 Va. Cir. 106, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 159 (Newport News Aug. 12, 2015).

§ 16.1-69.48:3. Fees charged to drug offenders.

Whenever in a general district court the costs provided for in subsection C of § 16.1-69.48:1 are assessed for a violation of any provision of Article 1 (§ 18.2-247 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2, a portion of the costs, as specified in subsection C of § 16.1-69.48:1, shall be included in the taxed costs and paid into the Drug Offender Assessment and Treatment Fund.

(1995, c. 463, § 14.1-134.1; 1998, cc. 783, 840, 872; 2002, c. 831; 2004, c. 1004.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1998, cc. 783 and 840, amended § 14.1-134.1, which was repealed by Acts 1998, c. 872, effective October 1, 1998. At the direction of the Code Commission, effect has been given in this section, as set out above, to Acts 1998, cc. 783 and 840. In accordance with cc. 783 and 840, the amendments, which are identical, substituted "seventy-five dollars" for "$50," inserted "and paid into the Drug Offender Assessment Fund," and deleted the former last sentence, which read: "The clerk shall pay the fee to the state treasury."

Effective date. - This section became effective October 1, 1998.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, rewrote the section.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1004 substituted "Drug Offender Assessment and Treatment Fund" for "Drug Offender Assessment Fund."

§ 16.1-69.48:4. Costs generally.

The provisions of Chapter 6 (§ 17.1-600 et seq.) of Title 17.1 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the laws of costs in the district courts.

(1998, c. 872.)

Effective date. - This section is effective October 1, 1998.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Clerk is not authorized to determine whether deferred judgment order is statutorily authorized prior to assessing applicable costs. - The clerk of the general district court is neither required nor authorized to determine whether a deferred judgment order is statutorily authorized prior to assessing applicable costs. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Joel C. Cunningham, Judge, General District Court of Halifax County, 01-046 (12/21/01).

§ 16.1-69.48:5. Fees for services of juvenile and domestic relations district court judges and clerks in certain civil cases.

Except as otherwise provided, upon the initial commencement of any case in the juvenile and domestic relations district court pursuant to subdivision A 3 of § 16.1-241 when the custody or visitation of a child is a subject of controversy or requires determination, there shall be a filing fee of $25. However, only one $25 fee shall be required for all custody and visitation petitions simultaneously initiated by a single petitioner. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, there shall be no other fees or costs added to this fee as a condition of filing. No case to which this fee is applicable shall be set for hearing by the clerk until this fee has been paid except on account of poverty as provided in § 17.1-606 . Fees shall be paid to the clerk in the jurisdiction in which the petition is filed.

This fee shall not be charged in any case brought by an agent of the Commonwealth or of a local government entity.

When service of process is had on the respondent named in a petition for which the filing fee established by this section has been paid, such petition may be reissued once by changing the return day of such process, for which service there shall be no charge; however, reissuance of such process shall be within three months after the original return day.

In the case of an appeal filed pursuant to § 16.1-296, the clerk shall collect any applicable fees for service of process of the notice of appeal in the circuit court from the appellant prior to transmitting the case to the clerk of the circuit court. For purposes of this section, service of process in the circuit court may include service on the appellee by the sheriff or private process server or certified or registered mail, and service on the attorney for the appellee by regular mail.

(2003, c. 906; 2004, cc. 366, 659, 727.)

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 366 added the last paragraph.

The 2004 amendments by cc. 659 and 727 are identical, and inserted the second and third sentences in the first paragraph.

Law review. - For 2003/2004 survey of family and juvenile law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2004).

§ 16.1-69.48:6. Fees for offenses related to sex trafficking.

The court shall order any person convicted of a misdemeanor violation of § 18.2-346.01 or of § 18.2-348 or 18.2-349 to pay a $100 fee, which shall be deposited into the Virginia Prevention of Sex Trafficking Fund to be used in accordance with § 9.1-116.4 .

(2019, c. 728; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 188.)

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 188, effective July 1, 2021, substituted " § 18.2-346.01 " for "subsection B of § 18.2-346 ."

§ 16.1-69.49.

Repealed by Acts 1978, c. 611.

§ 16.1-69.50. Quarters for court and clerk.

Each county and city having a general district court or juvenile and domestic relations district court shall provide suitable quarters for such court and its clerk and social services staff and a suitable room or rooms for the sessions of the court at the places designated for such purpose, except that if the court of a county is held in a city or town, other than the county seat, such city or town shall provide a suitable place for the court to be held. Such county or city shall also provide all necessary furniture, filing cabinets and other equipment necessary for the efficient operation of the court.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

§ 16.1-69.51. Books, supplies, etc.; how furnished; Committee to determine form of records.

The Commonwealth shall provide dockets and other books, stationery and supplies necessary for the efficient operation of all district courts. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Committee on District Courts, after consultation with the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, may determine the form and character of the records of the district courts and magistrates. All dockets shall be uniform, and the form thereof shall also be subject to approval by the Auditor of Public Accounts.

(1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334; 1985, c. 133.)

§ 16.1-69.51:1. Display of flags in courtrooms.

There shall be displayed inside each courtroom of all district courts in the cities and counties of the Commonwealth the flag of the United States of America and the flag of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The governing bodies of the respective counties and cities shall make provision for such display and may accept gifts or flags for such purpose.

(1976, c. 445.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 8B M.J. Flags and Emblems, § 1.

§ 16.1-69.52.

Repealed by Acts 1983, c. 499.

Cross references. - For current provisions as to retention and disposition of district court records, see § 16.1-69.53 et seq.

Article 6. Retention and Disposition of District Court Records.

§ 16.1-69.53. Definitions; construction of references to period of years.

As used in this article, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

"Court records" shall include case records, financial records and administrative records as defined in this section.

"Case records" shall mean all documents, dockets and indices.

"Documents" shall mean all motions for judgment, bills of complaint, answers, bills of particulars, other pleadings, interrogatories, motions in writing, warrants, summonses, petitions, proof of service, witness summonses and subpoenas, documents received in evidence, transcripts, orders, judgments, writs, and any other similar case-related records and papers in the possession of the district courts and filed with the pleadings in the case.

"Financial records" shall mean all papers and records related to the receipt and disbursement of money by the district court.

"Administrative records" shall mean all other court papers and records not otherwise defined.

Whenever a reference to a period of years for the retention of documents is made in this section, it shall be construed to commence on January 2 of the first year following (i) the final adjudication of a civil case or (ii) the final disposition in all other cases, unless otherwise specified herein. In foster care cases, the final disposition date is the date of transfer of custody to a local board of social services or a child welfare agency.

(1983, c. 499; 2002, c. 747.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 747, effective October 1, 2002, deleted "public welfare or" preceding "social services" in the last paragraph.

§ 16.1-69.54. General provisions.

  1. Each district court shall retain and store its court records as provided in this article. The Committee on District Courts, after consultation with the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, shall determine the methods of processing, retention, reproduction and disposal of records and information in district courts, including records required to be retained in district courts by statute.
  2. Whenever a court record has been reproduced for the purpose of record retention under this article, such original may be disposed of upon completion of the Commonwealth's audit of the court records unless approval is given by the Auditor of Public Accounts for earlier disposition. In the event of such reproduction, the reproduction of the court record shall be retained in accordance with the retention periods specified in this section. The reproduction shall have the same force and effect as the original court record and shall be given the same faith and credit to which the original itself would have been entitled in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
  3. Electronic case papers, whether originating in electronic form or converted to electronic form, shall constitute the official record of the case. Such electronic case papers shall also fulfill any statutory requirement that requires an original, original paper, paper, record, document, facsimile, memorandum, exhibit, certification, or transcript if such electronic case papers are in an electronic form approved by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court. When case papers are transmitted between the district and circuit courts and there is an agreement between the chief judge of the applicable district court and the clerk of the circuit court for the electronic transmission of case papers, the case papers shall be transmitted between the courts by an electronic method approved by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, with the exception of any exhibit that cannot be electronically transmitted. The clerk in the appellate court may also request that any paper trial records be forwarded to such clerk.

    (1983, c. 499; 2018, cc. 32, 134.)

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 32 and 134 are identical, and inserted the subsection A and B designations and added subsection C.

§ 16.1-69.54:1. Request for district court records.

  1. For the purposes of this section, "confidential court records," "court records," and "nonconfidential court records" shall have the same meaning as set forth in § 17.1-292 .
  2. Requests for copies of nonconfidential court records maintained in individual case files shall be made to the clerk of a district court.
  3. Requests for reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data fields that are viewable through the online case information systems maintained by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall be made to the Office of the Executive Secretary. Such reports of aggregated case data shall not include the name, date of birth, or social security number of any party and shall not include images of the individual records in the respective case files. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any reports or aggregated case data to be sold or posted on any other website or in any way redistributed to any third party. The Executive Secretary, in his discretion, may deny such request to ensure compliance with these provisions. However, such data may be included in products or services provided to a third party, provided that such data is not made available to the general public.
  4. Any clerk or the Executive Secretary, as applicable, may require that the request be in writing and that the requester provide his name and legal address. A request for nonconfidential court records or reports of aggregated nonconfidential case data shall identify the requested records with reasonable specificity. Any clerk or the Executive Secretary, as applicable, may determine the costs to provide the requested records to the requester, advise the requester of such costs, and, before continuing to process the request, require the requester to agree to payment of a deposit not to exceed the amount of the advance determination, which shall be credited to the final cost of supplying the requested records. No clerk, nor the Executive Secretary, shall be required to create a new record if the record does not already exist or provide a report of aggregated, nonconfidential case data in a format not regularly used by the clerk or the Executive Secretary; however, a clerk or the Executive Secretary, as applicable, may abstract or summarize information under such terms and conditions as agreed to by the requester and the clerk or Executive Secretary, as provided herein.
  5. Except where the nature or size of the request would interfere with the business of the court or with its use by the general public, or as otherwise provided by law, the requested court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data shall be provided to the requester within a reasonable period of time, given the nature of the request and the availability of staff to respond to the request, but in no event longer than 30 days from the date of a complete request made by a requester that is fully compliant with the requirements of this section and other applicable law. Any objection or assertion of confidentiality shall be provided to the requester within a reasonable period of time, but in no event longer than 30 days from the date of a complete request made by a requester.
  6. Any clerk, or the Executive Secretary, may require payment in advance of all reasonable costs, not to exceed the actual cost incurred in accessing, duplicating, reviewing, supplying, or searching for the requested court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data, including removing any confidential information contained in the court records from the nonconfidential court records being provided, excluding any extraneous, intermediary, or surplus fees or expenses to recoup the general overhead costs associated with creating or maintaining records or transacting the general business of the clerk or the Office of the Executive Secretary. Before processing a request for court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data, any clerk or the Executive Secretary may require the requester to pay any amounts owed to the clerk or the Office of the Executive Secretary for previous requests for court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data that remain unpaid 30 days or more after billing.
  7. Any clerk and the Executive Secretary shall be immune from any suit arising from the production of court records or reports of aggregated nonconfidential case data in accordance with this section absent gross negligence or willful misconduct.

    (2018, cc. 127, 584.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, cc. 355 and 356, cl. 5 provides: "That the Virginia Housing Commission shall request data from the Executive Secretary pursuant to § 16.1-69.54:1 and conduct evaluations of the effectiveness and efficiency of the eviction diversion pilot program established by the first enactment of this act. To assist the Commission, the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Virginia Supreme Court shall provide the data requested by the Commission in electronic format, at such times as requested by the Commission."

§ 16.1-69.55. Retention of case records; limitations on enforcement of judgments; extensions.

  1. Criminal and traffic infraction proceedings:
    1. In misdemeanor and traffic infraction cases, except misdemeanor cases under § 16.1-253.2, 18.2-57.2 , or 18.2-60.4 , all documents shall be retained for 10 years, including cases sealed in expungement proceedings under § 19.2-392.2. In misdemeanor cases under § 16.1-253.2, 18.2-57.2 , or 18.2-60.4 , all documents shall be retained for 20 years. In misdemeanor cases under §§ 18.2-67.4 , 18.2-67.4:1 , 18.2-67.4 :2, 18.2-346 , 18.2-346 .01, 18.2-347 , 18.2-348 , 18.2-349 , 18.2-370 , 18.2-370.01 , 18.2-374 , 18.2-386.1 , 18.2-387 , and 18.2-387 .1, all documents shall be retained for 50 years. Documents in misdemeanor and traffic infraction cases for which an appeal has been made shall be returned to and filed with the clerk of the appropriate circuit court pursuant to § 16.1-135;
    2. In felony cases that are certified to the grand jury, all documents shall be certified to the clerk of the appropriate circuit court pursuant to §§ 19.2-186 and 19.2-190. All other felony case documents shall be handled as provided in subdivision 1;
    3. Dockets and indices shall be retained for 10 years.
  2. Civil proceedings:
    1. All documents in civil proceedings in district court that are dismissed, including dismissal under § 8.01-335 , shall be retained until completion of the Commonwealth's audit of the court records. Notwithstanding § 8.01-275.1 , the clerks of the district courts may destroy documents in civil proceedings in which no service of process is had 24 months after the last return date;
    2. In civil actions that result in a judgment, all documents in the possession of the general district court shall be retained for 10 years and, unless sooner satisfied, the judgment shall remain in force for a period of 10 years;
    3. In civil cases that are appealed to the circuit court pursuant to § 16.1-112, all documents pertaining thereto shall be transferred to the circuit court in accordance with those sections;
    4. The limitations on enforcement of general district court judgments provided in § 16.1-94.1 shall not apply if the plaintiff, prior to the expiration of that period for enforcement, pays the circuit court docketing and indexing fees on judgments from other courts together with any other required filing fees and dockets the judgment in the circuit court having jurisdiction in the same geographic area as the general district court. However, a judgment debtor wishing to discharge a judgment pursuant to the provisions of § 8.01-456 , when the judgment creditor cannot be located, may, prior to the expiration of that period for enforcement, pay the circuit court docketing and indexing fees on judgments from other courts together with any other required filing fees and docket the judgment in the circuit court having jurisdiction in the same geographic area as the general district court. After the expiration of the period provided in § 16.1-94.1, executions on such docketed civil judgments may issue from the general district court wherein the judgment was obtained upon the filing in the general district court of an abstract from the circuit court. In all other respects, the docketing of a general district court judgment in a circuit court confers upon such judgment the same status as if the judgment were a circuit court judgment;
    5. Dockets for civil cases shall be retained for 10 years;
    6. Indices in civil cases shall be retained for 10 years.
  3. Juvenile and domestic relations district court proceedings:
    1. In adult criminal cases, all records shall be retained as provided in subdivision A 1;
    2. In juvenile cases, all documents and indices shall be governed by the provisions of § 16.1-306;
    3. In all cases involving support arising under Title 16.1, 20, or 63.2, all documents and indices shall be retained until the last juvenile involved, if any, has reached 19 years of age and 10 years have elapsed from either dismissal or termination of the case by court order or by operation of law. Financial records in connection with such cases shall be subject to the provisions of § 16.1-69.56;
    4. In all cases involving sexually violent offenses, as defined in § 37.2-900 , and in all misdemeanor cases under §§ 18.2-67.4 , 18.2-67.4 :1, 18.2-67.4:2 , 18.2-346 , 18.2-346.01 , 18.2-347 , 18.2-348 , 18.2-349 , 18.2-370 , 18.2-370.01 , 18.2-374 , 18.2-386.1 , 18.2-387 , and 18.2-387 .1, all documents shall be retained for 50 years;
    5. In cases transferred to circuit court for trial as an adult or appealed to circuit court, all documents pertaining thereto shall be transferred to circuit court;
    6. All dockets in juvenile cases shall be governed by the provisions of subsection F of § 16.1-306.
  4. At the direction of the chief judge of a district court, the clerk of that court may cause any or all papers or documents pertaining to civil and criminal cases that have been ended to be destroyed if such records, papers, or documents will no longer have administrative, fiscal, historical, or legal value to warrant continued retention, provided such records, papers, or documents have been microfilmed or converted to an electronic format. Such microfilm and microphotographic processes and equipment shall meet state archival microfilm standards pursuant to § 42.1-82 , or such electronic format shall follow state electronic records guidelines, and such records, papers, or documents so converted shall be placed in conveniently accessible files and provisions made for examining and using the same. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to the documents for misdemeanor cases under §§ 16.1-253.2, 18.2-57.2 , 18.2-60.4 , 18.2-67.4 , 18.2-67.4 :1, 18.2-67.4:2 , 18.2-346 , 18.2-346.01 , 18.2-347 , 18.2-348 , 18.2-349 , 18.2-370 , 18.2-370.01 , 18.2-374 , 18.2-386.1 , 18.2-387 , and 18.2-387 .1, which shall be retained as provided in subsection A. (1983, c. 499; 1990, c. 258; 1996, c. 463; 2003, c. 126; 2005, c. 135; 2007, cc. 369, 468, 869; 2008, c. 749; 2009, c. 740; 2011, cc. 445, 480; 2013, cc. 187, 377; 2014, c. 287; 2018, c. 128; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 188.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 126 substituted "10" for "ten" throughout the section; in subdivision B 1, deleted "or in which no service of process is had" following " § 8.01-335 ," and added the last sentence; and substituted "19" for "nineteen" in subdivision C 3.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 135 rewrote subdivision B 4.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendments by cc. 369 and 468 are identical, and inserted the present second sentence in subdivision B 4.

The 2007 amendment by c. 869 substituted "civil cases that are appealed to the circuit court pursuant to § 16.1-112" for "civil cases which are either removed or appealed to the circuit court pursuant to §§ 16.1-92 and 16.1-112 respectively" in subdivision B 3.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 749, in subdivision A 1, inserted "except misdemeanor cases under § 16.1-253.2 or 18.2-57.2 " in the first sentence and inserted the second sentence.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 740, in subdivision A 1, inserted the third sentence; added subdivision C 4; and redesignated former subdivisions C 4 and C 5 and subdivisions C 5 and C 6, respectively.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 445 and 480 are identical, and in subdivision A 1, twice inserted "or 18.2-60.4 " and made related changes.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendments by cc. 187 and 377 are nearly identical, and in subsection A, deleted "18.2-370.1" preceding "18.2-374" in the next-to-last sentence of subdivision A 1, in subdivision A 2, substituted "that" for "which" in the first sentence and deleted "A 1 of this section" from the end of the last sentence; in subsection B, substituted "that" for "which" in the first sentence of subdivision B 1 and in subdivision B 2; in subsection C, deleted "of this section" following "subdivision A 1" in subdivision C 1, substituted "Title" for "Titles" in the first sentence of subdivision C 3, deleted "18.2-370.1" preceding "18.2-374" in subdivision C 4, and substituted "subsection F of § 16.2-306" for " § 16.1-306 F" in subdivision C 6; and added subsection D.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 287, in subsection D deleted "general" preceding "district court" in the first sentence.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 128 deleted "for a period of three years or longer" following "have been ended" in the first sentence of subsection D.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 188, effective July 1, 2021, inserted "18.2-346.01" in subdivisions A 1 and C 4, and subsection D.

Law review. - For article reviewing recent developments and changes in legislation, case law, and Virginia Supreme Court Rules affecting civil litigation, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 95 (2005).

For 2007 annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 229 (2007).

CASE NOTES

Certification of records. - Circuit court did not err in admitting a general district court's records because after the records were properly certified by the circuit court clerk, they became a part of the circuit court's file, were properly authenticated when the circuit court clerk certified them, and were admissible as evidence. Snowden v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 482, 749 S.E.2d 223, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 303 (2013).

§ 16.1-69.56. Retention of financial and administrative records.

Appropriate retention periods for the financial and administrative records of the district courts and magistrates shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court of Virginia. In the case of financial records only, the retention period prescribed by the court shall be subject to approval by the Auditor of Public Accounts.

(1983, c. 499; 1987, c. 160.)

§ 16.1-69.57. Destruction of court records.

The clerk of each district court shall destroy the court records upon expiration of the appropriate retention period as set forth in §§ 16.1-69.55 and 16.1-69.56 and consistent with the requirements of confidentiality for juvenile records. The Supreme Court shall determine the methods to be used in destroying court records. Likewise, magistrates shall destroy records retained in the office of the magistrate upon the expiration of the appropriate retention period as set forth in § 16.1-69.56.

(1983, c. 499; 1987, c. 160.)

§ 16.1-69.58. Processing, retention and reproduction of court records; retention and destruction of records in which final disposition was entered before January 1, 1985.

The Committee on District Courts, after consultation with the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, shall determine the methods for processing, retention and reproduction of court records and all other records required by statute to be retained in the district courts and for records retained in the office of the magistrate.

The provisions for retention and destruction of records contained in §§ 16.1-117, 16.1-118 and 16.1-118.1 shall apply to court records in district court cases in which a final disposition was entered before January 1, 1985.

(1983, c. 499; 1987, c. 160.)

Chapter 5. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction.

Sec.

§§ 16.1-70 through 16.1-75.

Repealed by Acts 2018, c. 164, cl. 2.

Editor's note. - Former § 16.1-70 pertaining to certain city and town police courts, derived from 1956, c. 555.

Former § 16.1-70.1, pertaining to abolition of municipal court of the Town of Herndon, derived from 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 648; 1977, c. 95.

Former § 16.1-71, pertaining to applicability of provisions of municipal charters and the authority of city or town council, derived from Acts 1956, c. 555.

Former § 16.1-72, pertaining to removal of actions involving more than fifty dollars, derived from Acts 1956, c. 555.

Former § 16.1-73, pertaining to appeals of actions in municipal courts, derived from Acts 1956, c. 555.

Former § 16.1-74, pertaining to procedure in certain courts of limited jurisdiction, derived from Acts 1956, c. 555.

Former § 16.1-75, pertaining to jurisdiction of mayors, etc., superseded, and continuance of other powers of courts of limited jurisdiction, derived from Acts 1956, c. 555.

§ 16.1-75.1.

Repealed by Acts 1973, c. 545.

Chapter 6. Venue, Jurisdiction and Procedure in Civil Matters.

Venue in Civil Matters.

Jurisdiction in Civil Actions.

Procedure in Civil Cases.

Trying Title to Property Levied on Under Distress or Execution.

Small Claims Court.

Article 1. Venue in Civil Matters.

§ 16.1-76. Venue.

In all civil actions over which the general district courts have jurisdiction pursuant to § 16.1-77, venue shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 (§ 8.01-257 et seq.) of Title 8.01.

(1956, c. 555; 1977, c. 624; 1978, c. 421.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Venue, § 5.

Article 2. Jurisdiction in Civil Actions.

§ 16.1-77. Civil jurisdiction of general district courts; amending amount of claim.

Except as provided in Article 5 (§ 16.1-122.1 et seq.), each general district court shall have, within the limits of the territory it serves, civil jurisdiction as follows:

  1. Exclusive original jurisdiction of (i) any claim to specific personal property or to any debt, fine or other money, or to damages for breach of contract or for injury done to property, real or personal, when the amount of such claim does not exceed $4,500, exclusive of interest and any attorney fees, and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts having jurisdiction in such territory of any such claim when the amount thereof exceeds $4,500 but does not exceed $25,000, exclusive of interest and any attorney fees, and (ii) any action for injury to person, regardless of theory, and any action for wrongful death as provided for in Article 5 (§ 8.01-50 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 8.01 when the amount of such claim does not exceed $4,500, exclusive of interest and any attorney fees, and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts having jurisdiction in such territory of any such claim when the amount thereof exceeds $4,500 but does not exceed $50,000, exclusive of interest and any attorney fees. However, the jurisdictional limit shall not apply with respect to distress warrants under the provisions of § 8.01-130.4 , cases involving liquidated damages for violations of vehicle weight limits pursuant to § 46.2-1135 , nor cases involving forfeiture of a bond pursuant to § 19.2-143. While a matter is pending in a general district court, upon motion of the plaintiff seeking to increase the amount of the claim, the court shall order transfer of the matter to the circuit court that has jurisdiction over the amended amount of the claim without requiring that the case first be dismissed or that the plaintiff suffer a nonsuit, and the tolling of the applicable statutes of limitations governing the pending matter shall be unaffected by the transfer. Except for good cause shown, no such order of transfer shall issue unless the motion to amend and transfer is made at least 10 days before trial. The plaintiff shall pay filing and other fees as otherwise provided by law to the clerk of the court to which the case is transferred, and such clerk shall process the claim as if it were a new civil action. The plaintiff shall prepare and present the order of transfer to the transferring court for entry, after which time the case shall be removed from the pending docket of the transferring court and the order of transfer placed among its records. The plaintiff shall provide a certified copy of the transfer order to the receiving court.
  2. Jurisdiction to try and decide attachment cases when the amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed $25,000 exclusive of interest and any attorney fees.
  3. Jurisdiction of actions of unlawful entry or detainer as provided in Article 13 (§ 8.01-124 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 8.01, and in Chapter 14 (§ 55.1-1400 et seq.) of Title 55.1, and the maximum jurisdictional limits prescribed in subdivision (1) shall not apply to any claim, counter-claim or cross-claim in an unlawful detainer action that includes a claim for damages sustained or rent against any person obligated on the lease or guarantee of such lease.
  4. Except where otherwise specifically provided, all jurisdiction, power and authority over any civil action or proceeding conferred upon any general district court judge or magistrate under or by virtue of any provisions of the Code.
  5. Jurisdiction to try and decide suits in interpleader involving personal or real property where the amount of money or value of the property is not more than the maximum jurisdictional limits of the general district court. However, the maximum jurisdictional limits prescribed in subdivision (1) shall not apply to any claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim in an interpleader action that is limited to the disposition of an earnest money deposit pursuant to a real estate purchase contract. The action shall be brought in accordance with the procedures for interpleader as set forth in § 8.01-364 . However, the general district court shall not have any power to issue injunctions. Actions in interpleader may be brought by either the stakeholder or any of the claimants. The initial pleading shall be either by motion for judgment, by warrant in debt, or by other uniform court form established by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The initial pleading shall briefly set forth the circumstances of the claim and shall name as defendant all parties in interest who are not parties plaintiff.
  6. Jurisdiction to try and decide any cases pursuant to § 2.2-3713 of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et seq.) or § 2.2-3809 of the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (§ 2.2-3800 et seq.), for writs of mandamus or for injunctions.
  7. Jurisdiction to try and decide any cases pursuant to § 55.1-1819 of the Property Owners' Association Act (§ 55.1-1800 et seq.) or § 55.1-1959 of the Virginia Condominium Act (§ 55.1-1900 et seq.).
  8. Concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts to submit matters to arbitration pursuant to Chapter 21 (§ 8.01-577 et seq.) of Title 8.01 where the amount in controversy is within the jurisdictional limits of the general district court. Any party that disagrees with an order by a general district court granting an application to compel arbitration may appeal such decision to the circuit court pursuant to § 8.01-581.016 . For purposes of this section, the territory served by a county general district court expressly authorized by statute to be established in a city includes the general district court courtroom. (1956, c. 555; 1968, c. 5; 1973, c. 440; 1978, c. 40; 1981, c. 404; 1983, c. 616; 1987, cc. 87, 93; 1988, c. 799; 1990, cc. 217, 471; 1991, c. 135; 1992, cc. 111, 777; 1995, c. 799; 1997, c. 753; 1998, cc. 482, 495; 1999, cc. 945, 987; 2001, cc. 473, 477; 2002, cc. 200, 506, 645; 2004, cc. 344, 460; 2008, cc. 840, 843; 2009, c. 663; 2010, c. 181; 2011, cc. 14, 76, 372, 378, 702; 2016, c. 181; 2017, c. 657; 2019, cc. 240, 787; 2020, cc. 898, 899; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 199, 463.)

Cross references. - As to constitutional authority to establish and regulate jurisdiction of inferior courts, see Va. Const., Art. IV, § 14.

Editor's note. - Acts 1988, c. 799, cl. 2, as amended by Acts 1990, c. 565, cl. 1, Acts 1993, c. 593, cl. 1, and Acts 1997, c. 253, cl. 1, provides that the provisions of the 1988 act, which, in part, amended this section, shall become effective October 1, 1988, and no longer expire, as provided for in the original legislation.

To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitutions were made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "8.01-130.4" for "55-230," "Chapter 14 ( § 55.1-1400 et seq.) of Title 55.1" for "Chapter 13 ( § 55-217 et seq.) of Title 55" and " § 55.1-1819 of the Property Owners' Association Act ( § 55.1-1800 et seq.) or § 55.1-1959 of the Virginia Condominium Act ( § 55.1-1900 et seq.)" for " § 55-79.80:2 of the Condominium Act ( § 55-79.39 et seq.) or § 55-513 of the Property Owners' Association Act ( § 55-508 et seq.)."

The 1998 amendments. - The 1998 amendments by cc. 482 and 495 are identical, and substituted "$3,000" for "$1,000" in two places in subdivision (1).

The 1999 amendments. - The 1999 amendments by cc. 945 and 987 are identical, and substituted "( § 46.2-355.1 et seq.)" for "( § 46.2-351 et seq.)" in subdivision (7).

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendments by cc. 473 and 477, effective October 1, 2001, are identical, and added subdivision (8).

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendments by cc. 200 and 506 are identical, and in subdivision (1), substituted "person that" for "person, which" in the first sentence and added "nor shall it apply to cases involving liquidated damages for violations of vehicle weight limits pursuant to § 46.2-1135 " at the end of the second sentence; and at the beginning of subdivision (8), deleted the parenthetical "(Effective October 1, 2001)."

The 2002 amendment by c. 645 substituted "$4,500" for "$3,000" twice in subdivision 1.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 344, in subdivision (3), inserted "counter-claim or cross-claim in an action" near the middle in the first sentence and added the last sentence.

The 2004 amendment by c. 460, in subdivision (1), in the last sentence, deleted "nor shall it apply to" following " § 55-230" and inserted "nor cases involving forfeiture of a bond pursuant to § 19.2-143" at the end.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 840 and 843, effective July 1, 2010, are identical, and inserted "or § 2.2-3809 of the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act" in subdivision (6).

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 663, in subdivision (3), in the first sentence, inserted "an unlawful detainer," "that includes a claim" and "against any person obligated on the lease."

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 181, in subdivision (5), added the second sentence, added "or by other uniform court form established by the Supreme Court of Virginia" to the end of the fifth sentence, and made a related change.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 14 and 702 are identical, and in subdivision (1), twice substituted "$25,000" for "$15,000"; and in subdivision (2), substituted "$25,000" for "$15,000."

The 2011 amendment by c. 76, in subdivision (3), in the first sentence, deleted "proved to be owning where the premises were used by the occupant primarily for business, commercial or agricultural purposes" from the end and added "or guarantee of such lease," and deleted the last sentence, which read: "Any counter-claim or cross-claim shall arise out of the same use of the property for business, commercial or agricultural purposes."

The 2011 amendments by cc. 372 and 378 are identical, and added subdivision (9).

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 181 deleted "of this chapter" following "( § 16.1-122.1 et seq.)" in the introductory paragraph; in subdivision (4), deleted "of Virginia" at the end; in subdivision (6), inserted "( § 2.2-3800 et seq.)"; and added subdivision (10).

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 657 substituted "attorney fees" for "attorney's fees contracted for in the instrument" throughout subdivisions (1) and (2).

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 240 added the last paragraph.

The 2019 amendment by c. 787 added the last five sentences to subdivision (1).

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 898 and 899 are identical, and deleted the existing provisions of subdivision (8), which read "Jurisdiction to try and decide cases alleging a civil violation described in § 18.2-76 ." and redesignated accordingly.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 199, effective July 1, 2021, in subdivision (1), inserted the clause (i) designation, deleted "or for any injury to the person that would be recoverable by action at law or suit in equity" following "real or personal" therein, and added clause (ii) in the first sentence, and substituted "the jurisdictional" for "this $25,000" in the second sentence; and made stylistic changes.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 463, effective July 1, 2021, deleted former subdivision (7), which read: "Concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts having jurisdiction in such territory to adjudicate habitual offenders pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 ( § 46.2-355.1 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 46.2," and redesignated the remaining subdivisions according.

Law review. - For note, "Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Corporations in Virginia," see 12 U. Rich. L. Rev. 369 (1978). For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985). For article, "Civil Rights and 'Personal Injuries': Virginia's Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Suits," see 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199 (1985).

For survey on civil procedure and practice in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511 (1989).

For 2003/2004 survey of civil practice and procedure, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 87 (2004).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1A M.J. Actions, § 2; 2A M.J. Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 2, 24; 5A M.J. Courts, § 43.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under former statutes corresponding to this section.

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction limited by statute. - The judicial authority of a justice of the peace [now general district court judge] is entirely statutory. He can exercise only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on him. City of Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688 , 77 S.E. 470 (1913); Epperty v. Holley, 3 Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 27 (1917); Copperthite Pie Corp. v. Whitehurst, 157 Va. 480 , 162 S.E. 189 (1932); Wall v. American Bank & Trust Co., 159 Va. 871 , 167 S.E. 425 (1933); Fuller v. Edwards, 180 Va. 191 , 22 S.E.2d 26 (1942).

A trial justice (appointed under Chapter 2 of former Title 16, now general district court judge) has limited jurisdiction and, since he derives all his jurisdictional authority from statute, he can only exercise such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred upon him. Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644 , 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946).

Actions involving title to realty. - See Martin v. City of Richmond, 108 Va. 765 , 62 S.E. 800 (1908).

A trial justice [now general district court judge] has no jurisdiction in cases involving title to real property. Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644 , 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946), decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

When it appeared from the evidence before the trial justice that the plaintiff in a petition for attachment based his claim upon the loss of acreage in, and an inaccurate description of, the tract of land described in his deed from defendants, it became the duty of the trial justice to dismiss the case. Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644 , 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946).

Circuit court erred in granting a foreclosure purchaser's motion for summary judgment and awarding it possession of the borrowers' property in the purchaser's unlawful detainer action because the circuit court had no more subject matter jurisdiction than the general district court and the general district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case where the borrowers' allegations raised a bona fide question of title that, if proved, could set aside the foreclosure. Parrish v. Fannie Mae, 292 Va. 44 , 787 S.E.2d 116 (2016).

An action for insulting words is within the jurisdiction of a trial justice [now general district court judge]. An injury to one's reputation is an "injury to the person" within the meaning of subsection (1). Fuller v. Edwards, 180 Va. 191 , 22 S.E.2d 26 (1942).

Recovery of fines. - The fine prescribed by former § 18-329 for violating the Sabbath was recoverable before a justice of the peace [now general district court judge] under this section, upon a civil warrant issued under former § 19.1-324 [now § 19.2-341]. Ex parte Marx, 86 Va. 40 , 9 S.E. 475 (1889).

Penalty against telegraph company for failure to deliver message. - Where a penalty of $100.00 was imposed by § 1292 of the Code of 1887 (similar to § 56-469 of this Code) for failure of a telegraph company to deliver a message, it was held that such penalty was a fine within the meaning of the forerunner of this section and a justice of the peace (now general district court judge) had no jurisdiction of the case because his jurisdiction was limited therein to $20.00 as to fines. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pettyjohn, 88 Va. 296 , 13 S.E. 431 (1891).

Amount of debt in controversy. - The law limiting the jurisdiction of justices of the peace [now general district court judges] is founded on public policy, and no manipulation of a debt can effect such jurisdiction. James v. Stokes, 77 Va. 225 (1883); Adams v. Jennings, 103 Va. 579 , 49 S.E. 982 (1905).

Judgment as res judicata. - The civil and police court [now general district court] is concededly one of limited jurisdiction and not a court of record. However, where both parties invoked its jurisdiction, and the claims for property damage asserted by each of them were cognizable in that court, its final judgment on the merits may be invoked by a plea of res judicata or estoppel of record as a bar to further litigation between the same parties of the identical issues litigated and decided in that court, and there is no merit to the contention that the former judgment cannot be a bar because rendered by an inferior court. Petrus v. Robbins, 196 Va. 322 , 83 S.E.2d 408 (1954), decided under former § 16-90, relating to jurisdiction of civil and police justices.

Prohibition against justice exceeding jurisdiction; collateral attack on judgments. - While a writ of prohibition will be awarded to prevent a justice of the peace [now general district court judge] from taking jurisdiction of a debt in excess of $100.00 (now $1,000), which has been split up into notes each less than all of which are due, and for which separate warrants are being prosecuted before him, yet where such warrants have proceeded to judgment before the justice, with the consent or acquiescence of the defendant, such judgments cannot be thereafter collaterally assailed by third persons. This result does not in any degree impinge upon the maxim that consent cannot give jurisdiction, as the justice had jurisdiction over the amount represented in each judgment. Adams v. Jennings, 103 Va. 579 , 49 S.E. 982 (1905).

Dismissal when suit not within jurisdiction. - When the cause of action is not within the jurisdiction granted by law to the tribunal, the court will dismiss the suit at any time when the fact is brought to its notice. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pettyjohn, 88 Va. 296 , 13 S.E. 431 (1891).

Applied in Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985); Cartwright v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 270 Va. 58 , 613 S.E.2d 449, 2005 Va. LEXIS 62 (2005).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Inapplicable to juvenile and domestic relations cases. - That §§ 16.1-106 and 16.1-113 do not apply to appeals from juvenile and domestic relations district courts is made clear by § 16.1-77, which gives general district courts exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases involving claims of $3,000 or less and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of civil cases involving claims above $3,000, and by § 16.1-69.5 (b), which defines "general district courts" as all courts not of record, except juvenile and domestic relations district courts. Commonwealth v. Neal, 58 Va. Cir. 205, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 142 (Richmond 2002).

Court limited by General District Court's jurisdiction. - Despite the court's original subject matter jurisdiction over equitable claims for rescission, on an appeal from general district court it was nonetheless limited by the jurisdiction of the general district court; as such, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in the instant case. Childers v. Woodlawn Funeral & Crematory, 99 Va. Cir. 388, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 126 (Norfolk July 31, 2018).

§ 16.1-77.1. When general district court may give judgment on forthcoming bond.

A general district court may, on motion, after 10 days' notice of the time and place thereof, give judgment on any forthcoming bond taken by a sheriff or other officer upon a fieri facias issued by such court.

(Code 1950, § 8-457; 1977, c. 624; 1983, c. 616; 2007, c. 869.)

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 869 deleted the second sentence, which read: "Any such case meeting the requirements of § 16.1-92 may be removed to the circuit court in accordance with the procedures prescribed by that section," and made stylistic changes.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 8B M.J. Forthcoming and Delivery Bonds, § 27.

§ 16.1-77.2. Jurisdiction of partition of personal property and proceedings therefor.

Every general district court shall have jurisdiction of proceedings for partition of personal property, within the limits as to value and in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained.

When joint owners of personal property of the value of more than $20 but not more than maximum jurisdictional limits of the court as provided in § 16.1-77 (1) cannot agree upon a partition thereof, any party in interest may compel partition, the proceeding for which shall be commenced by a petition presented to a general district court as prescribed in subdivision 5 of § 8.01-262 . A copy of the petition, together with a notice of the time and place the petitioner will ask for a hearing thereon, shall be served on each of the defendants at least 10 days prior to the day of hearing. The court shall hear and decide the matter without the appointment or use of commissioners.

Any party aggrieved by a final judgment rendered by the general district court in any such proceeding shall have an appeal of right to any circuit court of the county or city having jurisdiction of appeals from such general district court, to be perfected within the time, and in all other respects in accordance with the provisions of law concerning appeals from general district courts in other civil cases.

(Code 1950, § 8-703; 1952, c. 252; 1972, c. 368; 1977, c. 624; 1983, c. 616; 2007, c. 869.)

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 869 deleted the former third paragraph, which read: "Any such case meeting the requirements of § 16.1-92 may be removed to the circuit court in accordance with procedures prescribed by that section."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Cotenancy, § 45.

§ 16.1-78. Judgment by confession not affected.

None of the provisions of § 16.1-77 shall affect the right of any person to obtain judgment by confession in any court of record having jurisdiction thereof, or in the clerk's office of any such court, when such right exists under some other statute or act, on any claim for money, property or damages, regardless of the amount of such claim for money or damages or the value of such property.

(1956, c. 555.)

Article 3. Procedure in Civil Cases.

§ 16.1-79. Actions brought on warrant.

A civil action in a general district court may be brought by warrant directed to the sheriff or to any other person authorized to serve process in such county or city, requiring the person against whom the claim is asserted to appear before the court on a certain day, not exceeding sixty days from the date of service thereof, to answer the complaint of the plaintiff set out in the warrant. After the warrant has been issued and delivered for service it shall not be altered, nor any blank filled, except by order of the court.

(1956, c. 555; 1991, c. 26.)

Cross references. - As to service of process in actions brought on warrant, see § 8.01-329 .

Research References. - Enforcement of Judgments and Liens in Virginia (Matthew Bender). Chapter 3. The Writ Firea Facies: Execution. § 3.2 Execution. Rendleman.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 6-105. Case Disposition; No. 5-712. Warrant in Debt et seq.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1A M.J. Actions, § 2; 2A M.J. Assumpsit, § 2; 5A M.J. Covenant, Action of, § 1; 5C M.J. Debt, Action of, § 1; 13A M.J. Motions for Judgment, § 2.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Petition by unemancipated minors for protective orders. - A minor may seek an emergency protective order in certain situations, but a minor who has not been emancipated, however mature that individual may be, can seek a protective order only through a next friend. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Charniele L. Herring, Member, House of Delegates, 10-116, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 2 (01/21/11).

Demurrer. - A demurrer can be filed in both general district courts and circuit courts to challenge the legal sufficiency of a cause of action. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of Delegates, No. 14-078, 2015 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (2/4/15).

§ 16.1-79.1. Electronic filing of civil cases.

The general district courts shall accept case data in an electronic format for any civil action filed. The use of the electronic transfer shall be at the option of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, and if electronic transfer is utilized, the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney shall comply with the security and data configuration standards established by the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court. If electronic transfer is utilized, the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney shall be responsible for filing with the clerk of the general district court the paper copies of any pleading for the proper processing of such civil actions as otherwise required by law, unless the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney has established at his expense a system for the filing of a pleading generated through the electronic transfer of data; such system has been authorized by, and meets the filing requirements of, the clerk; and the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney transmits the process in an electronic format directly with the sheriff as otherwise provided by law. Notwithstanding any electronic transfer, the plaintiff shall remain responsible for payment of any required fees upon case initiation or filing and as otherwise required by law.

(2010, cc. 550, 622; 2011, c. 766.)

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 766 added "unless the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney has established at his expense a system for the filing of a pleading generated through the electronic transfer of data; such system has been authorized by, and meets the filing requirements of, the clerk; and the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney transmits the process in an electronic format directly with the sheriff as otherwise provided by law" at the end of the second sentence and added the last sentence.

Law review. - For article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 183 (2010).

§ 16.1-80. Service of warrant and return thereof.

The officer issuing a warrant shall deliver to the officer to whom it is directed, or to the plaintiff, for service, one or more original warrants and as many copies as there are defendants upon whom it is to be served. Service of the warrant shall be made as provided in Chapter 8 (§ 8.01-285 et seq.) of Title 8.01, but the warrant must be served not less than five days before the return day. Returns shall be made on the original, or on one or more of them if there be more than one issued, and shall show when, where, how and upon whom service was made. The warrant or warrants with the returns thereon shall be delivered to the court prior to the return day thereof, but if not so delivered may, in the discretion of the judge of the court, be delivered before the court convenes on the return day.

(1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-81. Actions brought by motion for judgment.

A civil action in a general district court may be brought by motion for judgment. Such motion shall be in writing, signed by the plaintiff or his attorney, and shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court and the title of the action, which shall include the names of all parties and the address of each defendant. It shall state the facts on which the plaintiff relies, and shall be sufficient if it clearly informs the defendant or defendants of the true nature of the claim asserted. The motion shall notify the defendant or defendants of the day on which such motion shall be made, which day shall not be more than sixty days from the date of service of the motion.

(1956, c. 555; 1990, c. 762.)

Cross references. - As to service of process in actions brought on motion for judgment, see § 8.01-329 .

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1A M.J. Actions, §§ 2, 13; 2A M.J. Assumpsit, § 2; 5A M.J. Covenant, Action of, § 1; 5C M.J. Debt, Action of, § 1; 13A M.J. Motions for Judgment, § 4.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Petition by unemancipated minors for protective orders. - A minor may seek an emergency protective order in certain situations, but a minor who has not been emancipated, however mature that individual may be, can seek a protective order only through a next friend. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Charniele L. Herring, Member, House of Delegates, 10-116, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 2 (01/21/11).

§ 16.1-81.1. Certain corporations; pro se representation.

When the amount in controversy in any action at law in a general district court does not exceed the sum of $2,500, exclusive of interest, attorney fees contracted for in the instrument, and costs, a corporate plaintiff or defendant, the stock of which is held by no more than five persons and is not publicly offered or planned to be publicly offered at the time of the litigation, may be represented by an officer of that corporation who shall have all the rights and privileges given an individual to represent, plead, and try a case without an attorney, provided that such officer has the unanimous consent of all the shareholders to do so.

(2009, c. 666.)

§ 16.1-82. Service of motion; return thereon and delivery to the court; how disposed of.

The plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the court an original motion for judgment and as many copies as there are defendants upon whom it is to be served, with the proper fees. The original motion and copies thereof shall then be delivered to the sheriff or other person for service. Service of such motion shall be as provided in Chapter 8 (§ 8.01-285 et seq.) of Title 8.01, but the motion must be served not less than five days before the return day. Returns shall be made on the original motion for judgment and shall show when, where, how and upon whom service was made. The motion or motions with the returns thereon shall be returned by the sheriff or other persons making service to the court within three days of the date service is made. The motion for judgment shall be heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as if it were a civil warrant. Except as otherwise provided herein, procedure upon such motion for judgment shall conform as nearly as practicable to the procedure in motions for judgment prescribed by Rules of Court for civil actions in courts of record.

(1956, c. 555; 1981, c. 576; 1990, c. 943.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1A M.J. Abatement, Survival and Revival, § 38.

CASE NOTES

Timely service not shown. - Where the only evidence of the time of receipt of process offered by plaintiffs, other than an undated return receipt, was the testimony of their own counsel that an employee of defendant insurer had telephoned him "two days before the return day," even if counsel's testimony had been admitted into evidence, it would not have proved that the letter was received in the time required by § 8.01-288 and this section. Davis v. American Interinsurance Exch., 228 Va. 1 , 319 S.E.2d 723 (1984).

§ 16.1-83. Consent of parties required for trial within five days of service.

No trial of a warrant or motion for judgment under this title may be had within five days after service thereof except with the consent of the parties. Proceedings to enforce the rights and privileges conferred by the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et seq.) shall be conducted within the time limitations specified in § 2.2-3713 .

(1956, c. 555; 1990, c. 217.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 14B M.J. Process, § 12.

§ 16.1-83.1. Certification of expert witness opinion at time of service of process.

Every warrant in debt, counter claim, or third party claim in a medical malpractice action, at the time the plaintiff requests service of process upon a defendant, or requests a defendant to accept service of process, shall be deemed a certification that the plaintiff has obtained from an expert whom the plaintiff reasonably believes would qualify as an expert witness pursuant to subsection A of § 8.01-581.20 a written opinion signed by the expert witness that, based upon a reasonable understanding of the facts, the defendant for whom service of process has been requested deviated from the applicable standard of care and the deviation was a proximate cause of the injuries claimed. This certification is not necessary if the plaintiff, in good faith, alleges a medical malpractice action that asserts a theory of liability where expert testimony is unnecessary because the alleged act of negligence clearly lies within the range of the jury's common knowledge and experience.

The certifying expert shall not be required to be an expert witness expected to testify at trial nor shall any defendant be entitled to discover the identity or qualifications of the certifying expert or the nature of the certifying expert opinions. Should the certifying expert be identified as an expert expected to testify at trial, the opinions and bases therefor shall be discoverable pursuant to Rule 4:1 of the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia with the exception of the expert's status as a certifying expert.

Upon written request of any defendant, the plaintiff shall, within 10 business days after receipt of such request, provide the defendant with a certification form which affirms that the plaintiff had obtained the necessary certifying expert opinion at the time service was requested or affirms that the plaintiff did not need to obtain a certifying expert opinion. The court, upon good cause shown, may conduct an in camera review of the certifying expert opinion obtained by the plaintiff as the court may deem appropriate. If the plaintiff did not obtain a necessary certifying expert opinion at the time the plaintiff requested service of process on a defendant, the court shall impose sanctions according to the provisions of § 8.01-271.1 and may dismiss the case with prejudice.

(2005, cc. 649, 692; 2007, c. 489; 2013, cc. 65, 610.)

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 489 inserted "or requests a defendant to accept service of process" preceding "shall be deemed" in the first sentence of the first paragraph; and inserted "or qualifications" following "identity" in the first sentence of the second paragraph.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendments by cc. 65 and 610 are identical, and added the second sentence of the third paragraph.

Law review. - For 2007 annual survey article, "Health Care Law," see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 441 (2007).

For Survey article, see "Civil Practice and Procedure," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1 (2013).

§ 16.1-84. When action or proceeding not lost; when matured for hearing.

In the event the return day of any civil action or other proceeding is a day on which the court does not sit, such action or proceeding shall not be lost, but shall be deemed matured for hearing or other disposition by the court on the first day thereafter on which the court sits for hearing civil actions.

(1956, c. 555; 1958, c. 210.)

§ 16.1-85. What term "warrant" to include.

Whenever the word "warrant" is used in any section of the Code or act of assembly relating to civil proceedings, it shall, unless the context or use indicates a different meaning, be construed to mean "warrant or motion for judgment."

(1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-86. When action deemed brought.

A civil action on a warrant in a district court shall be deemed brought when the memorandum required by § 8.01-290 is filed with the clerk, magistrate, or other officer authorized to issue warrants and the required fee is paid. The officer issuing the warrant shall note on the memorandum the date and time it is received by him with the required fee.

A civil action on a motion for judgment as authorized in § 16.1-81 shall be deemed brought on the day on which the motion is filed with the court.

Whenever any other pleading in any civil action is filed in a district court, the clerk or his designee shall stamp or mark the date received and time of filing on the face of such pleading.

(1956, c. 555; 1980, c. 739; 1990, c. 109.)

§ 16.1-86.1.

Repealed by Acts 1990, c. 109.

§ 16.1-87.

Repealed by Acts 1983, c. 499.

Cross references. - For current provisions as to retention and disposition of district court records, see § 16.1-69.53 et seq.

§ 16.1-88. Procedure when plaintiff sues on sworn claim.

If a civil action in a general district court is upon a contract, express or implied, for the payment of money, or unlawful detainer pursuant to § 55.1-1245 or 55.1-1415 for the payment of money or possession of the premises, or both, or is brought by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision or agency thereof for the collection of taxes or to enforce any other obligation for the payment of money, an affidavit and a copy of the account if there be one and, in actions pursuant to § 55.1-1245 or 55.1-1415 , proof of required notice may be made and served on the defendant in accordance with § 8.01-296 with the warrant or motion for judgment as provided in § 8.01-28 for actions at law, whereupon the provisions of § 8.01-28 shall be applicable to the further proceedings therein. The affidavit and the account if there is one and proof of appropriate notice may be attached to the warrant or motion, in which event the combined papers shall be served as a single paper.

(1956, c. 555; 1973, c. 440; 1991, c. 503.)

Editor's note. - To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted " § 55.1-1245 or 55.1-1415 " for " § 55-225 or 55-248.31."

§ 16.1-88.01. Counterclaims.

In any proceeding before any general district court a defendant may, at his option, at any time before trial, plead in writing as a counterclaim, any cause of action at law for a money judgment in personam, or any matter which would entitle him to relief in equity in the nature of damages, that he has against the plaintiff or all plaintiffs jointly, whether or not it grows out of any transaction mentioned in the warrant or notice of motion for judgment, whether or not it is for liquidated damages, whether or not it is in tort or contract, and whether or not the amount demanded exceeds the amount claimed by the plaintiff in the warrant or notice of motion for judgment; however, no such counterclaim shall be filed or heard when the amount claimed therein exceeds the amount within the jurisdiction of such court.

Upon the request of either party, bills of particulars and grounds of defense may be ordered to ensure a fair trial on the merits of the issue presented. The court may, in its discretion, hear the counterclaim together with the original case, or may order and hold a separate hearing of any cause of action asserted in a counterclaim. In either event, the court shall render such final judgment on the whole case as the law and the evidence require.

(Code 1950, § 8-239.1; 1954, c. 608; 1977, c. 624; 1998, cc. 482, 495.)

The 1998 amendments. - The 1998 amendments by cc. 482 and 495 are identical, and in the first paragraph, deleted "provided" preceding "however" and deleted "that" following "however," and in the second paragraph, in the first sentence, substituted "either party" for "the respective parties," deleted "in the discretion of the general district court" following "may be ordered" and substituted "ensure" for "insure."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 62, 363; 3C M.J. Commercial Law, § 33; 5A M.J. Counties, § 83; 16 M.J. Setoff, Recoupment and Counterclaim, § 1.

CASE NOTES

Counterclaim held abandoned. - Defendant's inaction and failure to seek a definitive ruling when the district court failed, apparently through inadvertence, to rule upon defendant's counterclaim was an abandonment of the claim, and the circuit court properly refused to allow it to be revived in a trial de novo on plaintiff's claim. K-B Corp. v. Gallagher, 218 Va. 381 , 237 S.E.2d 183 (1977).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Counterclaim in excess of court's jurisdictional limit. - Under § 16.1-88.01, defendant, sued in general district court, could not file its counterclaim there because it sought damages in excess of that court's jurisdictional limit. But the granting of its motion to remove the case to circuit court triggered defendant's obligation to file its counterclaim within 21 days pursuant to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3:8; as it failed to do so, its counterclaim was dismissed. Millermusmar, P.C. v. Diakon Logistics, Inc., 72 Va. Cir. 69, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 173 (Fairfax County 2006).

§ 16.1-88.02. Cross-claims.

Subject to the jurisdictional limitations prescribed by law, in any proceeding before a general district court a defendant may, at his option, at any time before trial, plead in writing as a cross-claim any cause of action that he has against one or more defendants growing out of any matter pleaded in the plaintiff's warrant or notice or motion for judgment. The court may order and hold a separate hearing upon any cause of action asserted in a cross-claim.

(Code 1950, § 8-239.2; 1954, c. 608; 1977, c. 624.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Commercial Law, § 33; 5A M.J. Counties, § 83; 16 M.J. Setoff, Recoupment and Counterclaim, § 1.

§ 16.1-88.03. Pleadings and other papers by certain parties not represented by attorneys.

  1. Any corporation, partnership, limited liability company, limited partnership, professional corporation, professional limited liability company, registered limited liability partnership, registered limited liability limited partnership or business trust, the Fort Monroe Authority, and the Department of Military Affairs, when the amount claimed in any civil action pursuant to subdivision (1) or (3) of § 16.1-77 does not exceed the jurisdictional amounts authorized in such subsections, exclusive of interest, may prepare, execute, file, and have served on other parties in any proceeding in a general district court a warrant in debt, motion for judgment, warrant in detinue, distress warrant, summons for unlawful detainer, counterclaim, crossclaim, suggestion for summons in garnishment, garnishment summons, order of possession, writ of eviction, writ of fieri facias, interpleader and civil appeal notice without the intervention of an attorney. Such papers may be signed by a corporate officer, a manager of a limited liability company, a general partner of any form of partnership or a trustee of any business trust, or such corporate officer, with the approval of the board of directors, or manager, general partner or trustee may authorize in writing an employee, a person licensed under the provisions of § 54.1-2106.1 , or the property manager or the managing agent of a landlord as defined in § 55.1-1200 pursuant to the written property management agreement to sign such papers as the agent of the business entity. Only an agency employee designated in writing by the Adjutant General may sign such papers on behalf of the Department of Military Affairs. However, this section shall not apply to an action under subdivision (1) or (3) of § 16.1-77 which was assigned to a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, limited partnership, professional corporation, professional limited liability company, registered limited liability partnership, registered limited liability limited partnership or business trust, or individual solely for the purpose of enforcing an obligation owed or right inuring to another.
  2. Nothing in this section shall allow a nonlawyer to file a bill of particulars or grounds of defense or to argue motions, issue a subpoena, rule to show cause, or capias; file or interrogate at debtor interrogatories; or to file, issue or argue any other paper, pleading or proceeding not set forth in subsection A.
  3. The provisions of § 8.01-271.1 shall apply to any pleading, motion or other paper filed or made pursuant to this section.
  4. Parties not represented by counsel, and who have made an appearance in the case, shall promptly notify in writing the clerk of court wherein the litigation is pending, and any adverse party, of any change in the party's address necessary for accurate mailing or service of any pleadings or notices. In the absence of such notification, a mailing to or service upon a party at the most recent address contained in the court file of the case shall be deemed effective service or other notice.

    (1990, c. 645; 1992, c. 814; 1993, cc. 473, 478; 2003, cc. 665, 667; 2004, cc. 338, 365; 2005, c. 136; 2006, c. 374; 2017, c. 690; 2019, cc. 180, 477, 700; 2020, cc. 84, 194.)

Editor's note. - To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "55.1-1200" for "55-248.4."

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendments by cc. 665 and 667 are identical, and in subsection A, substituted "Any corporation, partnership, limited liability company, limited partnership, professional corporation, professional limited liability company, registered limited liability partnership, registered limited liability limited partnership or business trust, when" for "Any corporation or partnership, when" at the beginning of the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence, and inserted "limited liability company, limited partnership, professional corporation, professional limited liability company, registered limited liability partnership, registered limited liability limited partnership or business trust" in the third sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 338, in subsection A, substituted "subdivision" for "subsection" in the first sentence, added the language beginning "or such corporate officer" at the end of the second sentence, and substituted "subdivision (1) or (3) of § 16.1-77" for " § 16.1-77 (1) or (3)" in the last sentence.

The 2004 amendment by c. 365 inserted the language beginning "or such corporate officer" at the end of the second sentence in subsection A.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by 136 added subsection D.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 374 inserted "and who have made an appearance in the case" in subsection D.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 690 inserted "and the Department of Military Affairs" in the first sentence and added the third sentence in subsection A.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendments by cc. 180 and 700 are identical, and in subsection A, substituted "order of possession, writ of eviction" for "writ of possession."

The 2019 amendment by c. 477 inserted "pursuant to the written property management agreement" and made stylistic changes in subsection A.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 84 and 194 are identical, and inserted "the Fort Monroe Authority" in the first sentence in subsection A.

Law review. - For 2003/2004 survey of civil practice and procedure, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 87 (2004).

For article reviewing recent developments and changes in legislation, case law, and Virginia Supreme Court Rules affecting civil litigation, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 95 (2005).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Corporations. - Appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because appeal that was filed by counsel applied only to an individual, and the corporations were not properly before the court of appeals; the individual's motion for a new trial was only effective as to him and without effect to the corporations. Cajiao v. Warren, 90 Va. Cir. 64, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147 (Norfolk Feb. 24, 2015).

§ 16.1-88.1.

Repealed by Acts 1980, c. 183.

Cross references. - For current provisions as to affidavit regarding damages to motor vehicle, see § 8.01-416 .

§ 16.1-88.2. Evidence of medical reports or records; testimony of health care provider or custodian of records.

In a civil suit tried in a general district court or appealed to the circuit court to recover damages for personal injuries or to resolve any dispute with an insurance company or health care provider, either party may present evidence as to the extent, nature, and treatment of the injury, the examination of the person so injured, and the costs of such treatment and examination by the following:

  1. A report from the treating or examining health care provider as defined in § 8.01-581.1 or a health care provider licensed outside of the Commonwealth for his treatment of the plaintiff outside of the Commonwealth. Such medical report shall be admitted if the party intending to present evidence by the use of a report gives the opposing party or parties a copy of the report and written notice of such intention 10 days in advance of trial and if attached to such report is a sworn statement of (i) the treating or examining health care provider that (a) the person named therein was treated or examined by such health care provider, (b) the information contained in the report is true and accurate and fully descriptive as to the nature and extent of the injury, and (c) any statement of costs contained in the report is true and accurate or (ii) the custodian of such report that the same is a true and accurate copy of the report; or
  2. The records or bills of a hospital or similar medical facility at which the treatment or examination was performed. Such hospital or other medical facility records or bills shall be admitted if (i) the party intending to present evidence by the use of records or bills gives the opposing party or parties a copy of the records or bills and written notice of such intention 10 days in advance of trial and (ii) attached to the records or bills is a sworn statement of the custodian thereof that the same is a true and accurate copy of the records or bills of such hospital or other medical facility.

    If, thereafter, the plaintiff or defendant summons the health care provider or custodian making such statement to testify in proper person or by deposition, the court shall determine which party shall pay the fee and costs for such appearance or depositions, or may apportion the same among the parties in such proportions as the ends of justice may require. If such health care provider or custodian is not subject to subpoena for cross-examination in court or by a deposition, then the court shall allow a reasonable opportunity for the party seeking the subpoena for such health care provider or custodian to obtain his testimony as the ends of justice may require. The plaintiff may only present evidence pursuant to this section in circuit court if he has not requested an amount in excess of the ad damnum in the motion for judgment filed in the general district court.

    (1978, c. 490; 1983, c. 616; 1985, c. 379; 1989, c. 563; 1990, c. 279; 1996, c. 749; 2005, c. 811; 2007, cc. 425, 869; 2013, cc. 78, 145; 2014, cc. 25, 85, 446.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 811, in the first sentence, inserted "or filed in a general district court and removed to circuit court where the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount set forth in § 16.1-77" and substituted "10" for "ten."

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 425 inserted "or appealed to the circuit court by any defendant" near the beginning of the first sentence.

The 2007 amendment by c. 869 deleted "or filed in a general district court and removed to circuit court where the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount set forth in § 16.1-77" from the first sentence.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 78 deleted "by any defendant" following "circuit court" near the beginning of the first sentence; and added the last sentence.

The 2013 amendment by c. 145 restructured the section by inserting "the following:" at the end of the introductory paragraph and adding the subdivision designations; in subdivision 1, deleted "and the records of a hospital or similar medical facility at which the treatment or examination was performed" following "8.01-581.1"; in subdivision 2, added the first sentence, twice substituted "records or bills" for "record," inserted clause (i) and the clause (ii) designator, and substituted "the records or bills" for "it" in clause (ii); and in the last paragraph, deleted "taken de bene esse" following "or by deposition" in the first sentence, and deleted "de bene esse" following "by a deposition" in the second sentence.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendments by cc. 25 and 446 are identical, and in subdivision 1 added "or a health care provider licensed outside of the Commonwealth for his treatment of the plaintiff outside of the Commonwealth" at the end of the first sentence.

The 2014 amendment by c. 85, in subdivision 1 redesignated clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) as (a), (b), and (c), inserted the clause (i) designator, and inserted "or (ii) the custodian of such report that the same is a true and accurate copy of the report"; and made related changes.

Law review. - For 2007 annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 229 (2007).

§ 16.1-89. Subpoena duces tecum; attorney-issued subpoena duces tecum.

A judge or clerk of a district court may issue a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to the terms of Rule 4:9A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia except that such subpoena may be directed to a party to the case as well as to a person who is not a party.

Subpoenas duces tecum for medical records issued by an attorney shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 8.01-413 and 32.1-127.1:03 except that no separate fee for issuance shall be imposed.

A subpoena duces tecum may also be issued by an attorney-at-law who is an active member of the Virginia State Bar at the time of issuance, as an officer of the court. Any such subpoena duces tecum shall be on a form approved by the Committee on District Courts, signed by the attorney as if a pleading and shall include the attorney's address. A copy, together with the attorney's certificate of service pursuant to Rule 1:12, shall be mailed or delivered to the clerk's office of the court in which the case is pending on the day of issuance by the attorney. The law governing subpoenas duces tecum issued by a clerk shall apply mutatis mutandis, except that attorneys may not issue subpoenas duces tecum in those cases in which they may not issue a summons as provided in § 8.01-407 . A sheriff shall not be required to serve an attorney-issued subpoena that is not issued at least five business days prior to the date production of evidence is desired. When an attorney-at-law transmits one or more subpoenas duces tecum to a sheriff to be served in his jurisdiction, the provisions in § 8.01-407 regarding such transmittals shall apply.

If the time for compliance with a subpoena duces tecum issued by an attorney is less than 14 days after service of the subpoena, the person to whom it is directed may serve upon the party issuing the subpoena a written objection setting forth any grounds upon which such production, inspection or testing should not be had. If objection is made, the party on whose behalf the subpoena was issued and served shall not be entitled to the requested production, inspection or testing, except pursuant to an order of the court, but may, upon notice to the person to whom the subpoena was directed, move for an order to compel production, inspection or testing. Upon such timely motion, the court may quash, modify or sustain the subpoena.

(1956, c. 555; 1979, c. 668; 1984, c. 500; 1986, c. 160; 2000, c. 813; 2004, c. 335.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2000, c. 813, cl. 3 provides: "That the Virginia Bar Association, with the support of the Virginia Sheriffs Association and such other organizations from which it may request assistance, shall conduct a study of the effectiveness of this act and report its findings to the General Assembly no later than January 1, 2001."

Acts 2001, cc. 514 and 551 repealed Acts 2000, c. 813, cl. 2 which had provided: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on July 1, 2001, unless reenacted by the 2001 General Assembly. Any subpoena or subpoena duces tecum issued by an attorney in compliance with this act shall remain valid notwithstanding the expiration of this act."

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, the reference to "Rule 4:9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia" has been changed to "Rule 4:9A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 813 added the second, third, and fourth paragraphs.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 335 divided the former fourth sentence into the present fourth and fifth sentences by substituting "A sheriff shall not be required to serve an attorney-issued subpoena that is not issued at least" for "and may not issue a subpoena duces tecum less than" in the third paragraph; substituted "14" for "fourteen" in the first sentence of the last paragraph; and made a minor stylistic change.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on evidence for year 1977-1978, see 64 Va. L. Rev. 1451 (1978).

CASE NOTES

Issuance of subpoena as discovery for tenant in eviction proceeding. - In an eviction proceeding, as a discretionary matter, a general district court in Virginia could provide the tenant discovery by ordering a bill of particulars, and issue subpoenas duces tecum, and has the power to issue a final order that would satisfy the requirements for a written decision. Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1986).

§ 16.1-90. Recognizance upon continuation of case.

Judges of courts not of record may, upon the continuance of any case, require the witnesses or any of them, to enter into recognizance in such penalty as the judge may deem proper, either with or without security, for their appearance at a subsequent date to give evidence in the case, such recognizance to conform to the requirements of §§ 19.2-135 through 19.2-137 for taking recognizance of witnesses.

(1956, c. 555; 1960, c. 372.)

§ 16.1-91.

Repealed by Acts 1984, c. 25.

§ 16.1-91.1. Costs to be included in judgment on forthcoming bond.

The judge of a general district court, on giving judgment on a forthcoming bond, shall include in the costs of the judgment the clerk's fee as stated in subdivision A 21 of § 17.1-275 ; and the clerk shall not receive any fee or reward for any service he is required to perform by the provisions of § 8.01-529 , except that specified in subdivision A 21 of § 17.1-275 .

(Code 1950, § 8-460; 1962, c. 10; 1977, c. 624.)

§ 16.1-91.2. Judge to keep record of judgment on forthcoming bond; how to endorse execution.

The judge of the general district court, rendering a judgment under the provisions of Chapter 19 (§ 8.01-526 et seq.) of Title 8.01, shall keep a record thereof in the same manner as he is required by law in other cases. He shall not stay execution upon such judgment, and shall endorse on any fieri facias issued thereon "no security is to be taken."

(Code 1950, § 8-461; 1962, c. 10; 1977, c. 624.)

§ 16.1-92.

Repealed by Acts 2007, c. 869, cl. 2.

§ 16.1-93. Principles applicable to trial of cases.

Every action or other proceeding in a court not of record shall be tried according to the principles of law and equity, and when the same conflict the principles of equity shall prevail. No warrant, motion or other pleading shall be dismissed by reason of a mere defect, irregularity or omission in the proceedings or in the form of the pleadings when the same may be corrected by an order of the court. The court may direct such proceedings and enter such orders as may be necessary to correct any such defects, irregularities and omissions, and to bring about a trial of the merits of the controversy and promote substantial justice to all parties. The court may make such provisions as to costs and continuances as may be just.

(1956, c. 555.)

Cross references. - For provision on amendment of written pleadings, see Rule 8:8, Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Rules.

CASE NOTES

Section controls conduct of trial. - The trial before a justice of the peace (now district court judge) must be conducted under the provisions of this section. Copperthite Pie Corp. v. Whitehurst, 157 Va. 480 , 162 S.E. 189 (1932) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Right to allow setoff. - When this section and § 16.1-77 are read together, the right of the justice to entertain a plea of setoff and give judgment thereon seems to be expressly given. Copperthite Pie Corp. v. Whitehurst, 157 Va. 480 , 162 S.E. 189 (1932) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Evictions during COVID-19 pandemic. - Judicial branch mechanisms that may bar evictions across Virginia during the COVID-19 pandemic include the ability to suspend, toll, or extend filing deadlines, etc., including for unlawful detainers and discretion to grant continuances. See opinion of Attorney General to Hon. Marcia S. "Cia" Price, Hon. Lashrecse Aird, Hon. Jeion A. Ward, Hon. Patrick A. Hope, Hon. Marcus B. Simon, Hon. Paul E. Krizek, Hon. Kelly K. Convirs-Fowler, Hon. Jeffrey M. Bourne, Hon. Kathy K.L. Tran, Hon. Alex Q. Askew, Hon. Chris L. Hurst, and Hon. Lee J. Carter, Members, House of Delegates, 20-033, 2020 Va. AG LEXIS 26 (7/15/20).

§ 16.1-93.1. Use of telephonic communication systems or electronic video and audio communication systems to conduct hearing.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any proceeding under this chapter in which a party or witness is incarcerated or when otherwise authorized by the court, the court may, in its discretion, conduct any hearing using a telephonic communication system or an electronic audio and video communication system to provide for the appearance of any parties and witnesses. Any electronic audio and video communication system used to conduct such a hearing shall meet the standards set forth in subsection B of § 19.2-3.1.

(2001, c. 513.)

Law review. - For article, "Legal Issues Involving Children," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 741 (2001).

§ 16.1-94. Judgment to be noted on papers; formal orders may be entered.

Whenever a judgment is rendered in a court not of record the judgment shall be entered on the warrant, motion for judgment, counterclaim, cross-claim or other pleading and signed by the judge, or the signature of the judge may be affixed by a facsimile stamp, in which event the judge shall initial a notation of the judgment made on the warrant or other paper. If the action is on a note, bond or other written obligation, the date and amount of the judgment rendered shall be noted thereon, to which notation the judge or clerk shall affix his name or his initials. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the judge from entering a formal order in any case in which he deems such order to be appropriate, including but not limited to settlement and installment orders endorsed by counsel, or to affect the validity of any formal order so entered. If such action is on a lease for the recovery of rent or possession of property this section shall not operate to require marking of such lease unless the judge deems such marking necessary.

(1956, c. 555; 1962, c. 361; 2004, c. 341.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2004, c. 341, cl. 2 provides: "That this act is declarative of existing law."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 341 inserted "including but not limited to settlement and installment orders endorsed by counsel" in the third sentence.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on pleading and practice for the year 1972-1973, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1973).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judgments and Decrees, § 35.

CASE NOTES

Design of section. - This section is designed to allow a court not of record to enter an informal order on the face of the pleadings in disposing of cases. Barkman v. Chevalier, 214 Va. 6 , 196 S.E.2d 911 (1973).

This section requires the judge of a court not of record to enter a notation of judgment somewhere in the record. Barkman v. Chevalier, 214 Va. 6 , 196 S.E.2d 911 (1973).

But this section is procedural only. Barkman v. Chevalier, 214 Va. 6 , 196 S.E.2d 911 (1973).

A judgment may be entered in a court not of record on the warrant itself. - To effectuate a valid judgment, this section requires that the warrant be signed by the judge, or that the judge's signature be affixed by facsimile stamp, in which case the judge must initial the warrant. The requirement of the statute is procedural only. It is designed to allow a court not of record to enter an informal order on the face of the pleadings in disposing of cases. Meredith v. Commonwealth, No. 1117-93-3 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 10, 1995).

Lack of specific notation as to counterclaim not conclusive. - Where an informal order was entered on a civil warrant before the county court (now general district court), showing judgment in favor of a plaintiff, which may have been intended by the court to be an adverse ruling on the defendant's counterclaim, the lack of a specific notation concerning defendant's pleading is not conclusive of the question whether the counterclaim was recognized and ruled on by the county court. Barkman v. Chevalier, 214 Va. 6 , 196 S.E.2d 911 (1973).

District court final order would satisfy requirements for written decision. - In an eviction proceeding, as a discretionary matter, a general district court in Virginia could provide the tenant discovery by ordering a bill of particulars, and issue subpoenas duces tecum, and has the power to issue a final order that would satisfy the requirements for a written decision. Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1986).

§ 16.1-94.01. When and how satisfaction entered on judgment.

  1. When satisfaction of any judgment rendered in a court not of record is made, the judgment creditor shall by himself, or his agent or attorney, give written notice of such satisfaction, within 30 days of receipt, to the clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered. Such notice shall include the docket number, the names of the parties, and the date of the judgment. The clerk of the court shall then mark the judgment satisfied. For any money judgment marked as satisfied pursuant to this section, nothing herein shall satisfy an unexecuted order of possession entered pursuant to § 8.01-126 .
  2. If the judgment creditor fails to comply with subsection A, the judgment debtor, his heirs or personal representatives, may, on motion, after 10 days' notice thereof to the judgment creditor, or his assignee, his personal representative, or his agent or attorney, apply to the court in which the judgment was rendered to have the judgment marked satisfied. Upon proof that the judgment has been satisfied, the clerk shall mark the judgment satisfied. If the judgment creditor or his legal representatives cannot be reasonably located, the notice may be published and posted as an order of publication is required to be published and posted under §§ 8.01-316 and 8.01-317 .
  3. The cost of such proceedings, including reasonable attorney fees and the cost of publication, may be ordered to be paid by the judgment creditor.

    (1999, c. 370; 2015, c. 547; 2017, c. 481.)

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 547, in subsection A, deleted "payment or" preceding "satisfaction" twice in the first sentence and once in the third sentence, and added the last sentence; deleted "paid, discharged or otherwise" preceding "satisfied" in subsection B; substituted "attorney" for "attorney's" in subsection C; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 481 substituted "and the date of the judgment" for "the date and amount of the judgment, and the date of the satisfaction" in subsection A.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Order of remittance does not serve as a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to the statute. - An order of remittance, after the forfeiture of a bond in a general district court criminal matter has led to a docketed judgment, does not serve as a satisfaction of the judgment pursuant to the statute, but does operate as a satisfaction of the judgment docketed in the circuit court. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Joel C. Cunningham, Judge, General District Court of Halifax County, 02-040 (5/29/02).

§ 16.1-94.1. Limitations on enforcement of district court judgments.

For judgments entered in a general district court on or after January 1, 1985, no execution shall be issued or action brought on such judgment, including a judgment in favor of the Commonwealth, after ten years from the date of such judgment except as provided in § 16.1-69.55 B 4.

(1983, c. 499.)

Law review. - For article reviewing recent developments and changes in legislation, case law, and Virginia Supreme Court Rules affecting civil litigation, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 95 (2005).

§ 16.1-95. Abstract of judgment.

At any time while the papers in any case in which a judgment has been rendered by a general district court are retained by the court, the judge or clerk of the court shall certify and deliver an abstract of the judgment to any person interested therein. In the absence of any such judge or clerk, or in the event of a vacancy in the office of such judge or clerk, such abstract of judgment may be made and certified by the substitute judge or clerk, if there be one, or by any other judge of a general district court in such county or city.

(1956, c. 555; 1983, c. 499.)

§ 16.1-96. What abstract to contain.

An abstract of a judgment rendered in a court not of record shall contain the information required by § 8.01-449 for entry in the judgment dockets of courts of record, except that it shall not be necessary to include any information as to executions which have been issued thereon.

(1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-97.

Repealed by Acts 1987, c. 98.

Cross references. - For current provisions as to when a new trial is granted, see now § 16.1-97.1.

§ 16.1-97.1. When a new trial is granted.

  1. No new trial may be granted from any judgment in a district court unless a motion by one of the parties is made within thirty days after the date of judgment, not including the date of entry of such judgment. The motion for new trial shall be heard by the judge who rendered the judgment, but if the judge is not in office, is absent from the jurisdiction, or is otherwise unavailable to hear the motion for new trial, such motion may be heard by a judge of that district court.
  2. A hearing shall be held by the court, as provided herein, and the court shall rule on any such motions not later than forty-five days after the date of judgment, not including the date of entry of such judgment. Nothing contained in this section shall operate to alter the granting of a new trial by the court pursuant to § 8.01-428 , or to alter the requirements for appeal from any judgment of any district court as otherwise provided by law. (1987, c. 98; 1988, c. 506.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 13B M.J. New Trials, §§ 3, 49.

CASE NOTES

Purpose. - This section was enacted to permit the court not of record (now general district court) to consider, within 30 days (now 45 days) of judgment, a motion for new trial. Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092 , 277 S.E.2d 213 (1981) (decided under former § 16.1-97).

Writ of prohibition. - Pursuant to this section, a writ of prohibition will be granted to restrain a justice of the peace (now general district court judge) from allowing a new trial after more than 30 days (now 45 days) after judgment, and to restrain defendant from proceeding after such new trial is allowed. Burroughs v. Taylor, 90 Va. 55 , 17 S.E. 745 (1893) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Time limitations. - Because a general district court did not rule on the insureds' motions for a new trial within 45 day after the date of the judgment, as required by subsection B of § 16.1-97.1, the court lost jurisdiction to require an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage. Williams v. Morgan-Towe, 72 Va. Cir. 33, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 281 (Norfolk 2006).

Appeal dismissed. - Appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because appeal that was filed by counsel applied only to an individual, and the corporations were not properly before the court of appeals; the individual's motion for a new trial was only effective as to him and without effect to the corporations. Cajiao v. Warren, 90 Va. Cir. 64, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147 (Norfolk Feb. 24, 2015).

§ 16.1-98. Fieri facias or writ of possession on judgment.

Upon a judgment being rendered in a general district court a writ of fieri facias or a writ of possession shall be issued thereon only upon request of the judgment creditor, his assignee or his attorney. When the judgment is for personal property and the defendant is not given the option under § 8.01-121 to pay the amount of the judgment or surrender the property, the plaintiff may, at his option, have a writ of possession for the specific property and a writ of fieri facias for the damages or profits and costs, and if the writ of possession prove ineffectual he may have a writ of fieri facias for the alternate value. The judge or clerk shall write or stamp upon the docket of the court, or upon the original warrant or motion, the issuing of each such writ and the date of issuance.

(1956, c. 555; 1968, c. 260; 1974, c. 666; 1977, c. 624; 1983, c. 499.)

Cross references. - As to writs of possession generally, see §§ 8.01-470 and 8.01-471 .

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Courts, § 28; 8A M.J. Executions, § 2.

§ 16.1-99. When and where executions returnable; to whom directed.

A writ of fieri facias or a writ of possession issued from a general district court shall be made returnable within 90 days to the court from which it was issued, except that a writ of fieri facias issued in the instance of a wage garnishment shall be returnable not more than 180 days after the date of issuance. If, after the return day of the writ and the completion of any garnishment, interrogatory or other proceeding in connection therewith, the papers in the case have been returned to a circuit court, then the writ and other papers in connection with such proceeding shall likewise be returned to the circuit court and filed with the papers in the case. A writ of fieri facias may be directed to the sheriff of any county or to the sergeant or constable of any corporation.

(1956, c. 555; 1979, c. 45; 2003, c. 234.)

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 234, in the first sentence, substituted "90" for "ninety," and inserted "except that a writ of fieri facias issued in the instance of a wage garnishment shall be returnable not more than 180 days after the date of issuance" at the end.

§ 16.1-100. Additional executions; by whom issued.

Subject to the limitations prescribed in Chapter 17 (§ 8.01-426 et seq.) of Title 8.01, additional executions may be issued as provided in § 8.01-475 . Such executions shall be issued by the judge or clerk of the general district court and shall be returned to the court in which such papers are held on the return day of the execution.

(1956, c. 555; 1983, c. 499.)

§ 16.1-101. Proceedings against officer failing to make or making improper return.

If an officer fail to make due return of any execution issued from a court not of record, he may, on motion of the plaintiff and after ten days' notice, be fined from time to time by the judge of such court in an amount not less than five nor more than twenty dollars for each offense. And if an officer make such return upon an execution issued from a court not of record as would, on a motion against the officer, authorize judgment to be entered against him for all or any part of the amount of such execution if the execution had issued from a court of record, the creditor on whose behalf such execution issued, or his personal representative, may, on a motion before the judge of such court after like notice obtain such judgment against the officer, his sureties and others as could be given by a court of record if the execution had issued therefrom. Section 16.1-106 with respect to appeals in civil actions shall apply to such judgment. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section any such officer may be proceeded against as provided in Chapter 16 (§ 15.2-1600 et seq.) of Title 15.2, or a motion for judgment may be brought as authorized in § 8.01-227 .

(1956, c. 555.)

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction to hear motion and give judgment. - A justice of the peace (now district court judge) has jurisdiction to hear a motion and to give judgment against an officer and his sureties, for the failure of the officer to pay over money collected on an execution. Hendricks v. Shoemaker, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 197 (1846) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Is not dependent upon amount involved. - The jurisdiction of the justice in such case is not dependent upon the amount of the execution, or of the judgment on which the execution issued; nor is it affected by the fact that the party prosecuting the motion, is at the same time prosecuting other motions of the same kind, against the same parties, before the same or any other justice, whatever may be the number or aggregate pecuniary amount of the several defaults of the officer. Hendricks v. Shoemaker, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 197 (1846), cited in James v. Stokes, 77 Va. 225 (1883). Both cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

Joint notice and separate judgments. - One joint notice to the officer and his sureties, upon defaults of the officer in several cases, is sufficient; but the justice should give a separate and distinct judgment in each case. Hendricks v. Shoemaker, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 197 (1846) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

§ 16.1-102. Officers and sureties liable for money collected after return day.

If, after the return day of an execution issued on a judgment rendered by a court not of record, an officer shall collect money or take possession of property under such execution, he and his sureties shall be liable for such money or property in like manner as if it had been collected or taken before the return day.

(1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-103. Proceedings by interrogatories.

Whenever a fieri facias has been issued upon a judgment rendered in a general district court the judge or clerk of the court may issue the summons provided for in § 8.01-506 . In such case the judge of the general district court shall have all of the powers and authority respecting interrogatories conferred by §§ 8.01-506 to 8.01-510 upon any court or judge mentioned therein. The commissioner before whom any person is required to appear by such summons shall have the same powers and authority as if such summons had been issued under § 8.01-506. All interrogatories, answers, reports and other proceedings under such summons, and also all money, evidences of indebtedness and other security in the hands of an officer which are directed by any section of Chapter 18 (§ 8.01-466 et seq.) of Title 8.01 to be returned or delivered to such court or judge, or to the clerk's office of such court, shall, when the summons was issued by a judge of a general district court be returned or delivered in like manner to the court from which the summons issued.

From any order of the judge of the general district court which involves the disposition of any money or property exceeding the sum of fifty dollars in value, exclusive of interest, there shall be an appeal in the same manner and upon the same conditions as in appeals from judgments rendered in civil matters in general district courts.

(1956, c. 555; 1978, c. 66; 1983, c. 499.)

CASE NOTES

Continuance of interrogatory hearing for status. - Where debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition on the morning of a hearing on interrogatories that were served on her for discovery in aid of execution of Virginia state court judgment, continuing her interrogatories hearing for status violated the automatic stay, as there was no question that creditor and its attorney had actual notice of her bankruptcy filing. Even if creditor's attorney did not request continuance for status, she should have dismissed debtor's interrogatories as soon as she learned of the bankruptcy filing, thus obviating need for a continuance by the state court. In re Hafer,, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4630 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 4, 2013).

§ 16.1-104.

Repealed by Acts 1983, c. 499.

Cross references. - For current provision as to limitations on enforcement of judgments in general district court cases, and extensions thereof, see § 16.1-69.55.

§ 16.1-105. Attachments.

The proceedings on any attachment brought in a court not of record shall conform to the provisions of Chapter 20 (§ 8.01-533 et seq.) of Title 8.01, but if an attachment is returned executed and the defendant has not been served with a copy thereof, and the amount claimed in the attachment does not exceed $500, exclusive of interest and any attorney's fees contracted for in the instrument, the judge or clerk of the court, upon affidavit in conformity with §§ 8.01-316 and 8.01-317 , shall forthwith cause a copy of the attachment to be posted at the front door of the courthouse of the county or the front door of the courtroom of the city or town wherein the attachment was issued, and shall file a certificate of the fact with the papers in the case, and, in addition to such posting, the plaintiff in the attachment or his attorney shall give to the judge or his clerk the last known address or place of abode of the defendant, verified by affidavit, and the judge or clerk shall forthwith mail a copy of the attachment to the defendant at his last known address or place of abode, or if the defendant be a corporation, at its last known address. The mailing of the copy as herein required shall be certified by the judge or clerk in writing, and such certification shall be filed with the papers in the case. Fifteen days after the copy of the attachment has been posted and a copy thereof mailed as herein required, the court may hear and decide the attachment. If the amount claimed in the attachment is more than $500, exclusive of interest and any attorney's fees contracted for in the instrument, an order of publication shall be entered and published and other proceedings had in accordance with the provisions of §§ 8.01-316 , 8.01-317 , 8.01-318 , and 8.01-320 . Personal service on a nonresident defendant out of this Commonwealth as provided in § 8.01-320 shall have the same effect, and no other, as an order of publication duly executed or the posting and mailing of a copy of the attachment as provided herein.

If any such attachment is levied on real estate, the court shall not take cognizance of the case, but the same shall be forthwith removed to a court of record having jurisdiction of other actions removed therefrom, to be further proceeded with in such court of record as if the attachment had originated therein.

(1956, c. 555; 2010, c. 343.)

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 343 substituted "$500" for "$300" in the first and fourth sentences of the first paragraph.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 2A M.J. Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 2, 24, 48.

§ 16.1-106. Appeals from courts not of record in civil cases.

  1. From any order entered or judgment rendered in a court not of record in a civil case in which the matter in controversy is of greater value than $20, exclusive of interest, any attorney fees contracted for in the instrument, and costs, or when the case involves the constitutionality or validity of a statute of the Commonwealth, or of an ordinance or bylaw of a municipal corporation, or of the enforcement of rights and privileges conferred by the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et seq.), or of a protective order pursuant to § 19.2-152.10, or of an action filed by a condominium unit owners' association or unit owner pursuant to § 55.1-1959 , or of an action filed by a property owners' association or lot owner pursuant to § 55.1-1819 , or from any order entered or judgment rendered in a general district court that alters, amends, overturns, or vacates any prior final order, there shall be an appeal of right, if taken within 10 days after such order or judgment, to a court of record. Such appeal shall be to a court of record having jurisdiction within the territory of the court from which the appeal is taken and shall be heard de novo.
  2. If any party timely notices an appeal as provided by subsection A, such notice of appeal shall be deemed a timely notice of appeal by any other party on a final order or judgment entered in the same or a related action arising from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the underlying action; however, all parties will be required to timely perfect their own respective appeals by giving a bond and the writ tax and costs, if any, in accordance with § 16.1-107.

    If an appeal is noted and perfected after the sheriff has served the notice of intent to execute a writ of eviction, which is required to be served at least 72 hours before such eviction in accordance with law, the party noting or noting and perfecting such appeal shall notify the sheriff of such appeal.

  3. The court from which an appeal is sought may refuse to suspend the execution of a judgment that refuses, grants, modifies, or dissolves an injunction in a case brought pursuant to § 2.2-3713 of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act. A protective order issued pursuant to § 19.2-152.10, including a protective order required by § 18.2-60.4 , shall remain in effect upon petition for or the pendency of an appeal or writ of error unless ordered suspended by the judge of a circuit court or so directed in a writ of supersedeas by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. (1956, c. 555; 1977, c. 624; 1990, c. 217; 1997, c. 831; 2009, c. 729; 2013, cc. 73, 97; 2014, c. 784; 2015, c. 714; 2020, cc. 1048, 1049.)

Cross references. - As to appeals in criminal cases, see § 16.1-132 et seq.

As to appeal from judgment in actions for unlawful entry and detainer, see § 8.01-129 .

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2009, c. 729, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of this act are declarative of existing law."

To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitutions were made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "55.1-1959" for "55-79.80:2" and "55.1-1819" for "55-513."

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 729 added "and shall be heard de novo" at the end of the first paragraph.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendments by cc. 73 and 97 are identical, and inserted "including a protective order required by § 18.2-60.4 " in the second sentence of the second paragraph; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 784 in the first paragraph inserted "or of an action filed by a condominium unit owners' association or unit owner pursuant to § 55-79.80:2, or of an action filed by a property owners' association or lot owner pursuant to § 55-513" and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 714 substituted "$20" for "$50" in the first sentence.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 1048 and 1049 are identical, and designated the existing text as subsections A and C; in subsection A, inserted "or from any order entered or judgment rendered in a general district court that alters, amends, overturns, or vacates any prior final order"; and inserted subsection B.

Law review. - For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985).

For an article, "Final and Interlocutory Appeals in Virginia," see 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 337 (1999).

For annual survey, "A Look Back and Forward: Legislative and Regulatory Highlights for 2008 and 2009 and a Discussion of Juvenile Transfer," see 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 53 (2009).

For annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 269 (2009).

For article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 54 U. Rich. L. Rev. 7 (2019).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 232, 356-360, 362, 363; 2A M.J. Attachment and Garnishment, § 24.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

CASE NOTES

Purpose of section. - The legislative purpose of this section is to afford a summary and speedy settlement of trifling controversies before justices of the peace (now district court judges). Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Clark, 92 Va. 118 , 22 S.E. 867 (1895).

Section § 16.1-112 and this section are remedial and should be construed to effectuate the purposes of their enactment. Southern Ry. v. Hill, 106 Va. 501 , 56 S.E. 278 (1907).

The right of appeal is statutory and the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is confined to the provisions of the written law. Covington Virginian, Inc. v. Woods, 182 Va. 538 , 29 S.E.2d 406 (1944).

Appeal of right generally. - Section § 16.1-106 does not require the appealing party to appeal every adverse ruling of the general district court but, rather, provides an appeal of right for any order entered or judgment rendered. Robert & Bertha Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen, 295 Va. 130 , 810 S.E.2d 48, 2018 Va. LEXIS 15 (2018).

Supreme Court of Virginia holds that the appeal of right belongs to the party applying for the same. When the general district court enters a final, appealable judgment on claims pleaded in a warrant, summons, or complaint, Va. Sup. Ct. R. 7B:4(a); a counterclaim or cross-claim, Va. Sup. Ct. R. 7B:3(a); or a third-party civil warrant or complaint, Va. Sup. Ct. R. 7B:10(a), any party seeking on appeal to change or modify an unfavorable disposition of a claim asserted by or against him must file a notice of appeal. The failure to do so will leave the general district court's judgment on the claim intact and subject to res judicata principles. Robert & Bertha Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen, 295 Va. 130 , 810 S.E.2d 48, 2018 Va. LEXIS 15 (2018).

Ruling on motion requesting a new trial not appealable under this section. - Circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear tenant's appeal in unlawful detainer action from denial of her motion requesting a new trial because the decision denying the motion was not a final order or judgment, as it did not dispose of the merits of the unlawful detainer summons, and therefore was not "any order entered or judgment rendered" as required by this section. Ragan v. Woodcroft Village Apts., 255 Va. 322 , 497 S.E.2d 740 (1998).

Ruling on motion to set aside verdict not a final judgment. - Trial court properly granted the prevailing parties motion to dismiss the losing parties appeal from the general district court, as the losing parties motion to set aside was not a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken. Architectural Stone, LLC v. Wolcott Ctr., LLC, 274 Va. 519 , 649 S.E.2d 670, 2007 Va. LEXIS 107 (2007).

Jurisdictional amount. - Under this section costs are not to be computed as a part of the matter in controversy in determining the right of appeal. Shafer v. C & O R.R., 2 Va. Dec. 252, 23 S.E. 221 (1895).

Under this section no appeal lies from a judgment for $10.00 (now $50.00) and costs, costs being no part of the controversy. Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Clark, 92 Va. 118 , 22 S.E. 867 (1895).

Judgment involving constitutionality of statute. - The language of this section is broad enough to cover the right of appeal to the circuit court from a judgment involving the constitutionality of a statute. Southern Ry. v. Hill, 106 Va. 501 , 56 S.E. 278 (1907).

Appeal on statute's constitutionality does not lie if previously decided by Supreme Court. - Where the sole ground for an appeal is the constitutionality of a statute, the validity of which has been settled by former decisions of the Supreme Court, an appeal will not be entertained. This is the rule even if the constitutional objections are not precisely the same ones previously adjudicated. Myers v. Moore, 204 Va. 409 , 131 S.E.2d 414 (1963).

Abandoned counterclaim not revived in trial de novo of plaintiff's claim. - Defendant's inaction and failure to seek a definitive ruling when the district court failed, apparently through inadvertence, to rule upon defendant's counterclaim was an abandonment of the claim, and the circuit court properly refused to allow it to be revived in a trial de novo on plaintiff's claim. K-B Corp. v. Gallagher, 218 Va. 381 , 237 S.E.2d 183 (1977).

Consideration of pleadings. - Circuit court properly considered the pleadings filed in the general district court because, although appeals from courts not of record were heard by the circuit court de novo, the lower court was statutorily required to transmit its record to the circuit court. Parrish v. Fannie Mae, 292 Va. 44 , 787 S.E.2d 116 (2016).

Jurisdiction after nonsuit. - Circuit court erred when it exercised subject matter jurisdiction over a case alleging an unfit pet owner pursuant to former § 3.1-796.115 that originated in general district court, was appealed to the circuit court and nonsuited there, was subsequently refiled in the general district court, dismissed, and then appealed to the circuit court. The county was required by subsection A of § 8.01-380 to refile its petition, following the nonsuit, in the circuit court. Although the circuit court did not have original or general jurisdiction over the § 3.1-796.115 petition pursuant to § 17.1-513 , the circuit court did obtain appellate jurisdiction derivatively from the de novo appeal taken from the general district court. Davis v. County of Fairfax, 282 Va. 23 , 710 S.E.2d 466, 2011 Va. LEXIS 125 (2011).

Appeal from denial of coram nobis petition proper. - Circuit court finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant's appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in a criminal conviction was error because § 16.1-106 was not restricted to only monetary cases; however, coram nobis did not lie as a means by which appellant was allowed to collaterally challenge his guilty plea. Appellant's allegation that he suffered from some undefined lack of capacity due to medication at the time of his guilty plea was not a clerical error nor a claim of an error in fact. Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 503 , 650 S.E.2d 514, 2007 Va. LEXIS 108 (2007).

Dismissal proper. - Circuit court properly dismissed a father's complaint to amend custody and visitation because, while the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the father's refiled appeals, the parties' circumstances changed during the pendency of the nonsuit, the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the father's refiled appeals and did the only thing it could do. Barrett v. Minor, No. 0173-14-3, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (May 12, 2015).

Applied in Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092 , 277 S.E.2d 213 (1981); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985); Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293 , 672 S.E.2d 870, 2009 Va. LEXIS 40 (2009).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Applicability of statute. - Sections 16.1-106 and 16.1-113 govern civil cases over which general district courts, not juvenile and domestic relations district courts, have jurisdiction; specifically, § 16.1-106 grants an appeal of right in certain civil cases, and § 16.1-113 specifies how such appeals shall be tried in circuit court. Commonwealth v. Neal, 58 Va. Cir. 205, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 142 (Richmond 2002).

Inapplicable to juvenile and domestic relations cases. - That §§ 16.1-106 and 16.1-113 do not apply to appeals from juvenile and domestic relations district courts is made clear by § 16.1-77, which gives general district courts exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases involving claims of $3,000 or less and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of civil cases involving claims above $3,000, and by § 16.1-69.5 (b), which defines "general district courts" as all courts not of record, except juvenile and domestic relations district courts. Commonwealth v. Neal, 58 Va. Cir. 205, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 142 (Richmond 2002).

Appeal of void judgment order. - Where an order denying a debtor's motion to vacate a void judgment under § 8.01-428 A (ii) disposed of the whole subject matter of the requested relief, it was appealable as a final judgment. Reston Dental Arts Ctr. v. Shepherd, 61 Va. Cir. 734, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 310 (Fairfax County 2002).

Appeal from mayor. - Where the charter of a city declares that the judgment of the mayor shall be final when the penalty imposed by him is a fine not exceeding $10.00, a judgment of such mayor imposing a fine of $2.00 for violation of a city ordinance cannot be reviewed on a writ of certiorari nor does any appeal lie from such judgment to the circuit court under the provisions of this section, since it applies only to judgments rendered by justices of the peace in civil cases. Danville St. Car Co. v. Wooding, 2 Va. L. Reg. 244 (Danville Cir. Ct. 1896).

Parties on appeal. - Effect of an appeal from a judgment entered against one of two defendants was to completely nullify the effect of the district court judgment; thus, regardless of the finding of the lower court, the reviewing court had appellate jurisdiction over all the parties to the case, including the defendant against whom judgment was not entered. Khan v. Washington, 74 Va. Cir. 95, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 255 (Alexandria 2007).

De novo hearing. - Although the employer was properly served with a suggestion of garnishment and in default in general district court, it was nevertheless entitled to a de novo hearing on its appeal to circuit court. McClenahen v. McNabb, 54 Va. Cir. 489, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 209 (Spotsylvania County 2001).

Nonsuit of appeal permitted. - On appeal of a judgment of the Virginia General District Court (GDC) to the Virginia Circuit Court, under § 16.1-106, the rulings of the GDC were completely null and void, and an original plaintiff was provided a new trial, and was not barred from taking a nonsuit of the appeal to the Circuit Court; § 16.1-106 granted an appeal of right if timely filed, and § 16.1-113 granted authority for the judge or, if required by either party, a jury to make a determination based upon evidence, whether or not that evidence was offered in the GDC, and the only limitations placed on a party in appealing to the Circuit Court were that the appeal be from an order or judgment of a court not of record, and that the appeal be timely made. Joseph v. Giant Food, Inc., 61 Va. Cir. 143, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 52 (Fairfax County 2003).

No jurisdiction for appeal. - Because the tenant's retaliation claim against the landlord under Virginia's Manufactured Home Lot Rental Act, Va. Code Ann. § 55.1-1300 , was part of the landlord's underlying unlawful detainer action and that action was not appealed, that claim was not properly before the circuit court. Even if the tenant had noted an appeal of the tenant's retaliation claim, the decision on that claim was not a final order or judgment that was appealable as the tenant only appealed the tenant's negligence, negligence per se, and breach of contract claims. Cadd v. Bowman Assocs., LLC, 105 Va. Cir. 144, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 55 (Roanoke County Apr. 20, 2020).

No appeal from dismissal without prejudice. - Plaintiff's notice of appeal of dismissal, without prejudice, of the plaintiff's personal injury suit was stricken because dismissal without prejudice was not a final, appealable order for purposes of § 16.1-106. Poullath v. Rzasa, 75 Va. Cir. 349, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 69 (Fairfax County 2008).

§ 16.1-106.1. Withdrawal of appeal in civil cases.

  1. A party who has appealed a final judgment or order rendered by a general district court or a juvenile and domestic relations district court in a civil case may seek to withdraw that appeal at any time.
    1. If the appeal has not been perfected by posting a required appeal bond or paying required costs, or within 10 days after entry of the judgment or order when no appeal bond or costs are required to perfect the appeal, the appeal may be withdrawn by filing in the district court that entered the judgment or order and serving, in person or by first-class mail, on all parties or their counsel a written notice of intent to withdraw the appeal. When the appeal is withdrawn in the district court, the judgment or order of the district court shall have the same effect as if no appeal had been noted.
    2. After the appeal is perfected by posting a required appeal bond or paying required costs, or after 10 days have elapsed since the entry of the judgment or order when no appeal bond or costs are required to perfect the appeal, an appealing party may request that the appeal be withdrawn by filing in the circuit court and serving, in person or by first-class mail, on all parties or their counsel a written notice of intent to withdraw the appeal.
  2. Upon receipt of a notice of intent to withdraw an appeal filed in the circuit court, any party to the appeal, or the circuit court on its own motion, may give notice of a hearing, which shall be scheduled no later than the date set by the circuit court for trial of the appeal. Unless the hearing is scheduled at the time previously set for trial of the appeal, notice of the hearing shall be given, in person or by first-class mail, to all parties or their counsel, any non-party who has posted an appeal bond, and, when appropriate, the Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement.
  3. At the hearing, the circuit court shall determine whether any party objects to the proposed withdrawal. A party may object to the withdrawal of an appeal by filing in the circuit court and serving, in person or by first-class mail, on all parties or their counsel a written notice of objection to withdrawal of the appeal. If such a written objection is filed and served within a reasonable period after service of the notice of intent to withdraw the appeal, upon a showing of good cause by the party objecting to the withdrawal of the appeal, the circuit court may decline to permit the withdrawal of the appeal. If no such written objection is timely filed, the appeal shall be deemed to be withdrawn and, subject to subsections E and F, the circuit court shall enter an order disposing of the case in accordance with the judgment or order entered in the district court.
  4. If a party who has appealed a judgment or order of a district court fails to appear in circuit court either at the time for setting the appeal for trial or on the trial date, the circuit court may, upon the motion of any party, enter an order treating the appeal as withdrawn and disposing of the case in accordance with this section. If no party appears for trial, the court may deem the appeal to be withdrawn without a motion and enter an order disposing of the case in accordance with this section.
  5. Upon the withdrawal of an appeal from a general district court, the circuit court shall, upon request of a party who did not appeal the judgment or order, determine whether, as a result of the appeal, a party has a right to additional relief in the circuit court which has accrued since the appeal was noted, including but not limited to attorneys' fees provided for by contract or statute. Subject to any rights of a surety pursuant to § 16.1-110, the circuit court shall also order its clerk to disburse any cash bond posted to perfect the appeal as follows:
    1. First, to the clerk of the court to cover taxable costs in the circuit court as provided by statute;
    2. Second, to the prevailing party in an amount sufficient to satisfy any judgment or order entered in the general district court and any additional relief granted by the circuit court; and
    3. Third, the balance, if any, to the person who posted the bond in the general district court.

      In addition, the circuit court shall enter such order as may be appropriate to conclude all matters arising out of the appeal from the general district court.

  6. Upon the withdrawal of an appeal from a juvenile and domestic relations district court, the circuit court shall, upon request of a party who did not appeal the judgment or order, determine whether, as a result of the appeal, a party has a right to additional relief in the circuit court which has accrued since the appeal was noted, including but not limited to attorneys' fees provided for by contract or statute. Subject to any rights of a surety pursuant to § 16.1-110, the circuit court shall also order its clerk to disburse any cash bond posted to perfect the appeal as follows:
    1. First, to the clerk of the court to cover taxable costs in the circuit court as provided by statute;
    2. Second, to the prevailing party in an amount sufficient to satisfy any judgment or order entered in the juvenile and domestic relations district court and any additional relief granted by the circuit court; and
    3. Third, the balance, if any, to the person who posted the bond in the juvenile and domestic relations district court.

      In addition, the circuit court shall enter such order as may be appropriate to conclude all matters arising out of the petition or motion filed in the juvenile and domestic relations district court and the appeal in circuit court, consistent with the judgment or order entered in the juvenile and domestic relations district court, as modified by the grant of any additional relief by the circuit court pursuant to this subsection. Unless the circuit court orders that the case remain in the circuit court, the case shall be remanded to the juvenile and domestic relations district court for purposes of enforcement and future modification and shall be subject to all the requirements of § 16.1-297.

      (2008, c. 706.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal & Error, § 232.

CASE NOTES

Dismissal of appeal. - Circuit court did not err in dismissing a parent's appeals from a termination of parental rights order as the evidence supported the circuit court's factual findings that the parent had actual notice of the hearing and the parent was not present at the hearing. A social worker testified as to having spoken to the parent on the telephone and that the parent told the worker that the parent was aware of the hearing, that the parent had been in touch with the parent's counsel about the hearing, and that the parent intended to be at the hearing. Vargas v. Arlington County Dep't of Human Servs., No. 0530-18-4, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 315 (Nov. 13, 2018).

Appellee not required to object. - Appellee did not need to object to appellant's withdrawal of the appeal for the order regarding fees to remain enforceable; the circuit court had already ordered appellant to pay legal fees, and the additional relief that subsection F of § 16.1-106.1 contemplated was already granted. Torchiani v. Senske, No. 1581-19-4, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 161 (June 2, 2020).

§ 16.1-107. Requirements for appeal.

  1. No appeal shall be allowed unless and until the party applying for the same or someone for him shall give bond, in an amount and with sufficient surety approved by the judge or by his clerk if there is one, or in an amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment of the court in which it was rendered. Either such amount shall include the award of attorney fees, if any. Such bond shall be posted within 30 days from the date of judgment, except for an appeal from the judgment of a general district court on an unlawful detainer pursuant to § 8.01-129 . However, no appeal bond shall be required of a plaintiff in a civil case where the defendant has not asserted a counterclaim, the Commonwealth or when an appeal is proper to protect the estate of a decedent, an infant, a convict, or an insane person, or the interest of a county, city, town or transportation district created pursuant to the Transportation District Act of 1964 (§ 33.2-1900 et seq.) of Title 33.2. In a case where a defendant with indemnity coverage through a policy of liability insurance appeals, the bond required by this section shall not exceed the amount of the judgment that is covered by a policy of indemnity coverage.
  2. In all civil cases, except trespass, ejectment, unlawful detainer against a former owner based upon a foreclosure against that owner, or any action involving the recovering rents, no indigent person shall be required to post an appeal bond. In cases of unlawful detainer against a former owner based upon a foreclosure against that owner, a person who has been determined to be indigent pursuant to the guidelines set forth in § 19.2-159 shall post an appeal bond within 30 days from the date of judgment.
  3. In cases of unlawful detainer for a residential dwelling unit, notwithstanding the provisions of § 8.01-129 , an appeal bond shall be posted by the defendant with payment into the general district court in the amount of outstanding rent, late charges, attorney fees, and any other charges or damages due, as contracted for in the rental agreement, and as amended on the unlawful detainer by the court. If such amount is not so paid, any such appeal shall not be perfected as a matter of law. Upon perfection of an appeal, the defendant shall pay the rental amount as contracted for in the rental agreement to the plaintiff on or before the fifth day of each month. If any such rental payment is not so paid, upon written motion of the plaintiff with a copy of such written motion mailed by regular mail to the tenant, the judge of the circuit court shall, without hearing, enter judgment for the amount of outstanding rent, late charges, attorney fees, and any other charges or damages due as of that date, subtracting any payments made by such tenant as reflected in the court accounts and on a written affidavit submitted by the plaintiff, plaintiff's managing agent, or plaintiff's attorney with a copy of such affidavit mailed by regular mail to the tenant, and an order of possession without further hearings or proceedings in such court. Any funds held in a court account shall be released to the plaintiff without further hearing or proceeding of the court unless the defendant has filed a motion to retain some or all of such funds and the court, after a hearing, enters an order finding that the defendant is likely to succeed on the merits of a counterclaim alleging money damages against the plaintiff, in which case funds shall be held by order of such court.
  4. If such bond is furnished by or on behalf of any party against whom judgment has been rendered for money or property or both, the bond shall be conditioned for the performance and satisfaction of such judgment or order as may be entered against such party on appeal, and for the payment of all costs and damages which may be awarded against him in the appellate court. If the appeal is by a party against whom there is no recovery except for costs, the bond shall be conditioned for the payment of such costs and damages as may be awarded against him on the appeal.
  5. In addition to the foregoing, any party applying for appeal shall, within 30 days from the date of the judgment, pay to the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken the amount of the writ tax of the court to which the appeal is taken and costs as required by subdivision A 13 of § 17.1-275 , including all fees for service of process of the notice of appeal in the circuit court pursuant to § 16.1-112. (1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 585; 1978, c. 501; 1992, c. 565; 1993, c. 970; 1998, c. 266; 2004, c. 366; 2006, c. 116; 2007, c. 869; 2008, c. 706; 2010, c. 267; 2011, c. 58; 2017, c. 657; 2019, c. 785; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 199.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 970, cl. 2, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 3 and Acts 1996, c. 616, cls. 3 and 5, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 970, cl. 1, "shall expire on May 31, 1998; provided, however, that the provisions of this act shall apply on and after June 1, 1998, only to any final order which disposes of a proceeding in a support case, when such proceeding was commenced in a juvenile and domestic relations district court prior to June 1, 1998, and when such case is appealed to the circuit court, regardless of whether such proceeding was commenced by a petition, motion or other pleading."

Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cls. 3 and 5, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

References in this section were updated at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission to conform to the recodification of Title 33.2 by Acts 2014, c. 805, effective October 1, 2014.

The 1998 amendment, in the first paragraph, in the last sentence, deleted "or" following "interest of a county, city" and added "or transportation district created pursuant to Chapter 45 ( § 15.2-4500 et seq.) of Title 15.2."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 366, in the last paragraph, substituted "30" for "thirty" and added the language beginning "including all fees" at the end.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 116 inserted "a plaintiff in a civil case where the defendant has not asserted a counterclaim" in the second sentence of the first paragraph; and substituted "any party" for "the party" in the last paragraph.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 869 inserted the present second and last sentences in the first paragraph.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 706 inserted "or if withdrawn pursuant to § 16.1-106.1" near the end of the first sentence in the first paragraph.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 267, in the first paragraph, inserted "unlawful detainer against a former owner based upon a foreclosure against that owner" in the next-to-last sentence, and added the last sentence.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 58, in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, substituted "or in an amount sufficient" for "to abide by such judgment as may be rendered on appeal if such appeal is perfected, or if not so perfected or if withdrawn pursuant to § 16.1-106.1, then" and added the second and third sentences.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 657 inserted the second sentence in the first paragraph.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 785 added the designations for subsections A and B; inserted subsection C; and added the designations for subsections D and E.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 199, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection A, substituted the last sentence for the former last two sentences, which read: "No appeal bond shall be required of a defendant with indemnity coverage through a policy of liability insurance sufficient to satisfy the judgment if the defendant's insurer provides a written irrevocable confirmation of coverage in the amount of the judgment. If defendant's insurer does not provide a written irrevocable confirmation of coverage in the amount of the judgment then an appeal bond will be required."

Law review. - For survey of Virginia practice and pleading for the year 1977-1978, see 64 Va. L. Rev. 1501 (1978). For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985).

For 2007 annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 229 (2007).

For article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 183 (2010).

For annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 9 (2011).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 232, 356, 360; 5A M.J. Costs, § 8.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

CASE NOTES

Generally. - Supreme Court of Virginia holds that the appeal of right belongs to the party applying for the same. When the general district court enters a final, appealable judgment on claims pleaded in a warrant, summons, or complaint, Va. Sup. Ct. R. 7B:4(a); a counterclaim or cross-claim, Va. Sup. Ct. R. 7B:3(a); or a third-party civil warrant or complaint, Va. Sup. Ct. R. 7B:10(a), any party seeking on appeal to change or modify an unfavorable disposition of a claim asserted by or against him must file a notice of appeal. The failure to do so will leave the general district court's judgment on the claim intact and subject to res judicata principles. Robert & Bertha Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen, 295 Va. 130 , 810 S.E.2d 48, 2018 Va. LEXIS 15 (2018).

Statutory requirements must be observed. - The right of appeal is statutory and the statutory procedural prerequisites must be observed. Covington Virginian, Inc. v. Woods, 182 Va. 538 , 29 S.E.2d 406 (1944).

Though substantial compliance is sufficient. - A substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is all that is necessary. Brooks v. Epperson, 164 Va. 37 , 178 S.E. 787 (1935).

The words "or someone for him" mean that the bond called for by this section may be given by someone other than the party taking the appeal, provided the bond is conditioned as required by the statute and carries sufficient surety. Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Mundy, 210 Va. 3 , 168 S.E.2d 127 (1969).

The requirements for appeal bonds are mandatory, and the exercise of appellate jurisdiction confined to the provisions of the written law. Covington Virginian, Inc. v. Woods, 182 Va. 538 , 29 S.E.2d 406 (1944), holding that provision requiring bond was not waived.

And a surety is necessary. - In civil appeals from civil and police justices the appeal bond must be with surety. Brooks v. Epperson, 164 Va. 37 , 178 S.E. 787 (1935), decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

Hence, a deposit of cash is not a substantial compliance with this section and a certified check is not "surety" within the meaning of the section. Brooks v. Epperson, 164 Va. 37 , 178 S.E. 787 (1935) (decided under former statute), wherein the court dealt with the check as cash. However, now a cash deposit may be made in lieu of giving bond. See § 16.1-108.

The appeal bond required by this section is not a "fee" or "costs" within the meaning of § 14.1-183 (now § 17.1-606 ). Greer v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 668 (1973).

It is one thing for the State to excuse indigents from payment of fees and costs which are essentially state interests; it is another thing for the State to excuse indigents from posting bonds designed to protect the judgment rights of successful litigants. Greer v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 668 (1973).

Appeal bond is not required from orders terminating parental rights. Casey v. Hopewell Dep't of Social Servs., 14 Va. App. 222, 415 S.E.2d 878 (1992).

Absence of reference to appeal bond does not abrogate section's provisions. - The provisions of § 16.1-136 et seq. indeed make no provision for an appeal bond; however, the absence of any reference to an appeal bond in § 16.1-136 et seq. in no way abrogates the mandatory provisions of this section, which requires a bond in an appeal of a civil case. Scheer v. Isaacs, 10 Va. App. 338, 392 S.E.2d 201 (1990).

Thirty-day limit for giving bond. - Consistent with annulment of the earlier 10-day provision, the 1956 enactments, when considered with the 1972 changes, implicitly establish a 30-day limit for giving bond. Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092 , 277 S.E.2d 213 (1981).

A deficient appeal bond does not require dismissal of the appeal since under § 16.1-114.1 the court is empowered to correct defects, irregularities or omissions in the proceedings of a court not of record and § 16.1-109 empowers an appellate court to require the appellant to give new or additional security. Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322 , 200 S.E.2d 521 (1973).

Insufficient bond of corporation. - Defendant corporation gave what it thought was an appeal bond under this section with surety approved by the trial justice (now district court judge). The bond was executed by the president of the corporation, but the corporate seal was not affixed to the instrument. It was contended that there was a substantial compliance with this section, because the executed instrument provided ample security for the payment of any judgment in plaintiff's favor, in that defendant was bound by its written obligation and its surety could not, under other sections of the Code, deny its liability. It was held that there was no merit in the contention. Covington Virginian, Inc. v. Woods, 182 Va. 538 , 29 S.E.2d 406 (1944).

Effect of failure to require appeal bond. - That it is the duty of a justice of the peace (now district court judge) before allowing an appeal, to require an appeal bond may be conceded, but his omission to require such bond does not oust the circuit court of its jurisdiction. Under § 16.1-114.1, it is the duty of the court to correct the omission of the justice and require the execution of the bond, and upon due execution thereof to proceed with the trial of the case according to the principles of law and equity. Jenkins v. Bertram, 163 Va. 672 , 177 S.E. 204 (1934).

Civil contempt of court did not alter nature of relief. - Where judgment was for arrearages in child support payments established by the terms of a previously-entered property settlement agreement, and where husband filed his notice of appeal with the circuit court but posted no appeal bond, upon the expiration of 30 days, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal; the fact that husband also was found in civil contempt of court, and a sanction was imposed, did not alter the fundamental nature of the relief sought by wife; the case was treated as a civil proceeding in the juvenile and domestic relations court and the appeal to the circuit court was, therefore, civil in nature. Scheer v. Isaacs, 10 Va. App. 338, 392 S.E.2d 201 (1990).

No appeal bond was required by this section where the juvenile and domestic relations proceeding from which defendant appealed was his motion to quash the department's withholding order and his motion to be allowed credit for Social Security benefits paid to his children and the order did not establish a support arrearage or enter judgment for an arrearage. Commonwealth, Dep't of Social Servs. ex rel. Comptroller v. Skeens, 18 Va. App. 154, 442 S.E.2d 432 (1994).

Writ tax provisions mandatory. - The provisions of the second paragraph of this section are mandatory, not merely directory. Unless the writ tax is paid to the district court clerk within 30 days from the judgment date, the district court has no authority to transmit the case to the circuit court. Thus, the intended appeal is not perfected and the circuit court does not obtain jurisdiction. Hurst v. Ballard, 230 Va. 365 , 337 S.E.2d 284 (1985).

Timely payment of writ tax is jurisdictional. - In an appeal of a civil case from a general district court to a circuit court, payment of the writ tax within the provided period is jurisdictional. Hurst v. Ballard, 230 Va. 365 , 337 S.E.2d 284 (1985).

Applicability to appeal following incarceration for failing to pay child support. - Denial of a parent's appeal of the denial of a bond motion for an appeal of an order incarcerating the parent for failure to pay child support was summarily affirmed as a parent did not post an appeal bond and there was no indigency exception to subsection H of § 16.1-296; § 16.1-107 concerned appeals of the general district court, rather than the juvenile courts, and § 8.01-676.1 did not apply to appeals of the juvenile courts. Shadwell v. Commonwealth, No. 0236-08-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 444 (Sept. 30, 2008).

Applied in Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Jurisdiction. - It is not the transmission of the case papers which creates the jurisdiction of the circuit court, but rather the filing of the notice of appeal. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Additional time to post bond. - Circuit court exercised its authority under § 16.1-109 by allowing plaintiff additional time to post the bond on the counter-claim as there was no reason as to why plaintiff should have to post two separate bonds, one for the appeal of his claim and one for the appeal of the counter-claim, when the claims arose out of the same cause of action and doing so would frustrate the principles of § 16.1-114.1. Van Garris v. Harold, 71 Va. Cir. 411, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 260 (Norfolk 2005).

Appeal bond requirement did not violate right to jury trial. - Debtor's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated when the clerk of a district court did not forward to the circuit court the record in the district court case, after the debtor's request to waive an appeal bond on indigency grounds was denied following a review by the district court of the financial status of the debtor, because the appeal bond statute, complete with its indigency waiver, was a reasonable provision for circuit court appellate review of district court decisions. Elyazidi v. Barr, 91 Va. Cir. 89, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 163 (Fairfax County Aug. 6, 2015).

Indigent persons. - Mention of specific items in subsection B implies that all items omitted were not intended to be included; subsection B provides a specific list of exceptions to the general rule that indigent persons are not required to post bond, and those exceptions, trespass, ejectment, unlawful detainer against a former owner based upon a foreclosure against that owner, or any action involving the recovering of rents, are therefore the only exceptions contemplated and allowed by the law. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Subsection C does not mention the indigent nor does it purport to create a new exception for this action; unlawful detainer for a residential dwelling unit is simply not one of the listed exceptions to the general rule waiving bond for the indigent in subsection B. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Release of appeal bond. - This section clearly requires that a "judgment or order" be entered against the appellant in the appeal itself as a necessary condition for release of the appeal bond to a plaintiff; § 16.1-113 by its text also requires a judgment in circuit court before its provisions for execution of a judgment apply. Cajiao v. Warren, 90 Va. Cir. 64, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147 (Norfolk Feb. 24, 2015).

Motion for release of civil appeal bond denied. - Plaintiff's motion for release of the civil appeal bond was denied because there was no judgment or order against defendants in the appeal; the amendment of the statute to remove the language allowing appeal bonds to be disbursed upon the withdrawal of an appeal supports the conclusion that the court may not require a surety to pay until the appeal has concluded on the merits. Cajiao v. Warren, 90 Va. Cir. 64, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147 (Norfolk Feb. 24, 2015).

Appeal bond not required. - Appeal was properly noted, and the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of an unlawful detainer case because the tenant was indigent, and the circuit court had entered an order finding her such and waiving costs and fees; because the action for unlawful detainer for a residential dwelling unit did not qualify for any of the exceptions enumerated in subsection B, an indigent appellant was not required by § 16.1-107 to post the bond described in subsection C. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Because no arrearages for child support was set by the juvenile and domestic relations district court appealed by appellant, the only issue on appeal was the award of attorney fees set by the final order of the juvenile and domestic relations district court, and the motion to amend the amount of child support was withdrawn, the appeal of attorney fees was not so intrinsically and logically related to arrearages as to constitute support; and appellant was not required to post an appeal bond. Chamberlain v. O'Leary, 105 Va. Cir. 511, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 121 (Spotsylvania County Aug. 18, 2020).

Appeal bond of $0.00. - Lender's motion to dismiss was denied because the lienor satisfied the statutory requirements and purpose of an appeal bond where, while the trial court found for the lender on a lienor's counterclaim, no money judgment was entered against the lienor in favor of the lender, there were no financial interests of the lender to protect during the appeal, and the lienor paid the appeal costs. FedStar Fed. Credit Union v. Euro-Specialty, Inc., 91 Va. Cir. 262, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 136 (Roanoke Oct. 8, 2015).

Insufficient evidence of coverage. - Letter by the vehicle manufacturer stating that an insurer provided coverage for appellant's vehicle did not constitute a "written irrevocable confirmation of indemnity coverage" as required under this section. Damtew v. Shawfang Jeng, 101 Va. Cir. 89, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 6 (Fairfax County Jan. 24, 2019).

§ 16.1-108. Deposit of money in lieu of bond.

In lieu of giving bond with surety as provided in this article, any party appealing from the judgment or order of the court may deposit with the judge or clerk thereof, who shall issue his official receipt therefor, such sum of money as the judge or clerk may estimate to be sufficient to discharge any judgment or order which may be entered by the court of record on the trial of the appeal to secure the appeal bond. The money so deposited shall be transmitted in cash, by check of the court, surety bond, or bank check, or by draft from the escrow account of the appealing party's attorney to the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken, who shall likewise issue his official receipt therefor.

(1956, c. 555; 1975, c. 227; 1988, c. 698; 2007, c. 131.)

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 131, in the last sentence, inserted "surety bond, or bank check, or by draft from the escrow account of the appealing party's attorney" and made a related change.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 360.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Appeal bond of $0.00. - Lender's motion to dismiss was denied because the lienor satisfied the statutory requirements and purpose of an appeal bond where, while the trial court found for the lender on a lienor's counterclaim, no money judgment was entered against the lienor in favor of the lender, there were no financial interests of the lender to protect during the appeal, and the lienor paid the appeal costs. FedStar Fed. Credit Union v. Euro-Specialty, Inc., 91 Va. Cir. 262, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 136 (Roanoke Oct. 8, 2015).

§ 16.1-109. Appellate court may require new or additional security.

  1. The court to which the appeal is taken may on motion for good cause shown, after reasonable notice to the appellant, require the appellant to give new or additional security, and if such security be not given within the time prescribed by the appellate court the appeal shall be dismissed with costs, and the judgment or order of the court from which the appeal was taken shall remain in effect and the appellate court shall award execution thereon, with costs, against the appellant and his surety.
  2. When a bond or other security is required by law to be posted or given in connection with an appeal or removal from a district court, and there is either (i) a defect in such bond or other security as a result of an error of the district court, or (ii) the district court erroneously failed to require the bond or other security, and the defect or failure is discovered prior to sending the case to the circuit court, the district court shall order that the appellant or applicant for removal cure such defect or failure within a period not longer than the initial period of time for posting the bond or giving the security. If the error or failure is discovered after the case has been sent to the circuit court, the circuit court shall return the case to the district court for the district court to order the appellant or applicant for removal to cure the defect or post the required bond or give the required security within a period of time not longer than the initial period of time for posting the bond or giving the security for removal. Failure to comply with such order shall result in the disallowance of the appeal or denial of the application for removal.

    (1956, c. 555; 2007, c. 464.)

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 464 added the A designation at the beginning of the first paragraph and added subsection B.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 360.

CASE NOTES

Juvenile and domestic relations court abused its discretion when setting bond at $500 for an appeal of a judgment of arrearage of $18,975. Similarly, the circuit court abused its discretion by denying mother's motion to require father to provide new or additional security in an amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment on appeal. Smiley v. Erickson, 29 Va. App. 426, 512 S.E.2d 842 (1999).

A deficient appeal bond does not require dismissal of the appeal since under § 16.1-114.1 the court is empowered to correct defects, irregularities or omissions in the proceedings of a court not of record and this section empowers an appellate court to require the appellant to give new or additional security. Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322 , 200 S.E.2d 521 (1973).

Error not to correct discrepancies in appeal bond. - It is error for a trial court to fail to exercise its statutory power to correct the discrepancies in an appeal bond of a proceeding in a court not of record where such a correction would have brought the dispute to a trial on the merits and thereby facilitated final adjudication of the rights of the parties. Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322 , 200 S.E.2d 521 (1973).

Cure not allowed where a party totally failed to comply with the bond requirement. - Trial court properly dismissed a father's appeal of a juvenile court order which modified his child support obligation and assessed an arrearage; a court clerk's act of setting an appeal bond at "0" did not excuse the father of the requirement to post an appeal bond under subsection H of § 16.1-296, and this section did not allow for a cure where there was a total failure to comply with the bond requirement, and thus the failure to post the bond divested the trial court of jurisdiction. Sharma v. Sharma, 46 Va. App. 584, 620 S.E.2d 553, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 389 (2005).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Error not to correct discrepancies in appeal bond. - Circuit court exercised its authority to allow plaintiff additional time to post the bond on the counter-claim as there was no reason why plaintiff should have to post two separate bonds, one for the appeal of his claim and one for the appeal of the counter-claim, when the claims arose out of the same cause of action and doing so would frustrate the principles of § 16.1-114.1. Van Garris v. Harold, 71 Va. Cir. 411, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 260 (Norfolk 2005).

§ 16.1-110. Bankruptcy of appellant does not release surety.

No surety in any appeal bond given by the appellant shall be released by the appellant's being adjudicated a bankrupt at any time subsequent to the judgment rendered in the court not of record, but such surety shall be entitled to make any defense on the trial of the appeal that the appellant could have made, except the defense of bankruptcy.

(1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-111. Court to which appeal sent.

The party taking an appeal may, when there is more than one court having jurisdiction, direct to which of such courts the appeal shall be sent for trial, but in the absence of such directions the judge or clerk shall send the same to any court having jurisdiction.

(1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-112. All papers transmitted to appellate court; further proceedings.

The judge or clerk of any court from which an appeal is taken under this article shall promptly transmit to the clerk of the appellate court the case papers, which shall include the original warrant or warrants or other notices or pleadings with the judgment endorsed thereon, together with all pleadings, exhibits, and other papers filed in the trial of the case. The required bond, and, if applicable, the money deposited to secure such bond and the writ tax and costs paid pursuant to § 16.1-107 shall also be submitted, along with the fees for service of process of the notice of appeal in the circuit court. Upon receipt of the foregoing by the clerk of the appellate court, the case shall then be docketed, except that an appeal from an order of protection issued pursuant to § 19.2-152.10 shall be assigned a case number within two business days upon receipt of such appeal.

When such case has been docketed, the clerk of such appellate court shall by writing to be served, as provided in §§ 8.01-288 , 8.01-293 , 8.01-296 , and 8.01-325 , or by certified mail, with certified delivery receipt requested, notify the appellee, or by regular mail to his attorney, that such an appeal has been docketed in his office, provided that upon affidavit by the appellant or his agent in conformity with § 8.01-316 being filed with the clerk, the clerk shall post such notice at the front door of his courtroom and shall mail a copy thereof to the appellee at his last known address or place of abode or to his attorney, and he shall file a certificate of such posting and mailing with the papers in the case. No such appeal shall be heard unless it appears that the appellee or his attorney has had such notice, or that such certificate has been filed, 10 days before the date fixed for trial, or has in person or by attorney waived such notice.

If a party files an appeal of a district court order of protection entered pursuant to § 19.2-152.10, such notice of appeal shall be on a form prescribed by the Office of the Executive Secretary. The district court clerk shall contact the appellate court to determine whether the hearing on the appeal shall be set by the appellate court on (i) a date scheduled by the district court clerk with the court, (ii) on the next docket call date, or (iii) a date set for district court appeals. Once the hearing date is set and the appeal documents have been transmitted, the appellate court shall have the parties served with notice of the appeal stating the date and time of the hearing in accordance with subdivision 1 of § 8.01-296 . No such hearing on the appeal shall be heard in the appellate court unless the appellee has been so served with such notice or notice has been waived by the non-moving party.

(1956, c. 555; 1958, c. 211; 1972, c. 585; 1984, c. 108; 1988, c. 698; 2004, c. 366; 2016, c. 612; 2018, cc. 32, 134; 2019, c. 718; 2020, c. 905.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2016, c. 612, cl. 2, effective January 1, 2017, provides: "That any clerk who uses private technology systems authorized pursuant to § 17.1-502 may utilize the provisions of § 16.1-112 provided that the electronic method for transmittal to the appellate court complies with the security and data standards established by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 366 added the language beginning "and the fees for service of process" at the end of the first sentence in the first paragraph; and in the last paragraph, inserted "or by regular mail" near the middle of the first sentence and substituted "10" for "ten" in the last sentence.

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 612, effective January 1, 2017, in the first paragraph, divided the former first sentence into the first and second sentences, inserted "case papers, which shall include the" in the first sentence, substituted " § 16.1-107 shall also be submitted along with the fees" for " § 16.1-107, and the fees" in the second sentence and added the third through sixth sentences; and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 32 and 134 are identical, and deleted the third through fifth sentences in the first paragraph, which pertained to electronic submission of court records.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 718, in the first paragraph, added "except that an appeal from an order of protection issued pursuant to § 19.2-152.10 shall be assigned a case number within two business days upon receipt of such appeal" at the end; and made a stylistic change.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 905 added the last paragraph.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 360.

CASE NOTES

This section and § 16.1-106 are remedial and should be construed to effectuate the purposes of their enactment. Southern Ry. v. Hill, 106 Va. 501 , 56 S.E. 278 (1907) (decided under former statute corresponding to these sections).

Status of judgments after appeal. - No other statute deals with the status of the judgments of a civil and police justice (now district court judge) after appeal, although they necessarily remain unchanged until the appeal is perfected. Thomas Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co., 166 Va. 95 , 184 S.E. 457 (1936) (decided under former statute corresponding to these sections).

The papers required to be delivered by the justice to the clerk constitute the case and are the essential groundwork for intelligent proceeding in the appellate court. Wygal v. Wilder, 117 Va. 896 , 86 S.E. 97 (1915) (decided under former statute corresponding to these sections).

Papers held below until tax and costs paid. - This section requires prompt transmittal of the appellate papers, including the bond, to the circuit court, but permits those papers to be held below for thirty days until the writ tax and costs are paid to the clerk of the court not of record. Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092 , 277 S.E.2d 213 (1981).

A notice that an appeal has been docketed is simply notification of continuing action in the same case, of whose pendency the defendant is already aware. The notice is required by this section to be served only upon the appellee or his attorney. The appellee often is the plaintiff, who could hardly be expected to respond to his own civil warrant or other similar pleading. No particular form is prescribed for the notice; the clerk is required merely to give notice that "such an appeal has been docketed in his office." Overnite Transp. Co. v. Barnett's, Inc., 217 Va. 222 , 227 S.E.2d 695 (1976).

Not like notice of motion for judgment. - A notice that an appeal has been docketed is not, by name, nature, or form, equivalent or even similar to a notice of motion for judgment. A notice of motion for judgment is notice to the defendant of a new action brought against him. In prescribed form, the notice specifically calls upon him timely to respond or suffer the enunciated danger of default. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Barnett's, Inc., 217 Va. 222 , 227 S.E.2d 695 (1976).

Transmission of record to circuit court. - Circuit court properly considered the pleadings filed in the general district court because, although appeals from courts not of record were heard by the circuit court de novo, the lower court was statutorily required to transmit its record to the circuit court. Parrish v. Fannie Mae, 292 Va. 44 , 787 S.E.2d 116 (2016).

Applied in Albert v. Ramirez, 45 Va. App. 799, 613 S.E.2d 865, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 225 (2005).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Transmission of record to circuit court. - By failing to transmit the case papers to the circuit court, the general district court (GDC) acted in derogation of strong policy reasons favoring certainty of results in judicial proceedings because its action called into question the finality of the judgment in the absence of a ruling from the circuit court; the GDC in effect delayed timely adjudication of the appeal de novo by declining to perform a ministerial act, namely the forwarding of its case papers to the circuit court. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

It is not the transmission of the case papers that creates the jurisdiction of the circuit court, but rather the filing of the notice of appeal. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Jurisdiction. - When a lower court procedurally impedes an appeal by failing to transmit its case papers to the upper court under the mistaken belief the circuit court does not have jurisdiction and the appellant has taken all steps in the lower court properly to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court, then, in effect, the upper court has already acquired jurisdiction over the appeal. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Mandamus proceeding was unnecessary because the circuit court possessed jurisdiction over the cause, and merely did not have the general district court's (GDC) case papers; while the GDC did not transmit the relevant case papers to the circuit court, the circuit court acquired jurisdiction to determine the appropriateness of the appeal by the filing of the notice of appeal in the GDC. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

When a disputed issue of first impression arises regarding the circuit court's jurisdiction, particularly interpretation of a new statutory provision, due process and prudence suggest the general district court clerk should transmit the case papers to the upper court to permit it to determine the issue of its jurisdiction; this concept of erring on the side of affording litigants meaningful opportunity to be heard should be of particular focus when the consequences of error could be dire. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

General district court divested of jurisdiction. - Case was properly before the circuit court because the general district court having been divested of jurisdiction by virtue of a tenant's appeal, the obtaining of the case papers from the GDC became the province of the circuit court's inherent power to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate those causes properly entrusted to the forum; the Calendar Control Judge thus appropriately set a hearing to consider whether the bond set by the GDC judge was required to perfect the appeal. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

§ 16.1-113. How appeals tried.

Every such appeal shall be tried by the court in a summary way, or, if the amount in controversy exceeds fifty dollars, by a jury if either party requires it. All legal evidence produced by either party shall be heard, whether or not it was produced before the court from which the appeal is taken. If judgment is recovered by the appellee, execution shall issue against the principal and his surety, jointly or separately, for the amount of the judgment, including interests and costs, with damages on the aggregate at the rate of ten percent annually, from the date of that judgment until payment, and for the costs of the appeal; and the execution shall be endorsed "No security is to be taken." If the decision is reversed, the party substantially prevailing shall recover his costs and the order or judgment shall be made or given as ought to have been made or given by the judge of the court from which the appeal was taken. When the appeal is from an order or judgment under §§ 16.1-119 through 16.1-121, the court shall enter such judgment respecting the property, the expense of keeping it, and any injury done to it, as may be equitable among the parties.

(1956, c. 555; 1980, c. 129; 1984, c. 38; 1988, c. 337.)

Cross references. - See § 16.1-114.1. For rules of court governing procedure in civil actions, see Rules 3:1 through 3:25.

Law review. - For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 362, 363.

CASE NOTES

The words "that judgment" appearing in the third sentence of this section refer to no other judgment than the one recovered on appeal. There is no other existing judgment, the judgment in a county court (now general district court) having lost all of its effect. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 208 Va. 28 , 155 S.E.2d 358 (1967).

The purpose of the ten percent penalty damage was for the purpose of discouraging appeals with little or no basis in law or fact from courts not of record. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 208 Va. 28 , 155 S.E.2d 358 (1967).

Effect of appeal from judgment of trial justice. - An appeal from the trial justice, properly perfected, transfers the entire record to the circuit court for a retrial as though originally brought therein. The judgment of the trial justice is completely annulled by the appeal and is not thereafter effective for any purpose. Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644 , 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946) (decided under former statute corresponding to these sections).

In a de novo appeal of a general district court or special justice's determination that a person meets the requirements for involuntary commitment, the circuit court is required by § 37.2-821 to evaluate the evidence for commitment as of the date of the circuit court hearing of the de novo appeal, using the criteria of subsection C of § 37.2-817 . This conclusion is supported by § 16.1-113. Paugh v. Henrico Area Mental Health & Developmental Servs., 286 Va. 85 , 743 S.E.2d 277, 2013 Va. LEXIS 77 (2013) (pursuant to the legislative summary the 2020 amendments to § 37.2-821 by Acts 2020, c. 1175 were in response to this decision).

Abandoned counterclaim not revived in trial de novo of plaintiff's claim. - Defendant's inaction and failure to seek a definitive ruling when the district court failed, apparently through inadvertence, to rule upon defendant's counterclaim was an abandonment of the claim, and the circuit court properly refused to allow it to be revived in a trial de novo on plaintiff's claim. K-B Corp. v. Gallagher, 218 Va. 381 , 237 S.E.2d 183 (1977).

Right to jury trial not improperly denied where plaintiff did not follow procedure. - Dismissal of suit, which complained only of the denial of a trial by jury and asserted a collusion by defendants to deny him one, was proper, where plaintiff's own actions in bringing suit in the general district court rather than the circuit court deprived him of a trial by jury. Had he originally brought his personal injury claim in circuit court, as he was entitled to by § 17-123 (now § 17.1-513 ), he would have received a jury upon request under § 8.01-336 . He also could have received a de novo jury trial by properly perfecting his appeal from general district court under this section. His failure to receive a jury trial, therefore, was the result of his own failure to follow valid state procedures rather than the result of any collusion by defendants in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088, 106 S. Ct. 1475, 89 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1986).

Applied in Leisge v. Leisge, 223 Va. 688 , 292 S.E.2d 352 (1982); Slawski v. Commonwealth, Dep't. of Social Servs., Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Sheehan, 29 Va. App. 721, 514 S.E.2d 773 (1999).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Applicability of statute. - Sections 16.1-106 and 16.1-113 govern civil cases over which general district courts, not juvenile and domestic relations district courts, have jurisdiction; specifically, § 16.1-106 grants an appeal of right in certain civil cases, and § 16.1-113 specifies how such appeals shall be tried in circuit court. Commonwealth v. Neal, 58 Va. Cir. 205, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 142 (Richmond 2002).

Inapplicable to juvenile and domestic relations cases. - That §§ 16.1-106 and 16.1-113 do not apply to appeals from juvenile and domestic relations district courts is made clear by § 16.1-77, which gives general district courts exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases involving claims of $3,000 or less and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of civil cases involving claims above $3,000, and by § 16.1-69.5 (b), which defines "general district courts" as all courts not of record, except juvenile and domestic relations district courts. Commonwealth v. Neal, 58 Va. Cir. 205, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 142 (Richmond 2002).

Parties on appeal. - Effect of an appeal from a judgment entered against one of two defendants was to completely nullify the effect of the district court judgment; thus, regardless of the finding of the lower court, the reviewing court had appellate jurisdiction over all the parties to the case, including the defendant against whom judgment was not entered. Khan v. Washington, 74 Va. Cir. 95, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 255 (Alexandria 2007).

Nonsuit of appeal permitted. - On appeal of a judgment of the Virginia General District Court (GDC) to the Virginia Circuit Court, under § 16.1-106, the rulings of the GDC were completely null and void, and an original plaintiff was provided a new trial, and was not barred from taking a nonsuit of the appeal to the Circuit Court; § 16.1-106 granted an appeal of right if timely filed, and § 16.1-113 granted authority for the judge or, if required by either party, a jury to make a determination based upon evidence, whether or not that evidence was offered in the GDC, and the only limitations placed on a party in appealing to the Circuit Court were that the appeal be from an order or judgment of a court not of record, and that the appeal be timely made. Joseph v. Giant Food, Inc., 61 Va. Cir. 143, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 52 (Fairfax County 2003).

Release of appeal bond. - Section 16.1-107 clearly requires that a "judgment or order" be entered against the appellant in the appeal itself as a necessary condition for release of the appeal bond to a plaintiff; § 16.1-113 by its text also requires a judgment in circuit court before its provisions for execution of a judgment apply. Cajiao v. Warren, 90 Va. Cir. 64, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147 (Norfolk Feb. 24, 2015).

Motion for release of civil appeal bond denied. - Plaintiff's motion for release of the civil appeal bond was denied because there was no judgment or order against defendants in the appeal; the Virginia Code does not authorize releasing the surety bond following the dismissal of the appeal. Cajiao v. Warren, 90 Va. Cir. 64, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 147 (Norfolk Feb. 24, 2015).

§ 16.1-114.

Repealed by Acts 1983, c. 499.

§ 16.1-114.1. Principles applicable in trial of appeals; defective or irregular warrants or motions.

Actions or proceedings appealed from district courts shall be tried according to the principles of law and equity, and when the same conflict the principles of equity shall prevail. No warrant, motion or other pleading shall be dismissed by reason of a mere defect, irregularity or omission in the proceedings in the district court, or in the form of any such pleading, when the same may be corrected by a proper order of the court of record. In any such case the court of record shall retain the same, with full power to direct all necessary amendments, to enter orders and direct proceedings to correct such defects, irregularities and omissions, to promote substantial justice to all parties, and to bring about a trial of the merits of the controversy. In any case where an appeal is taken by a defendant the circuit court may direct amendments to increase the amount of the claim above the jurisdictional amount set forth in § 16.1-77. This section shall be liberally construed, to the end that justice is not delayed or denied by reason of errors in the pleadings or in the form of the proceedings.

(1986, c. 45; 1997, c. 753; 2007, c. 869.)

Cross references. - See § 16.1-113. For rules of court governing procedure in civil actions, see Rules 3:1 through 3:25. Specifically, for application of rules, see Rule 3:1.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 869 deleted "or removed" following "proceedings appealed" near the beginning.

Law review. - For essay, see "Nonsuit in Virginia Civil Trials," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 265 (2013).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Amendments, § 4; 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 363, 364.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under former § 16.1-114 and corresponding former statutes.

CASE NOTES

This section affords the circuit court full power to control the course of appeals. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Barnett's, Inc., 217 Va. 222 , 227 S.E.2d 695 (1976).

The circuit court may require a defendant in an appealed case to file responsive pleadings and declare him in default for failure to respond as required. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Barnett's, Inc., 217 Va. 222 , 227 S.E.2d 695 (1976).

Formal defects disregarded. - This section and § 8.01-545 seem to accentuate the wholesome purpose of disregarding formal defects that the attainment of the ends of substantial justice may be had. Jenkins v. Faulkner, 174 Va. 43 , 4 S.E.2d 788 (1939).

Section does not excuse total failure to comply with requirement. - The statute refers to "mere defects," "irregularities," and "the form of such pleading"; it does not envision or authorize the exercise of discretion to excuse the total failure to comply with a mandatory statutory requirement for an appeal bond. Scheer v. Isaacs, 10 Va. App. 338, 392 S.E.2d 201 (1990).

This section does not empower a circuit court to correct an irregularity in the day-to-day operations of a district court clerk's office that inadvertently causes an appellant to miss the statutory deadline for timely filing an appeal bond. Hutchins v. Carrillo, 27 Va. App. 595, 500 S.E.2d 277 (1998).

Jurisdiction of appellate court is derivative. - The general rule, subject to the exception stated in § 8.01-129 , relating to an appeal from a decision of the trial justice in an action of forceful entry or unlawful detainer, is that jurisdiction of the circuit court to try cases appealed from a decision of a trial justice is derivative and if the trial justice had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction by an appeal - that is, the jurisdiction of the appellate court in such matters is the same as that of the court in which the action was originally instituted. Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644 , 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946).

And motion to dismiss is proper where justice had no jurisdiction. - In Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644 , 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946), it was held that the trial justice did not have jurisdiction of the case appealed, and when that lack of jurisdiction appeared in the circuit court that court should have sustained the motion to dismiss. Stacy v. Mullins, 185 Va. 837 , 40 S.E.2d 265 (1946).

Amendment of pleadings beyond justice's jurisdiction. - A plaintiff, while his case is pending in the circuit court on appeal from a decision of a trial justice, may not amend his pleadings to present a case which, as clearly shown on the face of the pleadings, the trial justice had no jurisdiction to determine. Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644 , 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946).

Amendment to claim amount in excess of justice's jurisdiction. - On appeal of a civil action from a trial justice appointed under Chapter 2 of former Title 16, a plaintiff may not, in the circuit court, amend his complaint to claim an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial justice. Even if this section were applicable, it would not authorize the amendment, for the reason that the appeal was a continuation of the original case, and on the appeal the warrant could not be amended to make a case of which the trial justice would not have had jurisdiction. Stacy v. Mullins, 185 Va. 837 , 40 S.E.2d 265 (1946).

Substitution of plaintiff as an individual in action brought by her as executrix where plaintiff would be sole distributee of any recovery. See Grinels v. Legg, 208 Va. 63 , 155 S.E.2d 56 (1967).

When a trial court judge fails to require an appeal bond, under this section, which should be liberally construed, it is the duty of the circuit court to correct the omission, and require the execution of the bond, and upon due execution thereof to proceed with the trial of the case according to the principles of law and equity. Jenkins v. Bertram, 163 Va. 672 , 177 S.E. 204 (1934).

Effect of failure to post appeal bond. - Failure of appealing party to post appeal bond in appeal of judgment of juvenile and domestic relations district court was a fatal jurisdictional defect that could not be cured under this section. Commonwealth, Va. Dep't of Social Servs. ex rel. May v. Walker, 253 Va. 319 , 485 S.E.2d 134 (1997).

A deficient appeal bond does not require dismissal of the appeal since under this section the court is empowered to correct defects, irregularities or omissions in the proceedings of a court not of record and § 16.1-109 empowers an appellate court to require the appellant to give new or additional security. Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322 , 200 S.E.2d 521 (1973).

Error not to correct discrepancies in appeal bond. - It is error for a trial court to fail to exercise its statutory power to correct the discrepancies in an appeal bond of a proceeding in a court not of record where such a correction would have brought the dispute to a trial on the merits and thereby facilitated final adjudication of the rights of the parties. Burks v. Three Hills Corp., 214 Va. 322 , 200 S.E.2d 521 (1973).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Principle of equity in mortgage case. - Having conceded that she could not maintain ownership and possession of the real estate without regularly paying the deed of trust note, having established a mechanism for paying the note into the registry of the court, and then having failed to honor her payment obligations, the mortgagor would not be heard to say that she should be allowed to maintain her defense of the case; as this action was removed from the General District Court, and under § 16.1-114.1, equity principles applied and a fundamental principle of equity was that one who sought equity had to do equity, so the mortgagee was granted a writ of possession. Principal Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Curtis, 61 Va. Cir. 151, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 5 (Roanoke 2003).

Effect of failure to post appeal bond. - Circuit court held that plaintiff should be given additional time to post a $15,000 bond on the appeal of defendant's counter-claim as there was no reasoning as to why plaintiff should have to post two separate bonds, one for the appeal of his claim and one for the appeal of the counter-claim when the claims arose out of the same cause of action as doing so would frustrate the principles of § 16.1-114.1. Van Garris v. Harold, 71 Va. Cir. 411, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 260 (Norfolk 2005).

Parties on appeal. - Effect of an appeal from a judgment entered against one of two defendants was to completely nullify the effect of the district court judgment; thus, regardless of the finding of the lower court, the reviewing court had appellate jurisdiction over all the parties to the case, including the defendant against whom judgment was not entered. Khan v. Washington, 74 Va. Cir. 95, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 255 (Alexandria 2007).

Amendment permitted. - Although plaintiff selected only the "contract" box on warrant in debt, plaintiff was permitted to amend its pleadings to include damages not arising from contract because, in light of the trial occurring in the lower court, the tenant could not claim that she was not properly informed as to the true nature of the claims against her. Amendment was permitted under § 16.1-114.1 and Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:8. PNG Invs., L.L.C. v. Gravely-Robinson, 71 Va. Cir. 140, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 242 (Roanoke County 2006).

Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint, to increase the amount of damages requested in the ad damnum clause, was granted because the plaintiff was entitled under § 16.1-114.1 and Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:8 to seek an amendment following an appeal by a defendant in an attempt to procure full compensation for damages suffered. The court, in making its determination, noted that: (1) there was no showing that either the defendant or the codefendant would have been prejudiced by an amendment increasing the ad damnum clause; (2) the motion for leave to amend was the plaintiff's first request to amend the complaint; and (3) the parties had ample time to prepare based on the increased ad damnum clause because the trial was more than six months away. Khan v. Washington, 74 Va. Cir. 95, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 255 (Alexandria 2007).

Judicial notice. - To promote substantial justice and to bring about a decision on the merits of a second appeal, an appeal from a juvenile and domestic relations district court, a circuit court took judicial notice of the notice of appeal filed by counsel for appellant in the juvenile and domestic relations district court, which was not made a part of the record before the circuit court by either party. Va. Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Ines v. Curran, 100 Va. Cir. 114, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 336 (Fairfax County Sept. 28, 2018).

§ 16.1-115.

Repealed by Acts 1986, c. 45.

§ 16.1-116. Issuance of executions and abstracts and proceedings by interrogatories after papers returned to circuit court.

When a judgment has been rendered in a civil action in a general district court and the papers in the action have been returned to the clerk of the circuit court for filing and preserving, executions upon and abstracts of the judgment may be issued by the clerk of such circuit court within the periods permitted under § 8.01-251 , provided that such judgment has been duly entered in the judgment lien docket book of such court. However, for a period of two years from the date of any such judgment, the judge or clerk of the general district court may also issue executions upon and abstracts of the judgment. In addition, proceedings by interrogatories may be had in the circuit court as if the judgment had been rendered by that court.

(1956, c. 555; 1962, c. 444; 1983, c. 499.)

§ 16.1-117. When papers in civil cases in certain municipal courts may be destroyed.

The clerk of any municipal court in which papers are filed and preserved under § 16.1-69.55 may destroy the files, papers and records connected with any civil case in such court, if:

  1. Such case was dismissed without any adjudication of the merits of the controversy, and the final order entered was one of dismissal and six months have elapsed from the date of such dismissal; or
  2. Judgment was entered in such case but the right to issue an execution or bring a scire facias or an action on such judgment is barred by § 8.01-251 ; and
  3. The destruction of such papers is authorized and directed by an order of the judge of the court in which they are filed and preserved, which order may refer to such papers by any one or more of the above classifications, or to any group or kind of cases embraced therein, without express reference to any particular case.

    (1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-118. When papers in civil cases returned to courts of record may be destroyed.

The clerk of any court of record to whose office papers in civil cases in the district court have been returned for indexing and preserving under § 16.1-69.55 may destroy the files, papers and records connected with any such civil case, if:

  1. Such case was dismissed without any adjudication of the merits of the controversy, and the final order entered was one of dismissal and one year has elapsed from the date of such dismissal; or
  2. Judgment was entered in such case but twenty years have elapsed since entry of such judgment and a motion to extend the period for enforcement of judgment has not been brought prior to the expiration of twenty years from the date such judgment was entered; or
  3. No service of the warrant or motion or other process or summons was had on any defendant and one year has elapsed from the date of such process or summons; and
  4. The destruction of such papers is authorized and directed by an order of the judge of the court in which they are preserved, which order may refer to such papers by any one or more of the above classifications, or to any group or kind of cases embraced therein, without express reference to any particular case.

    (1956, c. 555; 1962, c. 444; 1972, c. 491; 1977, c. 169; 1982, c. 153.)

§ 16.1-118.1. Destruction of papers in civil cases in certain district courts.

In Henrico County or Montgomery County, the clerk of any district court in which papers are filed and preserved under § 16.1-69.55 may destroy the files, papers and records connected with any civil case in such court, if:

  1. Such case was dismissed without any adjudication of the merits of the controversy, and the final order entered was one of dismissal and one year has elapsed from the date of such dismissal; or
  2. Judgment was entered in such case but the right to issue an execution or bring a motion to extend the period for enforcing a judgment or an action on such judgment is barred by § 8.01-251 ; or
  3. No service of the warrant or motion or other process or summons was had on any defendant and one year has elapsed from the date of such process or summons; and
  4. The destruction of such papers is authorized and directed by an order of the judge of the court in which they are preserved, which order may refer to such papers by any one or more of the above classifications, or to any group or kind of cases embraced therein, without express reference to any particular case; and
  5. The audit has been made for the period to which the files, papers and records are applicable.

    (1966, c. 404; 1973, c. 143; 1977, c. 169; 1982, c. 153; 2007, c. 813.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2007, c. 813, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of this act shall not affect the powers of any locality with respect to any ordinance, resolution or bylaw validly adopted and not repealed or rescinded prior to July 1, 2007."

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 813 substituted "Henrico County or Montgomery County" for "any county having a population of more than 70,000 but less than 75,000 or more than 100,000 but less than 125,000 and adjoining a city having a population of more than 200,000 but less than 300,000, or in any county operating under the county manager form of government as provided in Chapter 6 ( § 15.2-600 et seq.) of Title 15.2" in the introductory paragraph.

Article 4. Trying Title to Property Levied on Under Distress or Execution.

§ 16.1-119. Proceedings to try title to property levied on under distress or execution.

When an execution on a judgment of a general district court, or a warrant of distress, is levied on property, or when a lien is acquired on money or other personal estate by virtue of § 8.01-501 and some person other than the party against whom the process issued claims such property, money or other personal estate, or some part thereof, either the claimant, the officer having such process, or the party who had the same issued may apply to the general district court of the county or city wherein the property, money or other personal estate may be to try the claim of the party so claiming the same or some part thereof, provided that the property, money or other personal estate does not exceed the maximum jurisdictional limit of the court as provided in § 16.1-77 (1).

(1956, c. 555; 1978, c. 42; 1986, c. 27.)

Research References. - Enforcement of Judgments and Liens in Virginia (Matthew Bender). Chapter 3. The Writ Firea Facies: Execution. § 3.2 Execution. Rendleman.

§ 16.1-120. Summons in such case.

If the party making such application shall make and file an affidavit that to the best of his belief such property, money or other personal estate so claimed by such third party is not of greater value than the maximum jurisdictional limits of the court as provided by § 16.1-77 (1), the judge or clerk of the court shall issue a summons directed to the sheriff of his county or city, as the case may be, requiring him to summon both the creditor and the debtor to appear and show cause why such property, money or other personal estate, or any part thereof, should not be discharged from levy or lien of such execution or distress warrant. A copy of such summons shall be served upon the claimant of the property, money or other personal estate, unless the summons is sued out at his instance. The summons shall be made returnable not less than five days after date of its issuance, and if an earlier day shall have been fixed for the sale of the property, or for the return of any process subjecting such money or other personal estate to a final disposition, the judge shall make and endorse on the summons an order requiring the postponement of the sale, or the hearing to be had on such process, until after the return day of the summons.

(1956, c. 555; 1978, c. 42; 1983, c. 616.)

§ 16.1-121. Order after hearing.

After hearing the parties or such of them as may attend after being summoned, and such witnesses as may be introduced by either party, the judge shall order the officer, or the possessor of any money or other personal estate, to deliver the same to the claimant, if he be of opinion that the same belongs to the claimant; but if he be of opinion that the property, money or other personal estate, or any part thereof, belongs to the person against whom the execution or warrant of distress issued, he shall order the officer who levied on the same to sell the property so liable, to satisfy the execution or warrant of distress; or when there is money or other personal estate in the possession of a bailee or garnishee, he shall order the bailee or garnishee, as the case may be, to make delivery to the execution creditor of all such money or other personal estate so found to belong to the execution debtor, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution; and he may give such judgment respecting the property, the expense of keeping it, any injury done by it, and for the costs, as may be just and equitable among the parties.

(1956, c. 555.)

§ 16.1-122. Appeal.

If the property or money claimed in any such proceeding is more than $50 in value, an appeal of right may be had to the judgment or order of the court as provided in § 16.1-106.

(1956, c. 555; 1978, c. 42; 1986, c. 25; 1998, cc. 482, 495; 2002, c. 645; 2007, c. 869.)

The 1998 amendments. - The 1998 amendments by cc. 482 and 495 are identical, and substituted "$3,000" for "$1,000" in the first sentence and added the last sentence.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 645 substituted "$4,500" for "$3,000."

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 869, in the first paragraph, deleted the former first sentence, which read: "If the money or property claimed in any such proceeding is more than $4,500 in value, the proceeding may be removed to a circuit court and heard and disposed of therein as provided in § 16.1-92"; deleted the former last sentence, which read: "The limits for removal of cases under the Tort Claims Act ( § 8.01-195.1 et seq.) shall be governed by the jurisdictional amounts set forth in that act"; and made stylistic changes.

Article 5. Small Claims Court.

§ 16.1-122.1. Small claims court; designated.

On or before July 1, 1999, each general district court shall establish, using existing facilities, a small claims division to be designated a small claims court.

Such courts shall not have jurisdiction over suits against the Commonwealth under the Virginia Tort Claims Act (§ 8.01-195.1 et seq.) or suits against any officer or employee of the Commonwealth for claims arising out of the performance of their official duties or responsibilities.

(1988, c. 799; 1989, c. 451; 1990, c. 564; 1994, c. 576; 1995, c. 589; 1998, cc. 656, 779.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1988, c. 799, cl. 2, as amended by Acts 1990, c. 565, cl. 1, Acts 1993, c. 593, cl. 1, and Acts 1997, c. 253, cl. 1, provides that the provisions of the 1988 act, which enacted this article, shall become effective October 1, 1988, and no longer expire on July 1, 1998. The 1997 amendment by c. 253 deleted the provisions which had provided for the expiration of this article on July 1, 1998.

Acts 1996, c. 1033, cl. 1, provides: "The Cities of Harrisonburg and Richmond and the Counties of Brunswick, Greensville, Roanoke, Rockingham and Washington are hereby authorized to establish within their general district court a small claims court division, which shall be designated the small claims court, pursuant to the provisions of § 16.1-122.1."

Acts 1997, c. 253, cl. 2, as amended by Acts 1998, cc. 656 and 779, cl. 2, provides: "That any small claims court created prior to July 1, 1999, shall continue in effect."

The 1998 amendments. - The 1998 amendments by cc. 656 and 779 are identical and rewrote this section.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Courts, § 41.

§ 16.1-122.2. Jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the small claims court shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the general district court, over the civil action specified in § 16.1-77 (1) when the amount claimed does not exceed $5,000, exclusive of interest.

(1988, c. 799; 2002, c. 704; 2006, c. 141.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 704 substituted "$2,000" for "$1,000."

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 141 substituted "$5,000" for "$2,000."

§ 16.1-122.3. Actions; how commenced; notice; continuances; pleadings.

  1. Actions in the small claims court shall be commenced by the filing of a small claims civil warrant by a plaintiff.
  2. At the time of filing a small claims civil warrant, the plaintiff shall pay to the clerk a required fee, which will be taxed as costs in the case. The plaintiff may be afforded the opportunity to receive preprinted information promulgated by the Committee on District Courts explaining the small claims court, including but not limited to information on case preparation, courtroom procedures, methods of collection, removal rights and appeals. The plaintiff shall select a time for the hearing which shall be held at least five days after service of the warrant. Such time shall be subject to concurrence by the clerk's office. The chief judge may limit the number of cases any one person may set for trial on any one date.
  3. Upon the filing of the small claims civil warrant in small claims court, the court shall cause notice of process to be served upon the defendant. Notice of process shall consist of a copy of the warrant and shall be served by the method used in general district court. If applicable, the defendant shall be served with a copy of the preprinted information identified in subsection B of this section attached to the copy of the civil warrant.
  4. All forms required by this article shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
  5. The trial shall be conducted on the first return date. However, by consent of all parties or upon order of the court, the time for trial may be changed from the time set for the first return. A continuance shall be granted to either the plaintiff or defendant only upon good cause shown.
  6. There shall be no pleadings in small claims court actions other than the warrant and answer, grounds of defense and counterclaims not to exceed $5,000.

    (1988, c. 799; 1990, c. 564; 2002, c. 704; 2006, c. 141.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 704 substituted "$2,000" for "$1,000" in subsection F.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 141 substituted "$5,000" for "$2,000" in subsection F.

§ 16.1-122.4. Representation and removal; rights of parties.

  1. All parties shall be represented by themselves in actions before the small claims court except as follows:
    1. A corporate or partnership plaintiff or defendant may be represented by an owner, a general partner, an officer or an employee of that corporation or partnership who shall have all the rights and privileges given an individual to represent, plead and try a case without an attorney. An attorney may serve in this capacity if he is appearing pro se, but he may not serve in a representative capacity.
    2. A plaintiff or defendant who, in the judge's opinion, is unable to understand or participate on his own behalf in the hearing may be represented by a friend or relative if the representative is familiar with the facts of the case and is not an attorney.
  2. A defendant shall have the right to remove the case to the general district court at any point preceding the handing down of the decision by the judge and may be represented by an attorney for that purpose.

    (1988, c. 799; 1997, c. 243; 2001, c. 74.)

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 74 inserted "and may be represented by an attorney for that purpose" at the end of subsection B.

§ 16.1-122.5. Informal hearings; rules of evidence suspended.

In trials before the small claims court, witnesses shall be sworn. The general district court judge shall conduct the trial in an informal manner so as to do substantial justice between the parties. The judge shall have the discretion to admit all evidence which may be of probative value although not in accordance with formal rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence, except that privileged communications shall not be admissible. The object of such trials shall be to determine the rights of the litigants on the merits and to dispense expeditious justice between the parties.

(1988, c. 799.)

§ 16.1-122.6. Judgment and collection.

The small claims court shall follow the procedures of the general district court in judgment and collection.

(1988, c. 799.)

§ 16.1-122.7. Appeals.

Appeals from the small claims court shall be as in other cases from the general district court.

(1988, c. 799.)

Chapter 7. Jurisdiction and Procedure in Criminal Matters.

Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters.

Procedure in Criminal Cases.

Article 1. Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters.

§ 16.1-123.

Repealed by Acts 1984, c. 506.

§ 16.1-123.1. Criminal and traffic jurisdiction of general district courts.

  1. Each general district court shall have, within the county, including the towns within such county, or city for which it is established, exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of:
    1. All offenses against the ordinances, laws and bylaws of such county, including the towns within such county, or city or of any service district within such county or city, except a city ordinance enacted pursuant to §§ 18.2-372 through 18.2-391.1 . All offenses against the ordinances of a service district shall be prosecuted in the name of such service district;
    2. All other misdemeanors and traffic infractions arising in such county, including the towns in such county, or city.
  2. Each general district court which is established within a city shall also have:
    1. Concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of such city for all violations of state revenue and election laws; and
    2. Exclusive original jurisdiction, except as otherwise provided by general law or the city charter, within the area extending for one mile beyond the corporate limits thereof, for the trial of all offenses against the ordinances, laws and bylaws of the city.
  3. If a city lying within a county has no general district court provided by city charter or under general law, then the general district court of the county within which such city lies shall have the same jurisdiction in such city as a general district court established for a city would have.
  4. Each general district court shall have such other jurisdiction, exclusive or concurrent, as may be conferred on such court by general law or by provisions of the charter of the city for which the court was established.
  5. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection C of § 19.2-244, any county general district court authorized by § 16.1-69.35:01 to be established in a city shall have exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all misdemeanors committed within or upon the general district court courtroom.
  6. Upon certification by the general district court of any felony charge and ancillary misdemeanor charge or when an appeal of a conviction of an offense in general district court is noted, jurisdiction as to such charges shall vest in the circuit court, unless such case is reopened pursuant to § 16.1-133.1; a final judgment, order, or decree is modified, vacated, or suspended pursuant to Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1:1; or the appeal has been withdrawn in the general district court within 10 days pursuant to § 16.1-133.
  7. Nothing herein shall affect the jurisdiction conferred on the juvenile and domestic relations district court by Chapter 11 (§ 16.1-226 et seq.).

    (1984, c. 506; 2019, c. 240; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 187.)

Cross references. - For constitutional provisions, see Va. Const., Art. I, §§ 8, 11.

For provision redesignating county courts as general district courts, see § 16.1-69.8.

For right of appeal, see § 16.1-132.

For right of jury trial, see § 16.1-136.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 240 added subdivision 5 and redesignated former subdivision 5 as subdivision 6; and made stylistic changes.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 187, effective July 1, 2021, inserted subsection 6 and redesignated former subsection 6 as subsection 7.

Law review. - For article, "Trial by Jury and Speedy Justice," see 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 309 (1971). For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985).

For article surveying developments in criminal law and procedure in Virginia from July 2001 to September 2002, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 45 (2002).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 2B M.J. Automobiles, § 118; 5A M.J. Courts, §§ 43, 44.

CASE NOTES

Petty offenses not requiring jury trial. - Notwithstanding the broad language of the Virginia Constitution, there are many petty offenses against statutes or municipal ordinances which are triable without a jury, because they were so triable when the Constitution was adopted, and the right of trial by jury which is secured is the right as it existed at the time the Constitution was adopted. This was decided in Ex parte Marx, 86 Va. 40 , 9 S.E. 475 (1889), and such is the settled law on the subject. Ragsdale v. City of Danville, 116 Va. 484 , 82 S.E. 77 (1914).

Ordinance violations involving title to real estate. - See Martin v. City of Richmond, 108 Va. 765 , 62 S.E. 800 (1980); City of Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688 , 77 S.E. 470 (1913).

Applied in Greenwalt v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 498 , 297 S.E.2d 709 (1982); Kelley v. Stamos, 285 Va. 68 , 737 S.E.2d 218, 2013 Va. LEXIS 10 (2013); Davis v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 45, 754 S.E.2d 533, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 53 (2014).

§§ 16.1-124, 16.1-125.

Repealed by Acts 1984, c. 506.

Cross references. - As to the criminal and traffic jurisdiction of general district courts, see now § 16.1-123.1.

§ 16.1-126. Certain courts of record may try misdemeanors; procedure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, the circuit court of any county or city having criminal jurisdiction, shall have jurisdiction to try any person for any misdemeanor for which a presentment or indictment is brought in or for which an information is filed; or such court may certify the presentment, indictment or information for trial to the court not of record which would otherwise have jurisdiction of the offense; in which event the presentment, indictment or information shall be in lieu of any warrant, petition or other pleading which might otherwise be required by law.

(1956, c. 555.)

Law review. - For article, "Trial by Jury and Speedy Justice," see 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 309 (1971).

§ 16.1-127. Courts may conduct preliminary examinations.

In addition to the power and authority conferred by this chapter on courts not of record having criminal jurisdiction, each such court shall have power to conduct preliminary examinations of persons charged with crime within its jurisdiction in the manner prescribed in Chapter 7 (§ 19.2-71 et seq.) of Title 19.2.

(1956, c. 555; 1960, c. 362.)

CASE NOTES

County (now general district) courts have no jurisdiction over felonies. Kost v. Cox, 317 F. Supp. 884 (W.D. Va. 1970).

With the exception of conducting preliminary hearings. - See Kost v. Cox, 317 F. Supp. 884 (W.D. Va. 1970).

In Virginia, a preliminary hearing in an adult criminal case is merely a procedural requirement, not jurisdictionally significant. Nottingham v. Zahradnick, 573 F.2d 193 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S. Ct. 464, 58 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1978).

And may be preempted. - Determination by a grand jury of probable cause to indict preempts an adult defendant's right to a preliminary hearing. Nottingham v. Zahradnick, 573 F.2d 193 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S. Ct. 464, 58 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1978).

§ 16.1-128. Exception when jurisdiction in State Corporation Commission.

Nothing in this chapter shall be held to confer upon courts not of record any jurisdiction or power over offenses of which jurisdiction is specifically vested in the State Corporation Commission or in courts of record under the corporation laws of the Commonwealth.

(1956, c. 555.)

Article 2. Procedure in Criminal Cases.

§ 16.1-129. Offenses tried on warrants, or as provided in Chapter 7 of Title 19.2.

Every offense of which a court not of record is given jurisdiction under this title may be tried upon a warrant; or the judge of such court may, in his discretion, make an examination into the offense and proceed according to the provisions of Chapter 7 (§ 19.2-71 et seq.) of Title 19.2. The word warrant as used in this chapter shall be construed to include a summons or notice requiring a person to appear and answer a charge of having violated any statute, ordinance, or any regulation having the force and effect of law.

(1956, c. 555; 1960, c. 373.)

Law review. - For article, "Trial by Jury and Speedy Justice," see 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 309 (1971).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 8B M.J. Forgery, §§ 9, 24; 12A M.J. Larceny, § 11.

CASE NOTES

No opportunity for vindictive deterrence of appeal. - The Virginia two-tier system of administering criminal justice does not present the opportunity for the vindictive deterrence of appeal condemned in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969); McClung v. Weatherholtz, 351 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Failure to appear on charging summons. - Traffic summons was a public record as it became the charging document on which a general district court tried an accused, under § 16.1-129, and if an accused willfully violated his written promise to appear in court, given when he signed the summons, he could be convicted for failure to appear under § 19.2-128, regardless of the disposition of, and in addition to, the charge upon which he was originally arrested, under subdivision A 3 of § 19.2-74, and, given this statutory scheme, each signed summons clearly could constitute a separate offense under § 18.2-168 , regarding forgery of a public document. Hines v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 752, 576 S.E.2d 781, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 92 (2003).

On appeal, court properly granted motion to amend summons. - Where both an arrest warrant and a summons charged defendant with violating a city ordinance and § 18.2-266 , each of which is a misdemeanor, and the defendant was convicted on the summons and appealed, and on appeal, the circuit court granted the Commonwealth's motion to amend the summons to delete the reference to the city ordinance, this action was proper, as the amendment did not change the nature or character of the offense charged. Hill v. Commonwealth, No. 1240-91-4 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 2, 1993).

Applied in Bellinger v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 471, 477 S.E.2d 779 (1996).

§ 16.1-129.1.

Repealed by Acts 1990, c. 75.

§ 16.1-129.2. Procedure when warrant defective.

Upon the trial of a warrant, the court may, upon its own motion or upon the request either of the attorney for the prosecution or for the accused, amend the form of the warrant in any respect in which it appears to be defective. But when the warrant is so defective in form that it does not substantially appear from the same what is the offense with which the accused is charged, or even when it is not so seriously defective, the judge of the court having examined on oath the original complainant, if there be one, or if he sees good reason to believe that an offense has been committed, then without examination of witnesses, may issue under his own hand his warrant reciting the offense and requiring the defendant in the original warrant to be arrested and brought before him. Upon the arrest of the defendant on the new warrant and his production or appearance in court the trial shall proceed upon the new warrant. When there is an amendment of the original warrant the trial shall proceed on the amended warrant. But whether the warrant is amended or a new warrant is issued, the court before proceeding to trial on the same may grant a continuance to the prosecution or to the defendant upon such terms as to costs as may be proper under the circumstances of the case; provided, however, that if the warrant be amended or if a new warrant be issued after any evidence has been heard, the accused shall be entitled to a continuance as a matter of right.

When a warrant is amended or a new warrant is issued the costs already accrued shall be taxed against the defendant, if he is ultimately convicted, as a part of the costs arising under the new or amended warrant.

(1968, c. 495.)

Cross references. - For provision on amendment of written pleadings, see Rule 8:8, Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Rules.

CASE NOTES

Judge's authority to amend warrant. - Assuming a trial judge never actually accepted a defendant's plea of guilty to a charge of driving under the influence, the judge retained the authority to amend the charging warrant and then find the defendant guilty of reckless driving. Kelley v. Stamos, 285 Va. 68 , 737 S.E.2d 218, 2013 Va. LEXIS 10 (2013).

Amendment did not render warrant defective. - Arrest warrant issued was not defective as a result of having been amended sometime prior to a trial de novo in the lower appellate court, where the dates of the offense were amended, as the same particularity was not required in warrants of arrest as was required in formal indictments; pursuant to §§ 16.1-129.2 and 16.1-137, as long as the warrant was not so defective as to fail to notify the defendant of the nature and character of the offense charged, both district courts and circuit courts had the power to amend a warrant in any respect in which the warrant appeared to be defective, on the courts' own motion and without the consent of the parties. Raja v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 710, 581 S.E.2d 237, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 318 (2003).

Amendment did not render indictment defective. - Even though the trial court allowed the indictment to be amended, the indictment was not rendered defective by the amendment. The trial court merely allowed the indictment to be changed from reading that defendant robbed the store to defendant robbed the store clerk, but at all times, defendant was aware of the nature of the conduct forming the robbery charge against defendant. Thomas v. Commonwealth, No. 1206-06-2, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 605 (Dec. 20, 2006).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Amendment could not change nature and character of offense charged. - Amendment to a warrant could not change the nature and character of the offense originally charged; a trial court erred when, after hearing the evidence and without the agreement of the parties or the request of either, sua sponte, amended a DUI warrant to reckless driving and convicted defendant, since reckless driving was not a lesser included offense of DUI. Commonwealth v. Sumner, 66 Va. Cir. 266, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 322 (Salem Dec. 3, 2004).

Dismissal of an appeal was required because, although defendant was tried on a charge of improper lane change, he was convicted of the charge of failure to give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle, pursuant to Fairfax, Va., County Code § 82-4-24, and the district court had not amended the warrant, because an amendment could not change the nature and character of the offense originally charged. Commonwealth v. Dipietro, 79 Va. Cir. 55, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 67 (Fairfax Apr. 22, 2009).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Prosecutorial discretion. - While a prosecutor is permitted to move to amend a misdemeanor charge alleging a violation of a municipal ordinance to the equivalent misdemeanor charge alleging a violation of state law when such an arrest or summons was made by an officer of a local police department or a deputy for a local sheriff's department, any such an amendment is subject to judicial review and may be made only by an appropriate judicial officer. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Richard K. Newman, Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Hopewell, 11-080, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 8 (2/17/12).

§ 16.1-129.3.

Repealed by Acts 1974, c. 481.

§ 16.1-130.

Repealed by Acts 1983, c. 499.

Cross references. - For provision as to retention of records of criminal cases in the general district courts and juvenile and domestic relations district courts, see § 16.1-69.55.

§ 16.1-131. Subpoenas duces tecum and recognizances of witnesses; applicable provisions.

The provisions of § 16.1-90 with respect to recognizances for witnesses upon the continuation of any case, shall be applicable to proceedings of a criminal nature as well as to civil actions. The provisions of Rule 3A:12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court shall apply to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and punishment for failure to comply.

(1956, c. 555; 1986, c. 160.)

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-706. Subpoena Duces Tecum.

§ 16.1-131.1. Procedure when constitutionality of a statute is challenged in a court not of record.

In any criminal or traffic case in a court not of record, if the court rules that a statute or local ordinance is unconstitutional, it shall upon motion of the Commonwealth, or the locality if a local ordinance is the subject of the ruling, stay the proceedings and issue a written statement of its findings of law and relevant facts, if any, in support of its ruling and shall transmit the case, together with all papers, documents, and evidence connected therewith, to the circuit court for a determination of constitutionality. Either party may file a brief with the circuit court. Either party may request oral argument before the circuit court. The circuit court shall give the issue priority on its docket. If the circuit court rules that the statute or local ordinance is unconstitutional, the Commonwealth or the locality may appeal such interlocutory order to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court; however, if the circuit court rules that the statute or local ordinance is constitutional, the circuit court shall remand the case to the court not of record for trial consistent with the ruling of the circuit court.

(2006, cc. 571, 876; 2010, cc. 303, 609.)

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendments by cc. 303 and 609 are identical, and inserted "or the locality if a local ordinance is the subject of the ruling" following "Commonwealth" in the first sentence and "or the locality" following "Commonwealth" in the last sentence.

Law review. - For 2006 survey article, "Criminal Law and Procedure," see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 83 (2006).

§ 16.1-132. Right of appeal.

Any person convicted in a district court of an offense not felonious shall have the right, at any time within ten days from such conviction, and whether or not such conviction was upon a plea of guilty, to appeal to the circuit court. There shall also be an appeal of right from any order or judgment of a district court forfeiting any recognizance or revoking any suspension of sentence.

(1956, c. 555.)

Cross references. - For constitutional provision, see Va. Const., Art. I, § 8.

For appeals in civil cases, see §§ 16.1-106 through 16.1-114.1.

Law review. - For comment, "Right to Court-Appointed Counsel for Misdemeanants in Virginia," see 4 U. Rich. L. Rev. 306 (1970). For survey of Virginia law on criminal law and procedure for the year 1969-1970, see 56 Va. L. Rev. 1572 (1970). For survey of Virginia criminal law and procedure for the year 1970-1971, see 57 Va. L. Rev. 1438 (1971). For article, "Trial by Jury and Speedy Justice," see 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 309 (1971). For survey of Virginia law on criminal law for the year 1971-1972, see 58 Va. L. Rev. 1206 (1972). For survey of Virginia law on criminal procedure for the year 1972-1973, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1478 (1973). For note, "Limiting Judicial Incompetence: The Due Process Right to a Legally Learned Judge in State Minor Court Criminal Proceedings," see 61 Va. L. Rev. 1454 (1975). For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985).

For an article relating to all published Virginia criminal law decisions between July 1, 1997, and July 1, 1998, see 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1091 (1998).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 9-3008. Notice of Appeal (General District Court), et seq.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 25, 85, 357, 376, 377, 380, 382; 4C M.J. Constitutional Law, §§ 128, 141; 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 14; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, § 15; 12A M.J. Larceny, § 33.

CASE NOTES

This section and § 16.1-136 were enacted pursuant to the Va. Const., Art. I, § 8, and provide the means of securing a trial by jury. Commonwealth v. Bass, 113 Va. 760 , 74 S.E. 397 (1912), decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

No violation of Equal Protection Clause. - With respect to appellate procedure, the distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors either do not exist or, where they do, are based upon well-reasoned objectives which serve a legitimate state interest and protect the constitutional right of defendants convicted of crime and thus do not violate equal protection. Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697 , 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974).

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is not violated by the procedure in which a person convicted of a misdemeanor in a court not of record is given an automatic appeal to a higher court while a person originally convicted in a court of record has no such automatic right of appeal to a higher court. Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697 , 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974).

Construction with other laws. - Where the provisions of §§ 16.1-69.24 and 18.2-459 address the specific subject of appeals from summary contempt adjudications in the district courts, and the provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136 address the general subject of appeals from the district courts, to the extent that the more specific provisions of §§ 16.1-69.24 and § 18.2-459 are in conflict with the general provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136, the more specific statutes prevail. Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222 , 657 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Va. LEXIS 23 (2008).

Because the provisions of § 16.1-69.24 and § 18.2-459 had to prevail over the more general provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136, a contemnor appealing an adjudication of summary contempt does not receive a trial de novo in the circuit court with attendant Sixth Amendment protections and, thus, does not have a Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in that summary contempt adjudication in the circuit court. Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222 , 657 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Va. LEXIS 23 (2008).

This section contains no unreasonable restrictions. Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486 , 144 S.E.2d 293 (1965).

Section does not limit appeals from other juvenile court orders or judgments. - Although this section mentions a right to an appeal only with respect to orders or judgments pertaining to convictions, filing for recognizance, or revoking suspension of sentences, this provision does not operate to limit the right of appeal from other juvenile court orders or judgments. Hairfield v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 649, 376 S.E.2d 796 (1989).

Orders transferring juveniles are final, a contrary interpretation would contravene legislative intent, and such orders are immediately appealable to the circuit court and need not be preceded by a conviction under this section. Hairfield v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 649, 376 S.E.2d 796 (1989).

This section insures an unrestricted right of appeal to the circuit court, where the accused can demand a jury. Lacey v. Palmer, 93 Va. 159 , 24 S.E. 930 (1896), decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

Regardless of whether error was committed. - The intent of the former statutes relating to appeals from justices of the peace, and trial justices appointed under Chapter 2 of former Title 16, was to grant an appeal, in the nature of a new trial, as of right without inquiry as to whether the justice or trial justice has committed error or not. And considering the nature and procedure of these courts it seemed to be an undesirable practice to make appeals therefrom depend, in any case, upon the establishment by parol testimony that the justice had been guilty of judicial misconduct or had committed error. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787 , 173 S.E. 543 (1934) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

The trial de novo procedure involves a fresh determination of guilt or innocence by the court of general jurisdiction, which is not the court that acted before and has no motive to deal more strictly with a de novo defendant than it would with any other. Griffith v. Kerkhoff, 345 F. Supp. 1160 (W.D. Va. 1972).

An appeal of a district court order revoking a suspended sentence must be heard de novo in the circuit court. Barnes v. City of Newport News, 9 Va. App. 466, 389 S.E.2d 481 (1990).

The effect of an appeal from the inferior court's decision is not only to deprive him of further jurisdiction but to annul his judgment of conviction. Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

An appeal under this section and § 16.1-136 is, in effect, a statutory grant of a new trial which annuls the judgment of the inferior court, and accordingly such judgment may not be introduced in evidence before the jury in the circuit court. Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695 , 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969).

An appeal under this section is in effect a statutory grant of a new trial, which annuls the judgment of the inferior court as completely as if there had been no previous trial, and it is reversible error to mention such judgment of conviction in a trial of the case on appeal. Buck v. City of Danville, 213 Va. 387 , 192 S.E.2d 758 (1972).

Whenever a defendant exercises his rights under § 16.1-132 and a conviction in general district court is appealed, the fact of that conviction is not admissible in the appeal or in a subsequent civil proceeding. Baker v. Elmendorf, 271 Va. 474 , 628 S.E.2d 358, 2006 Va. LEXIS 39 (2006).

In a malicious prosecution suit, it was error to admit into evidence, under Ricketts v. J.G. McCrory Co., 138 Va. 548 (1924), the fact of a previous conviction as conclusive evidence of probable cause; where the conviction was reversed on appeal, the de novo appeal annulled the judgment of the inferior tribunal completely as if there had been no previous trial and "wiped out" guilty pleas. Baker v. Elmendorf, 271 Va. 474 , 628 S.E.2d 358, 2006 Va. LEXIS 39 (2006).

The right of appeal is not dependent upon the posting of a bond. - The right of an accused to appeal from the district court to the circuit court and obtain retrial of a misdemeanor charge pursuant to this section is not dependent upon his posting an appeal bond. Hill v. Middlesex County, 12 Va. App. 58, 402 S.E.2d 243 (1991).

No condition imposed except appeal be made within 10 days from conviction. - No condition is imposed upon the exercise of the statutory right to appeal in this section other than the requirement that the appeal be made within 10 days from conviction in the district court. Hill v. Middlesex County, 12 Va. App. 58, 402 S.E.2d 243 (1991).

The right to appeal is not waived by form of plea. - The words "and whether or not such conviction was upon a plea of guilty," make statutory the holding in Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787 , 173 S.E. 543 (1934), that a plea of guilty or not guilty does not operate to waive or bar the right of appeal given by that section. The case cited disapproves the contrary rule laid down in Cooper v. Town of Appalachia, 145 Va. 861 , 134 S.E. 591 (1926).

Nor by motion to suspend jail sentence. - A motion to suspend a jail sentence made by or on behalf of the accused after he had been sentenced is not a waiver of, or a bar to, the right of the accused to appeal to the circuit court. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787 , 173 S.E. 543 (1934) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Accused, convicted by a trial justice and informed that if he paid his fine and costs he would not be granted an appeal, stated that he did not intend to appeal, paid the fine and costs, and was remanded to jail to begin the service of his sentence. Within the ten-day period in which an appeal is allowed by this section, his application to the trial justice for an appeal was denied. It was held that his right to appeal was not waived. Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662 , 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

And payment of fine and partial submission to judgment of trial justice do not constitute waiver of the right to appeal if proper steps are taken to perfect such an appeal within the period named in this section. Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662 , 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946) decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Assignment of errors not required. - An appeal of right is given by the statute to one convicted in the inferior court without assigning errors. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 491 (1886)(decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Plea of guilty not to be considered on appeal. - The language of this section indicates that a plea of guilty in an inferior court should not be considered on appeal. Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695 , 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969).

Since under the terms of this section an accused is given the right to a new trial whether or not such conviction was upon a plea of guilty in the inferior court, such plea of guilty was not admissible in evidence on the appeal to the court of record. Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695 , 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969).

Double jeopardy is not violated where defendant is re-indicted on original offense after appeal de novo to the circuit court because the plea-based conviction is thereby vacated and jeopardy continues until a final conviction is rendered. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 389, 363 S.E.2d 440 (1987).

When the defendant appealed her misdemeanor possession conviction to the circuit court, as she had a right to do under this section, her conviction was vacated; therefore, the defendant could be retried for the same or a greater offense without double jeopardy being violated. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 389, 363 S.E.2d 440 (1987).

Imposition of greater sentence on retrial. - Allowing a jury to impose a greater sentence on retrial without evidence of supervening misconduct does not place an unconstitutional condition on one's exercise of the right to a trial by jury. Manns v. Allman, 324 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).

When a jury in a de novo trial imposed a more severe sentence than was imposed in the lower court of record, there was no denial of either due process or equal protection. Manns v. Allman, 324 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).

When a greater sentence is imposed at a retrial by a jury, such a penalty will be valid in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Manns v. Allman, 324 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).

The imposition of a harsher sentence in the absence of any intervening misconduct at a de novo trial on appeal of the defendant's conviction of reckless driving does not violate the due process clause. Griffith v. Kerkhoff, 345 F. Supp. 1160 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Fact that defendant was sentenced to a greater punishment after his de novo trial in circuit court did not establish a violation of due process or show that a manifest injustice occurred. Breznick v. Commonwealth, No. 0982-19-3, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 216 (July 28, 2020).

No conviction of greater offense on appeal from conviction of lesser included offense. - One who was tried in a court not of record on a warrant charging him with driving under the influence of alcohol, and who was convicted of the lesser included offense of impaired driving, may not be tried and convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants on an appeal of his conviction to the corporation (now circuit) court. Buck v. City of Danville, 213 Va. 387 , 192 S.E.2d 758 (1972).

When a warrant charges an accused with an offense of several grades, and on his trial in a court not of record he is acquitted of the greater offense and convicted of the lesser included offense, on appeal from that conviction the defendant is not placed in the same position as to the offense of which he was acquitted as if no trial had been had. Buck v. City of Danville, 213 Va. 387 , 192 S.E.2d 758 (1972).

Due process affords the appellant the right to a de novo hearing in the circuit court without having to risk an attempt by the Commonwealth to convict him of a more serious charge with a greater potential punishment for the same criminal incident. Allen v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 334, 549 S.E.2d 652, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 447 (2001).

Commonwealth's indictment and conviction of the appellant for a felony offense upon his invocation of this section was constitutionally impermissible as a violation of due process; appellant could only be tried in the circuit court for the original misdemeanor, and the indictment for the felony offense should have been dismissed. Allen v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 334, 549 S.E.2d 652, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 447 (2001).

Reopening of case by district court where appeal withdrawn. - Where an appeal had been perfected to the circuit court, and where appellant withdrew his appeal, until a de novo hearing on the merits had commenced, the district court could "for good cause shown" reopen and reconsider its judgment within sixty days from the final judgment. Zamani v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 59, 492 S.E.2d 854 (1997), aff'd, 256 Va. 391 , 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).

Evidence of statements or admissions. - There is nothing in the language of this section or § 16.1-136 which excludes evidence of statements or admissions made by an accused while testifying in the inferior court. Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695 , 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969).

Evidence of guilty plea that was followed by appeal to circuit court was properly excluded in later civil trial. - In a civil suit by plaintiff buyer against defendant individual to recover damages for personal injuries arising from an altercation, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence that the individual had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge in relation to the altercation in the district court, as the individual had appealed the conviction to the circuit court under § 16.1-132, which effectively "wiped out" the guilty plea, making evidence of the plea inadmissible. Santen v. Tuthill, 265 Va. 492 , 578 S.E.2d 788, 2003 Va. LEXIS 48 (2003).

Timeliness of appeal. - In a case in which a circuit court quashed defendant's appeal of a revocation of suspension of his sentence for contributing to the delinquency of a minor based on an excessive number of unexcused school absences of one of his four minor children, from the juvenile and domestic relations district court (juvenile court) because it was untimely, the circuit court incorrectly determined that the December 17, 2008, order was a final order by the juvenile court and that his appeal within ten days after entry of the February 11, 2009, order was untimely. Not until the juvenile court heard additional evidence on February 11, 2009, regarding compliance with the conditions of suspension did it make a final, appealable determination regarding whether to impose the previously suspended 30-day sentence or to re-suspend some or all of that time, and defendant's appeal was filed on the same day. Smith v. Commonwealth, No. 0613-09-3, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 557 (Dec. 15, 2009).

Defendant's appeal of his misdemeanor conviction in the general district court for a de novo trial in the circuit court fell precisely within the class of cases and controversies that the statutes granted the circuit court authority to adjudicate, and the question of whether his notice of appeal was timely filed concerned the circuit court's active jurisdiction, which could be waived if not preserved. Because defendant failed to preserve this argument in circuit court, it could not be addressed on appeal. Breznick v. Commonwealth, No. 0982-19-3, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 216 (July 28, 2020).

Applied in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 766 , 146 S.E.2d 197 (1966); Hogan v. Lukhard, 351 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D. Va. 1972); White v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 559 , 203 S.E.2d 443 (1974); Preston v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 731, 419 S.E.2d 288 (1992).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Jurisdiction. - When defendant failed to file a notice of a appeal of his driving under the influence conviction within 10 days, he was not entitled to a trial de novo as the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Copto-Lavalle, 58 Va. Cir. 148, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 29 (Fairfax County 2002).

Alleged denial of due process cured. - When defendant exercised his statutory right to note an appeal, his conviction in the general district court was vacated and a de novo trial began anew in the circuit court; any alleged denial of due process in the general district court was cured with the de novo trial in the circuit court. Commonwealth v. Chastain,, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 111 (Fairfax County Apr. 5, 2021).

§ 16.1-133. Withdrawal of appeal.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 16.1-135, any person convicted in a general district court, a juvenile and domestic relations district court, or a court of limited jurisdiction of an offense not felonious may, at any time before the appeal is heard, withdraw an appeal which has been noted, pay the fine and costs to such court, and serve any sentence which has been imposed.

A person withdrawing an appeal shall give written notice of withdrawal to the court and counsel for the prosecution prior to the hearing date of the appeal. If the appeal is withdrawn more than ten days after conviction, the circuit court shall forthwith enter an order affirming the judgment of the lower court and the clerk shall tax the costs as provided by statute. Fines and costs shall be collected by the circuit court, and all papers shall be retained in the circuit court clerk's office.

Where the withdrawal is within ten days after conviction, no additional costs shall be charged, and the judgment of the lower court shall be imposed without further action of the circuit court.

(1956, c. 555; 1973, c. 18; 1974, c. 228; 1979, c. 536; 1982, c. 366; 1983, c. 105; 1990, c. 25.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on criminal procedure for the year 1972-1973, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1478 (1973).

For 2003/2004 survey of criminal law and procedure, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 133 (2004).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 9-3008. Notice of Appeal (General District Court), et seq.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 232, 376, 381.

CASE NOTES

Construction with § 16.1-133.1. - The General Assembly intended to make fully available to a person convicted of a misdemeanor both the right to seek review by a de novo appeal and the right, within the specified period, to petition to reopen the case in the district court; this section and § 16.1-133.1 must be construed in a manner that affords a convicted person the full opportunity to employ both post-trial procedures to the extent the exercise of one does not conflict with the exercise of the other. Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391 , 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).

Termination of district court's jurisdiction following appeal to circuit court. - Where a case is brought in the circuit court on appeal from the district court, a de novo hearing on the merits must commence before the district court's jurisdiction to reopen the case is terminated; accordingly, where a defendant had noted his appeal to the circuit court and, at the only hearing in that court, the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial and the case was continued, such incidents did not rise to the dignity of a de novo hearing on the merits, the district court retained jurisdiction to reopen its judgment and the defendant could withdraw his appeal to the circuit court. Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391 , 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).

Validity of district court's jurisdiction following appeal to circuit court. - Where defendant withdrew an appeal of a district court judgment, pursuant to § 16.1-133, more than 10 days after the date of the judgment, and a de novo hearing was not held, the judgment was stayed, but remained valid; a circuit court's appellate order did not annul or abrogate the district court judgment. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 266 Va. 260 , 585 S.E.2d 552, 2003 Va. LEXIS 90 (2003).

Reopening of case by district court. - Where an appeal had been perfected to the circuit court, and where appellant withdrew his appeal, until a de novo hearing on the merits had commenced, the district court could "for good cause shown" reopen and reconsider its judgment within sixty days from the final judgment. Zamani v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 59, 492 S.E.2d 854 (1997), aff'd, 256 Va. 391 , 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).

Applied in Turner v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 381, 641 S.E.2d 771, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 78 (2007).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Responsibility for costs. - Defendant's appeal of a district court conviction for unreasonably failing to permit his blood or breath to be tested when charged with driving while intoxicated was a criminal matter to which the same procedures applied as appeals from misdemeanor convictions, and defendant was therefore responsible for the jury expense incurred in the circuit court when defendant withdrew his appeal on the day of trial when a jury had been assembled and resolved his case via plea bargain; to avoid the charge, defendant would have had to have withdrawn his jury demand at least 10 days prior to trial. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 54 Va. Cir. 214, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 579 (Northampton County 2000).

§ 16.1-133.1. Reopening case after conviction.

Within sixty days from the date of conviction of any person in a general district court or juvenile and domestic relations district court for an offense not felonious, the case may be reopened upon the application of such person and for good cause shown. Such application shall be heard by the judge who presided at the trial in which the conviction was had, but if he be not in office, or be absent from the county or city or is otherwise unavailable to hear the application, it may be heard by his successor or by any other judge or substitute judge of such court. If the case is reopened after the case documents have been filed with the circuit court, the clerk of the circuit court shall return the case documents to the district court in which the case was originally tried.

(1973, c. 440; 1975, c. 298; 1983, c. 21.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 9-3005. Order Vacating Plea of Guilty (Court Not of Record).

CASE NOTES

Construction with § 16.1-133. - The General Assembly intended to make fully available to a person convicted of a misdemeanor both the right to seek review by a de novo appeal and the right, within the period specified in this section, to petition to reopen the case in the district court; this section and § 16.1-133 must be construed in a manner that affords a convicted person the full opportunity to employ both post-trial procedures to the extent the exercise of one does not conflict with the exercise of the other. Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391 , 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).

Termination of district court's jurisdiction following appeal to circuit court. - Where a case is brought in the circuit court on appeal from the district court, a de novo hearing on the merits must commence before the district court's jurisdiction to reopen the case is terminated; accordingly, where a defendant had noted his appeal to the circuit court and, at the only hearing in that court, the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial and the case was continued, such incidents did not rise to the dignity of a de novo hearing on the merits, the district court retained jurisdiction to reopen its judgment and the defendant could withdraw his appeal to the circuit court. Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391 , 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).

Juvenile court lost jurisdiction since no timely appeal filed. - Because a mother did not comply with subsection A of § 16.1-296 and § 16.1-133.1 by appealing a dispositional order within 10 days of its entry or applying to reopen the case within 60 days, pursuant to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1, the juvenile court lost jurisdiction of a charge and the court's dismissal of that charge had no force; therefore, since the juvenile court had authority under subdivision A 13 c of § 16.1-278.8 to maintain custody of the child with the social services department, the circuit court properly denied the mother's motion to dismiss proceedings and return custody of her son. Lee v. Frederick County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2693-07-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 370 (Aug. 5, 2008).

Reopening of case where appeal withdrawn. - Where an appeal had been perfected to the circuit court, and where appellant withdrew his appeal, until a de novo hearing on the merits had commenced, the district court could "for good cause shown" reopen and reconsider its judgment within sixty days from the final judgment. Zamani v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 59, 492 S.E.2d 854 (1997), aff'd, 256 Va. 391 , 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).

Finding of contempt based on valid conviction. - Trial court's finding that defendant was in contempt of court was based on a valid conviction; as the district court did not dismiss defendant's conviction within 21 days of the conviction order, the district court no longer had jurisdiction and could not dismiss defendant's conviction. Wilson v. Commonwealth, No. 1959-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 465 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 13, 2002).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Applicability. - Statutory authority of § 16.1-133.1 applies only to convictions not matters rendered nolle prosequi; while the district court may retain its revisory power over criminal sentences within the time frame allotted by Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1, it is clear the General Assembly did not statutorily authorize the district court, on application of the Commonwealth, to vacate the nolle prosequi once entered. Commonwealth v. Darab, 99 Va. Cir. 138, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County May 2, 2018).

Construction. - While the statute does elongate the time of the revisory power of such courts, it does so only when application is made by the defendant; In addition, in excluding the Commonwealth from the ability to reopen cases, the statute appears to enjoin completely the Commonwealth from revisiting a judgment of conviction to exact an altered punishment. Commonwealth v. Darab, 99 Va. Cir. 138, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County May 2, 2018).

Double jeopardy. - Because the Commonwealth terminated a prosecution after jeopardy had attached, the nolle prosequi acted as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, and, therefore, the cause had to be dismissed with finality. Commonwealth v. Darab, 99 Va. Cir. 138, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County May 2, 2018).

Litigants are entitled to the certainty that a nolle prosequi is not a mere fleeting grant of a temporary end of a prosecution easily reversed by a judge upon the whim of the moment, but instead triggers the statutory due process rights attendant to bringing charges anew. Commonwealth v. Darab, 99 Va. Cir. 138, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County May 2, 2018).

District court abused its discretion in vacating nolle prosequi order. - District court's action of taking the uninvited initiative to cause the nolle prosequi to be vacated and proceeding to trial without the formal recharging of the offense constituted an abuse of discretion because it never announced in reversing its original ruling why its previous judgment was in error; the district court acted in a manner that could be interpreted as crossing the line between prosecuting and judging the case. Commonwealth v. Darab, 99 Va. Cir. 138, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County May 2, 2018).

Statute does not apply to matters rendered nolle prosequi. - Statutory authority applies only to convictions not matters rendered nolle prosequi; while the district court may retain its revisory power over criminal sentences within the time frame allotted by Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1, it is clear the General Assembly did not statutorily authorize the district court, on application of the Commonwealth, to vacate the nolle prosequi once entered. Commonwealth v. Darab, 99 Va. Cir. 138, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County May 2, 2018).

Court cannot reacquire jurisdiction by vacating nolle prosequi order. - District court could not vacate its written grant of a nolle prosequi motion because it divested itself of jurisdiction over defendant and thus, could not reacquire the same by vacating its divesting order; to re-institute the jurisdiction of the district court over defendant, due process required the reinstatement of the case through recharging, assuming double jeopardy was of no bar. Commonwealth v. Darab, 99 Va. Cir. 138, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County May 2, 2018).

§ 16.1-134. Appeal by Commonwealth in revenue cases.

In any case involving the violation of a law relating to the state revenue tried in a court not of record under this title, the Commonwealth shall also have the right at any time within ten days from final judgment to appeal to the circuit court.

(1956, c. 555.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 47, 376.

§ 16.1-135. Bail and recognizance; papers filed with circuit court.

A person who has been convicted of an offense in a district court and who has noted an appeal, either at the time judgment is rendered or subsequent to its entry, shall be given credit for any bond that he may have posted in the court from which he appeals and shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 (§ 19.2-119 et seq.) of Chapter 9 of Title 19.2. Any new bond which may be required for the release of such person pending the appeal shall be given before the judge or the clerk of the district court and treated in accordance with Article 1 of Chapter 9 of Title 19.2; however, if the judge or clerk is not available to take the bond, the bond may be given before a magistrate serving the jurisdiction. Whenever an appeal is taken and the ten-day period prescribed by § 16.1-133 has expired the papers shall be promptly filed with the clerk of the circuit court.

(1956, c. 555; 1981, c. 159; 1999, cc. 829, 846; 2008, cc. 551, 691.)

The 1999 amendments. - The 1999 amendments by cc. 829 and 846 are identical, and substituted "Article 1 ( § 19.2-119 et seq.) of Chapter 9 of Title 19.2" for " §§ 19.2-123 and 19.2-124" in the first and second sentences.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 551 and 691 are identical, and substituted "magistrate serving the jurisdiction" for "magistrate of the jurisdiction" in the next-to-last sentence.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 376, 378; 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 14.

CASE NOTES

Authority of justice after judgment of conviction. - The only prerogative that can be lawfully exercised, after judgment of conviction has been pronounced, by a justice of the peace (now district court judge) is to admit the accused to bail, if applied for immediately, or grant bail if subsequently applied for within ten days, or carry into execution the judgment. Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087 , 156 S.E. 574 (1931) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

He cannot grant a new trial or hold judgment in abeyance. - There is no statutory provision for a new trial to be had before a justice of the peace (now district court judge) in a criminal case, nor is there any warrant of law authorizing him to hold in abeyance the judgment of conviction. Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087 , 156 S.E. 574 (1931) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

It is his mandatory duty to forthwith return and file all papers with the clerk of the court having appellate jurisdiction of the case. Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087 , 156 S.E. 574 (1931), cited in Omohundro v. Palmer, 158 Va. 693 , 164 S.E. 541 (1932) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

When such filing has been done by the justice his jurisdiction is at an end and any further act committed in connection with the judgment is ultra vires and void. Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087 , 156 S.E. 574 (1931) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

A police justice (now district court judge) loses all jurisdiction over a case when he notes the appeal, admits the accused to bail and delivers the papers to the clerk of the hustings court. Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

The right of appeal is not dependent upon the posting of a bond. - The right of an accused to appeal from the district court to the circuit court and obtain retrial of a misdemeanor charge pursuant to § 16.1-132 is not dependent upon his posting an appeal bond. Hill v. Middlesex County, 12 Va. App. 58, 402 S.E.2d 243 (1991).

This section authorizes the requirement of bail and describes the manner of taking and handling bail bonds. It does not require the accused to secure his release on bail, nor does it impose a bonding condition upon his exercise of his right to trial de novo. Hill v. Middlesex County, 12 Va. App. 58, 402 S.E.2d 243 (1991).

No condition imposed except appeal be made within 10 days from conviction. - No condition is imposed upon the exercise of the statutory right to appeal in § 16.1-132 other than the requirement that the appeal be made within 10 days from conviction in the district court. Hill v. Middlesex County, 12 Va. App. 58, 402 S.E.2d 243 (1991).

§ 16.1-136. How appeal tried.

Any appeal taken under the provisions of this chapter shall be heard de novo in the appellate court and shall be tried without formal pleadings in writing; and, except in the case of an appeal from any order or judgment of a court not of record forfeiting any recognizance or revoking any suspension of sentence, the accused shall be entitled to trial by a jury in the same manner as if he had been indicted for the offense in the circuit court.

(1956, c. 555.)

Cross references. - As to procedure on appeal in civil cases, see §§ 16.1-106, 16.1-113 and 16.1-114.1.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on criminal law and procedure for the year 1969-1970, see 56 Va. L. Rev. 1572 (1970). For survey of Virginia criminal law and procedure for the year 1970-1971, see 57 Va. L. Rev. 1438 (1971). For article, "Trial by Jury and Speedy Justice," see 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 309 (1971). For survey of Virginia law on criminal law for the year 1971-1972, see 58 Va. L. Rev. 1206 (1972). For survey of Virginia law on criminal procedure for the year 1972-1973, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1478 (1973). For survey of Virginia practice and pleading for the year 1975-1976, see 62 Va. L. Rev. 1460 (1976). For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 379, 380, 382; 2B M.J. Automobiles, § 118; 2C M.J. Autrefois, Acquit and Convict, § 11; 4C M.J. Constitutional Law, §§ 128, 141; 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 77; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, § 15; 19 M.J. Warrants, § 6.

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

Constitutionality of distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors with respect to appeals. - With respect to appellate procedure, the distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors either do not exist or, where they do, are based upon well-reasoned objectives which serve a legitimate state interest and protect the constitutional rights of defendants convicted of crime and thus do not violate equal protection. Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697 , 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974).

Construction with other laws. - Where the provisions of §§ 16.1-69.24 and 18.2-459 address the specific subject of appeals from summary contempt adjudications in the district courts, and the provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136 address the general subject of appeals from the district courts, to the extent that the more specific provisions of §§ 16.1-69.24 and § 18.2-459 are in conflict with the general provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136, the more specific statutes prevail. Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222 , 657 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Va. LEXIS 23 (2008).

Because the provisions of § 16.1-69.24 and § 18.2-459 had to prevail over the more general provisions of §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136, a contemnor appealing an adjudication of summary contempt does not receive a trial de novo in the circuit court with attendant Sixth Amendment protections and, thus, does not have a Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in that summary contempt adjudication in the circuit court. Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222 , 657 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Va. LEXIS 23 (2008).

Double jeopardy does not attach. - Assertion that the trial on the new warrant under this section was barred by the double jeopardy clause was without merit. An appeal de novo from a general district court to a circuit court annuls the former judgment as completely as if no trial had ever occurred. To allow a defendant to appeal a conviction in the general district court de novo and then plead double jeopardy in the circuit court would grant every criminal defendant who appealed an automatic pass to freedom. Ledbetter v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 805, 447 S.E.2d 250 (1994).

Trial by jury. - This section and § 16.1-132 were enacted pursuant to Va. Const., Art. I, § 8, and provide the means of securing a trial by jury. Commonwealth v. Bass, 113 Va. 760 , 74 S.E. 397 (1912) (decided under former statutes corresponding to this section and § 16.1-132).

Improper denial of de novo appeal. - Circuit court committed clear error in denying a mother her right to a de novo appeal of an order awarding a father custody of the parties' child because the circuit court considered the transcript of the juvenile and domestic relations district court hearing on the matter and pronounced that its ruling would be the same unless the mother presented different evidence; the circuit court improperly shifted the burden of production and persuasion from the father to the mother by requiring the mother to present new or different evidence and imposed an award of attorney's fees as a punitive measure to punish the mother for pursuing her right to a trial de novo. Alexander v. Flowers, 51 Va. App. 404, 658 S.E.2d 355, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 139 (2008).

No opportunity for vindictive deterrence of appeal. - The Virginia two-tier system of administering criminal justice does not present the opportunity for the vindictive deterrence of appeal condemned in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969). McClung v. Weatherholtz, 351 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Applied in Eames v. Town of Rocky Mount, 217 Va. 16 , 225 S.E.2d 197 (1976); Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs. v. Nordel, 29 Va. App. 400, 512 S.E.2d 830 (1999).

II. TRIAL DE NOVO.

The court is given a free hand in conducting the trial on appeal, under this section and § 16.1-137, in such a way as to guarantee every substantial right, on the one hand, and, on the other, to cut off frivolous and formal objections. Collins v. City of Radford, 134 Va. 518 , 113 S.E. 735 (1922) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

The de novo trial is a two-edged sword. Just as a defendant is protected against having anything that happened in the lower court used against him in the de novo trial, he may not seek to incur any of the benefits. The fact that the prosecution may have agreed to a lesser penalty below is irrelevant in the de novo trial. McClung v. Weatherholtz, 351 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Which is to be heard de novo. - Under the provisions of this section appeals from convictions by mayors, police justices, justices of the peace and trial justices appointed under Chapter 2 of former Title 16 (now district court judges), are to be tried de novo. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 126 Va. 800 , 101 S.E. 357 (1919); Ossa v. Town of Appalachia, 137 Va. 795 , 119 S.E. 51 (1923); Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087 , 156 S.E. 574 (1931); Peak v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 535 , 199 S.E. 473 (1938); Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662 , 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946). The above cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section; Laing v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 682 , 127 S.E.2d 142 (1962), cert. denied, Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 421 S.E.2d 635 (1992).

In Virginia, on appeal from convictions of misdemeanors in courts not of record to courts of record, the defendant is entitled to a trial de novo under this section. Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Circuit court erred because it acted as a court of appeals and did not conduct a de novo trial by asking a father to show where in the record he preserved his arguments; the circuit court did not conduct a new hearing on the underlying issues but rather reviewed the determination of the juvenile and domestic relations district court and rendered a decision based upon that review. Minor v. Barrett, No. 0103-16-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 263 (Oct. 11, 2016).

And without formal pleadings. - This section dispenses with formal pleadings in writing on the trial where an appeal has been taken from the judgment of a justice convicting one of an offense. Harding v. Commonwealth, 105 Va. 858 , 52 S.E. 832 (1906); Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664 , 108 S.E. 648 (1921); Collins v. City of Radford, 134 Va. 518 , 113 S.E. 735 (1922); Ossa v. Town of Appalachia, 137 Va. 795 , 119 S.E. 51 (1923); McWilliams v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 725 , 181 S.E. 391 (1935); Peak v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 535 , 199 S.E. 473 (1938). The above cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

This section does not deprive an accused of the right or relieve him of the duty to file informal or special pleas, if he intends to rely on them. Royals v. City of Hampton, 201 Va. 552 , 111 S.E.2d 795 (1960).

A trial de novo in the circuit court grants to a litigant every advantage which would have been his had the case been tried originally in such court. Walker v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 223 Va. 557 , 290 S.E.2d 887 (1982).

Consideration of evidence. - A trial court is required to consider any relevant evidence developed prior to the hearing date that may impact on the child's best interests. Parish v. Spaulding, 20 Va. App. 130, 455 S.E.2d 728 (1995).

The appeal is in effect a statutory grant of a new trial to the accused to be had before the appellate court. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787 , 173 S.E. 543 (1934); Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662 , 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946); Baylor v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116 , 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949). These cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

The intent of this section and § 16.1-137 is to afford the accused, by giving him a new trial before the court on appeal, the opportunity to have every advantage which would have been his had he been tried originally in such court. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787 , 173 S.E. 543 (1934) (decided under former corresponding statutes).

The appeal is in effect a statutory grant of a new trial to the accused, to be had before a court of record having original criminal jurisdiction. Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486 , 144 S.E.2d 293 (1965).

The intent of this section and § 16.1-137, is to grant a new trial to the accused, with the opportunity to have every advantage which he would have had had he been tried originally in a circuit court, and to give such court a free hand in conducting such new trial in such a way as to guarantee to the accused every substantial right on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to cut frivolous and purely formal objections. Royals v. City of Hampton, 201 Va. 552 , 111 S.E.2d 795 (1960).

It annuls the judgment of the trial justice, and it is reversible error to permit such judgment to be introduced in evidence before the jury on the trial of the case on appeal. Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941); Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662 , 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946); Baylor v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116 , 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949). These cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

The appeal annuls the judgment of the inferior tribunal as completely as if there had been no previous trial. Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486 , 144 S.E.2d 293 (1965); Walker v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 223 Va. 557 , 290 S.E.2d 887 (1982).

The appeal not only annuls the judgment of the inferior court, but it is reversible error to permit such judgment to be introduced in evidence before the jury on a trial of the case on appeal. Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486 , 144 S.E.2d 293 (1965).

An appeal under this section and § 16.1-132 is, in effect, a statutory grant of a new trial which annuls the judgment of the inferior court, and accordingly such judgment may not be introduced in evidence before the jury in the circuit court. Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695 , 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969).

The statutory grant of a new trial under this section annuls the judgment of the inferior court. Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972).

This section annuls the judgment of the court not of record as completely as if there had been no previous trial. The amount of punishment awarded in the previous trial may not be imparted to the jury. The judgment appealed from is completely annulled, and is not thereafter available for any purpose. Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Where a hearing is de novo, an appeal to the circuit court from a juvenile court under this section annuls the judgment of the juvenile court as completely as if there had been no previous trial. Cox v. Cox, 16 Va. App. 146, 428 S.E.2d 515 (1993).

Also a former plea of guilty. - The appeal in effect annuls or wipes out a former plea of guilty entered before the trial justice. The purpose of this section is to give the accused a new trial in the circuit court, unhampered and unprejudiced by such plea. Baylor v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116 , 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949) (decided under former § 16-10, corresponding to this section).

And a plea of guilty by accused before the trial justice is not admissible in the circuit court as "a confession." Baylor v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116 , 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949) (decided under former § 16-10, corresponding to this section).

A plea of guilty in the court not of record may not be considered in the appeal. Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972).

And the trial on appeal is not a review of the proceedings before the justice. Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Where the court made no factual findings, offered no independent basis for its decision and rendered no independent final judgment based on the facts, the trial court has acted inconsistently with its duty to render a new and inherently independent judgment upon the evidence presented to it. In re Fener, No. 0588-03-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 596 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 18, 2003).

The statute contemplates that the accused shall plead anew in the circuit court, for unless he does so he could not be tried by a jury in the same manner as if he had been indicted for the offense in said court. Baylor v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116 , 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949) (decided under former § 16-10, corresponding to this section).

The judgment of the inferior court may not be introduced in evidence before the jury in the court of record. Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972).

And record of such court may not be used as reason for increased punishment. - In a de novo trial in Virginia, it is improper for the sentencing judge in the court of record to consider the record in the inferior court so that he can state his reasons for giving increased punishment. The jury verdict of a finding of guilt and fixing punishment, of course, states no reasons. The judge, after a verdict, merely imposes the sentence fixed by the jury. Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Imposition of greater sentence on retrial. - Allowing a jury to impose a greater sentence on retrial without evidence of supervening misconduct does not place an unconstitutional condition on one's exercise of the right to a trial by jury. Manns v. Allman, 324 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).

When a jury in a de novo trial imposed a more severe sentence than was imposed in the lower court of record, there was no denial of either due process or equal protection. Manns v. Allman, 324 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).

When a greater sentence is imposed at a retrial by a jury, such a penalty will be valid in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Manns v. Allman, 324 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).

The fact that a state's law provides for a de novo trial on appeal does not prevent the prohibition of a longer sentence after appeal. Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972).

The question on appeal is whether the accused is guilty of the offense charged and for which he has been tried. In determining this issue the judgment of the trial justice is disregarded. Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941); Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662 , 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946); Baylor v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116 , 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949). These cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section. See also, Royals v. City of Hampton, 201 Va. 552 , 111 S.E.2d 795 (1960).

The question on the appeal is not whether the county court (now general district court) was in error, but whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. And that matter is determined by an entirely new trial. McClung v. Weatherholtz, 351 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Va. 1972).

And not whether the judgment of the justice is correct. - The question on appeal from a justice's decision is not whether his judgment is correct, and in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused the judgment is disregarded. Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941); Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662 , 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946). These cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

It is improper to inform the jury of the punishment given accused by the trial justice, since this section provides that the appeal must be tried de novo. Green v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 619 , 195 S.E. 520 (1938) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

It was improper for the prosecutor in argument to refer to the punishment requested in the lower court, but since there was no reference to the punishment actually imposed, the impropriety was not grounds for reversal, particularly since the jury was appropriately instructed. Mawyer v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 898 , 128 S.E.2d 433 (1962).

Arguments in general district court not binding. - The Commonwealth, on appeal from a conviction in general district court, is no more bound by the assertions of the prosecutor in the first trial than is the defendant bound by his counsel's actions therein. Ledbetter v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 805, 447 S.E.2d 250 (1994).

Amendment of judgment changing acquittal to conviction. - Courts cannot alter the language of the judgment of a police justice (now district court judge) so as to change an acquittal to a conviction, in order to secure a trial de novo. Peak v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 535 , 199 S.E. 473 (1938) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Evidence of statements or admissions. - There is nothing in the language of this section or § 16.1-132 which excludes evidence of statements or admissions made by an accused while testifying in the inferior court. Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695 , 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969).

No conviction of greater offense on appeal from conviction of lesser included offense. - One who was tried in a court not of record on a warrant charging him with driving under the influence of alcohol, and who was convicted of the lesser included offense of impaired driving, may not be tried and convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants on an appeal of his conviction to the corporation (now circuit) court. Buck v. City of Danville, 213 Va. 387 , 192 S.E.2d 758 (1972).

When a warrant charges an accused with an offense of several grades, and on his trial in a court not of record he is acquitted of the greater offense and convicted of the lesser included offense, on appeal from that conviction the defendant is not placed in the same position as to the offense of which he was acquitted as if no trial had been had. Buck v. City of Danville, 213 Va. 387 , 192 S.E.2d 758 (1972).

Although a circuit court had discretion under § 16.1-137 to amend a defective warrant, defendant's double jeopardy rights were violated when the circuit court, in an appeal de novo under § 16.1-136, improperly amended the warrant to charge driving under the influence (DUI) second offense under § 18.2-266 after defendant had been acquitted of that charge by a district court, which had then convicted defendant of a lesser offense of DUI first offense. Turner v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 381, 641 S.E.2d 771, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 78 (2007).

An appeal of a district court order revoking a suspended sentence must be heard de novo in the circuit court. Barnes v. City of Newport News, 9 Va. App. 466, 389 S.E.2d 481 (1990).

An appeal of a district court order suspending driver's license. - Because the appeal of a conviction from a general district court to circuit court results in a trial de novo, perfecting the appeal in the district court renders the judgment a nullity under § 16.1-136; if the judgment in the district court is void, there is no conviction and therefore no suspension of the license. The license is returned to the accused simply because the court has no authority to retain physical custody of it; the language of § 46.2-398 requiring the return of the license upon effecting an appeal would be unnecessary if this statute did not apply to appeals from the circuit court. Corbin v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 196, 604 S.E.2d 111, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 516 (2004).

Validity of district court's jurisdiction following appeal to circuit court. - Where defendant withdrew an appeal of a district court judgment more than 10 days after the date of the judgment, and a de novo hearing was not held, the judgment was stayed but remained valid; a circuit court's appellate order did not annul or abrogate the district court judgment. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 266 Va. 260 , 585 S.E.2d 552, 2003 Va. LEXIS 90 (2003), reversing 38 VA. App. 713, 568 S.E.2d 401 (2002).

III. APPEALS FROM JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISTRICT COURTS.

Transfer decision appeal. - The circuit court that hears an appeal of a juvenile court's transfer decision de novo pursuant to this section must, in the absence of any provision specifying a different procedure, follow the mandatory provisions that govern juvenile court transfer proceedings. Hairfield v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 649, 376 S.E.2d 796 (1989).

Review of juvenile court record in making determination on transfer issue. - The critical requirement is that the circuit court make an independent determination on the issue of transfer but it is permissible for the circuit court to review the transcripts and written records from the juvenile court. Grogg v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988).

Section only vehicle for appeal from juvenile court. - Although this chapter relates to "Jurisdiction and Procedure in Criminal Matters," this section remains the only vehicle for appeal from the juvenile court to the circuit court, having been reenacted as a part of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law of 1977. Walker v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 223 Va. 557 , 290 S.E.2d 887 (1982).

Distinction between appeal and divestiture of further jurisdiction in juvenile court. - Under the statutory scheme this distinction between an appeal under this section and a divestiture of further jurisdiction in the juvenile court by operation of subsection A of § 16.1-244 is intentional and consistent with and conducive to the best interests of children who are the subjects of custody disputes between their natural parents, the protection of parental rights, and, less significantly, with the notion of judicial economy. Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 364 S.E.2d 232 (1988).

In an appeal to the circuit court, the "advantage" granted to the noncustodial parent is simply the avoidance of the additional burden of proof imposed by the change in circumstance test; in the de novo appeal, the issue is simply what is in the best interests of the child. Accordingly, the procedural distinction between an appeal under this section and a divestiture of further jurisdiction in the juvenile court by operation of subsection A of § 16.1-244 is significant and perhaps controlling in most cases. Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 364 S.E.2d 232 (1988).

The procedural distinction between an appeal under this section and a divestiture of further jurisdiction in the juvenile court by operation of subsection A of § 16.1-244 relating to divorce proceedings is significant. An order adjudicating an appeal from the juvenile court to the circuit court is not entitled to the procedural convenience of transfer provided by § 20-79 . Rather, such order, together with related issues embraced by the appeal, rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court pending disposition by that court. Calfee v. Calfee, 29 Va. App. 88, 509 S.E.2d 552 (1999).

De novo review precludes issues concerning notice provided by JDR court. - Because the custody case was heard de novo in the trial court, the decision of the juvenile and domestic relations district court (JDR court) was annulled under § 16.1-136. Any issues concerning the notice provided by the JDR court were moot. Harris v. Burd,, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 393 (Aug. 22, 2006).

Impartial de novo standard of review not denied. - Trial court did not deny a mother an impartial de novo standard of review on appeal from an order of a juvenile and domestic relations district court because although the trial court reviewed the JDR court's opinion in issuing its pendente lite order, the trial court stated that it reached its own conclusions; from the trial court's letter opinion, and the fact that the pendente lite hearing lasted for two days, it was apparent that the mother was allowed to put on evidence, and in addition, the final hearing took place over two days, with one day devoted to custody issues. Huston v. Huston,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 407 (Oct. 19, 2010).

Circuit court retained jurisdiction of juvenile proceeding following disposition of appeal. - Where the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over an appeal de novo of a juvenile proceeding, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to hear a parole revocation proceeding concerning the juvenile upon her release from the department of juvenile justice. Austin v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 33, 590 S.E.2d 68, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 676 (2003), aff'd, 268 Va. 439 , 604 S.E.2d 430 (2004).

Admission of orders terminating parental rights. - Record belied a parent's assertion that the trial court did not afford the parent a trial de novo and shifted the burden of going forward with evidence to the parent as a result of its admission of orders terminating the parent's residual parental rights. To the contrary, the record showed that the trial court admitted the orders, but limited their use to show the procedural history of the case, not the substantive history. Chappell v. Alexandria Dep't of Human Servs.,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 267 (June 3, 2008).

Burden of proof. - A de novo hearing means a trial anew, with the burden of proof remaining upon the party with whom it rested in the juvenile court. Box v. Talley, 1 Va. App. 289, 338 S.E.2d 349 (1986).

Burden on appeal of termination order on social services department. - On appeal to circuit court brought by parents under this section from orders of the juvenile and domestic relations district court terminating their residual parental rights pursuant to § 16.1-283, the circuit court erred in placing the burden of proof on the parents rather than the department, as should have occurred in a trial de novo. Walker v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 223 Va. 557 , 290 S.E.2d 887 (1982).

Civil contempt of court did not alter nature of relief. - Where judgment was for arrearages in child support payments established by the terms of a previously-entered property settlement agreement, and where husband filed his notice of appeal with the circuit court but posted no appeal bond, upon the expiration of 30 days, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal; the fact that husband also was found in civil contempt of court, and a sanction was imposed, did not alter the fundamental nature of the relief sought by wife; the case was treated as a civil proceeding in the juvenile and domestic relations court and the appeal to the circuit court was, therefore, civil in nature. Scheer v. Isaacs, 10 Va. App. 338, 392 S.E.2d 201 (1990).

Absence of reference to appeal bond does not abrogate § 16.1-107 provisions. - The provisions of this section and following sections indeed make no provision for an appeal bond; however, the absence of any reference to an appeal bond in this section in no way abrogates the mandatory provisions of § 16.1-107, which requires a bond in an appeal of a civil case. Scheer v. Isaacs, 10 Va. App. 338, 392 S.E.2d 201 (1990).

Award of attorney fees. - Circuit court erred in awarding a father attorney fees in his child custody action because it denied the mother a de novo review on appeal and used the attorney fees award as a punitive measure to punish the mother for pursuing her right to a trial de novo; the circuit court's action imposed upon the mother the burden of proving that the juvenile and domestic relations court judge had decided the parties' custody dispute wrongly and/or had weighed the evidence incorrectly, and the circuit court abdicated its responsibility to independently weigh the evidence, make its own credibility determinations, and decide in the exercise of its sound discretion in which parent custody would be vested so as to serve the best interest of the child. Alexander v. Flowers, 51 Va. App. 404, 658 S.E.2d 355, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 139 (2008).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Jurisdiction. - When defendant failed to file a notice of a appeal of his driving under the influence conviction within 10 days, he was not entitled to a trial de novo as the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Copto-Lavalle, 58 Va. Cir. 148, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 29 (Fairfax County 2002).

Finding of not guilty of contempt and lack of arrearages was not appealable, and thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case; any finding by the juvenile and domestic relations court not holding a father in contempt was not appealable by either party since the district court found the father not in contempt because no arrearages existed and that distinct connection between the alleged arrears and contempt were litigated fully in the district court. Shipe v. Shipe,, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 194 (Culpeper Sept. 21, 2021).

Trial de novo. - When defendant exercised his statutory right to note an appeal, his conviction in the general district court was vacated and a de novo trial began anew in the circuit court; any alleged denial of due process in the general district court was cured with the de novo trial in the circuit court. Commonwealth v. Chastain,, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 111 (Fairfax County Apr. 5, 2021).

Nonsuit. - Nonsuit in de novo appeal from child support proceedings could be taken by the Division of Child Support Enforcement under subsection D of § 8.01-380 because although the appeal was heard de novo without formal pleadings under § 16.1-136, the father was not relieved of the duty to file an actual counterclaim. Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Abediyi v. Ferguson, 77 Va. Cir. 341, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 163 (Roanoke 2008).

Jury trial. - In an action where defendant was charged with a Class 4 misdemeanor, for an animal running at large, pursuant to Chesapeake City Code § 10-42, which offense was punishable by a maximum fine of $250, the court on appeals did not err by granting defendant's request for a jury trial, as such was provided for under § 16.1-136. Commonwealth v. Boone,, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 92 (Chesapeake Mar. 25, 2021).

§ 16.1-137. Procedure on appeal when warrant defective.

Upon the trial of the warrant on appeal the court may, upon its own motion or upon the request either of the attorney for the prosecution or for the accused, amend the form of the warrant in any respect in which it appears to be defective. But when the warrant is so defective in form that it does not substantially appear from the same what is the offense with which the accused is charged, or even when it is not so seriously defective, the judge of the court having examined on oath the original complainant, if there be one, or if he sees good reason to believe that an offense has been committed, then without examination of witnesses, may issue under his own hand his warrant reciting the offense and requiring the defendant in the original warrant to be arrested and brought before him. Upon the arrest of the defendant on the new warrant and his production or appearance in court the trial shall proceed upon the new warrant. When there is an amendment of the original warrant the trial shall proceed on the amended warrant. But whether the warrant is amended or a new warrant is issued, the court before proceeding to trial on the same may grant a continuance to the prosecution or to the defendant upon such terms as to costs as may be proper under the circumstances of the case; provided, however, that if the warrant be amended or if a new warrant be issued after any evidence has been heard, the accused shall be entitled to a continuance as a matter of right.

When a warrant is amended or a new warrant is issued the costs already accrued shall be taxed against the defendant, if he is ultimately convicted, as a part of the costs arising under the new or amended warrant.

(1956, c. 555; 1958, c. 399.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 380; 19 M.J. Warrants, §§ 2, 6.

CASE NOTES

Legislative intent. - This section was intended to provide broad powers and abundant opportunity to amend a defective warrant where justice so requires. Watkins v. Commonwealth, No. 0975-96-3, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 294 (Ct. of Appeals May 6, 1997).

Formal pleadings are dispensed with. - Formal pleadings are dispensed with on the trial of an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace (now district court judge) convicting one of an offense. Harding v. Commonwealth, 105 Va. 858 , 52 S.E. 832 (1906) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section). See § 16.1-136.

And a warrant does not require technical precision. - A warrant need not have the particularity or technical precision of pleading required in an indictment. Harding v. Commonwealth, 105 Va. 858 , 52 S.E. 832 (1906). See Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664 , 108 S.E. 648 (1921). These cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

But it must recite the offense charged. - While a warrant is not required to describe the offense with that particularity demanded of indictments, it must recite the offense charged. Commonwealth v. Doss, 159 Va. 968 , 167 S.E. 371 (1933); Smith v. Commonwealth, 160 Va. 943 , 169 S.E. 550 (1933). Both cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

It was error for the trial court to convict the defendant of a violation of a state statute upon a warrant which, at the time of conviction, charged a violation of a county ordinance. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 766 , 146 S.E.2d 197 (1966).

With sufficient clarity. - Where an appeal has been taken from the judgment of a justice of the peace (now district court judge) convicting one of an offense, the charge of the offense must be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the accused of the precise offense with which he is charged. Harding v. Commonwealth, 105 Va. 858 , 52 S.E. 832 (1906) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

A warrant charging the accused with the violation of § 36 of Michie's Virginia Code of 1930, by hunting during the closed season, was held fatally defective as legal notice to the accused of the offense with which he was charged. Smith v. Commonwealth, 160 Va. 943 , 169 S.E. 550 (1933) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

The court is given a free hand in conducting the trial on appeal, under this section and § 16.1-136, in such way as to guarantee every substantial right, on the one hand, and, on the other, to cut off frivolous and formal objections. Collins v. City of Radford, 134 Va. 518 , 113 S.E. 735 (1922) (decided under former statutes corresponding to this section and § 16.1-136).

It may amend warrants or issue new ones. - Under this section, on appeals from convictions before a mayor, justice of the peace or police justice (now district court judges), the appellate court has full power to amend the warrants in any particular, or to issue new warrants in lieu thereof. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 126 Va. 800 , 101 S.E. 357 (1919); Ossa v. Town of Appalachia, 137 Va. 795 , 119 S.E. 51 (1923); Commonwealth v. Doss, 159 Va. 968 , 167 S.E. 371 (1933); Smith v. Commonwealth, 160 Va. 943 , 169 S.E. 550 (1933). These cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

Under this section abundant opportunity is afforded to correct a warrant. Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664 , 108 S.E. 648 (1921) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Under this section there is ample power to correct formal objection to a warrant. Flint v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 820 , 76 S.E. 308 (1912) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Where the original warrant was sufficient to inform the accused of the charge against him, the court did not err in permitting amendments thereto instead of issuing a new warrant. McWilliams v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 725 , 181 S.E. 391 (1935) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Because a warrant provided defendant with notice of the nature and character of the offense with which defendant was charged, and because §§ 16.1-137 and 19.2-226 authorized the trial court to amend the warrant to delete reference to a city code, which was mere surplusage, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and found defendant guilty of a second offense of driving under the influence under § 18.2-266 . Dennis v. Commonwealth,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 530 (Dec. 9, 2008).

The court may change a warrant to cover another offense. - Under the broad powers conferred by this section, the court of its own motion may direct the attorney for the Commonwealth to change a warrant from an attempt to commit larceny of oats to an attempt to obtain money by false pretenses. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 844 , 69 S.E. 518 (1910), distinguished in, Eddy v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 873 , 89 S.E. 899 (1916). These cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

Where the real subject of prosecution was the violation of a local law against catching fish with nets, and the warrant charged defendant with a violation of the fish laws of the State, the defect could have been corrected by amendment under this section. Burks v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 763 , 101 S.E. 230 (1919) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

And it may be duty bound to do so. - When it was brought to the attention of the trial court by accused that the appeal warrant charged him with an offense against the State, whereas he had been tried before the police justice for an offense against a city ordinance, it became the duty of the trial court, under this section, to amend the warrant so as to conform it to the facts so brought to its attention. Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Instead of remanding case to trial justice. - See Read v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 618 (1873); Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846 , 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941). Both cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

The court was bound to take the warrant as it read when the evidence was concluded and the defendant's motion to strike was made. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 766 , 146 S.E.2d 197 (1966).

Substitution of warrant pending appeal may be error. - Where a prisoner convicted by a police justice of the violation of a city ordinance against houses of ill fame appeals to the corporation court, neither the attorney for the Commonwealth nor the police justice can, pending the appeal, change the warrant so as to charge an offense under former § 18.1-196 (now § 18.2-347 ). There having been no conviction of any offense under the statute, the provisions of this section as to amendments and changes of the warrant have no application, and until such conviction, the corporation court has no jurisdiction, with or without the consent of the accused, to hear and determine a charge of misdemeanor under former § 18.1-196 (now § 18.2-347 ). Eddy v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 873 , 89 S.E. 899 (1916). Both cases were decided under former statute corresponding to this section.

The court may try a case on a new warrant. - Under the broad terms of this section if there is any substantial reason to suppose that the accused does not know from the warrant what he is charged with, the court may discard the original warrant and proceed to trial on a new warrant for the offense. Collins v. City of Radford, 134 Va. 518 , 113 S.E. 735 (1922) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Or on a warrant issued before commission of offense. - In a prosecution for the unlawful sale of ardent spirits, it was held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the fact that the warrant was issued, though not served, before the sale for which he was tried, since, under the broad powers given by this section, the court could have issued a warrant in the exact words of the warrant on which the defendant was tried. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 785 , 87 S.E. 553 (1916) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

The circuit court is the proper forum to try cases when it issues a new warrant. Ledbetter v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 805, 447 S.E.2d 250 (1994).

Failure to allege venue not ground for reversal. - Where the accused could have been tried without a warrant in the first instance under former § 16.1-129.1, and as abundant opportunity is afforded under this section to correct the warrant where one has been issued, and as in either event the appeal is to be tried "without formal pleadings in writing" ( § 16.1-136), the Supreme Court ought not to reverse the judgment of the trial court simply because the warrant failed to allege the venue of the offense. Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664 , 108 S.E. 648 (1921) (decided under former statutes corresponding to this section, former § 16.1-129.1 and § 16.1-136).

Where no objection to the warrant is made in the trial court, and no motion is made to correct it under the comprehensive provisions of this section, the Supreme Court will not reverse the judgment of the trial court for formal imperfections of the warrant unless the ends of justice require it. Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664 , 108 S.E. 648 (1921) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

Where no objection was made in the trial court to the sufficiency of a warrant in a prosecution for disorderly conduct, and no demurrer thereto was interposed, defendant cannot object for the first time in the Supreme Court that the warrant did not specify the acts of disorderly conduct complained of. Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664 , 108 S.E. 648 (1921) (decided under former statute corresponding to this section).

On appeal from the judgment of a civil and police justice (now district court judge) to the corporation court (now circuit court) in a criminal case, a general motion to quash the warrant on appeal, which points out no specific objections, cannot under the terms of this section and § 16.1-136, avail after verdict as against any defect in form unless it appears from the record of the trial that the accused was or could have been prejudiced thereby. Collins v. City of Radford, 134 Va. 518 , 113 S.E. 735 (1922) (decided under former statutes corresponding to this section and § 16.1-136).

Amendment of warrant and conviction constituted double jeopardy. - Although a circuit court had discretion under § 16.1-137 to amend a defective warrant, defendant's double jeopardy rights were violated when the circuit court, in an appeal de novo under § 16.1-136, improperly amended the warrant to charge driving under the influence (DUI) second offense under § 18.2-266 after defendant had been acquitted of that charge by a district court, which had then convicted defendant of a lesser offense of DUI first offense. Turner v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 381, 641 S.E.2d 771, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 78 (2007).

On appeal, court properly granted motion to amend summons. - Where both an arrest warrant and a summons charged defendant with violating a city ordinance and § 18.2-266 , each of which is a misdemeanor, and the defendant was convicted on the summons and appealed, and on appeal, the circuit court granted the Commonwealth's motion to amend the summons to delete the reference to the city ordinance, this action was proper, as the amendment did not change the nature or character of the offense charged. Hill v. Commonwealth, No. 1240-91-4 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 2, 1993).

Defective warrant held not prejudicial. - For a case where a defective warrant was held not to be prejudicial, see Laing v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 682 , 127 S.E.2d 142 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962, 83 S. Ct. 542, 9 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1963).

Amendment did not render warrant defective. - Arrest warrant issued was not defective as a result of having been amended sometime prior to a trial de novo in the lower appellate court, where the dates of the offense were amended, as the same particularity was not required in warrants of arrest as was required in formal indictments; pursuant to §§ 16.1-129.2 and 16.1-137, as long as the warrant was not so defective as to fail to notify the defendant of the nature and character of the offense charged, both district courts and circuit courts had the power to amend a warrant in any respect in which the warrant appeared to be defective, on the courts' own motion and without the consent of the parties. Raja v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 710, 581 S.E.2d 237, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 318 (2003).

Even though the trial court allowed the indictment to be amended, the indictment was not rendered defective by the amendment. The trial court merely allowed the indictment to be changed from reading that defendant robbed the store to defendant robbed the store clerk, but at all times, defendant was aware of the nature of the conduct forming the robbery charge against defendant. Thomas v. Commonwealth, No. 1206-06-2, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 605 (Dec. 20, 2006).

§ 16.1-138.

Repealed by Acts 1983, c. 499.

Cross references. - As to retention and disposition of district court records, see § 16.1-69.53 et seq.

Chapter 8. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts.

§§ 16.1-139 through 16.1-217.

Repealed by Acts 1977, c. 559.

Cross references. - For new sections covering the same subject matter as the repealed sections, see §§ 16.1-226 through 16.1-334.

§§ 16.1-217.1 through 16.1-217.4.

Repealed by Acts 1975, c. 341.

Cross references. - For present provisions as to child abuse and neglect, see § 63.2-1500 et seq.

Chapter 9. Judicial Conference of Virginia for District Courts.

Sec.

§ 16.1-218. Established; active and honorary members.

There is hereby established a Judicial Conference of Virginia for District Courts whose active members shall be the judge of every general district court and juvenile and domestic relations district court of the Commonwealth. The Attorney General of Virginia, the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee who shall be a member of the committee, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or his designees who shall be a member of the committee, the president and secretary of the Virginia State Bar, the president and secretary of the Virginia Bar Association, the president and secretary of the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, the president and secretary of the Old Dominion Bar Association, the president and secretary of the Virginia Association of Commonwealth's Attorneys, the president and secretary of the Virginia Women Attorneys Association, the president and secretary of the Virginia College of Criminal Defense Attorneys, and the president and secretary of the Virginia Association of Defense Attorneys shall be honorary members of the Conference without voting privilege.

(1962, c. 622; 1970, c. 559; 1972, c. 518; 1975, c. 334; 1980, c. 447; 1981, c. 231; 1989, c. 597; 1990, c. 249; 2001, c. 229; 2008, c. 115.)

Cross references. - As to the Judicial Conference of Virginia for courts of record, see § 17.1-706 .

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee who shall be a member of the committee, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or his designees who shall be a member of the committee" for "the chairmen of the Courts of Justice Committees of the Senate and House of Delegates or their designees who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees." March 10, 2021.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 229 inserted "the president and secretary of the Virginia College of Criminal Defense Attorneys" in the second sentence.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 115 inserted "or their designees who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees" near the beginning of the second sentence.

§ 16.1-219. President; election of executive committee; assistance by Executive Secretary of Supreme Court.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be president of the Conference. The Conference shall elect from the judges of courts not of record seven judges who shall act as an executive committee. The Chief Justice shall be chairman of the executive committee, but he may designate the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court to preside at meetings of the executive committee and the Conference and may assign him administrative duties relating to the committee and Conference.

(1962, c. 622; 1970, c. 559.)

§ 16.1-220. Meetings; active members must give notice of inability to attend; special session concerning motor vehicle and traffic laws.

The Conference shall meet at least once in each calendar year at the call of the president and at such other times as may be designated by him or by the executive committee for the purpose of discussing and considering means and methods of improving the administration of justice in this Commonwealth. If any active member shall for any cause be unable to attend, he shall promptly notify the president. Unless excused from attendance, it shall be the duty of each active member to attend and remain throughout the proceedings of the Conference.

In conjunction with said meetings and as a part thereof, the Conference shall conduct a session at least once each year devoted to the consideration of and instruction on the Commonwealth's motor vehicle and traffic laws and their proper administration. Unless excused from attendance, it shall be the duty of each active member whose jurisdiction includes cases involving violations of such laws to attend this session. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall be responsible for preparing the program for this session, and the office of the Attorney General, Department of State Police and Department of Motor Vehicles shall cooperate with him in preparing for this session.

(1962, c. 622; 1968, c. 496; 1970, c. 559.)

§ 16.1-221. Members to receive actual expenses.

The active members and honorary members shall receive their actual expenses while in attendance at the meetings of the Conference, and of the executive committee.

(1962, c. 622; 1964, c. 9.)

Chapter 10. Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System.

Sec.

§ 16.1-222. Established; powers of Director.

  1. There is hereby established within the Department of Juvenile Justice the Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System which shall operate separate and apart from the Central Criminal Records Exchange.
  2. The Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice is authorized to employ such personnel, establish such offices, acquire such equipment and use such available equipment as shall be necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter. He is further authorized to enter into agreements with other state agencies for services to be performed for the Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System by employees of such other agencies.

    (1976, c. 589; 1989, c. 733.)

Cross references. - As to personal information systems which are exempt from the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, see § 2.2-3802 .

Law review. - For article, "The Revision of Virginia's Juvenile Court Law," see 13 U. Rich. L. Rev. 847 (1979).

For a book review, "Random Violence and the Transformation of the Juvenile Justice Debate," see 86 Va. L. Rev. 1095 (2000).

§ 16.1-223. Receipt, etc., of data; forms for reports; confidentiality.

  1. The Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System shall receive, classify and file data reported to it pursuant to § 16.1-224. The Director is authorized to prepare and furnish to all court service personnel automated data processing equipment, which shall be used for making the data submissions.
  2. Data stored in the Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System shall be confidential, and information from such data that may be used to identify a juvenile may be released only in accordance with § 16.1-300.

    The data submissions may be made available to the Central Criminal Records Exchange or any other automated data processing system, unless the data is identifiable with a particular juvenile. The State Board of Juvenile Justice shall promulgate regulations governing the security and confidentiality of the data submission.

    (1976, c. 589; 1978, c. 684; 1988, c. 541; 2001, cc. 203, 215.)

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendments by cc. 203 and 215 are identical, and in subsection A, deleted "required to be" following "file data," and substituted "pursuant to" for "by"; in subsection B, in the first paragraph, inserted "and information from such data that may be used to identify a juvenile may be released only in accordance with § 16.1-300," and deleted the former second sentence, which formerly read: "The information from such data which may be used to identify a juvenile shall be released only to the judge, prosecuting attorney and probation officers assigned to serve a court having the child currently before it in any proceeding in accordance with standards adopted by the Department of Juvenile Justice," and substituted "State Board" for "Department" in the last paragraph.

§ 16.1-224. Data submissions by court service units.

  1. All court service units serving juvenile and domestic relations district courts shall make data submissions to the Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System of any persons referred to an intake officer of a court service unit pursuant to § 16.1-260, except that no data submission shall be required for a juvenile charged with a traffic infraction as defined in § 46.2-100 .
  2. In the case of a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent and who is referred to a court service unit pursuant to § 16.1-260, the data submissions required by subsection A of this section shall contain the name, date of birth and, if any, the social security number of the juvenile before the court. The data submissions concerning all other children coming before a juvenile and domestic relations district court, except those charged with traffic infractions, may in accordance with standards adopted by the Department of Juvenile Justice, contain information identifying the child.
  3. The court service unit shall make a data submission to the Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System of the final disposition of each case reported to the System. When the court service unit reports a disposition of a case which is other than a finding of guilty, the name and other personal identification of the juvenile shall be deleted from the data submissions required by subsection B of this section and from the report of final disposition required by this subsection.

    (1976, c. 589; 1978, c. 684; 1988, c. 541.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

§ 16.1-225. Penalty for violation of confidentiality of records.

Any person who knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of this chapter which require confidentiality of such records shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.

(1976, c. 589; 1977, c. 360; 1988, c. 541.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 2 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Chapter 11. Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts.

General Provisions.

Organization and Personnel.

Jurisdiction and Venue.

Immediate Custody, Arrest, Detention and Shelter Care.

Intake, Petition and Notice.

Appointment of Counsel.

Transfer and Waiver.

Adjudication.

Disposition.

Probation and Parole.

Appeal.

Confidentiality and Expungement.

Virginia Juvenile Community Crime Control Act.

Facilities for Detention and Other Residential Care.

Funding of Local Juvenile Facilities,

Programs and Certain Court

Service Units.

Private Operation of Juvenile Detention Facilities.

Interstate Compact Relating to Juveniles.

Serious or Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program.

Emancipation of Minors.

Psychiatric Treatment of Minors Act.

Standby Guardianship.

Juvenile Competency.

Article 1. General Provisions.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, §§ 81, 84.

§ 16.1-226. Short title.

The short title of the statutes embraced in this chapter is "Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law."

(Code 1950, § 16.1-139; 1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1977, c. 559.)

Cross references. - As to constitutional authority to establish and regulate jurisdiction of inferior courts, see Va. Const., Art. IV, § 14.

As to the definitions used in the chapter regarding the Department of Criminal Justice Services, see § 9.1-101 .

As to duty of the Commissioner of Social Services to encourage and direct training of personnel of local boards and departments engaged in administering programs within the purview of § 16.1-226 et seq., see § 63.2-204 .

As to initiation by the Commissioner of Social Services of collection procedures upon an administrative support order, pursuant to § 16.1-226 et seq., see § 63.2-1916 .

As to the Uniform Collaborative Law Act, see Chapter 11 ( § 20-168 et seq.) of Title 20.

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Many of the cases cited in the notes under the various sections of this chapter were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 8 of this title.

Law review. - For note entitled, "The Dilemma of the 'Uniquely Juvenile' Offender," see 14 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 386 (1972). For survey of Virginia law on domestic relations for the year 1976-1977, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1418 (1977). For article, "The Revision of Virginia's Juvenile Court Law," see 13 U. Rich. L. Rev. 847 (1979). For article, "The Rights of Adolescents," see 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 363 (1982).

For a book review, "Random Violence and the Transformation of the Juvenile Justice Debate," see 86 Va. L. Rev. 1095 (2000).

For annual survey article on legal issues involving children, see 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 161 (2003).

For 2003/2004 survey of family and juvenile law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2004).

CASE NOTES

The jurisdiction, practice, and procedure of the juvenile and domestic relations district courts are entirely statutory, and are set forth in this chapter. Walker v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 223 Va. 557 , 290 S.E.2d 887 (1982).

Strict compliance with substantive statutes required. - Taken as a whole, the Virginia cases compel strict compliance with the requirements of the juvenile statutes that are not merely procedural. Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S. Ct. 1282, 59 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1979).

But failure to comply with any statute may not be jurisdictional defect. - Virginia cases do not indicate that the failure to comply with any juvenile statute is a jurisdictional defect and establish no per se rule to that effect. Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S. Ct. 1282, 59 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1979).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Cases arising within boundaries of United States Naval Weapons Station. - Virginia courts have jurisdiction to issue and enforce orders pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 and Title 63.2 for child-protective services cases arising within the boundaries of the United States Naval Weapons Station. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James E. Barnett, County Attorney for York County, 03-034 (3/3/04).

A local department of social services is obligated to provide child welfare services within the Naval Weapons Station, including removal and protective orders, and to apply current abuse and neglect statutes. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James E. Barnett, County Attorney for York County, 03-034 (3/3/04).

Local courts may order social workers to enter the Naval Weapons Station to perform home studies and conduct investigations regarding allegations of abuse, neglect, or delinquency. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James E. Barnett, County Attorney for York County, 03-034 (3/3/04).

Release of information to local commissioner of revenue. - This section does not prohibit a landlord or managing agent of an apartment complex from releasing to the local commissioner of the revenue a tenant list and vehicle information. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Geraldine M. Whiting, Commissioner of the Revenue for Arlington County, 03-022 (10/8/03).

§ 16.1-227. Purpose and intent.

This law shall be construed liberally and as remedial in character, and the powers hereby conferred are intended to be general to effect the beneficial purposes herein set forth. It is the intention of this law that in all proceedings the welfare of the child and the family, the safety of the community and the protection of the rights of victims are the paramount concerns of the Commonwealth and to the end that these purposes may be attained, the judge shall possess all necessary and incidental powers and authority, whether legal or equitable in their nature.

This law shall be interpreted and construed so as to effectuate the following purposes:

  1. To divert from or within the juvenile justice system, to the extent possible, consistent with the protection of the public safety, those children who can be cared for or treated through alternative programs;
  2. To provide judicial procedures through which the provisions of this law are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other rights are recognized and enforced;
  3. To separate a child from such child's parents, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis only when the child's welfare is endangered or it is in the interest of public safety and then only after consideration of alternatives to out-of-home placement which afford effective protection to the child, his family, and the community; and
  4. To protect the community against those acts of its citizens, both juveniles and adults, which are harmful to others and to reduce the incidence of delinquent behavior and to hold offenders accountable for their behavior.

    (Code 1950, § 16.1-140; 1956, c. 555; 1977, c. 559; 1990, c. 554; 1991, c. 392; 1996, cc. 755, 914.)

The 1996 amendments. - The 1996 amendments by cc. 755 and 914 are identical, and in the introductory paragraph, substituted "and the family, the safety of the community and the protection of the rights of victims are" for "the family is" substituted "concerns" for "concern," and substituted "these purposes" for "humane purposes," and in subdivision 4, inserted "both juveniles and adults" following "acts of its citizens" and inserted "and to hold offenders accountable for their behavior" following "the incidence of delinquent behavior."

Law review. - For survey of Virginia domestic relations law for the year 1977-1978, see 64 Va. L. Rev. 1439 (1978). For comment on termination of parental rights, see 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 213 (1980). For survey of Virginia law on criminal procedure for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 261 (1980).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, § 82.

CASE NOTES

The primary function of the juvenile courts properly considered is not conviction or punishment for crime; but crime prevention and juvenile rehabilitation. Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833 , 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957).

Strict compliance with substantive statutes required. - Taken as a whole, the Virginia cases compel strict compliance with the requirements of the juvenile statutes that are not merely procedural. Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S. Ct. 1282, 59 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1979).

But failure to comply with any statute may not be jurisdictional defect. - Virginia cases do not indicate that the failure to comply with any juvenile statute is a jurisdictional defect and establish no per se rule to that effect. Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S. Ct. 1282, 59 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1979).

Impeachment with prior juvenile adjudications. - A prosecutor may not impeach the defendant with evidence of prior juvenile adjudications, and the attempt to so cross-examine defendant was not harmless error. Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 395 S.E.2d 211 (1990).

Authority to issue interlocutory order. - Trial court properly affirmed juvenile and domestic relations court's order which held the juvenile in contempt for failing to attend school, as § 16.1-227 provided the court with authority to issue the interlocutory order. B.P. v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 735, 568 S.E.2d 412, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 498 (2002).

Best interests of child. - Mother and father's apparent stipulation to the correctness of the juvenile and domestic relations court's adjudicatory order making a nonspecific finding that their child was abused was not binding on the trial court to the extent that agreement conflicted with the trial court's duty to determine what disposition would serve the best interest of the child. Thus, the trial court needed to hear evidence and make findings about who was inflicting the abuse, and what type of abuse was being inflicted, since § 16.1-227 expressed the intent of the legislature that the welfare of the child and the family were the paramount concerns of the Commonwealth. Anonymous B v. Anonymous C, 51 Va. App. 657, 660 S.E.2d 307, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 201 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying a mother's request for a nonsuit under § 8.01-380 because the evidence supported a finding that it was in the best interests of her child for the trial court to transfer the right to advocate for the protective order to the father and the guardian ad litem, and since the mother was a respondent to the preliminary protective order, her right to nonsuit the case against her was subordinate to the welfare of the child; in cases where allegations of child sexual abuse have been presented to the trial court and a preliminary protective order has been issued pursuant to those allegations, an alleged abuser's "right" to nonsuit must be subordinate to the welfare of the child, and the right to advocate a protective order on behalf of the child can be transferred to a party of interest. Anonymous C v. Anonymous B, No. 2232-09-2, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 14 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 11, 2011).

Applied in Ballard v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 213 , 321 S.E.2d 284 (1984); Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 394 S.E.2d 492 (1990); Tross v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 362, 464 S.E.2d 523 (1995).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Equitable powers of juvenile court. - Juvenile court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over the petition the city social services agency filed that alleged the minor child was a child in need of services and that continued placement in the home would be contrary to the minor child's welfare; evidence showing that the mother had previously abused the minor child's brother was sufficient to invoke the juvenile court's equitable jurisdiction even though the evidence did not show that the minor child had been abused, as the juvenile court was authorized to prevent the minor child's placement with a known abuser and did not have to wait for the minor child herself to be abused. Norfolk Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Petermore, 63 Va. Cir. 315, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 351 (Norfolk 2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Contempt proceedings. - A juvenile and domestic relations (JDR) court may enforce, through indirect contempt proceedings, a provision of an emergency protective order (EPO) granting the petitioner the possession of a companion animal when a magistrate has issued the EPO. The contempt proceedings may be initiated by a JDR court through the issuance of a show cause summons. A JDR court has discretion in imposing punishment for a violation of a companion animal provision in an EPO, but the punishment may not exceed a jail sentence in excess of six months or a fine in excess of $500 without affording the defendant the right to trial by jury. See opinion of Attorney General to Honorable Anita D. Filson, Chief Judge, Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the 25th Judicial District, No. 14-033, 2014 Va. AG LEXIS 62 (11/21/14).

Transportation of juveniles. - Statute authorizes the chief judge of a juvenile and domestic relations district court to order that local law-enforcement personnel shall be responsible for transporting violent and disruptive juveniles to court-ordered out-of-state destinations; when a local law-enforcement officer is transporting a prisoner in another state, he has only such law-enforcement authority over the prisoner as may be provided by the laws of that state. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable C.T. Woody, Jr., Sheriff, City of Richmond, No. 16-037, 2017 Va. AG LEXIS 12 (4/6/17).

§ 16.1-228. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires a different meaning:

"Abused or neglected child" means any child:

  1. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care creates or inflicts, threatens to create or inflict, or allows to be created or inflicted upon such child a physical or mental injury by other than accidental means, or creates a substantial risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental functions, including, but not limited to, a child who is with his parent or other person responsible for his care either (i) during the manufacture or attempted manufacture of a Schedule I or II controlled substance, or (ii) during the unlawful sale of such substance by that child's parents or other person responsible for his care, where such manufacture, or attempted manufacture or unlawful sale would constitute a felony violation of § 18.2-248 ;
  2. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care neglects or refuses to provide care necessary for his health; however, no child who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination shall for that reason alone be considered to be an abused or neglected child. Further, a decision by parents who have legal authority for the child or, in the absence of parents with legal authority for the child, any person with legal authority for the child who refuses a particular medical treatment for a child with a life-threatening condition shall not be deemed a refusal to provide necessary care if (i) such decision is made jointly by the parents or other person with legal authority and the child; (ii) the child has reached 14 years of age and is sufficiently mature to have an informed opinion on the subject of his medical treatment; (iii) the parents or other person with legal authority and the child have considered alternative treatment options; and (iv) the parents or other person with legal authority and the child believe in good faith that such decision is in the child's best interest. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to limit the provisions of § 16.1-278.4;
  3. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care abandons such child;
  4. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care commits or allows to be committed any act of sexual exploitation or any sexual act upon a child in violation of the law;
  5. Who is without parental care or guardianship caused by the unreasonable absence or the mental or physical incapacity of the child's parent, guardian, legal custodian, or other person standing in loco parentis;
  6. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care creates a substantial risk of physical or mental injury by knowingly leaving the child alone in the same dwelling, including an apartment as defined in § 55.1-2000 , with a person to whom the child is not related by blood or marriage and who the parent or other person responsible for his care knows has been convicted of an offense against a minor for which registration is required as a Tier III offender pursuant to § 9.1-902 ; or
  7. Who has been identified as a victim of sex trafficking or severe forms of trafficking as defined in the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7102 et seq., and in the federal Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. If a civil proceeding under this chapter is based solely on the parent having left the child at a hospital or emergency medical services agency, it shall be an affirmative defense that such parent safely delivered the child to a hospital that provides 24-hour emergency services or to an attended emergency medical services agency that employs emergency medical services personnel, within 14 days of the child's birth. For purposes of terminating parental rights pursuant to § 16.1-283 and placement for adoption, the court may find such a child is a neglected child upon the ground of abandonment. "Adoptive home" means the place of residence of any natural person in which a child resides as a member of the household and in which he has been placed for the purposes of adoption or in which he has been legally adopted by another member of the household. "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or older. "Ancillary crime" or "ancillary charge" means any delinquent act committed by a juvenile as a part of the same act or transaction as, or that constitutes a part of a common scheme or plan with, a delinquent act that would be a felony if committed by an adult. "Boot camp" means a short-term secure or nonsecure juvenile residential facility with highly structured components including, but not limited to, military style drill and ceremony, physical labor, education and rigid discipline, and no less than six months of intensive aftercare. "Child," "juvenile," or "minor" means a person who is (i) younger than 18 years of age or (ii) for purposes of the Fostering Futures program set forth in Article 2 (§ 63.2-917 et seq.) of Chapter 9 of Title 63.2, younger than 21 years of age and meets the eligibility criteria set forth in § 63.2-919 . "Child in need of services" means (i) a child whose behavior, conduct or condition presents or results in a serious threat to the well-being and physical safety of the child or (ii) a child under the age of 14 whose behavior, conduct or condition presents or results in a serious threat to the well-being and physical safety of another person; however, no child who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination shall for that reason alone be considered to be a child in need of services, nor shall any child who habitually remains away from or habitually deserts or abandons his family as a result of what the court or the local child protective services unit determines to be incidents of physical, emotional or sexual abuse in the home be considered a child in need of services for that reason alone. However, to find that a child falls within these provisions, (i) the conduct complained of must present a clear and substantial danger to the child's life or health or to the life or health of another person, (ii) the child or his family is in need of treatment, rehabilitation or services not presently being received, and (iii) the intervention of the court is essential to provide the treatment, rehabilitation or services needed by the child or his family. "Child in need of supervision" means: 1. A child who, while subject to compulsory school attendance, is habitually and without justification absent from school, and (i) the child has been offered an adequate opportunity to receive the benefit of any and all educational services and programs that are required to be provided by law and which meet the child's particular educational needs, (ii) the school system from which the child is absent or other appropriate agency has made a reasonable effort to effect the child's regular attendance without success, and (iii) the school system has provided documentation that it has complied with the provisions of § 22.1-258; or 2. A child who, without reasonable cause and without the consent of his parent, lawful custodian or placement authority, remains away from or deserts or abandons his family or lawful custodian on more than one occasion or escapes or remains away without proper authority from a residential care facility in which he has been placed by the court, and (i) such conduct presents a clear and substantial danger to the child's life or health, (ii) the child or his family is in need of treatment, rehabilitation or services not presently being received, and (iii) the intervention of the court is essential to provide the treatment, rehabilitation or services needed by the child or his family. "Child welfare agency" means a child-placing agency, child-caring institution or independent foster home as defined in § 63.2-100 . "The court" or the "juvenile court" or the "juvenile and domestic relations court" means the juvenile and domestic relations district court of each county or city. "Delinquent act" means (i) an act designated a crime under the law of the Commonwealth, or an ordinance of any city, county, town, or service district, or under federal law, (ii) a violation of § 18.2-308.7 , or (iii) a violation of a court order as provided for in § 16.1-292, but does not include an act other than a violation of § 18.2-308.7 , which is otherwise lawful, but is designated a crime only if committed by a child. "Delinquent child" means a child who has committed a delinquent act or an adult who has committed a delinquent act prior to his 18th birthday, except where the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has been terminated under the provisions of § 16.1-269.6. "Department" means the Department of Juvenile Justice and "Director" means the administrative head in charge thereof or such of his assistants and subordinates as are designated by him to discharge the duties imposed upon him under this law. "Driver's license" means any document issued under Chapter 3 (§ 46.2-300 et seq.) of Title 46.2, or the comparable law of another jurisdiction, authorizing the operation of a motor vehicle upon the highways. "Family abuse" means any act involving violence, force, or threat that results in bodily injury or places one in reasonable apprehension of death, sexual assault, or bodily injury and that is committed by a person against such person's family or household member. Such act includes, but is not limited to, any forceful detention, stalking, criminal sexual assault in violation of Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2, or any criminal offense that results in bodily injury or places one in reasonable apprehension of death, sexual assault, or bodily injury. "Family or household member" means (i) the person's spouse, whether or not he or she resides in the same home with the person, (ii) the person's former spouse, whether or not he or she resides in the same home with the person, (iii) the person's parents, stepparents, children, stepchildren, brothers, sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters, grandparents and grandchildren, regardless of whether such persons reside in the same home with the person, (iv) the person's mother-in-law, father-in-law, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law who reside in the same home with the person, (v) any individual who has a child in common with the person, whether or not the person and that individual have been married or have resided together at any time, or (vi) any individual who cohabits or who, within the previous 12 months, cohabited with the person, and any children of either of them then residing in the same home with the person. "Fictive kin" means persons who are not related to a child by blood or adoption but have an established relationship with the child or his family. "Foster care services" means the provision of a full range of casework, treatment and community services for a planned period of time to a child who is abused or neglected as defined in § 63.2-100 or in need of services as defined in this section and his family when the child (i) has been identified as needing services to prevent or eliminate the need for foster care placement, (ii) has been placed through an agreement between the local board of social services or a public agency designated by the community policy and management team and the parents or guardians where legal custody remains with the parents or guardians, (iii) has been committed or entrusted to a local board of social services or child welfare agency, (iv) has been placed under the supervisory responsibility of the local board pursuant to § 16.1-293, or (v) is living with a relative participating in the Federal-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program set forth in § 63.2-1305 and developed consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 673 or the State-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program set forth in § 63.2-1306 . "Independent living arrangement" means placement of (i) a child at least 16 years of age who is in the custody of a local board or licensed child-placing agency by the local board or licensed child-placing agency or (ii) a child at least 16 years of age or a person between the ages of 18 and 21 who was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice immediately prior to placement by the Department of Juvenile Justice, in a living arrangement in which such child or person does not have daily substitute parental supervision. "Independent living services" means services and activities provided to a child in foster care 14 years of age or older and who has been committed or entrusted to a local board of social services, child welfare agency, or private child-placing agency. "Independent living services" may also mean services and activities provided to a person who (i) was in foster care on his 18th birthday and has not yet reached the age of 21 years; (ii) is between the ages of 18 and 21 and who, immediately prior to his commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, was in the custody of a local board of social services; or (iii) is a child at least 16 years of age or a person between the ages of 18 and 21 who was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice immediately prior to placement in an independent living arrangement. "Independent living services" includes counseling, education, housing, employment, and money management skills development and access to essential documents and other appropriate services to help children or persons prepare for self-sufficiency. "Intake officer" means a juvenile probation officer appointed as such pursuant to the authority of this chapter. "Jail" or "other facility designed for the detention of adults" means a local or regional correctional facility as defined in § 53.1-1 , except those facilities utilized on a temporary basis as a court holding cell for a child incident to a court hearing or as a temporary lock-up room or ward incident to the transfer of a child to a juvenile facility. "The judge" means the judge or the substitute judge of the juvenile and domestic relations district court of each county or city. "This law" or "the law" means the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law embraced in this chapter. "Legal custody" means (i) a legal status created by court order which vests in a custodian the right to have physical custody of the child, to determine and redetermine where and with whom he shall live, the right and duty to protect, train and discipline him and to provide him with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights and responsibilities or (ii) the legal status created by court order of joint custody as defined in § 20-107.2 . "Permanent foster care placement" means the place of residence in which a child resides and in which he has been placed pursuant to the provisions of §§ 63.2-900 and 63.2-908 with the expectation and agreement between the placing agency and the place of permanent foster care that the child shall remain in the placement until he reaches the age of majority unless modified by court order or unless removed pursuant to § 16.1-251 or 63.2-1517 . A permanent foster care placement may be a place of residence of any natural person or persons deemed appropriate to meet a child's needs on a long-term basis. "Qualified individual" means a trained professional or licensed clinician who is not an employee of the local board of social services or licensed child-placing agency that placed the child in a qualified residential treatment program and is not affiliated with any placement setting in which children are placed by such local board of social services or licensed child-placing agency. "Qualified residential treatment program" means a program that (i) provides 24-hour residential placement services for children in foster care; (ii) has adopted a trauma-informed treatment model that meets the clinical and other needs of children with serious emotional or behavioral disorders, including any clinical or other needs identified through assessments conducted pursuant to clause (viii) of this definition; (iii) employs registered or licensed nursing and other clinical staff who provide care, on site and within the scope of their practice, and are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; (iv) conducts outreach with the child's family members, including efforts to maintain connections between the child and his siblings and other family; documents and maintains records of such outreach efforts; and maintains contact information for any known biological family and fictive kin of the child; (v) whenever appropriate and in the best interest of the child, facilitates participation by family members in the child's treatment program before and after discharge and documents the manner in which such participation is facilitated; (vi) provides discharge planning and family-based aftercare support for at least six months after discharge; (vii) is licensed in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) and accredited by an organization approved by the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services; and (viii) requires that any child placed in the program receive an assessment within 30 days of such placement by a qualified individual that (a) assesses the strengths and needs of the child using an age-appropriate, evidence-based, validated, and functional assessment tool approved by the Commissioner of Social Services; (b) identifies whether the needs of the child can be met through placement with a family member or in a foster home or, if not, in a placement setting authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 672(k)(2), including a qualified residential treatment program, that would provide the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment and be consistent with the short-term and long-term goals established for the child in his foster care or permanency plan; (c) establishes a list of short-term and long-term mental and behavioral health goals for the child; and (d) is documented in a written report to be filed with the court prior to any hearing on the child's placement pursuant to § 16.1-281, 16.1-282, 16.1-282.1, or 16.1-282.2. "Residual parental rights and responsibilities" means all rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after the transfer of legal custody or guardianship of the person, including but not limited to the right of visitation, consent to adoption, the right to determine religious affiliation and the responsibility for support. "Secure facility" or "detention home" means a local, regional or state public or private locked residential facility that has construction fixtures designed to prevent escape and to restrict the movement and activities of children held in lawful custody. "Shelter care" means the temporary care of children in physically unrestricting facilities. "State Board" means the State Board of Juvenile Justice. "Status offender" means a child who commits an act prohibited by law which would not be criminal if committed by an adult. "Status offense" means an act prohibited by law which would not be an offense if committed by an adult. "Violent juvenile felony" means any of the delinquent acts enumerated in subsection B or C of § 16.1-269.1 when committed by a juvenile 14 years of age or older. (Code 1950, § 16.1-141; 1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1977, c. 559; 1978, c. 605; 1979, c. 15; 1981, c. 491; 1984, c. 631; 1985, c. 260; 1986, cc. 281, 308; 1987, c. 632; 1988, c. 794; 1990, cc. 704, 769, 842; 1991, c. 534; 1992, cc. 742, 830, 886; 1993, cc. 435, 467, 494; 1994, cc. 859, 865, 949; 1996, cc. 755, 914; 1999, cc. 453, 665, 697, 721; 2002, cc. 810, 818; 2003, cc. 538, 547, 835; 2004, cc. 245, 753; 2006, c. 868; 2008, cc. 475, 483; 2011, cc. 445, 480; 2015, cc. 502, 503; 2016, c. 631; 2017, c. 623; 2018, c. 497; 2019, cc. 282, 688; 2020, cc. 95, 732, 829, 1227, 1246, 1285, 1286; 2021 Sp. Sess. I, cc. 254, 310, 550, 551.)

Cross references. - As to the availability of confidential medical and mental health records of children maintained by the Department of Juvenile Justice, see § 16.1-300.

As to the Uniform Collaborative Law Act, see Chapter 11 ( § 20-168 et seq.) of Title 20.

As to foster care services for a child who is abused or neglected as defined in § 63.2-100 or in need of services as defined in § 16.1-228, see § 63.2-905 .

As to parental or agency consent for adoption, and exceptions to consent requirement, see § 63.2-1202 .

For the definition in this section applying to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court rules, see Rule 8:2, in Volume 11.

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, the new paragraph added by Acts 2016, c. 631, was inserted following subdivision 6 of the definition of "Abused or neglected child."

To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "55.1-2000" for "55-79.2."

Acts 2020, c. 829, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0 for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities and cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

Acts 2020, cc. 1227 and 1246, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2021."

Acts 2020, cc. 1227 and 1246, cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 854 of the Acts of Assembly of 2019 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, in clause (ii) of the definition for "Child," "younger" was substituted for "less" to conform to the language of Acts 2020, cc. 1285 and 1286. In the definition of "Ancillary crime," "or that constitutes" was substituted for "or which constitutes" at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, cl. 2 provides: "The Board of Social Services (the Board) shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act. Such regulations shall include conditions for establishing a kinship guardianship, requirements for the development and amendment of a kinship guardianship assistance agreement, and circumstances that qualify a prospective kinship guardian for exemption from the relative foster home approval process. The Board's initial adoption of regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act shall be exempt from the Administrative Process Act ( § 2.2-4000 et seq. of the Code of Virginia), except that the Board shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the regulations prior to adoption."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, cl. 7 provides: "That, except for (i) the provisions of Article 29 ( § 2.2-2499.1 et seq.) of Chapter 24 of Title 2.2 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 4.1-600 through 4.1-628 , 4.1-1100 , 4.1-1101 , 4.1-1101.1 , 4.1-1105.1 , 4.1-1107 through 4.1-1110 , 4.1-1112 , 4.1-1120 , 4.1-1121 , and 4.1-1302 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, Chapter 15 ( § 4.1-1500 et seq.) of Title 4.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 15.2-1627 , 16.1-69.48:1, 16.1-228, 16.1-278.8:01, 18.2-251.02 , 18.2-308.09 , 18.2-308.1:5 , 19.2-389.3, 19.2-392.1, 19.2-392.4, and 24.2-233 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, §§ 19.2-392.2:1, 19.2-392.2:2, and 46.2-341.20:7 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, and § 54.1-3442.6 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and (ii) the repeal of § 18.2-250.1 of the Code of Virginia, the provisions of the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eleventh enactments of this act shall not become effective unless reenacted by the 2022 Session of the General Assembly. The provisions of §§ 4.1-1101.1 and 4.1-1105.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall expire on January 1, 2024, if the provisions of the first, third, and fourth enactments of this act are reenacted by the 2022 Session of the General Assembly."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, cl. 8 provides: "That (i) the provisions of the second enactment of this act, (ii) the provisions of Article 29 ( § 2.2-2499.1 et seq.) of Chapter 24 of Title 2.2 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 4.1-600 through 4.1-628 , 4.1-1100 , 4.1-1101 , 4.1-1101.1 , 4.1-1105.1 , 4.1-1107 through 4.1-1110 , 4.1-1112 , 4.1-1120 , 4.1-1121 , and 4.1-1302 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, Chapter 15 ( § 4.1-1500 et seq.) of Title 4.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, §§ 15.2-1627 , 16.1-69.48:1, 16.1-228, 16.1-278.8:01, 18.2-251.02 , 18.2-308.09 , and 18.2-308.1:5 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, § 46.2-341.20:7 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, and § 54.1-3442.6 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and (iii) the repeal of § 18.2-250.1 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on July 1, 2021."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, cl. 26 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 1289 of the Acts of Assembly of 2020 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice. The provisions of this enactment shall become effective in due course."

The 1996 amendments. - The 1996 amendments by cc. 755 and 914 are identical, and added the paragraphs defining "Ancillary crime," "Boot camp" and "Violent juvenile felony."

The 1999 amendments. - The 1999 amendment by c. 453, in the paragraph defining "Child in need of supervision," in subdivision 1, deleted "and" preceding "(ii) the school," and inserted "and (iii) the school system has provided documentation that it has complied with the provisions of § 22.1-258" near the end of the paragraph, and in subdivision 2, deleted "habitually" preceding "deserts or abandons," and inserted "on more than one occasion" preceding "or escapes."

The 1999 amendment by c. 665 substituted "any act involving violence, force, or threat" for "any act of violence" in the paragraph defining "Family abuse."

The 1999 amendments by c. 697 and 721 are identical, and substituted "regardless of whether such persons reside" for "who reside" in clause (iii) of the paragraph defining "Family or household member."

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendments by cc. 810 and 818 are identical, and in the definition of "family abuse," inserted "but not limited to," substituted "results in bodily injury" for "results in physical injury," and deleted "serious" following "apprehension of."

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendments by cc. 538 and 547 are nearly identical, and substituted "12" for "twelve," "14" for "fourteen," and "18" for "eighteen" throughout the section; in the paragraph defining "Child in need of services," in the first paragraph, inserted the clause (i) designation, and inserted "or (ii) a child under the age of 14 whose behavior, conduct or condition presents or results in a serious threat to the well-being and physical safety of another person," and inserted "to the life or health of another person" in the second paragraph; and substituted "that" for "which" following "residential facility" in the paragraph defining "Secure facility."

The 2003 amendment by c. 835 substituted "18" for "eighteen" in the paragraphs defining "Adult" and "'Child,' 'juvenile' or 'minor"'; in the paragraph defining "Family or household member," inserted "half-brothers, half-sisters" in clause (iii) and substituted "12" for "twelve" in clause (vi); and substituted "14" for "fourteen" in the paragraph defining "Violent juvenile felony."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 245 added the last paragraph in the definition of "Abused or neglected child."

The 2004 amendment by c. 753 added the language beginning "including, but not limited to" in paragraph 1 of the definition of "Abused or neglected child."

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 868, in the paragraph defining "Abused or neglected child," inserted the subdivision 6 designation and the first paragraph thereof, transferred the second paragraph in subdivision 5 to the second paragraph in subdivision 6 and made a related change.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 475 and 483 are nearly identical, and inserted the definitions of "Independent living arrangement" and "Independent living services"; and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 445 and 480 are identical, and in the definition for "Family abuse," in the first sentence, deleted "including, but not limited to, any forceful detention" following "threat," inserted "death, sexual assault, or" and made minor stylistic changes, and added the last sentence.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendments by cc. 502 and 503 are identical, and in the last paragraph in the definition of "Abused or neglected child," substituted "emergency medical services agency" for "rescue squad" twice and substituted "medical services personnel" for "medical technicians."

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 631, added subdivision 7 in the definition for "Abused or neglected child."

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 623, effective March 16, 2017, in the definition of "Delinquent act," deleted "blood or" preceding "breath test" in the last sentence.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 497, in the definition for "Independent living arrangement," inserted "(i)," deleted "and has been placed" preceding "by the local board" and inserted "or (ii) a child at least 16 years of age or a person between the ages of 18 and 21 who was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice immediately prior to placement by the Department of Juvenile Justice"; and in the definition for "Independent living services," added clauses (ii) and (iii); and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendments by cc. 282 and 688 are identical, and added the definitions for "Fictive kin," "Qualified individual," and "Qualified residential treatment program."

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 95 and 732 are identical, and in the definition of "Child," "juvenile," or "minor," inserted "who is (1)," added clause (ii), and made a related change.

The 2020 amendment by c. 829 substituted "Tier III" for "violent sexual" in subdivision 6 in the definition of "Abused or neglected child."

The 2020 amendments by cc. 1227 and 1246 are identical, effective January 1, 2021, and rewrote the introductory language; added the definition of "Driver's license"; and in subdivision 7 of the definition of "Abused or neglected child," inserted "federal" twice.

The 2020 amendments by cc. 1285 and 1286 are identical, and in the definition for "Child," "juvenile," or "minor," substituted "younger" for "less"; in the definition for "Delinquent act," substituted "does" for "shall" in the first sentence, substituted " 'delinquent act' includes" for "the term shall include" in the second sentence and added the last sentence; in the definition for "Independent living services," substituted " 'Independent living services' includes" for "Such services shall include" in the last sentence and made stylistic changes.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, effective July 1, 2021, added clause (v) at the end of in the definition of "foster care services."

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 310, effective July 1, 2021, in subdivision 2, added the second and third sentences; and in subdivision 4, inserted "in subdivision 2."

The 2021 amendments by Sp. Sess. I, cc. 550 and 551, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and deleted the former last sentence of the definition for "Delinquent act," which read: "For purposes of § § 16.1-241, 16.1-273, 16.1-278.8, 16.1-278.8:01, and 16.1-278.9, "delinquent act" includes a violation of § 18.2-250.1 ."

Law review. - For note, "The Constitutionality of Excluding Young People From Jury Service," see 29 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 131 (1972). For comment on termination of parental rights, see 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 213 (1980). For survey of Virginia law on criminal procedure for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 261 (1980). For overview of Virginia Supreme Court decisions on domestic relations, see 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 321 (1981). For 1987 survey of Virginia law as to children, see 21 U. Rich. L. Rev. 789 (1987).

For survey on evidence in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 647 (1989). For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989).

For a review of Virginia legal issues involving children, see 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1001 (1999).

For article, "Gender Bias Task Force: Comments on Family Law Issues," see 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1089 (2001). For article, "Family Law," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 651 (2001).

For article surveying developments in criminal law and procedure in Virginia from July 2001 to September 2002, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 45 (2002).

For article surveying developments in family law in Virginia, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 155 (2002).

For 2006 survey article, "Criminal Law and Procedure," see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 83 (2006).

For 2006 survey article, "Family and Juvenile Law," see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 151 (2006).

For article, "Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence," see 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1841 (2006).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 72; 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, §§ 13, 15; 14A M.J. Parent & Child, § 8.

CASE NOTES

Guardianship, legal custody distinguished. - The distinction between "legal custody" and "guardianship" is a reflection of the extent of the power over, and the responsibility to, the child involved in each. Thus, in the Commonwealth, legal custody is the right to have physical charge of the child and generally direct the day-to-day activities of the child's life. Guardianship of the person and estate of a child, by contrast, is a broader power to have the custody of the ward and the right to take possession of the ward's estate, real and personal, and out of the proceeds of such estate provide for the ward's maintenance and education. Additionally, the legal custodian, while being required to provide for the child, is not fiduciary or guarantor of the child. Rather, it is the guardian of the person and estate who carries the burden of managing the ward's estate and making good the lawful debts of his ward. In re O'Neil, 18 Va. App. 674, 446 S.E.2d 475 (1994).

Legal custodian not required to pay support for child in physical custody of another. - Under the definition of "legal custody" in this section, a divorced grandmother and grandfather who had been granted joint legal custody of their granddaughter had the duty to provide her "with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical care," but no more; the grandfather was required to provide these necessities for the child during the periods of the year that she stayed with him, but he was not similarly responsible for her needs while she was staying with her grandmother. Russell v. Russell, 35 Va. App. 360, 545 S.E.2d 548, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 224 (2001).

Protective order did not in effect change legal custody. - Child protective order did not in effect change legal custody of a child from a parent to a grandparent because the order only expressed certain responsibilities the grandparent was authorized to exercise while the child remained in the grandparent's care. Wisman v. Harrisonburg Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., No. 0451-15-3, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 317 (Nov. 10, 2015).

Code contemplates intervention where severe injury likely if child returned to parent. - The Code contemplates intervention in circumstances, which are without realistic probability of improvement of conditions, by allowing for the emergency removal of children before placement into an environment where the child would be subjected to an imminent threat to life or health to the extent that severe or irreversible injury would be likely to result if the child were returned to or left in the custody of his parent. Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Social Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 409 S.E.2d 16 (1991).

Definition of abused or neglected child does not require proof of actual harm. - The statutory definitions of an abused or neglected child do not require proof of actual harm or impairment having been experienced by the child. The term "substantial risk" speaks in futuro. Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Social Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 409 S.E.2d 16 (1991).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the mother's child was neglected, as it showed that the mother violated a protective order that directed her to keep the child away from the mother's suspected abusive boyfriend and no showing had to be made that the child had been actually harmed, as the evidence showed that the child was at a substantial risk of future harm from him becuase the mother would not keep the child away from him although he was already suspected of having abused the child once. S.V.R. v. Hampton Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0073-04-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 450 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 21, 2004).

In a case involving termination of residual parental rights, removal of a child was warranted based on a father's history of not having provided his children with appropriate housing and his lack of a plan for appropriate housing since the definition of abused or neglected child did not require proof of actual harm or impairment; the term "substantial risk" spoke in futuro, and the living conditions in a motel were not adequate to meet the child's needs. Williams-Kemp v. Prince Edward County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1979-14-2, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 41 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 10, 2015).

Violation not established. - Alleged violation of subsection 1 was not established because there was no evidence that the children suffered any injury; while the Commonwealth referenced the "flat affect" as the mental injury, there was no evidence causally linking the flat affect of the children to any act or omission of defendant. Wilmer v. Commonwealth, No. 0654-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 223 (Aug. 29, 2017).

No evidence of active abuse but court found "passive" abuse. - Where appellant contended that because there was no visible evidence of active abuse and trial court found "passive" abuse, that the requirements of this section were unmet, this position was without merit. The fact that the child suffered no injury while her parent was under the influence of self-induced drugs was not a mitigating circumstance. The evidence clearly supported the trial court's finding of neglect. Deskin v. Clarke County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 0623-97-4 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 25, 1997).

Ties between parent and child severed forever when parental rights terminated. - When a court orders termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and child are severed forever and the parent becomes "a legal stranger to the child." Cage v. Harrisonburg Dep't of Social Servs., 13 Va. App. 246, 410 S.E.2d 405 (1991).

Juvenile court abuse and neglect action in relation to termination of parental rights action. - Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights pursuant to subsection C of § 16.1-283; in an appeal de novo from a juvenile court, an agency was not limited to the evidence and arguments presented in an earlier abuse and neglect action in the juvenile court pursuant to this section § 16.1-228, and thus the agency was not limited to seeking termination pursuant to subsection B of § 16.1-283. Nguyen v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 0938-04-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 465 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 28, 2004).

In a case in which the Petersburg Department of Social Services (DSS) filed petitions alleging that two children were abused and/or neglected within the meaning of § 16.1-228, and the father appealed the § 16.1-283 termination of his parental rights arguing that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights where he was exercising his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent due to pending criminal charges related to the present proceedings, even if the trial court erroneously based its decisions to terminate the father's parental rights in part on the allegations of father's sexual abuse and his decision to assert his Fifth Amendment rights, any such error was harmless because sufficient evidence not related to the sexual abuse allegations or the criminal charges supported the trial court's decisions. In addition to the father's failure to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, he had not provided the DSS with verification of employment or housing, he had not participated in parenting classes, he had not paid child support or visited the children, and he had tested positive for drug use in the recent past. White v. Petersburg Dep't of Soc. Servs.,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 481 (Oct. 27, 2009).

Sufficient evidence of neglect. - Trial court did not err in entering the protective order due to neglect based on its finding that despite months of counseling the father continued to discourage the youngest daughter's relationship with the mother, the father would not cooperate with social workers and counselors, and the father refused to encourage the older children to participate in therapy with the mother and the youngest daughter. Rhodes v. Harrisonburg Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., No. 2221-14-3, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 309 (Nov. 3, 2015).

Trial court did not err in its decision approving the removal and initial foster care plans relating to two children because the record supported the findings that the children were abused and neglected where the children were residing in a hotel room that was filthy. The trial court did not err by finding that there was no less drastic alternative than removal and foster care placement due to the fact that a grandmother's house was not an option due to the lack of space; moreover, the father failed to clean and maintain the hotel room after a court hearing informed him of the need to do so. Beim v. Roanoke Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1210-15-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 44 (Feb. 16, 2016).

Trial court did not err by finding that the mother abused and neglected her child because she took the child to the police department and reported that she was afraid for his safety, she willingly gave him to the police department, she was hospitalized twice for mental health issues and diagnosed with a delusional disorder, she was unable to care for the child, and she refused to accept her diagnosis and comply with treatment. Moses v. Alexandria Dep't of Cmty. & Human Servs., No. 1749-17-4, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 44 (Feb. 20, 2018).

Circuit court's finding that the children were abused or neglected was not error where one child had reported the father's sexual abuse to a number of different people over a significant period of time, the child's language about the abuse was very detailed and credible, and some physical evidence recovered from the family home corroborated some details. Curtin v. Spotsylvania Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0709-18-2, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 354 (Dec. 18, 2018).

Circuit court did not err in finding that there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate that another child was abused or neglected because at the time of the child's birth three of the mother's other children had already been removed from her care due to her inability to provide a safe and stable home, and the mother did not inform the Department of Human Services of the child's birth and left him in the care of another person. Silver v. Norfolk Dep't of Human Servs., No. 0830-20-1, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 25 (Feb. 23, 2021).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's adjudication of abuse or neglect under § 16.1-228 because the undisputed evidence showed that during the mother's high-risk pregnancy with the children she did not seek any prenatal care, she admitted to using PCP on several occasions, the children were born prematurely, and the mother's 2017 parental capacity assessment concluded that she was at risk for future child neglect. Simms v. Alexandria Dep't of Cmty. & Human Servs., No. 0915-20-4, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 93 (June 15, 2021).

Child in need of services. - Circuit court did not err in finding sufficient evidence of abuse or neglect or in ordering that children remain with their fathers because the mother had numerous reports, investigations, and family assessments over the years; the department of social services (DSS) did not fail to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal because the mother not only failed to provide DSS an opportunity to inspect and approve possible homes but also relocated her children without notifying DSS. Gerald v. Charlottesville Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0918-18-2, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 62 (Mar. 19, 2019).

Because the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant's child was a "child in need of services, "defendant's conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor was reversed, as the 911 call the child made could not be considered treatment, rehabilitation, or services not presently being received, and there was no evidence that defendant's conduct would have continued indefinitely had the court not intervened, as defendant and the children were already inside the house when the deputy arrived. Spell v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 629, 851 S.E.2d 83, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 302 (2020).

"Family or household member." - In a prosecution for domestic assault in violation of § 18.2-57.2 , evidence that defendant considered the victim's child to be his daughter was sufficient to prove the victim was his "family or household member" as defined in § 16.1-228 and incorporated in § 18.2-57.2 . As he made no timely request for court-ordered DNA testing, he could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue on appeal. Graves v. Commonwealth, No. 2938-05-3, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 63 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 20, 2007).

Mother's claim that the father committed child abuse by allowing the children to stay with the paternal grandfather failed, because this section specifically excluded relatives. Padula-Wilson v. Wilson, No. 1203-14-2, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 123 (Apr. 14, 2015).

History of family abuse. - Award of primary physical custody of the children to the father was proper, in part because the mother's argument that the circuit court abused its discretion in disregarding the history of family abuse that she endured throughout the marriage was without merit. All facts pertaining to the allegation of family abuse were before the circuit court, and it appeared from the record that the court did consider them; the court simply gave greater weight to the testimony of father and that finding was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Gudino v. Gudino, No. 0068-11-2, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 327 (Nov. 1, 2011).

Trial court did not err by finding that there was no abuse or history of family abuse because it had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, and the record supported its findings; a doctor and the guardian ad litem reported that there were inconsistencies in the children's reports, and the children appeared to be repeating incidents that occurred years earlier. Gudino v. Gudino, No. 0711-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 66 (Mar. 1, 2016).

Reasonable fear of bodily injury. - Threats which placed defendant's wife in reasonable apprehension of death or bodily injury were part of Virginia's definition of domestic abuse under § 16.1-228, and 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(8)(B) reached those restrained from engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner, and the absence of findings in the protective order of prior violence or prior bodily injury inflicted on the wife did not suffice to vitiate defendant's § 922(g)(8) conviction on Second Amendment grounds. United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2083 (4th Cir. 2012).

Definition of "child." - Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony under § 18.2-308.2 , as an undated juvenile adjudication order stating that a "child" was found guilty of breaking and entering and larceny and was committed to the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was adequate proof that defendant, while a juvenile, committed two acts that would have been felonies if committed by an adult. Under § 16.1-228, "child" meant a person less than 18 years of age; and under § 16.1-278.7, only a juvenile 11 years or older could be committed to DJJ. Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724 , 652 S.E.2d 95, 2007 Va. LEXIS 129 (2007).

Definition of "delinquent." - By unsuccessfully soliciting oral sex from a minor, defendant willfully encouraged her to engage in a criminal act in violation of § 18.2-29 . As his solicitation was clearly designed to encourage her to commit that act, which would have rendered her delinquent under this section, the evidence established that he contributed to the delinquency of a minor in violation of § 18.2-371 . MacDonald v. Commonwealth,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 7 (Jan. 9, 2007).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under § 17.1-513 over defendant's trial, even though under subsection A of § 16.1-241, the juvenile and domestic relations district courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving a juvenile who was alleged to be delinquent, defined under this section as one under 18 years old, as defendant gave defendant's birthdate as December 13, 1986, and the indictment stated that the offense occurred on December 16, 2006. Hall v. Commonwealth, No. 2902-07-3, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 73 (Feb. 17, 2009).

Contributing to the delinquency of a minor. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give defendant's proposed instruction on the definition of a "person responsible for the care of a child," a phrase that did not appear in the statutes applicable to the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, because the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the offense and all necessary definitions. Miller v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 769 S.E.2d 706, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 98 (2015).

Evidence supported the jury's finding that defendant left her child without "parental care or guardianship" because when defendant chose to go inside a store and leave her young child in the car, either alone or under the intermittent monitoring of a stranger, she left the child without parental care, which was the care provided by a parent to his or her child; the statute does not require actual harm or impairment. Miller v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 769 S.E.2d 706, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 98 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor because defendant's actions caused her daughter to falsely report sexual abuse, a criminal act under the laws of Virginia; a rational fact finder could conclude that defendant caused the daughter to falsely report sexual abuse by her father when she hypnotized the daughter and facilitated the daughter's disclosure of the abuse to a detective and child protective services. Gibson v. Commonwealth, No. 0986-18-4, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 174 (July 23, 2019).

Definition of "adoptive parents." - Phrase "adoptive parents" in subsection K of § 16.1-241 must be interpreted to describe, as set forth in this section, the residence of any natural person in which the child resides as a member of the household and in which he has been placed for the purposes of adoption. Segura v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 0858-07-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 93 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 26, 2008).

Insurer may condition coverage on obtaining guardianship. - Because the statutory definition of legal custody in this Commonwealth includes the power to direct medical care, legal guardianship of the person was not a necessary legal status for grandparents who had such custody to obtain to direct such care for their granddaughter. However, the status of legal custodian does not require a non-governmental entity such as their insurance carrier to recognize their financial responsibility for her medical care. Therefore, their insurance carrier could decline to recognize the child as an insured person until they obtained the status of legal guardians of the person in order to comply with their contract. In re O'Neil, 18 Va. App. 674, 446 S.E.2d 475 (1994).

Civil rights claims. - In a family's suit against numerous state, county, and private defendants for separating the daughter from the mother and stepfather based upon allegations of sexual abuse, certain substantive due process, procedural due process, and unlawful seizure claims survived dismissal, but the emergency removal of the daughter was authorized by Virginia law. Gedrich v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., 282 F. Supp. 2d 439, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16312 (E.D. Va. 2003).

Right to bear arms. - While the Second Amendment did not historically protect individuals subject to domestic protective orders, as defendant had committed an act of family violence under § 16.1-253.1, and as the deprivation of defendant's right to bear arms was only temporary, defendant's prosecution under 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(8) was not unconstitutional. United States v. Elkins,, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47105 (W.D. Va. May 2, 2011).

Circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine parentage in domestic assault cases. - Florida circuit court does not err in exercising subject matter jurisdiction to determine parentage for purposes of adjudicating a defendant's guilt on charges of felony domestic assault, whether or not other proceedings involving a determination of parentage are then pending in the juvenile and domestic relations district court. Graves v. Commonwealth, No. 2938-05-3, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 63 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 20, 2007).

Sufficient evidence of neglected child. - There was sufficient credible evidence for the trial court to find that the infant was a neglected child as defined in this section where while in mother's care, the infant's weight dropped to a dangerously low level, risking permanent damage to her physical development; instructions and assistance by case workers had little effect in alleviating mother's problems; and mother's own testimony demonstrated that she remained confused about her child's nutritional needs. Barr v. Winchester Dep't of Social Servs., No. 1144-93-4 (Ct. of Appeals May 31, 1994).

Evidence that the mother was not an appropriate caretaker because she had a history of serious emotional disturbance characterized by aggressive and emotional outbursts, poor impulse control, poor judgment, and poor problem-solving skills that interfered with her ability to provide a safe and secure environment was sufficient to support a finding of neglect and/or abuse. Wilson v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 2606-02-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 405 (Ct. of Appeals July 15, 2003).

Evidence showed that father's action in taking his children to a bank where he and the mother uttered a forgery, which caused the police to take the father and mother away to jail, caused the father to be unreasonably absent and the children to be without parental care; accordingly, the trial court's finding that the children were neglected, for the purposes of the city welfare agency's request for an emergency order of removal of the children, was not clearly erroneous and was affirmed. Lewis v. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2832-02-2, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 432 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 12, 2003).

Where the evidence showed that a child's mother was a heroin abuser, was unable to stop using heroin, was occasionally incarcerated, was often discovered having left her son unattended, and was unable to remedy her heroin addiction or provide her son with a stable environment, and where her son had been in foster care for 29.5 months, was returned to her mother's care, and was soon after removed from her care because the mother was using heroin within a week, the Department of Family Services proved by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights existed and that the child's best interests would be served through adoption. Foster v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 0026-04-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 346 (Ct. of Appeals July 20, 2004).

Court properly terminated a father's parental rights because the father admitted that he smoked marijuana after the department removed the children the second time, and an expert noted that the father suffered from alcohol dependence, a history of polysubstance abuse, along with a narcissistic personality disorder with antisocial traits. Farrell v. Warren County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 719 S.E.2d 329, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 1 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate a mother's parental rights on the basis that the children were abused or neglected because the mother's continued drug use created an unsafe environment, and the mother's failure to adequately address one child's medical needs created an unsafe environment for all the children because a doctor expressed concerns regarding the child's weight and malnourishment. Farrell v. Warren County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 342, 719 S.E.2d 313, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 4 (2012).

Trial court did not err in finding that children were neglected because the expert testimony in the record supported a finding that the mother's mental incapacity prevented her from rendering appropriate parental care; several social workers and home-based counselors testified about mother's lack of insight into her family's situation. Redd v. Loudoun County Dep't of Family Servs., Nos. 1915-13-4, 1991-13-4, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (Apr. 29, 2014).

Substantial risk of neglect. - Department proved that the youngest child was at substantial risk of abuse and neglect, given that less than two months before the child's birth, another court had terminated mother's parental rights to her eleven oldest children because of her abuse toward the children, plus she refused to address the allegations of abuse. Carlos v. Va. Beach Dep't of Human Servs., No. 1060-15-1, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 13 (Jan. 19, 2016).

Sufficient evidence of abuse and neglect. - Record contained credible evidence that the mother inflicted physical and mental abuse on her child, as she refused to allow him to attend a public school, requiring him instead to stay at home and essentially home-school himself, provided the child with no social activities, and failed to provide a safe, comfortable environment in which the child could thrive mentally or physically; accordingly, the trial court's finding of abuse and neglect was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, pursuant to subdivisions 1 and 2 of § 16.1-228. Parker v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs., No. 0301-03-3, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 450 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 26, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the father's two-year-old daughter was abused or neglected, as proof of actual harm or impairment was not required because the statutory term "substantial risk" spoke in futuro; accordingly, the father's admission that he was in violation of the conditions of his probation and parole, that he was a fugitive, and that he knew a warrant would be issued for his arrest yet he exposed the two-year-old daughter to the potential for harm during his arrest was sufficient to support the trial court's finding. Seibert v. Alexandria Div. of Soc. Servs.,, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 163 (Apr. 26, 2005).

Appellant's residual parental rights to her daughter were properly terminated pursuant to subdivision C 2 of § 16.1-283, as the evidence established that the child was abused and neglected as defined in § 16.1-228, because appellant was not prepared to care for the child at home, and because of her mental retardation and mental health issues, appellant did not understand how to feed an infant or the frequency of feedings, and the evidence established that appellant did not have the cognitive ability to care for the child, and that further time would not remedy appellant's cognitive functioning. Sylvia v. Hampton Dep't of Soc. Servs.,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 109 (Mar. 20, 2007).

Because a doctor's education, experience, knowledge, and skill regarding child abuse qualified the doctor as an expert, and because the parents did not preserve their arguments under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18 and 5A:20(c) that the doctor relied on hearsay and that their child was injured while in their care, the child was properly found to be abused and neglected under § 16.1-228. Hersey v. New Kent Dep't of Soc. Servs.,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 321 (Aug. 28, 2007).

Finding that the children, a boy and a girl, were abused or neglected under § 16.1-228, was supported by evidence that the mother allowed the father to commit sexual acts upon the girl by continuing to leave the girl in father's care after the girl reported the sexual abuse to the mother, the father created physical injury by throwing objects at the boy, and the boy was a child whose parent committed a sexual act upon a child. Kelly v. Hopewell Dep't of Soc. Servs.,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 206 (May 5, 2009).

Uncle's nieces, in the uncle's care, were properly found to be abused or neglected under § 16.1-228, based on the uncle's commission of sexual acts with another child, because the victim of the uncle's sexual act did not have to be a child in the uncle's care, under § 16.1-228, as "a child" in the statute, stating "abused or neglected child" meant any child whose custodian committed or allowed to be committed any sexual act upon a child in violation of the law, referred to "any child." Cumbo v. Dickenson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 62 Va. App. 124, 742 S.E.2d 885, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 173 (2013).

Uncle's nieces, in the uncle's care, were properly found to be abused or neglected under § 16.1-228, based on the uncle's commission of sexual acts with another child, when related criminal charges against the uncle were nolle prosequied, because the presumption of innocence did not require a conviction, as (1) the presumption did not apply to civil abuse and neglect proceedings, (2) a criminal conviction required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while a lesser preponderance of the evidence standard applied to abuse and neglect proceedings, and (3) the uncle's admission to the sexual contact provided sufficient evidence to find the uncle engaged in sexual activity with a minor. Cumbo v. Dickenson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 62 Va. App. 124, 742 S.E.2d 885, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 173 (2013).

Uncle's nieces, in the uncle's care, were properly found to be abused or neglected under § 16.1-228, based on the uncle's commission of sexual acts with another child, resulting in criminal charges that were nolle prosequied, because (1) the statute required only that the uncle perform a sexual act with a child, not that the uncle be convicted of such an act, and (2) the uncle did not contest that the uncle took indecent liberties with the other child in violation of § 18.2-370 . Cumbo v. Dickenson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 62 Va. App. 124, 742 S.E.2d 885, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 173 (2013).

Trial court did not err in finding that the mother abused or neglected her child because the evidence proved that the child had threatened to harm herself, had a plan to do so, and had done so in the past; when the school asked the mother to get the child evaluated, she refused to seek the appropriate medical care for the child; she continually denied that the child had any mental health issues, despite the fact that the child had expressed an intent to harm herself and had a plan to do so; and she essentially abandoned the child when she left her at the hospital and would not even talk with the child's doctor there. Williams v. Charlottesville Dep't of Soc. Servs.,, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 260 (July 22, 2014).

Trial court erred in granting mother's motion to strike at the close of department's case-in-chief, as the department established a prima facie showing of abuse and neglect, but the error was harmless as the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ultimately discounting previous findings of abuse made in a prior order and relying on the lack of any subsequent evidence of abuse following the prior order's finding. Lynchburg Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Boxley, No. 1560-19-3, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (May 19, 2020).

In a case in which two protective orders were issued by the trial court finding that the mother committed an act of family abuse and ordered her not to commit any future acts of family abuse against her children, the evidence was sufficient to show that the mother committed an act of family abuse because she admitted that she locked her son - who had had heat-induced seizures in the past - in the backseat of a car with only one window slightly open and left him there alone for an extended period of time while she continued shopping. Walker v. Pierce, No. 0452-02-2, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 297 (Dec. 8, 2020).

A mother's minor children were abused and neglected because the mother left the children unsupervised on numerous occasions, homeless shelter staff had to remove small objects from the children's mouths because of the mother's inattentiveness, the mother repeatedly declined offered services, the mother's mental health evaluation indicated that the mother could not safely parent the children, and the mother left Virginia for a time while the children remained in the care of a social services agency. Payne v. Prince Edward Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0839-20-2, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 9 (Jan. 26, 2021).

The finding of abuse and neglect was supported by the evidence, which included broken nose, two black eyes, and abrasions around the child's neck resulting from an altercation with the parents, as well as additional injuries in different stages of healing. Cotton v. City of Hampton Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1255-20-1, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 154 (Aug. 17, 2021).

Reasonable apprehension of family abuse. - In a case in which two protective orders were issued by the trial court finding that the mother committed an act of family abuse and ordered her not to commit any future acts of family abuse against her children, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the daughter had a reasonable apprehension of facing the same form of family abuse as her brother because a child could reasonably expect to face treatment from her parent similar to that received by her twin sibling. Walker v. Pierce, No. 0452-02-2, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 297 (Dec. 8, 2020).

Because there was evidence of a father's previous physical abuse against a mother, his pursuit of the mother and child in a car chase, his contact with the child and the mother at the child's sporting events despite the court order prohibiting him from attending, and his assault of a family friend in a parking lot at night in the mother and child's presence, the father's actions in stalking the mother and the child placed both in a reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury. Vechery v. Cottet-Moine, No. 0636-20-4, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 94 (June 15, 2021).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that in stalking a mother and a child, a father committed an act of abuse against a family member, and, therefore, the circuit court was authorized to issue an order to protect the mother and the child; the father intended to cause fear or knew or should have known that his conduct would cause fear for the mother and child because he pursued the mother and child in a car chase, and he knew the mother had reported that the child feared him. Vechery v. Cottet-Moine, No. 0636-20-4, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 94 (June 15, 2021).

Insufficient evidence of abuse and neglect. - Trial court erred in convicting defendant of causing an act or omission that rendered a child abused or neglected because he did not create or inflict a physical or mental injury upon the children or cause them to be without care by an unreasonable absence; both, or either of the children's mothers independently, were responsible for the children's care during the time that defendant left the children with them, and neither of the children was injured or harmed. Wilmer v. Commonwealth, No. 0654-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 223 (Aug. 29, 2017).

Circuit court did not err in finding that a mother abused or neglected the mother's children because a social services department presented evidence that the mother had verbally, emotionally, and physically abused all the children by kicking the children, hitting the children, throwing objects at the children, yelling at the children, and pulling the hair of the children. One child had attempted suicide multiple times, yet the mother insisted that the child was just seeking attention and did not need mental health treatment. Jaffar v. City of Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1002-20-2, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 76 (May 11, 2021).

Dismissal of abuse and neglect finding. - Circuit court did not err in dismissing an abuse and neglect finding against a father because the guardian ad litem for the minor children left the dismissal on the grounds of mootness uncontested, and the basis of mootness alone provided a sufficient legal foundation for the circuit court's ruling; although the guardian argued the issue of mootness before the circuit court, he did not raise it on appeal, and thus his failure to address the issue resulted in a waiver of any claim of error. Steinberg v. Befekadu, No. 1814-18-4, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 189 (Aug. 13, 2019).

Sufficient evidence of child in need of services. - Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that sixteen-year-old was a "child in need of services" under this section where she was taken by appellant to her home where she spent the night with appellant's son without her parents' permission and was involved in sexual activity and appellant was involved in preplanning this event, took the child from her home, lied both to her parents and the police about her departure and the circumstances surrounding her overnight stay. The court was justified in concluding that her family needed assistance and services to regain control over their daughter and to remove appellant's detrimental influence. Watkins v. Commonwealth, No. 0975-96-3, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 294 (Ct. of Appeals May 6, 1997).

Circuit court did not err in finding that a father's children were in need of services and in awarding custody to a paternal aunt because behavioral issues associated with the children were affecting their well-being and safety - the children were lying, using drugs, and had been suspended from school - and the father was unable and perhaps unwilling to see to their needs. Hamilton v. Loudoun County Dep't of Family Servs.,, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 421 (Dec. 30, 2014).

Trial court properly found that a child was a child in need of services and approved the foster care plan with the goal of adoption because the child's mental condition was attributed to inconsistency in primary caregivers due in part to the frequent removals caused by the custodian's drug problems, the child needed the permanent stability that could only be found through continuing the foster care placement with the foster mother, and the trial court properly considered appropriate factors, including the best interests of the child, in making its decision. Roberts-Bond v. Harrisonburg-Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., Nos. 0770-16-3, 1159-16-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 359 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 20, 2016).

Child in need of services. - Child was not in need of services under this section where child's situation quickly improved without the necessity of court intervention once the child was removed from the defendant's control. DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 751, 514 S.E.2d 788 (1999).

The trial judge is required to consider any history of family abuse as defined in this section when determining custody of minor children. Davenport v. Davenport, No. 1517-93-2 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 31, 1995).

Circuit court had jurisdiction where defendant failed to prove he was under 18 when offenses were committed. - Although there was conflicting evidence as to defendant's age, credible evidence supported trial court's conclusion that defendant failed to meet his burden of proving he was less than 18 years of age on date offenses were committed, and therefore trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to set aside his conviction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Winston v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 746, 497 S.E.2d 141 (1998).

Court lacked jurisdiction. - Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear a mother's appeal because the circuit court's orders, that her children were abused or neglected or were at risk of abuse or neglect, were not final orders where the orders were adjudicatory in nature, did not make any of the seven statutory dispositions, and did not make any final determinations regarding custody. Byrd v. Petersburg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0782-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 203 (Ct. of Appeals July 19, 2016).

Applied in Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356 , 297 S.E.2d 799 (1982); Deahl v. Winchester Dep't of Social Servs., 224 Va. 664 , 299 S.E.2d 863 (1983); Kauffman v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 400, 382 S.E.2d 279 (1989); Stanley v. Fairfax County Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 596, 395 S.E.2d 199 (1990); Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Va. 1991); Kluis v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 720, 418 S.E.2d 908 (1992); Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 475, 477 S.E.2d 781 (1996); DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 437, 524 S.E.2d 151 (2000); Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gile, 259 Va. 164 , 524 S.E.2d 642 (2000); Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143 , 645 S.E.2d 284, 2007 Va. LEXIS 74 (2007).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Jurisdiction. - Issue of whether the court could or should enter a proposed order with special immigrant juvenile status findings was not reached where the child had turned 18 since the juvenile order, and although he was intellectually and physically disabled and could not care for himself, legally he had become emancipated and was no longer a minor whose custody could be adjudicated by the juvenile court. In re Alas-Leiva, 101 Va. Cir. 556, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 715 (Norfolk Dec. 7, 2018).

Truancy. - Though a Child in Need of Supervision order may have been defective and thus voidable because of improperly documented compliance with § 22.1-258, because no motion to reconsider was made within 21 days and no appeal to the circuit court was lodged within 10 days, the order could not be collaterally attacked in a contempt proceeding. Commonwealth v. May, 62 Va. Cir. 360, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 275 (Rockingham County 2003).

Exclusion from marital home. - Husband met the requirements to exclude the wife from the marital home because the husband's testimony showed health problems resulting from the wife's alleged "hoarding" and threatening to use a gun and to have someone come and "take him out." Didier v. Didier, 85 Va. Cir. 72, 2012 Va. Cir. LEXIS 186 (Chesapeake July 26, 2012).

Abandonment and neglect. - Reunification with a child's father was not viable due to abandonment and neglect, where the father had contributed nothing toward the support and maintenance of the child, the father had no contact with the child in approximately three years, and the father had physically abused the child and his mother. Esmeralda v. Edmundo,, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 440 (Fairfax County Aug. 29, 2019).

Sufficient evidence of abuse or neglect. - Although parents claimed they did not cause their 11-month-old daughter's injuries and did not allow someone else to cause her injuries, a doctor's testimony that the child displayed symptoms of shaken baby syndrome was sufficient for the court to find that the child was abused or neglected, within the meaning of § 16.1-228, and the court found that the child was abused or neglected and that her two-year-old brother was a child at risk of being abused or neglected because of the injuries his sister sustained. In re McBride, 60 Va. Cir. 261, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 391 (Richmond 2002).

Insufficient evidence of abuse or neglect. - County department of social services' (DSS) neglect/abuse petition was dismissed as when the petition was filed, the child was in a residential program and had not been subjected to physical assaults by his father for a significant period of time; the child had been adjudicated a child in need of services and DSS did not show that the child was now being abused or neglected. Madison County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Aylor,, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 149 (Madison County Aug. 14, 2006).

Finding that a father's daughter was abused and neglected under § 16.1-228 was not supported by the evidence; instead, pursuant to § 20-124.2 , the court gave regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship. While the father used poor judgment in taking the daughter out of school, in not taking her to two court-ordered visits with her counselor, and in moving her out of state, this did not show that the father had refused to provide care necessary for the daughter's health. In re Baxter, 73 Va. Cir. 520, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 133 (Henrico County 2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Petition by emancipated minors for protective orders. - Emancipated minor may file petitions for protective orders under applicable statutes. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Charniele L. Herring, Member, House of Delegates, 10-116, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 2 (01/21/11).

Act, omission, or condition that renders a child delinquent, etc. - A parent or caretaker who leaves a child alone in the same room with a sexually violent offender, yet remains within the residence, has not violated § 18.2-371 by leaving the child "alone in the same dwelling" with an offender within the meaning of § 16.1-228. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable A. Donald McEachin, Member, Senate of Virginia, 14-015, 2014 Va. AG LEXIS 14 (5/23/14).

§ 16.1-229. This chapter controlling in event of conflict.

Whenever any specific provision of this chapter differs from or is in conflict with any provision or requirement of any other chapters of this title relating to the same or a similar subject, then such specific provision shall be controlling with respect to such subject or requirement.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-142; 1956, c. 555; 1977, c. 559.)

§ 16.1-229.1. Removal of a child; names and contact information of persons with a legitimate interest.

In any proceeding held pursuant to this chapter in which a child is removed from his home, the court may order the parents or guardians of such child to provide the names and contact information for all persons with a legitimate interest to the local department of social services.

(2019, c. 434.)

Article 2. Organization and Personnel.

§ 16.1-230. Organization and operation of juvenile and domestic relations district courts.

The provisions of Chapter 4.1 (§ 16.1-69.1 et seq.) of this title establishing the district court system shall be controlling over the provisions of this chapter with respect to the organization, judges, administration and supervision, personnel, and financing of the juvenile and domestic relations district courts in the event of any conflict between the provisions of Chapter 4.1 and this chapter.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-153.1; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1977, c. 559.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

Law review. - For note, "Limiting Judicial Incompetence: The Due Process Right to a Legally Learned Judge in State Minor Court Criminal Proceedings," see 61 Va. L. Rev. 1454 (1975). For article, "The Revision of Virginia's Juvenile Court Law," see 13 U. Rich. L. Rev. 847 (1979).

§ 16.1-231. Rules of procedure.

The chief judge may adopt and publish rules not in violation of law or in conflict with rules adopted pursuant to Chapter 4.1 (§ 16.1-69.1 et seq.) of this title to regulate the conduct of the clerks and employees of the court, which rules shall be construed and enforced liberally in furtherance of the remedial purposes of this chapter. Insofar as is practicable all such records and rules shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-154; 1956, c. 555; 1968, c. 451; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1975, c. 334; 1977, c. 559.)

§ 16.1-232. Attorney for the Commonwealth to prosecute certain cases and represent Commonwealth on appeal.

The attorney for the Commonwealth shall prosecute felony charges before the juvenile court, unless relieved of such responsibility by order of the court. In his discretion, the attorney for the Commonwealth may prosecute misdemeanor charges before such court.

The attorney for the Commonwealth shall represent the Commonwealth in all cases appealed from the juvenile and domestic relations district court to the circuit court.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-155; 1956, c. 555; 1977, c. 559; 1980, c. 530; 1991, c. 262.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 4A M.J. Commonwealth's and State's Attorney, § 4.

CASE NOTES

Purpose. - This section, in effect, gives the Commonwealth's attorney some discretion in prosecuting certain criminal cases in the juvenile and domestic relations courts and requires him to prosecute all cases appealed to the circuit court. But the statute does not confer authority to represent parties in civil cases in which the Commonwealth is not a party in interest. Walthall v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 674, 353 S.E.2d 169 (1987).

Duty to prosecute foreign support orders. - The Commonwealth's attorney has a duty to prosecute foreign support orders that are properly before a Virginia court pursuant to the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ( §§ 20-88.12 to 20-88.31) [see now the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ( § 20-88.32 et. seq.)] Walthall v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 674, 353 S.E.2d 169 (1987).

The word "case," as used in the second paragraph of this section, refers to the cases described in the paragraph immediately preceding it. The first paragraph provides that the Commonwealth shall prosecute felony charges before the juvenile court and may prosecute misdemeanor charges before that court, but shall be required to do so only when the court so directs. Walthall v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 674, 353 S.E.2d 169 (1987).

The second paragraph of this section, which states that the Commonwealth shall represent the state in all cases appealed from the juvenile and domestic relations district court to the circuit court, refers only to cases in which the Commonwealth is a party or, at least, has an interest. Walthall v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 674, 353 S.E.2d 169 (1987).

Real party in interest has right to own counsel. - In civil matters appealed to the circuit court, the Commonwealth may have a theoretical interest in seeing that the best interests of children are provided for in both custody disputes and support proceedings. However, the real party in interest has a right to his or her own counsel. Certainly the legislature never intended that under these circumstances the Commonwealth's attorney be allowed to control litigation in a purely civil case. Walthall v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 674, 353 S.E.2d 169 (1987).

§ 16.1-233. Department to develop court services; court services units; appointment and removal of employees; salaries.

  1. Within funds appropriated for the purpose, it shall be a function of the Department to develop and operate, except as hereinafter provided, probation, parole and other court services for juvenile and domestic relations district courts in order that all children coming within the jurisdiction of such courts throughout the Commonwealth shall receive the fullest protection of the court. To this end the Director may establish court services units in the Department. The Director shall appoint such employees as he may find to be necessary to carry out properly the responsibilities of the Department relative to the development, supervision and operation of probation, parole and other court services throughout the Commonwealth as set forth in this chapter.
  2. The salaries of the persons employed pursuant to this section shall be paid out of funds appropriated for such purpose to the Department of Juvenile Justice. The Director and such employees as he may find necessary to carry out properly the responsibilities of the Department pursuant to subsection A of this section shall have access to all probation offices, other social services and to their records.
  3. The State Board shall establish minimum standards for court service staffs and related supportive personnel and promulgate regulations pertaining to their appointment and function to the end that uniform services, insofar as is practical, will be available to juvenile and domestic relations district courts throughout the Commonwealth. In counties or cities now served by regional juvenile and domestic relations courts or where specialized court service units are not provided, and in any county or city which provided specialized services on June 30, 1973, that requests the development of a court service unit, appointment to positions in such units shall be based on merit as provided in the Virginia Personnel Act (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.).
  4. No person shall be assigned to or discharged from the state-operated court service staff of a juvenile and domestic relations district court except as provided in the Virginia Personnel Act (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.). The Director shall have the authority, for good cause, after consulting with the judge or judges of that juvenile and domestic relations district court and after due notice and opportunity to be heard, to order the transfer, demotion or separation of any person from the court service staff subject only to the limitations of the Virginia Personnel Act. (Code 1950, § 16.1-203; 1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1977, c. 559; 1979, c. 700; 1989, c. 733; 1995, cc. 696, 699; 2001, c. 853; 2003, c. 648.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

Acts 1995, cc. 696 and 699, cl. 2, provide: "That this act shall become effective January 1, 1996, if state funds are provided to carry out the purposes of the Virginia Juvenile Community Crime Control Act during the 1995 Session of the General Assembly." Appropriation for this act was made pursuant to Acts 1995, c. 853, item 578.

Acts 2001, c. 853, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment in juvenile correctional facilities. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0."

The 1995 amendments. - The 1995 amendments by cc. 696 and 699 are identical, and deleted "except as otherwise provided in § 16.1-311 as it pertains to employees of juvenile detention homes and probation houses" following "pursuant to this section" near the beginning of subsection B.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 853 inserted "parole" following "probation" once in the first, and once in the third sentence of subsection A.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 648, in the second sentence of subsection A, substituted "may" for "is empowered to" and "the" for "his" preceding "Department"; substituted "the Virginia Personnel Act ( § 2.2-2900 et seq.)" for "Chapter 29 ( § 2.2-2900 et seq.) of Title 2.2" at the end of subsection C; and rewrote subsection D, which formerly read: "No person shall be assigned to or discharged from the state-operated court service staff of a juvenile and domestic relations district court except as provided in Chapter 29 of Title 2.2, nor without the prior mutual approval of the judge thereof and the Director. However, the chief judge of any such court shall be empowered, for good cause, after due notice and opportunity to be heard, to order the transfer of any person from the court service staff of his court, and the Director shall likewise be empowered to order such transfer or separation subject only to the limitations of Chapter 29 of Title 2.2."

Law review. - For article, "Legal Issues Involving Children," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 741 (2001).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, § 88.

Applied in Tross v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 362, 464 S.E.2d 523 (1995).

§ 16.1-234. Duties of Department; provision of quarters, utilities, and office equipment to court service unit.

The Director shall cause the Department to study the conditions existing in the several cities and counties, to confer with the judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district courts, the directors and boards of social services, and other appropriate officials, as the case may be, and to plan, establish and operate unless otherwise provided an adequate and coordinated program of probation, parole and related services to all juvenile and domestic relations district courts in counties or cities heretofore served by regional juvenile and domestic relations courts, and where specialized probation, parole and related court services were not provided as of July 1, 1973, and to counties and cities that request a development of a court service unit with the approval of the governing bodies after consultation with the chief juvenile and domestic relations district court judge.

In each county and city in which there is located an office for a state juvenile and domestic relations district court service unit such jurisdiction shall provide suitable quarters and utilities, including telephone service, for such court service unit staff. Such county or city shall also provide all necessary furniture and furnishings for the efficient operation of the unit. When such court service unit serves counties or cities in addition to the county or city where the office is located, the jurisdiction or jurisdictions so served shall share proportionately, based on the population of the jurisdictions, in the cost of the quarters and utilities, including telephone service and necessary furniture and furnishings. All other office equipment and supplies, including postage, shall be furnished by the Commonwealth and shall be paid out of the appropriation for criminal charges.

In counties and cities that provided specialized court service programs prior to July 1, 1973, which do not request the development of a state-operated court service unit, it shall be the duty of the Department to insure that minimum standards established by the State Board are adhered to, to confer with the judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district court and other appropriate officials as the case may be, and to assist in the continued development and extension of an adequate and coordinated program of court services, probation, parole and detention facilities and other specialized services and facilities to such juvenile and domestic relations district courts.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-204; 1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 641; 1977, c. 559; 1979, c. 700; 2001, c. 853.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2001, c. 853, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment in juvenile correctional facilities. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 853 in the first sentence substituted "directors and boards of social services" for "superintendents and boards of public welfare," inserted "parole" following "probation," twice, substituted "services were not provided" for "services are not being provided," and substituted "that" for "which" preceding "request"; and in the last paragraph, substituted "that provided" for "providing" near the beginning of the paragraph, and inserted "parole" following "probation."

§ 16.1-235. How probation, parole and related court services provided.

Probation, parole and related court services shall be provided through the following means:

  1. State court service units. - The Department shall develop and operate probation, parole and related court services in counties or cities heretofore served by regional juvenile and domestic relations district courts and where specialized probation, parole and related court services were not provided as of July 1, 1973, and make such services available to juvenile and domestic relations district courts, as required by this chapter and by regulations established by the Board. All other counties or cities may request the development of a state-operated court service unit with the approval of their governing bodies after consultation with the chief judge of the juvenile and domestic relations district court of such jurisdiction.
  2. Local units. - In counties and cities providing specialized court services as of July 1, 1973, who do not request the development of a state-operated court service unit, the governing body or bodies of the district shall appoint one or more suitable persons as probation and parole officers and related court service personnel in accordance with established qualifications and regulations and shall develop and operate probation, parole, detention and related court services. The transfer, demotion, or separation of probation officers and related court service personnel appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be under the authority of the governing body or bodies of the district and shall be only for good cause shown, after consulting with the judge or judges of that juvenile and domestic relations district court, in accordance with the Virginia Personnel Act (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.) and after due notice and opportunity to be heard.
  3. A county or city that is providing court services through a state-operated court services unit, with the approval of its governing body after consultation with the chief judge of the juvenile and domestic relations district court of the jurisdiction, may cease providing services through a state-operated court services unit and commence operation as a local unit, subject to all laws, regulations, policies and procedures applicable to a local unit.

    (Code 1950, § 16.1-205; 1956, c. 555; 1972, cc. 73, 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, cc. 44, 45, 673; 1977, c. 559; 2001, c. 853; 2002, c. 510; 2003, c. 648.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2001, c. 853, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment in juvenile correctional facilities. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 853 inserted "parole" following "Probation," in the introductory language; in the first sentence of subdivision A, inserted "parole" following "probation," twice, and substituted "services were not provided" for "services are not being provided"; in the third sentence of subdivision A, inserted "parole" following "probation," inserted "and parole" following "probation" preceding "officers" and substituted "services were not provided" for "services are not being provided"; and in subdivision B, inserted "parole" following "probation," and inserted "and parole" following "probation" preceding "officers."

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by ch. 510 added subsection C.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 648 deleted the former last sentence of subsection A, which read: "In counties or cities now served by regional juvenile and domestic relations district courts and where specialized probation, parole and related court services were not provided as of July 1, 1973, the judge or judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district court may from a list of eligibles certified by the Director appoint one or more suitable persons as probation and parole officers and related court service personnel in accordance with established qualifications and regulations"; in subsection B, in the first paragraph, deleted "the chief judge or judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district court may, from a list of eligibles certified by the Director or by" following "service unit," and inserted "shall" following "district," and added the second paragraph.

§ 16.1-235.1. Provision of court services; replacement intake officers.

The chief judge may make arrangements for a replacement intake officer from another court service unit to ensure the capability of a prompt response in matters under § 16.1-255 or 16.1-260 during hours the court is closed. The replacement intake officer shall have all the authority and power of an intake officer of that district when authorized in writing by the appointing authority and by the chief judge of that district.

(2002, c. 700; 2012, cc. 164, 456.)

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 164 and 456 are identical, and deleted the former third sentence, which read: "The arrangements shall conform to policy governing the use of replacement intake officers established by the State Board of Juvenile Justice."; and made a minor stylistic change.

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 9-101. Notice of Intake Hearing.

§ 16.1-236. Supervisory officers.

In any court where more than one probation or parole officer or other court services staff has been appointed under the provisions of this law, one or more probation or parole officers may be designated to serve in a supervisory position, other than court services unit director, by the Director, if it is a state-operated court services unit, or by the local governing body, if it is a locally operated court services unit.

The transfer, demotion, or separation of supervisory officers, other than court services unit directors, of state court service units shall be under the authority of the Director and shall be only for good cause shown, after consulting with the judge or judges of that juvenile and domestic relations district court, and in accordance with the Virginia Personnel Act (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.). The transfer, demotion or separation of supervisory officers of local court service units shall be under the authority of the local governing body and shall be only for good cause shown, after consulting with the judge or judges of that juvenile and domestic relations district court and after due notice and opportunity to be heard.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-207; 1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 673; 1977, c. 559; 2001, c. 853; 2003, c. 648.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2001, c. 853, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment in juvenile correctional facilities. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 853 inserted "or parole" following "probation" twice in the first sentence.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 648 rewrote the section.

§ 16.1-236.1. Court services unit directors.

  1. State-operated court services units. A court services unit director shall be designated for each state-operated court services unit. The judge or judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district court shall, from a list of eligible persons submitted by the Director appoint one court services unit director for the state-operated court services unit serving that district court. The list of eligible persons shall be developed in accordance with state personnel laws and regulations, and Department policies and procedures. If any list of eligible persons submitted by the Director is unsatisfactory to the judge or judges, the judge or judges may request the Director to submit a new list containing the names of additional eligible persons. Upon such request by the judge or judges, the Director shall develop and submit a new list of eligible persons in accordance with state personnel laws and regulations, and Department policies and procedures. The transfer, demotion, or separation of a court services unit director, appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be under the authority of the Director and shall be only for good cause shown, after consulting with the judge or judges of that juvenile and domestic relations district court, and in accordance with the Virginia Personnel Act (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.).
  2. Locally operated court services units. A court services unit director shall be designated for each locally operated court services unit. The judge or judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district court shall, from a list of eligible persons submitted by the governing body or bodies of the district, appoint one court services unit director for the locally operated court services unit serving that district court. The list of eligible persons shall be in accordance with locally established qualifications that are consistent with state personnel laws and regulations, and Department policies and procedures. If any list of eligible persons submitted by the governing body or bodies of the district is unsatisfactory to the judge or judges, the judge or judges may request the governing body or bodies to submit a new list containing the names of additional eligible persons. Upon such request by the judge or judges, the governing body or bodies shall develop and submit a new list of eligible persons in accordance with locally established qualifications that are consistent with state personnel laws and regulations, and Department policies and procedures. The transfer, demotion, or separation of a court services unit director appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be under the authority of the local governing body or bodies and shall be only for good cause shown after consulting with the judge or judges of that juvenile and domestic relations district court and in accordance with the Virginia Personnel Act (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.). (2003, c. 648.)

CASE NOTES

Reassignment. - Circuit court erred in reversing a hearing officer's decision that granted an employee's request for relief and reinstatement to his former position, because the employee's grievance went through every procedural step available and policy to which he was entitled, the hearing officer had jurisdiction to take the necessary action, the position was a statutory creation, the hearing officer's findings of fact generally reflected positively on the employee, and the Department of Juvenile Justice reassigned the employee arbitrarily or as a form of unwarranted punishment. Va. Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. Milner, Nos. 1812-14-2, 2147-14-2, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 223 (July 21, 2015).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

"List of eligible persons," for state-operated court services unit directors consists of those individuals submitted by the Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to state personnel laws and regulations and Department policies and procedures. Such list is the only list from which judges may appoint a director. Should the list be unsatisfactory to judges, they may request new lists. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Barry R. Green, Director, Department of Juvenile Justice, 05-068, 2005 Va. AG LEXIS 42 (10/19/05).

§ 16.1-237. Powers, duties and functions of probation and parole officers.

In addition to any other powers and duties imposed by this law, a probation or parole officer appointed hereunder shall:

  1. Investigate all cases referred to him by the judge or any person designated so to do, and shall render reports of such investigation as required;
  2. Supervise persons placed under his supervision and shall keep informed concerning the conduct and condition of every person under his supervision by visiting, requiring reports and in other ways, and shall report thereon as required;
  3. Under the general supervision of the director of the court service unit, investigate complaints and accept for informal supervision cases wherein such handling would best serve the interests of all concerned;
  4. Use all suitable methods not inconsistent with conditions imposed by the court to aid and encourage persons on probation or parole and to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition;
  5. Furnish to each person placed on probation or parole a written statement of the conditions of his probation or parole and instruct him regarding the same;
  6. Keep records of his work including photographs and perform such other duties as the judge or other person designated by the judge or the Director shall require;
  7. Have the authority to administer oaths and take acknowledgements for the purposes of §§ 16.1-259 and 16.1-260 to facilitate the processes of intake and petition;
  8. Have the powers of arrest of a police officer and the power to carry a concealed weapon when specifically so authorized by the judge; and
  9. Determine by reviewing the Local Inmate Data System or the Juvenile Tracking System (JTS) upon intake and again prior to discharge whether a blood, saliva, or tissue sample has been taken for DNA analysis for each offender required to submit a sample pursuant to § 16.1-299.1 and, if no sample has been taken, require an offender to submit a sample for DNA analysis.

    (Code 1950, § 16.1-208; 1956, c. 555; 1964, c. 516; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, c. 464; 1977, c. 559; 2001, c. 853; 2007, c. 528; 2009, c. 726.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2001, c. 853, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment in juvenile correctional facilities. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 853 inserted "or parole" following "probation," in the introductory language; substituted "persons placed" for "such persons as are placed" near the beginning of subdivision B; inserted "or parole" following "probation" once in subdivision D, and twice in subdivision E; and substituted "the judge" for "him" near the end of subdivision F.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 528 added subsection I and made related changes.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 726 inserted "including photographs" in subsection F.

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-278. Order for Investigation and Report.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Probation and parole officers described in this section are not "law-enforcement officers" for purposes of the Virginia Law Officers' Retirement System. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Harry B. Blevins, Member, Senate of Virginia, 08-075 (10/30/08).

§ 16.1-238. Compensation of probation officers, court service staff members and related court service personnel; reimbursement; traveling and other expenses.

The compensation of probation officers and other court service staff members appointed in accordance with subsection B of § 16.1-235 shall be fixed by the governing body of the city or county in which they serve. They shall be paid out of the county or city treasury. One-half of such compensation shall be reimbursed to any city or county from funds appropriated to the Department. Any funds from the Department of Criminal Justice Services or from other public fund sources outside of the provisions of this law which are used in compensating such personnel shall not be considered state funds.

Compensation of all other probation officers and related court service personnel appointed in accordance with subsection A of § 16.1-235 shall be fixed in accordance with Chapter 29 (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.) of Title 2.2. Personnel transferred from local and regional court staffs shall suffer no reduction in pay and shall transfer into the state program all accrued leave and other benefits allowable under Chapter 29 of Title 2.2. Probation officers and related court service personnel appointed in accordance with subsection A of § 16.1-235 shall be paid necessary traveling and other expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties.

The salary and expenses provided for personnel appointed in accordance with subsection A of § 16.1-235 shall be paid by the Commonwealth, and no part shall be paid by or chargeable to any county or city. The governing body of any county or city, however, may add to the compensation of such personnel such an amount as the governing body may appropriate not to exceed 50 percent of the amount paid by the Commonwealth. No such additional amount paid by a local governing body shall be chargeable to the Department of Juvenile Justice nor shall it remove or supersede any authority, control or supervision of the Department.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-206; 1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1977, c. 559; 1982, c. 636; 1983, c. 358; 1989, c. 733; 2012, cc. 164, 456.)

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 164 and 456 are identical, and in the first paragraph, substituted "subsection B of § 16.1-235" for " § 16.1-235 B" and deleted "in accordance with minimum standards prescribed by the State Board," in the first sentence, and deleted "complying with the minimum standards set by the State Board" following "city or county" in the third sentence; substituted "subsection A of § 16.1-235" for " § 16.1-235 A" twice in the second paragraph and once in the third paragraph; and made a mnor stylistic change.

Applied in Tross v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 362, 464 S.E.2d 523 (1995).

§ 16.1-239. Payment of traveling expenses of court officers; reimbursement.

In counties and cities providing specialized court service programs prior to July 1, 1973, as provided in §§ 16.1-234 and 16.1-235, and under the rules of the Department the traveling expenses incurred by a probation officer, court service officer or other officer of the court when traveling under the order of the judge, shall be paid out of the county or city treasury. One-half of such expenses shall be reimbursed to the city or county by the Department out of funds appropriated for such purposes.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-213; 1956, c. 555; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1977, c. 559; 1982, c. 636; 1983, c. 358.)

§ 16.1-240. Citizens advisory council.

  1. The governing bodies of each county and city served by a court service unit may appoint one or more members to a citizens advisory council, in total not to exceed 15 members; and the chief judge of the juvenile and domestic relations district court may appoint one or more members to the advisory council, in total not to exceed five members. The duties of the council shall be as follows:
    1. To advise and cooperate with the court upon all matters affecting the working of this law and other laws relating to children, their care and protection and to domestic relations;
    2. To consult and confer with the court and director of the court service unit from time to time relative to the development and extension of the court service program;
    3. To encourage the member selected by the council to serve on the central advisory council to visit, as often as the member conveniently can, institutions and associations receiving children under this law, and to report to the court from time to time and at least annually in its report made pursuant to subdivision 5 the conditions and surroundings of the children received by or in charge of any such persons, institutions or associations;
    4. To make themselves familiar with the work of the court under this law; and
    5. To make an annual report to the court and the participating governing bodies on the work of the council.
  2. If the governing body does not exercise its option to appoint a citizens advisory council pursuant to subsection A, the judge of the juvenile and domestic relations district court may appoint an advisory board of citizens, not to exceed 15 members, who shall perform the same duties as provided in this section.

    (Code 1950, § 16.1-157; 1956, c. 555; 1968, c. 435; 1977, c. 559; 1989, c. 733; 2012, cc. 164, 456.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 2, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 4, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 930, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "if state funds are provided, including all local costs, to carry out the purposes of this bill by the General Assembly." The funding was not provided.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 164 and 456 are identical, and deleted "hereof" following "subdivision 5" in subdivision A 3; deleted former subsections B and D pertaining to traveling expenses, and the selection of a member to serve on a central advisory council, respectively, and redesignated former subsection C as B; deleted "of this section" following "subsection A" in subsection C; and made minor stylistic changes.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, § 88.

Article 3. Jurisdiction and Venue.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1A M.J. Abortion, § 1; 4A M.J. Commonwealth's and State's Attorney, § 4; 6A M.J. Divorce and Alimony, § 69; 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, §§ 13, 82, 84; 11B M.J. Jurisdiction, § 21.

§ 16.1-241. Jurisdiction; consent for abortion.

The judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district court elected or appointed under this law shall be conservators of the peace within the corporate limits of the cities and the boundaries of the counties for which they are respectively chosen and within one mile beyond the limits of such cities and counties. Except as hereinafter provided, each juvenile and domestic relations district court shall have, within the limits of the territory for which it is created, exclusive original jurisdiction, and within one mile beyond the limits of said city or county, concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court or courts of the adjoining city or county, over all cases, matters and proceedings involving:

  1. The custody, visitation, support, control or disposition of a child:
    1. Who is alleged to be abused, neglected, in need of services, in need of supervision, a status offender, or delinquent except where the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has been terminated or divested;
    2. Who is abandoned by his parent or other custodian or who by reason of the absence or physical or mental incapacity of his parents is without parental care and guardianship; 2a. Who is at risk of being abused or neglected by a parent or custodian who has been adjudicated as having abused or neglected another child in the care of the parent or custodian;
    3. Whose custody, visitation or support is a subject of controversy or requires determination. In such cases jurisdiction shall be concurrent with and not exclusive of courts having equity jurisdiction, except as provided in § 16.1-244;
    4. Who is the subject of an entrustment agreement entered into pursuant to § 63.2-903 or 63.2-1817 or whose parent or parents for good cause desire to be relieved of his care and custody;
    5. Where the termination of residual parental rights and responsibilities is sought. In such cases jurisdiction shall be concurrent with and not exclusive of courts having equity jurisdiction, as provided in § 16.1-244;
    6. Who is charged with a traffic infraction as defined in § 46.2-100 ; or
    7. Who is alleged to have refused to take a blood test in violation of § 18.2-268.2 . In any case in which the juvenile is alleged to have committed a violent juvenile felony enumerated in subsection B of § 16.1-269.1, and for any charges ancillary thereto, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall be limited to conducting a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the act alleged and that the juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, and any matters related thereto. In any case in which the juvenile is alleged to have committed a violent juvenile felony enumerated in subsection C of § 16.1-269.1, and for all charges ancillary thereto, if the attorney for the Commonwealth has given notice as provided in subsection C of § 16.1-269.1, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall be limited to conducting a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the act alleged and that the juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, and any matters related thereto. A determination by the juvenile court following a preliminary hearing pursuant to subsection B or C of § 16.1-269.1 to certify a charge to the grand jury shall divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction over the charge and any ancillary charge. In any case in which a transfer hearing is held pursuant to subsection A of § 16.1-269.1, if the juvenile court determines to transfer the case, jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the case shall be divested as provided in § 16.1-269.6. In all other cases involving delinquent acts, and in cases in which an ancillary charge remains after a violent juvenile felony charge has been dismissed or a violent juvenile felony has been reduced to a lesser offense not constituting a violent juvenile felony, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall not be divested unless there is a transfer pursuant to subsection A of § 16.1-269.1. The authority of the juvenile court to adjudicate matters involving the custody, visitation, support, control or disposition of a child shall not be limited to the consideration of petitions filed by a mother, father or legal guardian but shall include petitions filed at any time by any party with a legitimate interest therein. A party with a legitimate interest shall be broadly construed and shall include, but not be limited to, grandparents, step-grandparents, stepparents, former stepparents, blood relatives and family members. A party with a legitimate interest shall not include any person (i) whose parental rights have been terminated by court order, either voluntarily or involuntarily, (ii) whose interest in the child derives from or through a person whose parental rights have been terminated by court order, either voluntarily or involuntarily, including, but not limited to, grandparents, stepparents, former stepparents, blood relatives and family members, if the child subsequently has been legally adopted, except where a final order of adoption is entered pursuant to § 63.2-1241 , or (iii) who has been convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 , § 18.2-63 , subsection B of § 18.2-366 , or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, when the child who is the subject of the petition was conceived as a result of such violation. The authority of the juvenile court to consider a petition involving the custody of a child shall not be proscribed or limited where the child has previously been awarded to the custody of a local board of social services. A1. Making specific findings of fact required by state or federal law to enable a child to apply for or receive a state or federal benefit. For the purposes of this subsection only, when the court has obtained jurisdiction over the case of any child, the court may continue to exercise its jurisdiction until such person reaches 21 years of age, for the purpose of entering findings of fact or amending past orders, to include findings of fact necessary for the person to petition the federal government for status as a special immigrant juvenile, as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
  2. The admission of minors for inpatient treatment in a mental health facility in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 (§ 16.1-335 et seq.) and the involuntary admission of a person with mental illness or judicial certification of eligibility for admission to a training center for persons with intellectual disability in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 8 (§ 37.2-800 et seq.) of Title 37.2. Jurisdiction of the involuntary admission and certification of adults shall be concurrent with the general district court.
  3. Except as provided in subsections D and H, judicial consent to such activities as may require parental consent may be given for a child who has been separated from his parents, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis and is in the custody of the court when such consent is required by law.
  4. Judicial consent for emergency surgical or medical treatment for a child who is neither married nor has ever been married, when the consent of his parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis is unobtainable because such parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis (i) is not a resident of the Commonwealth, (ii) has his whereabouts unknown, (iii) cannot be consulted with promptness, reasonable under the circumstances, or (iv) fails to give such consent or provide such treatment when requested by the judge to do so.
  5. Any person charged with deserting, abandoning or failing to provide support for any person in violation of law.
  6. Any parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis of a child:
    1. Who has been abused or neglected;
    2. Who is the subject of an entrustment agreement entered into pursuant to § 63.2-903 or 63.2-1817 or is otherwise before the court pursuant to subdivision A 4; or
    3. Who has been adjudicated in need of services, in need of supervision, or delinquent, if the court finds that such person has by overt act or omission induced, caused, encouraged or contributed to the conduct of the child complained of in the petition.
  7. Petitions filed by or on behalf of a child or such child's parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis for the purpose of obtaining treatment, rehabilitation or other services that are required by law to be provided for that child or such child's parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis. Jurisdiction in such cases shall be concurrent with and not exclusive of that of courts having equity jurisdiction as provided in § 16.1-244.
  8. Judicial consent to apply for a work permit for a child when such child is separated from his parents, legal guardian or other person standing in loco parentis.
  9. The prosecution and punishment of persons charged with ill-treatment, abuse, abandonment or neglect of children or with any violation of law that causes or tends to cause a child to come within the purview of this law, or with any other offense against the person of a child. In prosecution for felonies over which the court has jurisdiction, jurisdiction shall be limited to determining whether or not there is probable cause.
  10. All offenses in which one family or household member is charged with an offense in which another family or household member is the victim and all offenses under § 18.2-49.1 . In prosecution for felonies over which the court has jurisdiction, jurisdiction shall be limited to determining whether or not there is probable cause. Any objection based on jurisdiction under this subsection shall be made before a jury is impaneled and sworn in a jury trial or, in a nonjury trial, before the earlier of when the court begins to hear or receive evidence or the first witness is sworn, or it shall be conclusively waived for all purposes. Any such objection shall not affect or be grounds for challenging directly or collaterally the jurisdiction of the court in which the case is tried.
  11. Petitions filed by a natural parent, whose parental rights to a child have been voluntarily relinquished pursuant to a court proceeding, to seek a reversal of the court order terminating such parental rights. No such petition shall be accepted, however, after the child has been placed in the home of adoptive parents.
  12. Any person who seeks spousal support after having separated from his spouse. A decision under this subdivision shall not be res judicata in any subsequent action for spousal support in a circuit court. A circuit court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction in all causes of action under this subdivision.
  13. Petitions filed for the purpose of obtaining an order of protection pursuant to § 16.1-253.1, 16.1-253.4, or 16.1-279.1, and all petitions filed for the purpose of obtaining an order of protection pursuant to § 19.2-152.8, 19.2-152.9, or 19.2-152.10 if either the alleged victim or the respondent is a juvenile.
  14. Any person who escapes or remains away without proper authority from a residential care facility in which he had been placed by the court or as a result of his commitment to the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice.
  15. Petitions for emancipation of a minor pursuant to Article 15 (§ 16.1-331 et seq.).
  16. Petitions for enforcement of administrative support orders entered pursuant to Chapter 19 (§ 63.2-1900 et seq.) of Title 63.2, or by another state in the same manner as if the orders were entered by a juvenile and domestic relations district court upon the filing of a certified copy of such order in the juvenile and domestic relations district court.
  17. Petitions for a determination of parentage pursuant to Chapter 3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of Title 20. A circuit court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction to the extent provided for in § 20-49.2 .
  18. [Repealed.]
  19. Petitions filed by school boards against parents pursuant to §§ 16.1-241.2 and 22.1-279.3.
  20. Petitions to enforce any request for information or subpoena that is not complied with or to review any refusal to issue a subpoena in an administrative appeal regarding child abuse and neglect pursuant to § 63.2-1526 .
  21. Petitions filed in connection with parental placement adoption consent hearings pursuant to § 63.2-1233 . Such proceedings shall be advanced on the docket so as to be heard by the court within 10 days of filing of the petition, or as soon thereafter as practicable so as to provide the earliest possible disposition.
  22. Petitions filed for the purpose of obtaining the court's assistance with the execution of consent to an adoption when the consent to an adoption is executed pursuant to the laws of another state and the laws of that state provide for the execution of consent to an adoption in the court of the Commonwealth.
  23. Petitions filed by a juvenile seeking judicial authorization for a physician to perform an abortion if a minor elects not to seek consent of an authorized person. After a hearing, a judge shall issue an order authorizing a physician to perform an abortion, without the consent of any authorized person, if he finds that (i) the minor is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independent of the wishes of any authorized person, or (ii) the minor is not mature enough or well enough informed to make such decision, but the desired abortion would be in her best interest. If the judge authorizes an abortion based on the best interests of the minor, such order shall expressly state that such authorization is subject to the physician or his agent giving notice of intent to perform the abortion; however, no such notice shall be required if the judge finds that such notice would not be in the best interest of the minor. In determining whether notice is in the best interest of the minor, the judge shall consider the totality of the circumstances; however, he shall find that notice is not in the best interest of the minor if he finds that (a) one or more authorized persons with whom the minor regularly and customarily resides is abusive or neglectful and (b) every other authorized person, if any, is either abusive or neglectful or has refused to accept responsibility as parent, legal guardian, custodian or person standing in loco parentis. The minor may participate in the court proceedings on her own behalf, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor. The court shall advise the minor that she has a right to counsel and shall, upon her request, appoint counsel for her. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provisions of this subsection shall govern proceedings relating to consent for a minor's abortion. Court proceedings under this subsection and records of such proceedings shall be confidential. Such proceedings shall be given precedence over other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay in order to serve the best interests of the minor. Court proceedings under this subsection shall be heard and decided as soon as practicable but in no event later than four days after the petition is filed. An expedited confidential appeal to the circuit court shall be available to any minor for whom the court denies an order authorizing an abortion without consent or without notice. Any such appeal shall be heard and decided no later than five days after the appeal is filed. The time periods required by this subsection shall be subject to subsection B of § 1-210 . An order authorizing an abortion without consent or without notice shall not be subject to appeal. No filing fees shall be required of the minor at trial or upon appeal. If either the original court or the circuit court fails to act within the time periods required by this subsection, the court before which the proceeding is pending shall immediately authorize a physician to perform the abortion without consent of or notice to an authorized person. Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to authorize a physician to perform an abortion on a minor in circumstances or in a manner that would be unlawful if performed on an adult woman. A physician shall not knowingly perform an abortion upon an unemancipated minor unless consent has been obtained or the minor delivers to the physician a court order entered pursuant to this section and the physician or his agent provides such notice as such order may require. However, neither consent nor judicial authorization nor notice shall be required if the minor declares that she is abused or neglected and the attending physician has reason to suspect that the minor may be an abused or neglected child as defined in § 63.2-100 and reports the suspected abuse or neglect in accordance with § 63.2-1509 ; or if there is a medical emergency, in which case the attending physician shall certify the facts justifying the exception in the minor's medical record. For purposes of this subsection: "Authorization" means the minor has delivered to the physician a notarized, written statement signed by an authorized person that the authorized person knows of the minor's intent to have an abortion and consents to such abortion being performed on the minor. "Authorized person" means (i) a parent or duly appointed legal guardian or custodian of the minor or (ii) a person standing in loco parentis, including, but not limited to, a grandparent or adult sibling with whom the minor regularly and customarily resides and who has care and control of the minor. Any person who knows he is not an authorized person and who knowingly and willfully signs an authorization statement consenting to an abortion for a minor is guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. "Consent" means that (i) the physician has given notice of intent to perform the abortion and has received authorization from an authorized person, or (ii) at least one authorized person is present with the minor seeking the abortion and provides written authorization to the physician, which shall be witnessed by the physician or an agent thereof. In either case, the written authorization shall be incorporated into the minor's medical record and maintained as a part thereof. "Medical emergency" means any condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of the pregnant minor as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create a serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. "Notice of intent to perform the abortion" means that (i) the physician or his agent has given actual notice of his intention to perform such abortion to an authorized person, either in person or by telephone, at least 24 hours previous to the performance of the abortion or (ii) the physician or his agent, after a reasonable effort to notify an authorized person, has mailed notice to an authorized person by certified mail, addressed to such person at his usual place of abode, with return receipt requested, at least 72 hours prior to the performance of the abortion. "Perform an abortion" means to interrupt or terminate a pregnancy by any surgical or nonsurgical procedure or to induce a miscarriage as provided in § 18.2-72 , 18.2-73 , or 18.2-74 . "Unemancipated minor" means a minor who has not been emancipated by (i) entry into a valid marriage, even though the marriage may have been terminated by dissolution; (ii) active duty with any of the Armed Forces of the United States; (iii) willingly living separate and apart from his or her parents or guardian, with the consent or acquiescence of the parents or guardian; or (iv) entry of an order of emancipation pursuant to Article 15 (§ 16.1-331 et seq.).
  24. Petitions filed pursuant to Article 17 (§ 16.1-349 et seq.) relating to standby guardians for minor children.
  25. Petitions involving minors filed pursuant to § 32.1-45.1 relating to obtaining a blood specimen or test results.
  26. Petitions filed pursuant to § 16.1-283.3 for review of voluntary agreements for continuation of services and support for persons who meet the eligibility criteria for the Fostering Futures program set forth in § 63.2-919 . The ages specified in this law refer to the age of the child at the time of the acts complained of in the petition. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no fees shall be charged by a sheriff for the service of any process in a proceeding pursuant to subdivision A 3, except as provided in subdivision A 6 of § 17.1-272 , or subsection B, D, M, or R. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 18.2-71 , any physician who performs an abortion in violation of subsection W shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. Upon certification by the juvenile and domestic relations district court of any felony charge and ancillary misdemeanor charge committed by an adult or when an appeal of a conviction or adjudication of delinquency of an offense in the juvenile and domestic relations district court is noted, jurisdiction as to such charges shall vest in the circuit court, unless such case is reopened pursuant to § 16.1-133.1; a final judgment, order, or decree is modified, vacated, or suspended pursuant to Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1:1; or the appeal has been withdrawn in the juvenile and domestic relations district court within 10 days pursuant to § 16.1-133. (Code 1950, § 16.1-158; 1956, c. 555; 1960, c. 388; 1968, c. 225; 1970, cc. 232, 600; 1973, c. 440; 1976, cc. 42, 324; 1977, cc. 525, 559; 1978, c. 648; 1979, cc. 597, 605, 628; 1980, cc. 527, 529; 1981, cc. 454, 475, 488, 491, 501, 502, 510; 1982, c. 46; 1983, c. 280; 1984, cc. 631, 645, 651, 665, 669; 1985, c. 270; 1986, cc. 59, 506; 1987, c. 632; 1988, cc. 797, 906; 1989, cc. 368, 733; 1990, cc. 704, 975; 1991, cc. 511, 715; 1992, cc. 585, 742; 1994, cc. 575, 719, 813, 859, 949; 1995, cc. 7, 665, 772, 826, 852; 1996, cc. 755, 914; 1997, cc. 690, 708; 1998, c. 829; 1999, cc. 697, 721, 1028; 2000, c. 830; 2003, cc. 229, 960, 962; 2004, c. 588; 2005, cc. 716, 839, 890; 2007, cc. 284, 370; 2008, cc. 164, 201; 2010, c. 402; 2012, cc. 424, 476, 507, 637; 2014, c. 653; 2017, c. 623; 2019, cc. 27, 412, 631; 2020, cc. 95, 732, 987, 988; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 187, 286.)

Cross references. - As to notice of right to counsel, see § 16.1-266.

As to the one year deadline for claims of error or defect, see § 16.1-272.1.

As to punishment for Class 3 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

As to visitation of child placed in foster care, see § 63.2-912 .

As to testimony of child by use of two-way closed-circuit television in civil proceedings involving alleged abuse or neglect of a child, see § 63.2-1521 . As to admission of out-of-court statements made by certain children in civil proceedings involving alleged abuse or neglect of a child, see § 63.2-1522 . As to use of videotaped statements of certain children who are complaining witnesses in civil proceedings involving alleged abuse or neglect of a child, see § 63.2-1523 .

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2003, cc. 960 and 962, cl. 2 provides: "That if the amendments made by this act to § 16.1-241 are ever temporarily or permanently restrained or enjoined by judicial order, the provisions of § 16.1-241 shall be enforced as though the amendments were not enacted; however, if such temporary or permanent restraining order or injunction is ever stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases to have effect, § 16.1-241, as amended by this act, shall have full force and effect."

Acts 2019, cc. 412 and 631 added subsection A1, which grants the juvenile and domestic relations district court's jurisdiction to make "specific findings of fact required by state or federal law to enable a child to apply for or receive a state or federal benefit." The Canales v. Orellana , 67 Va. App. 759, 800 S.E.2d 208 (2017) decision, was reached before the 2019 acts became effective.

The 1996 amendments. - The 1996 amendments by cc. 755 and 914 are identical, and substituted "terminated or divested" for "terminated under the provisions of § 16.1-269.6" in subdivision A 1, added the present second and third paragraphs of subdivision A 6, and substituted "or subsection B, D, M or R" for "subsections M or R" in the last paragraph.

The 1998 amendment added subsection W.

The 1999 amendments. - The 1999 amendment by cc. 697 and 721 are identical, and added "and" at the end of subdivision A 5; in subsection D, in clause (ii), inserted "has" and deleted "is" preceding "unknown," and deleted "he" at the beginning of clause (iii); added "or" at the end of subdivision F 2; and deleted the former fourth sentence in the second paragraph of subsection J, which read: "For purposes of this subsection, 'family or household member,' as defined in § 16.1-228, shall also be construed to include parent and child, stepparent and stepchild, brothers and sisters, and grandparent and grandchild, regardless of whether such persons reside in the same home."

The 1999 amendment by c. 1028 inserted " § 18.2-63 " in clause (ii) of the concluding paragraph of subsection A.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 830 substituted " § 63.1-219.48" for " § 63.1-231" at the end of clause (i) in the concluding paragraph of subsection A; and substituted " § 63.1-219.40" for " § 63.1-22.3" at the end of the first sentence in subsection U.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 229, in the first paragraph following subdivision A 6, twice substituted "14" for "fourteen," and in the third paragraph thereof, rewrote the third sentence, which formerly read: "A party with a legitimate interest shall not include any person (i) whose parental rights have been terminated by court order, either voluntarily or involuntarily, or any other person whose interest in the child derives from or through such person whose parental rights have been so terminated, including, but not limited to, grandparents, stepparents, former stepparents, blood relatives and family members, if the child subsequently has been legally adopted, except where a final order of adoption is entered pursuant to § 63.2-1241 , or (ii) who has been convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 , § 18.2-63 or subsection B of § 18.2-366 when the child who is the subject of the petition was conceived as a result of such violation"; substituted "10" for "ten" in subdivision U; and in subdivision V, in the paragraph defining "Notice of intent to perform the abortion," substituted "24" for "twenty-four," and "72" for "seventy-two."

The 2003 amendments by cc. 960 and 962 are identical, and substituted "14" for "fourteen" throughout the section; substituted "the Commonwealth" for "this Commonwealth" in subdivision D (i); substituted "that are" for "which are" in subdivision G; substituted "that causes" for "which causes" in subdivision I; substituted "10" for "ten" in subdivision U; and rewrote subdivision V.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 588 inserted "except as provided in subdivision A 6 of § 17.1-272 " near the end in the next-to-last paragraph of subsection W.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 716, effective October 1, 2005, rewrote subsection B and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2005 amendment by c. 839, effective October 1, 2005, substituted "subsection B of § 1-210 " for " § 1-13.3:1" in the sixth paragraph of subsection V; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2005 amendment by c. 890 inserted "or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction" in the last paragraph of subsection A; made a related change; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendments by cc. 284 and 370 are identical, and added subsection X.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 164 and 201 are identical, and added the second sentence of subsection Q.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 402 deleted former subsection X, which read: "Petitions filed pursuant to § 18.2-370.5 for an order allowing the petitioner to enter and be present on school or child day center property. In such cases jurisdiction shall be concurrent with and not exclusive of circuit courts."

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 424 added subsection V and redesignated former subsection V as W; substituted "subsection W" for "subsection V" in the last paragraph, and made related and minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 476 and 507 are identical, and substituted "persons with intellectual disability in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 8 ( § 37.2-800 et seq.) of Title 37.2" for "persons with mental retardation in accordance with the provisions of Chapters 1 ( § 37.2-100 et seq.) and 8 ( § 37.2-800 et seq.) of Title 37.2" at the end of the first sentence of subsection B; and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

The 2012 amendment by c. 637 added ", 16.1-253.4, or 16.1-279.1, and all petitions filed for the purpose of obtaining an order of protection pursuant to § 19.2-152.8, 19.2-152.9, or 19.2-152.10 if either the alleged victim or the respondent is a juvenile" at the end of subsection M; repealed former subsection R, whch read: "Petitions for the purpose of obtaining an emergency protective order pursuant to § 16.1-253.4."; and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 653 in the last paragraph of subsection A inserted "step-grandparents" in the second sentence.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 623, effective March 16, 2017, added subdivision A 7, and made related changes.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 27 added subsection Y.

The 2019 amendments by cc. 412 and 631 are identical, and added subsection A1.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 95 and 732 are identical, and inserted subsection Z.

The 2020 amendment by c. 987, in subsection A in the paragraph after subdivision 7, substituted "16 years" for "14 years" in the first and second sentences; and in subsection W in the last sentence of the third paragraph, substituted "(a)" and "(b)" for "(i)" and "(ii)," respectively.

The 2020 amendment by c. 988, in subsection A in the paragraph after subdivision 7, substituted "16 years" for "14 years" in the first and second sentences.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 187, effective July 1, 2021, added the last paragraph in the section.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 286, effective July 1, 2021, added the last sentence in subsection A1.

Law review. - For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989).

For 1994 survey of Virginia domestic relations law, see 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 981 (1994).

For 1995 survey of criminal law and procedure, see 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 951 (1995).

For an article relating to recent changes of formidable importance in major areas of domestic relations, both nationally and in Virginia, see 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1165 (1998).

For an article, "Legal Issues Involving Children," see 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1345 (1998).

For an article, "Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers," see 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 351 (1998).

For annual survey article on legal issues involving children, see 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 161 (2003).

For annual survey article, see "Family Law," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 135 (2013).

Research References. - Enforcement of Judgments and Liens in Virginia (Matthew Bender). Chapter 7 Family Support Obligations. § 7.5 Contempt. Rendleman.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-155. Petition for Protective Order - Family Abuse, et seq.

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality of parental notice provision. - The Parental Notice Act, as legislation that respects the fundamental interests of responsible parents in the rearing and in the educational, moral and religious development of their children, without unduly burdening the fundamental abortion right, is facially constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 1998).

The unmistakable implication in this section and the guidelines given by the supreme court to its lower courts is that, whenever possible, bypass petitions should be resolved within the four-day statutory period required for holding hearings and no more is required to sustain the statute against a facial challenge to its constitutionality. Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 1998).

The imposing confidentiality protections provided for in this and other statutes and promulgated by the supreme court in the form of instructions to the judges and clerks who will handle cases under the parental notification law, would be adequate to sustain a statute requiring parental consent and they are clearly adequate to sustain this statute requiring only notice. Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 1998).

Provided that a parental notice statute, such as this one, does not condition the minor's access to abortion upon notice to abusive or neglectful parents, absent parents who have not assumed their parental responsibilities or parents with similar relationships with their daughters, nothing more is required in order to withstand a facial challenge to its constitutionality. Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 1998).

Power of circuit court. - A circuit court possesses the inherent power to punish juveniles for criminal contempt for disobedience to its orders, decrees, and processes. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 318, 477 S.E.2d 7 (1996).

The juvenile code does not require a circuit court seeking to punish a juvenile for contempt of a court's subpoena power to refer the legal or factual issues to a separate juvenile and domestic relations court. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 318, 477 S.E.2d 7 (1996).

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District (JDR) court and a circuit court on appeal were not required to make findings supporting a child's application for Special Immigrant Juvenile status when awarding custody because these courts did not decide if any such findings made when awarding custody helped a child achieve such status. Canales v. Orellana, 67 Va. App. 759, 800 S.E.2d 208 (2017).

Jurisdiction. - This section grants the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases, matters and proceedings concerning a juvenile who is alleged to have been delinquent. Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405 , 527 S.E.2d 415 (2000), rev'd on other grounds, Pope v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 451, 559 S.E.2d 388 (2002).

The jurisdiction of a juvenile and domestic relations district court is remarkably broad and includes concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts over the custody, visitation and support of a child whose custody, visitation or support is a subject of controversy or requires determination. Croteau v. Croteau (In re Croteau), 246 Bankr. 254, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 302 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).

Subdivision A 1 of § 16.1-241, by its plain language, does not predicate subject matter jurisdiction on the residence of the child but grants exclusive jurisdiction to juvenile and domestic relations district courts over all cases, matters and proceedings involving the custody of a child who was alleged to be abused or neglected. Wilson v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 2606-02-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 405 (Ct. of Appeals July 15, 2003).

Circuit court properly declined jurisdiction over appellant mother's subsection K § 16.1-241 petition to reverse a prior adjudication terminating her parental rights because the phrase "adoptive parents" had to be interpreted to describe, as set forth in § 16.1-228, the residence of any natural person in which the child resided as a member of the household and in which he had been placed for the purposes of adoption; thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the petition because the child had been placed in the home of adoptive parents, even though a final order of adoption had not been entered. Segura v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 0858-07-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 93 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 26, 2008).

Because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction under subdivision A 3 of § 16.1-241 and § 20-124.3 to determine visitation for a person who was 18 years old, the appellant's motion was moot; therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the matter. Crossman v. Harrisonburg Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., No. 0632-08-2, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 369 (Aug. 5, 2008).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under § 17.1-513 over defendant's trial, even though under subsection A of this section, the juvenile and domestic relations district courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving a juvenile who was alleged to be delinquent, defined under § 16.1-228 as one under 18 years old, as defendant gave defendant's birthdate as December 13, 1986, and the indictment stated that the offense occurred on December 16, 2006. Hall v. Commonwealth, No. 2902-07-3, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 73 (Feb. 17, 2009).

Juvenile and domestic relations district court had subject matter jurisdiction under subdivision A 3 of § 16.1-241 to enter an order granting joint custody of a child to the mother and an adoptee because the custody of the child was the subject of controversy and/or required determination, and the rights of the biological father were also at issue; subdivision A 3 of § 16.1-241 does not restrict a juvenile and domestic relations district court's jurisdiction only to matters in which a disagreement exists between parents or other interested parties. Morgan v. Kifus, No. 0399-10-4, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 126 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 12, 2011).

Circuit court erred in finding that the juvenile and domestic relations (JDR) district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify an order because subsection A granted the JDR court the jurisdiction over that specified class of cases or controversies at issue in the order, which involves visitation of the parties' child. Minor v. Barrett, No. 0103-16-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 263 (Oct. 11, 2016).

Waiver of jurisdiction. - Nothing in either this section or § 16.1-244 permits the juvenile court to "waive" its jurisdiction and allow a party to bring an original action in the circuit court without meeting the statutory requirements. Willis v. Gamez, 20 Va. App. 75, 455 S.E.2d 274 (1995).

When the legislature enacted subsection (J), it created an exception to the general rule that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Burke v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 183, 510 S.E.2d 743 (1999).

Defendant waived his objection to the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction over his preliminary hearing by not raising such objection before trial in the circuit court. Burke v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 183, 510 S.E.2d 743 (1999).

Defendant waived jurisdictional objection to his preliminary hearing, where he failed to raise his objection before trial in circuit court. Waller v. Commonwealth, No. 0657-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 330 (Ct. of Appeals June 8, 1999).

Award of custody to non-parents. - Because there was sufficient evidence to show that child's father was unfit, there was a compelling state interest for the court to award custody to non-parents; the father, therefore, was not deprived of substantive due process and this section was not unconstitutional. Switzer v. Smith, Nos. 0779-00-3, 1159-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 454 (Ct. of Appeals July 31, 2001).

Court of appeals erred when the court upheld a circuit court's decision awarding custody of a child who had been adjudicated as abused and neglected and removed the child from the child's parents, pursuant to §§ 16.1-251 and 16.1-252, giving custody to the child's grandparents, based on the court's conclusion that language in subsection A of § 16.1-241 and subsection B of § 16.1-278.15 subordinated Virginia statutes on foster care to Virginia's general custody statutes. The only interpretation of Titles 16.1 and 20 that gave effect to both statutory schemes and the intent of the Virginia General Assembly was that a trial court had to make the specific factual findings required by the foster care statutes in a custody case involving a child who was subject to a foster care plan. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465 , 666 S.E.2d 361, 2008 Va. LEXIS 97 (2008).

Custody order did not violate Marriage Affirmation Amendment. - Custody order granting joint custody of a child to the mother and an adoptee was not void as violative of the Virginia Marriage Amendment, Va. Const., Art. I, § 15-A, or the Marriage Affirmation Act, § 20-45.3, because the custody order was premised on the adoptee's status as a party with a legitimate interest under subsection A of § 16.1-241 and stated that the adoptee was a fit and proper person to care for the minor child; there was no language in the custody order recognizing a legal relationship between the mother and adoptee or indicating the juvenile and domestic relations district court's decision to award joint custody to the adoptee was based on the relationship between the mother, adoptee, and father, rather than the relationship between the adoptee and child. Morgan v. Kifus, No. 0399-10-4, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 126 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 12, 2011).

Court had jurisdiction and authority to order mother's alcohol evaluation. - While defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she was a contributing factor to her daughter's need for supervision as required under this section, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that she contributed to the need for supervision and, therefore, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to order the alcohol evaluation. Hanson v. Commonwealth, No. 2899-95-3, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 206 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 1, 1997).

Circuit court retained jurisdiction over a juvenile's parole revocation proceeding. - Where the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over an appeal of a juvenile proceeding originally heard by the juvenile court, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to hear a parole revocation proceeding concerning the juvenile upon her release from the department of juvenile justice. Austin v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 33, 590 S.E.2d 68, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 676 (2003), aff'd, 268 Va. 439 , 604 S.E.2d 430 (2004).

Commonwealth not "victim" in all criminal cases. - Although it is true that the Commonwealth is the plaintiff party in any criminal case in the Virginia courts, one cannot infer from that fact that the Commonwealth is the victim in all criminal cases for purposes of applying this section. By the Commonwealth's rationale, no family or household member could ever be the victim of a crime committed by a family member, because the Commonwealth would be the victim. That analysis effectively would render subdivision J meaningless. Pope v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 130, 449 S.E.2d 269 (1994).

The term "party with a legitimate interest" means not only a party possessed of legal rights with respect to the child, but also any party having a cognizable and reasonable interest in maintaining a close relationship with the child. Thrift v. Baldwin, 23 Va. App. 18, 473 S.E.2d 715 (1996).

Person with a legitimate interest. - Great great stepaunt of a nine-year-old child was a family member under subsection A of § 16.1-241; because the statutory phrase "person with a legitimate interest" was to be broadly construed to accommodate the best interest of the child, the trial court erred in ruling the great great stepaunt was not a person with a legitimate interest. Joseph v. Portsmouth Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1984-05-1, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 264 (June 13, 2006).

"Adoptive parents." - Phrase "adoptive parents" in subsection K must be interpreted to describe, as set forth in § 16.1-228, the residence of any natural person in which the child resides as a member of the household and in which he has been placed for the purposes of adoption. Segura v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 0858-07-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 93 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 26, 2008).

Court did not have authority to order visitation by man determined not to be father. - Subdivision A of this section does not confer upon the juvenile and domestic relations district courts, or upon the circuit courts on appeal, authority and jurisdiction to order visitation with a child by one, not married to the mother, previously thought to be the father but later determined not to be. Kogon v. Ulerick, 12 Va. App. 595, 405 S.E.2d 441 (1991).

Although the adoption of the children by the defendants extinguished the plaintiffs' grandparental and sibling relationship, the blood relationship continued, and this section particularly confers standing to all plaintiffs to seek visitation. Thrift v. Baldwin, 23 Va. App. 18, 473 S.E.2d 715 (1996).

Forgery conviction vacated for lack of jurisdiction. - Because defendant's brother was the victim of forgery committed by defendant, the juvenile and domestic relations district court had exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine whether there was probable cause. Therefore, since defendant was never brought before a juvenile and domestic relations district court for the purpose of determining probable cause, or for any purpose, but rather was brought before the general district court which acted in the absence of jurisdiction and thus had no power to certify the case to the circuit court, the forgery conviction should be vacated. Pope v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 130, 449 S.E.2d 269 (1994).

Jurisdiction properly exercised. - The defendant burglarized the house of the widow of his father. He was brought before general district court for a preliminary hearing, indicted, and tried in the circuit court. The fact that the defendant was the illegitimate son of the victim's deceased husband was stipulated. The defendant contended that he was a stepchild of the victim and should have been tried under this section. Without a former marriage no stepchild is possible and the defendant fell under neither the technical definition of a stepchild nor in the statutory intent to protect and preserve family harmony. Consequently, the general district court was the proper forum for the defendant's criminal prosecution to begin. Bell v. Commonwealth, No. 0799-95-1, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 424 (Ct. of Appeals June 11, 1996).

Trial court did not err when it denied a mother's motion to dismiss the Virginia Beach Department of Social Services' action to terminate the mother's parental rights pursuant to § 16.1-283 based upon a petition filed in Norfolk because, even if a Virginia Beach juvenile and domestic relations court lacked jurisdiction to issue an emergency removal order pursuant to which the child was removed from the mother, the mother lost her parental rights through a petition that originated out of Norfolk, which was the proper venue under § 16.1-243 and had jurisdiction under this section. Paris v. City of Va. Beach Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2009-04-1, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 30 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 25, 2005).

Because trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under § 16.1-241 in earlier proceeding, any defects in order awarding mother custody rendered it voidable, not void. Department waived issue of whether the mother was a "party with a legitimate interest" to seek custody by failing to timely appeal the trial court's earlier order. Hudson v. Franklin County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0576-06-3, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 53 (Feb. 13, 2007).

Circuit court did not err in denying parents' motions to dismiss petitions filed by a county department of family services pursuant to subdivision A 1 of § 16.1-241 alleging that their children were abused and neglected because the circuit court had the power to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction since subsection B of § 16.1-251 was procedural and directory, rather than mandatory and jurisdictional, and the parents failed to show that they suffered any prejudice as a result of the juvenile and domestic relations district court's alleged failure to comply with subsection B of § 16.1-251; the department's action invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, upon appeal to the circuit court, the circuit court's jurisdiction was derivative of that of the district court, and therefore, if the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, so too did the circuit court upon appeal from the district court order. Marrison v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., 59 Va. App. 61, 717 S.E.2d 146, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 336 (2011).

Adoptive parents' failure to timely appeal the juvenile court's visitation order was of no legal consequence because there was no need for them to file a separate pleading to seek the termination of biological grandparents' visitation when entry of the order of adoption divested the grandparents of any right to visitation; the petition for adoption necessarily implied a question of the grandparents' ongoing visitation, and the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Harvey v. Flockhart, 65 Va. App. 131, 775 S.E.2d 427 (2015).

Juvenile and domestic relations court properly exercised jurisdiction over a father's motions to amend custody in cases transferred to the court because (1) the transferring court had statutory jurisdiction, (2) no appeal was pending at the time of transfer, (3) the transfer was statutorily authorized, and (4) any error not raised in the trial court was waived. Barrett v. Minor, No. 1250-16-3, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 284 (Oct. 23, 2018), appeal dismissed, mot. denied, sanctions allowed, 843 S.E.2d 749, 2020 Va. LEXIS 63 (2020).

Lack of jurisdiction. - Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear a mother's appeal because the circuit court's orders, that her children were abused or neglected or were at risk of abuse or neglect, were not final orders where the orders were adjudicatory in nature, did not make any of the seven statutory dispositions, and did not make any final determinations regarding custody. Byrd v. Petersburg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0782-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 203 (Ct. of Appeals July 19, 2016).

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District (JDR) court and a circuit court on appeal had no jurisdiction to make findings supporting a juvenile immigrant's application for Special Immigrant Juvenile status because no state or federal statute authorized or required such findings when deciding custody, as Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-241 did not authorize a JDR court to conduct a hearing for such purposes. Canales v. Orellana, 67 Va. App. 759, 800 S.E.2d 208 (2017).

Circuit court properly dismissed a mother's appeal-of an order denying her motions to restore her parental rights and for full custody of her child-for lack of jurisdiction because the mother was not a "party with a legitimate interest" where her parental rights had been terminated, the child adopted, and she had exhausted her appeals of that decision, and the record did not reflect that she filed any objections to the transcript with the clerk of the circuit court. Haney v. Roanoke City Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1219-16-3, No. 1220-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 86 (Mar. 21, 2017).

Exclusive, original jurisdiction. - This section provides that each juvenile and domestic relations district court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over proceedings involving delinquent children, unless the case is transferred to the circuit court. Tross v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 362, 464 S.E.2d 523 (1995).

The juvenile and domestic relations district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over criminal offenses alleged to have been committed by a juvenile. Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 38, 473 S.E.2d 724 (1996).

Circuit court had jurisdiction where defendant failed to prove he was under 18 when offenses were committed. - Although there was conflicting evidence as to defendant's age, credible evidence supported trial court's conclusion that defendant failed to meet his burden of proving he was less than 18 years of age on date offenses were committed, and therefore trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to set aside his conviction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Winston v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 746, 497 S.E.2d 141 (1998).

The circuit court, sitting as chancery court in divorce case, lacked jurisdiction to terminate father's parental rights and, with that termination, father's child support obligation. Church v. Church, 24 Va. App. 502, 483 S.E.2d 498 (1997).

Jurisdiction based on entrustment agreement. - By the plain language of this statutory provision, a valid and effective entrustment agreement which meets the requirements set forth in former § 63.1-56 (see now § 63.2-900 ) must be executed before the court may adjudicate a petition for the termination of parental rights. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Brown, 33 Va. App. 313, 533 S.E.2d 12 (2000).

Validity of entrustment agreements jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. - Parents did not waive their challenge to the validity of entrustment agreements signed by their children's aunt when the termination issue was tried de novo in the circuit court because the question of whether requirements of this section were met, and particularly whether the children were the subjects of a valid entrustment agreement, was jurisdictional in nature; because the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction could not be waived by the parties, the validity of the entrustment agreements was properly before the circuit court even assuming the parents had entered an agreed order in the juvenile and domestic relations court approving the execution of the challenged agreements. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Brown, 33 Va. App. 313, 533 S.E.2d 12 (2000).

Jurisdiction of circuit court coincident with juvenile and domestic relations court. - Because the jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear and decide the issues raised in a petition to terminate parental rights is wholly derivative of that of the juvenile and domestic relations court, its power to adjudicate such a petition is coincident with that of the lower court. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Brown, 33 Va. App. 313, 533 S.E.2d 12 (2000).

Authority to issue interlocutory order. - Trial court properly affirmed juvenile and domestic relations court's order which held the juvenile in contempt for failing to attend school, as § 16.1-241 A. provided the court with authority to issue the interlocutory order. B.P. v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 735, 568 S.E.2d 412, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 498 (2002).

Probable cause finding divested juvenile court of jurisdiction. - Defendant juvenile, tried as an adult on a charge of malicious wounding and convicted of the lesser included offense of unlawful wounding, could not have the case transferred back to the juvenile court, as once the juvenile court made a probable cause finding, the juvenile court had no further jurisdiction; under subdivision A 6 of § 16.1-241, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was limited to conducting a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the act alleged and that the juvenile was fourteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, and any matters related thereto. Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 448, 573 S.E.2d 324, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 765 (2002).

Applied in Ward v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Social Servs., 13 Va. App. 144, 408 S.E.2d 921 (1991); Fauquier County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Robinson, 20 Va. App. 142, 455 S.E.2d 734 (1995); Catron v. Morrison, 186 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); Calfee v. Calfee, 29 Va. App. 88, 509 S.E.2d 552 (1999); Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs. v. Nordel, 29 Va. App. 400, 512 S.E.2d 830 (1999).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

"Person with legitimate interest." - Since petitioner was a child's foster parent for the first eighteen months of the child's life, cared for the child continuously during that period, held the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfilled the same socializing functions as a natural family, she qualified as a "persona with a legitimate interest" and had standing to pursue her petition for custody of the child. Welch v. Wise County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 84 Va. Cir. 245, 2012 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Wise County Jan. 27, 2012).

While petitioner's name did not appear on the foster care agreement that placed a child in petitioner's home and was not the child's foster parent, petitioner was an approved foster care household member, she performed parental duties, and she contributed to the maintenance and well-being of the child; therefore, she qualified as a "persona with a legitimate interest" and had standing to pursue her petition for custody of the child. Welch v. Wise County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 84 Va. Cir. 245, 2012 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Wise County Jan. 27, 2012).

Finding that a child is at risk of being abused or neglected. - Although parents claimed they did not cause their 11-month-old daughter's injuries and did not allow someone else to cause her injuries, a doctor's testimony that the child displayed symptoms of shaken baby syndrome was sufficient for the court to find that the child was abused or neglected, within the meaning of § 16.1-228, and the court found that the child was abused or neglected and that her two-year-old brother was a child at risk of being abused or neglected because of the injuries his sister sustained. In re McBride, 60 Va. Cir. 261, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 391 (Richmond 2002).

Jurisdiction over child in need of services petition. - Juvenile court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over the petition the city social services agency filed that alleged the minor child was a child in need of services and that continued placement in the home would be contrary to the minor child's welfare; evidence showing that the mother had previously abused the minor child's brother was sufficient to invoke the juvenile court's equitable jurisdiction even though the evidence did not show that the minor child had been abused, as the juvenile court was authorized to prevent the minor child's placement with a known abuser and did not have to wait for the minor child herself to be abused. Norfolk Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Petermore, 63 Va. Cir. 315, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 351 (Norfolk 2003).

Jurisdiction. - Motion filed by a mother and father to dismiss foster parents' adoption petition was granted because the case did not involve a parental placement within the meaning of §§ 63.2-1230 through 63.2-1240 when the custody order did not mention any placement for the purpose of foster care or adoption, and neither birth parent placed the child with the foster parents for adoption; jurisdiction could not rest on subdivision A 5 of § 16.1-241 because there was no pleading filed to request termination of parental rights, the juvenile court's order did not refer to a termination proceeding, and a separate proceeding was not instituted as required by subsection A of § 16.1-283. In re Terry, 78 Va. Cir. 25, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 272 (Henrico County 2008).

Because a mother nonsuited a petition for child support in the juvenile and domestic relations district court, her current petition for child support was not before the circuit court on an appeal; therefore, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the petition in that manner, and the filing of the petition in the circuit court was not an appropriate proceeding because child support was not incidental to the custody trial the circuit court would hear. Name Redacted by the Court, 96 Va. Cir. 393, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 173 (Fairfax County Sept. 20, 2017).

Father's motion to dismiss a mother's petition for child support for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was granted because the juvenile and domestic relations district court was not without jurisdiction to hear the petition, and there was no good cause to bring it before the circuit court; any perceived convenience for the parties did not amount to "good cause," especially when the juvenile and domestic relations district court retained jurisdiction to hear the petition. Name Redacted by the Court, 96 Va. Cir. 393, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 173 (Fairfax County Sept. 20, 2017).

Power of circuit court. - In a case in which a consent decree was entered in the juvenile and domestic relations district court in which a husband was ordered to pay spousal support through November 30, 2008, at which time the spousal support would terminate, and the husband later filed for divorce, the res judicata language of subsection L of § 16.1-241 did not apply to the consent decree entered by the juvenile and domestic relations district court. Since the consent decree was reduced to writing in a court order and signed by or on behalf of the husband and the wife, it constituted a binding stipulation or contract as contemplated by subsection C of § 20-109 , and, since it was filed before the entry of a final decree, the circuit court was prevented from entering a spousal support order contrary to the terms of the parties' agreement. Paul v. Paul, 77 Va. Cir. 124, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 250 (Salem 2008).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Juvenile court has jurisdiction over adult charged with driving in reckless manner which places juvenile in danger. - The juvenile court, and not the general district court, has jurisdiction to try a case involving an adult charged with driving in a reckless manner which places the person of a juvenile in danger. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Michael J. Valentine, Judge, Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, 01-021 (9/28/01).

Consent for medical treatment of minor by substitute judge. - Without a specific appointment, a substitute judge is not a sitting judge, and therefore should not be called upon by a hospital seeking judicial consent for medical treatment of a minor. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Charles E. Poston, Judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit, 01-112 (2/28/02).

§ 16.1-241.1.

Repealed by Acts 2002, c. 305.

§ 16.1-241.2. Proceedings against certain parents.

  1. Upon the failure of a parent to comply with the provisions of § 22.1-279.3, the school board may, by petition to the juvenile and domestic relations court, proceed against such parent for willful and unreasonable refusal to participate in efforts to improve the student's behavior as follows:
    1. If the court finds that the parent has willfully and unreasonably failed to meet, pursuant to a request of the principal as set forth in subsection D of § 22.1-279.3, to review the school board's standards of student conduct and the parent's responsibility to assist the school in disciplining the student, maintaining order, or ensuring the child's school attendance, and to discuss improvement of the child's behavior, school attendance, or educational progress, it may order the parent to so meet; or
    2. If the court finds that the parent has willfully and unreasonably failed to accompany a suspended student to meet with school officials pursuant to subsection F of § 22.1-279.3, or upon the student receiving a second suspension or being expelled, it may order (i) the student or his parent to participate in such programs or such treatment as the court deems appropriate to improve the student's behavior, including, but not limited to, extended day programs and summer school or other education programs and counseling, or (ii) the student or his parent to be subject to such conditions and limitations as the court deems appropriate for the supervision, care, and rehabilitation of the student or his parent; in addition, the court may order the parent to pay a civil penalty not to exceed $500.

      The court may use its contempt power to enforce any order entered under this section.

  2. The civil penalties established pursuant to this section shall be enforceable in the juvenile and domestic relations court or its successor in interest in which the student's school is located and shall be paid into a fund maintained by the appropriate local governing body to support programs or treatments designed to improve the behavior and school attendance of students as described in subdivision 2 of subsection G of § 22.1-279.3. Upon the failure to pay any civil penalties imposed by this section and § 22.1-279.3, the attorney for the appropriate county, city, or town shall enforce the collection of such civil penalties.
  3. For the purposes of this section and § 22.1-279.3, "parent" or "parents" means any parent, guardian, legal custodian, or other person having control or charge of a child.

    (1994, c. 813; 1995, c. 852; 1996, c. 771; 2004, c. 573.)

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 573, in subdivision A 1, deleted "and" preceding "maintaining order," inserted "or ensuring the child's school attendance," and substituted "school attendance" for "and"; inserted "the language "including, but not limited to ... and counseling" in clause (i) of subdivision A 2; substituted "may" for "shall not" in the last paragraph of subsection A; and inserted "and school attendance" in the first sentence of subsection B.

Law review. - For 2003/2004 survey of family and juvenile law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2004).

§ 16.1-241.3. Newborn children; substance abuse.

Upon the filing of a petition alleging that an investigation has been commenced in response to a report of suspected abuse or neglect of the child based upon a factor specified in subsection B of § 63.2-1509 , the court may enter any order authorized pursuant to this chapter which the court deems necessary to protect the health and welfare of the child pending final disposition of the investigation pursuant to Chapter 15 (§ 63.2-1500 et seq.) of Title 63.2 or other proceedings brought pursuant to this chapter. Such orders may include, but shall not be limited to, an emergency removal order pursuant to § 16.1-251, a preliminary protective order pursuant to § 16.1-253 or an order authorized pursuant to subdivisions A 1 through 4 of § 16.1-278.2. The fact that an order was entered pursuant to this section shall not be admissible as evidence in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding other than a proceeding to enforce the order.

The order shall be effective for a limited duration not to exceed the period of time necessary to conclude the investigation and any proceedings initiated pursuant to Chapter 15 (§ 63.2-1500 et seq.) of Title 63.2, but shall be a final order subject to appeal.

(1998, cc. 704, 716; 2002, c. 860; 2012, cc. 504, 640.)

Cross references. - As to filing of a petition pursuant to § 16.1-241.3 by a local social services department upon a report or complaint based upon one of the factors in § 63.2-1509 B, see § 63.2-1505 B 1 and § 63.2-1506 B 1.

Editor's note. - Acts 1998, c. 716, cl. 2 provides: "That on or before October 1, 1999, and each year thereafter for the following two years, the Department of Social Services shall report to the General Assembly on the implementation of this act. The report shall include data compiled in conjunction with the State Board of Medicine, the Department of Health, the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services [now the Department of Behavioral Health and Development Services] and the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, on the numbers of mothers and infants affected, the number of reports made pursuant to subsection A 1 of [former] § 63.1-248.3 [see now § 63.2-1509 ] and investigations resulting therefrom, the outcome of those investigations, the number of petitions filed with the juvenile courts pursuant to § 16.1-241.3 and the disposition on those petitions, the types of treatments and other services provided and such other information as representatives of those departments having expertise in perinatal addiction or abuse and neglect cases deem appropriate to a thorough evaluation of this act. For purposes of preparing this report, the departments and offices shall establish procedures which are necessary and appropriate to track cases involving suspected addiction of newborn infants during the period to be covered by the report."

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 860 substituted "subsection B" for "subsection A 1" in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 504 and 640 are identical, and in the first paragraph, deleted "within twenty-one days of a child's birth" following "filing of a petition" in the first sentence and substituted "subdivisions A 1 through 4 of § 16.1-278.2" for "subdivisions 1 through 4 of subsection A of § 16.1-278.2" at the end of the next-to-last sentence.

§ 16.1-242. Retention of jurisdiction.

When jurisdiction has been obtained by the court in the case of any child, such jurisdiction, which includes the authority to suspend, reduce, modify, or dismiss the disposition of any juvenile adjudication, may be retained by the court until such person becomes 21 years of age, except when the person is in the custody of the Department or when jurisdiction is divested under the provisions of § 16.1-244. In any event, when such person reaches the age of 21 and a prosecution has not been commenced against him, he shall be proceeded against as an adult, even if he was a juvenile when the offense was committed.

(Code 1950, § 16.1-159; 1956, c. 555; 1977, c. 559; 1978, c. 740; 1992, c. 509; 2018, c. 656.)

Cross references. - As to the Court-Appointed Special Advocate Program, see § 9.1-151 .

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

Acts 2018, c. 656, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act are declaratory of existing law."

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 656 inserted "which includes the authority to suspend, reduce, modify, or dismiss the disposition of any juvenile adjudication" in the first sentence and made minor stylistic changes.

Law review. - For discussion of retrial of infant as adult, see 4 U. Rich. L. Rev. 142 (1969). For comment, "The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in Virginia," see 14 U. Rich. L. Rev. 435 (1979).

For article, "Legal Issues Involving Children," see 26 U. Rich. L. Rev. 797 (1992).

CASE NOTES

Prosecution as adult after loss of jurisdiction. - A defendant who is charged with the commission of a crime when a juvenile and is not validly tried therefor before he reaches 21 years of age, is no longer within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court but may be proceeded against as an adult. Pruitt v. Guerry, 210 Va. 268 , 170 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

Statutes governing insanity defense not applicable in juvenile proceedings. - If the statutory scheme governing the disposition of persons acquitted by reason of insanity were available to a juvenile, that scheme's indeterminate period of commitment for inpatient hospitalization could run afoul of the limited duration of the juvenile and domestic relations district courts' jurisdiction pursuant to this section; therefore, the statutory provisions relating to the insanity defense are inapplicable in juvenile proceedings. Commonwealth v. Chatman, 260 Va. 562 , 538 S.E.2d 304, 2000 Va. LEXIS 131 (2000).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Probation revocation proceedings. - A juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a probationer although he has reached the age of twenty-one prior to a probation revocation proceeding. See opinion of Attorney General to Honorable Harvey L. Bryant, Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Virginia Beach, 05-037, 2005 Va. AG LEXIS 26 (6/20/05).

§ 16.1-242.1. Retention of jurisdiction; appeals involving children in foster care.

Upon appeal to the circuit court of any case involving a child placed in foster care and in any appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court of Virginia, the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction to continue to hear petitions filed pursuant to §§ 16.1-282 and 16.1-282.1. Orders of the juvenile court in such cases shall continue to be reviewed and enforced by the juvenile court until the circuit court, Court of Appeals or Supreme Court rules otherwise.

(1998, c. 550.)

CASE NOTES

Permanency planning. - Pursuant to the second sentence of the statute, the permanency planning orders continued to be reviewed and enforced by the juvenile and domestic relations district court until the trial court or appellate court ruled on the appeal of the orders because nothing in the statute indicates that the filing of a notice of appeal to the trial court for a permanency planning order renders that order void. Amirah Alfarqui v. Newport News Dep't of Human Servs., Nos. 0469-14-1, 0470-14-1, 0471-14-1, 0473-14-1, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 324 (Sept. 23, 2014).

§ 16.1-243. Venue.

  1. Original venue:
    1. Cases involving children, other than support or where protective order issued: Proceedings with respect to children under this law, except support proceedings as provided in subdivision 2 or family abuse proceedings as provided in subdivision 3, shall:
      1. Delinquency: If delinquency is alleged, be commenced in the city or county where the acts constituting the alleged delinquency occurred or they may, with the written consent of the child and the attorney for the Commonwealth for both jurisdictions, be commenced in the city or county where the child resides;
      2. Custody or visitation: In cases involving custody or visitation, be commenced in the court of the city or county which, in order of priority, (i) is the home of the child at the time of the filing of the petition, or had been the home of the child within six months before the filing of the petition and the child is absent from the city or county because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in the city or county; (ii) has significant connection with the child and in which there is substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships; (iii) is where the child is physically present and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent; or (iv) it is in the best interest of the child for the court to assume jurisdiction as no other city or county is an appropriate venue under the preceding provisions of this subdivision;
      3. Adoption: In parental placement adoption consent hearings pursuant to §§ 16.1-241, 63.2-1233 , and 63.2-1237 , be commenced in any city or county, provided, however, that diligent efforts shall first be made to commence such hearings (i) in the city or county where the child to be adopted was born, (ii) in the city or county where the birth parent(s) reside, or (iii) in the city or county where the prospective adoptive parent(s) reside. In cases in which a hearing is commenced in a city or county other than one described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii), the petitioner shall certify in writing to the court that diligent efforts to commence a hearing in such city or county have been made but have proven ineffective;
      4. Abuse and neglect: In cases involving an allegedly abused or neglected child, be commenced (i) in the city or county where the child resides, (ii) in the city or county where the child is present when the proceedings are commenced, or (iii) in the city or county where the alleged abuse or neglect occurred; and
      5. All other cases: In all other proceedings, be commenced in the city or county where the child resides or in the city or county where the child is present when the proceedings are commenced.
    2. Support: Proceedings that involve child or spousal support or child and spousal support, exclusive of proceedings arising under Chapter 5 (§ 20-61 et seq.) of Title 20, shall be commenced in the city or county where either party resides or in the city or county where the respondent is present when the proceeding commences.
    3. Family abuse: Proceedings in which an order of protection is sought as a result of family abuse shall be commenced where (i) either party has his or her principal residence (ii) the abuse occurred or (iii) a protective order was issued if at the time the proceeding is commenced the order is in effect to protect the petitioner or a family or household member of the petitioner.
  2. Transfer of venue:
    1. Generally: Except in custody, visitation and support cases, if the child resides in a city or county of the Commonwealth and the proceeding is commenced in a court of another city or county, that court may at any time, on its own motion or a motion of a party for good cause shown, transfer the proceeding to the city or county of the child's residence for such further action or proceedings as the court receiving the transfer may deem proper. However, such transfer may occur in delinquency proceedings only after adjudication, which shall include, for the purposes of this section, a finding of facts sufficient to justify a finding of delinquency.
    2. Custody and visitation: In custody and visitation cases, if venue lies in one of several cities or counties, the court in which the motion for transfer is made shall determine which such city or county is the most appropriate venue unless the parties mutually agree to the selection of venue. In the consideration of the motion, the best interests of the child shall determine the most appropriate forum.
    3. Support: In support proceedings, exclusive of proceedings arising under Chapter 5 (§ 20-61 et seq.) of Title 20, if the respondent resides in a city or county in the Commonwealth and the proceeding is commenced in a court of another city or county, that court may, at any time on its own motion or a motion of a party for good cause shown or by agreement of the parties, transfer the proceeding to the city or county of the respondent's residence for such further action or proceedings as the court receiving the transfer may deem proper. For the purposes of determining venue of cases involving support, the respondent's residence shall include any city or county in which the respondent has resided within the last six months prior to the commencement of the proceeding or in which the respondent is residing at the time that the motion for transfer of venue is made. If venue is transferable to one of several cities or counties, the court in which the motion for transfer is made shall determine which such city or county is the most appropriate venue unless the parties mutually agree to the selection of such venue. When the support proceeding is a companion case to a child custody or visitation proceeding, the provisions governing venue in the proceeding involving the child's custody or visitation shall govern.
    4. Subsequent transfers: Any court receiving a transferred proceeding as provided in this section may in its discretion transfer such proceeding to a court in an appropriate venue for good cause shown based either upon changes in circumstances or mistakes of fact or upon agreement of the parties. In any transfer of venue in cases involving children, the best interests of the child shall be considered in deciding if and to which court a transfer of venue would be appropriate.
    5. Enforcement of orders for support, maintenance and custody: Any juvenile and domestic relations district court to which a suit is transferred for enforcement of orders pertaining to support, maintenance, care or custody pursuant to § 20-79 (c) may transfer the case as provided in this section.
  3. Records: Originals of all legal and social records pertaining to the case shall accompany the transfer of venue. Records imaged from the original documents shall be considered original documents for purposes of the transfer of venue. The transferor court may, in its discretion, retain copies as it deems appropriate.

    (Code 1950, § 16.1-160; 1956, c. 555; 1977, c. 559; 1985, c. 367; 1987, cc. 598, 608, 620; 1989, c. 545; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1996, c. 866; 2000, c. 830; 2010, cc. 717, 760; 2012, c. 424; 2018, c. 17; 2019, cc. 126, 235.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1994, c. 564, cl. 1, and Acts 1996, c. 616, cl. 3, provides that the amendment to this section by Acts 1993, c. 929, cl. 1, shall become effective June 1, 1998, "only if state funds are provided by the General Assembly sufficient to provide adequate resources, including all local costs, for the court to carry out the purposes of this act and to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Commonwealth." The funding was not provided.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 830 substituted "63.1-219.40 and 63.1-219.44" for "and 63.1-220.3" in subdivision A 1 c.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendments by cc. 717 and 760 are identical, and in subsection C, inserted the second sentence and deleted "such" preceding "copies" in the last sentence.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 424 rewrote subdivision A 1 c, which formerly read "Adoption: In parental placement adoption consent hearings pursuant to §§ 16.1-241, 63.2-1233 and 63.2-1237 , be commenced (i) in the city or county where the child to be adopted was born, (ii) in the city or county where the birth parent(s) reside, or (iii) in the city or county where the prospective adoptive parent(s) reside" and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 17, in subdivision A 1 c, in the second sentence, substituted "clause (i), (ii), or (iii)" for "clauses (i) through (iii)"; inserted subdivision A 1 d and redesignated former subdivision A 1 d as A 1 e; and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendments by cc. 126 and 235 are identical, and substituted "may occur in delinquency proceedings only after adjudication, which shall include, for the purposes of this section, a finding of facts sufficient to justify a finding of delinquency" for "may occur only after adjudication in delinquency proceedings" in subdivision B 1.

Law review. - For 1987 survey of Virginia law as to children, see 21 U. Rich. L. Rev. 789 (1987).

For survey on domestic relations in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 561 (1989).

CASE NOTES

Propriety of action where child was removed pursuant to emergency removal ordered by court lacking jurisdiction. - Trial court did not err when it denied a mother's motion to dismiss the Virginia Beach Department of Social Services' action to terminate