Subtitle I. General Provisions Relating to Social Services.

Chapter 1. General Provisions.

§ 63.2-100. Definitions.

As used in this title, unless the context requires a different meaning:

“Abused or neglected child” means any child less than 18 years of age:

  1. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care creates or inflicts, threatens to create or inflict, or allows to be created or inflicted upon such child a physical or mental injury by other than accidental means, or creates a substantial risk of death, disfigurement, or impairment of bodily or mental functions, including, but not limited to, a child who is with his parent or other person responsible for his care either (i) during the manufacture or attempted manufacture of a Schedule I or II controlled substance, or (ii) during the unlawful sale of such substance by that child’s parents or other person responsible for his care, where such manufacture, or attempted manufacture or unlawful sale would constitute a felony violation of § 18.2-248 ;
  2. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care neglects or refuses to provide care necessary for his health. However, no child who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination shall for that reason alone be considered to be an abused or neglected child. Further, a decision by parents who have legal authority for the child or, in the absence of parents with legal authority for the child, any person with legal authority for the child, who refuses a particular medical treatment for a child with a life-threatening condition shall not be deemed a refusal to provide necessary care if (i) such decision is made jointly by the parents or other person with legal authority and the child; (ii) the child has reached 14 years of age and is sufficiently mature to have an informed opinion on the subject of his medical treatment; (iii) the parents or other person with legal authority and the child have considered alternative treatment options; and (iv) the parents or other person with legal authority and the child believe in good faith that such decision is in the child’s best interest. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to limit the provisions of § 16.1-278.4;
  3. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care abandons such child;
  4. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care commits or allows to be committed any act of sexual exploitation or any sexual act upon a child in violation of the law;
  5. Who is without parental care or guardianship caused by the unreasonable absence or the mental or physical incapacity of the child’s parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis;
  6. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care creates a substantial risk of physical or mental injury by knowingly leaving the child alone in the same dwelling, including an apartment as defined in § 55.1-2000 , with a person to whom the child is not related by blood or marriage and who the parent or other person responsible for his care knows has been convicted of an offense against a minor for which registration is required as a Tier III offender pursuant to § 9.1-902 ; or
  7. Who has been identified as a victim of sex trafficking or severe forms of trafficking as defined in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C § 7102 et seq., and in the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. If a civil proceeding under this title is based solely on the parent having left the child at a hospital or emergency medical services agency, it shall be an affirmative defense that such parent safely delivered the child to a hospital that provides 24-hour emergency services or to an attended emergency medical services agency that employs emergency medical services providers, within 14 days of the child’s birth. For purposes of terminating parental rights pursuant to § 16.1-283 and placement for adoption, the court may find such a child is a neglected child upon the ground of abandonment. “Adoptive home” means any family home selected and approved by a parent, local board or a licensed child-placing agency for the placement of a child with the intent of adoption. “Adoptive placement” means arranging for the care of a child who is in the custody of a child-placing agency in an approved home for the purpose of adoption. “Adult abuse” means the willful infliction of physical pain, injury or mental anguish or unreasonable confinement of an adult as defined in § 63.2-1603 . “Adult day care center” means any facility that is either operated for profit or that desires licensure and that provides supplementary care and protection during only a part of the day to four or more aged, infirm or disabled adults who reside elsewhere, except (i) a facility or portion of a facility licensed by the State Board of Health or the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, and (ii) the home or residence of an individual who cares for only persons related to him by blood or marriage. Included in this definition are any two or more places, establishments or institutions owned, operated or controlled by a single entity and providing such supplementary care and protection to a combined total of four or more aged, infirm or disabled adults. “Adult exploitation” means the illegal, unauthorized, improper, or fraudulent use of an adult as defined in § 63.2-1603 or his funds, property, benefits, resources, or other assets for another’s profit, benefit, or advantage, including a caregiver or person serving in a fiduciary capacity, or that deprives the adult of his rightful use of or access to such funds, property, benefits, resources, or other assets. “Adult exploitation” includes (i) an intentional breach of a fiduciary obligation to an adult to his detriment or an intentional failure to use the financial resources of an adult in a manner that results in neglect of such adult; (ii) the acquisition, possession, or control of an adult’s financial resources or property through the use of undue influence, coercion, or duress; and (iii) forcing or coercing an adult to pay for goods or services or perform services against his will for another’s profit, benefit, or advantage if the adult did not agree, or was tricked, misled, or defrauded into agreeing, to pay for such goods or services or to perform such services. “Adult foster care” means room and board, supervision, and special services to an adult who has a physical or mental condition. Adult foster care may be provided by a single provider for up to three adults. “Adult foster care” does not include services or support provided to individuals through the Fostering Futures program set forth in Article 2 (§ 63.2-917 et seq.) of Chapter 9. “Adult neglect” means that an adult as defined in § 63.2-1603 is living under such circumstances that he is not able to provide for himself or is not being provided services necessary to maintain his physical and mental health and that the failure to receive such necessary services impairs or threatens to impair his well-being. However, no adult shall be considered neglected solely on the basis that such adult is receiving religious nonmedical treatment or religious nonmedical nursing care in lieu of medical care, provided that such treatment or care is performed in good faith and in accordance with the religious practices of the adult and there is a written or oral expression of consent by that adult. “Adult protective services” means services provided by the local department that are necessary to protect an adult as defined in § 63.2-1603 from abuse, neglect or exploitation. “Assisted living care” means a level of service provided by an assisted living facility for adults who may have physical or mental impairments and require at least a moderate level of assistance with activities of daily living. “Assisted living facility” means any congregate residential setting that provides or coordinates personal and health care services, 24-hour supervision, and assistance (scheduled and unscheduled) for the maintenance or care of four or more adults who are aged, infirm or disabled and who are cared for in a primarily residential setting, except (i) a facility or portion of a facility licensed by the State Board of Health or the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, but including any portion of such facility not so licensed; (ii) the home or residence of an individual who cares for or maintains only persons related to him by blood or marriage; (iii) a facility or portion of a facility serving infirm or disabled persons between the ages of 18 and 21, or 22 if enrolled in an educational program for the handicapped pursuant to § 22.1-214, when such facility is licensed by the Department as a children’s residential facility under Chapter 17 (§ 63.2-1700 et seq.), but including any portion of the facility not so licensed; and (iv) any housing project for persons 62 years of age or older or the disabled that provides no more than basic coordination of care services and is funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or by the Virginia Housing Development Authority. Included in this definition are any two or more places, establishments or institutions owned or operated by a single entity and providing maintenance or care to a combined total of four or more aged, infirm or disabled adults. Maintenance or care means the protection, general supervision and oversight of the physical and mental well-being of an aged, infirm or disabled individual. “Auxiliary grants” means cash payments made to certain aged, blind or disabled individuals who receive benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended, or would be eligible to receive these benefits except for excess income. “Birth family” or “birth sibling” means the child’s biological family or biological sibling. “Birth parent” means the child’s biological parent and, for purposes of adoptive placement, means parent(s) by previous adoption. “Board” means the State Board of Social Services. “Child” means any natural person who is (i) under 18 years of age or (ii) for purposes of the Fostering Futures program set forth in Article 2 (§ 63.2-917 et seq.) of Chapter 9, under 21 years of age and meets the eligibility criteria set forth in § 63.2-919 . “Child-placing agency” means (i) any person who places children in foster homes, adoptive homes or independent living arrangements pursuant to § 63.2-1819 , (ii) a local board that places children in foster homes or adoptive homes pursuant to §§ 63.2-900 , 63.2-903 , and 63.2-1221 , or (iii) an entity that assists parents with the process of delegating parental and legal custodial powers of their children pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 20-166 et seq.) of Title 20. “Child-placing agency” does not include the persons to whom such parental or legal custodial powers are delegated pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 20-166 et seq.) of Title 20. Officers, employees, or agents of the Commonwealth, or any locality acting within the scope of their authority as such, who serve as or maintain a child-placing agency, shall not be required to be licensed. “Child-protective services” means the identification, receipt and immediate response to complaints and reports of alleged child abuse or neglect for children under 18 years of age. It also includes assessment, and arranging for and providing necessary protective and rehabilitative services for a child and his family when the child has been found to have been abused or neglected or is at risk of being abused or neglected. “Child support services” means any civil, criminal or administrative action taken by the Division of Child Support Enforcement to locate parents; establish paternity; and establish, modify, enforce, or collect child support, or child and spousal support. “Child-welfare agency” means a child-placing agency, children’s residential facility, or independent foster home. “Children’s residential facility” means any facility, child-caring institution, or group home that is maintained for the purpose of receiving children separated from their parents or guardians for full-time care, maintenance, protection and guidance, or for the purpose of providing independent living services to persons between 18 and 21 years of age who are in the process of transitioning out of foster care. Children’s residential facility shall not include: “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of the Department, his designee or authorized representative. “Department” means the State Department of Social Services. “Department of Health and Human Services” means the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States government or any department or agency thereof that may hereafter be designated as the agency to administer the Social Security Act, as amended. “Disposable income” means that part of the income due and payable of any individual remaining after the deduction of any amount required by law to be withheld. “Energy assistance” means benefits to assist low-income households with their home heating and cooling needs, including, but not limited to, purchase of materials or substances used for home heating, repair or replacement of heating equipment, emergency intervention in no-heat situations, purchase or repair of cooling equipment, and payment of electric bills to operate cooling equipment, in accordance with § 63.2-805 , or provided under the Virginia Energy Assistance Program established pursuant to the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981 (Title XXVI of Public Law 97-35), as amended. “Family and permanency team” means the group of individuals assembled by the local department to assist with determining planning and placement options for a child, which shall include, as appropriate, all biological relatives and fictive kin of the child, as well as any professionals who have served as a resource to the child or his family, such as teachers, medical or mental health providers, and clergy members. In the case of a child who is 14 years of age or older, the family and permanency team shall also include any members of the child’s case planning team that were selected by the child in accordance with subsection A of § 16.1-281. “Federal-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program” means a program consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 673 that provides, subject to a kinship guardianship assistance agreement developed in accordance with § 63.2-1305 , payments to eligible individuals who have received custody of a child of whom they had been the foster parents. “Fictive kin” means persons who are not related to a child by blood or adoption but have an established relationship with the child or his family. “Foster care placement” means placement of a child through (i) an agreement between the parents or guardians and the local board where legal custody remains with the parents or guardians or (ii) an entrustment or commitment of the child to the local board or licensed child-placing agency. “Foster care placement” does not include placement of a child in accordance with a power of attorney pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 20-166 et seq.) of Title 20. “Foster home” means a residence approved by a child-placing agency or local board in which any child, other than a child by birth or adoption of such person or a child who is the subject of a power of attorney to delegate parental or legal custodial powers by his parents or legal custodian to the natural person who has been designated the child’s legal guardian pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 20-166 et seq.) of Title 20 and who exercises legal authority over the child on a continuous basis for at least 24 hours without compensation, resides as a member of the household. “General relief” means money payments and other forms of relief made to those persons mentioned in § 63.2-802 in accordance with the regulations of the Board and reimbursable in accordance with § 63.2-401 . “Independent foster home” means a private family home in which any child, other than a child by birth or adoption of such person, resides as a member of the household and has been placed therein independently of a child-placing agency except (i) a home in which are received only children related by birth or adoption of the person who maintains such home and children of personal friends of such person; (ii) a home in which is received a child or children committed under the provisions of subdivision A 4 of § 16.1-278.2, subdivision 6 of § 16.1-278.4, or subdivision A 13 of § 16.1-278.8; and (iii) a home in which are received only children who are the subject of a properly executed power of attorney pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 20-166 et seq.) of Title 20. “Independent living” means a planned program of services designed to assist a child age 16 and over and persons who are former foster care children or were formerly committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice and are between the ages of 18 and 21 in transitioning to self-sufficiency. “Independent living arrangement” means placement of (i) a child at least 16 years of age who is in the custody of a local board or licensed child-placing agency by the local board or licensed child-placing agency or (ii) a child at least 16 years of age or a person between the ages of 18 and 21 who was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice immediately prior to placement by the Department of Juvenile Justice, in a living arrangement in which such child or person does not have daily substitute parental supervision. “Independent living services” means services and activities provided to a child in foster care 14 years of age or older who was committed or entrusted to a local board of social services, child welfare agency, or private child-placing agency. “Independent living services” may also mean services and activities provided to a person who (i) was in foster care on his 18th birthday and has not yet reached the age of 21 years; (ii) is between the ages of 18 and 21 and who, immediately prior to his commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, was in the custody of a local board of social services; or (iii) is a child at least 16 years of age or a person between the ages of 18 and 21 who was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice immediately prior to placement in an independent living arrangement. Such services shall include counseling, education, housing, employment, and money management skills development, access to essential documents, and other appropriate services to help children or persons prepare for self-sufficiency. “Independent physician” means a physician who is chosen by the resident of the assisted living facility and who has no financial interest in the assisted living facility, directly or indirectly, as an owner, officer, or employee or as an independent contractor with the residence. “Intercountry placement” means the arrangement for the care of a child in an adoptive home or foster care placement into or out of the Commonwealth by a licensed child-placing agency, court, or other entity authorized to make such placements in accordance with the laws of the foreign country under which it operates. “Interstate placement” means the arrangement for the care of a child in an adoptive home, foster care placement or in the home of the child’s parent or with a relative or nonagency guardian, into or out of the Commonwealth, by a child-placing agency or court when the full legal right of the child’s parent or nonagency guardian to plan for the child has been voluntarily terminated or limited or severed by the action of any court. “Kinship care” means the full-time care, nurturing, and protection of children by relatives. “Kinship guardian” means the adult relative of a child in a kinship guardianship established in accordance with § 63.2-1305 or 63.2-1306 who has been awarded custody of the child by the court after acting as the child’s foster parent. “Kinship guardianship” means a relationship established in accordance with § 63.2-1305 or 63.2-1306 between a child and an adult relative of the child who has formerly acted as the child’s foster parent that is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining as evidenced by the transfer by the court to the adult relative of the child of the authority necessary to ensure the protection, education, care and control, and custody of the child and the authority for decision making for the child. “Local board” means the local board of social services representing one or more counties or cities. “Local department” means the local department of social services of any county or city in this Commonwealth. “Local director” means the director or his designated representative of the local department of the city or county. “Merit system plan” means those regulations adopted by the Board in the development and operation of a system of personnel administration meeting requirements of the federal Office of Personnel Management. “Parental placement” means locating or effecting the placement of a child or the placing of a child in a family home by the child’s parent or legal guardian for the purpose of foster care or adoption. “Public assistance” means Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); auxiliary grants to the aged, blind and disabled; medical assistance; energy assistance; food stamps; employment services; child care; and general relief. “Qualified assessor” means an entity contracting with the Department of Medical Assistance Services to perform nursing facility pre-admission screening or to complete the uniform assessment instrument for a home and community-based waiver program, including an independent physician contracting with the Department of Medical Assistance Services to complete the uniform assessment instrument for residents of assisted living facilities, or any hospital that has contracted with the Department of Medical Assistance Services to perform nursing facility pre-admission screenings. “Qualified individual” means a trained professional or licensed clinician who is not an employee of the local board of social services or licensed child-placing agency that placed the child in a qualified residential treatment program and is not affiliated with any placement setting in which children are placed by such local board of social services or licensed child-placing agency. “Qualified residential treatment program” means a program that (i) provides 24-hour residential placement services for children in foster care; (ii) has adopted a trauma-informed treatment model that meets the clinical and other needs of children with serious emotional or behavioral disorders, including any clinical or other needs identified through assessments conducted pursuant to clause (viii) of this definition; (iii) employs registered or licensed nursing and other clinical staff who provide care, on site and within the scope of their practice, and are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; (iv) conducts outreach with the child’s family members, including efforts to maintain connections between the child and his siblings and other family; documents and maintains records of such outreach efforts; and maintains contact information for any known biological family and fictive kin of the child; (v) whenever appropriate and in the best interest of the child, facilitates participation by family members in the child’s treatment program before and after discharge and documents the manner in which such participation is facilitated; (vi) provides discharge planning and family-based aftercare support for at least six months after discharge; (vii) is licensed in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) and accredited by an organization approved by the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services; and (viii) requires that any child placed in the program receive an assessment within 30 days of such placement by a qualified individual that (a) assesses the strengths and needs of the child using an age-appropriate, evidence-based, validated, and functional assessment tool approved by the Commissioner of Social Services; (b) identifies whether the needs of the child can be met through placement with a family member or in a foster home or, if not, in a placement setting authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 672(k)(2), including a qualified residential treatment program, that would provide the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment and be consistent with the short-term and long-term goals established for the child in his foster care or permanency plan; (c) establishes a list of short-term and long-term mental and behavioral health goals for the child; and (d) is documented in a written report to be filed with the court prior to any hearing on the child’s placement pursuant to § 16.1-281, 16.1-282, 16.1-282.1, or 16.1-282.2. “Residential living care” means a level of service provided by an assisted living facility for adults who may have physical or mental impairments and require only minimal assistance with the activities of daily living. The definition of “residential living care” includes the services provided by independent living facilities that voluntarily become licensed. “Sibling” means each of two or more children having one or more parents in common. “Social services” means foster care, adoption, adoption assistance, child-protective services, domestic violence services, or any other services program implemented in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board. Social services also includes adult services pursuant to Article 4 (§ 51.5-144 et seq.) of Chapter 14 of Title 51.5 and adult protective services pursuant to Article 5 (§ 51.5-148 ) of Chapter 14 of Title 51.5 provided by local departments of social services in accordance with regulations and under the supervision of the Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services. “Special order” means an order imposing an administrative sanction issued to any party licensed pursuant to this title by the Commissioner that has a stated duration of not more than 12 months. A special order shall be considered a case decision as defined in § 2.2-4001 . “State-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program” means a program that provides payments to eligible individuals who have received custody of a relative child subject to a kinship guardianship assistance agreement developed in accordance with § 63.2-1306 . “Supervised independent living setting” means the residence of a person 18 years of age or older who is participating in the Fostering Futures program set forth in Article 2 (§ 63.2-917 et seq.) of Chapter 9 where supervision includes a monthly visit with a service worker or, when appropriate, contracted supervision. “Supervised independent living setting” does not include residential facilities or group homes. “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families” or “TANF” means the program administered by the Department through which a relative can receive monthly cash assistance for the support of his eligible children. “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families-Unemployed Parent” or “TANF-UP” means the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program for families in which both natural or adoptive parents of a child reside in the home and neither parent is exempt from Virginia Initiative for Education and Work (VIEW) participation under § 63.2-609 . “Title IV-E Foster Care” means a federal program authorized under §§ 472 and 473 of the Social Security Act, as amended, and administered by the Department through which foster care is provided on behalf of qualifying children.

1. A licensed or accredited educational institution whose pupils, in the ordinary course of events, return annually to the homes of their parents or guardians for not less than two months of summer vacation;

2. An establishment required to be licensed as a summer camp by § 35.1-18 ; and

3. A licensed or accredited hospital legally maintained as such.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-101, 63-222, 63-232, 63-347, 63-351; 1954, cc. 259, 290, 489; 1956, cc. 300, 641; 1960, cc. 331, 390; 1962, cc. 297, 603; 1966, c. 423; 1968, cc. 578, 585, §§ 63.1-87, 63.1-172, 63.1-195, 63.1-220; 1970, c. 721; 1972, cc. 73, 540, 718; 1973, c. 227; 1974, cc. 44, 45, 413, 415, § 63.1-250; 1975, cc. 287, 299, 311, 341, 437, 507, 524, 528, 596, §§ 63.1-238.1, 63.1-248.2; 1976, cc. 357, 649; 1977, cc. 105, 241, 532, 547, 559, 567, 634, 645, §§ 63.1-55.2, 63.1-55.8; 1978, cc. 536, 730, 749, 750; 1979, c. 483; 1980, cc. 40, 284; 1981, cc. 75, 123, 359; 1983, c. 66; 1984, cc. 74, 76, 498, 535, 781; 1985, cc. 17, 285, 384, 488, 518; 1986, cc. 80, 281, 308, 437, 594; 1987, cc. 627, 650, 681; 1988, c. 906; 1989, cc. 307, 647; 1990, c. 760; 1991, cc. 534, 595, 651, 694; 1992 c. 356, § 63.1-194.1; 1993, cc. 730, 742, 957, 993, § 63.1-196.001; 1994, cc. 107, 837, 865, 940; 1995, cc. 401, 520, 649, 772, 826; 1997, cc. 796, 895; 1998, cc. 115, 126, 397, 552, 727, 850; 1999, c. 454; 2000, cc. 61, 290, 500, 830, 845, 1058, § 63.1-219.7; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 467; 2004, cc. 70, 196, 245, 753, 814; 2006, c. 868; 2007, cc. 479, 597; 2008, cc. 475, 483; 2009, cc. 705, 813, 840; 2011, cc. 5, 156; 2012, cc. 803, 835; 2013, cc. 5, 362, 564; 2015, cc. 502, 503, 758, 770; 2016, c. 631; 2017, c. 195; 2018, cc. 497, 769, 770; 2019, cc. 210, 282, 297, 688; 2020, cc. 95, 224, 366, 732, 829, 860, 861; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 254.

Cross references.

As to foster care services for a child who is abused or neglected or in need of services, see § 63.2-905 .

As to public bodies charged with the administration of public assistance programs being exempt from the Virginia Public Procurement Act, see § 2.2-4345 .

As to number of persons in foster care being a factor in the distribution formula for law-enforcement expenditures, see § 9.1-165 . As to automatic notification of registration of sex offenders to certain entities, see § 9.1-914 . As to zoning provisions for family day homes, see § 15.2-2292 . As to sex offenses prohibiting proximity to children, see § 18.2-370.2 . As to sex offenses prohibiting residing in proximity to children, see § 18.2-370.3 .

Transition provisions.

In accordance with § 30-149 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia Code Commission undertook the recodification of Title 63.1 of the Code of Virginia. This title, dealing with social services, was last revised in 1968. Since that time, the Department of Social Services has undergone extensive administrative and programmatic changes, including welfare reform. Revising this title provided an opportunity to delete provisions made obsolete by federal law and to update nomenclature. Also, the Departments of Blind and Vision Impaired and Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing were transferred out of Title 63.1 and into Title 51.5.

The Virginia Code Commission began working on this recodification in 2000. Staff utilized informal work groups made up of Department of Social Services staff and others with expertise in the field of social services to assist staff in making recommendations to the Code Commission. A draft report detailing the work of the Virginia Code Commission between June 2000 and October 2001 was circulated for public comment. The Commission completed its work on Title 63.1 and the recodification bill was introduced and passed at the 2002 Session of the General Assembly and signed by the Governor, as Acts 2002, Chapter 747.

Where appropriate, the historical citations to former sections have been added to corresponding new sections.

Many of the case notes appearing in this title were decided under corresponding former sections or under prior law.

For tables of corresponding former and new sections, see the tables in Volume 10.

Acts 2002, c. 747, cl. 3, provides: “That whenever any of the conditions, requirements, provisions or contents of any section or chapter of Title 63.1 or any other title of the Code of Virginia as such titles existed prior to October 1, 2002, are transferred in the same or modified form to a new section or chapter of Title 63.2 or any other title of the Code and whenever any such former section or chapter is given a new number in title 63.2 or any other title, all references to any such former section or chapter of Title 63.1 or other title appearing in this Code shall be construed to apply to the new or renumbered section or chapter containing such conditions, requirements, provisions, contents or portions thereof.”

Acts 2002, c. 747, cl. 4, provides: “That the regulations of any department or agency affected by the revision of Title 63.1 or such other titles in effect on the effective date of this act shall continue in effect to the extent that they are not in conflict with this act and shall be deemed to be regulations adopted under this act.”

Acts 2002, c. 747, cl. 5, provides: “That this title revision of Title 63.1 as Title 63.2 shall not be construed to require the reappointment of any officer or any member of a board, council, committee or other appointed body referred to in Title 63.2 and each such officer and member shall continue to serve for the term for which appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 63.1.”

Acts 2002, c. 747, cl. 6, provides: “That the provisions of § 30-152 of the Code of Virginia shall apply to the codification of Title 63.2 so as to give effect to other laws enacted by the 2002 Session of the General Assembly notwithstanding the delay in the effective date of this act.”

Acts 2002, c. 747, cl. 7, provides: “That the repeal of Title 63.1, effective as of October 1, 2002, shall not affect any act or offense done or committed, or any penalty incurred, or any right established, accrued or accruing on or before such date, or any proceeding, prosecution, suit or action pending on that day. Except as otherwise provided in this act, neither the repeal of Title 63.1 nor the enactment of Title 63.2 shall apply to offenses committed prior to October 1, 2002, and prosecution for such offenses shall be governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose. For the purpose of this enactment, an offense was committed prior to October 1, 2002, if any of the essential elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.”

Acts 2002, c. 747, cl. 8, provides: “That any notice given, recognizance taken, or process or writ issued before October 1, 2002, shall be valid although given, taken or to be returned to a day after such date, in like manner as if Title 63.2 had been effective before the same was given, taken or issued.”

Editor’s note.

Acts 2004, c. 814, which added the definition of “subsidized custody,” in cl. 4 provides: “That the provisions of this act shall not become effective unless federal funds are made available through a federal Title IV-E waiver and an appropriation of funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act for the period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006, passed during the 2004 Session of the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor.” No funds were appropriated in the general appropriation bill for July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006; therefore, the definition has been deleted from the section.

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 62 provides: “That the provisions of this act amending §§ 63.2-100 , 63.2-313 , 63.2-315 , 63.2-405 , 63.2-1600 , 63.2-1601 , 63.2-1602 , 63.2-1605 , and 63.2-1606 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on July 1, 2013.”

Acts 2013, c. 564, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in a general appropriation act passed by the 2013 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.”

Acts 2013, c. 564, cl. 3 provides: “That the General Assembly determines that the requirements of the second enactment of this act have been met.”

Acts 2014, c. 530, cl. 1 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall review current policies governing facilitation of placement of children in kinship care to avoid foster care placements in the Commonwealth and shall develop recommendations for regulations governing kinship care placements, which shall include recommendations related to (i) a description of the rights and responsibilities of local boards, birth parents, and kinship caregivers; (ii) a process for the facilitation of placement or transfer of custody; (iii) a model disclosure letter to be provided to the parents and potential kinship caregivers, including information about the differences between kinship care and kinship foster care, the impact of transferring custody from the birth parent to the kinship caregiver, the birth parent’s role following transfer, and the plan requirements for custody to be returned to the birth parent; (iv) a process for developing a safety or service plan for the family, which shall include gathering input from birth parents, potential kinship caregivers, and other community and family supports; (v) a description of funding sources available to support safety or service plans; (vi) a process for gathering and reporting data regarding the well-being and permanency of children in kinship care; and (vii) a description of the training plan for local department of social services workers. The Department shall also review the fiscal impact of proposed regulations. The Department shall report its recommendations and findings to the Governor, the General Assembly, and the Board of Social Services by January 1, 2016.”

Acts 2015, cc. 758 and 770, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act amending §§ 15.2-2292 , 63.2-100 , and 63.2-1704 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on July 1, 2016.”

To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted “55.1-2000” for “55-79.2.”

Acts 2020, c. 829, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0 for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities and cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice.”

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 3 provides: “That the provisions of the first and second enactments of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2021, except that § 22.1-289.04 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective in due course.”

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, cl. 2 provides: “The Board of Social Services (the Board) shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act. Such regulations shall include conditions for establishing a kinship guardianship, requirements for the development and amendment of a kinship guardianship assistance agreement, and circumstances that qualify a prospective kinship guardian for exemption from the relative foster home approval process. The Board’s initial adoption of regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act shall be exempt from the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq. of the Code of Virginia), except that the Board shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the regulations prior to adoption.”

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

The 2003 amendments.

The 2003 amendment by c. 467 substituted “12” for “twelve,” “13” for “thirteen,” “16” for “sixteen,” “18” for “eighteen,” “21” for “twenty-one,” “22” for “twenty-two,” “24” for “twenty-four,” and “62” for “sixty-two” throughout the section; deleted “including but not limited to, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Sections 8, 202, 221(d) (3), 221(d) (4), 231, 236, or 811 housing” following “Development” in clause (iv) of the definition of “Assisted living facility”; and substituted “Office of Personnel Management” for “Department of Health and Human Services” in the definition of “Merit system plan.”

The 2004 amendments.

The 2004 amendment by c. 70 substituted “18” for “eighteen” in the introductory paragraph of the definition of “Abused or neglected child”; substituted “24” for “twenty-four” in the definition of “Child day program”; substituted “12” for “twelve” in the third sentence of the definition of “Family day home”; and inserted the definition of “Kinship care.”

The 2004 amendment by c. 196, in the paragraph defining “Children’s residential facility,” substituted “or for the purpose of providing independent living services to persons between 18 and 21 years of age who are in the process of transitioning out of foster care. Children’s residential facility shall not include” for “except” at the end.

The 2004 amendment by c. 245 added the last paragraph in the definition of “Abused or neglected child”; and substituted “12” for “twelve” in the first and third sentences of the definition of “Family day home.”

The 2004 amendment by c. 753, added the language beginning “including, but not limited” in subdivision 1 of the definition of “Abused or neglected child”; twice substituted “12” for “twelve” in the definition of “Family day home.”

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendment by c. 868, in the paragraph defining “Abused or neglected child,” inserted the subdivision 6 designation and the first paragraph thereof, transferred the second paragraph in subdivision 5 to the second paragraph in subdivision 6 and made a related change.

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendments by cc. 479 and 597 are nearly identical, and added the last sentence in subdivision 2 in the definition of “Abused or neglected child.”

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 475 and 483 are nearly identical, and in the definition of “Independent living,” substituted “planned program of services designed to assist a child aged 16 and over” for “program of services and activities for children in foster care who are 16 years of age or older” near the beginning and substituted “in transitioning” for “that prepares them for the successful transition” at the end; inserted the definitions of “Independent living arrangement” and “Independent living services,” and deleted the definition of “Independent living placement.”

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 705 added the last sentence of the paragraph defining “Adult neglect.”

The 2009 amendments by cc. 813 and 840 are identical, and substituted “Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services” for “Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services” in clause (i) of the paragraphs defining “Adult day care center” and “Assisted living facility.”

The 2011 amendments.

The 2011 amendment by cc. 5 and 156 are identical, and deleted “or the public agency designated by the community policy and management team” following “local board” in the definition for “Foster care placement.”

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 803 and 835, cl. 59, effective July 1, 2013, are identical, and in the definition for “Independent living,” substituted “age 16” for “aged 16”; and in the definition for “Social services,” deleted “adult services, adult protective services” following “adoption assistance” and added the last sentence.

The 2013 amendments.

The 2013 amendment by c. 5, in the paragraph defining “Independent living,” deleted “from foster care” preceding “to self-sufficiency.”

The 2013 amendments by cc. 362 and 564 are identical, and added the clause (i) designator and added clause (ii) in the paragraph defining “Independent living services.”

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendments by cc. 502 and 503 are identical, and in subdivision 6 of the definition for “Abused or neglected child,” substituted “emergency medical services agency” for “rescue squad” twice and “medical services providers” for “medical technicians” in the second paragraph.

The 2015 amendments by cc. 758 and 770 are identical, effective July 1, 2016, and in the definition for “Family day home” substituted “five” for “six” in the third sentence and “related to the provider by blood or marriage” for “grandchildren of the provider” in the fifth sentence.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 631 added subdivision 7 in the definition for “Abused or neglected child”; added the definition for “Sibling.”

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 195, inserted “as defined in § 63.2-1603 ” in the definitions for “Adult abuse,” “Adult neglect,” and “Adult protective services”; rewrote the definition for “Adult exploitation,” which formerly read: “ ‘Adult exploitation’ means the illegal use of an incapacitated adult or his resources for another’s profit or advantage.”

The 2018 amendments.

The 2018 amendment by c. 497, in the definition for “Independent living,” inserted “or were formerly committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice and are”; in the definition for “Independent living arrangement,” inserted “or (ii) a child at least 16 years of age or a person between the ages of 18 and 21 who was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice immediately prior to placement by the Department of Juvenile Justice”; and in the definition for “Independent living services,” inserted clause (iii) in the second sentence; and made stylistic changes.

The 2018 amendments by cc. 769 and 770 are identical, and added the definitions for “Kinship guardian,” “Kinship guardianship,” and “Kinship Guardianship Assistance program.”

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 210 substituted “Virginia Initiative for Education and Work (VIEW)” for “the Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare (VIEW)” in the definition for “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families-Unemployed Parent.”

The 2019 amendments by cc. 282 and 688 are identical, and added the definitions for “Family and permanency team,” “Fictive kin,” “Qualified individual,” and “Qualified residential treatment program”; and in the definition for “Foster home,” substituted “a residence licensed by a child-placing agency or local board” for “the place of residence of any natural person.”

The 2019 amendment by c. 297, in the definition of “Child-placing agency,” inserted “(i)” and “(ii)” and added clause (iii) in the first sentence and added the second sentence; in the definition for “Foster care placement,” added the second sentence; in the definition for “Foster home,” inserted “or a child who is the subject of a power of attorney to delegate parental or legal custodial powers by his parents or legal custodian to the natural person who has been designated the child’s legal guardian pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 20-166 et seq.) of Title 20 and who exercises legal authority over the child on a continuous basis for at least 24 hours without compensation”; in the definition for “Independent foster home,” added clause (iii); and made stylistic changes.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendments by cc. 95 and 732 are identical, and in the definition for “Adult foster care,” added the third sentence; in the definition for “Child,” added clause (ii); and inserted the definition for “Supervised independent living setting.”

The 2020 amendment by cc. 224 and 366 are identical, and in the definition for “Foster home,” substituted “approved” for “licensed.”

The 2020 amendment by c. 829 substituted “Tier III” for “violent sexual” in subdivision 6 of the definition for “Abused or neglected child.”

The 2020 amendments by cc. 860 and 861, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and deleted the definitions for “Child day center,” “Child day program,” “Family day home,” “Family day system,” and “Registered family day home” (now see § 22.1-289.02, effective July 1, 2021); and in the definition for “Child-welfare agency,” deleted “child day center” following “means a” and deleted “family day home, family day system” following “facility.”

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, effective July 1, 2021, added the definitions of “Federal-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program” and “State-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program”; in the definition of “Kinship guardianship,” inserted “or 63.2-1306 ” and deleted the definition of “Kinship Guardianship Assistance program.”

Law Review.

For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1980).

For survey of developments in Virginia domestic relations law for year 1979-80, see 67 Va. L. Rev. 351 (1981).

For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989).

For 2000 survey of Virginia health law, see 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 853 (2000).

For 2003/2004 survey of family and juvenile law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2004).

For 2006 survey article, “Family and Juvenile Law,” see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 151 (2006).

For 2007 annual survey article, “Family and Juvenile Law,” see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 417 (2007).

For 2007 annual survey article, “Health Care Law,” see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 441 (2007).

For Comment, “Unreasonable Seizure: Government Removal of Children from Homes with Drugs but No Evidence of Neglect,” see 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 631 (2013).

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Hospitals and Sanitariums, § 2.

CASE NOTES

Editor’s note.

Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

Constitutionality of religious exemption for child care centers. —

Virginia’s exemption of religiously affiliated child care centers from state licensing requirements is constitutional. Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5949 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S. Ct. 837, 102 L. Ed. 2d 969, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 411 (1989).

A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose; for a law to have forbidden effects, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence. Virginia, in exempting religious child care centers from its licensing requirement, cannot be said to be advancing religion through its own activities and influence; on the contrary, the objective observer should perceive this exemption as an accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a government endorsement of religion. Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5949 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S. Ct. 837, 102 L. Ed. 2d 969, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 411 (1989).

Purpose of religious exemption. —

A regulatory statute’s singular exemption of religious groups does not render its purpose suspect; where government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, there is no need to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities. Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5949 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S. Ct. 837, 102 L. Ed. 2d 969, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 411 (1989).

“Public assistance” not classified as part of gross income. —

Federal housing benefits mother received qualified as “public assistance,” and the trial court did not err by declining to include these benefits in mother’s gross income. Bennett v. Commonwealth, Va. Dep't of Social Servs. ex rel. Bennett, 22 Va. App. 684, 472 S.E.2d 668, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 513 (1996).

“Public assistance moneys.” —

Because food stamps and Medicaid assistance were not “public assistance moneys” as contemplated in § 63.2-1908 , and the legislature did not exempt a mother, as a noncustodial parent receiving those forms of public assistance, from reimbursing the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement, for moneys expended on behalf of their children as temporary assistance to needy families, the trial court properly affirmed an administrative support order requiring the mother to reimburse a public assistance debt incurred on behalf of her minor child. Hodges v. Dep't of Soc. Servs, Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 45 Va. App. 118, 609 S.E.2d 61, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 120 (2005).

“Neglect.” —

Because there was a real threat of harm to a five-year-old child after a caretaker left the child alone for at least 30 minutes in an area near a busy street, there was sufficient evidence to support a violation of former § 63.1-248.22; accordingly, the burden did not shift to the caretaker. Williams-Brooks v. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 29 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009).

Neglect found. —

Finding of neglect would be affirmed where father, who had sole custody of his 15-year-old daughter, failed to obtain supervision for his daughter before leaving the country for two weeks incident to his deployment with his National Guard Unit, despite his awareness of her prior difficulties, thus placing her in a situation beyond her level of maturity. Bothen v. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 378 (Va. Ct. App. July 9, 2002).

Because it was within the realm of common knowledge that a day-care provider’s act of leaving a four-year-old child for at least thirty-five minutes in a closed van at the end of July in Virginia, on a day when temperatures were in the low- to mid-eighties, was likely to result in serious harm to the child, a level one physical neglect and inadequate supervision finding entered against the day-care provider was upheld. Reynolds v. Conyers, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 302 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2007).

Requirements for abuse. —

Trial court erred in interpreting § 63.2-100 to require that the child suffer an actual mental injury because in actuality, all that was required under the statute was the creation of an environment that threatens to inflict physical or mental injury to the child. Anonymous C v. Anonymous B, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 14 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2011).

Abuse or neglect not found. —

Mother’s behavior did not constitute neglect under subdivision 2 of the definition of “Abused or neglected child” in former § 63.1-248.2 (see now § 63.2-100 ) where, on one occasion, she left nine-month-old twins at home alone for 15 minutes, while they were asleep, after asking neighbor to watch the house. Beaton v. Virginia Dep't of Social Servs., 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 172 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2000).

Decision finding that a father physically abused his child was reversed where, though the father handled his four-month-old baby roughly, insufficient evidence was provided to establish that the child’s injuries were other than accidental and caused by the father’s tight hugging or squeezing to encourage the child to have a bowel movement. Velasquez v. Goodwin, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 383 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2004).

Sexual abuse found. —

There was substantial evidence to support a finding of sexual abuse — sexual molestation — level one by a piano teacher who was taking a preschool child to a piano lesson on an elevator because the hearing officer found that the child was credible in reporting that the teacher had inappropriately touched the child, and the teacher corroborated the child’s statements that the teacher rode alone in the elevator with the child. The child, who was potty trained, had an atypical bowel movement upon returning to the classroom after the piano lesson. Moon v. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 225 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019).

The language “physical injury” is not impermissibly vague. —

This language puts the average person on notice that conduct that creates or inflicts physical harm upon the child falls within the statute’s proscription. Moreover, with regard to the facts of this case, the court finds that a person of average intelligence would understand that pulling out a section of hair from a three-year-old child’s head would result in a physical injury to that child. Turner v. Jackson, 14 Va. App. 423, 417 S.E.2d 881, 8 Va. Law Rep. 2906, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 131 (1992).

“Threaten.” —

Crux of the issue in Wolf v. Fauquier County Board of Supervisors, 555 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2009), did not involve determining the meaning of threaten, as it appears in § 63.2-100 , but rather the circumstances under which mandatory reporters are obliged to report allegations. Thus, it was error to rely on Wolf for the proposition that threaten, as it appears in § 63.2-100 , only refers to a verbal or spoken threat. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Betts, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (Va. Ct. App. June 12, 2018).

According to the Court of Appeals of Virginia’s plain language interpretation, the term threat as used in § 63.2-100 has multiple, commonplace meanings. A threat can come in the form of a verbal statement intended to convey ill-will from one individual to another. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Betts, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (Va. Ct. App. June 12, 2018).

As used in § 63.2-100 , threat can be used in the abstract, i.e., John is a threat to Jim. In that usage, the connotation conveyed is the prospective possibility of harm or ill-will between individuals, or even entities; cyber-terrorism is a threat to computer network security. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Betts, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (Va. Ct. App. June 12, 2018).

Court of Appeals of Virginia is not persuaded that the General Assembly intended for the language “threatens to create or inflict injury,” as used in § 63.2-100 , to apply when there is no evidence that an actual injury exists or when vague allegations and mere suggestions of prohibited conduct are claimed yet are not proven by the applicable evidentiary standard. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Betts, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (Va. Ct. App. June 12, 2018).

Circuit court erred in finding that a teacher had committed level three abuse under § 63.2-100 where although it properly held that such a determination could not rest on the creation of a risk of injury, there was no evidence of an actual injury, it erroneously interpreted case law to mean that threaten, as it appeared in § 63.2-100 , only referred to a verbal or spoken threat, and the teacher’s defensive responses to the student’s inflammatory, confrontational, and offensive actions did not create an environment in which physical injuries were likely. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Betts, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (Va. Ct. App. June 12, 2018).

No requirement of actual harm. —

The statutory definitions of an abused or neglected child do not require proof of actual harm or impairment having been experienced by the child. Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. 391, 419 S.E.2d 385, 8 Va. Law Rep. 2880, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 130 (1992).

Caretaker. —

Virginia Department of Social Services (DSS) improperly deemed a relative a caretaker because absent a factual basis for the assertion that the relative was a person responsible for the child’s care, DSS could not legally deem him so simply because of his residing presence in the home. Moore v. Brown, 63 Va. App. 375, 758 S.E.2d 68, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 181 (2014).

Enabling statute limits the authority of Virginia Department of Social Services (DSS) to findings of abuse committed by a parent or “other person responsible” for the abused child’s care; a person who is not in any way truly responsible for the child’s care cannot be said, either by the courts or DSS, to be a “person responsible” for the child’s care, and residing in the same home as the child, without more, does not change that fact. Moore v. Brown, 63 Va. App. 375, 758 S.E.2d 68, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 181 (2014).

For case dealing with physical neglect and inadequate supervision at summer camp, see M.H. v. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 308 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010).

Mental injury. —

Although guidelines might permit finding of mental abuse based solely upon behavior of parent or caretaker even in absence of mental injury to child, former § 63.1-248.2 (see now this section) in contrast merely covered behavior of parent which in fact inflicted mental injury upon child or behavior which created substantial risk of impairment of mental functions of child. Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. 391, 419 S.E.2d 385, 8 Va. Law Rep. 2880, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 130 (1992).

In an administrative child abuse proceeding, parent gave contradictory testimony about why child’s hair was grabbed, pulling out a nickel-sized plug of hair. Parent initially told investigator it was to prevent child from stepping into lane of traffic and later said child was being disciplined when hair was grabbed. Hearing officer was entitled to disregard parent’s testimony that parent grabbed child’s hair accidentally. Turner v. Jackson, 14 Va. App. 423, 417 S.E.2d 881, 8 Va. Law Rep. 2906, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 131 (1992).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Jurisdiction. —

Motion filed by a mother and father to dismiss foster parents’ adoption petition was granted because the case did not involve a parental placement within the meaning of §§ 63.2-1230 through 63.2-1240 ; the custody order did not mention any placement for the purpose of foster care or adoption, and neither birth parent placed the child with the foster parents for adoption. In re Terry, 78 Va. Cir. 25, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 272 (Henrico County Nov. 13, 2008).

Assisted living facility. —

Section 32.1-138 did not provide a nursing home patient with a private right of action. The nursing home was subject to § 32.1-138 , however, regardless of the patient referring to it as an assisted living facility, because the definitions of assisted living facility in § 63.2-100 and nursing home in § 32.1-123 were not mutually exclusive. Gregory v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 26, 2010 Va. Cir. LEXIS 259 (Virginia Beach July 28, 2010).

Abuse found. —

In reviewing the matter for substantial evidence, the court accepted the findings that the teacher physically abused a child by throwing a walkie-talkie at him, which was a grossly inappropriate attempt to modify his behavior; the teacher created a threat of physical harm, the purported lack of analysis in the hearing officer’s decision was irrelevant to this conclusion, and the applicable definition of bizarre discipline in the Virginia Department of Social Services Child and Family Services Manual was satisfied by the teacher’s conduct. Long v. Virginia, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 94 Va. Cir. 340, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 151 (Chesapeake Oct. 7, 2016).

Neglect found. —

Because petitioner knew of her boyfriend’s rape conviction of a minor and voluntarily left her minor children alone with him, there was substantial evidence supporting the Level One findings, and she failed to meet her burden of proving that a reasonable mind would necessarily have come to a different conclusion. Rhodes v. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 95 Va. Cir. 302, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 46 (Roanoke Mar. 16, 2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

“Foster care placement” construed. —

The definition of “foster care placement” in this section does not apply to the Kidsave International Summer Miracles program, and children coming into Virginia as part of the program are not being placed into foster care. See opinion of Attorney General to Delegate William J. Howell, 05-006 (5/10/05).

§ 63.2-100.1. Certified mail; subsequent mail or notices may be sent by regular mail.

Whenever in this title the Board or the Department is required to send any mail or notice by certified mail and such mail or notice is sent certified mail, return receipt requested, then any subsequent, identical mail or notice that is sent by the Board or the Department may be sent by regular mail.

History. 2011, c. 566.

§ 63.2-101. Authority of Department to request and receive information from other agencies; use of information so obtained; provide access to information for medical assistance eligibility purposes.

  1. The Department may request and shall receive from the records of all departments, boards, bureaus or other agencies of this Commonwealth and of other states such information as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions and programs of this title, and the same are authorized to provide such information; provided that, a written statement from the requesting party stating the reason for seeking such record is submitted and filed with the record sought. The Department may make such information available only to public officials and agencies of this Commonwealth, and other states, and political subdivisions of this Commonwealth and other states, where the request for information relates to administration of the various public assistance or social services programs.
  2. The Department shall provide, to the Department of Medical Assistance Services and to certain entities approved by the Board of Medical Assistance Services, access to information regarding a medical assistance applicant’s receipt of public assistance from programs administered by the Department. Such access shall be limited to information necessary to determine an individual’s eligibility for medical assistance services and to the extent specified in a memorandum of understanding between the Department and the Department of Medical Assistance Services.

History. 1975, c. 9, § 63.1-1.1:1; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747; 2016, c. 111.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 111 inserted the subsection A designation and added subsection B.

§ 63.2-102. Allowing access to records and information for public assistance programs and child support enforcement; penalty.

  1. All records, information and statistical registries of the Department and local boards and other information that pertain to public assistance and child support enforcement provided to or on behalf of any individual shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except to persons specified hereinafter and to the extent permitted by state and federal law and regulation. The local boards shall allow the Commissioner, at all times, to have access to the records of the local boards relating to the appropriation, expenditure and distribution of funds for, and other matters concerning, public assistance under this title.Except as provided by state and federal law and regulation, no record, information or statistical registries concerning applicants for and recipients of public assistance and child support shall be made available except for purposes directly connected with the administration of such programs. Such purposes include establishing eligibility, determining the amount of the public assistance and child support, and providing social services for applicants and recipients. It shall be unlawful for any person to disclose, directly or indirectly, any such confidential information, and any person violating these provisions shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
  2. If a request for a record or information concerning applicants for and recipients of public assistance or child support is made to the Department or a local department for a purpose not directly connected to the administration of such programs, the Commissioner or local director shall not provide the record or information unless permitted by state or federal law or regulation.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-41, 63-68, 63-140, 63-140.15, 63-161, 63-204, 63-220; 1952, c. 287; 1962, c. 621; 1968, cc. 43, 466, 578, §§ 63.1-34, 63.1-53, 63.1-126; 1970, c. 233; 1972, c. 718; 1974, c. 417; 1975, c. 311; 1984, c. 498; 1986, c. 594; 1988, c. 906; 1996, c. 455; 2001, c. 518; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to exchange of information among parties in accordance with argeements developed by hospital and community-based multi-disciplinary teams created to assist in identifying abused and neglected children, coordinating services for them, etc., see § 63.2-1503 J.

As to exemptions from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, see § 2.2-3705.5 .

As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Law Review.

For article, “Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia,” see 57 Va. L. Rev. 818 (1971).

Research References.

Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 9 Discovery. § 9.04 Privileges against discovery. Bryson.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Confidentiality of agency records. —

Because a husband was requesting confidential information from a county agency to help calculate the proper amount of child support payments, the confidentiality of the agency’s records was tantamount; therefore, the agency’s motion to quash the husband’s subpoena duces tecum was granted. Tyson v. Tyson, 69 Va. Cir. 92, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 213 (Fairfax County Sept. 19, 2005).

§ 63.2-103. Confidential records and information concerning child support enforcement.

Any records established pursuant to the provisions of § 63.2-1902 shall be available only for the enforcement of support of children and their caretakers and to the Attorney General, prosecuting attorneys, law-enforcement agencies, courts of competent jurisdiction and agencies in other states engaged in the enforcement of support of children and their caretakers. Information pertaining to actions taken on behalf of recipients of child support services may be disclosed to the recipient and other parties pursuant to Board regulations. The Board shall adopt regulations regarding the release of information to parties involved in administrative proceedings pursuant to Chapter 19 (§ 63.2-1900 et seq.) of this title, taking into account the health and safety of the parties to whom the information is related, and such releases of information shall be permitted, notwithstanding the provisions of the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (§ 2.2-3800 et seq.). Information may also be disclosed to authorized persons, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 663, in cases of unlawful taking or restraint of a child.

History. 1988, c. 906, § 63.1-274.6; 1990, c. 836; 1991, cc. 545, 588; 1994, c. 665; 1997, cc. 796, 895; 2001, c. 573; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-104. Confidential records and information concerning social services; penalty.

  1. The records, information and statistical registries of the Department, local departments and of all child-welfare agencies concerning social services to or on behalf of individuals shall be confidential information, provided that the Commissioner, the Board and their agents shall have access to such records, information and statistical registries, and that such records, information and statistical registries may be disclosed to any person having a legitimate interest in accordance with state and federal law and regulation.It shall be unlawful for any officer, agent or employee of any child-welfare agency; for the Commissioner, the State Board or their agents or employees; for any person who has held any such position; and for any other person to whom any such record or information is disclosed to disclose, directly or indirectly, any such confidential record or information, except as herein provided or pursuant to § 63.2-105 . Every violation of this section shall constitute a Class 1 misdemeanor.
  2. If a request for a record or information concerning applicants for and recipients of social services is made to the Department or a local department by a person who does not have a legitimate interest, the Commissioner or local director shall not provide the record or information unless permitted by state or federal law or regulation.
  3. This section shall not apply to the disposition of adoption records, reports and information that is governed by the provisions of § 63.2-1246 .

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-41, 63-140, 63-140.15, 63-161, 63-204, 63-220, 63-246; 1958, c. 433; 1962, c. 621; 1968, cc. 43, 578, §§ 63.1-34, 63.1-126, 63.1-209; 1972, c. 540; 1976, c. 365; 1977, c. 547, § 63.1-55.4; 1979, cc. 218, 666; 1981, c. 456; 1983, c. 604; 1986, c. 213; 1988, cc. 151, 898; 1994, c. 643; 2000, cc. 500, 830; 2001, cc. 503, 518; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to exchange of information among parties in accordance with argeements developed by hospital and community-based multi-disciplinary teams created to assist in identifying abused and neglected children, coordinating services for them, etc., see § 63.2-1503 J.

As to exclusion of reports and documentary evidence from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, see § 2.2-3705.5 .

As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Law Review.

For survey of Virginia law on domestic relations for the year 1975-1976, see 62 Va. L. Rev. 1431 (1976).

for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 281 (1980).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Request of agency records to calculate child support not allowed. —

Because a husband was requesting confidential information from a county agency to help calculate the proper amount of child support payments, the confidentiality of the agency’s records was tantamount; therefore, the agency’s motion to quash the husband’s subpoena duces tecum was granted. Tyson v. Tyson, 69 Va. Cir. 92, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 213 (Fairfax County Sept. 19, 2005).

Materiality of information. —

In a case in which the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the Department of Social Services jointly requested the court to quash a subpoena duces tecum filed by defendant, the court ruled that defendant’s right to discover exculpatory evidence did not include unsupervised authority to search through the Commonwealth’s files and make determination as to materiality of information. Commonwealth v. Demchuck, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 455 (Culpeper County Dec. 6, 2021).

Subpoena duces tecum for Department of Family Services records to mitigate punishment quashed. —

When defendant had a subpoena duces tecum issued for records of the Department of Family Services regarding abuse or neglect of defendant or defendant’s siblings as mitigating evidence should defendant be convicted of pending criminal charges, the subpoena was quashed because (1) the Department had a duty, under § 63.2-104 , to keep the records confidential, and (2) defendant’s request did not outweigh this duty, as the duty protected defendant’s minor siblings, and defendant could not claim a legitimate interest in the records simply because the records might assist defendant in defendant’s criminal case. Commonwealth v. Williams, 84 Va. Cir. 325, 2012 Va. Cir. LEXIS 20 (Fairfax County Feb. 22, 2012).

When defendant had a subpoena duces tecum issued for records of the Department of Family Services regarding abuse or neglect of defendant or defendant’s siblings as mitigating evidence should defendant be convicted of pending criminal charges, the subpoena was quashed because (1) defendant improperly requested the subpoena’s issuance to obtain Brady material under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:12, and (2) the Department had a compelling interest in protecting the confidentiality of information concerning social services to or on behalf of the individuals it served. Commonwealth v. Williams, 84 Va. Cir. 325, 2012 Va. Cir. LEXIS 20 (Fairfax County Feb. 22, 2012).

Subpoena duces tecum request for forensic interview records. —

Parent was not entitled to disclosure of a forensic interview conducted with a juvenile that formed the basis of an ex parte preliminary protective order issued by a court because the disclosure was not in the child’s best interest due to the sensitive nature of the questions and answers and the need to preserve confidentiality. The parent’s argument that the issuance of a protective order prohibited the parent from possession of a firearm in violation of U.S. Const. amend. II did not outweigh the child’s best interest. Patton v. Patton, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 126 (Culpeper County June 2, 2021).

Subpoena granted in part and denied in part. —

Department of Social Services (DSS) was allowed to quash a portion of defendant’s subpoena duces tecum requesting all its records pertaining to the Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation of the alleged victims in the case because, while defendant was not entitled to disclosure of confidential records and information and was barred from access to social services records until a final disposition in the criminal proceeding, he was entitled to certain information under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act and the constitution pursuant to a protective order that would assure to the extent possible the confidentiality of CPS records and limit dissemination of that information to its proper use in the defense of the case. Commonwealth v. DiRosario, 100 Va. Cir. 441, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 3068 (Westmoreland County June 26, 2007).

§ 63.2-104.1. Confidentiality of records of persons receiving domestic and sexual violence services.

  1. In order to ensure the safety of adult and child victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or victims of a violation of § 18.2-48 , 18.2-355 , 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357.1 , and their families, programs and individuals providing services to such victims shall protect the confidentiality and privacy of persons receiving services.
  2. Except as provided in subsections C and D, programs and individuals providing services to victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or victims of a violation of § 18.2-48 , 18.2-355 , 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357.1 , shall not:
    1. Disclose any personally identifying information or individual information collected in connection with services requested, utilized, or denied through programs for victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or victims of a violation of § 18.2-48 , 18.2-355 , 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357.1 ; or
    2. Reveal individual client information without the informed, written, reasonably time-limited consent of the person about whom information is sought; the minor and his parent or legal guardian, in cases in which the client is an unemancipated minor; or the guardian of an incapacitated person as defined in § 64.2-2000 , whether for this program or any other Federal, State, tribal, or territorial grant program. However, consent for release may not be given by the abuser or alleged abuser of the minor or incapacitated person, or the abuser or alleged abuser of the other parent of the minor.
  3. If release of information described in subsection B is compelled by statutory or court mandate, the program or individual providing services shall:
    1. Make reasonable attempts to provide notice to victims affected by the disclosure of information; and
    2. Take steps necessary to protect the privacy and safety of the persons affected by the release of the information.
  4. Programs and individuals providing services to victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or victims of a violation of § 18.2-48 , 18.2-355 , 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357.1 , may share:
    1. Nonpersonally identifying data in the aggregate regarding services to their clients and nonpersonally identifying demographic information in order to comply with Federal, State, tribal, or territorial reporting, evaluation, or data collection requirements;
    2. Court generated information and law-enforcement generated information contained in secure, governmental registries for protection order enforcement purposes; and
    3. Information necessary for law enforcement and prosecution purposes.For purposes of this section, “programs” shall include public and not-for-profit agencies the primary mission of which is to provide services to victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or victims of a violation of § 18.2-48 , 18.2-355 , 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357.1 .
  5. For the purposes of this section, a person may be a victim of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, or a victim of a violation of § 18.2-48 , 18.2-355 , 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357.1 , regardless of whether any person has been charged with or convicted of any offense.

History. 2006, c. 135; 2016, cc. 666, 670.

Editor’s note.

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, the reference to “37.2-1000” was changed to “64.2-2000” to conform to the recodification of Title 64.1 by Acts 2012, c. 614, effective October 1, 2012.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendments by cc. 666 and 670 are identical and rewrote the section.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Subpoena duces tecum request for forensic interview records. —

Parent was not entitled to disclosure of a forensic interview conducted with a juvenile that formed the basis of an ex parte preliminary protective order issued by a court because the disclosure was not in the child’s best interest due to the sensitive nature of the questions and answers and the need to preserve confidentiality. The parent’s argument that the issuance of a protective order prohibited the parent from possession of a firearm in violation of U.S. Const. amend. II did not outweigh the child’s best interest. Patton v. Patton, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 126 (Culpeper County June 2, 2021).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Reports of suspected child abuse. —

Advocates in domestic violence shelters and sexual assault crisis centers generally are not statutorily mandated to report child abuse and neglect. However, when such an advocate performs activities that would place him under any of the categories in subsection A of § 63.2-1509 , he would be required to report suspected child abuse or neglect. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable G. Manoli Loupassi, Member, House of Delegates, 09-097, (1/5/10).

§ 63.2-105. Confidential records and information concerning social services; child-protective services and child-placing agencies.

  1. The local department may disclose the contents of records and information learned during the course of a child-protective services investigation or during the provision of child-protective services to a family, without a court order and without the consent of the family, to a person having a legitimate interest when in the judgment of the local department such disclosure is in the best interest of the child who is the subject of the records. Persons having a legitimate interest in child-protective services records of local departments include, but are not limited to, (i) any person who is responsible for investigating a report of known or suspected abuse or neglect or for providing services to a child or family that is the subject of a report, including multidisciplinary teams and family assessment and planning teams referenced in subsections J and K of § 63.2-1503 , law-enforcement agencies and attorneys for the Commonwealth; (ii) child welfare or human services agencies of the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions when those agencies request information to determine the compliance of any person with a child-protective services plan or an order of any court; (iii) personnel of the school or child day program as defined in § 63.2-100 attended by the child so that the local department can receive information from such personnel on an ongoing basis concerning the child’s health and behavior, and the activities of the child’s custodian; (iv) a parent, grandparent, or any other person when such parent, grandparent or other person would be considered by the local department as a potential caretaker of the child in the event the local department has to remove the child from his custodian; and (v) the Commitment Review Committee and the Office of the Attorney General for the purposes of sexually violent predator civil commitments pursuant to Chapter 9 (§ 37.2-900 et seq.) of Title 37.2.Whenever a local department exercises its discretion to release otherwise confidential information to any person who meets one or more of these descriptions, the local department shall be presumed to have exercised its discretion in a reasonable and lawful manner.
  2. Any person who has not been legally adopted in accordance with the provisions of this title and who was a child for whom all parental rights and responsibilities have been terminated, shall not have access to any information from a child-placing agency with respect to the identity of the biological family, except (i) upon application of the child who is 18 or more years of age, (ii) upon order of a circuit court entered upon good cause shown, and (iii) after notice to and opportunity for hearing by the applicant for such order and the child-placing agency or local board that had custody of the child.An eligible person who is a resident of Virginia may apply for the court order provided for herein to (a) the circuit court of the county or city where the person resides or (b) the circuit court of the county or city where the principal office of the child-placing agency or local board that controls the information sought by the person is located. An eligible person who is not a resident of Virginia shall apply for such a court order to the circuit court of the county or city where the principal office of the child-placing agency or local board that controls the information sought by the person is located.If the identity and whereabouts of the biological family are known to the agency or local board, the court may require the agency or local board to advise the biological parents of the pendency of the application for such order. In determining good cause for the disclosure of such information, the court shall consider the relative effects of such action upon the applicant for such order and upon the biological parents.

History. 2001, c. 518, § 63.1-209.1; 2002, c. 747; 2004, cc. 114, 220; 2006, cc. 863, 914.

The 2004 amendments.

The 2004 amendment by c. 114 substituted “subsections J and K” for “subsection J” in clause (i) of the last sentence in the first paragraph of subsection A; and substituted “18” for “eighteen” in clause (i) of the first paragraph in subsection B.

The 2004 amendment by c. 220, in the first paragraph of subsection A, substituted “multidisciplinary” for “multi-disciplinary” and “subsections J and K” for “subsection J” in clause (i) in the last sentence; and substituted “18” for “eighteen” in clause (i) in the first paragraph of subsection B.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 863 and 914 are identical, and in subsection A, added clause (v) to the end of the first paragraph and made a related change.

CASE NOTES

Applicability. —

Exception in clause (iv) of subsection A of § 63.2-105 did not apply because, at the time the grandparents requested access, the father’s parental rights had been terminated for almost a year and the adoption had been in effect for almost six months; therefore, at the time of the request, the grandparents were not potential caretakers of the children. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Subpoena granted in part and denied in part. —

Department of Social Services (DSS) was allowed to quash a portion of defendant’s subpoena duces tecum requesting all its records pertaining to the Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation of the alleged victims in the case because, while defendant was not entitled to disclosure of confidential records and information and was barred from access to social services records until a final disposition in the criminal proceeding, he was entitled to certain information under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act and the constitution pursuant to a protective order that would assure to the extent possible the confidentiality of CPS records and limit dissemination of that information to its proper use in the defense of the case. Commonwealth v. DiRosario, 100 Va. Cir. 441, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 3068 (Westmoreland County June 26, 2007).

§ 63.2-106. Failure to obey subpoena or charging illegal fees; penalty.

If any person fails or refuses to obey any subpoena issued under the provisions of § 63.2-220 or § 63.2-322 , or charges or receives any fee contrary to the provisions of § 63.2-508 , he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-139, 63-160, 63-203, 63-219; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-125; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Subpoena duces tecum request for forensic interview records. —

Parent was not entitled to disclosure of a forensic interview conducted with a juvenile that formed the basis of an ex parte preliminary protective order issued by a court because the disclosure was not in the child’s best interest due to the sensitive nature of the questions and answers and the need to preserve confidentiality. The parent’s argument that the issuance of a protective order prohibited the parent from possession of a firearm in violation of U.S. Const. amend. II did not outweigh the child’s best interest. Patton v. Patton, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 126 (Culpeper County June 2, 2021).

Chapter 2. State Social Services.

Article 1. Department and Commissioner of Social Services.

§ 63.2-200. Department of Social Services created.

The Department of Social Services is hereby created in the executive branch responsible to the Governor. The Department shall be under the supervision and management of the Commissioner of Social Services.

History. 1974, cc. 44, 45, § 63.1-1.1; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to department and board of social services under the urban county executive form of government, see § 15.2-835 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2011, c. 258, provides: “§ 1. That the Department of Social Services shall develop a plan for the delivery of services to victims of human trafficking. Such plan shall include provisions for (i) identifying victims of human trafficking in the Commonwealth; (ii) assisting victims of human trafficking with applying for federal and state benefits and services to which they may be entitled; (iii) coordinating the delivery of health, mental health, housing, education, job training, victims’ compensation, legal, and other services for victims of human trafficking; (iv) preparing and disseminating educational and training programs and materials to increase awareness of human trafficking and services available to victims of human trafficking among local departments of social services, public and private agencies and service providers, and the public; (v) developing and maintaining community-based services for victims of human trafficking; and (vi) assisting victims of human trafficking with family reunification or return to their place of origin if the person so desires. In developing its plan, the Department shall work together with such other state and federal agencies, public and private entities, and other stakeholders as the Department shall deem appropriate.”

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 5 provides: “That the Department of Social Services and the Department of Education shall develop a plan and enter into a cooperative agreement to ensure a coordinated and seamless transition pursuant to the provisions of this act that occurs by July 1, 2021, and that is cost effective and does not interrupt the provision of state services or have undue impact on the operation or function of either agency.”

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

Law Review.

For essay, “Virginia Ranks Forty-Ninth of Fifty: The Need for Stronger Laws Supporting Foster Youth,” see 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 255 (2018).

CASE NOTES

Director of the Department of Welfare (now Commissioner of Social Services) has no enforcement or supervisory duties over the penal institutions of the Commonwealth, and so having no statutory duty toward plaintiff/prisoner, and absent allegations that he was otherwise involved, defendant’s failure to act in no way violated plaintiff’s rights. Payne v. Rollings, 402 F. Supp. 1225, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15913 (E.D. Va. 1975) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-201. Appointment of Commissioner.

The Commissioner of Social Services, shall be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly, if in session when the appointment is made, and if not in session, then at its next succeeding session.

History. Code 1950, § 63-2; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-2; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-202. Term of office; vacancies.

The Commissioner shall hold office at the pleasure of the Governor for a term coincident with that of each Governor making the appointment, or until his successor is appointed and qualified. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments are made.

History. Code 1950, § 63-3; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-3; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-203. Powers and duties of Commissioner generally.

  1. The Commissioner, subject to the regulations of the Board, shall have all of the powers and perform all the duties conferred upon him by law. Except as otherwise provided, he shall supervise the administration of the provisions of this title and shall see that all laws pertaining to the Department are carried out to their true intent and spirit.
  2. The Commissioner shall enforce the regulations adopted by the Board.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-5, 63-38, 63-254; 1968, cc. 578, 670, §§ 63.1-4, 63.1-31, 63.1-217; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1981, c. 21; 1999, cc. 737, 763; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2014, c. 128, cl. 1 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall convene a work group to review current state and federal laws and regulations governing criminal history background checks for all child care providers in the Commonwealth and to develop a plan for implementation of national fingerprint-based criminal history background checks for all child care providers in the Commonwealth, including recommendations for statutory and regulatory changes and budget actions necessary to implement the plan. Such work group shall include representatives of the Department of State Police, child day programs licensed by the Department of Social Services, unlicensed child day programs, and other stakeholders. The Department shall report its findings to the Governor and the General Assembly by November 1, 2014.”

Acts 2020, c. 929, cl. 1 provides: “§ 1. That the Commissioner of Social Services (the Commissioner) shall establish a work group, which shall include representatives of the Departments of Health Professions, Medical Assistance Services, and Social Services, pediatric health care providers, and such other stakeholders as the Commissioner may deem appropriate, to develop a plan for the licensure of prescribed pediatric extended care centers in the Commonwealth. Such plan shall include provisions for the construction, maintenance, operation, staffing, and management of prescribed pediatric extended care centers and the nature and scope of services to be provided by prescribed pediatric extended care centers in the Commonwealth. The work group shall report the plan to the Governor and the Chairmen of the House Committee on Health, Welfare and Institutions and the Senate Committee on Education and Health by November 1, 2020.”

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 212, cl. 1 provides: “That the Department of Social Services, in cooperation with the Department of Medical Assistance Services, shall convene a work group that shall include representatives of the Virginia Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, the American Heart Association, the Virginia Farmers Market Association, the Virginia Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Virginia Association of Free and Charitable Clinics, Medicaid managed care plans, the Virginia Association of Health Plans, and the Medical Society of Virginia to develop a plan for a three-year pilot Produce Rx Program (the Program) to incentivize consumption of qualifying fruits and vegetables by eligible individuals for whom increased consumption of fruits and vegetables is recommended by a qualified care provider. Such plan shall include (i) eligibility criteria for participation in the Program, including criteria for eligible individuals and qualified care providers; (ii) a process for enrolling eligible individuals in the Program; (iii) a process for the issuance by qualified care providers to eligible individuals of Program vouchers that may be redeemed for the purchase of qualifying fruits and vegetables; (iv) reporting requirements for qualified care providers who issue Program vouchers; and (v) a description of the role of the Department of Social Services and the Department of Medical Assistance Services and local government agencies in administering and overseeing the implementation of the Program. In developing such plan, the work group shall develop a detailed estimate of the cost of implementing the Program as a three-year pilot program, including state and local administrative costs, and identify sources of funding for such Program. The Department of Social Services shall report its activities and the elements of the plan to the Governor and the Chairmen of the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance and Appropriations by October 1, 2021.”

CASE NOTES

Editor’s note.

The cases below were decided under prior law.

Immunity from suit for damages. —

In his official capacity the Director of the Department of Welfare (now Commissioner of Social Services) is not subject to any suit for damages because he is an officer of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Any judgment against him for monetary damages would necessarily have to be satisfied out of the Commonwealth’s treasury. Such suits against an unconsenting state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. Wooldridge v. Virginia, 453 F. Supp. 1333, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16450 (E.D. Va. 1978).

The Director of the Department of Welfare (now Commissioner of Social Services) was absolutely immune in his individual capacity from any damage action arising out of his recommendation regarding a petition for adoption where he was acting pursuant to a valid court directive in preparing and submitting his recommendation to the circuit court. Wooldridge v. Virginia, 453 F. Supp. 1333, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16450 (E.D. Va. 1978).

The Commissioner’s adoption of guidelines interpreting the statute was within his statutory authority. Although the General Assembly did not grant the Commissioner the authority to enact regulations, it did authorize him to “supervise the administration of the provisions of this title and . . . [to] see that all laws pertaining to the [DSS] are carried out to their true intent and spirit.” The Commissioner has exercised his authority under this section by establishing guidelines to be applied by the local departments of social services throughout the Commonwealth in interpreting the definitions of abuse and neglect provided by statute. Consequently, the guidelines were adopted pursuant to the Commissioner’s authority to administer the statute and give effect to its true intent and spirit. Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. 391, 419 S.E.2d 385, 8 Va. Law Rep. 2880, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 130 (1992).

§ 63.2-204. Cooperation with local authorities.

The Commissioner shall assist and cooperate with local authorities in the administration of this title. He shall encourage and direct the training of all personnel of local boards and local departments engaged in the administration of any program within the purview of this title or Chapter 11 (§ 16.1-226 et seq.) of Title 16.1. The Commissioner shall collect and publish statistics and such other data as may be deemed of value in assisting the public authorities and other social agencies of the Commonwealth in improving the care of these persons and in correcting conditions that contribute to dependency and delinquency. The Commissioner shall also, in his discretion, initiate and conduct conferences designed to accomplish such ends and to further coordination of effort in this field.

History. Code 1950, § 63-39; 1968, cc. 578, 670, § 63.1-32; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 4 provides “That the State Department of Social Services shall develop and implement a more reliable, structured, and comprehensive case review and quality improvement process to monitor and improve foster care services provided by local boards and departments of social services in the Commonwealth.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Disclosure to law-enforcement officials of information regarding the identity and presence of residents at a spouse abuse shelter. —

Citizens Against Family Violence (CAFV) may provide law-enforcement officials with information regarding the identity and presence of residents at a spouse abuse shelter operated by CAFV where: (1) The police possess and wish to serve a criminal warrant, a civil warrant, or a subpoena or (2) The police do not have a warrant but nevertheless wish to question the resident in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Ward L. Armstrong, Member, House of Delegates, 02-005 (5/29/02).

§ 63.2-205. Requiring reports from local boards; forms and submission schedule; approval of budgets by Commissioner.

  1. The Commissioner shall require of local boards such reports relating to the administration of this title as the Commissioner may deem necessary to enable the Board and the Commissioner to exercise and perform the functions, duties and powers conferred and imposed by this title. He shall prescribe the form and submission schedule of applications, reports, affidavits, budgets and budget exhibits, and such other forms as may be required in the administration of this title.
  2. The Commissioner shall review budget requests submitted by local boards, make modifications consistent with the requirements of this title and transmit the approved budget to each local board.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-40, 63-42; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-33; 1975, c. 368; 1976, c. 383; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-206. Cooperation with federal agencies.

The Commissioner shall cooperate with the Department of Health and Human Services and other agencies of the United States and with the local boards, in relation to matters set forth in this title, and in any reasonable manner that may be necessary for this Commonwealth to qualify for and to receive grants or aid from such federal agencies for public assistance and services in conformity with the provisions of this title, including grants or aid to assist in providing rehabilitation and other services to help individuals to attain or retain capability for self-care or self-support and such services as are likely to prevent or reduce dependency and, in the case of dependent children, to maintain and strengthen family life. The Commissioner shall make such reports in such form and containing information as such agencies of the United States may require and shall comply with such provisions as such agencies require to assure the correctness and verification of such reports.

History. Code 1950, § 63-43; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-35; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-207. Authority to receive grants-in-aid, funds and gifts.

The Commissioner is authorized to receive, for and on behalf of the Commonwealth and its subdivisions, from the United States and agencies thereof, and from any and all other sources, grants-in-aid, funds and gifts, made for the purpose of providing, or to assist in providing, for funds for child welfare services including day care for children, disaster relief and emergency assistance awards, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and general relief, or any of them, including expenses of administration. Subject to the written approval of the Governor, the Commissioner is also authorized to receive from all such sources grants-in-aid, funds and gifts made for the purpose of alleviating, treating or preventing poverty, delinquency or other social problems encountered in programs under the supervision or administration of the Commissioner. All such funds shall be paid into the state treasury.

History. Code 1950, § 63-44; 1962, c. 297; 1964, c. 88; 1966, c. 105; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-36; 1977, c. 37; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-208. Standards for personnel.

The Commissioner shall enforce the minimum education, professional and training requirements and performance standards as determined by the Board for personnel employed in the administration of this title and remove each employee who does not meet such standards.

History. Code 1950, § 63-46; 1968, cc. 578, 670, § 63.1-37; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-209. Divisions of Department; staffing.

  1. The Commissioner shall establish in the Department such divisions and regional offices as may be necessary.
  2. The Commissioner shall ensure that regional offices responsible for oversight of foster care and adoption services are equipped with sufficient staff, and in no event less than four staff members, to provide effective oversight of and assistance with foster care and adoption services provided by local boards in the Commonwealth. At least one staff member shall be tasked with (i) reviewing the placement of children by local boards in children’s residential facilities to verify that such placements are warranted by medical necessity and (ii) monitoring other health-related issues, such as medication management, frequency of visits with health care providers, and use of psychotropic medications. At least one staff member shall be tasked with supporting the efforts of local boards to find family-based placement options for children who are placed in or at risk of being placed in a children’s residential facility without a medical necessity for congregate care. At least one staff member shall be tasked with supporting the efforts of local boards to find a permanent placement for children who have the greatest risk of aging out of foster care without a permanent family. At least one staff member shall be tasked with conducting foster care and adoption case reviews to ensure that local boards within the region are providing foster care and adoption services in a manner that complies with state and federal laws and regulations and protects the health, safety, and well-being of children under the supervision and control of such local boards. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, staff of regional offices shall have the authority to provide temporary staff support to local departments experiencing higher than normal caseloads or staff shortages.

History. Code 1950, § 63-7; 1968, cc. 578, 669, § 63.1-7; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747; 2019, c. 446.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 2 provides: “That the Commissioner of Social Services shall establish within the State Department of Social Services (Department) a director of foster care health and safety position. The director of foster care health and safety shall (i) identify local boards of social services (local boards) that fail to provide foster care services in a manner that complies with applicable laws and regulations and ensures the health, safety, and well-being of all children in the supervision and control of the local board; (ii) ensure that local boards remedy such failures, including those related to caseworker visits, safe and appropriate placement settings, and the provision of physical, mental, and behavioral health screenings and services; (iii) ensure that reports of abuse, neglect, mistreatment, and deaths of children in foster care are properly investigated; (iv) manage the process through which the Department reviews children’s residential facility placements for medical necessity; and (v) track health outcomes of children in foster care. On or before November 30 of each year, the director of foster care health and safety shall report to the Governor and the General Assembly on the implementation and effectiveness of such objectives and any other issues relevant to the health, safety, and well-being of children in foster care.”

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 4 provides: “That the State Department of Social Services shall develop and implement a more reliable, structured, and comprehensive case review and quality improvement process to monitor and improve foster care services provided by local boards and departments of social services in the Commonwealth.”

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 446 designated the existing provisions as subsection A and added subsection B.

§ 63.2-209.1. Office of New Americans.

  1. There is created in the Department an Office of New Americans (the Office) to assist immigrant integration within the Commonwealth on an economic, social, and cultural level.
  2. The Office shall:
    1. Implement a statewide strategy to promote the economic, linguistic, and civic integration of new Americans in the Commonwealth;
    2. Work with localities to coordinate and support local efforts that align with the statewide strategy to promote the economic, linguistic, and civic integration of new Americans in the Commonwealth;
    3. Provide advice and assistance to new Americans regarding (i) the citizenship application process and (ii) securing employment, housing, and services for which such persons may be eligible;
    4. Provide advice and assistance to state agencies regarding (i) the coordination of relevant policies across state agencies responsible for education, workforce, and training programs, including professional licensure guidance, small business development, worker protection, refugee resettlement, citizenship and voter education or engagement programs, housing programs, and other related programs, and (ii) the dissemination of information to localities and immigration service organizations regarding state programs that help new Americans find and secure employment, housing, and services for which they may be eligible;
    5. Educate localities and immigration service organizations on health epidemics and unlawful predatory actions, such as human trafficking, gang recruitment, and fraudulent financial and other schemes, to which communities of such persons may be especially vulnerable;
    6. Serve as the primary liaison with external stakeholders, particularly immigrant-serving and refugee-serving organizations and businesses, on immigrant integration priorities and policies;
    7. Partner with state agencies and immigrant-serving and refugee-serving organizations and businesses to identify and disseminate beneficial immigrant integration policies and practices throughout the Commonwealth;
    8. Manage competitive grant programs that replicate beneficial practices or test new innovations that improve the effectiveness and efficacy of immigrant integration strategies; and
    9. Advise the Governor, cabinet members, and the General Assembly on strategies to improve state policies and programs to support the economic, linguistic, and civic integration of new Americans throughout the Commonwealth.

History. 2020, cc. 1078, 1079.

§ 63.2-210. Appointment of division heads.

The Commissioner shall appoint heads of the divisions, subject to the provisions of Chapter 29 (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.) of Title 2.2.

History. Code 1950, § 63-8; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-8; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-211. Powers and duties of division heads.

The Commissioner may delegate to the heads of the various divisions and to such other employees of the Department as he deems desirable any and all of the powers and duties conferred upon him by law.

History. Code 1950, § 63-9; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-9; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-212. Employment of agents and employees.

The Commissioner may, subject to the provisions of Chapter 29 (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.) of Title 2.2, employ or authorize the employment of such agents and employees as may be needed by the Commissioner and the Department in the exercise of the functions, duties and powers conferred and imposed by law upon him and the Department, and in order to effect a proper organization and to carry out its duties.

History. Code 1950, § 63-10; 1968, cc. 578, 670, § 63.1-10; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-213. Powers, duties, titles and functions of agents and employees.

The functions, duties, powers and titles of the agents and employees provided for in § 63.2-212 , and their salaries and remuneration, not in excess of the amount provided therefor by law, shall be fixed by the Commissioner, subject to the provisions of Chapter 29 (§ 2.2-2900 et seq.) of Title 2.2.

History. Code 1950, § 63-11; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-11; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 467.

The 2003 amendments.

The 2003 amendment by c. 467 substituted “§ 63.2-212 ” for “§ 63.2-213 .”

§ 63.2-214. Bonds of such agents.

Proper bonds shall be required of all agents and employees who handle any funds which may come into custody of the Department. The premiums on the bonds shall be paid from funds appropriated by the Commonwealth for the administration of the activities of the Department.

History. Code 1950, § 63-12; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-12; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-214.1. Marriage and family programs; funding.

  1. To the extent authorized by federal law, the Department may spend up to one percent of all funds received through the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant during each fiscal year to fund programs that support the development of healthy marriages and the strengthening of families.
  2. A portion, not to exceed 10 percent, of the money required to be spent as provided in subsection A may be allocated to develop a process, in cooperation with any public institution of higher education, for identifying best practices and outcomes for programs supported by grants made pursuant to this section.
  3. If before implementation of any provision of this section a state agency determines that a waiver or authorization from a federal agency is necessary for implementation of that provision, the agency affected by the provision shall request the waiver or authorization and may delay implementing that provision until the waiver or authorization is granted.
  4. The Board shall adopt such rules and promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to implement programs developed pursuant to this section.

History. 2008, c. 439.

Editor’s note.

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, “institution of higher education” was substituted for “college or university” in subsection B to conform to Acts 2016, c. 588.

§ 63.2-214.2. Information related to shaken baby syndrome.

The Department shall make information about shaken baby syndrome, its effects, and resources for help and support for caretakers in a printable format, and information about how to acquire information about shaken baby syndrome and its effects in an audiovisual format, available to the public on its website. Such information shall be provided to every child welfare program required to be licensed by the Department at the time of initial licensure and upon request. The Department shall also make the information required in this section available to foster and adoptive parents and other persons, upon request.

History. 2010, c. 551.

§ 63.2-214.3. Information on human trafficking.

The Department, in consultation with experts in the field of human trafficking prevention, shall provide to the Board of Education:

  1. Resource information on human trafficking, including strategies for the prevention of trafficking of children; and
  2. Materials for distribution that describe local, state, and national resources to which students, parents, school resource officers, counselors, and school personnel can refer for information on human trafficking, including strategies for prevention of trafficking of children.

History. 2012, cc. 317, 370.

Article 2. State Board of Social Services.

§ 63.2-215. State Board of Social Services.

There shall be a State Board of Social Services consisting of 11 members appointed by the Governor. In making appointments, the Governor shall endeavor to select appointees of such qualifications and experience that the membership of the Board shall include persons suitably qualified to consider and act upon the various problems that the Board may be required to consider and act upon. The Board shall include a member from each of the social services regions of the state established by the Commissioner. At least one member of the Board shall be a licensed health care professional. The appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the General Assembly if in session and, if not, then at its next succeeding session.

The members of the Board shall be appointed for four-year terms, except that appointments to fill vacancies shall be for the unexpired term.

No person shall be eligible to serve for or during more than two successive terms; however, any person appointed to fill a vacancy may be eligible for two additional successive terms after the term of the vacancy for which he was appointed has expired. Members of the Board may be suspended or removed by the Governor at his pleasure.

The Board shall select a chairman from its membership, and under rules adopted by itself may elect one of its members as vice-chairman. It shall elect one of its members as secretary.

The Board shall meet at such times as it deems appropriate and on call of the chairman when in his opinion meetings are expedient or necessary, provided that the Board meet at least six times each calendar year.

A majority of the current membership of the Board shall constitute a quorum for all purposes.

The main office of the Board shall be in the City of Richmond.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-14, 63-15, 63-16, 63-18, 63-19, 63-20, 63-21, 63-22, 63-23; 1956, c. 104; 1968, cc. 465, 578, §§ 63.1-14, 63.1-15, 63.1-16, 63.1-18, 63.1-19, 63.1-20, 63.1-21, 63.1-22, 63.1-23; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1976 c. 217; 1980, c. 315; 1981, c. 21; 1998, c. 468; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 803, 835; 2020, cc. 860, 861.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 78 provides: “That at least two individuals appointed to the State Board of Social Services pursuant to § 63.2-215 for terms beginning July 1, 2012, shall be representatives of child care centers.”

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 3 provides: “That the provisions of the first and second enactments of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2021, except that § 22.1-289.04 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective in due course.”

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 803 and 835, cl. 75, are identical, and in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, substituted “11 members” for “nine members,” deleted “and one member shall be a licensed health care professional” from the end of the third sentence, and inserted the fourth sentence; in the fifth paragraph, substituted “expedient or necessary, provided that the Board meet” for “expedient or necessary; provided, however, that the Board shall meet”; and deleted the former last paragraph, which read: “No director, officer or employee of an institution subject to the provisions of this title shall be a member of the Board.”

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendments by cc. 860 and 861, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and deleted “one member shall be a representative of stand-alone licensed child care centers that meet the accountability standards of state recognized accreditation pursuant to § 22.1-19, and one member shall be a representative of religiously exempt child care centers” from the first paragraph, penultimate sentence.

§ 63.2-216. Powers and duties of Board in general.

In addition to such other duties as are assigned to it, the Board shall act in a capacity advisory to the Commissioner, and when requested shall confer and advise with him upon such matters as may arise in the performance of his duties. When requested by the Commissioner, or by the Governor, the Board shall investigate such questions and consider such problems as they, or either of them, may submit and shall report their findings and conclusions. The Board may also initiate investigations and consider problems and make recommendations to the Commissioner or to the Governor, of its own motion.

History. Code 1950, § 63-24; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-24; 1981, c. 21; 1999, cc. 737, 763; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-217. Board to adopt regulations.

The Board shall adopt such regulations, not in conflict with this title, as may be necessary or desirable to carry out the purpose of this title. Before the Board acts on a regulation to be published in the Virginia Register of Regulations pursuant to § 2.2-4007.05 , the Board shall examine the potential fiscal impact of such regulation on local boards. For regulations with potential fiscal impact, the Board shall share copies of the fiscal analysis with local boards prior to submission of the regulation to the Department of Planning and Budget for purposes of the economic impact analysis under § 2.2-4007.04 . The fiscal impact analysis shall include the projected costs and savings to the local boards to implement or comply with such regulation and, where applicable, sources of potential funds to implement or comply with such regulation.

The Board also may adopt such regulations to authorize local boards to destroy or otherwise dispose of such records as the local boards in their discretion deem are no longer necessary in such offices and that serve no further administrative, historical or financial purpose.

History. Code 1950, § 63-25; 1956, c. 125; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-25; 1974, c. 507, § 63.1-238.5; 1976, c. 216; 1998, c. 558; 2002, cc. 391, 747; 2007, cc. 873, 916.

Cross references.

As to authority of the State Board of Social Services upon amendments of the federal Social Security Act or regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services, see § 63.2-406 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2002, c. 391 amended § 63.1-25, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152, Acts 2002, c. 391 has been given effect in this section as set out above. The 2002 amendment by c. 391 substituted “H” for “G” preceding “of § 2.2-4007 ” in the first paragraph.

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 65 provides: “That effective July 1, 2013, the regulations of the Board of Social Services promulgated pursuant to § 63.2-217 , related to administration of auxiliary grants pursuant to § 63.2-800 , and adult services provided pursuant to Article 1 (§ 63.2-1600 et seq.) and adult protective services provided pursuant to Article 2 (§ 63.2-1603 ) of Chapter 16 of Title 63.2 shall be administered by the Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services and shall remain in full force and effect until the Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services promulgates regulations pursuant to the 64th enactment of this act.”

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 67 provides: “That as of July 1, 2012, the Department for Aging and Rehabilitative Services shall be deemed successor in interest to the Department for the Aging and the Department of Rehabilitative Services to the extent that this act transfers powers and duties. All right, title, and interest in and to any tangible personal property vested in the Department for the Aging and the Department of Rehabilitative Services to the extent that this act transfers powers and duties as of the effective date of this act shall be transferred to and taken as standing in the name of the Department for Aging and Rehabilitative Services.”

Acts 2017, c. 604, c. 1 provides: “That the State Board of Social Services shall promulgate regulations that require local departments of social services to respond to valid reports and complaints alleging suspected abuse or neglect of a child under the age of two within 24 hours of receiving such reports or complaints.”

Acts 2020, c. 848, cl. 1 provides: “The Department of Social Services shall convene a work group that includes representatives of assisted living facilities, advocates for residents of assisted living facilities, and other stakeholders to make recommendations to the Board regarding adoption of regulations for the audio-visual recording of residents in assisted living facilities, as defined in § 63.2-100 of the Code of Virginia, including provisions related to (i) resident privacy, (ii) notice and disclosure, (iii) liability, (iv) ownership and maintenance of equipment, (v) cost, (vi) recording and data security, and (vii) assisted living facility options for both assisted living facility-managed recording and resident-managed recording. The work group shall report its recommendations to the Governor, the Board of Social Services, and the General Assembly by December 1, 2020.”

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 6 provides: “That the regulations adopted by the State Board of Social Services to administer and implement the programs that are to be transferred from the State Board of Social Services to the Board of Education pursuant to this act shall remain in full force and effect until altered, amended, or rescinded by the Board of Education.”

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 7 provides: “That guidance adopted by the State Board of Social Services or Department of Social Services relating to programs to be transferred by this act shall remain in effect until amended or repealed.”

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendments by cc. 873 and 916 are identical, and in the first paragraph, substituted “2.2-4007.05” for “2.2-4007” and “§ 2.2-4007 .04” for “subsection H of § 2.2-4007 .”

CASE NOTES

Local directors do not have authority to set social services policy. —

County officials’ reliance on an applicant’s political affiliation as a reason for not hiring her as a local director of a county department of social services violated the applicant’s First Amendment rights because Virginia’s social services scheme did not provide local directors with authority to set general goals and programs for social services. However, the county officials were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the hiring decision that selecting a local director on the basis of political affiliation violated the First Amendment. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10719 (4th Cir. 2009).

§ 63.2-217.1. Board to amend regulations governing emergency response plans of assisted living facilities.

  1. The Board shall amend its regulations governing emergency preparedness and response plans and temporary emergency electrical power sources of assisted living facilities to require the following:
    1. Any assisted living facility that is equipped with an on-site emergency generator shall (i) include in its emergency preparedness and response plan a description of the emergency generator’s capacity to provide sufficient power for the operation of lighting, ventilation, temperature control, supplied oxygen, and refrigeration and (ii) test such emergency generator monthly and maintain records of such tests; and
    2. Any assisted living facility that is not equipped with an on-site emergency generator shall (i) enter into an agreement with a vendor capable of providing the assisted living facility with an emergency generator for the provision of electricity during an interruption of the normal electric power supply; (ii) enter into at least one agreement with a separate vendor capable of providing an emergency generator in the event that the primary vendor is unable to comply with its agreement with the assisted living facility during an emergency; and (iii) have its temporary emergency electrical power source connection tested at the time of installation and every two years thereafter by a contracted vendor and maintain records of such tests.
  2. The Department shall provide notice to all licensed assisted living facilities regarding the date by which such assisted living facilities must comply with the regulations promulgated pursuant to this section.

History. 2019, c. 91.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2019, c. 91 was codified as this section at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

§ 63.2-218. Board to adopt regulations regarding human research.

The Board shall adopt regulations to effectuate the provisions of Chapter 5.1 (§ 32.1-162.16 et seq.) of Title 32.1 for human research, as defined in § 32.1-162.16 , to be conducted or authorized by the Department, any agency or facility licensed by the Department, or any local department. The regulations shall require the human research committee to submit to the Governor, the General Assembly, and the Commissioner at least annually a report on the human research projects reviewed and approved by the committee and shall require the committee to report any significant deviations from the proposals as approved.

History. 1992, c. 603, § 63.1-25.01; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-219. Board to establish employee entrance and performance standards.

The Board shall establish minimum education, professional and training requirements and performance standards for the personnel employed by the Commissioner and local boards in the administration of this title and adopt regulations to maintain such education, professional and training requirements and performance standards, including such regulations as may be embraced in the development of a system of personnel administration meeting requirements of the Department of Health and Human Services under appropriate federal legislation relating to programs administered by the Board. The Board shall adopt minimum education, professional and training requirements and performance standards for personnel to provide public assistance or social services.

The Board shall provide that the Department and its local boards or local departments shall not employ any person in any family-services specialist position that provides direct client services unless that person holds at least a baccalaureate degree. Such requirement shall not be waived by the Department, Board, or any local director or local governing body, unless such person has been employed prior to January 1, 1999, by the Department or its local boards or local departments in a family-services specialist position that provides direct client services.

The state grievance procedure adopted pursuant to Chapter 30 (§ 2.2-3000 et seq.) of Title 2.2 shall apply to the personnel employed by the Commissioner. A local social services department or local board shall adopt a grievance procedure that is either (i) adopted by the locality in which the department or board is located, or in the case of a regional department or board, the grievance procedure adopted by one of its localities in the regional organization; or (ii) approved by the Board consistent with the provisions of Chapter 30 (§ 2.2-3000 et seq.) of Title 2.2. The grievance procedure adopted by the local board shall apply to employees, including local directors, of the local boards and local departments.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-26, 63-136, 63-140.13, 63-158, 63-200; 1960, c. 440; 1962, c. 621; 1966, c. 112; 1968, cc. 578, 668, 670, §§ 63.1-26, 63.1-123; 1974, cc. 491, 504; 1975, cc. 176, 438; 1984, c. 781; 1990, c. 537; 1995, cc. 770, 818; 1999, c. 854; 2002, c. 747; 2004, c. 208; 2005, c. 714; 2014, c. 285.

The 2004 amendments.

The 2004 amendment by c. 208, in the last paragraph, substituted “however, the grievance procedures adopted by localities pursuant to §§ 15.2-1506 and 15.2-1507 shall apply to” for “and” and deleted the language “unless the local governing body elects to include employees of local departments and local boards under the grievance procedure adopted pursuant to § 15.2-1506 ” at the end.

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 714 rewrote the last paragraph.

The 2014 amendments.

The 2014 amendment by c. 285, effective March 24, 2014, in the second paragraph substituted “family-services specialist” for “social work” in two places.

Law Review.

For discussion of Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993).

which addresses Eleventh Amendment immunity of local social service boards, see “ The Fourth Circuit Review,” 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 331 (1994).

CASE NOTES

Local department was state’s alter ego. —

Local department’s structure and organization and its relationship with the Virginia Department, coupled with the fact that most of the judgment would be paid from state funds, preponderated in favor of the conclusion that the local department was in essence the state’s alter ego and thus was protected by the Eleventh Amendment from a damage award in a § 1983 action in federal court. Bockes v. Fields, 798 F. Supp. 1219, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11699 (W.D. Va. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 999 F.2d 788, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19038 (4th Cir. 1993) (decided under prior law).

Local boards may not set general goals and programs. —

Local boards do no have authority to set “general goals and programs” for social services personnel; that authority is reserved for the State Board of Social Services. Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19038 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092, 114 S. Ct. 922, 127 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1183 (1994) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-220. Board may administer oaths, conduct hearings and issue subpoenas.

The Board in the exercise and performance of its functions, duties and powers under the provisions of this title is authorized to hold and conduct hearings, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of records, memoranda, papers and other documents, to administer oaths and to take testimony thereunder.

History. Code 1950, § 63-27; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-27; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to punishment for failing or refusing to obey subpoenas, see § 63.2-106 .

§ 63.2-221. Board to investigate institutions at direction of Governor.

Whenever the Governor considers it proper or necessary to investigate the management of any institution licensed by or required to be inspected by the Board under the provisions of this title, he may direct the Board, or any committee or agent thereof, to make the investigation. The Board, committee or agent designated by the Governor shall have power to administer oaths and to summon officers, employees or other persons to attend as witnesses and to enforce their attendance and to compel them to produce documents and give evidence.

History. Code 1950, § 63-33; 1968, c. 465, § 63.1-28.1; 2002, c. 747.

Article 3. Statewide Human Services Information and Referral Program.

§ 63.2-222. Establishment of system.

There shall be created a statewide human services information and referral system designed to:

  1. Collect and maintain accurate and complete resource data on a statewide basis;
  2. Link citizens needing human services with appropriate community resources to satisfy those needs;
  3. Assist in planning for human services delivery at the local, regional and state levels; and
  4. Provide information to assist decision-makers in allocating financial and other resources to respond to state and local human service priorities.

History. 1984, c. 402, § 63.1-314.1; 2002, c. 747.

§§ 63.2-223 through 63.2-225. Repealed by Acts 2003, cc. 54 and 75.

Editor’s note.

Former § 63.2-223 , which created the Human Services Information and Referral Advisory Council, was derived 1984, c. 402, § 63.1-314.2; 2002, c. 747. Former § 63.2-224, pertaining to members of the Council, was derived from 1984, c. 402, § 63.1-314.3; 1985, c. 19; 1989, c. 733; 1990, cc. 458, 915; 1994, c. 64; 2002, c. 747. Former § 63.2-225, pertaining to duties of Council, was derived from 1984, c. 402, § 63.1-314.4; 1990, c. 915; 2002, c. 747.

Repealed § 63.2-224 was amended by Acts 2003, c. 467.

§ 63.2-226. Duties of Department.

  1. The Department shall assume administrative responsibilities for the statewide system. In this capacity, the Department shall establish an office to:
    1. Develop a plan for the design and implementation of a statewide human services information and referral program;
    2. Coordinate and supervise the implementation and operation of the information and referral program;
    3. Coordinate funding for the system;
    4. Select regional providers of information and referral services;
    5. Supervise coordination of information management among information and referral regions across the Commonwealth;
    6. Encourage effective relationships between the system and state and local agencies and public and private organizations;
    7. Develop and implement a statewide publicity effort;
    8. Provide training, technical assistance, research, and consultation for regional and local information and referral centers, and to localities interested in developing information and referral services;
    9. Determine a core level of services to be funded from state government resources;
    10. Coordinate standardization of resource data collection, maintenance and dissemination;
    11. Stimulate and encourage the availability of statewide information and referral services;
    12. Develop and implement a program for monitoring and assessing the performance and success of the information and referral program; and
    13. Collect information on child-specific payments made through the Title IV-E foster care program and submit information, when available, to the Office of Children’s Services.
  2. The Department, in consultation with the Virginia Employment Commission and Virginia Community College System, shall develop and implement a plan for the provision to citizens receiving any form of public assistance of information regarding courses on financial literacy, offered online or through any other appropriate medium, that are available to such citizens at no cost to them.

History. 1984, c. 402, § 63.1-314.5; 1990, c. 915; 2002, c. 747; 2003, cc. 54, 75; 2008, c. 277; 2015, cc. 366, 521.

The 2003 amendments.

The 2003 amendments by cc. 54 and 75 are identical, and deleted “in conformance with standards and policies recommended by the Council” at the end of the first sentence of the first paragraph; deleted former subsection 1, which read: “Provide staff support to the Council” and renumbered the remaining subsections accordingly; deleted “conforming to the standards and policies recommended by the Council and submit the plan to the Council for review” at the end of subsection 1; and deleted “and present an annual report to the Council evaluating the effectiveness of the system” at the end of subsection 12.

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendment by c. 277 added subdivision 13; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendment by c. 366 substituted “Office of Children’s Services” for “Office of Comprehensive Services for At-Risk Youth and Families” in subdivision 13.

The 2015 amendment by c. 521 inserted the subsection A designation and added subsection B.

§ 63.2-227. Regional providers; duties.

There shall be established a regional system of providers of information and referral services. The Department shall select the regional providers.

The regional providers shall:

  1. Collect, maintain and disseminate resource data;
  2. Provide citizen access to information about resources throughout the Commonwealth;
  3. Assist in planning functions by providing selected data to the Department on a regular basis;
  4. Provide data to public and private agencies other than the Department on a contractual basis;
  5. Cooperate with the state administering agency;
  6. Seek funds from available sources;
  7. Maintain effective relationships between the system and state and local agencies and public and private organizations; and
  8. When feasible and appropriate and within the limits of available funds, establish satellite offices or develop cooperative agreements with local information and referral groups and resource and referral groups that can assist the regional providers in performing their duties and responsibilities.

History. 1984, c. 402, § 63.1-314.6; 1990, c. 915; 2002, c. 747; 2003, cc. 54, 75.

The 2003 amendments.

The 2003 amendments by cc. 54 and 75 are identical, and in the last sentence of the first paragraph deleted “Council shall define the boundaries of the regions, and the” preceding “Department” and deleted “according to standards and policies established by the Council” at the end.

§ 63.2-228. Repealed by Acts 2003, cc. 54 and 75.

Editor’s note.

Former § 63.2-228 , which created the Technical Assistance Committee, derived from 1990, c. 915, § 63.1-314.8; 1991, c. 563; 1996, c. 492; 2002, cc. 572, 747.

Chapter 3. Local Social Services.

Article 1. Local Boards of Social Services.

§ 63.2-300. Local boards established by local governments.

There shall be a local board in each county and city of the Commonwealth. However, any combination of counties and cities may establish one local board for those jurisdictions as hereinafter provided in this article.

History. Code 1950, § 63-51; 1952, c. 409; 1956, c. 126; 1968, cc. 578, 584, § 63.1-38; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to department and board of social services under the county manager form of government, see § 15.2-626 . As to department and board of social services under the urban county executive form of government, see § 15.2-835 .

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

Law Review.

For article, “Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia,” see 57 Va. L. Rev. 818 (1971).

For discussion of Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993).

which addresses Eleventh Amendment immunity of local social service boards, see “ The Fourth Circuit Review,” 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 331 (1994).

For essay, “Virginia Ranks Forty-Ninth of Fifty: The Need for Stronger Laws Supporting Foster Youth,” see 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 255 (2018).

§ 63.2-301. Local board appointments and terms of office.

The members of each local board first appointed shall be appointed initially for terms of from one to four years so as to provide for the balanced overlapping of the terms of the membership thereon and the members of a local board representing more than one county or city shall be appointed initially for such terms, of not less than one nor more than four years, as may be determined by the governing bodies of their respective counties or cities. Subsequent appointments shall be for a term of four years each, except that appointments to fill vacancies that occur during terms shall be for the remainder of those unexpired terms. Appointments to fill unexpired terms shall not be considered full terms, and such persons shall be eligible to be appointed to two consecutive full terms. No person may serve more than two consecutive full terms; however, this section shall not apply to a member of a local board who is also a member of the board of supervisors for a county represented by the board, who shall serve at the pleasure of the board of supervisors of which he is a member or until such time as he ceases to be a member of the board of supervisors, or in cases in which a local government official is constituted to be the local board. A member of a local board who serves two consecutive full terms shall be ineligible for reappointment to such local board until the end of an intervening two-year period dating from the expiration of the last of the two consecutive terms.

History. Code 1950, § 63-56; 1952, c. 409; 1956, c. 126; 1968, cc. 467, 578, § 63.1-39; 1974, c. 120; 1975, c. 300; 1980, c. 377; 2002, c. 747; 2005, c. 16; 2014, cc. 95, 121.

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 16, substituted “two-year” for “four-year” in the last sentence.

The 2014 amendments.

The 2014 amendments by cc. 95 and 121 are identical, and substituted “to a member of a local board who is also a member of the board of supervisors for a county represented by the board, who shall serve at the pleasure of the board of supervisors of which he is a member or until such time as he ceases to be a member of the board of supervisors, or in cases in which” for “where” in the fourth sentence.

§ 63.2-302. How local board for a single county is constituted.

The local board serving a single county shall be, at the discretion of the governing body of the county, either a local government official or a local board consisting of residents of the county who are, except as provided in § 63.2-303 , appointed by the governing body of the county. If residents of the county constitute the local board, such board shall consist of three or more members. The governing body shall appoint a member of the board of supervisors to be one member of the local board, except in those cases where the board of supervisors has determined otherwise. When a member of the board of supervisors who was appointed as a member of the local board ceases to be a member of the board of supervisors, his office as a member of the local board shall also be vacated and another member of the board of supervisors shall be appointed to fill such vacancy.

If a local government official constitutes the local board, he may designate a senior staff person in the local department to act in his behalf, in his absence, to approve, cancel or change grants made under the provisions of this title.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-52, 63-54, 63-56; 1952, c. 409; 1956, c. 126; 1966, c. 258; 1968, cc. 467, 578, § 63.1-40; 1970, c. 465; 1972, cc. 147, 714; 1984, c. 586; 2002, c. 747.

Law Review.

For annual survey of Virginia law on taxation, see 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 291 (2005).

§ 63.2-303. Local boards in counties having special forms of county government.

Where the statutes dealing with special forms of county government provide for the appointment of local boards, the provisions of such statutes shall control.

History. Code 1950, § 63-60; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-41; 1970, cc. 465, 467; 1981, c. 90; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-304. How local board of a city is constituted.

The local board serving a single city shall be, at the discretion of the city council, either a local government official or a local board consisting of five members appointed by the city council of such city in accordance with the provisions of § 63.2-301 . The city council may appoint one of its members to the local board. When a member of the city council who was appointed as a member of the local board ceases to be a member of the city council, his office as a member of the local board shall also be vacated and another member of the city council may be appointed to fill the vacancy.

If a local government official constitutes the local board, he may designate a senior staff person in the local department to act in his behalf, in his absence, with respect to approving, cancelling or changing grants made under the provisions of this title.

History. Code 1950, § 63-53.1; 1952, c. 409; 1956, c. 126; 1958, c. 195; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-43; 1977, c. 36; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 84, 158.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 84 and 158 are identical, and added the second and third sentences in the first paragraph.

§ 63.2-305. Advisory boards.

  1. If the governing body of a city or county or the governing bodies of any combination of cities and counties participating in a district designate, under the provisions of §§ 63.2-302 , 63.2-304 or § 63.2-307 , a local government official as constituting the local board, such governing body or bodies shall appoint a board to serve in an advisory capacity to such local government official with respect to the duties and functions imposed upon him by this title.Each such advisory board shall consist of no fewer than five and no more than thirteen members. In the case of an advisory board established for a district, there shall be at least one member on the board from each county and city in the district. The members shall be appointed initially for terms of from one to four years so as to provide for the balanced overlapping of the terms of the membership thereon. Subsequent appointments shall be for a term of four years each, except that appointments to fill vacancies that occur during terms shall be for the remainder of these unexpired terms. Appointments to fill unexpired terms shall not be considered full terms, and such persons shall be eligible to be appointed to two consecutive full terms. No person shall serve more than two consecutive full terms. The local government official shall be an ex officio member, without vote, of the advisory board.The advisory board shall elect its own chairman and shall meet at least bimonthly. In addition to regularly scheduled meetings, it may meet at the call of the chairman or on the petition of at least one-half of the members.
  2. The powers and duties of the advisory board shall be:
    1. To interest itself in all matters pertaining to the public assistance and social services needed by people of the political subdivision or subdivisions served by the local department;
    2. To monitor the formulation and implementation of public assistance and social services programs by the local department;
    3. To meet with the local government official who constitutes the local board at least four times a year for the purpose of making recommendations on policy matters concerning the local department;
    4. To make an annual report to the governing body or bodies, concurrent with the budget presentation of the local department, concerning the administration of the public assistance and social services programs; and
    5. To submit to the governing body or bodies, from time to time, other reports that the advisory board deems appropriate.

History. 1977, c. 36, § 63.1-43.1; 1981, c. 264; 1984, c. 586; 1989, c. 356; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-306. Local boards established by two or more political subdivisions.

The provisions of §§ 63.2-302 and 63.2-304 notwithstanding, the Board, with the prior consent of the Governor, may establish districts consisting of two or more counties or cities or combinations of cities and counties. Except as provided in § 63.2-307 , there shall be one district board of not less than three nor more than nine members for each such district. There shall be at least one member of the district board from each county and city in the district. Additional representation from one or more counties or cities within the stipulated maximum may be determined by the Board, with population being the principal factor in such determination. Appointments to the district board shall be made by the governing body of each county and city in the district, upon certification of the establishment of such district by the Board. The Board shall designate the initial term of each district board member to be not less than one nor more than four years in duration, so as to provide for a balanced overlapping of terms. Subsequent appointments shall be for terms of four years each, except appointments to fill a vacancy, which shall be for the unexpired term. Appointments to fill unexpired terms shall not be considered full terms, and such persons shall be eligible to be appointed to two consecutive full terms. No member shall serve for more than two consecutive full terms. A member who serves two consecutive full terms shall be ineligible for reappointment to the district board until the end of an intervening one-year period dating from the expiration of the last of the two consecutive terms. Before requesting the Governor’s approval for establishment of any such district, the Board shall consult with the governing body of each county or city that would be included in the district. No county or city shall be included in any such district served by one board unless the local governing body so elects. The district board of any district consisting of two or more counties or cities or combinations of counties and cities shall be considered to be a local board.

Administrative costs of a district board shall be borne by the participating local governments on the basis of population and case load with equal weight being given to each factor or in such manner as the respective governing bodies provide by agreement.

In cases in which a district board includes a county, a member of the board of supervisors of such county may be a member of the local board.

In cases in which a district board includes a city, a member of the council of such city may be a member of the local board, notwithstanding any provision of the charter of any city in force on March 4, 1971.

History. Code 1950, § 63-51; 1952, c. 409; 1956, c. 126; 1968, cc. 578, 584, § 63.1-44; 1970, c. 465; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 138; 1973, c. 201; 1980, cc. 377, 383; 1989, c. 356; 1992, c. 169; 1996, c. 481; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to reimbursement of localities by the Commonwealth for certain expenditures, see § 63.2-401 .

As to payment of public assistance by the district fiscal officer when two or more counties or cities have been combined to form a district pursuant to § 63.2-306 , see § 63.2-520 .

§ 63.2-306.1. Withdrawal from district boards of social services.

  1. The governing body of any county or city that has combined with one or more other counties or cities to establish a district board pursuant to § 63.2-306 may withdraw from such district board and establish a local board in accordance with a transition plan approved by the Board.
  2. The governing body of a county or city that wishes to withdraw from a district board shall adopt a resolution stating the local governing body’s intent to withdraw from the district board and setting forth the terms and conditions of a transition plan for the withdrawal from the district board and establishment of a local board by the local governing body. Such resolution shall be communicated to the Board and all other counties and cities participating in the district board.
  3. The transition plan required pursuant to subsection B shall include provisions related to:
    1. Establishment of a local board, including appointment of members to such local board;
    2. Withdrawal from the district board, including payment of any outstanding obligations by the local governing body to the district board and transfer of any property or funds from the district board to the local board;
    3. Transfer of financial and administrative powers and duties from the district board to the local board;
    4. Continued provision of social services in accordance with laws of the Commonwealth and regulations of the Board; and
    5. Any other matters necessary to accomplish the withdrawal of the local governing body from the district board.The transition plan shall also include a timeline for establishment of the local board and withdrawal of the local governing body from the district board and shall state whether the local governing body intends to withdraw from any single department of social services established by the local governing bodies of the counties or cities participating in the district board.
  4. Whenever the Board fails or refuses to approve the terms and conditions of a transition plan submitted pursuant to subsection B, the county or city seeking to withdraw from a district board may petition the circuit court of the county or city for approval of the transition plan. The Board, the district board, and the counties and cities participating in the district board shall be named as parties in such action. The circuit court may approve a transition plan for the withdrawal of a county or city from a district board and establishment of a local board subject to such transition plan with such terms and conditions that the court may deem appropriate.

History. 2014, c. 119.

§ 63.2-307. Local boards serving certain districts.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 63.2-306 :

  1. The local board for the York County and City of Poquoson district may be, at the discretion of the governing bodies of the participating city and county, the local director. If such local director serves as the local board, he may designate a senior staff person in the local department to act on his behalf, in his absence, to approve, cancel or change grants made under the provisions of this title.
  2. At the discretion of the governing bodies of the participating cities and counties, the local board for a district may be composed of the chief administrative officer of each political subdivision, who may designate his principal assistant to act on his behalf, in his absence, to approve, cancel or change grants made under the provisions of this title.In addition, the provisions of § 63.2-305 shall apply.

History. 1989, c. 356, § 63.1-44.1; 1995, cc. 262, 313; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-308. Suspension or removal of members.

Members of any local board may be suspended or removed for cause by the Board or by the local governing body authorized to appoint the members of the local board.

History. Code 1950, § 63-57; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-45; 2002, c. 747.

Law Review.

For discussion of Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993).

which addresses Eleventh Amendment immunity of local social service boards, see “ The Fourth Circuit Review,” 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 331 (1994).

CASE NOTES

Mandamus improper remedy for discretionary removal. —

Mandamus is a proper remedy for reinstating an officeholder wrongly deprived of his office, but mandamus will not lie to undo a discretionary act. Thus, where County Board of Supervisors exercised the discretion granted to it by the General Assembly in finding that cause existed to remove two members of the County Social Services Board, the trial judge erred in issuing the writ. Giles County Bd. of Supvrs. v. Carr, 222 Va. 379 , 282 S.E.2d 14, 1981 Va. LEXIS 320 (1981) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-309. Quorum.

A majority of the members of any local board shall constitute a quorum.

History. Code 1950, § 63-58; 1952, c. 409; 1956, c. 126; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-46; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-310. Compensation and expenses.

Each member of the local board of a county or a city or of a district shall be paid his reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in attendance at meetings and while otherwise engaged in the discharge of his duties. In addition to such expenses, the governing body of each city or county may, out of its general fund, pay to each member of the local board, as compensation for his services, an amount to be fixed by the governing body of such city or county. No such county or city shall be reimbursed out of either state or federal funds for any part of such compensation paid.

History. Code 1950, § 63-59; 1954, c. 258; 1962, c. 491; 1966, c. 478; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-47; 1972, c. 11; 1973, c. 201; 1978, c. 754; 1998, cc. 80, 192; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to department and board of social services under the county manager form of government, see § 15.2-626 .

§ 63.2-311. Fiscal officer for district board; compensation of such officer.

Whenever two or more political subdivisions establish a district pursuant to § 63.2-306 there shall be appointed a district fiscal officer for such district board. The district fiscal officer shall perform all the fiscal functions for the district board that had been previously performed for the local board by the treasurer or other fiscal officer of each locality within the district. The district fiscal officer for such district board shall be the treasurer of one of the participating counties or cities or combination of counties and cities, as mutually agreed upon by the district board with the approval of the governing bodies. In the event the local authorities cannot agree on the selection of a district fiscal officer, the Commissioner shall designate such district fiscal officer. For his services as district fiscal officer, the treasurer shall be paid such salary as may be agreed upon by the district board. In the event the district board and the treasurer so designated cannot agree on such compensation, then the amount of salary to be paid shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction and the amount so fixed by the judge shall be binding upon both the treasurer and the district board. Provided, that nothing contained in this section shall affect the regular salary or expense allowance of the treasurer as fixed annually by the State Compensation Board.

History. 1973, c. 201, § 63.1-47.1; 1974, cc. 44, 45, 503; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-312. Meetings; organization; chairman and vice-chairman; secretary.

The governing body or bodies shall immediately notify the members of the local board of their appointment, and such members shall, within fifteen days after their notification, elect a chairman and vice-chairman from among their number. The local board shall meet at least bimonthly and on other occasions on call of the chairman or in pursuance of action by the local board. At least one such meeting a year shall be an orientation and training session for local board members. The local director shall act as secretary of his local board and shall keep on file minutes of the attendance and transactions at all meetings of the local board.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-61, 63-62, 63-64; 1952, c. 409; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-48; 1975, c. 190; 1978, c. 754; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-313. Administration of law.

The local boards shall, subject to the regulations of the Board, administer the applicable provisions of this title in their respective counties and cities. The local boards shall also administer the applicable provisions of Chapter 14 (§ 51.5-116 et seq.) of Title 51.5 pursuant to the regulations of the Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services.

History. Code 1950, § 63-66; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-50; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 803, 835.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 62 provides: “That the provisions of this act amending §§ 63.2-100 , 63.2-313 , 63.2-315 , 63.2-405 , 63.2-1600 , 63.2-1601 , 63.2-1602 , 63.2-1605 , and 63.2-1606 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on July 1, 2013.”

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 803 and 835, cl. 59, effective July 1, 2013, are identical, and added the last sentence.

§ 63.2-314. Funds received from public or private sources; authority of local governing bodies to make grants; authority of local boards to establish regulations and fees for court ordered services.

  1. The local boards are authorized to receive and disburse funds derived from public grants or private sources in the form of gifts, contributions, bequests or legacies for the purpose of aiding needy persons within their respective counties, cities or districts. The governing bodies of counties and cities are authorized to make public grants hereunder to their respective local boards. Eligibility for aid from these sources need not be limited to requirements established for the public assistance programs in this Commonwealth. All funds received from such sources shall be deposited in the treasuries of the respective county, city or local district board to the credit of the county, city or local district board and dispensed as authorized by such county, city or local district board.
  2. Local boards may establish regulations and fee schedules and may receive fees for services that a court directs a local department to perform pursuant to § 16.1-274.

History. Code 1950, § 63-66.1; 1954, c. 269; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-51; 1972, c. 387; 1973, c. 201; 1975, c. 125; 1976, c. 516; 1993, c. 975; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-315. Furnishing reports.

The local boards shall furnish to the Commissioner and the governing body of its county or city such reports relating to the administration of this title as the Commissioner and such governing body, respectively, may require. The local boards shall furnish such reports relating to the administration of applicable provisions of Chapter 14 (§ 51.5-116 et seq.) of Title 51.5 to the Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services, as may be required.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-67, 63-67.1, 63-67.2; 1950, p. 641; 1954, c. 265; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-52; 1984, c. 498; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 803, 835.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 62 provides: “That the provisions of this act amending §§ 63.2-100 , 63.2-313 , 63.2-315 , 63.2-405 , 63.2-1600 , 63.2-1601 , 63.2-1602 , 63.2-1605 , and 63.2-1606 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on July 1, 2013.”

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 803 and 835, cl. 59, effective July 1, 2013, are identical, and added the last sentence.

§ 63.2-316. Submission of budget to governing bodies.

The local boards shall submit annually to the boards of supervisors or city councils of their respective counties and cities a budget, containing an estimate and supporting data setting forth the amount of money needed to carry out the provisions of this title, and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to the Commissioner, subject to the provisions of § 63.2-205 .

History. Code 1950, § 63-69; 1952, c. 409; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-54; 1975, c. 368; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-317. Employment of counsel for local boards and employees; payment of expenses.

Except in those cases in which the attorney for the Commonwealth or county or city attorney represents the local board, a local board may employ legal counsel in civil matters to give advice to or represent the local board or any of its members or the employees of the local department and may pay court costs and other expenses involved in the conduct of such civil matters from funds appropriated by the local governing body for the administration of the local department. Such counsel may be employed on a part-time basis for any particular action or actions. A local board may employ in-house counsel to provide general legal advice and representation and advice related to specific actions. However, prior approval of the Department shall be obtained by the local board before counsel is employed except in instances where legal counsel is necessary for the provision of services or assistance to eligible recipients under this title.

The Department may reimburse the local board for all or any part of such expenditures at the same rate in effect for all other administrative costs at the time of the expenditure. However, the Department shall not reimburse the local board for any expenses for which payment was available through an insurance policy currently in force.

Where such counsel is employed by the local board, the attorney for the Commonwealth or city attorney or county attorney may be relieved of his responsibility to represent the local board or local department in that matter.

History. 1976, c. 382, § 63.1-54.1; 1977, c. 184; 1985, c. 438; 2002, c. 747; 2014, cc. 122, 536.

The 2014 amendments.

The 2014 amendments by cc. 122 and 536 are identical, and in the first paragraph added the third sentence.

§ 63.2-318. Payment of legal fees and expenses for certain local department employees.

If any employee of a local department is arrested, indicted or otherwise prosecuted on any criminal charge arising out of an act committed in the discharge of his official duties, and the charge is subsequently terminated by entry of an order of dismissal, or nolle prosequi or upon trial he is found not guilty, the local board by which he is employed may reimburse such employee for all or part of the legal fees and expenses incurred by the employee in defense of such charge. The Department may reimburse the local board all or any part of such expenditures at the same rate in effect for all other administrative costs at the time of the expenditure to the extent that funds are available.

History. 1977, c. 82, § 63.1-54.2; 1985, c. 438; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-319. Child welfare and other services.

Each local board shall provide, either directly or through the purchase of services subject to the supervision of the Commissioner and in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board, any or all child welfare services herein described when such services are not available through other agencies serving residents in the locality. For purposes of this section, the term “child welfare services” means public social services that are directed toward:

  1. Protecting the welfare of all children including handicapped, homeless, dependent, or neglected children;
  2. Preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems that may result in the neglect, abuse, exploitation or delinquency of children;
  3. Preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their families by identifying family problems, assisting families in resolving these problems and preventing the break up of the family where preventing the removal of a child is desirable and possible;
  4. Restoring to their families children who have been removed by providing services to the families and children;
  5. Placing children in suitable adoptive homes in cases where restoration to the biological family is not possible or appropriate; and
  6. Assuring adequate care of children away from their homes in cases where they cannot be returned home or placed for adoption.Each local board is also authorized and, as may be provided by regulations of the Board, shall provide rehabilitation and other services to help individuals attain or retain self-care or self-support and such services as are likely to prevent or reduce dependency and, in the case of dependent children, to maintain and strengthen family life.

History. Code 1950, § 63-72.1; 1966, c. 593; 1968, cc. 466, 578, § 63.1-55; 1973, c. 122; 1977, c. 634; 1982, c. 171; 1984, c. 781; 1986, c. 281; 1992, cc. 837, 880; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to reimbursement of localities by the Commonwealth for certain expenditures, see § 63.2-401 .

As to authority of the State Board of Social Services upon amendments of the federal Social Security Act or regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services, see § 63.2-406 .

As to local boards of social services accepting persons under 18 years of age for placement in homes, facilities, etc., see § 63.2-900 .

As to permanent foster care placements, see § 63.2-908 . As to petition for relief of care and custody, see § 16.1-277.02.

§ 63.2-320. Accepting and expending certain funds on behalf of children placed by or entrusted to local board when no guardian appointed; disposition of funds when children discharged.

A local board is authorized and empowered to accept and expend on behalf of and for the benefit of any child placed by it where legal custody remains with the parents or guardians, committed or entrusted to its care under §§ 63.2-900 and 63.2-903 , when no guardian has been appointed, funds or money paid or tendered as pension, compensation, insurance or other benefit from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs or under the Railroad Retirement Act or the old age and survivors’ insurance provisions of the Social Security Act, as amended, or funds contributed or paid by parents or other persons for the support of such child, and the local board may, from any such funds received, provide for the current or future maintenance of such child.

Whenever any child is discharged by the local board all such funds held by the local board shall be paid to the child’s guardian if such funds exceed $1,000 upon such guardian posting bond as may be required by law, or disbursed in accordance with § 8.01-606 , if the sum does not exceed $1,000.

History. Code 1950, § 63-73.1; 1954, c. 224; 1958, c. 239; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-57; 1994, c. 865; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, “U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs” was substituted for “Veterans’ Administration.”

§ 63.2-321. Interest in and cooperation for public assistance and social services; directing local director.

It shall be the duty of each local board to interest itself in all matters pertaining to the public assistance and social services needed by people of the political subdivision or subdivisions served by the local department, to direct the activities of the local director and to cooperate with the juvenile and domestic relations courts and all other agencies operating for the social betterment of the community.

History. Code 1950, § 63-72; 1952, c. 409; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-57.1; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-322. Conducting hearings, issuing subpoenas, etc.

Local boards in the exercise and performance of their functions, duties and powers under the provisions of this title are authorized to hold and conduct hearings, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of records, memoranda, papers and other documents, to administer oaths and to take testimony thereunder.

History. Code 1950, § 63-74; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-58; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

For penalty for failing or refusing to obey a subpoena issued under this section, see § 63.2-106 .

§ 63.2-323. Emergency payments.

In emergency situations or in the event of delay or error in a state issuance of payments for public assistance and social services to eligible recipients, or expenditures for administration and services, emergency payments shall be issued by local boards as authorized by Board regulations. In emergency situations that result from lost or stolen checks, the Department shall assume liability for losses incurred by local boards due to fraudulent acts by recipients; however, the local board shall make diligent efforts to recoup any such lost funds in accordance with Board regulations.

History. 1975, c. 336, § 63.1-58.1; 1978, c. 296; 2002, c. 747.

Article 2. Local Departments and Local Directors of Social Services.

§ 63.2-324. Local departments of social services.

There shall be a local department of social services for each county or city under the supervision and management of a local director. However, two or more counties, cities, or any combination thereof, whether having separate local boards or a district board, may unite to establish a local department of social services and appoint a local director of social services to administer this title in such counties and cities, in which case such local director shall be the local director for each such county and city and the expenses incident to such local department shall be divided in such manner as the respective governing bodies provide by agreement.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-75, 63-75.1; 1952, c. 409; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-59; 2002, c. 747.

CASE NOTES

County department of social services exempt from Virginia Administrative Process Act. —

Because a county department of social services was a unit of county government and exempt from the Virginia Administrative Process Act, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear a daughter’s appeal of its decision; at no time did a state agency make a finding against the daughter, and consequently, the statutory right to judicial review of the case decision of an administrative agency under the Act did not apply. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Gosney, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 119 (Va. Ct. App. May 2, 2017).

§ 63.2-325. Appointment of local directors of social services and local employees.

Subject to the personnel standards and regulations of the Board, the local director shall be appointed by the local board, or, where the city charter or statutes relating to special forms of city or county government designate some other appointing authority, then by such other appointing authority, from a list of eligibles furnished by the Commissioner. Subject to the personnel standards, and regulations of the Board, the local boards or other appointing authority shall employ, or authorize the local director to employ, such other employees as may be required by the Commissioner to administer this title in the county or city.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-76, 63-77; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-60; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-326. Service at pleasure of local board or local director.

The local director and other employees shall serve at the pleasure of the local board, or other appointing authority, subject to the provisions of the merit system plan as defined in § 63.2-100 . If other employees are employed by the local director, they shall serve at the pleasure of the local director, within the provisions of the merit system plan.

History. Code 1950, § 63-78; 1960, c. 207; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-61; 1994, c. 82; 2002, c. 747.

CASE NOTES

A constitutional guarantee of procedural due process arises when a public employee is discharged in violation of the merit system plan as defined in former § 63.1-87 (see now § 63.2-100 ). Prince v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7764 (4th Cir. 1976) (decided under prior law).

Summary discharge unless constitutional right involved. —

Public employees serving at the will and pleasure of a public agency or authorized officer thereof are subject to summary discharge with or without cause, so long as such discharge is not in retribution for an exercise of some constitutionally protected right. Prince v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7764 (4th Cir. 1976) (decided under prior law).

Local directors do not have authority to set social services policy. —

County officials’ reliance on an applicant’s political affiliation as a reason for not hiring her as a local director of a county department of social services violated the applicant’s First Amendment rights because Virginia’s social services scheme did not provide local directors with authority to set general goals and programs for social services. However, the county officials were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the hiring decision that selecting a local director on the basis of political affiliation violated the First Amendment. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10719 (4th Cir. 2009).

§ 63.2-327. Removal by Commissioner.

Any local director and any such employee who does not meet the personnel standards established by the Board may be removed by the Commissioner.

History. Code 1950, § 63-79; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-62; 1970, c. 721; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-328. Bond.

Before entering upon the discharge of his duties, every local director shall enter bond with surety to be approved by the court or judge, in such sum as the court or judge may fix, conditioned upon the faithful discharge of his duties.

History. Code 1950, § 63-81; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-64; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-329. Bond of certain employees of local boards.

Every employee duly authorized to certify payments to be made or authorized to draw warrants on the treasurer or other fiscal officer shall, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, enter into a bond with surety to be approved by the judge of the circuit court of the county or city in such sum as the judge may fix, conditioned upon the faithful discharge of his duties. However, such sum shall be at least fifteen percent of the annual gross expenditures of the agency less nonrecurring items. The provisions of this section shall not apply in localities when provision for bonding such employees has been made by their governing bodies and the amount of the bonding equals or exceeds the amounts specified in this section.

History. Code 1950, § 63-81.1; 1956, c. 415; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-65; 1984, c. 507; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-330. Compensation.

The local director and other persons employed to administer the provisions of this title in each county or city shall be paid such compensation by such county or city as shall be fixed by the local board or other appointing authority within the compensation plan provided in the merit system plan. With the approval of the Board and the local governing body, the local board may provide that the local director and such other employees shall be paid compensation in excess of the maximums permitted in the compensation plan. Such excess compensation shall be paid wholly from the funds of such county or city and any federal funds that are available and appropriate for such use.

History. Code 1950, § 63-82; 1964, c. 359; 1968, cc. 467, 578, § 63.1-66; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-331. Counties with special forms of government.

In any county having a special form of government under which the governing body of the county would be the appointing authority of the local board, local director, and local employees, the governing body may, subject to the personnel standards and regulations of the Board, authorize the local board to exercise the powers relating to the employment of the local director and other employees required to administer this title in such county and the fixing of their compensation or authorize the local board to exercise such powers insofar as they relate to the local director and the local director to exercise such powers insofar as they relate to other employees required to administer this title in such county.

History. Code 1950, § 63-85; 1954, c. 573; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-67; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-332. Powers and duties of local directors.

The local director shall be the administrator of the local department and shall serve as secretary to the local board. Under the supervision of the local board, unless otherwise specifically stated, and in cooperation with other public and private agencies, the local director, in addition to the functions, powers and duties conferred and imposed by other provisions of law, shall have the powers and perform the duties contained in this title.

The local director shall designate nonattorney employees who are authorized to (i) initiate a case on behalf of the local department by appearing before an intake officer or (ii) complete, sign, and file with the clerk of the juvenile and domestic relations district court, on forms approved by the Supreme Court of Virginia, petitions for foster care review, petitions for permanency planning hearings, petitions to establish paternity, motions to establish or modify support, motions to amend or review an order, or motions for a rule to show cause.

History. Code 1950, § 63-87; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-67.1; 1972, c. 73; 2002, c. 747; 2016, c. 704.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2016, c. 704, cl. 2 provides: “That nothing in this bill shall be construed to invalidate prior filings or petitions by local departments of social services or by their employees on behalf of the local department prior to July 1, 2016.”

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 704 added the second paragraph. For applicability provision, see Editor’s note

CASE NOTES

Local directors do not have authority to set social services policy. —

County officials’ reliance on an applicant’s political affiliation as a reason for not hiring her as a local director of a county department of social services violated the applicant’s First Amendment rights because Virginia’s social services scheme did not provide local directors with authority to set general goals and programs for social services. However, the county officials were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the hiring decision that selecting a local director on the basis of political affiliation violated the First Amendment. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10719 (4th Cir. 2009).

Designated nonattorney employees of the Department of Social Services. —

Circuit court properly affirmed the juvenile and domestic relations court’s termination of the parties’ parental rights because the lower courts acquired active jurisdiction to adjudicate the matters where, while the emergency removal and permanency planning petitions were not signed by an attorney, the 2008 and 2016 statutory amendments clearly demonstrated the General Assembly’s express agreement that certain nonattorney employees of local departments of social services could complete, file, and sign form petitions and motions and would not invalidate prior filings or petitions. Rudolph v. City of Newport News Dep't of Human Servs., 67 Va. App. 140, 793 S.E.2d 831, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 355 (2016).

§ 63.2-333. Agent of Commissioner.

The local director shall act as agent for the Commissioner in implementing the provisions of federal and state law and regulation.

History. Code 1950, § 63-91; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-67.3; 2002, c. 747.

CASE NOTES

Local directors do not have authority to set social services policy. —

County officials’ reliance on an applicant’s political affiliation as a reason for not hiring her as a local director of a county department of social services violated the applicant’s First Amendment rights because Virginia’s social services scheme did not provide local directors with authority to set general goals and programs for social services. However, the county officials were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the hiring decision that selecting a local director on the basis of political affiliation violated the First Amendment. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10719 (4th Cir. 2009).

§ 63.2-334. Cooperation with private agencies.

The local director shall foster cooperation between all public and private charitable and social agencies in the county or city to the end that public resources may be conserved and the social services needs of the county or city be adequately met.

History. Code 1950, § 63-97; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-67.5; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-335. Keeping records.

The records of the cases handled and business transacted by the local department shall be kept in such manner and form as may be prescribed by the Board.

History. Code 1950, § 63-98; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-67.6; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-336. Annual report.

At the request of the local governing body, the local director shall each year prepare and keep on file a full report of the local department’s work and proceedings during the year. If such request is made, one copy of such report shall be filed with the local governing body and another with the Board.

History. Code 1950, § 63-99; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-67.7; 1976, c. 214; 1978, c. 146; 2002, c. 747.

Chapter 4. Funding of Public Assistance and Social Services.

§ 63.2-400. Local appropriation.

The governing body of each county and city shall each year appropriate sums of money sufficient to provide for the payment of public assistance and to provide social services, including cost of administration, under the provisions of Subtitles II and III of this title, within such county or city. Such governing bodies may also appropriate sums of money sufficient to provide for the full range of public assistance and social services for children and adults as may be required by federal legislation for reimbursement thereunder. The respective governing bodies of the counties and cities shall also appropriate sums of money as shall be sufficient to provide for the foster care of children in the custody or under the supervision of the local boards.

History. Code 1950, § 63-105; 1956, c. 641; 1958, c. 388; 1968, cc. 578, 666, § 63.1-91; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

For Subtitle II of this title, see § 63.2-500 et seq. For Subtitle III of this title, see § 63.2-900 et seq.

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Counties, § 38.

§ 63.2-401. Reimbursement of localities by the Commonwealth.

Such funds as are received from the United States and agencies thereof as grants-in-aid for the purpose of providing public assistance and social services grants shall be paid monthly by the Commissioner to each county, city or district fiscal officer as reimbursement of the federal share of such grants as have been paid by each county and city under the provisions of Subtitle II and III of this title. Within the limits of the appropriations of state funds, the Commissioner shall reimburse the entire balance of such public assistance and social services grants as have been paid by each city, county or district fiscal officer after crediting them with the reimbursement made from federal funds. Within the limits of the appropriations of state funds, the Commissioner shall reimburse monthly each city, county or district fiscal officer to the extent of sixty-two and one-half percent of such expenditures made in connection with general relief provided under § 63.2-802 . Within the limits of the appropriations of state funds for the purpose, the Commissioner shall reimburse monthly each city, county or district fiscal officer to the extent of eighty percent of expenditures made for auxiliary grants pursuant to § 51.5-160 . Within the limits of state funds appropriated for the purpose, the Commissioner shall reimburse to each county, city or district fiscal officer an amount not less than fifty percent or more than sixty-two and one-half percent of such expenditures, not federally reimbursable, made for the care of children placed in family homes or institutions pursuant to §§ 63.2-900 and 63.2-903 .

Administrative expenditures made by the localities in connection with the providing of public assistance grants, other benefits and related social services, including child welfare pursuant to § 63.2-319 , shall be ascertained by the Board, and the Commissioner shall, within the limits of available federal funds and state appropriations, reimburse monthly each county, city or district fiscal officer therefor out of such federal and state funds in an amount to be determined by the Board not less than fifty percent of such administrative costs.

The Commissioner also shall reimburse monthly, to the extent funds are available for such purpose, each county, city or district fiscal officer out of state and federal funds, to the extent provided in the preceding paragraph, for monthly rental payments for office space provided the local department in publicly owned buildings, for payments that are based on the cost of initial construction or purchase of a building or a reasonable amount for depreciation of such building, and for the cost of repairs and alterations to either a privately or publicly owned building. However, no monthly rental payment shall exceed a reasonable amount as determined by the Commissioner.

Claims for reimbursement shall be presented by the local board to the Commissioner, and shall be itemized and verified in such manner as the Commissioner may require. Such claim shall, upon the approval of the Commissioner, be paid out of funds appropriated by the Commonwealth and funds received from the federal government for the purposes of Subtitles II and III of this title, to the treasurer or other fiscal officer of the county or city. Wherever two or more counties or cities have been combined to form a district pursuant to § 63.2-306 , reimbursements by the Commissioner under this section shall be paid to the district fiscal officer or other person designated to receive such funds by the governing bodies of such counties or cities. The Commonwealth shall reimburse each county and city the full amount of public assistance grants provided for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-106, 63-107; 1956, cc. 608, 623; 1958, c. 519; 1962, c. 297; 1966, cc. 530, 599; 1968, cc. 466, 578, § 63.1-92; 1970, c. 776; 1972, cc. 73, 718; 1973, cc. 201, 264; 1974, cc. 44, 45, 488; 1975, c. 121; 1984, cc. 498, 781; 1985, c. 599; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 803, 835.

Editor’s note.

For Subtitle II of this title, see § 63.2-500 et seq. For Subtitle III of this title, see § 63.2-900 et seq.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 803 and 835, cl. 59, are identical, and updated the section reference in the next-to-last sentence of the first paragraph.

§ 63.2-402. Reimbursement of the Commonwealth by local board.

If any county or city through its appropriate authorities or officers fails or refuses to provide reimbursement of the Commonwealth, the Board shall authorize and direct the Commissioner to file at the end of each month with the State Comptroller and with the local governing body of such county or city a statement showing all disbursements and expenditures, including administrative expenditures, made for and on behalf of such county or city, and the Comptroller shall from time to time as such funds become available deduct from the funds appropriated by the Commonwealth, in excess of requirements of the Constitution of Virginia, for distribution to such county or city amounts required to reimburse the Commonwealth for expenditures incurred under the provisions of this section. All funds so deducted and transferred are hereby appropriated for the purposes set forth, and shall be expended and disbursed as provided in § 63.2-403 . Any county or city may provide such other necessary or incidental social or rehabilitative services as may be authorized by the Board in connection therewith.

History. 1974, c. 488, § 63.1-92.1; 1984, c. 781; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-403. Expenditures by Department.

  1. Appropriations made to the Department by the General Assembly for carrying out the provisions of Subtitles II and III of this title, including funds received from the United States and other sources for such purpose, shall be used for the following purposes:
    1. Paying such reasonable portion of the per diem and expenses of the members of the Board, the expenses of the Commissioner, the salaries and remuneration of agents and employees of the Board and of the Commissioner, as shall be chargeable for the administration of Subtitles II and III of this title;
    2. Paying all costs and expenses incurred by the Board and the Commissioner in the administration of Subtitles II and III of this title;
    3. Reimbursing the counties and cities to the extent provided in § 63.2-401 ;
    4. Paying public assistance to eligible recipients, and expenditures for social services and administration, in the event the Board adopts regulations to provide for state issuance of any or all of such payments;
    5. Paying to the United States, for so long as such payment shall be required as a condition for financial participation by the United States in any public assistance or social services program its proportionate share of the net amounts collected by local boards from recipients and estates of recipients; and
    6. Paying to the Social Security Administration the cost of administering state supplementation of the Supplemental Security Income program if the Commonwealth agrees to such federal administration.
  2. Expenditures and disbursements of all amounts appropriated for the foregoing purposes shall be made by the State Treasurer on warrants of the Comptroller issued with the approval of the Commissioner.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-109, 63-111; 1956, c. 608; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-93; 1970, c. 602; 1974, cc. 44, 45, 488, 503; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

For Subtitle II of this title, see § 63.2-500 et seq. For Subtitle III of this title, see § 63.2-900 et seq.

§ 63.2-404. Expenses of Auditor of Public Accounts, Comptroller and State Treasurer.

All expenses incurred by the Auditor of Public Accounts in auditing the books, records and accounts of the Board and the Commissioner, and in rendering other services to them and all expenses incurred by the Comptroller and the State Treasurer in performing the services required by or under Subtitles II and III of this title, may be treated as administrative expenses of the Department, and paid as such.

History. Code 1950, § 63-112; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-95; 1984, c. 498; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

For Subtitle II of this title, see § 63.2-500 et seq. For Subtitle III of this title, see § 63.2-900 et seq.

§ 63.2-405. Provisions for determination of eligibility for medical care and medical assistance; provision of social services; regulations.

  1. The Commissioner shall, in compliance with the state plan for medical assistance services, applicable regulations of the Board and other state and federal law, provide for the determination of eligibility for medical care and medical assistance and social services required for (i) state participation under Public Law 97 of the 89th Congress of the United States, approved July 30, 1965, as amended, and regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services; and (ii) other state and federal programs. The Commissioner, subject to the state plan for medical assistance services, applicable regulations of the Board and other state and federal law, may establish policies, in the form of guidance documents, necessary to implement such functions, including safeguarding information concerning applicants and recipients. An application for medical assistance services for a person admitted to a State Veterans Care Center located in the Commonwealth may be filed and processed in the jurisdiction where such Care Center is located.
  2. The Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services shall provide for the determination of eligibility for participation in the Auxiliary Grant Program set forth in Article 9 (§ 51.5-159 et seq.) of Chapter 14 of Title 51.5.

History. 1970, c. 721, § 63.1-97.1; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1984, c. 498; 1996, c. 511; 2002, c. 747; 2004, c. 305; 2012, cc. 803, 835.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 803 and 835, cl. 59, effective July 1, 2013, are identical, and inserted the A designation at the beginning of the first paragraph; and added subsection B.

§ 63.2-406. Authority of Board upon amendments of the Social Security Act or regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services.

In the event the Social Security Act or other statutes or regulations adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services are amended to change requirements to entitle the Commonwealth to federal grants or reimbursement for public assistance payments and expenditures for social services, the Board may by regulation adopt such standards, requirements and procedures that would bring the public assistance and social services programs into compliance with the federal requirements so as not to interfere with, diminish or jeopardize the Commonwealth’s entitlement to federal grants or reimbursement for public assistance payments or expenditures for social services.

If federal statutes or regulations are amended to permit funds appropriated by Congress to be used for public assistance to or social services for any persons eligible for assistance under §§ 63.2-319 and 63.2-802 , the Board may, pursuant to the provisions of § 63.2-217 , make applicable such provisions of Subtitles II and III of this title as the Board finds necessary to enable the Commonwealth to receive reimbursement for such public assistance and social services. The Board may also by regulation define eligibility within the limitations of § 63.2-802 of persons to receive public assistance or social services under any amendments of the Social Security Act or other statutes. It is the purpose of this section to enable the Commonwealth to meet the requirements for federal reimbursement of public assistance or social services to persons who are eligible for public assistance or social services under Subtitles II and III of this title or who may be eligible under amendments of the Social Security Act.

History. Code 1950, § 63-220.1; 1950, p. 958; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-98; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

For Subtitle II of this title, see § 63.2-500 et seq. For Subtitle III of this title, see § 63.2-900 et seq.

§ 63.2-407. Necessary or incidental public assistance or social services.

With respect to general relief, foster care for children and auxiliary grants for the aged, disabled or blind, any county or city may provide such other necessary or incidental public assistance or social services as may be authorized by the Board.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-135, 63-140.12, 63-157, 63-199; 1960, c. 440; 1962, c. 621; 1966, c. 112; 1968, cc. 578, 668, § 63.1-122; 1970, c. 721; 1974, c. 504; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-408. When a locality fails to provide public assistance or social services; deductions by Comptroller; social services; withholding payments.

If any county or city, through its appropriate authorities or officers fails or refuses to provide public assistance or social services in accordance with the provisions of Subtitles II and III of this title, the Board through appropriate proceedings shall require such authorities and officers to exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties imposed by Subtitles II and III.

For so long as the failure or refusal to provide for the public assistance or social services continues, the Board shall authorize and direct the Commissioner under regulations of the Board to provide for the payment of public assistance or the furnishing of social services in such county or city out of funds appropriated for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Subtitles II and III of this title. In such event, the Commissioner shall at the end of each month file with the State Comptroller and with the local governing body of such county or city a statement showing all disbursements and expenditures, including administrative expenditures, made for and on behalf of such county or city, and the Comptroller shall from time to time as such funds become available deduct from funds appropriated by the Commonwealth, in excess of requirements of the Constitution of Virginia, for distribution to such county or city amounts required to reimburse the Commonwealth for expenditures incurred under the provisions of this section. All such funds so deducted and transferred are hereby appropriated for the purposes set forth, and shall be expended and disbursed as provided in § 63.2-403 . If at any time a locality fails to operate public assistance programs or social service programs in accordance with state laws or regulations or fails to provide the necessary staff for the implementation of such programs, the Board may authorize and direct the Commissioner, under regulations of the Board, to withhold from such locality the entire reimbursement for administrative expenditures or a part thereof for the period of time the locality fails to comply with state laws or regulations.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-26, 63-135, 63-136, 63-140.12, 63-140.13, 63-157, 63-158, 63-199, 63-200; 1960, c. 440; 1962, c. 621; 1966, c. 112; 1968, cc. 578, 668, 670, §§ 63.1-122, 63.1-123; 1970, c. 721; 1974, cc. 491, 504; 1975, cc. 176, 438; 1984, c. 781; 1990, c. 537; 1995, cc. 770, 818; 1999, c. 854; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

For Subtitle II of this title, see § 63.2-500 et seq. For Subtitle III of this title, see § 63.2-900 et seq.

§ 63.2-409. No lien to attach to property of applicant or recipient; release of existing unforeclosed liens.

No lien in favor of the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions shall be claimed against, levied or attached to the real or personal property of any applicant for or recipient of public assistance or social services as a condition of eligibility therefor or to recover such aid following the death of such applicant or recipient except applicants for or recipients of long-term care nursing facility benefits paid for by the Department of Medical Assistance Services. However, this section shall not bar any action by the Commonwealth or a local department that seeks reimbursement for part or all of the costs incurred by the Commonwealth or local department for care and maintenance provided to an applicant of the Federal Supplemental Security Income program during the application period when such applicant becomes eligible for the program retroactive to the date of application. In addition, this section shall not be construed to bar any action by the Commonwealth or a local department that seeks reimbursement for public assistance paid through the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or refugee programs while the family attempts to dispose of real property which together with other resources causes its total resources to be in excess of the state’s allowable reserve.

History. 1970, c. 753, § 63.1-133.1; 1977, c. 83; 1985, c. 293; 1993, cc. 953, 989; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to disregard of amounts received pursuant to an Agent Orange settlement or judgment in determining public assistance, and unavailability of such amounts from reimbursement to the Commonwealth or any local department, see § 63.2-505 .

Research References.

Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 18 Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees. § 18.01 Exemptions from Executions. Bryson.

CASE NOTES

Recoupment of payments. —

This section does not forbid the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions from recouping general relief payments from supplemental security income payments. Fink v. Ritchie, 222 Va. 830 , 284 S.E.2d 841, 1981 Va. LEXIS 380 (1981) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-410. State pool of funds under the Children’s Services Act.

The General Assembly and the governing body of each county and city shall appropriate such sum or sums of money for use by the community policy and management teams through the state pool of funds established in Chapter 52 (§ 2.2-5200 et seq.) of Title 2.2 as shall be sufficient to provide basic foster care services for children who are identified as being at risk, as determined by policy developed by the Board, or who are under the custody and control of the local board. The local governing body of each county and city shall appropriate such sums of money as necessary for the purchase of such other essential social services to children and adults under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Board in accordance with federally reimbursed public assistance and social service programs.

History. Code 1950, § 63-72.1; 1966, c. 593; 1968, cc. 466, 578, § 63.1-55; 1973, c. 122; 1977, c. 634; 1982, c. 171; 1984, c. 781; 1986, c. 281; 1992, cc. 837, 880; 2002, c. 747; 2015, c. 366.

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendment by c. 366 substituted “Children’s Services Act” for “Comprehensive Services Act” in the section catchline.

§ 63.2-411. Construction and operation of children’s residential facilities.

Subject to approval by the Governor, a local board is authorized and empowered (i) to operate, construct, purchase, renovate or enlarge children’s residential facilities for children who are in the custody of such local board by reason of commitment, voluntary entrustment or temporary detention order or (ii) to contract for such services from other counties or cities operating such facilities or from individuals or private corporations whose facilities are licensed by the appropriate state agency. The cost of maintaining children in such facilities through purchase of service contracts shall be established in accordance with regulations of the Board. Any moneys paid by a local board of a county or city to another county or city for services purchased pursuant to this section shall be applied by that county or city to the establishment and operation of such children’s residential facilities. Children’s residential facilities established pursuant to the provisions of this section shall meet standards prescribed by the Board.

Within the limits of appropriations of state funds, the Department shall reimburse the local board one half the actual cost of the construction, purchase, renovation or enlargement of each such facility. The Commonwealth shall reimburse the local board for administrative costs of operations of such facilities, including the entire reasonable cost of food, medicines, disinfectants, beds and bedding, utilities, equipment and service maintenance, transportation, staff salaries and fringe benefits, insurance and other necessary supplies in accordance with the provisions of § 63.2-401 .

In the event that a local board requests and receives financial assistance for the costs of the local share of the construction, purchase, renovation or operation of children’s residential facilities for children who are in the custody of such local board from any source other than reimbursement provided pursuant to this section, the total financial assistance and reimbursement shall not exceed the total cost of construction, purchase, renovation or operations, and such funds shall not be considered state funds.

History. 1973, c. 383, § 63.1-56.1; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1977, c. 571; 1978, c. 293; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-412. Assistance to needy persons engaged in work or training programs; costs of administration of such programs.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Commissioner is authorized, subject to the approval of the Board, to initiate and administer a program providing for payments to or in behalf of needy persons engaged in work or training programs. Such payments may be made by transfer of funds to an appropriate agency administering a work or training program. The Commissioner is also authorized to pay all costs incurred in the administration of such programs from funds appropriated for such purposes.

History. Code 1950, § 63-5.3; 1968, c. 331, § 63.1-5.1; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747.

Subtitle II. Public Assistance.

Chapter 5. General Provisions.

§ 63.2-500. Definitions.

For purposes of this subtitle, unless the context otherwise clearly requires:

“Agreement” means the written individualized agreement of personal responsibility required by this chapter.

“Case manager” means the worker designated by the local department, a private-sector contractor or a private community-based organization including nonprofit entities, churches, or voluntary organizations that provide case management services.

“Intensive case management” means individualized services provided by a properly trained case manager.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.42; 1995, c. 450; 2002, c. 747.

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

§ 63.2-501. Application for assistance.

  1. Except as provided for in the state plan for medical assistance services pursuant to § 32.1-325 , application for public assistance shall be made to the local department and filed with the local director of the county or city in which the applicant resides; however, when necessary to overcome backlogs in the application and renewal process, the Commissioner may temporarily utilize other entities to receive and process applications, conduct periodic eligibility renewals, and perform other tasks associated with eligibility determinations. Such entities shall be subject to the confidentiality requirements set forth in § 63.2-501.1 . Applications and renewals processed by other entities pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to appeals pursuant to § 63.2-517 . Such application may be made either electronically or in writing on forms prescribed by the Commissioner and shall be signed by the applicant or otherwise attested to in a manner prescribed by the Commissioner under penalty of perjury in accordance with § 63.2-502 .If the condition of the applicant for public assistance precludes his signing or otherwise attesting to the accuracy of information contained in an application for public assistance, the application may be made on his behalf by his guardian or conservator. If no guardian or conservator has been appointed for the applicant, the application may be made by any competent adult person having sufficient knowledge of the applicant’s circumstances to provide the necessary information, until such time as a guardian or conservator is appointed by a court.
  2. Local departments or the Commissioner shall provide each applicant for public assistance with information regarding his rights and responsibilities related to eligibility for and continued receipt of public assistance. Such information shall be provided in an electronic or written format approved by the Board that is easily understandable and shall also be provided orally to the applicant by an employee of the local department, except in the case of energy assistance. The local department shall require each applicant to acknowledge, in a format approved by the Board, that the information required by this subsection has been provided and shall maintain such acknowledgment together with information regarding the application for public assistance.
  3. Local departments or the Commissioner shall provide each applicant for Medicaid with information regarding advance directives pursuant to Article 8 (§ 54.1-2981 et seq.) of Chapter 29 of Title 54.1, including information about the purpose and benefits of advance directives and how the applicant may make an advance directive.
  4. The Commissioner and local departments shall administer the Child Care Subsidy Program as provided for in the State Child Care Plan prepared by the Department of Education.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-116, 63-140.3, 63-142, 63-180, 63-206; 1962, c. 621; 1968, cc. 578, 781, § 63.1-107; 1970, c. 721; 1972, c. 718; 1975, cc. 524, 585; 1996, c. 511; 1997, cc. 801, 921; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 240, 530; 2015, c. 513; 2017, c. 106; 2020, cc. 860, 861.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 3 provides: “That the provisions of the first and second enactments of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2021, except that § 22.1-289.04 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective in due course.”

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 240, in the second paragraph, in the last sentence, substituted “Such application may be made either electronically or in writing” for “The application shall be in writing” and inserted “or otherwise attested to in a manner prescribed by the Commissioner”; and substituted “or otherwise attesting to the accuracy of information contained in an application for public assistance” for “an application” in the last paragraph.

The 2012 amendment by c. 530 added the subsection A designator and subsection B.

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendment by c. 513 in subsection A, substituted “department” for “board” and inserted “however, when necessary to overcome backlogs in the application and renewal process, the Commissioner may temporarily utilize other entities to receive and process applications, conduct periodic eligibility renewals, and perform other tasks associated with eligibility determinations” in the first sentence and added the second and third sentences; and substituted “departments or the Commissioner” for “boards” in subsection B.

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 106 added subsection C.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendments by cc. 860 and 861, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and added subsection D.

§ 63.2-501.1. Application for public assistance; accurate contact information; authorized disclosures.

  1. Every local department shall obtain accurate contact information from each applicant for public assistance, which shall include the best available address and telephone number of the applicant. Local departments shall also obtain alternative contact information, such as the applicant’s email address and cell phone number, and the applicant’s preferred method of contact, including direct mail, email, text message, or phone call.
  2. To the extent required by federal law and regulations, recipients of public assistance shall notify the local department of any change in address or telephone number within 30 days of such change, and the local department shall update any records maintained by the local department to reflect the change in the recipient’s contact information.
  3. Contact information received and maintained by local departments shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as required pursuant to § 63.2-102 . However, information related to any application for or receipt of medical assistance services pursuant to § 32.1-325 may be disclosed for purposes directly connected to administration of the state plan for medical assistance services pursuant to § 1902(a)(7) of the Social Security Act.

History. 2012, c. 367; 2017, c. 472.

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 472 added the second sentence in subsection A.

§ 63.2-502. False application or false swearing; penalty.

Any person who knowingly makes any false application for public assistance or who knowingly swears or affirms falsely to any matter or thing required by the provisions of this title or as to any information required by the Commissioner, incidental to the administration of the provisions of this title, to be sworn to or affirmed, shall be guilty of perjury and, upon conviction therefor, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of § 18.2-434 .

History. 1975, c. 585, § 63.1-107.1; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to payment by the Department of Social Services of assistant attorney for the Commonwealth for prosecution of public assistance fraud cases, see § 63.2-525 .

Law Review.

For survey of Virginia law on criminal law and procedure for the year 2007-2008, see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 149 (2008).

CASE NOTES

Knowledge. —

Because defendant knew that the cash in defendant’s bank accounts was available not only at the time defendant applied for public assistance benefits, but also during an entire disaster benefit period, defendant knew that a contrary answer to a question on the application was false. Mushaw v. Commonwealth, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 232 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006).

Evidence sufficient. —

Because defendant’s address was required on the application for public assistance and required by Title 63.2, the false statement, that defendant resided at the mother’s address in Smithfield, fell squarely under § 63.2-502 and provided support for defendant’s conviction. Evidence that defendant admitted to living in Newport News rather than at the mother’s, that address was listed on an application to lease furniture, and the phone and utilities were in defendant’s name supported the finding that defendant “resided” at the Newport News address. Burrell v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 72, 646 S.E.2d 35, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 243 (2007).

§ 63.2-503. Procedure upon receipt of application.

  1. Upon receipt of the application for public assistance, the local director or Commissioner shall make or cause to be made promptly an investigation to determine the completeness and correctness of the statements contained in the application and to ascertain the facts supporting the application and such other information as the local department or the Commissioner may require to determine whether an applicant is eligible for public assistance.
  2. In conducting the investigation required by subsection A, and only when consistent with federal law and regulations, the local director shall verify each applicant’s identity, income, assets, and any other information necessary for the purpose of determining eligibility for public assistance, eliminating the duplication of assistance, and deterring fraud.
  3. In cases in which information obtained as a result of the investigation required by subsection A is inconsistent with information provided by the applicant at the time of application or otherwise suggests that the applicant may not be eligible for public assistance, the local director shall notify the applicant in writing and provide opportunity for the applicant to explain the discrepancy. If the applicant fails to respond within 10 days of the date of such notice, the local director shall deny the application for public assistance. If the applicant responds within 10 days of such notice, upon receipt of such response, the local director shall conduct such further investigation as may be necessary to verify the applicant’s response and resolve the discrepancy or other issue arising from comparing the information provided by the applicant with information obtained as a result of the investigation required by subsection A. If the local director determines that the information obtained as a result of the investigation required by subsection A is accurate, and that as a result the applicant is ineligible for public assistance, the local director shall so notify the applicant and public assistance shall be denied. In any case in which the local director believes that the applicant has obtained or attempted to obtain public assistance by means of willful false statements or representations, impersonation, or other fraudulent devices, the local director shall initiate a fraud investigation pursuant to § 63.2-526 .
  4. The Department shall establish a means to obtain and provide the data necessary for the local departments to conduct the search required by subsection B in an automated electronic format. In doing so, the Department may use a third-party contractor. The local department shall immediately take action upon obtaining information indicating a change in a recipient’s circumstances that could warrant reconsideration, cancellation, or changes in the amount of public assistance paid to the recipient in accordance with the provisions of § 63.2-514 .
  5. The Department shall report to the General Assembly no later than December 1 of each year the following:
    1. Which specific types or sources of information local directors used, either directly or through a third-party contractor, during the past year for the purpose of verifying applicants’ identity, income, assets, and other information pursuant to subsection B; and
    2. Any types or sources of information that the Department plans to make available to local directors to use in the future to verify applicants’ identity, income, assets, and other information and the approximate date on which the local directors plan to begin using those types or sources of information.
  6. The Department shall include in its report required pursuant to subsection E the number of applications for public assistance received in accordance with this section, the number of cases in which eligibility for public assistance was approved or denied, and the number of cases referred for investigation and the reasons in each case.
  7. The Board may by regulation authorize the local directors to provide immediate and temporary assistance to persons pending action of the local departments.
  8. In the event that any provision of this section conflicts with federal law or regulations, provisions of federal law shall prevail.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-117, 63-140.4, 63-143, 63-181, 63-207, 63-212; 1960, c. 440; 1962, c. 621; 1966, c. 112; 1968, cc. 578, 781, § 63.1-108; 1974, c. 422; 2002, c. 747; 2015, cc. 509, 513.

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendment by c. 509 added subsections B through F and H and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; substituted “an investigation” for “such investigation as he deems necessary” and “to determine whether an applicant is eligible for public assistance” for “and shall submit recommendations in writing to the local board” at the end of subsection A.

The 2015 amendment by c. 513 inserted “or Commissioner”; substituted “department” for “board” and deleted “and shall submit recommendations in writing to the local board” at the end of the first paragraph; and substituted “departments” for “boards” at the end of the second paragraph.

§ 63.2-503.1. Legal presence required for public assistance; exceptions; proof of legal presence.

  1. In addition to meeting the existing eligibility requirements of the benefits applied for, no person who is not a United States Citizen or legally present in the United States shall receive state or local public assistance pursuant to this subtitle, except for state or local public assistance that is mandated by Federal Law pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1621.
  2. In addition to providing proof of other eligibility requirements, at the time of application for any state or local public benefit, an applicant who is 19 years of age or older shall provide affirmative proof that he is a U.S. citizen or is legally present in the United States. Such affirmative proof shall consist of documentary evidence as required pursuant to § 46.2-328.1 or a social security number as verified by the Social Security Administration. An applicant who is under the age of 19 years shall not be required to provide such affirmative proof; however, such person upon reaching the age of 19 years shall comply with the provisions of this section.An applicant who cannot provide proof that he is a citizen or legally present at the time of application shall sign an affidavit under oath attesting that he is a U.S. citizen or legally present in the United States in order to receive temporary benefits as provided in this section. The affidavit shall be on or consistent with forms prepared by the Commissioner, and shall be subject to and include an explanation of the provisions of § 63.2-502 relating to penalties for knowingly providing false information on a public document. The agency shall report in writing to the appropriate attorney for the Commonwealth those who are determined to have falsely attested to lawful presence.Once an applicant has provided the sworn affidavit required by this subsection, he shall be eligible to receive temporary benefits for either:
    1. Ninety days or until such time that it is determined that he is not legally present in the United States, whichever is earlier, or
    2. Indefinitely if the applicant provides a copy of a completed application for a birth certificate that has been filed and is pending and being actively pursued in accordance with § 32.1-259 or 32.1-260 or any substantially similar law of another state, the District of Columbia, or United States territory or commonwealth. Such extension shall terminate upon the applicant’s receipt of a birth certificate or a determination that a birth certificate does not exist because the applicant is not a United States citizen.
  3. The provisions of subsection B shall not apply to persons applying for benefits exempted by subsection A of this section and subsection A of § 32.1-325.03 .

History. 2005, cc. 867, 876.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2005, cc. 867 and 876, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2006.”

Acts 2005, cc. 867 and 876, cl. 3 provides: “That affected agencies of the Commonwealth shall cooperate with agencies of local government to develop a system to facilitate verification of legal presence in furtherance of the provisions of this act, including but not limited to the ‘Systematic Alien Verification Entitlements Program’ operated by the Department of Homeland Security, which enables federal, state, and local government agencies to obtain immigration status information they need in order to determine an applicant/recipient’s eligibility for public benefits.”

§ 63.2-504. Decision of local department that applicant entitled to public assistance.

Upon completion of the investigation, the local department shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for public assistance under this subtitle, and, if eligible, the amount of such public assistance and the date upon which such public assistance shall begin. If the local department approves the payment of public assistance, such public assistance shall thereupon, until changed, modified, or revoked, be paid as hereinafter provided.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-118, 63-144, 63-182, 63-208; 1968, cc. 578, 781, § 63.1-109; 1974, c. 422; 2002, c. 747; 2015, c. 513.

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendment by c. 513 substituted “department” for “board” in the first and second sentences and deleted the last sentence which read: “If the local board does not act upon any such application within the period specified by Board regulation, or, if the circumstances require immediate public assistance to prevent hardship, the local director may provide necessary public assistance pending determination by the local board.”

CASE NOTES

Construction of provisions. —

Former §§ 63.1-105 and 63.1-109 (see now this section and §§ 63.2-602 , 63.2-614 ) when read with portions of the 1981 biennial appropriations act, were not rendered ambiguous, but rather, were clear and unambiguous, thus precluding use of unpublished legislative history to construe the enactments, and invalidating a regulation of the State Board of Welfare (now State Board of Social Services) which the Board felt implemented the supposed intent of the General Assembly to “defund” Aid to Dependent Children coverage for students between the ages of 18 and 21. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316 , 330 S.E.2d 84, 1985 Va. LEXIS 208 (1985) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-505. Determining the amount of public assistance.

The Board shall adopt regulations governing the amount of public assistance persons receive under the provisions of this subtitle. In making such regulations, the Board shall consider significant differences in living costs in various counties and cities and, unless otherwise precluded by law, shall establish or approve such variations in monetary public assistance standards for shelter allowance on a regional or local basis, as may be appropriate.

The amount of public assistance any person receives under the provisions of this subtitle shall be determined according to Board regulations with regard to (i) the property and income of the person and any support he receives from other sources, including from persons legally responsible for his support, and (ii) the average cost of providing public assistance statewide. It shall be sufficient to provide public assistance that, when added to all other income and support of the recipient (exclusive of that not to be taken into account as hereinafter provided), provides such person with a reasonable subsistence. In determining the income of and support available to a person, the amount of income required to be exempted by federal statute, or if the federal statute makes such exemption permissive, then such portion thereof as may be determined by the Board shall not be considered in determining the amount of assistance any person may receive under this subtitle.

Any amounts received by a person pursuant to a settlement agreement with, or judgment in a lawsuit brought against, a manufacturer or distributor of “Agent Orange” for damages resulting from exposure to “Agent Orange” shall be disregarded in determining the amount of public assistance such person may receive from state public assistance programs and from federal public assistance programs to the extent permitted by federal law or regulation, and such amounts shall not be subject to a lien or be available for reimbursement to the Commonwealth or any local department for public assistance, notwithstanding the provisions of § 63.2-409 .

Any individual or family applying for or receiving public assistance under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, medical assistance services for low-income families with children, food stamp, or energy assistance programs, to the extent permitted by federal law and regulation, may have or establish one savings or other investment account per assistance unit not to exceed $5,000. Any such account, including any interest earned thereon or appreciation in value thereof, shall be exempt from consideration in any calculation under any specified public assistance program as long as no funds are withdrawn from the account. The State Board shall promulgate regulations permitting the withdrawal of funds from the account for purposes related to self-sufficiency, disregarding the funds withdrawn for such purposes in any calculation under any specified public assistance program, and establishing penalties for amounts withdrawn for any other purposes or other misuse of these funds.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-119, 63-145, 63-183, 63-209; 1950, p. 624; 1952, c. 62; 1954, c. 659; 1958, c. 519; 1962, cc. 363, 403; 1964, c. 92; 1966, c. 456; 1968, cc. 578, 781, § 63.1-110; 1970, c. 721; 1974, c. 328; 1977, c. 503; 1989, cc. 333, 521; 1993, c. 922; 1994, c. 263; 2001, c. 483; 2002, cc. 360, 747.

Cross references.

As to determining financial eligibility, see § 63.2-614 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2002, c. 360 amended § 63.1-110, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152, Acts 2002, c. 360 has been given effect in this section as set out above. The 2002 amendment by c. 360 rewrote the fourth paragraph, which formerly read: “Any individual or family applying for or receiving public assistance under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, medical assistance services for low income families with children, food stamp or energy assistance programs, to the extent permitted by federal law and regulation, may have or establish one savings or other investment account per assistance unit not to exceed $5,000. Any such account, and any interest earned thereon or appreciation in value thereof, shall be exempt from consideration in any calculation under any specified public assistance program as long as no funds are withdrawn from the account. The Board shall adopt regulations permitting the withdrawal of funds from the account for purposes related to self-sufficiency, disregarding the funds withdrawn for such purposes in any calculation under any specified assistance program, and establishing penalties for amounts withdrawn for any other purposes or other misuse of these funds.”

Acts 2002, ch. 360, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act shall not become effective unless an appropriation effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the 2002 Appropriation Act passed during the 2002 Session of the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor.” The appropriation was provided for in Acts 2002, c. 899, Item 354.

§ 63.2-505.1. Transitional food stamp benefits.

To the extent permitted by federal law, the Department shall provide transitional food stamp benefits for a period of not more than five months after the date on which Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance is terminated. However, no household shall be eligible for transitional food stamp benefits if TANF cash assistance was terminated because all children in the assistance unit were removed from the home as a result of a child protective services investigation.

History. 2005, c. 463.

§ 63.2-505.2. Eligibility for food stamps; drug-related felonies.

A person who is otherwise eligible to receive food stamp benefits shall be exempt from the application of § 115(a) of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193, and shall not be denied such assistance solely because he has been convicted of a drug-related felony.

History. 2005, c. 576; 2020, cc. 221, 361.

The number of this section was assigned by the Virginia Code Commission, the number in the 2005 act having been 63.2-505.1 .

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by cc. 221 and 361 are identical, and substituted “of § 115(a)” for “of section 115(a),” inserted “federal” preceding “Personal Responsibility,” inserted “drug-related” preceding “felony” and deleted “offense of possession of a controlled substance in violation of § 18.2-250 , provided such person is complying with, or has already complied with, all obligations imposed by the criminal court, is actively engaged in or has completed a substance abuse treatment program, participates in periodic drug screenings, and any other obligations as determined by the Department.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Other drug related charges. —

The federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act encompasses felony convictions for manufacturing controlled substances or for obtaining controlled substances by false pretenses; those persons with such convictions are disqualified from receiving food stamp benefits because § 63.2-505.2 does not exempt such convictions from the application of the federal law. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Gerald E. Mabe, II, Commonwealth’s Attorney, 11-112, (1/27/12).

§ 63.2-506. Public assistance not transferable or subject to execution.

Except as provided in § 63.2-512 , no public assistance given under this subtitle shall be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the money paid or payable as public assistance under this subtitle shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency laws.

History. Code 1950, § 63-102; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-88; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to notice of exemptions from garnishment and lien, see § 8.01-512.4 .

Research References.

Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 18 Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees. § 18.01 Exemptions from executions. Bryson.

§ 63.2-507. Personal representatives for recipients of public assistance funds.

  1. If any otherwise qualified applicant for, or recipient of, benefits accruing under the provisions of this subtitle is or shall become unable to manage the funds accruing thereunder, or otherwise fails so to manage, to the extent that deprivation or hazard to himself or others results, or, in the case of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the benefits are not being used for the children, a petition may be filed by the local director of the county or city wherein the applicant or recipient resides, in any court of that county or city having jurisdiction in fiduciary matters for the appointment of a personal representative not an employee of the local department, for the purpose of receiving and managing any such payments accruing thereunder for any such recipient or payee. The petition shall allege one or more of the above grounds for the appointment of such representative.
  2. The court shall summarily order a hearing on the petition and shall cause the applicant, recipient, or payee to be notified at least five days in advance of the time and place for the hearing. Findings of fact shall be made by the court without a jury. The court may require the local director to furnish a report containing any information necessary and this report shall remain confidential. Reports and findings of fact under this section shall not be competent as evidence in any proceeding dealing with any subject matter other than provided in this section.
  3. If the court finds that the applicant, recipient, or payee is unable to manage such payments, or otherwise fails so to manage, to the extent that deprivation or hazard to himself or others results, or, in the case of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the payment is not being used for such child or children, the court may enter an order stating its findings and appointing some responsible person, not an employee of the local department, as personal representative of the applicant, recipient or payee for the purpose set forth herein.
  4. The court may in its discretion at the time of the appointment or subsequently require the personal representative to give bond to assure the faithful performance of the duties required. An accounting by the personal representative shall be made at least annually and the court may require additional accounting at such intervals as may be deemed necessary. Failure to render such accounts and to account satisfactorily for all proceeds received shall be sufficient cause for the removal of the personal representative. The personal representative may be removed by the court upon the petition of the local director and another such representative may be appointed. No court costs shall be assessed in proceedings under this section; however, when the accruing benefits exceed $500 per year per applicant or recipient, the clerk of the court shall assess a fee of $5.

History. Code 1950, § 8-750.1; 1962, c. 418; 1972, c. 73; 1975, c. 118; 1977, c. 624, § 63.1-88.1; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-508. Fees for representing applicant or recipient.

No person shall make any charge or receive any fees for representing an applicant for or recipient of public assistance with respect to his application or request for increased assistance prior to a determination thereon by the local board, whether such fee or charge is paid by the applicant or recipient or any other person.

History. Code 1950, § 63-103; 1968, cc. 466, 578, § 63.1-89; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to punishment for charging or receiving fees in violation of this section, see § 63.2-106 .

§ 63.2-509. Public assistance subject to amendment or repeal of laws.

All public assistance granted under this subtitle shall be deemed to be granted and to be held subject to the provisions of this subtitle and any amending or repealing act that may hereafter be passed, and no recipient shall have any claim for compensation, or otherwise, by reason of his public assistance being affected in any way by any amending or repealing act.

History. Code 1950, § 63-104; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-90; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-510. Obligation of person to support certain children living in same home; penalty.

A person is responsible for the support and maintenance of any child or children living in the same home in which he and the natural or adoptive parent of such child or children cohabit as spouses and any such person who without cause willfully neglects or refuses or fails to provide for such support and maintenance is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of § 20-61 .

A pregnancy or the birth of a child during the time a person occupies the status set out above shall not be required as proof of cohabitation.

The obligations imposed herein shall continue so long as such person occupies the status herein described.

History. 1972, c. 536, § 63.1-90.1; 1974, c. 464; 2002, c. 747; 2020, c. 900.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by c. 900, in the first paragraph, substituted “is” for “shall be” twice and “spouses” for “man and wife.”

§ 63.2-511. Repealed by Acts 2016, c. 452, cl. 1.

Editor’s note.

Former § 63.2-511 , pertaining to proceedings against persons liable for support, derived from Code 1950, §§ 63-125, 63-151, 63-189; Acts 1968, cc. 578, § 63.1-127; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-512. Recovery of public assistance erroneously paid.

Any assistance or part thereof erroneously paid to a recipient or former recipient may be recovered by the Board or local board from the recipient or former recipient as a debt. In accordance with Board regulations, the amount erroneously paid may also be recovered from the income, assets or other property of the recipient or former recipient or from the public assistance payable to the recipient.

History. 1975, c. 320, § 63.1-127.2; 1983, c. 449; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to nontransferability of public assistance and its exception from execution, levy, etc., see § 63.2-506 .

For provisions relating to transfer of assets to qualify for assistance and liability of transferees, see § 20-88.02 .

§ 63.2-513. Notification of change in circumstances.

If at any time during the continuance of public assistance any change occurs, including but not limited to, the possession of any property or the receipt of regular income by the recipient or by any person who is included within a recipient’s grant, that, in the circumstances upon which current eligibility or amount of assistance were determined, would materially affect such determination, it shall be the duty of such recipient to notify as defined by regulation the local department of such change, and the local board may either cancel the public assistance, or alter the amount thereof.

Any recipient who knows or reasonably should know that such change in circumstances will materially affect his eligibility for assistance or the amount thereof and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of this section, is guilty of a violation of § 63.2-522 .

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-124, 63-149.1; 1952, c. 533; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-112; 1973, c. 482; 1975, c. 320; 1980, c. 19; 1986, c. 93; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to recovery of assistance erroneously paid, see § 63.2-512 .

As to payment for prosecution of public assistance fraud cases, see § 63.2-525 .

CASE NOTES

When evidence of prior conviction admissible. —

Evidence concerning the prior conviction of a defendant for a recent and similar offense in a prosecution under this section was admissible for the purpose of showing fraudulent intent. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 1979 Va. LEXIS 273 (1979) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-514. Reconsideration or changes in amount of public assistance; cancellation.

  1. Eligibility for public assistance shall be reconsidered in accordance with federal law or regulations by the local department at least annually or upon receipt of information indicating a change in the recipient’s circumstances that may affect the amount of assistance paid to a recipient or the recipient’s eligibility for assistance and at such other times as the local board may deem necessary. As part of such reconsideration, the local department shall conduct an investigation to determine whether a recipient is eligible for renewal of public assistance. Such investigation shall include a review of information described in subsection B of § 63.2-503 for each applicant. After such investigation, the amount of public assistance may be changed or public assistance may be entirely withdrawn, if the local department finds that the recipient’s circumstances have altered sufficiently to warrant such action.
  2. In cases in which information obtained as a result of the investigation required by subsection A is inconsistent with information provided by the applicant, the local department shall notify the applicant in writing and provide opportunity for the applicant to explain the discrepancy. If the applicant fails to respond within 10 days of the date of such notice, the local department shall refuse to renew the applicant’s eligibility for public assistance. If the applicant responds within 10 days of such notice, upon receipt of such response, the local department shall conduct such further investigation as may be necessary to verify the applicant’s response and resolve the discrepancy between information provided by the applicant and information obtained as a result of the investigation required by subsection A. If the local department determines that the information obtained as a result of the investigation required by subsection A is accurate and that as a result the applicant is ineligible for public assistance, the local director of social services shall so notify the applicant and public assistance shall be denied. In any case in which the local department believes that the applicant has obtained or attempted to obtain public assistance by means of willful false statements or representations, impersonation, or other fraudulent devices, the local director shall initiate a fraud investigation pursuant to § 63.2-526 .
  3. If the local director does not act within 30 days of the receipt of information affecting the amount of assistance or the eligibility therefor as to any recipient, or if the circumstances require immediate action, the Commissioner may make necessary adjustments in the amount of public assistance or suspend further assistance to any such individual pending action by the local department.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-123, 63-149, 63-187, 63-214; 1968, cc. 578, 781, § 63.1-113; 2002, c. 747; 2015, c. 509.

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendment by c. 509 rewrote subsections A and C and added subsection B.

§ 63.2-515. Notice to applicant or recipient of decision.

As soon as the local board makes any decision granting, denying, changing or discontinuing any grant of public assistance, it shall give written notice thereof to the applicant or recipient.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-121, 63-140.5, 63-147, 63-149, 63-185, 63-187, 63-214; 1962, c. 621; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-114; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-516. Record of decision.

The local board shall preserve for such time as the Commissioner may prescribe, a record of its decision and all supporting documents and records including the findings and recommendations of the local director.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-122, 63-140.6, 63-148, 63-186, 63-211; 1962, c. 621; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-115; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-517. Right of appeal to Commissioner.

Any applicant or recipient aggrieved by any decision of a local board in granting, denying, changing or discontinuing public assistance, may, within thirty days after receiving written notice of such decision, appeal therefrom to the Commissioner.

Any applicant or recipient aggrieved by the failure of the local board to make a decision within a reasonable time may ask for a review of the same by the Commissioner.

The Commissioner may delegate the duty and authority to duly qualified hearing officers to consider and make determinations on any appeal or review by an applicant for or recipient of public assistance concerning any decision of a local board. The Commissioner shall establish an appeals review panel to review administrative hearing decisions upon the request of either the applicant or the local board. Such panel shall determine if any changes are needed in the conduct of future hearings, or to policy and procedures related to the issue of the administrative appeal, and periodically report its findings to the Commissioner.

Any applicant or recipient aggrieved by any decision of a local board concerning food stamps may appeal to the Commissioner in accordance with federal law and regulation.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-131, 63-140.8, 63-153, 63-195, 63-216; 1962, c. 621; 1968, cc. 578, 781, § 63.1-116; 1970, c. 361; 1972, c. 718; 1975, c. 524; 1997, c. 412; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to right of TANF caretaker who is reported to have failed a drug test to appeal the report, see § 63.2-605 .

§ 63.2-518. Action by Commissioner on appeal.

The Commissioner shall provide an opportunity for a hearing, reasonable notice of which shall be given in writing to the applicant or recipient and to the proper local board in such manner and form as the Commissioner may prescribe. The Commissioner may make or cause to be made an investigation of the facts. The Commissioner shall give fair and impartial consideration to the testimony of witnesses, or other evidence produced at the hearing, reports of investigations of the local board and local director or of investigations made or caused to be made by the Commissioner, or any facts which the Commissioner may deem proper to enable him to decide fairly the appeal or review.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-132, 63-140.9, 63-154, 63-196; 1962, c. 621; 1968, cc. 578, 781, § 63.1-117; 1972, c. 718; 1975, c. 524; 1997, c. 412; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to right of TANF caretaker who is reported to have failed a drug test to appeal the report, see § 63.2-605 .

§ 63.2-519. Finality of decision of Commissioner.

The decision of the Commissioner shall be binding and considered a final agency action for purposes of judicial review of such action pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq.).

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-134, 63-140.11, 63-156, 63-198; 1962, c. 621; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-119; 1989, cc. 677, 734; 1997, c. 412; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to right of TANF caretaker who is reported to have failed a drug test to appeal the report, see § 63.2-605 .

§ 63.2-520. How public assistance paid.

Public assistance shall be paid to or on behalf of the applicant monthly, or at such other time or times as the regulations of the Board may provide, by the treasurer, the district fiscal officer, or other disbursing officer of the county or city, upon order of the local board or local director, from funds appropriated or made available for such purpose by the local governing body of such county or city. Wherever two or more counties or cities have been combined to form a district pursuant to § 63.2-306 , such public assistance payments shall be made by the district fiscal officer.

In the event, however, that the Board adopts regulations to provide for state issuance of public assistance payments, such public assistance shall be paid by the State Treasurer. In emergency situations or in the event of delay or error in a state issuance of public assistance payments, emergency payments may be issued by local boards as authorized by Board regulations.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-126, 63-140.7, 63-150, 63-190, 63-213; 1956, c. 578; 1962, c. 621; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-120; 1970, c. 721; 1972, c. 718; 1973, c. 201; 1974, cc. 488, 503; 1975, c. 337; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-521. Change of residence.

Any recipient of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or medical assistance who moves from one county or city in this Commonwealth to another county or city therein, shall thereafter be treated as if the grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or medical assistance had been made by the county or city into which he moves, and the local board of the county or city from which he moves shall transfer all necessary records relating to the recipient to the local board of the county or city into which such recipient moves.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-130, 63-152, 63-194; 1952, c. 449; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-121; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-522. False statements, representations, impersonations and fraudulent devices; penalty.

Whoever obtains, or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets any person in obtaining, by means of a willful false statement or representation, or by impersonation, or other fraudulent device, public assistance or benefits from other programs designated under regulations of the Board, State Board of Health or the Board of Medical Assistance Services to which he is not entitled or who fails to comply with the provisions of § 63.2-513 is guilty of larceny. It shall be the duty of the local director, the Commissioner of Health or the Director of the Department of Medical Assistance Services to investigate alleged violations and enforce the provisions of this section. A warrant or summons may be issued for each violation of which the local director, the Commissioner of Health or the Director of the Department of Medical Assistance Services has knowledge. The local director, the Commissioner or the Director shall ensure that the attorney for the Commonwealth is notified of any investigation or alleged violation under this section. Trial for violations of this section shall be in the county or city from whose local department assistance was sought or obtained.

In any prosecution under the provisions of this section, it shall be lawful and sufficient in the same indictment or accusation to charge and therein to proceed against the accused for any number of distinct acts of such false statements, representations, impersonations or fraudulent devices that may have been committed by him within six months from the first to the last of the acts charged in the indictment or accusation.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-137, 63-140.14, 63-159, 63-201, 63-217; 1952, c. 533; 1962, c. 621; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-124; 1972, c. 659; 1975, c. 207; 1978, cc. 535, 672; 1982, c. 282; 1984, c. 578; 1986, cc. 93, 551; 1995, c. 294; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to payment by the Department of Social Services for prosecution of public assistance fraud cases, see § 63.2-525 .

CASE NOTES

Evidence of prior conviction. —

Evidence concerning the prior conviction of a defendant for a recent and similar offense in a prosecution under this section was admissible for the purpose of showing fraudulent intent. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 1979 Va. LEXIS 273 (1979) (decided under prior law).

Evidence sufficient. —

Convictions for making a false application for welfare under § 63.2-502 , and welfare fraud under § 63.2-522 , were supported by evidence that defendant did not reside at the mother’s house, as shown by the fact that the phone and utilities at other address were in defendant’s name, and that defendant knew defendant was supplying a false address on the application for public assistance. Burrell v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 72, 646 S.E.2d 35, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 243 (2007).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of two counts of felony welfare fraud, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to strike as the evidence was sufficient to prove that she received overpayments of $200 or more during each of the periods covered by her two indictments because the Department of Social Services’s overpayment calculations reflected excess Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits of $1,900 during the period covered by defendant’s first indictment, and $1,517 during the period covered by appellant’s second indictment; and defendant’s undisclosed income was not eligible to receive a 20% earned income deduction for purposes of calculating SNAP benefits. Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 71 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018), vacated in part, aff'd, 298 Va. 1 , 833 S.E.2d 462, 2019 Va. LEXIS 134 (2019).

Evidence of welfare fraud. —

Court of Appeals properly upheld defendant’s convictions for welfare fraud because applying an earned income deduction the income defendant failed to report would not have reduced the total overpayment for each indictment period to less than $200, and a housing deduction would not have reduced the total overpayment for the first period to less than $200. Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 1 , 833 S.E.2d 462, 2019 Va. LEXIS 134 (2019).

§ 63.2-523. Unauthorized use of food stamps, electronic benefit transfer cards, and energy assistance prohibited; penalties.

Whoever knowingly and with intent to defraud transfers, acquires, alters, traffics in or uses, or aids or abets another person in transferring, acquiring, altering, trafficking in, using, or possessing food stamps, electronic benefit transfer cards or other devices subject to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulations regarding Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.1 et seq., or benefits from energy assistance programs, or possesses food coupons, authorization to purchase cards, electronic benefit transfer cards or other devices subject to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulations regarding Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.1 et seq., or benefits from energy assistance programs in any manner not authorized by law is guilty of larceny.

A violation of this section may be prosecuted either in the county or city where the public assistance was granted or in the county or city where the violation occurred.

History. 1975, c. 388, § 63.1-124.1; 1978, c. 731; 1984, c. 535; 1994, c. 249; 2002, c. 747; 2016, c. 501.

Cross references.

As to payment by the Department of Social Services for prosecution of public assistance fraud cases, see § 63.2-525 .

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendments by c. 501 substituted “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau” for “federal reserve system,” “C.F.R.” for “CFR,” and “1005.1” for “205.1.”

§ 63.2-524. Denial of benefits upon finding of fraudulent acts.

Any individual applying for or receiving benefits under the federal Food Stamp program or the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program may be denied such benefits in accordance with federal law if such person is found by a court or pursuant to an administrative hearing to have intentionally (i) made a false or misleading statement or misrepresented, concealed or withheld facts, or (ii) committed any act intended to mislead, misrepresent, conceal or withhold facts or propound a falsity, for the purpose of establishing or maintaining eligibility for such benefits.

The Board is authorized to adopt regulations governing conduct of administrative hearings and denial of benefits authorized by this section.

History. 1989, c. 373, § 63.1-124.2; 1992, c. 189; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to payment by the Department of Social Services for prosecution of public assistance fraud cases, see § 63.2-525 .

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14B M.J. Poor and Poor Laws, § 2.

§ 63.2-525. Payment by Department for legal services.

Notwithstanding any provision of §§ 2.2-2814 , 2.2-2815 , 2.2-2816 , 2.2-2823 , 2.2-2824 , 2.2-2825 or § 2.2-2826 to the contrary, whenever there shall be authorized by law an assistant attorney for the Commonwealth and such assistant’s duties consist of the prosecution of public assistance fraud cases pursuant to §§ 18.2-95 , 18.2-96 , 63.2-502 , 63.2-513 , 63.2-522 , 63.2-523 or § 63.2-524 , the Department may, with the consent of the attorney for the Commonwealth of the jurisdiction, contract with the county or city or combination thereof for whom such assistant attorney for the Commonwealth is authorized regarding the duties of such assistant and regarding the payment by the Department of the entire salary, expenses, including secretarial services, and allowances of such assistant, as shall be approved by the Compensation Board, for the entire time devoted to these duties. Any such contract may provide that the county, city, or combination thereof shall pay the entire amount of such salary, expenses, and allowances and that the Department shall reimburse such county or city therefor. The amount of such salary, expenses, and allowances shall be set by the Compensation Board as provided by law.

History. 1991, c. 5, § 63.1-124.3; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-526. Statewide fraud control program.

  1. The Department shall establish a statewide fraud control program to ensure that fraud prevention and investigation are pursued throughout the Commonwealth. The Board shall adopt regulations to implement the provisions of this section.
  2. Each local department shall establish fraud prevention and investigation units only insofar as money is appropriated therefor, which shall be staffed with sufficient qualified personnel to fulfill the regulations adopted by the Board. Solely for the purposes of obtaining motor vehicle licensing and registration information from entities within and without the Commonwealth, each local department fraud prevention and investigation unit shall be deemed to be a criminal justice agency as defined in § 9.1-101 . The local departments may contract with other local departments to share a fraud prevention and investigation unit and may contract with private entities to perform fraud investigation. Any private entity performing fraud investigations shall comply with the requirements of § 30-138 and shall not be deemed to be a criminal justice agency.
  3. The duties of fraud units may include but shall not be limited to (i) developing methods to prevent the fraudulent receipt of public assistance administered by the local board and (ii) investigating whether persons who receive public assistance through the local board are receiving it fraudulently. The fraud unit shall provide whatever assistance is necessary to attorneys for the Commonwealth in prosecuting cases involving fraud.
  4. There is hereby created in the state treasury a special nonreverting fund to be known as the Fraud Recovery Special Fund, hereafter referred to as “the Fund.” The Fund shall be established on the books of the Comptroller. All overpayment moneys collected or recovered by local departments related to food stamp, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and other federal benefit programs administered by the Department net of any refunds due the federal government shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the Fund, except as prohibited by federal law or regulation. Any moneys remaining in the Fund at the end of each fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund but shall remain in the Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used solely for the purpose of funding state and local fraud control programs.Funding for local and state fraud control activities shall be comprised of (i) general funds appropriated for this activity, (ii) any federal funds available for this purpose, and (iii) balances in the Fund.
  5. Local departments shall apply to the Commissioner for reimbursement from the Fund for the local share of direct costs. The Commissioner shall authorize reimbursements to the local departments from the Fund as provided in the general appropriation act. To receive or continue receiving reimbursements from the Fund, the local departments shall administer their fraud and investigation units in compliance with Board regulations. The number of local fraud workers for which the state will provide reimbursement in each locality shall be determined by Board regulations.

History. 1992, c. 190, § 63.1-58.2; 1998, c. 775; 2000, c. 459; 2002, c. 747.

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14B M.J. Poor and Poor Laws, § 2.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Termination from employment. —

To the extent that an employee alleged that the employee’s termination resulted from complying with the employee’s obligations under subsection C of § 63.2-526 , and §§ 19.2-201 and 19.2-208 , to report welfare fraud and to testify before a grand jury, the employee made out a claim under the Type 1 exception to the “employment-at-will” doctrine. McClosky v. Warren Co. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 81 Va. Cir. 35, 2010 Va. Cir. LEXIS 102 (Warren County July 15, 2010).

§ 63.2-527. Notice of earned income tax credit.

The Department shall provide notice regarding the availability of the federal earned income tax credit authorized in § 32 of the Internal Revenue Code and the state earned income tax credit authorized in subdivision B 2 of § 58.1-339.8 to all recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families pursuant to Chapter 6 (§ 63.2-600 et seq.), SNAP benefits pursuant to § 63.2-801 , or medical assistance pursuant to § 32.1-325 who had earned income in the prior tax year based on information available through the Virginia Employment Commission and, according to information made available by the Virginia Department of Taxation, either did not file federal or state income taxes or filed taxes and did not claim the federal or state earned income tax credit. Notice shall be distributed to recipients annually and shall include information on the qualifying income levels, the amount of credit available, the process for applying for the credit, and the availability of assistance in applying for the credit.

History. 2008, c. 86; 2016, c. 29.

Editor’s note.

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, “SNAP benefits pursuant to § 63.2-801 ” was substituted for “food stamps pursuant to § 63.2-801 ” to conform with amendments to § 63.2-801 by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 160.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 29 substituted “Notice shall be distributed” for “Notice shall be mailed” in the last sentence.

Chapter 6. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program.

§ 63.2-600. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); purpose; administration.

  1. There is hereby created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, hereinafter referred to as TANF or the “Program.” The Program shall be administered by the Department in compliance with Titles IV-A and IV-F of the Social Security Act and related federal regulations (excluding 45 C.F.R. Parts 255 and 256), as such laws and regulations were in effect at the time of the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193 on August 22, 1996, to the extent that such laws and regulations do not conflict with (i) those sections of P.L. 104-193 which are mandatory; (ii) waivers granted by the Department of Health and Human Services to Virginia in effect as of January 1, 1997; (iii) state laws and regulations; (iv) the State Plan For Title IV-A of the Social Security Act: Financial Assistance Aid to Families with Dependent Children in effect as of September 30, 1996; or (v) the Title IV-F of the Social Security Act Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program State Plan in effect as of September 30, 1996. Further, in any instance where a state law or regulation enacted pursuant to a waiver conflicts with the terms of P.L. 104-193 or the Title IV-A or IV-F State Plans, such state law or regulation shall control.
  2. The General Assembly declares that it is the policy of the Commonwealth to support the efforts of public agencies and charitable and community groups seeking to assist low-income Virginians in their efforts to become self-sufficient. To this end, the Department is designated as the state agency responsible for coordinating state efforts in this regard.

History. 1997, cc. 575, 621, § 63.1-86.1; 2002, c. 747; 2011, cc. 4, 857.

Cross references.

As to exemption of certain records from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, see § 2.2-3705.5 .

As to number of persons eligible for TANF being a factor in the distribution formula for law-enforcement expenditures, see § 9.1-165 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 350 C, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of state law, the Department of Social Services shall maintain a separate state program, as that term is defined by federal regulations governing the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, 45 C.F.R. § 260.30, for the purpose of providing welfare cash assistance payments to able-bodied two-parent families. The separate state program shall be funded by state funds and operated outside of the TANF program. Able-bodied two-parent families shall not be eligible for TANF cash assistance as defined at 45 C.F.R. § 260.31 (a)(1), but shall receive benefits under the separate state program provided for in this paragraph. Although various conditions and eligibility requirements may be different under the separate state program, the basic benefit payment for which two-parent families are eligible under the separate state program shall not be less than what they would have received under TANF. The Department of Social Services shall establish regulations to govern this separate state program.”

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

The 2011 amendments.

The 2011 amendment by cc. 4 and 857 are identical, and designated the existing provisions of the section as subsection A; and added subsection B.

Law Review.

For a book review, “Rights, Costs, and the Incommensurability Problem Reviewing the Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes,” see 86 Va. L. Rev. 1303 (2000).

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14B M.J. Poor and Poor Laws, §§ 2, 3.

§ 63.2-601. Virginia Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program; goals.

The goals of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program are to:

  1. Offer Virginians living in poverty the opportunity to achieve economic independence by removing barriers and disincentives to work and providing positive incentives to work;
  2. Provide families living in poverty with the opportunities and work skills necessary for self-sufficiency;
  3. Allow families living in poverty to contribute materially to their own self-sufficiency;
  4. Set out the responsibilities of and expectations for recipients of public assistance and the government; and
  5. Provide families living in poverty with the opportunity to obtain work experience through the Virginia Initiative for Education and Work (VIEW).None of the provisions of this chapter shall be construed or interpreted to create any rights, causes of action, administrative claims or exemptions to the provisions of the Program, except as specifically provided in §§ 63.2-609 , 63.2-613 , and 63.2-618 .The Department of Small Business and Supplier Diversity and the Virginia Employment Commission shall assist the Department in the administration of the Program.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.41; 1995, c. 450; 1996, cc. 589, 599; 2002, c. 747; 2013, c. 482; 2019, c. 210.

The 2013 amendments.

The 2013 amendment by c. 482, effective January 1, 2014, substituted “Small Business and Supplier Diversity” for “Business Assistance” in the last paragraph of the section.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 210 substituted “Virginia Initiative for Education and Work (VIEW)” for “Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare (VIEW)” in subdivision 5.

§ 63.2-601.1. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Fund established.

  1. There is hereby created in the state treasury a special nonreverting fund to be known as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Fund, hereafter referred to as “the Fund.” The Fund shall be established on the books of the Comptroller. All donations and contributions to the Fund and such moneys as shall be appropriated by the General Assembly shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the Fund. Interest earned on moneys in the Fund shall remain in the Fund and be credited to it. Any moneys remaining in the Fund, including interest thereon, at the end of each fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund but shall remain in the Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used solely for the purposes set forth in this section. Moneys in the Fund shall be used to:
    1. Supplement the assistance provided through the Department’s administration of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant; and
    2. Assist the Commonwealth in maximizing the amount of funds available to serve the stated purposes of the TANF program by leveraging individual, corporate, and charitable donations.
  2. Expenditures and disbursements from the Fund shall be made by the State Treasurer on warrants issued by the Comptroller upon written request signed by the Commissioner. Up to 10 percent of the Fund may be used to pay the Department’s expenses in administering the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program.
  3. The Department shall administer the Fund in accordance with the provisions of this section.

History. 2011, cc. 4, 857.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2011, cc. 4 and 857 are identical except the second sentence of subsection B in Acts 2011, c. 4 begins “Up to 12 percent,” while Acts 2011, c. 857 begins “Up to 10 percent.” Subsection B is set out in the form above at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

§ 63.2-601.2. Statewide Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program Funding Pool Program.

  1. The Department shall develop a Statewide TANF Program Funding Pool Program (the Funding Pool Program) and shall allocate to the Funding Pool Program that portion of the TANF block grant to be awarded to service providers for expanded TANF programs, which shall include all funds not transferred to the Social Services Block Grant or used for cash assistance, employment services, or child-care benefits through the TANF program, up to an amount equal to 12 percent of the total amount of the TANF block grant for that year.
  2. Prior to submission of its proposed biennial budget to the Governor, the Department shall issue a Request for Proposals for use of available funds from the Funding Pool Program to service providers providing expanded TANF programs through a competitive process that is designed in a manner that ensures that all service providers in the Commonwealth, regardless of size or geographic location, are afforded the opportunity to apply for funds. All programs and services funded through the Funding Pool Program shall comply with all federal and state statutory and regulatory requirements and shall serve the stated purposes of the TANF program.
  3. In developing the Request for Proposals, the Department shall include:
    1. A long-range planning and priority-setting process to identify state and local service needs and avoid overlap or duplication of services. The planning and priority-setting process shall include opportunity for citizen participation and consideration of local and statewide service needs and priorities;
    2. A competitive process, to include uniform eligibility criteria for service providers seeking funding and uniform application and selection procedures for comparable service categories;
    3. Uniform oversight, administrative, and reporting requirements for service providers receiving funding through the Funding Pool Program; and
    4. Uniform program evaluation criteria to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of comparable services funded through the Funding Pool Program.
  4. The Department shall require all service providers applying for funding through the Funding Pool Program to submit a detailed proposal that includes a proposed budget, proposed program outcomes, and proposed program outcome measures. Following review of applications for funding received pursuant to this section, the Department shall provide a summary of the requests for funding and recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly of the programs to be funded in the proposed biennial budget, the levels of funding recommended, and the rationale for such recommendations, and the Governor shall consider such recommendations in developing the proposed budget.
  5. The Department shall require all providers receiving Funding Pool Program funds to report annually on the use of the funds and outcomes achieved and shall include such information in its annual report to the General Assembly.

History. 2011, c. 531; 2020, cc. 860, 861.

The number of this section was assigned by the Virginia Code Commission, the number in the 2011 act having been 63.2-601.1 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 3 provides: “That the provisions of the first and second enactments of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2021, except that § 22.1-289.04 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective in due course.”

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendments by cc. 860 and 861, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and deleted “Child Care and Development Block Grant or” preceding “Social Services Block Grant” in subsection A.

§ 63.2-602. Eligibility for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); penalty.

  1. A person shall be eligible for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families if that person:
    1. Has not attained the age of 18 years, or, if a full-time student in a secondary school or in the equivalent level of career and technical education, has not attained the age of nineteen years;
    2. Is a resident of Virginia;
    3. Is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece in a residence maintained by such relative or is in placement under conditions specified by the Board;
    4. Is in need of public assistance; and
    5. If less than 18 years of age, is in compliance with compulsory school attendance laws (§ 22.1-254 et seq.) as described in § 63.2-606 . Prior to imposing a sanction of benefits, the local department shall make reasonable efforts to discuss with the parent or caretaker, by personal contact that may include direct telephone contact, a plan to return the child to school. If such efforts fail, the local department shall mail a written advance notice of proposed action to the parent or caretaker advising that benefits may be reduced if the parent or caretaker fails to contact the local department to develop a plan to return the child to school.
  2. An applicant for TANF shall:
    1. Furnish, apply for or have an application made on his behalf, and on behalf of all children for whom assistance is being requested, for a social security account number to be used in the administration of the program;
    2. Assign the Commonwealth any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have on his own behalf or on behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, except for any support that accrued prior to the execution of the assignment;
    3. Identify the parents of the child for whom aid is claimed, subject to the “good cause” provisions or exceptions in federal law or regulations. However, this requirement shall not apply if the child is in a foster care placement or if the local department determines, based upon the sworn statement of the applicant or recipient or of another person with knowledge of the circumstances, that the child was conceived as the result of incest or rape; and
    4. Cooperate in (i) locating the parent of the child with respect to whom TANF is claimed, (ii) establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock with respect to whom TANF is claimed, (iii) obtaining support payments for such applicant or recipient and for a child with respect to whom TANF is claimed, and (iv) obtaining any other payments or property due such applicant or recipient for such child.Any applicant or recipient who intentionally misidentifies another person as a parent shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony.
  3. Unless an exception to the requirement set forth in subdivision B 3 applies, the Department’s Division of Child Support Enforcement shall proceed to determine parentage pursuant to Chapter 3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of Title 20. If paternity is not established after six months of receipt of TANF, the case shall be reviewed to determine the reason that paternity has not been established. If paternity has not been established due to the caretaker relative’s noncooperation, the local department may suspend the entire grant or the adult portion of the grant, subject to Board regulations.
  4. TANF shall be provided to two-parent families on the same terms and conditions that TANF is provided to single-parent families.

History. Code 1950, § 63-141; 1954, c. 495; 1966, c. 665; 1968, cc. 578, 667, 668, 781, § 63.1-105; 1970, c. 721; 1974, c. 418; 1976, c. 215, § 63.1-105.1; 1982, c. 386; 1993, c. 167; 1994, cc. 188, 934; 1995, c. 450; 1996, c, 848, 857; 1999, c. 638; 2001, c. 483; 2002, c. 747; 2010, c. 250; 2019, c. 376.

Cross references.

As to revision of schedule of TANF financial assistance for a newly born child of a family which is subject to a penalty for failure to comply with eligibility requirements, see § 63.2-604 .

For punishment for Class 5 felonies, see § 18.2-10 .

The 2010 amendments.

The 2010 amendment by c. 250 substituted “except for any support that accrued prior to the execution of the assignment” for “and that have accrued at the time such assignment is executed” in subdivision B 2.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 376, in subdivision A 1, substituted “a full-time student in” for “regularly attending” and deleted “and is reasonably expected to complete his senior year of school prior to attaining age nineteen” from the end; in subdivision A 5, substituted “less than 18 years of age” for “under the age of eighteen years.”

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Parent and Child, § 10.

CASE NOTES

Editor’s note.

The cases below were decided under prior law.

Construction of provisions. —

Former §§ 63.1-105 and 63.1-109 (see now §§ 63.2-504 , 63.2-614 , and this section) when read with portions of the 1981 biennial appropriations act, were not rendered ambiguous, but rather, were clear and unambiguous, thus precluding use of unpublished legislative history to construe the enactments, and invalidating a regulation of the State Board of Welfare (now State Board of Social Services) which the Board felt implemented the supposed intent of the General Assembly to “defund” Aid to Dependent Children coverage for students between the ages of 18 and 21. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316 , 330 S.E.2d 84, 1985 Va. LEXIS 208 (1985).

States are not free to arbitrarily exclude people under the state act who are covered under the federal act. Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11602 (W.D. Va. 1972).

State standard excluding persons eligible under federal standards is invalid. —

A state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid. Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11602 (W.D. Va. 1972).

State may refuse to grant aid for emancipated children. —

An emancipated child is not included within the definition of a dependent child for welfare purposes. Therefore, a state may choose to refuse aid to the families of such children for the benefit of these children. Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11602 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Marriage of a minor child, even if not consented to by the parents, emancipates the minor child from his parents. Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11602 (W.D. Va. 1972).

Adequate notice and opportunity for prior hearing. —

Welfare recipients must be given adequate notice of any proposed action affecting them adversely and an opportunity for a prior hearing on the matter. Where it is shown that the system designed to provide the opportunity for such hearing has purposely built into it a procedure intended to deter the exercise of that right and a sufficient possibility exists that undue influence might be used as the deterring factor, due process is lacking. Burgoyne v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 831, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12068 (E.D. Va. 1973).

Federal court lacks jurisdiction of claim for “restitution” of retroactive welfare payments against defendant state officials in their representative capacities, since the suit would in effect be a suit against the state itself. Frye v. Lukehard, 364 F. Supp. 1379, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11852 (W.D. Va. 1973).

In suit for retroactive payments, a federal court will be barred by the Eleventh Amendment from a decree of “restitution,” as such would necessitate a state appropriation and would be, in effect, an order to the state to take affirmative political action to which it has not consented. Frye v. Lukehard, 364 F. Supp. 1379, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11852 (W.D. Va. 1973).

§ 63.2-603. Eligibility for TANF; childhood immunizations.

An applicant for TANF shall provide verification that all eligible children not enrolled in school, a licensed family day home as defined in § 22.1-289.02, or a licensed child day center as defined in § 22.1-289.02, have received immunizations in accordance with § 32.1-46 . However, if an eligible child has not received immunizations in accordance with § 32.1-46 , verification shall be provided at the next scheduled redetermination of eligibility for TANF after initial eligibility is granted that the child has received at least one dose of each of the immunizations required by § 32.1-46 as appropriate for the child’s age and that the child’s physician or the local health department has developed a plan for completing the immunizations. Verification of compliance with the plan for completing the immunizations shall be presented at subsequent redeterminations of eligibility for TANF.

If necessary, the local department shall provide assistance to the TANF recipient in obtaining verification from immunization providers. No sanction may be imposed until the reason for the failure to comply with the immunization requirement has been identified and any barriers to accessing immunizations have been removed.

Failure by the recipient to provide the required verification of immunizations shall result in a reduction in the amount of monthly assistance received from the TANF program until the required verification is provided. The reduction shall be $50 for the first child and $25 for each additional child for whom verification is not provided.

Any person who becomes ineligible for TANF payments as a result of this provision shall nonetheless be considered a TANF recipient for all other purposes.

History. 1994, c. 188, § 63.1-105.2; 2002, c. 747; 2020, cc. 860, 861.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2020, cc. 860 and 861, cl. 3 provides: “That the provisions of the first and second enactments of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2021, except that § 22.1-289.04 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective in due course.”

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendments by cc. 860 and 861, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and in the first paragraph, inserted “as defined in § 22.1-289.02” twice in the first sentence; and made stylistic changes.

§ 63.2-604. Repealed by Acts 2020, c. 550, cl. 2.

Editor’s note.

Former § 63.2-604 , pertaining to eligibility for TANF for children born to TANF recipients, derived from Acts 1995, c. 450, § 63.1-105.7; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-605. Eligibility for TANF; parolees and probationers who fail drug tests.

Upon receipt of notification from a probation or parole officer that a TANF caretaker under his supervision has failed a drug test, the local department shall provide future TANF cash benefits to such caretaker’s assistance unit as protective or vendor payments to a third party payee for the benefit of the assistance unit. After twelve months, the local department may reinstate such caretaker as the payee for the assistance unit provided such caretaker has failed no subsequent drug test within such twelve-month period. Any caretaker who is reported to have failed a drug test under this section may appeal such report, including the validity of any test results, pursuant to §§ 63.2-517 , 63.2-518 and 63.2-519 .

History. 1997, c. 526, § 63.1-105.8; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-606. Eligibility for TANF; school attendance.

In order to be eligible for TANF, members of the assistance unit, including minor custodial parents, shall be in compliance with compulsory school attendance laws (§ 22.1-254 et seq.). The Board shall adopt regulations to implement the provisions of this section, including procedures for local departments to (i) receive notification from local school divisions of students who are truant and (ii) assist families in noncompliance to achieve compliance. An applicant for or recipient of TANF or any member of his assistance unit who has been found guilty under § 22.1-263 shall not be eligible for TANF financial assistance until in compliance with compulsory school attendance laws. Any person who becomes ineligible for TANF financial assistance as a result of this section shall nonetheless be considered a TANF recipient for all other purposes.

History. 1995, c. 450, § 63.1-105.4; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to eligibility for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families of person under age 18 who is in compliance with compulsory school attendance laws, see § 63.2-602 .

§ 63.2-607. Eligibility for TANF; minor parent residency.

  1. Except as provided in subsection B, an unemancipated minor custodial parent may receive TANF for himself and his child only if the individual and his child reside in the home maintained by his parent or person standing in loco parentis. For purposes of TANF eligibility determination, a minor who receives government-provided public assistance is not considered emancipated unless married.
  2. The provisions of subsection A shall not apply if:
    1. The individual has no parent or person standing in loco parentis who is living or whose whereabouts are known;
    2. The local department determines that the physical or emotional health or safety of the individual or his dependent child would be jeopardized if the individual and dependent child lived in the same residence with the individual’s parent or the person standing in loco parentis for the individual; or
    3. The local department otherwise determines, in accordance with Board regulations, that there is good cause for waiving the requirements of subsection A.
  3. If the individual and his dependent child are not required to live with the individual’s parent or the person standing in loco parentis for the individual, the local department shall assist the individual in locating an appropriate adult supervised supportive living arrangement taking into consideration the needs and concerns of the minor and thereafter shall require that the individual and his child reside in such living arrangement or an alternative appropriate arrangement as a condition of the continued receipt of TANF. If the local department is unable, after making diligent efforts, to locate any such appropriate living arrangement, it shall provide case management and other social services consistent with the best interests of the individual and child who live independently.

History. 1995, c. 450, § 63.1-105.6; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-607.1. Eligibility for TANF; drug-related felonies.

A person who is otherwise eligible to receive TANF assistance shall be exempt from the application of § 115(a)(1) of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193, and shall not be denied such assistance solely because he has been convicted of a drug-related felony.

History. 2020, cc. 221, 361.

§ 63.2-608. Virginia Initiative for Education and Work (VIEW).

  1. The Department shall establish and administer the Virginia Initiative for Education and Work (VIEW) to reduce long-term dependence on welfare, emphasize personal responsibility, and enhance opportunities for personal initiative and self-sufficiency by promoting the value of work. The Department shall endeavor to develop placements for VIEW participants that will enable participants to develop job skills that are likely to result in independent employment and that take into consideration the proficiency, experience, skills, and prior training of a participant.VIEW shall recognize clearly defined responsibilities and obligations on the part of public assistance recipients and shall include a written agreement of personal responsibility requiring parents to participate in work activities while receiving TANF, earned-income disregards to reduce disincentives to work, and a limit on TANF financial assistance.VIEW shall require all able-bodied recipients of TANF who do not meet an exemption to participate in a work activity. VIEW shall require eligible TANF recipients to participate in unsubsidized, partially subsidized or fully subsidized employment or other allowable TANF work activity as defined by federal law and enter into an agreement of personal responsibility.
  2. To the maximum extent permitted by federal law, and notwithstanding other provisions of Virginia law, the Department and local departments may, through applicable procurement laws and regulations, engage the services of public and private organizations to operate VIEW and to provide services incident to such operation.
  3. All VIEW participants shall be under the direction and supervision of a case manager.
  4. The Department shall ensure that participants are assigned to one of the following work activities within 90 days after the approval of TANF assistance:
    1. Unsubsidized private-sector employment;
    2. Subsidized employment, as follows:
      1. The Department shall conduct a program in accordance with this section that shall be known as the Full Employment Program (FEP). Persons who are otherwise eligible for TANF may participate in FEP unless exempted by this chapter. FEP shall assign participants to subsidized wage-paying private-sector jobs designed to increase the participants’ self-sufficiency and improve their competitive position in the workforce.
      2. Participants in FEP shall be placed in full-time employment when appropriate and shall be paid by the employer at an hourly rate not less than the federal or state minimum wage, whichever is higher. Wages earned by a FEP employee during the period for which his employer receives a subsidy pursuant to subdivision c shall be disregarded in the calculation of TANF benefits.
      3. Every employer subject to the Virginia unemployment insurance tax shall be eligible for assignment of FEP participants, but no employer shall be required to utilize such participants. Pursuant to Board regulations, participating employers shall receive a subsidy of up to $1,000 per month for each FEP employee for a period not to exceed six months. Employers shall ensure that jobs made available to FEP participants are in conformity with § 3304(a)(5) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. FEP participants cannot be used to displace regular workers.
      4. FEP employers shall:
        1. Endeavor to make FEP placements positive learning and training experiences;
        2. Provide on-the-job training to the degree necessary for the participants to perform their duties;
        3. Pay wages to participants at the same rate that they are paid to other employees performing the same type of work and having similar experience and employment tenure;
        4. Provide sick leave, holiday and vacation benefits to participants to the same extent and on the same basis that they are provided to other employees performing the same type of work and having similar employment experience and tenure;
        5. Maintain health, safety and working conditions at or above levels generally acceptable in the industry and no less than those in which other employees perform the same type of work;
        6. Provide workers’ compensation coverage for participants;
        7. Encourage volunteer mentors from among their other employees to assist participants in becoming oriented to work and the workplace; and
        8. Sign an agreement with the local department outlining the employer requirements to participate in FEP. All agreements shall include notice of the employer’s obligation to repay FEP reimbursements in the event the employer violates FEP rules.
      5. As a condition of FEP participation, employers shall be prohibited from discriminating against any person, including program participants, on the basis of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, age, or disability;
    3. Part-time or temporary employment;
    4. Community work experience, as follows:
      1. The Department and local departments shall work with other state, regional and local agencies and governments in developing job placements that serve a useful public purpose as provided in § 482(f) of the Social Security Act, as amended. Placements shall be selected to provide skills and serve a public function. VIEW participants shall not displace regular workers.
      2. The number of hours per week for participants shall be determined by combining the total dollar amount of TANF and SNAP benefits and dividing by the minimum wage with a maximum of a work week of 32 hours, of which up to 12 hours of employment-related education and training may substitute for work experience employment;
    5. Educational activities that lead to a post-secondary credential, such as a degree or industry-recognized credential, certification, or license from an accredited institution of higher education or other postsecondary school licensed or certified by the Board of Education or the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia; or
    6. Any other allowable TANF work activity as defined by federal law.
  5. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections A and D, if a local department determines that a VIEW participant is in need of job skills and would benefit from immediate job skills training, it may place the participant in a program preparing individuals for a high school equivalency examination approved by the Board of Education, a career and technical education program targeted at skills required for particular employment opportunities, or an apprenticeship program developed by the local department in accordance with requirements established by the Department. Eligible participants include those with problems related to obtaining and retaining employment, such as participants (i) with less than a high school education, (ii) whose reading or math skills are at or below the eighth grade level, (iii) who have not retained a job for a period of at least six months during the prior two years, or (iv) who are in a treatment program for a substance abuse problem or are receiving services through a family violence treatment program. The VIEW participant may continue in a high school equivalency examination preparation program, career and technical education program, or apprenticeship program for as long as the local department determines he is progressing satisfactorily and to the extent permitted by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193), as amended.
  6. Participants may be reevaluated after a period determined by the local department and reassigned to another work component. In addition, the number of hours worked may be reduced by the local department so that a participant may complete additional training or education to further his employability.
  7. Local departments shall be authorized to sanction parents up to the full amount of the TANF grant for noncompliance, unless good cause exists.
  8. VIEW participants shall not be assigned to projects that require that they travel unreasonable distances from their homes or remain away from their homes overnight without their consent.Any injury to a VIEW participant arising out of and in the course of community work experience shall be covered by the participant’s existing Medicaid coverage. If a community work experience participant is unable to work due to such an accident, his status shall be reviewed to determine whether he is eligible for an exemption from the limitation on TANF financial assistance.A community work experience participant who becomes incapacitated for 30 days or more shall be eligible for TANF financial assistance for the duration of the incapacity, if otherwise eligible.The Board shall adopt regulations providing for the accrual of paid sick leave or other equivalent mechanism for community work experience participants.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.49; 1995, c. 450; 1996, c. 1023; 1999, c. 759; 2000, cc. 483, 491; 2001, c. 483; 2002, c. 747; 2003, cc. 428, 467; 2005, c. 472; 2007, c. 568; 2014, c. 84; 2016, c. 101; 2019, c. 210; 2020, c. 1137; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 160, 209.

Cross references.

As to powers and duties of Virginia Board of Workforce Development and the Virginia Workforce System, see § 2.2-2472 .

Editor’s note.

The Federal Unemployment Tax Act, referred to above, is codified as 26 U.S.C.S. § 3301 et seq.

The 2003 amendments.

The 2003 amendment by c. 428 substituted “30” for “thirty,” “32” for “thirty-two,” and “90” for “ninety” throughout the section; deleted former subsection F, which read: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections A and D, persons eligible to participate in TANF shall also be eligible to participate in approved projects established through the Economic and Employment Improvement Program for Disadvantaged Persons of Chapter 7 (§ 63.2-700 et seq.) of this title”; and redesignated former subsections G through I as present subsections F through H.

The 2003 amendment by c. 467 substituted “30” for “thirty,” “32” for “thirty-two,” and “90” for “ninety” throughout the section; and in subsection E, substituted “career and technical education” for “vocational educational” in the next-to-last sentence.

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 472 deleted “by accident” preceding “arising” in the first sentence of the second paragraph of subsection H.

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendment by c. 568 rewrote the last paragraph in subsection A and subsections D and E; and in subsection G, substituted “parents” for “participants” and “for noncompliance, unless good cause exists” for “and food stamps allotment for noncompliance.”

The 2014 amendments.

The 2014 amendment by c. 84, in subsection E, substituted “program preparing individuals for a high school equivalency examination approved by the Board of Education” for “general educational development (GED) program” in the first sentence, and substituted “high school equivalency examination preparation” for “GED” in the last sentence.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 101, in subsection E, inserted “or an apprenticeship program developed by the local department in accordance with requirements established by the Department” in the first sentence, inserted “or apprenticeship program” in the last sentence and made related and stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 210 substituted “Virginia Initiative for Education and Work (VIEW)” for “Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare (VIEW)” in subsection A.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by c. 1137 inserted “sexual orientation, gender identity” in subdivision D 2 e.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 160, effective July 1, 2021, substituted “SNAP benefits” for “food stamps” in subdivision D 4 b; added subsection D 5; and made related changes.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 209, effective July 1, 2021, in subdivision D 2 a, deleted the former second sentence, which read: “FEP replaces TANF with subsidized employment” and deleted “not able to find unsubsidized employment” following “Persons” in the second sentence; rewrote the last sentence in subdivision D 2 b, which formerly read: “At no point shall a participant’s spendable income received from wages and tax credits be less than the value of TANF received prior to the work placement”; and inserted the second sentence in subdivision D 2 c.

§ 63.2-609. VIEW exemptions.

The following TANF recipients shall be exempt from mandatory participation in VIEW and shall remain eligible for TANF financial assistance:

  1. Any individual, including all minor caretakers, under 16 years of age;
  2. Any individual at least 16, but no more than 19 years of age, who is enrolled full-time in elementary or secondary school, including career and technical education programs. The career and technical education program must be equivalent to secondary school. Whenever feasible, such recipients should participate in summer work;
  3. Any individual who is unable to participate because of a temporary medical condition that is preventing employment or training, as determined by a physician or other qualified medical professional and certified by a written medical statement. Such an exemption shall be reevaluated every 60 days to determine whether the person is still exempt;
  4. Any individual who is disabled, as determined by receipt of Social Security Disability Benefits or Supplemental Security Income;
  5. Any individual 60 years of age or older;
  6. Any individual who is the sole caregiver of another member of the household who is disabled as determined by receipt of Social Security Disability Benefits or Supplemental Security Income or who is incapacitated by another condition as determined by the Board and whose presence is essential for the care of the other member on a substantially continuous basis;
  7. A parent or caretaker-relative of a child under 12 months of age who personally provides care for the child. A parent or caretaker-relative exempt from mandatory participation in VIEW pursuant to this subdivision shall be exempt for a period of no more than 12 months. Months during which a parent or caretaker-relative is exempt may be consecutive or nonconsecutive.In a TANF-UP case, both parents shall be referred for participation unless one meets an exemption; only one parent can be exempt. If both parents meet an exemption criterion, they shall decide who will be referred for participation.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, §§ 63.1-133.43, 63.1-133.48; 1995, c. 450; 2001, c. 483; 2002, cc. 81, 747; 2007, c. 568; 2011, c. 426; 2020, c. 550.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2002, c. 81 amended § 63.1-133.43, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152, Acts 2002, c. 81 has been given effect in this section as set out above. The 2002 amendment by c. 81 added “or by a registered nurse who is the physician’s designee or licensed nurse practitioner” at the end of subdivision 8.

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendment by c. 568 deleted the former next-to-last sentence in subdivision 2, which read: “Once the individual loses this exemption, he cannot requalify for the exemption, even if he returns to school, unless the case is closed and reopened or he becomes exempt for another reason”; in subdivision 3, in the first sentence, deleted “entry into” preceding “employment” and inserted “or other qualified medical professional”; in subdivision 4, substituted “disabled” for “incapacitated” in the first sentence and deleted the last sentence, which formerly read: “This exemption shall not be granted to either parent in a TANF-UP case; eligibility shall be evaluated for regular TANF cases on the basis of the parent’s incapacity”; in subdivision 6, substituted “disabled” for “incapacitated” and inserted “who is incapacitated by”; substituted “12 months” for “eighteen months” in the first sentence of subdivision 7; and deleted subdivisions 8 through 10, concerning pregnant women, children receiving Title IV-E Foster Care and persons standing in loco parentis.

The 2011 amendments.

The 2011 amendment by c. 426 made minor stylistic changes in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 5; and added the second and third sentences in subdivision 7.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by c. 550 deleted “A parent of a child not considered part of the TANF public assistance unit under § 63.2-604 may be granted a temporary exemption of not more than six weeks after the birth of such child” in subdivision 7 at the end.

§ 63.2-610. Participation in VIEW; coordinated services.

  1. In administering VIEW, the Department shall ensure that local departments provide delivery and coordination of all services through intensive case management. VIEW participants shall be referred to a case manager. The case manager shall fully explain VIEW to the participant and shall provide the participant with written materials explaining VIEW.
  2. The Department shall assist local departments in improving the delivery of services, including intensive case management, through the utilization of public, private and nonprofit organizations, to the extent permissible under federal law.
  3. The Department shall be responsible for the coordination of the intensive case management. Job finding and job matching leading to independent employment shall be facilitated by the Virginia Employment Commission and the Department of Small Business and Supplier Diversity.
  4. The Secretary of Health and Human Resources, assisted by the Secretary of Commerce and Trade, shall prepare and maintain an annual plan for coordinating and integrating all appropriate services in order to promote successful outcomes. The plan shall encourage the use of local and regional service providers and permit a variety of methods of providing services. Emphasis shall be placed on coordinating and integrating career counseling, job development, job training and skills, job placement, and academic and technical education. Public and private institutions of higher education and other agencies which offer similar or related services shall be invited to participate as fully as possible in developing, implementing and updating the annual coordination plan.
  5. The Secretary of Health and Human Resources shall:
    1. Increase public awareness of the federal earned income credit and encourage families who may be eligible to apply for this tax credit;
    2. Pursue aggressive child-support initiatives as established by the General Assembly;
    3. Work with community providers to develop adoption, education, family planning, marriage, parenting, and training options for Program participants;
    4. Increase public awareness of the tax advantages of relocating one’s residence in order to secure employment;
    5. Provide leadership for the development of community work experience opportunities in VIEW;
    6. Develop strategies to educate, assist and stimulate employers to hire participants and to provide community work experience opportunities, in consultation with representatives of employers and relevant public and private agencies on the state and local level; and
    7. Provide technical assistance to local departments to assist them in working with employers in the community to develop job and community work experience opportunities for participants.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.45; 1995, c. 450; 1996, cc. 589, 599; 1999, cc. 840, 855; 2002, c. 747; 2013, c. 482.

The 2013 amendments.

The 2013 amendment by c. 482, effective January 1, 2014, substituted “Small Business and Supplier Diversity” for “Business Assistance” at the end of subsection C.

§ 63.2-611. Case management; support services; transitional support services.

  1. The Commissioner, through the local departments, with such funds as appropriated, shall offer families participating in VIEW intensive case management services throughout the family’s participation in VIEW. Case management services shall include initial assessment of the full range of services that will be needed by each family including testing and evaluation, development of the individualized agreement of personal responsibility, and periodic reassessment of service needs and the agreement of personal responsibility. It shall be the goal of the Department to have a statewide intensive case management ratio not higher than the statewide average ratio in Title IV-F of the Social Security Act Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program State Plan as the ratio existed on July 1, 1995.
  2. Local departments are authorized to provide services to VIEW families throughout the family’s participation in VIEW subject to regulations adopted by the Board, including:
    1. Child care for the children of participants if:
      1. The participant is employed and child-care services are required to enable the continued employment of the participant;
      2. Child-care services are required to enable a participant to receive job placement, job training or education services; or
      3. The participant is otherwise eligible for child care pursuant to Board regulations.
    2. Transportation that will enable parental employment or participation in services required by the agreement of personal responsibility.
    3. Job counseling, education and training, and job search assistance consistent with the purposes of VIEW.
    4. Medical assistance.
  3. A participant whose TANF financial assistance is terminated, either voluntarily or involuntarily, shall receive the following services for up to 12 months after termination, if needed:
    1. Assistance with child care if such assistance enables the individual to work or the individual is enrolled in an accredited public institution of higher education or other postsecondary school licensed or certified by the Board of Education or the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia and is taking courses as part of a curriculum that leads to a postsecondary credential, such as a degree or an industry-recognized credential, certification, or license;
    2. Assistance with transportation, if such transportation enables the individual to work;
    3. Medical assistance, including transitional medical assistance for families with a working parent who becomes ineligible for TANF financial assistance because of increased earnings according to policies of the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services; and
    4. Financial assistance of $50 per month, if the participant is employed and is working at least 30 hours per week or more at the time of TANF closure and remains employed and continues to work at least 30 hours per week or more.
  4. The Department or local departments may purchase or otherwise acquire motor vehicles from the centralized fleet of motor vehicles controlled by the Commissioner of Highways under Article 7 (§ 2.2-1173 et seq.) of Chapter 11 of Title 2.2 and sell or otherwise transfer such vehicles to TANF recipients or former recipients. Purchases, sales, and other transfers of vehicles under this subsection shall not be subject to the provisions of the Virginia Public Procurement Act (§ 2.2-4300 et seq.), or the provisions of §§ 2.2-1124 , 2.2-1153 , 2.2-1156 , and 2.2-1177 relating to the sale, purchase, and transfer of surplus motor vehicles and other surplus state property.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed or interpreted to create a cause of action or administrative claim based upon a right or entitlement to any specific services or an exemption or waiver from any provision of VIEW.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.46; 1995, c. 450; 1999, c. 910; 2002, c. 747; 2007, c. 568; 2019, cc. 166, 218.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2011, cc. 36 and 152, cl. 3 provides: “That the Virginia Code Commission shall carry out such editorial changes to the Code of Virginia as may be required to reflect the provisions of this act changing the title ‘Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner’ to ‘Commissioner of Highways.”’ “Commissioner of Highways” was substituted for “Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner” in this section.

Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 350 F, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: “A participant whose Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) financial assistance is terminated due to the receipt of 24 months of assistance as specified in § 63.2-612 , Code of Virginia, or due to the closure of the TANF case prior to the completion of 24 months of TANF assistance, excluding cases closed with a sanction for noncompliance with the Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare program, shall be eligible to receive employment and training assistance for up to 12 months after termination, if needed, in addition to other transitional services provided pursuant to § 63.2-611 , Code of Virginia.”

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendment by c. 568 deleted the former last sentence in subsection A, which read: “The Department shall include in its annual report to the Governor and General Assembly an evaluation of program effectiveness statewide and by locality, including an evaluation of case management services”; substituted “required to enable” for “essential to” in subdivision B 1 a; and in subsection C, substituted “according to policies of the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services; and” for “unless (i) medical insurance is available through the parent’s employer or (ii) family income exceeds 185 percent of the federal poverty level” in subdivision C 3, added subdivision C 4 and made a related change.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendments by c. 166 and 218 are identical, and rewrote subdivision C 1, which read: “Assistance with child care if such assistance enables the individual to work”; and made stylistic changes.

§ 63.2-612. Time limit on the receipt of TANF.

Unless otherwise exempt, VIEW participants and their families may receive TANF financial assistance for a maximum of 24 months only, subject to § 63.2-613 . VIEW participants and their families may receive TANF financial assistance, if otherwise eligible, after a subsequent period of 24 months. However, the 24-month period of ineligibility shall not apply when a child is removed from the parents’ home as the result of a child protective services report or complaint as defined in regulations promulgated by the Board and is placed with a relative. In such cases, the relative with whom the child is placed shall be eligible to receive TANF financial assistance immediately and without waiting for the 24-month period of ineligibility to run.

The local department shall notify a VIEW participant and his family that his TANF financial assistance is scheduled to be terminated as provided in this section. Notice shall be given 60 days prior to such termination and shall inform the VIEW participant and his family of the exception regulations adopted by the Board and the procedure to be followed by the VIEW participant and his family if he believes that he is entitled to an extension of benefits.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.50; 1995, c. 450; 2002, c. 747; 2007, c. 568; 2008, cc. 132, 564.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 350 F, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: “A participant whose Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) financial assistance is terminated due to the receipt of 24 months of assistance as specified in § 63.2-612 , Code of Virginia, or due to the closure of the TANF case prior to the completion of 24 months of TANF assistance, excluding cases closed with a sanction for noncompliance with the Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare program, shall be eligible to receive employment and training assistance for up to 12 months after termination, if needed, in addition to other transitional services provided pursuant to § 63.2-611 , Code of Virginia.”

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendment by c. 568 deleted “without (i) participation in VIEW, (ii) the receipt of TANF financial assistance, or (iii) the receipt of transitional assistance” at the end of the first paragraph.

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 132 and 564 are identical, and added the last two sentences in the first paragraph and made minor stylistic changes.

§ 63.2-613. Hardship exceptions.

The Board shall adopt regulations providing exceptions to the time limitations of this chapter in cases of hardship. In adopting regulations, the Board shall address circumstances:

  1. Where a VIEW participant has been actively seeking employment by engaging in job-seeking activities required pursuant to § 60.2-612 and is unable to find employment;
  2. Where factors relating to job availability may be unfavorable;
  3. Where the VIEW participant loses his job as a result of factors not related to his job performance; and
  4. Where extension of benefits for up to one year will enable a participant to complete employment-related education or training.The Department shall (i) keep records of the number of VIEW participants who receive an exception to the time limitations on TANF benefits due to hardship and the specific circumstances relied upon to grant such exceptions and (ii) annually publish nonidentifying statistics regarding such information.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.51; 1995, c. 450; 2002, c. 747; 2020, c. 7.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by c. 7 added the last paragraph.

§ 63.2-614. Financial eligibility.

  1. Pursuant to regulations adopted by the Board, the parent of an eligible child or children who is married to a person not the parent of the child or children shall not be eligible for TANF if the parent’s spouse’s income, when deemed available to the family unit according to federal regulations, in and of itself, exceeds the state eligibility standard for such aid. However, eligibility for the child or children shall be considered by counting the income of such parent and child or children, and any portion of the parent’s spouse’s income that exceeds 150 percent of the federal poverty level for the spouse and parent. If the income of the parent’s spouse that is deemed available does not, in and of itself, exceed the state eligibility standard for TANF, none of the spouse’s income shall be counted as available to the family unit, and eligibility shall be determined considering only the income, if any, of the parent and the child or children. If the parent fails or refuses to cooperate with the Department’s Division of Child Support Enforcement in the pursuit of child support, the income of the parent’s current spouse shall be counted in accordance with Title IV-A federal regulations at 45 C.F.R. 233.20(a) (3) (xiv) in determining eligibility for TANF for the parent’s child or children.
  2. Program participants shall be eligible for the income disregards and resource exclusions in § 63.2-505 .
  3. VIEW participants and their families shall also be eligible for the following income disregards and resource exclusions:
    1. To reward work, a VIEW participant and his family who have earned income from any source other than VIEW, may continue to receive TANF financial assistance for up to two years from the date that both parties initially sign the agreement. However, in no event shall the TANF payment when added to the earned income exceed such percentage of the federal poverty level established by the Commissioner, and if necessary any TANF payment shall be reduced so that earned income plus the TANF payment equals such percentage of the federal poverty level established by the Commissioner.
    2. The fair market value, not to exceed $7,500, of one operable motor vehicle per family.

History. Code 1950, § 63-141; 1954, c. 495; 1966, c. 665; 1968, cc. 578, 667, 668, 781, § 63.1-105; 1970, c. 721; 1974, c. 418; 1982, c. 386; 1993, c. 167; 1994, cc. 188, 858, 951, § 63.1-133.47; 1995, c. 450; 1996, c. 857; 1999, c. 638; 2001, c. 483; 2002, c. 747.

CASE NOTES

Construction of provisions. —

Former §§ 63.1-105 and 63.1-109 (see now §§ 63.2-504 , 63.2-602 , and this section) when read with portions of the 1981 biennial appropriations act, were not rendered ambiguous, but rather, were clear and unambiguous, thus precluding use of unpublished legislative history to construe the enactments, and invalidating a regulation of the State Board of Welfare (now State Board of Social Services) which the Board felt implemented the supposed intent of the General Assembly to “defund” Aid to Dependent Children coverage for students between the ages of 18 and 21. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316 , 330 S.E.2d 84, 1985 Va. LEXIS 208 (1985) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-615. Payment of tuition and other expenses of public assistance recipients enrolled in skill development training programs.

The Board may authorize the payment of tuition fees, transportation costs or other necessary or incidental expenses for obtaining skill development training or retraining for qualified public assistance recipients. The Board may, by regulation, prescribe necessary requisites and conditions under which such payments may be made. Such assistance shall be in addition to any other public assistance for which such recipient may be eligible and shall not affect his entitlement thereto.

History. Code 1950, § 63-110.1; 1968, c. 586, § 63.1-96.1; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-616. Provision of public assistance and social services.

Local departments may combine community resources to assist the families of persons who may be in need because of the limitations on TANF financial assistance and may arrange for appropriate care of needy families where the limitation on TANF financial assistance as a result of the birth of an additional child or the two-year limit on TANF financial assistance is executed. Public assistance and social services may be provided that include, but are not limited to, help for families in obtaining donated food and clothing, continuation of food stamps for adults and children who are otherwise eligible, child care, and Medicaid coverage for adults and children who are otherwise eligible for Medicaid.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.52; 1995, c. 450; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-617. Diversionary cash assistance.

  1. The Board shall adopt regulations to enable TANF-eligible applicants meeting certain criteria to receive at one time the maximum TANF cash assistance that the applicant would otherwise receive for a period up to 120 days or $1,500, whichever is greater. An individual may receive diversionary TANF cash assistance only one time in a 12-month period and, in so doing, waives his eligibility for TANF for the number of days for which assistance is granted multiplied by 1.33. Diversionary assistance shall be used to divert the family from receiving ongoing TANF cash assistance by providing assistance for one-time emergencies.
  2. The Board shall adopt regulations to enable TANF-eligible applicants meeting certain criteria to receive a TANF emergency assistance payment of up to $1,500 to prevent eviction or to address needs resulting from a fire or natural disaster.

History. 1995, c. 450, § 63.1-105.3; 2002, c. 747; 2009, cc. 61, 547; 2020, c. 1159.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2009, cc. 61 and 547, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall report to the chairmen of the Senate Finance and House Appropriations committees no later than October 1, 2012, on the savings achieved through use of diversionary assistance in Fiscal Year 2010 through Fiscal Year 2012.”

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendments by cc. 61 and 547 are identical, and substituted “12-month period” for “sixty-month period” in the next-to-last sentence.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by c. 1159, in subsection A in the first sentence, added “or $1,500, whichever is greater” at the end; and in the second sentence, substituted “the number of days for which assistance is granted multiplied by 1.33” for “a period of up to 160 days” and added subsection B.

§ 63.2-618. Notice and appeal.

A participant aggrieved by the decision of a local board granting, denying, changing or discontinuing public assistance may appeal such decision pursuant to § 63.2-517 . If a hearing request is received prior to the effective date of any proposed change in benefit status, a participant appealing such change shall have the right to continued direct payment of TANF benefits pending final administrative action on such appeal.

History. 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.53; 1995, c. 450; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-619. Repealed by Acts 2016, c. 23, cl. 2.

Editor’s note.

Former § 63.2-619 , pertaining to evaluation methods and reporting for the program, derived from 1994, cc. 858, 951, § 63.1-133.54; 1995, c. 450; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-620. Child care services for TANF and low-income families.

The Department shall identify strategies for Virginia to obtain the maximum amount of federal funds available for child care services for TANF recipients and families whose incomes are at or below 185 percent of the federal poverty level. The Department shall provide an annual report on these strategies to the chairmen of the House Committees on Appropriations and on Health, Welfare and Institutions and the Senate Committees on Finance and Appropriations and on Rehabilitation and Social Services by December 15.

History. 2001, c. 184, § 63.1-105.9; 2002, c. 747.

Editor’s note.

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of “Senate Committees on Finance and Appropriations” for “Senate Committees on Finance” and in the second sentence, inserted “on” preceding “Health” and preceding “Rehabilitation” and inserted “the” preceding “Senate.” March 10, 2021.

§ 63.2-621. Restrictions on use of TANF cash assistance.

Recipients of TANF benefits pursuant to this chapter shall not access TANF cash benefits through an electronic benefit transaction (i) for the purchase of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, lottery tickets, or sexually explicit visual materials as defined in § 18.2-374.1 ; (ii) in any transaction in any (a) government store established for the sale of alcoholic beverages, (b) establishment in which pari-mutuel wagering or charitable gaming is conducted, or (c) establishment in which tattooing or body-piercing, as defined in § 54.1-700 , is performed for hire or consideration; or (iii) in any establishment that provides adult-oriented entertainment in which performers or other individuals connected with the business appear nude or partially nude.

History. 2013, cc. 160, 733.

Chapter 7. Economic Employment Improvement Program for Disadvantaged Persons.

§§ 63.2-700 through 63.2-702.

Repealed by Acts 2003, c. 428.

Editor’s note.

Former § 63.2-700 , which established the Economic and Employment Improvement Program, derived from 2000, cc. 483, 491, § 63.1-133.56; 2001, c. 483; 2002, c. 747. Former § 63.2-701, which provided for administration of the Economic and Employment Improvement Program by the Department, derived from 2000, cc. 483, 491, § 63.1-133.57; 2002, c. 747. Former § 63.2-702, which reestablished the Grant Awards Committee, derived from 2000, cc. 483, 491, § 63.1-133.58; 2001, c. 483; 2002, c. 747.

Repealed § 63.2-702 was amended by Acts 2003, c. 467.

Chapter 7.1. Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.

§ 63.2-703. Faith-based and community initiatives; responsibilities of Department.

  1. The General Assembly finds that faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations make significant contributions to the welfare of our society and constitute an underutilized and underrepresented reservoir of assistance for social programs, and special efforts to increase utilization of faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations will enhance the Commonwealth’s ability to carry out human welfare programs. To carry out these initiatives, the Department of Social Services shall have the following responsibilities:
    1. Lead and facilitate meetings as necessary, with faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations for the purpose of sharing information to help carry out human welfare programs in Virginia;
    2. Encourage conferences and meetings at the community level for faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations, as needed;
    3. Provide procurement and funding information to faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations, as needed;
    4. Provide information regarding faith-based and community initiatives and other information the Department may deem appropriate, to faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations, and other state agencies whose missions may be enhanced by increased awareness of such initiatives and information;
    5. Encourage the development and maintenance of a statewide network of local liaisons to assist in the dissemination of information and assistance;
    6. Develop a statewide list of available faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations. Such statewide list shall be made available to the public through the Department’s website;
    7. Obtain information concerning faith-based, volunteer, private and community organizations in other states;
    8. Coordinate offers of assistance from faith-based organizations during natural disasters; and
    9. Perform such other duties as the Department deems appropriate.
  2. Nothing in this section shall imply or be inferred to mean that additional federal or state funds will be available for these purposes or that contractual preferences will be given to such organizations other than past or potential performance standards utilized under the Virginia Public Procurement Act (§ 2.2-4300 et seq.).

History. 2002, c. 326, § 63.1-133.59; 2006, cc. 142, 386; 2016, c. 23.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2002, c. 326, enacted a new Chapter 6.7 in Title 63.1 consisting of a section numbered 63.1-133.59, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152, Acts 2002, c. 326 has been given effect in Chapter 7.1 of Title 63.2 and this section as set out above.

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 142 and 386 are identical, and rewrote subdivision A 8, wich read: “Conduct a survey of local departments of social services, community action agencies, and other appropriate entities by July 1, 2004, to collect information on unmet social service needs of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families recipients.”

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 23 deleted subdivision A 9, which read “Make regular reports to the Governor and General Assembly on the fulfillment of the Department’s responsibilities related to faith-based and community initiatives” and renumbered former subdivision A 10 as subdivision A 9.

Chapter 8. Other Grants of Public Assistance.

§ 63.2-800. Repealed by Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 61, effective July 1, 2013.

Cross references.

For current provisions as to the Auxiliary grants program, see § 51.5-160 .

Editor’s note.

Former § 63.2-800 , relating to Auxiliary grants program; administration of program, was derived from 1973, c. 264, § 63.1-25.1; 1974, cc. 44, 45; 1981, c. 21; 1985, c. 229; 1991, c. 532; 1993, cc. 957, 993; 1995, c. 649; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 128, 387.

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 65 provides: “That effective July 1, 2013, the regulations of the Board of Social Services promulgated pursuant to § 63.2-217 , related to administration of auxiliary grants pursuant to § 63.2-800 , and adult services provided pursuant to Article 1 (§ 63.2-1600 et seq.) and adult protective services provided pursuant to Article 2 (§ 63.2-1603 ) of Chapter 16 of Title 63.2 shall be administered by the Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services and shall remain in full force and effect until the Commissioner for Aging and Rehabilitative Services promulgates regulations pursuant to the 64th enactment of this act.”

Acts 2012, cc. 803 and 835, cl. 67 provides: “That as of July 1, 2012, the Department for Aging and Rehabilitative Services shall be deemed successor in interest to the Department for the Aging and the Department of Rehabilitative Services to the extent that this act transfers powers and duties. All right, title, and interest in and to any tangible personal property vested in the Department for the Aging and the Department of Rehabilitative Services to the extent that this act transfers powers and duties as of the effective date of this act shall be transferred to and taken as standing in the name of the Department for Aging and Rehabilitative Services.”

§ 63.2-801. SNAP benefits program.

  1. The Board is authorized, in accordance with the federal Food Stamp Act, to implement a SNAP benefits program in which each political subdivision in the Commonwealth shall participate. Such program shall include participation in the Restaurant Meals Program and shall be administered in conformity with the Board regulations.
  2. To the extent authorized by federal law and regulations, the Board shall (i) establish broad-based categorical eligibility for SNAP benefits in accordance with 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(j)(2), (ii) set the gross income eligibility standard for SNAP benefits at 200 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, and (iii) not impose an asset limit for eligibility for SNAP benefits.
  3. The Board shall increase opportunities for self-sufficiency through postsecondary education by allowing SNAP benefits program participants, to the greatest extent allowed by federal law and regulations, to satisfy applicable employment and training requirements through enrollment in an accredited public institution of higher education or other postsecondary school licensed or certified by the Board of Education or the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia. The Board shall (i) identify postsecondary education opportunities in the Commonwealth that meet the definition of “employment and training program” as set forth in 7 C.F.R. § 271.2 and the definition of “career and technical education” as set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 2302; (ii) average a SNAP benefits program participant’s classroom and study hours on a monthly basis to determine whether the SNAP benefits program participant has met applicable education hour requirements; (iii) deem a SNAP benefits program participant who is approved for a federal or state work study position but who has not yet been placed in a work study position to have satisfied applicable employment and training requirements, as permitted under federal law; (iv) create a standardized form and process for SNAP benefits program participants to verify compliance with education requirements; (v) allow accredited public institutions of higher education or other postsecondary schools licensed or certified by the Board of Education or the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia to apply for SNAP ET third party reimbursement designation through the established procurement process; and (vi) establish and make available to SNAP benefits program participants materials that provide clear guidance regarding satisfaction of employment and training requirements through postsecondary education.

History. 1974, c. 504, § 63.1-25.2; 1975, c. 311; 1981, c. 21; 2002, c. 747; 2020, c. 843; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 160.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2020, c. 843, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall develop and implement a plan to begin participating in the Restaurant Meals Program (RMP) of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program no later than January 1, 2021.”

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by c. 843 inserted “include participation in the Restaurant Meals Program and shall” in the second sentence.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 160, effective July 1, 2021, added the subsection A designation and substituted “SNAP benefits” for “food stamps” therein; and added subsections B and C.

§ 63.2-802. Eligibility for general relief.

If a local board has exercised its option to establish a program of general relief, a person shall be eligible for such components of the general relief program as the locality chooses to provide if he is in need of general relief. The establishment of and continued participation in such general relief program shall be optional with the local board. Nothing contained in this section shall restrict the authority of a local board under § 63.2-314 . No person shall be deemed to be in need of general relief, however, if he fails to accept available employment which is appropriate to his physical and mental abilities and training, taking into consideration his home and family responsibilities which would affect his availability for employment. Prepaid funeral expenses, which do not exceed an amount established by the Board, shall not be considered a financial asset in determining a person’s eligibility for general relief.

History. Code 1950, § 63-205; 1968, cc. 578, 666, § 63.1-106; 1972, c. 768; 1977, c. 241; 1980, cc. 18, 20; 2002, c. 747.

Cross references.

As to reimbursement of localities by the Commonwealth for certain expenditures, see § 63.2-401 .

As to authority of the State Board of Social Services upon amendments of the federal Social Security Act or regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services, see § 63.2-406 .

§ 63.2-803. Payment for legal services in claims for Supplemental Security Income.

The Commissioner shall establish an advocacy project to assist recipients of general relief or children entrusted or committed to foster care who may be eligible for federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits in obtaining such benefits. Local departments may determine and refer appropriate potential SSI claimants to attorneys, or advocates working under the supervision of an attorney, for representation under this project. This project shall provide for disbursements to any such attorney or advocate upon receipt of a favorable decision in such referred claims.

Such disbursements shall be in an amount determined by the Board to be sufficient to ensure prompt and adequate representation of such recipients. This amount shall not exceed the lesser of the recoupment for state and local assistance paid, as provided by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (g), as amended, or twenty-five percent of the maximum federal back-due SSI grant payable to an individual.

Such disbursement shall be made upon submission by the attorney of a petition and a copy of the favorable decision. Petitions must be presented within sixty days of the favorable Social Security Administration decision.

The Board, in consultation with the Virginia State Bar, shall adopt regulations necessary to implement this section.

History. 1992, c. 170, § 63.1-89.1; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-804. Eligibility to receive convict-made dentures.

Any person who is a recipient of dental care provided by the Department of Health is eligible to receive, if so prescribed, dentures manufactured in a state correctional facility.

History. 1972, c. 54, § 63.1-110.1; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-805. Home Energy Assistance Program; report; survey.

  1. The General Assembly declares that it is the policy of this Commonwealth to support the efforts of public agencies, private utility service providers, and charitable and community groups seeking to assist low-income Virginians in meeting their residential energy needs. To this end, the Department is designated as the state agency responsible for coordinating state efforts in this regard.
  2. There is hereby created in the state treasury a special nonreverting fund to be known as the Home Energy Assistance Fund, hereinafter the “Fund.” Moneys in the Fund shall be used to:
    1. Supplement the assistance provided through the Department’s administration of the federal Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program Block Grant; and
    2. Assist the Commonwealth in maximizing the amount of federal funds available under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program and the Weatherization Assistance Program by providing funds to comply with fund-matching requirements, and by means of leveraging in accordance with the rules set by the Home Energy Assistance Program.

      The Fund shall be established on the books of the Comptroller. The Fund shall consist of donations and contributions to the Fund and such moneys as shall be appropriated by the General Assembly. Interest earned on money in the Fund shall remain in the Fund and be credited to it. Any moneys remaining in the Fund, including interest thereon, at the end of each fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund but shall remain in the Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used solely for the purposes set forth in this section. The State Treasurer shall make expenditures and disbursements from the Fund on warrants issued by the Comptroller upon written request signed by the Commissioner. Up to twelve percent of the Fund may be used to pay the Department’s expenses in administering the Home Energy Assistance Program.

  3. The Department shall establish and operate the Home Energy Assistance Program. In administering the Home Energy Assistance Program, it shall be the responsibility of the Department to:
    1. Administer distributions from the Fund;
    2. Lead and facilitate meetings with the Department of Housing and Community Development, the Department of Energy, and other agencies of the Commonwealth, as well as any nonstate programs that elect to participate in the Home Energy Assistance Program, for the purpose of sharing information directed at alleviating the seasonal energy needs of low-income Virginians, including needs for weatherization assistance services;
    3. Collect and analyze data regarding the amounts of energy assistance provided through the Department, categorized by fuel type in order to identify the unmet need for energy assistance in the Commonwealth;
    4. Develop and maintain a statewide list of available private and governmental resources for low-income Virginians in need of energy assistance; and
    5. Report annually to the Governor and the General Assembly on or before October 1 of each year through October 1, 2007, and biennially thereafter, on the effectiveness of low-income energy assistance programs in meeting the needs of low-income Virginians. In preparing the report, the Department shall:
      1. Conduct a survey biennially in each year that the report is due to the General Assembly that shall collect information regarding the extent to which the Commonwealth’s efforts in assisting low-income Virginians are adequate and are not duplicative of similar services provided by utility services providers, charitable organizations and local governments;
      2. Obtain information on energy programs in other states; and
      3. Obtain necessary information from the Department of Housing and Community Development, the Department of Energy, and other agencies of the Commonwealth, as well as any nonstate programs that elect to participate in the Home Energy Assistance Program, to complete the biennial survey and to compile the required report. The Department of Housing and Community Development, the Department of Energy, and other agencies of the Commonwealth, as well as any nonstate programs that elect to participate in the Home Energy Assistance Program, shall provide the necessary information to the Department.The Department is authorized to assume responsibility for administering all or any portion of any private, voluntary low-income energy assistance program upon the application of the administrator thereof, on such terms as the Department and such administrator shall agree and in accordance with applicable law and regulations. If the Department assumes administrative responsibility for administering such a voluntary program, it is authorized to receive funds collected through such voluntary program and distribute them through the Fund.
  4. Local departments may, to the extent that funds are available, promote interagency cooperation at the local level by providing technical assistance, data collection and service delivery.
  5. Subject to Board regulations and to the availability of state or private funds for low-income households in need of energy assistance, the Department is authorized to:
    1. Receive state and private funds for such services; and
    2. Disburse funds to state agencies, and vendors of energy services, to provide energy assistance programs for low-income households.
  6. Actions of the Department relating to the review, allocation and awarding of benefits and grants shall be exempt from the provisions of Article 3 (§ 2.2-4018 et seq.) and Article 4 (§ 2.2-4024 et seq.) of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq.).
  7. No employee or former employee of the Department shall divulge any information acquired by him in the performance of his duties with respect to the income or assistance eligibility of any individual or household obtained in the course of administering the Home Energy Assistance Program, except in accordance with proper judicial order. The provisions of this section shall not apply to (i) acts performed or words spoken or published in the line of duty under law; (ii) inquiries and investigations to obtain information as to the implementation of this chapter by a duly constituted committee of the General Assembly, or when such inquiry or investigation is relevant to its study, provided that any such information shall be privileged; or (iii) the publication of statistics so classified as to prevent the identification of any individual or household.

History. 2001, c. 676, §§ 63.1-336, 63.1-337, 63.1-338, 63.1-339, 63.1-340, 63.1-341, 63.1-342, 63.1-343, 63.1-339; 2002, cc. 243, 747; 2007, c. 312; 2009, c. 127; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 532.

Cross references.

As to voluntary contributions of tax refunds, see § 58.1-344.3 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2002, c. 243 amended § 63.1-339, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152, Acts 2002, c. 243 has been given effect in this section as set out above. The 2002 amendment by c. 243, in subsection C, redesignated former subdivision 2 as present subdivision 5, inserted present subdivisions 2 through 4, and in present present subdivision 5, added the language beginning “In preparing the annual report” at the end of the introductory paragraph and added subdivisions a. through c. and the following paragraph.

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 532, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2021.”

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendment by c. 312, in subdivision C 5, inserted “through October 1, 2007, and biennially thereafter,” deleted “annual” before “report” in subdivisions C 5 and C 5 c; and deleted the second paragraph of subdivision C 5 c, concerning cessation of reporting requirements October 1, 2007.

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 127 substituted “in each year that the report is due to the General Assembly” for “beginning in 2002” in paragraph C 5 a.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 532, effective October 1, 2021, in subdivision C 2 and twice in subdivision C 5 c, substituted “Department of Energy” for “Department of Mines, Minerals and Energy.”

Subtitle III. Social Services Programs.

Chapter 9. Foster Care.

Article 1. General Provisions.

§ 63.2-900. Accepting children for placement in homes, facilities, etc., by local boards.

  1. Pursuant to § 63.2-319 , a local board shall have the right to accept for placement in suitable family homes, children’s residential facilities or independent living arrangements, subject to the supervision of the Commissioner and in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board, such persons under 18 years of age as may be entrusted to it by the parent, parents or guardian, committed by any court of competent jurisdiction, or placed through an agreement between it and the parent, parents or guardians where legal custody remains with the parent, parents, or guardians.The Board shall adopt regulations for the provision of foster care services by local boards, which shall be directed toward the prevention of unnecessary foster care placements and towards the immediate care of and permanent planning for children in the custody of or placed by local boards and that shall achieve, as quickly as practicable, permanent placements for such children. The local board shall first seek out kinship care options to keep children out of foster care and as a placement option for those children in foster care, if it is in the child’s best interests, pursuant to § 63.2-900.1 . In cases in which a child cannot be returned to his prior family or placed for adoption and kinship care is not currently in the best interests of the child, the local board shall consider the placement and services that afford the best alternative for protecting the child’s welfare. Placements may include but are not limited to family foster care, treatment foster care and residential care. Services may include but are not limited to assessment and stabilization, diligent family search, intensive in-home, intensive wraparound, respite, mentoring, family mentoring, adoption support, supported adoption, crisis stabilization or other community-based services. The Board shall also approve in foster care policy the language of the agreement required in § 63.2-902 . The agreement shall include at a minimum a Code of Ethics and mutual responsibilities for all parties to the agreement.Within 30 days of accepting for foster care placement a person under 18 years of age whose father is unknown, the local board shall request a search of the Virginia Birth Father Registry established pursuant to Article 7 (§ 63.2-1249 et seq.) of Chapter 12 to determine whether any man has registered as the putative father of the child. If the search results indicate that a man has registered as the putative father of the child, the local board shall contact the man to begin the process to determine paternity.The local board shall, in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Board and in accordance with the entrustment agreement or other order by which such person is entrusted or committed to its care, have custody and control of the person so entrusted or committed to it until he is lawfully discharged, has been adopted or has attained his majority.Whenever a local board places a child where legal custody remains with the parent, parents or guardians, the board shall enter into an agreement with the parent, parents or guardians. The agreement shall specify the responsibilities of each for the care and control of the child.The local board shall have authority to place for adoption, and to consent to the adoption of, any child properly committed or entrusted to its care when the order of commitment or entrustment agreement between the parent or parents and the agency provides for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child for the purpose of placing and consenting to the adoption of the child.The local board shall also have the right to accept temporary custody of any person under 18 years of age taken into custody pursuant to subdivision B of § 16.1-246 or § 63.2-1517 . The placement of a child in a foster home, whether within or without the Commonwealth, shall not be for the purpose of adoption unless the placement agreement between the foster parents and the local board specifically so stipulates.
  2. Prior to the approval of any family for placement of a child, a home study shall be completed and the prospective foster or adoptive parents shall be informed that information about shaken baby syndrome, its effects, and resources for help and support for caretakers is available on a website maintained by the Department as prescribed in regulations adopted by the Board. Home studies by local boards shall be conducted in accordance with the Mutual Family Assessment home study template and any addenda thereto developed by the Department.
  3. Prior to placing any such child in any foster home or children’s residential facility, the local board shall enter into a written agreement with the foster parents, pursuant to § 63.2-902 , or other appropriate custodian setting forth therein the conditions under which the child is so placed pursuant to § 63.2-902 . However, if a child is placed in a children’s residential facility licensed as a temporary emergency shelter, and a verbal agreement for placement is secured within eight hours of the child’s arrival at the facility, the written agreement does not need to be entered into prior to placement, but shall be completed and signed by the local board and the facility representative within 24 hours of the child’s arrival or by the end of the next business day after the child’s arrival.Agreements entered into pursuant to this subsection shall include a statement by the local board that all reasonably ascertainable background, medical, and psychological records of the child, including whether the child has been the subject of an investigation as the perpetrator of sexual abuse, have been provided to the foster home or children’s residential facility.
  4. Within 72 hours of placing a child of school age in a foster care placement, as defined in § 63.2-100 , the local social services agency making such placement shall, in writing, (i) notify the principal of the school in which the student is to be enrolled and the superintendent of the relevant school division or his designee of such placement, and (ii) inform the principal of the status of the parental rights.If the documents required for enrollment of the foster child pursuant to § 22.1-3.1, 22.1-270 or 22.1-271.2, are not immediately available upon taking the child into custody, the placing social services agency shall obtain and produce or otherwise ensure compliance with such requirements for the foster child within 30 days after the child’s enrollment.
  5. Every local board shall submit to the Department through its statewide automated system the names of all foster parents licensed to provide foster care services in the locality served by the local board and update such list quarterly.

History. Code 1950, § 63-73; 1952, c. 409; 1960, c. 331; 1968, cc. 466, 578, § 63.1-56; 1975, cc. 248, 406; 1977, cc. 559, 562, 634, 645; 1978, c. 734; 1984, c. 734; 1986, c. 281; 1991, c. 34; 1994, c. 865; 1999, c. 889; 2002, c. 747; 2004, c. 70; 2005, cc. 343, 653; 2006, c. 360; 2008, cc. 241, 308; 2010, c. 551; 2011, cc. 9, 170; 2015, c. 531; 2017, cc. 193, 200; 2018, c. 694; 2019, c. 446.

Cross references.

For provision authorizing local board to accept and expend certain funds on behalf of children placed by or entrusted to it when no guardian has been appointed, see § 63.2-320 .

As to reimbursement of localities by the Commonwealth for certain expenditures, see § 63.2-401 .

As to parental or agency consent for adoption, and exceptions to consent requirement, see § 63.2-1202 .

As to placement of children for adoption by agency or local board, see § 63.2-1221 .

As to adoption assistance for adoption of children with special needs, see § 63.2-1300 et seq.

As to the criteria establishing eligibility for access to the state pool of funds to be allocated to community policy and management teams under the Children’s Services Act for children placed pursuant to this section, see § 2.2-5212 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2005, c. 343, cl. 2 provides: “That the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services shall issue a memorandum as soon as practicable after the enactment of this act to inform local school division superintendents and local social services agencies of its provisions.”

Acts 2005, c. 653, cl. 2 provides: “That the State Board of Social Services shall amend its home study regulations to allow homes to be dually approved as both foster and adoptive homes.”

Acts 2008, cc. 241 and 308, cl. 2 provides: “That the Board of Social Services shall approve the agreement in foster care policy by January 1, 2009, establishing the requirements of the agreement signed by foster parents prior to placement of children in their home as referenced in subsection C of § 63.2-900 of the Code of Virginia. In approving the foster care policy, the Board shall assure that the Department has secured input from representatives from foster and adoptive families, local boards and departments, child-placing agencies, judicial staff, youth in foster and adoptive homes, and such other advocates or experts as the Board deems necessary. The Board shall ensure that the agreement includes: (i) the identification of mutual responsibilities for foster parents, foster care workers, and directors of child-placing agencies, including local departments; and (ii) a Code of Ethics for all parties to the agreement. The model agreement shall be used by all local departments and private agencies and shall require the signature of each foster parent and worker, as well as the local department of social services’ or child-placing agency’s chief executive officer or his designee.”

Acts 2010, c. 192, provides: “That the Governor and the Department of Social Services, together with other appropriate executive branch agencies, shall develop a plan to increase the safe and permanent placement of children with families to reduce the number of children in foster care by 25 percent by 2020. The plan shall provide for the placement of children currently in foster care or children entering foster care in safe, appropriate, permanent living arrangements.”

Acts 2017, c. 193, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services is authorized to amend or update its Mutual Family Assessment home study template and any addenda thereto when necessary to improve the process of adoptive and foster placements, provided such amendments or updates do not lessen the requirements of the home study process.”

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 2 provides: “That the Commissioner of Social Services shall establish within the State Department of Social Services (Department) a director of foster care health and safety position. The director of foster care health and safety shall (i) identify local boards of social services (local boards) that fail to provide foster care services in a manner that complies with applicable laws and regulations and ensures the health, safety, and well-being of all children in the supervision and control of the local board; (ii) ensure that local boards remedy such failures, including those related to caseworker visits, safe and appropriate placement settings, and the provision of physical, mental, and behavioral health screenings and services; (iii) ensure that reports of abuse, neglect, mistreatment, and deaths of children in foster care are properly investigated; (iv) manage the process through which the Department reviews children’s residential facility placements for medical necessity; and (v) track health outcomes of children in foster care. On or before November 30 of each year, the director of foster care health and safety shall report to the Governor and the General Assembly on the implementation and effectiveness of such objectives and any other issues relevant to the health, safety, and well-being of children in foster care.”

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 3 provides: “That the State Department of Social Services shall develop and implement a data-driven strategic plan, to be updated biennially, to improve the recruitment and retention of foster parents in the Commonwealth.”

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 4 provides: “That the State Department of Social Services shall develop and implement a more reliable, structured, and comprehensive case review and quality improvement process to monitor and improve foster care services provided by local boards and departments of social services in the Commonwealth.”

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 5 provides: “That the State Department of Social Services shall develop and implement an ongoing review process to monitor the placement of children by local boards of social services in children’s residential facilities and ensure that such placements are warranted by medical necessity for congregate care.”

Acts 2019, c. 446, cl. 6 provides: “That the State Department of Social Services shall develop and implement a process to (i) identify and review foster care cases in which the child has been in foster care for 24 months or longer; (ii) provide assistance to local boards and departments of social services to find a permanent home for such children; and (iii) conduct follow-up reviews of such cases annually to ensure that the local board and department of social services continue to make diligent efforts to secure a permanent home for such children.”

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

The 2004 amendments.

The 2004 amendment by c. 70, in subsection A, substituted “18” for “eighteen” in two places, substituted “and that” for “and which” in the second sentence, and inserted the present third sentence; and substituted “24” for “twenty-four” in the last sentence of subsection B.

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 343 added subsection D.

The 2005 amendment by c. 653 inserted subsection B and redesignated former subsection B as subsection C.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendment by c. 360, in the second paragraph of subsection A, inserted “first” and “pursuant to § 63.2-900.1 ” in the last sentence.

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 241 and 308 are identical, and added the second and third sentences of the second paragraph of subsection A, and inserted “pursuant to § 63.2-902 ” in the first sentence of subsection C.

The 2010 amendments.

The 2010 amendment by c. 551 inserted “and the prospective foster or adoptive parents shall be informed that information about shaken baby syndrome, its effects, and resources for help and support for caretakers is available on a website maintained by the Department” in subsection B and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2011 amendments.

The 2011 amendments by cc. 9 and 170 are identical, and in the second paragraph in subsection A, added the second through fifth sentences, and deleted the former last sentence, which read: “The local board shall first seek out kinship care options to keep children out of foster care and as a placement option for those children in foster care, if it is in the child’s best interest, pursuant to § 63.2-900.1 .”

The 2015 amendments.

The 2015 amendment by c. 531 added the third paragraph of subsection A.

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 193 added the last sentence in subsection B.

The 2017 amendment by c. 200 substituted “Virginia Birth Father Registry” for “Putative Father Registry” in the third paragraph of subsection A.

The 2018 amendments.

The 2018 amendment by c. 694 added the last paragraph in subsection C.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 446 added subsection E.

Law Review.

For 2003/2004 survey of family and juvenile law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2004).

For 2006 survey article, “Family and Juvenile Law,” see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 151 (2006).

For essay, “Virginia Ranks Forty-Ninth of Fifty: The Need for Stronger Laws Supporting Foster Youth,” see 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 255 (2018).

Research References.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-300. Checklist for Agency Adoption, et seq.

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Parent and Child, § 7.

CASE NOTES

Legal custodian without authority to execute entrustment agreements. —

This section requires that an entrustment agreement be entered by either a “parent” or a “guardian,” and since an aunt who was the legal custodian of the children at issue was neither their parent nor guardian, entrustment agreements she had executed with the department of social services were invalid and ineffective. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Brown, 33 Va. App. 313, 533 S.E.2d 12, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 634 (2000) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-900.1. Kinship foster care.

  1. The local board shall, in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board, determine whether the child has any relative who may be eligible to become a kinship foster parent. Searches for relatives eligible to serve as kinship foster parents shall be conducted at the time the child enters foster care, at least annually thereafter, and prior to any subsequent changes to the child’s placement setting. The local board shall take all reasonable steps to provide notice to such relatives of their potential eligibility to become kinship foster parents and explain any opportunities such relatives may have to participate in the placement and care of the child, including opportunities available through kinship foster care or kinship guardianship.
  2. Kinship foster care placements pursuant to this section shall be subject to all requirements of, and shall be eligible for all services related to, foster care placement contained in this chapter. Subject to approval by the Commissioner, a local board may grant a waiver of the Board’s standards for foster home approval, set forth in regulations, that are not related to safety. Training requirements may be waived for purposes of initial approval; however, such training requirements shall be completed within six months of the initial approval. If a local board determines that training requirements are a barrier to placement with a kinship foster parent and that placement with such kinship foster parent is in the child’s best interest, the local board shall submit a waiver request to the Commissioner. Waivers granted pursuant to this subsection shall be considered and, if appropriate, granted on a case-by-case basis and shall include consideration of the unique needs of each child to be placed. Upon request by a local board, the Commissioner shall review the local board’s decision and reasoning to grant a waiver and shall verify that the foster home approval standard being waived is not related to safety. If the Commissioner grants the waiver and allows approval of the home in accordance with Board regulations, the child may be placed in the home immediately. The approval or disapproval by the Commissioner of the local board’s waiver shall not be considered a case decision as defined in § 2.2-4001 .
  3. The kinship foster parent shall be eligible to receive payment at the full foster care rate for the care of the child.
  4. During the process of determining whether a person should be approved as a kinship foster parent, a local board shall not require that the child be removed from the physical custody of the kinship foster parent who is the subject of such approval process, provided the placement remains in the child’s best interest.
  5. A child placed in kinship foster care pursuant to this section shall not be removed from the physical custody of the kinship foster parent, provided that the child has been living with the kinship foster parent for six consecutive months and the placement continues to meet approval standards for foster care, unless (i) the kinship foster parent consents to the removal; (ii) removal is agreed upon at a family partnership meeting as defined by the Department; (iii) removal is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (iv) removal is warranted pursuant to § 63.2-1517 .
  6. For purposes of this section, “relative” means an adult who is (i) related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption or (ii) fictive kin of the child.

History. 2006, c. 360; 2012, c. 568; 2014, c. 257; 2016, c. 25; 2019, cc. 437, 438, 446; 2020, cc. 224, 366, 562.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2014, c. 530, cl. 1 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall review current policies governing facilitation of placement of children in kinship care to avoid foster care placements in the Commonwealth and shall develop recommendations for regulations governing kinship care placements, which shall include recommendations related to (i) a description of the rights and responsibilities of local boards, birth parents, and kinship caregivers; (ii) a process for the facilitation of placement or transfer of custody; (iii) a model disclosure letter to be provided to the parents and potential kinship caregivers, including information about the differences between kinship care and kinship foster care, the impact of transferring custody from the birth parent to the kinship caregiver, the birth parent’s role following transfer, and the plan requirements for custody to be returned to the birth parent; (iv) a process for developing a safety or service plan for the family, which shall include gathering input from birth parents, potential kinship caregivers, and other community and family supports; (v) a description of funding sources available to support safety or service plans; (vi) a process for gathering and reporting data regarding the well-being and permanency of children in kinship care; and (vii) a description of the training plan for local department of social services workers. The Department shall also review the fiscal impact of proposed regulations. The Department shall report its recommendations and findings to the Governor, the General Assembly, and the Board of Social Services by January 1, 2016.”

Acts 2020, c. 562, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall develop a training program that is tailored to persons seeking approval as a kinship foster parent. Such program shall take into consideration the unique characteristics of kinship foster care placements and include information regarding services, funding, options, and other resources that will be available to the kinship foster parent.”

Acts 2020, c. 562, cl. 3 provides: “That the Department of Social Services (the Department) shall develop a document that provides comprehensive information regarding kinship foster care, including information about available services, funding, options, and other resources. The Department shall make such document available on its website and require local boards of social services to provide information about such document to all potential kinship foster parents.”

Acts 2020, c. 562, cl. 4 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall provide training to local boards of social services regarding the process through which a person may be approved as a kinship foster parent without requiring removal of the child from the physical custody of such person.”

Acts 2020, c. 562, cl. 5 provides: “That the Board of Social Services (the Board) shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act, including the process for relative foster home approval. The Board’s initial adoption of regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act shall be exempt from the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq. of the Code of Virginia), except that the Board shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the regulations prior to adoption.”

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 568 added the second and third sentences of subsection B.

The 2014 amendments.

The 2014 amendment by c. 257 added subsection D.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 25, in subsection B, rewrote the second sentence, which read “However, the Commissioner may grant a variance from the requirements of this chapter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(10) and allow the placement of a child in with a kinship foster care provider when he determines that (i) the requirement would impose a substantial hardship on the kinship foster care provider and (ii) the variance would not adversely affect the safety and well-being of the child to be placed in an arrangement for kinship care as defined in § 63.2-100 or with the kinship foster care provider.”, substituted “Waivers” for “Variances” in the third sentence, and added the last two sentences.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendments by cc. 437 and 438 are identical, and in subsection A, substituted “any relative who may be” for “a relative who is” and added the last sentence; and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment by c. 446 added the second sentence to subsection A.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by cc. 224 and 366 are identical and added subsection E, which was redesignated as subsection F at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

The 2020 amendment by c. 562 inserted the third, fourth, and next to last sentences in subsection B; inserted subsection D and redesignated former subsection D as subsection E.

Law Review.

For 2006 survey article, “Family and Juvenile Law,” see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 151 (2006).

§ 63.2-900.2. Placement of sibling groups; visitation.

All reasonable steps shall be taken to place siblings entrusted to the care of a local board or licensed child-placing agency, committed to the care of a local board or agency by any court of competent jurisdiction, or placed with a local board or public agency through an agreement between a local board or a public agency and the parent, parents, or guardians, where legal custody remains with the parent, parents, or guardian, together in the same foster home.

Where siblings are placed in separate foster homes, the local department, child-placing agency, or public agency shall develop a plan to encourage frequent and regular visitation or communication between the siblings. The visitation or communication plan shall take into account the wishes of the child, and shall specify the frequency of visitation or communication, identify the party responsible for encouraging that visits or communication occur, and state any other requirements or restrictions related to such visitation or communication as may be determined necessary by the local department, child-placing agency, or public agency.

History. 2008, c. 397.

§ 63.2-900.3. School placement of children in foster care.

When placing a child of school age in a foster care placement, as defined in § 63.2-100 , the local social services agency making such placement shall, in writing, determine jointly with the local school division whether it is in the child’s best interests to remain enrolled at the school in which he was enrolled prior to the most recent foster care placement, pursuant to § 22.1-3.4.

History. 2011, c. 154; 2012, c. 711.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 711 substituted “When placing” for “Before placing.”

§ 63.2-901. Supervision of placement of children in homes.

The local director shall supervise the placement in suitable homes of children placed through an agreement with the parents or guardians or entrusted or committed to the local board pursuant to §§ 63.2-900 , 63.2-902 and 63.2-903 .

History. Code 1950, § 63-89; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-67.2; 1994, c. 865; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-901.1. Criminal history and central registry check for placements of children.

  1. Each local board and licensed child-placing agency shall obtain, in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board, criminal history record information from the Central Criminal Records Exchange and the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Central Criminal Records Exchange and the results of a search of the child abuse and neglect central registry of any individual with whom the local board or licensed child-placing agency is considering placing a child on an emergency, temporary or permanent basis, including the birth parent of a child in foster care placement, unless the birth parent has revoked an entrustment agreement pursuant to § 63.2-1223 or 63.2-1817 or a local board or birth parent revokes a placement agreement while legal custody remains with the parent, parents, or guardians pursuant to § 63.2-900 . The local board or licensed child-placing agency shall also obtain such background checks on all adult household members residing in the home of the individual with whom the child is to be placed pursuant to subsection B. Such state criminal records or registry search shall be at no cost to the individual. The local board or licensed child-placing agency shall pay for the national fingerprint criminal history record check or may require such individual to pay the cost of the fingerprinting or the national fingerprinting criminal history record check or both. In addition to the fees assessed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the designated state agency may assess a fee for responding to requests required by this section.
  2. Background checks pursuant to this section require the following:
    1. A sworn statement or affirmation disclosing whether or not the individual has a criminal conviction or is the subject of any pending criminal charges within or outside the Commonwealth and whether or not the individual has been the subject of a founded complaint of child abuse or neglect within or outside the Commonwealth;
    2. That the individual submit to fingerprinting and provide personal descriptive information to be forwarded along with the individual’s fingerprints through the Central Criminal Records Exchange to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of obtaining criminal history record information. The local board or licensed child-placing agency shall inform the individual that he is entitled to obtain a copy of any background check report and to challenge the accuracy and completeness of any such report and obtain a prompt resolution before a final decision is made of the individual’s fitness to have responsibility for the safety and well-being of children.The Central Criminal Records Exchange, upon receipt of an individual’s record or notification that no record exists, shall forward it to the designated state agency. The state agency shall, upon receipt of an individual’s record lacking disposition data, conduct research in whatever state and local recordkeeping systems are available in order to obtain complete data. The state agency shall report to the local board or licensed child-placing agency whether the individual meets the criteria for having responsibility for the safety and well-being of children based on whether or not the individual has ever been convicted of or is the subject of pending charges for any barrier crime as defined in § 19.2-392.02 . Copies of any information received by a local board or licensed child-placing agency pursuant to this section shall be available to the state agency that regulates or operates such a child-placing agency but shall not be disseminated further; and
    3. A search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect. In addition, a search of the child abuse and neglect registry maintained by any other state pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, in which a prospective parent or other adult in the home has resided in the preceding five years.
  3. In emergency circumstances, each local board may obtain, from a criminal justice agency, criminal history record information from the Central Criminal Records Exchange and the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Virginia Criminal Information Network (VCIN) for the criminal records search authorized by this section. Within three days of placing a child, the local board shall require the individual for whom a criminal history record information check was requested to submit to fingerprinting and provide personal descriptive information to be forwarded along with the fingerprints through the Central Criminal Records Exchange to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of obtaining criminal record history information, pursuant to subsection B. The child shall be removed from the home immediately if any adult resident fails to provide such fingerprints and written permission to perform a criminal history record check when requested.
  4. Any individual with whom the local board is considering placing a child on an emergency basis shall submit to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 and the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect. The search of the central registry must occur prior to emergency placement. Such central registry search shall be at no cost to the individual. Prior to emergency placement, the individual shall provide a written statement of affirmation disclosing whether he has ever been the subject of a founded case of child abuse or neglect within or outside the Commonwealth. Child-placing agencies shall not approve individuals with a founded complaint of child abuse as foster or adoptive parents.
  5. The child-placing agency shall not approve a foster or adoptive home if any individual has been convicted of any barrier crime as defined in § 19.2-392.02 or is the subject of a founded complaint of abuse or neglect as maintained in registries pursuant to § 63.2-1515 and 42 U.S.C.S. 16901 et seq. A child-placing agency may approve as a foster parent an applicant who has been convicted of not more than one misdemeanor as set out in § 18.2-57 , or any substantially similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction, not involving the abuse, neglect, or moral turpitude of a minor, provided that 10 years have elapsed following the conviction.
  6. A local board or child-placing agency may approve as a kinship foster care parent an applicant who has been convicted of the following offenses, provided that 10 years have elapsed from the date of the conviction and the local board or child-placing agency makes a specific finding that approving the kinship foster care placement would not adversely affect the safety and well-being of the child: (i) any offense set forth in clause (iv) of the definition of barrier crime in § 19.2-392.02 or (ii) any misdemeanor offense under § 18.2-80 , 18.2-81 , 18.2-83 , 18.2-87 , 18.2-87.1 , or 18.2-88 or any substantially similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction.
  7. Any individual participating in the Fostering Futures program, which allows local departments to continue to provide foster care services to individuals who are 18 years of age or older but have not reached 21 years of age, who is placed in a foster home shall be subject to the background check requirements set forth in subsection B. The results of such background check shall be used for the sole purpose of determining whether other children should be placed or remain in the same foster home as the individual subject to the background check. The results of the background check shall not be used to terminate or suspend the approval of the foster home pursuant to subsection E. For purposes of this subsection, “individual participating in the Fostering Futures program” means a person who is 18 years of age or older but has not reached 21 years of age and is receiving foster care services through the Fostering Futures program.

History. 2002, cc. 587, 606, § 63.1-56.01; 2005, c. 722; 2006, c. 558; 2007, cc. 606, 617, 623, 871; 2011, cc. 5, 156; 2012, c. 568; 2017, cc. 194, 809.

Cross references.

As to dissemination of criminal history record information, see § 19.2-389 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2002 cc. 587 and 606, which are identical, enacted § 63.1-56.01, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152, Acts 2002, cc. 587 and 606 have been given effect in this section as set out above.

Acts 2007, c. 871, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act shall become effective on April 1, 2007.” The act had no emergency clause. See Va. Const., Art. IV, § 13.

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 722 inserted subsection C.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendment by c. 558, in subsection A, deleted “statewide” preceding “criminal history,” inserted “and the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Centeral Criminal Records Exchange” following “Central Criminal Records Exchange,” added the language beginning “The local board or” and ending “national fingerprints criminal history record check or both,” substituted “a national fingerprint criminal history” for “the criminal history record information,” inserted “upon request” following “the local board or agency”; in subsection B, inserted “and the Federal Bureau of Investigation” following “Central Criminal Records Exchange” and added the language beginning “Within three days” and ending “history record check or both.”

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendments by cc. 606, 617 and 623, are nearly identical, and inserted “unless the birth parent has revoked an entrustment agreement pursuant to § 63.2-1223 or 63.2-1817 or a local board or birth parent revokes a placement agreement while legal custody remains with the parent, parents, or guardians pursuant to § 63.2-900 ” at the end of the first sentence in subsection A.

The 2007 amendment by c. 871, effective April 1, 2007, rewrote the section.

The 2011 amendments.

The 2011 amendment by cc. 5 and 156 are identical, and in subsection A, substituted “child-placing agency shall also obtain” for “child-placing agency may also obtain” in the second sentence, and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 568 substituted “agency shall pay” for “agency must pay” in the fourth sentence of subsection A, and added subsection F.

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 194 added subsection G.

The 2017 amendment by c. 809, in subdivision B 2, substituted “for any barrier crime as defined in § 19.2-392.02 ” for “set forth in § 63.2-1719 ” in the last paragraph; in subsection E, substituted “been convicted of any barrier crime as defined in § 19.2-392.02 or is the subject of” for “a record of an offense as defined in § 63.2-1719 or” in the first sentence and inserted “who has been” and “or any substantially similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction” in the second sentence; in subsection F, rewrote clauses (i) and (ii) which formerly read “(i) a felony conviction for possession of drugs as set out in Article 1 (§ 18.2-247 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2, but not including a felony conviction for possession of drugs with the intent to distribute; (ii) a misdemeanor conviction for arson as set out in Article 1 (§ 18.2-77 et seq.) of Chapter 5 of Title 18.2; or (iii) an equivalent offense in another state.”

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Best interests of child. —

It was in the best interests of a child under § 20-124.3 to remain in her current custodial arrangement as the evidence showed that the child had bonded well with her current foster family, there was a substantial risk that removing the child again from an established home would exacerbate, rather than mitigate, any developmental damage, there was an entrustment agreement with the current foster family, and the family indicated that they wished to proceed with the adoption process. Since there was currently a founded complaint of abuse against one of the petitioners, the department, pursuant to subsection E of § 63.2-901.1 , was not permitted to approve petitioners’ home as a foster or adoptive home. Welch v. Wise County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 84 Va. Cir. 245, 2012 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Wise County Jan. 27, 2012).

§ 63.2-902. Agreements with persons taking children; dispute resolution; appeals.

  1. Every local board and licensed child-placing agency shall, with respect to each child placed by it in a foster home or children’s residential facility, enter into a written agreement contained in an approved foster care policy with the head of such home or facility, which agreement shall provide that the authorized representatives of the local board or agency shall have access at all times to such child and to the home or facility, and that the head of the home or facility will release custody of the child so placed to the authorized representatives of the local board or agency whenever, in the opinion of the local board or agency, or in the opinion of the Commissioner, it is in the best interests of the child.
  2. Local boards and licensed child-placing agencies shall implement and publicize a dispute resolution process through which a foster parent may contest an alleged violation of the regulations governing the collaboration, communication, access, and transparency between the local boards and licensed child-placing agencies and foster parents. Prior to filing a complaint through such dispute resolution process, the foster parent shall contact the family services specialist assigned to the foster home, provide a detailed description of the conduct constituting the alleged violation of the regulations governing collaboration, communication, access, and transparency between the local boards and licensed child-placing agencies and foster parents, and attempt to resolve the dispute. Family services specialists shall respond within five business days and explain any corrective action to be taken in response to the foster parent’s complaint. If the foster parent and family services specialist are unable to resolve the complaint informally, the foster parent may file a written complaint through the dispute resolution process with the local board’s foster care supervisor or assigned designee. The complaint shall include a detailed description of the conduct constituting the alleged violation of the regulations governing collaboration, communication, access, and transparency between the local boards and licensed child-placing agencies and foster parents, along with any other information required by Department regulation. The foster care supervisor or assigned designee shall respond to the complaint in writing within five business days, setting forth all findings regarding the alleged violation and any corrective action to be taken.If the foster parent disagrees with the findings or corrective actions proposed by the foster care supervisor or assigned designee, the foster parent may appeal the decision to the local director by filing a written notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall include a detailed description of the conduct constituting the alleged violation of the regulations governing collaboration, communication, access, and transparency between the local boards and licensed child-placing agencies and foster parents, a copy of the foster care supervisor or assigned designee’s findings and recommendations, and any other information required by Department regulation. The local director shall hold a meeting between all parties within seven business days to gather any information necessary to determine the validity of the alleged violation of the regulations governing collaboration, communication, access, and transparency between the local boards and licensed child-placing agencies and foster parents and the appropriateness of any recommendations for corrective action made by the family services specialist and foster care supervisor or assigned designee. A summary of the meeting shall be documented in writing by the family services specialist after approval by the foster care supervisor or assigned designee. Following such meeting and documentation, the local director shall issue to all parties written findings and, when applicable, recommendations for corrective action.

History. Code 1950, § 63-243; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-206; 2002, c. 747; 2008, cc. 241, 308; 2019, c. 336.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2019, c. 336, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall promulgate regulations to ensure collaboration, communication, access, and transparency between the local boards and licensed child-placing agencies and foster parents to be effective within 280 days of the enactment of this act. These regulations shall include a statement of the rights and responsibilities of foster parents, requirements for the provision of background, medical, and psychological information to foster parents for each child placed in their home, and requirements for notice to foster parents of any court hearings and scheduled meetings regarding a foster child placed in their care.”

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 241 and 308 are identical, and inserted “contained in an approved foster care policy” near the beginning of the section.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 336 designated the existing provisions as subsection A and added subsection B.

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, § 81.

CASE NOTES

Editor’s note.

The case annotated below was decided under prior law.

Constitutionality. —

As to constitutionality of a similar provision of the former law, see Turner v. Children's Home Soc'y of Va., Inc., 158 Va. 406 , 163 S.E. 399 , 1932 Va. LEXIS 265 (1932).

This section is one of many safeguards for the care of state wards committed to child-placing agencies, and applies only between the party receiving the temporary custody of such a ward from an agency and the agency. Turner v. Children's Home Soc'y of Va., Inc., 158 Va. 406 , 163 S.E. 399 , 1932 Va. LEXIS 265 (1932).

And such an agency is not vested with sole discretion as to interests of child. —

A former similar statute very similar to this section did not delegate to a child-placing agency the sole discretion of what is for the best interests of the child. The opinion of the agency was binding only in jurisdictions other than that of the committing court. The final determination of the welfare of a ward of the State is in the court under whose guardianship it remains. Turner v. Children's Home Soc'y of Va., Inc., 158 Va. 406 , 163 S.E. 399 , 1932 Va. LEXIS 265 (1932).

§ 63.2-903. Entrustment agreements; adoption.

  1. Whenever a local board accepts custody of a child pursuant to an entrustment agreement entered into under the authority of § 63.2-900 , or a licensed child-placing agency accepts custody of a child pursuant to an entrustment agreement entered into under the authority of § 63.2-1817 , in the city or county juvenile and domestic relations district court a petition for approval of the entrustment agreement (i) shall be filed within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 89 days after the execution of an entrustment agreement for less than 90 days, if the child is not returned to his home within that period; (ii) shall be filed within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 30 days after the execution of an entrustment agreement for 90 days or longer or for an unspecified period of time, if such entrustment agreement does not provide for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child; and (iii) may be filed in the case of a permanent entrustment agreement which provides for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child.
  2. For purposes of §§ 63.2-900 , 63.2-1817 and this section, a parent who is less than 18 years of age shall be deemed fully competent and shall have legal capacity to execute a valid entrustment agreement, including an agreement that provides for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities, and shall be as fully bound thereby as if such parent had attained the age of 18 years. An entrustment agreement for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities shall be executed in writing and notarized. An entrustment agreement for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child shall be valid notwithstanding that it is not signed by the father of a child born out of wedlock if the identity of the father is not reasonably ascertainable, or if such father is given notice of the entrustment by registered or certified mail to his last known address and fails to object to the entrustment within 15 days of mailing of such notice. An affidavit of the mother that the identity of the father is not reasonably ascertainable shall be sufficient evidence of this fact, provided there is no other evidence that would refute such an affidavit. The absence of such an affidavit shall not be deemed evidence that the identity of the father is reasonably ascertainable. For purposes of determining whether the identity of the father is reasonably ascertainable, the standard of what is reasonable under the circumstances shall control, taking into account the relative interests of the child, the mother and the father.
  3. An entrustment agreement for the termination of parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child shall be valid notwithstanding that it is not signed by the birth father of a child when such father has been convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 , § 18.2-63 , subsection B of § 18.2-366 , or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, and the child was conceived as a result of such violation.
  4. A child may be placed for adoption by a licensed child-placing agency or a local board, in accordance with the provisions of § 63.2-1221 .

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-73, 63-241; 1952, c. 409; 1960, c. 331; 1968, cc. 466, 578, 585, §§ 63.1-56, 63.1-204; 1972, c. 50; 1974, c. 620; 1975, cc. 248, 406; 1977, cc. 559, 562, 634, 645; 1978, cc. 730, 734, 735; 1981, c. 259; 1984, c. 734; 1985, cc. 18, 285; 1986, cc. 88, 281; 1988, c. 882; 1989, c. 647; 1991, c. 34; 1994, c. 865; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, cc. 889, 1028; 2000, c. 830; 2002, c. 747; 2004, c. 815; 2005, c. 890; 2007, cc. 606, 623.

Cross references.

For provision authorizing local board to accept and expend certain funds on behalf of children placed by or entrusted to it when no guardian has been appointed, see § 63.2-320 .

As to reimbursement of localities by the Commonwealth for certain expenditures, see § 63.2-401 .

As to parental or agency consent for adoption, and exceptions to consent requirement, see § 63.2-1202 .

As to adoption assistance for adoption of children with special needs, see § 63.2-1300 et seq. As to jurisdiction of juvenile and domestic relations district courts, see § 16.1-241. As to approval of entrustment agreements by court, see § 16.1-277.01.

The 2004 amendments.

The 2004 amendment by c. 815 inserted the present second sentence in subsection B and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 890 inserted “or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction” in subsection C; and made a related change.

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and substituted “15 days” for “21 days” in the third sentence of subsection B.

Law Review.

For survey of Virginia law on domestic relations for the year 1971-1972, see 58 Va. L. Rev. 1257 (1972).

For survey of Virginia law on domestic relations for the year 1977-1978, see 64 Va. L. Rev. 1439 (1978).

For discussion of statutory changes in child placement by the 1978 session of the General Assembly, see 12 U. Rich. L. Rev. 739 (1978).

Research References.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-300. Checklist for Agency Adoption, et seq.

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Parent and Child, § 7.

CASE NOTES

Editor’s note.

The cases below were decided under prior law.

Parental rights of natural father must be considered before adoption. —

Subsection C of this section by its very terms recognizes that the unmarried natural father has parental rights, though limited, which must be considered and dealt with by means of due process before the child can be adopted. Augusta County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Unnamed Mother, 3 Va. App. 40, 348 S.E.2d 26, 3 Va. Law Rep. 386, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 332 (1986).

Father’s rights cannot be terminated without notice. —

Where the mother knows the identity of the father but refuses to reveal his identity, the father’s rights in the child attach and cannot be terminated without due process notice. Augusta County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Unnamed Mother, 3 Va. App. 40, 348 S.E.2d 26, 3 Va. Law Rep. 386, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 332 (1986).

Order of publication to notify father who is not identified by mother. —

Where unnamed mother entered into an entrustment agreement for the adoption of her child, but refused to reveal father’s identity, proper course for the circuit court was to enter an appropriate order of publication after granting the mother a reasonable opportunity to reveal the identity of the father so that notice of the entrustment agreement could be given to him pursuant to law. Augusta County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Unnamed Mother, 3 Va. App. 40, 348 S.E.2d 26, 3 Va. Law Rep. 386, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 332 (1986).

Constructive notice not required. —

Where the identity of the parent whose parental rights are to be terminated is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable, based on the statutory standard of this section, subsection C of § 16.1-283 does not require constructive notice to such parent. Rather, where the court finds upon clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the child and that the child has been in foster care for a period of 12 months without contact by the unknown parent, the parental rights of such parent may be terminated. Unknown Father of Baby Girl Janet v. Division of Social Servs., 15 Va. App. 110, 422 S.E.2d 407, 9 Va. Law Rep. 331, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (1992).

“Not reasonably ascertainable.” —

Where the mother’s testimony failed to suggest even a clue as to the father’s identity, his whereabouts, or that a reasonable inquiry or search would successfully identify and locate him, the identity of the father was “not reasonably ascertainable.” Unknown Father of Baby Girl Janet v. Division of Social Servs., 15 Va. App. 110, 422 S.E.2d 407, 9 Va. Law Rep. 331, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (1992).

Finality of permanent separation. —

The legislature intended, by its 1960 amendment to former § 16.1-178 (see now § 16.1-278.8), that permanent separation orders entered on competent evidence heard by an impartial judge should have greater finality than extrajudicial agreements which may be subject to this section and which are sometimes executed hastily in times of temporary privation or sudden tragedy and always under great emotional stress. Shank v. Department of Social Servs., 217 Va. 506 , 230 S.E.2d 454, 1976 Va. LEXIS 313 (1976).

Evidence held insufficient to show duress or fraud which would negate entrustment agreement by minor unwed mother. Norfolk Div. of Social Servs. v. Unknown Father, 2 Va. App. 420, 345 S.E.2d 533, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 289 (1986).

§ 63.2-904. Investigation, visitation, and supervision of foster homes or independent living arrangement; removal of child.

  1. Before placing or arranging for the placement of any such child in a foster home or independent living arrangement, a local board or licensed child-placing agency shall cause a careful study to be made to determine the suitability of such home or independent living arrangement, and after placement shall cause such home or independent living arrangement and child to be visited as often as necessary to protect the interests of such child. Home studies by local boards shall be conducted in accordance with the Mutual Family Assessment home study template and any addenda thereto developed by the Department.
  2. Every local board or licensed child-placing agency that places a child in a foster home or independent living arrangement shall maintain such supervision over such home or independent living arrangement as shall be required by the standards and policies established by the Board.
  3. Whenever any child placed by a local board or licensed child-placing agency and still under its control or supervision is subject, in the home in which he is placed, to unwholesome influences or to neglect or mistreatment, or whenever the Commissioner shall so order, such local board or agency shall cause the child to be removed from such home and shall make for him such arrangements as may be approved by the Commissioner. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commissioner shall have the authority to place, remove, or direct the placement or removal of any child who is under the supervision and control of a local board or licensed child-placing agency. Pursuant to such authority, the Commissioner shall remove or direct the removal of any child placed by a local board or licensed child-placing agency in a foster home or children’s residential facility that fails to comply with any state or federal requirements intended to protect the child’s health, safety, or well-being.
  4. Consistent with the reasonable and prudent parent standard defined in 42 U.S.C. § 675(10)(A), caregivers for children in foster care shall support normalcy for such children. The Board shall adopt regulations to assist local boards and licensed child-placing agencies in carrying out practices that support careful and sensible parental decisions that maintain the health, safety, and best interest of the child while at the same time encouraging his emotional and developmental growth.

History. Code 1950, §§ 63-242, 63-248; 1968, c. 578, §§ 63.1-205, 63.1-211; 1989, c. 307; 2002, c. 747; 2008, cc. 475, 483; 2016, c. 631; 2017, c. 193; 2019, cc. 336, 446.

Cross references.

As to removal of child from adoptive home, see § 63.2-1207 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2017, c. 193, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services is authorized to amend or update its Mutual Family Assessment home study template and any addenda thereto when necessary to improve the process of adoptive and foster placements, provided such amendments or updates do not lessen the requirements of the home study process.”

Acts 2019, c. 336, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall promulgate regulations to ensure collaboration, communication, access, and transparency between the local boards and licensed child-placing agencies and foster parents to be effective within 280 days of the enactment of this act. These regulations shall include a statement of the rights and responsibilities of foster parents, requirements for the provision of background, medical, and psychological information to foster parents for each child placed in their home, and requirements for notice to foster parents of any court hearings and scheduled meetings regarding a foster child placed in their care.”

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 475 and 483 are identical, and substituted “independent living arrangement” for “independent living placement” and “independent placement” throughout this section.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 631 added subsection D.

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 193 added the last sentence in subsection A.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendments by cc. 336 and 446 are identical, and added the second and third sentences in subsection C.

Law Review.

For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989).

§ 63.2-904.1. Intervention by Commissioner; corrective action plans; assumption of temporary control.

  1. The Commissioner shall have the authority to create and enforce a corrective action plan for any local board that, in the Commissioner’s discretion, (i) fails to provide foster care services or make placement and removal decisions in accordance with this title or Board regulations or (ii) takes any action or fails to act in a manner that poses a substantial risk to the health, safety, or well-being of any child under its supervision and control. The corrective action plan shall (a) include specific objectives that the local board must meet in order to comply with applicable laws and regulations and ensure the health, safety, and well-being of all children in its supervision and control and (b) set the date by which such objectives must be completed, which shall not extend beyond 90 days after implementation of the corrective action plan unless the Commissioner determines that the objectives of the corrective action plan cannot be reasonably accomplished within such time frame. During the time the corrective action plan is in effect, the Commissioner may direct Department staff to provide assistance to the local board, monitor its progress in meeting the objectives stated in the plan, and take any measures necessary to protect the health, safety, and well-being of children in the local board’s supervision and control. The Commissioner shall provide regular updates to the chairman of the Board, chairman of the local board, and local director regarding the local board’s progress in meeting the objectives of the corrective action plan.Prior to implementing a corrective action plan, the Commissioner shall provide written notice of his intent to implement the corrective action plan and the reasons for which such plan was developed to the chairman of the Board, chairman of the local board, and local director. Upon request by the chairman of the Board, chairman of the local board, or local director, the Commissioner shall hold a hearing to determine whether a corrective action plan is appropriate.
  2. If the local board fails to timely comply with the corrective action plan, the Commissioner shall have the authority to temporarily assume control over all or part of the local board’s foster care services and associated funds. Upon assuming such control, the Commissioner may utilize Department staff or contract with private entities to provide foster care services in the locality served by the local board and manage funds appropriated for such purposes. For any period during which a local board is under the Commissioner’s control, the Commissioner shall work with the local board and local director to make any adjustments necessary to facilitate the local board’s resumption of control over its foster care services and funds. The Commissioner shall remit control of such foster care services and funds to the local board upon determining that the local board has made all adjustments necessary to ensure that foster care services are provided in compliance with state and federal law and regulations and in a manner that adequately protects the health, safety, and well-being of all children in its supervision and control.
  3. Whenever the Commissioner assumes temporary control over a local board’s foster care services and funds pursuant to this section, the amount of local funding made available for such services shall remain equal to or greater than the amounts available immediately prior to the Commissioner’s assumption of temporary control. Additionally, the locality in which the local board is located shall be required to pay the local share of any costs associated with any services necessary to align the local board’s foster care services with state and federal laws and regulations.

History. 2019, c. 446.

§ 63.2-904.2. Complaint system.

The Commissioner shall establish and maintain mechanisms to receive reports and complaints from foster parents, interested stakeholders, and other citizens of the Commonwealth regarding violations of laws or regulations applicable to foster care and any other matters affecting the health, safety, or well-being of children in foster care. Such mechanisms shall include establishing a statewide, toll-free hotline to be administered by the Department; publicizing the existence of such hotline; and enhancing electronic communication with the Department for the receipt of reports or complaints.

Reports and complaints received through the foster care hotline or other mechanisms established pursuant to this section shall be investigated pursuant to Board regulations. All information received or maintained by the Department in connection with such reports, complaints, or investigations shall be confidential and not subject to the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et seq.), except that such information may be relayed and used on a confidential basis pursuant to Board regulations for the purposes of investigation and to protect the health, safety, and well-being of children in foster care.

History. 2019, c. 446.

§ 63.2-905. Foster care services.

Foster care services are the provision of a full range of casework, treatment, and community services, including but not limited to independent living services, for a planned period of time to a child who is abused or neglected as defined in § 63.2-100 or in need of services as defined in § 16.1-228 and his family when the child (i) has been identified as needing services to prevent or eliminate the need for foster care placement, (ii) has been placed through an agreement between the local board or the public agency designated by the community policy and management team and the parents or guardians where legal custody remains with the parents or guardians, (iii) has been committed or entrusted to a local board or licensed child placing agency, or (iv) is living with a relative participating in the Federal-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program set forth in § 63.2-1305 and developed consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 673 or the State-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance Program set forth in § 63.2-1306 . Foster care services also include the provision and restoration of independent living services to a person who is over the age of 18 years but who has not yet reached the age of 21 years, in accordance with § 63.2-905.1 .

History. 1977, cc. 562, 634, § 63.1-55.8; 1986, c. 281; 1994, c. 865; 2002, c. 747; 2008, cc. 475, 483; 2013, c. 5; 2018, cc. 769, 770; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 254.

Cross references.

As to the establishment of a state pool of funds to be allocated to community policy and management teams under the Children’s Services Act, see § 2.2-5211 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, cl. 2 provides: “The Board of Social Services (the Board) shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act. Such regulations shall include conditions for establishing a kinship guardianship, requirements for the development and amendment of a kinship guardianship assistance agreement, and circumstances that qualify a prospective kinship guardian for exemption from the relative foster home approval process. The Board’s initial adoption of regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act shall be exempt from the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq. of the Code of Virginia), except that the Board shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the regulations prior to adoption.”

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 475 and 483 are identical, and inserted “including but not limited to independent living services” near the beginning of this section.

The 2013 amendments.

The 2013 amendment by c. 5 added the second sentence.

The 2018 amendments.

The 2018 amendments by cc. 769 and 770 are identical, and inserted “or (iv) is living with a relative participating in the Kinship Guardianship Assistance program set forth in § 63.2-1305 and developed consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 673” and made stylistic changes.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, effective July 1, 2021, inserted “Federal-Funded” and “or the State-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program pursuant to § 63.2-1306 ” in clause (iv).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Mandated mental health services for children. —

This section does not mandate that mental health services be provided; it merely defines the term foster care services. The Comprehensive Services Act (CSA) mandates the provision of such foster care services by the state and locality to prevent foster care placements when the child receiving the services is abused and neglected as defined in § 63.2-100 , or is in need of services as defined in § 16.1-228. Statutory and constitutional provisions require mandated services pursuant to CSA to be provided to eligible children without their parents having to relinquish custody to local service agencies. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable William H. Fralin, Jr., Member, House of Delegates, 05-095 (12/6/06).

§ 63.2-905.1. Independent living services.

Local departments and licensed child-placing agencies shall provide independent living services to any person between 18 and 21 years of age who is in the process of transitioning from foster care to self-sufficiency. Any person who was committed or entrusted to a local board or licensed child-placing agency may choose to discontinue receiving independent living services any time before his twenty-first birthday in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board. The local board or licensed child-placing agency shall restore independent living services at the request of that person provided that (i) the person has not yet reached 21 years of age and (ii) the person has entered into a written agreement, less than 60 days after independent living services have been discontinued, with the local board or licensed child-placing agency regarding the terms and conditions of his receipt of independent living services.

Local departments and licensed child-placing agencies shall provide independent living services to any person between 18 and 21 years of age who (a) was in the custody of the local department of social services immediately prior to his commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, (b) is in the process of transitioning from a commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice to self-sufficiency, and (c) provides written notice of his intent to receive independent living services and enters into a written agreement for the provision of independent living services, which sets forth the terms and conditions of the provision of independent living services, with the local board or licensed child-placing agency within 60 days of his release from commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice.

Local departments shall provide any person who chooses to leave foster care or terminate independent living services before his twenty-first birthday written notice of his right to request restoration of independent living services in accordance with this section by including such written notice in the person’s transition plan. Such transition plan shall be created within 90 days prior to the person’s discharge from foster care. Local departments and licensed child-placing agencies may provide independent living services as part of the foster care services provided to any child 14 years of age or older. All independent living services shall be provided in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board.

History. 2004, c. 196; 2008, cc. 187, 475, 483; 2010, c. 257; 2013, cc. 5, 362, 564; 2014, cc. 94, 134.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2013, c. 564, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in a general appropriation act passed by the 2013 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.”

Acts 2013, c. 564, cl. 3 provides: “That the General Assembly determines that the requirements of the second enactment of this act have been met.”

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendment by c. 187 added the second and third sentences.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 475 and 483 are identical, and substituted “and licensed child-placing agencies may provide” for “may provide” in the first sentence; and added the fourth and fifth sentences.

The 2010 amendments.

The 2010 amendment by c. 257 inserted the fourth and fifth sentences and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2013 amendments.

The 2013 amendment by c. 5 deleted “that provide independent living services to persons between 18 and 21 years of age” following “Local departments” in the first sentence of the third paragraph, and substituted “within 90 days prior” for “at least 90 days prior” in the second sentence thereof.

The 2013 amendments by cc. 362 and 564 are identical, and divided the former provisions into the first and third paragraphs; added the second paragraph; and made a stylistic change.

The 2014 amendments.

The 2014 amendments by cc. 94 and 134 are identical, and in the second paragraph, substituted “shall” for “may” in the first sentence.

§ 63.2-905.2. Security freezes and annual credit checks for children in foster care.

  1. Local departments shall request the placement of a security freeze pursuant to the provisions of § 59.1-444.3 on the credit report or record of any child who is less than 16 years of age and has been in foster care for at least six months in order to prevent cases of identity theft and misuse of personal identifying information. The local department shall request removal of the security freeze (i) upon the child’s removal from foster care, (ii) upon the child’s request if the child is 16 years of age or older, or (iii) upon a determination by the local department that removal of the security freeze is in the best interest of the child.
  2. Local departments shall conduct annual credit checks on all children 14 years of age or older but less than 18 years of age who are in foster care to identify cases of identity theft or misuse of personal identifying information of such children. Local departments shall resolve, to the greatest extent possible, cases of identity theft or misuse of personal identifying information of foster care children identified pursuant to this section.

History. 2012, c. 432; 2016, c. 631; 2019, cc. 676, 677.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2012, c. 432, cl. 2, provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall develop and implement policies and procedures designed to protect personal identifying information of children aged 16 years and older in foster care in order to prevent identity theft by foster care providers and others who may have access to personal identifying information of such children. In doing so, the Department shall include policies and procedures for (i) assigning unique identifying numbers other than social security numbers to children entering foster care; (ii) limiting, to the greatest extent possible, disclosure of foster children’s social security numbers and other unique identifying information to foster parents or other persons who may have access to personal identifying information about a child in foster care; and (iii) responding to valid requests for information regarding a foster child’s social security number or other personal identifying information from individuals and entities having a legitimate need for such information. The Department shall also develop policies and procedure s for conducting annual credit checks on foster children.”

Acts 2012, c. 432, cl. 3, provides: “That the Department shall report to the General Assembly on its activities to implement provisions of this act, including any recommendations for legislative or regulatory action necessary to enable the Department to implement the provisions of this act, no later than December 1, 2012.”

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 631 substituted “14 years of age” for “aged 16” in the first sentence.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendments by cc. 676 and 677 are identical, added subsection A and inserted added the subsection B designation; and in subsection B, substituted “on all children 14 years of age or older but less than 18 years of age” for “on children 14 years of age and older.”

§ 63.2-905.3. Documents provided to foster care youth.

When a child is leaving foster care upon reaching 18 years of age, unless the child has been in foster care for less than six months, the local department shall ensure that the child has, if eligible to receive, (i) a certified birth certificate, (ii) a social security card, (iii) health insurance information, (iv) a copy of the child’s health care records, and (v) a driver’s license or identification card issued by the Commonwealth.

History. 2016, c. 631.

§ 63.2-905.4. Individuals in foster care on eighteenth birthday; enrollment in Commonwealth’s program of medical assistance.

Local departments shall ensure that any individual who was in foster care on his eighteenth birthday is enrolled, unless the individual objects, in the Commonwealth’s program of medical assistance established pursuant to § 32.1-325 , provided that such individual is eligible to receive health care services under the Commonwealth’s program of medical assistance and was enrolled in such program on his eighteenth birthday. Prior to enrollment, local departments shall provide such individuals with basic information about health care services provided under the state plan for medical assistance services and inform such individuals that, if eligible, they will be enrolled in the Commonwealth’s program of medical assistance unless they object.

History. 2017, c. 203.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2017, c. 203, cl. 2 provides: “That the State Board of Social Services shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act.”

§ 63.2-905.5. Survey of children aging out of foster care.

The Department shall, in coordination with the Commission on Youth, develop a process and standardized survey to gather feedback from children aging out of foster care. The survey shall include requests for information regarding the child’s experience with and opinion of the Commonwealth’s foster care services, recommendations for improvement of such services, the amount of time the child spent in the foster care system, and any other information deemed relevant by the Department of Social Services or the Commission on Youth.

History. 2017, c. 187.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2017, c. 187, was codified as this section at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

§ 63.2-906. Foster care plans; permissible plan goals; court review of foster children.

  1. Each child who is committed or entrusted to the care of a local board or to a licensed child-placing agency or who is placed through an agreement between a local board and the parent, parents or guardians, where legal custody remains with the parent, parents or guardians, shall have a foster care plan prepared by the local department, the child welfare agency, or the family assessment and planning team established pursuant to § 2.2-5207 , as specified in § 16.1-281. The representatives of such local department, child welfare agency, or team shall (i) involve in the development of the plan the child’s parent(s), except when parental rights have been terminated or the local department or child welfare agency has made diligent efforts to locate the parent(s) and such parent(s) cannot be located, relatives and fictive kin who are interested in the child’s welfare, and any other person or persons standing in loco parentis at the time the board or child welfare agency obtained custody or the board or the child welfare agency placed the child and (ii) for any child for whom reunification remains the goal, meet and consult with the child’s parent(s) or other person standing in loco parentis, provided that the parent(s) or other person has been located and parental rights have not been terminated, no less than once every two months and at all critical decision-making points throughout the child’s foster care case. If reunification is not the goal for the child, the local board, child welfare agency, or team shall provide information to the child’s parents regarding the parents’ option to voluntarily terminate parental rights, unless a parent’s parental rights have been terminated. The representatives of such department, child welfare agency, or team shall involve the child in the development of the plan if (a) the child is 12 years of age or older or (b) the child is younger than 12 years of age and such involvement is consistent with the best interests of the child. In cases where either the parent(s) or child is not involved in the development of the plan, the department, child welfare agency, or team shall include in the plan a full description of the reasons therefor in accordance with § 16.1-281.A court may place a child in the care and custody of (1) a public agency in accordance with § 16.1-251 or 16.1-252 or (2) a public or licensed private child-placing agency in accordance with § 16.1-278.2, 16.1-278.4, 16.1-278.5, 16.1-278.6, or 16.1-278.8. Children may be placed by voluntary relinquishment in the care and custody of a public or private agency in accordance with § 16.1-277.01 or §§ 16.1-277.02 and 16.1-278.3. Children may be placed through an agreement where legal custody remains with the parent, parents or guardians in accordance with §§ 63.2-900 and 63.2-903 , or § 2.2-5208 .
  2. Each child in foster care shall be assigned a permanent plan goal to be reviewed and approved by the juvenile and domestic relations district court having jurisdiction of the child’s case. Permissible plan goals are to:
    1. Transfer custody of the child to his prior family;
    2. Transfer custody of the child to a relative other than his prior family or to fictive kin for the purpose of establishing eligibility for the Federal-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program pursuant to § 63.2-1305 or the State-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program pursuant to § 63.2-1306 ;
    3. Finalize an adoption of the child;
    4. Place a child who is 16 years of age or older in permanent foster care;
    5. Transition to independent living if, and only if, the child is admitted to the United States as a refugee or asylee; or
    6. Place a child who is 16 years of age or older in another planned permanent living arrangement in accordance with subsection A2 of § 16.1-282.1.
  3. Each child in foster care shall be subject to the permanency planning and review procedures established in §§ 16.1-281, 16.1-282, and 16.1-282.1.

History. 2002, c. 747; 2005, c. 653; 2008, cc. 475, 483; 2009, c. 124; 2011, c. 730; 2016, c. 631; 2019, c. 446; 2020, cc. 224, 366, 934; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 254, 535.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2005, c. 653, cl. 2 provides: “That the State Board of Social Services shall amend its home study regulations to allow homes to be dually approved as both foster and adoptive homes.”

Acts 2020, c. 934, cl. 3 provides: “That the Commissioner of Social Services shall develop clear guidance documents for local boards of social services and child-placing agencies that explain the process through which a parent may voluntarily terminate parental rights and the manner in which such information should be relayed to the parent.”

Acts 2020, c. 934, cl. 4 provides: “That the Commissioner of Social Services (the Commissioner) shall establish a work group to review the feasibility and costs of establishing a standard for supervisory spans of control that would limit the number of caseworkers that a foster care supervisor may oversee. The Commissioner shall report the findings and recommendations of the work group to the Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations by November 30, 2020.”

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, cl. 2 provides: “The Board of Social Services (the Board) shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act. Such regulations shall include conditions for establishing a kinship guardianship, requirements for the development and amendment of a kinship guardianship assistance agreement, and circumstances that qualify a prospective kinship guardian for exemption from the relative foster home approval process. The Board’s initial adoption of regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act shall be exempt from the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq. of the Code of Virginia), except that the Board shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the regulations prior to adoption.”

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 653, in subsection A, inserted “prepared by the local department, the designated public or child welfare agency, or the family assessment and planning team established pursuant to § 2.2-5207 ” in the first sentence, added the last three sentences and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 475 and 483 are nearly identical, and substituted “Transition to” for “Achieve” at the beginning of subdivision B 5.

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 124, in subsection A, in the first sentence of the first paragraph, deleted “or a public agency designated by the community policy and management team” preceding “and the parent” and “designated public or” preceding “child welfare agency”; inserted “child welfare” in three places; in the second sentence, substituted “child welfare agency” for “other designated agency” and “child welfare agency” for “public agency” and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendments.

The 2011 amendment by c. 730 rewrote subdivision B 5.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 631 added “in accordance with § 16.1-281” at the end of the last sentence in the first paragraph of subsection A; substituted “a child who is 16 years of age or older” for “the child” in subdivisions B 4 and B 6.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 446 substituted “such local department” for “such department,” inserted “(i),” deleted “of social services” preceding “or child welfare,” and added clause (ii); and made stylistic changes.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by cc. 224 and 366 are identical, and added “or to fictive kin for the purpose of establishing eligibility for the Kinship Guardianship Assistance program pursuant to § 63.2-1305 ” in subdivision B 2.

The 2020 amendment by c. 934 inserted the third-to-last sentence in subsection A, first paragraph.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 254, effective July 1, 2021, inserted “Federal-Funded” and “or the State-Funded Kinship Guardianship Assistance program pursuant to § 63.2-1306 ” in subdivision B 2.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 535, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection A in the first paragraph, moved “in the development of the plan” from following to preceding “the child’s parent(s)” and inserted “relatives and fictive kin who are interested in the child’s welfare” in clause (i) and inserted “(a) the child is 12 years of age or older or (b) the child is younger than 12 years of age and”; and in the second paragraph, substituted “(1)” for “(a)” and “or (2)” for “and (b).”

Research References.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-289 Permanency Planning Order.

CASE NOTES

Foster care plan. —

Trial court did not err in determining that a county department of social services involved a father in a foster care plan because the father’s participation in the development of the foster care plans was limited by his incarceration and deportation; the father received two letters from the department: the first letter notified him that his children were in the custody of the department, and the second letter was sent when the goal was changed to adoption, and the father also was present at one juvenile and domestic relations district court hearing and was represented by his guardian ad litem at all of the foster care hearings. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 293 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009).

Goal of adoption. —

Trial court properly found that a child was a child in need of services and approved the foster care plan with the goal of adoption because the child’s mental condition was attributed to inconsistency in primary caregivers due in part to the frequent removals caused by the custodian’s drug problems, the child needed the permanent stability that could only be found through continuing the foster care placement with the foster mother, and the trial court properly considered appropriate factors, including the best interests of the child, in making its decision. Roberts-Bond v. Harrisonburg-Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 359 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016).

§ 63.2-906.1. Qualified residential treatment programs.

  1. In cases in which a child is placed by a local board or licensed child-placing agency in a qualified residential treatment program as defined in § 63.2-100 , the foster care plan shall include (i) a description of the reasonable and good faith efforts made by the local department to identify and include on the child’s family and permanency team all appropriate biological relatives, fictive kin, professionals, and, if the child is 14 years of age or older, members of the child’s case planning team that were selected by the child in accordance with subsection A of § 16.1-281; (ii) contact information for all members of the child’s family and permanency team and for other family members and fictive kin; (iii) evidence that all meetings of the family and permanency team are held at a time and place convenient for the child’s family; (iv) if reunification is the goal for the child, evidence demonstrating that the parent from whom the child was removed provided input on the members of the family and permanency team; (v) the assessment report prepared pursuant to clause (viii) of the definition of qualified residential treatment program set forth in § 63.2-100 and evidence that such assessment was conducted in conjunction with the child’s family and permanency team; (vi) the placement preferences of the child and the family and permanency team with recognition that the child should be placed with his siblings unless the court finds that such placement is contrary to the best interest of the child; and (vii) if the placement preferences of the child and the family and permanency team differ from the placement recommended in the assessment report prepared pursuant to clause (viii) of the definition of qualified residential treatment program set forth in § 63.2-100 , the reasons why the preferences of the child and the family and permanency team were not recommended.
  2. In all cases in which a child is placed by a local board or licensed child-placing agency in a qualified residential treatment program as defined in § 63.2-100 , a hearing shall be held in accordance with the provisions of subsection E of § 16.1-281 within 60 days of such placement.
  3. If any child 13 years of age or older is placed in a qualified residential treatment program for more than 12 consecutive months or 18 nonconsecutive months, or any child 12 years of age or younger is placed in a qualified residential treatment program for more than six consecutive or nonconsecutive months, the Commissioner shall submit to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services (i) the most recent versions of the evidence and documentation required under subdivision E 2 of § 16.1-281 and (ii) a written approval, signed by the Commissioner, for the continued placement of the child in the qualified residential treatment program.

History. 2019, cc. 282, 688.

§ 63.2-907. Administrative review of children in foster care.

Each local board shall establish and keep current a social service plan with service objectives and shall provide the necessary social services for achievement of a permanent home for each child for whom it has care and custody or has an agreement with the parents or guardians to place in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board. Each local board shall review the cases of children placed through an agreement or in its custody in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Board. Each local board shall review the cases of children placed through an agreement or in its custody on a planned basis to evaluate the current status and effectiveness (i) of the service plan’s objectives and (ii) of the services being provided for each child in custody, which are directed toward the immediate care of and planning for permanency for the child, in accordance with policies of the Board.

The Department shall establish and maintain (a) a system to review and monitor compliance by local boards with the policies adopted by the Board and (b) a tracking system of every child in the care and custody of or placed by local boards in order to monitor the effectiveness of service planning, service objectives and service delivery by the local boards that shall be directed toward the achievement of permanency for children in foster care. As part of the system to review and monitor compliance by local boards, the Department shall establish and maintain an online dashboard, to be updated quarterly, that is accessible by local boards. Such dashboard shall be categorized by local board and include information regarding (1) the number of children who did not receive all required caseworker visits and the amount of time that has lapsed since each child’s last visit; (2) the number of children placed in children’s residential facilities; (3) the number of children who have been in foster care for more than 24 months, 36 months, and 48 months; (4) safety concerns identified in case reviews and whether such concerns have been alleviated; (5) the number of foster care caseworkers with caseloads exceeding the standard established pursuant to § 63.2-913.1 ; (6) the number of children in foster care to whom a caseworker with a caseload exceeding the standard set forth in § 63.2-913.1 has been assigned; and (7) the turnover rate of entry-level and experienced foster care caseworkers. Local boards shall provide to the Department any data and information necessary to populate the dashboard.

The Board shall adopt regulations necessary to implement the procedures and policies set out in this section. The Board shall establish as a goal that at any point in time the number of children who are in foster care for longer than twenty-four months shall not exceed 5,500 children.

History. 1977, c. 634, § 63.1-56.2; 1982, c. 171; 1994, c. 865; 2002, c. 747; 2019, c. 446.

The 2019 amendments.

The 2019 amendment by c. 446 added the last 3 sentences in the second paragraph.

§ 63.2-908. Permanent foster care placement.

  1. Permanent foster care placement means the place in which a child has been placed pursuant to the provisions of §§ 63.2-900 , 63.2-903 and this section with the expectation and agreement between the placing agency and the place of permanent foster care that the child shall remain in the placement until he reaches the age of majority unless modified by court order or unless removed pursuant to § 16.1-251 or § 63.2-1517 . A permanent foster care placement may be a place of residence of any natural person or persons deemed appropriate to meet a child’s needs on a long-term basis.
  2. A local department or a licensed child-placing agency shall have authority pursuant to a court order to place a child who is 16 years of age or older over whom it has legal custody in a permanent foster care placement where the child shall remain until attaining majority or thereafter, until the age of 21 years, if such placement is a requisite to providing funds for the care of such child, so long as the child is a participant in an educational, treatment or training program approved pursuant to regulations of the Board. No such child shall be removed from the physical custody of the foster parents in the permanent care placement except upon order of the court or pursuant to § 16.1-251 or § 63.2-1517 . The department or agency so placing a child shall retain legal custody of the child. A court shall not order that a child be placed in permanent foster care unless it finds that (i) diligent efforts have been made by the local department to place the child with his natural parents and such efforts have been unsuccessful, and (ii) diligent efforts have been made by the local department to place the child for adoption and such efforts have been unsuccessful or adoption is not a reasonable alternative for a long-term placement for the child under the circumstances.
  3. Unless modified by the court order, the foster parent in the permanent foster care placement shall have the authority to consent to surgery, entrance into the armed services, marriage, application for a motor vehicle and driver’s license, application for admission into an institution of higher education, and any other such activities that require parental consent and shall have the responsibility for informing the placing department or agency of any such actions.
  4. Any child placed in a permanent foster care placement by a local department shall, with the cooperation of the foster parents with whom the permanent foster care placement has been made, receive the same services and benefits as any other child in foster care pursuant to §§ 63.2-319 , 63.2-900 and 63.2-903 and any other applicable provisions of law.
  5. The Board shall establish minimum standards for the utilization, supervision and evaluation of permanent foster care placements.
  6. The rate of payment for permanent foster care placements by a local department shall be in accordance with standards and rates established by the Board. The rate of payment for such placements by other licensed child-placing agencies shall be in accordance with standards and rates established by the individual agency.
  7. If the child has a continuing involvement with his natural parents, the natural parents should be involved in the planning for a permanent placement. The court order placing the child in a permanent placement shall include a specification of the nature and frequency of visiting arrangements with the natural parents.
  8. Any change in the placement of a child in permanent foster care or the responsibilities of the foster parents for that child shall be made only by order of the court which ordered the placement pursuant to a petition filed by the foster parents, local department, licensed child-placing agency or other appropriate party.

History. 1977, c. 559, § 63.1-206.1; 1978, c. 671; 1984, c. 70; 2002, c. 747; 2016, c. 631.

Cross references.

As to permanency planning hearing for children in foster care, see § 16.1-282.1. As to Virginia taxable income of residents, see § 58.1-322 .

Editor’s note.

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, “an institution of higher education” was substituted for “college” in subsection C to conform to Acts 2016, c. 588.

The 2016 amendments.

The 2016 amendment by c. 631 inserted “who is 16 years of age or older” and substituted “21” for “twenty-one” in the first sentence of subsection B.

Research References.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-290 Permanent Foster Care Placement Order.

CASE NOTES

Editor’s note.

Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

This section provides statutory scheme for permanent foster care placement. That scheme is intended to provide a more permanent placement for a child in a particular foster home than is generally obtained in regular foster care, and yet does not, as in the case of adoption proceedings, serve as a vehicle for terminating parental rights. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 348 S.E.2d 13, 3 Va. Law Rep. 359, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (1986).

Permanent foster care is distinct and secondary alternative to adoption. —

A petition for permanent foster care is not a less drastic alternative to termination of parental rights. The court can only consider permanent foster care after it has determined that adoption, upon termination of residual parental rights, is not an alternative in a given case. Given this statutory preference, permanent foster care is a distinct, and secondary, alternative to adoption. Stanley v. Fairfax County Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 596, 395 S.E.2d 199, 7 Va. Law Rep. 59, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 129 (1990), aff'd, 242 Va. 60 , 405 S.E.2d 621, 7 Va. Law Rep. 2823, 1991 Va. LEXIS 106 (1991).

“Other appropriate party” includes the natural parent. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 348 S.E.2d 13, 3 Va. Law Rep. 359, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (1986).

Court lacked jurisdiction absent petition. —

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to order a placement in permanent foster care pursuant to this section where trial court had no petition before it seeking a permanent foster care placement. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 348 S.E.2d 13, 3 Va. Law Rep. 359, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (1986).

Where the natural parent is not given specific notice by a petition seeking a specific placement, and where substantial parental rights are at stake, a trial court has no jurisdiction to enter sua sponte an order terminating or reducing those parental rights. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 348 S.E.2d 13, 3 Va. Law Rep. 359, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (1986).

Burden of proof. —

Statutory requirements of subsection A of former § 63.1-206.1 (see now subsection B of § 63.2-908 ) must be proved by a preponderance of evidence. Hash v. Campbell County Dep't of Social Servs., 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 605 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1999).

No change can occur in permanent foster care placement without order of the court which instituted the placement. A proper petition, filed by the foster parents, local department, licensed child-placing agency or “other appropriate party,” is required for such a change. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 348 S.E.2d 13, 3 Va. Law Rep. 359, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (1986).

Permanent foster placement proper. —

Trial court had little choice but to approve a permanent foster care plan placement for the minor child. The father was incarcerated and the mother was unfit, which made the preferred placement with the natural parents as contemplated by subsection B of § 63.2-908 an impossibility, and the trial court could not order adoption under that statute since the minor child would have to be removed from the foster family with whom the child was thriving. Rader v. Goochland County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 446 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2008).

Order placing the mother’s three sons in permanent foster care was supported by evidence of the mother’s inability to adequately parent, and the fact that the sons were doing well in a foster home that offered to have the sons remain until they each reached 18 years of age. Davila v. Harrisonburg Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 434 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2010).

Because a father’s history of mental illness, and his pattern of behavior indicated an unwillingness to ensure that his child was surrounded by responsible adult figures, termination of his parental rights and a permanent foster care placement with the goal of adoption under §§ 16.1-283 and 63.2-908 were appropriate. Mongold v. Harrisonburg Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 73 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2011).

Failure to comply with statutory requirements. —

Father’s motion to change the foster care plan’s goal to adoption and terminate his parental rights did not comply with the statutory scheme to terminate his parental rights and approve a goal of adoption because the father only recited facts and argument as to why the court had to terminate his parental rights and change the foster care plan goal to adoption. Cisneros v. Arlington County Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 261 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2016).

Petition for termination of parental rights pursuant to § 16.1-283 does not encompass a petition for permanent foster care. —

The latter is not a less drastic form of the former, but rather is a different and distinct alternative. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 348 S.E.2d 13, 3 Va. Law Rep. 359, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (1986).

Trial court’s denial of a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to be followed by adoption did not result in an impermissible de facto permanent foster care placement, since the division of social services never presented the court with a petition for permanent foster care. Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Hardy, 42 Va. App. 546, 593 S.E.2d 528, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 107 (2004).

§ 63.2-909. Child support for child placed in foster care by court.

Pursuant to § 16.1-290, responsible persons shall pay child support for a child placed in foster care from the date that custody was awarded to the local department. The court order shall state the names of the responsible persons obligated to pay support, and either specify the amount of the support obligation pursuant to §§ 20-108.1 and 20-108.2 or indicate that the Division of Child Support Enforcement will establish the amount of the support obligation. In fixing the amount of support, the court or the Division of Child Support Enforcement shall consider the extent to which the payment of support by the responsible person may affect the ability of such responsible person to implement a foster care plan developed pursuant to § 16.1-281.

History. 1995, c. 817, § 63.1-204.2; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-910. Child support for child placed in foster care where legal custody remains with parent or guardian.

Responsible persons shall pay child support for a child placed in foster care through an agreement where legal custody remains with the parent or guardian pursuant to subdivision A 4 of § 16.1-278.2 or § 63.2-900 , from the date that the child was placed in foster care. The agreement between the parents and the local board shall include provisions for the payment of child support. In fixing the amount of support, the court, the Division of Child Support Enforcement, and the local board shall consider the extent to which the payment of support by the responsible person may affect the ability of such responsible person to implement a foster care plan. If the responsible person fails or refuses to pay such sum on a timely basis, the local board may petition the juvenile court to order such payment.

History. 1995, c. 817, § 63.1-204.3; 1997, c. 420; 2002, c. 747; 2009, c. 124.

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 124 deleted “or public agency” following “local board” in the second and last sentences and in the next-to-last sentence, inserted “and” following “Division of Child Support Enforcement” and deleted “or the public agency” following “local board.”

§ 63.2-910.1. Acceptance of children by local departments of social services.

A local department of social services has the authority to take custody of abandoned children, to arrange appropriate placements for abandoned children, including foster care, and to institute proceedings for the termination of parental rights of abandoned children as provided in this title and Title 16.1.

History. 2003, cc. 816, 822.

Law Review.

For annual survey article on legal issues involving children, see 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 161 (2003).

§ 63.2-910.2. Petition to terminate parental rights.

  1. If a child has been in foster care under the responsibility of a local board for 15 of the most recent 22 months or if the parent of a child in foster care has been convicted of an offense under the laws of the Commonwealth or a substantially similar law of any other state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction that constitutes (i) murder or voluntary manslaughter, or a felony attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any such offense, if the victim of the offense was a child of the parent, a child with whom the parent resided at the time such offense occurred, or the other parent of the child; or (ii) felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury or felony bodily wounding resulting in serious bodily injury or felony sexual assault, if the victim of the offense was a child of the parent or a child with whom the parent resided at the time of such offense, the local board shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents and concurrently identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for adoption of the child, unless:
    1. At the option of the local board, the child is being cared for by a relative;
    2. The local board has determined that the filing of such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child and has documented a compelling reason for such determination in the child’s foster care plan, such as (i) a relative has shown the will and ability to care for the child or (ii) the parent’s incarceration or participation in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program constitutes the primary factor in the child’s placement in foster care, and termination of parental rights is not in the child’s best interests; or
    3. The local board has not provided to the family of the child, within the time period established in the child’s foster care plan, services deemed necessary for the child’s safe return home or has not otherwise made reasonable efforts to return the child home, if required under § 473(a)(15)(B)(ii) of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 673).
  2. As used in this section, “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that involves substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.

History. 2017, c. 190; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 535.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 535, effective July 1, 2021, inserted “such as (i) a relative has shown the will and ability to care for the child or (ii) the parent’s incarceration or participation in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program constitutes the primary factor in the child’s placement in foster care, and termination of parental rights is not in the child’s best interests” in subdivision A 2.

§ 63.2-911. Liability insurance for foster parents.

The Department may provide liability insurance for civil matters for persons providing basic foster care services in foster homes, as defined in §§ 63.2-100 and 63.2-905 , that are approved by local boards for children in their custody or children who the board has entered into an agreement to place where legal custody remains with the parents or guardians.

History. 1978, c. 291, § 63.1-56.3; 1994, c. 865; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-912. Visitation of child placed in foster care.

The circuit courts and juvenile and domestic relations district courts shall have the authority to grant visitation rights to the natural parents, siblings, and grandparents of any child entrusted or committed to foster care if the court finds (i) that the parent, sibling, or grandparent had an ongoing relationship with the child prior to his being placed in foster care and (ii) it is in the best interests of the child that the relationship continue. The order of the court committing the child to foster care shall state the nature and extent of any visitation rights granted as provided in this section.

History. 1985, c. 583, § 63.1-204.1; 2002, c. 747; 2008, c. 188.

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendment by c. 188 inserted “siblings” and “sibling” in the first sentence.

Research References.

Child Custody and Visitation Law and Practice (Matthew Bender).

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-285 Dispositional Order for Underlying Petition, Foster Care Plan.

§ 63.2-913. Establishment of minimum training requirements.

The Department shall, pursuant to Board regulations, establish minimum training requirements and shall provide educational programs for foster and adoption workers employed by the local department and their supervisors.

History. 2008, cc. 133, 700.

The number of this section was assigned by the Virginia Code Commission, the number in the 2008 acts having been § 63.2-914 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2008, cc. 133 and 700, cl. 2 provides: “That any costs associated with complying with the provisions of this act shall be absorbed by the Department of Social Services within the funds appropriated to it by the General Assembly for training and assistance to local staff.”

§ 63.2-913.1. Caseload standard.

The Department shall, pursuant to Board regulations, establish a caseload standard that limits the amount of foster care cases that may be assigned to each foster care caseworker. Such caseload standard shall be reviewed and updated, as appropriate, annually on the basis of the time and work necessary to effectively manage each foster care case.

History. 2019, c. 446.

§ 63.2-914. (Repealed) Not in effect.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2009, c. 678, enacted § 63.2-914 , pertaining to “A Place of My Own” Program.

Acts 2009, c. 678, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2010 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” As of May 2012, no funds were available. This section has thus been deleted at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

Acts 2009, c. 678, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act shall expire on June 30, 2012, if no moneys have been deposited into the A Place of My Own Program Fund, established pursuant to § 63.2-914 of the Code of Virginia.” As of May 2012, no deposits had been made into the A Place of My Own Program Fund.

§ 63.2-915. Appeals to Commissioner.

  1. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12), any individual whose claim for benefits available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. or whose claim for benefits pursuant to § 63.2-905 is denied or is not acted upon by the local department with reasonable promptness shall have the right to appeal to the Commissioner.
  2. The Commissioner shall provide an opportunity for a hearing, reasonable notice of which shall be given in writing to the applicant or recipient and to the proper local board in such manner and form as the Commissioner may prescribe. The Commissioner may make or cause to be made an investigation of the facts. The Commissioner shall give fair and impartial consideration to testimony of witnesses, or other evidence produced at the hearing, reports by the local board and local director or of investigations made or caused to be made by the Commissioner, or any facts that the Commissioner may deem proper to enable him to decide fairly the appeal or review. The decision of the Commissioner shall be binding and considered a final agency action for purposes of judicial review of such action pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq.).
  3. The Commissioner may delegate the duty and authority to consider and make determinations on any appeal filed in accordance with this section to duly qualified officers.
  4. The Board shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this section.

History. 2013, c. 437.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2013, c. 437, cl. 2 provides: “That the Board of Social Services shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act to be effective within 280 days of its enactment.”

§ 63.2-916. Notice of developmental disabilities.

The local department of social services shall notify the appropriate community services board as soon as it is known that a child in the foster care system has a developmental disability so that the community services board may screen the child for placement on the statewide developmental disability waiver waiting list.

History. 2019, c. 301.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2019, c. 301, cl. 1 was codified as this section at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

Article 2. Fostering Futures.

§ 63.2-917. Fostering Futures program; established.

The Fostering Futures program is established to provide services and support to individuals 18 years of age or older but less than 21 years of age who were in foster care upon turning 18 years of age. Such services and support shall be designed to assist the program participant in transitioning to adulthood, becoming self-sufficient, and creating permanent, positive relationships. The program is voluntary and shall at all times recognize and respect the autonomy of the participant. The Fostering Futures program shall not be construed to abrogate any other rights that a person 18 years of age or older may have as an adult under state law.

History. 2020, cc. 95, 732.

Cross references.

As to review of voluntary continuing services and support agreements for former foster youth, see § 16.1-283.3.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2020, cc. 95 and 732, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall, regarding the Fostering Futures program, (i) establish criteria for identifying appropriate services for program participants; (ii) establish requirements for program participants to be included in the voluntary continuing services and support agreement, including regular contact with the program participant’s service worker, timely payment of rental fees, and other requirements deemed necessary based on the unique circumstances and needs of the program participant; (iii) allow local departments of social services to disenroll participants from the Fostering Futures program for substantial violations of the voluntary continuing services and support agreement; and (iv) develop budget or payment forms to monitor the manner in which program participants are using maintenance payment funds and allow increased oversight of such use when necessary.”

Acts 2020, cc. 95 and 732, cl. 3 provides: “That the Board of Social Services (the Board) shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this act. The Board’s initial adoption of regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act shall be exempt from the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq. of the Code of Virginia), except that the Board shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the regulations prior to adoption.”

Acts 2020, cc. 95 and 732, cl. 4 provides: “That the Department of Social Services shall analyze the feasibility of and opportunities for allowing local departments of social services to use video conferencing for monthly visits with participants in the Fostering Futures program in a manner that complies with federal laws and regulations.”

§ 63.2-918. Definitions.

For purposes of this article:

“Case plan” means the plan developed by the local department for a program participant in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 675(1).

“Child” means an individual who is (i) less than 18 years of age or (ii) for purposes of the Fostering Futures program set forth in this article, less than 21 years of age and meets the eligibility criteria set forth in § 63.2-919 .

“Fostering Futures” means the services and support available to individuals between 18 and 21 years of age who are participating in the Fostering Futures program.

“Local department” means the local department of social services under the local board having care and custody of the program participant when he reached 18 years of age.

“Program participant” means an individual who meets the eligibility criteria set forth in § 63.2-919 .

“Voluntary continuing services and support agreement” means a binding written agreement entered into by the local department and program participant in accordance with § 63.2-921 .

History. 2020, cc. 95, 732.

§ 63.2-919. Fostering Futures program; eligibility.

The Fostering Futures program is available, on a voluntary basis, to an individual between 18 and 21 years of age who:

  1. Was (i) in the custody of a local department immediately prior to reaching 18 years of age, remained in foster care upon turning 18 years of age, and entered foster care pursuant to a court order; or (ii) in the custody of a local department immediately prior to commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice and is transitioning from such commitment to self-sufficiency; and
  2. Is (i) completing secondary education or an equivalent credential; (ii) enrolled in an institution that provides postsecondary or vocational education; (iii) employed for at least 80 hours per month; (iv) participating in a program or activity designed to promote employment or remove barriers to employment; or (v) incapable of doing any of the activities described in clauses (i) through (iv) due to a medical condition, which incapability is supported by regularly updated information in the program participant’s case plan.

History. 2020, cc. 95, 732.

§ 63.2-920. Continuing services and support.

Continuing services and support provided under the Fostering Futures program shall include the following, where necessary:

  1. Medical care under the state plan for medical assistance;
  2. Housing, placement, and support in the form of continued foster care maintenance payments in an amount not less than the rate set immediately prior to the program participant’s exit from foster care. Policies and decisions regarding housing options shall take into consideration the program participant’s autonomy and developmental maturity, and safety assessments of such living arrangements shall be age-appropriate and consistent with federal guidance on supervised settings in which program participants live independently. For program participants residing in an independent living setting, the local department may send all or part of the foster care maintenance payments directly to the program participant, as agreed upon by the local department and the program participant. For program participants residing in a foster family home, foster care maintenance payments shall be paid to the foster parents; and
  3. Case management services, including a case plan that describes (i) the program participant’s housing or living arrangement; (ii) the resources available to the program participant in the transition from the Fostering Futures program to independent adulthood; and (iii) the services and support to be provided to meet the program participant’s individual goals, provided such services and support are appropriate for and consented to by the program participant. All case plans shall be developed in consultation with the program participant and, at the participant’s option, with up to two members of the case planning team who are chosen by the program participant and are not a foster parent of or caseworker for such program participant. An individual selected by a program participant to be a member of the case planning team may be removed from the team at any time if there is good cause to believe that the individual would not act in the best interests of the program participant.

History. 2020, cc. 95, 732.

§ 63.2-921. Voluntary continuing services and support agreement; services provided; service worker; duties.

  1. In order to participate in the Fostering Futures program, the eligible program participant shall enter into a written voluntary continuing services and support agreement with the local department. Such agreement shall include, at a minimum, the following:
    1. A requirement that the program participant maintain eligibility to participate in the Fostering Futures program in accordance with the provisions of § 63.2-919 for the duration of the voluntary continuing services and support agreement;
    2. A disclosure to the program participant that participation in the Fostering Futures program is voluntary and that the program participant may terminate the voluntary continuing services and support agreement at any time;
    3. The specific conditions that may result in the termination of the voluntary continuing services and support agreement and the program participant’s early discharge from the Fostering Futures program; and
    4. The program participant’s right to appeal the denial or delay of a service required in the case plan.
  2. The services and support to be provided to the program participant pursuant to the voluntary continuing services and support agreement shall begin no later than 30 days after both the program participant and the local department sign the voluntary continuing services and support agreement in accordance with § 63.2-921 .
  3. The local department shall assign a service worker for each participant in the Fostering Futures program to provide case management services. Every service worker shall have specialized training in providing transition services and support for program participants and knowledge of resources available in the community.
  4. The local department shall make continuing efforts to achieve permanency and create permanent connections for all program participants.
  5. The local department shall fulfill all case plan obligations consistent with the applicable provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) for all program participants.
  6. Upon the signing of the voluntary continuing services and support agreement by the program participant and the local department, the local department shall conduct a redetermination of income eligibility for purposes of Title IV-E of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 672.

History. 2020, cc. 95, 732.

Cross references.

As to review of voluntary continuing services and support agreements for former foster youth, see § 16.1-283.3.

§ 63.2-922. Termination of voluntary continuing services and support agreement; notice; appeal.

  1. A program participant may terminate the voluntary continuing services and support agreement at any time. Upon such termination, the local department shall provide the program participant with a written notice informing the program participant of the potential negative effects resulting from termination, the option to reenter the Fostering Futures program at any time before reaching 21 years of age, and the procedures for reentering if the participant meets the eligibility criteria of § 63.2-919 .
  2. If the local department determines that the program participant is no longer eligible to participate in the Fostering Futures program under § 63.2-919 , the local department shall terminate the voluntary continuing services and support agreement and cease the provision of all services and support to the program participant. The local department shall give written notice to the program participant 30 days prior to termination that the voluntary continuing services and support agreement will be terminated and provide (i) an explanation of the basis for termination, (ii) information about the process for appealing the termination, (iii) information about the option to enter into another voluntary continuing services and support agreement once the program participant reestablishes eligibility under § 63.2-919 , and (iv) information about and contact information for community resources that may benefit the program participant, including state programs established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 677. Academic breaks in postsecondary education attendance, such as semester and seasonal breaks, and other transitions between eligibility requirements under § 63.2-919, including education and employment transitions not longer than 30 days, shall not be a basis for termination.
  3. Appeals of terminations of voluntary continuing services and support agreements or denials or delays of the provision of services specified in the agreement shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of § 63.2-915 and Board regulations.

History. 2020, cc. 95, 732.

§ 63.2-923. Court proceedings; administrative reviews.

A local department that enters into a voluntary continuing services and support agreement with a program participant shall file a petition for review of the agreement and the program participant’s case plan in accordance with § 16.1-283.3. If no subsequent hearings are held by the court to review the agreement and case plan after the initial review hearing held pursuant to § 16.1-283.3, the local department shall conduct administrative reviews of the case for the remaining term of the voluntary continuing services and support agreement no less than every six months.

History. 2020, cc. 95, 732.

Chapter 10. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

§ 63.2-1000. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children; form of compact.

The Governor of Virginia is hereby authorized and requested to execute, on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, with any other state or states legally joining therein, a compact which shall be in form substantially as follows:

The contracting states solemnly agree that:

ARTICLE I. Purpose and Policy.

It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate with each other in the interstate placement of children to the end that:

  1. Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care.
  2. The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of the child.
  3. The proper authorities of the state from which the placement is made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a projected placement before it is made.
  4. Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of children will be promoted.As used in this compact:

ARTICLE II. Definitions.

  1. “Child” means a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental, guardianship or similar control.
  2. “Sending agency” means a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state.
  3. “Receiving state” means the state to which a child is sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or agencies, and whether for placement with state or local public authorities or for placement with private agencies or persons.
  4. “Placement” means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution but does not include any institution caring for individuals with mental illness, intellectual disability, or epilepsy or any institution primarily educational in character, and any hospital or other medical facility.

ARTICLE III. Conditions for Placement.

  1. No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children therein.
  2. Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state. The notice shall contain:
    1. The name, date and place of birth of the child.
    2. The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian.
    3. The name and address of the person, agency or institution to or with which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the child.
    4. A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made.
  3. Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in receipt of a notice pursuant to paragraph (b) of this article may request of the sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending agency’s state, and shall be entitled to receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it may deem necessary under the circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy of this compact.
  4. The child shall not be sent, brought or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child.The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any receiving state of a child in violation of the terms of this compact shall constitute a violation of the laws respecting the placement of children of both the state in which the sending agency is located or from which it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. Such violation may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in accordance with its laws. In addition to liability for any such punishment or penalty, any such violation shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empowers or allows it to place, or care for children.

ARTICLE IV. Penalty for Illegal Placement.

ARTICLE V. Retention of Jurisdiction.

  1. The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency’s state, until the child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes self-supporting or is discharged with the concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another location and custody pursuant to law. The sending agency shall continue to have financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of the placement. Nothing contained herein shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving state sufficient to deal with an act of delinquency or crime committed therein.
  2. When the sending agency is a public agency, it may enter into an agreement with an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state providing for the performance of one or more services in respect of such cases by the latter as agent for the sending agency.
  3. Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent a private charitable agency authorized to place children in the receiving state from performing services or acting as agent in that state for a private charitable agency of the sending state; nor to prevent the agency in the receiving state from discharging financial responsibility for the support and maintenance of a child who has been placed on behalf of the sending agency without relieving the responsibility set forth in paragraph (a) hereof.A child adjudicated delinquent may be placed in an institution in another party jurisdiction pursuant to this compact but no such placement shall be made unless the child is given a court hearing on notice to the parent or guardian with opportunity to be heard, prior to his being sent to such other party jurisdiction for institutional care and the court finds that:
    1. Equivalent facilities for the child are not available in the sending agency’s jurisdiction; and
    2. Institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child and will not produce undue hardship.The executive head of each jurisdiction party to this compact shall designate an officer who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact in his jurisdiction and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party jurisdictions, shall have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact.This compact shall not apply to:

ARTICLE VI. Institutional Care of Delinquent Children.

ARTICLE VII. Compact Administrator.

ARTICLE VIII. Limitations.

  1. The sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by his parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such relative or nonagency guardian in the receiving state.
  2. Any placement, sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state pursuant to any other interstate compact to which both the state from which the child is sent or brought and the receiving state are party, or to any other agreement between said states which has the force of law.This compact shall be open to joinder by any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the consent of Congress, the Government of Canada or any province thereof. It shall become effective with respect to any such jurisdiction when such jurisdiction has enacted the same into law. Withdrawal from this compact shall be by the enactment of a statute repealing the same, but shall not take effect until two years after the effective date of such statute and until written notice of the withdrawal has been given by the withdrawing state to the Governor of each other party jurisdiction. Withdrawal of a party state shall not affect the rights, duties and obligations under this compact of any sending agency therein with respect to a placement made prior to the effective date of withdrawal.The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

ARTICLE IX. Enactment and Withdrawal.

ARTICLE X. Construction and Severability.

History. 1975, c. 406, § 63.1-219.2; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 476, 507.

Cross references.

As to implementation of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, see § 63.2-1100 et seq.

As to fulfilling requirements for visitation, inspection, or supervision of children, homes, etc., in another party state by an agency in the receiving state, see § 63.2-1103 .

As to deeming of court issuing the interlocutory order for parental placement adoption as the sending agency when petitioner moves outside the Commonwealth after issuance of the order, see § 63.2-1240 .

Compact cross references.

As to provisions of other member states, see:

Alabama: Code of Ala. §§ 44-2-20 to 44-2-26.

Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§ 47.70.010 to 47.70.080.

Arizona: A.R.S. §§ 8-548 to 8-548.06.

Arkansas: A.C.A. §§ 9-29-201 to 9-29-208.

California: Cal Fam Code §§ 7900 to 7913.

Colorado: C.R.S. 24-60-1801 to 24-60-1803.

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 17a-175 to 17a-184.

Delaware: 31 Del. C. §§ 381 to 389.

District of Columbia: D.C. Code §§ 4-1421 to 4-1424.

Florida: Fla. Stat. § 409.401.

Georgia: O.C.G.A. §§ 39-4-1 to 39-4-10.

Hawaii: HRS §§ 350E-1 to 350E-9.

Idaho: Idaho Code §§ 16-2101 to 16-2107.

Illinois: 45 ILCS 15/0.01 to 15/9.

Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-28-4-1 to 31-28-4-8.

Iowa: Iowa Code §§ 232.158 to 232.168.

Kansas: K.S.A. §§ 38-1201 to 38-1206.

Kentucky: KRS §§ 615.030 to 615.050.

Louisiana: La. Ch.C. Art. 1608 to 1622.

Maine: 22 M.R.S. §§ 4191 to 4247.

Maryland: Md. Family Law Code Ann. §§ 5-601 to 5-611.

Massachusetts: Mass. Spec. Laws ch. S95, §§ 1 to 8.

Michigan: MCLS §§ 3.711 to 3.717.

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 260.851 to 260.93.

Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-18-1 to 43-18-17.

Missouri: §§ 210.620 to 210.640 R.S.Mo.

Montana: Mont. Code Anno., §§ 41-4-101 to 41-4-109.

Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. § 43-1103.

Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.320 to 127.350.

New Hampshire: 12 RSA 170-A:1 to 170-A:7.

New Jersey: N.J. Stat. § 9:23-5.

New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A-11-1 to 32A-11-7.

New York: NY CLS Soc Serv § 374-a.

North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-3800 to 7B-3806.

North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code, §§ 14-13-01 to 14-13-08.

Ohio: ORC Ann. 5103.20 to 5103.237 (Anderson).

Oklahoma: 10 Okl. St. §§ 571 to 577.

Oregon: ORS §§ 417.200 to 417.260.

Pennsylvania: 62 P.S. §§ 761 to 765.

Puerto Rico: 8 L.P.R.A. § 549.

Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 40-15-1 to 40-15-10.

South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-2200.

South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§ 26-13-1 to 26-13-9.

Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-4-201 to 37-4-207.

Texas: Tex. Fam. Code §§ 162.101 to 162.115.

Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-4a-701 to 62A-4a-710.

Vermont: 33 V.S.A. §§ 5901 to 5927.

Virgin Islands: 34 V.I.C. §§ 121 to 127.

Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §§ 26.34.010 to 26.34.080.

West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§ 49-7-101, 49-7-102.

Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 48.99.

Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-5-101 to 14-5-108.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2013, c. 597, cl. 1, provides: “§ 1. That the Department of Social Services shall utilize all federal adoption bonus payments received by the Commonwealth in a fiscal year to support post-adoption services.”

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 476 and 507 are identical, and substituted “individuals with mental illness, intellectual disability, or epilepsy” for “the mentally ill, mentally defective or epileptic” in paragraph (d) of ARTICLE II.

CASE NOTES

Failure to cooperate with home study. —

Trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights under subdivision C 2 of § 16.1-283 because the father never provided, or realistically offered to provide, the most basic necessity for a child, a physical place to live; the father failed to cooperate with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children home study, which was required under § 63.2-1000 in order for the Virginia Department of Human Services to consider placing the child with him. Lannigan v. Va. Beach Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 231 (Va. Ct. App. July 12, 2011).

Compact inapplicable. —

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children was inapplicable because a mother had legal custody of her children when she moved to another state; because the permanency planning order returning custody of one of the children to the mother was never stayed, that order remained in effect under § 16.1-298, and when the mother moved, she had custody of both children. Dover v. Alexandria Dep't of Cmty. & Human Servs., 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 135 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013).

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children was inapplicable because a mother had legal custody of her children when she moved to another state; under Article III of the Compact, the mother’s relocation was not a “placement” as statutorily defined, much less placement into foster care or for possible adoption. Dover v. Alexandria Dep't of Cmty. & Human Servs., 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 135 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013).

Chapter 11. Implementation of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

§ 63.2-1100. Definitions.

For the purposes of Chapter 10 (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.) of this title, the following words shall have the meaning ascribed to them by this section:

  1. “Appropriate public authorities” as used in Article III of the compact means, with reference to this Commonwealth, the Department.
  2. “Appropriate authority in the receiving state” as used in subdivision (a) of Article V of the compact means, with reference to this Commonwealth, the Commissioner.

History. 1975, c. 406, § 63.1-219.1; 2002, c. 747.

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

Law Review.

For survey of developments in Virginia domestic relations law for the year 1979-80, see 67 Va. L. Rev. 351 (1981).

§ 63.2-1101. Discharging financial responsibilities imposed by compact or agreement.

Financial responsibility for any child placed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 10 (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.) of this title shall be determined in accordance with the provision of Article V of the compact. In the event of partial or complete default of performance thereunder, the provisions of Chapter 19 (§ 63.2-1900 et seq.) of this title may also be invoked.

History. 1975, c. 406, § 63.1-219.3; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-1102. Supplementary agreements.

The officers and agencies of this Commonwealth and its subdivisions having authority to place children are hereby empowered to enter into supplementary agreements with appropriate officers or agencies in other party states pursuant to subdivision (b) of Article V of the compact pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.) of this title. Any such agreement which contains a financial commitment or imposes a financial obligation on this Commonwealth or on a subdivision or agency thereof is subject to the written approval of the State Comptroller and of the chief fiscal officer of the subdivision involved.

History. 1975, c. 406, § 63.1-219.4; 2002, c. 747.

§ 63.2-1103. Fulfilling requirements for visitation, inspection or supervision.

Requirements for visitation, inspection or supervision of children, homes, institutions or other agencies in another party state set forth in Subtitle IV (§ 63.2-1700 et seq.) of this title shall be deemed to be fulfilled if performed by an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state pursuant to an agreement entered into by appropriate officers or agencies of this Commonwealth or of a subdivision thereof as provided in subdivision (b) of Article V of the compact pursuant to Chapter 10 (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.) of this title.

History. 1975, c. 406, § 63.1-219.5; 2002, c. 747.

Law Review.

For survey of developments in Virginia domestic relations law for the year 1979-80, see 67 Va. L. Rev. 351 (1981).

§ 63.2-1104. Children from other states and countries.

  1. Any child-placing agency or court that brings or sends, or causes to be brought or sent, a nonresident child into Virginia for the purpose of an interstate placement shall comply with the regulations and procedures adopted by the Board for the administration of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.) regardless of whether the state from which the child is sent is a party to the compact. The agency shall also comply with all the regulations of the Board relating to nonresident children so brought or sent into the Commonwealth. Intercountry placements made by licensed child-placing agencies, courts, or other entities are subject to regulations prescribed by the Board.
  2. The Board is authorized to adopt regulations for the bringing or sending of such children into the Commonwealth by child-placing agencies or courts for the purpose of an interstate placement, and for the care, maintenance, supervision and control of all children so brought or sent into the Commonwealth until they have been adopted, attained their majority, or have been otherwise lawfully discharged or released, as are reasonably conducive to the welfare of such children and as comply with the provisions of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.).
  3. In situations where a custodial parent identifies an urgent need for assistance or relief, the parent may, in cooperation with the receiving children’s residential facility, place a child prior to final approval of the placement pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children when the placement is made without the involvement of a public officer or agency.

History. Code 1950, § 63-245; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-207; 1975, c. 406; 1977, c. 645; 1980, c. 40; 1981, c. 75; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 82, 773; 2013, c. 720.

Cross references.

For provision allowing omission of probationary adoption period and interlocutory order if the child was placed into Virginia from a foreign country in accordance with § 63.2-1104 under certain circumstances, see § 63.2-1210 .

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 82 added subsection C, which was subsequently redesignated as D at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

The 2012 amendment by c. 773 added subsection C.

The 2013 amendments.

The 2013 amendment by c. 720 deleted former subsection D, which read: “Regulations adopted by the Board pursuant to this section shall not prohibit the placement of a nonresident child in a children’s residential facility in the Commonwealth by a custodial parent who assumes full financial responsibility for the child prior to final approval of the placement pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children when the placement is made without the involvement of a public officer or agency.”

§ 63.2-1105. Children placed out of Commonwealth.

  1. Any child-placing agency, licensed pursuant to Subtitle IV (§ 63.2-1700 et seq.), local board or court that takes or sends, or causes to be taken or sent, any resident child out of the Commonwealth for the purpose of an interstate or intercountry placement shall comply with the appropriate provisions of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.) or shall first obtain the consent of the Commissioner, given in accordance with regulations of the Board relating to resident children so taken or sent out of the Commonwealth.
  2. The Board is authorized to adopt regulations for the placement of children out of the Commonwealth by licensed child-placing agencies, local boards or courts as are reasonably conducive to the welfare of such children and as comply with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (§ 63.2-1000 et seq.). Provided, however, notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (d) of Article II of the compact that exclude from the definition of “placement” those institutions that care for individuals with mental illness, intellectual disability, or epilepsy or any institution primarily educational in character and any hospital or other medical facility, the Board shall prescribe procedures and regulations to govern such placements out of the Commonwealth by licensed child-placing agencies, local boards or courts.

History. Code 1950, § 63-73; 1952, c. 409; 1960, c. 331; 1968, cc. 466, 578, § 63.1-56; 1975, cc. 248, 406; 1977, cc. 559, 562, 634, 645, § 63.1-207.1; 1980, c. 40; 1978, c. 734; 1981, c. 75; 1984, c. 734; 1986, c. 281; 1991, c. 34; 1994, c. 865; 1999, c. 889; 2002, c. 747; 2012, cc. 476, 507.

Cross references.

As to adoption assistance for adoption of children with special needs, see § 63.2-1300 et seq.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendments by cc. 476 and 507 are identical, and substituted “individuals with mental illness, intellectual disability, or epilepsy” for “the mentally ill, mentally defective or epileptic” in the second sentence of subsection B.

CASE NOTES

Failure to cooperate with home study. —

Trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights under subdivision C 2 of § 16.1-283 because the father never provided, or realistically offered to provide, the most basic necessity for a child, a physical place to live; the father failed to cooperate with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children home study, which was required under § 63.2-1000 in order for the Virginia Department of Human Services to consider placing the child with him. Lannigan v. Va. Beach Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 231 (Va. Ct. App. July 12, 2011).

Chapter 12. Adoption.

Article 1. General Provisions.

§ 63.2-1200. Who may place children for adoption.

A child may be placed for adoption by:

  1. A licensed child-placing agency;
  2. A local board;
  3. The child’s parent or legal guardian if the placement is a parental placement; and
  4. Any agency outside the Commonwealth that is licensed or otherwise duly authorized to place children for adoption by virtue of the laws under which it operates.

History. 1978, c. 730, § 63.1-220.1; 1985, c. 285; 1989, c. 647; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.8; 2002, c. 747; 2004, c. 815; 2006, cc. 825, 848.

Cross references.

For requirement that the court be informed when in the course of an investigation upon receipt of an adoption petition, it appears that there may have been a violation of § 63.2-1200 or § 63.2-1218 , see § 63.2-1208 . As to free public schools, see § 22.1-3.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2000, c. 830 enacted Chapter 10.2 of Title 63.1, §§ 63.1-219.7 through 63.1-219.55, and repealed Chapter 11 of Title 63.1, §§ 63.1-220 through 63.1-238.02.

Subsequently, Acts 2002, c. 747 enacted a new Title 63.2. The sections in Chapter 12 thereof were derived from Chapter 10.2 of Title 63.1, as enacted by Acts 2000, c. 830.

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

Acts 2013, c. 597, cl. 1, provides: “§ 1. That the Department of Social Services shall utilize all federal adoption bonus payments received by the Commonwealth in a fiscal year to support post-adoption services.”

Effective date.

This title became effective October 1, 2002.

The 2004 amendments.

The 2004 amendment by c. 815, in subdivision 4, added the language beginning “however, when any such agency” at the end of the first sentence and added the last sentence.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848, are identical, and in subdivision 4, deleted “however, when any such agency outside the Commonwealth, or its agent, executes an entrustment agreement in the Commonwealth with a birth parent for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities” from the end of the first sentence and the last sentence, which read: “Any entrustment agreement that fails to comply with such requirements shall be void.” Acts 2006, c. 848 took effect July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825, is effective July 1, 2007.

Law Review.

For survey of Virginia law on domestic relations for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 281 (1980).

For an overview of Virginia Supreme Court decisions on domestic relations, see 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 321 (1981).

For survey of developments in Virginia domestic relations law for the year 1979-80, see 67 Va. L. Rev. 351 (1981).

For comment on contemporary legal aspects of surrogate mother agreements, see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 467 (1982).

For comment on Jane Doe v. John Doe, 222 Va. 736 , 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981) as to fitness of homosexuals as parents, see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 851 (1982).

For article on recent developments in Virginia domestic relations law, see 68 Va. L. Rev. 507 (1982).

For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989).

for the year 1991, see 25 U. Rich. L. Rev. 773 (1991).

for the year 1995, see 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1117 (1995).

For an article relating to recent changes of formidable importance in major areas of domestic relations, both nationally and in Virginia, see 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1165 (1998).

For 2000 survey of Virginia law regarding children, see 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 939 (2000).

For 2003/2004 survey of family and juvenile law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2004).

For 2006 survey article, “Family and Juvenile Law,” see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 151 (2006).

Research References.

Adoption Law and Practice (Matthew Bender). Hollander.

Friend’s Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1 Courts. § 1.03 Court of Appeals. Chapter 39A Interlocutory Appeals. § 39A.01 Interlocutory Appeal Statute. Friend.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-300 Checklist for Agency Adoption, et seq.

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 20.1.

CASE NOTES

Adoption of children is covered by statute. Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409 , 38 S.E.2d 433, 1946 Va. LEXIS 210 (1946); McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455 , 69 S.E.2d 445, 1952 Va. LEXIS 154 (1952) (decided under prior law).

Which is to be liberally construed. —

Since the statutes relating to adoption confer a beneficial interest they are to be liberally construed, particularly in a contest between the adopted son and the estate of his intestate foster parents; to a less extent when the contest is between the adopted son and the estate of some remote ancestor by adoption. Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409 , 38 S.E.2d 433, 1946 Va. LEXIS 210 (1946) (decided under prior law).

Adoption statutes should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution, and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges acquired by it as a result of the adoption. McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455 , 69 S.E.2d 445, 1952 Va. LEXIS 154 (1952) (decided under prior law).

Attorney’s fees. —

There was no statute specifically authorizing an award of attorney’s fees in an adoption proceeding under Chapter 12; to the extent the trial court relied on any such specific statutory authorization in awarding attorney’s fees to appellee, it erred. Pellek v. Byers, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 506 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008).

§ 63.2-1200.1. Recognition of foreign adoption; issuance of birth certificates.

  1. Any adoption of a child who was born in a foreign country and who was not a citizen of the United States at the time of birth shall, subject to the provisions of subsection D of § 63.2-1201.1 , be recognized by the Commonwealth and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be determined as though the order of adoption was entered by a court of the Commonwealth if the adoption was finalized pursuant to the laws of the country from which the child was adopted, and the child was admitted to the United States with an IR-3 or IH-3 visa issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. In such cases, the adoptive parents shall not be required to readopt the child in Virginia.
  2. In cases in which an adoption of a child was finalized pursuant to the laws of a foreign country and the child was admitted to the United States with an IR-3 or IH-3 visa, the adoptive parents, if residents of the Commonwealth at the time the adoption was finalized, may submit a report of adoption to the State Registrar of Vital Records on a form furnished by the State Registrar, which shall (i) include evidence as to the date, place of birth, and parentage of the adopted person; (ii) provide information necessary to establish a new certificate of birth for the adopted person; (iii) include a certified or notarized copy of the final order of adoption entered by the foreign court, together with a certified translation or a notarized copy of a certified translation of the final order of adoption in cases in which the original order is not in English; and (iv) include an affidavit from the adoptive parents indicating that they are receiving supervision from a licensed or approved child-placing agency in the United States or have received supervision from a licensed or approved child-placing agency in the United States and have satisfied all post-adoption requirements as required by the foreign country from which the child was adopted. Upon receipt of a report pursuant to this subsection, the State Registrar shall establish a new certificate of birth for the adopted person, and such certificate of birth shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of § 32.1-261 .

History. 2011, c. 486; 2012, c. 323.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 323, in the first sentence of subsection B, inserted “if residents of the Commonwealth at the time the adoption was finalized” in the introductory clause, substituted “certified or notarized copy” for “certified copy” and “certified translation or a notarized copy of a certified translation” for “certified translation” in clause (iii), and inserted “or have received supervision from a licensed or approved child-placing agency in the United States and have satisfied all post-adoption requirements as required by the foreign country from which the child was adopted” at the end of clause (iv).

§ 63.2-1201. Filing of petition for adoption; venue; jurisdiction; and proceedings.

Proceedings for the adoption of a minor child and for a change of name of such child shall be instituted only by petition to a circuit court in the county or city in which the petitioner resides, in the county or city in which the child-placing agency that placed the child is located, or in the county or city in which a birth parent executed a consent pursuant to § 63.2-1233 . Such petition may be filed by any natural person who resides in the Commonwealth, or who has custody of a child placed by a child-placing agency of the Commonwealth, or by an adopting parent of a child who was subject to a consent proceeding held pursuant to § 63.2-1233 , or by intended parents who are parties to a surrogacy contract. The petition shall ask leave to adopt a minor child not legally the petitioner’s by birth and, if it is so desired by the petitioner, also to change the name of such child. In the case of married persons, or persons who were previously married who are permitted to adopt a child under § 63.2-1201.1 , the petition shall be the joint petition of the husband and wife or former spouses but, in the event the child to be adopted is legally the child by birth or adoption of one of the petitioners, such petitioner shall unite in the petition for the purpose of indicating consent to the prayer thereof only. If any procedural provision of this chapter applies to only one of the adoptive parents, then the court may waive the application of the procedural provision for the spouse of the adoptive parent to whom the provision applies. The petition shall contain a full disclosure of the circumstances under which the child came to live, and is living, in the home of the petitioner. Each petition for adoption shall be signed by the petitioner as well as by counsel of record, if any. In any case in which the petition seeks the entry of an adoption order without referral for investigation, the petition shall be under oath.

A single petition for adoption under the provisions of this section shall be sufficient for the concurrent adoption by the same petitioners of two or more children who have the same birth parent or parents, and nothing in this section shall be construed as having heretofore required a separate petition for each of such children.

The petition for adoption, except those filed pursuant to subdivisions 5 and 6 of § 63.2-1210 , shall include an additional $50 filing fee that shall be used to fund the Virginia Birth Father Registry established in Article 7 (§ 63.2-1249 et seq.) of this chapter.

A petition filed while the child is under 18 years of age shall not become invalid because the child reaches 18 years of age prior to the entry of a final order of adoption. Any final order of adoption entered pursuant to § 63.2-1213 after a child reaches 18 years of age, where the petition was filed prior to the child turning 18 years of age, shall have the same effect as if the child was under 18 years of age at the time the order was entered by the circuit court provided the court has obtained the consent of the adoptee.

History. Code 1950, § 63-348; 1952, c. 550; 1954, c. 489; 1956, c. 300; 1964, c. 459; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-221; 1970, c. 672; 1973, c. 406; 1975, c. 461; 1978, c. 730; 1983, c. 614; 1988, c. 882; 1989, c. 647; 1991, cc. 76, 602; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.9; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2007, cc. 606, 623; 2008, cc. 116, 868; 2009, c. 805; 2017, c. 200.

Cross references.

As to fees collected by clerks of circuit courts generally, see § 17.1-275 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848, in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, substituted “the” for “is located the” and inserted the language beginning “is located, or in the county” to the end, divided the former second sentence into the second and third sentences by inserting “The petition shall ask” preceding “leave to adopt a minor”; substituted the language beginning “or by an adopting parent” to the end of the second sentence for “for”; and substituted “the petitioner’s” for “his” in the third sentence.

The 2006 amendment by c. 825 also added the last paragraph, effective July 1, 2007. Acts 2006, c. 848, was effective July 1, 2006.

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and added the fifth sentence in the first paragraph.

The 2008 amendments.

The 2008 amendment by c. 116 added the last paragraph.

The 2008 amendment by c. 868 inserted “or persons who were previously married who are permitted to adopt a child under § 63.2-1201.1 ” in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph.

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 805, in the first paragraph, in the fifth sentence, substituted “of the adoptive parents” for “adoptive parent,” “for the spouse” for “as to the spouse” and inserted “to whom the provision applies.”

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 200 substituted “Virginia Birth Father Registry” for “Putative Father Registry” in the third paragraph.

Research References.

Friend’s Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 3 Venue. § 3.02 Statutory Rules of Venue. Friend.

CASE NOTES

Man may adopt child born to wife by artificial insemination. —

A man by proceeding in accordance with this section may adopt a child born to his wife by artificial insemination with a third party donor’s sperm. Welborn v. Doe, 10 Va. App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 732, 7 Va. Law Rep. 133, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 139 (1990) (decided under prior law).

Jurisdiction over adoption petition. —

Adoptive parents’ failure to timely appeal the juvenile court’s visitation order was of no legal consequence because there was no need for them to file a separate pleading to seek the termination of biological grandparents’ visitation when entry of the order of adoption divested the grandparents of any right to visitation; the petition for adoption necessarily implied a question of the grandparents’ ongoing visitation, and the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Harvey v. Flockhart, 65 Va. App. 131, 775 S.E.2d 427, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 247 (2015).

Because a juvenile and domestic relations (JDR) district court had no jurisdiction to hear a petition related to consent for adoption that was not a parental placement adoption, a circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction at all to hear the appeal as the circuit court had no more subject matter jurisdiction than the JDR district court had in that court’s original proceeding. Knight v. Ottrix, 69 Va. App. 519, 820 S.E.2d 411, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (2018).

Circuit court had jurisdiction to considered the foster parents’ petition for adoption because it was not a case of parental placement for adoption and neither biological parent consented to the adoption, and therefore adoption had to be instituted by petition to a circuit court of proper venue, and the foster parents properly filed their petition in the county circuit court in which they resided. Coward v. Joseph, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 145 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2021).

Court not divested of jurisdiction. —

Revocation of consent to adoption after petition for adoption had been filed was ineffective to divest court of jurisdiction, which had attached as of the date of filing the petition for adoption. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974) (decided under prior law).

Petition must be joined by spouse. —

The statute requires a trial judge to dismiss a petition for adoption if the spouse of a married petitioner does not join in the petition. Sozio v. Thorpe, 22 Va. App. 271, 469 S.E.2d 68, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 267 (1996) (decided under prior law).

Standing to file adoption petition. —

Circuit court erred by determining that former foster parents lacked standing to file adoption petition for their former foster child because the foster parents were “natural persons” residing in the Commonwealth; while the foster parents could or could not be successful on the merits of their adoption petition, they had standing to file their petition pursuant to the broad language of the statute. Yokshas v. Bristol City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 286 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Waiver of consent. —

Motion filed by a mother and father to dismiss foster parents’ adoption petition was granted because the case did not involve a parental placement within the meaning of §§ 63.2-1230 to 63.2-1240 when the custody order did not mention any placement for the purpose of foster care or adoption, and neither birth parent placed the child with the foster parents for adoption, and subsection H of § 63.2-1202 did not apply; a petition for adoption must be filed in circuit court, § 63.2-1201 , which can waive consent when an adoption petition has been filed and the birth parent has failed to contact or visit the child within the six months preceding the filing of the petition, but this section does not authorize the juvenile and domestic relations district court to waive consent based on the birth parent or parents’ failure to maintain contact, before any petition for adoption is filed. In re Terry, 78 Va. Cir. 25, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 272 (Henrico County Nov. 13, 2008).

§ 63.2-1201.1. Previously married persons who stood in loco parentis during the time of the marriage may adopt in the same manner as married persons.

  1. A man and woman previously married to each other who stood in loco parentis to a child during their marriage to each other, and who could have adopted or readopted the child pursuant to this chapter while married to each other, but whose marriage is void, has been annulled or has dissolved, may adopt or readopt the child pursuant to the provisions in this chapter that are applicable to married persons.
  2. An individual previously married to a parent of a child by birth or adoption, and who stood in loco parentis to that child during the marriage, and who could have adopted the child pursuant to § 63.2-1241 during the marriage, may, with the consent of the prior spouse who is a parent of the child by birth or adoption, adopt the child, after the marriage has been dissolved, annulled or voided, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter that are applicable to step-parents.
  3. Any person or persons seeking to adopt or readopt pursuant to this section may be permitted to do so even if they have remarried.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any child to have more than two living parents by birth or adoption, who have legal rights and obligations in respect to the child, in the form of one father and one mother.

History. 2008, c. 868.

§ 63.2-1202. Parental, or agency, consent required; exceptions.

  1. No petition for adoption shall be granted, except as hereinafter provided in this section, unless written consent to the proposed adoption is filed with the petition. Such consent shall be in writing, signed under oath and acknowledged before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. The consent of a birth parent for the adoption of his child placed directly by the birth parent shall be executed as provided in § 63.2-1233 , and the circuit court may accept a certified copy of an order entered pursuant to § 63.2-1233 in satisfaction of all requirements of this section, provided the order clearly evidences compliance with the applicable notice and consent requirements of § 63.2-1233.
  2. A birth parent who has not reached the age of 18 shall have legal capacity to give consent to adoption and perform all acts related to adoption, and shall be as fully bound thereby as if the birth parent had attained the age of 18 years.
  3. Consent shall be executed:
    1. By the birth mother and by any man who:
      1. Is an acknowledged father under § 20-49.1 ;
      2. Is an adjudicated father under § 20-49.8 ;
      3. Is a presumed father under subsection D; or
      4. Has registered with the Virginia Birth Father Registry pursuant to Article 7 (§ 63.2-1249 et seq.).Verification of compliance with the notice provisions of the Virginia Birth Father Registry shall be provided to the court.
    2. By the child-placing agency or the local board having custody of the child, with right to place him for adoption, through court commitment or parental agreement as provided in § 63.2-900 , 63.2-903 , or 63.2-1221 ; or an agency outside the Commonwealth that is licensed or otherwise duly authorized to place children for adoption by virtue of the laws under which it operates; and
    3. By the child if he is 14 years of age or older, unless the circuit court finds that the best interests of the child will be served by not requiring such consent.
  4. A man shall be presumed to be the father of a child if:
    1. He and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage;
    2. He and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is born within 300 days of their date of separation, as evidenced by a written agreement or decree of separation, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce; or
    3. Before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in apparent compliance with the law, even if the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300 days of their date of separation, as evidenced by a written agreement or decree of separation, or within 300 days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce.Such presumption may be rebutted by sufficient evidence that would establish by a preponderance of the evidence the paternity of another man or the impossibility or improbability of cohabitation with the birth mother for a period of at least 300 days prior to the birth of the child.
  5. No consent shall be required of a birth father if he denies under oath and in writing the paternity of the child. Such denial of paternity may be withdrawn no more than 10 days after it is executed. Once the child is 10 days old, any executed denial of paternity is final and constitutes a waiver of all rights with respect to the adoption of the child and cannot be withdrawn.
  6. No consent shall be required of the birth father of a child when the birth father is convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 , § 18.2-63 , subsection B of § 18.2-366 , or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, and the child was conceived as a result of such violation.
  7. No notice or consent shall be required of any person whose parental rights have been terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, including foreign courts that have competent jurisdiction. No notice or consent is required of any birth parent of a child for whom a guardianship order was granted when the child was approved by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services for purposes of adoption.
  8. No consent shall be required of a birth parent who, without just cause, has neither visited nor contacted the child for a period of six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption or the filing of a petition to accept consent to an adoption. The prospective adoptive parent(s) shall establish by clear and convincing evidence that the birth parent(s), without just cause, has neither visited nor contacted the child for a period of six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption or the filing of a petition to accept consent to an adoption. This provision shall not infringe upon the birth parent’s right to be noticed and heard on the allegation of abandonment. For purposes of this section, the payment of child support, in the absence of other contact with the child, shall not be considered contact.
  9. A birth father of the child may consent to the termination of all of his parental rights prior to the birth of the child.
  10. The failure of the nonconsenting party to appear at any scheduled hearing, either in person or by counsel, after proper notice has been given to said party, shall constitute a waiver of any objection and right to consent to the adoption.
  11. If a birth parent, legal guardian, or prospective adoptee, executing a consent, entrustment, or other documents related to the adoption, cannot provide the identification required pursuant to § 47.1-14 , the birth parent, legal guardian, or prospective adoptee may execute a self-authenticating affidavit as to his identity subject to the penalties contained in § 63.2-1217 .
  12. A legal custodian of a child being placed for adoption, and any other named parties in pending cases in which the custody or visitation of such child is at issue, whether such case is in a circuit or district court, shall be entitled to proper notice of any adoption proceeding and an opportunity to be heard.

History. Code 1950, § 63-351; 1954, c. 489; 1956, c. 300; 1960, c. 331; 1962, c. 603; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-225; 1972, cc. 73, 475, 823; 1974, c. 620; 1978, cc. 730, 735, 744; 1985, c. 18; 1986, c. 387; 1989, c. 647; 1993, c. 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.10; 2002, c. 747; 2005, c. 890; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2007, cc. 606, 623; 2009, c. 805; 2011, c. 486; 2012, c. 424; 2017, c. 200; 2020, c. 3.

Cross references.

As to identification of reports required by § 63.2-1208 and § 63.2-1212 with child’s name, birth registration number, and name by which the child is to be known after adoption, see § 63.2-1227 .

As to foster parent adoption, see § 63.2-1229 .

As to approval of entrustment agreements, see § 16.1-277.01.

Editor’s note.

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

The 2005 amendments.

The 2005 amendment by c. 890 inserted “or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction” in subsection D; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848, in the next-to-last sentence of subsection A, inserted “in writing” and “under oath”; inserted “perform all acts related to adoption, and” in subsection B; added subsection C; redesignated former subsections C, D and E as subsections D, F and G and rewrote subsections D and G; and added subsections E and H through J. Subdivisions C 2, C 3, D 1 d and D 1 e, as amended by c. 825 also contain references to the Putative Father Registry, effective July 1, 2007.

The 2007 amendments.

The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and transferred former subsection C to subsection D; redesignated former subsection D as present subsection C and substituted “subsection D” for “subsection C”; deleted former subdivision D 1 e regarding unregistered putative fathers, and added the undesignated paragraph following subdivision C 1; in subsection G, inserted “including foreign courts that have competent jurisdiction” in the first sentence and added the second sentence; deleted “not married to the mother” in subsection I; substituted “any” for “the” preceding “scheduled” in subsection J and added subsection K.

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 805 added the present last sentence of subsection H.

The 2011 amendments.

The 2011 amendment by c. 486, in subsection G, deleted “whose adoption was finalized in a foreign country or” following “birth parent of a child.”

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 424, in subsection H, substituted “for a period of six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption or the filing of a petition to accept consent to an adoption” for “for a period of six prior to the filing of the petition for adoption” in the first and second sentences; and in subsection K, substituted “birth parent, legal guardian, or prospective adoptee, executing a consent” for “birth parent or legal guardian, executing a consent” and “birth parent, legal guardian, or prospective adoptee may execute” for “birth parent may execute” in subsection K; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendments.

The 2017 amendment by c. 200 substituted “Virginia Birth Father Registry” for “Putative Father Registry” twice in subdivision C 1 d.

The 2020 amendments.

The 2020 amendment by c. 3 added subsection L.

Law Review.

For essay, see “Terminating Parental Rights through a Backdoor in the Virginia Code: Adoptions Under section 63.2-1202 (H),” 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 371 (2013).

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Parent and Child, §§ 8, 11.

CASE NOTES

Editor’s note.

Some of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

Construction of statutes terminating legal relationship. —

Statutes terminating the legal relationship between parent and child should be interpreted consistently with the governmental objective of preserving, when possible, the parent-child relationship. Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Resources, 220 Va. 921 , 265 S.E.2d 692, 1980 Va. LEXIS 185 (1980).

Rights of parents may not be lightly severed, but are to be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of the child. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393 , 192 S.E.2d 794, 1972 Va. LEXIS 373 (1972); Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120 , 253 S.E.2d 658, 1979 Va. LEXIS 220 (1979).

While the welfare of the child is of paramount concern in adoption cases, nonetheless the rights of a natural parent vis-`-vis a nonparent will be maintained if at all consistent with the child’s best interests. Cunningham v. Gray, 221 Va. 792 , 273 S.E.2d 562, 1981 Va. LEXIS 210 (1981).

Adoption over the objection and without the consent of a natural parent must be clearly warranted before the court will take such extreme action. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

Stepparent adoptions. —

Circuit court erred in concluding that subsection H of § 63.2-1202 did not apply to stepparent adoptions; neither § 63.2-1241 nor § 63.2-1242 expressly or implicitly exclude or modify the applicability of § 63.2-1202 . Graves v. Jones, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2017).

Because the circuit court held that a stepfather’s adoption was in the best interests of the child, the court of appeals need not decide whether the circuit court erred in finding that a biological father’s consent to the adoption was not necessary. Shiflet v. Melson, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 177 (Va. Ct. App. June 23, 2020).

Court must find continued relationship would be detrimental. —

While the trial court made a finding pursuant to former § 63.1-225 D (see now subsection C of this section) that the father’s consent was withheld contrary to the best interest of the child, it failed to base that finding on a determination that a continuing relationship between the father and the child would be detrimental to the child’s welfare; without parental consent, such a determination is necessary before courts can grant an adoption and terminate parental rights based on a child’s best interest. Gibson v. Bryant, No. 0698-86-3 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 30, 1987).

Before an adoption may be granted over the objection of a natural parent on the basis that consent is being withheld contrary to the child’s best interests, the trial court must make a prerequisite finding, based on clear and convincing evidence, that a continued or expanded relationship would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Mazzocco v. Miller, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (Va. Ct. App. May 22, 1990).

Where the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence proved it was in the child’s best interests to grant the petition for adoption, and that a continued relationship with her natural father was detrimental to her welfare, the adoption order would be affirmed. Knight v. Laney, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1996).

Adoption without the biological mother’s consent violated her due process rights because there was no finding, as required by Virginia law, that the mother’s continuing relationship with her child would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 773, 689 S.E.2d 784, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 91 (2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011).

Six-month period for failure to maintain contact with child. —

Six-month period of time under subsection H of § 63.2-1202 for a biological mother’s failure to maintain contact with her child referred to the six-month period of time immediately preceding the filing of an adoption petition. Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 773, 689 S.E.2d 784, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 91 (2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011).

Court of appeals did not err in reversing the circuit court’s ruling that the mother’s consent to an adoption was not necessary under subsection H of § 63.2-1202 because the phrase “prior to” in subsection H of § 63.2-1202 referred to the six months immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition; the mother visited the child within the six-month period prior to the applicant’s petition for adoption. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

Standard of proof. —

As to standards of proof under different statutes, see Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

To prove former § 63.1-225 D (see now subsection C of this section), the evidence must establish that the person withholding consent is acting prejudicially to the child’s interest. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

Consent of father to adoption of illegitimate child. —

Under former section as it stood before 1974 amendment, unless child was legitimated by the marriage of her parents before a petition for her adoption was filed, the consent of the father to the adoption was unnecessary. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 215 Va. 49 , 205 S.E.2d 644, 1974 Va. LEXIS 230 (1974).

Failure to register as putative father. —

Circuit court properly denied a putative father’s request to intervene in an adoption proceeding because the father had neither standing to intervene nor a right to withhold his consent to the adoption since the record failed to establish his paternity; the putative father did not register as a putative father before the deadline for doing so expired under the Virginia Putative Father Registry. Chollette v. Keeling, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 279 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015).

Lack of written consent. —

Where child’s father was not married to its mother at the time she gave her consent to its adoption, but the father and mother were subsequently married prior to the final order of adoption, the court was without authority to enter a final decree contemplated by completing the adoption procedure, because the written consent of both parents required by the mandatory provisions of the section as it stood before the 1974 amendment had not been given. Harmon v. D'Adamo, 195 Va. 125 , 77 S.E.2d 318, 1953 Va. LEXIS 182 (1953).

Voluntary relinquishment of custody by parent must be shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589 , 299 S.E.2d 500, 1983 Va. LEXIS 165 (1983).

Adoption over objection of parent. —

Consent to adoption by a stepfather was withheld by the natural father contrary to the best interests of the children sought to be adopted, where the father, an incarcerated felon, was motivated by a desire to deny the children the security of the family unit in the hope that he could preserve his legal affiliation with them and resume visitations at some future indefinite date determined by his parole. Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 390 S.E.2d 188, 6 Va. Law Rep. 1743, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 177 (1990).

Where the evidence revealed that adoption would be in the child’s best interests and the continued relationship with the non-consenting parent would be detrimental, it followed that the failure to grant the adoption would be detrimental to the child; thus, where consent was withheld contrary to the child’s interests, the adoption would be affirmed. Hickman v. Futty, 25 Va. App. 420, 489 S.E.2d 232, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 548 (1997).

Where appellant father was convicted of the first degree murder of biological mother of children who were the subjects of proceeding, the trial judge did not err in finding that appellant withheld his consent contrary to the children’s best interests and that adoption would be in the children’s best interests. Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688, 492 S.E.2d 464, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 667 (1997).

Father’s withholding of consent to adoption was contrary to best interests of child, where father was unmarried and sentenced to over 30 years in prison, had never seen the child, and could not realistically provide physical custody or support for an undetermined number of years. Peters v. Hagerman, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 365 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999).

Where the evidence reveals that adoption would be in a child’s best interests and a continued relationship with the non-consenting parent would be detrimental, it follows that the failure to grant the adoption would be detrimental to the child and, in such a case, the conclusion that consent is withheld contrary to the child’s best interests is compelled. Mills v. Mills, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 259 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2000).

Order granting maternal grandmother’s petition for adoption of grandchild was proper, because the mother executed a valid consent and, contrary to the mother’s claim, that consent was not revoked according to the terms of § 63.2-1204 , governing revocation of consent in a close family adoption. T.S.G. v. B.A.S., 52 Va. App. 583, 665 S.E.2d 854, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 470 (2008).

Mother’s equal protection rights were not violated when the circuit court granted an applicant’s petition to adopt a child without the mother’s consent pursuant to subsection H of § 63.2-1202 because the mother was not similarly situated to a person whose parental rights were involuntarily terminated by the state under § 16.1-283, where children were in the custody of the state and parental rights were in jeopardy of being terminated under the Virginia foster care statutes; unlike the foster care context, the government did not remove the child from the mother’s custody, but rather, by entering into an entrustment agreement with the applicant, the mother voluntarily relinquished custody of the child. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights over his child and approving the adoption of the child by the child’s grandparents; trial court also did not err in holding that the father withheld his consent to the adoption contrary to the best interests of the child. Lester v. Lester, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 127 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2014).

Mother’s withholding of consent to an adoption was contrary to the child’s best interests given her repeated law violations and incarcerations, substance abuse issues, and occasionally violent behavior. Geouge v. Traylor, 68 Va. App. 343, 808 S.E.2d 541, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 336 (2017).

Department’s consent obtained. —

Grandparents identified no statute or constitutional right that required they consent to the adoption; the only required consent was the consent of the department, which was the agency having custody of the children, and because all necessary consents were obtained and presented, the lack of consent by the grandparents did not provide a basis to exempt the adoption order from the finality provisions of the rule. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

Due process. —

Virginia Code’s adoption statutes meet constitutional due process scrutiny because they encompass far more than mere consideration of the child’s best interests as defined in cases involving a contest between natural parents. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

Court of appeals erred in its judgment that the circuit court violated the mother’s due process rights under §§ 63.2-1203 and 63.2-1205 when it granted an applicant’s petition to adopt a child without the mother’s consent under subsection H of § 63.2-1202 because the circuit court gave adequate consideration to the mother’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; the circuit court explicitly and comprehensively considered each factor enumerated in § 63.2-1205 , and its determination went beyond whether the adoption would be in the child’s best interest by finding in the mother some showing of unfitness and implicitly recognizing that continuance of the relationship between the mother and the child would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Waiver of consent. —

Motion filed by a mother and father to dismiss foster parents’ adoption petition was granted because the case did not involve a parental placement within the meaning of §§ 63.2-1230 through 63.2-1240 when the custody order did not mention any placement for the purpose of foster care or adoption, and neither birth parent placed the child with the foster parents for adoption, and subsection H of § 63.2-1202 did not apply; a petition for adoption must be filed in circuit court, § 63.2-1201 , which can waive consent when an adoption petition has been filed and the birth parent has failed to contact or visit the child within the six months preceding the filing of the petition, but this section does not authorize the juvenile and domestic relations district court to waive consent based on the birth parent or parents’ failure to maintain contact, before any petition for adoption is filed. In re Terry, 78 Va. Cir. 25, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 272 (Henrico County Nov. 13, 2008).

§ 63.2-1203. When consent is withheld or unobtainable.

  1. If, after consideration of the evidence, the circuit court finds that the valid consent of any person or agency whose consent is required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child as set forth in § 63.2-1205 , or is unobtainable, the circuit court may grant the petition without such consent:
    1. Fifteen days after personal service of notice of petition on the party or parties whose consent is required by this section;
    2. If personal service is unobtainable, 10 days after the completion of the execution of an order of publication against the party or parties whose consent is required by this section concerning the petition;
    3. If a birth parent is deceased, upon the filing of a death certificate for a deceased birth parent with the court; or
    4. If the judge certifies on the record that the identity of any person whose consent is hereinabove required is not reasonably ascertainable.An affidavit of the birth mother that the identity of the birth father is not reasonably ascertainable shall be sufficient evidence of this fact, provided there is no other evidence before the circuit court that would refute such an affidavit. The absence of such an affidavit shall not be deemed evidence that the identity of the birth father is reasonably ascertainable. For purposes of determining whether the identity of the birth father is reasonably ascertainable, the standard of what is reasonable under the circumstances shall control, taking into account the relative interests of the child, the birth mother and the birth father.
  2. If the child is not in the custody of a child-placing agency and both parents are deceased, the circuit court, after hearing evidence to that effect, may grant the petition without the filing of any consent.
  3. In an adoption proceeding where the consent of a birth parent is required, but the petition for adoption alleges that the birth parent is withholding consent to the adoption, the court shall provide written notice to the birth parent of his right to be represented by counsel prior to any hearing or decision on the petition. Upon request, the court shall appoint counsel for any such birth parent if such parent has been determined to be indigent by the court pursuant to § 19.2-159 .

History. Code 1950, § 63-351; 1954, c. 489; 1956, c. 300; 1960, c. 331; 1962, c. 603; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-225; 1972, cc. 73, 475, 823; 1974, c. 620; 1978, cc. 730, 735, 744; 1985, c. 18; 1986, c. 387; 1989, c. 647; 1993, c. 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.11; 2002, c. 747; 2009, c. 805; 2012, c. 425.

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 805, in subdivision A 1, substituted “Fifteen days” for “Twenty-one days”; added present subdivision A 3; redesignated former subdivision A 3 as present subdivision A 4 and made a related change.

The 2012 amendments.

The 2012 amendment by c. 425 added subsection C, and made a minor stylistic change in subdivision A 2.

Law Review.

For essay, see “Terminating Parental Rights through a Backdoor in the Virginia Code: Adoptions Under section 63.2-1202 (H),” 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 371 (2013).

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Parent and Child, § 27.

CASE NOTES

Child’s best interest. —

Where evidence clearly supported the trial court’s finding that a father’s continued relationship with a child was detrimental where the father had abandoned and sexually abused the child; an adoption was in the best interests of the child and father’s consent to the adoption was being withheld contrary to the child’s best interests. Starkell v. Geris, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 706 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002).

Circuit court properly determined that the termination of a father’s parental rights on grounds that he was unfit as a parent was in the best interest of the child, and that the child should be placed for adoption, as sufficient evidence was presented of the father’s inability to provide for the welfare of his child due to his incarceration and status as a convicted felon, his lack of employment and a stable home, his past drug abuse, and a history of violence toward women. Wheless v. Commonwealth Catholic Charities, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 401 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2007).

Circuit court in approving, over a mother’s objection, the adoption of the mother’s son under subsection A of § 63.2-1203 did not erroneously fail to make a specific finding that continuing the mother’s parent-child relationship with the mother’s son would be detrimental to the son because § 63.2-1205 required no such finding. Instead, § 63.2-1205 focused on the best interests of the child. Gooch v. Harris, 52 Va. App. 157, 662 S.E.2d 95, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 282 (2008).

Adoption without the biological mother’s consent violated her due process rights because there was no finding, as required by Virginia law, that the mother’s continuing relationship with her child would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 773, 689 S.E.2d 784, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 91 (2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011).

Great-aunt’s petition for leave to adopt the mother’s child was properly granted as the mother was withholding her consent to the adoption contrary to the best interests of the child because, even from birth, there were periods when the mother was only minimally involved in the child’s care; the mother was unable to assume full custody of the child based on her incarceration; the mother had a history of untreated mental health problems, continuing drug abuse, and violent behavior in the child’s presence; the great-aunt had provided the child a safe and stable environment; and a change in physical custody would be extremely detrimental to the child’s well-being. Tolley v. Tolley, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 67 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018).

Circuit court made required findings. —

Circuit court did not err by failing to make additional findings under § 16.1-283 because adoption petitions were brought by a couple seeking to adopt a child without the mother’s consent pursuant to §§ 63.2-1242.2 and 63.2-1203 . The circuit court made the findings required by §§ 63.2-1203 and 63.2-1205 . Hughes v. Hughes, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 85 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2011).

Procedures followed. —

Trial court did not have the authority to grant the grandmother’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights, and the fact that the petition to terminate was attached to the grandmother’s petition for adoption did not affect the trial court’s ability to consider the petition for adoption; the trial court followed the statutory scheme when it granted the petition for adoption, and the trial court did not err in proceeding with the adoption petition after granting the motion to strike on the termination petition. Hardy v. Poston, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 368 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014).

Subject matter jurisdiction. —

Because a juvenile and domestic relations (JDR) district court had no jurisdiction to hear a petition related to consent for adoption that was not a parental placement adoption, a circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction at all to hear the appeal as the circuit court had no more subject matter jurisdiction than the JDR district court had in that court’s original proceeding. Knight v. Ottrix, 69 Va. App. 519, 820 S.E.2d 411, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (2018).

§ 63.2-1204. When consent is revocable; fraud or duress; mutual consent.

Parental consent to an adoption or an entrustment agreement not yet finalized by the court, shall be revocable prior to the final order of adoption (i) upon proof of fraud or duress or (ii) after placement of the child in an adoptive home, upon written, mutual consent of the birth parents and prospective adoptive parents or the child-placing agency.

History. Code 1950, § 63-351; 1954, c. 489; 1956, c. 300; 1960, c. 331; 1962, c. 603; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-225; 1972, cc. 73, 475, 823; 1974, c. 620; 1978, cc. 730, 735, 744; 1985, c. 18; 1986, c. 387; 1989, c. 647; 1993, c. 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.12; 2002, c. 747; 2009, c. 805.

Cross references.

As to removal of child from adoptive home, see § 63.2-1207 .

The 2009 amendments.

The 2009 amendment by c. 805 inserted “or an entrustment agreement not yet finalized by the court” and “or the child-placing agency.”

CASE NOTES

Revocation not accomplished. —

Order granting maternal grandmother’s petition for adoption of the grandchild was properly granted, because the mother failed to revoke the mother’s consent according to § 63.2-1204 , governing revocation of consent in a close family adoption. T.S.G. v. B.A.S., 52 Va. App. 583, 665 S.E.2d 854, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 470 (2008).

Evidence held insufficient to show duress or fraud which would negate entrustment agreement by minor unwed mother. Norfolk Div. of Social Servs. v. Unknown Father, 2 Va. App. 420, 345 S.E.2d 533, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 289 (1986) (decided under prior law).

§ 63.2-1205. Best interests of the child; standards for determining.

In determining whether the valid consent of any person whose consent is required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, or is unobtainable, the circuit court or juvenile and domestic relations district court, as the case may be, shall consider whether granting the petition pending before it would be in the best interest of the child. The circuit court or juvenile and domestic relations district court, as the case may be, shall consider all relevant factors, including the birth parent(s)’ efforts to obtain or maintain legal and physical custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s)’ efforts to assert parental rights were thwarted by other people; the birth parent(s)’ ability to care for the child; the age of the child; the quality of any previous relationship between the birth parent(s) and the child and between the birth parent(s) and any other minor children; the duration and suitability of the child’s present custodial environment; and the effect of a change of physical custody on the child.

History. 1995, cc. 772, 826, § 63.1-225.1; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.13; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 467; 2006, cc. 825, 848.

Cross references.

As to granting of adoption petition without parental consent when the court finds that consent is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, see § 63.2-1203 .

As to execution of consent for parental placement adoptions, and exceptions to consent requirements, see § 63.2-1233 .

Editor’s note.

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

The 2003 amendments.

The 2003 amendment by c. 467 twice inserted “circuit court or,” and twice inserted “as the case may be.”

The 2006 amendments.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are identical, and in the first sentence, substituted “granting” for “the failure to grant” and “in the best interest of” for “detrimental to,” and in the last sentence, substituted “The” for “In determining whether the failure to grant the petition would be detrimental to the child, the” and inserted “whether the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child.” Acts 2006, c. 848, is effective July 1, 2006. For effective date of Acts 2006, c. 825, see Editor’s notes.

Law Review.

For essay, see “Terminating Parental Rights through a Backdoor in the Virginia Code: Adoptions Under section 63.2-1202 (H),” 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 371 (2013).

Michie’s Jurisprudence.

For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Parent and Child, § 27.

CASE NOTES

  • Analysis
  • I.In General.

    Editor’s note.

    Some of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

    Welfare of child is paramount concern. —

    In custody and adoption cases the welfare of the child is of paramount concern and takes precedence over the rights of parents. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393 , 192 S.E.2d 794, 1972 Va. LEXIS 373 (1972); Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120 , 253 S.E.2d 658, 1979 Va. LEXIS 220 (1979).

    In adoption cases the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration and the technical rights of the parents may be disregarded if the child’s welfare would best be served by denying custody to the parents. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    The welfare of a child is the guidepost in every custody and adoption proceeding. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

    To promote the best interests of a child is to advance or to contribute to his interest. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393 , 192 S.E.2d 794, 1972 Va. LEXIS 373 (1972).

    Withholding consent contrary to child’s best interests explained. —

    When consent to adoption is withheld contrary to a child’s best interests, it means that the person so withholding is “obstinately self-willed in refusing to concur” and that he is acting prejudicially to the child’s interests. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393 , 192 S.E.2d 794, 1972 Va. LEXIS 373 (1972).

    Comparative best interests rule inapposite to contests between parent and nonparent. —

    Rule of comparative best interests applied in child custody contests between parents is inapposite to contests between parent and nonparent. Rocka v. Roanoke County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515 , 211 S.E.2d 76, 1975 Va. LEXIS 182 (1975).

    Failure to state on record that all elements mandated by statute have been considered. —

    Where trial court cited only two reasons for making its determination: father’s fulfillment of his financial obligations and his disinclination to separate blood relatives. While these are important, relevant factors, they must be considered in light of all the elements mandated by this statute. Although the trial court may, in fact, have considered these elements, its failure to state on the record that they were considered constituted “clear evidence” that the proper standard was not applied, and the petition was prematurely denied. Sell v. Palmarini, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 628 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1997).

    Because the record did not include the circuit court’s findings with respect to the statutory factors, the court of appeals was unable to determine why it held the evidence a biological mother and her husband presented did not prove the biological father was withholding his consent to the adoption contrary to the child’s best interests; the evidence proved that the mother had sole legal and physical custody of the child, and the father had not filed any motions to modify custody or visitation. Graves v. Jones, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2017).

    Failure to hear evidence or make findings. —

    The trial court denied the mother’s due process rights when it failed to hear any evidence or make any findings regarding this section and § 63.2-1208 , before concluding that the mother’s withholding her consent to the adoption was contrary to the child’s best interests. Gregory v. Martin, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2014).

    Court should act without hesitation once determination is made. —

    Once the considered determination is made that a child’s welfare requires that the adoption be granted and the parent’s rights terminated, the trial court should act without hesitation in granting the petition, since the future well-being of the child lies in the balance. Mazzocco v. Miller, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (Va. Ct. App. May 22, 1990).

    It does not automatically follow that the court should decide that the best interest of a child will be served by adoption, merely because the same evidence shows those interests will not be served by a custody transfer. Watson v. Shepard, 217 Va. 538 , 229 S.E.2d 897, 1976 Va. LEXIS 318 (1976).

    Procedures followed. —

    Trial court did not have the authority to grant the grandmother’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights, and the fact that the petition to terminate was attached to the grandmother’s petition for adoption did not affect the trial court’s ability to consider the petition for adoption; the trial court followed the statutory scheme when it granted the petition for adoption, and the trial court did not err in proceeding with the adoption petition after granting the motion to strike on the termination petition. Hardy v. Poston, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 368 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014).

    Burden of proof on proponents of adoption. —

    See Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    Where proponents of adoption have satisfied the provisions of former § 63.1-225 (see now §§ 63.2-1202 to 63.2-1204 ), they are entitled to an interlocutory order if the trial court, after hearing the evidence of both the proponents and the opponents of the adoption, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed adoption would be in the child’s best interests. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    Evidence held sufficient. —

    The evidence was sufficient to find that the adoption was in the children’s best interest and that a continuing relationship with their natural father would be detrimental to their welfare, where the father deserted his wife and daughters for another woman, taking all the food from the family home and disconnecting the electricity and water, intentionally leaving the family in necessitous circumstances; the mother was forced to apply for public assistance to help feed and support the children; the father demonstrated recurring incidents of spousal and child abuse, including sexual abuse; and the older child had made it known that she did not wish to maintain contact with her father. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

    Where the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence proved it was in the child’s best interests to grant the petition for adoption, and that a continued relationship with her natural father was detrimental to her welfare, the adoption order was affirmed. Knight v. Laney, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1996).

    Where the evidence revealed that adoption would be in the child’s best interests and the continued relationship with the non-consenting parent would be detrimental, it followed that the failure to grant the adoption would be detrimental to the child; thus, where consent was withheld contrary to the child’s interests, the adoption would be affirmed. Hickman v. Futty, 25 Va. App. 420, 489 S.E.2d 232, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 548 (1997).

    Evidence supported a trial court’s findings that a child’s continued relationship with the child’s natural parent would have been detrimental to the child and that the natural parent unreasonably withheld consent to adoption where (1) the natural parent had been incarcerated for the child’s entire life and had no relationship with the child; (2) the natural parent made inappropriate references in letters to the child; (3) the natural parent’s ability to work was limited by medical problems; and (4) the child’s other parent and spouse provided a loving environment and financial and emotional support. Reed v. Hersam, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 483 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2001).

    Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s findings, under § 63.2-1205 , that father withheld consent to his children’s adoption by their stepfather contrary to the children’s best interests, and that his continued relationship with them would be detrimental to them, where the mother and stepfather provided a positive home environment where the children thrived academically, socially and emotionally, the father provided almost no financial assistance, his contact with one child was rare, he had no contact with the other child, after he consented to an order suspending his visitation and obligation to support the children, he did not use his right to petition for visitation, and evidence from one child and an expert showed that continuing or creating a parent-child affiliation between the father and the children would be detrimental. McCray v. Law, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 260 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2003).

    Circuit court properly determined that the termination of a father’s parental rights on grounds that he was unfit as a parent was in the best interest of the child, and that the child should be placed for adoption, as sufficient evidence was presented of the father’s inability to provide for the welfare of his child due to his incarceration and status as a convicted felon, his lack of employment and a stable home, his past drug abuse, and a history of violence toward women. Wheless v. Commonwealth Catholic Charities, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 401 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2007).

    Trial court did not err in finding under § 63.2-1205 that the adoption was in the child’s best interests since it was clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities, and the child was doing well in the grandparents’ care. Jones v. Bennett, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 554 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2009).

    Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a stepfather to adopt his wife’s biological children, pursuant to § 63.2-1241 , over objections by the guardian ad litem, because the guardian did not avail himself of the opportunity to present evidence or request a formal evidentiary hearing, and the record contained sufficient evidence that the adoption was in the children’s best interests pursuant to § 63.2-1205 . In re C.J.F., 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 344 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010).

    Evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that the adoption of a biological father’s child was in the child’s best interests; at the time of the circuit court hearing, the child was six years old and had been living with the adoptive parent for almost four years. Rorrer v. Underwood, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 207 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2021).

    Circuit court made required findings. —

    Circuit court did not err by failing to make additional findings under § 16.1-283 because adoption petitions were brought by a couple seeking to adopt a child without the mother’s consent pursuant to §§ 63.2-1242.2 and 63.2-1203 . The circuit court made the findings required by §§ 63.2-1203 and 63.2-1205 . Hughes v. Hughes, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 85 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2011).

    Consent to adoption withheld contrary to best interests of children. —

    Consent to adoption by a stepfather was withheld by the natural father contrary to the best interests of the children sought to be adopted, where the father, an incarcerated felon, was motivated by a desire to deny the children the security of the family unit in the hope that he could preserve his legal affiliation with them and resume visitations at some future indefinite date determined by his parole. Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 390 S.E.2d 188, 6 Va. Law Rep. 1743, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 177 (1990).

    Where father was convicted of the first degree murder of biological mother of children who were the subjects of adoption proceeding, the trial judge did not err in finding that father withheld his consent contrary to the children’s best interests and that adoption would be in the children’s best interests. Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688, 492 S.E.2d 464, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 667 (1997).

    As § 9.1-908 did not operate to preclude a convicted sex offender who was required to register annually for ten years and who had not yet registered from adopting a child, and nothing in § 63.2-1205 automatically precluded adoption in such a case, a birth father’s challenge to his child’s adoption by withholding consent was denied. Gray v. Bourne, 46 Va. App. 11, 614 S.E.2d 661, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 237 (2005).

    Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights over his child and approving the adoption of the child by the child’s grandparents; trial court also did not err in holding that the father withheld his consent to the adoption contrary to the best interests of the child. Lester v. Lester, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 127 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2014).

    Trial court did not err in finding that a child’s biological mother was withholding her consent to adoption contrary to the child’s best interests. Although the mother argued that the adoptive parents thwarted her efforts to see the child, the evidence proved that the mother was the one who left the child with her teenage son and did not return for the child. Roessell v. Bowles, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 237 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2017).

    Great-aunt’s petition for leave to adopt the mother’s child was properly granted as the mother was withholding her consent to the adoption contrary to the best interests of the child because, even from birth, there were periods when the mother was only minimally involved in the child’s care; the mother was unable to assume full custody of the child based on her incarceration; the mother had a history of untreated mental health problems, continuing drug abuse, and violent behavior in the child’s presence; the great-aunt had provided the child a safe and stable environment; and a change in physical custody would be extremely detrimental to the child’s well-being. Tolley v. Tolley, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 67 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018).

    Circuit court did not err in finding that the adoption of the children by the stepmother was in the children’s best interests and that the biological mother withheld her consent to the adoption contrary to the children’s best interests because the circuit court found that the biological mother had done very little over the course of six years to maintain custody of the children; she was unable to assume custody of the children as she had been hospitalized twice for mental health concerns in the previous six years, had attempted suicide and threatened to drive a car off a cliff, and had been incarcerated several times; and there was no evidence that the father or stepmother had thwarted the biological mother’s parental rights. Pruitt v. Williams, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 170 (Va. Ct. App. June 9, 2020).

    II.Presumption in Favor of Parents.

    Parental rights of custody are founded upon the strong presumption that the best interests of the child will be served by placing it in the custody of its natural parents. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    But this presumption is rebuttable by clear, cogent and convincing proof of either voluntary relinquishment of the right to custody or unfitness of the parent. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    The general rule is that the parent prevails unless the nonparent bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, both that the parent is unfit and that the best interest of the child will be promoted by granting custody to the nonparent. Rocka v. Roanoke County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515 , 211 S.E.2d 76, 1975 Va. LEXIS 182 (1975).

    The presumption in favor of parental custody is rebuttable by proof that the requirements of the statute have been met as of the date of filing the petition for adoption. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    The presumption in favor of parental custody is rebuttable by proof that the requirements of former § 63.1-225 (see now §§ 63.2-1202 to 63.2-1204 ) have been met as of the date of filing the petition for adoption. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    Determining whether parent-child relationship is to be continued. —

    Whether continuation of a parent-child relationship, or expanding the contacts between them, will be detrimental to the child cannot be answered by examining only the nonconsenting parent’s fitness to be a custodial parent; the ramifications which a continuance or an expansion of the relationship will have upon the child’s welfare must also be carefully considered, including consideration from the viewpoint that contacts or visitation with a noncustodial parent may be limited, restricted, or modified in time as circumstances dictate. Mazzocco v. Miller, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (Va. Ct. App. May 22, 1990).

    The full breadth of the parent-child connection in all its dimensions must be studied before it can properly be determined that parental consent is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, permitting the court to grant adoption without such consent. Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120 , 253 S.E.2d 658, 1979 Va. LEXIS 220 (1979).

    Court must find continued relationship would be detrimental. —

    Before an adoption may be granted over the objection of a natural parent on the basis that consent is being withheld contrary to the child’s best interests, the trial court must make a prerequisite finding, based on clear and convincing evidence, that a continued or expanded relationship would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Mazzocco v. Miller, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (Va. Ct. App. May 22, 1990).

    Lack of evidence that relationship is beneficial is not sufficient. —

    If the relationship with the natural parent does not benefit the child, yet it is not shown to be detrimental, there is insufficient justification for granting an adoption over the objection of the natural parent; however, a child need not be in a desperate situation before an adoption may be ordered over the natural parent’s objection. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

    Failure to consider whether continuation of relationship will be detrimental. —

    A trial court’s failure to consider whether a continuation of the parent-child relationship will be detrimental to the child prevents a full consideration of the necessary inquiries to decide whether consent is being withheld contrary to the child’s best interest; unless the relationship itself, and the continuation thereof, will somehow be a detriment, the parent cannot be found to have obstinately withheld consent contrary to the child’s best interests. Mazzocco v. Miller, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (Va. Ct. App. May 22, 1990).

    Adoption without the biological mother’s consent violated her due process rights because there was no finding, as required by Virginia law, that the mother’s continuing relationship with her child would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 773, 689 S.E.2d 784, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 91 (2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011).

    Showing required for adoption over parent’s objection. —

    Where there is no question of the fitness of the nonconsenting parent and he has not by conduct or previous legal action lost his rights to the child, it must be shown that continuance of the relationship between the two would be detrimental to the child’s welfare for the child to be adopted over the parent’s objection. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393 , 192 S.E.2d 794, 1972 Va. LEXIS 373 (1972); Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120 , 253 S.E.2d 658, 1979 Va. LEXIS 220 (1979); Robinette v. Keene, 2 Va. App. 578, 347 S.E.2d 156, 3 Va. Law Rep. 141, 1986 Va. App. LEXIS 309 (1986).

    Considering the finality of adoption as it affects the nonconsenting parent, something more is required than a mere showing of friction between contesting adults and of “some reaction” on the part of the child for an adoption over a natural parent’s objection. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393 , 192 S.E.2d 794, 1972 Va. LEXIS 373 (1972).

    A showing of abandonment, unfitness, or other extreme parental misconduct, while significant, does not always have to be shown before the adoption may be granted without parental consent. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

    A simple finding that adoption would promote the child’s interest or that the adoptive parent could better provide for the child does not alone support the conclusion that consent was withheld contrary to the best interests of the child. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

    An adoption over objection by a natural parent should not be granted except upon clear and convincing evidence that the adoption would be in a child’s best interest and that it would be detrimental to continue the natural parent-child relationship. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

    III.Factors for Consideration.

    Parent’s equal protection rights not violated. —

    Mother’s equal protection rights were not violated when the circuit court granted an applicant’s petition to adopt a child without the mother’s consent pursuant to subsection H of § 63.2-1202 because the mother was not similarly situated to a person whose parental rights were involuntarily terminated by the state under § 16.1-283, where children were in the custody of the state and parental rights were in jeopardy of being terminated under the Virginia foster care statutes; unlike the foster care context, the government did not remove the child from the mother’s custody, but rather, by entering into an entrustment agreement with the applicant, the mother voluntarily relinquished custody of the child. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

    Due process. —

    Virginia’s statutory scheme for adoption, including §§ 63.2-1205 and 63.2-1208 , defines the best interests of the child in terms that require more expansive analysis than when the contest is between two biological parents, and inclusion of the precise language of “detriment” is not necessary for these statutes to pass constitutional muster because the phrase “detriment to the child” is no term of art or requisite mantra; rather, for these statutes to pass constitutional due process scrutiny, they must provide for consideration of parental fitness and detriment to the child, and the Virginia statutory scheme does so. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

    Virginia Code’s adoption statutes meet constitutional due process scrutiny because they encompass far more than mere consideration of the child’s best interests as defined in cases involving a contest between natural parents; the eight factors in § 63.2-1205 , including whether the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child and the birth parent(s)’ ability to care for the child, focus on both the parent and child and therefore compel a court to consider whether a parent’s unfitness would be harmful to the child’s welfare. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

    Parent’s due process rights adequately considered. —

    Court of appeals erred in its judgment that the circuit court violated the mother’s due process rights under §§ 63.2-1203 and 63.2-1205 when it granted an applicant’s petition to adopt a child without the mother’s consent under subsection H of § 63.2-1202 because the circuit court gave adequate consideration to the mother’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; the circuit court explicitly and comprehensively considered each factor enumerated in § 63.2-1205 , and its determination went beyond whether the adoption would be in the child’s best interest by finding in the mother some showing of unfitness and implicitly recognizing that continuance of the relationship between the mother and the child would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

    Legal affiliation of nonconsenting parent and child must be considered. —

    The relationship that must be examined in determining whether adoption should be granted over a nonconsenting parent’s objection is not limited to a social, familial or custodial connection, but encompasses also the legal affiliation that is always present between parent and child. Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120 , 253 S.E.2d 658, 1979 Va. LEXIS 220 (1979); Cunningham v. Gray, 221 Va. 792 , 273 S.E.2d 562, 1981 Va. LEXIS 210 (1981); Jolliff v. Crabtree, 224 Va. 654 , 299 S.E.2d 358, 1983 Va. LEXIS 174 (1983).

    Court may grant petition even though nonconsenting parent proves fit. —

    Even though the nonconsenting parent may prove himself fit and genuinely desirous of a continued legal affiliation with the child, if the child’s particular physical, mental, or emotional needs or attachments are such that a denial of adoption would be contrary to the child’s best interests, the trial court may grant the petition over the natural parent’s objection. Mazzocco v. Miller, 1990 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (Va. Ct. App. May 22, 1990).

    Department of social services report. —

    Circuit court correctly stated that the report of the department of social services did not investigate factors relevant to determining whether consent of the birth parent was withheld contrary to the best interest of the child, but the department was not required to investigate those factors because the order of reference did not include such a requirement. Graves v. Jones, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2017).

    Affluence of parent not critical to fitness. —

    Many of the interests of any child of any parent of modest means might be better served in the custody of a more affluent foster parent, but that does not mean that the natural parent is unfit for custody. Rocka v. Roanoke County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515 , 211 S.E.2d 76, 1975 Va. LEXIS 182 (1975).

    Where the evidence established that a valid consent to adoption had been executed, the adoptive parents were not required to show that the natural parents were unfit parents, but only to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s best interest would be served if she remained in their custody and were adopted by them. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    When execution of a valid consent for adoption, within the meaning of the statute, is proved, the natural parents, in a contest with the adoptive parents, will be denied custody of the child, provided the adoptive parents establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s best interests will be served if it remains in their custody. Harry v. Fisher, 216 Va. 530 , 221 S.E.2d 118, 1976 Va. LEXIS 160 (1976).

    Burden of proof in attempting to regain custody after relinquishment. —

    Once the relinquishment of custody is established, the natural parents who seek to regain custody must bear the burden of proving that such a change is in the child’s best interests. Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589 , 299 S.E.2d 500, 1983 Va. LEXIS 165 (1983).

    Error in allowing adoption when marital problems unsettled. —

    The chancellor erred in permitting adoption to proceed at a time when the prospective adoptive parents’ marital problems were unsettled and the issues arising from their marital discord were undetermined. Watson v. Shepard, 217 Va. 538 , 229 S.E.2d 897, 1976 Va. LEXIS 318 (1976).

    Father held entitled to continue legal affiliation with son. —

    Where father had not seen his son for eight years and had not contributed financially to his support, but was not solely responsible for that state of affairs, since his right of visitation was abruptly terminated by mother when she took the child and concealed his whereabouts from father, whatever dereliction and lack of solicitude might be attributed to father, he was entitled to continue his legal affiliation with his son because there was no evidence that continuance or broadening of that relationship would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Jolliff v. Crabtree, 224 Va. 654 , 299 S.E.2d 358, 1983 Va. LEXIS 174 (1983).

    Every lesbian mother or homosexual father is not per se an unfit parent. However, this is not to be construed as approving, condoning, or sanctioning such unorthodox conduct, even in the slightest degree. Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736 , 284 S.E.2d 799, 1981 Va. LEXIS 368 (1981).

    Lesbian relationship is proper factor to consider. —

    Where a natural mother who was admittedly engaged in a lesbian relationship refused to consent to the adoption of her child, her unnatural life-style was a proper factor to have been considered in determining her fitness as a mother and what was in the best interest of the child. It was not determinative, however, since, standing alone as it did, proof of her unorthodox life-style did not outweigh the clear and convincing evidence that she was a devoted mother and, in every other respect, a fit parent. Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736 , 284 S.E.2d 799, 1981 Va. LEXIS 368 (1981).

    Judicial notice as to effect of lesbian life-style. —

    Regardless of how offensive the court may find a mother’s lesbian life-style, its effect on her son’s welfare is not a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736 , 284 S.E.2d 799, 1981 Va. LEXIS 368 (1981).

    Willingness to sever lesbian relationship. —

    In determining the fitness as a mother of a natural mother who was leading a lesbian lifestyle, and in determining the future welfare of her son, the court was not unmindful of the mother’s testimony that should it become necessary, for her son’s sake she would sever the relationship with the woman with whom she was living. Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736 , 284 S.E.2d 799, 1981 Va. LEXIS 368 (1981).

    Consideration of whether continuation of relationship will be detrimental. —

    Circuit court in approving, over a mother’s objection, the adoption of the mother’s son under subsection A of § 63.2-1203 did not erroneously fail to make a specific finding that continuing the mother’s parent-child relationship with the mother’s son would be detrimental to the son because § 63.2-1205 required no such finding. Instead, § 63.2-1205 focused on the best interests of the child. Gooch v. Harris, 52 Va. App. 157, 662 S.E.2d 95, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 282 (2008).

    In ruling on the maternal grandmother’s petition to adopt the grandchild, the trial court was not required to consider whether the continuation of the mother’s relationship with the child was detrimental to the child. T.S.G. v. B.A.S., 52 Va. App. 583, 665 S.E.2d 854, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 470 (2008).

    Although the father argued that the trial court erred in granting the adoption where there was no evidence that the on-going relationship between him and the child would be detrimental to the child’s well-being, the court found that the detriment to the child standard was no longer applicable with the amendment of § 63.2-1205 in 2006. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it did not consider whether continuation of father’s relationship would be detrimental to the child. Jones v. Bennett, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 554 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2009).

    Trial court did not err in granting a petition by a minor child’s parent and stepparent for adoption and name change of the child, over the other biological parent’s objection, because the trial court found that any future relationship with the other parent, who was incarcerated, had a history of substance abuse and domestic violence, and had no relationship with the child, would have harmed the child. Chittum v. Hippenstiel, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 333 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2011).

    Granting of a petition for adoption in favor of the mother and stepfather was appropriate because the father’s withholding his consent to the adoption was contrary to the best interests of the child. When considering the totality of father’s situation, including his history of drug abuse, his criminal convictions, his lack of stability, and his poor choices, the trial court did not err in finding that his relationship with the child would be detrimental. Eiseman v. Beaudoin, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 331 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2011).

    Petition for adoption filed by the mother and the stepfather was properly granted based on the trial court finding that the father’s incarceration for sodomy of his child from another relationship prevented him from ever being able to obtain custody of the subject child while the child was a minor, the father would not be released from prison until the child was thirty-six years old, the father’s willful acts he committed against his other minor child also prevented him from ever being able to obtain custody of the child, the mother had not thwarted the father’s parental rights prior to his arrest, and the “heinous acts” that the father committed against his other biological child led to the conclusion that there was a risk for any other minor children. Graham v. Owens, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 359 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2012).

    Circuit court erred when it inquired during closing argument as to whether an ongoing relationship between a child and his biological father would be detrimental to the child because it was no longer a factor for a court to consider. Graves v. Jones, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2017).

    Factors properly considered. —

    Trial court considered the factors in the statute and made factual findings in light of those factors, including that the father had not had custody of the children for several years, he was not able to assume full responsibility for the children because he did not have a job or lease or own a home, he had no quality relationship with his son, and his relationship with his daughter was questionable at best; the trial court did not err in granting the grandmother’s petition for adoption. Hardy v. Poston, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 368 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014).

    Trial court did not err in holding that an incarcerated mother’s consent to the adoption of her child was being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child and entering an interlocutory adoption order. Contrary to the mother’s argument, the record indicated that the trial court considered the factors in § 63.2-1205 . Brown v. Williams, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 41 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2016).

    Mother’s withholding of consent to an adoption was contrary to the child’s best interests given her repeated law violations and incarcerations, substance abuse issues, and occasionally violent behavior. Geouge v. Traylor, 68 Va. App. 343, 808 S.E.2d 541, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 336 (2017).

    Trial court did not err in finding that the adoption of a child was in the child’s best interests and that the father was withholding his consent contrary to the child’s best interests where the father had no relationship with the child, had provided no financial support, the child had been living with the couple since she was eight months old and had a close bond with the couple and her half-siblings who had been adopted by the couple, and the couple was in good health and had the financial means to support the child. Bridge v. Layne, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 52 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

    Circuit court properly granted the maternal grandparents’ petition for adoption because the evidence they presented at trial regarding the statutory factors was sufficient to show that the biological father was withholding his consent to their adoption of the subject child, contrary to the child’s best interests, where he had not filed a petition for custody or visitation, had no relationship with the child, could not assume custody or care for the child due to his incarceration, had not attempted to visit with or contact the child since November 2016, the grandparents had not thwarted his efforts to establish a relationship with the child. Thompson v. Gillespie, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 252 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2019).

    Circuit court did not err by granting a petition for adoption because the adoption was in the child’s best interests; at the time of the circuit court hearing, the child was ten years old and had been living with his stepfather for seven years, and the biological father was unable, for the foreseeable future because of his incarceration, to obtain physical custody or to care for the child, either financially or otherwise. Shiflet v. Melson, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 177 (Va. Ct. App. June 23, 2020).

    Circuit court did not err in finding that an adoption was in a child’s best interests and that the father had withheld consent contrary to the child’s best interests as the court reviewed the statutory factors, based its findings on the evidence, and did not commit legal error. The court found that the father was unable to obtain custody or to care for the child because of the father’s incarceration, found that the father had made no effort to obtain custody, and considered the age of the child and the duration of the custodial arrangement. Huguley v. Phoenix, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 186 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2020).

    Circuit court properly granted the paternal grandparents’ petition for adoption and denied the mother’s motion to reconsider because the court considered the evidence presented and the factors delineated in § 63.2-1205 and determined that the adoption was in the child’s best interests since the child had lived with the grandparents since his birth four years earlier, a child protective order remained in place at the time of the adoption hearing, the grandparents had not thwarted the mother’s efforts to assert her parental rights, the child had a strong bond with the grandparents, and the child needed stability, which the grandparents had provided and the mother had been unable to demonstrate. Sledd v. Bowman, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 15 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2021).

    Factors not properly considered. —

    Circuit court did not properly consider the factors in light of the evidence presented, so the ruling that the mother withheld her consent to the adoption contrary to the best interests of the child was reversed; the circuit court inappropriately placed too much weight on the length of time that the mother had not seen the child while she was pursuing her appeals, and the lack of a current relationship between the mother and the child resulted from the length of the court proceedings, not the mother’s actions. Gregory v. Martin, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 308 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2018).

    Evidence of prior mother-child relationship erroneously excluded. —

    When an aunt sought to adopt a child over the objection of the child’s mother, it was error to bar the mother’s evidence of the mother’s relationship with the child before the aunt was granted custody because § 63.2-1205 required the court to consider such evidence in finding if the child ever had a relationship with the mother. Gregory v. Martin, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 199 (Va. Ct. App. July 19, 2016).

    CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

    Standard for adoption in absence of natural parents’ consent. —

    In order to grant a final decree of adoption in the absence of a birth parent’s consent, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that failure to grant the petition for adoption would be detrimental to the child. In re Adoption of Rivera, 57 Va. Cir. 377, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 219 (Arlington County Feb. 13, 2002).

    Prospective parents did not show that parental consent was withheld contrary to the best interests of the child by clear and convincing evidence where: (1) the birth mother, who was incarcerated, had undertaken efforts to obtain physical custody; (2) the birth parents planned for the biological grandmother to have custody of the child until the birth mother’s release from prison; (3) the prospective parents had thwarted the birth parents’ efforts to assert their rights as parents; and (4) there was no evidence that the birth parents could not care for the child upon the birth mother’s release from prison. In re Pruett, 87 Va. Cir. 68, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 80 (Roanoke County Aug. 15, 2013).

    Evidence insufficient to adopt without father’s consent. —

    A father’s lack of involvement and lack of financial support, alone, were not a sufficient basis to find that the failure to grant a stepfather’s adoption petition would be detrimental to a child in the absence of the father’s inappropriate behavior, physical or mental cruelty, mistreatment of the child, or general parental unfitness, other than a lack of visitation. In re Adoption of Rivera, 57 Va. Cir. 377, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 219 (Arlington County Feb. 13, 2002).

    § 63.2-1205.1. Certain offenders prohibited from adopting a child.

    No petition for adoption shall be granted if the person seeking to adopt has been convicted of an offense requiring registration pursuant to § 9.1-902 .

    History. 2006, c. 384; 2020, c. 829.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2020, c. 829, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $0 for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities and cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice.”

    The 2020 amendments.

    The 2020 amendment by c. 829 deleted “a sexually violent offense or” preceding “an offense.”

    § 63.2-1206. No parental presumption after revocation period expires.

    If, after the expiration of the appropriate revocation period provided for in § 63.2-1223 or § 63.2-1234 , a birth parent or an alleged birth parent attempts to obtain or regain custody of or attempts to exercise parental rights to a child who has been placed for adoption, there shall be no parental presumption in favor of any party. Upon the motion of any such birth parent or alleged birth parent, or upon the motion of any person or agency with whom the child has been placed, the circuit or juvenile and domestic relations district court, as the case may be, shall determine (i) whether the birth parent or alleged birth parent is a person whose consent to the adoption is required and, if so, then (ii) pursuant to § 63.2-1205 , whether, in the best interest of the child, the consent of the person whose consent is required is being withheld contrary to the best interest of the child or is unobtainable.

    History. 1995, cc. 772, 826, § 63.1-220.7; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.14; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 467.

    The 2003 amendments.

    The 2003 amendment by c. 467 inserted “as the case may be” in the last sentence.

    CASE NOTES

    Editor’s note.

    The cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

    Mother not precluded from opposing adoption. —

    Where the mother revoked consent, she was not precluded from opposing the adoption. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    Revocation of consent after filing of petition did not divest court of jurisdiction. —

    Revocation of consent to adoption after petition for adoption had been filed was ineffective to divest court of jurisdiction, which had attached as of the date of filing the petition for adoption. Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    Parties in adoption set aside proceeding. —

    Former section addressing how a parent could consent to the adoption of a child did not provide that an adoptive parent’s consent could be used in lieu of making the parent a party in a proceeding to set aside an adoption. No provision allows a person to become a party to a proceeding without being served with process or by appearing before the court either in person or by some duly authorized agent. In re Dwyer, 18 Va. App. 437, 445 S.E.2d 157, 10 Va. Law Rep. 1412, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 335 (1994).

    § 63.2-1207. Removal of child from adoptive home.

    When a child is placed in an adoptive home pursuant to an adoptive home placement agreement by a local board or by a licensed child-placing agency pursuant to § 63.2-1221 , or by the birth parent or legal guardian of the child pursuant to § 63.2-1230 , and a circuit court of competent jurisdiction has not entered an interlocutory order of adoption, such child shall not be removed from the physical custody of the adoptive parents, except (i) with the consent of the adoptive parents; (ii) upon order of the juvenile and domestic relations district court or the circuit court of competent jurisdiction; (iii) pursuant to § 63.2-904 , which removal shall be subject to review by the juvenile and domestic relations district court upon petition of the adoptive parents; or (iv) upon order of the juvenile and domestic relations district court that accepted consent when consent has been revoked as authorized by § 63.2-1204 or § 63.2-1223 .

    When a child has been placed in an adoptive home directly by the birth parents or legal guardian of the child, the adoptive parents have been granted custody of the child pursuant to § 63.2-1233 , and it becomes necessary to remove the child from the home of the adoptive parents, the juvenile and domestic relations district court entering such an order shall order that any consent given for the purposes of such placement shall be void and shall determine the custody of the child.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.5; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.15; 2002, c. 747.

    § 63.2-1208. Investigations; report to circuit court.

    1. Upon consideration of the petition, the circuit court shall, upon being satisfied as to proper jurisdiction and venue, immediately enter an order referring the case to a child-placing agency to conduct an investigation and prepare a report unless no investigation is required pursuant to this chapter. The court shall enter the order of reference prior to or concurrently with the entering of an order of publication, if such is necessary. Upon entry of the order of reference, the clerk shall forward a copy of the order of reference, the petition, and all exhibits thereto to the Commissioner and the child-placing agency retained to provide investigative, reporting, and supervisory services. If no Virginia agency was retained to provide such services, the order of reference, petition, and all exhibits shall be forwarded to the local director of social services of the locality where the petitioners reside or resided at the time of filing the petition or had legal residence at the time the petition was filed.
    2. Upon receiving a petition and order of reference from the circuit court, the applicable agency shall make a thorough investigation of the matter and report thereon in writing, in such form as the Commissioner may prescribe, to the circuit court within 60 days after the copy of the petition and all exhibits thereto are forwarded. A copy of the report to the circuit court shall be served on the Commissioner by delivering or mailing a copy to him on or before the day of filing the report with the circuit court. On the report to the circuit court there shall be appended either acceptance of service or certificate of the local director, or the representative of the child-placing agency, that copies were served as this section requires, showing the date of delivery or mailing. The circuit court shall expeditiously consider the merits of the petition upon receipt of the report.
    3. If the report is not made to the circuit court within the periods specified, the circuit court may proceed to hear and determine the merits of the petition and enter such order or orders as the circuit court may deem appropriate.
    4. The investigation requested by the circuit court shall include, in addition to other inquiries that the circuit court may require the child-placing agency or local director to make, inquiries as to (i) whether the petitioner is financially able, except as provided in Chapter 13 (§ 63.2-1300 et seq.) of this title, morally suitable, in satisfactory physical and mental health and a proper person to care for and to train the child; (ii) what the physical and mental condition of the child is; (iii) why the parents, if living, desire to be relieved of the responsibility for the custody, care, and maintenance of the child, and what their attitude is toward the proposed adoption; (iv) whether the parents have abandoned the child or are morally unfit to have custody over him; (v) the circumstances under which the child came to live, and is living, in the physical custody of the petitioner; (vi) whether the child is a suitable child for adoption by the petitioner; (vii) what fees have been paid by the petitioners or on their behalf to persons or agencies that have assisted them in obtaining the child; and (viii) whether the requirements of subsections E and F have been met. Any report made to the circuit court shall include a recommendation as to the action to be taken by the circuit court on the petition. A copy of any report made to the circuit court shall be furnished to counsel of record representing the adopting parent or parents. When the investigation reveals that there may have been a violation of § 63.2-1200 or § 63.2-1218 , the local director or child-placing agency shall so inform the circuit court and the Commissioner.
    5. The report shall include the relevant physical and mental history of the birth parents if known to the person making the report. The child-placing agency or local director shall document in the report all efforts they made to encourage birth parents to share information related to their physical and mental history. However, nothing in this subsection shall require that an investigation of the physical and mental history of the birth parents be made.
    6. The report shall include a statement by the child-placing agency or local director that all reasonably ascertainable background, medical, and psychological records of the child, including whether the child has been the subject of an investigation as the perpetrator of sexual abuse, have been provided to the prospective adoptive parent(s). The report also shall include a list of such records provided.
    7. If the specific provisions set out in §§ 63.2-1228 , 63.2-1238 , 63.2-1242 and 63.2-1244 do not apply, the petition and all exhibits shall be forwarded to the local director where the petitioners reside or to a licensed child-placing agency.

    History. Code 1950, §§ 63-348.1, 63-349, 63-356.1; 1950, pp. 441, 626; 1954, c. 489; 1956, cc. 187, 300, 489; 1962, c. 603; 1964, cc. 139, 429; 1968, cc. 346, 578, §§ 63.1-222, 63.1-223, 63.1-231; 1972, c. 823; 1974, cc. 26, 337, 421, 493, 507; 1975, c. 364; 1977, c. 526; 1978, c. 730; 1979 c. 339; 1980, c. 740; 1982, c. 115; 1985, cc. 298, 300; 1986, cc. 481, 482; 1987, c. 482; 1988, cc. 53, 579, 599, 882; 1989, c. 647; 1992, c. 607; 1993, c. 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, §§ 63.1-219.35, 63.1-219.45, 63.1-219.49, 63.1-219.51; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 502; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2007, c. 446; 2018, c. 694.

    Cross references.

    As to filing petition for agency adoption, see § 63.2-1227 .

    As to foster parent adoption, see § 63.2-1229 .

    For requirements of a parental placement adoption, see § 63.2-1232 .

    As to return and disposition of report, see § 63.2-1239 .

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2003 amendments.

    The 2003 amendment by c. 502, in subsection A, substituted “90” for “ninety,” and “21” for “twenty-one”; and added the second sentence in subsection D.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are identical, and added subsection A; redesignated former subsections A through E as subsections B through F and in subsection B, substituted “60 days” for “90 days” in the first sentence, deleted the former last sentence, which read: “The Commissioner may notify the circuit court within 21 days of the date of delivery or mailing of the report as shown by the agency, during which time the circuit court shall withhold consideration of the merits of the petition pending review of the agency report by the Commissioner, of any disapproval thereof stating reasons for any further action on the report that he deems necessary” and added the last sentence; and substituted “physical custody” for “same home” in clause (v) of the first sentence in subsection D.

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendment by c. 446 in subsection D, deleted “and” at the end of clause (vi), added “and” at the end of clause (vii) and added clause (viii); added present subsection F; and redesignated former subsection F as present subsection G.

    The 2018 amendments.

    The 2018 amendment by c. 694 inserted “including whether the child has been the subject of an investigation as the perpetrator of sexual abuse” in subsection F.

    Law Review.

    For 2007 annual survey article, “Family and Juvenile Law,” see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 417 (2007).

    CASE NOTES

    Interview of parent contesting adoption proceeding not needed. —

    A plain reading of the statute reveals no requirement that a parent contesting an adoption proceeding must be interviewed during the preparation of the social services report. Key v. Beckstoffer, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 102 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1994) (decided under prior law).

    Factors considered. —

    Because the mother conceded that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to consider the statutory factors in subsection D of § 63.2-1208 , the appellate court presumed that the trial court thoroughly weighed all of that evidence, considered the statutory factors, and made its determination based on the child’s best interest. T.S.G. v. B.A.S., 52 Va. App. 583, 665 S.E.2d 854, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 470 (2008).

    Due process. —

    Virginia Code’s adoption statutes meet constitutional due process scrutiny because they encompass far more than mere consideration of the child’s best interests as defined in cases involving a contest between natural parents. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

    The trial court denied the mother’s due process rights when it failed to hear any evidence or make any findings regarding this section and § 63.2-1205 , before concluding that the mother’s withholding her consent to the adoption was contrary to the child’s best interests. Gregory v. Martin, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2014).

    Due process considerations. —

    Virginia’s statutory scheme for adoption, including §§ 63.2-1205 and 63.2-1208 , defines the best interests of the child in terms that require more expansive analysis than when the contest is between two biological parents, and inclusion of the precise language of “detriment” is not necessary for these statutes to pass constitutional muster because the phrase “detriment to the child” is no term of art or requisite mantra; rather, for these statutes to pass constitutional due process scrutiny, they must provide for consideration of parental fitness and detriment to the child, and the Virginia statutory scheme does so. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 2011 Va. LEXIS 181 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 938, 132 S. Ct. 1918, 182 L. Ed. 2d 773, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3020 (2012).

    CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

    Adoption order vacated. —

    Granting of a motion to vacate an adoption order was appropriate because, although an attack upon validity of the adoption order was barred six months from the date of entry of the final order of adoption, the order was not final so that an adoption might proceed without notice to the biological father and the father was entitled to a trial de novo on the father’s appeal. Ottrix v. Knight, 99 Va. Cir. 424, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 320 (Norfolk Aug. 7, 2018).

    OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

    Children from foreign country involved in adoption proceeding. —

    Circuit court may not waive the order of reference mentioned in this section with respect to children from a foreign country involved in an agency placement adoption proceeding. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Rossie D. Alston, Jr., Judge, Thirty-First Judicial Circuit of Virginia, 04-008 (5/19/04).

    § 63.2-1209. Entry of interlocutory order.

    If, in the case of a direct parental placement adoption pursuant to § 63.2-1230 or in circumstances in which an interlocutory order is necessary in an agency adoption, after considering the home study or any required report, the circuit court is satisfied that all of the applicable requirements have been complied with, that the petitioner is financially able to maintain adequately, except as provided in Chapter 13 (§ 63.2-1300 et seq.) of this title, and is morally suitable and a proper person to care for and train the child, that the child is suitable for adoption by the petitioner, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, it shall enter an interlocutory order of adoption declaring that henceforth, subject to the probationary period hereinafter provided for and to the provisions of the final order of adoption, the child will be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner. If the petition includes a prayer for a change of the child’s name and the circuit court is satisfied that such change is in the best interests of the child, upon entry of final order, the name of the child shall be changed. An attested copy of every interlocutory order of adoption shall be forwarded forthwith by the clerk of the circuit court in which it was entered to the Commissioner and to the licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency or the local director that prepared the required home study or report. The agency or director shall, after receipt of the attested copy of the interlocutory order of adoption, prepare a report of visitation pursuant to § 63.2-1212 .

    If the circuit court denies the petition for adoption and if it appears to the circuit court that the child is without proper care, custody or guardianship, the circuit court may, in its discretion, appoint a guardian for the child or commit the child to a custodial agency as provided for in §§ 16.1-278.2, 16.1-278.3 and 64.2-1703 , respectively.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-352; 1954, c. 489; 1964, c. 429; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-226; 1974, c. 507; 1975, c. 364; 1989, c. 647; 1991, c. 534; 1992, c. 607; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.16; 2002, c. 747; 2009, c. 805.

    Editor’s note.

    At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, the reference to “31-5” was changed to “64.2-1703” to conform to the recodification of Title 64.1 by Acts 2012, c. 614, effective October 1, 2012.

    The 2009 amendments.

    The 2009 amendment by c. 805, in the first paragraph, inserted “in the case of a direct parental placement adoption pursuant to § 63.2-1230 or in circumstances in which an interlocutory order is necessary in an agency adoption” in the first sentence and added the last sentence.

    CASE NOTES

    Editor’s note.

    The cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

    Purpose of interlocutory order. —

    The interlocutory order contemplated by statute is for the purpose of giving the department an opportunity to visit the home of the adopting parents, to see that the child is being properly cared for, thereby forming some opinion as to the child’s future should it be permitted to remain in the home. Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245, 1952 Va. LEXIS 214 (1952); Harmon v. D'Adamo, 195 Va. 125 , 77 S.E.2d 318, 1953 Va. LEXIS 182 (1953).

    Absent an appealable order in an adoption proceeding, the Supreme Court may not determine whether any of the requirements for adoption have been met. Where the order in a case was not a final or even an interlocutory order of adoption, nor appealable as an order adjudicating the principles of a cause, any finding made in the adoption proceeding was not yet appealable. Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589 , 299 S.E.2d 500, 1983 Va. LEXIS 165 (1983).

    Standard of proof. —

    As to standards of proof when different statutes, see Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639 , 202 S.E.2d 880, 1974 Va. LEXIS 191 (1974).

    § 63.2-1210. Probationary period, interlocutory order and order of reference not required under certain circumstances.

    The circuit court may omit the probationary period and the interlocutory order and enter a final order of adoption under the following circumstances:

    1. If the child is legally the child by birth or adoption of one of the petitioners and the circuit court is of the opinion that the entry of an interlocutory order would otherwise be proper.
    2. If one of the petitioners is a step-parent of the child and the circuit court is of the opinion that the entry of an interlocutory order would otherwise be proper. The court may omit the order of reference if the petitioners meet the requirements of § 63.2-1241 .
    3. After receipt of the report required by § 63.2-1208 , if the child has been placed in the physical custody of the petitioner by a child-placing agency and (i) the placing or supervising agency certifies to the circuit court that the child has lived in the physical custody of the petitioner continuously for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition and has been visited by a representative of such agency at least three times within a six-month period, provided there are not less than 90 days between the first visit and the last visit, and (ii) the circuit court is of the opinion that the entry of an interlocutory order would otherwise be proper. The circuit court may, for good cause shown, in cases of placement by a child-placing agency, omit the requirement that the three visits be made within a six-month period.
    4. After receipt of the report, if the child has been in physical custody of the petitioner continuously for at least three years immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, and the circuit court is of the opinion that the entry of an interlocutory order would otherwise be proper.
    5. After receipt of the report, if the child has been legally adopted according to the laws of a foreign country with which the United States has diplomatic relations and if the circuit court is of the opinion that the entry of an interlocutory order would otherwise be proper, and the child (i) has been in the physical custody of the petitioners for at least one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition and a representative of a child-placing agency has visited the petitioner and child at least once in the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or during its investigation pursuant to § 63.2-1208 or (ii) has been in the physical custody of the petitioners for at least six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition, has been visited by a representative of a child-placing agency or of the local department three times within such six-month period with no fewer than ninety days between the first and last visits, and the last visit has occurred within six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition.
    6. After receipt of the report, if the child was placed into Virginia from a foreign country in accordance with § 63.2-1104 , the adoption was not finalized pursuant to the laws of that foreign country, and the child has been in the physical custody of the petitioner for at least six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition and has been visited by a representative of a licensed child-placing agency or of the local department three times within the six-month period with no fewer than 90 days between the first and last visits. The circuit court may, for good cause shown, in cases of an international placement, omit the requirement that the three visits be made within a six-month period.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-355; 1952, c. 71; 1954, c. 489; 1962, c. 603; 1964, c. 429; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-229; 1975, c. 364; 1978, c. 750; 1980, c. 268; 1983, c. 334; 1986, c. 470; 1992, c. 607; 1993, c. 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.17; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2011, c. 486.

    Cross references.

    As to fees collected by clerks of circuit courts generally, see § 17.1-275 .

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3 provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are virtually identical, and rewrote the section. Acts 2006, c. 848 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825 is effective July 1, 2007.

    The 2011 amendments.

    The 2011 amendment by c. 486, in subdivision 6, inserted “the adoption was not finalized pursuant to the laws of that foreign country” and made minor stylistic changes.

    § 63.2-1211. Revocation of interlocutory order.

    The circuit court may, by order entered of record, revoke its interlocutory order of adoption at any time prior to the entry of the final order, for good cause shown, on its own motion, or on the motion of the birth parents of the child, or of the petitioner, or of the child himself by his next friend, or of the child-placing agency, which placed the child with the petitioners or of the Commissioner; but, no such order of revocation shall be entered, except on motion of the petitioner, unless the petitioner is given ten days’ notice of such motion in writing and an opportunity to be heard or has removed from the Commonwealth. The clerk of the circuit court shall forward an attested copy of every such order to the Commissioner and to the child-placing agency that placed the child.

    When an interlocutory order has been entered and subsequently is revoked, the circuit court may proceed in the same manner as set forth in § 63.2-1209 to enter an order concerning the subsequent custody or guardianship of the child.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-353; 1954, c. 489; 1964, c. 429; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-227; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.18; 2002, c. 747.

    CASE NOTES

    Editor’s note.

    Some of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

    Purpose of section. —

    This section provides that the court may revoke its interlocutory order of adoption at any time prior to the entry of the final order “for good cause shown.” The purpose of this section and the interlocutory order is to provide an opportunity for inquiring into and considering matters which may have developed during the pendency of the order and which may constitute “good cause” for its revocation and the dismissal of the adoption proceeding. Newton v. Wilson, 199 Va. 864 , 102 S.E.2d 299, 1958 Va. LEXIS 134 (1958).

    Interest of child is paramount issue. —

    In proceedings to vacate interlocutory order of adoption the paramount issue is the best interests of the child. Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245, 1952 Va. LEXIS 214 (1952).

    In adoption proceedings the prime consideration is the best interests of the child. Newton v. Wilson, 199 Va. 864 , 102 S.E.2d 299, 1958 Va. LEXIS 134 (1958).

    “For good cause shown.” —

    The expression “for good cause shown” employed by this section means that the court may take into consideration matters discovered during the pendency of the order, and if there is an unfavorable change in the situation and good cause is shown as to why the adoption should not be consummated, then the statute may be employed and the interlocutory order vacated. Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245, 1952 Va. LEXIS 214 (1952).

    Good cause means more than changing of mind by parent. —

    “For good cause shown” means more than the simple changing of the mind by the parent who has given consent to the adoption. Where the consent has been freely and knowingly given, and where it has been acted upon, it cannot be arbitrarily revoked. Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245, 1952 Va. LEXIS 214 (1952).

    “Good cause shown” means something more than a mere change of mind by the parent who has consented to the adoption. Newton v. Wilson, 199 Va. 864 , 102 S.E.2d 299, 1958 Va. LEXIS 134 (1958).

    Where no legal reason was established for disturbing an interlocutory order of adoption, it could not be set aside simply because the consenting mother had changed her mind. Bidwell v. McSorley, 194 Va. 135 , 72 S.E.2d 245, 1952 Va. LEXIS 214 (1952).

    Consent of natural father becoming legal parent prior to final order. —

    The fact that during the pendency of an interlocutory order in an adoption proceeding the child’s natural father became its legal parent and had not given his consent to the adoption was a legally sufficient ground for vacating the order. Harmon v. D'Adamo, 195 Va. 125 , 77 S.E.2d 318, 1953 Va. LEXIS 182 (1953).

    Putative father had no standing to intervene in adoption proceeding. —

    Circuit court properly denied a putative father’s request to intervene in an adoption proceeding because the father had neither standing to intervene nor a right to withhold his consent to the adoption since the record failed to establish his paternity; the putative father did not register as a putative father before the deadline for doing so expired under the Virginia Putative Father Registry. Chollette v. Keeling, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 279 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015).

    Refusal to hear additional evidence held error. —

    The refusal of the lower court to hear additional evidence on the issues raised by the petition and amended petition of the child’s natural parents, alleging that they had withdrawn their consent and that the adoption would not be for the child’s best interest, was error. Newton v. Wilson, 199 Va. 864 , 102 S.E.2d 299, 1958 Va. LEXIS 134 (1958).

    § 63.2-1212. Visitations during probationary period and report.

    1. Except as hereinafter provided, after the entry of an interlocutory order of adoption, (i) the licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency; (ii) if the child was not placed by an agency and the placement is not a parental placement, the local director; (iii) if the placement is a parental placement, the child-placing agency that submitted the home study; or, (iv) if the child was placed by an agency in another state or by an agency, court, or other entity in another country, the local director or licensed child-placing agency, whichever agency completed the home study or provided supervision, shall cause or have caused the child to be visited at least three times within a period of six months by an agent of such local board or local department or by an agent of such licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency. Whenever practicable, such visits shall be made within the six-month period immediately following the date upon which the child was placed in the physical care of the adoptive parents or of entry of the interlocutory order; however, no less than ninety days shall elapse between the first visit and the last visit. The agency that placed the child, the child-placing agency that submitted the home study, the local director or the licensed child-placing agency, as applicable, shall make a written report to the circuit court, in such form as the Commissioner may prescribe, of the findings made pursuant to such visitations. A copy of the report to the circuit court shall be furnished to the counsel of record for the parties, which copy shall be returned by such counsel as is required by § 63.2-1246 for the return of the original report. A copy of the report to the circuit court shall be served on the Commissioner by delivering or mailing a copy to him on or before the day of filing the report with the circuit court. On the report to the circuit court there shall be appended either acceptance of service or certification of the local director or the representative of the child-placing agency, that copies were served as this section requires, showing the date of delivery or mailing.
    2. The three supervisory visits required in subsection A shall be conducted in the presence of the child. At least one such visit shall be conducted in the home of the petitioners in the presence of the child and both petitioners, unless the petition was filed by a single parent or one of the petitioners is no longer residing in the home.
    3. When it is determined for purposes of subsection B that the petitioner no longer resides in the adoptive home, the child-placing agency or local director shall contact the petitioner to determine whether or not the petitioner wishes to remain a party to the proceedings and shall include in its report to the circuit court the results of its findings.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-354; 1956, c. 187; 1962, c. 603; 1964, c. 429; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-228; 1972, c. 73; 1975, c. 364; 1976, c. 367; 1980, c. 740; 1988, c. 599; 1989, c. 647; 1992, c. 607; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.19; 2002, c. 747; 2007, cc. 606, 623; 2009, c. 805.

    Cross references.

    As to filing petition for agency adoption, see § 63.2-1227 .

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and deleted the last sentence from subsection A, which read: “The Commissioner may notify the circuit court within twenty-one days of the date of delivery or mailing of the report as shown by the agency, during which time the circuit court shall withhold consideration of the merits of the report pending review of the report by the Commissioner, of any disapproval thereof stating reasons for any further action on the report that he deems necessary.”

    The 2009 amendments.

    The 2009 amendment by c. 805 inserted “or have caused” and “upon which the child was placed in the physical care of the adoptive parents or” in subsection A.

    § 63.2-1213. Final order of adoption.

    After consideration of the report made pursuant to § 63.2-1212 or as permitted pursuant to § 63.2-1210 , if the circuit court is satisfied that the best interests of the child will be served thereby, the circuit court shall enter the final order of adoption. However, a final order of adoption shall not be entered until information has been furnished by the petitioner in compliance with § 32.1-262 unless the circuit court, for good cause shown, finds the information to be unavailable or unnecessary. No circuit court shall deny a petitioner a final order of adoption for the sole reason that the child was placed in the physical custody of the petitioner by a person not authorized to make such placements pursuant to § 63.2-1200 . An attested copy of every final order of adoption shall be forwarded, by the clerk of the circuit court in which it was entered, to the Commissioner and to the child-placing agency that placed the child or to the local director, in cases where the child was not placed by an agency.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-356; 1962, c. 603; 1964, c. 429; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-230; 1975, c. 364; 1981, c. 318; 1988, c. 431; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.20; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2007, cc. 606, 623.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2 provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3 provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are identical, and in the first sentence, substituted “After consideration of” for “After the expiration of six months from the date upon which the interlocutory order is entered, and after considering,” inserted “or as permitted pursuant to § 63.2-1210 ” and added the proviso to the end and substituted “in the physical custody of the petitioner” for “in the adoptive home” in the next-to-last sentence. Acts 2006, c. 848 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825, is effective July 1, 2007.

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and deleted “provided that the child has been in the physical custody of the petitioner for at least six months immediately prior to entry of the order” from the end of the first sentence.

    CASE NOTES

    Editor’s note.

    The cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

    Finality of proceeding. —

    An order in an adoption proceeding cannot be treated as a finality when such proceeding has stopped short of a final decree. Harmon v. D'Adamo, 195 Va. 125 , 77 S.E.2d 318, 1953 Va. LEXIS 182 (1953).

    To promote the best interests of a child is to advance or to contribute to his interest. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393 , 192 S.E.2d 794, 1972 Va. LEXIS 373 (1972).

    Absent an appealable order in an adoption proceeding, the Supreme Court may not determine whether any of the requirements for adoption have been met. Where the order in a case was not a final or even an interlocutory order of adoption, nor appealable as an order adjudicating the principles of a cause, any finding made in the adoption proceeding was not yet appealable. Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589 , 299 S.E.2d 500, 1983 Va. LEXIS 165 (1983).

    Adoption held not in best interests of child bitterly opposed to it. —

    Where it was shown that a child, 15 years old, was bitterly opposed to his adoption and wished to live with his parents, though ordinarily the attitude of a child is not controlling, adoption was held not to be in the child’s best interests. Newton v. Wilson, 201 Va. 1 , 109 S.E.2d 105, 1959 Va. LEXIS 185 (1959).

    § 63.2-1214. Annual review of pending petitions for adoption; duty of Commissioner and circuit court clerk.

    After the expiration of twelve months from the date of the entry of the last order upon a petition for adoption, except when the last order entered is a final order of adoption, it shall be the responsibility of the Commissioner to notify the clerk of the circuit court of all adoption cases that have been pending for a period of more than twelve months, and the clerk of the circuit court shall place on the docket all such cases for review by the circuit court as soon as practicable.

    History. 1976, c. 353, § 63.1-230.1; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.21; 2002, c. 747.

    § 63.2-1215. Legal effects of adoption.

    The birth parents, and the parents by previous adoption, if any, other than any such parent who is the husband or wife of one of the petitioners, shall, by final order of adoption, be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child including the right to petition any court for visitation with the child. Except where a final order of adoption is entered pursuant to § 63.2-1241 , any person whose interest in the child derives from or through the birth parent or previous adoptive parent, including but not limited to grandparents, stepparents, former stepparents, blood relatives and family members shall, by final order of adoption, be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child including the right to petition any court for visitation with the child. In all cases the child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to such persons divested of legal rights. Any child adopted under the provisions of this chapter shall, from and after the entry of the interlocutory order or from and after the entry of the final order where no such interlocutory order is entered, be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the person or persons so adopting him, and, unless and until such interlocutory order or final order is subsequently revoked, shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges, and subject to all the obligations, of a child of such person or persons born in lawful wedlock. An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent, and as such, the adopting parent shall be entitled to testify in all cases civil and criminal, as if the adopted child was born of the adopting parent in lawful wedlock.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-357; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-233; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1997, c. 690; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.22; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 229.

    Cross references.

    As to effect of agreement entrusting child to licensed child-placing agency or local board for adoption, see § 63.2-903 .

    The 2003 amendments.

    The 2003 amendment by c. 229 rewrote the section.

    Law Review.

    For annual survey of Virginia law article, “Wills, Trusts, and Estates,” see 47 U. Rich. L. Rev. 343 (2012).

    CASE NOTES

    Editor’s note.

    Some of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

    Biological parent and adoptive parent of equal rank and responsibility. —

    When an order of adoption becomes final, the adoptive parent obtains all the legal rights and obligations of a natural parent; the adoptive parent, in a stepparent adoption, becomes a joint guardian of the minor child along with the birth parent and is equally and jointly charged with the child’s care, nurture, welfare, education and support. Once the adoption is final, there is no distinction in law between the biological parent and the adoptive parent; they are parents to that child of equal rank and responsibility. Carter v. Carter, 35 Va. App. 466, 546 S.E.2d 220, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 263 (2001).

    The language of this section is very broad and inclusive. A child by adoption for “all intents and purposes” is the child and heir at law of the adopting parent and entitled to “all the rights and privileges” of a child of such parent born in lawful wedlock. Dickenson v. Buck, 169 Va. 39 , 192 S.E. 748 , 1937 Va. LEXIS 154 (1937); Newsome v. Scott, 200 Va. 833 , 108 S.E.2d 369, 1959 Va. LEXIS 175 (1959).

    Use of term “heir” in will. —

    When used in a will the term “heir” may include legal heirs under the statute of descent and distribution, or may include heirs of the body only, excluding heirs general and adopted children. Newsome v. Scott, 200 Va. 833 , 108 S.E.2d 369, 1959 Va. LEXIS 175 (1959).

    Phrase “but if she should die without heir” held not to have been intended to include an adopted child. Newsome v. Scott, 200 Va. 833 , 108 S.E.2d 369, 1959 Va. LEXIS 175 (1959).

    Phrase “if he dies without heirs” held under the circumstances not to include adopted child. Merson v. Wood, 202 Va. 485 , 117 S.E.2d 661, 1961 Va. LEXIS 133 (1961).

    An adopted child is conclusively presumed to be the lawful child of the adopting parent in all litigation in which it may be involved, except in a suit specifically brought to set aside and annul such adoption. The truth of an allegation that such adoption is invalid and void, made in a collateral suit, is not taken as admitted on demurrer. Bell v. Jones, 9 Va. L. Reg. 1070 (1904).

    And is his legal heir. —

    Testator devised land to his son for life and at his death to the son’s “legal heirs.” The adopted child of testator’s son contended that he was the latter’s sole legal heir, while the daughter of the testator asserted that she answered that description. It was held that, considering the will and the former law together, the devise in remainder was to the legal heirs of testator’s son, and this section created the legal heir of the life tenant and placed the adopted son in that position. Dickenson v. Buck, 169 Va. 39 , 192 S.E. 748 , 1937 Va. LEXIS 154 (1937).

    When interpreting whether adopted children were “direct lineal descendants” under trusts executed prior to 1978, the language of § 63.2-1215 (§ 5333 at the time the trusts were executed), providing that adopted children were heirs of their adopting parents, did not require a finding that the term “direct lineal descendants” in the trust instruments included adopted children, as the statute did not provide that an adopted child inherited from an adopting parent’s ancestor. McGehee v. Edwards, 268 Va. 15 , 268 Va. 23 , 597 S.E.2d 99, 2004 Va. LEXIS 96 (2004).

    Language does not accommodate “open adoption.” —

    Following adoption, the natural mother would be divested by statute of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the children and the children would be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to her. The children would become, to all intents and purposes, children of the adoptive parents. Such language does not accommodate “open adoption.” Cage v. Harrisonburg Dep't of Social Servs., 13 Va. App. 246, 410 S.E.2d 405, 8 Va. Law Rep. 1162, 1991 Va. App. LEXIS 287 (1991).

    Status acquired under foreign adoption proceedings will be recognized. —

    According to the great weight of authority, a status of adoption acquired under the law of one state will be recognized and given effect in another state provided that the foreign court had jurisdiction of the adoption proceedings, and that the recognition of status as fixed by the foreign decree is not inconsistent with, and will not offend, the laws of the public policy of the forum. Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 203 Va. 670 , 127 S.E.2d 145, 1962 Va. LEXIS 204 (1962).

    Unless such proceedings offend local public policy. —

    Virginia refuses to recognize adoption proceedings of any foreign country which offend her public policy. Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 203 Va. 670 , 127 S.E.2d 145, 1962 Va. LEXIS 204 (1962).

    As in case of adoption for parents’ convenience in disregard of child’s welfare. —

    A Virginia court properly refused to recognize a Greek adoption where the record showed that the adoption was merely an arrangement for the convenience of the adoptive parents, who were old and needed someone to care for them, and that it was effected without regard to the welfare of the child. Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 203 Va. 670 , 127 S.E.2d 145, 1962 Va. LEXIS 204 (1962).

    Parent’s duty to provide for child only eradicated upon final order for adoption. —

    Under Virginia law, a parent’s legal duty to provide for support of his or her child is eradicated only upon the final order of adoption. Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1328-87-1 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 17, 1989).

    Child support arrearages nondischargeable in bankruptcy. —

    Where the record did not indicate that defendant consented to adoption in exchange for plaintiff asking the juvenile and domestic relations court to vacate child support payments, and there was no final adoption order and the court vacated only future child support payments nunc pro tunc, past payments missed by the defendant should have retained their character as child support payments. Thus, the arrearage of payments was for child support, nondischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Labelle v. Melton, 34 Bankr. 323, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5083 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).

    Impact on former spouse amounted to termination of rights. —

    By statute the legal effect of proposed adoption would be to deprive mother and former wife of petitioner of all rights and obligations with respect to child since the defendant was no longer married to the petitioner. Sozio v. Thorpe, 22 Va. App. 271, 469 S.E.2d 68, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 267 (1996).

    Natural parent is forever divested of legal rights when adoption becomes final. —

    In custody, visitation, and support proceedings, a trial court retains jurisdiction to modify or correct orders which future developments prove to have been ill advised; however, when an order of adoption becomes final, the natural parent is forever divested of all legal rights and obligations with respect to the child, and the adoptive parent obtains all the legal rights and obligations of a natural parent. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315, 4 Va. Law Rep. 224, 1987 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (1987).

    After the adoption of the mother’s child by the family friends became final, the mother was divested of all legal rights regarding the child, and, thus, did not have standing to petition a court for visitation with the child. Crockett v. McCray, 38 Va. App. 1, 560 S.E.2d 920, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 177 (2002).

    Order of adoption divested biological grandparents of right to visitation. —

    Adoptive parents’ failure to timely appeal the juvenile court’s visitation order was of no legal consequence because there was no need for them to file a separate pleading to seek the termination of biological grandparents’ visitation when entry of the order of adoption divested the grandparents of any right to visitation; the petition for adoption necessarily implied a question of the grandparents’ ongoing visitation, and the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Harvey v. Flockhart, 65 Va. App. 131, 775 S.E.2d 427, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 247 (2015).

    Severing of alleged connection by adoption. —

    Because any alleged connection between a father’s child and the father’s biological cousin would derive from the father — whose legal connection to his biological family, including the cousin, was severed by adoption — the child was not a relative of the father’s biological cousin within the meaning of this section. Thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that the child was not a relative of the father’s biological cousin. Pilenza v. Nelson Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 71 Va. App. 650, 839 S.E.2d 116, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 70 (2020).

    § 63.2-1216. Final order not subject to attack after six months.

    After the expiration of six months from the date of entry of any final order of adoption from which no appeal has been taken to the Court of Appeals, the validity thereof shall not be subject to attack in any proceedings, collateral or direct, for any reason, including but not limited to fraud, duress, failure to give any required notice, failure of any procedural requirement, or lack of jurisdiction over any person, and such order shall be final for all purposes.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-361; 1954, c. 489; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-237; 1984, c. 703; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.23; 2002, c. 747.

    Michie’s Jurisprudence.

    For related discussion, see 12A M.J. Limitation of Actions, § 2.

    CASE NOTES

    Constitutionality. —

    Trial court did not err by determining that this section was not unconstitutional as applied to the mother’s case because the totality of the facts supported a finding that she did not lack an understanding of the nature and legal consequences of her consent and the adoption. The mother executed a form representing that she consented to the adoption of her son by her parents, the record indicated that she knew the adoption was not temporary, the adoption was sought to prevent the son’s father from becoming involved with the son, and she did not challenge the adoption for seven years. Lively v. Smith, 72 Va. App. 429, 848 S.E.2d 620, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 252 (2020).

    Statute does not extend circuit court’s jurisdiction. —

    Grandparents argued that the statute was intended to extend the period of time in which a circuit court had jurisdiction over an adoption order beyond the 21-day period specified in the rule; however, because the plain language of the statute does not compel such a result and such an interpretation would limit rather than advance the statute’s purpose to foster finality, the court declines to adopt it, and the rule’s finality provision applied to the adoption order in this case. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

    In the six months after entry of an adoption order, a person with standing may challenge an adoption order more than 21 days after its entry for any ground that would permit a challenge under the rule; after the six-month period has run, the statute prevents a person from challenging the adoption order even if one of the exceptions to the rule is present. This remains true even if the exception is based upon fraud, duress, failure to give notice, or lack of jurisdiction. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

    Finality of adoption order. —

    Grandparents were neither custodians nor guardians of the children at issue, and the father, through whom grandparents claimed their connection with the children, was alive and had his rights to the children terminated; neither the Constitution nor Virginia statutes required that the grandparents receive notice of the adoption proceeding, and thus the alleged lack of notice did not provide a basis to exempt the adoption order from the finality provisions of the rule. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

    Because both orders were entered more than 21 days before the grandparents filed their initial pleading, they had to show that some exception to the rule’s finality rule applied; absent an exception, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the grandparents’ challenges to the order terminating father’s parental rights or the order granting the adoption, and the circuit court correctly dismissed grandparents’ challenge to these orders. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

    Grandparents identified no statute or constitutional right that required they consent to the adoption; the only required consent was the consent of the department, which was the agency having custody of the children, and because all necessary consents were obtained and presented, the lack of consent by the grandparents did not provide a basis to exempt the adoption order from the finality provisions of the rule. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

    To set aside or reopen the final order in either the termination case or the adoption case, grandparents had to both allege and prove the orders were obtained by fraud; the failure to even allege that fraud occurred was fatal to their attempt to reopen either case. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep't of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 820 S.E.2d 400, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 319 (2018).

    Because maternal grandparents’ second challenge to an adoption order was filed more than a year after the adoption was completed, the statute precluded the circuit court from considering the arguments raised in the second challenge, rendering the circuit court’s order denying the maternal grandparents’ petition to vacate a nullity; as a result, the court of appeals could not address the substance of the maternal grandparents’ arguments. Cook v. Jensen, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 35 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2020).

    Circuit court did not retain jurisdiction of a stepparent adoption proceeding when a grandparent filed a notice of appeal after the 21-day period had elapsed because the period of time within which an adoption order was permitted to be challenged was not statutorily extended. Bonanno v. Quinn, 299 Va. 722 , 858 S.E.2d 181, 2021 Va. LEXIS 54 (2021).

    Non-English speaking father victim of fraud. —

    Although the state has a compelling interest in preserving stability in a family relationship, particularly when a young minor is involved, the application of the six-month statute of limitation was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of stability while simultaneously preserving a father’s fundamental right to continue the pre-existing relationship with his biological child where the father, who could not speak or read English, alleged that he had never abandoned the child, that he had been induced by the child’s maternal grandmother to sign a form consenting to the adoption by intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, and that he had not discovered that his parental rights had been terminated until after the six-month period had elapsed. F.E. v. G.F.M., 32 Va. App. 846, 531 S.E.2d 50, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 533 (2000) (decided under prior law).

    Construction with Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1. —

    Although the six-month period referenced in the statute is longer than the twenty-one-day period in Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1, it does not represent an extension of a circuit court’s jurisdiction in adoption cases; the time periods contained in both Rule 1:1 and the statute are both triggered by a circuit court’s entry of a final order. Cook v. Jensen, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 35 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2020).

    Error in holding that claims were untimely. —

    Although the trial court correctly denied a father’s request for an entry of default and properly refused to treat the factual allegations in his amended petition to vacate an adoption order as admitted, it erred in holding that 63.2-1216 barred claims filed more than six months from the discovery of the alleged fraud. McCallum v. Salazar, 49 Va. App. 51, 636 S.E.2d 486, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 504 (2006).

    No error in holding that claim was untimely. —

    Circuit court properly denied a biological mother’s petition to set aside the adoption of her two children because, despite learning of the adoption in 2010, she did not file a petition to set aside the adoption until 2016, she was statutorily prevented from attacking the final order of adoption, the trial court found that there was no evidence of fraud on the part of the adoptive mother, and the biological mother did not appeal that finding. Castillo v. Bell, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 282 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

    CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

    Adoption order vacated. —

    Granting of a motion to vacate an adoption order was appropriate because, although an attack upon validity of the adoption order was barred six months from the date of entry of the final order of adoption, the order was not final so that an adoption might proceed without notice to the biological father and the father was entitled to a trial de novo on the father’s appeal. Ottrix v. Knight, 99 Va. Cir. 424, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 320 (Norfolk Aug. 7, 2018).

    § 63.2-1217. Provision of false information; penalty.

    Any person who knowingly and intentionally provides false information in writing and under oath, which is material to an adoptive placement shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. The Commissioner is authorized to investigate such cases and may refer the case to the attorney for the Commonwealth for prosecution.

    History. 1995, cc. 772, 826, § 63.1-220.6; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.24; 2002, c. 747.

    Cross references.

    As to punishment for Class 6 felonies, see § 18.2-10 .

    § 63.2-1218. Certain exchange of property, advertisement, solicitation prohibited; penalty.

    No person or child-placing agency shall charge, pay, give, or agree to give or accept any money, property, service or other thing of value in connection with a placement or adoption or any act undertaken pursuant to this chapter except (i) reasonable and customary services provided by a licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency and fees paid for such services; (ii) payment or reimbursement for medical expenses and insurance premiums that are directly related to the birth mother’s pregnancy and hospitalization for the birth of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceedings, for mental health counseling received by the birth mother or birth father related to the adoption, and for expenses incurred for medical care for the child; (iii) payment or reimbursement for reasonable and necessary expenses for food, clothing, and shelter when, upon the written advice of her physician, the birth mother is unable to work or otherwise support herself due to medical reasons or complications associated with the pregnancy or birth of the child; (iv) payment or reimbursement for reasonable expenses incurred incidental to any required court appearance including, but not limited to, transportation, food and lodging; (v) usual and customary fees for legal services in adoption proceedings; and (vi) payment or reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred for transportation in connection with any of the services specified in this section or intercountry placements as defined in § 63.2-100 and as necessary for compliance with state and federal law in such placements. No person shall advertise or solicit to perform any activity prohibited by this section. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. The Commissioner is authorized to investigate cases in which fees paid for legal services appear to be in excess of usual and customary fees in order to determine if there has been compliance with the provisions of this section.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.4; 1993, c. 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.25; 2002, c. 747.

    Cross references.

    For requirement that the court be informed when in the course of an investigation upon receipt of an adoption petition, it appears that there may have been a violation of § 63.2-1200 or § 63.2-1218 , see § 63.2-1208 .

    For requirements of a parental placement adoption, see § 63.2-1232 .

    As to punishment for Class 6 felonies, see § 18.2-10 .

    § 63.2-1219. Suspected violation of property exchange information.

    If the juvenile and domestic relations or circuit court or any participating licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency suspects that there has been a violation of § 63.2-1218 in connection with a placement or adoption, it shall report such findings to the Commissioner for investigation and appropriate action. If the Commissioner suspects that a person has violated § 63.2-1218 , he shall report his findings to the appropriate attorney for the Commonwealth. If the Commissioner believes that such violation has occurred in the course of the practice of a profession or occupation licensed or regulated pursuant to Title 54.1, he shall also report such findings to the appropriate regulatory authority for investigation and appropriate disciplinary action.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.3; 1991, cc. 364, 602; 1992, c. 125; 1993, cc. 338, 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.26; 2002, c. 747.

    Cross references.

    For requirements of a parental placement adoption, see § 63.2-1232 .

    § 63.2-1220. Issuance of birth certificates for children adopted in the Commonwealth.

    For the purpose of securing a new birth certificate for a child adopted pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth, the procedures set forth in § 32.1-262 shall be followed. The Department shall furnish a document listing all post-adoption services available to adoptive families to the State Registrar of Vital Records for distribution to adoptive parents pursuant to § 32.1-261 .

    The Department of Social Services shall update annually and make available on its website the document listing all post-adoption services available to adoptive families pursuant to this section.

    History. 1970, c. 672, § 63.1-221.1; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.27; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 985; 2011, c. 486; 2015, cc. 5, 17.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2015, cc. 5 and 17, cl. 2 was codified as the second paragraph of this section at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

    The 2003 amendments.

    The 2003 amendment by c. 985 inserted the subsection A designation; and added subsections B and C.

    The 2011 amendments.

    The 2011 amendment by c. 486 deleted the subsection A designation; substituted “for a child adopted pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth” for “for an adopted child”; deleted subsection B, which concerned petitioning the circuit court for a Virginia certificate of birth for a child adopted in a foreign country and duty for parents to provide evidence of admission into the United States and a signed affidavit; and deleted subsection C, which concerned compliance with all adoption requirements of this chapter in order to get a Virginia certificate of birth.

    The 2015 amendments.

    The 2015 amendments by cc. 5 and 17 are identical, and added the second sentence.

    Research References.

    Friend’s Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 38 Appeals to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. § 38.27 Finality of Decisions of Court of Appeals; Review by Supreme Court. Chapter 39A Interlocutory Appeals. § 39A.01 Interlocutory Appeal Statute. Friend.

    § 63.2-1220.01. Foreign adoptions; establishment of date of birth.

    A circuit court may, as part of a proceeding for the adoption of a child born in a foreign country or upon petition to amend a certificate of birth for a person born in a foreign country, correct or establish a date of birth for such person. In cases in which adoptive parents are unable to ascertain the date of birth of the child or in which medical evidence indicates that the stated date of birth of the child is incorrect, the court may establish a corrected date of birth based on medical evidence of the child’s actual age and the State Registrar of Vital Records shall issue a certificate of birth pursuant to § 32.1-261 showing the date of birth established by the court.

    History. 2012, c. 424.

    § 63.2-1220.1. Establishment of minimum training requirements.

    The Department shall, pursuant to Board regulations, establish minimum training requirements and shall provide educational programs for foster and adoption workers employed by the local department and their supervisors.

    History. 2008, cc. 133, 700.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2008, cc. 133 and 700, cl. 2 provides: “That any costs associated with complying with the provisions of this act shall be absorbed by the Department of Social Services within the funds appropriated to it by the General Assembly for training and assistance to local staff.”

    Article 1.1. Post-Adoption Contact and Communication Agreements.

    § 63.2-1220.2. Authority to enter into post-adoption contact and communication agreements.

    1. In any proceeding for adoption pursuant to this chapter, the birth parent(s) and the adoptive parent(s) of a child may enter into a written post-adoption contact and communication agreement. A post-adoption contact and communication agreement may include, but is not limited to, provisions related to contact and communication between the child, the birth parent(s), and the adoptive parent(s) and provisions for the sharing of information about the child, including sharing of photographs of the child and information about the child’s education, health, and welfare. Unless the parental rights of the birth parent or parents have been terminated pursuant to subsection E of § 16.1-283, a local board of social services or child welfare agency required to file a petition for a permanency planning hearing pursuant to § 16.1-282.1 may inform the birth parent or parents and shall inform the adoptive parent or parents that they may enter into such an agreement and shall inform the child if he is 14 years of age or older that he may consent to such an agreement.
    2. Any post-adoption contact and communication agreement entered into by the birth parent(s) and the adoptive parent(s) of a child shall include acknowledgment by the birth parent(s) that the adoption of the child is irrevocable, even if the adoptive parent(s) do not abide by the post-adoption contact and communication agreement, and acknowledgment by the adoptive parent(s) that the agreement grants the birth parent(s) the right to seek to enforce the post-adoption contact and communication provisions set forth in the agreement. The petitioner for adoption shall file such agreement with other documents filed in the circuit court having jurisdiction over the child’s adoption.
    3. In no event shall failure to enter into a post-adoption contact and communication agreement with identified adoptive parent(s) after a valid entrustment agreement or consent to the child’s adoption is executed, or failure to comply with a post-adoption contact and communication agreement, affect the validity of (i) the consent to the adoption, (ii) the voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, (iii) the voluntary or involuntary termination of parental rights, or (iv) the finality of the adoption.
    4. No birth parent(s) or adoptive parent(s) of a child shall be required to enter into a post-adoption contact and communication agreement.

    History. 2010, c. 331; 2019, cc. 65, 84.

    Cross references.

    As to approval of entrustment agreements, see § 16.1-277.01. As to petition for relief of care and custody, see §§ 16.1-277.02, 16.1-278.3. As to authority to enter into voluntary post-adoption contact and communication agreement, see § 16.1-283.1.

    The 2019 amendments.

    The 2019 amendments by cc. 65 and 84 are identical, and added the third sentence in subsection A.

    § 63.2-1220.3. Approval of post-adoption contact and communication agreements.

    1. The circuit court may approve a post-adoption contact and communication agreement authorized pursuant to § 16.1-283.1 or entered into pursuant to this article and filed with the court for a petition for adoption if:
      1. The court determines that the child’s best interest would be served by approving the post-adoption contact and communication agreement;
      2. The adoptive parent or parents and birth parent or parents have consented to a post-adoption contact and communication agreement filed with the court;
      3. The agency authorized to place the child for adoption and to consent to an adoption or authorized to recommend the placement of a child for adoption and the child’s guardian ad litem have recommended that the post-adoption contact and communication agreement be approved as being in the best interest of the child, or, if there is no agency sponsoring the adoption, the agency that prepared the adoption report has been informed of the post-adoption contact and communication agreement and has recommended in the agency’s report to the circuit court that the post-adoption contact and communication agreement be approved; however, in cases in which no child placing agency or guardian ad litem for the child is involved, this requirement may be waived; and
      4. Where the child is 14 years of age or older, consent to the post-adoption contact and communication agreement is obtained from the child.
    2. To be enforceable, any agreement under this section shall be approved by the circuit court and incorporated into the final order of adoption.
    3. The circuit court shall not require execution of a post-adoption contact and communication agreement as a condition for approving any adoption.

    History. 2010, c. 331.

    § 63.2-1220.4. Jurisdiction to approve post-adoption contact and communication agreements.

    1. Unless otherwise stated in the final order of adoption, the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which the final order of adoption was entered shall retain jurisdiction to modify or enforce the terms of a post-adoption contact and communication agreement entered into pursuant to this article.
    2. A birth parent or parents or adoptive parent or parents who have executed a post-adoption contact and communication agreement as described in this article may file a petition with the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which the final order of adoption was entered:
      1. To modify the post-adoption contact and communication agreement; and
      2. To compel a birth or adoptive parent to comply with the post-adoption contact and communication agreement. The court may not award monetary damages as a result of the filing of a petition for modification of or compliance with the agreement. The court may modify the agreement at any time before or after the adoption if the court, after notice and opportunity to be heard by the birth parent or parents and the adoptive parent or parents, determines that the child’s best interest requires the modification of the agreement. Before the court modifies an agreement or hears a motion to compel compliance, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child’s best interest.
    3. The circuit court shall not grant a request to modify the terms of a post-adoption contact and communication agreement unless the moving party establishes that there has been a change of circumstances and the agreement is no longer in the child’s best interest; provided, however, that no modification shall affect the irrevocability of the adoption.

    History. 2010, c. 331.

    Article 2. Agency Adoptions.

    § 63.2-1221. Placement of children for adoption by agency or local board.

    A licensed child-placing agency or local board may place for adoption, and is empowered to consent to the adoption of, any child who is properly committed or entrusted to its care, in accordance with the provisions of §§ 63.2-900 , 63.2-903 , 63.2-1817 or this section, when the order of commitment or the entrustment agreement between the birth parent(s) and the agency or board provides for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child for the purpose of placing and consenting to the adoption of such child.

    The entrustment agreement shall divest the birth parent(s) of all legal rights and obligations with respect to the child, and the child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to them, provided that such rights and obligations may be restored to the birth parent(s) and the child by circuit court order prior to the entry of a final order of adoption upon proof of fraud or duress. An entrustment agreement for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities shall be executed in writing and notarized, and shall be revocable prior to entry of an order finalizing the agreement (i) upon proof of fraud or duress, or (ii) after the placement of the child in an adoptive home upon written mutual consent of the birth parents and prospective adoptive parents.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.2; 1990, c. 202; 1991, c. 364; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.28; 2002, c. 747; 2004, c. 815; 2009, c. 805.

    Cross references.

    As to parental or agency consent for adoption, and exceptions to consent requirement, see § 63.2-1202 .

    As to removal of child from adoptive home, see § 63.2-1207 .

    The 2004 amendments.

    The 2004 amendment by c. 815 added the last sentence in the last paragraph.

    The 2009 amendments.

    The 2009 amendment by c. 805 added the language beginning “and shall be revocable” to the second paragraph.

    Law Review.

    For 2000 survey of Virginia law regarding children, see 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 939 (2000).

    CASE NOTES

    Editor’s note.

    The cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

    Termination of parental rights is necessary to an adoption placement. Cage v. Harrisonburg Dep't of Social Servs., 13 Va. App. 246, 410 S.E.2d 405, 8 Va. Law Rep. 1162, 1991 Va. App. LEXIS 287 (1991).

    Duress. —

    Trial court’s finding that permanent entrustment agreements not revoked within 15 days could be invalidated because the mother who executed them did not feel her consent in signing them was voluntary due to her continuing criminal proceedings and her husband’s incarceration, erroneously failed to find that the mother had been subjected to fraud or duress, which were the only permissible grounds upon which to invalidate the agreements. Tazewell County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Boothe, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 134 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002).

    § 63.2-1222. Execution of entrustment agreement by birth parent(s); exceptions; notice and objection to entrustment; copy required to be furnished; requirement for agencies outside the Commonwealth.

    1. For the purposes of this section, a birth parent who is less than 18 years of age shall be deemed fully competent and shall have legal capacity to execute a valid entrustment agreement, including an agreement that provides for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities, and perform all acts related to adoption and shall be as fully bound thereby as if such birth parent had attained the age of 18 years.
    2. An entrustment agreement for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child shall be valid notwithstanding that it is not signed by the birth father of a child born out of wedlock if the identity of the birth father is not reasonably ascertainable or such birth father did not register with the Virginia Birth Father Registry pursuant to Article 7 (§ 63.2-1249 et seq.) or the birth father named by the birth mother denies under oath and in writing the paternity of the child. An affidavit signed by the birth mother stating that the identity of the birth father is unknown may be filed with the court alleging that the identity of the birth father is not known or reasonably ascertainable. A birth father shall be given notice of the entrustment if he is an acknowledged father pursuant to § 20-49.1 , an adjudicated father pursuant to § 20-49.8 , a presumed father pursuant to § 63.2-1202 , or a putative father who has registered with the Virginia Birth Father Registry pursuant to Article 7 (§ 63.2-1249 et seq.). If the putative father’s identity is reasonably ascertainable, he shall be given notice pursuant to the requirements of § 63.2-1250 .
    3. When a birth father is required to be given notice, he may be given notice of the entrustment by registered or certified mail to his last known address. If he fails to object to the entrustment within 15 days of the mailing of such notice, his entrustment shall not be required. An objection to an entrustment agreement shall be in writing, signed by the objecting party or counsel of record for the objecting party and filed with the agency that mailed the notice of entrustment within the time period specified in § 63.2-1223 .
    4. The execution of an entrustment agreement shall be required of a presumed father except under the following circumstances: (i) if he denies paternity under oath and in writing in accordance with § 63.2-1202 ; (ii) if the presumption is rebutted by sufficient evidence, satisfactory to the circuit court, which would establish by a preponderance of the evidence the paternity of another man or the impossibility or improbability of cohabitation of the birth mother and her husband for a period of at least 300 days preceding the birth of the child; (iii) if another man admits, in writing and under oath, that he is the biological father; or (iv) if an adoptive placement has been determined to be in the best interests of the child pursuant to § 63.2-1205 .
    5. When none of the provisions of subsections C and D apply, notice of the entrustment shall be given to the presumed father pursuant to the requirements of § 16.1-277.01.
    6. An entrustment agreement for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child shall be valid notwithstanding that it is not signed by the birth father of a child when the birth father has been convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 , § 18.2-63 , subsection B of § 18.2-366 , or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, and the child was conceived as a result of such violation.
    7. A birth father may execute an entrustment agreement for the termination of all of his parental rights prior to the birth of the child. Such entrustment shall be subject to the revocation provisions of § 63.2-1223 .
    8. No entrustment shall be required of a birth father if he denies under oath and in writing the paternity of the child. Such denial of paternity may be withdrawn no more than 10 days after it is executed. Once the child is 10 days old, any executed denial of paternity is final and constitutes a waiver of all rights with respect to the adoption of the child and cannot be withdrawn.
    9. A copy of the entrustment agreement shall be furnished to all parties signing such agreement.
    10. When any agency outside the Commonwealth, or its agent, that is licensed or otherwise duly authorized to place children for adoption by virtue of the laws under which it operates executes an entrustment agreement in the Commonwealth with a birth parent for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child, the requirements of §§ 63.2-1221 through 63.2-1224 shall apply. The birth parent may expressly waive, under oath and in writing, the execution of the entrustment under the requirements of §§ 63.2-1221 through 63.2-1224 in favor of the execution of an entrustment or relinquishment under the laws of another state if the birth parent is represented by independent legal counsel. Such written waiver shall expressly state that the birth parent has received independent legal counsel advising of the laws of Virginia and of the other state and that Virginia law is expressly being waived. The waiver also shall include the name, address, and telephone number of such legal counsel. Any entrustment agreement that fails to comply with such requirements shall be void.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.2; 1990, c. 202; 1991, c. 364; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.29; 2002, c. 747; 2004, c. 815; 2005, c. 890; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2007, cc. 606, 623; 2009, c. 805; 2012, c. 424; 2017, c. 200.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2004 amendments.

    The 2004 amendment by c. 815 substituted “18” for “eighteen” in two places in the first paragraph, sustituted “21” for “twenty-one” in the second paragraph, and added the last paragraph.

    The 2005 amendments.

    The 2005 amendment by c. 890 inserted “or an equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction” in the third paragraph; and made a related change.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are nearly the same, and rewrote the section. Acts 2006, c. 825, also inserted a reference to the Putative Father Registry in subsection B. Acts 2006, c. 848 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825 is effective July 1, 2007.

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and in subsection B, substituted “or” for “and” preceding “such birth” in the first sentence, “entrustment” for “proceedings,” “or a putative father who” for “a putative father that” and deleted “or a putative father that has not registered with Putative Father Registry but whose identity is reasonably ascertainable” in the second sentence and added the third sentence; deleted “subsection D of” preceding “§ 63.2-1202 ” in clause (i) of subsection D; substituted “subsections C and D” for “subsection D” in subsection E; and deleted “not married to the mother of the child” following “A birth father” in subsection G.

    The 2009 amendments.

    The 2009 amendment by c. 805 inserted the second sentence in subsection B.

    The 2012 amendments.

    The 2012 amendment by c. 424 deleted “of this chapter” following “(§ 63.2-1249 et seq.)” twice in subsection B; and substituted “An objection to an entrustment agreement shall be in writing, signed by the objecting party or counsel of record for the objecting party and filed with” for “Such objection shall be in writing, signed by the objecting party or counsel of record for the objecting party and shall be filed with” in the third sentence of subsection C.

    The 2017 amendments.

    The 2017 amendment by c. 200, in subsection B, substituted “Virginia Birth Father Registry” for “Putative Father Registry” in the first sentence and “the Virginia Birth Father Registry” for “Putative Father Registry” in the third sentence.

    CASE NOTES

    Parent’s identity “not reasonably ascertainable.” —

    Where mother’s testimony failed to suggest even a clue as to father’s identity, his whereabouts, or that a reasonable inquiry or search would successfully identify and locate him, the identity of the father was “not reasonably ascertainable.” Unknown Father of Baby Girl Janet v. Division of Social Servs., 15 Va. App. 110, 422 S.E.2d 407, 9 Va. Law Rep. 331, 1992 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (1992) (decided under prior law).

    Termination of parental rights order upheld on appeal. —

    Circuit court properly determined that the termination of a father’s parental rights on grounds that he was unfit as a parent was in the best interest of the child, and that the child should be placed for adoption, as sufficient evidence was presented of the father’s inability to provide for the welfare of his child due to his incarceration and status as a convicted felon, his lack of employment and a stable home, his past drug abuse, and a history of violence toward women. Wheless v. Commonwealth Catholic Charities, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 401 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2007).

    § 63.2-1223. Revocation of entrustment agreement.

    A valid entrustment agreement terminating all parental rights and responsibilities to the child shall be revocable by either of the birth parents until (i) the child has reached the age of 10 days and (ii) seven days have elapsed from the date of execution of the agreement. In addition, a valid entrustment agreement shall be revocable by either of the birth parents if the child has not been placed in the physical custody of the prospective adoptive parents at the time of such revocation. Revocation of an entrustment agreement shall be in writing and signed by the revoking party. The written revocation shall be delivered to the child-placing agency or local board to which the child was originally entrusted. Delivery of the written revocation shall be made during the business day of the child-placing agency or local board to which the child was originally entrusted, in accordance with the applicable time period set out in this section. If the revocation period expires on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday or any day on which the agency or local board is officially closed, the revocation period shall be extended to the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday or other day on which the agency or local board is officially closed. Upon revocation of the entrustment agreement, the child shall be returned to the parent revoking the agreement.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.2; 1990, c. 202; 1991, c. 364; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.30; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2007, cc. 606, 623.

    Cross references.

    For provision that after expiration of the revocation period, there shall be no presumption in favor of a birth parent with regard to a child who has been placed for adoption, and that upon motion the court shall determine whether the parent’s consent is required and whether such consent is being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, see § 63.2-1206 .

    As to removal of child from adoptive home, see § 63.2-1207 .

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are identical, and in the first sentence, substituted “10 days” for “twenty-five days” and “seven days” for “fifteen days” and “physical custody” for “home” in the second sentence. Acts 2006, c. 848 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825, is effective July 1, 2007.

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and inserted “the prospective” preceding “adoptive parents” in the second sentence.

    CASE NOTES

    Timeliness of revocation. —

    As a mother had properly and timely executed written revocations of five permanent entrustment agreements with a charity, under subdivision C 2 of § 16.1-283, the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the charity’s petitions requesting termination of the mother’s residual parental rights as to her five children. Norton v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Arlington, Inc., 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 407 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2007).

    No written revocation provided. —

    Trial court properly relied on entrustment agreements to terminate the mother’s residual parental rights where the mother failed to comply with a crucial requirement of § 63.2-1223 , that written revocation of the child-placing agency be provided. Butler v. Culpeper County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 48 Va. App. 537, 633 S.E.2d 196, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 388 (2006).

    Entrustment agreement was properly approved, because the mother did not deliver written revocation to the Department. Ferrell v. Alexandria Dep't of Cmty. & Human Servs., 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 215 (Va. Ct. App. July 3, 2012).

    Stipulations properly relied on at termination. —

    It was no error to rely, at termination, on stipulations related to a father’s revoked entrustment agreement because (1) such revocation did not revoke the stipulations, (2) the father conceded the facts supported termination, and (3) the father did not add to the stipulation before the stipulation was entered. Boatright v. Wise County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 64 Va. App. 71, 764 S.E.2d 724, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 374 (2014).

    § 63.2-1224. Explanation of process, legal effects of adoption required.

    Prior to the placement of a child for adoption, the licensed child-placing agency or local board having custody of the child shall provide an explanation of the adoption process to the birth mother and, if reasonably available, the man who is an acknowledged father pursuant to § 20-49.1 , an adjudicated father pursuant to § 20-49.8 , a presumed father pursuant to § 63.2-1202 , or a putative father who has registered with the Virginia Birth Father Registry pursuant to Article 7 (§ 63.2-1249 et seq.) of this chapter.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.2; 1990, c. 202; 1991, c. 364; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.31; 2002, c. 747; 2010, c. 855; 2017, c. 200.

    The 2010 amendments.

    The 2010 amendment by c. 855 substituted the language beginning “shall provide an explanation of the adoption process to the birth mother” through to the end for “shall counsel the birth mother or if reasonably available, both birth parents, concerning the disposition of their child.”

    The 2017 amendments.

    The 2017 amendment by c. 200 substituted “Virginia Birth Father Registry” for “Putative Father Registry.”

    § 63.2-1225. Determination of appropriate home.

    1. In determining the appropriate home in which to place a child for adoption, a married couple or an unmarried individual shall be eligible to receive placement of a child for purposes of adoption. Prior to or after the acceptance of custody of a child placed for adoption, a licensed child-placing agency or a local board shall consider the recommendations of the birth parent(s), a physician or attorney licensed in the Commonwealth, or a clergyman who is familiar with the situation of the prospective adoptive parent(s) or the child. No birth parent, physician, attorney or clergyman shall advertise that he is available to make recommendations, nor shall he charge any fee for such recommendations to a board or agency, except that an attorney may charge for legal fees and services rendered in connection with such placement.
    2. The agency or local board may give consideration to placement of the child with the recommended adoptive parent(s) if the agency or local board finds that such placement is in the best interest of the child. When the birth parent(s) has recommended such placement, the agency or local board shall provide the birth parent(s) the opportunity to be represented by independent legal counsel as well as the opportunity for counseling with a social worker, family-services specialist, or other qualified equivalent worker. The agency or board also shall advise the prospective adoptive parent(s) of the right to be represented by independent legal counsel. The parties may, but are not required to, exchange identifying information as provided for in subdivision A 3 of § 63.2-1232 .

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.2; 1990, c. 202; 1991, c. 364; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.32; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 779; 2006, cc. 654, 825; 2009, c. 805; 2014, c. 285.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2003 amendments.

    The 2003 amendment by c. 779 added the second sentence.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 654 and 825 are identical, and rewrote the section. Acts 2006, c. 654 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825 is effective July 1, 2007.

    The 2009 amendments.

    The 2009 amendment by c. 805, in subsection A, substituted “Prior to or after the acceptance of custody of a child placed for adoption” for “When” and deleted “accepts custody of the child for purposes of placing the child for adoption, the agency or local board” preceding “shall consider the.”

    The 2014 amendments.

    The 2014 amendment by c. 285, effective March 24, 2014, in subsection B inserted “family-services specialist, or other qualified equivalent worker” at the end of the second sentence.

    Law Review.

    For 2006 survey article, “Family and Juvenile Law,” see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 151 (2006).

    § 63.2-1226. When birth parents recommend adoptive parents.

    When a licensed child-placing agency or a local board is requested to accept custody of a child for the purpose of placing the child with adoptive parent(s) recommended by the birth parent(s) or a person other than a licensed child-placing agency or local board, either the parental placement adoption provisions or the agency adoption provisions of this chapter shall apply to such placement at the election of the birth parent(s). Such agency or local board shall provide information to the birth parent(s) regarding the parental placement adoption and agency adoption provisions and shall provide the birth parent the opportunity to be represented by independent legal counsel as well as counseling with a social worker, family-services specialist, or other qualified equivalent worker. No person shall charge, pay, give, or agree to give or accept any money, property, services, or other thing of value in connection with such adoption except as provided in § 63.2-1218 .

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.2; 1990, c. 202; 1991, c. 364; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.33; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 654, 825; 2007, cc. 606, 623; 2014, c. 285.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 654 and 825 are identical, and rewrote the section. Acts 2006, c. 654, is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825, is effective July 1, 2007.

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and substituted “accept” for “and accepts” preceding “custody” near the beginning of the section.

    The 2014 amendments.

    The 2014 amendment by c. 285, effective March 24, 2014, inserted “family-services specialist, or other qualified equivalent worker” at the end of the second sentence.

    § 63.2-1227. Filing of petition for agency adoption.

    A petition for the adoption of a child placed in the physical custody of the petitioners by a child-placing agency shall be filed in the name by which the child will be known after adoption, provided the name is followed by the registration number of the child’s original birth certificate and the state or country in which the registration occurred unless it is verified by the registrar of vital statistics of the state or country of birth that such information is not available. In the case of a child born in another country, an affidavit by a representative of the child-placing agency that a birth certificate number is not available may be substituted for verification by a registrar of vital statistics for that country. The report of investigation required by § 63.2-1208 and, when applicable, the report required by § 63.2-1212 shall be identified with the child’s name as it appears on the birth certificate, the birth registration number and the name by which the child is to be known after the final order of adoption is entered. The petition for adoption shall not state the birth name of the child or identify the birth parents unless it is specifically stated in the agency’s consent that the parties have exchanged identifying information.

    A single petition for adoption under the provisions of this section shall be sufficient for the concurrent adoption by the same petitioners of two or more children who have the same birth parent or parents, and nothing in this section shall be construed as having heretofore required a separate petition for each of such children.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-348; 1952, c. 550; 1954, c. 489; 1956, c. 300; 1964, c. 459; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-221; 1970, c. 672; 1973, c. 406; 1975, c. 461; 1978, c. 730; 1983, c. 614; 1988, c. 882; 1989, c. 647; 1991, cc. 76, 602; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.34; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 825, 848.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are identical, and in the first paragraph, substituted “physical custody” for “home” in the first sentence, inserted the second sentence and added the last sentence. Acts 2006, c. 848 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825, is effective July 1, 2007.

    § 63.2-1228. Forwarding of petition.

    Upon the filing of the petition, the circuit court shall, upon being satisfied as to proper jurisdiction and venue, immediately enter an order referring the case to a child-placing agency to conduct an investigation and prepare a report pursuant to § 63.2-1208 . Upon entry of the order of reference, the court shall forward a copy of the petition and all exhibits thereto to the Commissioner and to the agency that placed the child. In cases where the child was placed by an agency in another state, or by an agency, court, or other entity in another country, the petition and all exhibits shall be forwarded to the local director or licensed child-placing agency, whichever agency completed the home study or provided supervision. If no Virginia agency provided such services, or such agency is no longer licensed or has gone out of business, the petition and all exhibits shall be forwarded to the local director of the locality where the petitioners reside or resided at the time of filing the petition, or had legal residence at the time of the filing of the petition.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-349; 1954, c. 489; 1956, c. 489; 1956, c. 187; 1962, c. 603; 1964, c. 429; 1968, cc. 346, 578, § 63.1-223; 1974, cc. 26, 493, 507; 1975, c. 364; 1978, c. 730; 1980, c. 740; 1982, c. 115; 1988, cc. 579, 599, 882; 1989, c. 647; 1992, c. 607; 1993, c. 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.35; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 825, 848.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.”

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are identical, and divided the former first sentence into the first and second sentences by adding “Upon entry of the order of reference, the court shall” preceding “forward a copy” and added the language beginning “upon being satisfied” to the end of the first sentence and inserted “or such agency is no longer licensed or has gone out of business” in the last sentence. Acts 2006, c. 848 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825, is effective July 1, 2007.

    §§ 63.2-1228.1, 63.2-1228.2. Repealed by Acts 2010, c. 331, cl. 2.

    Editor’s note.

    Former §§ 63.2-1228.1 and 63.2-1228.2, relating to post-adoption contact and communication agreements, and jurisdiction to approve such agreements, were enacted by Acts 2009, cc. 98 and 260.

    § 63.2-1229. Foster parent adoption.

    When a foster parent who has a child placed in the foster parents’ home by a licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency desires to adopt the child and (i) the child-placing agency holding custody of the child consents to the adoption after the child has resided in the home of such foster parent continuously for at least six months or the child-placing agency holding custody of the child does not consent to the adoption and the child has resided in the home of such foster parent continuously for at least 18 months and (ii) the birth parents’ rights to the child have been terminated, the circuit court shall accept the petition filed by the foster parent and shall order a thorough investigation of the matter to be made pursuant to § 63.2-1208 . The circuit court may refer the matter for investigation to a licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency other than the agency holding custody of the child. Upon completion of the investigation and report and filing of the consent of the agency holding custody of the child, or upon the finding contemplated by § 63.2-1205 , the circuit court may enter a final order of adoption waiving visitation requirements, if the circuit court determines that the adoption is in the best interests of the child.

    History. Code 1950, § 63-348; 1952, c. 550; 1954, c. 489; 1956, c. 300; 1964, c. 459; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-221; 1970, c. 672; 1973, c. 406; 1975, c. 461; 1978, c. 730; 1983, c. 614; 1988, c. 882; 1989, c. 647; 1991, cc. 76, 602; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.36; 2002, c. 747; 2007, cc. 606, 623; 2018, c. 94.

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendments by cc. 606 and 623 are identical, and substituted “§ 63.2-1205 ” for “subsection D of § 63.2-1202 ” near the end of the section.

    The 2018 amendments.

    The 2018 amendment by c. 94, effective March 2, 2018, inserted “child-placing agency holding custody of the child consents to the adoption after the child has resided in the home of such foster parent continuously for at least six months or the child-placing agency holding custody of the child does not consent to the adoption and the” in clause (i) and made a stylistic change.

    Law Review.

    For essay, “Virginia Ranks Forty-Ninth of Fifty: The Need for Stronger Laws Supporting Foster Youth,” see 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 255 (2018).

    CASE NOTES

    Adoption proper. —

    Circuit court correctly determined that the adoption could proceed because the adoptive parents originally received custody of the children as foster parents, and the statute’s other conditions were satisfied; the plain meaning of “foster parent” included one in the adoptive parents’ position, either before or after their custody petition’s award. Harvey v. Flockhart, 65 Va. App. 131, 775 S.E.2d 427, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 247 (2015).

    Article 3. Parental Placement Adoptions.

    § 63.2-1230. Placement of children by parent or guardian.

    The birth parent, legal guardian, or adoptive parent of a child may place his child for adoption directly with the adoptive parents of his choice. Consent to the proposed adoption shall be executed upon compliance with the provisions of this chapter before a juvenile and domestic relations district court or, if the birth parent or legal guardian does not reside in Virginia, before a court having jurisdiction over child custody matters in the jurisdiction where the birth parent or legal guardian resides when requested by a juvenile and domestic relations district court of this Commonwealth, pursuant to § 20-146.11 . Consent proceedings shall be advanced on the juvenile and domestic relations district court docket so as to be heard by the court within ten days of filing of the petition, or as soon thereafter as practicable so as to provide the earliest possible disposition.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.3; 1991, cc. 364, 602; 1992, c. 125; 1993, cc. 338, 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.37; 2001, c. 305; 2002, c. 747; 2009, c. 805.

    Cross references.

    As to removal of child from adoptive home, see § 63.2-1207 . As to appointment of counsel and guardian ad litem, see § 16.1-266.

    The 2009 amendments.

    The 2009 amendment by c. 805 inserted “or adoptive parent,” made a related change, and made a minor stylistic change.

    Law Review.

    For 2000 survey of Virginia law regarding children, see 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 939 (2000).

    CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

    Jurisdiction. —

    Motion filed by a mother and father to dismiss foster parents’ adoption petition was granted because the case did not involve a parental placement within the meaning of §§ 63.2-1230 through 63.2-1240 ; the custody order did not mention any placement for the purpose of foster care or adoption, and neither birth parent placed the child with the foster parents for adoption. In re Terry, 78 Va. Cir. 25, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 272 (Henrico County Nov. 13, 2008).

    Parental placement adoption denied. —

    Petition did not meet the requirements for a parental placement adoption since neither birth parent consented to the placement, a consent hearing had not been conducted, and the court could not certify compliance with § 63.2-1232 , since the trial court did not make a determination regarding the home study and the Virginia Department of Social Services did not recommend the prospective parents for placement. In re Pruett, 87 Va. Cir. 68, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 80 (Roanoke County Aug. 15, 2013).

    CASE NOTES

    Subject matter jurisdiction. —

    Because a juvenile and domestic relations (JDR) district court had no jurisdiction to hear a petition related to consent for adoption that was not a parental placement adoption, a circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction at all to hear the appeal as the circuit court had no more subject matter jurisdiction than the JDR district court had in that court’s original proceeding. Knight v. Ottrix, 69 Va. App. 519, 820 S.E.2d 411, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (2018).

    § 63.2-1231. Home study; meeting required; exception.

    1. Prior to the consent hearing in the juvenile and domestic relations district court, a home study of the adoptive parent(s) shall be completed by a licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency and the prospective adoptive parents shall be informed that information about shaken baby syndrome, its effects, and resources for help and support for caretakers is available on a website maintained by the Department in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board. Home studies by local boards shall be conducted in accordance with the Mutual Family Assessment home study template and any addenda thereto developed by the Department. All home studies conducted pursuant to this section, whether by a local board or a child-placing agency, shall make inquiry as to (i) whether the prospective adoptive parents are financially able, morally suitable, and in satisfactory physical and mental health to enable them to care for the child; (ii) the physical and mental condition of the child, if known; (iii) the circumstances under which the child came to live, or will be living, in the home of the prospective adoptive family, as applicable; (iv) what fees have been paid by the prospective adoptive family or in their behalf in the placement and adoption of the child; (v) whether the requirements of subdivisions A 1, A 2, A 3, and A 5 of § 63.2-1232 have been met; and (vi) any other matters specified by the circuit court. In the course of the home study, the agency social worker, family-services specialist, or other qualified equivalent worker shall meet at least once with the birth parent(s) and at least once with the prospective adoptive parents. Upon agreement of both parties, such meetings may occur simultaneously or separately.
    2. Any home study conducted pursuant to this section for the purpose of parental placement or agency placement shall be valid for a period of 36 months from the date of completion of the study. However, the Board may, by regulation, require an additional state criminal background check before finalizing an adoption if more than 18 months have passed from the completion of the home study.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.3; 1991, cc. 364, 602; 1992, c. 125; 1993, cc. 338, 553; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1999, c. 1028; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.38; 2002, c. 747; 2006, cc. 825, 848; 2007, c. 808; 2008, c. 494; 2010, c. 551; 2014, c. 285; 2017, c. 193.

    Editor’s note.

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 2, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall be enacted July 1, 2007.”

    Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3, provides: “That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law.” The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

    Acts 2017, c. 193, cl. 2 provides: “That the Department of Social Services is authorized to amend or update its Mutual Family Assessment home study template and any addenda thereto when necessary to improve the process of adoptive and foster placements, provided such amendments or updates do not lessen the requirements of the home study process.”

    The 2006 amendments.

    The 2006 amendments by cc. 825 and 848 are identical, and deleted the former last sentence, which read: “When the child has been placed with prospective adoptive parents who are related to the child as specified in subdivision 6 of § 63.1-1233, this meeting is not required.” Acts 2006, c. 848 is effective July 1, 2006. Acts 2006, c. 825, is effective July 1, 2007.

    The 2007 amendments.

    The 2007 amendment by c. 808, in the third sentence, substituted “at least once with the prospective adoptive parents” for “prospective adoptive parents simultaneously”; and added the present last sentence.

    The 2008 amendments.

    The 2008 amendment by c. 494 designated the existing provisions as subsection A; and added subsection B.

    The 2010 amendments.

    The 2010 amendment by c. 551 inserted “and the prospective adoptive parents shall be informed that information about shaken baby syndrome, its effects, and resources for help and support for caretakers is available on a website maintained by the Department” in the first sentence of subsection A.

    The 2014 amendments.

    The 2014 amendment by c. 285, effective March 24, 2014, in subsection A, inserted “family-services specialist, or other qualified equivalent worker” in the third sentence.

    The 2017 amendments.

    The 2017 amendment by c. 193, in subsection A, inserted the second sentence, and substituted “All home studies conducted pursuant to this section, whether by a local board or a child-placing agency” for “The home study” in the third sentence.

    § 63.2-1232. Requirements of a parental placement adoption; exception.

    1. The juvenile and domestic relations district court shall not accept consent until it determines that:
      1. The birth parent(s) are aware of alternatives to adoption, adoption procedures, and opportunities for placement with other adoptive families, and that the birth parents’ consent is informed and uncoerced.
      2. A licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency has counseled the prospective adoptive parents with regard to alternatives to adoption, adoption procedures, including the need to address the parental rights of birth parents, the procedures for terminating such rights, and opportunities for adoption of other children; that the prospective adoptive parents’ decision is informed and uncoerced; and that they intend to file an adoption petition and proceed toward a final order of adoption.
      3. The birth parent(s) and adoptive parents have exchanged identifying information including but not limited to full names, addresses, physical, mental, social and psychological information and any other information necessary to promote the welfare of the child, unless both parties agree in writing to waive the disclosure of full names and addresses.
      4. Any financial agreement or exchange of property among the parties and any fees charged or paid for services related to the placement or adoption of the child have been disclosed to the court and that all parties understand that no binding contract regarding placement or adoption of the child exists.
      5. There has been no violation of the provisions of § 63.2-1218 in connection with the placement; however, if it appears there has been such violation, the court shall not reject consent of the birth parent to the adoption for that reason alone but shall report the alleged violation as required by § 63.2-1219 .
      6. A licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency has conducted a home study of the prospective adoptive home in accordance with regulations established by the Board and, in the case of home studies by local boards, in accordance with the Mutual Family Assessment home study template and any addenda thereto developed by the Department, and has provided to the court a report of such home study, which shall contain the agency’s recommendation regarding the suitability of the placement. A married couple or an unmarried individual shall be eligible to receive placement of a child for adoption.
      7. The birth parent(s) have been informed of their opportunity to be represented by legal counsel.
    2. The juvenile and domestic relations district court shall not accept the consent if the requirements of subsection A have not been met. In such cases, it shall refer the birth parent to a licensed or duly authorized child-placing agency for investigation and recommendation in accordance with §§ 63.2-1208 and 63.2-1238 . If the juvenile and domestic relations district court determines that any of the parties is financially unable to obtain the required services, it shall refer the matter to the local director.
    3. In cases in which a birth parent who resides in the Commonwealth places his child for adoption with adoptive parents in another state and the laws of that receiving state govern the proceeding for adoption, the birth parent may elect to waive the execution of consent pursuant to § 63.2-1233 and instead execute consent to the adoption pursuant to the laws of the receiving state. Any waiver of consent made pursuant to this subsection shall be made under oath and in writing, and shall expressly state that the birth parent has received independent legal counsel from an attorney licensed in the Commonwealth of Virginia advising him of the laws of the Commonwealth, the laws of the receiving state pursuant to which he elects to consent to the adoption, and the effects of his waiver of consent pursuant to § 63.2-1233 and election to consent pursuant to the laws of the receiving state. Any waiver of consent and election to consent pursuant to the laws of a receiving state shall include the name, address, and telephone number of such legal counsel. Failure to comply with this section shall render a waiver of consent pursuant to § 63.2-1233 and election to consent pursuant to the laws of the receiving state as authorized by this subsection invalid.
    4. When consent to a parental placement adoption is sought pursuant to this article and the prospective adoptive parent(s) have had continuous physical and legal custody of the child for five or more years, the juvenile and domestic relations district court may, in its discretion, accept consent without (i) a home study as required by subsection A of § 63.2-1231 and subdivision A 6 of this section and (ii) the meeting and counseling requirements, as they relate to the prospective adoptive parent(s), listed in subsection A of § 63.2-1231 and subdivision A 2 of this section. All other provisions of the parental placement adoption statutes shall apply.

    History. 1989, c. 647, § 63.1-220.3; 1991, cc. 364, 602; 1992, c. 125; 1993, cc