COURTS OF RECORD
ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
Cross references: For the disposition of fines and fees levied and collected in state courts, see § 30-10-102 (2); for the disposition of fines, penalties, or forfeitures collected pursuant to title 42, see § 42-1-217.
Law reviews: For a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with courts and procedure, see 66 Den. U. L. Rev. 739 (1989); for a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with courts and procedure, see 67 Den. U. L. Rev. 675 (1990).
Section
PART 1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
13-1-101. Clerks shall keep record books.
The clerks of the courts of record in this state shall keep in their respective offices suitable books for indexing the records of their said offices, one to be known as the direct index and one as the inverse index.
Source: L. 1889: p. 107, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1392. C.L. § 5610. CSA: C. 46, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-1.
ANNOTATION
Books of court are admissible as evidence. If the county court permits one of the books of its office to be taken into another court as evidence, the objection that the original, and not a certified copy, is produced is not tenable. McAllister v. People ex rel. Brisbane, 28 Colo. 156, 63 P. 308 (1900).
13-1-102. Entries in records.
In said indexes, the clerks shall properly enter the title of each cause or matter instituted in said courts and the case number references to the various orders, rulings, judgments, papers, and other proceedings of the court in such cause or matter. Any case number reference may be to a file jacket, page in a record book, microfilm record, or computer record.
Source: L. 1889: p. 107, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1393. C.L. § 5611. CSA: C. 46, § 2. CRS 53: § 37-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-2. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 596, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1-103. Lost or destroyed records.
When the record of any judgment, or decree, or other proceeding of any judicial court of this state, or any part of the record of any judicial proceeding has been lost or destroyed, any party or person interested therein, on application by complaint in writing under oath to such court and on showing to the satisfaction of such court that the same has been lost or destroyed without fault or negligence of the party or person making such application, may obtain an order from such court authorizing the defect to be supplied by a duly certified copy of the original record, where the same can be obtained, which certificate shall thereafter have the same effect as the original record would have had in all respects.
Source: L. 1889: p. 108, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1396. C.L. § 5614. CSA: C. 46, § 5. CRS 53: § 37-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-4.
13-1-104. Application for new order or record.
When the loss or destruction of any record or part thereof has happened, and such defects cannot be supplied as provided in section 13-1-103, any party or person interested therein may make a written application to the court to which such record belonged, verified by affidavit, showing the loss or destruction thereof, and that certified copies thereof cannot be obtained by the party or person making such application, and the substance of the record so lost or destroyed, and that the loss or destruction occurred without the fault or negligence of the party or person making such application, and that the loss or destruction of the record, unless supplied, will or may result in damage to the party or person making such application. The court shall cause said application to be entered of record in said court, and due notice of said application shall be given by personal service of summons or by publication as in other cases; except that, in cases in which publication is required, the court may direct by order, to be entered of record, the form of the notice, and designate the newspaper in which the same shall be published. If, upon such hearing, said court is satisfied that the statements contained in said application are true, the court shall make an order embracing the substance and effect of the lost or destroyed record, which order shall be entered of record in said court and have the same effect which the original record would have had if the same had not been lost or destroyed insofar as concerns the party or person making such application and the persons who had been notified, as provided for in this section. The record in all cases where the proceeding was in rem and no personal service was had may be supplied upon like notice, as nearly as may be, as in the original proceeding.
Source: L. 1889: p. 108, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1397. C.L. § 5615. CSA: C. 46, § 6. CRS 53: § 37-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-5.
13-1-105. Procedure where probate records destroyed.
In case of the destruction by fire or otherwise of the records, or a part thereof, of any court having probate jurisdiction, the court may proceed, upon its own motion or upon the application in writing of any party in interest, to restore the records, papers, and proceedings of the court relating to the estate of deceased persons, including recorded wills and wills probated or filed for probate in said court. The power of restoration granted in this section shall also extend to the records, papers, proceedings, and documents of any previous court of probate which are or should be in the custody of a probate or district court. For the purpose of restoring said records, wills, papers, or proceedings, or any part thereof, the court may cause citations to be issued to all parties to be designated by it and may compel the attendance in court of any witness whose testimony may be necessary to establish any such record, or part thereof, and the production of any and all written and documentary evidence which it deems necessary in determining the true import and effect of the original record, will, paper, or other document belonging to the files of the court, and may make such orders and decrees establishing such original record, will, paper, document, or proceeding, or the substance thereof, as to it seems just and proper. The court may make all such rules and regulations governing the proceedings for the restoration of the record, will, paper, document, and proceeding pertaining to the court as in its judgment will best secure the rights and protect the interests of all parties concerned.
Source: L. 1889: p. 109, § 3. R.S. 08: § 1398. C.L. § 5616. CSA: C. 46, § 7. CRS 53: § 37-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-6. L. 64: p. 224, § 56.
13-1-106. Certified copy of record in supreme court or court of appeals.
In all causes which have been removed to the supreme court of this state or to the court of appeals, a duly certified copy of the record of such cause remaining in the supreme court or the court of appeals may be filed in the court from which said cause was removed, on motion of any party or person claiming to be interested therein, and the copy so filed shall have the same effect as the original record would have had if the same had not been lost or destroyed.
Source: L. 1889: p. 110, § 4. R.S. 08: § 1399. C.L. § 5617. CSA: C. 46, § 8. CRS 53: § 37-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-7. L. 69: p. 269, § 3.
13-1-107. Costs of replacement.
The person making the application for the restoration of records shall pay all the costs thereof.
Source: L. 1897: p. 151, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1400. C.L. § 5621. CSA: C. 46, § 9. CRS 53: § 37-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-8.
13-1-108. Judge may order adjournment.
When in the opinion of the judge of any district or county court it is unnecessary or inadvisable to hold or convene any term of court fixed by statute, he may by an order in writing signed by him and filed with the clerk of such court adjourn the same sine die, or to a day certain, and the judges of said courts respectively have power to adjourn said courts, from time to time as may seem advisable, by written order signed and filed with the clerk of the court which may be so adjourned.
Source: L. 1897: p. 151, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1407. C.L. § 5621. CSA: C. 46, § 12. CRS 53: § 37-1-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-9.
13-1-109. Court may appoint trustee.
In all actions in any court of record of this state wherein any defendant is not found within the jurisdiction of the court and constructive service alone is had, and which is brought for the enforcement of an express, implied, or resulting trust, or for the removal of cloud from title to real estate, or for specific performance, or for the establishment of a lost or destroyed deed, conveyance, or instrument in writing, or for the establishment and proof of any conveyance, deed, or instrument in writing not properly proved and acknowledged, or in any other proceeding in rem, or affecting only specific property, where, according to the usual practice in courts of chancery, the court, if the defendant had been personally served, might direct or decree any act to be done or performed by the defendant in favor of plaintiff, the court may appoint a trustee for such defendant to do and perform in the place and stead of and for such defendant the acts required by the decree rendered in any such cause. Any act lawfully done by such trustee, under and in pursuance of any such decree, shall be as binding and effectual for all purposes as if done and performed by the defendant in pursuance of such decree.
Source: L. 1887: p. 254, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1408. C.L. § 5622. CSA: C. 46, § 13. CRS 53: § 37-1-10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-10.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For note, "Decrees in Rem Under the New Rules", see 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 140 (1941). For article, "A Decade of Colorado Law: Conflict of Laws, Security, Contracts and Equity", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247 (1951).
13-1-110. Appeal bond defective or insufficient.
If, at any time pending an appeal in any action, suit, or other proceeding, it appears to the appellate court that the appeal bond or undertaking is defective or insufficient or that any surety thereon has died, or has removed or is about to remove from this state, or has become or is likely to become insolvent, such appellate court shall order another appeal bond or undertaking, or such other and further security as to the appellate court seems proper, if the appellant or his attorney of record has been served with at least twenty-four hours' written notice of an application of the appellee for such order. If the appellant fails to comply with said order within ten days after the making of the same, the appeal shall be dismissed.
Source: L. 19: p. 113, § 1. C.L. § 5623. CSA: C. 46, § 14. CRS 53: § 37-1-11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-11. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1575, § 11, effective July 10.
ANNOTATION
The appellate court has full powers of determining the sufficiency of appeal bonds. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561 , 27 P.2d 588 (1933).
An objection to the sufficiency of an appeal bond in a lower court cannot be raised for first time on review. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561 , 27 P.2d 588 (1933).
In effect this section abolishes motions to dismiss appeals for insufficient bond, and substitutes a motion for new bond, and where no such motion is filed, a motion to dismiss for defective bond is properly overruled. Peters v. Peters, 82 Colo. 503, 261 P. 874 (1927).
Powers of appellate court. The appellate court can set the amount of an appeal bond, order an additional surety, or approve the signature of a new surety on an old bond. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561 , 27 P.2d 588 (1933).
Court can provide for addition of new sureties. If, after the approval of an appeal bond, it is found that a surety is insufficient, this section provides for the addition of new sureties, even after appeal. Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313 , 14 P.2d 693 (1932).
The fact that a new surety signed the first bond instead of new one is immaterial. Where on appeal the surety on the bond died and another was procured, the fact that the latter, through inadvertence, signed the first instead of the new bond, was held immaterial, where the bond signed had endorsed thereon the approval of the court clerk. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561 , 27 P.2d 588 (1933).
Filing appeal bond without order fixing amount does not nullify appeal. Where on appeal from county to district court, the county judge entered an order reciting the filing of an appeal bond and its approval, the mere fact that there was no order fixing the amount of the bond did not nullify the appeal. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561 , 27 P.2d 588 (1933).
Appeal bond as used in this statute means the cost bond described by C.A.R. 7 and not a supersedeas bond. Hart v. Schwab, 990 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1999).
13-1-111. Courts of record.
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Each of the following courts shall have a seal and shall be a court of record:
- The supreme court;
- The district courts;
- The county courts;
- The juvenile court in the city and county of Denver;
- The probate court in the city and county of Denver;
- Any court established by law and expressly denominated a court of record;
- Repealed.
- The court of appeals.
Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 412. Code 08: § 447. Code 21: § 449. Code 35: § 449. CRS 53: § 37-1-12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-12. L. 64: p. 224, § 57. L. 72: p. 590, § 53. L. 77: (1)(h) added, p. 279, § 24, effective June 29. L. 79: IP(1) amended, p. 596, § 2, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(g) repealed, p. 572, § 12, effective November 14, 1986.
ANNOTATION
The acts of a court of record are known by its records. Judicial records are not only necessary but indispensable to the administration of justice. The court judgments can be evidenced only by its records. The acts of a court of record are known by its records alone and cannot be established by parol testimony. The court speaks only through its records, and the judge speaks only through the court. Herren v. People, 147 Colo. 442 , 363 P.2d 1044 (1961).
13-1-112. Clerk to keep seal.
The clerk of each court of record shall keep the seal thereof.
Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 413. Code 08: § 448. Code 21: § 450. Code 35: § 450. CRS 53: § 37-1-13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-13.
13-1-113. Seal - how attached.
- A seal of a court or public officer, when required on any writ, process, or proceeding or to authenticate a copy of any record or document, may be impressed with wax, wafer, or any other substance and then attached to the writ, process, or proceeding or to the copy of the record or document, or it may be impressed on the paper alone or electronically attached to or logically associated with an electronic record or document. When jury summonses, subpoenas, or subpoenas duces tecum are prepared by means of mechanical reproduction, the seal of the summoning court may be printed thereon instead of being impressed.
- A seal may also consist of a rubber stamp with a facsimile affixed thereon of the seal required to be used and may be placed or stamped upon the document requiring the seal with indelible ink.
Source: L. 1887: p. 198, § 362. Code 08: § 396. Code 21: § 397. Code 35: § 397. CRS 53: § 37-1-14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-14. L. 67: p. 70, § 1. L. 75: Entire section R&RE, p. 489, § 4, effective July 14. L. 80: (1) amended, p. 506, § 1, effective March 25. L. 2011: (1) amended, (HB 11-1018), ch. 18, p. 46, § 1, effective March 11.
13-1-114. Powers of court.
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Every court has power:
- To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
- To enforce order in the proceedings before it or before a person empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
- To compel obedience to its lawful judgments, orders, and process and to the lawful orders of its judge out of court in action or proceeding pending therein;
- To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers; and
- To preserve access to courthouses and court proceedings, prevent interruption of court proceedings, and enforce protection from civil arrest at a courthouse or on its environs pursuant to section 13-1-403.
- Any judge of any court, when he reasonably believes that there is a risk of violence in the court, shall immediately advise the law enforcement agency designated to provide security for the court, and the law enforcement agency shall determine and provide appropriate security measures consistent with the degree of risk present. For the purpose of this subsection (2), a district or county judge shall have the assistance of the county sheriff, and a municipal judge shall have the assistance of the municipal police department. The court shall have discretion to assess all or part of the expense incurred in implementing such security measures as costs to be paid by the party or parties or other person or persons determined by the court to have necessitated such security measures.
- Any county sheriff or municipal peace officer providing security for persons involved in judicial proceedings in courts pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from civil liability for damages except for gross negligence or reckless, wanton, or intentional misconduct.
Source: L. 1887: p. 216, § 428. Code 08: § 463. Code 21: § 464. Code 35: § 464. CRS 53: § 37-1-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-15. L. 86: (2) and (3) added, p. 673, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2020: (1)(d) amended and (1)(e) added, (SB 20-083), ch. 63, p. 218, § 2, effective March 23.
ANNOTATION
A county's duties under subsection (2) may not be reduced or ended pursuant to art. X, § 20(9) of the state constitution. State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).
Applied in Campbell v. District Court, 304 Colo. 195 , 577 P.2d 1096 (1978).
13-1-115. Courts may issue proper writs.
The courts have power to issue all writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of the power conferred on them by the constitution and laws of this state. The district courts have authority in ne exeat proceedings according to the usual practice in such cases in courts of chancery.
Source: L. 1887: p. 217, § 434. L. 1891: p. 85, § 1. Code 08: § 469. Code 21: § 470. Code 35: § 470. CRS 53: § 37-1-16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-16.
ANNOTATION
The court, in a civil action, has authority to issue a writ of ne exeat to protect the interests of a litigant. Struble v. Hicks, 123 Colo. 16 , 224 P.2d 932 (1950) (decided under repealed § 31 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935, which was similar to this section).
C.R.C.P. 106 merely abolished the form and not the substance of the remedial writs such as the writ of ne exeat. A district court still possesses the authority to issue a writ in the nature of ne exeat, which is designed to prevent a person from leaving the court's jurisdiction. In re People ex rel. B.C., 981 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1999).
13-1-116. Courts sit at county seat.
Every court of record shall sit at the county seat of the county in which it is held, except as may be otherwise provided by law.
Source: L. 1887: p. 214, § 418. Code 08: § 453. Code 21: § 455. Code 35: § 455. CRS 53: § 37-1-18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-18.
ANNOTATION
A district court can be in session only in its own county. State Bank v. Plummer, 46 Colo. 71, 102 P. 1082 (1909) (decided under repealed provisions antecedent to § 25 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935).
Moving trial to hospital to hear closing arguments, give instructions to jury, and allow jury to deliberate because of a seriously ill juror did not deprive court of jurisdiction and retrial will not constitute double jeopardy. People v. Higa, 735 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1987).
Section 13-5-119 (2) is an exception to the county seat requirement in this section. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).
13-1-117. Juridical days.
The courts of justice may be held and judicial business may be transacted on any day except as provided in section 13-1-118.
Source: L. 1887: p. 213, § 415. Code 08: § 450. Code 21: § 452. Code 35: § 452. CRS 53: § 37-1-19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-19.
ANNOTATION
There can be no exceptions to statutory days of judicial business. When the law has prescribed a time and place at which the judicial business of the county must be transacted, there can be no exception to the provision, unless it is expressly made by statute. State Bank v. Plummer, 46 Colo. 71, 102 P. 1082 (1909); Scott v. Stutheit, 21 Colo. App. 28, 121 P. 151 (1912) (decided under repealed provisions antecedent to § 25 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935).
13-1-118. Judicial holidays.
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No court shall be opened nor shall any judicial business be transacted on Sunday or any legal holiday except for the following purposes:
- To give, upon their request, instruction to a jury then deliberating on their verdict;
- To receive a verdict or discharge a jury;
- For the exercise of the powers of a judge in a criminal action or in a proceeding of a criminal nature;
- When it appears by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or someone in his behalf, in cases for the recovery of specific personal property, that the defendant is about to conceal, dispose of, or remove such property out of the jurisdiction of the court, an order for taking possession of the same may be issued and the writ or process executed on any day;
- When an application for writ of attachment is made, if it shall appear by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or someone in his behalf, that the defendant is about to dispose of, conceal, or remove property subject to execution or attachment out of the jurisdiction of the court, a writ of attachment may be issued and executed on any day.
- When the day fixed for the opening of a court falls on any of the days mentioned in this section, the court shall stand adjourned until the next succeeding day.
Source: L. 1887: p. 213, § 416. Code 08: § 451. Code 21: §§ 451, 453. Code 35: § 453. CRS 53: § 37-1-20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-20.
ANNOTATION
Verdicts may be received on a judicial holiday. Receiving a verdict is a ministerial act performed for the jury in a judicial proceeding. The weight of authority is to the end that verdicts, the result of trials started and concluded before Sunday, may be received on Sunday and statutory holidays. Carr v. People, 99 Colo. 477 , 63 P.2d 1221 (1936) (decided under repealed § 23 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935, which was similar to this section).
Judgment entered on legal holiday not void and becomes effective next business day. Subsection (1) does not provide that any judicial business transacted in violation of its provisions is void. Rather, the statute is silent as to the effect of any order entered or other judicial business transacted in violation of its prohibitions. Subsection (2) provides that the effect of having a day fixed for the opening of a court that falls on a prohibited day is that "the court shall stand adjourned until the next succeeding day." Thus, the effect of the trial court's entry of an order reviving judgment on a legal holiday was not to invalidate the order but, rather, merely to postpone its effective date until the next day the courts were open. Arvada 1st Indus. Bank v. Hutchison, 15 P.3d 292 (Colo. App. 2000).
13-1-119. Judgment record and register of actions open for inspection.
The judgment record and register of actions shall be open at all times during office hours for the inspection of the public without charge, and it is the duty of the clerk to arrange the several records kept by him in such manner as to facilitate their inspection. In addition to paper records, such information may also be presented on microfilm or computer terminal.
Source: L. 1887: p. 166, § 231. Code 08: § 250. Code 21: § 251. Code 35: § 251. CRS 53: § 37-1-21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-21. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 596, § 3, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
The court did not err by taking judicial notice of defendant's probation status after determining the status from the state computer system. Since this section and Crim. P. 55 expressly approve of records kept and maintained in a state computer system, the court may take judicial notice of the court records contained in the system. People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008).
13-1-119.5. Electronic access to name index and register of actions.
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Statewide electronic read-only access to the name index and register of actions of public case types must be made available to the following agencies or attorneys appointed by the court:
- County departments, as defined in section 19-1-103, and attorneys who represent the county departments as county attorneys, as defined in section 19-1-103, as it relates to the attorneys' work representing the county;
- The office of the state public defender, created in section 21-1-101, C.R.S.;
- Guardians ad litem under contract with the office of the child's representative, created in section 13-91-104, or authorized by the office of the child's representative to act as a guardian ad litem, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court;
- Attorneys under contract with the office of the alternate defense counsel, created in section 21-2-101, C.R.S., as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court;
- A respondent parent's counsel under contract with the office of the respondent parents' counsel, created in section 13-92-103, or authorized by the office of the respondent parents' counsel to act as a respondent parent's counsel, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court;
- Criminal justice agencies as described in section 24-72-302 (3); and
- A licensed attorney working with a nonprofit association pursuant to the provisions of section 19-1-304 (7)(f).
- The supreme court may adopt rules regarding access to the name index and register of actions, including rules identifying confidential information maintained in the system and state requirements for using the confidential information. All agencies with access pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall ensure that individuals who use the system receive training on appropriate usage and confidentiality of register of action information. Additionally, the state court administrator may monitor the use of the system and information through audits and the review of ad hoc queries or reports.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1240, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2016: IP(1) and (1)(e) amended, (HB 16-1193), ch. 81, p. 207, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2017: (1)(e) and (1)(f) amended and (1)(g) added, (HB 17-1204), ch. 206, p. 785, § 8, effective November 1. L. 2021: (1)(a) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 708, § 5, effective October 1.
13-1-120. Proceedings in English - abbreviations.
Every written proceeding in a court of justice in this state, or before a judicial officer, shall be in the English language, but such abbreviations as are now commonly used in that language may be used, and numbers expressed by figures or numerals in the customary manner.
Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 411. Code 08: § 446. Code 21: § 448. Code 35: § 448. CRS 53: § 37-1-22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-22.
ANNOTATION
The translation of instructions into Spanish for the use and instruction of a juror understanding that language alone would not be inhibited by the spirit of this section. The object of the provision is to secure a record in English, and this would in nowise be defeated. Trinidad v. Simpson, 5 Colo. 65 (1879) (decided under repealed provisions antecedent to § 18 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935).
13-1-121. Action not affected by vacancy.
No action or proceeding in a court of justice in this state shall be affected by a vacancy in the office of any of the judges, or by failure of a term thereof.
Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 410. Code 08: § 445. Code 21: § 447. Code 35: § 447. CRS 53: § 37-1-23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-23.
13-1-122. When judge shall not act unless by consent.
A judge shall not act as such in any of the following cases: In an action or proceeding to which he is a party, or in which he is interested; when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity in the third degree; or when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or proceeding, unless by consent of all parties to the action.
Source: L. 1887: p. 216, § 429. Code 08: § 464. Code 21: § 465. Code 35: § 465. CRS 53: § 37-1-24. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-24.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. Since § 13-1-122 is similar to repealed provisions antecedent to § 28 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
A judge must disqualify himself if he has a private interest. Any personal or private interest within this statute or rule would disqualify the county judge as the trial judge, and his refusal to remove himself as the trial judge would be grounds for reversal. Any action involving a situation where the trial judge may benefit in a pecuniary way depending upon his decision would be a prime example of a situation in which a trial judge would have no alternative other than to disqualify himself. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296 , 439 P.2d 43 (1968).
Generally, a judge has a discretionary prerogative in the area of public interest. In the area of public interest, a judge upon being challenged, may in his discretionary prerogative remove himself, but if he refuses, his decision will not be reversed unless it is shown convincingly that his interest was so intense that a probability existed that his decision would be tainted. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296 , 439 P.2d 43 (1968).
A differentiation must be made between a judge's private and public interest. In considering the trial court's purported interest in the subject and outcome of the school bond election contest, it is necessary to differentiate between a "private" interest and a "public" interest in the controversy and the outcome. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296 , 439 P.2d 43 (1968).
Public interest as a citizen is not grounds for disqualification. An interest which a judge may have as a citizen in a public question or issue is no basis per se for his removal as the trial judge in an action contesting an election determinative of the public question or issue. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296 , 439 P.2d 43 (1968).
A public interest is an interest shared by citizens generally in the affairs of local, state, or national government, and is not the same character of interest which compels disqualification as would a private interest. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296 , 439 P.2d 43 (1968).
Interest in bond election may be so great so as to make it private interest. The attached affidavits and exhibits are insufficient to show that the county judge who was a qualified taxpaying elector, and who voted for and publicly approved the new school and bond issue, had such an interest in the bond election contest, or that he was so prejudiced against the contest action that he should have as a matter of law disqualified himself. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296 , 439 P.2d 43 (1968).
Generally, obligations as taxpayer are not grounds for disqualification. The personal effect upon the trial judge, who as the owner of property would be charged with the obligation of the school bonds, is a pecuniary advantage or disadvantage so contingent, speculative, and remote as to be of no consequence. Public improvements, like new school buildings, may have the effect of increasing the tax obligation on real property but they also result in increasing the value of the property so that it is therefore next to impossible to state as a matter of certainty that a public improvement will be a disadvantage or advantage to any given piece of property. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296 , 439 P.2d 43 (1968).
Whether to disqualify himself in a civil case is a question within the discretion of the trial judge, and the judge's ruling on that issue will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Colo. State Bd. of Agriculture v. First Nat'l Bank, 671 P.2d 1331 (Colo. App. 1983).
A judge, having been of counsel for either party in the previous trial of the action, is under this section clearly disqualified from acting as judge in the trial of the case, and, where the disqualification is not waived by consent of the party he represented as counsel, has no authority to act judicially therein. O'Connell v. Gavett, 7 Colo. 40, 1 P. 902 (1883).
He must by his own motion certify this to the district court. Under this section, a county judge who has acted as counsel in behalf of either litigant is not only disqualified from hearing motions to set aside judgments, but it is his duty on his own motion to certify the matters to the district court. People ex rel. Brown v. District Court, 26 Colo. 226, 56 P. 1115 (1899).
Applied in Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635 (Colo. 1987).
13-1-123. Transfer of civil actions.
When in any civil action pending in any court of record, whether filed as a special statutory proceeding, or otherwise, if for any reason the proceedings could be more expeditiously continued in another county, with the express consent of all parties, the court may order the cause transferred to any other county wherein the court finds the proceedings could be more expeditiously continued. No additional docket fee shall be required. Upon such a transfer being ordered, the clerk shall transfer all files, books, and records of the cause, or, if that is not practicable, he shall make, at the expense of the parties, and send to the clerk of the court to which the cause is transferred a certified copy of all records in the cause which are necessary for the continuation of the proceedings in the court to which such cause is transferred, and the cause shall continue in the court to which it is transferred with the same effect and force as though such cause were originally docketed in such court.
Source: L. 59: p. 349, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-1-25. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-25.
Cross references: For venue and change of venue generally, see C.R.C.P. 98.
13-1-123.5. Transfer of venue - actions involving related persons.
In addition to the authority to change venue granted by sections 19-2.5-104 and 19-3-201 for good cause shown, a court, on its own motion, on the motion of another court in this state, or on the motion of a party or guardian ad litem, may order the transfer of a pending action brought pursuant to title 14 or title 19 or rule 365 of the Colorado rules of county court civil procedure to a court in another county when there is an action pending in the other county that names the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of a child who is the subject of the action brought pursuant to title 14 or title 19. The county to which the action is being transferred must be one in which venue is proper. Upon an order for such transfer, the transferring court shall notify all parties of the transfer and transmit all documents to the receiving court. The transferred action continues in the court to which it is transferred with the same force and effect as though originally docketed in the receiving court.
Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 46, § 1, effective January 1, 1996. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1687, § 13, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 708, § 6, effective October 1.
13-1-124. Jurisdiction of courts.
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Engaging in any act enumerated in this section by any person, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado, either in person or by an agent, submits such person and, if a natural person, such person's personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from:
- The transaction of any business within this state;
- The commission of a tortious act within this state;
- The ownership, use, or possession of any real property situated in this state;
- Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk residing or located within this state at the time of contracting;
- The maintenance of a matrimonial domicile within this state with respect to all issues relating to obligations for support to children and spouse in any action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity of marriage, or support of children if one of the parties of the marriage continues without interruption to be domiciled within the state;
- The engaging of sexual intercourse in this state as to an action brought under article 4 or article 6 of title 19, C.R.S., with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse, as set forth in verified petition; or
- The entering into of an agreement pursuant to part 2 or 5 of article 22 of this title.
Source: L. 65: p. 472, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-26. L. 82: (1)(c) and (1)(d) amended and (1)(e) added, p. 280, § 1, effective April 2. L. 91: (1)(f) added, p. 248, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 359, § 1, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Analysis
- I. General Consideration.
- II. Transacting Business.
- III. Commission of Tort.
- IV. Real Property in Colorado.
- V. Contracts of Insurance.
- VI. Maintenance of Matrimonial Domicile.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
A. In General.
Law reviews. For note, "One Year Review of Colorado Law -- 1964", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For comment discussing the impact of Shaffer v. Heitner (433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977)) on state long arm statute, see 55 Den. L.J. 365 (1978). For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", see 56 Den. L.J. 491 (1979). For article, "Jurisdiction and Service of Process Beyond Colorado Boundaries", see 11 Colo. Law. 648 (1982). For article, "Legislative Activities in Family Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 1560 (1982). For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with in personam jurisdiction, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 219 (1985). For article, "Where to Sue and Defend: An Update on Personal Jurisdiction Law", see 47 Colo. Law. 26 (Feb. 2018).
This section and § 13-1-125 are sometimes referred to as the "long arm" or "single act" statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451 , 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437 , 417 P.2d 792 (1966); Geer Co. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 48 , 469 P.2d 734 (1970).
Section is procedural, not substantive. This statute, an example of "long arm" statutes, is "procedural" rather than "substantive" and may operate retrospectively. Its effect is not to create a right or liability where none existed before; its only effect is to broaden the procedure whereby one seeking redress against an alleged tortfeasor may compel him to answer in the forum initially determined by the plaintiff to be the most convenient. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).
Section merely establishes a new mode of obtaining jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in order to secure existing rights. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).
Section was passed by the general assembly in order to extend rather than to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
Due process inquiry is all that is necessary. By extending jurisdiction to the maximum limits permissible under the United States and Colorado Constitutions, the general assembly obviated the need for further statutory analysis. New Frontier Media, Inc. v. Freeman, 85 P.3d 611 (Colo. App. 2003); Rome v. Reyes, 2017 COA 84 , 401 P.3d 75.
Federal court's jurisdiction in diversity cases. In diversity cases, the federal district court's jurisdiction is coextensive with the state court's. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982).
Jurisdiction based on facts at time of complaint. An amendment of a pleading to justify long arm jurisdiction must be based on facts existing at the time the complaint was filed. Jenkins v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., 42 Colo. App. 118, 590 P.2d 983 (1979).
Personal jurisdiction and venue distinguished. Personal jurisdiction is a question of the court's power to exercise control over defendants while venue is primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Resolution of personal jurisdiction generally takes precedence over the determination of the propriety of venue. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Resolution of jurisdictional issues under section frequently involves an ad hoc analysis of the facts. Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1981).
Privilege defenses such as lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue may be lost by failure to assert them seasonably, by formal submission in a cause, or by submission through conduct. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Mere filing of or participation in motion does not necessarily entail waiver to defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Request for award of attorney fees, as part of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, does not constitute a general appearance and does not waive defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendants did not seek affirmative relief; rather, they only defended against plaintiff's claims. Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 259 P.3d 497 ( Colo. 2011 ).
For discussion of conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, see Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1983).
Section need not be relied on when service is made inside Colorado. It is not necessary to rely on "long arm" statute to sustain jurisdiction of district court over foreign corporation where service of process was not made outside of state, but was made upon agent of foreign corporation in the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
Jurisdiction over foreign corporation where personal service effected in state. Colorado state courts have jurisdiction over a foreign corporation qualified to do business in the state where personal service on the foreign corporation is effected within the state, regardless of the fact that the cause of action does not arise out of the foreign corporation's business activity within the state, but, to the contrary, arises out of a transaction occurring in another state. Budde v. Kentron Hawaii, Ltd., 565 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1977).
Burden imposed upon one who seeks remedy under long arm statute is to allege in complaint sufficient facts to support reasonable inference that defendants engaged in conduct described in statute which subjects them to in personam jurisdiction. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973); Jenkins v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., 42 Colo. App. 118, 590 P.2d 983 (1979); Shon v. District Court, 199 Colo. 90 , 605 P.2d 472 (1980).
This section requires purposeful acts performed within forum state by defendant in relation to the contract. Weyrich v. Lively, 361 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Colo. 1973).
Prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction is sufficient and may be determined from allegations of complaint. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973).
A plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction, which may be determined from the allegations of the complaint, to withstand defendant's motion to dismiss under, C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2). Pioneer Astro Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 409 , 566 P.2d 1067 (1977).
In determining whether a prima facie showing has been established, it is appropriate to consider the allegations of the complaint as well as any other evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982).
A party may make the required prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction by alleging jurisdictional facts in the complaint, by submitting affidavits, or presenting evidence at the hearing on the motion to dismiss or to quash service of process. Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1983).
The allegations of the complaint, as well as any evidence introduced by the parties at any hearing conducted to determine the jurisdictional issue, may be considered to determine whether the plaintiff has established such prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 (Colo. 1984).
Prima facie showing required. A party asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the long arm statute must make a prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982).
When defendant asserts permissive claim, long arm jurisdiction becomes general in personam. By the assertion of a permissive counter-claim and a cross-claim, claimant was invoking of the jurisdiction of the court in its own behalf, and expanded the limited in personam jurisdiction originally acquired under the long arm statute into general in personam jurisdiction. T.L. Smith Co. v. District Court, 163 Colo. 444 , 431 P.2d 454 (1967).
Where a defendant in a civil action files various cross-claims and third-party claims, the jurisdiction of the court is invoked and the defendant waives any objection to the issue of a personam jurisdiction. Fagerberg v. Webb, 678 P.2d 544 (Colo. App. 1983).
Finding that long-arm statute cannot be properly invoked is a final determination that defendants are not subject to the court's jurisdiction and an appeal can be taken therefrom. Wilbourn v. Hagan, 716 P.2d 485 (Colo. App. 1986).
In general, the activities of a non-resident subject him to long-arm jurisdiction if the quality, nature, and frequency of his conduct in Colorado is such that the non-resident should reasonably anticipate being haled into the Colorado courts. Von Palffy-Erdoed v. Bugescu, 708 P.2d 816 (Colo. App. 1985); Pub. Warranty Corp. v. Mullins, 757 P.2d 1140 (Colo. App. 1988); Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, 418 P.3d 523.
Trial court had personal jurisdiction over estate after plaintiffs amended complaint to name estate and estate's special administrator as defendants instead of deceased, non-existent defendant before any answer had been filed in the case. This cured the defect in personal jurisdiction contained in the original complaint. Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709 (Colo. 2009).
Distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. This section, together with defendant's note submitting to jurisdiction of Colorado courts for purposes of enforcement, conferred subject-matter jurisdiction. However, in absence of valid service of process under § 13-1-125 and C.R.C.P. 4 court lacked personal jurisdiction and judgment was void. United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992).
A party's lack of capacity to sue or be sued has no bearing upon a court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709 (Colo. 2009).
A deceased defendant's lack of capacity to be sued does not divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a particular type of case or grant a specific type of relief. Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709 (Colo. 2009).
Applied in Nations Enters., Inc. v. Process Equip. Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, 486 F. Supp. 131 (D. Colo. 1980 ); Goldenhersh v. Febrey, 711 P.2d 717 (Colo. App. 1985); Rogers v. Clipper Cruise Lines, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 143 (D. Colo. 1986 ); In re Ness, 759 P.2d 844 (Colo. App. 1988); CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Colo. 2011 ).
B. Constitutionality.
Jurisdiction to extend to constitutional limits. The Colorado general assembly, in enacting this section, intended to extend the jurisdiction of the courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184 , 590 P.2d 964 (1979); Halliburton Co. v. Texana Oil Co., 471 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1979 ); Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980 ); Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 ( Colo. 1980 ), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1981); Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 ( Colo. 1982 ); Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 ( Colo. 1983 ); Beckman v. Carlson, 553 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983 ); Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 ( Colo. 1984 ); Pub. Warranty Corp. v. Mullins, 757 P.2d 1140 (Colo. App. 1988).
This statute confers jurisdiction, limited only by the bounds of the fourteenth amendment, consistent with the standards of due process enunciated in Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington (326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)) and subsequent cases. Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1980).
The general assembly did not intend that this section be construed to permit jurisdiction to be asserted where to do so would violate due process of law. Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1980).
Constitutionality depends upon its application to the facts. The constitutionality of any state long arm statute depends on the manner of its particular application to the facts presented. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966).
This section meets the due process test of Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, i.e., that the activity of the defendant "establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligation which appellant has incurred there". Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Colo. 1966).
It does not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he is not present within the territory of the forum, he must have certain minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 4 91, 418 P.2d 527 (1966); Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 4 56 , 448 P.2d 783 (1968); People ex rel. Jeffers v. Gibson, 181 Colo. 4, 508 P.2d 374 (1973).
Quality and nature of activity must be considered in determining jurisdiction. In order to assure fairness and justice, the trial court must look at the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in determining whether the assertion of jurisdiction complies with due process. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with a forum state. It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456 , 448 P.2d 783 (1968).
Convenience alone insufficient for judgment against nonresident. Due process of law does not contemplate that a state may make a binding judgment in personam against a nonresident defendant merely out of considerations of convenience. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982).
An assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant must satisfy both the requirements of the Colorado long-arm statute and the requirements of due process of law. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Daniel, McKee & Co., 791 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1990); Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, 418 P.3d 523.
Determination of jurisdiction involves a two-tiered inquiry. Court must first determine whether the statute provides a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, and then must consider whether exercise of jurisdiction would violate federal due process principles. Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
C. Procedure.
When evidentiary hearing appropriate. In its discretion, a court may address a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on documentary evidence alone or by holding an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing may be appropriate when the proffered evidence is conflicting or when the plaintiff's affidavits are incredible. However, if the jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the case, caution is advised to avoid endangering the substantive right to a jury trial. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 ( Colo. 2005 ); Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 ( Colo. 2007 ).
If the issue is to be resolved on documentary evidence alone, plaintiff needs only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to defeat the motion to dismiss. Allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true to the extent they are not contradicted by defendant's competent evidence. Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).
The court may not resolve disputed material issues of jurisdictional fact without a hearing. Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).
Purpose of inquiry is to screen out cases in which personal jurisdiction is obviously lacking and those in which the jurisdictional challenge is patently bogus. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 ( Colo. 2005 ); Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 ( Colo. 2007 ).
II. TRANSACTING BUSINESS.
A. In General.
Law reviews. For comment on White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, appearing below, see 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 443 (1967). For note, "Doing Business in Colorado for Foreign Corporations: Service of Process, Qualification, Taxation", see 49 Den. L.J. 529 (1973). For article, "Constitutional Law", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with minimum contacts, see 64 Den. U. L. Rev. 209 (1987). For article, "Civil Procedure", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with jurisdiction, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 405 (1988).
No jurisdiction unless defendant "present" in state. Unless the level of a defendant's activity is sufficient to make him "present" in the forum state, there is no jurisdiction where the cause of action is unrelated to the forum state activities. Automated Quill, Inc. v. Chernow, 455 F. Supp. 428 (D. Colo. 1978).
Substantial connection rather than physical presence required. Although it is not necessary that the defendant be physically present in the state for purposes of transacting business, there must be a substantial connection between the business transacted and the forum state. Weyrich v. Lively, 361 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Colo. 1973); Custom Vinyl Compounding v. Bushart & Assoc., 810 F. Supp. 285 (D. Colo. 1992).
"Substantial contacts" with Colorado held not present. Beckman v. Carlson, 553 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983 ); Vickery v. Amarillo Freightliner Sales, Inc., 695 P.2d 306 (Colo. App. 1984); Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Assn. of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010, 105 S. Ct. 1879, 85 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1985); Sands v. Victor Equip. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Colo. 1985 ); GCI 1985 -1 LTD. v. Murray Props. P'ship, 770 F. Supp. 585 (D. Colo. 1991 ).
B. Minimum Contacts Principle.
Law reviews. For article, "A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction", see 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 5 (1989).
This section codifies minimum contacts principles. The question of when a state can obtain in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident by service of process outside the state is basically governed by the "minimum contacts" test enunciated in Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington.
In order for the nonresident defendant to be subject to the state's personal jurisdiction, "he has certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice&rlsquo". The Colorado "long arm" statute was designed to codify the "minimum contacts" principle. Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966 ); Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184 , 590 P.2d 964 (1979); Premier Corp. v. Newsom, 620 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1980); Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980 ).
Minimal contacts are necessary for the operation of this section. Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437 , 417 P.2d 792 (1966).
Minimal contacts are necessary to satisfy due process requirements. It is clear that this section is based on certain minimum contacts which must satisfy requisites of due process in accord with the test of Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).
For jurisdiction to attach under subsection (1)(b), certain "minimum contacts" between the forum state and the defendant are necessary in order not to offend traditional notions of due process, fair play, and substantial justice. E.R. Callender Printing Co. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 25 , 510 P.2d 889 (1973).
The essential requirement of the "minimum contacts" rule is that "the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws". Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).
The minimum amount of contacts required to exercise personal jurisdiction depends on whether the plaintiff has alleged general or specific jurisdiction. A court has general jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant conducted continuous and systematic activities that are of a general business nature in the forum state. A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant if the injuries triggering the litigation arise out of and are related to activities that are significant and purposefully directed by the defendant at the residents of the forum state. Found. for Knowledge in Dev. v. Interactive Design Consultants, 234 P.3d 673 (Colo. 2010).
Test for determining if courts may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident is whether the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction is authorized by statute, and, if so, whether such exercise is consistent with constitutional requirements of due process. Vickery v. Amarillo Freightliner Sales, Inc., 695 P.2d 306 (Colo. App. 1984).
The test to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice requires that (1) the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting in Colorado or of causing important consequences here; (2) the cause of action must arise from the consequences in Colorado of the defendant's activities; (3) the activities of the defendant or the consequences of those activities must have a substantial enough connection with Colorado to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Duckworth v. M.M. Cole Publ'g Co., 38 Colo. App. 33, 552 P.2d 520 (1976); Automated Quill, Inc. v. Chernow, 455 F. Supp. 428 (D. Colo. 1978 ); Associated Inns & Restaurant Co. of Am. v. Dev. Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1981 ); H2O Eng'g, Inc. v. Leidy's, Inc., 799 P.2d 432 (Colo. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 811 P.2d 38 ( Colo. 1991 ); RAF Fin. v. Resurgens, 127 B.R. 458 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991 ); Alameda Nat. Bank v. Kanchanapoom, 752 F. Supp. 367 (D. Colo. 1990 ); Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992 ); F.D.I.C. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 937 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Colo. 1996 ); Gwynn v. Transcor Am., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Colo. 1998 ).
Unfairness factor in determining sufficient contacts. While fairness is not an affirmative basis for granting jurisdiction, unfairness may become a factor in determining whether certain contacts are sufficient. Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1980).
Court does not adopt a "stream of commerce plus" approach. The proper analysis is the stream of commerce test articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980), and not the stream of commerce plus test. Under the stream of commerce theory, personal jurisdiction can be established if a defendant delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state. But courts have split on the proper approach to this theory, particularly on the issue of an added requirement that a plaintiff must prove additional conduct of a defendant beyond placing a product into the stream of commerce. Justice Breyer's concurrence in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (2011), and Justice Brennan's concurrence in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987), are controlling and together hold that World-Wide Volkswagen remains the prevailing decision articulating the stream of commerce theory. Boustred v. Align Corp. Ltd., 2016 COA 67 , 410 P.3d 640, aff'd, 2017 CO 103, 421 P.3d 163.
Court applied the U.S. supreme court stream of commerce plus test articulated in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court to conclude minimum contacts established. Etchieson v. Cent. Purchasing LLC, 232 P.3d 301 (Colo. App. 2010).
Each case must be decided on its own facts. On the question of "doing business" every case must be decided solely on its own facts. The complete test is one of total impact. The corporation must have certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Elliot v. Edwards Eng'g Corp., 257 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1965).
Whether in a particular case a nonresident defendant, who is served outside the forum state, has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to warrant the latter in exercising in personam jurisdiction over the person of such nonresident necessarily depends on the facts of the case at hand. Premier Corp. v. Newsom, 620 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1980).
Even single contact is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction where the cause of action arose out of that contact. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Single act does not uniformly result in the exercise of jurisdiction when that act is not substantial enough to make the defendant "present". Trans-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. A Little Bit of Swed., Inc., 658 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1982).
One meeting constituting sole contact insufficient. Where the only contact the defendant had with Colorado was an initial meeting with the plaintiff, this one meeting did not constitute the minimum contacts requirement. Weyrich v. Lively, 361 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Colo. 1973).
Quantity of contact cannot be measured by dollar value alone. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
No minimal contact if cause arose outside state and no control over representative. Plaintiff's claim did not arise out of any dealing the company had in Colorado. This important factor, combined with almost a complete absence of control over representative, requires that the motion to quash the summons be granted. Elliott v. Edwards Eng'g Corp., 257 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1965).
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966 ); Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14 , 424 P.2d 110 (1967).
The mere existence of a contract executed by a Colorado resident, is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over an absent nonresident defendant. To hold otherwise would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).
Nonresident attorney's relationship with client provided sufficient connection for jurisdiction. A professional relationship of substantial duration and a client's claimed reliance upon her nonresident attorney's advice with respect to the client's financial interests, the attorney's failure to communicate with the client or to take any action in regard to the client's interests may be productive of adverse consequences to the client in this state so as to provide a sufficient connection and render reasonable the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident. Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 ( Colo. 1980 ), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1981); Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267 ( Colo. 2002 ).
Agreement by nonresident defendant attorney to represent a Colorado corporation and the attorney's subsequent conduct were acts by which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Colorado and thus was reasonably subject to Colorado's long arm statute jurisdiction. Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 ( Colo. 1984 ).
Sales promotion and distribution channels reveal minimal contacts. The affidavit does reveal "minimal contact" in Colorado as required by due process because it clearly reflects that defendant set up channels of sales promotion and distribution in Colorado for the purpose of selling its products in Colorado. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117 , 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
Manufacturer's promotional activities and solicitation of customers while in Colorado, together with actual sales, was sufficient to invoke long-arm jurisdiction. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Violation of the Colorado Securities Act constitutes the "transaction of business" in Colorado for purposes of this section, as stated in § 11-51-706 . Rome v. Reyes, 2017 COA 84 , 401 P.3d 75.
Contacts were sufficient to find jurisdiction over manufacturer of medical syringe. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Contacts found insufficient where sale took place outside of Colorado and issues of tort concerned creation of contract and terms. Vickery v. Amarillo Freightliner Sales, Inc., 695 P.2d 306 (Colo. App. 1984).
Jurisdiction not proper. Jurisdiction is not proper merely because the defendants received a check drawn on a Colorado bank or because the defendants wrote several letters regarding the contract to the plaintiff in Colorado. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982).
Jurisdiction is not proper in Colorado merely because one of the parties to a contract is a Colorado resident. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982); SGI Air Holdings II LLC v. Novartis Int'l, AG, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Colo. 2002).
Minimum contacts sufficient. In executing a contract of guarantee in another state of payment of rent and performance of lease covenants, where petitioner induced lessors to furnish their consent for the assignment of a lease of Colorado real property, the facts amply justify long-arm jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Giger v. District Court, 189 Colo. 305 , 540 P.2d 329 (1975).
An out-of-state bank, which issued letter of credit in connection with Colorado real estate transaction, inducing reliance by purchaser's agent, had sufficient connection with Colorado to permit exercise of jurisdiction under this section in agent's action against bank for consequences resulting from cancellation of letter. Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, 189 Colo. 145 , 538 P.2d 425 (1975).
Nonresident publishing company had sufficient contacts with the state of Colorado for the assumption of in personam jurisdiction where it initiated the contract with the plaintiff at his residence in Colorado and solicited the resultant contract, and the parties intended the plaintiff prepare the manuscripts at home in Colorado and submit them to the company's offices in Chicago for publication. Duckworth v. M.M. Cole Publ'g Co., 38 Colo. App. 33, 552 P.2d 520 (1976).
Where a New York resident contracted to have brochures mailed throughout the United States, including Colorado, and where said New York resident opened a checking account in Colorado to receive the money generated by the mailing, there were sufficient contacts to allow in personam jurisdiction by Colorado courts. At Home Magazine v. District Court, 194 Colo. 331 , 572 P.2d 476 (1977).
It is not unreasonable to subject a guarantor to the jurisdiction of courts in the very state where an obligation is specifically payable when the makers fail to perform their obligations and the guarantee becomes operable. Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1983).
Negotiating and signing an agreement in this state to personally guarantee a portion of a corporation's debts constitutes sufficient contacts for a court of this state to exercise personal jurisdiction over such a person. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. District Court, 194 Colo. 519 , 574 P.2d 95 (1978).
Execution of promissory notes, given in conjunction with and as part and parcel of the contract for purchase of Colorado real property, constituted sufficient acts to meet the minimum contacts test. Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1984).
Where president of defendant corporation came to Colorado and, in the course of various business negotiations, orally agreed to the terms of an oil development contract under which the defendant corporation was obligated to send payment to plaintiff corporation in Colorado for the performance of supervisory and managerial functions under the contract and defendant corporation reasonably could have anticipated that plaintiff corporation's duties under the contract would be largely performed at their headquarters in Colorado, defendant corporation had sufficient contacts with Colorado to meet the test of due process. Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1980).
Communication with buyer, acceptance of payments, and attempted repossession in Colorado by agent constitute minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Von Palffy-Erdoed v. Bugescu, 708 P.2d 816 (Colo. App. 1985).
Phone calls, letters, facsimiles, and e-mails in addition to a contract, although unsigned, provide evidence that foreign defendant pursued a continuing business relationship sufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement. AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2008).
For other examples of satisfaction of minimum contacts requirements, see Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).
Contact with Colorado through actions of agent may be sufficient to bring defendant within jurisdiction. H2O Eng'g, Inc. v. Leidy's, Inc., 799 P.2d 432 (Colo. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 811 P.2d 38 ( Colo. 1991 ).
Minimum contacts insufficient. Requisite minimum contacts did not exist as between foreign manufacturer and Colorado. Ferrari, S.p.A. SEFAC v. District Court, 185 Colo. 136 , 522 P.2d 105 (1974), overruled in part in Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
Where corporate buyer's only contact with Colorado was to place an order in Kansas City for the purchase of goods and merchandise from a Colorado seller, the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process are absent, and, therefore, in personam jurisdiction over the corporate buyer cannot be obtained by means of the long-arm statute. E.R. Callender Printing Co. v. District Court, 185 Colo. 25 , 510 P.2d 889 (1973).
Execution, in California, of contract executed in Colorado by another, by guarantor, who was California resident, does not provide that quantum of minimum contact with Colorado such that the maintenance of a suit against the guarantor to recover on the contract would not offend traditional notions of due process. D.E.B. Adjustment Co. v. Dillard, 32 Colo. App. 184, 508 P.2d 420 (1973).
The mere planting of fish in Utah, which fish "entered" Colorado and caused injury, did not constitute sufficient contacts with Colorado to subject those planting the fish to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Colo. River Water Conservation v. Andrus, 476 F. Supp. 966 (D. Colo. 1979).
Where an out-of-state bank's only connection to Colorado was its probable knowledge that the letter of credit it issued was going to be used in the sale of Colorado property to a Colorado corporation, this slight connection does not meet the "minimum contacts" standard, and the assertion of jurisdiction in a Colorado forum violates the out-of-state bank's right to due process. Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1982).
Since British asbestos manufacturer did not distribute or market its product in Colorado, there was not sufficient contact between the manufacturer and Colorado to establish personal jurisdiction. Ward v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1988).
Individuals who transported an inmate from Oregon to Colorado under a contract for extradition transportation between their employer and the Colorado department of corrections availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Colorado, committed tortious acts in Colorado, and caused important consequences in Colorado, making the exercise of jurisdiction over them reasonable, where one individual allegedly sexually assaulted the inmate and the other failed to report the assaults. Gwynn v. Transcor Am., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Colo. 1998).
Alleged patent infringer's activities in Colorado were too tenuous to establish that it purposely availed itself of the forum. Although the company advertised its product in national magazines that reach Colorado, no evidence was presented demonstrating that the company made deliberative efforts, either direct or indirect, to serve the Colorado market. The fact that the advertisements resulted in telephone inquiries about the product was insufficient to establish that the company took advantage of the Colorado market or its laws. Also, no sales of the product occurred in Colorado. Therefore, the company did not have sufficient contact with the state to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Dart Intern., Inc. v. Interactive Target Sys., 877 F. Supp. 541 (D. Colo. 1995).
Defendant lacks sufficient contacts with Colorado for Colorado courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendant where contracts regarding purchase of defendant's interest were signed out of state, defendant did not travel to Colorado regarding the purchase or the interest, and did not conduct any business in Colorado. Sender v. Powell, 902 P.2d 947 (Colo. App. 1995).
Activities of the partnership satisfy the minimum-contacts test as to individual partners. Through the instrumentality of the partnership, individual partners purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business activities and invoked the benefits and protections of the law. Intercontinental Leasing, Inc. v. Anderson, 410 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1969); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 822 F. Supp. 1512 (D. Colo. 1993).
Where damaged product was brought into Colorado by purchaser from another state, and defendant's only contact amounted to less than one-half of one percent of annual sales, (which did not include this particular damaged item), there was not sufficient business contact to warrant exercise of personal jurisdiction. Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1993).
Rigid "last event" test rejected. While appropriate in conflict-of-laws analysis, for purposes of application of long-arm statute it is not flexible enough to give Colorado courts jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause. Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
C. What Constitutes Transacting Business.
What constitutes doing business is a matter of state law. So long as the dictates of federal due process are met, what constitutes doing business within a state is a matter of state law. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
Whether claim arose out of business transacted in Colorado is a factor. While whether a claim arose out of business done in this state is one factor that may be considered, the supreme court has, in promulgating state law on this subject, clearly indicated that this is not necessarily the controlling element in determining whether the corporation has sufficient contacts in this state to subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state when service is made within the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
Transaction of business test is a case by case determination. The standards for considering whether or not jurisdiction attaches under the statute on the basis of transaction of business within the state are those of a case by case analysis considering, among other things, regular and systematic activity, continuity of contacts, promotion and utilization of channels of interstate commerce, benefits and protections afforded by the state, casualness of presence, and an estimate of inconveniences. People ex rel. Jeffers v. Gibson, 181 Colo. 4 , 508 P.2d 374 (1973).
Ongoing and continuous business relationship. Where defendants actively solicited plaintiff's business in Colorado and had an ongoing and continuous business relationship for a period of close to two years, defendants have purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in Colorado. Combs Airways, Inc. v. Trans-Air Supply Co., 560 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1983).
Execution of contract within state. If a nonresident comes to Colorado and, within the boundaries of this state, executes a contract and receives earnest money, the defendant is within the purview of the Colorado long arm statute, and it does not offend traditional notions of fair play to require the defendant to appear in a federal district court in Colorado when a dispute arises over the return of the earnest money. East Vail Townhomes, Inc. v. Eurasian Dev. D.A., Inc., 716 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1983).
Contract negotiations, plus Colorado is place of "entering into", are sufficient. Where negotiations leading to the contract upon which this action is brought were conducted in Colorado, and the contract itself provided that Colorado is the place of "entering into" the agreement, nondomiciliary defendant's contracts were constitutionally sufficient to support service under long arm statute. Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395 (D. Colo. 1967).
Even though the "last act", such as the signing of a contract, may have occurred outside the geographical confines of the forum state, nevertheless, the statutory test of a claim arising out of the transaction of any business within the state may still be met by the showing of other "purposeful acts", performed within the forum state by the defendant in relation to the contract, even though such acts were preliminary, or even subsequent, to the execution of the contract itself. Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14 , 424 P.2d 110 (1967); Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
Contract for the transport of inmates from other states to Colorado constitutes the transaction of business within the state and establishes the general jurisdiction requirement that contacts with the forum state are systematic and continuous. Gwynn v. Transcor Am., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Colo. 1998).
Activity in furtherance of a contract is sufficient to give the court long arm jurisdiction. If the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state, this is enough to give the court jurisdiction. It is not even necessary that defendant or his agent be physically present in the state for the purpose of transacting business. Colorado-Florida Living, Inc. v. Deltona Corp., 338 F. Supp. 880 (D. Colo. 1972).
A conditional sales interest indicates business transaction. The fact that defendant retained a conditional sale interest and could have enforced its right to repossess the ski lift in the Colorado courts was a sufficient contact. Defendant was enjoying the benefits and protections of Colorado law, and was willing to service the lift. This is a further indication of the continuing nature of the defendant's business transactions in Colorado. Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).
Contract negotiations by mail do not constitute transacting business. Major negotiations and execution of the agreement were conducted by an exchange of correspondence and documents between the parties or their representatives in Kansas and Colorado respectively. None of the crucial steps took place wholly within the state of Colorado. Plaintiff's contention that a one-day trip to Colorado and defendants' tour of its plant in Eaton, Colorado, are sufficient business contacts to confer in personam jurisdiction on this court is erroneous. Since neither defendant came to Colorado to "sell" plaintiff a license agreement and since no negotiations were conducted here, their obvious purpose was not to avail themselves of the privilege of conducting business here. In these circumstances, the minimum contacts necessary for an exercise of personal jurisdiction do not exist. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).
Defendants' mere execution of a contract with plaintiff, a Colorado corporation, did not constitute doing business in Colorado for purposes of this section. New Frontier Media, Inc. v. Freeman, 85 P.3d 611 (Colo. App. 2003).
Phone conversations and in-state negotiations deemed "doing business". Where the transaction forming the basis of the action was shaped by negotiations in Denver between defendant A and plaintiff as well as telephone conversations between defendant A in Colorado and defendant B in Texas and where an agreement to execute a note and personal guaranties was entered into in Colorado, by having engaged in these telephone conversations, defendant B transacted business within Colorado and caused important business consequences in this state, within the test set forth by the Colorado Supreme Court in Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, 189 Colo. 145 , 538 P.2d 425 (1975), sufficient and substantial enough so that the assertion of personal jurisdiction was both fair and reasonable. Halliburton Co. v. Texana Oil Co., 471 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1979 ).
Plaintiff established prima facie case of specific jurisdiction over defendant under subsection (1)(a) by alleging that defendant came to Colorado to talk about forming a joint venture with plaintiff involving use of plaintiff's trade secrets and that the parties agreed to such joint venture during these meetings. Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 259 P.3d 497 ( Colo. 2011 ).
Out-of-state defendants' active solicitation of a forum resident and his services, knowing he was in this forum, is enough to establish specific jurisdiction over defendants, even if they never physically entered the state. White v. Christian, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (D. Colo. 2020).
Subjecting defendant to the jurisdiction of Colorado courts is consistent with due process since defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Colorado. Defendant allegedly negotiated and entered into a joint venture while in Colorado with a Colorado resident and regularly communicated with that resident about the joint venture while in Colorado and by telephone and email. Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 259 P.3d 497 ( Colo. 2011 ).
The asserted sale of goods by the defendants in Colorado is too speculative to provide the requisite jurisdictional contacts since solicitations were made from Kansas and since the defendants maintain no sales or service personnel here. There has been no showing of the volume or extent of the defendants' sales or the relation of those sales to the license agreement. For personal jurisdiction purposes, the quality and nature of that activity is too indirect and remote from the license agreement upon which plaintiff has brought suit. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).
An out-of-state seller whose agents never enter Colorado is not subject to long arm jurisdiction. If an out-of-state milk handler has no outlets in Colorado, none of his employees come into the state, and the handler is divested of ownership of the milk before it enters Colorado, then the handler is not doing business in Colorado and the Colorado courts do not have jurisdiction over the handler under the Colorado long arm statute and do not have authority to grant injunctions against him under the Colorado marketing act. People ex rel. Jeffers v. Gibson, 181 Colo. 4 , 508 P.2d 374 (1973).
Corporate visit plus sending sales materials is a transaction of business. The visit of the assistant general sales manager of a Delaware corporation to Colorado in connection with franchise negotiations and the receipt of customer's lists, contracts, and other sales materials at plaintiff's offices in Denver constitute the transaction of business within the state of Colorado, which would authorize service of process upon the defendant outside the state of Colorado when the cause of action arises from that transaction and the failure to grant the franchise. Colorado-Florida Living, Inc. v. Deltona Corp., 338 F. Supp. 880 (D. Colo. 1972).
Manufacturer who assembles in Colorado subject to long arm. This section grants jurisdiction under "long arm" to Colorado courts in an action against a North Carolina manufacturer of products assembled and sold in Colorado. Czarnick v. District Court, 175 Colo. 482 , 488 P.2d 562 (1971).
Where the parent and its subsidiary maintain separate identities and charge each other for service performed, as reinsurance, the corporations will be treated as separate entities for the purpose of determining personal jurisdiction. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493 , 436 P.2d 124 (1968).
A nonpresent parent corporation is not "doing business" because of mere presence of subsidiary. Although a corporation is totally owned by another corporation, the mere presence in Colorado of the wholly-owned subsidiary, standing alone, does not in and of itself subject the nonpresent parent corporation to the state's jurisdiction where the two companies are operated as distinct entities. Bolger v. Dial-A-Style Leasing Corp., 159 Colo. 44 , 409 P.2d 517 (1966); SGI Air Holdings II LLC v. Novartis Int'l, AG, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Colo. 2002 ).
The relationship of a holding company and the subsidiaries of which the holding company owns stock is not of a nature to support an agency relationship, or consequently, personal jurisdiction over the holding company or its day-to-day managing company. SGI Air Holdings II LLC v. Novartis Int'l, AG, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Colo. 2002).
Stock ownership of subsidiary is not doing business. Neither does stock ownership in a domestic company nor common directors establish that defendant was doing business in Colorado. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493 , 436 P.2d 124 (1968).
It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966); Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo. 1971).
Jurisdiction will attach if the defendant purposely initiates or acquiesces in activity conducted within the forum state on its behalf. It must also avail itself of the protection of the forum state's law. Once that activity has been initiated, a single incident, substantial in nature, which gives rise to the plaintiff's claim will suffice to confer personal jurisdiction upon the courts of the forum state. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th. Cir. 1971).
Phone conversations, correspondence, and receipt of check are not purposeful acts. The interstate telephone conversations, correspondence, and the receipt in Illinois by petitioner of checks drawn on a Denver bank by respondent do not constitute acts by which the petitioner purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Colorado, thus invoking the benefits of its laws. Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456 , 448 P.2d 783 (1968).
Nor does advertising in national magazines distributed within the forum state alone constitute a transaction of business within that state. Such a contact is simply too tenuous upon which to found a claim of jurisdiction. Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456 , 448 P.2d 783 (1968).
An advertisement in a national magazine is not in itself sufficient to establish contacts in Colorado. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).
Allegations that defendant directed its activities at the country generally are insufficient to establish that defendant took intentional action that was expressly aimed at the state such that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado courts. zvelo, Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 3d 664 (D. Colo. 2020).
Maintenance of website does not constitute an intentional act. The complaint does not allege that the website contained Colorado-specific information or that it targeted state residents more so than residents of other states. zvelo, Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 3d 664 (D. Colo. 2020).
Transactions carried on in a state wholly by mail may be sufficient to constitute a doing of business within the state sufficient to enable the state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the corporation. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
Even the activities of even a single salesman certainly may be sufficient to constitute the doing of business within a state even though those activities do not involve the actual concluding of contracts but involve only solicitation of orders and service calls. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
When the activities of the agent are a continuous course of dealing. While it is clear that casual or intermittent presence of the corporation's agent within the state is not enough to support in personam jurisdiction based upon service on an agent, the United States supreme court has held that when the activities of the agent are such as to constitute a continuous course of dealings within the state, due process is not denied by the exercise of in personam jurisdiction through service on the agent in the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
Corporation's control over its representative. The amount of control the corporation exerted over its representative in the state and the fact that the representative maintains a listing in the Denver telephone directory are factors which point toward "doing business". Elliott v. Edwards Eng'g Corp., 257 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1965).
The payment of congressional salaries by merely transferring money to banks in Colorado does not establish minimum contacts with Colorado. Thus the clerk of the U.S. house of representatives and the secretary of the U.S. senate could not be reached by Colorado's long-arm statute and the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them. Shaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Colo. 1999).
Negotiation, execution, and delivery of a note in Colorado is transacting business. The negotiation of a loan from a Colorado bank, in Colorado, with the execution and delivery to the bank of a promissory note is transacting business within this state within the meaning of the statute. Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14 , 424 P.2d 110 (1967).
Mere fact that part of consideration for note is Colorado contract is not sufficient. The note was executed in Montana. Presumably all negotiations took place there. The only contact with Colorado is the fact that part of the consideration was a contract executed in Colorado. Such contact does not satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice". Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945); Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966).
A note is a specialty and is not to be regarded as the same transaction as that which gave rise to the debt. The note stands alone. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966).
Demand for payment of note executed outside state insufficient. Where a promissory note was executed and delivered outside of Colorado and, later, one of the parties relocated in Colorado and mailed a letter out of state demanding payment of the note, the contacts within the state are not sufficient for in personam jurisdiction. Associated Inns & Restaurant Co. of Am. v. Dev. Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1981).
Where foreign note is merely a renewal of a Colorado loan transacting of business continues. Though the petitioners admittedly executed the renewal note in Utah, they had each nonetheless performed in Colorado several "purposeful acts" relative thereto, but for the original loan in Colorado, there never would have been a renewal note. Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14 , 424 P.2d 110 (1967).
Actions of internal revenue officials insufficient. Officials who were out-of-state residents and who at no time worked in, or traveled in connection with work, in this state had not transacted business for purposes of this section. First Western Govern. Sec., Inc. v. U.S., 578 F. Supp. 212 (D. Colo. 1984).
A nonresident who filed a required claim in a probate proceeding does not constitute the transaction of business by the nonresident for purposes of Colorado's long-arm statute. Harman v. Stillwell, 944 P.2d 665 (Colo. App. 1997).
Economic injury in Colorado insufficient. Where defendant welded a pipe in Italy which was subsequently used by the plaintiff Colorado corporation in Texas, where the weld failed, allegedly causing economic injury in Colorado, the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court under this section. Res. Inv. Corp. v. Hughes Tool Co., 561 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Colo. 1983).
Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under the transaction of business subsection where his complaint failed to allege any facts in support of his conclusory statement that "defendants transacted business" in Colorado and his affidavit and response to motion to dismiss did not contain any additional facts that would sufficiently support jurisdiction. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).
Defendant's continuing contractual relationship with plaintiff was insufficient to allow personal jurisdiction over it in Colorado. Trial court did not err in determining that defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business activities within Colorado. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Arkhangelskgeoldobycha, 94 P.3d 1208 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 123 P.3d 1187 ( Colo. 2005 ).
Defendant's contacts to the state were necessitated by virtue of the plaintiff's moving its principal place of business to Colorado. Contacts that are necessitated by the plaintiff's unilateral move are given much less weight. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005).
Argument that the court has specific personal jurisdiction over defendant because defendant lists a Colorado office on its website is unavailing. Plaintiff made no averment that defendant's alleged misappropriation of trade secrets is somehow connected to defendant's state office. zvelo, Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 3d 664 (D. Colo. 2020).
The continuous presence of four employees of the defendant non-resident corporation in Colorado who are employed for the purpose of soliciting orders on behalf of such corporation constitutes sufficient contact in the forum for personal jurisdiction over the corporation. Schlesinger v. Merrill Pub. Co., 675 F. Supp. 591 (D. Colo. 1987).
An individual who has become an officer or a director of a Colorado corporation has sufficiently transacted business within the state to subject himself to the jurisdiction of its courts with respect to claims made by the corporation or by others on behalf of the corporation arising out of the individual's duties as an officer or director. Pub. Warranty Corp. v. Mullins, 757 P.2d 1140 (Colo. App. 1988).
Execution of note. When a person executes a note outside of this state but the note expressly obligates him to pay money to a resident of this state, he may be properly sued in Colorado. The single act of executing the note constituted a substantial enough connection to render exercise of jurisdiction reasonable under the circumstances. Kingston v. Brussat, 698 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1988); Alameda Nat. Bank v. Kanchanapoom, 752 F. Supp. 367 (D. Colo. 1990).
Defendants who induced plaintiff to rely on defendants' representations resulting in extension of more than two million dollars in credit and shipment of more than two million dollars worth of products from Colorado to defendants' clients are subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Contacts which included seven face-to-face meetings in two states, one mailing, and twenty-eight phone calls over a four-month period were sufficient to satisfy both transaction-of-business standards and due process requirements. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Daniel, McKee & Co., 791 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1990).
Because its promotional efforts were directed towards Colorado residents through local media advertising in Colorado, defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in this state and should reasonably have anticipated being subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts. Martinez v. Farmington Motors, Inc., 931 P.2d 546 (Colo. App. 1996).
Purported father found to have transacted business in state. Purported father's sending of letter agreeing to pay support that father knew would be relied upon by Colorado authorities for purpose of determining eligibility for public assistance constituted transacting business in this state. In re Parental Responsibilities of H.Z.G., 77 P.3d 848 (Colo. App. 2003).
D. Agency Theory.
Agency theory explained. Under Colorado's long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado based on the imputed contacts of defendant's agent. To establish this agency theory, jurisdictional facts must connect the actions of the agent to the principal by either "the transaction of any business" or "the commission of a tortious act." Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 ( Colo. 2007 ).
Jurisdiction and liability separate issues. A court's determination of agency for the purpose of personal jurisdiction is a separate determination from, and is not dispositive of, the substantive issue of defendant's liability for the actions of the agent. For jurisdictional purposes, plaintiff needs only make a prima facie showing of the connection between the actions of the agent and the principal. Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).
Due process requires that jurisdictional facts be examined to determine whether either general or specific jurisdiction exists and, if so, whether it is reasonable for the court to exercise that jurisdiction. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 ( Colo. 2005 ); Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 ( Colo. 2007 ).
Australian corporation was properly subject to personal jurisdiction because, although general jurisdiction was lacking due to the corporation's absence of business contacts with Colorado, plaintiff made a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction based on documentary evidence showing the corporation sent its agent on a business trip to various states, including Colorado, during the course of which trip the agent went to a restaurant with a coworker, became intoxicated, and caused an automobile accident that killed the coworker. Further, under the circumstances, it was held reasonable to require the corporation to defend in Colorado due to the legitimate interests of Colorado in protecting the safety of its roads and providing a forum for the plaintiff. Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 ( Colo. 2007 ).
III. COMMISSION OF TORT.
Law reviews. For comment on Vandermee v. District Court, appearing below, see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 471 (1968).
Section is constitutional. The new "long arm" statute, insofar as it permits the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents who commit a tortious act within the state of Colorado is not unconstitutional. Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Colo. 1966).
Where tortious act is committed within state, there need not be additional minimum contacts in state to meet constitutional requirements of due process. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973).
An out-of-state party's harassment of, threatening of, or attempt to coerce an individual known by the non-resident to be in the state is a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, 418 P.3d 523.
Tortious act. The noun "act" implies a single occurrence, a specific event, one happening. The adjective "tortious" implies an act with an attending injury proximately related to that act. The use of the term "tortious act" implies the total act embodying the cause and the effect through the continuum of time. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117 , 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
Our long arm statute grants Colorado courts jurisdiction over persons who commit tortious acts within this state. Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42 , 492 P.2d 624 (1972).
Colorado residents have local forum for damages inflicted on them by nonresidents. The legislative purpose, which inspired the adoption of the long arm statute, was the expansion of our court's jurisdiction within constitutional limitations in order to provide a local forum for Colorado residents who suffer damages in Colorado as a result of tortious acts of nonresidents. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117 , 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
Court has jurisdiction over nonresident motorist in Colorado accident. A nonresident motorist who is involved in an automobile accident in a particular state has established a sufficient contact with that state to warrant its courts in asserting in personam jurisdiction over him to determine the merits of any controversy that may happen to arise out of that accident. Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Colo. 1966).
Foreign corporation may be summoned based on tortious act of its agent within Colorado although "transacting business" standard may not be met. Goettman v. N. Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).
"Tortious act" is to be liberally construed but not to create a new tort. Although our supreme court has said that the term, "tortious act", is to be liberally construed to carry out the intent of the general assembly, it cannot be so liberally construed as to create a tort. People in Interest of D.R.B., 30 Colo. App. 603, 498 P.2d 1166 (1972), aff'd sub nom. A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439 , 507 P.2d 468 (1973).
The fathering of an illegitimate child in and of itself is not a "tortious act". People in Interest of D.R.B., 30 Colo. App. 603, 498 P.2d 1166 (1972), aff'd sub nom. A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439 , 507 P.2d 468 (1973).
Fact that person dies in Colorado does not constitute tortious act. Ferrari, S.p.A. SEFAC v. District Court, 185 Colo. 136 , 522 P.2d 105 (1974), overruled in part in Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
Disclosure of internal revenue agent's report concerning Colorado resident, in place other than Colorado, did not give rise to a tort in this state. First W. Govern. Sec., Inc. v. U.S., 578 F. Supp. 212 (D. Colo. 1984).
Injury must result from intended or foreseeable use. An additional requirement to be met before subjecting an alien manufacturer to personal jurisdiction is that the injury complained of must have resulted from a use intended or foreseeable by the manufacturer. Alliance Clothing, Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400 , 532 P.2d 351 (1975).
Use of foreign product in United States or state must be foreseen. In all the tort cases subjecting alien manufacturers to personal jurisdiction by long-arm statutes, the courts noted that the manufacturer could reasonably foresee that his product would be used in the United States or in the state in question. Alliance Clothing, Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400 , 532 P.2d 351 (1975).
Misrepresentations inducing reliance justify jurisdiction. Where the defendants make an affirmative misrepresentation intending to induce, and actually inducing, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff in Colorado, which causes him damages in Colorado, the defendants purposefully avail themselves of Colorado by proximately causing tort damage in Colorado. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982).
Telephone conversations which are nothing more than informational are inadequate to support a finding of personal jurisdiction. Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1983).
Two letters, an electronic presentation, and a conference call were sufficient contacts to establish prima facie showing that Colorado court has personal jurisdiction over defendant. First Horizon Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Mgmt., LLC, 166 P.3d 166 (Colo. App. 2007).
Participation in conference calls and failure to correct material omissions established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Although contacts were limited, the exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with due process. First Horizon Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Mgmt., LLC, 166 P.3d 166 (Colo. App. 2007).
Out-of-state repair of motor vehicle insufficient. Where the defendant truck stop's sole contact with Colorado was its allegedly negligent repair of the brakes on the truck driven in Colorado by the plaintiff, and it could not be proven that the truck stop had conducted any other activity in the state, the district court's exercise of jurisdiction violates due process. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 ( Colo. 1982 ).
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another state, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117 , 433 P.2d 335 (1967); Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42 , 492 P.2d 624 (1972).
Corporation must by some act avail itself of privilege of doing business in forum state. It is essential in each case "that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state". Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42 , 492 P.2d 624 (1972).
This test has been generalized to mean that the defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have an effect in the forum state. Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42 , 492 P.2d 624 (1972).
Statute does not apply to tortious act outside of state. The statute clearly provides that personal jurisdiction can only be grounded on the commission of a tortious act within the state, and the general assembly did not include tortious acts committed without the state which gave rise to injuries within the state. Had that been the legislative intent it could have been accomplished by specific language to that effect. Before this statute has any effect, both the asserted negligent act or acts of the nonresident defendant, as well as the injury they produce, must occur within the state of Colorado. Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966 ). But see Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117 , 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
But a tortious act committed outside the state may come within this section once it causes injury or damage within this state. Pace v. D & D Fuller CATV Const., Inc., 748 P.2d 1314 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 780 P.2d 520 ( Colo. 1989 ); Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), allegations of tortious conduct in another state which causes injury in Colorado have been held to constitute a prima facie showing of a tortious act within Colorado. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Daniel, McKee & Co., 791 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1990); Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
Negligent conduct initiated in foreign state which proximately results in injury incurred in Colorado constitutes tortious conduct within the meaning of long arm statute. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973); Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 ( Colo. 1984 ); Found. for Knowledge in Dev. v. Interactive Design Consultants, 234 P.3d 673 ( Colo. 2010 ).
To bring one under the jurisdiction of the Colorado court by use of the tort section of this section, sufficient facts need be alleged to support a claim that the alleged tortfeasor was negligent and that the negligent conduct proximately resulted in injury that occurred in Colorado, even if that conduct was initiated in a foreign state. Shaw v. Aurora Mobile Homes & Real Estate, Inc., 36 Colo. App. 321, 539 P.2d 1366 (1975).
Section may be relied on even if tort committed prior to effective date. This section and § 13-1-125 may be constitutionally applied where the complaint is filed after the effective date of the statute, though the tortious act complained of occurred before the effective date of the statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451 , 412 P.2d 428 (1966).
Retrospective application of this section is in accord with sound public policy. At the time of the accident, the defendant was a resident of Colorado. This fact, in itself, in addition to providing a sufficient contact with the state to satisfy the requirement of due process, makes it reasonable to conclude that the defendant might have expected to be subject to suit in Colorado for torts that she may have committed here during that period. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).
Generally, courts of one state do not have jurisdiction over foreign administrator or executor and should not interfere with administration of decedent's estate in foreign jurisdiction. However, rule must give way to legislative enactments in appropriate circumstances, such as where administrator's decedent has committed tort in state of forum. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973).
In personam jurisdiction may be obtained over personal representative of deceased nonresident tortfeasor. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973).
Plaintiff need not prove merits of action -- commission of tort within state -- to initially establish in personam jurisdiction. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973); Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184 , 590 P.2d 964 (1979).
Facts constituting commission of a tortious act within this state. Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184 , 590 P.2d 964 (1979).
Contact insufficient to justify personal jurisdiction. C.F.H. Enters., Inc. v. Heatcool, 538 F. Supp. 774 (D. Colo. 1982).
"Effects" test, as established by U.S. supreme court, specifies that where a defendant's intentional actions, taken outside the forum, are expressly directed at causing a harmful effect within the forum state, such actions are sufficient to satisfy due process in the context of an intentional tort. D & D Fuller CATV Const., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989).
Defendant's alleged tortious acts that have an effect in Colorado, without other contacts with Colorado, did not support a reasonable inference that defendant engaged in conduct subjecting it to personal jurisdiction. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Arkhangelskgeoldobycha, 94 P.3d 1208 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 123 P.3d 1187 ( Colo. 2005 ).
Jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasor requires that the injury itself occur in Colorado, even if the negligent act occurs in another state. McAvoy v. District Court, 757 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1988); AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2008).
Where Colorado resident was injured in an accident with a Washington resident in Washington due to alleged negligent actions which occurred in Washington, the allegations of subsequent treatment for the injury in Colorado, and effects of the accident which were manifest in Colorado, were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Colorado court under the long-arm statute. McAvoy v. District Court, 757 P.2d 633 ( Colo. 1988 ).
In order to satisfy the statutory standard for assertion of long arm jurisdiction, it is not necessary that both the tortious conduct constituting the cause and the injury constituting the effect take place in Colorado. However, the injury in the forum state must be direct, not consequential or remote. F.D.I.C. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 937 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Colo. 1996).
Plaintiff's allegation of a tort caused by unauthorized disbursements from a London account failed to allege that defendants engaged in any tortious conduct in Colorado. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff failed to allege an injury in Colorado sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction under subsection (1)(b) where alleged unauthorized disbursals occurred in London and were from a London account. That plaintiff may have been economically affected in Colorado simply because he lived here is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under subsection (1)(b). Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).
The loss of profits in the state of plaintiff's domicile is insufficient to sustain long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The injury in the forum state must be direct, not consequential or remote. When both the tortious conduct and the injury occur in another state, the fact that the plaintiff resides in Colorado and experiences some economic consequences here is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a Colorado court. AMAX Potash Corp. v. Trans-Resources, Inc., 817 P.2d 598 (Colo. App. 1991); Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 259 P.3d 497 ( Colo. 2011 ).
A person's conduct causes a minor child to leave a custodial parent, when the parent does not consent, or prevents a child's return to such parent, such conduct constitutes a tortious act. D & D Fuller CATV Const., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989).
Defendant's allegedly tortious action in collecting upon a voided wage assignment was expressly directed at causing a harmful effect within the forum state and thus created a sufficient nexus between defendant and the forum state so as to satisfy due process. Vogan v. County of San Diego, 193 P.3d 336 (Colo. App. 2008).
Tortious conduct in a foreign state which causes injury in Colorado may be deemed to be an act committed in Colorado so as to satisfy the long-arm statute. Ranger v. Fortune Ins. Co., 817 P.2d 600 (Colo. App. 1991).
Tort claims of intentional and negligent misrepresentations directed into Colorado during the course of telephone conversations from outside the state into the state are sufficient to constitute tortious acts within the state under this section. Broadview Fin., Inc. v. Entech Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 859 F. Supp. 444 (D. Colo. 1994).
Personal jurisdiction existed over nonresident attorney and his law firm which, in addressing two letters to plaintiff in Colorado, purposely directed their activities toward Colorado and plaintiff's injuries relate to that contact with Colorado. First Entm't, Inc. v. Firth, 885 F. Supp. 216 (D. Colo. 1995).
Exercise of jurisdiction held proper where defendants, in connection with sale of sports car through Nebraska dealership, placed ad in national magazine, made allegedly fraudulent representations via telephone to Colorado plaintiff, and knew that car would be transported to and used in Colorado. Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 ( Colo. 1992 ).
Applied in J.L. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (D. Colo. 2021).
IV. REAL PROPERTY IN COLORADO.
Transaction involving Colorado property gives long arm jurisdiction. This section commonly referred to as the long arm statute specifically provides that a person who transacts business in the state of Colorado or owns real property in the state of Colorado submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Colorado in any action arising from the transaction of such business or the ownership of such property. McHenry F.S., Inc., v. Clausen, 30 Colo. App. 253, 491 P.2d 592 (1971).
Being the state with greatest interest in transaction, jurisdiction in Colorado not offensive. Where a contract to purchase land was signed by both parties outside the state of Colorado but the defendant came to Colorado to view the property and employed a Colorado firm of consulting engineers to conduct a survey of the property, and the contract to purchase the property was prepared in Colorado, and the real estate broker and the vendor of the property were both Colorado residents, and the subject matter of the contract, the real estate, was located in Colorado thereby making Colorado the state with the greatest interest in the transaction, the defendant's purposeful acts in this state were significant, and the jurisdiction of the district court obtained through the long arm statute did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Dwyer v. District Court, 188 Colo. 41 , 532 P.2d 725 (1975).
Once defendants are personally served, court acquires in personam jurisdiction. Where the claims asserted against the defendants arose out of their title to certain real property and their transfer of that property to a company, and the defendants were personally served with process in the state of Illinois pursuant to the provisions of this section, consequently, the trial court obtained in personam jurisdiction over them. McHenry F.S., Inc. v. Clausen, 30 Colo. App. 253, 491 P.2d 592 (1971).
Nonresidency of all parties does not defeat long arm jurisdiction. The argument that since both the plaintiff and the defendants were residents of Illinois, the long arm statute was not available is without merit. McHenry F.S., Inc. v. Clausen, 30 Colo. App. 253, 491 P.2d 592 (1971).
V. CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE.
Reinsurance contract subject to law of state where made. The negotiation and execution outside the state of a contract of reinsurance is not doing business in the state where the insured property is situated and the original risk was assumed. Reinsurance effected under a contract made in one state does not constitute doing business in another, although the risks covered by the reinsurance agreement were in the latter state and were covered by the reinsurance contract. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493 , 436 P.2d 124 (1968).
Plaintiff must prove reinsurance treaty was executed in Colorado. As to the reinsurance treaties, the record fails to show that these were executed in Colorado. Plaintiff has the burden of proof in regard to this essential assertion of jurisdiction. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493 , 436 P.2d 124 (1968).
Mere fact that certain individuals who live in Colorado were parties to a reinsurance contract is insufficient to meet the minimum contacts test. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Equitas Ltd., 987 P.2d 954 (Colo. App. 1999).
Insurance company and liquidator subject to jurisdiction. Where an insurance company solicited and did substantial business in Colorado, the company, and its liquidator in case the company is insolvent, is subject to jurisdiction under the provisions of this section. Insurance Affiliates, Inc. v. O'Connor, 522 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo. 1981).
VI. MAINTENANCE OF MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE.
Trial court held to have acquired personal jurisdiction over husband for purposes of dividing marital property. In re Booker, 833 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1992).
A spouse's affidavit that the spouse has resided and continues to reside in Colorado is sufficient for a Colorado court to exercise long arm jurisdiction over the husband under subsection (1)(e). In re Akins, 932 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1997).
Entry of foreign decree that determined only the status of the marriage without addressing the division of marital property did not deprive the Colorado court of the power to divide property exclusive of husband's military pension and to award maintenance and child support. In re Akins, 932 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1997).
Federal act preempts state rules regarding jurisdiction over a military pension. Under the supremacy clause, the terms of the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act preempt state rules with respect to a court's jurisdiction to consider the military pension as a marital asset. In re Akins, 932 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1997).
13-1-125. Service of process.
- Service of process upon any person subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Colorado may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant or respondent outside this state, in the manner prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, with the same force and effect as if the summons had been personally served within this state.
- No service of any summons or other process upon any corporation shall be made outside the state in the manner provided in subsection (1) of this section when such corporation maintains an agent for process upon whom service may be made as provided in rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
- Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any process as prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
Source: L. 65: p. 472, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-27. L. 82: p. 280, § 2.
Cross references: For the manner of service, see C.R.C.P. 4.
ANNOTATION
Analysis
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For note, "One Year Review of Colorado Law -- 1964", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For article, "Jurisdiction and Service of Process Beyond Colorado Boundaries", see 11 Colo. Law. 748 (1982). For article, "Legislative Activities in Family Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 1560 (1982).
This section and § 13-1-124 are sometimes referred to as the "long arm" or "single act" statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451 , 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437 , 417 P.2d 792 (1966).
Purpose of sections was to extend the court's jurisdiction. These sections were passed by the general assembly in order to extend, rather than to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491 , 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
Section may be used even when cause arose before effective date. This section and § 13-1-124 may be constitutionally applied where the complaint is filed after the effective date of the statute, though the tortious act complained of occurred before the effective date of the statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451 , 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437 , 417 P.2d 792 (1966).
Retrospective application of this section is in accord with sound public policy. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).
For discussion of conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, see Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1983).
Applied in Nations Enters, Inc. v. Process Equip. Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, 486 F. Supp. 131 (D. Colo. 1980 ); Beckman v. Carlson, 553 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983 ).
II. PROPER SERVICE.
Transacting of business may not be proved unless process is properly served. Since respondents did not serve process on a foreign corporation by personal service as required by the "long arm" statute, its provisions concerning contacts sufficient to establish doing business are inapplicable under § 7-9-119. Geer Co. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 48 , 469 P.2d 734 (1970).
It is improper to dismiss a complaint because of improper or invalid service of process. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451 , 412 P.2d 428 (1966).
Quashing of process is not reviewable by writ of error. An order quashing a purported service of process is not tantamount to a judgment of dismissal and under our rules is not such an order as is subject to review by writ of error. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451 , 412 P.2d 428 (1966).
Process must be served on defendant at usual place of abode. The fact that the serviceman's usual place of abode was not the place of service is sufficient as a matter of law to overcome the prima facie showing made by the sheriff's return and that the service must therefore be set aside. Neher v. District Court, 161 Colo. 445 , 422 P.2d 627 (1967).
Term "usual place of abode" is not necessarily synonymous with domicile. The term "usual place of abode" has generally been construed to mean the place where that person is actually living at the time service is attempted. It is not necessarily synonymous with "domicile". Neher v. District Court, 161 Colo. 445 , 422 P.2d 627 (1967).
For necessity of process being served by proper person, see Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 177 Colo. 261 , 493 P.2d 1093 (1972).
Process will not be quashed for lack of jurisdiction if plaintiff makes prima facie showing. Where plaintiff makes prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction in complaint, process is not vulnerable to motion to quash based upon lack of jurisdiction. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432 , 506 P.2d 367 (1973).
13-1-126. Documents in court proceedings - designation by clerk of representative to attend court proceedings.
Documents from the office of the clerk of any court of record to be used as evidence in court proceedings shall be acknowledged, exemplified, verified, or attested to in a manner which shall make unnecessary the personal appearance of such clerk in court proceedings to acknowledge, exemplify, verify, or attest to the validity of such documents. The clerk of any court of record may designate a representative to attend court proceedings if the clerk is subpoenaed for the purpose of acknowledging, exemplifying, verifying, or attesting to the validity of documents furnished by the clerk's office.
Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p. 596, § 4, effective July 1.
13-1-127. Entities - school districts - legislative declaration - representation - definitions.
-
As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Closely held entity" means an entity, as defined in section 7-90-102 (20), C.R.S., with no more than three owners.
- "Cooperative" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (9), C.R.S.
- "Corporate licensed child placement agency" means an entity that places, or arranges for placement of, the care of any child with any family, person, or institution other than persons related to said child and that is licensed by the department of human services pursuant to section 26-6-104, C.R.S., as a child placement agency.
- "Corporation" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (10), C.R.S.
- "Entity" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (20), C.R.S.
- "Limited liability company" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (32), C.R.S.
- "Limited partnership" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (34), C.R.S.
- "Limited partnership association" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (35), C.R.S.
- "Nonprofit association" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (38), C.R.S.
- "Nonprofit corporation" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (39), C.R.S.
- "Officer" means a person generally or specifically authorized by an entity to take any action contemplated by this section.
- "Owner" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (43), C.R.S.
- "School district" means a school district organized and existing pursuant to law but does not include a local college district.
- "Truancy proceedings" means judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the "School Attendance Law of 1963", article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., brought pursuant to section 22-33-108, C.R.S.
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Except as otherwise provided in section 13-6-407, a closely held entity may be represented before any court of record or any administrative agency by an officer of such closely held entity if:
- The amount at issue in the controversy or matter before the court or agency does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, interest, or statutory penalties, on and after August 7, 2013; and
- The officer provides the court or agency, at or prior to the trial or hearing, with evidence satisfactory to the court or agency of the authority of the officer to appear on behalf of the closely held entity in all matters within the jurisdictional limits set forth in this section.
(2.3) For the purposes of this section, each of the following persons shall be presumed to have the authority to appear on behalf of the closely held entity upon providing evidence of the person's holding the specified office or status:
- An officer of a cooperative, corporation, or nonprofit corporation;
- A general partner of a partnership or of a limited partnership;
- A person in whom the management of a limited liability company is vested or reserved; and
- A member of a limited partnership association.
- (2.5) (a) The general assembly hereby finds and determines that the practice of law should not include the representation of a corporation in workers' compensation proceedings by an authorized employee of such corporation. While the general assembly respectfully recognizes the jurisdiction of the supreme court with respect to the regulation of the practice of law, it hereby finds and declares that the representation of a corporation in workers' compensation cases by an authorized employee of that corporation does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The general assembly has determined that the decision of a president or secretary of a corporation to have a corporate employee represent the corporation in a workers' compensation case is a business decision made voluntarily and knowingly by persons who are qualified and accustomed to making business decisions. The general assembly has further determined that allowing such representation will not hamper the orderly and proper disposition of workers' compensation cases and may expedite and facilitate such disposition. An employee of a defendant corporation with experience in the operations of such corporation and knowledge of the necessary facts and law can afford a defendant corporation with representation which is the substantial equivalent to, and may in some cases, be more effective than, a licensed attorney. The general assembly hereby declares that the protections afforded by the restrictions set forth by the supreme court with respect to the unauthorized practice of law are unnecessary for the described form of representation because the general public is not likely to be harmed by such representation. Further, the general assembly respectfully recommends that the supreme court adopt rules which permit and regulate such representation in which event the general assembly may choose to repeal this statute in deference to the supreme court's rules.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section concerning the amount at issue, any corporation which is in compliance with the requirements otherwise imposed on corporations by law may be represented by any employee of the corporation who is so authorized by the president or secretary of such corporation, in proceedings authorized under the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado", articles 40 to 47 of title 8, C.R.S., exclusive of proceedings before the industrial claim appeals office under part 3 of article 43 of title 8, C.R.S., appeals to the court of appeals under section 8-43-307, C.R.S., and summary reviews by the supreme court under section 8-43-313, C.R.S.
- The court may rely upon a written resolution of a closely held entity that allows a named officer to appear in the closely held entity's behalf.
- A closely held entity's exercise of the option authorized by this section to be represented by an officer shall not alone be construed to establish personal liability of the representing officer or any other officer, director, owner, or shareholder for action taken by that closely held entity.
- A corporate licensed child placement agency, as defined in paragraph (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section, that is in compliance with the requirements otherwise imposed on closely held entities by law, may be represented by any named officer or designated agent of the agency in any proceeding involving the termination of the parent-child relationship pursuant to the "Colorado Children's Code", title 19, C.R.S., or in any proceeding involving a petition for adoption pursuant to section 19-5-208, C.R.S.
- Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to restrict the classes of persons who, or circumstances in which persons, may be represented by other persons, or may appear in person, before Colorado courts or administrative agencies.
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- A school district board of education may authorize, by resolution, one or more employees of the school district to represent the school district in truancy proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction; except that the authorization of the board of education shall not extend to representation of the school district before a court of appeals or before the Colorado supreme court.
- A court may rely on the written resolution of the school district board of education that authorizes the named employee to represent the school district in truancy proceedings.
- An authorized employee who represents a school district in truancy proceedings pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (7) shall not be subject to the provisions of section 13-93-108.
- A school district board of education's exercise of the option authorized by this section to be represented in truancy proceedings by an employee shall not alone be construed to establish personal liability of the representing employee or any other employee or a school director of the school district for action taken by the school district.
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 598, § 1, effective May 25. L. 84: (1)(c) amended, p. 450, § 1, effective March 16. L. 90: IP(2) and (2)(a) amended, p. 849, § 3, effective May 31; (2)(a) amended, p. 854, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (2.5) added, p. 1285, § 1, effective April 14. L. 92: (1)(a.5) and (5) added, pp. 179, 180, §§ 2, 3, effective March 20; (2.5) amended, p. 276, § 1, effective April 14. L. 94: (1)(a.5) amended, p. 2639, § 85, effective July 1. L. 98: (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) amended and (2.3) and (6) added, p. 489, § 1, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2007: (1)(k), (1)(l), and (7) added, pp. 165, 164, §§ 2, 1, effective March 22. L. 2013: (2)(a) amended, (HB 13-1052), ch. 40, p. 111, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2017: (7)(c) amended, (SB 17-227), ch. 192, p. 704, § 4, effective August 9.
Cross references: (1) For representation of corporations in the small claims division of county court, see § 13-6-407.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (2) and subsection (2)(a), see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990. For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (1)(a.5), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.
ANNOTATION
Assuming that defendant church existed as a de facto corporation, if the pastor were recognized as a corporate officer, the pastor could represent the defendant in court. Where there was no showing that the pastor was a corporate officer, however, the pastor could not represent the defendant church. People v. LaPorte Church of Christ, 830 P.2d 1150 (Colo. App. 1992).
Trial court erred in permitting non-attorney manager to represent limited liability company (LLC) since LLC could not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of the statutory exception in subsection (2). Weston v. T&T, LLC, 271 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2011).
LLC not entitled to a new trial, however, because any error in permitting non-attorney manager to represent LLC was invited by LLC. Weston v. T&T, LLC, 271 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2011).
Applied in Keller Corp. v. Kelley, 187 P.3d 1133 (Colo. App. 2008).
13-1-128. Confidentiality of decisions of courts of record - violations - penalties - repeal.
- Each decision of a court of record shall be confidential until publicly announced.
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- If it appears that the provisions of subsection (1) of this section have been violated, petition shall be made to the chief judge of the district court for the city and county of Denver for the appointment of a special prosecutor and the convening of a grand jury.
- The chief judge, for good cause shown, shall appoint the special prosecutor and shall order the impaneling of a grand jury in accordance with the provisions of article 73 of this title. Any special prosecutor appointed pursuant to this section shall be compensated as provided in section 20-1-308, C.R.S.
- An action for violation of subsection (1) of this section may only be commenced by the return of an indictment by a grand jury notwithstanding any provision of section 16-5-101, C.R.S., to the contrary.
- Any person who knowingly violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section commits a class 6 felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S.
- This section is repealed, effective March 1, 2022.
Source: L. 87: Entire section added, p. 539, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89: (4) amended, p. 827, § 31, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4) amended, p. 1487, § 120, effective October 1. L. 2021: (5) added by revision, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, pp. 3157, 3331, §§ 154, 803.
Editor's note: Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act repealing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
13-1-129. Preferential trial dates.
- In any civil action filed in any court of record in this state, the court shall grant a motion for a preferential trial date which is accompanied by clear and convincing medical evidence concluding that a party suffers from an illness or condition raising substantial medical doubt of survival of that party beyond one year and which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting such motion for a preferential trial date.
- In any civil action filed in any court of record in this state, the court may grant a motion for a preferential trial date upon the motion of a party who is a natural person at least seventy years of age and a finding by the court that such claim is meritorious, unless the court finds that such party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole.
- A motion under this section may be filed and served at any time when the case is at issue and a party meets the requirements of subsection (1) or (2) of this section.
- Upon the granting of a motion for a preferential trial date, the court shall set the case for trial not more than one hundred nineteen days from the date the motion was filed. The court shall establish an accelerated discovery schedule in all such cases. No continuance shall be granted beyond the one-hundred-nineteen-day period except for physical or mental disability of a party or a party's attorney or upon a showing of other good cause. Any such continuance shall be for no more than one hundred nineteen days, and only one such continuance shall be granted to a party.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 858, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2012: (4) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 822, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1-130. Reports of convictions to department of education.
When a person is convicted of, pleads nolo contendere to, or receives a deferred sentence for a felony and the court knows the person is a current or former employee of a school district or a charter school in this state or holds a license or authorization pursuant to the provisions of article 60.5 of title 22, C.R.S., the court shall report such fact to the department of education.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1025, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1843, § 22, effective August 2. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 2514, § 1, effective June 5.
13-1-131. Speedy trial option in civil actions.
If a trial date has not been fixed by the court in any civil action within ninety days from the date the case is at issue, upon agreement of all the parties, the parties may elect to have the matter heard by a master, appointed by the court in accordance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure. When such a trial is held before a master, the parties shall pay the costs of such trial, as allocated fairly among the parties by the master. The master shall have all the powers of a judge.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 851, § 11, effective May 31.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.
13-1-132. Use of interactive audiovisual devices in court proceedings.
- Except for trials, when the appearance of any person is required in any court of this state, such appearance may be made by the use of an interactive audiovisual device. An interactive audiovisual device shall operate so as to enable the person and the judge or magistrate to view and converse with each other simultaneously.
- Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a judge or magistrate may order a person to appear in court.
- A full record of such proceeding shall be made.
- The supreme court may prescribe rules of procedure pursuant to section 13-2-109 to implement this section.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 318, § 1, effective April 29.
13-1-133. Use of recycled paper.
- The general assembly finds and declares that there is a need to expand upon existing laws which foster the effective and efficient management of solid waste by requiring that certain documents submitted by attorneys-at-law to state courts of record be submitted on recycled paper. The general assembly further finds that such expansion will protect and enhance the environment and the health and safety of the citizens of Colorado.
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- Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), no document shall be submitted by an attorney to a court of record after January 1, 1994, unless such document is submitted on recycled paper. The provisions of this section shall apply to all papers appended to each such document. (2) (a) (I) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), no document shall be submitted by an attorney to a court of record after January 1, 1994, unless such document is submitted on recycled paper. The provisions of this section shall apply to all papers appended to each such document.
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- Procedures adopted to implement the provisions of this section shall not impede the conduct of court business nor create grounds for an additional cause of action or sanction.
- No document shall be refused by a court of record solely because it was not submitted on recycled paper.
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to:
- Photographs;
- An original document that was prepared or printed prior to January 1, 1994;
- A document that was not created at the direction or under the control of the submitting attorney;
- Facsimile copies otherwise permitted to be filed with a court of record in lieu of the original document; however, if the original is also required to be filed, such original shall be submitted in compliance with this section;
- Existing stocks of nonrecycled paper and preprinted forms acquired or printed prior to January 1, 1994.
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- The provisions of this section shall not be applicable if recycled paper is not readily available.
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For purposes of this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
- "Attorney" means an attorney-at-law admitted to practice law before any court of record in this state.
- "Courts of record" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 13-1-111.
- "Document" means any pleading or any other paper submitted as an appendix to such pleading by an attorney, which document is required or permitted to be filed with a clerk of court concerning any action to be commenced or which is pending before a court of record.
- "Recycled paper" means paper with not less than fifty percent of its total weight consisting of secondary and postconsumer waste and with not less than ten percent of such total weight consisting of postconsumer waste.
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 622, § 2, effective July 1.
Cross references: For further provisions concerning the purchase of recycled paper and recycled products, see §§ 24-103-207, 25-16.5-102, and 30-11-109.5.
13-1-134. Court automation system - juvenile or domestic actions.
- The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that the accurate and efficient exchange of information between the courts and state family service agencies is beneficial in providing aid to families in need in Colorado. Further, the general assembly declares that the use of a computer automation system to link the courts with each other and with state family service agencies for the purpose of the exchange of information regarding families would aid in identifying and providing services to families in need. It is for this reason that the general assembly has adopted this section.
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- On or before January 15, 1996, the state court administrator shall establish and administer a program for automation of the court computer technology systems in order to link the juvenile courts and district courts involved in domestic actions around the state with each other and with state family service agencies, including, but not limited to, the department of human services, the juvenile probation department, law enforcement offices, and any other agency involved in the investigation, evaluation, or provision of services to families involved in domestic actions pursuant to title 19, C.R.S., and articles 4 and 10 of title 14, C.R.S. Said automation system shall provide those parties linked to the system with automatic access to information obtained by any one of the parties in regard to a family or family member involved in said domestic actions; except that said automation system shall not include information which is required to be kept confidential under any state or federal law.
- Repealed.
- The provisions of this section shall not affect the confidentiality of juvenile records.
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 931, § 1, effective May 28. L. 94: (2) amended, p. 2639, § 86, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(b) repealed, p. 1264, § 175, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (2), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994. For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act repealing subsection (2)(b), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
13-1-135. Family courts - implementation report. (Repealed)
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1256, § 1, effective June 6. L. 96: (1) repealed, p. 1264, § 176, effective August 7. L. 98: (2) repealed, p. 818, § 13, effective August 5.
13-1-136. Civil protection orders - single set of forms.
- The general assembly hereby finds that the statutes provide for the issuance of several types of civil protection orders to protect the public, but that many of these protection orders have many elements in common. The general assembly also finds that consolidating the various forms for issuing and verifying service of civil protection orders and creating, to the extent possible, a standardized set of forms that will be applicable to the issuance and service of civil protection orders will simplify the procedures for issuing these protection orders and enhance the efficient use of the courts' and citizens' time and resources.
- On or before July 1, 2003, the state court administrator, pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Colorado supreme court, shall design and make available to the courts copies of a standardized set of forms that shall be used in the issuance and verification of service of civil protection orders issued pursuant to article 14 of this title or section 14-10-108, C.R.S., or rule 365 of the Colorado rules of county court civil procedure. The state court administrator shall design the standardized set of forms in such a manner as to make the forms easy to understand and use and in such a manner as will facilitate and improve the procedure for requesting, issuing, and enforcing civil protection orders.
- In developing the standardized set of forms for the issuance and verification of service of civil protection orders pursuant to this section, the state court administrator shall work with representatives of municipal, county, and district court judges, law enforcement, a member of the Colorado bar association, and representatives of other interested groups.
Source: L. 98: Entire section added, p. 243, § 1, effective April 13. L. 99: (2) amended, p. 501, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 493, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1002, § 3, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Standard form of order not necessary under this section in probate court guardianship case where restraining order was entered as part of a broader order concerning parenting time. People ex rel. A.R.D., 43 P.3d 632 (Colo. App. 2001).
13-1-137. Reporting of data concerning juvenile proceedings.
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Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the judicial branch shall report annually to the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and senate, or to any successor committees, information concerning:
- The number of juvenile delinquency cases;
- The number of juvenile delinquency cases that involved an appointment of counsel;
- The number of juvenile cases that involved a waiver of counsel;
- The status of recommended reviews to juvenile court rules, forms, and chief justice directives regarding the representation of children in juvenile delinquency courts;
- The number of juvenile delinquency cases that involved a detention hearing, the number of juveniles who were released after the detention hearing, and the number of juveniles who remained in detention after the detention hearing; and
- The process of training judicial officers and private defense attorneys concerning determinations of competency to proceed for juveniles and adults, competency evaluation reports, services to restore competency, and certification proceedings governed by article 65 of title 27.
Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (HB 14-1032), ch. 247, p. 955, § 11, effective November 1. L. 2017: IP(1) amended, (SB 17-241), ch. 171, p. 623, § 1, effective April 28. L. 2019: (1)(d) and (1)(e) amended and (1)(f) added, (SB 19-223), ch. 227, p. 2291, § 14, effective July 1.
13-1-138. Notification of court reminder program.
A court that participates in the court reminder program established in section 13-3-101 (14)(a)(I) shall notify a criminal defendant or juvenile participant, as defined in section 13-3-101 (14), at each court appearance that the individual can elect to provide a mobile telephone number that will be used by the court solely to provide text message reminders for future court dates and unplanned court closures, and shall provide the opportunity for the individual to provide a mobile telephone number or update a mobile telephone number for that purpose.
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (SB 19-036), ch. 293, p. 2687, § 2, effective August 2.
13-1-139. Court limitations on medication-assisted treatment - prohibited.
A court shall not condition participation in a drug or problem-solving court or other judicial program, or enter orders relating to probation or parole or placement in community corrections, based on the requirement that a person cease participating in prescribed medication-assisted treatment for substance use disorders, as defined in section 23-21-803, unless the person or the prescriber determines that medication-assisted treatment is no longer necessary or is no longer an effective treatment for the person.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-007), ch. 286, p. 1390, § 5, effective July 13.
PART 2 COURT SECURITY CASH FUND COMMISSION
13-1-201. Legislative declaration.
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The general assembly hereby finds that:
- Ensuring the safety of employees and users of state court facilities is a significant component of ensuring access to justice for the people of the state of Colorado;
- Responsibility for providing security for state court facilities lies with the county governments; and
- Colorado is a geographically, demographically, and economically diverse state and this diversity affects the funding and services of individual counties. Although the provision of security for state court facilities is a county responsibility, the variation in funds available to individual counties may not allow fundamental security measures to be met in each county.
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The general assembly, therefore, determines and declares that:
- The creation of the court security cash fund commission and the court security cash fund will be beneficial to, and in the best interests of, the people of the state of Colorado; and
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The goals of the commission and the cash fund shall be to:
- Provide supplemental funding for ongoing security staffing in the counties with the most limited financial resources; and
- Provide moneys to counties for court security equipment costs, training of local security teams on issues of state court security, and emergency needs related to court security.
Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1264, § 1, effective May 25.
13-1-202. Definitions.
As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Commission" means the court security cash fund commission created in section 13-1-203.
- "Fund" means the court security cash fund created in section 13-1-204.
- "Local security team" means a group of individuals from a county that oversees issues of court security for the county and that includes, at a minimum, the chief judge of the district court in the county or his or her designee, the sheriff or his or her designee, and a county commissioner or county manager or his or her designee.
Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1265, § 1, effective May 25.
13-1-203. Court security cash fund commission - creation - membership.
- There is hereby created in the judicial department the court security cash fund commission to evaluate grant applications received pursuant to this part 2 and make recommendations to the state court administrator for awarding grants from the court security cash fund. The commission shall be appointed no later than July 1, 2007.
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The commission shall be composed of seven members, as follows:
- Two representatives of an association that represents county commissioners who are recommended by the association and who are appointed by the governor;
- Two representatives of an association that represents county sheriffs who are recommended by the association and who are appointed by governor;
- Two members of the judicial branch who are appointed by the chief justice; and
- One member of the general public who is appointed by the chief justice.
- The commission membership described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall include, at all times, at least one representative from a county in which the population is above the median population for the state of Colorado, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs, and at least one representative from a county in which the population is below the median population for the state of Colorado, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs.
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The commission shall be composed of seven members, as follows:
- The term of office of each member of the commission shall be three years; except that, of those members first appointed, one member representing each entity shall be appointed for a one-year term and one member representing each entity shall be appointed for a two-year term. A vacancy shall be filled by the respective appointing authority for the unexpired term only.
- Members of the commission shall serve without compensation and without reimbursement for expenses.
Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1265, § 1, effective May 25.
13-1-204. Court security cash fund - creation - grants - regulations.
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- There is hereby created in the state treasury the court security cash fund. The moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the implementation of this part 2. The state court administrator is authorized to accept gifts, grants, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of implementing this part 2. All private and public moneys received by the state court administrator from gifts, grants, or donations shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the fund in addition to any moneys that may be appropriated to the fund directly by the general assembly.
- A five-dollar surcharge shall be assessed and collected as provided by law on docket fees and jury fees for specified civil actions filed on and after July 1, 2007, on docket fees for criminal convictions entered on and after July 1, 2007, on filing fees for specified probate filings made on and after July 1, 2007, on docket fees for specified special proceeding filings made on and after July 1, 2007, on fees for specified filings in water matters initiated on and after July 1, 2007, and on docket fees for specified traffic infraction penalties assessed on and after July 1, 2007. The surcharge shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the surcharge to the fund.
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- All investment earnings derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
- Notwithstanding any provision of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) to the contrary, on April 20, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct one million five hundred thousand dollars from the court security cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
- Notwithstanding any provision of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) to the contrary, on July 1, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct five hundred thousand dollars from the court security cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
- Moneys from the fund that are distributed to counties pursuant to this part 2 shall be used to supplement existing county funding for purposes related to security of facilities containing a state court or probation office and shall not be used to supplant moneys already allocated by the county for such purposes.
- All moneys credited to the fund shall be available for grants awarded by the state court administrator, based on recommendations of the commission, to counties for the purposes described in this part 2; except that the state court administrator may use up to ten percent of the moneys annually appropriated from the fund for administrative costs incurred through the implementation of this part 2. The state court administrator, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, is hereby authorized to expend moneys appropriated from the fund pursuant to this part 2.
- In accordance with the principles set out in section 13-1-205, the commission shall adopt guidelines prescribing the procedures to be followed in making, filing, and evaluating grant applications, the criteria for evaluation, and other guidelines necessary for administering the fund.
Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1266, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2009: (1)(c) amended, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 619, § 7, effective April 20; (1)(c)(III) added, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1925, § 3, effective June 1.
13-1-205. Grant applications - duties of counties.
- To be eligible for moneys from the fund, a local security team shall apply to the commission through the state court administrator for moneys to be used as specified in this part 2 and in accordance with the timelines and guidelines adopted by the commission and using the application form provided by the commission. For the commission to consider a grant application, the application shall be signed by the administrative authority of each entity that is represented on the local security team.
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Grants from the fund shall be used to fund counties that meet the criteria specified in subsection (4) of this section for:
- The provision of court security staffing at a facility containing a state court or probation office;
- The purchase of security equipment or related structural improvements for a facility containing a state court or probation office;
- The provision of training on issues of court security; or
- Miscellaneous funding needs associated with issues of court security or security equipment.
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Moneys credited to the fund that are available for grant distribution shall be awarded based on the following priority schedule:
- Requests from counties that meet the criteria specified in subsection (4) of this section shall have the highest priority; and
- Requests for moneys for personnel costs shall be given subsequent priority.
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Counties that meet at least two of the following criteria shall be given the highest priority for need-based grants for court security personnel services pursuant to this part 2:
- Counties in which the total population is below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs;
- Counties in which the per capita income is below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs;
- Counties in which property tax revenues are below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs; or
- Counties in which the total county population living below the federal poverty line is greater than the state median, as determined by the most recent census published by the United States bureau of the census.
Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1267, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2010: (4)(d) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2068, § 21, effective August 11.
13-1-206. Repeal of part. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1268, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2017: Entire section repealed, (SB 17-221), ch. 349, p. 1832, § 1, effective June 5.
PART 3 UNDERFUNDED COURTHOUSE FACILITIES
13-1-301. Legislative declaration.
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The general assembly hereby finds that:
- Providing access to state court facilities and ensuring the safety of employees and other users of state court facilities are fundamental components of ensuring access to justice for the people of the state of Colorado;
- Recent years have seen numerous occasions in which courthouse repair, renovation, improvement, and expansion needs have become important priorities for judicial districts and the counties they serve;
- In some cases these needs result from anticipated causes, such as expanding caseloads, the allocations of new judges to the district, or the aging of existing courtroom facilities and the attendant need to bring them up to current operational and safety standards;
- In other cases the needs are driven by unexpected events, such as natural disasters, accidents, or the discovery of previously unknown threats to health and safety; and
- While the responsibility for providing adequate courtrooms and other court facilities lies with county governments, the geographically, demographically, and economically diverse nature of our state affects the level of funding and services that each county can provide.
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The general assembly, therefore, determines and declares that:
- The creation of the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund commission and the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund is beneficial to and in the best interests of the people of the state of Colorado; and
- The purpose of the commission and the fund is to provide supplemental funding for courthouse facility projects in the counties with the most limited financial resources.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (HB 14-1096), ch. 186, p. 691, § 1, effective May 14.
13-1-302. Definitions.
As used in this part 3, unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Commission" means the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund commission created in section 13-1-303.
- "Court security cash fund commission" means the court security cash fund commission created in section 13-1-203.
- "Fund" means the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund created in section 13-1-304.
- "Imminent closure of a court facility" means a court facility with health, life, or safety issues that impact court employees or other court users and that is designated for imminent closure by the state court administrator in consultation with the state's risk management system or other appropriate professionals. Health, life, or safety issues include air quality issues, water intrusion problems, temperature control issues, structural conditions that cannot reasonably be mitigated, fire hazards, electrical hazards, and utility problems. Certain health, life, or safety issues may require additional third-party evaluations such as an environmental or structural engineering review.
- "Master planning" means entering into contracts for professional design services or engineering consulting to determine construction or remodeling options, feasibility, or cost estimates for a proposed building project.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (HB 14-1096), ch. 186, p. 692, § 1, effective May 14.
13-1-303. Underfunded courthouse facility cash fund commission - creation - membership.
- There is hereby created in the judicial department the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund commission to evaluate grant applications received pursuant to this part 3 and make recommendations to the state court administrator for awarding grants from the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund based on the statutory criteria set forth in section 13-1-305. The commission shall be appointed no later than July 1, 2014.
-
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The commission has seven members, as follows:
- Two representatives of an association that represents county commissioners, appointed by the association;
- One member from the department of local affairs, appointed by the department of local affairs;
- Two members from the judicial branch, appointed by the chief justice;
- One member from the court security cash fund commission, appointed by the chief justice; and
- A representative of the state historical society, appointed by the president of the state historical society.
- The commission membership described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) must include, at all times, at least one representative from a county in which the population is above the median population for the state, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs, and at least one representative from a county in which the population is below the median population for the state, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs.
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The commission has seven members, as follows:
- Each member of the commission serves a three-year term; except that, of those members first appointed, one member representing each entity that appoints two members is appointed for a one-year term and one member representing each entity that appoints two members is appointed for a two-year term. A vacancy must be filled by the respective appointing authority no later than thirty days after the vacating member's last day for the unexpired term only.
- Members of the commission serve without compensation and without reimbursement for expenses.
- Four member votes are required for any final commission recommendations. The commission's final recommendations are subject to final approval by the state court administrator and are not subject to any form of appeal.
- In accordance with the principles set out in section 13-1-305, the commission shall adopt guidelines prescribing the procedures to be followed in making, filing, and evaluating grant applications, the criteria for evaluation, and other guidelines necessary for administering the program.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (HB 14-1096), ch. 186, p. 692, § 1, effective May 14.
13-1-304. Underfunded courthouse facility cash fund - creation - grants - regulations.
- There is hereby created in the state treasury the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund that consists of any moneys appropriated by the general assembly to the fund. The moneys in the fund are subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the implementation of this part 3. The state court administrator may accept gifts, grants, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of implementing this part 3. All private and public moneys received by the state court administrator from gifts, grants, or donations must be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the fund in addition to any moneys that may be appropriated to the fund directly by the general assembly. All investment earnings derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund remain in the fund and may not be transferred or revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
- Moneys from the fund that are distributed to counties pursuant to this part 3 may only be used for commissioning master planning services, matching funds or leveraging grant funding opportunities for construction or remodeling projects, or addressing emergency needs due to the imminent closure of a court facility. Moneys from the fund may not be allocated for the purchase of furniture, fixtures, or equipment or as the sole source of funding for new construction. Moneys from the fund may not be allocated as the sole source of funding for remodeling, unless the need for funding is associated with the imminent closure of a court facility.
- All moneys credited to the fund shall be available for grants awarded by the state court administrator, based on recommendations of the commission, to counties for the purposes described in this part 3; except that the state court administrator may use a portion of the moneys annually appropriated from the fund for administrative costs incurred through the implementation of this part 3. The state court administrator, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, may expend moneys appropriated from the fund pursuant to this part 3.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (HB 14-1096), ch. 186, p. 694, § 1, effective May 14.
13-1-305. Grant applications - duties of counties.
- To be eligible for moneys from the fund, a county must apply to the commission through the state court administrator, using the application form provided by the commission, in accordance with the timelines and guidelines adopted by the commission. For the commission to consider a grant application, the application must first be reviewed and approved by the chief judge of the county and the board of county commissioners.
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Grants from the fund may only be used to fund counties that meet the requirements set forth in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2) and the criteria specified in subsection (4) of this section to:
- Commission master planning services;
- Serve as matching funds or leverage grant funding opportunities; or
- Address emergency needs due to the imminent closure of a court facility.
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Grants from the fund may only be awarded to a county when:
- The county has demonstrated good faith in attempting to resolve the issues before seeking a grant from the fund;
- The county has agreed to disclose pertinent financial statements to the commission or the state court administrator for review; and
- The state court administrator is satisfied that the county does not have significant uncommitted reserves.
- Grants from the fund may not supplant any county funding for a county that has the means to support its court facility.
- The approval of a grant shall not result in the state or commission assuming ownership or liability for a county courthouse or other county facility that houses county offices and employees. The county shall continue to have ownership and liability for all such facilities.
- Once a county is awarded a grant, the county shall complete the project as designated and described in the grant award.
- The commission shall develop a compliance review process to ensure that counties are using each grant as specified in the grant award.
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Grants from the fund may only be used to fund counties that meet the requirements set forth in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2) and the criteria specified in subsection (4) of this section to:
- Counties that meet all four of the criteria specified in subsection (4) of this section must be given the highest priority for need-based grants for underfunded courthouse facilities pursuant to this part 3.
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Counties that meet at least two of the following criteria qualify for need-based grants for underfunded courthouse facilities pursuant to this part 3:
- Counties in which the total population is below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs;
- Counties in which the per capita income is below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs;
- Counties in which property tax revenues are below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs; or
- Counties in which the total county population living below the federal poverty line is greater than the state median, as determined by the most recent census published by the United States bureau of the census.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (HB 14-1096), ch. 186, p. 694, § 1, effective May 14.
13-1-306. Legislative review - repeal.
The underfunded courthouse facility cash fund commission repeals on September 1, 2024. Prior to repeal, the underfunded courthouse facility cash fund commission is subject to review as provided in section 24-34-104, C.R.S.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (HB 14-1096), ch. 186, p. 696, § 1, effective May 14. L. 2016: Entire section amended, (HB 16-1192), ch. 83, p. 233, § 14, effective April 14.
PART 4 PROTECT COURT ACCESS
13-1-401. Legislative declaration.
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The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
- Access to courts is a cornerstone of Colorado's republican form of government and is therefore a matter of statewide concern. Civil arrest of a person at a courthouse or on its environs, or while going to, attending, or coming from a court proceeding, threatens the values of public access and the core functions of courts and is considered an unreasonable and unlawful seizure whether undertaken by a local, state, or federal officer.
- Courts have the affirmative obligation to assert their powers to ensure order and efficient functioning in their proceedings through exercising their contempt power and issuing writs in order to protect the dignity, independence, and integrity of proceedings;
- There exists from English common law a privilege from civil arrest at a courthouse and on its environs, or while going to, attending, or coming from a court proceeding. The common law of England is "the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority" pursuant to section 2-4-211, and the common law privilege from civil arrest has not been legislatively repealed.
- The general assembly has the power to protect Colorado's court proceedings in order to preserve Colorado's republican form of government and has previously codified the privilege from arrest in specific circumstances to protect the proper functioning of courts; and
- This act clarifies Colorado law with respect to court access and judicial power to enforce the protection in order to ensure court access and to prevent interruption of the administration of justice, and clarifies that the protection extends to proceedings conducted under the authority of a court, including, but not limited to, probation and pretrial services.
- Nothing in this part 4 narrows, or in any way lessens, any rights or protections from civil arrest at a courthouse or on its environs, or while going to, attending, or coming from a court proceeding, under common law, statute, the United States constitution, the state constitution, or the remedies available for violations of those rights or privileges.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-083), ch. 63, p. 215, § 1, effective March 23.
13-1-402. Definitions.
As used in this part 4, unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Civil arrest" means an arrest that is solely or primarily in connection with a civil proceeding but does not include an arrest made in connection with a judge's contempt authority or other judicially issued process.
- "Court" means a court of the state of Colorado or its counties or municipalities.
- "Courthouse" means the entirety of a building in which a court is located including, but not limited to, a courtroom, hallway, restroom, or lobby.
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"Court proceeding" means a proceeding conducted by a court or under the authority of a court, including, but not limited to:
- Accessing a service or conducting business with a court;
- A criminal proceeding;
- A civil proceeding;
- A grand jury proceeding;
- A civil protection order proceeding;
- An arbitration;
- A deposition;
- A pretrial services appointment; or
- A probation services appointment.
- "Environs" means the vicinity surrounding a courthouse, including, but not limited to, a sidewalk, driveway, entryway, green space, or parking area serving the courthouse.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-083), ch. 63, p. 216, § 1, effective March 23.
13-1-403. Prohibition of civil arrest - writ of protection - procedure.
- A person shall not be subject to civil arrest while the person is present at a courthouse or on its environs, or while going to, attending, or coming from a court proceeding.
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- A judge or magistrate may issue a writ of protection to prohibit a civil arrest pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. A judge or magistrate may incorporate the writ of protection in other regularly issued documents.
- The protection described in subsection (1) of this section applies regardless of whether a writ of protection has been issued.
- Nothing in this section precludes a criminal arrest or execution of a criminal arrest warrant issued by a judge or magistrate based on probable cause of a violation of criminal law.
- An on-duty law enforcement officer who is not employed by or contracted with courthouse security, or participating in a court proceeding, shall present credentials and state the purpose of the officer's presence to any existing courthouse security, who shall maintain a record of the information.
- The chief judge of any court may enter an order to ensure that arrests made while persons are present at a courthouse or on its environs, or while going to, attending, or coming from a court proceeding, comply with this section.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-083), ch. 63, p. 217, § 1, effective March 23.
13-1-404. Remedies.
- A person who knowingly violates section 13-1-403 (1) or a writ of protection issued pursuant to section 13-1-403 (2) is liable for damages in a civil action for false imprisonment.
- A person who knowingly violates section 13-1-403 (1) or a writ of protection issued pursuant to section 13-1-403 (2) is subject to contempt of court.
- The attorney general may bring a civil action on behalf of the people of the state for a violation of section 13-1-403 to obtain appropriate equitable or declaratory relief.
- A person arrested or detained in violation of section 13-1-403 may seek a writ of habeas corpus.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-083), ch. 63, p. 217, § 1, effective March 23.
13-1-405. Severability.
If any provision of this part 4 or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or application of this part 4 that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this part 4 are severable.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-083), ch. 63, p. 218, § 1, effective March 23.
ARTICLE 1.5 UNIFORM TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION RECIPROCAL ACCESS ACT
Section
13-1.5-101. Short title.
This article may be cited as the "Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act".
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 451, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-102. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Reciprocating jurisdiction" means a state of the United States of America, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or possession of the United States of America, or a province or territory of Canada, which has enacted this article or provides substantially equivalent access to its courts and administrative agencies.
- "Person" means an individual person, a corporation, a business trust, an estate, a trust, a partnership, an association, a joint venture, a government in its private or public capacity, a governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal entity.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 451, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-103. Forum.
An action or other proceeding for injury or threatened injury to property or person in a reciprocating jurisdiction caused by pollution originating, or that may originate, in this jurisdiction may be brought in this jurisdiction.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 451, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-104. Right to relief.
A person who suffers, or is threatened with, injury to his person or property in a reciprocating jurisdiction caused by pollution originating, or that may originate, in this jurisdiction has the same rights to relief with respect to the injury or threatened injury and may enforce those rights in this jurisdiction as if the injury or threatened injury occurred in this jurisdiction.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-105. Applicable law.
The law to be applied in an action or other proceeding brought pursuant to this article, including what constitutes pollution, is the law of this jurisdiction excluding choice of law rules.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-106. Equality of rights.
This article does not accord a person injured or threatened with injury in another jurisdiction any rights superior to those that the person would have if injured or threatened with injury in this jurisdiction.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-107. Right additional to other rights.
The right provided in this article is in addition to and not in derogation of any other rights.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-108. Waiver of sovereign immunity.
The defense of sovereign immunity is applicable in any action or other proceeding brought pursuant to this article only to the extent that it would apply to a person injured or threatened with injury in this jurisdiction.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.
13-1.5-109. Uniformity of application and construction.
This article shall be applied and construed to carry out its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among jurisdictions enacting it.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.
ARTICLE 2 SUPREME COURT
Cross references: For procedural rules adopted by the supreme court, see C.A.R. 1 to 58.
Section
13-2-101. Terms of supreme court.
In each year there shall be three terms of the supreme court: One beginning on the second Monday in September, another beginning on the second Monday in January, and another beginning on the second Monday in April.
Source: L. 1889: p. 443, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1409. C.L. § 5624. CSA: C. 46, § 15. CRS 53: § 37-2-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-1.
13-2-102. Special terms.
Special terms of said court may be called under such general rules and regulations as may be adopted by the court.
Source: G.L. § 2614. G.S. § 3235. R.S. 08: § 1410. C.L. § 5625. CSA: C. 46, § 16. CRS 53: § 37-2-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-2.
13-2-103. Open sessions - oral arguments.
The court shall be in open session as often as practicable during each of its terms to hear and determine matters and causes which may come before it, and, at the discretion of the court, oral arguments may be allowed on final hearing in any cause on the request of any party thereto.
Source: L. 1889: p. 443, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1411. C.L. § 5626. CSA: C. 46, § 17. CRS 53: § 37-2-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-3. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 568, § 1, effective May 31.
ANNOTATION
Oral arguments in the supreme court when requested are a matter of right, but they are subject to reasonable regulation by the court, and failure to request constitutes a waiver. In re Morrish's Estate, 105 Colo. 349 , 97 P.2d 442 (1939).
Oral arguments must be requested and may be regulated. Oral arguments are granted only on request, and are subject to reasonable regulation by the court. Brown v. Maier, 96 Colo. 1 , 38 P.2d 905 (1934).
Failure to request privilege of oral argument on application for supersedeas is a waiver, in case the court should render final judgment on such application. Brown v. Maier, 96 Colo. 1 , 38 P.2d 905 (1934).
13-2-104. Quorum - adjournment.
If a quorum of the justices of the supreme court is not present on the first day of any term, the court shall stand adjourned from day to day until a quorum attends; and said court, if a quorum is present, may adjourn to any day specified, as may be deemed advisable.
Source: G.L. § 2602. G.S. § 3225. R.S. 08: § 1412. C.L. § 5627. CSA: C. 46, § 18. CRS 53: § 37-2-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-4.
ANNOTATION
Quorum means the majority of the entire body. This section clearly determines, that which is necessarily implied in § 5 of art. VI, Colo. Const., that a quorum of the justices may transact business and decide cases. This section does not define a quorum. The word, therefore, must be held to be used in its ordinary meaning, and that meaning is a majority of the entire body. Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18, 31 P. 716 (1892); Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. People ex rel. Wilson, 68 Colo. 487, 190 P. 513 (1920).
13-2-105. Continuance of causes.
All matters, suits, and causes undisposed of at any term of the supreme court shall stand continued to the next succeeding term.
Source: G.L. § 2607. G.S. § 3229. R.S. 08: § 1413. C.L. § 5628. CSA: C. 46, § 19. CRS 53: § 37-2-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-5.
13-2-106. Process from supreme court.
All process issued out of the supreme court shall bear teste in the name of the chief justice, be signed by the clerk of the court, sealed with its seal, and made returnable according to law or the rules and orders of the court and shall be executed by the officer to whom the same is directed.
Source: G.L. § 2603. G.S. § 3226. R.S. 08: § 1416. C.L. § 5629. CSA: C. 46, § 20. CRS 53: § 37-2-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-6.
ANNOTATION
Scire facias must be directed to sheriff of county where defendant resides. A scire facias or summons to hear errors issued by the clerk of the supreme court must be directed to the sheriff of the county where the defendant in error resides or may be found, and no other person than such sheriff or his authorized deputy has authority to serve such summons. An attempted service of such summons made by a person not authorized by law to make such service is a nullity. Wellington v. Beck, 29 Colo. 73, 66 P. 881 (1901).
13-2-107. Judge shall not act as attorney.
No justice of the supreme court shall practice as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of the state, nor give advice touching any cause pending or to be brought therein.
Source: G.L. § 2608. G.S. § 3230. R.S. 08: § 1419. C.L. § 5631. CSA: C. 46, § 22. CRS 53: § 37-2-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-7.
13-2-108. Rules of civil procedure.
The supreme court has the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the courts of record in the state of Colorado the practice and procedure in civil actions and all forms in connection therewith; except that no rules shall be made by the supreme court permitting or allowing trial judges to comment to the jury on the evidence given on the trial. Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigants. The supreme court shall fix the dates when such rules take effect and the extent to which they apply to proceedings then pending, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Source: L. 39: p. 264, § 1. CSA: omitted. CRS 53: § 37-2-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-8. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 597, § 5, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
There reposes in the supreme court the power to adopt rules for the regulation of practice and conduct of the business of courts of record in this state. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551 , 357 P.2d 352 (1960).
It may not diminish federal jurisdiction. This section authorizing the supreme court to prescribe rules of civil procedure in civil actions gave it no authority to modify, abridge, or enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of federal courts. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551 , 357 P.2d 352 (1960).
Nor abridge, modify, or enlarge substantive rights. The supreme court had no power to give legal effect to modifications which unquestionably would "abridge", "enlarge", or "modify" substantive rights of litigants. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551 , 357 P.2d 352 (1960).
What is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551 , 357 P.2d 352 (1960).
The supreme court by rule cannot invest trial courts with an expanded jurisdiction. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551 , 357 P.2d 352 (1960).
Where there is a conflict between a statute and a rule, the former must govern; rules of court can neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify substantive rights of a litigant. Sherman v. Colo. Springs Planning Comm'n, 729 P.2d 1014 (Colo. App. 1986), aff'd, 763 P.2d 292 ( Colo. 1988 ); Herstam v. Bd. of Dirs., 895 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1995).
Applied in Inwood Indus., Inc. v. Priestley, 37 Colo. App. 78, 545 P.2d 732 (1975); Zimmerman v. Mozer, 10 B.R 1002 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981 ).
13-2-109. Rules of criminal procedure.
- The supreme court has the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, practice, and procedure with respect to all proceedings in all criminal cases in all courts of the state of Colorado.
- The supreme court shall fix the dates when such rules take effect and the extent to which they apply to proceedings then pending.
Source: L. 60: p. 118, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-34. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-27.
Cross references: For the Colorado rules of criminal procedure, see chapter 29 of the Colorado court rules.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Colorado Criminal Procedure -- Does It Meet Minimum Standards?", see 28 Dicta 14 (1951). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 39 Dicta 81 (1962). For article, "The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client", see 59 Den. L.J. 75 (1981).
13-2-110. Court to prescribe rules and forms.
The supreme court from time to time may institute rules of practice, and prescribe forms of process to be used, and regulations for the keeping of the records and proceedings of the court, not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of this state.
Source: G.L. § 2604. G.S. § 3227. R.S. 08: § 1418. C.L. § 5630. CSA: C. 46, § 21. CRS 53: § 37-2-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-9.
ANNOTATION
Power to make rules is the constitutional right of the supreme court, aside from any common-law right or statutory grant. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).
The word "rules" is synonymous with practice, procedure, custom, method, and system. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).
Rules must not be inconsistent with the constitution or statute laws of the state. There is no statute giving costs to a defendant in case of a reversal of a criminal case, and the supreme court cannot award them under the guise of a power to prescribe rules of practice. Boykin v. People, 23 Colo. 183, 46 P. 635 (1896).
The court seriously questions the power of the general assembly to make any rules or to enact any laws relative to procedure in courts. It is doubtful if the general assembly could have enacted any law with reference to procedure in courts of record unless that power had been expressly or tacitly surrendered to it by the judiciary. Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929).
Courts always have regulated their own practice and procedure. The act of the general assembly granting the supreme court the power to prescribe rules was not a delegation of legislative power, for the court has always regulated its own practice and procedure. Ernst v. Lamb, 73 Colo. 132, 213 P. 994 (1923).
The general assembly may not attempt to regulate the court's discretionary granting of a final decree in a divorce action for this is a procedural matter. Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929).
13-2-111. Employees - compensation.
- The supreme court may appoint one clerk, two deputy clerks, one librarian of the supreme court library, one reporter and an assistant reporter of its decisions, two bailiffs, and such additional clerical assistants as may be necessary.
- Each justice of the supreme court may appoint one or more law clerks and such clerical personnel as may be necessary to assist him in fulfilling the duties of his office.
- All employees appointed under the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall be appointed and compensated pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105.
Source: L. 1891: p. 368, § 1. L. 05: p. 357, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1420. L. 11: p. 610, § 1. L. 17: p. 514, § 1. C.L. § 5632. L. 23: p. 614, § 2. L. 27: p. 677, § 1. CSA: C. 46, §§ 23, 24. L. 37: p. 497, § 3. L. 49: p. 402, § 1. L. 53: p. 295, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-10. L. 59: p. 350, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-10. L. 79: (1) and (3) amended, p. 597, § 6, effective July 1. L. 81: (2) R&RE, p. 874, § 1, effective June 18.
Cross references: For the reporter of decisions in the court of appeals, see § 13-4-111 (1).
13-2-112. Duties of bailiff.
- The bailiff appointed shall attend upon the court and the judges thereof. It is the duty of the bailiff to assist the librarian of the supreme court, when not otherwise engaged.
- In case of the absence of the bailiff, the court or judges may appoint some suitable person to act in his stead, and the person so appointed shall perform like services and shall receive the same salary as the bailiff.
Source: L. 1891: p. 368, §§ 2, 3. R.S. 08: §§ 1423, 1424. C.L. §§ 5635, 5636. CSA: C. 46, §§ 28, 29. CRS 53: § 37-2-13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-11.
13-2-113. Fees of clerk of supreme court.
Except for the court of appeals docket fees, the supreme court is authorized to fix such fees for the services of the clerk of said court, in causes pending therein, as to the court seems proper, such fees to be paid by the parties to a cause pursuant to law and the order of the court.
Source: G.L. § 1162. G.S. § 1417. R.S. 08: § 1425. C.L. § 5637. CSA: C. 46, § 30. CRS 53: § 37-2-14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-12. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 285, § 1, effective July 1.
Cross references: For fees payable upon appeal and procedure for waiver thereof, see C.A.R. 12.
13-2-114. Seal of supreme court.
The seal of the supreme court shall be one and three-quarter inches in diameter, with a device inscribed thereon as follows: Upon a ground of white the figure of justice sitting faced to the left, but with body and face inclined to the front, arms outstretched, and holding in her left hand the scales and in her right the sword of justice. Upon the left, and just above the ground, shall appear the rising sun, with golden rays proceeding therefrom. On the right, and resting upon the ground, a shield, having inscribed thereon the coat of arms of the state of Colorado, the upper part of the shield leaning upon the figure of justice; upon the right of the shield a vine extending from the ground to the top of the shield; above the inscription and around the edge of the seal shall be the words "supreme court"; below the inscription and around the edge of the seal shall be the words, "State of Colorado", engraved thereon.
Source: G.L. § 2618. G.S. § 3238. R.S. 08: § 1427. C.L. § 5639. CSA: C. 46, § 32. CRS 53: § 37-2-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-13.
13-2-115. Pensions of supreme court judges.
- Any person who has served as a judge of the supreme court of Colorado for not less than ten years, who has ceased to hold said office, and who has reached the age of sixty-five years is entitled to receive an annual pension during the remainder of his life in the amount of one-fourth of the annual salary of an associate judge of the supreme court. If such judge has served twenty years or more and has attained the age of seventy-two years, the annual pension shall be one-third of the annual salary of an associate judge of the supreme court. All pensions due under this section shall be paid monthly out of the general fund of this state.
- Upon the death of any judge, eligible to receive an annual pension pursuant to this section, who leaves a surviving spouse of at least sixty-five years of age to whom he has been married for at least twenty years, such spouse is entitled to receive a pension during the remainder of such spouse's life, or as long as such spouse remains unmarried, in the amount of seven thousand dollars per year, payable monthly from the general fund of this state.
- It is the intent of this section to limit the benefits payable under this section to persons, or their widows, who have terminated their service on the supreme court prior to May 16, 1974, or whose election or appointment to the supreme court took place prior to May 16, 1974. The retirement benefits payable to judges of the supreme court who are appointed subsequent to May 16, 1974, shall be as otherwise provided by law.
Source: L. 25: p. 504, § 1. CSA: C. 46, § 33. L. 39: p. 317, § 1. L. 53: p. 238, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-16. L. 55: p. 262, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-14. L. 67: p. 452, § 1. L. 69: p. 242, § 1. L. 74: Entire section amended, p. 233, § 1, effective May 16. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 295, § 4, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "New Supreme Court Rule", see 24 Dicta 161 (1947).
Nowhere are pensions mentioned in the constitution of Colorado. Unless the granting of them is expressly prohibited, or language is used that by necessary implication must be construed as a prohibition, the power to grant them exists as a residual power of the state. Bedford v. White, 106 Colo. 439 , 106 P.2d 469 (1940).
This section is not unconstitutional. Bedford v. White, 106 Colo. 439 , 106 P.2d 469 (1940).
Judges ceasing to serve prior to enactment. Judges of the supreme court of this state are eligible to receive pensions under this section even though they have ceased to serve in that capacity when this section became law. Bedford v. White, 106 Colo. 439 , 106 P.2d 469 (1940).
13-2-116. Disposition of law books.
- The state librarian and all other officers who receive for public use from any other state or territory, or any officer thereof, or any other person any books of judicial reports or public statutes or any other books of law shall forthwith cause one copy of such books or statutes, and all of such books of reports, and other books of law to be deposited in the library of the supreme court, there to remain.
- The supreme court librarian shall furnish the supreme court annually, as the court may direct, a report designating any such copies of judicial reports, statutes, or books of law which, in the librarian's opinion, can be properly removed from the supreme court library and disposed of.
- The supreme court may take action pursuant to such report by ordering any copies of such judicial reports, statutes, or books of law designated therein disposed of in such manner as it shall determine.
Source: G.L. § 2623. G.S. § 3242. R.S. 08: § 1428. L. 11: p. 488, § 1. C.L. § 5640. CSA: C. 46, § 34. CRS 53: § 37-2-17. L. 57: p. 317, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-15.
13-2-117. Librarian to have charge of library.
The librarian of the supreme court, under the direction of the court, shall have custody of the books pertaining to the library of the supreme court.
Source: G.L. § 2621. G.S. § 3240. R.S. 08: omitted. C.L. § 5641. CSA: C. 46, § 35. L. 37: p. 495, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-16.
13-2-118. Duties of librarian.
It is the duty of the librarian to keep his office open every day in the year, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excepted, from 8:30 a.m. until 5 p.m. of each day, so that the public may have access to the library, under such rules and regulations as the supreme court may prescribe.
Source: G.L. § 2622. G.S. § 3241. R.S. 08: § 1429. C.L. § 5642. CSA: C. 46, § 36. CRS 53: § 37-2-19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-17.
13-2-119. Disposition of fees.
- At the end of each month, all fees collected by the clerk of the supreme court during said month, except fees for admission to the bar and attorney registration fees, shall be deposited by the clerk with the state treasurer, by whom the same shall be kept separate and apart from all other funds in the state treasurer's hands.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 685 , § 1, effective July 1, 1998.)
Source: L. 07: p. 594, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1430. L. 19: p. 680, § 1. C.L. § 5643. CSA: C. 46, § 37. CRS 53: § 37-2-20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-18. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 597, § 7, effective July 1. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 285, § 2, effective July 1. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 685, § 1, effective July 1.
13-2-120. Supreme court library fund.
The funds so set apart, together with the balance of the fund now in the state treasurer's hands and designated as the "supreme court library fund", shall be known as the "supreme court library fund", and the supreme court is authorized to use said fund for the purchase of books for the supreme court library, for paying the expenses of binding briefs and other documents for use in said library, for the purchase and maintenance of bookcases, catalogues, furniture, fixtures, and other equipment for said library, and for such other library service expenses as the chief justice deems necessary.
Source: L. 07: p. 594, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1430. L. 19: p. 680, § 2. C.L. § 5644. CSA: C. 46, § 38. CRS 53: § 37-2-21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-19. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 541, § 1, effective April 6.
13-2-121. Manner of disbursement.
The state controller is authorized to draw warrants upon said fund, from time to time upon certificate, of the sums required for the purposes specified in section 13-2-120 under the signature of the chief justice or a majority of the judges of the supreme court, and the state treasurer is directed to pay the same out of said fund.
Source: L. 07: p. 594, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1430. L. 19: p. 680, § 3. C.L. § 5645. CSA: C. 46, § 39. CRS 53: § 37-2-22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-20.
13-2-122. Supreme court and court of appeals opinions published.
The opinions of the supreme court of the state of Colorado and of the court of appeals shall be published in volumes of the size, as nearly as may be, as present volumes of the Colorado reports, and containing not less than six hundred fifty pages each.
Source: L. 1891: p. 369, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1431. C.L. § 5646. CSA: C. 46, § 40. CRS 53: § 37-2-23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-21. L. 69: p. 269, § 4.
ANNOTATION
The publication of the opinions of the supreme court is not the publication of "department reports", within the meaning of § 29 of art. V, Colo. Const., which requires the printing, binding, and distribution of department reports to be performed under contract to be given to the lowest responsible bidder. Gillette v. Peabody, 19 Colo. App. 356, 75 P. 18 (1904).
13-2-123. Duty of reporter.
It is the duty of the reporter of the decisions of said courts, within four months after a sufficient number of opinions to constitute a volume of the prescribed size have been delivered to him, to compile and prepare the same for publication, together with such other proceedings of the supreme court as the justices thereof may designate for insertion in such volume, with syllabi, title pages, digest, and table of cases reported.
Source: L. 1891: p. 370, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1434. C.L. § 5649. CSA: C. 46, § 43. CRS 53: § 37-2-26. L. 63: p. 268, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-22. L. 69: p. 269, § 5.
13-2-124. Publication of reports.
- In lieu of the publication of the opinions of the supreme court and the court of appeals as provided for in this article, the supreme court may designate the published volumes of the decisions of the supreme court and the court of appeals, as the same are published by any person, firm, or corporation, to be the official reports of the decisions of the supreme court and the court of appeals. Any publication so designated as the official reports may include both the opinions of the supreme court and the court of appeals in the same volume.
- When any law of this state refers to the reports of the supreme court of the state of Colorado, said law shall be construed as referring to the reports in which are also contained the reported opinions of the court of appeals created pursuant to article 4 of this title.
- All books, both bound and unbound, and matrices covering the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals which were published prior to July 1, 1982, and which are in the custody of the supreme court shall remain in the custody of the supreme court for the purpose of sale or replacement, and the supreme court may fix the price at which the prior official reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals are to be sold to the public. The supreme court may replace any lost or destroyed books free of cost if such books were originally distributed free of cost. The supreme court may authorize the reprinting of any prior volumes, the replacement supply of which has become exhausted or insufficient. The supreme court may also contract for the storage of such books and to sell, give away, destroy, or otherwise dispose of any excess books, bound or unbound, which it deems not needed to provide a reasonable replacement supply.
Source: L. 1891: p. 370, § 3. R.S. 08: § 1435. L. 19: p. 682, § 1. C.L. § 5650. L. 27: p. 678, § 1. CSA: C. 46, § 44. CRS 53: § 37-2-27. L. 57: p. 318, §§ 1, 2. L. 63: p. 268, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-23. L. 69: p. 269, § 6. L. 82: Entire section R&RE, p. 287, § 1, effective July 1.
13-2-125. Purchase, distribution, and sale of reports.
- Upon the publication of each volume of the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals under contract with the judicial department, the publisher shall be responsible for distributing as many copies as are required to meet the needs of the state in accordance with a list provided by the librarian of the supreme court. Costs of mailing incurred in such distribution shall be borne by the state from appropriations made to the judicial department.
-
The distribution pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall include the following:
- State and territorial libraries, as directed by the librarian of the supreme court;
- The library of congress and of the United States supreme court;
- The attorney general and secretary of state of Colorado, and officials of the executive branch as required;
- District attorneys and judges of Colorado courts of record;
- The justices and reporter of the Colorado supreme court;
- The law library of the university of Colorado, and the library of any other accredited law school in Colorado;
- Copies for use in the supreme court library and by the general assembly;
- Copies to be used for exchange purposes in the maintenance of the supreme court library, as directed by the librarian of the supreme court;
- Office of legislative legal services.
- All copies distributed to offices and agencies of the state of Colorado are at all times the property of the state and not the personal property of the incumbents of the respective offices and shall be so marked as the property of the state. This shall not apply to the justices and reporter of the supreme court as to volumes prepared during their tenure of office.
- The publisher shall sell the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals to the public at a price which is set at the cost of the report plus a twenty percent markup for handling. The publisher shall retain the markup charges and remit to the state the costs of the reports sold as reimbursement to the general fund for payment by the state of the expenses of publication thereof. The unsold copies of all reports shall remain the property of the state and shall be returned by the publisher to the secretary of state upon the termination of the contract for publication. Until otherwise designated by law or order of the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court, the secretary of state shall be the legal custodian of the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals. The secretary of state shall sell any remaining copies of such reports to the public at such cost plus twenty percent and transmit the sale proceeds to the state treasurer for deposit to the credit of the general fund.
Source: L. 1891: p. 371, § 7. R.S. 08: § 1438. C.L. § 5653. L. 27: p. 680, § 1. CSA: C. 46, § 46. L. 37: p. 495, § 2. CRS 53: § 37-2-30. L. 63: p. 269, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-24. L. 75: (1), IP(2), and (4) amended, p. 850, § 2, effective July 1. L. 76: (1) and (4) amended, p. 515, § 1, effective April 19. L. 88: (2)(i) amended, p. 310, § 18, effective May 23.
13-2-126. Reports and session laws furnished.
-
The legal custodian of publications of the state of Colorado is directed to furnish to the law library of the university of Colorado free of charge from existing stocks if feasible and in any event as such publications are from time to time issued:
- Thirty copies each of the reports of the supreme court of the state of Colorado; and
- Fifty copies of any published regulations and decisions of the various administrative agencies of the state of Colorado; and
- Such number of copies, not to exceed fifty, of the session laws of Colorado as the law librarian for the university of Colorado may from time to time request; and
- Five copies each of the Colorado yearbook; and
- Two copies each of published legislative journals, published opinions and reports of the attorney general, and printed briefs and abstracts of record of the supreme court of Colorado.
- The law library is authorized to exchange any or all of the above publications for like publications of other jurisdictions.
Source: L. 15: p. 482, § 1. C.L. § 5655. CSA: C. 46, § 48. L. 49: p. 338, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-32. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-25. L. 75: IP(1) amended, p. 851, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2015: (1)(b) amended and (1)(b.5) added, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 948, § 28, effective August 5.
13-2-127. Method for review.
Appellate review by the supreme court of any action or proceeding of an inferior tribunal, whether such action or proceeding is civil, criminal, special, statutory, common law, or otherwise, shall be prescribed by rule of the supreme court, except as otherwise provided by law.
Source: L. 41: p. 369, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-33. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-26. L. 64: p. 225, § 58. L. 69: p. 269, § 7.
ARTICLE 3 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS
Section
13-3-101. State court administrator - report - definitions - repeal.
- There is created, pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, the position of state court administrator, who is appointed by the justices of the supreme court at such compensation as is determined by them. The state court administrator is responsible to the supreme court, and in addition to the duties described within this section, the state court administrator shall perform the duties assigned to him or her by the chief justice and the supreme court.
- The state court administrator shall employ such other personnel as the supreme court deems necessary to aid the administration of the courts, as provided in section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution.
- The state court administrator shall establish standards to ensure proficiency in court reporting in the courts of this state. The state court administrator shall also develop or cause to be developed examinations no less difficult than the examinations of the national shorthand reporters association and shall qualify those individuals who successfully complete such examination.
- Repealed.
- The state court administrator shall provide to the director of research of the legislative council criminal justice information and statistics and any other related data requested by the director. The state court administrator shall provide to the state commission on judicial performance and to district commissions on judicial performance, established in section 13-5.5-104, case management statistics for justices and judges who are being evaluated.
- The state court administrator shall make grants from the family violence justice fund pursuant to the provisions of section 14-4-107, C.R.S.
-
- The state court administrator shall make grants from the family-friendly court program cash fund pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-113.
- Repealed.
(7.5) The state court administrator shall make grants from the eviction legal defense fund pursuant to the provisions of section 13-40-127.
- Repealed.
- The state court administrator is authorized to seek federal funding as it becomes available on behalf of the state court system for the establishment, maintenance, or expansion of veterans' treatment courts.
- Repealed.
-
- There is created in the office of the state court administrator a position responsible for education and outreach regarding judicial office vacancies. The position shall create and deliver educational programming for attorneys and law students regarding judicial vacancies and the application process.
-
- The position shall report on or before October 1, 2020, and on or before October 1 each year thereafter through 2030, to the chief justice of the supreme court and the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and senate, or any successor committees, concerning the background, professional history, and qualifications of judicial officers in the state. Notwithstanding the requirement in section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the requirement to submit the report required in this section continues until the repeal of this subsection (11)(b) pursuant to subsection (11)(b)(II) of this section.
- This subsection (11)(b) is repealed, effective January 1, 2031.
-
-
On or before November 1, 2019, and on or before each November 1 thereafter, the state court administrator shall submit a report to the joint budget committee of the general assembly and the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and the senate, or any successor committees, on case management statistics for the prior state fiscal year that includes:
(I) The total number and types of:
- New district court cases assigned;
- District court cases resolved; and
-
District court cases remaining on the docket; and
(II) For each judicial district and each district court judge the total number and types of:
(A) New district court cases assigned;
(B) District court cases resolved; and
(C) District court cases remaining on the docket.
- Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the requirement to submit the report required in subsection (12)(a) of this section continues indefinitely.
-
On or before November 1, 2019, and on or before each November 1 thereafter, the state court administrator shall submit a report to the joint budget committee of the general assembly and the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and the senate, or any successor committees, on case management statistics for the prior state fiscal year that includes:
- The state court administrator or his or her designee shall present at the judicial department's hearing pursuant to section 2-7-203 statistics related to extreme risk protection orders in article 14.5 of this title 13. The statistics must include the number of petitions filed for temporary extreme risk protection orders, the number of petitions filed for extreme risk protection orders, the number of temporary extreme risk protection orders issued and denied, the number of extreme risk protection orders issued and denied, the number of temporary extreme risk protection orders terminated, the number of extreme risk protection orders terminated, and the number of extreme risk protection orders renewed. The state court administrator or his or her designee shall also report state court data related to all persons who are subject to any temporary emergency risk protection order or emergency risk protection order and who, within thirty days after the issuance or execution of the protection order, are charged with a criminal offense. The report must include the nature of the criminal offense, including but not limited to any offense for violation of the emergency risk protection order and the disposition or status of that criminal offense.
-
-
- On and after January 1, 2020, the state court administrator shall administer a court reminder program in at least four judicial district courts to remind criminal defendants and juvenile participants to appear at each of their scheduled court appearances and to provide reminders about an unplanned court closure. The objective of such reminders is to significantly reduce the number of criminal defendants and juvenile participants who are taken into custody solely as a result of their failure to appear in court. No later than July 1, 2020, the program must be administered in every eligible court, as defined in subsection (14)(h) of this section, in the state. (14) (a) (I) On and after January 1, 2020, the state court administrator shall administer a court reminder program in at least four judicial district courts to remind criminal defendants and juvenile participants to appear at each of their scheduled court appearances and to provide reminders about an unplanned court closure. The objective of such reminders is to significantly reduce the number of criminal defendants and juvenile participants who are taken into custody solely as a result of their failure to appear in court. No later than July 1, 2020, the program must be administered in every eligible court, as defined in subsection (14)(h) of this section, in the state.
- The state court administrator shall issue a request for proposal to choose a third-party vendor to develop and operate the court reminder program. At the conclusion of the request for proposal process, the state court administrator may choose to develop and operate the program without utilizing a third-party vendor.
- A phone number collected for the express purpose of administering the court reminder program pursuant to this section must be kept separate from other identifying information. Such phone number must only be used to achieve the statutory objective of the program as described in subsection (14)(a)(I) of this section and must not be used or shared by the judicial department for any other purpose.
- In administering the program, the state court administrator shall prioritize the use of text messages to remind criminal defendants and juvenile participants who have agreed to receive text messages and have the capacity to receive text messages at the mobile telephone number provided. The program must use text messages unless and until a more effective technological means of reminding defendants and juvenile participants becomes available. In addition, or when a defendant or juvenile participant is unable to receive text messages, the state court administrator, at his or her discretion, may also use other communication methods, including telephone, e-mail, or other internet-based technology to remind defendants and juvenile participants of court dates and unplanned court closures.
-
The program must:
- Provide at least two text message reminders for all court appearances for criminal defendants and juvenile participants in an eligible court with the capacity to receive text messages and for whom the state court administrator has a working mobile telephone number. The reminders must include at least the date, location, and time of the court appearance and contact information for questions related to the court appearance.
- Provide an alert to a defendant or juvenile participant who misses court that the defendant or juvenile has missed court and that the defendant or juvenile should immediately contact his or her attorney, if the defendant or juvenile has one, or the court to determine next steps;
- Identify each instance in which a criminal defendant or juvenile participant was sent a text message reminder to a working mobile telephone number;
- Identify defendants and juvenile participants with upcoming court appearances who cannot be reached and, as resources allow, attempt to acquire current contact information; and
- Collect data concerning the number of criminal defendants and juvenile participants who fail to appear at their scheduled court appearances despite having been sent one or more reminders to a working telephone number.
- Each eligible court shall utilize the reminder services of the state court administrator described in this subsection (14) unless the court chooses to opt out and has its own procedure for using text messaging to remind all criminal defendants and juvenile participants to appear at their scheduled court appearances and remind them of an unplanned court closure.
- On and after January 1, 2020, the state court administrator shall track data in each eligible court concerning the failure of criminal defendants and juvenile participants to appear for their scheduled court appearances.
-
In its annual report to the committees of reference pursuant to section 2-7-203, the judicial department shall include information concerning the activities of the state court administrator pursuant to this subsection (14). To the extent practicable, the report must include:
- The number of reminders sent to a criminal defendant's or juvenile participant's working telephone number in each eligible court;
- The number of criminal defendants and juvenile participants in each eligible court who failed to appear for a court hearing;
- The number of criminal defendants and juvenile participants in each eligible court who were sent a reminder to a working telephone number from the program but who nonetheless failed to appear for a court hearing; and
- Any other data collected by the state court administrator that the state court administrator determines to be useful to the general assembly in assessing the effectiveness of the program at reducing the number of criminal defendants and juvenile participants who fail to appear for their court appearances and reducing the number of criminal defendants and juvenile participants who are jailed for failure to appear at a court appearance.
- Nothing in this subsection (14) creates a right for any criminal defendant or juvenile participant to receive a reminder from the program.
-
As used in this subsection (14), unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Eligible court" means a district court, county court, or municipal court that uses the integrated Colorado online network that is the judicial department's case management system.
- "Juvenile participant" means a juvenile who has been alleged to have committed a delinquent act, as defined in section 19-2.5-102, who is required to appear before an eligible court. "Juvenile participant" includes the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
-
- [ Editor's note: Subsection (15) is effective January 1, 2023.] The state court administrator shall administer the "Colorado Electronic Preservation of Abandoned Estate Planning Documents Act", article 23 of title 15.
-
-
On or before July 31, 2022, and on or before each July 31 thereafter, the state court administrator shall submit a report to the general assembly that includes the following:
(I) The number of charges brought in each judicial district for unlawful storage of a firearm pursuant to section 18-12-114 in the prior state fiscal year and the disposition of those charges; and
(II) The number of charges brought in each judicial district for a violation of section 18-12-405 in the prior state fiscal year and the disposition of those charges.
- This subsection (16) is repealed, effective December 31, 2024.
-
On or before July 31, 2022, and on or before each July 31 thereafter, the state court administrator shall submit a report to the general assembly that includes the following:
Source: L. 53: p. 236, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-10-1. L. 59: p. 356, § 1. L. 67: p. 453, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-1. L. 77: (3) added, p. 779, § 1, effective June 19; (4) added, p. 861, § 1, effective July 1, 1979. L. 79: (4)(a)(III) amended, p. 1663, § 130, effective July 1. L. 84: (4) repealed, p. 453, § 1, effective March 26. L. 94: (5) added, p. 1098, § 11, effective May 9. L. 99: (6) added, p. 1180, § 6, effective June 2. L. 2002: (7) added, p. 631, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2005: (7)(b) repealed, p. 1004, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2006: (8) added, p. 1590, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2008: (5) amended, p. 1284, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2010: (9) added, (HB 10-1104), ch. 139, p. 465, § 2, effective April 16. L. 2017: (5) amended, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1780, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2018: (10) added, (SB 18-056), ch. 298, p. 1820, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2019: (11) and (12) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 142, § 11, effective March 21; (13) added, (HB 19-1177), ch. 108, p. 399, § 2, effective April 12; (7.5) added, (SB 19-180), ch. 372, p. 3391, § 3, effective May 30; (1) amended and (14) added, (SB 19-036), ch. 293, p. 2684, § 1, effective August 2; (15) added, (HB 19-1229), ch. 252, p. 2446, § 2, effective January 1, 2023. L. 2021: (16) added, (HB 21-1106), ch. 39, p. 148, § 6, effective July 1; (14)(h)(II) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 709, § 7, effective October 1.
Editor's note: (1) The effective date for amendments made to this section by chapter 216, L. 77, was changed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, by chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, L. 78, and was subsequently changed to July 1, 1979, by chapter 157, § 23, L. 79. See People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452 , 611 P.2d 574 (1980).
(2) Subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective January 1, 2007. (See L. 2006, p. 1590 .)
(3) Subsection (15) was numbered as (14) in HB 19-1229 but was renumbered on revision for ease of location.
(4) Subsection (10)(c) provided for the repeal of subsection (10), effective June 30, 2019. (See L. 2018, p. 1820 .)
(5) Subsection (15) was added by HB 19-1229, effective January 1, 2021, but the effective date was subsequently amended to January 1, 2023, in section 2 of HB 20-1368. (See L. 2020, p. 1441 .)
(6) Section 8 of chapter 39 (HB 21-1106), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2021.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsection (9), see section 1 of chapter 139, Session Laws of Colorado 2010. For the legislative declaration in SB 19-180, see section 1 of chapter 372, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.
(2) For the short title ("Promoting Child Safety Through Responsible Firearm Storage Act") and the legislative declaration in HB 21-1106, see sections 1 and 2 of chapter 39, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The System for Administration of Justice in Colorado", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 299 (1956). For article, "Colorado's Program to Improve Court Administration", see 38 Dicta 1 (1961).
13-3-102. Surveys - conferences - reports.
- The state court administrator under the direction of the chief justice shall make a continuous survey of the conditions of the dockets and the business of the courts of record and shall make reports and recommendations thereon to the chief justice.
- The chief justice shall assemble the judges of the courts of record at least once yearly to discuss such recommendations and such other business as will benefit the judiciary and the expedition of the business of the several courts. When so summoned, the judges of the courts of record shall attend such conferences at the expense of the state of Colorado. Each judge shall file a verified itemized statement of the mileage and all moneys actually paid out for personal maintenance expenses in attending such conferences with the court administrator, who shall audit the same and submit it to the state controller. The state controller shall draw a warrant therefor, which warrant shall be paid by the state treasurer out of the appropriate fund. Unless excused by illness, such judges are required to attend the conferences unless excused by the chief justice.
- Repealed.
Source: L. 53: p. 236, § 2. CRS 53: § 37-10-2. L. 59: p. 357, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-2. L. 67: p. 453, § 6. L. 97: (3) repealed, p. 1482, § 37, effective June 3.
13-3-103. Nominating and discipline commissions - expenses.
- Members of judicial nominating commissions appointed pursuant to section 24 of article VI of the state constitution and members of the commission on judicial discipline appointed pursuant to section 23 of article VI of the state constitution shall be reimbursed for actual and necessary personal maintenance expenses while performing official duties, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and returning from the place where official duties are performed.
- The mileage and expenses incurred by members of judicial nominating commissions and members of the commission on judicial discipline shall be paid from funds appropriated to the judicial department of the state. Each commission member shall keep an account of the mileage and all moneys actually paid out for personal maintenance expenses and shall file a verified itemized statement thereof with the court administrator, who shall audit the same and submit it to the state controller. The state controller shall draw a warrant therefor, which warrant shall be paid by the state treasurer out of the appropriate fund.
Source: L. 53: p. 237, § 3. CRS 53: § 37-10-3. L. 59: p. 358, § 1. L. 67: p. 454, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-3. L. 72: p. 590, § 55. L. 79: (1) amended, p. 597, § 8, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1576, § 12, effective July 10.
13-3-104. State shall fund courts.
- The state of Colorado shall provide funds by annual appropriation for the operations, salaries, and other expenses of all courts of record within the state, except for county courts in the city and county of Denver and municipal courts.
- When a board of county commissioners determines that any furniture or equipment transferred to the judicial department as of January 1, 1970, has historic value, it shall remain in the county courthouse and revert to the county when no longer used by the judicial department.
Source: L. 69: p. 246, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-6. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 780, § 1, effective May 24. L. 2006: (1) amended, p. 141, § 6, effective August 7.
13-3-105. Personnel - duties - qualifications - compensation - conditions of employment.
- The supreme court, pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, shall prescribe, by rule, a personnel classification plan for all courts of record to be funded by the state, as provided in section 13-3-104.
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Such personnel classification and compensation plan shall include:
- A basic compensation plan of pay ranges to which classes of positions are assigned and may be reassigned;
- The qualifications for each position or class of positions, including education, experience, special skills, and legal knowledge;
- An outline of the duties to be performed in each position or class of positions;
- The classification of all positions based on the required qualifications and the duties to be performed, taking into account, where applicable, the amount and kinds of judicial business in each court of record subject to the provisions of this section;
- The number of full-time and part-time positions, by position title and classification, in each court of record subject to the provisions of this section;
- The procedures for and the regulations governing the appointment and removal of court personnel; and
- The procedures for and regulations governing the promotion or transfer of court personnel.
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The supreme court shall also prescribe by rule:
- The amount, terms, and conditions of sick leave and vacation time for court personnel, including annual allowance and accumulation thereof; and
- Hours of work and other conditions of employment.
- To the end that all state employees are treated generally in a similar manner, the supreme court, in promulgating rules as set forth in this section, shall take into consideration the compensation and classification plans, vacation and sick leave provisions, and other conditions of employment applicable to employees of the executive and legislative departments.
Source: L. 69: p. 246, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-7.
ANNOTATION
The Colorado judicial system personnel rules do not create an objective expectation of tenure which should be characterized as a property interest subject to due process protection. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).
Contractual right of certified employee to continued employment would violate state policy. Even if the language of Colorado judicial system personnel rules 25 and 26, which relate to the dismissal of certified employees, could be read to create a contractual right to continued employment, a certified employee could not prevail because the recognition of such a contract would violate the expressed public policy of the state of Colorado. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).
The fourteenth amendment affords no extraordinary protection. Even if it were assumed that a certified employee had a recognizable property interest which would not be contrary to express public policy, the fourteenth amendment affords him no protection other than the ordinary protections that would be afforded in a court of law on a breach of contract suit. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).
Requirements for protection of certified employee. The minimum opportunity to learn of the reasons for the action terminating employment and a chance to address the decision-maker is all that would be required as protection to a certified employee. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).
13-3-106. Judicial department operating budget - fiscal procedures.
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- The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prepare annually a consolidated operating budget for all courts of record subject to the provisions of section 13-3-104, such budget to be known as the judicial department operating budget.
- The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prepare an annual budget request upon forms and according to procedures agreed to by the executive director of the department of personnel and the joint budget committee of the general assembly. The budget request documents and such additional information as may be requested shall be submitted to the department of personnel and the joint budget committee according to the same time schedule for budgetary review and analysis required of all executive agencies. The governor shall include recommendations for court appropriations as part of his or her regular budget message and according to section 24-37-301, C.R.S. The general assembly, upon recommendation of the joint budget committee, shall make appropriations to courts based on an evaluation of the budget request and the availability of state funds.
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The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prescribe the procedures to be used by the judicial department and each court of record subject to the provisions of section 13-3-104, with respect to:
- The preparation of budget requests;
- The disbursement of funds appropriated to the judicial department by the general assembly;
- The purchase of forms, supplies, equipment, and other items as authorized in the judicial department operating budget; and
- Any other matter relating to fiscal administration.
- The court administrator shall consult with the state controller in the preparation of regulations pertaining to budgetary and fiscal procedures and forms and the disbursement of funds.
Source: L. 69: p. 246, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-8. L. 72: p. 590, § 56. L. 76: (1)(b) amended, p. 301, § 28, effective May 20. L. 83: (1)(b) amended, p. 971, § 27, effective July 1, 1984. L. 95: (1)(b) amended, p. 638, § 24, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (1)(b), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
13-3-107. Consolidation of offices of clerks of court in certain counties.
- The chief justice, pursuant to his authority under section 5 of article VI of the state constitution, may consolidate the offices of the clerks of the district and county courts in any county when he finds that there is insufficient judicial business to warrant the maintenance of separate offices.
- When the offices of the clerk of the district and county courts are so consolidated, the consolidated office shall be under a single clerk, who shall be both the clerk of the district court and the clerk of the county court; except that all functions, operations, and records required to be kept separate shall be so kept.
Source: L. 69: p. 247, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-9. L. 79: (1) amended, p. 598, § 9, effective July 1.
13-3-108. Maintenance of court facilities - capital improvements.
- The board of county commissioners in each county shall continue to have the responsibility of providing and maintaining adequate courtrooms and other court facilities including janitorial service, except as otherwise provided in this section.
- The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prepare annually a capital construction budget. The capital construction budget shall specify: The additional court housing facilities required for each court; the estimated cost of such additional structures or facilities and whether such additional court structures or facilities will include space used by other governmental units for nonjudicial purposes; and a detailed report on the present court facilities currently in use and the reasons for their inadequacy.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 97, p. 1482 , § 38, effective June 3, 1997.)
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- The chief justice is authorized to approve payment of state funds for the construction of any capital improvement facilities to be used for judicial purposes authorized and approved by the general assembly.
- The court administrator, with the approval of the chief justice, shall enter into leasing agreements with the governing body of the appropriate local unit of government when joint construction is authorized, or when the approved facilities are also to be used for nonjudicial purposes. The leasing agreement shall provide for the payment of state funds for that portion of the construction costs related to the operation of the courts.
- Construction or remodeling of any court or court-related facility shall be commenced only with prior approval of the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court after consultation with the board of county commissioners; except that a board of county commissioners, at its discretion, may take such actions.
Source: L. 69: p. 247, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-10. L. 72: p. 591, § 57. L. 75: (5) added, p. 565, § 1, effective July 1; (5) added, p. 558, § 9, effective July 1. L. 78: (2) and (3) amended, p. 261, § 43, effective May 23. L. 97: (2) and (3) amended, p. 1482, § 38, effective June 3. L. 2006: (5) amended, p. 142, § 7, effective August 7.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (5) by House Bill 75-1049 and House Bill 75-1055 were harmonized.
ANNOTATION
Historically, Colorado law has placed the duty of providing a suitable courthouse upon the county commissioners of each county. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).
Even though the general assembly indicated its intention to take over from the counties the financial burden of providing judicial facilities, the general assembly has not provided funds for the construction of court facilities in the various counties of the state, and the burden of providing courtroom space and facilities remains with the counties. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).
Mandamus appropriate. The language of subsection (1) meets the test for mandamus relief, and thus, an action in the nature of mandamus is available as a proper means of enforcing the statute. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975); State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 ( Colo. 1995 ).
Judicial guidelines. To achieve compliance with subsection (1) requiring county commissioners to provide adequate court facilities, without undue encroachment upon the prerogatives of the county commissioners, a judgment should give reasonable guidelines delineating what would constitute "adequate" space and then should direct that the space and related facilities be provided within a specific time. Included among the guidelines should be such physical requirements as dimensions, partitions, ventilation, security of prisoners, etc., as well as other details which would lead to creation of courtroom facilities of a character and quality commensurate with the proper and effective administration of justice. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).
Court exceeded its authority in issuing order requiring the board of county commissioners to provide a new judicial facility. While court does have the inherent authority to order the board to provide a new courthouse, the record does not demonstrate that the chief justice approved the initiation of the proceeding as required by subsection (5). In re Court Facilities for the Routt County Combined Ct., 107 P.3d 981 (Colo. App. 2004).
Mandamus order containing only one alternative unacceptable. While an action in the nature of mandamus will lie to enforce subsection (1), a judgment designating one alternative course of action that the county commissioners must follow in meeting the requirements of the subsection constitutes an unacceptable intrusion into the exclusive province of the executive branch of government, and, accordingly, the specific course of action to be followed by the county commissioners in complying with the subsection and with a mandamus judgment must be one of their choosing. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).
Subsection (5) is applied in Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1984).
A county's duties under this section may not be reduced or ended pursuant to art. X, § 20(9) of the state constitution. State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).
13-3-109. Retirement - past service benefits.
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Past service benefits in the public employees' retirement association shall be purchased for each employee covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105 who, on January 1, 1970, meets all of the following conditions:
- Is sixty years of age or older;
- Was not a member of a county or a city and county retirement plan, or, if a member, is not eligible to receive a deferred annuity;
- If a member of a county or a city and county retirement plan, has withdrawn the funds credited to his account with the county or city and county retirement fund, and paid the full amount thereof, exclusive of any voluntary contributions to such county or city and county retirement plan, into the public employees' retirement association, or who withdraws such funds and deposits them with the public employees' retirement association no later than March 31, 1970.
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- When an employee meets all of the conditions in subsection (1) of this section, the public employees' retirement association shall grant him prior service credit based on length of service in a court, or department thereof, covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105, up to a maximum of five years.
- The public employees' retirement association shall calculate the cost of granting such prior service credit to each employee, after giving credit for the amount paid, if any, by the employee, and shall bill the judicial department for such cost. In the event that the cost for an employee is less than the amount paid in by him pursuant to subsection (1)(c) of this section, the treasurer of the public employees' retirement association shall instead refund the difference to the employee.
- The judicial department shall include the total of such billings in its appropriation request. The grant of prior service credits provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall be made only if an appropriation therefor is made by the general assembly.
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- Any employee under the age of sixty years covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105 who has been a member of a county or city and county retirement plan may purchase prior service credit by withdrawing the funds credited to his account with the county or city and county retirement fund and paying the full amount thereof into the public employees' retirement fund.
- The public employees' retirement association shall calculate the amount of prior service credit purchased by an employee as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) and shall so notify him.
- An employee covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105 may also purchase prior service credit, not to exceed the actual number of years of employment in a court of record, or department thereof, by making a direct payment to the public employees' retirement association in an amount determined by the public employees' retirement association to be actuarially sound and without expense to the state.
- For the purposes set forth in article 51 of title 24, C.R.S., the employees for whom prior service credit is granted under this section shall be considered to have been employees of the state for the period of such prior service.
Source: L. 69: p. 248, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-11. L. 79: (3)(c) amended, p. 603, § 1, effective June 19. L. 87: (1)(c), (2)(b), (3)(c), and (4) amended, p. 1091, § 5, effective July 1.
13-3-110. Expenses and compensation of judges outside county of residence.
- When it is necessary for any district court judge, in the discharge of his duties, to hold court or transact judicial business outside the county of his residence, whether within or without the judicial district in which he resides, he shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses in the manner prescribed by rule of the supreme court, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled going to and returning from the place where he is engaged in judicial duties.
- When any county judge, juvenile court judge, or probate court judge is assigned to perform judicial duties in a court outside of his county of residence pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, he shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses in the manner prescribed by rule of the supreme court, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled going to and returning from the place where he is engaged in judicial duties.
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- When any county judge is assigned to perform judicial duties in a district, probate, or juvenile court outside of the judicial district in which he resides, as provided in section 13-6-218, he shall be paid for each day of such judicial duty, in addition to reimbursement for expenses and mileage as provided in this section, an amount equal to the difference between his per diem salary and the per diem salary of the judge of the court to which he is assigned.
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- When any county judge from a county of Class C or Class D is assigned to perform judicial duties in any district court pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, and when the duties the county judge performs increase the county judge's workload beyond the percentage of workload for which he or she is paid pursuant to section 13-30-103 (1)(l), the county judge shall be paid for each day of such judicial duty, in addition to the county judge's normal part-time salary and to reimbursement for expenses and mileage as provided in this section, an amount equal to the per diem salary of the judge of the district court to which the county judge is assigned.
- When any county judge from a county of Class C or Class D is assigned to perform judicial duties in any other county court pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, and when the duties the county judge performs increase the county judge's workload beyond the percentage of workload for which he or she is paid pursuant to section 13-30-103 (1)(l), the county judge shall be paid for each day of such judicial duty, in addition to the county judge's normal part-time salary and to reimbursement for expenses and mileage as provided in this section, an amount equal to the per diem salary of a full-time county judge.
- For the purposes of this subsection (3), the per diem salary of a judge shall be computed by dividing his annual salary by the figure two hundred forty.
- When a retired justice of the supreme court or retired judge of any other court of record is assigned to judicial duties pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, he shall be compensated as provided in said section and be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses in the manner prescribed by rule of the supreme court, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and returning from the place where he is engaged in judicial duties.
- Any mileage and expenses incurred by a judge or a retired justice or judge pursuant to this section, except judges assigned to the county court of the city and county of Denver, shall be paid by the state pursuant to section 13-3-104. The records and procedures for such payment shall be prescribed by the state court administrator pursuant to section 13-3-106.
- Any per diem salary pursuant to subsection (3) or (4) of this section shall be paid by the state pursuant to section 13-3-104. The records and procedures for such payments shall be prescribed by the state court administrator pursuant to section 13-3-106.
Source: L. 71: p. 366, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-12. L. 72: p. 187, § 1. L. 79: (1), (2), and (4) amended, p. 598, § 10, effective July 1. L. 82: (3)(b) amended, p. 289, § 1, effective March 17. L. 85: (2) and (3)(a) amended, p. 569, § 2, effective November 14, 1986. L. 89: (1), (2), and (4) amended, p. 747, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (3)(b) amended, p. 768, § 3, effective July 1, 1998.
Cross references: For compensation of justices and judges, see § 13-30-103.
13-3-111. Appointment of retired or resigned justice or judge pursuant to agreement of parties - appointment discretionary.
- Upon agreement of all appearing parties to a civil action that a specific retired or resigned justice of the supreme court or a retired or resigned judge of any other court be assigned to hear the action and upon agreement that one or more of the parties shall pay the agreed upon salary of the selected justice or judge, together with all other salaries and expenses incurred, the chief justice may assign any retired or resigned justice or retired or resigned intermediate appellate, district, county, probate, or juvenile court judge who consents temporarily to perform judicial duties for such action.
- The decision as to whether a retired or resigned justice or judge shall be assigned to judicial duties, pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, shall be entirely within the discretion of the chief justice. The chief justice may require such undertakings as in his or her opinion may be necessary to ensure that proceedings held pursuant to this section shall be without expense to the state.
- Such appointment may be made at any time after the action is at issue.
- Orders, decrees, verdicts, and judgments resulting from hearings or trials presided over by a judge appointed pursuant to this section shall have the same force and effect as orders, decrees, verdicts, or judgments resulting from a hearing or trial presided over by a regularly serving judge.
- Orders, decrees, verdicts, and judgments resulting from hearings or trials presided over by a judge appointed pursuant to this section may be enforced or appealed in the same manner as orders, decrees, verdicts, or judgments resulting from a hearing or trial presided over by a regularly sitting judge.
- The salaries and expenses paid to judges appointed pursuant to this section shall be at the rate agreed upon by the parties and the judge.
- The supreme court may promulgate such rules as may be necessary to implement this section.
Source: L. 81: Entire section added, p. 875, § 1, effective May 26. L. 96: (1) to (3) and (6) amended, p. 128, § 1, effective August 7. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 92, § 1, effective March 23.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "A Practical Guide to Trials by 'Appointment' Under C.R.S. § 13-3-111 ", see 26 Colo. Law. 69 (Nov. 1997). For article, "Privatizing Family Law Adjudications: Issues and Procedures", see 34 Colo. Law. 95 (Aug. 2005). For article, "Appointed Judges Under New C.R.C.P. 122: A Significant Opportunity for Litigants", see 34 Colo. Law. 37 (Sept. 2005).
13-3-112. Report on increase in docket fees. (Repealed)
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 851, § 10, effective May 31. L. 96: Entire section repealed, p. 1267, § 187, effective August 7.
13-3-113. "Family-friendly Courts Act".
- Short title. This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Family-friendly Courts Act".
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Legislative declaration.
- The general assembly hereby finds and declares that many families experience challenges and transitions with legal ramifications that often necessitate court involvement. Frequently individuals and family members attend court or visit other governmental offices for juvenile delinquency proceedings, domestic relations proceedings, protective proceedings related to domestic abuse or domestic violence, child protection proceedings, meetings with probation officers, and other matters. Many persons who attend court proceedings are responsible for the care of young children. For many such individuals, child care issues can distract from, if not present obstacles or even barriers to, effective and complete participation in ongoing court proceedings. The general assembly finds that these issues were acknowledged and addressed in the 1999 report entitled "Creating Family Friendly Courts in Colorado: Children's Centers for the Courthouse", which report was submitted by the Colorado supreme court family friendly facilities task force and which report recommended the establishment of children's centers in courthouses.
- The general assembly further finds that the same individuals who are in need of child care services when they are participating in court proceedings may also benefit from the availability of information and resource referrals relating to certain types of services within the community, including services addressing at-risk youth, employment counseling, employment training and placement, health education and counseling, financial management, education, legal counseling and referral, mediation, domestic abuse and domestic violence, fatherhood programs, and substance abuse.
- The general assembly further finds that individuals who are involved in court proceedings may have additional court-ordered service needs involving their children, including, but not limited to, supervised parenting time and the transfer of the physical custody of a child from one parent to the other.
- The general assembly therefore determines and declares that the creation of family-friendly court programs is beneficial to and in the best interests of the citizens of Colorado. The general assembly further finds that the goal of such programs shall primarily be providing quality child care in or near courthouses to the children of individuals and families who attend court-related proceedings but that such programs may also provide additional court-related family services at the facility and serve as a clearinghouse of information and resource referrals for program patrons concerning the wide variety of available services in the community, including services that provide help to at-risk youth; educational services; health services; behavioral, mental health, and substance use disorder services; legal services; and domestic abuse information.
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Definitions. For purposes of this section:
- "At-risk youth" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 26-6.8-104 (3), C.R.S.
- "Domestic abuse" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 13-14-101 (2).
- "Domestic violence" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.
- "Family-friendly court services" means child care and court-related family services provided in the courthouse or courthouse complex or in reasonable proximity to the courthouse.
- "Program" means the family-friendly court program established pursuant to this section.
- Provision of family-friendly court services. There is hereby created the family-friendly court program. The purpose of the program shall be to provide quality family-friendly court services to families and the children of individuals who are attending court proceedings or related matters and to serve as a central location for the dissemination of information to families about resources and services relating to at-risk youth, employment counseling, employment training and placement, health education and counseling, financial management, education, legal counseling and referral, mediation, domestic abuse and domestic violence, fatherhood programs, and substance abuse. Grants awarded pursuant to this section shall be used to establish and maintain new family-friendly court programs in judicial districts throughout the state that do not have comparable existing programs, as well as to enhance existing family-friendly court programs.
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Grant applications - duties of judicial districts.
- To be eligible for moneys from the family-friendly court program cash fund, created in subsection (6) of this section, for the provision of family-friendly court services, a judicial district shall apply to the state court administrator in accordance with the timelines and guidelines adopted by the state court administrator, using an application form provided by the state court administrator.
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The state court administrator, in determining which judicial districts may receive grant money pursuant to this section, shall consider the extent that a judicial district is responsible for:
- Actively recruiting qualified and skilled child care providers to provide quality child care services to families and children of individuals who are attending court proceedings or related matters;
- Conducting the necessary criminal history checks through the Colorado bureau of investigation and hiring qualified and appropriate child care providers;
- Selecting and establishing a safe physical location in the courthouse or in the courthouse complex or in reasonable proximity to the courthouse, for the provision of child care services;
- When reasonably practicable in consideration of funding, staffing, and assistance from other public and private organizations, providing additional court-related family services to families and children experiencing the challenges and transitions that necessitate court involvement, including, but not limited to, supervised parenting time and transfer of the physical custody of a child from one parent to the other;
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Soliciting information from community-based organizations, faith communities, governmental entities, schools, community mental health centers, local nonprofit or not-for-profit agencies, local law enforcement agencies, businesses, and other community service providers about the following services and resources for the purpose of providing such information to patrons of the family-friendly court services:
- Youth services, including but not limited to youth mentoring services, services to prevent or reduce youth crime and violence, student dropout prevention and intervention services, and any other services that may be available in the community, the goal and purpose of which are to assist at-risk youth;
- Multipurpose service centers for displaced homemakers pursuant to article 15.5 of title 8, C.R.S., and other information to assist displaced homemakers, which information shall relate to employment counseling, employment training, employment placement, health education and counseling services, financial management services, educational services, and legal counseling and services;
- Information related to health insurance and health-care coverage, including but not limited to the children's basic health plan and dental health plan, established pursuant to article 8 of title 25.5, C.R.S., and children eligible for the medical assistance program pursuant to article 5 of title 25.5, C.R.S.;
- Substance use disorder programs that are available in the community;
- Services and potential financial resources that may be available for victims of domestic abuse or domestic violence, including but not limited to counseling for persons who are victims of domestic abuse and their dependents, advocacy programs that assist victims in obtaining services and information, and educational services for victims of domestic violence;
- Fatherhood programs that are available in the community; and
- Any other services that would be beneficial to families experiencing challenges and transition necessitating court involvement, including but not limited to family stabilization services as provided in section 19-1-125, C.R.S., and mediation services; and
- Providing to persons staffing the program training and ongoing support with regard to the available resources and additional referrals provided through the program at each court location.
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The judicial districts that are selected by the state court administrator to provide family-friendly court services shall be responsible for:
- Implementing a method of evaluating the effectiveness of the family-friendly court program and assessing the impact of the child care and informational services provided through the program; and
- Reporting annually to the state court administrator concerning the results of the judicial district's evaluation of the family-friendly court program as well as an accounting of fiscal contributions received and expenditures made by the judicial district for the implementation, administration, and maintenance of the program and such other information that the state court administrator may require or that the judicial district determines to be relevant and informative.
- The judicial districts that are selected by the state court administrator to provide family-friendly court services that provide child care services shall meet the licensing requirements for child care facilities set forth in part 1 of article 6 of title 26, C.R.S., and all child care licensing rules promulgated by the state board of human services in connection therewith.
- In addition to grants received from the state court administrator pursuant to this section, judicial districts implementing or enhancing existing family-friendly court programs pursuant to this section are authorized to accept any funds, grants, gifts, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of implementing this section; except that no grant or donation shall be accepted if the conditions attached to the grant or donation require the expenditure thereof in a manner contrary to law. Any such moneys received by a judicial district shall be credited to the family-friendly court program cash fund created in subsection (6) of this section for grants awarded by the board pursuant to this section.
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Family-friendly court program cash fund.
- There is hereby created in the state treasury the family-friendly court program cash fund. The moneys in the family-friendly court program cash fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the implementation of this section. The state court administrator is authorized to accept on behalf of the state any grants, gifts, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of this section. All private and public funds received through grants, gifts, or donations shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the family-friendly court program cash fund in addition to any moneys that may be appropriated to the cash fund directly by the general assembly. In addition, commencing July 1, 2002, the one-dollar surcharge set forth in section 42-4-1701 (4)(a)(VI), C.R.S., shall be transmitted to the state treasurer who shall credit the same to the family-friendly court program cash fund created in this subsection (6). All investment earnings derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund of the state at the end of any fiscal year.
- All moneys in the family-friendly court program cash fund, created in paragraph (a) of this subsection (6), shall be available for grants awarded by the state court administrator to judicial districts seeking to implement or enhance existing family-friendly court programs and administrative costs associated with the implementation and administration of this section. The state court administrator, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, is hereby authorized to expend moneys appropriated to the judicial department from the family-friendly court program cash fund to judicial districts seeking to establish or enhance family-friendly court programs pursuant to this section.
(6.5) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (6) of this section to the contrary, on April 20, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct two hundred thousand dollars from the family-friendly court program cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
- The state court administrator shall announce to all judicial districts the availability of grants pursuant to this section for the establishment and maintenance or enhancement of family-friendly court services programs in the judicial districts.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 1000 , § 1, effective June 2, 2005.)
Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 627, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (3)(b) amended, p. 554, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2005: (5)(b)(V)(C) amended, p. 764, § 19, effective June 1; (2), (3)(d), (4), (5), and (8) amended, p. 1000, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2006: (5)(b)(V)(C) amended, p. 2001, § 45, effective July 1. L. 2009: (6.5) added, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 620, § 8, effective April 20. L. 2013: (3)(a) amended, (HB 13-1117), ch. 169, p. 588, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2014: (5)(b)(V)(C) amended, (SB 14-067), ch. 12, p. 115, § 9, effective February 27. L. 2017: (2)(d), IP(5)(b), and (5)(b)(V)(D) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1292, § 104, effective May 25.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (5)(b)(V)(C) by House Bill 05-1337 and Senate Bill 05-030 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act amending subsection (3)(a), see section 1 of chapter 169, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
13-3-114. State court administrator - compensation for exonerated persons - definitions - annual payments - child support payments - financial literacy training - qualified health plan - damages awarded in civil actions - reimbursement to the state.
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As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
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"Annual payment" means a payment of monetary compensation made by the state court administrator or his or her designee to an exonerated person pursuant to this section. An annual payment shall be in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars, which amount shall be adjusted annually by the state auditor to account for inflation; except that:
- If the remaining amount of the state's duty of monetary compensation owed to the exonerated person is less than one hundred thousand dollars, the amount of the annual payment shall be equal to the remaining amount; and
- The amount of an annual payment may be reduced as described in subsection (5) of this section.
- "Exonerated person" means a person who has been determined by a district court pursuant to section 13-65-102 to be actually innocent, as defined in section 13-65-101 (1).
- "Incarceration" means a person's custody in a county jail or a correctional facility while he or she serves a sentence issued pursuant to the person's conviction of a felony or pursuant to the person's adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for the commission of one or more offenses that would be felonies if committed by a person eighteen years of age or older. For the purposes of this section, "incarceration" includes placement as a juvenile to the custody of the state department of human services or a county department of human or social services.
- "Personal financial management instruction course" means a personal financial management instruction course that has been approved by the United States trustee's office pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sec. 111.
- "State's duty of monetary compensation" means the total amount of monetary compensation owed by the state to an exonerated person.
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"Annual payment" means a payment of monetary compensation made by the state court administrator or his or her designee to an exonerated person pursuant to this section. An annual payment shall be in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars, which amount shall be adjusted annually by the state auditor to account for inflation; except that:
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Not more than fourteen days after the state court administrator receives directions from a district court pursuant to section 13-65-103 to compensate an exonerated person, the state court administrator shall:
- Issue an annual payment to the exonerated person. Annually thereafter, on or before the date that such payment was made, until the state's duty of monetary compensation is satisfied, the state court administrator or his or her designee shall issue an annual payment to the exonerated person.
- Pay on the exonerated person's behalf any amount of compensation for child support payments owed by the exonerated person that became due during his or her incarceration, or any amount of interest on child support arrearages that accrued during his or her incarceration but which have not been paid, as described in section 13-65-103 (2)(e)(III). The state court administrator, or his or her designee, shall make such payment in a lump sum to the appropriate county department of human or social services or other agency responsible for receiving such payments not more than thirty days after the state court administrator receives directions from a district court to compensate an exonerated person pursuant to section 13-65-103.
- Pay on the exonerated person's behalf the amount of reasonable attorney fees awarded to the exonerated person pursuant to section 13-65-103 (2)(e)(IV).
- The amount of any payment made to, or on behalf of, an exonerated person pursuant to this section shall be deducted from the state's duty of monetary compensation to the exonerated person.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, after the state court administrator has issued one annual payment to an exonerated person, the state court administrator shall not issue another annual payment to the exonerated person until the exonerated person has completed a personal financial management instruction course.
- In each year in which the state court administrator issues an annual payment to an exonerated person, the person's annual payment shall be reduced by ten thousand dollars if the person fails to present to the state court administrator a policy or certificate showing that the person has purchased or otherwise acquired a qualified health plan for himself or herself and his or her dependents that is valid for at least six months. Such amount shall be deducted from the state's duty of monetary compensation to the exonerated person as if such amount had been issued to the exonerated person.
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An exonerated person who receives monetary compensation pursuant to this section shall reimburse the state for the total amount of annual payments made to the exonerated person pursuant to this section if:
- The exonerated person prevails in or settles a civil action against the state or against any other government body in a civil action concerning the same acts that are the bases for the petition for compensation; and
- The judgment rendered in the civil action or the settlement of the civil action includes an award of monetary damages to the exonerated person.
- For the purposes of paragraph (a) of this subsection (6), in any proceeding that satisfies the description set forth in said paragraph (a), upon a satisfactory showing by the state that the exonerated person has received monetary compensation pursuant to this section, the court shall offset a sufficient amount of moneys from the exonerated person's award of monetary damages to reimburse the state for such monetary compensation. The court shall transfer such moneys to the state treasurer, who shall credit the moneys to the general fund.
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An exonerated person who receives monetary compensation pursuant to this section shall reimburse the state for the total amount of annual payments made to the exonerated person pursuant to this section if:
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Notwithstanding any provision of this section, the state court administrator shall not issue an annual payment to an exonerated person if:
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- The exonerated person has prevailed in or settled a civil action for monetary damages as described in subsection (6) of this section; and
- The amount of the monetary damages awarded by the court in the civil action, or stipulated in the settlement of the action, and collected by the exonerated person equals or exceeds the remaining amount of the state's duty of monetary compensation to the exonerated person;
- The exonerated person is convicted of a class 1 or class 2 felony, or of an offense that would be considered a class 1 or class 2 felony in Colorado, after the date upon which a court issues an order of compensation on the person's behalf; or
- The person has not yet completed a personal financial management instruction course, as required by subsection (4) of this section.
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-
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At any point after the state court administrator makes an annual payment to an exonerated person pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the exonerated person may elect to receive the remaining balance of the state's duty of monetary compensation in a lump sum by:
- Notifying the state court administrator, the governor, and the general assembly of such election, which notification must be provided in writing;
- Completing a personal financial management instruction course; and
- Acquiring and committing to maintain a qualified health insurance plan.
- Upon receiving written documentation that an exonerated person has satisfied the requirements described in subsection (8)(a) of this section, the state court administrator shall pay to the exonerated person the balance of the state's duty of monetary compensation not later than one year after receiving such written documentation.
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At any point after the state court administrator makes an annual payment to an exonerated person pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the exonerated person may elect to receive the remaining balance of the state's duty of monetary compensation in a lump sum by:
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1230), ch. 409, p. 2423, § 3, effective June 5. L. 2017: (8) added, (SB 17-125), ch. 109, p. 395, § 1, effective April 4. L. 2018: (1)(c) and (2)(b) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 398, § 6, effective August 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act adding this section, see section 1 of chapter 409, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
13-3-114.5. State court administrator - reimbursement of monetary amounts paid following a vacated conviction or amended order of restitution.
Within twenty-eight days after receipt of an order from a district or county court for payment of a refund of monetary amounts paid, the state court administrator shall issue a refund payment to the person who established eligibility under section 18-1.3-703.
Source: L. 2017: Entire section added, (HB 17-1071), ch. 70, p. 220, § 2, effective September 1.
13-3-115. Diversion funding committee.
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The state court administrator shall establish a diversion funding committee, referred to in this section as the "committee". The committee shall consist of:
- The attorney general or his or her designee;
- The executive director of a statewide organization representing district attorneys or his or her designee;
- The state public defender or his or her designee;
- The director of the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety; and
- The state court administrator or his or her designee;
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- The committee shall develop funding guidelines, including permissible uses for the funding, and an application process for elected district attorneys to request funds appropriated by the general assembly in order to operate an adult diversion program consistent with section 18-1.3-101, C.R.S.
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The committee shall also develop an application that includes but is not limited to:
- A description of the adult pretrial diversion program, including the project's goals, objective, and timeline for implementation;
- The number of adults that could be enrolled in a pretrial diversion program using the funds requested and a description of the eligibility criteria developed by the district attorney;
- The process and method by which a participant's treatment or services needs will be assessed;
- Outcomes and performance measures that the program will use in its evaluation;
- Itemized expenses for the amount of the funding request and whether the funding request is for a new adult pretrial diversion program or funding to continue or expand an existing adult pretrial diversion program;
- The diversion supervision fees, if any, that the district attorney will require as a condition of participation in a pretrial diversion program; and
- A list of any other agencies, organizations, service providers, or planning groups that would be involved in the planning and implementation of the project.
- The committee must review all funding requests submitted by a district attorney to support an adult pretrial diversion program. By majority vote, the committee may approve all or a portion of a funding request that meets the guidelines established pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section or deny a request.
- The judicial department shall execute the contract and allocate the funding requests approved by the committee.
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A district attorney who receives funding pursuant to this section shall collect data and provide a status report to the judicial department by a date prescribed by the committee that includes but is not limited to:
- The number of people screened and the number of people who met the diversion program criteria;
- The number of people enrolled in the adult pretrial diversion program;
- Demographic information on those enrolled in the adult pretrial diversion program including age, gender, and ethnicity;
- Participant status, including the number of people that have successfully completed the diversion program, the number of people still under active supervision in the diversion program, the number of people terminated from the diversion program, and the reason for their termination; and
- The accounting of the funds expended and the amount of any funds unexpended and unencumbered at the end of the funding period.
- Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), by January 31, 2015, and each January 31 thereafter, the judicial department shall provide to the joint budget committee a status report that includes the information required by subsection (5) of this section.
- Any funds provided to a district attorney for purposes of operating an adult pretrial diversion program pursuant to this section shall not be reverted to the general fund if unexpended by the end of the fiscal year in which the funds were received.
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1156), ch. 336, p. 1961, § 15, effective August 7. L. 2017: (6) amended, (SB 17-241), ch. 171, p. 623, § 2, effective April 28.
13-3-116. Restorative justice coordinating council - establishment - membership.
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- A council to provide assistance and education related to restorative justice programs is hereby established. The council shall be known as the "restorative justice coordinating council" and shall be established in the state judicial department within the office of the state court administrator. To the extent that resources permit, the restorative justice coordinating council shall support the development of restorative justice programs, serve as a central repository for information, assist in the development and provision of related education and training, and provide technical assistance to entities engaged in or wishing to develop restorative justice programs.
- In order to assess the efficacy of restorative justice practices in providing satisfaction to participants, the council shall develop a uniform restorative justice satisfaction evaluation by September 1, 2013. The evaluation must be based on research principles. The evaluation must include a preconference questionnaire for the offender and participating victims, if practicable, to establish a baseline and a postconference questionnaire that is suitable to administer to restorative justice participants, including community members, participating victims, and offenders.
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- The council shall develop a database of existing restorative justice programs in the state by December 31, 2013, and update it annually by December 31 of each year.
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The database must consist of the following information:
- The location of the restorative justice program;
- The types of restorative justice practices used in the program and the costs and fees associated with the practices; and
- The background, training, and restorative justice experience of the facilitators in the restorative justice program.
- Repealed.
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The restorative justice coordinating council includes, at a minimum, the following:
- A member who represents a statewide juvenile justice council who shall be appointed by the executive director of the department of public safety;
- A representative from the division of youth services in the department of human services who is appointed by the executive director of the department of human services;
- A representative from the department of public safety who shall be appointed by the executive director of the department of public safety;
- A representative from the judicial department who shall be appointed by the state court administrator;
- Two representatives from a statewide organization or organizations whose primary purpose is related to the development and implementation of restorative justice programs and who shall be appointed by the executive director of the department of public safety;
- A district attorney with juvenile justice experience who shall be appointed by the executive director of the Colorado district attorneys' council;
- A victim's representative within the judicial department with restorative justice experience who shall be appointed by the state court administrator;
- A representative from the department of education who shall be appointed by the commissioner of education;
- A representative from the state board of parole appointed by the chair of the parole board;
- A representative from the department of corrections appointed by the executive director of the department of corrections;
- A representative from a nongovernment statewide organization representing victims appointed by the executive director of the department of public safety;
- Three restorative justice practitioners appointed by the state court administrator;
- A representative of the juvenile parole board appointed by the chair of the juvenile parole board;
- The state public defender or his or her designee;
- A judge appointed by the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court; and
- A representative of law enforcement appointed by the state court administrator based upon a recommendation from the restorative justice coordinating council.
- The restorative justice coordinating council shall select a chairperson from among the members of the council who shall serve a term to be determined by the council. The chairperson shall be responsible for convening the council at a frequency that shall be determined by the council.
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Members of the restorative justice coordinating council serve without compensation but may be reimbursed for expenses incurred while serving on the council.
(4.5) The restorative justice coordinating council may accept money from trainings and conferences and gifts, grants, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of supporting restorative justice practices. All private and public money received by the restorative justice coordinating council from gifts, grants, or donations or any other source must be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the restorative justice surcharge fund created pursuant to section 18-25-101, in addition to any money that may be appropriated to the fund directly by the general assembly.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2017.)
Source: L. 2017: Entire section added with relocations, (SB 17-220), ch. 173, p. 629, § 1, effective April 28; (2)(b) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1973, § 31, effective June 6. L. 2019: (4) amended, (HB 19-1205), ch. 292, p. 2683, § 1, effective August 2.
Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former § 19-2-213 as it existed prior to 2017.
(2) Changes to § 19-2-213 (2)(b) by HB 17-1329 were harmonized with SB 17-220 and relocated to subsection (2)(b).
13-3-117. State court administrator - automatic drug conviction sealing.
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The state court administrator shall compile a list of drug convictions pursuant to article 18 of title 18:
- That are eligible for sealing pursuant to sections 24-72-703 and 24-72-706; and
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- If the drug conviction is for a petty offense or misdemeanor, that seven years have passed since the disposition of the case; or
- If the drug conviction is for a felony, that at least ten years have passed since the disposition of the case.
- The state court administrator shall use the state conviction database and the conviction databases of entities that do not report convictions to the state database to compile the list. The state court administrator shall compile the list based on a name-based review with sufficient points of reference for identification validation as determined by the state court administrator. The state court administrator must only include convictions on the list if sufficient points of validation, as determined by the state court administrator, are present. The state court administrator shall sort the list by judicial district of conviction.
- The state court administrator shall compile the initial list pursuant to this subsection (1) by February 1, 2024, and the court shall seal all conviction records eligible for sealing pursuant to the final list compiled pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section based on the initial list by July 1, 2024.
- Beginning July 1, 2024, the state court administrator shall compile the list pursuant to this subsection (1) on the first Monday of every month and the Colorado bureau of investigation and district attorneys shall complete their review within thirty-five days of receiving a new list. The court shall seal all conviction records eligible for sealing pursuant to the list compiled pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section within fourteen days of receipt of the amended list from each district attorney.
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The state court administrator shall compile a list of drug convictions pursuant to article 18 of title 18:
- The state court administrator shall forward the list compiled pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the Colorado bureau of investigation. The Colorado bureau of investigation shall compare the list with criminal history reports. The Colorado bureau of investigation shall complete the comparison based on a fingerprint-based review with sufficient points of reference for identification validation as determined by the Colorado bureau of investigation. The Colorado bureau of investigation shall remove any convictions from the list from the state court administrator in which sufficient identification validation cannot be made by the Colorado bureau of investigation and any convictions for which the defendant has an intervening conviction during the seven-year waiting period if the conviction is for a petty offense or misdemeanor or during the ten-year waiting period if the conviction is for a felony. The Colorado bureau of investigation shall forward each amended list to each district attorney.
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- Upon receipt of the list from the Colorado bureau of investigation, each district attorney shall remove convictions from the list in which a condition of plea was that the defendant agreed to not have the conviction record sealed and convictions in which the defendant has a pending criminal charge. Each district attorney shall send its amended list to the state court administrator. The state court administrator shall compile each of the lists into one final list and sort the convictions by judicial district.
- The district attorney shall send the final list compiled pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section to the chief judge for the judicial district, and the courts of that judicial district shall enter sealing orders based on the list received. The district court shall send a copy of the sealing order to the Colorado bureau of investigation, the law enforcement agency that investigated the case, and the district attorney's office that prosecuted the case to facilitate sealing of the records held by those entities. The court shall also send a copy to the defendant if the contact information for the defendant is available and to the state court administrator for purposes of subsection (3)(c) of this section.
- The state court administrator shall develop a website that allows a defendant to confidentially determine whether his or her conviction has been sealed pursuant to this section and information about how to receive a copy of the sealing order.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1214), ch. 455, p. 3037, § 11, effective September 7.
ARTICLE 4 COURT OF APPEALS
Section
13-4-101. Establishment.
There is hereby created the court of appeals, pursuant to section 1 of article VI of the state constitution. The court of appeals shall be a court of record. Judges of the court of appeals may serve in any state court with full authority as provided by law, when called upon to do so by the chief justice of the supreme court.
Source: L. 69: p. 265, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-1. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1247, § 1, effective April 5.
ANNOTATION
Court of appeals created to relieve appellate backlog. Colorado has now provided for an intermediate court of appeals, which will relieve the appellate backlogs caused by the press of court business in recent years. Tanksley v. Warden State Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1970).
13-4-102. Jurisdiction.
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Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the court of appeals shall have initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of, and interlocutory appeals of certified questions of law in civil cases pursuant to section 13-4-102.1 from, the district courts, the probate court of the city and county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver, except in:
- Repealed.
- Cases in which a statute, a municipal charter provision, or an ordinance has been declared unconstitutional;
- Cases concerned with decisions or actions of the public utilities commission;
- Water cases involving priorities or adjudications;
- Writs of habeas corpus;
- Cases appealed from the county court to the district court, as provided in section 13-6-310;
- Review actions of the Colorado dental board in refusing to issue or renew or in suspending or revoking a license to practice dentistry or dental hygiene, as provided in section 12-220-208;
- Cases appealed from the district court granting or denying postconviction relief in a case in which a sentence of death has been imposed for an offense charged prior to July 1, 2020.
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The court of appeals has initial jurisdiction to:
- Review awards or actions of the industrial claim appeals office, as provided in articles 43 and 74 of title 8, C.R.S.;
- Review orders of the banking board granting or denying charters for new state banks, as provided in article 102 of title 11, C.R.S.;
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2006, p. 761 , § 19, effective July 1, 2006.)
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado podiatry board, as provided in section 12-290-115 ;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado state board of chiropractic examiners, as provided in section 12-215-122 ;
- Review actions of the Colorado medical board in refusing to grant or in revoking or suspending a license or in placing the holder thereof on probation, as provided in section 12-240-127 ;
- Review actions of the Colorado dental board in refusing to issue or renew or in suspending or revoking a license to practice dentistry or dental hygiene, as provided in section 12-220-137;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state board of nursing, as provided in articles 255 and 295 of title 12;
- Review actions of the state board of optometry in refusing to grant or renew, revoking, or suspending a license, issuing a letter of admonition, or placing a licensee on probation or under supervision, as provided by section 12-275-122 (2) ;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the director of the division of professions and occupations, as provided in article 285 of title 12;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state board of pharmacy, as provided in section 12-280-128 ;
- Review decisions of the board of education of a school district in proceedings for the dismissal of a teacher, as provided in section 22-63-302 (10), C.R.S.;
- Review final decisions or orders of the Colorado real estate commission, as provided in parts 2 and 5 of article 10 of title 12;
- Repealed.
- Review final decisions and orders of the Colorado civil rights commission, as provided in parts 3, 4, and 7 of article 34 of title 24, C.R.S.;
- Repealed.
- Review decisions of the state personnel board, as provided in section 24-50-125.4 , C.R.S.;
- Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state electrical board, as provided in article 115 of title 12;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state board of licensure for architects, professional engineers, and professional land surveyors, as provided in section 12-120-407 (4) ;
- Review final actions and orders of the boards, as defined in section 12-245-202 (1) , that are appropriate for judicial review and final actions;
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2008, p. 426 , § 25, effective August 5, 2008.)
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the coal mine board of examiners, as provided in section 34-22-107 (8) , C.R.S.;
- Review final actions and orders of the director of the division of professions and occupations appropriate for judicial review, as provided in section 12-145-116 ;
- Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the examining board of plumbers;
- Review decisions of the board of assessment appeals, as provided in section 39-8-108 (2) , C.R.S.;
- Repealed.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 818 , § 14, effective August 5, 1998.)
- Repealed.
- Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the securities commissioner, as provided in section 11-59-117 , C.R.S.;
- Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the commissioner of insurance, pursuant to title 10, C.R.S.;
- Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado racing commission, as provided in section 44-32-507 (4) ;
- Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado passenger tramway safety board, as provided in section 12-150-109 ;
- Repealed.
- Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state board of veterinary medicine, as provided in section 12-315-113 ;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the director of the division of professions and occupations, as provided in section 12-225-109 (4) ;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the executive director of the department of labor and employment, as provided in section 8-20-104 , C.R.S.;
- Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the director of the division of professions and occupations in the department of regulatory agencies, as provided in section 12-270-114 (8) ;
- Repealed.
- Review final decisions or orders of the administrator as provided in article 20 of title 5; and
- [ Editor's note: Subsection (2)(nn) is effective January 1, 2022.] Review final decisions or orders of the administrator as provided in article 21 of title 5.
- The court of appeals shall have authority to issue any writs, directives, orders, and mandates necessary to the determination of cases within its jurisdiction.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 95, p. 235 , § 4, effective April 17, 1995.)
Source: L. 69: p. 265, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-2. L. 73: p. 358, § 2. L. 74: (1)(a) repealed, p. 236, § 4, effective July 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 555, § 2, effective April 9; (2) amended, p. 459, § 9, effective July 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 717, § 2, effective July 1. L. 78: (2) amended, p. 302, § 4, effective July 1. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 919, § 1, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 803, § 5, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 553, § 1, effective March 1, 1980. L. 80: (1)(g) amended, p. 438, § 2, effective January 1, 1981. L. 83: (2) amended, p. 473, § 4, effective April 5. L. 85: (2) amended, p. 566, § 12, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 484, § 2, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 532, § 12, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 505, § 21, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 510, § 8, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 538, § 13, effective July 1; IP(1) and (1)(f) amended, p. 570, § 3, effective November 14, 1986. L. 86: (2) amended, p. 978, § 9, effective April 3; (2) amended, p. 653, § 31, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 498, § 116, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 621, § 34, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 1217, § 14, effective July 1. L. 88: (2)(x) added, p. 1305, § 14, effective April 29; (2)(o) and (2)(p) amended and (2)(u) added, p. 1199, § 9, effective May 3; (2)(o) and (2)(p) amended and (2)(r) added, p. 470, § 12, effective July 1; (2)(o) amended and (2)(s) and (2)(t) added, p. 568, § 6, effective July 1; (2)(o) and (2)(p) amended and (2)(v) added, p. 582, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(q) added, p. 502, § 22, effective July 1; (2)(w) added, p. 593, § 19, effective July 1. L. 89: (2)(m) amended, p. 744, § 23, effective April 3; (2)(y), (2)(z), and (2)(aa) added, pp. 728, 747, 406, §§ 31, 4, 6, effective July 1. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2)(bb) added, p. 13, § 3, effective July 7. L. 90: (2)(l) amended, p. 1128, § 2, effective July 1. L. 91: (2)(cc) added, p. 2425, § 4, effective June 8; (2)(a) amended and (4) added, p. 1337, § 54, effective July 1. L. 92: (2)(dd) added, p. 1613, § 167, effective May 20; (1)(b) amended, p. 271, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (2)(ee) added, p. 1235, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(ee) added, p. 1033, § 14, effective July 1; (2)(ff) added, p. 1532, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (2)(y) repealed, p. 705, § 7, effective April 19; (1)(h) added, p. 1474, § 3, effective July 1. L. 95: (2)(a) and (4) amended, p. 235, § 4, effective April 17; (2)(f) amended, p. 1072, § 24, effective July 1; (2)(aa) amended, p. 419, § 6, effective July 1. L. 98: (2)(s) amended, p. 1158, § 28, effective July 1; (2)(gg) added, p. 1186, § 4, effective July 1; (2)(o) and (2)(aa) amended, p. 818, § 14, effective August 5. L. 2001: (2)(ii) added, p. 1260, § 8, effective June 5; (2)(hh) added, p. 480, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2003: (2)(jj) added, p. 1828, § 21, effective May 21; (2)(b) amended, p. 1209, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2)(c) amended, p. 1310, § 52, effective May 28; (2)(g) amended, p. 857, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: (2)(c) and (2)(r) amended, p. 761, § 19, effective July 1. L. 2008: (2)(kk) added, p. 830, § 3, effective July 1; (2)(s) and (2)(t) amended, p. 426, § 25, effective August 5. L. 2010: (2)(f) amended, (HB 10-1260), ch. 403, p. 1985, § 70, effective July 1; IP(1) amended, (HB 10-1395), ch. 364, p. 1719, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2011: IP(2) and (2)(i) amended, (SB 11-094), ch. 129, p. 451, § 29, effective April 22; IP(2) and (2)(s) amended, (SB 11-187), ch. 285, p. 1326, § 66, effective July 1. L. 2012: (2)(z) amended, (HB 12-1297), ch. 139, p. 506, § 4, effective April 26; (2)(k) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1617, § 33, effective July 1. L. 2013: (2)(m.5) added, (HB 13-1277), ch. 352, p. 2054, § 4, effective January 1, 2015. L. 2014: (2)(kk) amended and (2)(ll) added, (HB 14-1398), ch. 353, p. 1646, § 3, effective June 6; (2)(g) amended, (HB 14-1227), ch. 363, p. 1736, § 41, effective July 1. L. 2016: (1)(g) amended, (SB 16-189), ch. 210, p. 758, § 22, effective June 6. L. 2018: (2)(gg) amended, (SB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1696, § 9, effective May 29; (2)(ee) amended, (HB 18-1024), ch. 26, p. 321, § 8, effective October 1; (2)(gg) amended, (SB 18-036), ch. 34, p. 377, § 4, effective October 1. L. 2019: (2)(o) repealed, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3463, § 6, effective August 2; (2)(mm) added, (SB 19-002), ch. 157, p. 1872, § 4, effective August 2; (2)(d), (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(g), (2)(h), (2)(i), (2)(j), (2)(k), (2)(m), (2)(o), (2)(q), (2)(r), (2)(s), (2)(v), (2)(bb), (2)(ff), (2)(hh), (2)(ii), and (2)(kk) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1661, § 66, effective October 1. L. 2020: (1)(h) amended, (SB 20-100), ch. 61, p. 204, § 2, effective March 23; (2)(m.5) repealed, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1045, § 23, effective June 30; (2)(bb) repealed, (HB 20-1183), ch. 157, p. 699, § 49, effective July 1; (2)(gg) repealed, (HB 20-1001), ch. 302, p. 1516, § 13, effective July 14; (1)(g) amended, (HB 20-1056), ch. 64, p. 262, § 4, effective September 14; (2)(kk) amended and (2)(ll) repealed, (HB 20-1217), ch. 93, p. 369, § 3, effective September 14. L. 2021: (2)(kk) amended, (SB 21-003), ch. 4, p. 29, § 6, effective January 21; (2)(nn) added, (HB 21-1282), ch. 482, p. 3444, § 2, effective January 1, 2022.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (2) by House Bill 79-1234 and Senate Bill 79-038 were harmonized with Senate Bill 79-099, effective March 1, 1980.
(2) Amendments to subsection (2) by Senate Bill 85-013, Senate Bill 85-049, House Bill 85-1030, House Bill 85-1031, House Bill 85-1032, and House Bill 85-1209 were harmonized.
(3) Amendments to subsection (2) by Senate Bill 86-011, Senate Bill 86-012, Senate Bill 86-165, House Bill 86-1029, and House Bill 86-1268 were harmonized.
(4) Amendments to subsection (2)(ee) by House Bill 93-1034 and House Bill 93-1268 were harmonized.
(5) Amendments to subsection (2)(gg) by HB 18-1375 and SB 18-036 were harmonized.
(6) Subsection (2)(o) was amended in HB 19-1172, effective October 1, 2019. However, those amendments were superseded by the repeal of subsection (2)(o) in SB 19-241, effective August 2, 2019.
(7) Section 4(2) of chapter 482 (HB 21-1282), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2022.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act enacting subsection (2)(jj), see section 1 of chapter 279, Session Laws of Colorado 2003. For the legislative declaration in SB 19-002, see section 1 of chapter 157, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The Problem of Delay in the Colorado Court of Appeals", see 58 Den. L.J. 1 (1980). For article, "Knowing When to Change Trains: The Ins and Outs of Interlocutory Appeals", see 41 Colo. Law. 31 (June 2012).
General assembly may change appellate subject matter jurisdiction. The changes brought about by this section, § 13-4-108 , and § 13-4-110 pertain to the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction of the supreme court and court of appeals and, as such, the changes are within the authority of the general assembly. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Statutes pertaining to the creation of appellate remedies take precedence over judicial rules of procedure. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
A court cannot adopt a rule that changes jurisdiction. The supreme court has authority to adopt rules for the regulation of the business of the courts and the procedure to be followed by litigants in doing that business. Nonetheless, absent constitutional authority, it is equally clear that this court cannot adopt a rule that changes jurisdiction of a court contrary to a provision of a statute. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Where the general assembly has enacted statutes prescribing appellate procedure, this court may not modify the jurisdiction granted it by statute. People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 598 P.2d 526 (1979).
The manner in which subject matter jurisdiction is exercised is properly within the scope of the supreme court's rule-making powers vested by § 2(1) of art. VI, Colo. Const. This procedure has been established and is set forth in C.A.R. 50-57. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Court of appeals has no jurisdiction over constitutionality of a city charter. Where claimant contends that a city charter provision is unconstitutional, the Colorado court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to decide the issue. McCamant v. City & County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 287, 501 P.2d 142 (1972).
Jurisdiction of court of appeals to hear appeal. Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the district court, or any part thereof, depends upon whether the matters presented were properly before the district court. Zaharia v. County Court ex rel. County of Jefferson, 673 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1983).
An appeal that is filed before the entry of final judgment does not remove jurisdiction from the trial court. People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429 (Colo. App. 2005).
The final judgment of the district court, following a trial de novo, is subject to review by the court of appeals under both § 13-6-310 and this section. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).
This section provides that court of appeals does not have initial jurisdiction over appeals from summary proceeding under certain election statutes, but statute does not bar court of appeals' jurisdiction after the supreme court has declined to exercise its initial jurisdiction. Zivian v. Brooke-Hitching, 28 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2001).
Right to appeal to courts from special assessment for public improvements does not exist except by statute. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361 , 513 P.2d 199 (1973).
Subsection (1)(h) expressly divests the court of appeals of jurisdiction over appeals from postconviction proceedings in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. When this provision is combined with § 16-12-101.5 and §§ 16-12-201 to 16-12-210, the legislature has made plain that it does not want the court of appeals to resolve issues arising from cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. People v. Owens, 219 P.3d 379 (Colo. App. 2009).
Subsection (2)(x) does not, by its language, limit the court of appeals' jurisdiction to review board of assessment appeals decisions that are not related to property valuation. Prop. Tax Adjustment Specialists, Inc. v. Mesa County Bd. of Comm'rs, 956 P.2d 1277 (Colo. App. 1998).
Final judgment defined. A final judgment is defined as one which ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding. D.H. v. People, 192 Colo. 542 , 561 P.2d 5 (1977); Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 ( Colo. 1982 ); People in Interest of S.M.O., 931 P.2d 572 (Colo. App. 1996).
A decision on the merits is a final judgment for appeal purposes despite any outstanding issue of attorney fees and certification pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54 (b) is not a prerequisite to appellate review of the merits of a case if a judgment has been entered and only the issue of attorney fees remains to be determined. Baldwin v. Bright Mortg. Co., 757 P.2d 1072 ( Colo. 1988 ); LHM Corp., TCD v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78, 499 P.3d 1050 (overruling Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936 ( Colo. 1993 ), to the extent it suggests appealability of a judgment hinges on the fact-specific determination of whether the attorney fees at issue are best classified as costs or damages).
However, a judgment under § 10-3-1116 (1) is not final until a determination of attorney fees and costs is made because attorney fees and costs are components of damages under the statute. Hall v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2012 COA 201 , 292 P.3d 1196.
An arbitrator's award is not a "final judgment" within the meaning of this section. S. Wash. Assoc. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).
Order granting a stay in action pending resolution of case involving similar issues in another state was not a final appealable order where the issues and parties were not identical in the two proceedings and the order did not preclude plaintiff from seeking to lift the stay based upon a showing of prejudice. Things Remembered v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1089 (Colo. App. 1996).
Court of appeals jurisdiction is limited to review of final orders, and the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court by consent. Arevalo v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 72 P.3d 436 (Colo. App. 2003).
Court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement until the trial court either certifies its orders as final pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b) or issues an order that outlines the parties' exact responsibilities pursuant to the settlement agreement and services plan and does not allow the trial court to further modify or vacate these responsibilities. Arevalo v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 72 P.3d 436 (Colo. App. 2003).
A judgment of conviction is not final until sentence is imposed. Absent a specific finding that the victim did not suffer a pecuniary loss, restitution is a mandatory part of the sentence. Thus, absent such a finding, sentencing is not final until restitution is ordered. People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429 (Colo. App. 2005).
Order of dismissal without prejudice is a final judgment when the applicable statute of limitations period has expired. SMLL, L.L.C. v. Daly, 128 P.3d 266 (Colo. App. 2005).
A transfer order from juvenile to district court is not a final judgment from which appeal lies because it is interlocutory in nature and in no sense completely determines the rights of the parties. D.H. v. People, 192 Colo. 542 , 561 P.2d 5 (1977).
Juvenile court's order denying a tribe's request to transfer jurisdiction to a tribal court is a final, appealable order based on the collateral order doctrine. People in Interest of L.R.B., 2019 COA 85 , __ P.3d __ (decided prior to 2019 amendment to § 19-1-126 ).
Remand for further proceedings before city council of case against ordinance was final appealable order. Where the city council in enacting a special assessment ordinance had made all the required findings and in an action to enjoin the assessment, the district court, without explicitly stating whether it was affirming or reversing the council's action, remanded the case to the council for further proceedings, such action by the district court constituted final judgment and the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider any appeal from the district court's order. Cline v. City of Boulder, 35 Colo. App. 349, 532 P.2d 770 (1975).
Trial court's order on attorney fees was a final judgment and could have been reviewed by the court of appeals if a party had appealed some other aspect of the case and the matter was otherwise properly before the court. Bye v. District Court, 701 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1985).
However, court of appeals has initial jurisdiction to review an order regarding attorney fees that has been certified as final by the trial court, even though other claims in the underlying action are pending before the trial court. Steven A. Gall, P.C. v. District Court, 965 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1998).
A postjudgment collection order is final if the order ends the particular part of the action in which it is entered, leaves nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties as to that part of the proceeding, and is more than a ministerial or administrative determination. Luster v. Brinkman, 250 P.3d 664 (Colo. App. 2010).
An order dismissing a plaintiff's complaint based on C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) resolved the rights of the parties as to the claims in the complaint and left nothing for the court to do, so it was a final and appealable order. Scott v. Scott, 2018 COA 25 , 428 P.3d 626.
A plaintiff cannot create final action for purposes of appeal by dismissing without prejudice the case's remaining claims after the trial court dismissed with prejudice the case's other claims via a partial motion to dismiss. Wilson v. Advisorlaw LLC, 2020 COA 122 , __ P.3d __.
No review of issue raised first time on appeal. Questioning the constitutionality of a statute for the first time in an appellate brief will not successfully raise the issue for review by Colorado supreme court on appeal. Manka v. Martin, 200 Colo. 260 , 614 P.2d 875 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S. Ct. 1354, 67 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1981).
No jurisdiction over constitutionality of statute. Court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, despite a supreme court order stating that jurisdiction of the case "shall be retained by the court of appeals" because the general assembly did not intend to confer upon the supreme court the power to expand and contract the jurisdictional authority of the court of appeals. People v. Salazar, 715 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1985), cert. denied, 744 P.2d 80 ( Colo. 1987 ); Kollodge v. Charnes, 741 P.2d 1260 (Colo. App. 1987); People v. Woertman, 786 P.2d 443 (Colo. App. 1989); Flores v. Dept. of Rev., 802 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Truesdale, 804 P.2d 287 (Colo. App. 1990); Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Merrill, 816 P.2d 958 (Colo. App. 1991); People v. Robinson, 833 P.2d 832 (Colo. App. 1992).
Court of appeals has jurisdiction over constitutionality of a statute when issue raised in appeal of decisions of statutorily created tribunals under subsection (2). Indus. Comm'n v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 690 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1984).
Statute does not otherwise limit court of appeals authority to address constitutional issues raised in a Colorado appellate rule promulgated by the Colorado supreme court. Refusal to address the constitutional issues raised over C.A.R. 3.4 may mean that appellants would have no forum for their arguments, thus court of appeals concluded it had jurisdiction to address appellant's challenges to constitutionality of the rule. People ex rel. T.D., 140 P.3d 205 (Colo. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1020, 127 S. Ct. 564, 166 L. Ed. 2d 411, and 549 U.S. 1024, 127 S. Ct. 565, 166 L. Ed. 2d 419 (2006).
Constitutional challenges to sales and use tax provisions of municipal code made to an administrative agency but were not made in declaratory judgment action in district court are not properly preserved for appellate review. Arapahoe Roofing & Sheet Metal v. Denver, 831 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1992).
Jurisdiction of the court of appeals was not precluded by subsection (1)(b) since the court was being asked to determine the facial constitutionality of an executive order of the mayor of the city and county of Denver rather than a statute, charter provision, or ordinance. Casados v. City & County of Denver, 832 P.2d 1048 (Colo. App. 1992) (decided prior to 1992 amendment to subsection (1)(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 862 P.2d 908 ( Colo. 1993 ), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S. Ct. 1372, 128 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1994).
General assembly's authority to determine the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is exclusive. S. Wash. Assoc. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).
Parties to an arbitration agreement cannot define and prescribe the powers of a court of law. Where a contract term purported to allow an appellate court to conduct a substantive review of the arbitration panel's award, contrary to the controlling statutes, clause was void and unenforceable. S. Wash. Assoc. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).
Court of appeals has jurisdiction to address facial constitutionality challenge to a municipal executive order. Casados v. City & County of Denver, 832 P.2d 1048 (Colo. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 862 P.2d 908 ( Colo. 1993 ), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S. Ct. 1372, 128 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1994).
However, where the court of appeals refers a question of its jurisdiction to the supreme court, which then determined the case properly within the court of appeal's jurisdiction, that ruling is conclusive. Barela v. Beye, 916 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1996).
Court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review an arbitration award; jurisdiction extends only to orders and judgments entered by statutorily specified courts. Thomas v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1993).
Court of appeals does not possess general powers of supervision over lower courts or attorneys appearing therein. Rather, such powers are vested in the supreme court. People v. Bergen, 883 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1994).
Defendant's assertion that Colorado's homicide statutes violate principles of equal protection brings into question the constitutionality of a statute and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the court. People v. Seigler, 832 P.2d 980 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 ( Colo. 1993 ).
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the supreme court may retain and review an appeal of a declaratory order of the state personnel board that should have been filed with the court of appeals. The court's authority rests in its power under C.A.R. 50(b) to review cases pending in the court of appeals prior to judgment and under C.A.R. 2 to suspend the rules of appellate procedure. Colo. Ass'n of Pub. Emp. v. Dept. of Hwys., 809 P.2d 988 ( Colo. 1991 ).
Court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus. All district courts have jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and one seeking habeas corpus may select his forum. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1994).
Crim. P. 35(c) motion is properly vested in the court of appeals. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1994).
Under this section, the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over an appeal of a district court's decision modifying a county court decision, regardless of whether a district court judgment which modifies a county court judgment is a final judgment of the district court under rule 37 of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure. People v. Smith, 874 P.2d 452 (Colo. App. 1993).
The final judgment of the district court, following a trial de novo, is subject to review by the court of appeals under both § 13-6-310 and this section. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).
The dismissal of a claim without prejudice is generally not appealable unless such dismissal prohibits further proceedings, such as an applicable statute of limitations. Golden Lodge No. 13, I.O.O.F. v. Easley, 916 P.2d 666 (Colo. App. 1996).
The dismissal of a claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the laws and regulations of the Sovereign Lodge was not appealable because the defendant Golden Lodge could at any time file an internal appeal protesting the actions of the Grand Lodge with the supreme governing body, the Sovereign Grand Lodge. Golden Lodge No. 13, I.O.O.F v. Easley, 916 P.2d 666 (Colo. App. 1996).
A denial of a summary judgment motion is not generally considered a final decision that is immediately appealable under this section. City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996).
An appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss based on tribal sovereign immunity when the issue presented is one of law not of fact. Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Mtn. Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402 (Colo. App. 2004).
Trial court's order reserving ruling on a summary judgment motion and allowing full discovery to proceed is a final judgment for purposes of conferring appellate jurisdiction. Furlong v. Gardner, 956 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1998).
Trial court's direction regarding how the proceeds of moneys recovered by defendants should be applied as a result of other related judgments does not alter the finality of the underlying judgment. BDG Int'l, Inc. v. Bowers, 2013 COA 52 , 303 P.3d 140.
The same rules of finality apply in probate cases as in other civil cases. An order of the probate court is final if it ends the particular action in which it is entered and leaves nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties as to that proceeding. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 ( Colo. 2006 ).
C.R.C.P. 54(b) governs the interlocutory appeal of a probate court order. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 ( Colo. 2006 ).
Where probate court's order of partial summary judgment adjudicated fewer than all of the parties' claims, it was not a final judgment, and party could not appeal the order without C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 ( Colo. 2006 ).
As reenacted, § 22-63-302 authorizes teachers to appeal only school board decisions of dismissal. Under § 22-63-302, the court does not have jurisdiction to consider appeals of school board decisions placing a teacher on probation. Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448 (Colo. App. 1994).
Because an order directing a new trial is not a final judgment, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction over such an appeal, even if the defendant assert that a new trial would violate his or her rights. People v. Jones, 942 P.2d 1258 (Colo. App. 1996).
Trial court retains jurisdiction to determine substantive matters when a party files a premature notice of appeal of a nonfinal judgment. Barring extraordinary circumstances, a judgment subject to C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification must be so certified in order to be considered final and sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals. Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244 (Colo. 2006).
A trial court's ruling on a question of sovereign immunity under the CGIA raised by a public entity or public employee is a final, appealable judgment. However, when a trial court refuses to dismiss on the basis of allegations of willful and wanton conduct that would eliminate the employee's immunity, its order is not immediately appealable. Carothers v. Archuleta County Sheriff, 159 P.3d 647 (Colo. App. 2006).
Court of appeals has jurisdiction to address an appeal of a trial court's Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunity ruling on interlocutory appeal. Absent any Colorado appellate decision addressing whether the court may review an interlocutory appeal as a final judgment, the court may look to federal authority interpreting the federal appellate jurisdiction statute. Considering federal appellate practice and Colorado case law, the FSIA immunity rulings are immediately appealable as final judgments within the meaning of this section and, based on principles of neutrality and sound appellate practice, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to immediately review a trial court's FSIA immunity ruling. United States Taekwondo v. Kukkiwon, 2013 COA 105 , 411 P.3d 782.
Trial court's act of state ruling is not immediately appealable as a final judgment within the meaning of this section. Based on federal appellate practice and Colorado case law, the act of state rulings are not immediately appealable pursuant to this section. Addressing act of state doctrine issues on interlocutory appeal would require appellate courts to attempt to predict not only when and on what basis the trial court will render its final decision on the merits, but what the foreign policy implications of the act of state ruling will be at that time. The more sound appellate practice is to wait to address act of state issues on appeal from final judgment, when an appellate court can more easily assess the foreign policy implications of its ruling. United States Taekwondo v. Kukkiwon, 2013 COA 105 , 411 P.3d 782.
The court of appeals has jurisdiction to review a district court decision regarding matters within the water courts' exclusive jurisdiction only insofar as is necessary to determine its own and the district court's jurisdiction. Although the water courts do not, in general, have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ownership of a water right as opposed to the use of the right under the rule of priority of appropriation, the rule is otherwise when the ownership claims are based on adverse possession and abandonment. In this case, the district court has jurisdiction only with regard to a damages claim, necessitating reversal of the holdings regarding ownership. Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d 281 (Colo. App. 2006).
Appellate relief must be available to review whether a district court has overstepped its jurisdiction when it transfers a county court case to the district court in violation of a chief judge's order setting forth the proper procedure. People v. Maser, 2012 CO 41, 278 P.3d 361.
Appellate court may consider claims for prosecutorial misconduct when defendant seeks reversal of the conviction and a new trial. People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44 , 370 P.3d 197.
The court of appeals can order a limited remand to the district court for restoration proceedings pursuant to § 16-8.5-111 for future determination of motions to dismiss counsel and dismiss the appeal. People v. Liggett, 2018 COA 94 M, __ P.3d __.
Applied in Evans v. Simpson, 190 Colo. 426 , 547 P.2d 931 (1976); In re Petrafeck v. Indus. Comm'n, 191 Colo. 566 , 554 P.2d 1097 (1976); Kelce v. Touche Ross & Co., 37 Colo. App. 352, 549 P.2d 415 (1976); Mizel v. Banking Bd., 196 Colo. 98 , 581 P.2d 306 (1978); Thomas v. County Court, 198 Colo. 87 , 596 P.2d 768 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243 , 606 P.2d 1300 ( Colo. 1980 ); People v. Scott, 630 P.2d 615 ( Colo. 1981 ); In re W.D.A. v. City & County of Denver, 632 P.2d 582 ( Colo. 1981 ); People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1981); People v. Abbott, 638 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1981); Riley v. Indus. Comm'n, 628 P.2d 147 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Boyd, 642 P.2d 1 ( Colo. 1982 ); People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 ( Colo. 1982 ); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982); People v. Wieder, 693 P.2d 1006 (Colo. App. 1984), aff'd, 722 P.2d 396 ( Colo. 1986 ); People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1984); Leske v. Golder, 124 P.3d 863 (Colo. App. 2005).
13-4-102.1. Interlocutory appeals of determinations of questions of law in civil cases.
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The court of appeals, under rules promulgated by the Colorado supreme court, may permit an interlocutory appeal of a certified question of law in a civil matter from a district court or the probate court of the city and county of Denver if:
- The trial court certifies that immediate review may promote a more orderly disposition or establish a final disposition of the litigation; and
- The order involves a controlling and unresolved question of law.
- A majority of the judges who are in regular active service on the court of appeals and who are not disqualified may, if approved by rules promulgated by the Colorado supreme court, order that an interlocutory appeal permitted by the court of appeals be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.
Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1395), ch. 364, p. 1719, § 2, effective August 11.
Cross references: For interlocutory appeals in civil cases, see C.A.R. 4.2.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Interlocutory Appeals in Civil Cases Under C.A.R. 4.2", see 41 Colo. Law. 67 (April 2012). For article, "Knowing When to Change Trains: The Ins and Outs of Interlocutory Appeals", see 41 Colo. Law. 31 (June 2012).
Interlocutory resolution would not promote a more orderly disposition. Where plaintiff petitioned for interlocutory review of district court's order that economic loss rule barred plaintiff's other claims against defendants, immediate review would not have avoided a trial. Therefore, interlocutory resolution of the economic loss question would not promote a more orderly disposition of the litigation. Wahrman v. Golden W. Realty, 313 P.3d 674 (Colo. App. 2011).
Motion to trial court to reconsider disqualification order did not toll the provisions of C.A.R. 4.2(c) requiring the filing of a motion or stipulation for certification by the trial court within 14 days after the date of the disqualification order. The trial court does not have authority pursuant to C.R.C.P. 6(b) to extend the 14-day deadline for filing a motion for certification of issues in the trial court. The department of human services' motion for reconsideration was not a C.R.C.P. 59 motion. Further, C.A.R. 26(b) does not apply because the failure to timely file was not the result of excusable neglect. People in Interest of A.M.C., 2014 COA 31 , 411 P.3d 90.
Generally, an issue of contract interpretation that applies well-settled principles is not a "question of law" for purposes of this section. Rich v. Ball Ranch P'ship, 2015 COA 6 , 345 P.3d 980.
Applied in Kowalchik v. Brohl, 2012 COA 25 , 277 P.3d 885; Triple Crown v. Vill. Homes of Colo., 2013 COA 144 , 389 P.3d 888.
13-4-102.2. Interlocutory appeals of motions to dismiss actions involving constitutional rights.
The court of appeals has initial jurisdiction over appeals from motions to dismiss actions involving constitutional rights pursuant to section 13-20-1101.
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (HB 19-1324), ch. 414, p. 3650, § 2, effective July 1.
13-4-103. Number of judges - qualifications.
- The number of judges of the court of appeals shall be sixteen. Effective July 1, 2006, the number of judges of the court of appeals shall be nineteen. Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges of the court of appeals shall be twenty-two.
- Judges of the court of appeals shall have the same qualifications as justices of the Colorado supreme court.
Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-3. L. 74: (1) amended, p. 236, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 560, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: (1) amended, p. 22, § 1, effective July 1; (1) amended, p. 142, § 8, effective August 7. L. 2007: (1) amended, p. 1530, § 17, effective May 31.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1) by Senate Bill 06-033 and House Bill 06-1028 were harmonized.
13-4-104. Term of office - selection.
- The term of office for a judge of the court of appeals is eight years.
- Judicial appointments to the court of appeals shall be made pursuant to section 20 of article VI of the state constitution.
Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-4. L. 72: p. 592, § 65.
13-4-104.5. Temporary judicial duties.
Whenever the chief justice of the supreme court deems assignment of a judge necessary to the prompt disposition of judicial business, the chief justice may assign any judge of the court of appeals, or any retired judge of the court of appeals who consents, to temporarily perform judicial duties in any court of record. For each day of such temporary service a retired judge shall receive compensation as provided by law.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1247, § 2, effective April 5.
13-4-105. Chief judge.
The chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint a judge of the court of appeals to serve as chief judge at the pleasure of the chief justice. The chief judge shall exercise such administrative powers as may be delegated to him by the chief justice.
Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-5.
13-4-106. Divisions.
- The court of appeals shall sit in divisions of three judges each to hear and determine all matters before the court.
- The chief judge, with the approval of the chief justice, shall assign judges to each division. Such assignments shall be changed from time to time as determined by the chief judge, with the approval of the chief justice.
- Cases shall be assigned to the divisions of the court of appeals in rotation according to the order in which they are filed with the clerk of the court of appeals or transferred by the supreme court, except that the chief judge has the authority to transfer cases from one division to another to maintain approximately equal case loads or for any other appropriate reason.
Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-6.
13-4-107. Place of court.
The court of appeals shall be located in the city and county of Denver, but any division of the court of appeals may sit in any county seat for the purpose of hearing oral argument in cases before the division.
Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-7.
13-4-108. Supreme court review.
- Before application may be made for writ of certiorari, as provided in this section, application shall be made to the court of appeals for a rehearing if required by supreme court rule.
- Within twenty-eight days after a rehearing has been refused by the court of appeals, any party in interest who is aggrieved by the judgment of the court of appeals may appeal by application to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari.
- Procedures on writs of certiorari, including procedures for rehearings, shall be as prescribed by rule of the supreme court.
Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-8. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 949, § 11, effective May 27. L. 2013: (2) amended, (HB 13-1126), ch. 58, p. 191, § 2, effective July 1.
Cross references: For review on certiorari, see C.A.R. 49.
ANNOTATION
This section, § 13-4-110 , and § 2(2) of art. VI, Colo. Const., are not in conflict. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
The procedure established in this section and § 13-4-110 and in C.R.C.P. 50-57 clearly provides for appellate review in the supreme court. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
This section establishes certiorari as the form of review from the court of appeals. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Certiorari is presently recognized as a form of appellate review. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
General assembly may legislate appellate subject matter jurisdiction. The changes brought about by this section, § 13-4-102 , and § 13-4-110 pertain to the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction of the supreme court and court of appeals and, as such, the changes are within the authority of the general assembly. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Statutes pertaining to the creation of appellate remedies take precedence over judicial rules of procedure. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Applied in Honey v. Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co., 191 Colo. 503 , 553 P.2d 799 (1976); Wiggins v. People, 199 Colo. 341 , 608 P.2d 348 (1980); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 665 P.2d 598 ( Colo. 1983 ).
13-4-109. Certification of cases to the supreme court.
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The court of appeals, prior to final determination, may certify any case before it to the supreme court for its review and final determination, if the court of appeals finds:
- The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest;
- The case involves legal principles of major significance; or
- The case load of the court of appeals is such that the expeditious administration of justice requires certification.
- The supreme court shall consider such certification and may accept the case for final determination or remand it for determination by the court of appeals.
- The supreme court may order the court of appeals to certify any case before the court of appeals to the supreme court for final determination.
Source: L. 69: p. 267, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-9.
ANNOTATION
Applied in Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335 , 586 P.2d 23 (1978); Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519 ( Colo. 1982 ); Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2016 CO 28, 369 P.3d 586.
13-4-110. Determination of jurisdiction - transfer of cases.
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- When a party in interest alleges, or the court is of the opinion, that a case before the court of appeals is not properly within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the court of appeals shall refer the case to the supreme court. The supreme court shall decide the question of jurisdiction in a summary manner, and its determination shall be conclusive.
- A party in interest shall allege that a case is not properly within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals by motion filed with the court of appeals within twenty-one days after the date the record is filed with the clerk of the court of appeals, failing which any objection to jurisdiction by a party in interest shall be waived.
- Any case within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals which is filed erroneously in the supreme court shall be transferred to the court of appeals by the supreme court.
- No case filed either in the supreme court or the court of appeals shall be dismissed for having been filed in the wrong court but shall be transferred and considered properly filed in the court which the supreme court determines has jurisdiction.
Source: L. 69: p. 267, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-10. L. 71: p. 372, § 1. L. 2012: (1)(b) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 822, § 2, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Law Reviews. For article "Civil Interlocutory Appeals in Colorado State Courts", 49 Colo. Law. 38 (Oct. 2020).
Section is not in conflict with the constitution. This section and § 13-4-108 , and § 2(2) of art. VI, Colo. Const., are not in conflict. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
General assembly may legislate appellate subject matter jurisdiction. The changes brought about by this section, § 13-4-102 , and § 13-4-108 pertain to the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction of the supreme court and court of appeals and, as such, the changes are within the authority of the general assembly. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Statutes pertaining to the creation of appellate remedies take precedence over judicial rules of procedure. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Procedure is established for final review in the supreme court. The procedure established in this section and § 13-4-108 and in C.A.R. 50-57 clearly provides for appellate review in the supreme court. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
This section permits transfer to the court of appeals of certain cases filed in the supreme court prior to January 1, 1970. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
Because the substance of the complaint addressed primarily the use of water rights rather than their ownership, the complaint related to a water matter and should have been filed in a water court. However, the appeal was properly transferred from the supreme court to the court of appeals because the appeal was from a district court judgment. City of Sterling v. Sterling Irrig. Co., 42 P.3d 72 (Colo. App. 2002).
Although subsection (3) provides that cases filed in wrong appellate court shall not be dismissed, where appeal will not lie in either court, the only review being by certiorari, the case must be dismissed for failure to comply with the statutory procedure. People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 598 P.2d 526 (1979).
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the supreme court may retain and review an appeal of a declaratory order of the state personnel board that should have been filed with the court of appeals. The court's authority rests in its power under C.A.R. 50(b) to review cases pending in the court of appeals prior to judgment and under C.A.R. 2 to suspend the rules of appellate procedure. Colorado Ass'n of Pub. Emp. v. Dept. of Highways, 809 P.2d 988 ( Colo. 1991 ).
Court of appeals has jurisdiction over interlocutory ruling in injunction proceeding when the supreme court declined to exercise jurisdiction. Joel L. Schaffer v. C. M. Sullivan, P.C., 844 P.2d 1327 (Colo. App. 1992).
Trial court had jurisdiction as a matter of law to waive bond requirement for indigent taxpayer and proceed to adjudicate merits of appeal concerning use tax deficiency where undisputed evidence in affidavit form was proffered to the trial court reciting taxpayer's inability to post bond or make deposit required by statute. AF Prop. v. Dept. of Rev., 852 P.2d 1267 (Colo. App. 1992).
Where the court of appeals refers a question of its jurisdiction to the supreme court, which then determined the case properly within the court of appeal's jurisdiction, that ruling is conclusive. Barela v. Beye, 916 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1996).
Applied in Thomas v. County Court, 198 Colo. 87 , 596 P.2d 768 (1979); People v. White, 199 Colo. 82 , 606 P.2d 847 (1980); People v. Dooley, 630 P.2d 608 ( Colo. 1981 ); People v. Scott, 630 P.2d 615 ( Colo. 1981 ); People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1981); People v. Abbott, 638 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1981); Federal Lumber Co. v. Wheeler, 643 P.2d 31 (Colo. 1981); People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 ( Colo. 1982 ); Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519 ( Colo. 1982 ); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982).
13-4-111. Employees - compensation.
- Subject to the rules and regulations of the supreme court, the court of appeals shall appoint a clerk, a reporter of decisions, deputy clerks, and such other assistants as may be necessary.
- Each judge of the court of appeals may appoint a law clerk who shall be learned in the law and one secretary or stenographer. The persons so employed may be discharged or removed at the pleasure of the judge employing them.
- All employees appointed under subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall be paid such compensation as shall be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the supreme court.
Source: L. 69: p. 267, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-11. L. 74: (1) amended, p. 236, § 3, effective July 1.
13-4-112. Fees of the clerk of court of appeals.
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- Within the time allowed or fixed for transmission of the record, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court of appeals a docket fee of two hundred twenty-three dollars.
- The docket fee for the appellee shall be one hundred forty-eight dollars to be paid upon the entry of appearance of the appellee.
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Each fee collected pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section shall be transmitted to the state treasurer and divided as follows:
- One hundred fifty dollars shall be deposited in the supreme court library fund created pursuant to section 13-2-120;
- Five dollars shall be deposited in the judicial stabilization cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (6); and
- Sixty-eight dollars shall be deposited in the justice center cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (7)(a).
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Each fee collected pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section shall be transmitted to the state treasurer and divided as follows:
- Seventy-five dollars shall be deposited in the supreme court library fund created pursuant to section 13-2-120;
- Five dollars shall be deposited in the judicial stabilization cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (6); and
- Sixty-eight dollars shall be deposited in the justice center cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (7)(a).
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Each fee collected pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section shall be transmitted to the state treasurer and divided as follows:
Source: L. 69: p. 268, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-12. L. 82: Entire section R&RE, p. 285, § 3, effective July 1. L. 98: (2) amended, p. 685, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: Entire section amended, p. 1530, § 18, effective May 31. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 2114, § 6, effective June 4.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 417, Session Laws of Colorado 2008.
13-4-113. Publication of decisions.
- Repealed.
- Those court of appeals opinions to be published in full shall be selected as prescribed by supreme court rule.
Source: L. 69: p. 268, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-13. L. 74: (1) repealed, p. 236, § 4, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the duty of reporter to compile and publish decisions, see § 13-2-123.
ARTICLE 5 JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
Section
PART 1 JUDGES - TERMS
13-5-101. Judicial districts and terms.
[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective until January 7, 2025. ] The state is divided into twenty-two judicial districts as prescribed by this part 1. Terms of court shall be fixed by rules adopted by the district court in each district; except that at least one term of court shall be held each calendar year in each county within the district, at the county seat of such county.
13-5-101. Judicial districts and terms.
[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective January 7, 2025. ] The state is divided into twenty-three judicial districts as prescribed by this part 1. Terms of court shall be fixed by rules adopted by the district court in each district; except that at least one term of court shall be held each calendar year in each county within the district, at the county seat of such county.
Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 600, § 2, effective May 20. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (HB 20-1026), ch. 40, p. 136, § 2, effective January 7, 2025.
Cross references: (1) For the constitutional authority for general assembly's changing of boundaries of judicial districts by a two-thirds vote of each house, see § 10(1) of art. VI, Colo. Const.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 20-1026, see section 1 of chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).
This statute is irreconcilable with § 13-5-119 (2); however, under rules of statutory construction § 13-5-119 (2) controls since it was enacted later. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).
13-5-102. First district.
- The first judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Gilpin and Jefferson.
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- The number of judges for the first judicial district shall be eleven.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the first judicial district shall be twelve.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the first judicial district shall be thirteen.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2011, (SB 11-028), ch. 21, p. 52, § 1, effective March 11, 2011.)
- Repealed.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2012, the number of judges for the first judicial district shall be thirteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2020, the number of judges for the first judicial district is fourteen.
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- Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the district and county judges regularly assigned to Gilpin county may sit and maintain their official chambers at a single location anywhere within such county, and any related office may also be maintained at such location.
- As used in this subsection (3), "related office" includes but need not be limited to the offices of the sheriff, county clerk and recorder, county treasurer, clerk of district court, and clerk of county court.
Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-2. L. 75: (1) amended, p. 559, § 1, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 557, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 16, § 1, effective January 1, 1991. L. 93: (3) added, p. 91, § 1, effective July 1. L. 99: (2) amended, p. 557, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1) and (2) amended, p. 141, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1525, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2011: (2) amended, (SB 11-028), ch. 21, p. 52, § 1, effective March 11. L. 2012: (2)(e) repealed and (2)(f) added, (HB 12-1073), ch. 11, p. 28, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2019: (2)(g) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 140, § 1, effective March 21.
13-5-103. Second district.
- The second judicial district shall be composed of the city and county of Denver.
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- The number of judges for the second judicial district shall be nineteen. Effective January 1, 1978, the number of judges shall be twenty.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the second judicial district shall be twenty-one.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the second judicial district shall be twenty-three.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2019, the number of judges for the second judicial district is twenty-five.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2020, the number of judges for the second judicial district is twenty-seven.
Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-3. L. 71: p. 368, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 557, § 2, effective January 1, 1976. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1525, § 2, effective May 31. L. 2019: (2)(d) and (2)(e) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 140, § 2, effective March 21.
13-5-104. Third district.
- The third judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Las Animas and Huerfano.
- The number of judges for the third judicial district shall be two.
- The third judicial district shall be divided into two divisions. The northern division shall consist of the county of Huerfano, and the southern division shall consist of the county of Las Animas. One judge of the district shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the northern division of the district, and one judge shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the southern division of the district. Travel and maintenance expenses shall be allowed a judge of the district only when he is outside the county of his official residence. For all other purposes, the district shall be considered as a single entity. The allocation of judges to the northern and southern divisions shall be made by court rule. In the event that the judges of the district are unable to agree upon an allocation by rule, the matter shall be determined by the chief justice of the supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-4. L. 81: (3) amended, p. 2024, § 12, effective July 14.
13-5-105. Fourth district.
- The fourth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of El Paso and Teller.
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- The number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be fifteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be sixteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be seventeen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be nineteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be twenty.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be twenty-two.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2019, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district is twenty-three.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2020, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district is twenty-four.
Source: L. 64: pp. 399, 405, 407, §§ 5, 1, 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-5. L. 67: p. 258, § 1. L. 69: p. 261, § 1. L. 71: p. 369, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 557, § 3, effective January 1, 1976. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 16, § 2, effective January 1, 1991. L. 91: (2) amended, p. 349, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (2) amended, p. 939, § 1, effective July 1, 1998. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 71, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 141, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 3, effective May 31. L. 2019: (2)(g) and (2)(h) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 140, § 3, effective March 21.
13-5-106. Fifth district.
- The fifth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Clear Creek, Eagle, Lake, and Summit.
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- The number of judges for the fifth judicial district shall be six.
- Repealed.
- At least one of the judges for the fifth judicial district shall maintain his or her official chambers and residence in the county of Eagle, Lake, or Summit.
Source: L. 64: p. 399, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-6. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 559, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 454, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2013: (2)(a) amended and (2)(b) and (2)(c) repealed, (HB 13-1035), ch. 13, p. 35, § 1, effective July 1.
13-5-107. Sixth district.
- The sixth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Archuleta, La Plata, and San Juan.
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- The number of judges for the sixth judicial district shall be two.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2012.)
- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2012, the number of judges for the sixth judicial district shall be four.
Source: L. 64: p. 399, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-7. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2012: (2) amended, (HB 12-1073), ch. 11, p. 28, § 2, effective July 1.
13-5-108. Seventh district.
- The seventh judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Montrose, Ouray, and San Miguel.
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- The number of judges for the seventh judicial district shall be three.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the seventh judicial district shall be four.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2011, the number of judges for the seventh judicial district shall be five.
Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-8. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 454, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2011: (2) amended, (SB 11-028), ch. 21, p. 52, § 2, effective March 11.
13-5-109. Eighth district.
- The eighth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Larimer and Jackson.
-
- The number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be five.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be six.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be seven.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be eight.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2020, the number of judges for the eighth judicial district is nine.
Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-9. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 557, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 4, effective May 31. L. 2019: (2)(e) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 141, § 4, effective March 21.
ANNOTATION
Applied in Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631 ( Colo. 1981 ); Corr v. District Court, 661 P.2d 668 ( Colo. 1983 ).
13-5-110. Ninth district.
- The ninth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Garfield, Pitkin, and Rio Blanco.
-
- The number of judges for the ninth judicial district shall be five.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2013.)
Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-10. L. 72: p. 188, § 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 5, effective May 31. L. 2013: (2) amended, (HB 13-1035), ch. 13, p. 35, § 2, effective July 1.
13-5-111. Tenth district.
- The tenth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Pueblo.
-
- The number of judges for the tenth judicial district shall be six.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the tenth judicial district shall be seven.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2019, the number of judges for the tenth judicial district is eight.
Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-11. L. 73: p. 493, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 558, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 6, effective May 31. L. 2019: (2)(c) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 141, § 5, effective March 21.
13-5-112. Eleventh district.
- The eleventh judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Chaffee, Custer, Fremont, and Park.
-
- The number of judges for the eleventh judicial district shall be three.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the eleventh judicial district shall be four.
- The eleventh judicial district shall be divided into two divisions. The northern division shall consist of the counties of Chaffee and Park, and the southern division shall consist of the counties of Fremont and Custer. One judge of the district shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the northern division of the district, one judge shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the southern division of the district, and one judge shall sit in both divisions as assigned by the chief judge. Travel and maintenance expenses shall be allowed a judge of the district only when he is outside the county of his official residence. For all other purposes the district shall be considered as a single entity. The allocation of judges to the northern and southern divisions shall be made by court rule. In the event that the judges of the district are unable to agree upon an allocation by rule, the matter shall be determined by the chief justice of the supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-12. L. 80: (2) and (3) amended, p. 507, § 1, effective July 1. L. 81: (3) amended, p. 2024, § 13, effective July 14. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 7, effective May 31.
13-5-113. Twelfth district.
- The twelfth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Alamosa, Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, Rio Grande, and Saguache.
-
- The number of judges for the twelfth judicial district shall be two.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the twelfth judicial district shall be three.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2015, the number of judges for the twelfth judicial district shall be four.
Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-13. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 8, effective May 31. L. 2015: (2)(c) added, (HB 15-1034), ch. 39, p. 98, § 1, effective March 20.
13-5-114. Thirteenth district.
- The thirteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Kit Carson, Logan, Morgan, Phillips, Sedgwick, Washington, and Yuma.
-
- The number of judges for the thirteenth judicial district shall be four.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2019, the number of judges for the thirteenth judicial district is five.
Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-14. L. 69: p. 261, § 2. L. 2019: (2) amended, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 141, § 6, effective March 21.
13-5-115. Fourteenth district.
- The fourteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Grand, Moffat, and Routt.
-
- The number of judges for the fourteenth judicial district shall be two.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the fourteenth judicial district shall be three.
Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-15. L. 74: (2) amended, p. 235, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 9, effective May 31.
13-5-116. Fifteenth district.
- The fifteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Baca, Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Prowers.
- The number of judges for the fifteenth judicial district shall be two.
Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-16.
13-5-117. Sixteenth district.
- The sixteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Bent, Crowley, and Otero.
- The number of judges for the sixteenth judicial district shall be two.
Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-17.
13-5-118. Seventeenth district.
- The seventeenth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Adams and the city and county of Broomfield.
-
- The number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be eight.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be nine.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be ten.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be eleven.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be thirteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be fifteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2020, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district is sixteen.
- The seventeenth judicial district shall have jurisdiction over all causes of action accruing and all crimes committed within the city and county of Broomfield on or after November 15, 2001. Prior to November 15, 2001, the judicial districts for the counties, as they existed prior to November 15, 2001, shall have jurisdiction over all causes of action accruing and crimes committed within such counties.
Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-18. L. 67: p. 229, § 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 3, effective July 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 454, § 3, effective September 1. L. 2000: (1) amended and (3) added, p. 251, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 143, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 10, effective May 31. L. 2019: (2)(g) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 141, § 7, effective March 21.
13-5-119. Eighteenth district.
-
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1) is effective until January 7, 2025.] The eighteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Arapahoe, Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln.
(1) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1) is effective January 7, 2025. ] The eighteenth judicial district shall be composed of Arapahoe county.
-
- The number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be fourteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be fifteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be sixteen.
-
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be seventeen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be eighteen.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be twenty.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be twenty-one.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2014, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district is twenty-three.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2020, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district is twenty-four.
- [ Editor's note: Subsection (2)(d)(VII) is effective January 7, 2025.] Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2025, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district is seventeen.
- The district judges regularly assigned to Arapahoe county shall maintain their offices in one location within Arapahoe county.
- Repealed.
Source: L. 64: pp. 401, 405, §§ 19, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-19. L. 67: p. 229, § 2. L. 69: p. 261, § 3. L. 75: (2) amended and (3) added, p. 558, § 6, effective January 1, 1976. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 4, effective July 1. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 604, § 1, effective June 19. L. 81: (3) repealed, p. 2025, § 14, effective July 14. L. 85: (2) amended, p. 569, § 1, effective November 14, 1986. L. 86: (2) amended, p. 674, § 1, effective November 14. L. 93, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 33, § 1, effective September 13. L. 97: (2) amended, p. 939, § 2, effective July 1, 1998. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 71, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 143, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2)(d) amended, p. 1527, § 11, effective May 31. L. 2014: (2)(d)(V) added, (HB 14-1050), ch. 36, p. 192, § 1, effective March 14. L. 2019: (2)(d)(VI) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 141, § 8, effective March 21. L. 2020: (1) amended and (2)(d)(VII) added, (HB 20-1026), ch. 40, p. 136, § 3, effective January 7, 2025.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 20-1026, see section 1 of chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
This section was intended to be an exception to the county seat requirement in § 13-1-116 and authorizes district judges assigned to Arapahoe county to sit at a single location anywhere in that county. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).
This statute is irreconcilable with § 13-5-101; however, under rules of statutory construction subsection (2) controls since it was enacted later. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).
13-5-120. Nineteenth district.
- The nineteenth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Weld.
-
- The number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be four.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be five.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be six.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be seven.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be eight.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be nine.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2019, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district is ten.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective January 1, 2020, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district is eleven.
Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-20. L. 68: p. 48, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 558, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 143, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1528, § 12, effective May 31. L. 2019: (2)(g) and (2)(h) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 141, § 9, effective March 21.
13-5-121. Twentieth district.
- The twentieth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Boulder.
-
- The number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be six.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be seven.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be eight.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective June 30, 2010, the number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be nine.
Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-21. L. 69: p. 262, § 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 782, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 144, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1528, § 13, effective May 31.
13-5-122. Twenty-first district.
- The twenty-first judicial district shall be composed of the county of Mesa.
-
- The number of judges for the twenty-first judicial district shall be four.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the twenty-first judicial district shall be five.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2019, the number of judges for the twenty-first judicial district is six.
Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-22. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 782, § 6, effective July 1. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 16, § 3, effective January 1, 1991. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1528, § 14, effective May 31. L. 2019: (2)(c) added, (SB 19-043), ch. 41, p. 141, § 10, effective March 21.
13-5-123. Twenty-second district.
- The twenty-second judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Dolores and Montezuma.
-
- The number of judges for the twenty-second judicial district shall be one.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the twenty-second judicial district shall be two.
Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-23. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1529, § 15, effective May 31.
13-5-123.1. Twenty-third district.
[ Editor's note: This section is effective January 7, 2025.]
- The twenty-third judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln.
- Subject to available appropriations, the number of judges for the twenty-third judicial district is eight.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (HB 20-1026), ch. 40, p. 136, § 4, effective January 7, 2025.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 20-1026, see section 1 of chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
13-5-123.2. Twenty-third judicial district - elections in 2024 - reports - repeal.
-
- Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), commencing with the presentation in 2021 and each presentation thereafter to and including the presentation in 2025, at the joint hearings conducted pursuant to the "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act", part 2 of article 7 of title 2, the judicial department shall report on its progress toward making the system changes and other steps necessary for the creation of the twenty-third judicial district. Prior to these presentations, the judicial department shall request input from each of the counties in the then-existing eighteenth judicial district and include their input in the presentation.
- For state fiscal years 2020-21 to 2024-25, as part of its annual budget requests to the joint budget committee of the general assembly, the judicial department shall include details about any budget requests related to the preparation for and creation of the twenty-third judicial district.
- At its presentation in 2026, at the joint hearings conducted pursuant to the "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act", part 2 of article 7 of title 2, the judicial department shall prepare a final report detailing the entire transition process from the enactment of House Bill 20-1026, enacted in 2020, to the effective date of the creation of the twenty-third judicial district, detailing what aspects went relatively smoothly, what aspects created issues, and any recommendations to the general assembly concerning how any future revision of judicial district lines might be made easier.
-
Due to the creation of the twenty-third judicial district in 2025, at the general election in November of 2024:
- A question shall be presented to the electors of Arapahoe county concerning the election of the district attorney for the eighteenth judicial district who will take office in January of 2025;
- A question shall be presented to the electors of the counties of Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln concerning the election of the district attorney for the twenty-third judicial district who will take office in January of 2025; and
- Any district court judge of the eighteenth judicial district who is eligible for retention at the November 2024 election may stand for a retention election from the electors of the eighteenth judicial district.
-
- Effective January 7, 2025, any district court judge who on that date was serving as a district court judge in the eighteenth judicial district and who lives within the boundaries of the new twenty-third judicial district shall, pursuant to section 10 of article VI of the state constitution, complete the term for which the judge was last elected or appointed as a district court judge in the twenty-third judicial district. Such district court judges are eligible for a retention election in the twenty-third judicial district in the same year that they would have been eligible for a retention election in the eighteenth judicial district but for the creation of the twenty-third judicial district.
- On and after January 7, 2025, assignment of judges shall be pursuant to sections 10 and 11 of article VI of the state constitution.
- This section is repealed, effective July 7, 2027.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (HB 20-1026), ch. 40, p. 136, § 5, effective September 14.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 20-1026, see section 1 of chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
13-5-124. Appointment of clerk and employees.
District court personnel shall be appointed pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105.
Source: L. 64: p. 403, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-27. L. 69: p. 249, § 5. L. 79: Entire section R&RE, p. 598, § 11, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For note, "One Year Review of Constitutional Law", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 77 (1964). For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).
13-5-125. Clerks to keep records.
The clerks of district courts shall keep the financial records prescribed by the state court administrator under the provisions of section 13-3-106.
Source: L. 67: p. 454, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-30. L. 73: p. 1402, § 29.
13-5-126. Duties of bailiff.
It is the duty of every bailiff to preserve order in the court to which he may be appointed; to attend upon the jury; to open and close the court; and to perform such other duties as may be required of him by the judge of the court.
Source: L. 67: p. 454, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-31.
13-5-127. Duties of reporters.
The shorthand reporter, on the direction of the court, shall take down in shorthand all the testimony, rulings of the court, exceptions taken, oral instructions given, and other proceedings had during the trial of any cause, and in such causes as the court may designate.
Source: L. 67: p. 454, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-32.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. Since § 13-5-127 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 91, a relevant case construing those provisions has been included in the annotations to this section.
From whom a defendant can obtain the testimony for his bill of exceptions. The defendant had the right to assume that he would obtain the testimony from the stenographer for his bill of exceptions. He was not called upon to make any other arrangements nor to anticipate that he would be called upon to procure that testimony from any other source, nor compelled to depend upon the uncertain memory of those present as to what the testimony was. King v. People, 54 Colo. 122, 129 P. 235 (1912)(special concurring opinion by J. Musser).
It has been the invariable custom for district judges to appoint stenographers for their respective districts to appear at every criminal trial, and under the court's direction, take down the testimony and other matters, and when a defendant wanted a bill of exceptions, containing all of the testimony in a case, if desired, it has been the custom invariably to obtain it from the stenographer. King v. People, 54 Colo. 122, 129 P. 235 (1912)(special concurring opinion by J. Musser).
Court of record has an affirmative duty to contemporaneously record all proceedings. Reconstruction of the record at a later time is not an adequate substitute for a contemporaneous record. Jones v. District Court, 780 P.2d 526 (Colo. 1989).
13-5-128. Compensation of reporter.
The shorthand reporter of a court of record shall be compensated for preparation of the original and any copies of the typewritten transcript of his shorthand notes at such rates as from time to time may be established and promulgated by the supreme court of the state of Colorado. Where, in a court of record, no shorthand reporter is employed and trial transcripts are prepared by other court personnel, such personnel shall be similarly compensated for any transcript preparation required to be accomplished in other than normal working hours.
Source: L. 67: p. 455, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-33. L. 69: p. 1085, § 1. L. 73: p. 494, § 1. L. 79: Entire section R&RE, p. 605, § 1, effective May 22.
13-5-129. Reporters' expenses. (Repealed)
Source: L. 67: p. 455, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-34. L. 69: p. 249, § 6. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.
13-5-130. Reporters to file verified statements. (Repealed)
Source: L. 67: p. 455, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-35. L. 72: p. 591, § 58. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.
13-5-131. Multiple-judge districts.
In any district court composed of more than one judge, each of the judges shall sit separately for the trial of causes and the transaction of business and shall have and exercise all the powers and functions, as well in vacation of court as in term time, which he might have and exercise if he were the sole judge of said court.
Source: L. 67: p. 456, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-38.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Expediting Court Procedure", see 10 Dicta 113 (1933).
Annotator's note. Since § 13-5-131 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 107, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
This section is constitutional. Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417, 36 P. 218 (1894).
Intent of section is to empower each district court judge to rule on matters challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case only when sitting separately. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
District court has no authority to set motions challenging constitutionality of death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case for a hearing or for determination by a multi-judge panel. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
Each of the judges herein provided for is authorized to exercise the powers of a district court. Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417, 36 P. 218 (1894).
Each judge must exercise all the powers and functions of the court. In the trial of causes, and in the hearing and determination of any matter of purely judicial cognizance pending in the district court, each judge must sit and act alone. He must exercise all the powers and functions of the court and assume the full responsibility in the decision of each and every cause, demurrer, motion, and the like, coming before him for adjudication, as if he were the sole judge of said court. Two or more judges, by sitting together, cannot share or divide such responsibility. They cannot thus jointly hear and determine, and render a valid and binding judgment or order in any cause. People ex rel. Rucker v. District Court, 14 Colo. 396, 24 P. 260 (1890).
Purposes set forth in § 13-5-133 (3) do not include the hearing or determination of motions or the making of decisions, orders, decrees, or judgments in criminal or civil cases filed in the district court. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
13-5-132. Powers of judges sitting separately.
Each court held by the several judges, while sitting separately, shall be known as the district court in and for the county where such court is held and shall have the same power to vacate or modify its own judgments, decrees, or orders rendered or made while so held as if the said court were composed of a single judge.
Source: L. 67: p. 456, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-39.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Expediting Court Procedure", see 10 Dicta 113 (1933). For article, "Supplementary Rules to Rules of the District Court", see 17 Dicta 107 (1940).
Section has same meaning as its predecessor statute and therefore the same interpretation for them is adopted. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
This section relates to the powers of the several district judges sitting as the district court of a county. Lenich v. Lenich, 138 Colo. 251 , 331 P.2d 498 (1958) (decided under repealed § 37-4-18, CRS 53).
Intent of section is to empower each district court judge to rule on matters challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case only when sitting separately. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
District court has no authority to set motions challenging constitutionality of death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case for a hearing or for determination by a multi-judge panel. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
A second judge may correct error of a judge no longer on the bench. It makes little sense to hold that if a palpable error were committed by one judge in refusing the continuance, it cannot be corrected by a second judge since the judge first presiding is no longer on the bench. Sunshine v. Robinson, 168 Colo. 409 , 451 P.2d 757 (1969).
Purposes set forth in § 13-5-133 (3) do not include the hearing or determination of motions or the making of decisions, orders, decrees, or judgments in criminal or civil cases filed in the district court. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
Applied in K-R Funds, Inc. v. Fox, 640 P.2d 257 (Colo. App. 1981).
13-5-133. Judges may sit en banc - purpose - rules.
- In any district court composed of more than one judge, the judges may sit en banc at such times as they may determine, for the purpose of making rules of court, the appointment of a clerk and other employees, subject to the provisions of section 13-3-105, and other ministerial duties, subject to the administrative powers delegated to the chief judge by the chief justice of the supreme court pursuant to section 5 (4) of article VI of the state constitution.
-
Subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court, a district court sitting en banc may make rules:
- To facilitate the transaction of business in the courts held by the judges sitting separately; and
- To provide for the classification, arrangement, and distribution of the business of the court among the several judges thereof.
- Judges of a district court in districts having more than one judge may sit en banc only for the purposes enumerated in this section, and the court so sitting en banc shall have no power to review any order, decision, or proceeding of the court held by any judge sitting separately.
Source: L. 67: p. 456, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-40. L. 69: p. 250, § 9.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Expediting Court Procedure", see 10 Dicta 113 (1933).
Section has same meaning as its predecessor statute and therefore the same interpretation for them is adopted. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
Intent of section is to empower each district court judge to rule on matters challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case only when sitting separately. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
District court has no authority to set motions challenging constitutionality of death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case for a hearing or for a determination by a multi-judge panel. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
In this state two or more district judges cannot lawfully sit and act together as a district court except as they sit en banc for the purposes specified in this section. People ex rel. Rucker v. District Court, 14 Colo. 396, 24 P. 260 (1890) (decided under repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 109).
Purposes set forth in subsection (3) do not include the hearing or determination of motions or the making of decisions, orders, decrees, or judgments in criminal or civil cases filed in the district court. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).
13-5-134. Juries.
Jurors may be summoned and empaneled for each of the judges sitting separately as though each were the sole court.
Source: L. 67: p. 457, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-41. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 476, § 1, effective February 6.
13-5-135. Time limit on judgment.
Every motion, issue, or other matter arising in any cause pending or to be brought in any district court of this state, and which is submitted to any such court for judgment or decision thereof, shall be determined by the court within ninety days after the adjournment of court. This section shall not be so construed as to prohibit a decision after the expiration of the time limited, but only as working a forfeiture as provided in section 13-5-136.
Source: L. 67: p. 457, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-42.
ANNOTATION
Neither this section nor § 13-5-136 is an authority for the entry of a judgment in vacation or at chambers. A judgment appearing upon the records of the district court of one county, but which by the same record appears to have been rendered by the judge while at his chambers, in a different county, will be reversed on appeal. Scott v. Stutheit, 21 Colo. App. 28, 121 P. 151 (1912).
This section does not divest jurisdiction or affect the validity of a judgment. Neither the statute nor the constitution in any way divests the trial court of jurisdiction to render a decision or affects the validity of the judgment rendered solely because of the lengthy delay between trial and judgment. Uptime Corp. v. Colo. Research Corp., 161 Colo. 87 , 420 P.2d 232 (1966).
The bare fact of the delay is not sufficient to warrant reversal of the judgment. Since no transcript of the evidence has been presented to this court, it appears that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are fully supported by the evidence. Uptime Corp. v. Colo. Research Corp., 161 Colo. 87 , 420 P.2d 232 (1966).
13-5-136. Forfeit of salary.
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If any judge of any district court, to whom any motion, issue, or other matter, arising in any cause, is submitted for judgment or decision, fails or neglects to decide or give judgment upon the same within the time limited by section 13-5-135, such judge shall not receive from the state treasury any salary for the quarter in which such failure occurred, when the following requirements are satisfied:
- The party aggrieved by the failure of such judge to rule in a timely manner files a complaint demanding the withholding of the salary of such judge with the commission on judicial discipline established in section 23 (3) of article VI of the state constitution;
- The commission on judicial discipline, in accordance with rule 4 of the Colorado rules of judicial discipline, investigates the judge's alleged violation of section 13-5-135;
- After such investigation the commission on judicial discipline, in accordance with rule 4 of the Colorado rules of judicial discipline, makes a recommendation concerning the allegation to the Colorado supreme court; and
- If deemed appropriate, the Colorado supreme court issues an order directing the department of the treasury to withhold the judge's salary.
- This section shall not apply in case of the sickness or death of a judge.
Source: L. 67: p. 457, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-43. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 153, § 1, effective March 17.
13-5-137. Judges seeking retention in office. (Repealed)
Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p, 606, § 1, effective April 25; entire section repealed, p. 606, § 1, effective June 30, 1980.
13-5-138. Appeals to district court.
If a statute provides for review of the acts of any court, board, commission, or officer by certiorari or other writ and if no time within which review may be sought is provided by statute, a petition to review such acts shall be filed in the district court not later than thirty days from the final action taken by said court, board, commission, or officer.
Source: L. 81: Entire section added, p. 877, § 1, effective April 24.
13-5-139. Transfer of information from orders for child support and maintenance to child support enforcement agency - payment of support and maintenance.
- On and after July 1, 1991, and contingent upon the executive director of the department of human services notifying the state court administrator that a particular county or judicial district is ready to implement and participate in the family support registry created in section 26-13-114, C.R.S., the clerk of the court of every judicial district in the state shall transfer the information described in section 26-13-114 (7), C.R.S., to the delegate child support enforcement unit within five working days after entry or modification of a court order or filing of an administrative order in any IV-D case, as defined in section 26-13-102.5 (2), C.R.S.
- to (4) Repealed.
Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 588, § 3, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 591, § 12, effective July 10. L. 88: (4) amended, p. 635, § 15, effective July 1. L. 90: (1) amended and (2) to (4) repealed, pp. 1412, 1416, §§ 6, 17, effective June 8. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 2640, § 87, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.
13-5-140. Transfer of certain registry functions - cooperation between departments.
The judicial department and the department of human services shall cooperate in the transfer of the functions relating to the collection of child support from the courts to the child support enforcement agency specified in article 13 of title 26, C.R.S. In order to implement such transfer, which shall be completed on or after July 1, 1991, and upon notification to the state court administrator by the executive director of the department of human services that a particular county or judicial district is ready to implement and participate in the family support registry, the judicial department shall transfer to the state child support enforcement agency all necessary data, computer programs, technical written material, and budgetary information and shall provide such technical assistance as may be required. The judicial department shall retain payment records relating to child support orders until the executive director of the department of human services notifies the state court administrator that retention of the records is no longer necessary.
Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 588, § 3, effective July 1. L. 88: Entire section amended, p. 636, § 16, effective July 1. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1412, § 7, effective June 8. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 2640, § 88, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.
13-5-141. Compilation - sentences received upon conviction of felony.
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The state court administrator's office shall, by March 1 and by September 1 of each year, prepare and make available to the public at each district court, for a reasonable charge, a compilation of the sentences imposed in felony cases by each judge in each district court. Such compilation shall include:
- The name of each judge;
- The name of each offender and a description of the crime for which he was convicted;
- The sentence imposed by each such judge for each such felony case; and
- A statement that complete information concerning aggravating and mitigating factors, plea and sentence concessions, and other sentencing considerations is available in the court file. As soon as practical, such information shall be included in the compilation.
Source: L. 87: Entire section added, p. 542, § 1, effective July 1.
13-5-142. National instant criminal background check system - reporting.
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On and after March 20, 2013, the state court administrator shall send electronically the following information to the Colorado bureau of investigation created pursuant to section 24-33.5-401, referred to in this section as the "bureau":
- The name of each person who has been found to be incapacitated by order of the court pursuant to part 3 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S.;
- The name of each person who has been committed by order of the court to the custody of the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 27-81-112; and
- The name of each person with respect to whom the court has entered an order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-107, for extended certification for treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-108, or for long-term care and treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-109.
(1.5) Not more than forty-eight hours after receiving notification of a person who satisfies the description in paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of subsection (1) of this section, the state court administrator shall report such fact to the bureau.
- Any report made by the state court administrator pursuant to this section shall describe the reason for the report and indicate that the report is made in accordance with 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g)(4).
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The state court administrator shall take all necessary steps to cancel a record made by the state court administrator in the national instant criminal background check system if:
- The person to whom the record pertains makes a written request to the state court administrator; and
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No less than three years before the date of the written request:
- The court entered an order pursuant to section 15-14-318, C.R.S., terminating a guardianship on a finding that the person is no longer an incapacitated person, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a finding of incapacity;
- The period of certification or commitment of the most recent order of certification, commitment, recertification, or recommitment expired, or a court entered an order terminating the person's incapacity or discharging the person from certification or commitment in the nature of habeas corpus, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on an order of certification or commitment to the custody of the office of behavioral health in the department of human services; except that the state court administrator shall not cancel any record pertaining to a person with respect to whom two recommitment orders have been entered pursuant to section 27-81-112 (7) and (8), or who was discharged from treatment pursuant to section 27-81-112 (11) on the grounds that further treatment is not likely to bring about significant improvement in the person's condition; or
- The record in the case was sealed pursuant to section 27-65-107 (7), or the court entered an order discharging the person from certification in the nature of habeas corpus pursuant to section 27-65-113, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a court order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of a mental health disorder.
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Pursuant to section 102 (c) of the federal "NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007" (Pub.L. 110-180), a court, upon becoming aware that the basis upon which a record reported by the state court administrator pursuant to subsection (1) of this section does not apply or no longer applies, shall:
- Update, correct, modify, or remove the record from any database that the federal or state government maintains and makes available to the national instant criminal background check system, consistent with the rules pertaining to the database; and
- Notify the attorney general that such basis does not apply or no longer applies.
Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 753, § 1, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2010: (1)(b), (1)(c), (3)(b)(II), and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 780, § 15, effective April 29. L. 2013: IP(1), (2), IP(3), (3)(a), and (3)(b)(II) amended and (1.5) and (4) added, (HB 13-1229), ch. 47, p. 131, § 2, effective March 20. L. 2017: IP(1), (1)(b), and (3)(b)(II) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1251, § 5, effective May 25. L. 2018: (1)(c) and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 18-091), ch. 35, p. 382, § 8, effective August 8. L. 2020: (1)(b) amended, (SB 20-007), ch. 286, p. 1414, § 42, effective July 13; (3)(b)(II) and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 281, § 2, effective September 14.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-091, see section 1 of chapter 35, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-136, see section 1 of chapter 70, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
Certification for involuntary short-term mental health treatment entered by a professional person under § 27-65-107 is not a court order under subsection (1)(c) of this section and a person's information should not be sent to the bureau for forwarding on to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, which would subject the person to federal firearms prohibitions. Ray v. People, 2019 COA 24 , 456 P.3d 54.
13-5-142.5. National instant criminal background check system - judicial process for awarding relief from federal prohibitions - legislative declaration.
- Legislative declaration. The purpose of this section is to set forth a judicial process whereby a person may apply or petition for relief from federal firearms prohibitions imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (d)(4) and (g)(4), as permitted by the federal "NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007" (Pub.L. 110-180, sec. 105).
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Eligibility. A person may petition for relief pursuant to this section if:
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- He or she has been found to be incapacitated by order of the court pursuant to part 3 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S.;
- He or she has been committed by order of the court to the custody of the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 27-81-112; or
- The court has entered an order for the person's involuntary certification for short-term treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-107, for extended certification for treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-108, or for long-term care and treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-109; and
- He or she is a person to whom the sale or transfer of a firearm or ammunition is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (d)(4), or who is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g)(4).
-
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Due process. In a court proceeding pursuant to this section:
- The petitioner shall have an opportunity to submit his or her own evidence to the court concerning his or her petition;
- The court shall review the evidence; and
- The court shall create and thereafter maintain a record of the proceeding.
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Proper record. In determining whether to grant relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the court shall receive evidence concerning, and shall consider:
- The circumstances regarding the firearms prohibitions imposed by 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g)(4);
- The petitioner's record, which must include, at a minimum, the petitioner's mental health records and criminal history records; and
- The petitioner's reputation, which the court shall develop, at a minimum, through character witness statements, testimony, or other character evidence.
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Proper findings.
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Before granting relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the court shall issue findings that:
- The petitioner is not likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
- Granting relief to the petitioner is not contrary to the public interest.
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- If the court denies relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the petitioner may petition the court of appeals to review the denial, including the record of the denying court.
- A review of a denial shall be de novo in that the court of appeals may, but is not required to, give deference to the decision of the denying court.
- In reviewing a denial, the court of appeals has discretion, but is not required, to receive additional evidence necessary to conduct an adequate review.
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Before granting relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the court shall issue findings that:
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1229), ch. 47, p. 132, § 3, effective March 20. L. 2017: (2)(a)(II) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1251, § 6, effective May 25. L. 2018: (2)(a)(III) amended, (SB 18-091), ch. 35, p. 383, § 9, effective August 8. L. 2020: (2)(a)(II) amended, (SB 20-007), ch. 286, p. 1414, § 43, effective July 13.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-091, see section 1 of chapter 35, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
13-5-142.8. Notice by professional persons.
Under sections 13-9-123 (1), 13-9-124 (2), 13-5-142 (1), and 13-5-142.5 (2), an order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-107 shall also include a notice filed by a professional person pursuant to section 27-65-107, and an order for extended certification for treatment of mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-108 shall also include a notice filed by a professional person pursuant to section 27-65-108.
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (SB 19-177), ch. 311, p. 2812, § 3, effective August 2.
13-5-143. Judge as party to a case - recusal of judge upon motion.
- If a judge or former judge of a district court is a party in his or her individual and private capacity in a case that is to be tried within any district court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge is or was a judge of a district court, any party to the case may file a timely motion requesting that the judge who is appointed to preside over the case recuse himself or herself from the case.
- If a district court receives a motion filed by a party pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the judge who is appointed to preside over the case shall recuse himself or herself if he or she is a judge of a district court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge who is a party to the case in his or her individual and private capacity is or was a judge of a district court.
- If a judge recuses himself or herself pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court or his or her designee shall appoint a judge from outside the judicial district to preside over the case.
- The provisions of this section shall not apply to a water judge or referee when he or she is acting within his or her exclusive jurisdiction over water matters pursuant to section 37-92-203, C.R.S.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 435, § 1, effective August 5.
13-5-144. Chief judge - veterans treatment court authority.
The chief judge of a judicial district may establish an appropriate program for the treatment of veterans and members of the military. In establishing any such program, the chief judge, in collaboration with the probation department, the district attorney, and the state public defender, shall establish program guidelines and eligibility criteria.
Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1104), ch. 139, p. 465, § 3, effective April 16. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1078), ch. 135, p. 890, § 2, effective August 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding this section, see section 1 of chapter 139, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For comment, "Colorado's About Face: Mechanics, Progress, and Challenges Facing Veterans Trauma Courts in Colorado", see 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 385 (2017).
13-5-145. Truancy detention reduction policy - legislative declaration.
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The general assembly finds that:
- Imposing a sentence of detention on a juvenile who violates a court order to attend school does not improve the likelihood that the juvenile will attend school and does not address the underlying causes of the juvenile's truancy;
- The best methods to address truancy and its underlying causes and the resources needed to implement those methods are different in each community;
- Since 2014, the juvenile courts in many judicial districts around the state have successfully reduced the use of detention for juveniles who are truant by implementing pilot projects through which the juvenile court imposes reasonable sanctions and, where possible, provides incentives to attend school, reserving detention as a sanction of last resort; and
- These pilot projects need additional time to produce meaningful data regarding the effectiveness of the alternate sanctions and incentives and to determine whether they result in improved outcomes for juveniles and their families.
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The chief judge in each judicial district, or his or her designee, shall convene a meeting of community stakeholders to create a policy for addressing truancy cases that seeks alternatives to the use of detention as a sanction for truancy. Community stakeholders may include, but need not be limited to:
- Parents;
- Representatives from school districts;
- Representatives from county departments of human or social services;
- Guardians ad litem;
- Court-appointed special advocates;
- Juvenile court judges;
- Respondent counsel;
- Representatives from law enforcement agencies;
- Mental health-care providers;
- Substance use disorder treatment providers;
- Representatives from the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety;
- Representatives from the state department of human services; and
- Representatives from the department of education.
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The chief judge in each judicial district shall adopt a policy for addressing truancy cases no later than March 15, 2016. In developing the policy for addressing truancy cases, the chief judge and the community stakeholders shall consider, at a minimum:
- Best practices for addressing truancy that are used in other judicial districts and in other states;
- Evidence-based practices to address and reduce truancy;
- Using a wide array of reasonable sanctions and reasonable incentives to address and reduce truancy;
- Using detention only as a last resort after exhausting all other reasonable sanctions and, when imposing detention, appropriately reducing the number of days served; and
- Research regarding the effect of detention on juveniles.
- The state court administrator's office shall report to the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and the senate, or any successor committees, no later than April 15, 2016, regarding the policy for addressing truancy cases adopted by each judicial district.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (SB 15-184), ch. 286, p. 1172, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2017: (2)(j) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1292, § 105, effective May 25. L. 2018: (2)(c) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 398, § 7, effective August 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
PART 2 DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATES
13-5-201. District court magistrates.
- District court magistrates may be appointed, subject to available appropriations, pursuant to section 13-3-105, if approved by the chief justice of the supreme court.
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A district court magistrate shall be a qualified attorney-at-law admitted to practice in this state and in good standing. Nothing in this part 2 shall affect the qualifications of water referees appointed pursuant to section 37-92-203 (6), C.R.S.
(2.5) District court magistrates shall have the power to solemnize marriages pursuant to the procedures in section 14-2-109, C.R.S.
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District court magistrates may hear such matters as are determined by rule of the supreme court, subject to the provision that no magistrate may preside in any trial by jury.
(3.5) District court magistrates shall have the power to preside over matters specified in section 13-17.5-105.
- For purposes of this part 2, the Denver probate court shall be regarded as a district court.
Source: L. 83: Entire part added, p. 600, § 1, effective May 20. L. 89: (2.5) added, p. 781, § 2, effective April 4. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 354, § 2, effective April 9. L. 93: (2) amended, p. 1774, § 30, effective June 6. L. 95: (3.5) added, p. 480, § 2, effective July 1.
Cross references: For magistrates in the small claims division of county courts, see § 13-6-405; for magistrates in county courts, see part 5 of article 6 of this title.
ANNOTATION
A district court magistrate must receive the consent of a party to have the authority to hear a habeas corpus case. Medina v. Williams, 2021 CO 24, 484 P.3d 709.
PART 3 FAMILY LAW MAGISTRATES
13-5-301 to 13-5-305. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2004: Entire part repealed, p. 224, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This part 3 was added in 1985. For amendments to this part 3 prior to its repeal in 2004, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
ARTICLE 5.5 COMMISSIONS ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
Editor's note: This article 5.5 was added in 1988. It was repealed and reenacted in 2017, resulting in the addition, relocation, or elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this article 5.5 prior to 2017, consult the 2016 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated. For a detailed comparison of this article 5.5, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
Section
13-5.5-101. Legislative declaration.
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It is the intent of the general assembly to provide:
- A comprehensive evaluation system of judicial performance;
- Information to the people of Colorado regarding the performance of judges and justices throughout the state; and
- Transparency and accountability for judges and justices throughout the state of Colorado.
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Therefore, the general assembly finds and declares that it is in the public interest and is a matter of statewide concern to:
- Provide judges and justices with useful information concerning their own performances, along with training resources to improve judicial performance as necessary;
- Establish a comprehensive system of evaluating judicial performance to provide persons voting on the retention of judges and justices with fair, responsible, and constructive information about individual judicial performance;
- Establish an independent office on judicial performance evaluation with full authority to implement the provisions of this article 5.5; and
- Conduct statewide judicial performance evaluations, as well as judicial performance evaluations within each judicial district, using uniform criteria and procedures pursuant to the provisions of this article 5.5.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1765, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2019: (1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(a), and (2)(b) amended, (SB 19-187), ch. 374, p. 3396, § 1, effective May 30.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-101 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-102. Definitions.
As used in this article 5.5, unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Attorney" means a person admitted to practice law before the courts of this state.
- "Commission" means both the state and district commissions on judicial performance, established in section 13-5.5-104, unless the usage otherwise specifies the state commission or a district commission.
- "Commissioner" means an appointed member of the state commission or one of the district commissions on judicial performance established in section 13-5.5-104.
- "Department" means the state judicial department.
- "Executive director" means the executive director of the office on judicial performance evaluation created in section 13-5.5-103.
- "Fund" means the state commission on judicial performance cash fund, created in section 13-5.5-115.
- "Improvement plan" means an individual judicial improvement plan developed and implemented pursuant to section 13-5.5-110.
- "Interim evaluation" means an interim evaluation conducted by a commission pursuant to section 13-5.5-109 during a full term of office of a justice or judge.
- "Judge" includes all active judges.
- "Justice" means a justice serving on the supreme court of Colorado.
- "Office" means the office on judicial performance evaluation created in section 13-5.5-103.
- "Retention year evaluation" means a judicial performance evaluation conducted by a commission pursuant to section 13-5.5-108 of a justice or judge whose term is to expire and who must stand for retention election.
- Repealed.
- "Volunteer courtroom observer program" means a systemwide program comprised of volunteers who provide courtroom observation reports for use by state and district commissions in judicial performance evaluations. The state commission shall develop rules, guidelines, and procedures for the volunteer courtroom observer program pursuant to section 13-5.5-105 (2)(i).
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1766, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2019: (9) amended and (13) repealed, (SB 19-187), ch. 374, p. 3397, § 2, effective May 30.
13-5.5-103. Office on judicial performance evaluation - executive director - duties - oversight.
- The office on judicial performance evaluation is established in the judicial department. The state commission on judicial performance, established pursuant to section 13-5.5-104, shall oversee the office.
- The state commission shall appoint an executive director of the office. The executive director serves at the pleasure of the state commission. The executive director's compensation is the same as that which the general assembly establishes for a judge of the district court. The state commission shall not reduce the executive director's compensation during the time that he or she serves as executive director. The executive director shall hire additional staff for the office as necessary and as approved by the state commission.
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Subject to the state commission's supervision, the office shall:
- Staff the state and district commissions when directed to do so by the state commission;
- Train state and district commissioners as needed and requested;
- Collect and disseminate data on judicial performance evaluations, including judicial performance surveys developed, collected, and distributed, pursuant to section 13-5.5-105 (2);
- Conduct public education efforts concerning the judicial performance evaluation process and the recommendations made by the state and district commissions;
- Measure public awareness of the judicial performance evaluation process through regular polling; and
- Complete any other duties as assigned by the state commission.
- Office expenses are paid for from the state commission on judicial performance cash fund created pursuant to section 13-5.5-115.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1767, § 1, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-101.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-104. State commission on judicial performance - district commissions on judicial performance - established - membership - terms - immunity - conflicts.
- The state commission on judicial performance is established, and a district commission on judicial performance is established in each judicial district of the state. In appointing the membership of each commission, the appointing entities must, to the extent practicable, include persons from throughout the state or judicial district and persons with disabilities and take into consideration race, gender, and the ethnic diversity of the state or district. Justices and judges actively performing judicial duties may not be appointed to serve on a commission. Former justices and judges are eligible to be appointed as attorney commissioners; except that a former justice or judge may not be assigned or appointed to perform judicial duties while serving on a commission.
- Repealed.
-
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The state commission consists of eleven members, appointed on or before March 1, 2019, as follows:
- The speaker of the house of representatives shall appoint one attorney and one nonattorney;
- The minority leader of the house of representatives shall appoint one nonattorney;
- The president of the senate shall appoint one attorney and one nonattorney;
- The minority leader of the senate shall appoint one nonattorney;
- The chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint two attorneys; and
- The governor shall appoint two nonattorneys and one attorney.
- The terms of state commissioners appointed prior to January 31, 2019, shall continue until such time as his or her term was originally set to expire; except that the term of the two nonattorneys appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court pursuant to subsection (2)(a)(IV) of this section expires on January 31, 2019.
- This subsection (3) becomes effective February 1, 2019.
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The state commission consists of eleven members, appointed on or before March 1, 2019, as follows:
-
-
Each district commission consists of ten members, appointed on or before March 1, 2019, as follows:
- The speaker of the house of representatives shall appoint one attorney and one nonattorney;
- The president of the senate shall appoint one attorney and one nonattorney;
- The minority leader of the house of representatives shall appoint one nonattorney;
- The minority leader of the senate shall appoint one nonattorney;
- The chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint two attorneys; and
- The governor shall appoint two nonattorneys.
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The terms of district commissioners appointed prior to January 31, 2019, shall continue until such time as his or her term was originally set to expire; except that the following commissioners' terms expire on January 31, 2019:
- The two nonattorneys appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court pursuant to subsection (2)(a)(IV) of this section; and
- The attorney appointed by the governor pursuant to subsection (2)(a)(III) of this section.
- This subsection (4) becomes effective February 1, 2019.
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Each district commission consists of ten members, appointed on or before March 1, 2019, as follows:
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- The term for a commissioner is four years and expires on November 30 of an odd-numbered year. The term of a commissioner appointed to replace a member at the end of the commissioner's term begins on December 1 of the same year.
- The original appointing authority shall fill any vacancy on a commission, but a commissioner shall not serve more than two full terms including any balance remaining on an unexpired term if the initial appointment was to fill a vacancy. Within five days after a vacancy arises on a commission, the commission with the vacancy shall notify the original appointing authority of the vacancy. The original appointing authority shall make an appointment within forty-five days after the date of the vacancy. If the original appointing authority fails to make the appointment within forty-five days after the date of the vacancy, the state commission shall make the appointment.
- The appointing authority may remove a commissioner whom he or she appointed for cause.
- Each commission shall elect a chair every two years by a vote of the membership.
- State and district commissioners and employees of the state or a district commission are immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based upon official acts performed in good faith as commissioners and employees of the state or a district commission.
- A commissioner shall recuse himself or herself from an evaluation of the person who appointed the commissioner to the commission.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1768, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2019: (5)(b) amended, (SB 19-187), ch. 374, p. 3397, § 3, effective May 30.
Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former §§ 13-5.5-102 and 13-5.5-104 as they existed prior to 2017.
(2) Subsection (2)(c) provided for the repeal of subsection (2), effective January 31, 2019. (See L. 2017, p. 1768 .)
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. Since § 13-5.5-104 is similar to former § 13-5.5-102 as it existed in 2005, a relevant case construing that provision has been included in the annotations to this section.
Effect of 1997 amendment was to establish that terms of all members expire on November 30 of even-numbered years. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182 (Colo. 2006).
A member may serve past the expiration of the member's term until a successor is appointed. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182 (Colo. 2006).
Original appointing official may not appoint a successor more than 45 days after the expiration of a member's term. The state commission is authorized to appoint a successor when the original appointing official fails to make the appointment within 45 days after the expiration of a member's term. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182 (Colo. 2006).
13-5.5-105. Powers and duties of the state and district commissions - rules.
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In addition to any other powers conferred or duties assigned upon the separate commissions by this article 5.5, all commissions have the following powers and duties:
- To review any available case management data and statistics provided by the state court administrator, the state commission, and district commissions related to individual justices and judges. A district commission may ask the state court administrator to provide supplemental information and assistance in assessing a judge's overall case management.
- To review written judicial opinions and orders authorized by justices and judges under the commission's oversight;
- To collect information from courtroom observation by commissioners of justices and judges, as well as information provided to the commissions by the volunteer courtroom observer program;
- To interview justices and judges under the commission's oversight and to accept information and documentation from interested persons as necessary, including judicial performance surveys;
- To make recommendations and prepare narratives that reflect the results of performance evaluations of justices and judges; and
- At an individual commission's discretion after it completes an interim evaluation of a justice or judge pursuant to section 13-5.5-109, to recommend that the chief justice or appropriate chief judge develop an individual judicial improvement plan pursuant to section 13-5.5-110.
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In addition to other powers conferred and duties imposed upon the state commission by this article 5.5 and section 13-5.5-106, the state commission has the following powers and duties:
- To appoint and supervise the executive director of the office on judicial performance evaluation;
- To assist the executive director in managing the office and providing fiscal oversight of the office's operating budget;
- To review data, prepare narratives, and make recommendations related to individual supreme court justices and judges of the court of appeals in accordance with sections 13-5.5-108 and 13-5.5-109;
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- To develop surveys to evaluate the performance of justices and judges, which surveys are completed by individuals who interact with the court, including but not limited to attorneys, jurors, represented and unrepresented litigants; law enforcement personnel; attorneys within the district attorneys' and public defenders' offices, employees of the court, court interpreters, employees of probation offices, and employees of local departments of social services; and victims of crimes, as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (5);
- To develop rules, guidelines, and procedures to make the results of surveys developed pursuant to this subsection (2)(d) readily available to all parties set forth in subsection (2)(d)(I) of this section;
- To develop rules, guidelines, and procedures to provide interested parties with accessible and timely opportunities to review the surveys developed pursuant to this subsection (2)(d); and
- To develop rules, guidelines, and procedures to make the surveys developed pursuant to this subsection (2)(d) and any available survey reports available to the public;
(I.5) The surveys developed pursuant to subsection (2)(d)(I) of this section are to be distributed primarily through electronic means, and the state commission shall make efforts to locate electronic mail addresses for the parties identified in said subsection.
- To determine the validity of completed surveys developed pursuant to this subsection (2), report to the district commissions on the validity of the surveys for their districts, and prepare alternatives to surveys where sample populations are inadequate to produce valid results;
- To produce and distribute survey reports and public narratives that reflect the results of each judicial performance evaluation;
- To develop rules, guidelines, and procedures for the review of the deliberation procedures established by the district commissions; except that the state commission does not have the power or duty to review actual determinations made by a district commission;
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To promulgate rules pursuant to section 13-5.5-106 concerning:
- The evaluation of justices and judges based on performance evaluation criteria set forth in section 13-5.5-107;
- The creation of a standards matrix or scorecard related to the performance evaluation criteria set forth in section 13-5.5-107; and
- The continuous collection of data for use in the evaluation process, including surveys developed pursuant to subsection (2)(d) of this section;
- To develop rules, guidelines, and procedures concerning a systemwide judicial training program and a systemwide volunteer courtroom observer program; and
- To prepare a report pursuant to section 13-5.5-114.
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In addition to other powers conferred and duties imposed upon a district commission by this article 5.5, in conformity with the rules, guidelines, and procedures adopted by the state commission pursuant to section 13-5.5-106 and the state commission's review of the deliberation procedures pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, each district commission has the following powers and duties:
- To obtain information from parties and attorneys regarding judges' handling of cases with respect to the judges' fairness, patience with pro se parties, gender neutrality, racial disparity, and handling of emotional parties;
- To review data, prepare narratives, and make evaluations related to judges pursuant to the provisions of sections 13-5.5-108 and 13-5.5-109; and
- Upon completing the required recommendations and narratives pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, to collect all documents and other information, including all surveys and copies, received regarding each judge who was evaluated and forward such documents and information to the state commission within thirty days.
- Unless recused pursuant to a provision of this article 5.5, each commissioner of the state and district commissions has the discretion to evaluate the performance of a justice or judge under the commission's oversight and vote as to whether the justice or judge meets the performance standard based upon the commissioner's review of all of the information available to the commission.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1770, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2019: (2)(d)(I), (2)(d)(III), and (2)(h)(II) amended and (2)(d)(I.5) added, (SB 19-187), ch. 374, p. 3397, § 4, effective May 30.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former §§ 13-5.5-103 and 13-5.5-105 as they existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-106. Rules, guidelines, and procedures.
- The state commission shall adopt rules, guidelines, and procedures as necessary to implement and effectuate the provisions of this article 5.5, including rules, guidelines, and procedures governing the district commissions.
- The state commission shall consider proposed rules, guidelines, or procedures from the judicial department; except that nothing in this section requires the state commission to seek approval from the judicial department. The state commission retains the authority for the adoption of final rules, guidelines, or procedures. The state commission may, at its discretion and within existing appropriations and resources, retain independent legal counsel to review any rules, guidelines, or procedures adopted pursuant to this section or section 13-5.5-105.
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The state commission may adopt rules, guidelines, or procedures that provide guidance to commissioners regarding the review or interpretation of information obtained as a result of the evaluation process and the criteria contained in section 13-5.5-107. Any such rules, guidelines, or procedures must:
- Take into consideration the reliability of survey data and be consistent with section 13-5.5-105; and
- Not divest any commissioner of his or her ultimate authority to decide whether a justice or judge meets the minimum performance standards, as established by the state and district commissions.
- The state commission shall post a notice of the proposed rule, guideline, or procedure; allow for a period for public comment; and give the public an opportunity to address the state commission concerning the proposed rule, guideline, or procedure at a public hearing.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1773, § 1, effective August 9.
13-5.5-107. Judicial performance evaluation criteria.
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The state commission and each district commission shall evaluate each justice and judge in Colorado utilizing the powers and duties conferred upon each commission in section 13-5.5-105. The evaluations must only include the following performance evaluation criteria:
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Integrity, including but not limited to whether the justice or judge:
- Avoids impropriety or the appearance of impropriety;
- Displays fairness and impartiality toward all participants; and
- Avoids ex parte communications;
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Legal knowledge, including but not limited to whether the justice or judge:
- Demonstrates, through well-reasoned opinions and courtroom conduct, an understanding of substantive law and relevant rules of procedure and evidence;
- Demonstrates, through well-reasoned opinions and courtroom conduct, attentiveness to factual and legal issues before the court; and
- Adheres to precedent or clearly explains the legal basis for departure from precedent and appropriately applies statutes or other sources of legal authority;
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Communication skills, including but not limited to whether the justice or judge:
- Presents clearly written and understandable opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders;
- Presents clearly stated and understandable questions or statements during oral arguments or presentations, and, for trial judges, clearly explains all oral decisions; and
- Clearly presents information to the jury, as necessary;
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Judicial temperament, including but not limited to whether the justice or judge:
- Demonstrates courtesy toward attorneys, litigants, court staff, and others in the courtroom; and
- Maintains and requires order, punctuality, and appropriate decorum in the courtroom;
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Administrative performance, including but not limited to whether the justice or judge:
- Demonstrates preparation for oral arguments, trials, and hearings, as well as attentiveness to and appropriate control over judicial proceedings;
- Manages workload and court time effectively and efficiently;
- Issues opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders in a timely manner and without unnecessary delay;
- Participates in a proportionate share of the court's workload, takes responsibility for more than his or her own caseload, and is willing to assist other justices or judges; and
- Understands and complies, as necessary, with directives of the Colorado supreme court; and
- Service to the legal profession and the public by participating in service-oriented efforts designed to educate the public about the legal system and improve the legal system.
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Integrity, including but not limited to whether the justice or judge:
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1773, § 1, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-105.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-108. Judicial performance evaluations in retention election years - procedure - recommendations.
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Judicial performance evaluations for justices or judges whose terms are to expire and who must stand for retention election are conducted as follows:
- The state commission shall conduct a judicial performance evaluation of each such justice of the supreme court and judge of the court of appeals; and
- The district commission shall conduct a judicial performance evaluation for each district judge and county judge.
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- The applicable commission shall complete a retention year evaluation and related narrative to be communicated to the justice or judge no later than forty-five days prior to the last day available for the justice or judge to declare his or her intent to stand for retention.
- The narrative prepared for a retention year evaluation must include an assessment of the justice's or judge's strengths and weaknesses with respect to the judicial performance criteria contained in section 13-5.5-107, a discussion regarding any deficiency identified in an interim evaluation prepared pursuant to section 13-5.5-109, a review of any improvement plan developed pursuant to section 13-5.5-110, and a statement of whether the applicable commission concludes that any deficiency identified has been satisfactorily addressed, or a statement from the chief justice or appropriate chief judge that an improvement plan, if any, was satisfactorily followed by the justice or judge.
- The applicable commission shall grant each justice or judge who receives a retention year evaluation the opportunity to meet with the commission or otherwise respond to the evaluation no later than ten days following his or her receipt of the evaluation. If the meeting is held or a response is made, the applicable commission may revise its evaluation.
- After the requirements of subsection (2) of this section are met, the applicable commission shall make a recommendation regarding the performance of each justice or judge who declares his or her intent to stand for retention. The recommendations must be stated as "meets performance standard" or "does not meet performance standard". For a justice or judge to receive a designation of "does not meet performance standard", there must be a majority vote by the commission members that the particular justice or judge should receive such a recommendation.
- District commissions shall forward recommendations, narratives, and any other relevant information, including any completed judicial surveys, to the state commission according to the provisions of section 13-5.5-105.
- The state commission shall release the narrative, the recommendation, and any other relevant information related to a retention year evaluation, including the information forwarded pursuant to section 13-5.5-105, to the public no later than two months prior to the retention election. The state commission shall arrange to have the narrative and recommendation for each justice and judge standing for retention printed in the ballot information booklet prepared pursuant to section 1-40-124.5 and mailed to electors pursuant to section 1-40-125.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1775, § 1, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-106 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-109. Judicial performance evaluations in interim years between elections - procedure.
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Within the first two years of a justice's or judge's appointment to the bench, the appropriate commission shall conduct an initial evaluation of each justice and each judge. The appropriate commission shall complete and communicate its judicial performance interim evaluations as follows:
- The state commission shall communicate its findings, including any recommendations for improvement plans, to the chief justice of the supreme court or the chief judge of the court of appeals and the appellate justice or judge who was evaluated; and
- The applicable district commission shall communicate its findings, including any recommendations for improvement plans, to the chief judge of the district and the judge who was evaluated.
- If a commission recommends an improvement plan, the procedure development and implementation for such a plan will follow the guidelines set forth in section 13-5.5-110.
- The appropriate commission, at its discretion, may conduct a subsequent interim evaluation of each justice and each judge during the years between when the justice or judge stands for retention, if applicable.
- The appropriate commission shall grant each justice or judge who receives an initial or interim evaluation the opportunity to meet with the commission or otherwise respond to the initial or interim evaluation no later than ten days following the justice's or judge's receipt of the initial or interim evaluation. If a meeting is held or a response is made, the appropriate commission may revise its initial or interim evaluation.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1776, § 1, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-106.3 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-110. Individual judicial improvement plans.
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- If the state commission or a district commission recommends, pursuant to section 13-5.5-109 (1), that a justice or judge receive an individual judicial improvement plan, the commission shall communicate such recommendation to the chief justice or appropriate chief judge. The chief justice or chief judge shall then develop an improvement plan for such judge and shall send the improvement plan to the state commission for review. After the state commission reviews and approves the improvement plan, the chief justice or chief judge shall have the responsibility for implementing and overseeing the improvement plan.
- Once the justice or judge has completed the improvement plan, the chief justice or chief judge shall convey the results of the improvement plan activities to the appropriate commission, which will then maintain a copy of the improvement plan and the statement of results in its files.
- If a justice or judge is required to complete an improvement plan pursuant to this section, and he or she fails to satisfactorily complete the requirements of such improvement plan, the appropriate commission shall automatically issue a "does not meet performance standard" designation on his or her performance evaluation summary.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1777, § 1, effective August 9.
13-5.5-111. Judicial performance evaluations - senior judges. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1777, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2019: Entire section repealed, (SB 19-187), ch. 374, p. 3398, § 5, effective May 30.
13-5.5-112. Recusal.
- A commissioner shall disclose to his or her commission any professional or personal relationship with a justice or judge that may affect an unbiased evaluation of the justice or judge, including involvement with any litigation involving the justice or judge and the commissioner, the commissioner's family, or the commissioner's financial interests. A commission may require, upon a two-thirds vote of the other commissioners, the recusal of one of its commissioners because of a relationship with a justice or judge.
- A justice or judge who is being evaluated by a state or district commission may not recuse himself or herself from a case solely on the basis that an attorney, party, or witness in the case is a commissioner on the evaluating commission.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1777, § 1, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-106.4 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-113. Confidentiality.
- Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, all self-evaluations, personal information protected under section 24-72-204 (3)(a)(II), additional oral or written information, content of any judicial improvement plans, and any matter discussed in executive session is confidential except as otherwise specifically provided by rule. All surveys must allow for the participant's name to remain confidential. Comments in surveys are confidential but may be summarized in aggregate for use in judicial performance evaluation narratives. A commissioner shall not publicly discuss the evaluation of a particular justice or judge.
- Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, all recommendations and narratives are confidential until released to the public on the first day following the deadline for justices and judges to declare their intent to stand for retention.
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Information required to be kept confidential pursuant to this article 5.5 may be released only under the following circumstances:
- To the supreme court attorney regulation committee, as provided by rule of the state commission;
- To the commission on judicial discipline, as provided by rule of the state commission; or
- With the consent of the justice or judge being evaluated.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1778, § 1, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-106.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-114. Reporting requirements - "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act" report.
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The state commission shall gather and maintain statewide data and post a statistical report of the statewide data on its website no later than thirty days prior to each retention election. The report must specify, at a minimum:
- The total number of justices and judges who were eligible to stand for retention and the number who declared their intent to stand for reelection;
- The total number of judicial performance evaluations of justices and judges performed by the state and district commissions;
- The total number of justices and judges who were evaluated but did not stand for retention; and
- The total number of justices and judges who received a "meets performance standard" or "does not meet performance standard" recommendation, respectively.
- Beginning in January 2019, and every two years thereafter, the state commission shall report on the activities of the commissioners to the joint judiciary committee of the general assembly as part of its "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act" presentation required by section 2-7-203.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1778, § 1, effective August 9.
13-5.5-115. State commission on judicial performance cash fund - acceptance of private or federal grants - general appropriations.
The state commission is authorized to accept any grants of federal or private funds made available for any purpose consistent with the provisions of this article 5.5. Any money received pursuant to this section must be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the state commission on judicial performance cash fund, which is hereby created. The fund also includes the amount of the increases in docket fees collected pursuant to sections 13-32-105 (1) and 42-4-1710 (4)(a). Any interest derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund is credited to the fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year remains in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or another fund. Money in the fund may be expended by the state commission, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, for the purposes of this article 5.5. In addition, the general assembly may make annual appropriations from the general fund for the purposes of this article 5.5.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1779, § 1, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-5.5-107 as it existed prior to 2017.
13-5.5-116. Private right of action - definition.
- Final actions of the state commission are subject to judicial review as provided for in this section. For purposes of this section, "final action" means a rule, guideline, or procedure adopted by the state commission pursuant to this article 5.5. A "final action" does not include a final recommendation regarding a justice or a judge that is made by the state commission or a district commission pursuant to section 13-5.5-108 or 13-5.5-109, an improvement plan developed pursuant to section 13-5.5-110, surveys developed pursuant to section 13-5.5-105 (2)(d), or any aspect of an individual justice's or judge's individual judicial performance evaluation.
- A person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final action of the state commission may commence an action for judicial review in the Denver district court within thirty-five days after such action becomes effective. Upon a finding by the court that irreparable injury would otherwise result, the reviewing court shall postpone the effective date of the state commission's action to preserve the rights of the parties, pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
- If the court finds no error, it shall affirm the state commission's final action. If the court finds that the state commission's action is arbitrary or capricious; a denial of a statutory right; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, purposes, or limitations; not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations set forth in this article 5.5 or as otherwise required by law; an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous on the whole record; unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole; or otherwise contrary to law, then the court shall hold the action unlawful, set it aside, restrain enforcement, and afford such other relief as may be appropriate. In all cases under review, the court shall determine all questions of law, interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved, and apply the interpretation to the facts duly found or established.
Source: L. 2017: Entire article R&RE, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1779, § 1, effective August 9.
ARTICLE 6 COUNTY COURTS
Cross references: For the power of the general assembly to provide simplified procedures in county courts for the trial of misdemeanors, see § 21 of art. VI, Colo. Const.
Section
PART 1 ESTABLISHMENT AND JURISDICTION
13-6-101. Establishment.
Pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of article VI of the Colorado constitution, there is hereby established in each county of the state of Colorado a county court.
Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-1.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).
For the general assembly using its constitutional power to create county courts, see Rowland v. Theobald, 159 Colo. 1 , 409 P.2d 272 (1965).
13-6-102. Court of record.
Each county court shall be a court of record, with such powers as are inherent in constitutionally created courts.
Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-2.
ANNOTATION
County court records are entitled to the same presumptions as those of district courts. The county courts are courts of record, and as to matters within their jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of this state, their records are supported by the same presumptions and intendments of law as the records of district courts. Fletcher v. Stowell, 17 Colo. 94, 28 P. 326 (1891), citing Hughes v. Cummings, 7 Colo. 138, 2 P. 289 (1883); Dusing v. Nelson, 7 Colo. 184, 2 P. 922 (1883); Behymer v. Nordloh, 12 Colo. 352, 21 P. 37 (1888); In re Rogers, 14 Colo. 18, 22 P. 1053 (1890)(cases decided under repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 156).
13-6-103. Statewide jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the county court shall extend to all cases which arise within the boundaries of this state or are subject to its judicial power and which are within the limitations imposed by this article, but the exercise of this jurisdiction is subject to restrictions of venue as established by this article or, if there are none, by rule of the Colorado supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-3. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 598, § 12, effective July 1.
13-6-104. Original civil jurisdiction.
- On and after January 1, 2019, the county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in civil actions, suits, and proceedings in which the debt, damage, or value of the personal property claimed does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars, including by way of further example, and not limitation, jurisdiction to hear and determine actions in tort and assess damages therein not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars. The county court shall also have jurisdiction of counterclaims in all such actions when the counterclaim does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.
- The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in actions to foreclose liens pursuant to article 20 of title 38 and in cases of forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer, except when such cases involve the boundary or title to real property and except as provided in section 13-40-109. Judgment in the county court for rent, damages on account of unlawful detention, damages for injury to property, and damages incurred under article 20 of title 38 pursuant to this subsection (2) shall not exceed a total of twenty-five thousand dollars, exclusive of costs and attorney fees, nor shall the county court on and after January 1, 2019, have jurisdiction if the monthly rental value of the property exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars.
- The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in petitions for change of name.
- Repealed.
- The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court to issue temporary and permanent civil restraining orders as provided in article 14 of this title.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 99, p. 501 , § 5, effective July 1, 1999.)
- The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court to hear actions brought pursuant to section 25-8-607, C.R.S.
- The county court shall have original jurisdiction in hearings concerning the impoundment of motor vehicles pursuant to section 42-13-106, C.R.S.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 99, p. 501 , § 5, effective July 1, 1999.)
Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-4. L. 67: p. 1063, § 2. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 1419, § 8, effective April 24; (1) and (2) amended, p. 561, § 1, effective October 1. L. 78: (5) added, p. 352, § 1, effective April 21. L. 79: (6) added, p. 599, § 13, effective July 1. L. 81: (1) and (2) amended, p. 879, § 1, effective July 1; (7) added, p. 1338, § 2, effective July 1. L. 82: (5) R&RE and (6) amended, p. 301, §§ 2, 3, effective April 23. L. 86: (8) added, p. 924, § 2, effective April 3. L. 87: (2) amended, p. 1576, § 13, effective July 10. L. 90: (1) and (2) amended, p. 848, § 2, effective May 31; (1) and (2) amended, p. 854, § 2, effective July 1. L. 92: (9) added, p. 292, § 2, effective April 23. L. 94: (4) repealed, p. 2031, § 6, effective July 1; (8) amended, p. 2548, § 29, effective January 1, 1995. L. 99: (5), (6), and (9) amended, p. 501, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1517, § 11, effective September 1. L. 2018: (1) and (2) amended, (SB 18-056), ch. 298, p. 1816, § 1, effective January 1, 2019.
Cross references: (1) For treatment by county court of restraining orders issued in restraint of persons threatening assaults and bodily harm, see C.R.C.P. 365(b); for civil protection orders, see article 14 of this title; for provisions relating to domestic abuse programs, see article 7.5 of title 26.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending subsections (1) and (2), see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.
ANNOTATION
Analysis
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For comment on Ohmie v. Martinez, appearing below, see 38 Dicta 123 (1961). For note, "Rural Poverty and the Law in Southern Colorado", see 47 Den. L.J. 82 (1970).
Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-104 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 156, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
The jurisdiction of district and county courts is concurrent with respect to matters which fall within the jurisdiction of both. Ohmie v. Martinez, 141 Colo. 480 , 349 P.2d 131 (1960).
County court may enforce a state agency's imposition of a monetary penalty. Gibbs v. Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 883 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1994).
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
County courts have general subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power. Camplin v. Jackson, 34 Colo. 447, 83 P. 1017 (1905).
County court has jurisdiction in all civil matters, both in law and in equity, except as expressly limited. Flynn v. Casper, 26 Colo. App. 344, 144 P. 1137 (1914), citing Sievers v. Garfield County Court, 11 Colo. App. 147, 52 P. 634 (1898); Arnett v. Berg, 18 Colo. App. 341, 71 P. 636 (1903).
County court has jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus by a parent, demanding the custody of his infant child, is, under this section, within the jurisdiction of the county court. Flynn v. Casper, 26 Colo. App. 344, 144 P. 1137 (1914).
This section does not apply to proceedings under the eminent domain act. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Poundstone, 74 Colo. 191, 220 P. 234 (1923).
Nor does it apply in proceedings for injunction against city or town ordinance. County courts have no jurisdiction to control, by injunction, proceedings before police magistrates or justices of the peace acting as such in the enforcement of the ordinances of cities and towns. Hart v. Dana, 12 Colo. App. 499, 55 P. 958 (1889).
III. JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT.
Annotator's note. The jurisdictional amount in repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 156, was $2,000.
The purpose behind regulating the jurisdiction of the county court as to the amount in controversy is to expedite the handling of small claims. This purpose must be considered in the light of the policy that a person cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, acquiesce in the decree thus obtained, and later question the validity of the judgment when it is enforced against him. Under the circumstances, the petitioner is estopped by his acquiescence and conduct from asserting the invalidity of the judgment in the county court. In re Estate of Lee v. Graber, 170 Colo. 419 , 462 P.2d 492 (1969).
Jurisdictional allegation is an essential prerequisite. Jurisdictional allegation in the complaint that the relief sought does not exceed the jurisdictional sum is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court. Myers v. Myers, 110 Colo. 412 , 135 P.2d 235 (1943).
This section does not prescribe a form for the jurisdictional averment. There is nothing in this section that indicates an intention to require the jurisdictional averment to be in a prescribed form. The import of the language employed therein is, that it must affirmatively appear from the complaint that the value of the property in controversy, or the amount involved, for which relief is sought, does not exceed the jurisdictional sum. Hughes v. Brewer, 7 Colo. 583, 4 P. 1115 (1884); Bloomer v. Jones, 22 Colo. App. 404, 125 P. 541 (1912).
Complaint may be amended to show jurisdiction. A complaint in a county court which is insufficient by reason of the omission of a jurisdictional averment may be amended so as to give the court jurisdiction. Myers v. Myers, 110 Colo. 412 , 135 P.2d 235 (1943).
Amendment may be allowed to include averment. In condemnation proceedings in the county courts under this section the complaint, if lacking the requisite jurisdictional allegations, is not entirely void but amendable, and when a complaint is amended, it stands as though it had originally read as amended. Goodman v. City of Ft. Collins, 164 F. 970 (8th Cir. 1908).
A defect in this respect may be aided by the answer. A complaint in an action in the county court which did not allege that the value of the property involved was less than $2,000, if defective in that respect, was aided by the answer, which alleged it was not worth $1,500. Petri v. Doughty, 75 Colo. 551, 227 P. 388 (1924).
In a bill to quiet title to lands, an averment that "the value of the property involved does not exceed or equal two thousand dollars", suffices to support the jurisdiction of the county court. Green v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 346, 127 P. 239 (1912).
Complaint must indicate value of land. In a complaint, in an action to quiet the title to lands, no money judgment being demanded, an averment that "the amount herein involved and sued for does not equal $2,000", gives no indication of the value of the land, and is not a compliance with this section. A decree given upon such complaint is void, and may be collaterally assailed. Bloomer v. Jones, 22 Colo. App. 404, 125 P. 541 (1912).
On error defendant will not be heard to question the jurisdiction of the court for want of the averment as to the amount in controversy required by this section. To permit the jurisdiction to be thus questioned for the first time in the court of review would deprive plaintiff of the right to amend granted by the code of civil procedure. Nelson v. Chittenden, 53 Colo. 30, 123 P. 656 (1912).
Uncertainties in the record will be resolved in favor of the party successful below; e.g., as to whether an averment essential to the jurisdiction of the court below, appearing by interlineation in the complaint, was therein, when it was originally filed. Dunkle v. French, 51 Colo. 170, 116 P. 1039 (1911).
Determination of jurisdictional amount. The amount fixed as the statutory limitation of the jurisdiction must be taken to mean the amount due the plaintiff, or the value or amount of his claim, or the value of the property sought to be recovered at the time of bringing the action, and in an action for the recovery of money, where the principal sum draws interest, if the amount due at the time of the commencement of the action, including interest, does not exceed the jurisdictional amount, the county court, under the constitution and this section, has jurisdiction, and the accumulation of interest pendente lite will not oust such jurisdiction. Denver Brick Mfg. Co. v. McAllister, 6 Colo. 326 (1882).
Jurisdictional limit applies to the total amount to be paid, and not to each monthly payment of child support. Mathews v. Urban, 645 P.2d 290 (Colo. App. 1982).
For when averments are sufficient, see Hughes v. Brewer, 7 Colo. 583, 4 P. 1115 (1884).
Once a court has jurisdiction over a case because the total sum sought is within the jurisdictional limit, the court does not lose jurisdiction simply because the case is litigated, and attorney fees incurred and awarded exceed the jurisdictional amount. Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936 ( Colo. 1993 ), overruled in LHM Corp. v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78, 499 P.3d 1050, to the extent Ferrell suggests appealability of a judgment hinges on the fact-specific determination of whether the attorney fees at issue are best classified as costs or damages.
13-6-105. Specific limits on civil jurisdiction.
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The county court has no civil jurisdiction except that specifically conferred upon it by law. In particular, it has no jurisdiction over the following matters:
- Matters of probate;
- Matters of mental health, including certification, restoration to competence, and the appointment of conservators;
- Matters of dissolution of marriage, declaration of invalidity of marriage, and legal separation;
- Matters affecting children, including the allocation of parental responsibilities, support, guardianship, adoption, dependency, or delinquency;
- Matters affecting boundaries or title to real property;
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Original proceedings for the issuance of injunctions, except:
- As provided in sections 13-6-104 (5) and 38-12-507 (1)(b);
- As required to enforce restrictive covenants on residential property and to enforce section 6-1-702.5; and
- As otherwise specifically authorized in this article 6 or, if there is no authorization, by rule of the Colorado supreme court.
- Any powers or duties previously placed in the county court by law in connection with any of the matters excluded from the jurisdiction of the county court by this section are transferred to the district court or, if within their jurisdiction, to the probate court of the city and county of Denver or the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver, and the statutes relating thereto shall be so construed.
- Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent the appointment of county judges as magistrates in juvenile matters or as magistrates in mental health and other matters. Appointments of county judges as magistrates in mental health and other matters are authorized, and, when so appointed by the district judge, the county judge shall serve as a district court officer for the designated purposes.
Source: L. 64: p. 410, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-5. L. 78: (1)(f) amended, p. 353, § 2, effective April 21. L. 79: (1)(f) amended, p. 599, § 14, effective July 1; (3) amended, p. 963, § 12, effective July 1. L. 88: (1)(f) amended, p. 601, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 356, § 8, effective April 9. L. 98: (1)(d) amended, p. 1392, § 24, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2000: (1)(f) amended, p. 2034, § 2, effective August 2. L. 2008: (1)(f) amended, p. 596, § 4, effective August 5. L. 2019: IP(1) and (1)(f) amended, (HB 19-1170), ch. 229, p. 2305, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2020: (1)(b) amended, (SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 282, § 3, effective September 14.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-136, see section 1 of chapter 70, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
Specific exclusions to county court jurisdiction are found in this section. The jurisdiction of the newly created county courts was defined and specific exclusions were mentioned in this section. Rowland v. Theobald, 159 Colo. 1 , 409 P.2d 272 (1965).
Election disputes are not withdrawn from county court jurisdiction. Six classifications of legal matters are expressly mentioned with reference to which the county court shall have no jurisdiction. Nothing concerning election disputes is withdrawn from consideration by the county courts by these expressed exclusions. Rowland v. Theobald, 159 Colo. 1 , 409 P.2d 272 (1965).
County court forced entry and detainer judgment not dispositive of subsequent property ownership question. Because county courts are specifically precluded from deciding any matters affecting title to real property, judgment entered in a county court forced entry and detainer action cannot be dispositive of the property ownership question in a subsequent quiet title action. Gore Trading Co. v. Alice, 35 Colo. App. 97, 529 P.2d 324 (1974).
Section not applicable to decrees of specific performance. In interpreting the reference in this section to "injunctions", presumption is that the general assembly was aware of the legal distinction between injunctions and specific performance decrees. Therefore, subsection (1)(f), which limits a county court's power to issue injunctions, does not limit the court's power to issue decrees of specific performance, and C.R.C.P. 370 properly may be read with the understanding that county courts have jurisdiction to issue decrees of specific performance. Snyder v. Sullivan, 705 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1985).
13-6-106. Original criminal jurisdiction.
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The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in the following criminal matters:
- Criminal actions for the violation of state laws which constitute misdemeanors or petty offenses, except those actions involving children over which the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver or the district courts of the state, other than in Denver, have exclusive jurisdiction;
- The issuance of warrants, the conduct of preliminary examinations, the conduct of dispositional hearings pursuant to section 16-5-301 (1), C.R.S., and section 18-1-404 (1), C.R.S., the issuance of bindover orders, and the admission to bail in felonies and misdemeanors.
- The provisions of subsection (1)(b) of this section shall not apply to any child under the age of eighteen years alleged to have committed a felony, except a crime of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment where the accused is sixteen years of age or older.
Source: L. 64: p. 411, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-6. L. 67: p. 1051, § 6. L. 79: (1)(a) amended, p. 599, § 15, effective July 1. L. 98: (1)(b) amended, p. 1274, § 4, July 1.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Commitment of Misdemeanants to the Colorado State Reformatory", see 29 Dicta 294 (1952).
Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-106 is similar to repealed § 37-7-1, CRS 53, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.
Under this section, the jurisdiction of county courts in criminal cases is limited to misdemeanors; hence a conviction of grand larceny in the county court and a sentence to the state penitentiary is void. Latham v. People, 136 Colo. 252 , 317 P.2d 894 (1957).
The jurisdiction conferred by the general assembly in § 42-4-1504 for misdemeanors involving the operation of motor vehicles did not intend to impliedly repeal this section conferring original jurisdiction upon the county courts in misdemeanor cases. People v. Griffith, 130 Colo. 475 , 276 P.2d 559 (1954).
Jurisdiction extends to offenses under § 42-4-1501 . Jurisdiction of the county courts includes those offenses reclassified as misdemeanor traffic offenses under § 42-4-1501 . Phillips v. County Court, 42 Colo. App. 187, 591 P.2d 600 (1979).
Since a person under age 18 can only be charged with an offense in the manner permitted by the Children's Code, the county court had no jurisdiction to entertain or to dispose of the merits of the proceeding involving an offense alleged against a juvenile and was without authority to go further than merely dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. People in Interest of C.O., 870 P.2d 1266 (Colo. App. 1994).
13-6-107. Restraining orders to prevent emotional abuse of the elderly. (Repealed)
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 290, § 1, effective April 23. L. 94: (5), (9), (10), and (11) amended and (13) added, p. 2005, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: (1) and (5) amended, p. 244, § 2, effective April 13. L. 99: Entire section repealed, p. 501, § 6, effective July 1.
PART 2 JUDGES AND OTHER PERSONNEL
13-6-201. Classification of counties.
- For such organizational and administrative purposes concerning county courts as are specified in this part 2, counties shall be classified as provided in subsection (2) of this section. The classifications established in this section shall not have any effect upon any classifications now provided by law for any other purpose and specifically shall have no effect upon the existing classification of counties for the purpose of fixing judicial salaries for county judges as provided by section 13-30-103.
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Classes of counties for this part 2 are:
- Class A. Class A shall consist of the city and county of Denver.
- Class B. Class B shall consist of the counties of Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Douglas, Eagle, El Paso, Fremont, Jefferson, La Plata, Larimer, Mesa, Montrose, Pueblo, Summit, Weld, and the city and county of Broomfield.
- Class C. Class C shall consist of the counties of Alamosa, Delta, Garfield, Las Animas, Logan, Montezuma, Morgan, Otero, Prowers, and Rio Grande.
- Class D. Class D shall consist of the counties of Archuleta, Baca, Bent, Chaffee, Cheyenne, Clear Creek, Conejos, Costilla, Crowley, Custer, Dolores, Elbert, Gilpin, Grand, Gunnison, Jackson, Hinsdale, Huerfano, Kiowa, Kit Carson, Lake, Lincoln, Mineral, Moffat, Ouray, Park, Phillips, Pitkin, Saguache, San Juan, San Miguel, Sedgwick, Rio Blanco, Routt, Teller, Washington, and Yuma.
Source: L. 64: p. 411, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-1. L. 72: p. 591, § 59. L. 75: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 563, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (2)(b) R&RE and (2)(c) amended, p. 783, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1, 1978. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 2025, § 15, effective July 14. L. 92: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 274, § 1, effective February 12. L. 93: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 1774, § 31, effective June 6. L. 97: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 984, § 1, effective July 1, 1998. L. 2001: (2)(b) amended, p. 56, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1), (2)(b), and (2)(c) amended, p. 363, § 1, effective April 2. L. 2009: (2)(b) and (2)(c) amended, (HB 09-1037), ch. 18, p. 95, § 1, effective March 18.
13-6-202. Number of judges.
- In each county there shall be one county judge; except that: In the county of El Paso, there shall be eight county judges; in each of the counties of Arapahoe and Jefferson, there shall be seven county judges; in the county of Adams, there shall be six county judges; in the county of Boulder, there shall be five county judges; in each of the counties of Larimer and Weld, there shall be four county judges; in each of the counties of Pueblo, Douglas, and Mesa, there shall be three county judges; and, in the city and county of Denver, there shall be the number of county judges provided by the charter and ordinances thereof. In the city and county of Broomfield, there shall be one county judge. One of the county judges in Boulder county shall maintain a courtroom in the city of Longmont at least three days per week. The judge of the Eagle county court shall conduct court business in that portion of Eagle county lying in the Roaring Fork river drainage area in a manner sufficient to deal with the business before the court.
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- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Jefferson shall be eight.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of county judges in the county of Jefferson shall be nine.
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- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of El Paso shall be nine.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of county judges in the county of El Paso shall be ten.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Larimer shall be five.
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- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Adams shall be seven.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of county judges in the county of Adams shall be eight.
- Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Arapahoe shall be eight.
Source: L. 64: p. 412, § 8. L. 65: p. 476, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-2. L. 67: p. 485, § 1. L. 68: p. 38, § 1. L. 72: pp. 189, 592, §§ 1, 60. L. 73: p. 495, § 1. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 565, § 2, effective October 1. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 785, § 1, effective July 1. L. 80: Entire section amended, p. 509, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 454, § 4, effective September 1. L. 89: Entire section amended, p. 749, § 1, effective April 1, 1990. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 275, § 2, effective February 12. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 452, § 1, effective May 16. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 668, § 1, effective May 18. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 56, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: Entire section amended, p. 22, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: Entire section amended, p. 1529, § 16, effective May 31.
13-6-203. Qualifications of judges.
- The county judge shall be a qualified elector of the county for which he is elected or appointed and shall reside there so long as he serves as county judge.
- In counties of Class A and B, no person shall be eligible for election or appointment to the office of county judge unless he has been admitted to the practice of law in Colorado.
- In counties of Class C and Class D, a person is not eligible for appointment to the office of county judge unless he or she has graduated from high school or has successfully completed a high school equivalency examination, as defined in section 22-33-102 (8.5), C.R.S.
- Repealed.
- Judges-elect who have not been admitted to the practice of law shall not take office for the first time as county judge until they have attended an institute on the duties and functioning of the county court to be held under the supervision of the supreme court, unless such attendance is waived by the supreme court. Judges who are attorneys and who are taking office for the first time as county judge may attend this institute if they wish. All judges are entitled to their actual and necessary expenses while attending this institute. The supreme court shall establish the institute to which this subsection (5) refers and shall provide that it be held when the appointment of a sufficient number of nonlawyer county judges warrants, as determined by the chief justice.
Source: L. 64: p. 412, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-3. L. 67: p. 457, § 9. L. 69: p. 250, § 10. L. 72: p. 592, § 61. L. 73: p. 1402, § 30. L. 79: (3) amended and (4) repealed, pp. 599, 602, §§ 16, 30, effective July 1. L. 2014: (3) amended, (SB 14-058), ch. 102, p. 377, § 2, effective April 7.
13-6-204. Activities of judges.
- In counties of Class A and B, county judges shall devote their full time to judicial duties and shall not engage in the private practice of law. They may also serve as municipal judges in counties of Class A but may not do so in counties of Class B.
- In counties of Class C and D, county judges, if admitted to the bar, may engage in the private practice of law in courts other than the county court and in matters which have not and will not come before the county court and may serve as municipal judges.
- County judges of any class county may be appointed as magistrates in juvenile matters and as magistrates for the district court in mental health matters and shall receive no additional compensation for such service. County judges may accept appointment as magistrates in any other matter, and for such service a county judge is entitled to such compensation as the appointing district judge may allow, payable from funds provided under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-106.
Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-4. L. 79: (3) amended, p. 764, § 13, effective July 1. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 356, § 9, effective April 9.
13-6-205. Term and appointment of judges.
The term of office of county judges shall be four years. County judge appointments shall be made pursuant to section 20 of article VI of the state constitution. This section shall not apply to the city and county of Denver, and the term of office and manner of selection of county judges therein shall be determined by the charter and ordinances thereof.
Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-5. L. 72: p. 592, § 62.
13-6-206. Vacancies.
- If the office of a county judge, except in the city and county of Denver, becomes vacant because of death, resignation, failure to be retained in office pursuant to section 25 of article VI of the state constitution, or other cause, the governor, as provided in section 20 of article VI of the state constitution, shall appoint an individual possessing the qualifications specified in section 13-6-203.
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If the office of a county judge becomes vacant, the general assembly encourages the judicial district nominating commission in certifying the names of the nominees to the governor to give preference to persons who:
- Reside within the county in which the vacancy occurs; and
- Have been admitted to practice law in the state.
Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-6. L. 67: p. 457, § 10. L. 2016: Entire section amended, (SB 16-153), ch. 194, p. 684, § 1, effective August 10.
ANNOTATION
Vacancy exists if newly elected judge dies before possessing office. People v. Boughton, 5 Colo. 487 (1880) (decided under repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 122).
13-6-207. Bond. (Repealed)
Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-7. L. 69: p. 250, § 11. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.
13-6-208. Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges.
- In order to provide for the expeditious handling of county court business and for county court sessions in population centers which are not county seats, there may be created in counties designated by law the positions of special associate county judge, associate county judge, and assistant county judge.
- Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges, when so provided by law, except in the city and county of Denver, shall be elected or appointed at the same time, in the same manner, and for the same term, and shall possess the same qualifications, as the county judges of their respective counties. Vacancies in positions for special associate, associate, and assistant county judges shall be filled in the same manner as a vacancy in the office of county judge.
- The location of the official residence and court chambers for the purpose of holding court of special associate, associate, and assistant county judges shall be as prescribed by law. Travel and maintenance expenses shall be allowed special associate, associate, and assistant county judges only when they are performing official duties outside of their official places of residence.
- Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges when actually performing judicial duties shall have all the jurisdiction and power of a county judge, and their orders and judgments shall be those of the county court.
- Repealed.
- Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges in counties of Classes B, C, and D, if admitted to the bar, may engage in the private practice of law in courts other than the county court and in matters which have not and will not come before the county court, and may serve as municipal judges.
Source: L. 64: p. 414, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-8. L. 67: p. 457, § 11. L. 71: p. 370, § 1. L. 80: (5) repealed, p. 578, § 8, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
This statute does not purport to create a new court. Rather, it creates two new judicial positions, namely, that of associate county judge and assistant county judge. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455 , 444 P.2d 645 (1968).
The only difference between an associate or assistant county judge and a county judge relates to the emoluments which go with the respective judicial offices. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455 , 444 P.2d 645 (1968).
The jurisdiction and power of an associate or an assistant county judge is coequal with that of a full-fledged county judge. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455 , 444 P.2d 645 (1968).
Associate and assistant judges are part-time. Though the statute is silent on the matter, the general assembly must have intended that an associate county judge would perform, volumewise at least, about one-half the amount of work customarily performed by the county judge and the assistant county judge about one-fourth. Associate and assistant county judges are "part-time" -- not "full-time" -- county judges, even though under the statute they have all of the jurisdiction and power of a county judge. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455 , 444 P.2d 645 (1968).
Judge may sit in population centers other than the county seat. One purpose of the statute creating associate county judges is to locate judicial officers with the power and jurisdiction of a county judge in population centers which are not county seats. This is not special or local legislation of the type prohibited by our constitution, which prohibitions relate essentially to the organization, jurisdiction and practice of and in a given court, and not to the number or titles of judicial officers, who are authorized to preside in a particular court. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455 , 444 P.2d 645 (1968).
13-6-209. Special associate and associate county judges - designated counties.
- In the county of Montrose there shall be an associate county judge who shall maintain his or her official residence in Montrose county and court chambers in that portion of Montrose county that is included in the southwestern water conservation district as set forth and described in section 37-47-103, C.R.S.
- In the county of Garfield there shall be a special associate county judge who shall maintain his official residence and court chambers in the city of Rifle.
- In the county of Rio Blanco there shall be an associate county judge who shall maintain his official residence and court chambers in the city of Rangely.
- Repealed.
Source: L. 64: p. 414, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-9. L. 67: p. 485, § 2. L. 71: p. 371, § 2. L. 75: (4) repealed, p. 564, § 3, effective January 1, 1979. L. 2012: (1) amended, (HB 12-1323), ch. 105, p. 358, § 1, effective April 13.
ANNOTATION
Section is constitutional. Subsection (2) of this section does not violate § 25 of art. V, or § 19 of art. VI, Colo. Const., for there is no dispute that the general assembly has the power to determine the number of judges in each district. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455 , 444 P.2d 645 (1968).
13-6-210. Assistant county judges - designated counties. (Repealed)
Source: L. 64: p. 415, § 16. L. 65: p. 477, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-10. L. 67: p. 304, § 1. L. 69: p. 263, § 1. L. 72: p. 592, § 63. L. 77: (1) repealed, p. 785, § 2, effective July 1. L. 79: (3) amended, p. 607, § 1, effective May 18. L. 90: (2) repealed, p. 861, § 1, effective March 22. L. 92: (3) repealed, p. 275, § 3, effective February 12.
13-6-211. Appointment of clerk.
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- The position of clerk of the county court is established in counties of Classes A, B, C, and D, except as otherwise provided in this section and in section 13-3-107.
- In counties of Class A, the appointment of the clerk shall be made and his salary fixed as prescribed in the charter and ordinances of such county.
- In counties of Classes B, C, and D, the appointment and salary of the clerk shall be in accordance with the provisions of section 13-3-105.
- In such counties as may be determined by the chief justice, the functions of the office of the clerk of the county court may be performed by a consolidated office serving both the district and county courts, as provided in section 13-3-107.
- In any county in which there is no clerk of the county court provided pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105, the judge of the county court shall act as ex officio clerk without further compensation and have all the duties and powers of the clerk.
Source: L. 64: p. 416, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-14. L. 69: p. 251, § 14. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 599, § 17, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-211 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 191, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
A county judge may elect to perform the duties of clerk of his court and when he does so elect is authorized to issue and sign all processes from his court. But when a clerk has been appointed by a county judge, so long as the appointment is not revoked, the clerk or his deputy alone has power to discharge the clerical duties of the office, and a summons issued and signed by the judge is void notwithstanding the disqualification of the clerk to act on account of absence or sickness. McNevins v. McNevins, 28 Colo. 245, 64 P. 199 (1901).
A clerk may also be probation officer. There is no statutory inhibition against one person holding the offices of clerk of the county court and probation officer. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Wharton, 82 Colo. 466, 261 P. 4 (1927).
13-6-212. Duties of clerk.
- The powers and duties of the clerk of the county court shall be similar to the powers and duties of the clerk of the district court exclusive of the powers of the district court clerk in probate and shall include such duties as may be assigned to him by law, by court rules, and by the county judge.
-
Upon approval by the chief justice of the supreme court, the chief judge of a judicial district may authorize, either generally or in specific cases, the clerk of the county court to do the following:
- Issue bench warrants, misdemeanor or felony warrants, and writs of restitution upon written or oral order of a judge;
- Advise defendants in criminal cases of their procedural and constitutional rights;
- Accept pleas of not guilty in all criminal cases and set dates for hearings or trials in such cases;
- Subject to the requirements of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, enter default and default judgments and issue process for the enforcement of said judgments;
- Under the direction of a judge, grant continuances, set motions for hearing, and set cases for trial; and
- With the consent of the defendant, accept pleas of guilty and admissions of liability and impose penalties pursuant to a schedule approved by the presiding judge in misdemeanor cases involving violations of wildlife and parks and outdoor recreation laws for which the maximum penalty in each case is a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, and in misdemeanor traffic and traffic infraction cases involving the regulation of vehicles and traffic for which the penalty specified in section 42-4-1701, C.R.S., or elsewhere in articles 2 to 4 of title 42, C.R.S., in each case is less than three hundred dollars. A clerk shall not levy a fine of over said amounts nor sentence any person to jail. If, in the judgment of the clerk, a fine of over said amounts or a jail sentence is justified, the case shall be certified to the judge of the county court for rearraignment and trial de novo.
Source: L. 64: p. 417, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-15. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 608, § 1, effective April 25. L. 83: (2)(f) amended, p. 602, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: (2)(f) amended, p. 921, § 7, effective January 1, 1985. L. 94: (2)(f) amended, p. 2549, § 30, effective January 1, 1995.
Cross references: For court clerk's duties, see article 1 of this title and § 13-5-125; for law enforcement and penalties relating to wildlife and parks and outdoor recreation, see articles 6 and 15 of title 33.
13-6-213. Bond of clerk. (Repealed)
Source: L. 64: p. 417, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-16. L. 69: p. 251, § 15. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.
13-6-214. Other employees.
- In counties of Class A, such deputy clerks, assistants, reporters, stenographers, and bailiffs as shall be necessary for the transaction of the business of the county court may be appointed and their compensation fixed in the manner provided in the charter and ordinances thereof.
- In counties of Classes B, C, and D, there shall be appointed such deputy clerks, assistants, reporters, stenographers, and bailiffs as are necessary, in accordance with the provisions of section 13-3-105.
Source: L. 64: p. 417, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-17. L. 69: p. 252, § 16.
13-6-215. Presiding judges.
In each county court which has more than one county judge, the court, by rule, shall provide for the designation of a presiding judge. If there is a failure to select a presiding judge by rule, the chief justice shall designate a presiding judge.
Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 24. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-18. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 599, § 18, effective July 1.
13-6-216. Judges to sit separately.
In each county court which has more than one county judge, each judge shall sit separately for the trial of cases and the transaction of judicial business, and each court so held shall be known as the county court of the county wherein held. Each judge shall have all of the powers which he might have if he were the sole judge of the court, including the power to vacate his own judgments, decrees, or orders, or those of a predecessor when permitted by law, but not county court orders of another judge of the same county court who is still in office.
Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 25. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-19.
13-6-217. Judges may sit en banc.
In each county court which has more than one judge, the court may sit en banc for the purpose of making rules of court, the appointment of a clerk and other employees, pursuant to section 13-3-105, and the conduct of other business relating to the administration of the court, as authorized by and subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 26. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-20. L. 67: p. 458, § 14. L. 69: p. 252, § 17.
13-6-218. Assignment of county judges and retired county judges to other courts authorized.
Any county judge or retired county judge who has been licensed to practice law in this state for five years may be assigned by the chief justice of the supreme court, pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, to perform judicial duties in any district court, the probate court of the city and county of Denver, or the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver.
Source: L. 67: p. 458, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-21. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 570, § 4, effective November 14, 1986.
ANNOTATION
Chief justice of supreme court can properly delegate appointment powers to another judicial officer, and appointments by chief district judges are not limited to specific cases. There is no statutory basis for requiring the chief justice of the supreme court to personally make each temporary appointment. Furthermore, reading the statute to preclude delegation would bring it into conflict with art. VI, § 5(4), the constitutional provision expressly allowing the chief justice to delegate administrative powers. People v. McCulloch, 198 P.3d 1264 (Colo. App. 2008).
13-6-219. Judge as party to a case - recusal of judge upon motion.
- If a judge or former judge of a county court is a party in his or her individual and private capacity in a case that is to be tried within any county court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge is or was a judge of a county court, any party to the case may file a timely motion requesting that the judge who is appointed to preside over the case recuse himself or herself from the case.
- If a county court receives a motion filed by a party pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the judge who is appointed to preside over the case shall recuse himself or herself if he or she is a judge of a county court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge who is a party to the case in his or her individual and private capacity is or was a judge of a county court.
- If a judge recuses himself or herself pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court or his or her designee shall appoint a judge from outside the judicial district to preside over the case.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 436, § 2, effective August 5.
PART 3 GENERAL PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
13-6-301. Court rules.
Each county court possesses the power to make rules for the conduct of its business to the extent that such rules are not in conflict with the rules of the supreme court or the laws of the state, but are supplementary thereto. In each county court which has more than one judge, or has an associate judge sitting regularly, the court shall make such rules as it deems necessary for the classification, arrangement, and distribution of the business of the court among the several judges thereof. All county court rules are subject to review by the supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-1.
13-6-302. Terms of court.
Terms of the county court shall be fixed by rule of the court in each county; except that at least one term shall be held in each county in each year.
Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 28. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-2.
13-6-303. Place of holding court.
In each county, the county court shall sit at the county seat, and the county court by rule or order also may provide for hearing and trials to be held in locations other than the county seat. In particular, if the corporate limits of a municipality extend into two counties, the county court of either county, for the hearing of matters for which venue is properly laid before them or the requirements thereof are waived, may sit at any place within such municipality without regard to the location of the county line. Where the county court sits regularly at locations other than the county seat, proper venue within the county shall be fixed by court rule.
Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 29. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-3.
13-6-304. Court facilities.
The county commissioners shall provide court facilities at the county seat and are authorized to do so elsewhere. Such facilities may be provided by arrangement with municipal authorities, by rental, or by other appropriate means.
Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 30. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-4.
ANNOTATION
A county's duties under this section may not be reduced or ended pursuant to art. X, § 20(9) of the state constitution. State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).
13-6-305. Maintenance of records.
- Permanent records of the county court shall be maintained at the office of the clerk of the court at the county seat.
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- If the county court sits regularly at a location other than the county seat, and the court so provides by rule, cases may be docketed at such locations, and thereafter all pleadings, writs, judgments, and other documents in the case shall be filed at such other location.
- Repealed.
- In criminal cases, a single copy of items filed is sufficient. A notice of docketing of criminal cases with sufficient information to identify the defendant and the offense charged shall be forwarded forthwith to the clerk of the court at the county seat. After termination of the case, all records on file and a transcript of the judgment shall be forwarded to the county seat.
Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 31. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-5. L. 79: (2)(b) repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.
13-6-306. Seal.
The county court of each county shall have an appropriate seal.
Source: L. 64: p. 420, § 32. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-6.
13-6-307. Process.
- Each county court shall have the power to issue process necessary to acquire jurisdiction, to require attendance, and to enforce all orders, decrees, and judgments. Such process runs to any county within the state and, when authorized by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, may be served outside the state. Any sheriff to whom process is directed is authorized and required to execute the same, and he is entitled to the same fees as are allowed for serving like process from the district courts. Persons other than the sheriff or his deputies may also serve process from the county court when permitted by the Colorado rules of civil procedure or by law.
- Upon request of the court, the prosecuting county, or the defendant, the clerk of the county court shall issue a subpoena for the appearance, at any and all stages of the court's proceedings, of the parent, guardian, or lawful custodian of any child under eighteen years of age who is charged with the violation of a county ordinance. Whenever a person who is issued a subpoena pursuant to this subsection (2) fails, without good cause, to appear, the court may issue an order for the person to show cause to the court as to why the person should not be held in contempt. Following a show cause hearing, the court may make findings of fact and conclusions of law and may enter an appropriate order, which may include finding the person in contempt.
Source: L. 64: p. 420, § 33. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-7. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 908, § 1, effective April 28.
Cross references: For persons authorized to serve process, see C.R.C.P. 4(d); for personal and other service of process outside the state, see C.R.C.P. 4(e) and (g).
13-6-308. Juries.
- When required, juries shall be selected and summoned as provided for courts of record in articles 71 to 74 of this title, with such exceptions as are provided in this section. With the consent of the district court and the jury commissioners, the county court may, if feasible, use the same panel of jurors summoned for the district court. Jurors selected and summoned for the county court may also be used in municipal court in counties of Class A, as defined in section 13-6-201.
- If a county court sits regularly in a location other than the county seat and if jury trials are held at that location as well as at the county seat, the jury commissioner may establish jury districts within the county for the selection of county court jurors. The county shall be divided into as many such districts as there are locations in which the county court regularly holds jury trials, and each district shall include one such location as well as appropriate contiguous territory. In counties so divided, the jury commissioner shall select separate lists of persons from each jury district to serve as county court jurors within their respective districts. Such lists shall contain not less than one hundred names. When jurors are to be summoned for county court service within such districts, names shall be drawn from the list by the jury commissioner. In all other respects, the provisions of articles 71 to 74 of this title shall be followed in selecting, drawing, and summoning jurors in counties divided into county court jury districts.
Source: L. 64: p. 420, § 34. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-8. L. 71: p. 875, § 2. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 881, § 1, effective April 24. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1269, § 15, effective June 5.
13-6-309. Verbatim record of proceedings.
A verbatim record of the proceedings and evidence at trials in the county court shall be maintained by electronic devices or by stenographic means, as the judge of the court may direct, except when such record may be unnecessary in certain proceedings pursuant to specific provisions of law.
Source: L. 64: p. 421, § 35. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-9. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 600, § 19, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Judge's discretion to employ court reporters instead of electronic recording devices is subject to availability of funds in judicial department's consolidated operating budget and approval of chief justice acting as executive head of judicial system. Yeager v. Quinn, 767 P.2d 766 (Colo. App. 1988).
13-6-309.5. Traffic violations bureau - schedule of traffic offenses and fines or penalties - method of payment - effect of payment. (Repealed)
Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 787, § 1, effective January 10, 1978. L. 91: Entire section repealed, p. 1404, § 2, effective July 1.
13-6-310. Appeals from county court.
- Appeals from final judgments and decrees of the county courts shall be taken to the district court for the judicial district in which the county court entering such judgment is located. Appeals shall be based upon the record made in the county court.
- The district court shall review the case on the record on appeal and affirm, reverse, remand, or modify the judgment; except that the district court, in its discretion, may remand the case for a new trial with such instructions as it may deem necessary, or it may direct that the case be tried de novo before the district court.
- Repealed.
- Further appeal to the supreme court from a determination of the district court in a matter appealed to such court from the county court may be made only upon writ of certiorari issued in the discretion of the supreme court and pursuant to such rules as that court may promulgate.
Source: L. 64: p. 421, § 36. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-10. L. 85: (3) repealed and (4) amended, pp. 572, 570, §§ 12, 5, effective November 14, 1986.
Cross references: For review on certiorari from a county court as authorized by this section, see C.A.R. 49.
ANNOTATION
Analysis
- I. General Consideration.
- II. Statutory Right of Appeal.
- III. Action of the District Court.
- IV. Appeals to Supreme Court.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For article, "Criminal Law", see 32 Dicta 409 (1955). For article, "One Year Review of Contracts", see 39 Dicta 161 (1962). For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 66 (1963). For article, "Appeals of County Court, Municipal Court, and Magistrate Rulings", see 47 Colo. Law. 32 (Oct. 2018).
Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-310 is similar to repealed § 37-15-101, C.R.S. 1963, § 37-6-101, CRS 53, CSA, C. 46, § 165, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those sections have been included in the annotations to this section.
Although § 13-4-110 (3) provides that cases filed in wrong appellate court shall not be dismissed, where appeal will not lie in either court, the only review being by certiorari, the case must be dismissed for failure to comply with the statutory procedure. People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 598 P.2d 526 (1979).
Applied in Chavez v. People, 193 Colo. 50 , 561 P.2d 1270 (1977); People v. Gonzales, 198 Colo. 546 , 603 P.2d 139 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243 , 606 P.2d 1300 (1980); Garcia v. People, 200 Colo. 413 , 615 P.2d 698 (1980); People v. Luna, 648 P.2d 624 ( Colo. 1982 ).
II. STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL.
This section gives a statutory right of appeal. There is no constitutional right to an appeal from the county court to the district court; such right exists only when the general assembly has expressly or by clear implication declared in its favor. Callahan v. Jennings, 16 Colo. 471 , 27 P. 1055 (1891); Shapter v. Arapahoe County Court, 13 Colo. App. 484, 59 P. 59 (1892); Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536 , 341 P.2d 475 (1959).
This section provides that appeals from county courts shall be taken to the district courts. This is a statute general in nature. Russell v. Wheeler, 159 Colo. 588 , 413 P.2d 700 (1966).
Appeals of final judgments. This statute provides that appeals from final judgments and decrees of the county court "shall be" taken to the district court. People ex rel. City of Aurora v. Smith, 162 Colo. 72 , 424 P.2d 772 (1967).
An order vacating a previous order setting aside a judgment is not a final judgment from which an appeal will lie. Hayhurst v. Hayhurst, 91 Colo. 58 , 11 P.2d 804 (1932).
This section applies only to ordinary civil actions. Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536 , 341 P.2d 475 (1959).
Therefore, no appellate jurisdiction exists in district court in special statutory proceedings. The appellate jurisdiction of district courts from final judgments of county courts applies only to judgments rendered in ordinary civil actions. No such jurisdiction exists in special statutory proceedings. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Poundstone, 74 Colo. 191 , 220 P. 234 (1923); Selk v. Ramsey, 110 Colo. 223 , 132 P.2d 454 (1942); Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536 , 341 P.2d 475 (1959); Council of City of Englewood v. Nat'l Tea Co., 147 Colo. 96 , 362 P.2d 1048 (1961).
The section does not except from its operation those cases which are commenced in the municipal court and thereafter appealed to the county court. Appeal from all final judgments of the county court is now to be made to the district court. People ex rel. City of Aurora v. Smith, 162 Colo. 72 , 424 P.2d 772 (1967); People v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 84 , 492 P.2d 844 (1972).
Allowance of appeal from judgment by default. An appeal is allowable from the county court to the district court from a judgment by default on two conditions: First, that the party aggrieved make application to have the judgment by default set aside within 10 days after its rendition; and, second, that the appeal be taken within 10 days, or the time allowed by the court, after the refusal of the court to set aside the default. Johnson v. Lawson, 9 Colo. App. 128, 50 P. 1087 (1897); County Court v. Eagle Rock Gold Mining & Reduction Co., 50 Colo. 365, 115 P. 706 (1911).
Appeal from part of judgment permissible. Where a personal judgment was rendered in the county court against the lessees of a mining claim which was declared to be a lien against the mine, the owners of the mine could appeal to the district court from that part of the judgment declaring the lien without appealing from the entire judgment and without making the defendants, against whom personal judgment was rendered, parties to the appeal. Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 P. 354 (1900).
Objection to jurisdiction of district court on appeal may be waived. Plaintiff was nonsuited in the county court, and, without making a motion to set aside the nonsuit according to this section, he appealed to the district court. The defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal being there denied, he appeared as though there were no irregularities in the proceedings, and, without taking an exception to the ruling, renewing his objection or standing upon his motion, introduced witnesses, etc. It was held that he waived objection to the jurisdiction of the district court. Norton v. Young, 6 Colo. App. 187, 40 P. 156 (1895).
When a felony case starts in county court pursuant to § 16-5-101 (1)(c) and is resolved by a plea to only misdemeanor charges, it is a county court matter and an appeal must be made to the district court. People v. Vargas-Reyes, 2018 COA 181 , 434 P.3d 1198.
III. ACTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
Under the statute, the district court, upon appeal of the case to it, has three threshold alternatives: (1) It may review the case on the record; (2) it may remand the case for a new trial with instructions to the court from which appealed, or (3) it may direct that the case be tried de novo before it. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434 , 473 P.2d 982 (1970).
The general assembly, having provided for both review on the record and for trial de novo, recognized the historical differences between the two both procedurally and in substance, so it is incumbent on the courts to make the same differentiation in carrying out their functions under the statute. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434 , 473 P.2d 982 (1970).
A trial de novo conducted by the district court is not a review of the county court judgment; it is an entirely new proceeding. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).
A trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction, in the absence of statutory language restricting its scope, means a trial in the commonly accepted sense of that term in such court. Any court conducting such a trial may make its own findings and judgment. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434 , 473 P.2d 982 (1970).
The district court would have the power to make new and independent findings of fact if it were acting as a trial court. The statute provides a procedure whereby the district court can act as a trial court rather than as a court of review, if it directs the case be tried de novo before it. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434 , 473 P.2d 982 (1970).
Only in cases tried de novo by the district court will the district court judgment be subject to direct appeal. Justifiably, then, the defendant may seek direct appeal when the district court enters its judgment from a de novo trial. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).
The final judgment of the district court, following a trial de novo, thus, is subject to review by the court of appeals under both § 13-4-102 and this section. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).
Where the district court does not direct that the case be tried de novo before the district court, as it might do pursuant to subsection (2), the appeal is limited to review of the record on appeal and a consideration of the accompanying briefs and arguments. People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 513 , 485 P.2d 500 (1971).
It is bound by the findings of the trial court. The district court is reviewing the record on appeal from the county court and is bound by the findings of the trial court which have been determined on disputed evidence. People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 513 , 485 P.2d 500 (1971).
The function of the reviewing court is to correct any errors of law committed by the trial court and not to try, nor retry, issues of fact. The lack of sufficient competent evidence to support a finding of a material fact, however, would be a matter of law and fall within the court's powers on review. People v. Williams. 172 Colo. 434 , 473 P.2d 982 (1970).
It cannot act as a fact finder. Where the district court is exercising its powers of review rather than conducting a trial de novo, it cannot act as a fact finder. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434 , 473 P.2d 982 (1970).
Proper appeal from district court action is by writ of certiorari to the supreme court, and not by appeal to the court of appeals. Gallagher v. Ingram, 32 P.3d 50 (Colo. App. 2001).
IV. APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT.
Certiorari review does not suffice as an appellate review from a final judgment of the district court. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).
Subsequent appeal to the supreme court only on certiorari. Appeal to the supreme court from a determination of the district court in a matter appealed to such court from the county court may be made only on a writ of certiorari issued in the discretion of the supreme court. People ex rel. City of Aurora v. Smith, 162 Colo. 72 , 424 P.2d 772 (1967); People ex rel. Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Colo. 391 , 488 P.2d 66 (1971).
It must be distinguished from constitutional certiorari. The writ of certiorari mentioned in § 3 of art. VI, Colo. Const., is to be distinguished from, and not to be confused with, the statutory writ of certiorari provided for in this section. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448 , 468 P.2d 37 (1970).
"Further appeal" not limited to review of affirmances. The legislative authorization for "further appeal" is not limited to cases where the superior court's determination would otherwise end the matter, as in an affirmance of the trial court's judgment. People v. Dee, 638 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1981).
Review of superior court's reversal permitted. The state supreme court may review by certiorari a superior court's reversal of a county court judgment. People v. Dee, 638 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1981) (decided prior to abolition of superior courts in 1986).
For the supreme court granting certiorari, see Eyrich v. People, 161 Colo. 554 , 423 P.2d 582 (1967).
Applied in Lucero v. Goldberger, 804 P.2d 206 (Colo. App. 1990); Byrd v. People, 58 P.3d 50 ( Colo. 2002 ).
13-6-311. Appeals from county court - simplified procedure.
-
- If either party in a civil action believes that the judgment of the county court is in error, he or she may appeal to the district court by filing notice of appeal in the county court within fourteen days after the date of entry of judgment and by filing within the said fourteen days an appeal bond with the clerk of the county court. The bond shall be furnished by a corporate surety authorized and licensed to do business in this state as surety, or one or more sufficient private sureties, or may be a cash deposit by the appellant and, if the appeal is taken by the plaintiff, shall be conditioned to pay the costs of the appeal and the counterclaim, if any, and, if the appeal is taken by the defendant, shall be conditioned to pay the costs and judgment if the appealing party fails. The bond shall be approved by the judge or the clerk.
- Upon filing of the notice of appeal, the posting and approval of the bond, and the deposit by the appellant of an estimated fee in advance for preparing the record, the county court shall discontinue all further proceedings and recall any execution issued. The appellant shall then docket his or her appeal in the district court. A motion for new trial is not required as a condition of appeal. If a motion for new trial is made within fourteen days, the time for appeal shall be extended until fourteen days after disposition of the motion, but only matters raised on the motion for new trial shall be considered on an appeal thereafter.
-
- Upon the deposit of the estimated record fee, the clerk of the court shall prepare and issue as soon as possible a record of the proceedings in the county court, including the summons, the complaint, proof of service, and the judgment. The record shall also include a transcription of such part of the actual evidence and other proceedings as the parties may designate or, in lieu of transcription, to which they may stipulate. If a stenographic record has been maintained or the parties agree to stipulate, the party appealing shall lodge with the clerk of the court the reporter's transcript of the designated evidence or proceedings or a stipulation covering such items within forty-two days after the filing of the notice of appeal. If the proceedings have been recorded electronically, the transcription of designated evidence and proceedings shall be prepared in the office of the clerk of the county court, either by him or her or under his or her supervision, within forty-two days after the filing of the notice of appeal.
- The clerk shall notify, in writing, the opposing parties of the completion of the record, and the parties have fourteen days within which to file objections. If none are received, the record shall be certified forthwith by the clerk. If objections are made, the parties shall be called for hearing and the objections settled by the county judge as soon as possible and the record then certified.
- When the record has been duly certified and any additional fees therefor paid, it shall be filed with the clerk of the district court by the clerk of the county court, and the opposing parties shall be notified of such filing by the clerk of the county court.
- A written brief setting out matters relied upon as constituting error and outlining any arguments to be made shall be filed in the district court by the appellant within twenty-one days after filing of the record therein. A copy of the brief shall be served on the appellee. The appellee may file an answering brief within twenty-one days after such service. In the discretion of the district court, time for filing of briefs and answers may be extended.
- Unless there is further review by the supreme court upon writ of certiorari and pursuant to the rules of that court, after final disposition of the appeal by the district court, the judgment on appeal therein shall be certified to the county court for action as directed by the district court, except upon trials de novo held in the district court or in cases in which the judgment is modified, in which cases the judgment shall be that of the district court and enforced therefrom.
- Repealed.
Source: L. 64: p. 428, § 54. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-16-18. L. 80: (1) and (2)(b) amended, p. 511, § 1, effective April 6. L. 85: (6) repealed, p. 572, § 12, effective November 14, 1986. L. 2012: (1), (2), and (4) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 822, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2013: (1) and (2)(b) amended, (HB 13-1126), ch. 58, p. 192, § 3, effective July 1; (2) amended, (HB 13-1086), ch. 32, p. 77, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (2)(b) by House Bill 13-1086 and House Bill 13-1126 were harmonized.
ANNOTATION
Analysis
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For comment on Miller v. Miller, appearing below, see 31 Dicta 160 (1954). For article, "Appeals of County Court, Municipal Court, and Magistrate Rulings", see 47 Colo. Law. 32 (Oct. 2018).
Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-311 is similar to repealed § 37-6-11, CRS 53, CSA, C. 46, §§ 167, 168, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
This section is mandatory; and, although appellant, after the expiration of the prescribed time, dockets his appeal by paying his docket fee, the transcript should be remitted to the lower court on appellee's motion, so that the latter might proceed as though no appeal had been taken. Tierney v. Campbell, 7 Colo. App. 299, 44 P. 948 (1896); Thomas v. Beattie, 42 Colo. 235, 93 P. 1093 (1908).
Good faith and reasonable promptness are sufficient. On appeal from county to district court, when appellant has acted in good faith, with reasonable promptness, and no one has suffered, this section ought not to be so strictly construed as to deny the right of appeal. Markey v. People, 73 Colo. 466, 216 P. 526 (1923).
This section requires that after taking an appeal there shall be filed in the district court the record, including original process, pleadings, and other papers relating to the suit, and filed in the county court. Miller v. Miller, 129 Colo. 462 , 271 P.2d 411 (1954).
If appeal is not filed in time, district court lacks jurisdiction. Where a party does not lodge her appeal in a district court within the time required by this section, the court acquires no jurisdiction in the matter and has no authority to proceed in any manner in that action. McKelvey v. District Court, 140 Colo. 557 , 345 P.2d 726 (1959).
A motion to dismiss will be sustained after that time. Where an appeal from the county to the district court was not made within 10 days after the judgment, and no order extending the time in which to perfect an appeal was obtained, a motion to dismiss it should be sustained. Grove v. Foutch, 6 Colo. App. 357, 40 P. 852 (1895); Slattery v. Robinson, 7 Colo. App. 22, 42 P. 179 (1895).
This section provides for the filing of the original process, pleadings, and other papers with the clerk of a district court and for the docketing of the action in that court in appeals. Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536 , 341 P.2d 475 (1959).
A motion for new trial filed in apt time suspends a judgment so that it becomes final only when the motion is overruled. Kinney v. Yoelin Bros. Mercantile Co., 74 Colo. 295, 220 P. 998 (1923); Charles v. Sprott, 75 Colo. 90, 224 P. 222 (1924), citing Bates v. Woodward, 66 Colo. 555, 185 P. 351 (1919).
Time for docketing. Subsection (1)(b) and rule 411(a)(1) of the county court rules clearly provide that the docketing must take place no later than the time allowed for completing and lodging the record. Tumbarello v. Superior Court, 195 Colo. 83 , 575 P.2d 431 (1978).
Section applies only to civil actions. Where an information filed against defendant charges him with misdemeanors, the action is not a civil suit; hence is not governed by this section. Naranjo v. People, 130 Colo. 236 , 274 P.2d 607 (1954).
Appeal to superior court. The district court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the appeal process between the county and superior courts. Petry v. County Court, 666 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1983) (decided prior to abolition of superior courts in 1986).
Fact that district court may enforce its order in the event that there is no appeal does not impact the appellate process: Proper appeal from district court action is by writ of certiorari to the supreme court. Gallagher v. Ingram, 32 P.3d 50 (Colo. App. 2001).
II. APPEAL BOND.
The essential step in the perfection of an appeal is the filing of a bond; even though the party had given a notice of appeal, or had in some other manner manifested intent to appeal, the judicial requirement of a bond filed within 10 days would still remain. Wellmuth v. Rogers, 25 Colo. App. 386, 138 P. 69 (1914); Swingle v. Estate of Pollo, 145 Colo. 591 , 360 P.2d 808 (1961).
The filing of bond is a condition precedent to appeal. The filing of the bond required by this section, in the county court, "and its approval by the judge or clerk of said court", is a condition precedent to the appeal, and unless such steps are taken the district court is without jurisdiction. Fuller v. Fuller's Estate, 7 Colo. App. 555, 44 P. 72 (1896).
An appeal is not made until the bond is approved. This clause requires appeals to the district court to be "made" within 10 days after judgment is rendered. An appeal is not "made" until the appeal bond is approved. Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313 , 14 P.2d 693 (1932).
Giving appeal bond is not equivalent to a general appearance in the district court. This section clearly contemplates that in an appeal from the county to the district court, the appellant, if he has not entered his appearance in the county court, may be heard upon his appeal to object to the form of the summons, or the manner of serving the same, if he made that objection in the county court. Necessarily, therefore, giving of the appeal bond is not equivalent to a general appearance in the district court. White House Mt. Gold Mining Co. v. Powell, 30 Colo. 397, 70 P. 679 (1902).
Section does not prescribe any particular manner or form in which the appeal bond on appeal from a county court to a district court must be approved. Stephens v. Wheeler, 60 Colo. 351 , 153 P. 444 (1915); Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313 , 14 P.2d 693 (1932), citing Adams v. Decker, 50 Colo. 326 , 114 P. 654 (1911).
A county court party found to be indigent and allowed to proceed in forma pauperis is not required to post a judgment bond before appealing to district court. O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008).
However, as with appeals from the district court to the court of appeals, the prevailing party in the county court would be able to execute the judgment while the appeal is still pending because the judgment would not have been stayed by a judgment bond. O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008).
Judgment against sureties on appeal bond. On an appeal from the county to the district court from a judgment against the appellant where judgment in the district court is in favor of appellee, the court in entering up an absolute and unconditional judgment against the sureties on the appeal bond does simply what it is required to do by this section. By serving a scire facias upon the sureties they are given an opportunity to show cause why the judgment should not be enforced against them. Gutheil Suburban Inv. Co. v. Fahey, 12 Colo. App. 487, 55 P. 946 (1899).
Bond not containing proper statutory conditions. Where on appeal from the county court to the district court the appeal bond was conditioned to pay all costs and damages adjudged to the appellee on appeal and to satisfy the judgment appealed from instead of the statutory condition to pay any judgment the district court should render, and the district court rendered a judgment against appellant in a greater amount than that of the county court, the measure of the liability of the sureties on the appeal bond was the original judgment of the county court with interest and costs. Barela v. Tootle, 29 Colo. 52, 66 P. 899 (1901).
This section is not to be regarded as providing another mode of commencing civil actions; it does not provide for introducing a new cause of action into the suit in which the undertaking is given; but the true construction of the section is that by executing the undertaking the sureties are deemed to consent that they shall, under the contingencies specified in the undertaking, be considered parties to the original suit, and liable to judgment for the original cause of action against their principal. Shannon v. Dodge, 18 Colo. 164, 32 P. 61 (1893).
For the sufficiency of the bond, see Swingle v. Estate of Pollo, 145 Colo. 591 , 360 P.2d 808 (1961).
PART 4 COUNTY COURT - SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION
Law reviews: For article, "Changes to the Statutes and Rules Governing Procedures in Colorado Small Claims Courts", see 31 Colo. Law. 29 (Feb. 2002).
13-6-401. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations frequently do not pursue meritorious small civil claims because of the disproportion between the expense and time of counsel and litigation and the amount of money or property involved; that the law and procedures of civil litigation are technical and frequently unknown to persons who are representing themselves; that procedures for the inexpensive, speedy, and informal resolution of small claims in a forum where the rules of substantive law apply, but the rules of procedure and pleading and the technical rules of evidence do not apply, are desirable; that such procedures should be conducted at times convenient to the persons using them, including evening and Saturday sessions; that the personnel implementing and conducting such procedures should be trained and equipped to assist anyone with a small claim in a friendly, efficient, and courteous manner; and that, therefore, the establishment of a small claims division of the county court as provided in this part 4 is in the public interest.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 517, § 1, effective October 1. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 789, § 1, effective June 19. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1512, § 1, effective September 1.
ANNOTATION
The rules of substantive law apply in small claims actions. Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114 (Colo. 2001).
13-6-402. Establishment of small claims division.
There is hereby established in each county court a division designated as the small claims court.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 517, § 1, effective October 1.
13-6-403. Jurisdiction of small claims court - limitations.
- On and after January 1, 1996, the small claims court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the county and district courts in all civil actions in which the debt, damage, or value of the personal property claimed by either the plaintiff or the defendant, exclusive of interest and cost, does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars, including such civil penalties as may be provided by law. By way of further example, and not limitation, the small claims court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions in tort and assess damages therein not to exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars. The small claims court division shall also have concurrent original jurisdiction with the county and district courts in actions where a party seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant on residential property and the amount required to comply with the covenant does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, in actions where a party seeks replevin if the value of the property sought does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars, and in actions where a party seeks to enforce a contract by specific performance or to disaffirm, avoid, or rescind a contract and the amount at issue does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars.
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The small claims court shall have no jurisdiction except that specifically conferred upon it by law. In particular, it shall have no jurisdiction over the following matters:
- Those matters excluded from county court jurisdiction under section 13-6-105 (1) ;
- Actions involving claims of defamation by libel or slander;
- Actions of forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer;
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 2001, p. 1512 , § 2, effective September 1, 2001.)
- Actions brought or defended on behalf of a class;
- Actions requesting or involving prejudgment remedies;
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Actions involving injunctive relief, except as required to:
- Enforce restrictive covenants on residential property;
- Enforce the provisions of section 6-1-702.5 , C.R.S.;
- Accomplish replevin; and
- Enter judgments in actions where a party seeks to enforce a contract by specific performance or to disaffirm, avoid, or rescind a contract;
- Traffic violations and other criminal matters;
- Awards of body executions.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 879, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 544, § 1, effective July 1. L. 88: (1), (2)(e), and (2)(h) amended, p. 601, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: (1) amended, p. 849, § 4, effective May 31; (1) amended, p. 855, § 4, effective July 1. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 728, § 1, effective January 1, 1996. L. 2000: (2)(h) amended, p. 2034, § 3, effective August 2. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1512, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2008: (2)(h)(II) amended, p. 596, § 5, effective August 5.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.
ANNOTATION
Small claims court actions for monetary damages do not bar on the basis of res judicata subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for equitable relief in federal court. Ortiz v. Costilla County Bd. of Comm'rs, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Colo. 1998).
13-6-404. Clerk of the small claims court.
The clerk of the county court or a deputy designated by said clerk shall act as the clerk of the small claims court. The clerk of the small claims court shall provide such assistance as may be requested by any person regarding the jurisdiction, operations, and procedures of the small claims court; however, the clerk shall not engage in the practice of law. All necessary forms shall be available from the clerk.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1.
13-6-405. Magistrate in small claims court.
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In the following circumstances, a magistrate may hear and decide claims in a small claims court:
- In Class A counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, magistrates for small claims may be appointed by the presiding judge.
- In Class B counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, magistrates for small claims may be appointed, pursuant to section 13-3-105, if approved by the chief justice.
- A magistrate shall be a qualified attorney-at-law admitted to practice in the state of Colorado or a nonattorney if the nonattorney is serving as a county judge pursuant to section 13-6-203.
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While acting as a magistrate for small claims, a magistrate shall have the same powers as a judge.
(3.5) A magistrate shall have the power to solemnize marriages pursuant to the procedures in section 14-2-109, C.R.S.
- If any party files a timely written objection, pursuant to rule of the supreme court, with the magistrate conducting the hearing, that party's case shall be rereferred to a judge.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 459, § 1, effective April 5. L. 89: (3.5) added, p. 782, § 4, effective April 4. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 356, § 10, effective April 9. L. 2001: (2) and (4) amended, p. 1513, § 3, effective September 1.
Cross references: For magistrates in county courts, see part 5 of this article; for magistrates in district courts, see § 13-5-201.
13-6-406. Schedule of hearings.
The small claims court shall conduct hearings at such times as the judge or magistrate may determine or as the supreme court may order.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 356, § 11, effective April 9.
13-6-407. Parties - representation.
- Any natural person, corporation, partnership, association, or other organization may commence or defend an action in the small claims court, but no assignee or other person not a real party to the transaction which is the subject of the action may commence an action therein, except as a court-appointed personal representative, conservator, or guardian of the real party in interest.
-
-
- Notwithstanding the provisions of article 93 of this title 13, in the small claims court, an individual shall represent himself or herself; a partnership shall be represented by an active general partner or an authorized full-time employee; a union shall be represented by an authorized active union member or full-time employee; a for-profit corporation shall be represented by one of its full-time officers or full-time employees; an association shall be represented by one of its active members or by a full-time employee of the association; and any other kind of organization or entity shall be represented by one of its active members or full-time employees or, in the case of a nonprofit corporation, a duly elected nonattorney officer or an employee. (2) (a) (I) Notwithstanding the provisions of article 93 of this title 13, in the small claims court, an individual shall represent himself or herself; a partnership shall be represented by an active general partner or an authorized full-time employee; a union shall be represented by an authorized active union member or full-time employee; a for-profit corporation shall be represented by one of its full-time officers or full-time employees; an association shall be represented by one of its active members or by a full-time employee of the association; and any other kind of organization or entity shall be represented by one of its active members or full-time employees or, in the case of a nonprofit corporation, a duly elected nonattorney officer or an employee.
- It is the intent of this section that no attorney, except pro se or as an authorized full-time employee or active general partner of a partnership, an authorized active member or full-time employee of a union, a full-time officer or full-time employee of a for-profit corporation, or a full-time employee or active member of an association, which partnership, union, corporation, or association is a party, shall appear or take any part in the filing or prosecution or defense of any matter in the small claims court, except as permitted by supreme court rule.
- In actions arising under part 1 of article 12 of title 38, C.R.S., including, but not limited to, actions involving claims for the recovery of a security deposit or for damage to property arising from a landlord-tenant relationship, a property manager who has received security deposits, rents, or both, or who has signed a lease agreement on behalf of the owner of the real property that is the subject of the small claims action, shall be permitted to represent the owner of the property in such action.
-
- In any action to which the federal "Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940", as amended, 50 App. U.S.C. sec. 521, is applicable, the court may enter a default against a defendant who is in the military without entering judgment, and the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the interests of the defendant prior to the entry of judgment against the defendant.
- If an attorney appears, as permitted in subsection (2) or (3) of this section, the other party or parties in the case may be represented by counsel, if such party or parties so choose.
- Nothing contained in this section is intended to limit or otherwise interfere with a party's right to assign, or to employ counsel to pursue that party's rights and remedies subsequent to the entry of judgment by a small claims court.
- Any small claims court action in which an attorney appears shall be processed and tried pursuant to the statutes and court rules governing small claims court actions.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 88: (2) amended, pp. 602, 1438, §§ 3, 43, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1514, § 4, effective September 1. L. 2007: (3) amended, p. 2024, § 23, effective June 1. L. 2017: (2)(a)(I) amended, (SB 17-227), ch. 192, p. 704, § 5, effective August 9.
Cross references: For representation of closely held corporations before courts or administrative agencies, see § 13-1-127.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "What Is a Lawyer Doing in Small Claims Court?", see 13 Colo. Law. 430 (1984).
This section contains the only exception to the principle that a partnership is an entity separate and apart from its general partners and may be represented in court only by a licensed attorney. E & A Assoc. v. First Nat. Bank of Denver, 899 P.2d 243 (Colo. App. 1994).
13-6-408. Counterclaims exceeding jurisdiction of small claims court - procedures - sanctions for improper assertion.
Counterclaims exceeding the jurisdiction of the small claims court shall be removed to the county or district court of appropriate jurisdiction pursuant to rule of the supreme court. If a county or district court determines that a plaintiff who originally filed a claim in the small claims court is entitled to judgment and also that a counterclaim against the same plaintiff in the small claims action was filed solely to defeat the jurisdiction of the small claims court and was without merit, the county or district court may also award the plaintiff costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in prosecuting the action in the county or district court.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1576, § 14, effective July 10. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1515, § 5, effective September 1.
13-6-409. Trial procedure.
The judge or magistrate shall conduct the trial in such manner as to do justice between the parties and shall not be bound by formal rules or statutes of procedure or pleading or the technical rules of evidence, except for rules promulgated by the supreme court controlling the conduct of proceedings in the small claims court.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 789, § 2, effective June 19. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 356, § 12, effective April 9.
13-6-410. Appeal of a claim.
A record shall be made of all small claims court proceedings, and either the plaintiff or the defendant may appeal pursuant to county court rules. Upon appeal, all provisions of law and rules concerning appeals from the county court shall apply, including right to counsel. A tape recording of the trial proceedings shall satisfy any requirements of a transcript for appeal, upon the payment of a nominal fee by the appellant.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1775, § 32, effective June 6. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1515, § 6, effective September 1.
13-6-411. Limitation on number of claims filed.
- No plaintiff may file more than two claims per month, eighteen claims per year, in the small claims court of any county. Each claim filed in any small claims court shall contain a certification by the plaintiff that the plaintiff has not filed any more than two claims during that month and eighteen claims in that year in the small claims court of that county.
- The limitation imposed by subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a state-supported institution of higher education which files claims to recover loans or other outstanding obligations due to such institution; except that no such state-supported institution of higher education shall file more than a total of thirty such claims per month in all small claims courts in Colorado.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 880, § 3, effective July 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 792, § 1, effective June 3. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 544, § 2, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 289, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1) amended, p. 1515, § 7, effective September 1.
13-6-411.5. Place of trial.
- Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all actions in the small claims court shall be brought in the county in which any defendant at the time of filing of the claim resides, is regularly employed, is a student at an institution of higher education, or has an office for the transaction of business.
- Actions to enforce restrictive covenants and actions arising under part 1 of article 12 of title 38, C.R.S., including, but not limited to, actions involving claims for the recovery of a security deposit or for damage to property arising from a landlord-tenant relationship, may be brought in the county in which the defendant's property that is the subject of the action is situated.
- If a defendant appears and defends a small claims action on the merits at trial, such defendant shall be deemed to have waived any objection to the place of trial permitted under this section.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 850, § 5, effective May 31. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1515, § 8, effective September 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.
13-6-412. Notice to public.
The clerk of the small claims court shall publicize in an appropriate manner the existence of the small claims court, its procedures, and its hours of operation. Such publication shall be made so as to bring the court's existence to the attention of the entire community. The state court administrator shall publish a small claims court handbook outlining the procedures of the court in layman's language.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1.
13-6-413. Supreme court shall promulgate rules.
The supreme court shall implement this part 4 by appropriate rules of procedure for the small claims court.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1.
13-6-414. No jury trial.
There shall be no right to a trial by jury in the small claims court.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1.
13-6-415. Service of process.
Every defendant shall be notified that an action has been filed against that defendant in the small claims court either by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service of process, as provided by the rules of procedure for the small claims court. The clerk of the small claims court shall collect, in advance, the fee provided for in section 13-32-104 (1)(i) for each service of process attempted by certified mail.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 850, § 7, effective May 31. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1516, § 9, effective September 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.
13-6-416. Facilities.
No county shall be required to furnish new facilities pursuant to this part 4.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 3, effective October 1.
13-6-417. Execution and proceedings subsequent to judgment.
Execution and proceedings subsequent to judgment entered in the small claims division may be processed in the small claims division and shall be the same as in a civil action in the county court as provided by law.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 850, § 5, effective May 31.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.
PART 5 MAGISTRATE ADJUDICATION SYSTEM
Cross references: For magistrates in the small claims division of county courts, see § 13-6-405; for magistrates in district courts, see § 13-5-201.
13-6-501. County court magistrates - qualifications - duties.
- In Class A counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, county court magistrates may be appointed by the presiding judge.
- In Class B counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, county court magistrates may be appointed pursuant to section 13-3-105, if approved by the chief justice.
- Any county court magistrate shall be a qualified attorney-at-law admitted to practice in the state of Colorado and in good standing; except that a county court magistrate who hears only class A and class B traffic infraction matters need not be an attorney-at-law and except that any duly appointed county judge may act as a traffic magistrate regardless of whether he is an attorney-at-law.
-
Subject to the provision that no magistrate may preside in any trial by jury, county court magistrates shall have power to hear the following matters:
- Class 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses and class A and class B traffic infractions, as defined in section 42-4-1701, C.R.S.;
- Such other matters as determined by rule of the supreme court.
(4.5) County court magistrates shall have the power to solemnize marriages pursuant to the procedures in section 14-2-109, C.R.S.
(4.7) County court magistrates shall have the power to preside over matters specified in section 13-17.5-105.
- Except in class A and class B traffic infraction matters, before a county court magistrate may hear any matter, all parties thereto shall have waived, on the record, their right to proceed before a county judge. If any party fails to waive such right, or objects to the magistrate, that party's case shall be rereferred to a county judge.
- Magistrates, when handling county court matters and class A and class B traffic infraction matters and where the parties to such proceedings, other than traffic infraction matters, shall have waived their right to proceed before a county judge, shall have all the jurisdiction and power of a county judge, and their orders and judgments shall be those of the county court.
- Procedure in matters heard by a county court magistrate shall be determined by statute and by rules promulgated by the supreme court and by local rules.
- The duties, qualifications, compensation, conditions of employment, and other administrative details concerning magistrates who hear traffic infraction matters not set forth in this part 5 shall be established in accordance with the provisions of section 13-3-105.
- The supreme court shall adopt such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this part 5 relating to traffic infraction matters, including, but not limited to, procedural matters.
- Existing space provided by a county, including already existing courtroom and administrative space, shall be used to the maximum extent possible for hearings on traffic infraction matters.
- Before any county court magistrate is appointed pursuant to the provisions of this part 5, the judicial department shall consult with the board of county commissioners of the affected county or counties regarding any additional space or facilities that may be required. All feasible alternatives shall be considered and the least costly alternative shall be accepted by the department whenever practicable.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 791, § 1, effective January 1, 1978. L. 82: (3), (4)(a), (5), and (6) amended and (8) to (11) added, p. 653, § 1, effective January 1, 1983. L. 83: (3) amended, p. 602, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (4)(a) amended, p. 1495, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89: (4.5) added, p. 782, § 5, effective April 4. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 357, § 13, effective April 9. L. 94: (4)(a) amended, p. 2549, § 31, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (4.7) added, p. 480, § 3, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Salutary purposes of informal traffic infraction hearings would be frustrated if collateral estoppel were to be applied so as to limit a full and fair consideration of the issue in a criminal trial. Williamsen v. People, 735 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1987).
Magistrates exercise authority only at the discretion of the judges who appoint them. Therefore no impropriety in the provision of a court memorandum prohibiting magistrates from conducting bond hearings. Wiegand v. Larimer County Court Magistrate, 937 P.2d 880 (Colo. App. 1996).
13-6-502. Jury trials.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 16-10-109, C.R.S., or any other provision of law, the right to a jury trial shall not be available at a hearing before a magistrate where the cited person is charged with a class A or a class B traffic infraction.
Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 654, § 2, effective January 1, 1983. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1775, § 33, effective June 6.
13-6-503. Evidence offered by officer.
At any hearing on a class A or class B traffic infraction, the officer who issued the citation shall offer evidence of the facts concerning the alleged infraction either in person or by affidavit, as such affidavit may be established by rules adopted by the supreme court pursuant to section 13-6-501 (9). If such officer appears personally, the magistrate and the cited person may then examine such officer. The cited party shall have the right to call the officer by subpoena as in the case of other civil matters.
Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 654, § 2, effective January 1, 1983. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 358, § 14, effective April 9.
13-6-504. Appeals procedure.
- Any appeal, either by the state or the cited person, from a judgment entered pursuant to this part 5 shall be processed as an appeal from the county court.
- The district attorney or deputy district attorney shall represent the state on the appeal.
- The state may appeal only a ruling by a magistrate that declares a state statute unconstitutional or unenforceable. Whether or not to appeal shall be in the discretion of the district attorney.
Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 654, § 2, effective January 1, 1983. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 358, § 15, effective April 9.
ARTICLE 7 SUPERIOR COURTS
13-7-101 to 13-7-112. (Repealed)
Source: L. 85: Entire article repealed, p. 572, § 12, effective November 14, 1986.
Editor's note: This article was numbered as article 10 of chapter 37, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this article prior to its repeal in 1986, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
ARTICLE 8 JUVENILE COURT OF DENVER
Section
13-8-101. Establishment.
Pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of article VI of the Colorado constitution, there is hereby established the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver.
Source: L. 64: p. 437, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-1.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The Denver Juvenile Court", see Den. B. Ass'n R. 1 (May 1928). For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).
13-8-102. Court of record - powers.
The juvenile court shall be a court of record with such powers as are inherent in constitutionally created courts and with such legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction and carry out its orders, judgments, and decrees as are possessed by the district courts.
Source: L. 64: p. 437, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-2.
ANNOTATION
Jurisdiction to enter money judgment against Denver department of social services. It is within the jurisdiction of the Denver juvenile court to enter a money judgment against the Denver department of social services to require payment for the costs of the care and maintenance of a minor found to be a child in need of supervision. City & County of Denver v. Brockhurst Boys Ranch, Inc., 195 Colo. 22 , 575 P.2d 843 (1978).
Enforcement of a money judgment against the Denver department of social services for payments that should have gone to party is within the juvenile court's jurisdiction. People in Interest of D.C., 797 P.2d 840 (Colo. App. 1990).
Applied in People in Interest of R.J.G., 38 Colo. App. 148, 557 P.2d 1214 (1976).
13-8-103. Jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver is as set forth in sections 19-1-104, 19-2.5-103, and 19-4-109 for juvenile courts, as defined in section 19-1-103.
Source: L. 64: p. 437, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-3. L. 67: p. 1051, § 7. L. 78: (1)(h) amended, p. 262, § 44, effective May 23; (1)(b) amended, p. 367, § 13, effective July 1, 1979. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 560, § 8, effective April 5. L. 85: (1)(d)(I) amended, p. 688, § 7, effective March 1; entire section R&RE, p. 690, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 6, effective October 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1688, § 14, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 709, § 8, effective October 1.
ANNOTATION
The juvenile court is a statutory court with no jurisdiction beyond that expressly given by statute. Maniatis v. Karakitsios, 161 Colo. 378 , 422 P.2d 52 (1967) (decided under repealed § 37-9-2, C.R.S. 1963).
No general jurisdiction to litigate controversies arising outside jurisdictional areas encompassed within this section. City & County of Denver v. Brockhurst Boys Ranch, Inc., 195 Colo. 22 , 575 P.2d 843 (1978).
Order to Denver department of welfare within court's jurisdiction. The juvenile court did not exceed its jurisdiction, or lack jurisdiction, to order the Denver department of welfare to return a child who was adjudicated in need of supervision to a group care facility. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157 , 511 P.2d 898 (1973).
Denver juvenile court was within its jurisdiction in ordering the Denver department of social services to refund respondent's federal tax refund which had been obtained through a federal income tax refund intercept program designed to collect delinquent child support payment. People in Interest of G.S., 678 P.2d 1033 (Colo. App. 1983).
The juvenile court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition to determine the paternity of an unborn child. The juvenile court may, in its discretion in a proper case, issue temporary orders providing for protection, support, or medical or surgical treatment as it deems in the best interest of the child prior to adjudication or disposition of the petition to determine paternity. People in Interest of an Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445 , 457 P.2d 698 (1969).
13-8-104. Number of judges.
There shall be three judges of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver.
Source: L. 64: p. 438, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-4. L. 73: p. 496, § 1.
13-8-105. Qualifications of judges.
A judge of the juvenile court shall be a qualified elector of the city and county of Denver at the time of his election or selection and shall have been licensed to practice law in the state of Colorado for five years at such time. He shall be a resident of the city and county of Denver during his term of office.
Source: L. 64: p. 438, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-5.
13-8-106. Activities of judge.
A judge of the juvenile court shall devote his full time to judicial duties and shall not engage in the private practice of law while serving in office.
Source: L. 64: p. 438, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-6.
ANNOTATION
License of attorney revoked for violating this section. An attorney who, while occupying the position of juvenile judge, practiced his profession for compensation in violation of this section, held guilty of unprofessional conduct, his license revoked, and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law in this state. People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Lindsey, 86 Colo. 458, 283 P. 539 (1929) (decided under repealed CSA, C. 46, § 205).
13-8-107. Term of office.
The term of office of a judge of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver shall be six years.
Source: L. 64: p. 439, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-8. L. 67: p.459, § 16. L. 73: p. 496, § 2.
13-8-108. Vacancies.
If the office of juvenile court judge becomes vacant because of death, resignation, failure to be retained in office pursuant to section 25 of article VI of the state constitution, or other cause, the vacancy shall be filled by the governor as provided in section 20 of article VI of the state constitution.
Source: L. 64: p. 439, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-9. L. 67: p. 459, § 17.
13-8-109. Magistrates.
The judges of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver may appoint magistrates, as provided in section 19-1-108, C.R.S.
Source: L. 64: p. 440, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-11. L. 67: p. 1052, § 8. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 764, § 14, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 7, effective October 1. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 1109, § 60, effective May 31.
13-8-110. Clerk.
- The judges of the juvenile court shall appoint a clerk of the juvenile court pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105.
- Repealed.
- The powers and duties of the clerk of the juvenile court shall be similar to the powers and duties of the clerk of the district court. The duties of the clerk of the juvenile court shall also include such matters as may be assigned to him by law, by court rules, and by the juvenile judges.
Source: L. 64: p. 440, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-12. L. 69: p. 252, § 20. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1; (2) repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.
13-8-111. Other employees.
The judges of the juvenile court shall also appoint, pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105, probation officers and such other employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions and duties of the juvenile court, including the clerk's office thereof.
Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-13. L. 69: p. 252, § 21. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 600, § 20, effective July 1.
13-8-112. Judges may sit en banc - presiding judge.
The judges of the juvenile court may sit en banc for the purpose of making rules of court, the appointment of a clerk and other employees pursuant to section 13-3-105, and the conduct of other business relating to the administration of the court, including the selection of a presiding judge, as authorized by and subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-14. L. 67: p. 460, § 19. L. 69: p. 253, § 22.
13-8-113. Judges to sit separately.
In the juvenile court, each of the judges shall sit separately for the trial of cases and the transaction of judicial business, and each of the courts so held shall be known as the juvenile court. Each judge shall have all of the powers which he might have if he were the sole judge of the court, including the power to vacate his own judgments, decrees, or orders, or those of a predecessor when permitted by law, but not juvenile court orders of another judge of the juvenile court who is still in office.
Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-15.
13-8-114. Practice and procedure.
Practice and procedure in the juvenile court shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this article and title 19, C.R.S.
Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-16. L. 67: p. 1052, § 9.
13-8-115. Rules of court.
The juvenile court has the power to make rules for the conduct of its business to the extent that such rules are not in conflict with the rules of the supreme court or the laws of the state but are supplementary thereto. Juvenile court rules are subject to review by the supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-17.
ANNOTATION
A local rule of court is reviewable pursuant to this statute. In re Rules by Juvenile Court, 178 Colo. 268 , 496 P.2d 1014 (1972).
A memorandum opinion is not reviewable under this section. To the extent that a memorandum opinion is or may be construed by some as a local rule, it is not, in the manner and under the circumstances under which it is rendered, reviewable under this section. In re Rules by Juvenile Court, 178 Colo. 268 , 496 P.2d 1014 (1972).
13-8-116. Terms.
Terms of the juvenile court shall be fixed by rule of court; but at least one term shall be held each year.
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-18.
13-8-117. Seal.
The juvenile court shall have a seal, bearing upon the face thereof the words "The Juvenile Court of the City and County of Denver, Colorado".
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-19.
13-8-118. Process.
The juvenile court has the power to issue process necessary to acquire jurisdiction, to require attendance, and to enforce all orders, decrees, and judgments. Such process runs to any county within the state and, when authorized by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure in civil cases, or the Colorado rules of criminal procedure in criminal cases, may be served outside of the state. Any sheriff to whom process is directed is authorized and required to execute the same and shall be entitled to the same fees as are allowed by law for serving like process from the district court. Persons other than the sheriff or his deputies also may serve process from the juvenile court when permitted by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure in civil cases or the Colorado rules of criminal procedure in criminal cases.
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-20.
13-8-119. Venue.
Venue in the juvenile court is described in sections 19-2.5-104, 19-3-201, 19-4-109, 19-5-102, 19-5-204, and 19-6-102.
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-21. L. 67: p. 1053, § 10. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 8, effective October 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1688, § 15, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 709, § 9, effective October 1.
13-8-120. Sheriff to attend.
It is the duty of the sheriff of the city and county of Denver to attend in the juvenile court.
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-22.
13-8-121. Appearance by district attorney and city attorney.
Upon the request of the court, the district attorney shall represent the state in the interest of the child in any proceedings brought under section 19-1-104 (1)(a), C.R.S., and the city attorney shall represent the state in the interest of the child in any other proceedings.
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-23. L. 67: p. 1053, § 11.
13-8-122. Juries.
When required, juries may be selected and summoned as provided for courts of record in articles 71 to 74 of this title. With the permission of the district court, the juvenile court may use the panel of jurors summoned for the district court of the second judicial district.
Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 24. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-24. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1270, § 16, effective June 5.
13-8-123. Judgments.
The judgments of the juvenile court shall be enforceable in the same manner as judgments of the district court and, when appropriate, may be made liens upon real estate or other property in the manner provided by law for judgments of the district court.
Source: L. 64: p. 443, § 25. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-25.
Cross references: For procedures for attachment and duration of a judgment lien, see § 13-52-102.
ANNOTATION
Jurisdiction to enter money judgment against Denver department of social services. It is within the jurisdiction of the Denver juvenile court to enter a money judgment against the Denver department of social services to require payment for the costs of the care and maintenance of a minor found to be a child in need of supervision. City & County of Denver v. Brockhurst Boys Ranch, Inc., 195 Colo. 22 , 575 P.2d 843 (1978).
Applied in People in Interest of R.J.G., 38 Colo. App. 148, 557 P.2d 1214 (1976).
13-8-124. Appellate review.
Appellate review of any order, decree, or judgment may be taken to the supreme court or the court of appeals, as provided by law and the Colorado appellate rules. Initials shall appear on the record on appeal in place of the name of the child. Appeals from orders or decrees concerning legal custody, the allocation of parental responsibilities, termination of parent-child legal relationships, and adoptions shall be advanced upon the calendar of the supreme court or of the court of appeals and shall be decided at the earliest practicable time.
Source: L. 64: p. 443, § 26. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-26. L. 67: p.1053, § 12. L. 69: p. 270, § 9. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 1029, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 9, effective October 1. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 1392, § 25, effective February 1, 1999.
13-8-125. Fees.
The fees charged by the juvenile court and the clerk thereof shall be those provided in article 32 of this title.
Source: L. 64: p. 443, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-27.
13-8-126. Supervision by supreme court.
The supervisory powers of the supreme court established by article 3 of this title shall extend to the juvenile court.
Source: L. 64: p. 444, § 30. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-30.
ARTICLE 9 PROBATE COURT OF DENVER
Cross references: For the Colorado rules of probate procedure, see chapter 27 of the Colorado court rules.
Section
13-9-101. Establishment.
Pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of article VI of the Colorado constitution, there is hereby established the probate court of the city and county of Denver.
Source: L. 64: p. 445, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-1.
13-9-102. Court of record - powers.
The probate court shall be a court of record with such powers as are inherent in constitutionally created courts and with such legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction and carry out its orders, judgments, and decrees as are possessed by the district courts.
Source: L. 64: p. 445, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-2.
13-9-103. Jurisdiction.
-
The probate court of the city and county of Denver has original and exclusive jurisdiction in said city and county of:
- The administration, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents, wards, and absentees;
- Property vested in any person under a legal disability but paid to or held by another for such person's use or benefit as authorized by court order or as authorized by a power contained in a will or trust instrument;
- Property vested in any minor pursuant to the "Colorado Uniform Transfers to Minors Act", or any predecessor act thereto, or any act having a substantially similar legal effect;
- The probate of wills;
- The granting of letters testamentary, of administration, of guardianship, and of conservatorship;
- The administration of guardianships of minors and of persons declared mentally incompetent and of conservatorships of persons with mental health disorders or persons with an intellectual and developmental disability and of absentees;
- Proceedings under article 23 of title 17 and articles 10 to 15 of title 27, C.R.S.;
- The determination of heirship in probate proceedings and the devolution of title to property in probate proceedings;
- Actions on the official bonds of fiduciaries appointed by it;
- The construction of wills;
- The administration of testamentary trusts, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section; and
- All other probate matters.
- If a testamentary trust is established by the will of the decedent and if it appears that it was not the intention of the testator that the court should continue the administration of the estate after the payment in full of all debts and legacies except the trust property, the court shall proceed to final settlement of such estate as in other cases, order the trust fund or property to be turned over to the trustee as such, and shall not require the filing of inventories and accounts, or supervise the administration of the trust; except that any party in interest of such trust, including the trustee thereof, may invoke the jurisdiction of the probate court with respect to any matters pertaining to the administration or distribution of such trust or to construe the will under which it was established.
-
The court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection with decedents', wards', and absentees' estates, so far as the question concerns any person who is before the court by reason of any asserted right in any of the property of the estate or by reason of any asserted obligation to the estate, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the jurisdiction:
- To give full and complete legal and equitable relief in any case in which it is alleged that the decedent breached an agreement to make or not to make a will;
- In any case in which a district court could grant such relief in a separate action brought therein, to impose or raise a trust with respect to any of the property of the decedent or any property in the name of the decedent, individually or in any other capacity, in any case in which the demand for such relief arises in connection with the administration of the estate of a decedent;
- To partition any of the real or personal property of any estate in connection with the settlement thereof.
- Nothing in this article shall prevent any district court sitting in law or equity from construing a will which is not before the probate court or from determining questions arising in connection with trusts which are not under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
- The court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising out of or in connection with express trusts.
- The provisions of articles 10 to 20 of title 15, article 23 of title 17, and articles 10 to 15 of title 27, C.R.S., shall govern the issuance and service and proof of service of any process, notice, citation, writ, or order of court and shall govern all other proceedings had pursuant to the powers of the court recited in subsections (1) and (2) of this section. The Colorado rules of civil procedure shall govern such matters when the proceedings are had pursuant to the powers granted to the court under any of the other provisions of this section.
- With respect to any trust established by or for an individual with his or her assets, income, or property of any kind, notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, the court shall not authorize, direct, or ratify any trust that either has the effect of qualifying or purports to qualify the trust beneficiary for federal supplemental security income, or public or medical assistance pursuant to title 26, C.R.S., unless the trust meets the criteria set forth in sections 15-14-412.6 to 15-14-412.9, C.R.S., and any rule adopted by the medical services board pursuant to section 25.5-6-103, C.R.S.
Source: L. 64: p. 445, § 3. L. 65: pp. 483, 484, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-3. L. 67: p. 103, § 1. L. 79: (1)(g) and (6) amended, p. 1634, § 22, effective July 19. L. 84: (1)(c) amended, p. 394, § 4, effective July 1. L. 94: (7) added, p. 1604, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2000: (7) amended, p. 1832, § 3, effective January 1, 2001. L. 2006: (7) amended, p. 2001, § 46, effective July 1; (1)(f) amended, p. 1395, § 35, effective August 7. L. 2017: (1)(f) amended, (HB 17-1046), ch. 50, p. 156, § 3, effective March 16; (1)(f) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1292, § 106, effective May 25.
Cross references: (1) For the "Colorado Uniform Transfers to Minors Act", see article 50 of title 11.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the Denver Probate Court", see 46 Den. L.J. 496 (1969). For article, "Will Contests -- Some Procedural Aspects", see 15 Colo. Law. 787 (1986). For article, "Probate Jurisdiction for Creditors' Claims", see 29 Colo. Law. 57 (May 2000). For article, "Sitting Pretty in Probate: What Sandstead Means for Probate Jurisdiction", see 48 Colo. Law. 50 (Jan. 2019).
Specific enumeration of court's subject-matter jurisdiction is applicable to all district courts sitting in probate matters since all probate courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction vested by this title. Lembach v. Lembach, 622 P.2d 606 (Colo. App. 1980).
In determining proper jurisdiction as between district court and probate court, the court must look at the facts alleged, the claims asserted, and the relief requested. Here, where the complaints were premised upon defendant's alleged legal malpractice in the drafting of the estate instruments, the estate planning, and the implementation of the estate plan, the complaints were not considered probate claims, and, therefore, jurisdiction lay with the district court not the probate court. Levine v. Katz, 192 P.3d 1008 (Colo. App. 2006).
Probate court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims of legal malpractice where plaintiff does not seek to recover assets of the estate. Levine v. Katz, 167 P.3d 141 (Colo. App. 2006).
The phrase "in connection with" in subsection (3)(a) is a grant of authority to resolve disputes logically relating to an estate. This grant of jurisdiction presupposes, by necessary implication, the possibility that a person may have a valid claim to property claimed by an estate, and therefore contemplates that such property, while claimed by the estate, does not belong to the estate. In re Estate of Murphy, 195 P.3d 1147 (Colo. App. 2008); In Interest of Black, 2018 COA 7 , 422 P.3d 592.
In evaluating the child's best interests, the probate court did not exceed its jurisdiction by directing the GAL to find a permanent guardian or by considering the potential for a future adoption. Nothing in this section deprives the district court of the authority to appoint a guardian for a child. In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726 (Colo. 2007).
When extrinsic fraud is shown to exist, a judgment may be collaterally attacked, for such fraud renders the judgment not merely irregular, but void. As such, the judgment has neither life nor incipience and as a nullity it may be attacked directly or collaterally at any time. In re Estate of Bonfils, 190 Colo. 70 , 543 P.2d 701 (1975).
Intrinsic frauds, however, cannot give rise to collateral attack, though they may create voidable judgments, be the basis of a successful direct appeal, or be the subject of a motion for relief from judgment. In re Estate of Bonfils, 190 Colo. 70 , 543 P.2d 701 (1975).
Probate court had jurisdiction to order cancellation of bonds and release of security held by trustee pursuant to municipal revenue bond trust indenture. Petition of First Interstate Bank, 767 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 1988).
Trial court sitting in probate had jurisdiction under subsection (3)(b) to resolve dispute because the dispute presented a question as to whether multiple-party account funds that one daughter moved to another bank account that her sister could not access were part of mother's probate estate. Sandstead-Corona v. Sandstead, 2018 CO 26, 415 P.3d 310.
The probate court has the authority, in the appropriate circumstances, to instruct trustee to act or not act to carry out the court's goal in the administration of such trust without relying on C.R.C.P. 65. When a trustee's administration of a trust is challenged, the probate court has the authority to issue an injunction against the trustee without establishing grounds for a preliminary injunction to prevent further depletion of the trust while proper distribution of the trust is determined. In re Estate of Scott, 77 P.3d 906 (Colo. App. 2003).
13-9-104. Number of judges.
There shall be one judge of the probate court of the city and county of Denver.
Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-4.
13-9-105. Qualifications of judges.
A judge of the probate court shall be a qualified elector of the city and county of Denver at the time of his selection and shall have been licensed to practice law in the state of Colorado for five years at such time. He shall be a resident of the city and county of Denver during his term of office. He shall not engage in the private practice of law while serving in office.
Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-5.
13-9-106. Compensation of judges.
A probate judge shall receive an annual salary as provided by law.
Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-6.
Cross references: For salaries of probate judges, see § 13-30-103.
13-9-107. Appointment and term of office.
- The term of office of a probate judge shall be six years.
- A probate judge shall be appointed for the probate court of the city and county of Denver in the same manner provided for the appointment of district judges.
Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-7. L. 67: p. 460, § 20.
13-9-108. Vacancies.
If the office of probate court judge becomes vacant because of death, resignation, failure to be retained in office pursuant to section 25 of article VI of the state constitution, or other cause, the vacancy shall be filled by the governor as provided in section 20 of article VI of the state constitution.
Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-8. L. 67: p. 460, § 21.
13-9-109. Clerk.
- The judge of the probate court shall appoint a clerk of the probate court pursuant to section 13-3-105.
- Repealed.
- The powers and duties of the clerk of the probate court shall be similar to the powers and duties of the clerk of the district court including such powers as may be delegated to the clerk of the district court in probate matters. The duties of the clerk of the probate court shall also include such matters as may be assigned to him by law, by court rules, and by the probate judge.
Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-10. L. 69: p. 253, § 25. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 424, § 15, effective July 1; (2) repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
No authority to set aside divorce decree. Constitutional and statutory provisions vest in the probate court the authority to decide, inter alia, matters relating to the probate of wills. They do not, however, confer authority upon the probate court to disregard the rules relating to collateral attacks on judgments and to set aside a divorce decree of a district court which has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. In re Estate of Bonfils, 190 Colo. 70 , 543 P.2d 701 (1975).
13-9-110. Other employees.
The judge of the probate court shall appoint pursuant to section 13-3-105 such deputy clerks, assistants, reporters, stenographers, and bailiffs as may be necessary for the transaction of the business of the court.
Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-11. L. 69: p. 253, § 26.
13-9-111. Practice and procedure.
Practice and procedure in the probate court shall be conducted in accordance with laws providing special proceedings for matters within its jurisdiction and with the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-12.
13-9-112. Rules of court.
The probate court has the power to make rules for the conduct of its business to the extent that such rules are not in conflict with the rules of the supreme court or the laws of the state but are supplementary thereto. Probate court rules are subject to review by the supreme court.
Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-13.
13-9-113. Terms.
Terms of the probate court shall be fixed by rule of court, but at least one term shall be held each year.
Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-14.
13-9-114. Seal.
The probate court shall have a seal, bearing upon the face thereof the words: "The Probate Court of the City and County of Denver, Colorado".
Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-15.
13-9-115. Process.
The probate court has the power to issue process necessary to acquire jurisdiction, to require attendance, and to enforce all its orders, decrees, and judgments. Such process runs to any county within the state and, when authorized by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, may be served outside the state. Any sheriff to whom process is directed is authorized and required to execute the same and shall be entitled to the same fees as are allowed by law for serving like process from the district court. Persons other than the sheriff or his deputies also may serve process from the probate court when permitted by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-16.
Cross references: For procedures and persons authorized to serve process of the district court, see C.R.C.P. 4.
13-9-116. Venue.
Venue in the probate court shall be determined as provided in articles 10 to 20 of title 15, C.R.S., or by other applicable statutes prescribing special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-17.
13-9-117. Juries.
When required, juries may be selected and summoned as provided for courts of record in articles 71 to 74 of this title. With the permission of the district court, the probate court may use the panel of jurors summoned for the district court of the second judicial district.
Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-18. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1270, § 17, effective June 5.
13-9-118. Judgments.
The judgments of the probate court shall be enforceable in the same manner as judgments of the district court and may be made liens upon real estate or other property in the manner provided by law for judgments of the district court.
Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-19.
Cross references: For procedures for attachment and duration of a judgment lien, see § 13-52-102.
13-9-119. Appeals.
Appellate review of final judgments of the probate court shall be by the supreme court or by the court of appeals, as provided by law, and shall be conducted in the same manner as prescribed by the Colorado appellate rules for review by the court of appeals and the supreme court of final judgments of the district courts.
Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-20. L. 69: p. 270, § 10.
13-9-120. Fees.
The fees charged by the probate court and the clerk thereof shall be those provided in article 32 of this title.
Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-21.
13-9-121. Funds.
Funds for the operation of the probate court, including the salaries of the employees thereof, shall be provided in the same manner as funds are provided for the establishment and operation of the district courts for the second judicial district.
Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-22. L. 69: p. 254, § 27.
13-9-122. Supervision by supreme court.
The supervisory powers of the supreme court established by article 3 of this title extend to the probate court.
Source: L. 64: p. 450, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-23.
13-9-123. National instant criminal background check system - reporting.
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On and after March 20, 2013, the state court administrator shall send electronically the following information to the Colorado bureau of investigation created pursuant to section 24-33.5-401, referred to in this section as the "bureau":
- The name of each person who has been found to be incapacitated by order of the court pursuant to part 3 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S.;
- The name of each person who has been committed by order of the court to the custody of the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 27-81-112; and
- The name of each person with respect to whom the court has entered an order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-107, for extended certification for treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-108, or for long-term care and treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-109.
(1.5) Not more than forty-eight hours after receiving notification of a person who satisfies the description in paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of subsection (1) of this section, the state court administrator shall report such fact to the bureau.
- Any report made by the state court administrator pursuant to this section shall describe the reason for the report and indicate that the report is made in accordance with 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g)(4).
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The state court administrator shall take all necessary steps to cancel a record made by the state court administrator in the national instant criminal background check system if:
- The person to whom the record pertains makes a written request to the state court administrator; and
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No less than three years before the date of the written request:
- The court entered an order pursuant to section 15-14-318, C.R.S., terminating a guardianship on a finding that the person is no longer an incapacitated person, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a finding of incapacity;
- The period of certification or commitment of the most recent order of certification, commitment, recertification, or recommitment expired, or the court entered an order terminating the person's incapacity or discharging the person from certification or commitment in the nature of habeas corpus, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on an order of certification or commitment to the custody of the office of behavioral health in the department of human services; except that the state court administrator shall not cancel any record pertaining to a person with respect to whom two recommitment orders have been entered pursuant to section 27-81-112 (7) and (8), or who was discharged from treatment pursuant to section 27-81-112 (11), on the grounds that further treatment is not likely to bring about significant improvement in the person's condition; or
- The record in the case was sealed pursuant to section 27-65-107 (7), or the court entered an order discharging the person from certification in the nature of habeas corpus pursuant to section 27-65-113, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a court order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of a mental health disorder.
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Pursuant to section 102 (c) of the federal "NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007" (Pub.L. 110-180), a court, upon becoming aware that the basis upon which a record reported by the state court administrator pursuant to subsection (1) of this section does not apply or no longer applies, shall:
- Update, correct, modify, or remove the record from any database that the federal or state government maintains and makes available to the national instant criminal background check system, consistent with the rules pertaining to the database; and
- Notify the attorney general that such basis does not apply or no longer applies.
Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 754, § 2, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2010: (1)(b), (1)(c), (3)(b)(II), and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 781, § 16, effective April 29. L. 2013: IP(1), (2), IP(3), (3)(a), and (3)(b)(II) amended and (1.5) and (4) added, (HB 13-1229), ch. 47, p. 134, § 4, effective March 20. L. 2017: IP(1), (1)(b), and (3)(b)(II) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1252, § 7, effective May 25. L. 2018: (1)(c) and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 18-091), ch. 35, p. 383, § 10, effective August 8. L. 2020: (1)(b) amended, (SB 20-007), ch. 286, p. 1414, § 44, effective July 13; (3)(b)(II) and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 282, § 4, effective September 14.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-091, see section 1 of chapter 35, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-136, see section 1 of chapter 70, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
Certification for involuntary short-term mental health treatment entered by a professional person under § 27-65-107 is not a court order under subsection (1)(c) of this section and a person's information should not be sent to the bureau for forwarding on to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, which would subject the person to federal firearms prohibitions. Ray v. People, 2019 COA 24 , 456 P.3d 54.
13-9-124. National instant criminal background check system - judicial process for awarding relief from federal prohibitions - legislative declaration.
- Legislative declaration. The purpose of this section is to set forth a judicial process whereby a person may apply or petition for relief from federal firearms prohibitions imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (d)(4) and (g)(4), as permitted by the federal "NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007" (Pub.L. 110-180, sec. 105).
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Eligibility. A person may petition for relief pursuant to this section if:
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- He or she has been found to be incapacitated by order of the court pursuant to part 3 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S.;
- He or she has been committed by order of the court to the custody of the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 27-81-112; or
- The court has entered an order for the person's involuntary certification for short-term treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-107, for extended certification for treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-108, or for long-term care and treatment of a mental health disorder pursuant to section 27-65-109; and
- He or she is a person to whom the sale or transfer of a firearm or ammunition is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (d)(4), or who is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g)(4).
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Due process. In a court proceeding pursuant to this section:
- The petitioner shall have an opportunity to submit his or her own evidence to the court concerning his or her petition;
- The court shall review the evidence; and
- The court shall create and thereafter maintain a record of the proceeding.
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Proper record. In determining whether to grant relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the court shall receive evidence concerning, and shall consider:
- The circumstances regarding the firearms prohibitions imposed by 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g)(4);
- The petitioner's record, which must include, at a minimum, the petitioner's mental health records and criminal history records; and
- The petitioner's reputation, which the court shall develop, at a minimum, through character witness statements, testimony, or other character evidence.
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Proper findings.
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Before granting relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the court shall issue findings that:
- The petitioner is not likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
- Granting relief to the petitioner is not contrary to the public interest.
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- If the court denies relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the petitioner may petition the court of appeals to review the denial, including the record of the denying court.
- A review of a denial shall be de novo in that the court of appeals may, but is not required to, give deference to the decision of the denying court.
- In reviewing a denial, the court of appeals has discretion, but is not required, to receive additional evidence necessary to conduct an adequate review.
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Before granting relief to a petitioner pursuant to this section, the court shall issue findings that:
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1229), ch. 47, p. 135, § 5, effective March 20. L. 2017: (2)(a)(II) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1252, § 8, effective May 25. L. 2018: (2)(a)(III) amended, (SB 18-091), ch. 35, p. 384, § 11, effective August 8. L. 2020: (2)(a)(II) amended, (SB 20-007), ch. 286, p. 1414, § 45, effective July 13.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-091, see section 1 of chapter 35, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
MUNICIPAL COURTS
ARTICLE 10 MUNICIPAL COURTS
Law reviews: For article, "Colorado's Municipal System", see 30 Colo. Law. 33 (Dec. 2001); for article, "The Right to a Jury Trial in Petty Offense Cases", see 45 Colo. Law. 27 (Dec. 2016).
Section
13-10-101. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly finds that the right to a trial by jury for petty offenses, as defined in section 16-10-109, C.R.S., is of vital concern to all of the people of the state of Colorado and that the interests of the state as a whole are so great that the general assembly shall retain sole legislative jurisdiction over the matter, which is hereby declared to be of statewide concern.
Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-1. L. 70: p. 150, § 2. L. 72: p. 266, § 2. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 654, § 3, effective January 1, 1983.
13-10-102. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
- "Municipal court" includes police courts and police magistrate courts created or existing under previous laws or under a municipal charter and ordinances.
- "Municipal judges" includes police magistrates as defined and used in previous laws.
- "Qualified municipal court of record" means a municipal court established by, and operating in conformity with, either local charter or ordinances containing provisions requiring the keeping of a verbatim record of the proceedings and evidence at trials by either electric devices or stenographic means, and requiring as a qualification for the office of judge of such court that he has been admitted to, and is currently licensed in, the practice of law in Colorado.
Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-1. L. 70: p. 150, § 2. L. 72: p. 266, § 2.
13-10-103. Applicability.
This article 10 applies to and governs the operation of municipal courts in the cities and towns of this state. Except for the provisions relating to the method of salary payment for municipal judges, the incarceration of children pursuant to sections 19-2.5-305 and 19-2.5-1511, the appearance of the parent, guardian, or lawful custodian of any child under eighteen years of age who is charged with a municipal offense as required by section 13-10-111, the right to a trial by jury for petty offenses pursuant to section 16-10-109, rules of procedure promulgated by the supreme court, and appellate procedure, this article 10 may be superseded by charter or ordinance enacted by a home rule city.
Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-1. L. 70: p. 150, § 2. L. 72: p. 266, § 2. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1041, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 10, effective October 1. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 909, § 2, effective April 28. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1688, § 16, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 709, § 10, effective October 1. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3208, § 338, effective March 1, 2022.
ANNOTATION
Right to trial by jury even if city charter denies it. In cases involving petty offenses, there is a right to a jury trial, even in a municipal court of a home rule city whose city charter has expressly denied such right. Hardamon v. Municipal Court, 178 Colo. 271 , 497 P.2d 1000 (1972).
Right to jury trial not abridged by forum for trial. The statutory right to a jury trial cannot be abridged on account of the forum in which the petty offense is tried. City of Aurora ex rel. People v. Erwin, 706 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1983).
Courts of home-rule cities are not excepted from the purview of municipal court rules of procedure issued by the supreme court. Alessi v. Municipal Court, 38 Colo. App. 153, 556 P.2d 87 (1976); Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 ( Colo. 1992 ).
The general assembly has made it clear that the power of home-rule cities over the operation of their municipal courts has some limitations, specifically in relation to rules of procedure. Alessi v. Municipal Court, 38 Colo. App. 153, 556 P.2d 87 (1976).
There is no violation of the due process clause in a trial before a nontenured judge. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977).
There is nothing to show that a trial before a nontenured judge in and of itself is sufficient to taint the fairness of the trial, thereby denying due process or equal protection. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977).
Tenure decision lies in hands of citizens of home-rule cities. The fact that the term of office for municipal judges is not included in the exceptions in this section clearly indicates the general assembly's recognition that the tenure decision lies in the hands of the citizens of home-rule cities. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977); Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 856 P.2d 823 ( Colo. 1993 ).
13-10-104. Municipal court created - jurisdiction.
The municipal governing body of each city or town shall create a municipal court to hear and try all alleged violations of ordinance provisions of such city or town.
Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-2.
ANNOTATION
Limitation on power of courts. This section does not give municipal courts the power to provide relief similar to that provided by remedial or original writs. City of Englewood v. Parkinson, 703 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1985).
Prerequisites of a written demand and $25 fee for a jury trial pursuant to C.R.M.P. 223 and this section do not violate defendant's right to a jury trial or deprive him of equal protection of the laws under the federal constitution. Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1992).
13-10-105. Municipal judge - appointment - removal.
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- Unless otherwise provided in the charter of a home rule city, the municipal court shall be presided over by a municipal judge who shall be appointed by the municipal governing body for a specified term of not less than two years and who may be reappointed for a subsequent term; except that the initial appointment under this section may be for a term of office which expires on the date of the next election of the municipal governing body. Any vacancy in the office of municipal judge shall be filled by appointment of the municipal governing body for the remainder of the unexpired term.
- The municipal governing body may appoint such assistant judges as may be necessary to act or such substitute judges as circumstances may require in case of temporary absence, sickness, disqualification, or other inability of the presiding or assistant municipal judges to act.
- In the event that more than one municipal judge is appointed, the municipal governing body shall designate a presiding municipal judge, who shall serve in this capacity during the term for which he was appointed.
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A municipal judge may be removed during his or her term of office only for cause. A judge may be removed for cause if:
- He is found guilty of a felony or any other crime involving moral turpitude;
- He has a disability which interferes with the performance of his duties and which is or is likely to become of a permanent character;
- He has willfully or persistently failed to perform his duties;
- He or she has a substance use disorder that is not in remission; or
- The municipality required the judge, at the time of appointment, to be a resident of the municipality, or county in which the municipality is located, and he subsequently becomes a nonresident of the municipality or the county during his term of office.
Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-3. L. 77: (2)(c) and (2)(d) amended and (2)(e) added, p. 793, § 1, effective June 3. L. 91: (1)(b) amended, p. 742, § 1, effective April 4. L. 2017: IP(2) and (2)(d) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1293, § 107, effective May 25.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
ANNOTATION
There is no violation of the due process clause in a trial before a nontenured judge. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977).
There is nothing to show that a trial before a nontenured judge in and of itself is sufficient to taint the fairness of the trial, thereby denying due process or equal protection. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977).
The fact that the term of office for municipal judges is not included in the exceptions in § 13-10-103 clearly indicates the general assembly's recognition that the tenure decision lies in the hands of the citizens of home-rule cities. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977).
Home-rule cities to specify terms of tenure. Subsection (1)(a), read in context with § 6 of art. XX, Colo. Const., makes it clear that the statute's unambiguous language offers home-rule cities the opportunity to specify the terms under which a municipal judge holds his office. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977).
The decision of a home-rule city to appoint judges removable at the will of the city council is consistent with this section. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144 , 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977).
Likewise, a city charter that provides for the appointment of a municipal judge by the city council for a fixed term and that limits the removal of a judge only for cause does not violate this section. Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 856 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1993).
13-10-106. Qualifications of municipal judges.
- A municipal judge shall have the same qualifications as a county judge in a Class D county, as set forth in section 13-6-203 (3).
- Preference shall be given by the municipal governing body, when possible, to the appointment of a municipal judge who is licensed to practice law in Colorado or who is trained in the law.
- The municipal governing body may appoint a county judge in a Class C or D county, as defined in section 13-6-203, to serve as a municipal judge.
- The municipal governing body may require that the municipal judge be a qualified elector of the municipality or the county in which the municipality is located.
Source: L. 69: p. 274, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-4. L. 77: (1) amended and (4) added, p. 793, § 2, effective June 3.
13-10-107. Compensation of municipal judges.
- The municipal governing body shall provide by ordinance for the salary of the municipal and assistant judges. Such salary shall be a fixed annual compensation and payable on a monthly or other periodic basis. The municipal governing body may pay any substitute judge appointed pursuant to section 13-10-105 (1)(b) based upon the number of court sessions served by such judge.
- (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 742 , § 2, effective April 4, 1991.)
Source: L. 69: p. 274, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-5. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 742, § 2, effective April 4.
13-10-108. Clerk of the municipal court.
- The municipal governing body shall establish the position of clerk of the municipal court, except that the municipal judge shall serve as ex officio clerk if the business of the court is insufficient to warrant a separate full-time or part-time clerk.
- The clerk of the municipal court shall be appointed by the presiding municipal judge and shall have such duties as are delegated to him by law, court rule, or the presiding municipal judge.
- The municipal governing body shall provide for the salary of the clerk of the municipal court in the same manner as specified in section 13-10-107; except that if the municipal judge serves as ex officio clerk, he shall not receive any additional compensation.
Source: L. 69: p. 274, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-6.
13-10-109. Bond.
- The clerk of the municipal court shall give a performance bond in the sum of two thousand dollars, or in such amount as may be set by ordinance, to the city or town for which he is appointed.
- The performance bond shall be approved by the municipal governing body and be conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties, and for the faithful accounting for, and payment of, all funds deposited with or received by the court.
- When the municipal judge serves as clerk of the municipal court, as provided in section 13-10-108 (3), he shall execute the performance bond required by this section.
- The governing body of the city or town may waive the bond required by this section.
Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-7. L. 89: (4) added, p. 1287, § 1, effective April 6.
13-10-110. Court facilities and supplies.
- The municipal governing body shall furnish the municipal court with suitable courtroom facilities and sufficient funds for the acquisition of all necessary books, supplies, and furniture for the proper conduct of the business of the court.
- In order to carry out the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the municipal governing body may locate court facilities outside of the municipality or county in which the municipality is located, if such facilities are in reasonable proximity to the municipality and the governing body determines that suitable facilities cannot be provided within the municipality.
- Any two or more governments may cooperate or contract, pursuant to part 2 of article 1 of title 29, C.R.S., to provide joint court facilities and supplies. Such joint facilities may be located outside of any or all of the cooperating or contracting governments but shall be located within reasonable proximity to each of the cooperating or contracting governments.
- Where, pursuant to this section, a municipality locates its court facilities outside of its boundaries, any reference in this article to the municipality in which the court is located shall mean the municipality creating the municipal court, and any reference in this article to the county in which the municipal court is located shall mean the county in which the municipality creating the court is located.
Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-8. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 567, § 1, effective June 13.
13-10-111. Commencement of actions - process.
- Any action or summons brought in any municipal court to recover any fine or enforce any penalty or forfeiture under any ordinance shall be filed in the corporate name of the municipality in which the court is located by and on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado.
- Any process issued from a municipal court runs in the corporate name of the municipality by and on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado. Processes from any municipal court shall be executed by any authorized law enforcement officer from the municipality in which the court is located.
- Any authorized law enforcement officer may execute within such officer's jurisdiction any summons, process, writ, or warrant issued by a municipal court from another jurisdiction arising under the ordinances of such municipality for an offense which is criminal or quasi-criminal. For the purposes of this subsection (3), traffic offenses shall not be considered criminal or quasi-criminal offenses unless penalty points may be assessed under section 42-2-127 (5)(a) to (5)(cc), C.R.S. The issuing municipality shall be liable for and pay all costs, including costs of service or incarceration incurred in connection with such service or execution.
- The clerk of the municipal court shall issue a subpoena for the appearance of any witness in municipal court upon the request of either the prosecuting municipality or the defendant. The subpoena may be served upon any person within the jurisdiction of the court in the manner prescribed by the rules of procedure applicable to municipal courts. Any person subpoenaed to appear as a witness in municipal court shall be paid a witness fee in the amount of five dollars.
- Upon the request of the municipal court, the prosecuting municipality, or the defendant, the clerk of the municipal court shall issue a subpoena for the appearance, at any and all stages of the court's proceedings, of the parent, guardian, or lawful custodian of any child under eighteen years of age who is charged with a municipal offense. Whenever a person who is issued a subpoena pursuant to this subsection (5) fails, without good cause, to appear, the court may issue an order for the person to show cause to the court as to why the person should not be held in contempt. Following a show cause hearing, the court may make findings of fact and conclusions of law and may enter an appropriate order, which may include finding the person in contempt.
Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-9. L. 77: (3) amended, p. 793, § 3, effective June 3. L. 78: (3) amended, p. 262, § 45, effective May 23. L. 81: (5) added, p. 882, § 1, effective April 30. L. 94: (5) amended, p. 909, § 3, effective April 28; (3) amended, p. 2549, § 32, effective January 1, 1995.
13-10-111.5. Notice to municipal courts of municipal holds.
- If a person is detained in a jail on a municipal hold and does not immediately receive a personal recognizance bond, the jail shall promptly notify the municipal court of any municipal hold; except that, if the municipal hold is the sole basis to detain the person, the jail shall notify the municipal court of the municipal hold within four hours. All municipal courts shall establish an e-mail address, if internet service is available, whereby the municipal court can receive notifications from jails. If internet service is not available, the municipal court shall establish a telephone line with voicemail for the same purpose. All jails shall be deemed to have met this notice requirement by sending an e-mail, fax, or teletype to the municipal court or, if these options are unavailable, leaving a voicemail with the municipal court, relaying the notice required in this section.
- Once a municipal court receives notice that the defendant is being held solely on the basis of a municipal hold, the municipal court shall hold a hearing within two calendar days, excluding Sundays and federal holidays; except that, if the defendant has failed to appear in that case at least twice and the defendant is incarcerated in a county different from the county where the demanding municipal court is located, the demanding municipal court shall hold a hearing within four calendar days, excluding Sundays and federal holidays.
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At the hearing required in subsection (2) of this section, the municipal court shall either:
- Arraign the defendant; or
- If the defendant was arrested for failure to appear, conduct the proceedings for which the defendant failed to appear, unless that proceeding is a trial or an evidentiary hearing or requires the presence of a witness.
- If the case is not resolved at this hearing, the municipal court shall immediately conduct a bond hearing to consider and set the least restrictive conditions, if any, for the defendant's release on bond.
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At the hearing required in subsection (2) of this section, the municipal court shall either:
- If the defendant does not appear before the municipal court for a hearing within the time frames required by subsection (2) of this section, the jail holding the defendant shall release the defendant on an unsecured personal recognizance bond with no other conditions returnable to the municipal court. This subsection (4) does not apply if the defendant refused to cooperate with the court's attempts to hold the hearing in compliance with subsection (2) of this section.
- Each municipal court shall adopt standing orders to implement subsection (4) of this section and shall provide the orders to each jail in the county where the municipal court is located. In every arrest warrant issued by a municipal court, the municipal court shall order that the defendant be released on a personal recognizance bond with no other conditions if the defendant does not appear before the municipal court for a hearing within the time frames required by subsection (2) of this section.
Source: L. 2017: Entire section added, (HB 17-1338), ch. 375, p. 1939, § 2, effective January 1, 2018.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 17-1338, see section 1 of chapter 375, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
13-10-112. Powers and procedures.
- The municipal judge of any municipal court has all judicial powers relating to the operation of his court, subject to any rules of procedure governing the operation and conduct of municipal courts promulgated by the Colorado supreme court. The presiding municipal judge of any municipal court has authority to issue local rules of procedure consistent with any rules of procedure adopted by the Colorado supreme court.
- The judicial powers of any municipal judge shall include the power to enforce subpoenas issued by any board, commission, hearing officer, or other body or officer of the municipality authorized by law or ordinance to issue subpoenas.
Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-10. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 742, § 3, effective April 4.
ANNOTATION
Contempt power is implied by need to maintain order and decorum indispensable to judicial proceedings. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
Determination whether or not certain conduct constitutes contempt is within the trial court's sound discretion, and it is not reviewable on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Tipton v. City of Lakewood ex rel. People, 198 Colo. 18 , 595 P.2d 689 (1979).
It is not designed to protect judge's dignity or person. A judge's power to punish contempt committed in his presence is not designed to protect his own dignity or person, but to protect the rights of litigants and the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be thwarted or obstructed. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
Contempt power must be exercised with self-restraint. Like other inherent judicial powers, the contempt power must be exercised with patience and self-restraint. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
While a court may have inherent power to perform its judicial functions effectively, the method a court chooses to use in exercising its inherent power must be one which the court has jurisdiction to utilize. City of Englewood v. Parkinson, 703 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1985).
Judges must be cautious to avoid overreacting when persons not familiar with court procedures, through ignorance or frustration, unintentionally cause minor commotions. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
When contempt power should be invoked. Since the contempt power is rooted in the necessity to maintain the respectful atmosphere appropriate to efficient administration of justice, it should be invoked only when the judicial process has been seriously affronted or disrupted. Only then is there a need to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court or to reestablish the respect owed to it. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
One cannot be convicted of contempt for respectfully declining to comply with an order which is beyond the court's authority. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
Invocation of contempt power to punish valid exercise of constitutional right is an abuse of discretion by the court. Tipton v. City of Lakewood ex rel. People, 198 Colo. 18 , 595 P.2d 689 (1979).
Ordering husband to reveal remarks to wife. A municipal judge had no authority, without the consent of the defendant or his wife, to order him to reveal what he had told her. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
Evidence insufficient to support contempt conviction. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
Where the record indicates that the only substantial delay or disruption in court proceedings occurred after the judge required the defendant to return to the courtroom, sought to force him to divulge his prior remarks to his wife, and had him handcuffed in open court, that disruption cannot be attributed to the defendant's conduct. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341 , 558 P.2d 576 (1977).
13-10-113. Fines and penalties.
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- Except as provided in subsection (1)(b) of this section, any person convicted of violating a municipal ordinance in a municipal court of record may be incarcerated for a period not to exceed three hundred sixty-four days or fined an amount not to exceed two thousand six hundred fifty dollars, or both.
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- The limitation on municipal court fines set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall be adjusted for inflation on January 1, 2014, and on January 1 of each year thereafter.
- As used in this paragraph (b), "inflation" means the annual percentage change in the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, consumer price index for Denver-Boulder, all items, all urban consumers, or its successor index.
(1.5) Any person convicted of violating a municipal ordinance in a municipal court which is not of record may be incarcerated for a period not to exceed ninety days or fined an amount not to exceed three hundred dollars, or both.
- In sentencing or fining a violator, the municipal judge shall not exceed the sentence or fine limitations established by ordinance. Any other provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the municipal judge may suspend the sentence or fine of any violator and place him on probation for a period not to exceed one year.
- The municipal judge is empowered in his discretion to assess costs, as established by the municipal governing body by ordinance, against any defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who enters into a plea agreement or who, after trial, is found guilty of an ordinance violation.
- Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a municipal court has the authority to order a child under eighteen years of age confined in a juvenile detention facility operated or contracted by the department of human services or a temporary holding facility operated by or under contract with a municipal government for failure to comply with a lawful order of the court, including an order to pay a fine. Any confinement of a child for contempt of municipal court shall not exceed forty-eight hours.
- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a juvenile, as defined in section 19-2.5-102, arrested for an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance, convicted of violating a municipal ordinance or probation conditions imposed by a municipal court, or found in contempt of court in connection with a violation or alleged violation of a municipal ordinance must not be confined in a jail, lockup, or other place used for the confinement of adult offenders but may be held in a juvenile detention facility operated by or under contract with the department of human services or a temporary holding facility operated by or under contract with a municipal government that shall receive and provide care for the juvenile. A municipal court imposing penalties for violation of probation conditions imposed by such court or for contempt of court in connection with a violation or alleged violation of a municipal ordinance may confine a juvenile pursuant to section 19-2.5-305 for up to forty-eight hours in a juvenile detention facility operated by or under contract with the department of human services. In imposing any jail sentence upon a juvenile for violating any municipal ordinance when the municipal court has jurisdiction over the juvenile pursuant to section 19-2.5-103 (1)(a)(II), a municipal court does not have the authority to order a juvenile under eighteen years of age to a juvenile detention facility operated or contracted by the department of human services.
- Whenever the judge in a municipal court of record imposes a fine for a nonviolent municipal ordinance or code offense, if the person who committed the offense is unable to pay the fine at the time of the court hearing or if he or she fails to pay any fine imposed for the commission of such offense, in order to guarantee the payment of such fine, the municipal judge may compel collection of the fine in the manner provided in section 18-1.3-506, C.R.S. For purposes of this subsection (6), "nonviolent municipal ordinance or code offense" means a municipal ordinance or code offense which does not involve the use or threat of physical force on or to a person in the commission of the offense.
- Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (1.5) of this section, the municipal judge of each municipality which implements an industrial wastewater pretreatment program pursuant to the federal act, as defined in section 25-8-103 (8), C.R.S., may provide such relief and impose such penalties as are required by such federal act and its implementing regulations for such programs.
- If, as a condition of or in connection with any sentence imposed pursuant to this section, a municipal court judge requires a juvenile who is younger than eighteen years of age to attend school, the municipal court shall notify the school district in which the juvenile is enrolled of such requirement.
Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-11. L. 81: (4) added, p. 882, § 2, effective April 30; (5) added, p. 1041, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (2) and (3) amended, p. 546, § 1, effective April 23; (4) and (5) amended, p. 814, § 11, effective October 1. L. 89: (6) added, p. 887, § 3, effective April 6. L. 90: (4) and (5) amended, p. 1016, § 1, effective April 20; (7) added, p. 1345, § 6, effective July 1. L. 91: (1) and (3) amended and (1.5) added, p. 743, § 4, effective April 4. L. 92: (7) amended, p. 2183, § 59, effective June 2. L. 94: (4) and (5) amended, pp. 2641, 2615, §§ 90, 23, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 1462, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (5) amended, p. 1679, § 2, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: (8) added, p. 320, § 8, effective April 7. L. 2002: (6) amended, p. 1487, § 121, effective October 1. L. 2013: (1) amended, (HB 13-1060), ch. 121, p. 411, § 1, effective April 18. L. 2019: (1)(a) amended, (HB 19-1148), ch. 59, p. 201, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2021: (5) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 710, § 11, effective October 1.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (5) by Senate Bill 94-089 and House Bill 94-1029 were harmonized.
Cross references: (1) For municipal ordinances and penalties relating thereto, see §§ 31-15-103 and 31-16-101.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsections (4) and (5), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (6), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
13-10-114. Trial by jury.
- In any action before municipal court in which the defendant is entitled to a jury trial by the constitution or the general laws of the state, such party shall have a jury upon request. The jury shall consist of three jurors unless, in the case of a trial for a petty offense, a greater number, not to exceed six, is requested by the defendant.
- In municipalities having less than five thousand population, juries may be summoned by the issuance of venire to a police officer or marshal. In municipalities having a population of five thousand or more, juries shall be selected from a jury list as is provided for courts of record.
- Jurors shall be paid the sum of six dollars per day for actual jury service and three dollars for each day of service on the jury panel alone; except that the governing body of a municipality may, by resolution or ordinance, set higher or lower fees for attending its municipal court.
- For the purposes of this section, a defendant waives his or her right to a jury trial under subsection (1) of this section unless, within twenty-one days after entry of a plea, the defendant makes a request to the court for a jury trial, in writing, and tenders to the court a fee of twenty-five dollars, unless the fee is waived by the judge because of the indigence of the defendant. If the action is dismissed or the defendant is acquitted of the charge, or if the defendant having paid the jury fee files with the court at least seven days before the scheduled trial date a written waiver of jury trial, the jury fee shall be refunded.
- At the time of arraignment for any petty offense in this state, the judge shall advise any defendant not represented by counsel of the defendant's right to trial by jury; of the requirement that the defendant, if he or she desires to invoke his or her right to trial by jury, request such trial by jury within twenty-one days after entry of a plea, in writing; of the number of jurors allowed by law; and of the requirement that the defendant, if he or she desires to invoke his or her right to trial by jury, tender to the court within twenty-one days after entry of a plea a jury fee of twenty-five dollars, unless the fee is waived by the judge because of the indigence of the defendant.
Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-12. L. 70: p. 150, § 3. L. 83: (4) amended, p. 615, § 1, effective July 1. L. 88: (3) amended, p. 1124, § 1, effective April 4. L. 2005: (4) and (5) amended, p. 428, § 10, effective July 28. L. 2012: (4) and (5) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 823, § 4, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Applicability of the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act. Although the act is not applicable to municipal courts, the statutory disqualifications in § 13-71-109 (2) should be applied to trials in municipal courts of record. City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984).
For purposes of § 13-71-109, a prospective juror summoned to a municipal court qualifies as a "resident of the county" as long as he resides in that part of the county located within the territorial limits of the municipality. City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984).
A defendant has the right to a jury in municipal court if charged with the commission of a petty offense, as defined under § 16-10-109, C.R.S. Bradford v. Longmont Mun. Court, 830 P.2d 1135 (Colo. App. 1992).
The rule proscribing a child's right to a jury trial is limited to delinquency proceedings. Bradford v. Longmont Mun. Court, 830 P.2d 1135 (Colo. App. 1992).
Prerequisites of a written demand and $25 fee for a jury trial pursuant to C.R.M.P. 223 and this section do not violate defendant's right to a jury trial or deprive him of equal protection of the laws under the federal constitution. Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1992).
Applied in Lininger v. City of Sheridan, 648 P.2d 1097 (Colo. App. 1982).
13-10-114.5. Representation by counsel - independent indigent defense - definition.
- At the time of first appearance on a municipal charge, if the defendant is in custody and the charged offense includes a possible sentence of incarceration, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant for purposes of the initial appearance unless, after a full advisement pursuant to C.M.C.R. 210 and section 16-7-207, C.R.S., the defendant makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to counsel.
- If the defendant remains in custody, the appointment of counsel continues until the defendant is released from custody. If the defendant is released from custody, he or she may apply for court-appointed counsel, and the court shall appoint counsel if the court determines that the defendant is indigent and the charged offense includes a possible sentence of incarceration.
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- On and after January 1, 2020, each municipality shall provide independent indigent defense for each indigent defendant charged with a municipal code violation for which there is a possible sentence of incarceration. Independent indigent defense requires, at minimum, that a nonpartisan entity independent of the municipal court and municipal officials oversee or evaluate indigent defense counsel.
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- Because the office of alternate defense counsel created in section 21-2-101 is an independent system of indigent defense overseen by an independent commission, provision of indigent defense by lawyers evaluated or overseen by the office of alternate defense counsel satisfies the requirement described in subsection (3)(a) of this section.
- Because a legal aid clinic at any Colorado law school accredited by the American bar association is an independent system of indigent defense overseen by the dean of the law school with which it is affiliated, any provision or oversight of indigent defense through a legal aid clinic associated with any Colorado law school accredited by the American bar association satisfies the requirement described in subsection (3)(a) of this section.
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To satisfy the requirement described in subsection (3)(a) of this section, a municipality that contracts directly with one or more defense attorneys to provide counsel to indigent defendants shall ensure that:
- The process to select indigent defense attorneys is transparent and based on merit; and
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Each contracted indigent defense attorney is periodically evaluated by an independent entity for competency and independence. The municipality shall evaluate each newly hired defense attorney as soon as practicable but no later than one year after he or she is hired. Otherwise, the municipality shall evaluate each defense attorney at least every three years. An independent entity that evaluates defense attorneys pursuant to this subsection (3)(c)(II) shall provide evaluation results and any recommendations for corrective action in writing to the municipality. For the purpose of this subsection (3), "independent entity" means:
- The office of alternate defense counsel;
- An attorney or a group of attorneys, each of whom has substantial experience practicing criminal defense in Colorado within the preceding five years, so long as the attorney or group of attorneys is not affiliated with the municipality receiving the services, including any municipal judge, prosecutor, or indigent defense attorney; or
- A local or regional independent indigent defense commission, as described in subsection (3)(d) of this section.
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- To satisfy the requirement described in subsection (3)(a) of this section, a municipality may establish a local independent indigent defense commission or coordinate with one or more other municipalities to establish a regional independent indigent defense commission. Any local or regional independent indigent defense commission in existence as of January 1, 2018, is deemed to be in compliance with this subsection (3)(d) and may continue as established.
- Each local or regional independent indigent defense commission must include at least three members, each of whom is selected by the chief municipal judge in consultation with the Colorado criminal defense bar, the office of alternate defense counsel, or the office of the state public defender. Prior to serving on a commission, any commission member who is selected by a chief municipal judge must be approved by the office of alternate defense counsel. The office of alternate defense counsel shall approve such appointed commission members whom the office, in its discretion, deems likely to promote the provision of competent and independent indigent defense.
- The terms and procedures for the members of a local or regional independent indigent defense commission must be determined by the municipality or municipalities that establish the independent indigent defense commission.
- A local or regional independent indigent defense commission established pursuant to this subsection (3)(d) has the responsibility and exclusive authority to appoint indigent defense counsel for a term of at least one year or more to be served until a successor is appointed. The independent indigent defense commission retains sole authority to supervise the indigent defense counsel and discharge him or her for cause.
- A local or regional independent indigent defense commission, through its ability to supervise, appoint, and discharge the indigent defense counsel, shall ensure that indigent defendants accused of violations of municipal ordinances for which there is a possible sentence of incarceration are represented independently of any political considerations or private interests, that such indigent defendants receive legal services that are commensurate with those available to nonindigent defendants, and that municipal indigent defense attorneys provide representation in accordance with the Colorado rules of professional conduct and the American bar association standards relating to the administration of criminal justice.
- A local or regional independent indigent defense commission shall not interfere with the discretion, judgment, and zealous advocacy of indigent defense attorneys in specific cases.
- A local or regional independent indigent defense commission shall make recommendations to its municipality or municipalities regarding the provision of adequate monetary resources to provide legal services to indigent defendants accused of violations of such municipal ordinances.
- The members of an independent indigent defense commission shall serve without compensation; except that a municipality that establishes a local independent indigent defense commission or that coordinates with one or more other municipalities to establish a regional independent indigent defense commission shall reimburse the members of the commission for actual and reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.
Source: L. 2016: Entire section added, (HB 16-1309), ch. 366, p. 1540, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2018: (3) added, (SB 18-203), ch. 354, p. 2110, § 1, effective August 8.
Editor's note: Section 1 of House Bill 17-1316 changed the effective date of this section from May 1, 2017, to July 1, 2018. (See L. 2017, p. 607 ).
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 16-1309, see section 1 of chapter 366, Session Laws of Colorado 2016.
13-10-115. Fines and costs.
All fines and costs collected or received by the municipal court shall be reported and paid monthly, or at such other intervals as may be provided by an ordinance of the municipality, to the treasurer of the municipality and deposited in the general fund of the municipality.
Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-13.
13-10-115.5. Expungement of juvenile delinquent records - definition.
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- For the purposes of this section, "expungement" is defined in section 19-1-103. Upon the entry of an expungement order by a municipal court, the person who is the subject of the expunged record may assert that he or she has no juvenile municipal court record. The person who is the subject of the expunged record may lawfully deny that he or she has ever been arrested, charged, adjudicated, convicted, or sentenced in regard to the expunged case, matter, or charge.
- The court, law enforcement agency, and all other agencies shall reply to any inquiry regarding an expunged record that no record exists with respect to the person named in the record, unless information may be shared with the inquiring party pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.
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- If a juvenile is sentenced by a municipal court, the municipal court, at sentencing, shall provide the juvenile and any respondent parent or guardian with a written advisement of the right to expungement and the time period and process for expunging the record. The municipal court may provide the notice through a municipal diversion program, the city attorney, or a municipal probation program.
- Expungement must be effectuated by physically sealing or conspicuously indicating on the face of the record or at the beginning of the computerized file of the record that the record has been designated as expunged.
- A prosecuting attorney shall not require as a condition of a plea agreement that a juvenile waive his or her right to expungement pursuant to this section upon the completion of the juvenile's sentence.
- Prior to the court ordering any records expunged, the court shall determine whether the juvenile has any actions pending before the municipal court, and, if the court determines that there is an action pending against the juvenile, the court shall stay the petition for expungement proceedings until the resolution of the pending case.
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- After expungement, basic identification information on the juvenile and a list of any state and local agencies and officials having contact with the juvenile, as they appear in the records, are not open to the public but are available to a prosecuting attorney, local law enforcement agency, the department of human services, the state and municipal judicial departments, and the victim, as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (5); except that such information is not available to an agency of the military forces of the United States.
- Notwithstanding any order for expungement pursuant to this section, any record that is ordered expunged is available to any judge and the probation department for use in any future proceeding in which the person whose record was expunged is charged with an offense as either a juvenile or as an adult. A new criminal, delinquency, or municipal charge may not be brought against the juvenile based upon information gained initially or solely from examination of the expunged records.
- Notwithstanding an order for expungement pursuant to this section, any criminal justice record of a juvenile who has been charged, adjudicated, or convicted of any offense must be available for use by the juvenile, the juvenile's attorney, a prosecuting attorney, any law enforcement agency, or any agency of the state or municipal judicial departments in any subsequent criminal investigation or prosecution as a substantive predicate offense conviction or adjudication of record.
- Notwithstanding any order for expungement issued pursuant to this section, nothing prevents the prosecuting attorney, including the staff of a prosecuting attorney's office, a victim or witness assistance program, a law enforcement agency, or law enforcement victim assistance program, from discussing with the victim the case, the results of any expungement proceedings, information regarding restitution, and information related to any victim services available to the victim as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (5), but copies of expunged records must not be provided to the victim. The victim may petition the court and request that a copy of the expunged records be provided to the victim. If the court finds that there are compelling reasons for the release, a copy of the expunged records may be released to the victim. If the court orders the release of a copy of the expunged records to the victim, the court must issue a protective order regarding the use of the expunged records.
- Notwithstanding any order for expungement issued pursuant to this section, any information, including police affidavits and reports and records related to any prior conviction or adjudication, are available without court order to the persons, government agencies, or entities allowed access to or allowed to exchange such information pursuant to section 19-1-303 for the purposes described therein. Any person who knowingly violates the confidentiality provisions of section 19-1-303 is subject to the penalty in section 19-1-303 (4.7).
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- In a juvenile municipal case where no natural person is listed as a victim, the municipal court shall order all records in the juvenile municipal case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case and charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged within forty-two days after the conclusion of the case.
- In a juvenile municipal case where a natural person is listed as a victim, the municipal court shall send notice on the date the sentence is completed to the prosecuting attorney that all records in a case charging a juvenile with a violation of a municipal code or ordinance, excluding offenses charged pursuant to title 42, all records of the case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case or charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization will be expunged forty-two days after completion of the municipal sentence.
- If the prosecuting attorney does not file an objection within forty-two days after receipt of the notice from the court pursuant to subsection (4)(b) of this section, the municipal court shall order all records related to the case and charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization expunged.
- If the prosecuting attorney files an objection within forty-two days after receipt of the notice by the court pursuant to subsection (4)(b) of this section, the court shall schedule a hearing on the issue of expungement. The court shall notify the prosecuting attorney of the hearing date.
- If a hearing is scheduled pursuant to subsection (4)(d) of this section, the court shall send notice to the last-known address of the juvenile notifying the juvenile of the date of the hearing and of the juvenile's right to appear at the hearing and to present evidence to the court in writing prior to the hearing and in person at the hearing. The notice must indicate that, at the hearing, the court will consider whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated and whether the expungement is in the best interests of the juvenile and the community. The juvenile is not required to appear at the hearing.
- At a hearing held pursuant to this subsection (4), the court shall order all records of the case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case or charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged if the juvenile has successfully completed the sentence, or the municipal court case is closed, unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the juvenile has not been rehabilitated and that expungement is not in the best interests of the juvenile or the community. If the court enters an order denying expungement of the records, the juvenile shall have the right to appeal to the district court, and all fees related to the appeal must be waived.
- The municipal court shall, on the first day of every month, review all juvenile municipal court files for that same month for the previous two years that resulted in a finding of not guilty or guilty or resulted in diversion, deferred adjudication, dismissal, or other disposition or resolution, and enter an expungement order for all juveniles eligible for expungement pursuant to this subsection (4) if the expungement order was not previously made.
- Unless a hearing has taken place and findings made pursuant to subsection (4)(f) of this section, the court shall order all records related to the municipal case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case and charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged pursuant to this subsection (4) if the court finds that the sentence has been completed or the municipal court case is closed.
- With the victim's consent, or if there is no named victim, the prosecuting attorney may agree at the time of a plea that there will be no objection to expungement upon the completion of the juvenile's sentence. In such a case, the court shall order all records of the case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case or charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged upon completion of the juvenile's sentence. A hearing is not required.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, a municipal court shall not expunge the record of a person who is charged, adjudicated, or convicted of any traffic offense or traffic infraction pursuant to title 42 or a corresponding municipal traffic code.
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Upon the entry of an order expunging a record pursuant to this section, the court shall order, in writing, the expungement of all case records in the custody of the court and any records related to the case and charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization. The court may order expunged any records, but, at a minimum, the following records must be expunged pursuant to every expungement order:
- All court records;
- All records retained within the office of the prosecuting attorney;
- All probation and parole records;
- All law enforcement records;
- All division of youth services records and jail records if the juvenile was detained in a division of youth services facility or in a jail;
- All department of human services records; and
- References to the municipal case or charge contained in the school records.
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- When an expungement order is issued pursuant to this section, the court shall send a copy of the order to the juvenile, the juvenile's last attorney of record, the prosecuting attorney, the law enforcement agency or agencies that investigated the case, and the Colorado bureau of investigation directing the entity to expunge its records within thirty-five days after the receipt of the order.
- The court shall also send a copy of the order to the municipal probation department if the juvenile was placed on municipal probation at any point during the case, the division of youth services if the juvenile was sentenced or ordered to any period of detention in a division of youth services facility by the municipal court, and the jail if the juvenile was held in or sentenced to time in a jail by the municipal court, directing the entity to expunge the records in its custody as soon as practicable but no later than ninety days after the receipt of the order.
- The juvenile, the juvenile's attorney, or the juvenile's parent or legal guardian may provide to the court, within seven days after the completion of the sentence or the case being closed, a list of all agency custodians that may have custody of any records subject to the expungement order. At no cost to the juvenile, the court shall send a copy of the expungement order to the agency, person, company, or organization, as requested, directing the entity to expunge its records within thirty-five days. Additionally, the juvenile or his or her parent or guardian may also provide a copy of the order to any other custodian of records subject to the order.
- Each entity described in this subsection (7) that is in possession of such records shall expunge the records in its custody as directed by the order.
- The person who is the subject of records expunged pursuant to this section may petition the court to permit inspection of the records held by persons named in the order, and the court may so order.
- Any agency, person, company, or organization that violates this section and knew that the records in question were subject to an expungement order may be subject to criminal and civil contempt of court and may be punished by a fine.
- Employers; educational institutions; landlords; and state and local government agencies, officials, and employees shall not, in any application or interview or in any other way, require an applicant to disclose any information contained in expunged records. In answer to any question concerning arrest or juvenile and criminal records information that has been expunged, an applicant need not include a reference to or information concerning the expunged information and may state that no record exists. An application may not be denied solely because of the applicant's refusal to disclose records or information that has been expunged.
- Nothing in this section authorizes the physical destruction of any juvenile or criminal justice record.
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (HB 19-1335), ch. 304, p. 2785, § 2, effective May 28. L. 2021: (1)(a) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 710, § 12, effective October 1.
13-10-116. Appeals.
- Appeals may be taken by any defendant from any judgment of a municipal court which is not a qualified municipal court of record to the county court of the county in which such municipal court is located, and the cause shall be tried de novo in the appellate court.
- Appeals taken from judgments of a qualified municipal court of record shall be made to the district court of the county in which the qualified municipal court of record is located. The practice and procedure in such case shall be the same as provided by section 13-6-310 and applicable rules of procedure for the appeal of misdemeanor convictions from the county court to the district court, and the appeal procedures set forth in this article shall not apply to such case.
- No municipality shall have any right to appeal from any judgment of a municipal court, not of record, concerning a violation of any charter provision or ordinance, but this subsection (3) shall not be construed to prevent a municipality from maintaining any action to construe, interpret, or determine the validity of any ordinance or charter provision involved in such proceeding. Nothing in this subsection (3) shall be construed to prevent a municipality from appealing any question of law arising from a proceeding in a qualified municipal court of record.
- If, in any municipal court, a defendant is denied a jury trial to which he is entitled under section 13-10-114, he is entitled to a trial by jury under section 16-10-109, C.R.S., and to a trial de novo upon application therefor on appeal.
- Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if confinement of a child is ordered pursuant to a contempt conviction as set forth in section 13-10-113 (4), appeal shall be to the juvenile court for the county in which the municipal court is located. Such appeals shall be advanced on the juvenile court's docket to the earliest possible date. Procedures applicable to such appeals shall be in the same manner as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section for appeals to the county court.
Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-14. L. 70: p. 151, § 4. L. 72: p. 267, § 3. L. 77: (3) amended, p. 794, § 4, effective June 3. L. 81: (5) added, p. 882, § 3, effective July 1. L. 85: (1), (2), and (5) amended, p. 570, § 6, effective November 14, 1986.
ANNOTATION
Analysis
- I. General Consideration.
- II. Appeals From Municipal Courts.
- III. Appeals From Municipal Courts of Record.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For note, "Colorado Appellate Procedure", see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 551 (1968).
Annotator's note. Since § 13-10-116 is similar to repealed § 139-36-2, CRS 53 and § 139-36-2, C.R.S. 1963, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
Municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances that fall within their jurisdiction. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559 , 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).
A court which assumes the trial duties of the municipal court in a trial de novo appeal may take judicial notice of the same ordinances which the lower court does. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559 , 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).
A county court may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances when an appeal is taken from the municipal court to the county court for a trial de novo. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559 , 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).
The appellate court in such a circumstance stands in the same position and has the same duties as the trial court. As a result, the county court may take judicial notice of the ordinances which were before the municipal court. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559 , 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).
Courts of general jurisdiction may not take judicial notice of the ordinances of municipal corporations in civil or criminal cases. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559 , 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).
When district court may take judicial notice of municipal ordinance. Where a municipal ordinance was properly the subject of judicial notice in the municipal court, and the case is then before a district court on appeal on the record, the district court may also take judicial notice of the municipal ordinance. Chavez v. People, 193 Colo. 50 , 561 P.2d 1270 (1977).
An executed sentence in municipal court does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the right of review to have the taint cleared on the name of the person. Where he has involuntarily complied with the sanction imposed by the trial court, he nevertheless has the opportunity to have undone the dishonor and discredit of a conviction. City of Pueblo v. Clemmer, 150 Colo. 546 , 375 P.2d 99 (1962).
A municipality cannot appeal acquittal of a violation of an ordinance. Under this section a judgment finding accused not guilty of a traffic violation is a judgment on the merits and concludes the litigation between the parties, there being no right in the municipality to appeal from such judgment. People ex rel. Town of Cherry Hills Vill. v. Cervi, 144 Colo. 338 , 356 P.2d 241 (1960).
Appellate procedure must be followed before defendant can seek habeas corpus. Defendant, a 14 year old, who was found guilty of reckless driving and sentenced to 90 days in jail, was not entitled to habeas corpus relief on the ground of alleged violation of his right to counsel where he did not appeal to county court where adequate remedy of trial de novo was available, but instead proceeded immediately by way of habeas corpus. Garrett v. Knight, 173 Colo. 419 , 480 P.2d 569 (1971).
Applied in Fuller v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 404, 610 P.2d 1078 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243 , 606 P.2d 1300 (1980).
II. APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL COURTS.
This section provides that appeals from a municipal or police court may be taken to the county court of the county where the municipal or police court is located. City of Central v. Axton, 159 Colo. 69 , 410 P.2d 173 (1966).
County court sitting as appellate court in trial de novo has same duties as trial court. Rainwater v. County Court, 43 Colo. App. 477, 604 P.2d 1195 (1979).
Trial de novo is not an entirely new trial, but is, instead, a continuation of the original trial in the form of an appeal. Rainwater v. County Court, 43 Colo. App. 477, 604 P.2d 1195 (1979).
"Any defendant" may appeal "any judgment". When he does appeal in compliance with the procedure set forth in this article, he is entitled to a trial de novo. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549 , 374 P.2d 863 (1962).
This section means that a defendant starts afresh in the county court, i.e, if he resolves to contest the charge against him in the county court, he may have a trial de novo there without regard to what took place in the municipal court. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549 , 374 P.2d 863 (1962).
Generally, municipal judges are untrained in the law. The general assembly and the courts recognize the fact that the judges and magistrates who preside over inferior tribunals are frequently untrained and unskilled in the law, and that they conduct courts not of record, in which the proceedings are apt to be summary in nature. They also recognize that, because of frequent shortcomings in training in the law, safeguards afforded defendants may be curtailed and, by reason thereof, defendants may not be properly advised of their rights in the premises or adequately warned of the consequences of a plea. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549 , 374 P.2d 863 (1962).
III. APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL COURTS OF RECORD.
If a municipal court is a court of record, the cause is heard on the record, and the practice and procedure is to be the same as provided for in regard to the appeal of misdemeanor convictions from county courts. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).
Remanded or tried de novo by the district court. These sections require a district court either to review a decision of a municipal court of record on the record, to remand the case for a new trial with instructions, or to direct that trial de novo be had before the district court. In the instant case, the district court adopted the first alternative, and therefore, the question is whether the court properly exercised the appellate jurisdiction granted to it under the sections noted above. People v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 84 , 492 P.2d 844 (1972).
The function of a district court in acting as an appellate court is the same whether the case originates in a municipal court of record or a county court. People v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 84 , 492 P.2d 844 (1972).
Party seeking review of a municipal court judgment is entitled to file a petition for rehearing unless the district court by express order dispenses with the filing of the petition. City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984).
Because appellant's conviction originated in a municipal court of record, appellant had 30 days following the judgment of conviction to file the notice of appeal pursuant to this section and its implementing rules. Normandin v. Town of Parachute, 91 P.3d 383 (Colo. 2004).
13-10-117. Time - docket fee - bond.
Appeals may be taken within fourteen days after entry of any judgment of a municipal court. No appeal shall be allowed until the appellant has paid to the clerk of the municipal court one dollar and fifty cents as a fee for preparing the transcript of record on appeal. If the municipal court is a court of record, the clerk of the municipal court is entitled to the same additional fees for preparing the record, or portions thereof designated, as is the clerk of the county court on the appeal of misdemeanors, but said fees shall be refunded to the defendant if the judgment is set aside on appeal. No stay of execution shall be granted until the appellant has executed an approved bond as provided in sections 13-10-120 and 13-10-121.
Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-15. L. 2012: Entire section amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 824, § 5, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
One appealing from a judgment of a municipal court must file an appeal bond as directed by this section. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549 , 374 P.2d 863 (1962) (decided under repealed § 139-36-4, CRS 53).
13-10-118. Notice - scope.
- Appeals may be taken by filing with the clerk of the municipal court a notice of appeal, in duplicate. The notice of appeal shall set forth the title of the case; the name and address of the appellant and appellant's attorney, if any; identification of the offense or violation of which the appellant was convicted; a statement of the judgment, including its date and any fines or sentences imposed; and a statement that the appellant appeals from the judgment. The notice of appeal shall be signed by the appellant or his attorney.
- The taking of an appeal shall not permit the retrial of any matter of which the appellant has been acquitted, or any conjoined charge from the conviction of which he does not seek to appeal.
Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-16.
ANNOTATION
Substantial compliance is appropriate standard for notice of appeal. Pueblo v. County Court, 761 P.2d 275 (Colo. App. 1988).
13-10-119. Certification to appellate court.
Upon payment of the fee provided in section 13-10-117, and filing of notice as provided in section 13-10-118, the original papers in the municipal court file, together with a transcript of the record of the municipal court, and a duplicate notice of appeal shall be certified to the appropriate appellate court pursuant to section 13-10-116 by the municipal court.
Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-17. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 883, § 4, effective July 1.
13-10-120. Bond - approval of sureties - forfeitures.
- When an appellant desires to stay the judgment of the municipal court, he shall execute a bond to the municipality in which the municipal court is located, in such penal sum as may be fixed by the municipal court, and in such form and with sureties qualified as the municipality may, by ordinance, designate.
- Sureties shall be approved by a judge of the municipal court from which the appeal is taken.
- The amount of bond shall not exceed double the amount of the judgment for fines and costs, plus an amount commensurate with any jail sentence, which latter amount shall be not less than fifty dollars nor more than a sum equal to two dollars for each day of jail sentence imposed.
Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-18.
13-10-121. Conditions of bond - forfeiture - release.
- The bond shall be conditioned that the appellant will duly prosecute such appeal and satisfy any judgment that may be rendered upon trial of the case in the appropriate appellate court to which appeal is taken pursuant to section 13-10-116 and that the appellant will surrender himself in satisfaction of such judgment if that is required.
- If the bond is forfeited, the appellate court, upon motion of the municipality, shall enter judgment against the appellant and sureties on the bond for the amount of such bond. The appellate court, with the consent of the municipality, shall enter judgment against the appellant and sureties on the bond for the amount of such bond. The appellate court, with the consent of the municipality, may set aside or modify the judgment.
- Any municipality may provide by ordinance such other bond terms and conditions as are not inconsistent with the provisions of this article. The filing of such bond or any notice thereof of record shall not constitute any lien against any property of the sureties.
- When the condition of the bond has been satisfied or the forfeiture thereof set aside or remitted, the municipal court shall exonerate the obligors and release the bond. At any time before final judgment in the appellate court, a surety may be exonerated by a deposit of cash in the amount of the bond or by timely surrender of the appellant into custody.
Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-19. L. 81: (1), (2), and (4) amended, p. 883, § 5, effective July 1.
13-10-122. Docket fee - dismissal.
The appellant shall pay a docket fee as provided by law to the clerk of the appellate court, within fourteen days from the date he or she ordered the transcript of record. If he or she does not do so, his or her appeal may be dismissed on motion of the municipality.
Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-20. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 883, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2012: Entire section amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 824, § 6, effective July 1.
13-10-123. Procedendo on dismissal.
Upon dismissal of an appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall at once issue a procedendo to the municipal court from the judgment on which appeal was taken, to the amount of the judgment and all costs incurred before the municipal court.
Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-21. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 883, § 7, effective July 1.
13-10-124. Action on bond in name of municipality.
Action may be instituted upon any bond under this article in the name of the municipality in whose favor it is executed.
Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-22.
13-10-125. Judgment.
Upon trial de novo of the case on appeal to the appellate court, if a jury has been demanded, the duties of the jurors shall be to determine only whether the appellant has violated the ordinance charged. Upon a verdict of guilty, the judge shall then hear and consider any material facts in mitigation or aggravation of the offense and shall impose a penalty as provided by ordinance.
Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-23. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 884, § 8, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
County judge imposes penalty as required by law. Since on appeal to county court, if a jury sits, this section requires that the jury determine only whether the ordinance has been violated, the trial judge has the responsibility of imposing "a penalty as provided by law". Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973) (decided under repealed § 139-36-17, C.R.S. 1963).
Under this section, "law" can be none other than municipal ordinance. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).
Judgment is a county court judgment. Whether action and penalties are characterized as criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil, a county court is empowered by statute to impose a sentence within the limits provided by the municipal ordinance, but it is nevertheless a county court judgment. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).
Municipal court has no power to issue execution on a county court judgment, as the county court must issue execution on its own judgment. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).
13-10-126. Prostitution offender program authorized - reports.
- Subject to the provisions of this section, a municipal or county court, or multiple municipal or county courts, may create and administer a program for certain persons who are charged with soliciting for prostitution, as described in section 18-7-202, C.R.S., patronizing a prostitute, as described in section 18-7-205, C.R.S., or any corresponding municipal code or ordinance.
-
A program created and administered by a municipal or county court or multiple municipal or county courts pursuant to subsection (1) of this section must:
-
Permit enrollment in the program only by an offender who either:
-
- Has no prior convictions or any charges pending for any felony; for any offense described in section 18-3-305, 18-3-306, or 18-13-128, C.R.S., in part 4 or 5 of article 3 of title 18, C.R.S., in part 3, 4, 6, 7, or 8 of article 6 of title 18, C.R.S., in section 18-7-203 or 18-7-206, C.R.S., or in part 3, 4, or 5 of article 7 of title 18, C.R.S.; or for any offense committed in another state that would constitute such an offense if committed in this state; and
- Has been offered and has agreed to a deferred sentencing arrangement as described in subsection (3) of this section; or
-
- Has at least one prior conviction for any offense described in section 18-7-201, 18-7-202, 18-7-204, 18-7-205, or 18-7-207, C.R.S.; or for any offense committed in another state that would constitute such an offense if committed in this state; and
- Has been sentenced by a court to complete the program as part of the penalty imposed for a subsequent conviction for soliciting for prostitution, as described in section 18-7-202, C.R.S., patronizing a prostitute, as described in section 18-7-205, C.R.S., or any corresponding municipal code or ordinance.
-
- Permit the court or courts to require each offender who enrolls in the program to pay an administration fee, which fee the court or courts shall use to pay the costs of administering the program;
- To the extent practicable, be available to offenders, courts, and prosecutors of other jurisdictions; and
- Be administered by the court or courts with assistance from one or more municipal prosecutor's offices, one or more district attorney's offices, one or more state or local law enforcement agencies, and one or more nonprofit corporations, as defined in section 7-121-401, C.R.S., which nonprofit corporations have a stated mission to reduce human trafficking or prostitution. The court or courts are encouraged to consult, in addition to the aforementioned entities, recognized criminology experts and mental health professionals.
-
Permit enrollment in the program only by an offender who either:
-
- Enrollment in the program shall be offered to each offender at the sole discretion of the prosecuting attorney in each offender's case.
-
If the prosecuting attorney offers enrollment in the program to an offender as a condition of a plea bargain agreement as described in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, the agreement shall include at a minimum the following stipulations:
- The offender shall enter a plea of guilty to the prostitution-related offense or offenses with which he or she is charged;
- The court shall defer judgment and sentencing of the offender for a period not to exceed two years, as described in section 18-1.3-102 (1), C.R.S., during which time the offender shall enroll in and complete the program and may be required to pay an administration fee, as described in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section;
- Upon the offender's satisfactory completion of the program, the court shall dismiss with prejudice the prostitution-related charge or charges;
- The offender shall waive his or her right to a speedy trial; and
- If the offender fails to complete the program or fails to satisfy any other condition of the plea bargain agreement, he or she shall be sentenced for the offenses to which he or she has pleaded guilty and shall be required to pay a fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars, or the maximum amount available to a municipal or county court, in the discretion of the court, in addition to any other sentence imposed by the court.
- If the prosecuting attorney offers enrollment in the program to an offender pursuant to subparagraph (II) of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section and the offender fails to complete the program, the offender shall be required to pay a fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars, or the maximum amount available to the municipal or county court, in the discretion of the court, in addition to any other sentence imposed by the court.
-
If a municipal or county court or multiple municipal or county courts create and administer a program pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the court or courts shall prepare and submit a report to the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and senate, or any successor committees, concerning the effectiveness of the program. The court or courts shall submit the report not less than two years nor more than three years after the creation of the program. The report shall include information concerning:
- The cost of the program and the extent to which the cost is mitigated by the imposition of the fees described in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section; and
- The effectiveness of the program in reducing recidivism among persons who commit prostitution-related offenses.
Source: L. 2011: Entire section added, (SB 11-085), ch. 257, p. 1126, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2013: (2)(a)(II)(A) amended, (HB 13-1166), ch. 59, p. 195, § 3, effective August 7. L. 2016: IP(2) and (2)(a)(I)(A) amended, (SB 16-146), ch. 230, p. 914, § 5, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2011 act adding this section, see section 1 of chapter 257, Session Laws of Colorado 2011.
CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
ARTICLE 14 CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
Law reviews: For article, "Civil Restraining Orders Pursuant to CRS §§ 13-14-100.2 et seq.: A Practitioner's Guide", see 43 Colo. Law. 63 (Aug. 2014).
Section
13-14-100.2. Legislative declaration.
- The general assembly hereby finds that the issuance and enforcement of protection orders are of paramount importance in the state of Colorado because protection orders promote safety, reduce violence and other types of abuse, and prevent serious harm and death. In order to improve the public's access to protection orders and to ensure careful judicial consideration of requests and effective law enforcement, there shall be two processes for obtaining protection orders within the state of Colorado, a simplified civil process and a mandatory criminal process.
- The general assembly further finds and declares that domestic abuse is not limited to physical threats of violence and harm but also includes mental and emotional abuse, financial control, document control, property control, and other types of control that make a victim more likely to return to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs. Many victims of domestic abuse are unable to access the resources necessary to seek lasting safety options. Victims need additional provisions in protection orders so that they can meet their immediate needs of food, shelter, transportation, medical care, and childcare for their appearance at protection order hearings. These needs may exist not only in cases that may end in dissolution of marriage but also in other circumstances, including cases in which reconciliation may occur.
- Additionally, the general assembly finds and declares that sexual assault affects Coloradans of all ages, backgrounds, and circumstances and is one of the most under-reported of all crimes. Sexual violence may occur in any type of relationship; however, the majority of sexual assault is perpetrated by someone whom the victim knows. Victims of sexual assault who do not report the crime, as well as victims who do report but whose case is not prosecuted, still need and deserve protection from future interactions with the perpetrator, as many victims experience long-lasting physical and emotional trauma from unwanted contact with the perpetrator.
- Finally, the general assembly finds and declares that stalking is a dangerous, high-risk crime that frequently escalates over time and that sometimes leads, tragically, to sexual assault or homicide. Countless youth and adults in Colorado have faced the fear, isolation, and danger of being victims of stalking, and many of these incidents go unreported and are not prosecuted. While stalking behaviors may appear innocuous to outside observers, the victims often endure intense physical and emotional distress that affects all aspects of their lives and are more likely than others to express anxiety, depression, and social dysfunction.
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added with relocations, (HB 13-1259), ch. 218, p. 1001, § 5, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-14-102 (1) as it existed prior to 2013.
13-14-101. Definitions.
For purposes of this article 14, unless the context otherwise requires:
-
"Abuse of the elderly or of an at-risk adult" means mistreatment of a person who is sixty years of age or older or who is an at-risk adult as defined in section 26-3.1-101 (1.5), including but not limited to repeated acts that:
- Constitute verbal threats or assaults;
- Constitute verbal harassment;
- Result in the inappropriate use or the threat of inappropriate use of medications;
- Result in the inappropriate use of physical or chemical restraints;
- Result in the misuse of power or authority granted to a person through a power of attorney or by a court in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding that results in unreasonable confinement or restriction of liberty; or
- Constitute threats or acts of violence against, or the taking, transferring, concealing, harming, or disposing of, an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by the elderly or at-risk adult, which threats or acts are intended to coerce, control, punish, intimidate, or exact revenge upon the elderly or at-risk adult.
(1.5) "Adult" means a person eighteen years of age or older.
(1.7) "Contact" or "contacting" means any interaction or communication with another person, directly or indirectly through a third party, and electronic and digital forms of communication, including but not limited to interaction or communication through social media.
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"Domestic abuse" means any act, attempted act, or threatened act of violence, stalking, harassment, or coercion that is committed by any person against another person to whom the actor is currently or was formerly related, or with whom the actor is living or has lived in the same domicile, or with whom the actor is involved or has been involved in an intimate relationship. A sexual relationship may be an indicator of an intimate relationship but is never a necessary condition for finding an intimate relationship. For purposes of this subsection (2), "coercion" includes compelling a person by force, threat of force, or intimidation to engage in conduct from which the person has the right or privilege to abstain, or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right or privilege to engage. "Domestic abuse" may also include any act, attempted act, or threatened act of violence against:
- The minor children of either of the parties; or
- An animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either of the parties or by a minor child of either of the parties, which threat, act, or attempted act is intended to coerce, control, punish, intimidate, or exact revenge upon either of the parties or a minor child of either of the parties.
(2.2) "Minor child" means a person under eighteen years of age.
(2.3) "Protected person" means the person or persons identified in a protection order as the person or persons for whose benefit the protection order was issued.
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(2.4) (a) "Protection order" means any order that prohibits the restrained person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, touching, stalking, or sexually assaulting or abusing any protected person or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises, or from taking, transferring, concealing, harming, disposing of or threatening harm to an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by a protected person, or any other provision to protect the protected person from imminent danger to life or health that is issued by a court of this state or a municipal court and that is issued pursuant to: