ADMINISTRATION

ARTICLE 1 ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION ACT OF 1968

Section

24-1-101. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly declares that this article is necessary to create a structure of state government which will be responsive to the needs of the people of this state and sufficiently flexible to meet changing conditions; to strengthen the powers of the governor and provide a reasonable span of administrative and budgetary controls within an orderly organizational structure of state government; to strengthen the role of the general assembly in state government; to encourage greater participation of the public in state government; to effect the grouping of state agencies into a limited number of principal departments primarily according to function; and to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort. It is the intent of the general assembly to provide for an orderly transfer of powers, duties, and functions of the various state agencies to such principal departments with a minimum of disruption of governmental services and functions and with a minimum of expense. To the ends stated in this section, this article shall be liberally construed.

Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-1.

ANNOTATION

Applied in Dodge v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 657 P.2d 969 (Colo. App. 1982).

24-1-102. Short title.

This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968".

Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-2.

24-1-103. Head of department defined.

When the term "head of a principal department" is used in this article, it means the head of one of the principal departments created by this article. Unless the head of a principal department is a state elected official, he shall have the title of executive director of the department or such other title as specifically designated by this article.

Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-3.

24-1-104. Policy-making authority and administrative powers of governor - delegation. (Repealed)

Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 4. CRS 1963: § 3-28-4. L. 81: Entire section repealed, p. 1126, § 1, effective June 29.

24-1-105. Types of transfers.

  1. Under this article, a type 1 transfer means the transferring intact of an existing department, institution, or other agency, or part thereof, to a principal department established by this article. When any department, institution, or other agency, or part thereof, is transferred to a principal department under a type 1 transfer, that department, institution, or other agency, or part thereof, shall be administered under the direction and supervision of that principal department, but it shall exercise its prescribed statutory powers, duties, and functions, including rule-making, regulation, licensing, and registration, the promulgation of rules, rates, regulations, and standards, and the rendering of findings, orders, and adjudications, independently of the head of the principal department. Under a type 1 transfer, any powers, duties, and functions not specifically vested by statute in the agency being transferred, including, but not limited to, all budgeting, purchasing, planning, and related management functions of any transferred department, institution, or other agency, or part thereof, shall be performed under the direction and supervision of the head of the principal department.
  2. Under this article, a type 2 transfer means the transferring of all or part of an existing department, institution, or other agency to a principal department established by this article. When all or part of any department, institution, or other agency is transferred to a principal department under a type 2 transfer, its statutory authority, powers, duties, and functions, records, personnel, property, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds, including the functions of budgeting, purchasing, and planning, are transferred to the principal department.
  3. Under this article, a type 3 transfer means the abolishing of an existing department, institution, or other agency and the transferring of all or part of its powers, duties, functions, records, personnel, property, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds to a principal department as specified under this article.
  4. When any department, institution, or other agency, or part thereof, is transferred by a type 2 or type 3 transfer to a principal department under the provisions of this article, its prescribed powers, duties, and functions, including rule-making, regulation, licensing, promulgation of rules, rates, regulations, and standards, and the rendering of findings, orders, and adjudications are transferred to the head of the principal department into which the department, institution, or other agency, or part thereof, has been transferred.

Source: L. 68: p. 74, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-5. L. 73: p. 187, § 1. L. 74: (1) and (2) amended, p. 202, § 2, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

State highway commission is empowered to direct the chief engineer in the areas which will enable it to exercise its prescribed statutory powers, duties, and functions independently of the head of the principal department. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Haase, 189 Colo. 69, 537 P.2d 300 (1975).

State department of personnel does not oversee the state personnel board's activities; rather, the board reviews the actions of the head of the personnel department. Spahn v. Dept. of Pers., 44 Colo. App. 446, 615 P.2d 66 (1980).

24-1-106. Agencies not enumerated - continuation.

Any board, commission, advisory board, or other entity not enumerated in this article, but established by law within or as advisory to an existing department, institution, or other agency shall continue to exercise all its powers, duties, and functions within or as advisory to such department, institution, or other agency under the principal department and the type of transfer to which such department, institution, or other agency is transferred under this article.

Source: L. 68: p. 74, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-6.

24-1-107. Internal organization of department - allocation and reallocation of powers, duties, and functions - limitations.

In order to promote economic and efficient administration and operation of a principal department and notwithstanding any other provisions of law, except as provided in section 24-1-105, the head of a principal department, with the approval of the governor, may establish, combine, or abolish divisions, sections, and units other than those specifically created by law and may allocate and reallocate powers, duties, and functions to divisions, sections, and units under the principal department, but no substantive function vested by law in any officer, department, institution, or other agency within the principal department shall be removed from the jurisdiction of such officer, department, institution, or other agency under the provisions of this section.

Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-7. L. 73: p. 188, § 1.

Cross references: For the definition of "head of a principal department", see § 24-1-103.

24-1-107.5. Nonprofit entities created or supported by state agencies and state-level authorities - requirements - legislative declaration.

  1. The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
    1. State agencies and state-level authorities currently benefit from working with nonprofit entities in a variety of areas, including contracting with nonprofit entities to obtain goods or services, developing working relationships with nonprofit entities to further an agency's or authority's goals and objectives, and using nonprofit entities to obtain gifts, bequests, or donations;
    2. Although state agencies also benefit from the ability to create nonprofit entities to assist them in carrying out their statutory powers and duties, the expenditure of state revenues through nonprofit entities created by state agencies hampers the general assembly's ability to adequately perform its duties of monitoring state revenues and ensuring that sufficient revenues are available for appropriations to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government;
    3. In order for the general assembly to carry out its duties to plan for and monitor state revenues, it is the intent of the general assembly to establish specific statutory requirements for the creation of nonprofit entities by state agencies to perform their statutory powers and duties and to establish accountability requirements for certain nonprofit entities formed for the benefit of state agencies; and
    4. It is the further intent of the general assembly to:
      1. Monitor the creation of nonprofit entities by state-level authorities where the creation of such entities could affect the purpose for which such authorities were established by imposing specific reporting requirements upon those authorities intending to create such entities; and
      2. Retain the laws applicable to the separate identity of nonprofit entities created by or on behalf of state agencies.
      1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, commencing July 1, 1999, no state agency or employee or agent acting on behalf of such agency shall establish a nonprofit entity without specific statutory authority if: (2) (a) (I) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, commencing July 1, 1999, no state agency or employee or agent acting on behalf of such agency shall establish a nonprofit entity without specific statutory authority if:
        1. The purpose of establishing a nonprofit entity is to carry out the governmental functions of the state agency; and
        2. The state agency or an employee or agent acting on behalf of such agency has actual control over the management and internal operations of the nonprofit entity.
      2. The provisions of this paragraph (a) shall not limit:
        1. The office of the governor;
        2. State-supported institutions of higher education from using nonprofit entities, such as foundations, institutes, or similar organizations, as authorized in section 23-5-112, C.R.S.;
        3. State-supported institutions of higher education from issuing revenue bonds or pledging revenues as authorized in sections 23-5-102, 23-5-103, 23-70-107, and 23-70-108, C.R.S.;
        4. The Colorado educational and cultural facilities authority from financing facilities and capital expenditures or refunding or refinancing outstanding indebtedness as authorized in sections 23-15-107 to 23-15-110, C.R.S.;
        5. State-supported institutions of higher education from creating or using nonprofit entities to issue obligations for or assist in the financing of capital expenditures on behalf of or for the benefit of such institutions; and
        6. The Colorado school for the deaf and the blind, as provided for in article 80 of title 22, C.R.S., from using nonprofit entities, such as foundations, institutes, or similar organizations, as authorized in section 22-80-103, C.R.S.
    1. No later than September 1, 1999, each state agency shall provide to the state auditor a list of all nonprofit entities in existence on July 1, 1999, that were established by the state agency or an employee or agent acting on behalf of such agency and that meet the criteria set forth in sub-subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), along with a copy of each nonprofit entity's most recent annual audit report or, if such entity has not been audited, the entity's most recent annual financial statement.
    2. The provisions of this subsection (2) do not apply to:
      1. Repealed.
      2. Any nonprofit corporation created by the board of regents of the university of Colorado pursuant to section 23-20-114 (2), C.R.S.; or
      3. Any private nonprofit corporation created by any state-supported institution of higher education, as authorized under section 23-5-121, C.R.S., for the purpose of developing discoveries and technology resulting from science and technology research at such institution of higher education.
  2. A state-supported institution of higher education may establish a nonprofit entity that would otherwise require specific statutory authority under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section upon a finding by the governing board of the institution that establishing the nonprofit entity would be in the best interests of the institution.
      1. Except as otherwise provided in sections 23-5-112 (3) and 23-5-121, C.R.S., subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a), and paragraph (b) of this subsection (4), any nonprofit entity created by or on behalf of a state agency under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section or subsection (3) of this section and any nonprofit entities reported under paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section shall be subject to an annual audit by the state auditor or his or her designee as required for state agencies under section 2-3-103 (1), C.R.S. (4) (a) (I) Except as otherwise provided in sections 23-5-112 (3) and 23-5-121, C.R.S., subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a), and paragraph (b) of this subsection (4), any nonprofit entity created by or on behalf of a state agency under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section or subsection (3) of this section and any nonprofit entities reported under paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section shall be subject to an annual audit by the state auditor or his or her designee as required for state agencies under section 2-3-103 (1), C.R.S.
      2. The provisions of this paragraph (a) do not apply to any nonprofit corporation created by the board of regents of the university of Colorado pursuant to section 23-20-114 (2), C.R.S.
    1. If any nonprofit entity, created for the sole benefit of one or more state-supported institutions of higher education, issues obligations to finance capital expenditures for the benefit of the institution or institutions and pledges payments to be received from the institution or institutions in repayment of such obligations, such capital financing activities are subject to the same audit requirements imposed for gifts and bequests received by a nonprofit entity under section 23-5-112 (3), C.R.S.
      1. Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a), beginning July 1, 1999, each state-level authority intending to create or participate in the creation of a nonprofit entity shall file a statement with the state auditor regarding its intent to create such entity. The statement shall include information about the purpose and use of the nonprofit entity. The state-level authority shall file such statement at least thirty days prior to the incorporation of the nonprofit entity. (5) (a) (I) Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a), beginning July 1, 1999, each state-level authority intending to create or participate in the creation of a nonprofit entity shall file a statement with the state auditor regarding its intent to create such entity. The statement shall include information about the purpose and use of the nonprofit entity. The state-level authority shall file such statement at least thirty days prior to the incorporation of the nonprofit entity.
      2. For purposes of the requirements specified in this paragraph (a), the office of the governor, the university of Colorado hospital authority, created in part 5 of article 21 of title 23, C.R.S., and the Denver health and hospital authority created in part 1 of article 29 of title 25, C.R.S., shall not be required to provide notice of its intent to create a nonprofit entity or to disclose any information relating to the modification, initiation, or cessation of patient care programs if the disclosure of such information would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage to any person or entity.
    1. For fiscal years ending after June 30, 1999, each state-level authority shall report the annual financial activities of any nonprofit entity it has created in conjunction with the filing of its annual financial audit report with the state auditor as required under section 29-1-603, C.R.S. The reporting of such financial activities may be a part of the audited financial statements if the financial activities are separately identified or the reporting may be performed separately.
    1. Except as provided in this section or other applicable law, any nonprofit entity supported by or established by or on behalf of a state agency shall not be an agency or department of state government and shall not be subject to any provisions of law affecting only governmental or public entities. The state of Colorado or the applicable state agency shall not be held responsible for any debt or liability incurred by any nonprofit entity supported by or established by or on behalf of a state agency, except as otherwise provided by law.
    2. The provisions of this subsection (6) shall apply to any nonprofit entity supported by or created by or on behalf of a state agency regardless of whether such entity is subject to the requirements specified in this section.
  3. For purposes of this section:
    1. "Nonprofit entity" means a nonprofit corporation created under the "Colorado Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act", articles 121 to 137 of title 7, C.R.S. "Nonprofit entity" may include, but is not limited to, a corporation, a partnership, a joint venture, a foundation, and an institute.
    2. "State agency" means an agency as defined in section 24-3-101 or an institution of higher education.
    3. "State-level authority" means a special purpose authority as defined in section 24-77-102 (15) and excludes nonprofit entities created by and for local governmental entities, such as municipalities, counties, city and counties, school districts, and special districts.

Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 460, § 1, effective May 16. L. 99: Entire section R&RE, p. 1350, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2003: (2)(a)(II)(D) and (2)(a)(II)(E) amended and (2)(a)(II)(F) added, p. 1585, § 18, effective September 1. L. 2011: (3) amended, (HB 11-1301), ch. 297, p. 1420, § 10, effective August 10. L. 2018: (2)(c)(I) repealed, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p.1704, § 32, effective May 29.

24-1-108. Appointment of officers and employees - repeal.

  1. Any provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding and subject to the provisions of the constitution of the state of Colorado, the head of a principal department shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate. The head of a principal department shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees of his or her office and the head of each division under his or her department, and the head of each division shall appoint all employees in his or her division, but all appointments made by the head of a principal department and heads of divisions shall be made in accordance with section 24-2-102.
  2. In the event that the lieutenant governor is appointed during his or her term of office to concurrently serve as the head of a principal department:
    1. Acceptance or retention of such an appointment shall not result in a forfeiture of the office of lieutenant governor; and
    2. It shall be deemed that holding the office of lieutenant governor while concurrently serving as the head of a principal department is not incompatible, inconsistent, or in conflict with the duties of the lieutenant governor or with the duties, powers, and functions of the head of a principal department.
  3. Repealed.
  4. In the event that the lieutenant governor is appointed during his or her term of office to concurrently serve as the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare within the office of the governor:
    1. Acceptance or retention of such an appointment shall not result in a forfeiture of the office of lieutenant governor; and
    2. It shall be deemed that holding the office of lieutenant governor while concurrently serving as the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare is not incompatible, inconsistent, or in conflict with the duties of the lieutenant governor or with the duties, powers, and functions of the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare.

Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-8. L. 71: p. 103, § 5. L. 2011: Entire section amended, (HB 11-1155), ch. 90, p. 264, § 1, effective April 6. L. 2016: (2) amended and (3) added, (HB 16-1462), ch. 192, p. 680, § 1, effective May 26. L. 2019: (4) added, (HB 19-1127), ch. 310, p. 2808, § 1, effective May 28.

Editor's note: Subsection (3)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (3), effective January 10, 2019. (See L . 2016, p. 680.)

Cross references: For the appointment of officers by governor, see § 6 of art. IV, Colo. Const.

24-1-109. Office of the governor.

The powers, duties, and functions now vested by law in the office of the governor are continued. Temporary commissions, unless otherwise provided, when established by law or by the governor, shall be units of the office of the governor. Interstate compacts authorized by law shall be administered under the direction of the office of the governor.

Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-9. L. 70: p. 104, § 1. L. 71: pp. 119, 1062, §§ 7, 4.

Cross references: For the constitutional powers of the governor, see §§ 2 and 5 to 12 of art. IV, Colo. Const.

24-1-110. Principal departments.

  1. In accordance with the provisions of section 22 of article IV of the state constitution, all executive and administrative offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive department of the state government and their respective functions, powers, and duties, except as otherwise provided by law, are allocated among and within the following principal departments created by this article 1:
    1. Department of state;
    2. Department of the treasury;
    3. Department of law;
    4. Department of higher education;
    5. Department of education;
    6. Repealed.
    7. Department of revenue;
    8. (Deleted by amendment, L . 93, p. 1087, § 3, effective July 1, 1994.)
    9. Department of public health and environment;
    10. (Deleted by amendment, L . 93, p. 1087, § 3, effective July 1, 1994.)
    11. Department of labor and employment;
    12. Department of regulatory agencies;
    13. Department of agriculture;
    14. Department of natural resources;
    15. Department of local affairs;
    16. (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 1054, § 4, effective July 1, 1991.)
    17. Department of military and veterans affairs;
    18. Department of personnel;
    19. Repealed.
    20. Department of corrections;
    21. Department of public safety;
    22. Department of transportation;
    23. Department of human services;
    24. Department of health care policy and financing.
    25. [ Editor's note: Subsection (1)(y) is effective July 1, 2022.] Department of early childhood.

Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-10. L. 72: p. 577, § 5. L. 74: (1)(t) added, p. 202, § 3, effective May 17. L. 77: (1)(t) amended, p. 950, § 14, effective July 13. L. 83: (1)(u) added and (1)(s) repealed, pp. 960, 971, §§ 2, 28, effective July 1, 1984. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 1054, § 4, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1087, § 3, effective July 1, 1994. L. 95: (1)(f) repealed, p. 622, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1)(q) amended, p. 357, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2021: IP(1) amended and (1)(y) added, (HB 21-1304), ch. 307, p. 1846, § 2, effective July 1, 2022.

Cross references: (1) For legislative oversight of principal departments, see article 7 of title 2; for the establishment of the office of state planning and budgeting within the office of the governor, see article 37 of this title.

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act repealing subsection (1)(f), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.

(3) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (1)(q), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

ANNOTATION

Applied in Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1982).

24-1-111. Department of state - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of state, the head of which shall be the secretary of state.
  2. The department of state and the office of secretary of state, created by article IV of the state constitution, and the powers, duties, and functions vested by law in said department and said office are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of state, subject to the state constitution.
  3. The department of state includes the electronic recording technology board established in section 24-21-402 (1), and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the board were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as such transfer is defined in section 24-1-105.

Source: L. 68: p. 76, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-11. L. 2016: (3) added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1477, § 2, effective June 10.

Cross references: For the creation of the department of state and office of secretary of state, see also §§ 1 and 22 of art. IV, Colo. Const.

24-1-112. Department of the treasury - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of the treasury, the head of which shall be the state treasurer.
  2. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of the treasury, created by article 36 of this title, and the powers, duties, and functions vested by law or the state constitution in the office of state treasurer are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of the treasury, subject to the state constitution.

Source: L. 68: p. 76, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-12.

Cross references: For the creation of the treasury department and office of state treasurer, see §§ 1 and 22 of art. IV, Colo. Const.

24-1-113. Department of law - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of law, the head of which shall be the attorney general.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this article or by law, the powers, duties, and functions of the department of law, created by article 31 of this title, and all other powers, duties, and functions vested by law or the state constitution in the office of attorney general are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of law, subject to the state constitution.
  3. and (4) Repealed.

Source: L. 68: p. 76, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-13. L. 73: pp. 176, 1476, §§ 3, 38. L. 77: (4) added, p. 633, § 7, effective July 1. L. 83: (4)(b) repealed, p. 522, § 2, effective March 15. L. 84: (3)(c) added, p. 1047, § 2, effective July 1. L. 92: (3)(d) added, p. 1091, § 1, effective March 6. L. 93: (3)(c) repealed, p. 974, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: IP(3) amended, p. 1725, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2017: (4)(a) amended, (HB 17-1238), ch. 260, p. 1173, § 19, effective August 9. L. 2020: IP(3), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(d), and (4)(a) repealed, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 48, § 1, effective September 14.

Cross references: For creation of the department of law and office of attorney general, see also §§ 1 and 22 of art. IV, Colo. Const.

24-1-114. Department of higher education - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of higher education, the head of which shall be the executive director of the Colorado commission on higher education, who shall be appointed by the governor and whose powers and duties are as specified in this section.
  2. The Colorado commission on higher education and the office of executive director thereof, created by article 1 of title 23, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of higher education.

    (2.5) Repealed.

  3. The department of higher education shall include the following divisions:
    1. Repealed.
    2. State historical society, created by part 2 of article 80 of this title. Its powers, duties, and functions, are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of higher education as a division thereof.
    3. The student loan division, created by article 3.1 of title 23, C.R.S. The division and the director thereof shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions as if transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
    4. The private occupational school division, created by article 64 of title 23. The private occupational school board, created by section 23-64-107, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if transferred to the department by a type 1 transfer. The division, except for the private occupational school board, and the director thereof shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions as if transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
  4. For the purposes of section 22 of article IV of the state constitution, the following are allocated to the department of higher education but shall otherwise continue to be administered as provided by law:
    1. The regents of the university of Colorado, created by section 12 of article IX of the state constitution, and the university of Colorado, created by section 5 of article VIII of the state constitution;
    2. The board of governors of the Colorado state university system, created by part 1 of article 30 of title 23, C.R.S.; Colorado state university, created by article 31 of title 23, C.R.S.; and Colorado state university - Pueblo, created by article 31.5 of title 23, C.R.S.;
    3. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2003, p. 792, § 17, effective July 1, 2003.)
    4. The board of trustees for the university of northern Colorado, created by section 23-40-104 (1) , C.R.S., and the university of northern Colorado at Greeley, created by article 40 of title 23, C.R.S.;
    5. The board of trustees of the Colorado school of mines, created by article 41 of title 23, C.R.S., and the school of mines at Golden, created by section 5 of article VIII of the state constitution;
    6. State board for community colleges and occupational education and the offices of director of occupational education and director of community and technical colleges, created by article 60 of title 23, C.R.S.;
    7. Repealed.
    8. The board of trustees for Adams state university, created by article 51 of title 23, C.R.S.;
    9. The board of trustees for Colorado Mesa university, created by article 53 of title 23, C.R.S.;
    10. The board of trustees for Metropolitan state university of Denver, created by article 54 of title 23, C.R.S.;
    11. The board of trustees for Western Colorado university, created by article 56 of title 23;
    12. The board of trustees for Fort L ewis College, created by article 52 of title 23, C.R.S.
    1. With respect to the divisions of the department specified in subsection (3) of this section, the executive director shall have the powers, duties, and functions prescribed in this article for heads of principal departments.
    2. With respect to the Colorado commission on higher education and the universities, colleges, and boards specified in subsection (4) of this section, the executive director has only those powers, duties, and functions prescribed in article 1 of title 23; except that the executive director of the Colorado commission on higher education is authorized to negotiate, implement, and monitor contracts, as described in sections 23-18-201 (2), 23-18-303.5, 23-18-304, and 23-41-104.6, with universities, colleges, and boards, in consultation with the Colorado commission on higher education.
  5. The office of state archaeologist, created by part 4 of article 80 of this title, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the state historical society, as a section thereof.

Source: L. 68: p. 77, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-14. L. 72: p. 577, § 6. L. 73: p. 1384, § 2. L. 75: (4)(c)(V) added and (4)(d) amended, p. 214, §§ 37, 38, effective July 16. L. 77: (4)(c)(III) amended, p. 281, § 29, effective June 29. L. 79: (3)(c) added, p. 823, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (2.5) added, p. 803, § 8, effective June 3; (4)(b) amended and (4)(c)(III) repealed, § 9, p. 2049, effective October 14. L. 85: (3)(c) amended, p. 1361, § 17, effective June 28. L. 88: IP(4)(c) and (4)(c) amended, p. 863, § 23, effective July 1. L. 90: (3)(d) added and (4)(c)(II) amended, pp. 1159, 1156, §§ 3, 14, effective July 1. L. 92: (3)(a) amended, p. 561, § 4, effective March 25. L. 93: (4)(g) added, p. 926, § 1, effective May 28. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 1102, § 34, effective May 31. L. 98: (3)(d) amended, p. 50, § 28, effective March 17. L. 99: (2.5) repealed, p. 876, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (4)(g) repealed, p. 1569, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4)(b) amended, p. 1246, § 17, effective August 7; (4)(b) amended, p. 709, § 10, effective July 1, 2003. L. 2003: (4)(c) amended and (4)(h), (4)(i), (4)(j), and (4)(k) added, p. 792, § 17, effective July 1. L. 2004: (5)(b) amended, p. 718, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2005: (5)(b) amended, p. 767, § 35, effective June 1. L. 2006: (3)(a) amended, p. 1658, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2008: (3)(d) amended, p. 1482, § 26, effective May 28. L. 2010: (4)(b) amended and (4)(l) added, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2081, § 58, effective August 11. L. 2011: (4)(i) amended, (SB 11-265), ch. 292, p. 1368, § 25, effective August 10. L. 2012: (4)(h) amended, (HB 12-1080), ch. 189, p. 761, § 24, effective May 19; (4)(j) amended, (SB 12-148), ch. 125, p. 428, § 19, effective July 1; (4)(k) amended, (HB 12-1331), ch. 254, p. 1271, § 19, effective August 1. L. 2013: (4)(b) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1680, § 46, effective August 7. L. 2014: (5)(b) amended, (HB 14-1319), ch. 169, p. 614, § 15, effective May 9. L. 2017: (5)(b) amended, (SB 17-297), ch. 210, p. 822, § 21, effective May 18; (3)(d) amended, (HB 17-1239), ch. 261, p. 1207, § 17, effective August 9. L. 2019: (4)(k) amended, (HB 19-1178), ch. 400, p. 3547, § 19, effective July 1. L. 2020: (5)(b) amended, (HB 20-1366), ch. 181, p. 835, § 17, effective July 1, 2021.

Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (4)(b) by House Bill 02-1260 and House Bill 02-1324 were harmonized.

(2) Subsection (3)(a)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(a), effective July 1, 2006. (See L . 2006, p. 1658.)

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2004 act amending subsection (5)(b), see section 1 of chapter 6, Session Laws of Colorado 2004.

(2) For the legislative declaration in the 2011 act amending subsection (4)(i), see section 1 of chapter 292, Session Laws of Colorado 2011.

(3) For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act amending subsection (4)(j), see section 1 of chapter 125, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.

24-1-115. Department of education - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of education, the head of which shall be the commissioner of education, who shall be appointed by the state board of education.
  2. The state board of education, created by part 1 of article 2 of title 22, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of education.
  3. The state department of education and the office of the commissioner of education, created by part 1 of article 2 of title 22, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education subject to the state constitution.
  4. The department of education shall include the state library, the ex officio head of which shall be the commissioner of education. The state library, created by article 90 of this title, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education as a division thereof.
  5. The state board of teacher certification, created by article 1 of chapter 123, C.R.S. 1963, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of education as additional powers, duties, and functions of the state board of education, and the state board of teacher certification is abolished.
  6. Repealed.
  7. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2003, p. 1586, § 19, effective July 1, 2004.)
  8. The Colorado school for the deaf and the blind, as provided for in article 80 of title 22, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of education.
  9. The department of education shall include the state charter school institute established in section 22-30.5-503, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the institute were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of education.
  10. The department of education shall include the division of online learning established in section 22-30.7-103, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the division were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education.
    1. The department of education shall include the division of public school capital construction assistance established in section 22-43.7-105, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the division were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education.
    2. The department of education shall include the public school capital construction assistance board established in section 22-43.7-106, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the board were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of education.
  11. The department of education shall include the facility schools unit established in section 22-2-403, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the unit were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education.
  12. The department of education shall include the facility schools board established in section 22-2-404, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the board were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of education.
  13. The department of education shall include the Colorado state advisory council for parent involvement in education created in section 22-7-303, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the council were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education.
  14. The department of education shall include the office of dropout prevention and student re-engagement established in section 22-14-103, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the office were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education.
  15. The department of education shall include the concurrent enrollment advisory board created in section 22-35-107, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, as if the board were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of education.

Source: L. 68: p. 78, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-15. L. 75: (4)(c)(V) and (6) added and (4)(d) amended, p. 681, § 2, effective July 16. L. 77: (7) added, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2003: (7) amended and (8) added, p. 1586, § 19, effective July 1, 2004. L. 2004: (9) added, p. 1649, § 58, effective July 1. L. 2007: (10) added, p. 1084, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2008: (11) added, p. 1063, § 5, effective May 22; (12) and (13) added, p. 1381, § 2, effective May 27; (6) repealed, p. 1902, § 88, effective August 5. L. 2009: (15) added, (HB 09-1243), ch. 290, p. 1424, § 7, effective May 21; (16) added, (HB 09-1319), ch. 286, p. 1322, § 12, effective May 21; (14) added, (SB 09-090), ch. 291, p. 1445, § 20, effective August 5.

24-1-116. Department of administration - creation. (Repealed)

Source: L. 68: p. 78, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-16. L. 70: p. 107, § 4. L. 71: pp. 103, 117, 119, 316, §§ 6, 1, 7, 21. L. 74: (3) repealed, p. 204, § 9, July 1. L. 75: (2)(g) added and (1)(l) and (2)(b) repealed, pp. 214, 822, §§ 39, 21, effective July 18. L. 76: (2)(h) added, p. 582, § 13, effective May 24. L. 77: (4)(b) amended, p. 1176, § 2, effective May 18; (2)(i) added, p. 1177, § 1, effective June 20. L. 79: (5) added, p. 886, § 3, effective July 1. L. 81: (2)(a) amended, p. 1286, § 3, effective January 1, 1982. L. 83: (2)(g) R&RE, p. 888, § 2, effective July 1. L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: p. 9, §§ 2, 3. L. 86: (3), (2)(j)(II), and (6) repealed, (1) amended, and (2)(d.5) added, pp. 757, 884, 900, 1225, §§ 13, 3, 2, 47, effective May 30. L. 87: (2)(h) amended, (8) added, and (2)(d) repealed, pp. 960, 983, 984, 1103, §§ 63, 3, 7, 2, effective July 1. L. 88: (4)(c) amended, p. 1435, § 29, effective June 11. L. 89: (2)(d.5) amended, p. 1024, § 1, effective March 9; (4)(c) and (7) repealed, pp. 491, 1646, §§ 23, 21, effective July 1. L. 90: (4)(d) amended, p. 1840, § 17, effective May 31. L. 94: (2)(d.5) amended, p. 48, § 1, effective March 11. L. 95: Entire section repealed, p. 622, § 2, effective July 1.

24-1-117. Department of revenue - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of revenue, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of revenue, who shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
  2. The department of revenue and the office of director of revenue, created by article 35 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of revenue.
  3. The powers, duties, and functions of the secretary of state with respect to fermented malt beverages and malt, vinous, and spirituous liquors under the provisions of articles 3, 4, and 5 of title 44, are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of revenue.
    1. The department of revenue shall consist of the following divisions:
      1. and (II) (Deleted by amendment, L . 2000, p. 1632, § 1, effective June 1, 2000.) (III) Repealed. (IV) L iquor enforcement division; (V) State lottery division; (VI) Division of racing events, including the Colorado racing commission; (VII) Division of gaming, including the Colorado limited gaming control commission; (VIII) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 1185, § 41, effective August 8, 2005.) (IX) Such other groups, divisions, sections, and units as the executive director of the department of revenue may create pursuant to section 24-35-103 ; and (X) The auto industry division created in section 44-20-105 . The division shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department of revenue as if the division were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer as described in section 24-1-105 .
    2. Repealed.
      1. Whenever any law of this state or any rule promulgated under the laws of this state refers to the division of enforcement of the department of revenue, such law or rule shall be deemed to refer to the department of revenue.
      2. Repealed.
  4. The motor carrier services division, created in section 42-8-103 (1), C.R.S., prior to the repeal of said subsection (1) by House Bill 12-1019, enacted in 2012, is abolished, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by type 3 transfers as follows:
    1. The powers, duties, and functions of its ports of entry section are transferred to the department of public safety and allocated to the Colorado state patrol.
    2. Its powers, duties, and functions relating to commercial driver's licenses and the international registration plan are transferred to the department of revenue.

Source: L. 68: p. 80, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-17. L. 71: p. 104, § 7. L. 73: p. 1475, § 37. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 1885, § 8, effective January 1, 1982. L. 82: (4) amended, pp. 385, 643, §§ 4, 4, effective April 30. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 4, effective May 23. L. 87: (4) amended, p. 865, § 1, effective June 20. L. 91: (4) amended, p. 1591, § 13, effective June 4. L. 93: (4) amended, p. 1783, § 53, effective June 6; (4) amended, p. 1033, § 15, effective July 1; (4) amended, p. 1237, § 6, effective July 1. L. 94: (4)(b) repealed, p. 692, § 1, effective April 19. L. 96: (4)(a) amended, p. 1545, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (4) amended, p. 1632, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2005: (4)(a) amended, p. 17, § 2, effective July 1; (4)(a)(VII) and (4)(a)(VIII) amended, p. 1185, § 41, effective August 8. L. 2012: (4)(a)(III) and (4)(c)(II) repealed and (5) added, (HB 12-1019), ch. 135, p. 463, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2017: (4)(a)(VII) and (4)(a)(IX) amended and (4)(a)(X) added, (SB 17-240), ch. 395, p. 2055, § 27, effective July 1. L. 2018: (4)(a)(X) amended, (SB 18-030), ch. 7, p. 139, § 9, effective October 1. L. 2019: (3) amended, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3468, § 24, effective August 2.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (4) by House Bills 93-1034, 93-1268, and 93-1342 were harmonized.

ANNOTATION

For the unconstitutionality of designation of executive director as a "confidential employee", see Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968).

24-1-118. Department of institutions - creation. (Repealed)

Source: L. 68: p. 81, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-18. L. 71: pp. 104, 689, §§ 8, 2. L. 73: p. 394, § 7. L. 75: (5) added, p. 214, § 40, effective July 16. L. 77: (3)(n) repealed, p. 293, § 7, effective May 26; (3)(l) repealed, p. 1095, § 5, effective July 1; (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(m) repealed, p. 955, § 37, effective August 1. L. 79: (6) added, p. 1119, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (3)(d), (3)(e), (3)(f) amended, p. 1160, § 17, effective April 26. L. 85: (3)(g) and (3)(h) amended, p. 710, § 8, effective March 30. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 5, effective May 23. L. 87: (5) amended, p. 819, § 31, effective July 10. L. 88: (3)(j) and (3)(k) repealed, pp. 754, 1431, §§ 5, 10, effective June 11. L. 89: (5)(b) repealed and (5.5) added, p. 922, §§ 9, 7, effective July 1. L. 91: (3)(c) and (3)(i) amended, p. 1144, § 10, effective May 18. L. 93: (7) added by revision, pp. 1088, 1168, §§ 4, 151.

Editor's note: Subsection (7) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 1994. (See L. 93, pp. 1088, 1168.)

24-1-119. Department of public health and environment - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of public health and environment. The head of the department shall be the executive director of the department of public health and environment. The governor shall appoint said executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
  2. The state board of health, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 25, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of public health and environment as the state board of health.
  3. The state water quality control commission, created by part 2 of article 8 of title 25, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of public health and environment as the state water quality control commission. Anything in this article to the contrary notwithstanding, the state board of health shall have no powers, duties, or functions with respect to water pollution control.
  4. Except for the state board of health, the state department of public health and the office of the executive director thereof, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 25, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment.
  5. The department of public health and environment shall consist of the following divisions:
    1. Division of administration. The division of administration, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 25, C.R.S., except for the office of the executive director of the state department of public health, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment as the division of administration.
    2. (Deleted by amendment, L . 93, p. 1089, § 5, effective July 1, 1994.)
    3. The prevention services division, created in article 20.5 of title 25, C.R.S.
  6. The division of administration shall include the following:
    1. The office of state chemist, created by part 4 of article 1 of title 25, C.R.S. Said office and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment and allocated to the division of administration as a section thereof.
    2. The office of state registrar of vital statistics, created by article 2 of title 25, C.R.S. Said office and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment and allocated to the division of administration as a section thereof.
    3. Repealed.
    4. The plant operators certification board, created by article 9 of title 25, C.R.S.

    (6.3) and (6.5) Repealed.

    1. The air quality control commission, created by part 1 of article 7 of title 25, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of public health and environment. Anything in this article to the contrary notwithstanding, the state board of health shall have no powers, duties, or functions with respect to air pollution other than as provided in section 25-7-111 (1), C.R.S.
    2. Repealed.
    3. The office of technical secretary, created by part 1 of article 7 of title 25, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of public health and environment and allocated to the air quality control commission.
  7. The solid and hazardous waste commission, created in part 3 of article 15 of title 25, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of public health and environment.
  8. Repealed.
  9. The office of health equity, created by section 25-4-2204, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment.
  10. The primary care office, created by part 4 of article 1.5 of title 25, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if it were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment.
  11. The clean fleet enterprise, created in section 25-7.5-103, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of public health and environment.
  12. The nursing home innovations grant board, created in section 25-1-107.5 (6)(a), shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if it were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment.

Source: L. 68: p. 81, § 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-19. L. 70: pp. 237, 424, §§ 3, 4, 14. L. 71: pp. 104, 657, §§ 9, 2. L. 73: p. 751, § 2. L. 74: (6)(c) repealed, p. 277, § 6, effective July 1. L. 79: (7) amended, p. 1058, § 3, effective June 20. L. 82: (5)(b) amended, p. 603, § 4, effective May 2. L. 83: (7) amended, p. 2049, § 10, effective October 14. L. 84: (7)(b) repealed, p. 768, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 6, effective May 23. L. 92: (8) added, p. 1235, § 1, effective August 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1089, § 5, effective July 1, 1994. L. 2000: (5)(c) added, p. 586, § 13, effective May 18; (9) added, p. 1569, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (6.5) added, p. 1574, § 2, effective June 7; (10) added, p. 427, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2004: (6.5) repealed, p. 862, § 3, effective May 21; (5)(c) amended, p. 113, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2006: (8) amended, p. 1138, § 25, effective July 1. L. 2007: (11) added, p. 904, § 1, effective May 15. L. 2009: (6.3) added, (HB 09-1111), ch. 396, p. 2141, § 4, effective June 2. L. 2013: (9) repealed, (HB 13-1117), ch. 169, p. 588, § 19, effective July 1; (6.3) repealed and (12) added, (HB 13-1074), ch. 150, p. 490, § 5, effective August 7; (10) repealed, (HB 13-1139), ch. 120, p. 407, § 1, effective August 7; (11) amended, (HB 13-1088), ch. 25, p. 64, § 9, effective August 7. L. 2021: (13) added, (SB 21-260), ch. 250, p. 1366, § 3, effective June 17; (14) added, (SB 21-128), ch. 302, p. 1818, § 3, June 23.

Cross references: (1) For employment of a technical secretary by the air quality control commission, see § 25-7-105 (3).

(2) For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act repealing subsection (9), see section 1 of chapter 169, Session Laws of Colorado 2013.

(3) For the legislative declaration in SB 21-260, see section 1 of chapter 250, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

24-1-119.5. Department of health care policy and financing - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of health care policy and financing, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of health care policy and financing, which office is hereby created. The governor shall appoint the executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
  2. The powers, duties, and functions relating to the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act", as specified in articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5, C.R.S., are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of health care policy and financing.
  3. Repealed.
  4. The powers, duties, and functions relating to the "Colorado Indigent Care Program", as specified in part 1 of article 3 of title 25.5, C.R.S., are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of health care policy and financing.

    (4.5) The powers, duties, and functions relating to the old age pension health and medical care program, as specified in section 25.5-2-101, C.R.S., are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of health care policy and financing.

  5. The medical services board created in part 3 of article 1 of title 25.5, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of health care policy and financing.
  6. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2006, p. 2007, § 68, effective July 1, 2006.)
  7. Repealed.
  8. The powers, duties, and functions relating to programs, services, and supports for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, as specified in article 10 of title 25.5, C.R.S., are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of health care policy and financing.
  9. The Colorado healthcare affordability and sustainability enterprise created in section 25.5-4-402.4 (3) shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of health care policy and financing.

Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1091, § 6, effective July 1, 1994. L. 94: (5) added, p. 1559, § 3, effective July 1. L. 95: (6) added, p. 501, § 1, effective May 16. L. 98: (7) added, p. 458, § 18, effective April 21. L. 2001: (7) repealed, p. 917, § 15, effective August 8. L. 2003: (4.5) added, p. 2583, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: (2), (4), (4.5), and (6) amended, p. 2007, § 68, effective July 1. L. 2007: (3) repealed, p. 2032, § 45, effective June 1. L. 2011: (4.5) amended, (SB 11-210), ch. 187, p. 721, § 5, effective July 15, 2012. L. 2013: (8) added, (HB 13-1314), ch. 323, p. 1805, § 34, effective March 1, 2014. L. 2017: (9) added, (SB 17-267), ch. 267, p. 1440, § 6, effective July 1.

Editor's note: Section 34 of chapter 267 (SB 17-267), Session L aws of Colorado 2017, provides that the section of the act amending this section does not take effect if the centers for medicare and medicaid services determine that the amendments do not comply with federal law. For more information, see SB 17-267. ( L . 2017, p. 1477.) The executive director of the department of health care policy and financing did not notify the revisor of statutes by June 1, 2017, of such determination; therefore, amendments to this section took effect July 1, 2017.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-267, see section 1 of chapter 267, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

24-1-120. Department of human services - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of human services, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of human services, which office is hereby created. The governor shall appoint the executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in title 26, C.R.S., the powers, duties, and functions of the department of social services and the department of institutions are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of human services, and the department of social services and the department of institutions are abolished.
  3. The state board of social services, created by article 1 of title 26, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of human services as the state board of human services.
  4. Unless otherwise transferred to the department of health care policy and financing or the department of public health and environment, the department of human services shall exercise the following powers and perform the following duties:
    1. Powers, duties, and functions relating to public assistance and welfare, which are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services;
    2. Repealed.
  5. The department of human services shall include the following:
    1. The Colorado commission on the aging and the office of the director thereof. Said office and director and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
    2. The Colorado veterans community living center at Homelake, which is transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services;
    3. The Colorado veterans community living centers, created by part 2 of article 12 of title 26, C.R.S., which are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services;
    4. The merit system council, created by article 1 of title 26, C.R.S. Said council and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
    5. The powers, duties, and functions regarding the state information agency under the "Uniform Interstate Family Support Act", created by article 5 of title 14, C.R.S. Said powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
    6. The state office on aging, created by part 2 of article 11 of title 26, C.R.S. Said state office and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
    7. The adoption intermediary commission, created by part 3 of article 5 of title 19, C.R.S. Said commission and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of human services.
    8. The Colorado commission for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deafblind, created by article 21 of title 26. The commission shall exercise its powers, duties, and functions under the department as if transferred by a type 2 transfer.
    9. The office of homeless youth services, created in section 24-32-723. Said office and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
    10. Repealed.
    11. The board of commissioners of veterans community living centers, created in section 26-12-402, C.R.S. Said board and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
    12. Repealed.
    13. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (5)(m) is effective until July 1, 2022.] The early childhood leadership commission created by article 6.2 of title 26, C.R.S.

      (m) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (5)(m) is effective July 1, 2022. ] The early childhood leadership commission created by part 3 of article 1 of title 26.5.

  6. The department consists of the following divisions, units, and offices:
    1. Repealed.
    2. The juvenile parole board, created pursuant to section 19-2.5-1201. The juvenile parole board and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of human services as a division.
    3. The office of behavioral health in the department of human services created pursuant to article 80 of title 27. The office of behavioral health and its powers, duties, and functions, including the powers, duties, and functions relating to the alcohol and drug driving safety program specified in section 42-4-1301.3, are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
    4. The division of youth services, created pursuant to section 19-2.5-1501. The division of youth services and the office of the director of the division of youth services and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services as a division.
  7. The department of human services shall supervise and control the following institutions which are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services:
    1. Colorado mental health institute at Pueblo;
    2. Wheat Ridge regional center;
    3. Grand Junction regional center;
    4. Pueblo regional center;
    5. Lookout Mountain school at Golden;
    6. Mount View school at Morrison;
    7. Colorado mental health institute at Fort Logan, in Denver;
    8. Adams youth services center at Brighton;
    9. Gilliam youth services center at Denver;
    10. Grand Mesa youth services center at Grand Junction;
    11. Pueblo youth services center;
    12. Zebulon Pike youth services center at Colorado Springs;
    13. Lookout Mountain youth services center at Golden;
    14. Mount View youth services center at Denver;
    15. Lathrop Park youth camp at Walsenburg.
  8. The state council on developmental disabilities, created by part 2 of article 10.5 of title 27, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of human services.
  9. The powers, duties, and functions of the Colorado brain injury trust fund board, created in section 26-1-302, are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
  10. The powers, duties, and functions of the Colorado child abuse prevention board, created in section 19-3.5-103, are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
  11. The powers, duties, and functions of the Tony Grampsas youth services board created in section 26-6.8-103, C.R.S., are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
  12. The office of the ombudsman for behavioral health access to care created in section 27-80-303 shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the office were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of human services.

Source: L. 68: p. 83, § 20. L. 69: p. 1188, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-20. L. 71: p. 104, § 10. L. 73: pp. 1223, 1508, §§ 13, 14, 2. L. 78: (3) added, p. 265, § 61, effective May 23. L. 85: (4)(d) added, § 4, effective May 29. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 7, effective May 23. L. 89: (4)(b) amended, p. 1235, § 12, effective April 6; (5) added, p. 1549, § 2, effective July 1. L. 91: (4)(e) added, p. 890, § 15, effective June 5. L. 92: (5) repealed, p. 2136, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section R&RE, p. 1092, § 7, effective July 1, 1994. L. 94: (4)(c) added, p. 2606, § 6, effective July 1; (6)(d) amended, p. 2555, § 49, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (6)(b) and (6)(c) amended and (6)(e) added, p. 1694, § 32, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: (5)(h) added, p. 1628, § 3, effective June 1. L. 2001: (4)(c) amended, p. 251, § 5, effective March 29; (4)(c) repealed and (5)(e) amended, pp. 1287, 1272, §§ 83, 28, effective June 5. L. 2002: (6)(d) amended, p. 666, § 13, effective May 28; (5)(c), (6)(d), and (8) amended, p. 1022, § 39, effective June 1; (6)(a) repealed, p. 357, § 11, effective July 1; (6)(d) amended, p. 1919, § 10, effective July 1; (9) added, p. 1609, § 2, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2004: (5)(i) added, p. 861, § 2, effective May 21; (9) amended, p. 1200, § 60, effective August 4. L. 2005: (5)(j) added, p. 599, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (5)(k) added, p. 441, § 2, effective July 1; (5)(l) added, p. 1221, § 2, effective August 3. L. 2008: (6)(b) repealed, p. 1105, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2009: (9) amended, (SB 09-005), ch. 135, p. 591, § 10, effective April 20; (5)(b) amended, (SB 09-056), ch. 177, p. 785, § 5, effective April 22. L. 2010: IP(6) and (6)(d) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 794, § 50, effective April 29. L. 2011: (5)(b) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1163, § 53, effective August 10. L. 2012: (5)(b) amended, (HB 12-1063), ch. 149, p. 537, § 5, effective May 3. L. 2013: (5)(m), (10), and (11) added, (HB 13-1117), ch. 169, p. 588, § 20, effective July 1; (5)(k) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1680, § 47, effective August 7. L. 2014: (5)(b), (5)(c), and (5)(k) amended, (SB 14-096), ch. 59, p. 262, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2015: (4)(b)(II) added by revision, (SB 15-239), ch. 160, pp. 487, 490, §§ 4, 14. L. 2017: IP(6) and (6)(d) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1256, § 16, effective May 25; IP(6) and (6)(e) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1980, § 50, effective June 6. L. 2018: (5)(h) amended, (HB 18-1108), ch. 303, p. 1836, § 9, effective August 8; (12) added, (HB 18-1357), ch. 252, p. 1551, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2019: (9) amended, (HB 19-1147), ch. 178, p. 2033, § 12, effective August 2. L. 2020: (5)(i) amended, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1050, § 43, effective June 30. L. 2021: (10) amended, (HB 21-1248), ch. 335, p. 2167, § 4, effective September 7; (6)(c) and (6)(e) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 741, § 104, effective October 1; (5)(m) amended, (HB 21-1304), ch. 307, p. 1856, § 7, effective July 1, 2022.

Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (6)(d) by Senate Bill 02-057, House Bill 02-1229, and Senate Bill 02-159 were harmonized.

(2) Subsection (5)(j)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (5)(j), effective July 1, 2007. (See L . 2005, p. 599.)

(3) Subsection (5)(l)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (5)(l), effective July 1, 2012. (See L . 2007, p. 1221.)

(4) Subsection (4)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (4)(b), effective July 1, 2016. (See L . 2015, p. 487.)

(5) Amendments to subsection IP(6) by SB 17-242 and HB 17-1329 were harmonized.

Cross references: (1) For the designation of the state department of human services as the state information agency for enforcement of support, see §§ 14-5-310 and 26-13-109; for the Colorado board of veterans affairs, see article 5 of title 28; for the Colorado commission on the aging, see article 11 of title 26; for the Trinidad state nursing home, see part 2 of article 12 of title 26; for the Colorado state veterans center, see part 2 of article 12 of title 26.

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act repealing subsection (6)(a), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act adding subsections (5)(m), (10), and (11), see section 1 of chapter 169, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in SB 15-239, see section 1 of chapter 160, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.

(3) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

The executive director is a proper party defendant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action where the administration of rules and regulations is contested. Oten v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 738 P.2d 37 (Colo. App. 1987).

The department of social services (now human services) is properly characterized as a public assistance and welfare organization and not as a public law enforcement agency. People v. Zurenko, 833 P.2d 794 (Colo. App. 1991).

Applied in Dodge v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 657 P.2d 969 (Colo. App. 1982).

24-1-120.5. Department of early childhood - creation.

[ Editor's note: This section is effective July 1, 2022.]

  1. There is created the department of early childhood, the head of which is the executive director of the department of early childhood, which office is created. The governor shall appoint the executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director serves at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after an initial election of a governor is subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
  2. The early childhood leadership commission created in part 3 of article 1 of title 26.5 and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of early childhood.

Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1304), ch. 307, p. 1846, § 3, effective July 1, 2022.

24-1-121. Department of labor and employment - creation.

  1. There is hereby created the department of labor and employment, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of labor and employment, which office is hereby created. The governor shall appoint said executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109. The executive director shall have the powers, duties, and functions prescribed for heads of principal departments in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title.

    (1.5) The department of labor and employment shall include, as part of the office of the executive director, the industrial claim appeals office, created by section 8-1-102, C.R.S. Said industrial claim appeals office shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department as if transferred thereto by a type 2 transfer.

  2. The industrial commission of Colorado, created by article 1 of title 8, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, except those powers, duties, and functions transferred to the state board of pharmacy and the industrial claim appeals office, are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of labor and employment, and the industrial commission of Colorado is abolished.
  3. The department of labor and employment consists of the following divisions and programs:
      1. The division of labor standards and statistics, the head of which is the director of the division of labor standards and statistics, which division and office are hereby created. The division and the director shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions specified by law under the department of labor and employment as if they were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
      2. (Deleted by amendment, L . 91, p. 1338, § 55, effective July 1, 1991.)
    1. The division of employment and training, the head of which is the director of the division of employment and training. The division, created by article 83 of title 8, C.R.S., and the director of the division shall exercise their powers, duties, and functions under the department of labor and employment as if transferred by a type 2 transfer.
    2. Repealed.
      1. The division of workers' compensation, the head of which shall be the director of the division of workers' compensation. Said division, created by section 8-47-101 , C.R.S., and the director thereof, shall exercise their powers, duties, and functions under the department of labor and employment as if transferred thereto by a type 2 transfer.
      2. Repealed.
    3. The division of oil and public safety, the head of which shall be the director of the division of oil and public safety, which division and office are created pursuant to section 8-20-101 , C.R.S. The division and the director shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions specified by law under the department of labor and employment as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
    4. The state work force development council, created by article 46.3 of this title, which shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department of labor and employment as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
    5. The division of unemployment insurance, the head of which is the director of the division of unemployment insurance. The division, created in article 71 of title 8, C.R.S., and the director of the division shall exercise their powers, duties, and functions under the department of labor and employment as if transferred by a type 2 transfer.
    6. The powers, duties, and functions relating to vocational rehabilitation programs, including the business enterprise program, which are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of labor and employment.
    7. The powers, duties, and functions relating to the oversight of independent living services pursuant to article 85 of title 8, C.R.S., are transferred by a type 2 transfer.
    8. The underground damage prevention safety commission created by section 9-1.5-104.2 . The commission and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of labor and employment.
    9. The office of new Americans, or "ONA", created in article 3.7 of title 8, the head of which is the director of the ONA. The ONA and the director shall exercise their powers, duties, and functions under the department of labor and employment as if transferred by a type 1 transfer.
    10. The state apprenticeship agency created in section 8-15.7-102 , which shall exercise its powers and perform the duties and functions specified by article 15.7 of title 8 under the department of labor and employment and the executive director of the department as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 1 transfer.
  4. The division of oil and public safety shall include the following:
    1. Repealed.
    2. The division of boiler inspection, created by article 4 of title 9, C.R.S. Said division and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of labor and employment and allocated to the division of oil and public safety as a section thereof.
    3. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2001, p. 1113, § 2, effective June 5, 2001.)
    4. Repealed.
  5. The petroleum storage tank committee shall exercise its powers and perform the duties and functions specified by article 20.5 of title 8, C.R.S., under the department of labor and employment and the executive director thereof as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 1 transfer.

Source: L. 68: p. 84, § 21. L. 69: p. 567, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-21. L. 71: p. 104, § 11. L. 73: p. 935, § 25. L. 75: (4)(d) repealed, p. 443, § 6, effective April 15; (4)(e) added, p. 214, § 41, effective July 16. L. 76: (3)(b) amended, p. 352, § 21, effective October 1. L. 77: (3)(b) amended, p. 281, § 30, effective July 1. L. 80: (4)(e) repealed, p. 451, § 6, effective April 13. L. 83: (3)(a) and (3)(b) amended, p. 404, § 3, effective May 25. L. 86: (3)(c) repealed, p. 540, § 54, effective May 3; (1) amended, p. 885, § 8, effective May 23; (1.5) added and (2) R&RE, p. 463, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: (4)(a) repealed, p. 378, § 4, effective May 20. L. 89: (3)(a) amended, p. 379, § 3, effective July 1. L. 90: (3)(a)(II)(A) amended, p. 567, § 44, effective July 1. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 1338, § 55, effective July 1. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 564, § 7, effective April 6. L. 95: (5) added, p. 419, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2001: (3)(e) added and IP(4), (4)(b), and (4)(c) amended, p. 1113, §§ 1, 2, effective June 5. L. 2008: (3)(f) added, p. 1290, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: IP(3) and (3)(b) amended and (3)(g) added, (HB 12-1120), ch. 27, p. 77, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2015: IP(3) amended and (3)(h) added, (SB 15-239), ch. 160, p. 487, § 5, effective July 1, 2016. L. 2016: (3)(i) added, (SB 16-093), ch. 54, p. 132, § 2, effective March 23; (3)(a)(I) amended, (HB 16-1323), ch. 131, p. 380, § 16, effective August 10. L. 2018: (3)(j) added, (SB 18-167), ch. 256, p. 1577, § 10, effective August 8. L. 2021: (3)(l) added, (HB 21-1007), ch. 309, p. 1890, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(k) added, (HB 21-1150), ch. 350, p. 2277, § 2, effective September 7.

Editor's note: (1) Subsection (3)(d)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(d)(II), effective July 1, 1992. (See L . 91, p. 1338.)

(2) Subsection (3)(c) was repealed, effective July 1, 1987, prior to subsection (3) being amended in 1991.

(3) The effective date for amendments to this section by House Bill 12-1120 (chapter 27, Session Laws of Colorado 2012) was changed from August 8, 2012, to June 1, 2012, by House Bill 12S-1002 (First Extraordinary Session, chapter 2, p. 2432, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.)

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 15-239, see section 1 of chapter 160, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.

24-1-122. Department of regulatory agencies - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of regulatory agencies, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of regulatory agencies, which office is hereby created. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.

    (1.1) Repealed.

  2. The department of regulatory agencies consists of the following divisions:
    1. The public utilities commission, created by article 2 of title 40, C.R.S. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies as a division thereof. The director of the commission shall serve as the division director.
    2. The office of the utility consumer advocate and the utility consumers' board, created in article 6.5 of title 40. The office of the utility consumer advocate and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies as a division of the department. The utility consumers' board shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer and allocated to the office of the utility consumer advocate.
      1. Division of insurance, the head of which shall be the commissioner of insurance. The division of insurance of the state of Colorado, created by section 10-1-103, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies as the division of insurance.
      2. The workers' compensation classification appeals board, created by section 8-55-101 (1), C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform duties and functions under the division of insurance as if such workers' compensation classification appeals board were transferred to the division of insurance by a type 1 transfer.
    3. Division of financial services, the head of which shall be the state commissioner of financial services. The financial services board, created by section 11-44-101.6, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred as if by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of financial services. The office of state commissioner of financial services and the financial services division of the state of Colorado, created by article 44 of title 11, C.R.S., are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of financial services.
    4. Division of banking, the head of which shall be the state bank commissioner. The banking board, created by article 102 of title 11, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of banking.
    5. Division of securities, the head of which shall be the commissioner of securities. The securities board, created in section 11-51-702.5, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of securities. The division of securities, and the office of commissioner of securities, created by article 51 of title 11, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies as the division of securities.
    6. Repealed.
    7. Division of professions and occupations, the head of which shall be the director of professions and occupations, which office is hereby created. The division of professions and occupations is transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies as the division of professions and occupations.
    8. Colorado civil rights division, the head of which shall be the director of the Colorado civil rights division. The Colorado civil rights commission, the Colorado civil rights division, and the office of director of the Colorado civil rights division, created by part 3 of article 34 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies as the Colorado civil rights division.
    9. Repealed.
      1. Division of real estate, the head of which shall be the director of the division. The division of real estate and the director of the division, created by part 2 of article 10 of title 12, shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies as if they were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer. The real estate commission, created by part 2 of article 10 of title 12, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies.
      2. The division shall include the board of real estate appraisers, created by part 6 of article 10 of title 12, which shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies as if the same were transferred thereto by a type 1 transfer. The division shall also include the board of mortgage loan originators, created by section 12-10-703. The board of mortgage loan originators shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies as if transferred thereto by a type 1 transfer.
    10. Division of conservation, the head of which is the director of the division. The division of conservation and the director of the division, created by article 15 of title 12, shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies as if they were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer. The conservation easement oversight commission, created by section 12-15-103, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of conservation.
  3. The following boards and agencies are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of professions and occupations:
    1. Repealed.
    2. State board of accountancy, created by article 100 of title 12;
    3. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2006, p. 742, § 10, effective July 1, 2006.)
    4. Repealed.
    5. Repealed.
    6. Repealed.
    7. Repealed.
    8. Colorado state board of chiropractic examiners, created by article 215 of title 12;
    9. Repealed.
    10. Colorado dental board, created in article 220 of title 12;
    11. Repealed.
      1. Colorado medical board, created by article 240 of title 12;
      2. Colorado podiatry board, created by article 290 of title 12;
    12. Repealed.
    13. State board of optometry, created by article 275 of title 12;
    14. Passenger tramway safety board, created by article 150 of title 12;
    15. State board of pharmacy, created by part 1 of article 280 of title 12;
    16. Repealed.
    17. State board of licensure for architects, professional engineers, and professional land surveyors, created by section 12-120-103 ;
    18. Colorado state board of psychologist examiners, created by part 3 of article 245 of title 12;
    19. Repealed.
    20. State board of veterinary medicine, created by article 315 of title 12;
    21. Board of examiners of nursing home administrators, created by article 265 of title 12;
    22. State plumbing board, created by article 155 of title 12;
    23. to (ee) Repealed.
    24. State electrical board, created by article 115 of title 12;
    25. State board of nursing, created by article 255 of title 12;
    26. Repealed.
    27. State board of social work examiners, created by part 4 of article 245 of title 12;
    28. State board of marriage and family therapist examiners, created by part 5 of article 245 of title 12;
    29. State board of licensed professional counselor examiners, created by part 6 of article 245 of title 12;
    30. State board of unlicensed psychotherapists, created by part 7 of article 245 of title 12;
    31. State board of addiction counselor examiners, created by part 8 of article 245 of title 12.
  4. The following boards and agencies are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of professions and occupations:
    1. Repealed.
  5. Repealed.
    1. The Colorado prescription drug affordability review board created in section 10-16-1402 is transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of insurance.
    2. The Colorado prescription drug affordability advisory council created in section 10-16-1409 is transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of regulatory agencies and allocated to the division of insurance.

Source: L. 68: p. 85, § 22. L. 69: p. 838, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-22. L. 70: p. 424, § 13. L. 71: p. 105, § 12. L. 72: p. 143, § 2. L. 73: pp. 935, 1038, 1065, §§ 26, 2, 2. L. 74: (3)(ff) added, p. 276, § 1, effective July 1. L. 75: IP(3) amended and (3)(dd) added, p. 443, §§ 4, 5, effective April 15; IP(3) amended, (3)(dd) repealed, and (4) added, pp. 542, 543, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1; (3)(ee) added, p. 553, § 2, effective July 1; (4) added, p. 487, § 2, effective July 1. L. 76: (3)(g) repealed, p. 400, § 11, effective April 3; (3)(ee) repealed and (4)(d) added, p. 305, §§ 40, 41, effective May 20; (3)(f) repealed, p. 416, § 13, effective July 1; (3)(l) repealed, p. 429, § 1, effective July 1, 1977. L. 77: (2)(j) added, p. 718, § 3, effective July 1; (3)(d) repealed, p. 626, § 1, effective July 1; (3)(e) R&RE and (3)(j) repealed, p. 623, §§ 2, 4, effective July 1; (3)(i) repealed, p. 633, § 8, effective July 1. L. 78: (2)(b) amended, p. 284, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(i) amended and (3)(x) repealed, pp. 265, 266, §§ 62, 63, effective May 23; (3)(bb) amended, p. 315, § 3, effective July 1; (3)(cc) repealed, p. 266, § 64, effective July 1; (3)(ff) added and (4)(a) repealed, pp. 325, 326, §§ 15, 17, effective July 1. L. 79: (2)(h) amended, p. 922, § 1, effective July 1; (2)(k) added, p. 567, § 1, effective July 1; (2)(k) added and (3)(w) repealed, §§ 7, 9, pp. 571, 572, effective July 1; (2)(j) repealed, p. 553, § 1, effective March 1, 1980. L. 80: (5) added, p. 592, § 2, effective May 1; (3)(m) amended, p. 795, § 51, effective June 5; (3)(o) and (3)(t) repealed, p. 495, § 5, effective July 1; (3)(gg) added, p. 495, § 3, effective July 1. L. 81: (1.1) added, p. 1192, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(hh) added and (4)(c) repealed, p. 825, §§ 25, 27, effective July 1. L. 82: (2)(i) repealed, p. 624, § 23, effective April 2. L. 83: (3)(n) repealed, p. 575, § 10, effective April 22; (3)(a) repealed, p. 513, § 4, effective May 16; (4)(e) added, p. 580, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(bb) repealed, p. 2049, § 11, effective October 14. L. 85: (2)(b) amended, p. 382, § 4, effective April 17; (2)(f) amended, p. 553, § 6, effective July 1. L. 86: (4)(d) repealed, p. 447, § 6, effective April 17. L. 88: (2)(d) amended, p. 417, § 7, effective April 11; (3)(v) amended, (3)(ii), (3)(jj), (3)(kk), and (3)(ll) added, and (4)(b) repealed, pp. 567, 569, §§ 2, 9, effective July 1; (4)(e) repealed, p. 582, § 3, effective July 1. L. 89: (2)(a) amended, p. 1524, § 1, effective April 12; (2)(c) and (3)(hh) amended, pp. 621, 728, §§ 16, 32, effective July 1. L. 90: (2)(k) amended, p. 846, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: (2)(c) amended , p. 1455, § 19, effective June 6; (2)(f) repealed, p. 1784, § 54, effective June 6; (2)(a.5) added, p. 974, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(f) repealed, p. 1033, § 16, effective July 1; (2)(f) repealed, p. 1237, § 7, effective July 1. L. 94: (3)(hh) repealed, p. 705, § 8, effective April 19; (2)(e) amended, p. 1848, § 16, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(b) amended, p. 1144, § 3, effective October 1. L. 97: (1.1) repealed, p. 523, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (3)(e) repealed, p. 2025, § 31, effective July 1. L. 2003: (2)(a) amended, p. 1704, § 16, effective May 14; (2)(d) amended, p. 1210, § 20, effective July 1. L. 2004: (3)(u) amended, p. 1310, § 54, effective May 28. L. 2006: (3)(c) and (3)(u) amended, p. 742, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2010: (3)(m)(I) amended, (HB 10-1260), ch. 403, p. 1988, § 81, effective July 1; (2)(k) amended, (HB 10-1141), ch. 280, p. 1299, § 29, effective August 11. L. 2011: (3)(p) amended, (SB 11-094), ch. 129, p. 452, § 32, effective April 22; (3)(ll) amended and (3)(mm) added, (SB 11-187), ch. 285, p. 1328, § 72, effective July 1. L. 2012: (3)(r) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1627, § 68, effective July 1. L. 2014: (3)(k) amended, (HB 14-1227), ch. 363, p. 1738, § 46, effective July 1. L. 2016: IP(3) amended, (SB 16-189), ch. 210, p. 765, § 45, effective June 6. L. 2018: (2)(l) added, (HB 18-1291), ch. 273, p. 1693, § 8, effective May 29. L. 2019: (2)(k), (2)(l), (3)(b), (3)(h), (3)(k), (3)(m), (3)(p), (3)(q), (3)(r), (3)(u), (3)(v), (3)(y), (3)(z), (3)(aa), (3)(ff), (3)(gg), and (3)(ii) to (3)(mm) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1685, § 124, effective October 1. L. 2020: (3)(ll) amended, (HB 20-1206), ch. 304, p. 1551, § 66, effective July 14. L. 2021: (6) added, (SB 21-175), ch. 240, p. 1276, § 3, effective June 16; IP(2) and (2)(a.5) amended, (SB 21-103), ch. 477, p. 3413, § 10, effective September 1.

Editor's note: (1) Section 4 of chapter 131, Session Laws of Colorado 1975, provides that the act enacting subsection (4) is effective July 1, 1975, but the governor did not approve the act until July 16, 1975.

(2) Section 5 of chapter 142, Session Laws of Colorado 1975, provides that the act amending the introductory portion to subsection (3), repealing subsection (3)(dd), and enacting subsection (4) is effective July 1, 1975, but the governor did not approve the act until July 25, 1975.

(3) Amendments to subsection (2)(k) by Senate Bill 79-242 and House Bill 79-1231 were harmonized.

(4) Subsection (5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (5), effective July 1, 1981. (See L . 80, p. 592.)

Cross references: (1) For the creation of the office of commissioner of insurance, see § 10-1-104.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 21-175, see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

24-1-123. Department of agriculture - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of agriculture, the head of which shall be the commissioner of agriculture.
  2. The state agricultural commission, created by article 1 of title 35, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of agriculture.
  3. The state department of agriculture and the office of commissioner of agriculture, created by article 1 of title 35, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of agriculture.
  4. The department of agriculture shall consist of the following divisions:
    1. Division of markets, the head of which shall be the director of the division of markets. The division of markets and the office of chief thereof, created by article 1 of title 35, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of agriculture as the division of markets.
    2. Division of plant industry, the head of which shall be the director of the division of plant industry. The division of plant industry and the office of chief thereof, created by article 1 of title 35, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of agriculture as the division of plant industry.
      1. Division of animal industry, the head of which shall be the director of the division of animal industry. The division of animal industry and the office of chief thereof, created by article 1 of title 35, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of agriculture as the division of animal industry.
      2. The state bureau of animal protection, created by article 42 of title 35, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of agriculture and allocated to the division of animal industry as a section thereof.
    3. Division of administrative services, the head of which shall be the director of administrative services division. The division of administrative services and the office of chief thereof, created by article 1 of title 35, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of agriculture as the division of administrative services.
    4. Division of inspection and consumer services, the head of which shall be the director of inspection and consumer services division. The division of inspection and consumer services and the office of chief thereof, created by article 1 of title 35, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of agriculture as the division of inspection and consumer services.
    5. Repealed.
      1. Division of brand inspection, the head of which shall be the brand commissioner. The state board of stock inspection commissioners and the office of brand commissioner, created by article 41 of title 35, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of agriculture as a part of the division of brand inspection.
      2. and (III) Repealed.
      1. The Colorado state fair authority, the head of which shall be the manager of the Colorado state fair and industrial exposition. The Colorado state fair authority and the office of manager of the Colorado state fair and industrial exposition, created by part 4 of article 65 of title 35, C.R.S., shall exercise their powers, duties, and functions as a division of the department of agriculture as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of agriculture.
      2. The Colorado state fair authority shall include the board of commissioners of the Colorado state fair authority, created by part 4 of article 65 of title 35, C.R.S., which shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as specified by law under the department of agriculture as a part of the Colorado state fair authority as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer.
    6. The state conservation board, created in article 70 of title 35, C.R.S. All its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of agriculture as a division thereof. The employees of the state conservation board appointed pursuant to section 35-70-103 (5)(g), C.R.S., are transferred to the department of agriculture by a type 2 transfer.
  5. The Colorado wine industry development board, created by article 29.5 of title 35, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred as if by a type 1 transfer to the department of agriculture.
  6. The aquaculture board, created by article 24.5 of title 35, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as specified by law under the department of agriculture and the executive director thereof as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
  7. The Colorado agricultural value-added development board, created in section 35-75-203, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as specified by law under the department as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 1 transfer.

Source: L. 68: p. 87, § 23. L. 69: pp. 121, 122, §§ 1, 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-23. L. 71: p. 162, § 7. L. 75: (4)(g)(III) amended, p. 1362, § 2, effective November 1. L. 83: (4)(f) repealed, p. 1374, § 19, effective June 2. L. 90: (5) added, p. 1604, § 6, effective July 1. L. 91: (6) added, p. 200, § 6, effective June 7. L. 93: (4)(g)(II) and (4)(g)(III) repealed, pp. 1855, 1846, §§ 3, 2, effective July 1. L. 97: (4)(h) added, p. 819, § 14, effective June 30. L. 2000: (4)(i) added, p. 558, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2001: (7) added, p. 623, § 1, effective May 30. L. 2002: (4)(i) amended, p. 513, § 2, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

The brand inspection division is considered to be an arm of the state for eleventh amendment immunity purposes, because it is part of the department of agriculture and is thus subject to control by state officials. Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2017).

24-1-124. Department of natural resources - creation - divisions.

  1. There is hereby created a department of natural resources, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of natural resources, who shall be the commissioner of mines. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor pursuant to law.
  2. The office of natural resources coordinator, created by article 33 of this title, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of natural resources.

    (2.1) The department of natural resources shall include, as a part of the office of the executive director:

    1. The office of commissioner of mines, created by section 1 of article XVI of the state constitution. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the office of the executive director of the department of natural resources.
    2. Repealed.
    3. The Colorado avalanche information center, created pursuant to section 24-33-116. The powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of natural resources and allocated to the office of the executive director.
  3. The department of natural resources consists of the following divisions:
    1. Division of water resources, the head of which shall be the state engineer;
    2. The Colorado water conservation board and the office of director thereof, created by article 60 of title 37, C.R.S. Their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources as a division thereof.
    3. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2000, p. 556, § 3, effective July 1, 2000.)
    4. The state board of land commissioners, created by section 9 of article IX of the state constitution. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources as a division thereof, subject to the state constitution.
    5. The division of reclamation, mining, and safety, created by section 34-20-103 , C.R.S., the head of which shall be the director of the division of reclamation, mining, and safety, under the supervision of the executive director of the department of natural resources. Said division and director shall exercise their powers, duties, and functions as prescribed by law under the department of natural resources and the executive director thereof as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer. The division of reclamation, mining, and safety shall include the following:
      1. The coal mine board of examiners, created by article 22 of title 34, C.R.S. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of natural resources as a section of the division of reclamation, mining, and safety.
      2. The mined land reclamation board and the office of mined land reclamation, created by article 32 of title 34, C.R.S. The mined land reclamation board and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources and allocated to the division of reclamation, mining, and safety. The office of mined land reclamation shall exercise its powers, duties, and functions as if the same were transferred to the department of natural resources and allocated to the division of reclamation, mining, and safety as a section thereof by a type 2 transfer.
      3. The office of active and inactive mines, created by article 21 of title 34, C.R.S. Said office shall exercise its powers, duties, and functions as prescribed by law under the division of reclamation, mining, and safety as if the same were transferred to the department of natural resources and allocated to the division of reclamation, mining, and safety as a section thereof by a type 2 transfer.
      4. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2005, p. 1462, § 1, effective July 1, 2005.)
      5. Repealed.
    6. The oil and gas conservation commission of the state of Colorado and the office of the director thereof, created by article 60 of title 34, C.R.S. Said commission and office and the powers, duties, and functions thereof are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources as a division thereof.
    7. Repealed.
      1. and (II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2011, (SB 11-208), ch. 293, p. 1382, § 3, effective July 1, 2011.)
      (III) Repealed.
    8. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2011, (SB 11-208), ch. 293, p. 1382, § 3, effective July 1, 2011.)
    9. The division of forestry, created in section 24-33-201 (1) , the head of which shall be the state forester, appointed pursuant to section 23-31-207 , C.R.S. The division of forestry and the state forester shall exercise their powers, duties, and functions as prescribed by law under the department of natural resources and the executive director thereof as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
        1. The parks and wildlife commission, created in article 9 of title 33, C.R.S. The powers, duties, and functions of the wildlife commission and the board of parks and outdoor recreation are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the parks and wildlife commission as powers, duties, and functions of the parks and wildlife commission. (k) (I) (A) The parks and wildlife commission, created in article 9 of title 33, C.R.S. The powers, duties, and functions of the wildlife commission and the board of parks and outdoor recreation are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the parks and wildlife commission as powers, duties, and functions of the parks and wildlife commission.
        2. The parks and wildlife commission includes, as an advisory council, the Colorado natural areas council created by article 33 of title 33, C.R.S.
        1. The division of parks and wildlife, the head of which is the director of the division of parks and wildlife. The division of parks and wildlife and the office of the director of the division of parks and wildlife are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources.
        2. The division of parks and wildlife includes the fish health board created by article 5.5 of title 33, C.R.S. The fish health board shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as specified by law under the department of natural resources and the executive director of the department of natural resources as if the same were transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer.
  4. The division of water resources shall include the following:
    1. The office of state engineer, created by article 80 of title 37, C.R.S. Said office and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources and allocated to the division of water resources as a section thereof.
    2. The division engineers, created by part 2 of article 92 of title 37, C.R.S. Said engineers and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources and allocated to the division of water resources as a section thereof.
    3. The ground water commission, created by article 90 of title 37, C.R.S. Said commission and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources and allocated to the division of water resources as a section thereof.
    4. The state board of examiners of water well construction and pump installation contractors, created by article 91 of title 37, C.R.S. Said board and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of natural resources and allocated to the division of water resources as a section thereof.
    5. Repealed.
  5. Repealed.

Source: L. 68: p. 88, § 24. L. 69: pp. 867, 1223, §§ 2, 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-24. L. 72: pp. 321, 493, §§ 2, 3, 12. L. 74: (3)(f)(IV) repealed, p. 195, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (2.1) and (5) added, (3)(e)(I) and (3)(e)(III) amended, pp. 281, 1130, 1629, §§ 31, 32, 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 81: (3)(e)(III) amended, p. 1665, § 17, effective June 30. L. 83: (2.1) amended, p. 1307, § 2, effective May 10. L. 84: (3)(i) and (3)(f) amended, pp. 923, 934, §§ 13, 2, effective January 1. L. 87: (4)(d) amended, p. 1581, § 34, effective July 10. L. 88: (3)(i) amended and (5) repealed, p. 1179, § 3, effective March 23; (3)(e)(II) amended, p. 1180, § 4, effective May 3; (3)(e)(I) and (3)(e)(III) amended, p. 1435, § 14, effective June 11; (2.1)(a) amended, p. 1215, § 7, effective July 1. L. 91: (4)(e) repealed, p. 884, § 4, effective June 5; (3)(h) amended, p. 200, § 7, effective June 7. L. 92: (2.1), (3)(e), and (3)(g) amended, p. 1917, § 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (3)(h)(III) added, p. 1710, § 7, effective July 1. L. 99: (3)(h)(III) amended, p. 533, § 3, effective May 3; (3)(h)(I) amended, p. 607, § 2, effective January 1, 2000. L. 2000: (3)(c) amended and (3)(j) added, p. 556, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2003: (2.1)(b) RC&RE and (3)(e)(V) repealed, p. 1961, §§ 2, 4, effective May 22. L. 2005: (3)(e)(IV) and (3)(g) amended, p. 1462, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: (3)(e) amended, p. 212, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2007: (3)(j) amended, p. 549, § 4, effective August 3. L. 2010: (3)(j) amended, (HB 10-1223), ch. 41, p. 164, § 2, effective August 11. L. 2011: IP(3), (3)(h)(I), (3)(h)(II), and (3)(i) amended and (3)(k) added, (SB 11-208), ch. 293, p. 1382, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: (3)(g) amended, (HB 12-1355), ch. 247, p. 1196, § 3, effective June 4; (3)(k)(I) amended, (HB 12-1317), ch. 248, p. 1203, § 6, effective June 4. L. 2013: (2.1)(c) added, (HB 13-1057), ch. 1, p. 2, § 5, effective January 31; (2.1)(b) repealed, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1681, § 48, effective August 7.

Editor's note: (1) Subsection (3)(h)(III)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(h)(III), effective July 1, 2009. (See L . 1999, p. 533.)

(2) Subsection (3)(g)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(g), effective January 31, 2013, if the revisor of statutes received notification described in § 23-41-209 (2). The revisor of statutes received said notification on January 25, 2013. (See L . 2012, p. 1196.)

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2011 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (3) and subsections (3)(h)(I), (3)(h)(II), and (3)(i) and adding subsection (3)(k), see section 1 of chapter 293, Session Laws of Colorado 2011.

ANNOTATION

Mining reclamation board and the division of mined land reclamation are definite and distinct entities and the designation of the division as a party defendant in lieu of a designation of the board in a challenge to the board's issuance of a mining permit was a failure to join an indispensable party, since the board is an indispensable party to such an action. Cold Springs Ranch v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 765 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1988).

24-1-125. Department of local affairs - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of local affairs, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of local affairs, which office is hereby created. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109. The executive director shall have those powers, duties, and functions prescribed for heads of principal departments in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title.
  2. The department of local affairs shall consist of the following divisions:
      1. Division of local government, the head of which shall be the director of local government. The division of local government and the office of the director thereof, created by part 1 of article 32 of this title 24, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of local affairs as the division of local government.
      2. The division of local government includes the Colorado resiliency office, the head of which is the director of the Colorado resiliency office. The Colorado resiliency office exercises its powers, duties, and functions under the division and the department as a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
    1. Division of property taxation, the head of which shall be the property tax administrator. The rule-making, administrative, and enforcement powers, duties, and functions, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, of the Colorado tax commission are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of local affairs, and said powers, duties, and functions shall be exercised or performed by the property tax administrator or the division of property taxation as is otherwise provided by law.
      1. Division of commerce and development, the head of which shall be the director of commerce and development. The division of commerce and development and the office of director thereof, created by part 3 of article 32 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of local affairs as the division of commerce and development.
      2. Repealed.
    2. Repealed.
    3. The division of housing, created by the "Colorado Housing Act of 1970", part 7 of article 32 of this title. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of local affairs as a division thereof.
    4. Division of planning, the head of which shall be the director of the division of planning. The division of planning and the office of director thereof, created by part 2 of article 32 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of local affairs as a division thereof.
    5. Repealed.
    6. Office of rural development, the head of which shall be the coordinator of rural development. The office of rural development and the position of coordinator of rural development, created by part 8 of article 32 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of local affairs.
    7. Repealed.
    8. The office of the Colorado youth service corps, created by part 20 of article 32 of this title, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department of local affairs as if the same were transferred to said department by a type 2 transfer.
    9. Repealed.
  3. The board of assessment appeals created by article 2 of title 39, C.R.S., shall be vested with the quasi-judicial powers, duties, and functions of the Colorado tax commission, which board shall constitute a part of the department of local affairs, and said board is transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of local affairs.
  4. The advisory committee to the property tax administrator, created by article 2 of title 39, C.R.S., shall constitute a part of the department of local affairs and shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department as if it were transferred to said department by a type 1 transfer.
  5. to (9) Repealed.

Source: L. 68: p. 90, § 25. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-25. L. 70: pp. 241, 387, §§ 2, 27. L. 71: pp. 105, 124, 1058, §§ 13, 2, 1. L. 73: p. 190, § 2. L. 76: (4) added, p. 756, § 8, effective July 1. L. 81: (2)(h) amended, p. 1128, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (2)(c) amended, p. 900 § 2, effective June 14; (2)(d), (2)(e), and (2)(h) repealed, p. 971, § 28, effective July 1, 1984. L. 85: (2)(c)(II)(A) amended and (2)(c)(II)(B) repealed, p. 791, §§ 2, 1, effective March 14; (2)(j) and (5) added, pp. 820, 929, §§ 2, 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 886, § 10, effective May 23. L. 87: (6) added, p. 1027, § 2, effective July 8. L. 89: (6)(b) amended, p. 339, § 2, effective June 7. L. 90: (2)(j) repealed, p. 1246, § 3, effective July 1. L. 91: (2)(k) added, p. 928, § 2, effective May 31. L. 92: (7) and (8) added, p. 1010, § 1, effective March 12; (6) RC&RE, p. 2176, § 32, effective June 2. L. 93: (6) amended, p. 469, § 1, effective April 21; (9) added, p. 1899, § 3, effective July 1; (5)(b) added by revision, pp. 1094, 1168, §§ 8, 151. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 564, § 8, effective April 6. L. 95: (9) repealed, p. 511, § 3, effective May 16. L. 2000: (2)(l) added, p. 1911, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2)(m) added and (7) amended, p. 1176, §§ 1, 2, effective August 4. L. 2008: (2)(l) repealed, p. 1290, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2012: (2)(m), (7), and (8) repealed, (HB 12-1283), ch. 240, p. 1137, § 55, effective July 1. L. 2018: (2)(a) amended, (HB 18-1394), ch. 234, p. 1472, § 18, effective August 8.

Editor's note: (1) Subsection (5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (5), effective July 1, 1994. (See L. 93, pp. 1094, 1168.)

(2) (a) Subsection (6)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (6), effective July 1, 1991. (See L . 89, p. 339.)

(b) Subsection (6)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (6), effective July 6, 1997. (See L . 93, p. 469.)

Cross references: (1) For the transfer of the powers, duties, and functions of the Colorado bureau of investigation, the Colorado law enforcement training academy, and the division of criminal justice from the department of local affairs to the department of public safety, see § 24-1-128.6.

(2) For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act repealing subsections (2)(m), (7), and (8), see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.

ANNOTATION

For the unconstitutionality of designation of executive director as a "confidential employee", see Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968).

24-1-126. State department of highways - creation. (Repealed)

Source: L. 68: p. 91, § 26. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-26. L. 71: p. 105, § 14. L. 74: (3)(d) added, p. 196, § 1, effective July 1. L. 83: (3)(b) repealed, p. 971, § 28, effective July 1, 1984. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 886, § 11, effective May 23. L. 91: Entire section repealed, p. 1135, § 224, effective July 1.

24-1-127. Department of military and veterans affairs - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of military and veterans affairs, the head of which shall be the adjutant general who shall be appointed by the governor pursuant to law.
  2. The office of the adjutant general, created by part 1 of article 3 of title 28, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of military and veterans affairs.
  3. The department of military and veterans affairs shall consist of the following divisions:
    1. The Colorado National Guard, created by part 2 of article 3 of title 28, C.R.S. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of military and veterans affairs as a division thereof.
    2. The Colorado department of civil air patrol, created by article 1 of title 28, C.R.S. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of military and veterans affairs as the Colorado division of the civil air patrol.
    3. Repealed.
    4. The Colorado state defense force, when organized by the governor pursuant to article 4 of title 28, C.R.S. If organized, its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of military and veterans affairs as a division thereof.
    5. Repealed.
    6. The division of veterans affairs, created by part 7 of article 5 of title 28, C.R.S. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of military and veterans affairs as a division thereof.
    7. The Colorado board of veterans affairs, created by section 28-5-702, C.R.S. Its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of military and veterans affairs as a division thereof.

Source: L. 68: p. 91, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-27. L. 73: p. 419, § 2. L. 84: (3)(c) repealed, p. 686, § 25, effective January 1, 1985. L. 86: (3)(d) amended, p. 1016, § 6, effective July 1. L. 88: (3)(e) added, p. 1090, § 3, effective January 1. L. 91: (3)(e) repealed, p. 1055, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1), (2), IP(3), (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(d) amended and (3)(f) and (3)(g) added, p. 358, § 12, effective July 1.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (1) and (2), the introductory portion to subsection (3), and subsections (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(d) and enacting subsections (3)(f) and (3)(g), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

24-1-128. Department of personnel - creation.

  1. Pursuant to the provisions of section 14 of article XII of the state constitution, there is hereby created a department of personnel, the head of which shall be the state personnel director, also referred to as the executive director of personnel, who shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and who shall serve at the pleasure of the governor.
  2. The state personnel board, created by section 14 of article XII of the state constitution, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of personnel, subject to the provisions of the state constitution.
  3. The civil service commission and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of personnel and allocated to the state personnel board and the state personnel director, pursuant to the provisions of the state constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto, and the civil service commission is abolished.
  4. The state employees' and officials' group insurance board of administration, created by part 2 of article 8 of title 10, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of personnel and allocated to the state personnel director, pursuant to the provisions of the state constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto, and the state employees' and officials' group insurance board of administration is abolished.
  5. Repealed.
  6. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of administration are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of personnel, and the department of administration is hereby abolished.
  7. The department of personnel shall include the following administrative support services:
    1. The powers, duties, and functions concerning purchasing, specified in part 2 of article 102 of this title, shall be administered as if transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel.
    2. The powers, duties, and functions concerning state archives and public records, specified in part 1 of article 80 of this title, shall be administered as if transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel.
    3. Repealed.
    4. The powers, duties, and functions concerning accounts and control and the office of controller, specified in part 2 of article 30 of this title, except those powers, duties, and functions transferred by paragraph (c) of this subsection (7), shall be administered as if transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel.
    5. Repealed.
    6. The office of administrative courts, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of personnel. The office of administrative courts, created by part 10 of article 30 of this title, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel as an office thereof.
    7. The powers, duties, and functions concerning central services, specified in part 11 of article 30 of this title, shall be administered as if transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel.
    8. The powers, duties, and functions concerning the risk management system, specified in part 15 of article 30 of this title, shall be administered as if transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel.
    9. (Deleted by amendment, L . 96, p. 1493, § 1, effective June 1, 1996.)
    10. Repealed.
    11. The powers, duties, and functions concerning state buildings. Such powers, duties, and functions, specified by part 13 of article 30 of this title and formerly vested in the office of state planning and budgeting, are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel.
    12. The state claims board, created by part 15 of article 30 of this title, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of personnel.
    13. Repealed.

Source: L. 71: p. 302, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-34. L. 74: Entire section added, p. 401, § 2, effective July 1. L. 89: (4) and (5) added, pp. 487, 1646, §§ 16, 22, effective July 1. L. 95: (6) and (7) added, p. 624, § 3, effective July 1. L. 96: (7)(a) to (7)(e) and (7)(g) to (7)(i) amended, p. 1493, § 1, effective June 1. L. 99: (7)(m) repealed, p. 872, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 1861, § 72, effective August 2. L. 2004: (7)(j) repealed, p. 304, § 2, effective April 7. L. 2005: (7)(f) amended, p. 851, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2008: (7)(c) and (7)(e) repealed, p. 1129, § 11, effective May 22. L. 2009: (5) repealed, (SB 09-066), ch. 73, p. 260, § 25, effective July 1.

Editor's note: The reference in subsection (4) of this section concerning the state employees' and officials' group insurance board of administration created in part 2 of article 8 of title 10 was repealed, effective May 19, 1994, but has been left in for historical purposes.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act enacting subsections (6) and (7), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.

24-1-128.1. Office of state planning and budgeting - creation. (Repealed)

Source: L. 74: Entire section added, p. 202, § 4, effective July 1. L. 78: (3) added, p. 266, § 65, effective May 23. L. 83: Entire section repealed, p. 971, § 28, effective July 1, 1984.

Cross references: For the establishment of the office of state planning and budgeting within the office of the governor, see article 37 of this title.

24-1-128.5. Department of corrections - creation.

  1. There is hereby created a department of corrections, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of corrections, who shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and who shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.

    (1.5) The department of corrections shall supervise and control each correctional facility, as defined in section 17-1-102, C.R.S. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of institutions relating to honor camps, work release programs, and other adult correctional programs are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of corrections. The powers, duties, and functions of the division of parole in the department of institutions are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of corrections, and the division of parole in the department of institutions is abolished. The executive director of the department of corrections shall have the powers and duties specified in title 17, C.R.S.

  2. The department of corrections shall consist of the following divisions:
    1. The division of adult parole, the head of which shall be the director of the division of adult parole. The division of adult parole shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department of corrections as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer.
    2. The division of correctional industries, the head of which shall be the director of the division of correctional industries. The division shall supervise and control correctional industries programs in this state. The division shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the department of corrections as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer.
    3. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2000, p. 859, § 73, effective May 24, 2000.)
  3. The state board of parole, created by part 2 of article 2 of title 17, C.R.S., is transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of corrections.

    (3.5) The division of correctional industries shall include, as a section thereof, the Colorado state agency for surplus property, created by part 4 of article 82 of this title. The agency and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of corrections and allocated to the division of correctional industries as a section thereof.

  4. Any powers, duties, and functions relating to adult corrections which were previously vested in the department of institutions and are not specifically transferred to the department of corrections shall be assigned thereto by the governor.

Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 950, § 15, effective July 13. L. 79: (2)(a) amended, p. 702, § 75, effective June 21. L. 86: (3.5) added, pp. 755, 886, §§ 4, 12, effective July 1. L. 90: (2)(c) added, p. 977, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2000: (2)(a) and (2)(c) amended, p. 859, § 73, effective May 24. L. 2010: (1.5) added and (2)(a) amended, (SB 10-130), ch. 106, p. 355, § 1, effective April 15.

24-1-128.6. Department of public safety - creation - repeal.

  1. There is hereby created a department of public safety, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of public safety. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
  2. The department of public safety consists of the following divisions:
    1. Colorado state patrol, the head of which shall be the chief of the Colorado state patrol. The Colorado state patrol and the office of chief thereof, created by part 2 of article 33.5 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety. The powers, duties, and functions of the state department of highways relating to the Colorado state patrol are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety and allocated to the Colorado state patrol. The powers, duties, and functions of the ports of entry section of the motor carrier services division of the division of motor vehicles of the department of revenue, which motor carrier services division is abolished pursuant to section 24-1-117 (5) , enacted by House Bill 12-1019, enacted in 2012, are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of public safety and allocated to the Colorado state patrol.
    2. Repealed.
    3. Colorado bureau of investigation, the head of which shall be the director of the Colorado bureau of investigation. The Colorado bureau of investigation and the office of director thereof, created by part 4 of article 33.5 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of local affairs relating to the Colorado bureau of investigation are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety and allocated to the Colorado bureau of investigation.
    4. Division of criminal justice, the head of which shall be the director of the division of criminal justice. The division of criminal justice and the office of director thereof, created by part 5 of article 33.5 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of local affairs relating to the division of criminal justice are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety and allocated to the division of criminal justice.
    5. Repealed.
    6. (Deleted by amendment, L . 2002, p. 1204, § 1, effective June 3, 2002.)
    7. Repealed.
      1. Division of homeland security and emergency management, the head of which is the director of the division of homeland security and emergency management. The division of homeland security and emergency management and the office of director thereof, created by part 16 of article 33.5 of this title, shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety and allocated to the division of homeland security and emergency management.
      2. The division of homeland security and emergency management includes the following agencies, which shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public safety as if the same were transferred thereto by a type 2 transfer:
        1. The office of emergency management created by part 7 of article 33.5 of this title, the head of which is the director of the office of emergency management. Effective July 1, 2012, the division of emergency management in the department of local affairs, created by part 21 of article 32 of this title, prior to its repeal in 2012, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety and allocated to the office of emergency management under the division of homeland security and emergency management pursuant to this article.
        2. Office of prevention and security, created in section 24-33.5-1606 ; and
        3. The office of preparedness, created in section 24-33.5-1606 .5.
    8. Division of fire prevention and control, the head of which is the director of the division of fire prevention and control. The division of fire prevention and control and the office of the director thereof, created by part 12 of article 33.5 of this title, and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety.
  3. Repealed.
    1. The Colorado emergency planning commission, created by section 24-33.5-1503, prior to the repeal of that section by House Bill 14-1004, is abolished, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 3 transfer as follows:
      1. The duty to promulgate any rules necessary for implementation of the federal "Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986", 42 U.S.C. sec. 11001 et seq., Title III of the federal "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986", Pub.L. 99-499, the other powers and duties described under section 24-33.5-1503.5 (2), and the duty to administer the SARA Title III fund created in section 24-33.5-1506, are transferred to the department of public safety and allocated to the director of the division of homeland security and emergency management; and
      2. All other functions relating to implementation of the federal "Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986", 42 U.S.C. sec. 11001 et seq., Title III of the federal "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986", Pub.L. 99-499, that were enjoyed by the Colorado emergency planning commission prior to its repeal by House Bill 14-1004, are transferred to the department of public safety and allocated to the emergency planning subcommittee of the homeland security and all-hazards senior advisory committee, which subcommittee is created under section 24-33.5-1614 (3.5).
    2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
  4. The witness protection board, created by section 24-33.5-106, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of public safety.
  5. The identity theft and financial fraud board, created by section 24-33.5-1703, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety.
  6. The cold case task force, created in section 24-33.5-109, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety.
    1. The Colorado commission on criminal and juvenile justice, created pursuant to section 16-11.3-102, C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public safety.
    2. This subsection (8) is repealed, effective July 1, 2023.
  7. The crime victim services advisory board, created pursuant to section 24-4.1-117.3, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 2 transfer to the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety.

Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 960, § 3, effective July 1, 1984. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 886, § 13, effective May 23. L. 87: (2)(g) added, p. 1569, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: (3) added, p. 1220, § 3, effective May 31. L. 92: (2)(e) and (3) repealed, p. 1011, § 2, effective March 12. L. 93: (4) added, p. 1323, § 3, effective June 6. L. 95: (5) added, p. 1346, § 2, effective June 5. L. 99: (2)(g) repealed, p. 437, § 7, effective April 30. L. 2002: (2)(f) amended and (2)(h) added, p. 1204, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2006: (6) added, p. 1298, § 2, effective May 30. L. 2007: (8) added, p. 1105, § 2, effective May 23; (7) added, p. 1897, § 4, effective June 1. L. 2009: (9) added, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 556, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: IP(2), (2)(h), and (4) amended, (2)(b) repealed, and (2)(i) added, (HB 12-1283), ch. 240, p. 1068, § 7, effective July 1; (2)(a) amended, (HB 12-1019), ch. 135, p. 464, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2014: (4) amended, (HB 14-1004), ch. 11, p. 101, § 1, effective February 27; (8) RC&RE, (HB 14-1363), ch. 302, p. 1267, § 21, effective May 31. L. 2018: (8)(b) amended, (HB 18-1287), ch. 318, p. 1909, § 2, effective May 30.

Editor's note: Prior to its recreation in 2014, subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective July 1, 2013. (See L . 2007, p. 1105.)

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (2) and subsections (2)(h) and (4), repealing subsection (2)(b), and adding subsection (2)(i), see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.

24-1-128.7. Department of transportation - creation - repeal.

  1. There is hereby created a department of transportation, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of transportation.
  2. The transportation commission, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 43, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of transportation.
  3. The department of transportation consists of the following divisions:
    1. Highway maintenance division, the head of which is the director of the highway maintenance division. The highway maintenance division and the office of the director thereof, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 43, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of transportation.
    2. Aeronautics division, the head of which shall be the director of the aeronautics division. The aeronautics division and the office of the director thereof, created by article 10 of title 43, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of transportation. The powers, duties, and functions of the division of aviation of the department of military and veterans affairs are transferred by a type 1 transfer to the department of transportation and allocated to the aeronautics division.
    3. Transportation development division, the head of which shall be the director of the transportation development division. The transportation development division and the office of the director thereof, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 43, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of transportation.
    4. Engineering, design, and construction division, the head of which shall be the chief engineer. The transportation development division and the office of the chief engineer, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 43, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of transportation.
    5. The transit and rail division created in part 1 of article 1 of title 43, C.R.S., the head of which shall be the director of the transit and rail division. The transit and rail division and the office of the director of the division shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of transportation and the executive director of the department as if the same were transferred thereto by a type 2 transfer.
  4. The state department of highways, created by section 24-1-126, prior to its repeal in 1991, and its powers, duties, and functions, are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of transportation, pursuant to the provisions of this article, and the state department of highways is abolished.
  5. The statewide bridge and tunnel enterprise created in section 43-4-805 (2) shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of transportation.
    1. The high-performance transportation enterprise created in section 43-4-806 (2)(a), C.R.S., shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of transportation.
    2. The statewide tolling enterprise, created by the transportation commission pursuant to section 43-4-803 (1), C.R.S., prior to the repeal and reenactment of said section by Senate Bill 09-108, enacted in 2009, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 3 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the high-performance transportation enterprise created in section 43-4-806 (2)(a), C.R.S., and the statewide tolling enterprise is abolished.
  6. Repealed.
    1. The southwest chief and front range passenger rail commission created in section 43-4-1001 (2)(a) shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of transportation.
    2. The southwest chief rail line economic development, rural tourism, and infrastructure repair and maintenance commission created in section 43-4-1001 (4) prior to the repeal and reenactment of said section by Senate Bill 17-153, enacted in 2017, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 3 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the southwest chief and front range passenger rail commission created in section 43-4-1001 (2)(a) and the southwest chief rail line economic development, rural tourism, and infrastructure repair and maintenance commission is abolished.
    3. This subsection (8) is repealed, effective May 15, 2022.
  7. The clean transit enterprise, created in section 43-4-1203, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of transportation.
  8. The nonattainment area air pollution mitigation enterprise, created in section 43-4-1303, shall exercise its powers and perform its duties as if the same were transferred by a type 1 transfer, as defined in section 24-1-105, to the department of transportation.

Source: L. 91: Entire section added, p. 1055, § 6, effective July 1. L. 92: (4) amended, p. 2176, § 33, effective June 2. L. 2002: (3)(b) amended, p. 358, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2009: (5) and (6) added, (SB 09-108), ch. 5, p. 48, § 2, effective March 2; (3)(e) added, (SB 09-094), ch. 280, p. 1249, § 1, effective May 20. L. 2014: (7) added, (HB 14-1161), ch. 185, p. 690, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2015: IP(3) and (3)(a) amended, (HB 15-1209), ch. 64, p. 173, § 1, effective March 30. L. 2017: (8) added, (SB 17-153), ch. 225, p. 865, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2021: (5) amended and (9) and (10) added, (SB 21-260), ch. 250, p. 1366, § 4, effective June 17; (8) repealed, (SB 21-238), ch. 401, p. 2673, § 2, effective May 15, 2022; (8)(c) added by revision, (SB 21-238), ch. 401, pp. 2673, 2674, §§ 2, 6.

Editor's note: Subsection (7)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (7), effective July 1, 2017. (See L . 2014, p. 690.)

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3)(b), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 21-260, see section 1 of chapter 250, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

24-1-129. Effect of transfer of powers, duties, and functions.

Any principal department to which powers, duties, and functions of any existing department, institution, or other agency are transferred or any division, section, or unit of any principal department to which such powers, duties, and functions are allocated shall be the successor in every way with respect to such powers, duties, and functions of the department, institution, or other agency in which such powers, duties, and functions were vested prior to July 1, 1968, except as otherwise provided by this article. Every act performed in the exercise of such powers, duties, and functions by or under the authority of the principal department or any division, section, or unit thereof to which such powers, duties, and functions are transferred or allocated by this article shall be deemed to have the same force and effect as if performed by the department, institution, or other agency in which such functions were vested prior to July 1, 1968. When any such department, institution, or other agency is referred to or designated by any law, contract, or other document, such reference or designation shall be deemed to apply to the principal department or the division, section, or unit thereof in which the powers, duties, and functions of such department, institution, or other agency so referred to or designated are vested by the provisions of this article.

Source: L. 68: p. 92, § 28. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-28.

24-1-130. Actions, suits, or proceedings not to abate by reorganization - maintenance by or against successors.

  1. No suit, action, or other proceeding, judicial or administrative, lawfully commenced, or which could have been lawfully commenced, by or against any department, institution, or other agency or by or against any officer of the state in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any reorganization under the provisions of this article. The court may allow the suit, action, or other proceeding to be maintained by or against the successor of any department, institution, or other agency, or any officer affected.
  2. No criminal action commenced or which could have been commenced by the state shall abate by the taking effect of this article.

Source: L. 68: p. 92, § 29. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-29.

24-1-131. Rules, regulations, and orders adopted prior to article - continuation.

All rules, regulations, and orders of departments, institutions, boards, commissions, or other agencies lawfully adopted prior to July 1, 1968, shall continue to be effective until revised, amended, repealed, or nullified pursuant to law.

Source: L. 68: p. 92, § 30. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-30.

24-1-132. Transfer of officers and employees.

Effective July 1, 1968, such officers and employees who were engaged prior to said date in the performance of powers, duties, and functions of any department, institution, or other agency transferred to a principal department under the provisions of this article and who, in the opinion of the head of the principal department and the governor, are necessary to perform the powers, duties, and functions of the principal department or of any division, section, or unit thereof shall become officers and employees of such principal department and shall retain all rights to state personnel system and retirement benefits under the laws of the state, and their services shall be deemed to be continuous. All transfers and any abolishment of positions of personnel in the state personnel system shall be made and processed in accordance with state personnel system laws and rules and regulations.

Source: L. 68: p. 93, § 32. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-31.

24-1-133. Transfer of property and records.

In all cases where, under the provisions of this article, the powers, duties, and functions of any department, institution, or other agency are transferred to a principal department or divided between any two or more principal departments, such principal department shall succeed to all property and records which were used for or pertain to the performance of the powers, duties, and functions transferred. Any conflict as to the proper disposition of such property or records arising under this section and resulting from the transfer, allocation, abolishment, or division of any department, institution, or other agency or the powers, duties, and functions thereof shall be determined by the governor, whose decision shall be final.

Source: L. 68: p. 93, § 33. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-32.

24-1-134. Subsequent powers and functions - assignment.

Pursuant to the provisions of section 22 of article IV of the state constitution, all powers and functions of the executive department of state government created or specified by law after July 1, 1968, including the creation of any new division, section, unit, or other agency of said executive department, shall be assigned to a principal department, and such powers and functions shall be exercised under such principal department as if the same were transferred to such department by this article under a type 2 transfer, unless otherwise specified by such law.

Source: L. 68: p. 93, § 35. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-33.

24-1-135. Effect of congressional redistricting.

  1. Effective January 1, 1983, the terms of office of persons appointed pursuant to section 11-102-103; sections 12-35-104 and 12-42.5-104, as these provisions existed prior to October 1, 2019; and sections 17-2-102, 23-60-104, 24-32-706, 25-1-103, 25-3.5-104, 25.5-1-602, 26-11-101, 33-11-105, 34-60-104, and 35-65-105 shall terminate. Prior thereto, the appointing authority designated by law shall appoint members to such boards, commissions, and committees for terms to commence on January 1, 1983, and to expire on the date the terms of the predecessors in office of such members would have expired, and any person whose term of office is terminated by this section may be reappointed effective January 1, 1983, and, for the purposes of such reappointment, shall not be deemed to succeed himself. Appointments thereafter shall be made as prescribed by law.
  2. Any member of a board, commission, or committee who was appointed or elected to the office as a resident of a designated congressional district pursuant to section 24 (2) of article VI of the state constitution or section 11-102-103; section 12-35-104 or 12-42.5-104, as these provisions existed prior to October 1, 2019; or section 22-2-105, 23-1-102, 23-20-102, 23-21-503, 23-60-104, 24-32-706, 25-1-103, 25-3.5-104, 25.5-1-602, 26-11-101, 33-11-105, 34-60-104, 35-65-401, or 44-30-301, and who no longer resides in the congressional district solely because of a change made to the boundaries of the district subsequent to the 1990 federal decennial census is eligible to hold office for the remainder of the term to which the member was elected or appointed, notwithstanding the nonresidency.

Source: L. 72: p. 545, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-35. L. 76: Entire section amended, p. 400, § 10, effective April 13. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1338, § 3, effective July 1. L. 82: Entire section R&RE, p. 349, § 1, effective April 30. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 923, § 14, effective January 1, 1985. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 382, § 5, effective April 17. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 890, § 16, effective June 5. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 1060, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2005: Entire section amended, p. 670, § 10, effective June 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 2032, § 46, effective June 1. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1704, § 33, effective May 29; (2) amended, (SB 18-034), ch. 14, p. 245, § 29, effective October 1. L. 2019: Entire section amended, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3468, § 25, effective October 1.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (2) by SB 18-034 and HB 18-1375 were harmonized.

24-1-135.1. Effect of congressional redistricting related to 2000 federal decennial census - definition.

    1. The appointing authority of the boards, commissions, or committees established pursuant to sections 13-91-104, 14-10-115, 21-2-101, 23-1-102, 23-21-503, 23-60-104, 24-32-706, 25-1-103, 25.5-1-301, 25.5-1-602, 26-11-101, 33-11-105, and 35-65-401, which require members to be appointed as residents of designated congressional districts, shall determine whether the current appointments to such boards, commissions, or committees adequately represent Colorado's new congressional districts. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, such appointing authority shall terminate the terms of current members and appoint new members to replace such members on the boards, commissions, or committees as is necessary to ensure proper representation from the new congressional districts; except that the term of a member who continues to reside in the district that such member was designated to represent shall not be terminated. Such changes shall be made no later than January 1, 2003. If the current members adequately represent the new congressional districts, the membership of the board, commission, or committee shall remain unchanged. Any member who continues to serve on a board, commission, or committee shall not be required to be reappointed.
    2. If the appointing authority of the boards, commissions, or committees set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) is the governor, with the consent of the senate, the governor alone shall determine whether the current appointments to such boards, commissions, or committees adequately represent the new congressional districts and terminate the terms of current members as is necessary to ensure proper representation from such districts, but senate consent shall still be required for the appointment of any new members.
    3. As used in this section, "new congressional districts" means the congressional districts for the state of Colorado as they exist after the changes that occurred as a result of the 2000 federal decennial census, including the addition of a seventh congressional district and the changes in boundaries of the other six congressional districts.
  1. The term of any new appointee who is appointed to replace a person on a board, commission, or committee pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall expire on the date that the term of the person that such new appointee replaced would have expired, and such member shall not be deemed to have served a full term for purposes of calculating any applicable term limits. If the total size of a board, commission, or committee was increased as a result of the new congressional districts, a new member to such board, commission, or committee shall serve for a term as prescribed by law.
  2. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the appointing authority of the boards, commissions, or committees set forth in subsection (1) shall not be required to make any changes to such boards, commissions, and committees in order to accommodate the new congressional districts, except as required by this section.
  3. Any member of a board or commission who was appointed to such office as a resident of a designated congressional district pursuant to section 24 (2) of article VI and section 6 (1) of article XXVII of the state constitution, and who no longer resides in such congressional district solely because of a change made to the boundaries of such district subsequent to the 2000 federal decennial census, is eligible to hold office for the remainder of the term to which the member was appointed, notwithstanding such nonresidency.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all appointments to the boards, commissions, and committees set forth in subsection (1) of this section shall be made as prescribed by law.

Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 942, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2003: (1)(a) amended, p. 1997, § 44, effective May 22. L. 2005: (1)(a) amended, p. 671, § 11, effective June 1; (1)(a) amended, p. 207, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1)(a) amended, (HB 13-1139), ch.120, p. 408, § 6, effective August 7. L. 2017: (1)(a) amended, (HB 17-1024), ch. 7, p. 21, § 2, effective August 9.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1)(a) by House Bill 05-1063 and House Bill 05-1205 were harmonized.

24-1-136. "Information Coordination Act" - policy - functions of the heads of principal departments.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Information Coordination Act". The legislative policy with reference to the coordination of information is hereby declared to be that:
    1. The operational reports of the executive agencies should provide complete, concise, and useful information about executive operations to the governor and the general assembly;
    2. The publications of executive agencies should be clearly related to agency functions and cost no more than is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the material is published;
    3. Executive agencies should recover the full cost of those publications not necessary to the agency's function but issued for the convenience of the users;
    4. Publication activities of executive agencies should be responsive to the direction of the governor; and
    5. Operational reports and publications of executive agencies should continue to be produced as long as they are useful, but the need for them should be reviewed periodically to ensure that public resources are not misdirected toward the fulfillment of outmoded directives.
  2. There is assigned to the heads of the principal departments the function of coordination and control of operational and administrative information within the executive branch.
  3. The heads of the principal departments shall jointly have the following responsibilities of coordination and control:
    1. Development and direction of a system for the collection, coordination, control, and distribution of state operational and administrative reports and information;
      1. Preparation for the governor of annual reports by the principal departments, accounting to the general assembly for the operations of all agencies in the executive branch, which shall include the results of any actions in furtherance of measurable annual objectives in the areas of operational efficiency and effectiveness set forth in the budget request of each department pursuant to section 24-37-304 (1)(a); and
      2. Publication of such reports subject to the approval of the governor;
    2. Preparation of operational and administrative reports and bringing to the attention of the governor special problems of agencies as disclosed through the reporting system;
    3. Delivery to the custody of the executive director of the department of personnel, as chief administrative officer of the state archives and public records, of two official archival copies of original published and processed agency reports, studies, and other publications and distribution of other copies of the original reports as directed by the governor. Colleges and universities shall forward a monthly listing of publications in the form and manner prescribed by the executive director of the department of personnel.
    4. Delivery to the custody of the state librarian of four copies of all state publications pursuant to section 24-90-204;
    5. Effecting economies in the publication of operational and administrative information consistent with the purpose of the publication and without interference to the discharge of the agency's statutory responsibilities.
  4. The governor or the general assembly may at any time require that the heads of the principal departments collect and from time to time publish certain regular or special reports, in whole or in part.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not apply to reports and publications of the legislative and judicial branches of state government nor to the publications of executive agencies in connection with research they perform under contract.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to change or supersede the present authority and responsibility of the executive director of the department of personnel to act as official custodian and trustee of permanent public documents and to respond to all reasonable requests for reference, research, and information and to provide facsimiles thereof concerning the contents of original agency reports.
  7. The authority of the heads of the principal departments over the issuance of publications as prescribed in this section shall in no way be construed as being in contravention of those administrative procedure laws which elsewhere either grant powers to executive agencies to promulgate and issue agency rules and regulations or define legal notice and publication with reference to such rules and regulations.
  8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to empower anyone to restrict or inhibit the free flow of news or the release of public information, or to establish censorship or control over news or information of actions by public employees or public bodies, or to restrict public access to public records; nor shall any part of this section be construed as restricting, amending, superseding, or contravening any existing law, order, or requirement relating to any required or permitted official or public notice or legal advertisement.
  9. Whenever any report is required or allowed to be made to the general assembly, including any report required to be made to any committee of the general assembly or legislative staff, the reporting entity shall file one electronic copy of the report with the joint legislative library, and four hard copies with the state librarian for the state publications depository and distribution center. Such filing is sufficient to comply with the direction or authority to make such report. The electronic filing shall be by means of a portable document format and shall include a hyperlink to the website where the report is located, if the report is directly accessible via the internet. If the reporting entity cannot provide an electronic copy of the report to the joint legislative library, then the reporting entity shall deliver six hard copies to the joint legislative library. The joint legislative library is responsible for delivering an electronic or hard copy of the report to the legislators, legislative committees, or legislative staff, as applicable, who are to receive the report. A legislator may request from the joint legislative library delivery of a hard copy of any report.
  10. An agency or department not having an appropriation for producing publications to be sold to the public shall obtain the approval of the controller prior to making any disbursements for said publications. The request for approval shall include the proposed procedures for control of the proceeds of sales.
      1. Effective July 1, 1996, whenever any report is required to be made to the general assembly by an executive agency or the judicial branch on a periodic basis, the requirement for such report shall expire on the day after the third anniversary of the date on which the first such report is due unless the general assembly, acting by bill, continues the requirement. (11) (a) (I) Effective July 1, 1996, whenever any report is required to be made to the general assembly by an executive agency or the judicial branch on a periodic basis, the requirement for such report shall expire on the day after the third anniversary of the date on which the first such report is due unless the general assembly, acting by bill, continues the requirement.
      2. Repealed.
    1. Among the matters to be considered by the sunrise and sunset review committee, created by joint rule of the senate and house of representatives, during each interim shall be an inventory and review of all existing requirements for reports by executive agencies or the judicial branch to the general assembly that are due to expire on or before July 1 of the following year pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (11); except that, if House Bill 96-1159 is enacted at the second regular session of the sixtieth general assembly and becomes law or if, for any other reason, the sunrise and sunset review committee ceases to exist, such inventory and review shall be conducted by the several committees of reference as directed by the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives, or otherwise as follows:
      1. The agriculture, livestock, and natural resources committee in the house of representatives and the agriculture, natural resources, and energy committee in the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 33 to 37, C.R.S.;
      2. The appropriations committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in articles 75 to 114 of this title;
      3. The business affairs and labor committee in the house of representatives and the business, labor, and technology committee in the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 4 to 12 and 40, C.R.S.;
      4. The education committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 22 and 23, C.R.S.;
      5. The finance committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 38 and 39, C.R.S.;
      6. The health and human services committees in the house of representatives and the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 25 to 27, C.R.S.;
      7. The judiciary committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 13 to 21, C.R.S.;
      8. The local government committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 30 to 32, C.R.S.;
      9. The state, veterans, and military affairs committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 1 to 3, C.R.S., titles 28 and 29, C.R.S., and this title with the exception of articles 75 to 114 and, in addition, any reporting requirement not otherwise assigned to a committee of reference under this paragraph (b); and
      10. The transportation and energy committee in the house of representatives and the transportation committee in the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 41 to 43, C.R.S.

Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 823, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (3)(d) and (6) amended, p. 1515, § 45, effective June 1; (1)(e) and (11) added, p. 1214, §§ 2, 3, effective August 7. L. 97: (3)(b) amended, p. 331, § 2, effective April 16; (11)(a)(II)(A) repealed, p. 1472, § 1, effective June 3. L. 98: (11)(a)(II)(B) repealed, p. 733, § 24, effective May 18. L. 2000: (11)(a)(II) amended, p. 1512, § 1, effective August 2; (11)(a)(II)(C) repealed, p. 1547, § 9, effective August 2. L. 2001: (11)(a)(II)(D) and (11)(a)(II)(E) repealed, p. 1169, § 1, effective August 8; (11)(a)(II)(D) and (11)(a)(II)(E) repealed, p. 1175, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2002: (11)(a)(II)(F) repealed, p. 874, § 16, effective August 7. L. 2007: (11)(b) amended, p. 2032, § 47, effective June 1. L. 2008: (9) amended, p. 1268, § 4, effective August 5. L. 2012: (9) amended, (SB 12-152), ch. 115, p. 395, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2017: (11)(a)(II) repealed, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1400, § 66, effective May 25.

Editor's note: House Bill 96-1159, referenced in subsection (11)(b), was enacted and became law, effective May 23, 1996.

Cross references: (1) For the provisions concerning the inspection, copying, or photographing of public records, see part 2 of article 72 of this title.

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act enacting subsections (1)(e) and (11), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.

24-1-136.5. Long-range planning for capital construction, controlled maintenance, capital renewal - policy - heads of principal departments.

  1. The executive director of each department, after consultation with the directors of the subordinate agencies, divisions, or offices within the department, has the authority to prescribe uniform policies, procedures, and standards of space utilization in department facilities, except for office space, for the development and approval of capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects for the department. Nothing in this subsection (1) should be construed to alter the authority of the office of the state architect to prescribe uniform standards for office space pursuant to section 24-30-1303 (1)(h).
  2. The executive director shall review facilities master planning and facilities program planning for all capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects on department real property, regardless of the source of funds and shall submit for approval all such facilities master plans and facilities program plans to the office of the state architect for approval as specified in section 24-30-1311. No capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal shall commence except in accordance with an approved facilities master plan, facilities program plan, and physical plan.
  3. The executive director shall ensure conformity of facilities master planning with approved department operational master plans, facilities program plans with approved facilities master plans, and physical plans with approved facilities program plans.
  4. Plans for any capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal project for the department are subject to the approval of the executive director, regardless of the source of funds. The executive director may exempt any project which requires less than five hundred thousand dollars of state moneys from the requirements for master planning and program planning.
  5. The executive director shall annually request from the director of each subordinate agency, division, or office within the department a five-year projection of any capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects. The projection must include the estimated cost, the method of funding, a schedule for project completion, and the director's priority for each project. The executive director shall determine whether a proposed project is consistent with operational master planning and facilities master planning of the department and conforms to space utilization standards established pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and section 24-30-1303 (1)(h).
    1. The executive director shall annually establish a department five-year capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal plan coordinated with department operational master plans and facilities master plans and forward the five-year plan to the office of the state architect for review as required in section 24-30-1311.
    2. The executive director shall transmit to the office of the state architect, consistent with the executive budget timetable, a recommended priority of funding of capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects for the department.
    3. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, it is the policy of the general assembly to appropriate funds only for projects approved by the office of the state architect.
  6. Any acquisition or utilization of real property by a department that is conditional upon or requires expenditures of state funds or federal funds is subject to the approval of the executive director and the office of the state architect, regardless of whether the acquisition is by lease, financed purchase of an asset, certificate of participation, purchase, gift, or otherwise.
  7. Prior to approving the facilities master plan and facilities program plan for any capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal project to be constructed, operated, and maintained solely from fees, gifts and bequests, grants, revolving funds, or a combination of such sources, the executive director shall request and consider recommendations from the office of the state architect.
  8. This section does not apply to the department of higher education, nor should it be construed to alter the duties of the Colorado commission on higher education set forth in section 23-1-106, C.R.S.
  9. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. "Capital construction" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (2).
    2. "Capital renewal" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (3).
    3. "Controlled maintenance" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (4), including the limitations specified in section 24-30-1303.9.
    4. "Facility" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (8).
    5. "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (15).

Source: L. 94: Entire section added, p. 561, § 2, effective April 6. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 639, § 28, effective July 1. L. 2007: (4) amended, p. 868, § 1, effective May 14. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1836, § 36, effective June 6. L. 2015: (1), (2), (6), (7), and (8) amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1217, § 16, effective June 5. L. 2021: (7) amended, (HB 21-1316), ch. 325, p. 2024, § 30, effective July 1.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (1), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.

(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.

24-1-137. Effect of decrease in length of terms of office for certain state boards, commissions, authorities, and agencies.

Persons who are holding office on June 15, 1987, and who were appointed to terms of office pursuant to sections 11-2-102, 12-4-103, 12-22-104, 12-32-103, 12-33-103, 12-36-103, 12-40-106, 12-60-102, 22-80-104, 23-9-103, 23-15-104, 23-40-104, 23-41-102, 24-32-706, 24-42-102, 25-25-104, 29-1-503, 29-4-704, 34-60-104, 35-41-101, 35-65-401, 35-75-104, 39-2-123, and 40-2-101, C.R.S., as said sections existed prior to June 15, 1987, shall continue to serve in such office, but such service shall be at the pleasure of the governor, who may appoint a replacement to serve for the unexpired term of any member. However, if the governor has not appointed any such replacement on or before November 15, 1987, then the person who is holding such office on June 15, 1987, shall no longer be subject to replacement pursuant to this section but shall be subject to whatever removal provisions may otherwise apply for such office. Any such member for whom a replacement has been appointed shall continue to serve until his or her successor is duly qualified. Appointments to new terms of office made after June 15, 1987, shall be made for terms of four years or as otherwise prescribed by law; except that such provision shall not apply to terms of office of persons appointed pursuant to section 23-9-103, C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2006, or to section 24-48.5-303, which is the former section 23-9-103, C.R.S.

Source: L. 87: Entire section added, p. 901, § 1, effective June 15. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1152, § 3, effective March 13. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 890, § 17, effective June 5. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1296, § 18, effective May 26. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 479, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 793, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2005: Entire section amended, p. 671, § 12, effective June 1. L. 2006: Entire section amended, p. 1658, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (SB 10-158), ch. 231, p. 1014, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2011: Entire section amended, (HB 11-1060), ch. 31, p. 88, § 2, effective August 10.

24-1-138. Mandatory donation of services prohibited.

  1. A regulatory agency or other department, division, agency, branch, instrumentality, or political subdivision of state government shall not require:
    1. A person practicing a regulated profession or occupation to donate the person's professional services without compensation to another person as a condition of admission to or continued licensure, or other authorization to practice the profession or occupation; or
    2. Payment of money in lieu of uncompensated service.
  2. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the crediting of required hours of continuing education in exchange for hours of donated services by a person in a regulated profession or occupation.

Source: L. 2019: Entire section added with relocations, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1642, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-1.5-101 as it existed prior to 2019.

ARTICLE 1.5 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION BOARD

Section

24-1.5-101. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the proliferation of type 1 agencies in state government has increased the number of state government programs through the adoption of administrative rules and regulations and that the level of accountability within each principal department of state government has decreased due to the independence of the type 1 agencies. The general assembly therefore adopts this article in order to evaluate existing type 1 agencies and to determine whether agencies created in the future should be so designated.

Source: L. 90: Entire article added, p. 1177, § 1, effective May 24.

24-1.5-102. State administrative organization board - creation - duties.

  1. There is hereby created the state administrative organization board, referred to in this article as the "board", to be comprised of eleven members. Two members of the board shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one of whom shall be a member of the general assembly. One member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the house of representatives and shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. The other member appointed by the speaker shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. Two members of the board shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one of whom shall be a member of the senate. One member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the senate and shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. The other member appointed by the president shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. Five members of the board shall be appointed by the governor, three of whom shall not be members of the general assembly or state government employees.
  2. The board shall develop a procedure to systematically and regularly review the functions and duties of all type 1 agencies in accordance with a schedule that the board shall devise. The board shall establish criteria for type 1 agencies to determine whether all existing type 1 agencies should continue as type 1 agencies and to evaluate the designation of proposed new type 1 agencies.
  3. The board shall select a chairman from among its members, and it shall meet as often as necessary to carry out the duties specified in this section.

Source: L. 90: Entire article added, p. 1177, § 1, effective May 24. L. 96: (2) and (3) amended, p. 1271, § 203, effective August 7.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act amending subsections (2) and (3), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.

ARTICLE 1.7 RESTRUCTURING THE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DELIVERY SYSTEM

Editor's note: This article was added in 1993. This article was repealed and reenacted in 1997, resulting in the addition, relocation, and elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this article prior to 1997, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated.

Section

24-1.7-101. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly hereby declares its support for local flexibility in the planning and delivery of health and human services and states its intent to foster continuing coordination, communication, and collaboration at the local level. The general assembly further states its support for local decisions to utilize people and resources at the local level in a more efficient, effective, and economical manner through consolidation of local advisory boards. The general assembly further declares its intent to streamline local planning and community input mechanisms.

Source: L. 97: Entire article R&RE, p. 1181, § 1, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former §§ 24-1.7-101 and 24-1.7-401 as they existed prior to 1997.

24-1.7-102. Local health and human services advisory boards - creation - functions.

  1. In order to accomplish the intent of prior legislation on human services delivery that there be an ongoing process or forum for continued coordination and collaboration at the local level concerning the delivery of human services, this article authorizes the creation of local health and human services advisory boards. A local health and human services advisory board may serve a single county, two or more counties jointly, one or more judicial districts, or other service areas. Members of an advisory board shall be appointed by the governing body or bodies of the counties included. Membership shall be locally determined and shall include appropriate geographic, ethnic, and cultural representation and representation from the public and from consumers of services. Membership shall also include persons who have program expertise for the types of programs the advisory board advises.
  2. In addition to, in combination with, or in lieu of creating a local health and human services advisory board, a county, judicial district, or other service area may elect to consolidate its advisory board with that of one or more other counties, judicial districts, or service areas as specified in section 24-1.7-103.

Source: L. 97: Entire article R&RE, p. 1181, § 1, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former §§ 24-1.7-201 and 24-1.7-402 to 24-1.7-404 as they existed prior to 1997.

24-1.7-103. Consolidation of local boards - process - requirements.

  1. The general assembly hereby finds that there are many advisory types of boards in the human services delivery system that have similar functions and purposes and have members with similar qualifications and expertise. The general assembly finds that greater efficiency and flexibility would be achieved by allowing counties, judicial districts, and other service areas to combine and consolidate some or all of these boards into one board that serves as a broad-based local planning group and carries out all of the functions and responsibilities of the previous boards through a consolidated board.
  2. Any combination of the following boards or groups may be consolidated into a single advisory board:
    1. Placement alternatives commissions, created pursuant to section 19-1-116 (2)(a), C.R.S.;
    2. Juvenile community review boards, as defined in section 19-2.5-102 and described in section 19-2.5-1402;
    3. Local juvenile services planning committees, created pursuant to section 19-2.5-302;
    4. Child protection teams, if such a team is created pursuant to section 19-3-308 (6)(a);
    5. Family preservation commissions, established pursuant to section 26-5.5-106, C.R.S.;
    6. A local health and human services advisory board, created pursuant to section 24-1.7-102.
  3. The consolidation of, and appointments to, local boards or groups that have different appointing authorities set in statute, are subject to the agreement of each appointing authority. Each of the separate functions and responsibilities of each board or group as specified in statute must continue to be met by the consolidated board.

Source: L. 97: Entire article R&RE, p. 1182, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2017: (2)(d) amended, (SB 17-016), ch. 107, p. 392, § 5, effective August 9. L. 2021: (2)(b) and (2)(c) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 742, § 105, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-1.7-103 as it existed prior to 1997.

ARTICLE 1.9 COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT OF MULTI-AGENCY SERVICES PROVIDED TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

Section

24-1.9-101. Legislative declaration.

  1. The general assembly hereby finds that children and families often benefit from treatment and services that involve multiple agencies, divisions, units, and sections of departments at the state and county level.
  2. The general assembly further finds that the development of a uniform system of collaborative management is necessary for agencies at the state and county levels to effectively and efficiently collaborate to share resources or to manage and integrate the treatment and services provided to children and families who would benefit from multi-agency services.
    1. The development of a more uniform system of collaborative management that includes the input, expertise, and active participation of parent advocacy or family advocacy organizations may reduce duplication and eliminate fragmentation of services; increase the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of services provided; encourage cost sharing among service providers; and ultimately lead to better outcomes and cost-reduction for the services provided to children and families in the state of Colorado.
    2. In addition, the general fund moneys saved through utilizing a collaborative approach and consolidating various sources of agency funding will allow for reinvestment of these moneys by the agencies participating in the systems of collaborative management to provide appropriate support to children and families who would benefit from collaborative management of treatment and services.
  3. The general assembly therefore finds that because a collaborative approach may lead to the provision of more appropriate and effective delivery of services to children and families and may ultimately allow the agencies providing treatment and services to provide appropriate services to children and families within existing consolidated resources, it is in the best interests of the state of Colorado to establish systems of collaborative management of multi-agency services provided to children and families.

Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1547, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2015: (1), (2), and (3)(a) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 425, § 1, effective May 1.

24-1.9-102. Memorandum of understanding - local-level interagency oversight groups - individualized service and support teams - coordination of services for children and families - requirements - waiver.

    1. Local representatives of each of the agencies specified in this subsection (1)(a) and county departments of human or social services may enter into memorandums of understanding that are designed to promote a collaborative system of local-level interagency oversight groups and individualized service and support teams to coordinate and manage the provision of services to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services. The memorandums of understanding entered into pursuant to this subsection (1) must be between interested county departments of human or social services and local representatives of each of the following agencies or entities:
      1. The local judicial districts, including probation services;
      2. The health department, whether a county or district public health agency;
      3. The local school district or school districts;
      4. Each community mental health center;
      5. Each behavioral health organization;
      6. The division of youth services;
      7. A designated managed service organization for the provision of treatment services for alcohol and drug abuse pursuant to section 27-80-107, C.R.S.; and
      8. A domestic abuse program as defined in section 26-7.5-102, C.R.S., if representation from such a program is available.
    2. In addition to the parties specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), the memorandums of understanding entered into pursuant to this subsection (1) may include family resource centers created pursuant to article 18 of title 26, C.R.S.
    3. The general assembly strongly encourages the agencies specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of this subsection (1) to enter into memorandums of understanding that are regional.
    4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1)(b) of this section, the agencies specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section may enter into memorandums of understanding involving only one or more county departments of human or social services, not necessarily by region, as may be appropriate to ensure the effectiveness of local-level interagency oversight groups and individualized service and support teams in the county or counties.
    5. In developing the memorandums of understanding, the general assembly strongly encourages the parties to the memorandums of understanding to seek input, support, and collaboration from key stakeholders in the private and nonprofit sector, as well as parent advocacy or family advocacy organizations that represent family members or caregivers of children who would benefit from multi-agency services.
    6. Nothing precludes the agencies specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section from including parties in addition to the agencies specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section in the memorandums of understanding developed for purposes of this section, and which may include the local juvenile services planning committee as described in section 19-2.5-302.

    (1.5) The department of human services shall ensure a uniform system of collaborative management that results in statewide consistency with respect to the requirements for program memorandums of understanding pursuant to this article.

    1. Each memorandum of understanding entered into shall include, but is not limited to, the requirements specified in paragraphs (b) to (j) of this subsection (2). On or before October 1, 2004, utilizing moneys in the performance incentive cash fund created in section 26-5-105.5 (3.2)(a), C.R.S., the state department of human services, in conjunction with the judicial department, shall develop and make available to the parties specified in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, a model memorandum of understanding based on the requirements specified in paragraphs (b) to (j) of this subsection (2).
    2. Identification of services and funding sources. The memorandum of understanding must specify the legal responsibilities and funding sources of each party to the memorandum of understanding as those responsibilities and funding sources relate to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, including the identification of the specific services that may be provided. Specific services that may be provided may include, but are not limited to: Prevention, intervention, and treatment services; family preservation services; family stabilization services; out-of-home placement services; services for children at imminent risk of out-of-home placement; probation services; services for children with behavioral or mental health disorders; public assistance services; medical assistance services; child welfare services; and any additional services the parties deem necessary to identify.
    3. Definition of the population to be served. The memorandum of understanding must include a functional definition of "children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services". The collaborative management program target population consists of at-risk children and youth from birth to twenty-one years of age, or families of children or youth, who would benefit from a multi-system integrated service plan that may include prevention, intervention, and treatment services.
    4. Creation of an oversight group. The memorandum of understanding shall create a local-level interagency oversight group and identify the oversight group's membership requirements, procedures for selection of officers, procedures for resolving disputes by a majority vote of those members authorized to vote, and procedures for establishing any necessary subcommittees of the interagency oversight group. Each interagency oversight group shall include a local representative of each party to the memorandum of understanding specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section, each of whom shall be a voting member of the interagency oversight group. In addition, the interagency oversight group may include, but is not limited to, the following advisory nonvoting members:
      1. Representatives of interested local private sector entities; and
      2. Family members or caregivers of children who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services or current or previous consumers of integrated multi-agency services.
    5. Establishment of collaborative management processes. The memorandum of understanding shall require the interagency oversight group to establish collaborative management processes to be utilized by individualized service and support teams authorized pursuant to paragraph (f) of this subsection (2) when providing services to children and families served by the parties to the memorandum of understanding. The collaborative management processes required to be established by the interagency oversight group shall address risk-sharing, resource-pooling, performance expectations, outcome-monitoring, and staff-training, and shall be designed to do the following:
      1. Reduce duplication and eliminate fragmentation of services provided to children or families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services;
      2. Increase the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of services delivered to children or families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services to achieve better outcomes for these children and families; and
      3. Encourage cost sharing among service providers.
    6. Authorization to create individualized service and support teams. The memorandum of understanding shall include authorization for the interagency oversight group to establish individualized service and support teams to develop a service and support plan and to provide services to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services.
    7. Authorization to contribute resources and funding. The memorandum of understanding shall specify that each party to the memorandum of understanding has the authority to contribute time, resources, and funding to solve problems identified by the local-level interagency oversight group in order to create a seamless, collaborative system of delivering multi-agency services to children and families, upon approval by the head or director of each agency or department specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section.
    8. Reinvestment of money saved to serve additional children and families. The memorandum of understanding must require the interagency oversight group to create a procedure, subject to approval by the head or director of each agency or department specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section, to allow any money resulting from waivers granted by the federal government, any local funds, and any state general fund money appropriated to the program to be used to provide services to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, as the population is defined by the memorandum of understanding pursuant to subsection (2)(c) of this section.
    9. Performance-based measures. The department of human services and the persons specified in section 24-1.9-103 (2)(b) shall develop performance measures for the system of collaborative management, which measures may be modified biennially to ensure that the measures remain valid. The memorandum of understanding must identify performance measures developed pursuant to this paragraph (i). If the parties to the memorandum of understanding meet the identified performance measures, the memorandum of understanding must require the interagency oversight group to create a procedure, subject to the approval of the head or director of each agency or department specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section, to allow any incentive moneys received by the department of human services and allocated pursuant to section 24-1.9-104 to be reinvested by the parties to the memorandum of understanding to provide appropriate services to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, as such population is defined by the memorandum of understanding pursuant to paragraph (c) of this subsection (2). The parties to a memorandum of understanding shall report annually to the department of human services on the performance measures identified in the parties' memorandum of understanding pursuant to this paragraph (i).
    10. Confidentiality compliance. The memorandum of understanding shall include a provision specifying that state and federal law concerning confidentiality shall be followed and that records used or developed by the interagency oversight group or its members or the individualized service and support teams that relate to a particular person are to be kept confidential and may not be released to any other person or agency except as provided by law.
  1. Each department or division, section, unit, or agency within a department that is a party to the memorandum of understanding shall enter into the memorandum of understanding and all revisions to the memorandum. Revisions to the memorandum shall be developed as necessary to reflect department reorganizations or statutory changes affecting the departments that are parties to the memorandum.
  2. The departments and agencies that provide oversight to the parties to the memorandum of understanding specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section are authorized to issue waivers of any rules to which the departments and agencies are subject and that would prevent the departments from effective implementation of the memorandums of understanding; however, the departments and agencies are prohibited from waiving a rule in violation of federal law or that would compromise the safety of a child.

Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1548, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2008: IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(IV), (1)(a)(V), and (2)(h) amended and (1)(a)(VI) and (1)(a)(VII) added, p. 1529, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2009: (1)(a)(VI) and (1)(a)(VII) amended and (1)(a)(VIII) added, (HB 09-1007), ch. 32, p. 137, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2010: (1)(a)(VII) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 795, § 51, effective April 29; (1), (2)(b), (2)(d), (2)(g), (2)(h)(I), (2)(i), and (4) amended, (SB 10-007), ch. 148, p. 510, § 2, effective August 11; (1)(a)(II) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2081, § 59, effective August 11. L. 2015: (1.5) added and (2)(c), (2)(h)(I), and (2)(i) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 426, § 2, effective May 1. L. 2017: (2)(b) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1320, § 176, effective May 25; IP(1)(a) and (1)(a)(VI) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1981, § 51, effective June 6. L. 2018: (1)(e) amended, (SB 18-154), ch. 161, p. 1125, § 3, effective April 25; (2)(h) amended, (SB 18-254), ch. 216, p. 1373, § 2, effective May 18; IP(1)(a) and (1)(c) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 439, § 94, effective August 8. L. 2021: (1)(e) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 742, § 106, effective October 1.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(II) by House Bill 10-1422 and Senate Bill 10-007 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(VII) by Senate Bill 10-007 and Senate Bill 10-175 were harmonized.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsections (1), (2)(b), (2)(d), (2)(g), (2)(h)(I), (2)(i), and (4), see section 1 of chapter 148, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

(3) For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "The Evolution of C olorado's School Attendance Laws: Moving Toward Prevention and Restoration", see 43 C olo. Law. 63 (July 2014).

24-1.9-102.5. Evaluation.

The department of human services shall ensure that an annual external evaluation of the statewide program and each county or regional program is conducted by an independent outside entity. The department may contract with the outside entity to conduct an external evaluation of those counties that opted not to participate in the collaborative management program. The department of human services shall utilize moneys in the performance-based collaborative management incentive cash fund created in section 24-1.9-104, or any general fund moneys appropriated for this purpose, for annual external evaluations of the counties participating in memorandums of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102, also known as the collaborative management program, as well as external evaluations as determined by the department of human services of those counties that opted to not participate in the collaborative management program. The annual external evaluation must include any evaluation that may be required in connection with a waiver authorized pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (4) and an evaluation of whether the parties to a collaborative management program have successfully met or exceeded the performance measures identified in the parties' memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i). Each county participating in the collaborative management program shall participate fully in the annual external evaluation.

Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1530, § 2, effective May 28. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (SB 10-007), ch. 148, p. 512, § 3, effective August 11. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 427, § 3, effective May 1.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 148, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.

24-1.9-102.7. Technical assistance.

The department of human services shall develop and implement training for counties participating in or interested in participating in the collaborative management program. The department of human services shall utilize moneys in the performance-based collaborative management incentive cash fund created in section 24-1.9-104, or any general fund moneys appropriated for this purpose, to develop and implement training for counties. The training shall identify management strategies to collaborate effectively and efficiently to share resources or to manage and integrate the treatment and services provided to children and families receiving collaborative management services pursuant to this article.

Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1530, § 2, effective May 28. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 427, § 4, effective May 1.

24-1.9-103. Reports - executive director review.

  1. Commencing January 1, 2007, and on or before each January 1 thereafter, each interagency oversight group shall provide a report to the executive director of each department and agency that is a party to any memorandum of understanding entered into that includes:
    1. The number of children and families served through the local-level individualized service and support teams and the outcomes of the services provided, including a description of any reduction in duplication or fragmentation of services provided and a description of any significant improvement in outcomes for children and families;
    2. A description of estimated costs of implementing the collaborative management approach and any estimated cost-shifting or cost-savings that may have occurred by collaboratively managing the multi-agency services provided through the individualized service and support teams;
    3. An accounting of moneys that were reinvested in additional services provided to children or families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services due to cost-savings that may have resulted or due to meeting or exceeding performance measures identified in the memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i);
    4. A description of any identified barriers to the ability of the state and county to provide effective services to persons who received multi-agency services; and
    5. Any other information relevant to improving the delivery of services to persons who would benefit from multi-agency services.
    1. Utilizing the reports created pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the persons specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2) shall meet at least annually with the governor, or his or her designee, to review the activities and progress of counties and agencies engaged in collaborative management of multi-agency services provided to children and families. The purpose of the meeting shall be to identify barriers encountered in collaborative management development or implementation or reinvestment of moneys and to discuss and effectuate solutions to these barriers to achieve greater efficiencies and better outcomes for the state, for local communities, and for persons who would benefit from multi-agency services.
    2. The following persons or their designees shall attend the annual meeting required pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this section:
      1. The commissioner of education;
      2. A superintendent of a school district that has entered into a memorandum of understanding and has met or exceeded the performance measures identified in the memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i), as such superintendent is selected by the commissioner of education;
      3. A director of a county department of human or social services that has entered into a memorandum of understanding and has met or exceeded the performance measures identified in the memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i), as such director is selected by the executive director of the state department of human services;
      4. The executive director of the department of health care policy and financing;
      5. The executive director of the department of human services;
      6. A director of a local mental health center that has entered into a memorandum of understanding and has met or exceeded the performance measures identified in the memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i), as such director is selected by the executive director of the department of human services;
      7. A representative from a statewide parent advocacy or family advocacy organization who participated in the development of a memorandum of understanding, as such representative is selected by a director of a county department of human or social services chosen by the state department of human services;
      8. The executive director of the department of public health and environment; and
      9. The chief justice of the Colorado supreme court.

Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1552, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2015: (1)(c), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), and (2)(b)(VI) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 428, § 5, effective May 1. L. 2018: IP(2)(b), (2)(b)(III), and (2)(b)(VII) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 439, § 95, effective August 8.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

24-1.9-104. Cash fund - creation - grants, gifts, and donations.

  1. On July 1, 2005, there shall be created in the state treasury the performance-based collaborative management incentive cash fund, which shall be referred to in this section as the "fund". The moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the department of human services for state fiscal year 2005-06 and each fiscal year thereafter. The fund shall consist of moneys received from docket fees in civil actions and transferred as specified in section 13-32-101 (5)(a)(II), C.R.S.
  2. The executive director of the department of human services is authorized to accept and expend on behalf of the state any grants, gifts, or donations from any private or public source for the purposes of this section. All private and public funds received through grants, gifts, or donations shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the fund in addition to moneys credited pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and any moneys that may be appropriated to the fund directly by the general assembly. All investment earnings derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund of the state or any other fund at the end of any fiscal year.

    (2.5) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on June 1, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct three hundred thousand dollars from the fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.

    1. On and after July 1, 2005, the executive director of the department of human services shall allocate the moneys in the fund, and any general fund moneys appropriated for this purpose, to provide incentives to parties to a memorandum of understanding who have agreed to performance-based collaborative management pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i) and who, based upon the annual report to the department of human services pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i), have successfully met or exceeded the performance measures identified in the parties' memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(i). The incentives shall be used to provide services to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, as such population is defined by the memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (2)(c).
    2. On and after July 1, 2008, the executive director of the department of human services is authorized to allocate moneys in the fund, and any general fund moneys appropriated for this purpose, to be used to cover the direct and indirect costs of the external evaluation of the performance-based collaborative management program described in section 24-1.9-102 and the technical assistance and training for counties as described in section 24-1.9-102.7.
    3. For purposes of allocating incentive moneys pursuant to this subsection (3), the executive director of the department of human services shall submit an accounting of moneys in the fund available for incentives, and any general fund moneys appropriated for this purpose, and a proposal for the allocation of incentive moneys to the state board of human services for review and approval prior to the allocation of the moneys. The state board of human services shall approve the proposal not later than thirty days after receipt of the proposal from the executive director of the department of human services.

Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1554, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2008: (3)(a.5) added, p. 1531, § 3, effective May 28. L. 2009: (2.5) added, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1926, § 7, effective June 1. L. 2011: (1) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1164, § 54, effective August 10. L. 2015: (3) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 428, § 6, effective May 1; (1) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 958, § 60, effective August 5.

ARTICLE 2 ORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS

Section

24-2-101. Application.

The provisions of this article, parts 2 and 11 of article 30, and articles 31, 35, and 36 of this title shall not be construed to apply to the judiciary nor the legislature, except when expressly specified.

Source: L. 41: p. 35, § 2. CSA: C. 3, § 2. CRS 53: § 3-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-2. L. 68: p. 138, § 175. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1273, § 29, effective June 5.

ANNOTATION

For the constitutionality of earlier administrative code, see Johnson v. People, 96 Colo. 175, 40 P.2d 615 (1935).

24-2-102. Appointment of officers and employees.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by law, such officers and employees as may be necessary in each principal department or institution of higher education shall be appointed by the head of each such department or institution in conformity with section 13 of article XII of the constitution of the state and the laws enacted in accordance therewith.
  2. The head of each principal department shall certify to the governor the number of officers and employees needed or required for the operation of his or her department for the ensuing twelve-month period in accordance with article 37 of this title.
  3. If, after appointments have been made to any principal department, the governor is of the opinion that the appointed personnel of any such department is in excess of its needs, the governor may require the separation of any of said appointees if ten days' prior notice of the proposed action is given by the governor to the head of any such department affected and opportunity given to such head within said ten-day period to be heard as to the necessity for the retention of all or any of said appointees proposed to be separated. The decision of the governor after such hearing shall be final and conclusive.
  4. If, during any fiscal period, there are not sufficient revenues available for expenditure during such period to carry on the functions of the state government and to support its agencies and institutions and such fact is made to appear to the governor, in the exercise of his discretion, by executive order, he may suspend or discontinue, in whole or in part, the functions or services of any department, board, bureau, or agency of the state government; except that the authority of the governor to restrict the expenditure of moneys appropriated from the capital construction fund shall be determined by the provisions of section 24-75-201.5. Such discontinuance or suspension shall become effective upon the first day of the calendar month following the entry of such executive order and shall continue for such period of time, not to exceed three months, as shall be determined by such executive order. If, during any such period of time, it again appears to the governor that such deficiency of revenues still persists, from time to time, he may extend the operation of such executive order for a like period of time not to exceed three months; but the state shall not be liable for the payment of any claim for salaries or expenses purporting to have accrued against any such department, board, bureau, or agency during any such period of suspension, and the controller shall not issue nor may the state treasurer honor any warrant therefor. Elective officers shall not be subject to the provisions of this article, parts 2 and 11 of article 30, and articles 31, 35, 36, and 101 to 111 of this title.

Source: L. 41: p. 37, § 5. CSA: C. 3, §§ 5, 6. CRS 53: § 3-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-4. L. 68: p. 137, § 171. L. 72: p. 182, §§ 2, 3. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 1286, § 4, effective January 1, 1982. L. 91: (4) amended, p. 805, § 2, effective July 1. L. 95: (4) amended, p. 1103, § 35, effective May 31. L. 99: (1) amended, p. 164, § 23, effective August 4. L. 2004: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1693, § 29, effective July 1, 2005.

Cross references: For power of the head of a principal department to discontinue divisions, sections, or units other than those created by law, see § 24-1-107.

ANNOTATION

Analysis

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Annotator's note. Cases decided under former law (prior to 1941) have been included in the annotations to this section.

II. APPOINTMENTS.

Persons necessary after department formed deemed necessary employees. The officers, assistants, and employees necessary in each principal department are those persons necessary after each department is formed, not those persons initially necessary to constitute the department. People v. Downen, 106 Colo. 557, 108 P.2d 224 (1940).

Motive or intent in making an appointment is irrelevant where the authority to make an appointment is conferred by statute. Davis v. Morley, 79 Colo. 168, 244 P. 599 (1926).

Chief of Colorado state patrol is appointed by head of department of highways and the appointment must be made from a list of three persons ranking highest, as determined by a competitive test of competence administered by the Colorado state personnel board. Schippers v. Colo. State Pers. Bd., 178 Colo. 154, 496 P.2d 307 (1972) (decided prior to the 1983 transfer of the Colorado state patrol to the department of public safety).

For the former requirement that appointments are to be approved by executive council, see People ex rel. Swayze v. Bixby, 102 Colo. 583, 81 P.2d 880 (1938).

III. SUSPENSIONS.

For constitutionality of provision authorizing suspensions for economy reasons, see Getty v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 454, 44 P.2d 506 (1935).

Suspension of positions within the Division of Disaster Emergency Services to decrease general fund expenditures is warranted regardless of whether the funding source of the positions is the general fund or federal funds. Bardsley v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1994).

Temporary discontinuance of a state department's functions and consequent lay off of employees as part of a budget reduction plan is lawful, but abolition of a statutorily created state agency and the transfer of its functions to another principal department without prior legislative authority is unlawful. Subsequent legislative authority for such transfer of functions does not make the issue of the validity of the Governor's actions moot. Bardsley v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1994).

Governor's suspension decision not open to judicial inquiry. The finding of the governor that sufficient reason exists for suspending or discontinuing an office, etc., is not open to judicial inquiry. Getty v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 454, 44 P.2d 506 (1935); People ex rel. Engley v. Martin, 19 Colo. 565, 36 P. 543 (1894); Lee v. Morley, 79 Colo. 481, 247 P. 178 (1926).

Order suspending officer may name incumbent. Where the governor, by executive order, under statutory authority, suspends the secretary of the state civil service commission (now the department of personnel), the fact that the incumbent is named personally in the order is unimportant. Getty v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 454, 44 P.2d 506 (1935).

Secretary of former civil service commission was not entitled to compensation during suspension. Bedford v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 452, 44 P.2d 508 (1935).

24-2-103. Compensation of heads of departments and other officers and employees.

    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1), officers and employees of the state who are exempt from the state personnel system shall receive compensation as fixed by law. Any officer or employee who receives compensation as fixed by law shall not receive compensation or fees from more than one department or institution of higher education or in more than one capacity; except that the lieutenant governor may be compensated for any additional duties and functions relating to a department or institution of higher education as may be authorized by law.
    2. If the compensation of an officer or employee who is exempt from the state personnel system is not fixed by law, the officer's or employee's compensation shall be determined as follows:
      1. The governor shall determine the compensation for the head of each principal department, and the head of each principal department shall determine the compensation for officers and employees of the department.
      2. The governing board of each institution of higher education, including the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., shall determine the compensation for the head of the institution, and the head of each institution shall determine the compensation for officers and employees of the institution.
    3. Officers and employees in the state personnel system shall receive compensation pursuant to section 13 of article XII of the state constitution and the compensation system established by the state personnel director pursuant to article 50 of this title. Officers and employees in the state personnel system shall not receive compensation or fees from more than one department or institution of higher education except as permitted by rules adopted by the state personnel director in accordance with article 4 of this title that are consistent with the overtime provisions of section 24-50-104.5.
    4. Nothing in this subsection (1) shall prevent departments and institutions of higher education, including the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., from sharing personnel if the terms and conditions of the personnel sharing agreement are in writing and include a provision concerning the distribution of compensation.
  1. Upon declaration of a fiscal emergency made pursuant to section 24-50-109.5 (1) and the subsequent imposition of mandatory furloughs or other measures to reduce personnel expenditures, such measures shall apply not only to state personnel system employees but shall be likewise imposed upon all other officers and employees of the executive branch, if exempt from the state personnel system, except as otherwise provided by law or prohibited by contract.

Source: L. 41: p. 39, § 6. CSA: C. 3, § 7. CRS 53: § 3-1-6. L. 61: p. 128, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-5. L. 68: p. 138, § 172. L. 73: p. 166, § 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 848, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2004: (1) R&RE, p. 1536, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2011: (1)(a) amended, (HB 11-1155), ch. 90, p. 265, § 2, effective April 6. L. 2012: (1)(b)(II) and (1)(d) amended, (HB 12-1081), ch. 210, p. 903, § 4, effective August 8.

ANNOTATION

Section 13 of art. XII, Colo. Const., operates as a limitation upon the power of the general assembly, governor, and department heads to fix the salaries of persons under the state personnel system; such power is limited to fixing salaries according to classes and grades and does not include discriminating between individuals in the same classification as determined by the state personnel board. Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541 (1947).

Constitutional or statutory provision fixing salary operates as continuous appropriation. When the constitution or a statutory provision fixes the salary to be received by a public officer, it operates as a continuous appropriation therefor, and no further legislative sanction is necessary to authorize the proper officers to pay the same. People ex rel. Hegwer v. Goodykoontz, 22 Colo. 507, 45 P. 414 (1896).

Appropriation for institution deemed appropriation for employees' salaries. An appropriation for the "support and maintenance" of a state institution is an appropriation for the payment of salaries of the employees thereof. Davis v. Morley, 79 Colo. 168, 244 P. 599 (1926).

24-2-104. Bonds. (Repealed)

Source: L. 41: p. 39, § 7. CSA: C. 3, § 8. CRS 53: § 3-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-6. L. 68: p. 138, § 173. L. 2018: Entire section repealed, (HB 18-1140), ch. 41, p. 462, § 2, effective August 8.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1140, see section 1 of chapter 41, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

24-2-105. Rules and regulations.

The head of each principal department is empowered, subject to the written approval of the governor, to prescribe rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, books, documents, and property pertaining thereto.

Source: L. 41: p. 39, § 8. CSA: C. 3, § 8. CRS 53: § 3-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-7. L. 68: p. 138, § 174.

Cross references: For rule-making procedures, see article 4 of this title.

ANNOTATION

Department of revenue rule may be inconsistent with retail sales tax law if deemed to create a "conclusive presumption" based upon the failure of the vendee to have a sales tax license or a store license, because the law imposes a tax on retail sales only, not on wholesale sales. Pluss v. Dept. of Rev., 173 Colo. 86, 476 P.2d 253 (1970).

24-2-106. Restriction of number of employees.

It is the duty of the governor as the supreme executive power of the state to restrict the number of employees in the various offices, boards, divisions, and agencies of the executive department to the lowest number required for efficient operation thereof. In making any appointment or in approving any appointment made by any other official of the executive department, the governor shall certify in writing that he deems such appointment necessary and for the best interests of the public service. In the exercise of his responsibility, the governor may delegate in writing to some other official the power to approve or disapprove appointments made by other officials of the executive department, subject always to final review by the governor at his option.

Source: L. 41: p. 51, § 10. CSA: C. 3, § 10. CRS 53: § 3-2-2. L. 63: p. 121, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-2.

24-2-107. Transfer of employees.

For the purpose of providing necessary flexibility to meet working conditions and seasonal demands, the governor has power, when he is of the opinion and so certifies in writing that it is necessary or desirable so to do, to transfer any employee of any office, board, division, or agency of the state government to any other office, board, division, or agency of the state government for such time as in the opinion of the governor is necessary.

Source: L. 41: p. 51, § 11. CSA: C. 3, § 11. CRS 53: § 3-2-3. L. 63: p. 121, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-3.

24-2-108. Departments to share information and mailings.

For the convenience of the citizens of this state and to promote economy in state government, it is the intent of the general assembly that all principal departments, when feasible and not contrary to federal or state law, shall share as much information as possible and, when reasonably feasible to do so, shall coordinate forms, both federal and state, and shall eliminate multiple mailings to addressees.

Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 1133, § 1, effective May 24.

Cross references: For the "Information Coordination Act", see § 24-1-136.

ARTICLE 3 AGENCIES AS PARTIES IN ACTIONS

Section

24-3-101. Agency defined.

As used in this article, the term "agency" means every agency in the executive branch of the state government which is required by the constitution or statutes of the state to exercise discretion or to perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As so qualified, the term "agency" includes, but is not limited to, boards, commissions, departments, divisions, offices, and officers.

Source: L. 57: p. 118, § 1. CRS 53: § 3-2-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-4.

24-3-102. Party in original action.

  1. Except as otherwise specifically provided and subject to applicable provisions of the constitution, statutes, and rules of civil procedure of the state of Colorado, every agency is authorized:
    1. To institute and appear as a party in original actions in the supreme court of the state of Colorado and the United States supreme court in all causes, matters, and proceedings involving the functions and duties of such agency where such courts have original jurisdiction;
    2. To prosecute appeals in all cases, causes, matters, and proceedings in which such agency is a party in the courts of this state and its subdivisions, federal courts, and courts in other jurisdictions.

Source: L. 57: p. 118, § 2. CRS 53: § 3-2-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-5.

24-3-103. Provisions procedural and remedial.

The provisions of this article shall be construed as procedural and remedial and shall not be construed as extending, conferring, or granting such agencies any substantive powers, duties, or functions, nor shall this article be construed as granting permission to sue the sovereign state of Colorado or any agency thereof.

Source: L. 57: p. 119, § 4. CRS 53: § 3-2-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-7.

ARTICLE 3.5 MEETINGS OF BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

Section

24-3.5-101. Legislative declaration relating to meetings of state boards and commissions.

The general assembly declares that public participation in government produces better government; therefore, to promote as much public participation in government as possible, every state board and commission established by law is encouraged to hold at least one-third of its regularly scheduled meetings outside the Denver metropolitan area each year, taking their budgetary constraints into account.

Source: L. 75: Entire article added, p. 791, § 1, effective June 20.

Cross references: For the open meetings law, see part 4 of article 6 of this title.

ARTICLE 3.7 STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR CREATION OF BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

Section

24-3.7-101. Statutory language required for creation of state boards and commissions.

When the general assembly statutorily creates any board or commission in state government, such statutory provision shall specify a termination date for such board or commission, the appointing authority for each member, any requirement for senate confirmation of appointments, the number and type of members, any per diem or allowance for expenses, the state department in which the board or commission shall be located, any explicit powers possessed by such board or commission, including but not limited to advisory authority, rule-making authority, or authority regarding the control of revenues, and any staffing, funding, or reporting requirements.

Source: L. 91: Entire article added, p. 834, § 1, effective March 29.

24-3.7-102. Best practices for state boards and commissions.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, commencing January 1, 2019, each statutorily created board or commission in state government, not including a special purpose authority as defined in section 24-77-102 (15), shall implement written policies or bylaws and obtain annual training on:
    1. Understanding and operating within the limits of statutory directives, legislative intent, and any specific directions or laws related to the board or commission's establishment and its powers and duties;
    2. Defining the board or commission's mission or role in the oversight of projects or entities approved to receive public funding, if applicable;
    3. Understanding the goals of the programs the board or commission oversees, and aligning the board or commission's processes with those goals;
    4. Identifying and managing conflicts of interest;
    5. Understanding the requirements of the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of this title 24, and the open meetings law, part 4 of article 6 of this title 24;
    6. Setting parameters regarding board or commission staff's duties relative to the board or commission's mission or role;
    7. Identifying and securing sufficient data in order for the board or commission to make informed decisions;
    8. Ensuring the appropriate involvement of members in the review of key communications and in any policy-making activities;
    9. Ensuring members act in accordance with their roles as public representatives;
    10. Coordinating with other boards or commissions, industry, educational institutions, and state agencies where responsibilities and interests overlap; and
    11. Annually reviewing management practices to ensure best practices are utilized.
  2. Each state agency responsible for a statutorily created board or commission shall ensure that the state board or commission obtains the annual training and implements the written policies specified in subsection (1) of this section.

Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (HB 18-1198), ch. 145, p. 930, § 1, effective August 8.

ARTICLE 4 RULE-MAKING AND LICENSING PROCEDURES BY STATE AGENCIES

C ross references: For limitation on licensing and revocation of licenses, see Graeb v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 55 C olo. 523, 139 P. 1099; Chenowith v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 141 P. 132 (1914); Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568, 11 P.2d 555 (1932); Paine v. People, 106 Colo. 258, 103 P.2d 686 (1940); Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953); Colorado State Board of Nurse Examiners v. Hohu, 129 Colo. 195, 268 P.2d 401 (1954); In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956); and Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146, 309 P.2d 606 (1957). For the distinction between "standards" which must be enacted by the general assembly and rules and regulations which can be enacted by the department, see cases annotated under article III of the Colorado Constitution; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935); Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953); and Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959); for article, "Administrative Rule Review: Procedures and Oversight by the Colorado General Assembly", see 33 Colo. Law. 83 (June 2004).

Law reviews: For article, "The C olorado Administrative Procedure Act: Exclusive Demanding Reform", see 44 Den. L.J. 42 (1967); for comment on the C olorado Administrative Procedure Act and its construction, see 51 Den. L.J. 275 (1974); for comment, "Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review: CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission", see 58 Den. L.J. 693 (1981); for article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with questions of administrative law, see 61 Den. L.J. 109 (1984); for article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with questions of administrative law, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 9 (1985); for "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with questions of administrative law, see 63 Den. U. L. Rev. 165 (1986); for article, "A Practitioner's Guide to the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission", see 16 Colo. Law. 1405 (1987); for article, "General Principles of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 16 Colo. Law. 1983 (1987); for article, "Prosecuting an Appeal from a Decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission", see 16 Colo. Law. 2163 (1987); for article, "Practicing Before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission", see 17 Colo. Law. 259 (1988); for article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with questions of administrative law, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 357 (1988); for a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with questions of administrative law, see 66 Den. U. L. Rev. 667 (1989); for a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with questions of administrative law, see 67 Den. U. L. Rev. 603 (1990); for article, "Parallel Criminal and Administrative Licensure Proceedings", see 20 Colo. Law. 213 (1991); for article, "Legislative Sunset of Administrative Rules", see 21 Colo. Law. 2191 (1992); for article, "Representing a Professional Licensee in A Regulatory Board Investigation", see 21 Colo. Law. 1397 (1992).

Section

PART 1 GENERAL

24-4-101. Short title.

This article shall be known and may be cited as the "State Administrative Procedure Act".

Source: L. 69: p. 91, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-7.

ANNOTATION

Applied in City of Aurora v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 132, 609 P.2d 129 (1980); CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 111, 640 P.2d 238 (1981).

24-4-101.5. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly finds that an agency should not regulate or restrict the freedom of any person to conduct his or her affairs, use his or her property, or deal with others on mutually agreeable terms unless it finds, after a full consideration of the effects of the agency action, that the action would benefit the public interest and encourage the benefits of a free enterprise system for the citizens of this state. The general assembly also finds that many government programs may be adopted without stating the direct and indirect costs to consumers and businesses and without consideration of such costs in relation to the benefits to be derived from the programs. The general assembly further recognizes that agency action taken without evaluation of its economic impact may have unintended effects, which may include barriers to competition, reduced economic efficiency, reduced consumer choice, increased producer and consumer costs, and restrictions on employment. The general assembly further finds that agency rules can negatively impact the state's business climate by impeding the ability of local businesses to compete with out-of-state businesses, by discouraging new or existing businesses from moving to this state, and by hindering economic competitiveness and job creation. Accordingly, it is the continuing responsibility of agencies to analyze the economic impact of agency actions and reevaluate the economic impact of continuing agency actions to determine whether the actions promote the public interest.

Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 1134, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 2369, § 1, effective August 6.

24-4-102. Definitions.

As used in this article 4, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. "Action" includes the whole or any part of any agency rule, order, interlocutory order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act. Any agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof which constitutes final agency action shall include a list of all parties to the agency proceeding and shall specify the date on which the action becomes effective.
  2. "Adjudication" means the procedure used by an agency for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of an order and includes licensing.
  3. "Agency" means any board, bureau, commission, department, institution, division, section, or officer of the state, except those in the legislative branch or judicial branch and except:
    1. State educational institutions administered pursuant to title 23, except part 1 of article 8, parts 2 and 3 of article 21, and parts 2 to 4 of article 31 of title 23;
    2. Repealed.
    3. The adjutant general of the National Guard, whose powers and duties are set forth in section 28-3-106, C.R.S.

    (3.5) "Aggrieved", for the purpose of judicial review of rule-making, means having suffered actual loss or injury or being exposed to potential loss or injury to legitimate interests including, but not limited to, business, economic, aesthetic, governmental, recreational, or conservational interests.

  4. "Counsel" means an attorney admitted to practice before the supreme court of this state.
  5. "Decision" means the determinative action in adjudication and includes order, opinion, sanction, and relief.

    (5.5) "Economic competitiveness" means the ability of the state of Colorado to attract new business and the ability of the businesses currently operating in Colorado to create new jobs and raise productivity.

  6. "Initial decision" means a decision made by a hearing officer or administrative law judge which will become the action of the agency unless reviewed by the agency.

    (6.2) "Interested person" includes any person who may be aggrieved by agency action.

    (6.5) "Legislative committees of reference" means the committees established by the rules of the house of representatives and rules of the senate of the general assembly having jurisdiction over subject matter regulated by state agencies.

  7. "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, registration, charter, membership, or statutory exemption.
  8. "Licensing" includes the procedure used by an agency respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license.
  9. "Opinion" means the statement of reasons, findings of fact, and conclusions of law in explanation or support of an order.
  10. "Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) by any agency in any matter other than rule-making.
  11. "Party" includes any person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any court or agency proceeding subject to the provisions of this article.
  12. "Person" includes an individual, limited liability company, partnership, corporation, association, county, and public or private organization of any character other than an agency.
  13. "Proceeding" means any agency process for any rule or rule-making, order or adjudication, or license or licensing.
  14. "Relief" includes the whole or any part of any agency grant of money, assistance, license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; or any other action upon the application or petition of, and beneficial to, any person.

    (14.5) "Representative group" means a diverse group convened by an agency prior to rule-making or invited to participate in the rule-making hearing to give input and to comment on the effect of the proposed rules. The group should represent different points of view and may include representatives of persons, businesses, advocacy groups, trade associations, labor organizations, environmental advocacy groups, consumer advocates, or the regulated industry or profession affected negatively or positively by proposed rules.

  15. "Rule" means the whole or any part of every agency statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or declaring law or policy or setting forth the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. "Rule" includes "regulation".
  16. "Rule-making" means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. "Rule-making" does not include a statutory citation correction authorized by section 24-4-103 (11)(l).
  17. "Sanction" includes the whole or any part of any agency prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; withholding of relief; imposition of any form of penalty or fine; destruction, taking, seizure, barring access to, or withholding of property; assessment of damages; reimbursement; restitution; compensation; costs; charges or fees; requirement; revocation or suspension of a license or the prescription or requirement of terms, conditions, or standards of conduct thereunder; or other compulsory or restrictive action.
  18. "Small business" means a business with fewer than five hundred employees.

Source: L. 59: p. 158, § 1. CRS 53: § 3-16-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-1. L. 67: p. 300, § 1. L. 69: p. 81, § 1. L. 76: (4) amended and (6.5) added, p. 582, § 14, effective May 24. L. 79: (3.5) added and (12) amended, pp. 842, 843, §§ 1, 1, effective May 26. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 1133, § 1, effective June 6. L. 83: (3) amended, p. 962, § 7, effective July 1, 1984. L. 87: (6) amended, p. 961, § 64, effective March 13. L. 90: (12) amended, p. 447, § 8, effective April 18. L. 93: (6.2) added, p. 1325, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2002: (3) amended, p. 586, § 6, effective May 24. L. 2003: (5.5) and (18) added, p. 2370, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2012: (14.5) added, (HB 12-1008), ch. 182, p. 691, § 1, effective May 17; (3)(b) repealed, (HB 12-1283), ch. 240, p. 1133, § 44, effective July 1. L. 2013: (3)(a) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1681, § 49, effective August 7. L. 2017: (16) amended, (HB 17-1006), ch. 31, p. 88, § 1, effective March 16. L. 2021: IP and (3)(a) amended, (HB 21-1264), ch. 308, p. 1876, § 16, effective June 23.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act repealing subsection (3)(b), see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.

(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1264, see section 2 of chapter 308, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Constitutional and Administrative Law", see 38 Dicta 154 (1961). For note, "Colorado's Ombudsman Office", see 45 Den. L.J. 93 (1968). For article, "A Review of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law", see 47 Den. L.J. 181 (1970). For comment, "Standing of State Political Subdivisions to Challenge State Agency Rulings Under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 53 Den. L. J. 437 (1976).

The director of the department of revenue is an "agency" for purposes of this act. Farmers Cafe v. State Dept. of Rev., 752 P.2d 1064 (Colo. App. 1988).

Board of chiropractic examiners is an "agency" of the state and not subject to civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stjernholm v. Colo. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 820 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1991).

State board for community colleges and occupational education is an "agency" of the state and no action for damages may be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).

Board of county commissioners is an "agency". Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970).

Labor department's division of employment must also be deemed an "agency", as that term is defined in this section. City of Aurora v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 132, 609 P.2d 129 (1980).

Air pollution (now air quality) control commission is an "agency" under this section and is subject to the provisions of the state administrative procedure act. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

University of Colorado not an "agency". Since the university of Colorado is neither a rule-making nor licensing agency, the administrative procedure act doesn't apply to it expressly or by implication. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).

Community college board not an "agency". Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and § 24-4-106, decisions by the state board for community colleges and occupational education and by a college president are excluded from judicial review. Van Pelt v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978).

Private hospital not an "agency". A private hospital's peer review process is not subject to judicial review under this article because, for purposes of this article, "agency" only applies to state actors. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare, 2 01 2 COA 43, 292 P.3d 1018.

"Aggrieved" parties defined. Those whose activities are exactly those to which a particular regulation apply, and who will be adversely affected by an application of the regulation, are "aggrieved" parties, with standing to seek judicial review of the regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

"Aggrieved" parties under health insurer conversion statute included a policyholder of the corporation to be converted and a coalition of nonprofit organizations that could be adversely affected if the entity established to receive the consideration under this section were not sufficiently funded. Hawes v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 32 P.3d 571 (Colo. App. 2001).

A letter from the executive director informing a petitioner that the executive director finds no basis to proceed with an investigation, issue a cease-and-desist order, or take other action is an "order" and constitutes agency action and final agency action. W. Colo. Motors v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2 016 COA 103, 411 P.3d 1068.

The executive director is not required to hold a formal adjudicatory proceeding before issuing a final agency action. W. Colo. Motors v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2 016 COA 103, 411 P.3d 1068.

"Party" seeking review need not file alternative regulation. Status as a "party" in seeking judicial review of agency action does not require that one have filed an alternative to a proposed regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

County not included in definition of "party". A county, as an arm of the state board of social services, has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and hence does not come within the definition of "party". Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974).

Board of county commissioners has standing to initiate action against Colorado department of social services because it is seeking judicial review on its own behalf, as distinct from its role as the county board of social services, for an alleged injury it has suffered. Under these circumstances, board is not subordinate to the department. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Romer, 931 P.2d 504 (Colo. App. 1996).

The state board for community colleges and occupational education is by definition a state agency, not a "person" under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, and no action for damages may be maintained against it under that statute. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).

State department of personnel and its director were not "persons" and lacked standing to seek judicial review of state personnel board's action in questioning part of decision made by department and director. State of Colo. v. Colo. State Pers. Bd., 722 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1986).

Division of labor's requirement that self-insured employers use payroll statement to calculate the tax owed amounted to a "rule" as defined in subsection (15). Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Div. of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).

Agency actions often invoke both rule-making and adjudicatory authority, but generally, agency proceedings that primarily seek to or in effect determine policies or standards of general applicability are rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).

Determining whether a proceeding constitutes rule-making requires careful analysis of the actual conduct and effect of the proceedings and a determination of the purpose for which the proceedings were called. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. &Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).

The mere fact that a particular proceeding may have collateral prospective effects on other similarly situated parties does not convert an adjudication into rule-making. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 89 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2004).

Although the decision of the public utilities commission (PUC) appeared as a classification of a single utility's services, it in effect established the standards and policies applicable to telecommunications services of all public utilities. The proceeding which resulted in the ruling was therefore a rule-making proceeding, subject to the APA requirements for rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991); Avicomm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1998).

It is within the discretion of the administrative law judge to decide, prior to issuing a decision which constitutes the final agency action in a particular matter, when that decision will become effective. Bethesda Found. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 877 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1994).

Secretary of state's notice informing games of chance suppliers and manufacturers of fee assessment and reporting requirement was equivalent to an order and therefore amounted to an agency "action" under subsection (1). Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995).

Colorado water quality control division's failure to act on a request for a temporary water discharge permit within 180 days constituted final agency action, thereby requiring any district court complaint concerning said action to be filed within 30 days after the end of the 180-day period. Roosevelt Tunnel, LLC v. Norton, 89 P.3d 427 (Colo. App. 2003).

Referring doctors to the state medical board for possible Medical Practice Act violations that the board may then further investigate is not a final agency "action" as defined by this section. Doe v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.

Substance of actions by PUC and not label attached to actions by PUC determines whether PUC has acted in an adjudicatory or rule-making capacity. Home Builders Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986).

Function of supreme court is to review the judgment of trial court, and a question of whether a commission violated administrative rule-making statutory provisions in consideration of a well application is beyond the scope of review. Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970).

Applied in Colo. State Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs v. Dixon, 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968); Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980); Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982); Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 665 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1983).

24-4-103. Rule-making - procedure - definitions - statutory citation correction.

  1. When any agency is required or permitted by law to make rules, in order to establish procedures and to accord interested persons an opportunity to participate therein, the provisions of this section shall be applicable. Except when notice or hearing is otherwise required by law, this section does not apply to interpretative rules or general statements of policy, which are not meant to be binding as rules, or rules of agency organization.

    (1.5) If an agency reinterprets an existing rule in a manner that is substantially different than previous agency interpretations of the rule or if there has been a change in a statute that affects the interpretation or the legality of a rule, the office of legislative legal services shall review the rule in the same manner as rules that have been newly adopted or amended under paragraph (d) of subsection (8) of this section upon receiving a request for such a review of the rule by any member of the general assembly.

  2. When rule-making is contemplated, public announcement thereof may be made at such time and in such manner as the agency determines. The agency shall establish a representative group of participants with an interest in the subject of the rule-making to submit views or otherwise participate informally in conferences on the proposals under consideration or to participate in the public rule-making proceedings on the proposed rules. In establishing the representative group, the agency shall make diligent attempts to solicit input from representatives of each of the various stakeholder interests that may be affected positively or negatively by the proposed rules. If the agency convenes a representative group prior to issuing a notice of proposed rule-making as provided in paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this section, the agency shall add those persons who participated in the representative group to the list of persons who receive notification of proposed rule-making as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section.

    1. (2.5) (a) At the time of filing a notice of proposed rule-making with the secretary of state as the secretary may require, an agency shall submit a draft of the proposed rule or the proposed amendment to an existing rule and a statement, in plain language, concerning the subject matter or purpose of the proposed rule or amendment to the office of the executive director in the department of regulatory agencies. The executive director, or his or her designee, shall distribute the proposed rule or amendment, the agency's statement concerning the subject matter or purpose of the proposed rule or amendment, and any cost-benefit analysis prepared pursuant to this section to all persons who have submitted a request to receive notices from the department of regulatory agencies about proposed rule-making. Any person may, within five days after publication of the notice of proposed rule-making in the Colorado register, request that the department of regulatory agencies require the agency submitting the proposed rule or amendment to prepare a cost-benefit analysis. The executive director, or his or her designee, shall determine, after consultation with the agency proposing the rule or amendment, whether to require the agency to prepare a cost-benefit analysis. If the executive director, or his or her designee, determines that a cost-benefit analysis is required, the agency shall complete a cost-benefit analysis at least ten days before the hearing on the rule or amendment, shall make the analysis available to the public by posting the analysis on the agency's official website, and shall submit a copy to the executive director or his or her designee. The executive director, or his or her designee, shall post the analysis on the department of regulatory agencies' official website. By filing an additional notice published in the Colorado register, the agency may postpone the hearing on the rule or amendment to comply with the requirement to complete the cost-benefit analysis at least ten days before the hearing. Failure to complete a requested cost-benefit analysis pursuant to this subsection (2.5) shall preclude the adoption of such rule or amendment. Such cost-benefit analysis shall include the following:
      1. The reason for the rule or amendment;
      2. The anticipated economic benefits of the rule or amendment, which shall include economic growth, the creation of new jobs, and increased economic competitiveness;
      3. The anticipated costs of the rule or amendment, which shall include the direct costs to the government to administer the rule or amendment and the direct and indirect costs to business and other entities required to comply with the rule or amendment;
      4. Any adverse effects on the economy, consumers, private markets, small businesses, job creation, and economic competitiveness; and
      5. At least two alternatives to the proposed rule or amendment that can be identified by the submitting agency or a member of the public, including the costs and benefits of pursuing each of the alternatives identified.
    2. The executive director, or his or her designee, shall study the cost-benefit analysis and may urge the agency to revise the rule or amendment to eliminate or reduce the negative economic impact. The executive director, or his or her designee, may inform the public about the negative impact of the proposed rule or the proposed amendment to an existing rule.
    3. Any proprietary information provided to the department of revenue by a business or trade association for the purpose of preparing a cost-benefit analysis shall be confidential.
    4. If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2.5), the rule or amendment shall not be invalidated on the ground that the contents of the cost-benefit analysis are insufficient or inaccurate.
    5. This subsection (2.5) shall not apply to orders, licenses, permits, adjudication, or rules affecting the direct reimbursement of vendors or providers with state funds.
    6. Repealed.
    7. Each state rule-making agency with a website containing rule-making information shall include the following information on its website:
      1. Information about the cost-benefit analysis process set forth in this subsection (2.5); and
      2. A link to the online regulatory notice enrollment form created by the executive director of the department of regulatory agencies or the executive director's designee and listed on the department's website.

    1. (2.7) (a) As used in this subsection (2.7):
      1. "Director" means the director of the office of state planning and budgeting.
      2. "State mandate" has the same meaning as set forth in section 29-1-304.5 (3)(d), C.R.S.
    2. No agency shall promulgate a rule creating a state mandate on a local government unless the agency complies with the requirements of section 29-1-304.5, C.R.S.
      1. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this subsection (2.7), beginning January 1, 2014, for each proposed rule that includes a state mandate, an agency shall provide to the director a description of:
        1. The proposed rule;
        2. The nature and extent of any consultations that the agency had with elected officials or other representatives of the local governments that would be affected by the proposed state mandate;
        3. The nature of any concerns of the elected officials or other representatives of the local governments;
        4. Any written communications or comments submitted to the agency by an elected official or other representative of a local government; and
        5. The agency's reasoning supporting the need to promulgate the rule containing the state mandate.
      2. The director shall review the information provided pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) and, if it complies with the requirements of this paragraph (c), the director shall send a written notice of compliance to the agency. An agency shall not conduct a public rule-making proceeding unless the agency has received the written notice of compliance from the director.
    3. Each agency shall develop a process to actively solicit the meaningful and timely input of elected officials and other representatives of local governments into the development of proposed rules with state mandates affecting local governments. Each agency shall implement its process no later than January 1, 2014, and post the process on the agency's website.
    4. The executive director of each department shall be responsible for ensuring implementation of and compliance with this subsection (2.7).
    5. The general assembly shall appropriate any moneys necessary for the implementation of this subsection (2.7) to the office of state planning and budgeting in the annual general appropriation act for the fiscal year 2013-14.
    6. Beginning January 1, 2014, for each proposed rule of the state board of education that imposes a new state mandate or an increase in the level of service for an existing state mandate beyond that required by statute, the department of education shall comply with the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection (2.7).
    1. Notice of proposed rule-making shall be published as provided in subsection (11) of this section and shall state the time, place, and nature of public rule-making proceedings that shall not be held less than twenty days after such publication, the authority under which the rule is proposed, and either the terms or the substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
    2. If the agency proposes a rule to increase fees or fines, at the time of giving notice of proposed rule-making or within ten days following the adoption of an emergency or temporary rule that increases fees or fines, the agency shall send a written or electronic notification to each member of the general assembly notifying the members of the general assembly of the proposed rule or the adoption of an emergency rule and specifying the amount of the increase in the fees or fines.
    3. Each rule-making agency shall maintain a list of all persons who request notification of proposed rule-making, including temporary or emergency rule-making. Any person on such list who requests a copy of the proposed rules shall submit to the agency a fee that shall be set by such agency based upon the agency's actual cost of copying and mailing the proposed rules to such person. All fees collected by the agency are hereby appropriated to the agency solely for the purpose of defraying such cost. On or before the date of the publication of notice of proposed rule-making in the Colorado register, the agency shall mail the notice of proposed rule-making to all persons on such list. If a person requests to be notified by electronic mail, notice is sufficient by such means if a copy of the proposed rules is attached or included in the electronic mail or if the electronic mail provides the location where the proposed rules may be viewed on the internet. No fees shall be charged for notification by electronic mail. A person may only request notification on his or her own behalf, and a request for notification by one person on behalf of another person need not be honored.
    1. At the place and time stated in the notice, the agency shall hold a public hearing at which it shall afford interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments and to present the same orally unless the agency deems it unnecessary. The agency shall consider all such submissions. Any proposed rule or revised proposed rule by an agency which is to be considered at the public hearing, together with a proposed statement of basis, specific statutory authority, purpose, and the regulatory analysis required in subsection (4.5) of this section, shall be made available to any person at least five days prior to said hearing. The rules promulgated by the agency shall be based on the record, which shall consist of proposed rules, evidence, exhibits, and other matters presented or considered, matters officially noticed, rulings on exceptions, any findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by any party, and any written comments or briefs filed.
    2. Subject to the provisions of section 24-72-204 (3)(a)(IV), any study or other documentation utilized by an agency as the basis of a proposed rule shall be a public document in accordance with the provisions of part 2 of article 72 of this title and shall be open for public inspection. Subject to the provisions of section 24-72-204 (3)(a)(IV), all information, including, but not limited to, the conclusions and underlying research data from any studies, reports, published papers, and documents, used by the agency in the development of a proposed rule shall be a public document in accordance with the provisions of part 2 of article 72 of this title and shall be open for public inspection.
    3. All proposed rules shall be reviewed by the agency. No rule shall be adopted unless:
      1. The record of the rule-making proceeding demonstrates the need for the regulation;
      2. The proper statutory authority exists for the regulation;
      3. To the extent practicable, the regulation is clearly and simply stated so that its meaning will be understood by any party required to comply with the regulation;
      4. The regulation does not conflict with other provisions of law; and
      5. The duplication or overlapping of regulations is explained by the agency proposing the rule.
    4. Rules, as finally adopted, shall be consistent with the subject matter as set forth in the notice of proposed rule-making provided in subsection (11) of this section. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate by reference on the rules adopted a written concise general statement of their basis, specific statutory authority, and purpose. The written statement of the basis, specific authority, regulatory analysis required by subsection (4.5) of this section, and purpose of a rule which involves scientific or technological issues shall include an evaluation of the scientific or technological rationale justifying the rule. Each agency shall maintain a copy of its currently effective rules and the current status of each published proposal for rules and minutes of all its action upon rules, as well as any attorney general's opinion rendered on any adopted or proposed rule. Such materials shall be available for inspection by any person during regular office hours.
    5. Within one hundred eighty days after the last public hearing on the proposed rule, the agency shall adopt a rule pursuant to the rule-making proceeding or terminate the proceeding by publication of a notice to that effect in the Colorado register.

    1. (4.5) (a) Upon request of any person, at least fifteen days prior to the hearing, the agency shall issue a regulatory analysis of a proposed rule. The regulatory analysis shall contain:
      1. A description of the classes of persons who will be affected by the proposed rule, including classes that will bear the costs of the proposed rule and classes that will benefit from the proposed rule;
      2. To the extent practicable, a description of the probable quantitative and qualitative impact of the proposed rule, economic or otherwise, upon affected classes of persons;
      3. The probable costs to the agency and to any other agency of the implementation and enforcement of the proposed rule and any anticipated effect on state revenues;
      4. A comparison of the probable costs and benefits of the proposed rule to the probable costs and benefits of inaction;
      5. A determination of whether there are less costly methods or less intrusive methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule; and
      6. A description of any alternative methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule that were seriously considered by the agency and the reasons why they were rejected in favor of the proposed rule.
    2. Each regulatory analysis shall include quantification of the data to the extent practicable and shall take account of both short-term and long-term consequences.
    3. The regulatory analysis shall be available to the public at least five days prior to the rule-making hearing.
    4. If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5), the rule shall not be invalidated on the ground that the contents of the regulatory analysis are insufficient or inaccurate.
    5. Nothing in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5) shall limit an agency's discretionary authority to adopt or amend rules.
    6. The provisions of this subsection (4.5) shall not apply to rules and regulations promulgated by the department of revenue regarding the administration of any tax which is within the authority of said department.
  3. A rule shall become effective twenty days after publication of the rule as finally adopted, as provided in subsection (11) of this section, or on such later date as is stated in the rule. Once a rule becomes effective, the rule-making process shall be deemed to have become final agency action for judicial review purposes.
    1. A temporary or emergency rule may be adopted without compliance with the procedures prescribed in subsection (4) of this section and with less than the twenty days' notice prescribed in subsection (3) of this section, or where circumstances imperatively require, without notice, only if the agency finds that immediate adoption of the rule is imperatively necessary to comply with a state or federal law or federal regulation or for the preservation of public health, safety, or welfare and compliance with the requirements of this section would be contrary to the public interest and makes such a finding on the record. Such findings and a statement of the reasons for the action shall be published with the rule. A temporary or emergency rule may be adopted without compliance with subsections (2.5) and (2.7) of this section, but shall not become permanent without compliance with such subsections (2.5) and (2.7). A temporary or emergency rule shall become effective on adoption or on such later date as is stated in the rule, shall be published promptly, and shall have effect for not more than one hundred twenty days after its adoption or for such shorter period as may be specifically provided by the statute governing such agency, unless made permanent by compliance with subsections (3) and (4) of this section.
    2. The period of effectiveness provided by this subsection (6) does not apply to temporary or emergency rules adopted by the public utilities commission under section 40-2-108 (2), C.R.S.
  4. Any interested person shall have the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. Such petition shall be open to public inspection. Action on such petition shall be within the discretion of the agency; but when an agency undertakes rule-making on any matter, all related petitions for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of rules on such matter shall be considered and acted upon in the same proceeding.
    1. No rule shall be issued except within the power delegated to the agency and as authorized by law. A rule shall not be deemed to be within the statutory authority and jurisdiction of any agency merely because such rule is not contrary to the specific provisions of a statute. Any rule or amendment to an existing rule issued by any agency, including state institutions of higher education administered pursuant to title 23, C.R.S., which conflicts with a statute shall be void.
    2. On and after July 1, 1967, no rule may be issued nor existing rule amended by any agency unless it is first submitted by the issuing agency to the attorney general for his or her opinion as to its constitutionality and legality. Any rule or amendment to an existing rule issued by any agency without being so submitted to the attorney general is void.
      1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and the provisions of section 24-4-107, all rules adopted or amended on or after January 1, 1993, and before November 1, 1993, expire at 11:59 p.m. on May 15 of the year following their adoption unless the general assembly by bill acts to postpone the expiration of a specific rule, and commencing with rules adopted or amended on or after November 1, 1993, all rules adopted or amended during any one-year period that begins each November 1 and continues through the following October 31 expire at 11:59 p.m. on the May 15 that follows such one-year period unless the general assembly by bill acts to postpone the expiration of a specific rule; except that a rule adopted pursuant to section 25.5-4-402.4 (6)(b)(III) expires at 11:59 p.m. on the May 15 following the adoption of the rule unless the general assembly acts by bill to postpone the expiration of a specific rule. The general assembly, in its discretion, may postpone such expiration, in which case, the provisions of section 24-4-108 or 24-34-104 apply and the rules expire or are subject to review as provided in those sections. The postponement of the expiration of a rule does not constitute legislative approval of the rule and is not admissible in any court as evidence of legislative intent. The postponement of the expiration date of a specific rule does not prohibit any action by the general assembly pursuant to the provisions of subsection (8)(d) of this section with respect to the rule.
      2. It is the intent of the general assembly that, in the event of a conflict between this paragraph (c) and any other provision of law relating to suspension or extension of rules by joint resolution (whether said provision was adopted prior to or subsequent to this paragraph (c)), this paragraph (c) shall control, notwithstanding the rule of law that a specific provision of law controls over a general provision of law.
    3. All rules adopted or amended on or after July 1, 1976, including temporary or emergency rules, shall be submitted by the adopting agency to the office of legislative legal services in the form and manner prescribed by the committee on legal services. Said rules and amendments to existing rules shall be filed by and in such office and shall be first reviewed by the staff of said committee to determine whether said rules and amendments are within the agency's rule-making authority and for later review by the committee on legal services for its opinion as to whether the rules conform with paragraph (a) of this subsection (8). The committee on legal services shall direct the staff of the committee to review the rules submitted by adopting agencies using graduated levels of review based on criteria established by the committee. The criteria developed by the committee shall provide that every rule shall be reviewed as to form and compliance with filing procedures and that, upon request of any member of the committee or any other member of the general assembly, the staff shall provide full legal review of any rule during the time period that such rule is subject to review by the committee. The official certificate of the director of the office of legislative legal services as to the fact of submission or the date of submission of a rule as shown by the records of his office, as well as to the fact of nonsubmission as shown by the nonexistence of such records, shall be received and held in all civil cases as competent evidence of the facts contained therein. Records regarding the review of rules pursuant to this section shall be retained by the office of legislative legal services in accordance with policies established pursuant to section 2-3-303 (2), C.R.S. Any such rule or amendment to an existing rule issued by any agency without being so submitted within twenty days after the date of the attorney general's opinion rendered thereon to the office of legislative legal services for review by the committee on legal services shall be void. The staff's findings shall be presented to said committee at a public meeting held after timely notice to the public and affected agencies. The committee on legal services shall, on affirmative vote, submit such rules, comments, and proposed legislation at the next regular session of the general assembly. The committee on legal services shall be the committee of reference for any bill introduced pursuant to this paragraph (d). Any member of the general assembly may introduce a bill which rescinds or deletes portions of the rule. Rejection of such a bill does not constitute legislative approval of the rule. Only that portion of any rule specifically disapproved by bill shall no longer be effective, and that portion of the rule which remains after deletion of a portion thereof shall retain its character as an administrative rule. Each agency shall revise its rules to conform with the action taken by the general assembly. A rule which has been allowed to expire by action of the general assembly pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection (8) because such rule, in the opinion of the general assembly, is not authorized by the state constitution or statute shall not be repromulgated by an agency unless the authority to promulgate such rule has been granted to such agency by a statutory amendment or by the state constitution or by a judicial determination that statutory or constitutional authority exists. Any rule so repromulgated shall be void. Such revision shall be transmitted to the secretary of state for publication pursuant to subsection (11) of this section. Passage of a bill repealing a rule does not result in revival of a predecessor rule. This paragraph (d) and subsection (4.5) of this section do not apply to rules of agency organization or general statements of policy which are not meant to be binding as rules. For the purpose of performing the functions assigned it by this paragraph (d), the committee on legal services, with the approval of the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate, may appoint subcommittees from the membership of the general assembly.
    4. The office of legislative legal services shall identify rules that were adopted during each applicable one-year period as a result of legislation enacted during any legislative session, regular or special, commencing on or after the previous eight calendar years. After the rules have been identified, the office of legislative legal services shall notify in writing any prime sponsors of the enacted legislation who are still serving in the general assembly and the current members of the applicable committees of reference in the senate and house of representatives for that enacted legislation that a rule has been adopted as a result of the legislation; except that the office of legislative legal services need not provide the notice regarding an adopted rule if the rule resulted from legislation that was enacted more than eight calendar years prior to the rule's adoption.

    1. (8.1) (a) An agency shall maintain an official rule-making record for each proposed rule for which a notice of proposed rule-making has been published in the Colorado register. Such rule-making record shall be maintained by the agency until all administrative and judicial review procedures have been completed pursuant to the provisions of this article. The rule-making record shall be available for public inspection.
    2. The agency rule-making record shall contain:
      1. Copies of all publications in the Colorado register with respect to the rule or the proceeding upon which the rule is based;
      2. Copies of any portions of the agency's public rule-making docket containing entries relating to the rule or the proceeding upon which the rule is based;
      3. All written petitions, requests, submissions, and comments received by the agency as of the date of the hearing on the rule and all other written materials, or a listing of such materials, considered by the agency in connection with the formulation, proposal, or adoption of the rule or the proceeding upon which the rule is based, which materials shall be available for public inspection during working hours;
      4. Any official transcript of oral presentations made in the proceeding upon which the rule is based or, if not transcribed, any tape recording or stenographic record of those presentations and any memorandum prepared by a presiding official summarizing the contents of those presentations;
      5. A copy of any regulatory analysis or cost-benefit analysis prepared for the proceeding upon which the rule was based, if applicable, and any formal statement made to the agency promulgating the rule by the executive director of the department of regulatory agencies regarding such cost-benefit analysis;
      6. A copy of the rule and explanatory statement filed in the office of the secretary of state;
      7. All petitions for exceptions to, amendments of, or repeal or suspension of the rule;
      8. A copy of any objection to the rule presented to the committee on legal services of the general assembly by its staff pursuant to paragraph (d) of subsection (8) of this section and the agency's response;
      9. A copy of any filed executive order with respect to the rule; and
      10. A copy of any information provided to the director pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection (2.7) of this section and the written notice of compliance from the director.
    3. Upon judicial review, the record required by this section constitutes the official rule-making record with respect to a rule. The agency rule-making record need not constitute the exclusive basis for agency action on that rule or for judicial review thereof; except that, this paragraph (c) shall not be interpreted to allow the introduction of evidence or information into such rule-making record from outside of the public rule-making hearing, or to allow such introduction of evidence or information without notice to all parties to such hearing and opportunity to respond.
    4. If an agency includes information required by subparagraph (X) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (8.1) in the rule-making record, the agency shall provide a copy of the portion of the record that includes such information with the executive committee of the legislative council in accordance with the provisions of section 24-1-136 (9).

    1. (8.2) (a) A rule adopted on or after September 1, 1988, shall be invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance with the provisions of this section. However, inadvertent failure to mail a notice of proposed rule-making to any person as required by subsection (3) of this section shall not invalidate a rule.
    2. An action to contest the validity of a rule on the grounds of its noncompliance with any provision of this section shall be commenced within thirty days after the effective date of the rule.

    1. (8.3) (a) On or after August 11, 2010, all new or amended rules or regulations promulgated pursuant to this section that refer to persons with disabilities shall comply with the provisions of section 2-2-802, C.R.S., as applicable to the new or amended rule.
    2. Violation of this subsection (8.3) shall not be grounds to invalidate any new or amended rule; however, such rules shall be amended to reflect the provisions of section 2-2-802, C.R.S., in any subsequent revision.
    3. Nothing in this subsection (8.3) shall constitute a requirement to change the name of any department, agency, or program of the state.
  5. Each agency shall make available to the public and shall deliver to anyone requesting it a copy of any notice of proposed rule-making proceeding in which action has not been completed. Upon request, such copy shall be certified. The agency may make a reasonable charge for supplying any such copy.
  6. No rule shall be relied upon or cited against any person unless, if adopted after May 1, 1959, it has been published and, whether adopted before or after said date, it has been made available to the public in accordance with this section.
    1. There is hereby established the code of Colorado regulations for the publication of rules of agencies of the executive branch and the Colorado register for the publication of notices of rule-making, proposed rules, attorney general's opinions relating to such rules, and adopted rules. The code and the register shall be the sole official publications for such rules, notices of rule-making, proposed rules, and attorney general's opinions. The code and the register shall contain, where applicable, references to court opinions and recommendations of the legal services committee of the general assembly that relate to or affect such rules and references to any action of the general assembly relating to the extension, expiration, deletion, or rescission of such rules and may contain other items that, in the opinion of the editor, are relevant to such rules. The register may also include other public notices, including annual departmental regulatory agendas submitted by principal departments to the secretary of state pursuant to section 2-7-203, C.R.S.; however, except as specifically permitted by law, the inclusion of such notices in the register shall be in addition to and not in substitution for existing public notice requirements.
    2. The secretary of state shall cause to be published in electronic form, and may cause to be published in printed form, at the least cost possible to the state, the code of Colorado regulations and the Colorado register no less often than once each calendar month. In the event of any discrepancy between the electronic and printed form of the code or the register, the electronic form shall prevail unless it is conclusively shown, by reference to the rule-making filings made with the secretary of state pursuant to this section, that the electronic form contains an error in publication.
    3. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
      1. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
      2. Each rule adopted, together with the attorney general's opinion rendered in connection therewith, shall be filed pursuant to subsection (12) of this section within twenty days after adoption with the secretary of state for publication in the Colorado register. Upon written request of an agency, the secretary of state shall correct typographical and other nonsubstantive errors appearing in the rules as filed by such agency that occur after final adoption of the rules by the agency during the preparation of such rules for publication in order to conform the published rules with the adopted rules. Notices of rule-making proceedings pursuant to subsection (3) of this section shall also be filed with the secretary of state in sufficient time for publication pursuant to subsection (5) of this section in the register. Rules revised to conform with action taken by the general assembly shall be filed with the secretary of state for publication in the register and in the code of Colorado regulations. The legal services committee of the general assembly shall notify the secretary of state whenever a rule published in the code is rescinded or a portion thereof is deleted by the general assembly and whenever a rule or a portion thereof is allowed to expire in accordance with section 24-4-108 or with subparagraph (I) of paragraph (c) of subsection (8) of this section, and the secretary of state shall direct the removal from the code of material so deleted, rescinded, or allowed to expire.
    4. The secretary of state shall establish and maintain an accurate docket system for recording the time and date of the filing of each document, the agency filing the same, and the title or description of such document required to be filed for publication under the provisions of this section, which docket system shall be cross-indexed as to such time, date, agency, and title or description.
    5. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
    6. Publication of notices and other required information related to proposed and adopted rules shall be by electronic publication.
    7. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
      1. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
      2. The Colorado register shall contain only such notices, proposed rules, adopted rules, opinions, and other relevant information and materials as are filed pursuant to law with the secretary of state.
      3. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
    8. Repealed.
    9. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
      1. An agency may request the secretary of state to correct a statutory citation contained in a rule, including a form incorporated into a rule, as published in the code of Colorado regulations if:
        1. The general assembly has relocated the statute in a manner that renders the rule's citation to the statute inaccurate; and
        2. The agency submits to the secretary a written determination by the attorney general that finds that the condition specified in subsection (11)(l)(I)(A) of this section applies, specifies what the correct citation is, and identifies each citation that should be corrected.
      2. Upon receipt of a request that complies with subsection (11)(l)(I) of this section, the secretary of state shall correct in the code of Colorado regulations each statutory citation listed in the determination specified in subsection (11)(l)(I)(B) of this section.
      3. A statutory citation correction authorized by this subsection (11)(l) is not rule-making and need not comply with any requirements of this section other than those specified in this subsection (11)(l).
    10. Repealed.
  7. All rules of any agency that have been submitted to the attorney general under the provisions of subsection (8) of this section and the opinion of the attorney general, when issued, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state. The secretary of state shall require that all rules of any agency that have been submitted to the attorney general under the provisions of subsection (8) of this section and the opinion of the attorney general, when issued, be filed in an electronic format that complies with any requirements established pursuant to sections 24-37.5-106 and 24-71.3-118.

    1. (12.5) (a) A rule may incorporate by reference all or any part of a code, standard, guideline, or rule that has been adopted by an agency of the United States, this state, or another state, or adopted or published by a nationally recognized organization or association, if:
      1. Repeating verbatim the text of the code, standard, guideline, or rule in the rule would be unduly cumbersome, expensive, or otherwise inexpedient;
      2. The reference fully identifies the incorporated code, standard, guideline, or rule by citation and date, identifies the address of the agency where the code, standard, guideline, or rule is available for public inspection, and states that the rule does not include any later amendments or editions of the code, standard, guideline, or rule;
      3. The code, standard, guideline, or rule is readily available to the public in written or electronic form;
      4. The rule states where copies of the code, standard, guideline, or rule are available for a reasonable charge from the agency adopting the rule and where copies are available from the agency of the United States, this state, another state, or the organization or association originally issuing the code, standard, guideline, or rule; and
      5. The agency maintains a copy of the code, standard, guideline, or rule readily available for public inspection at the agency office during regular business hours.
    2. The agency shall provide certified copies of the material incorporated at cost upon request or shall provide the requester with information on how to obtain a certified copy of the material incorporated by reference from the agency of the United States, this state, another state, or the organization or association originally issuing the code, standard, guideline, or rule.
    3. If any agency incorporates or proposes to incorporate any material by reference in a rule and the version or edition of the material to be incorporated has not previously been provided to the state publications depository and distribution center, and if the rule or proposed rule does not identify where the incorporated material is available to the public on the internet at no cost, then the agency shall provide one copy of the material in either paper or electronic format to the state publications depository and distribution center. The state librarian shall retain the copy of the material and shall make the copy available to the public.
  8. Any agency conducting a hearing shall have authority on its own motion or upon the motion of any interested person for good cause shown to: Administer oaths and affirmations; sign and issue subpoenas; regulate the course of the hearing, set the time and place for continued hearings, and fix the time for the filing of appropriate documents; take depositions or have depositions taken; issue appropriate orders which shall control the subsequent course of the proceedings; and take any other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this article. In the event more than one person engages in the conduct of a hearing, such persons shall designate one of their number to perform the functions of this subsection (13) and subsection (14) of this section as can best be performed by one person only, and thereafter such person only shall perform those functions which are assigned to him by the several persons conducting such hearing.
  9. Subpoenas shall be issued without discrimination between public and private parties by any agency or any member, the secretary or chief administrative officer thereof, or, with respect to any hearing for which a hearing officer or an administrative law judge has been appointed, the hearing officer or administrative law judge. A subpoena shall be served in the same manner as a subpoena issued by a district court. Upon failure of any witness to comply with such subpoena, the agency may petition any district court, setting forth that due notice has been given of the time and place of attendance of the witness and the service of the subpoena, in which event, the district court, after hearing evidence in support of or contrary to the petition, may enter an order as in other civil actions compelling the witness to attend and testify or produce books, records, or other evidence, under penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply with the order of the court. A witness shall be entitled to the fees and mileage provided for a witness in sections 13-33-102 and 13-33-103, C.R.S.

Source: L. 59: p. 159, § 2. CRS 53: § 3-16-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-2. L. 67: p. 300, § 2. L. 69: p. 82, §§ 2, 3. L. 76: (1) and (8)(a) amended and (8)(d) added, p. 582, § 15, effective May 24. L. 77: (8)(d) amended, p. 1134, § 2, effective May 31; (13) and (14) added, p. 1144, § 1, effective June 3; (4) amended, p. 1136, § 1, effective June 19; (4) amended and (11) R&RE, p. 1138, §§ 1, 2, effective June 19; (8)(d) amended, p. 1141, § 1, effective (see editor's note). L. 78: (12) amended, p. 390, § 1, March 30. L. 79: (5) amended, p. 842, § 2, effective May 22; (8)(d) and (11)(d) amended, p. 849, § 1, effective May 25; (8)(c) R&RE and (8)(d) amended, p. 845, §§ 1, 2, effective June 29. L. 81: (9) and (11) amended, (11)(k) added, and (11)(j) repealed, pp. 1129, 1130, §§ 1, 2; (12.5) added, p. 1131, § 1, effective July 1; (12) and (13) amended, p. 1133, § 2, effective July 1. L. 82: (11)(a) and (11)(d) amended, p. 360, § 1, effective March 11. L. 84: (4) amended, p. 649, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: (11)(k) amended, p. 915, § 1, effective July 1; (8)(c)(I) and (8)(d) amended, p. 919, § 2, effective July 3; (14) amended, p. 961, § 65, effective March 13. L. 88: (8)(d) amended, p. 311, § 19, effective May 23; (3), (6), and (8)(d) amended, (4) R&RE, and (4.5), (8.1), and (8.2) added, pp. 884, 886, 887, §§ 1, 2, 3, effective May 17. L. 89: (4.5)(f) added and (8.1)(b)(V) amended, pp. 1502, 1503, §§ 10, 11, effective July 1, 1990. L. 91: (1) amended, p. 807, § 3, effective June 5. L. 93: (3)(b), (6), (8.1)(c), (8.2)(b), and (11)(d) amended, p. 1325, § 2, effective June 6; (8)(d) amended, p. 2109, § 12, effective June 9; (8)(c)(I) amended, p. 496, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (1.5) added and (3)(a) and (12.5) amended, p. 2587, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (6) amended, p. 232, § 2, effective April 17. L. 98: (4)(a.5) added, p. 721, § 1, effective May 18. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 1861, § 73, effective August 2. L. 2001: (8)(d) amended, p. 318, § 2, effective April 12; (4)(a.5) amended, p. 1076, § 5, effective August 8; (12) amended, p. 38, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2002: (3)(b), (9), (11)(b), (11)(d), (11)(f), (11)(g), (11)(h), (11)(i), (11)(k), and (12) amended, p. 436, § 2, effective May 14. L. 2003: (11)(b) and (11)(d)(I) amended, p. 2048, § 1, effective May 22; (2.5) added and (6), (8.1)(b)(V), and (11)(b) amended, p. 2370, § 3, effective August 6. L. 2005: (12) amended, p. 768, § 36, effective June 1. L. 2006: IP(2.5)(a) and (2.5)(f)(I) amended, p. 202, § 1, effective March 31; (12) amended, p. 1735, § 20, effective June 6. L. 2007: (12) amended, p. 910, § 2, effective May 17. L. 2009: (8)(c)(I) amended, (HB 09-1293), ch. 152, p. 651, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2010: (3)(a), (8.1)(a), and (12.5) amended, (HB 10-1235), ch. 76, p. 258, § 1, effective April 5; (6) amended, (HB 10-1346), ch. 137, p. 460, § 1, effective April 15; (11) and (12) amended, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15; (8.3) added, (HB 10-1137), ch. 93, p. 320, § 2, effective August 11. L. 2012: (2), (3), and (11)(a) amended, (HB 12-1008), ch. 182, pp. 691, 694, §§ 2, 5, effective May 17; (2.7), (8.1)(b)(X), and (8.1)(d) added and (6)(a), (8.1)(b)(VIII), and (8.1)(b)(IX) amended, ch. 199, p. 797, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2013: IP(2.5)(a) amended and (8)(e) added, (SB 13-030), ch. 110, p. 379, § 1, effective April 8; IP(2.5)(a) and (2.5)(f) amended, (SB 13-158), ch. 283, p. 1490, § 1, effective July 1; IP(2.7)(c)(I) amended and (2.7)(g) added, (HB 13-1219), ch. 104, p. 366, § 20, effective August 7. L. 2015: (8)(e) amended, (SB 15-047), ch. 71, p. 190, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2016: (8)(b) amended, (HB 16-1094), ch. 94, p. 267, § 12, effective August 10. L. 2017: (11)(l) added, (HB 17-1006), ch. 31, p. 88, § 2, effective March 16; (11)(m) added, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1321, § 177, effective May 25; (8)(c)(I) amended, (SB 17-267), ch. 267, p. 1440, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2018: (2.5)(f) repealed and (2.5)(g) added, (HB 18-1237), ch. 165, p. 1137, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2021: (8)(e) amended, (HB 21-1137), ch. 37, p. 142, § 1, effective September 7.

Editor's note: (1) House Bill 77-1646, which amended subsection (8)(d), was delivered to the governor on June 20, 1977. The general assembly adjourned sine die on June 22, 1977. The governor disapproved House Bill 77-1646 on July 15, 1977, but the bill was not filed with the secretary of state until July 27, 1977, and the governor's letter stating objections to the bill was not filed with the secretary of state until August 2, 1977. Because House Bill 77-1646 and the governor's objections to it were not filed with the secretary of state within thirty days after adjournment of the general assembly, House Bill 77-1646 became a law pursuant to the provisions of § 11 of article IV of the Colorado Constitution.

(2) Amendments to subsection (4) by House Bill 77-1419 and House Bill 77-1623 were harmonized.

(3) Amendments to subsection (8)(d) by House Bill 79-1393 and House Bill 79-1063 were harmonized.

(4) Amendments to subsection (11)(b) by Senate Bill 03-121 and House Bill 03-1350 were harmonized.

(5) Amendments to the introductory portion to subsection (2.5)(a) by Senate Bill 13-030 and Senate Bill 13-158 were harmonized.

(6) Section 34 of chapter 267 (SB 17-267), Session L aws of Colorado 2017, provides that the section of the act amending this section does not take effect if the centers for medicare and medicaid services determine that the amendments do not comply with federal law. For more information, see SB 17-267. ( L . 2017, p. 1447.) The executive director of the department of health care policy and financing did not notify the revisor of statutes by June 1, 2017, of such determination; therefore, amendments to this section took effect July 1, 2017.

(7) Subsection (11)(m)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (11)(m), effective July 1, 2018. (See L . 2017, p. 1321.)

Cross references: (1) For the general authority of department heads to adopt rules and regulations, see § 24-2-105.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-267, see section 1 of chapter 267, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Discovery and Judicial Review in State Administrative Practice", see 10 C olo. Law. 2490 (1981). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth C ircuit decision dealing with rule-making, see 61 Den. L.J. 110 (1984). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with rulemaking, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 15 (1985). For article, "General Principles of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 16 Colo. Law. 1983 (1987). For article, "Hearsay Evidence and the Residuum Rule in Colorado", see 17 Colo. Law. 651 (1988). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with an agency's interpretation of its rules, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 366 (1988). For article, "Legislative and Judicial Oversight of Rulemaking", see 18 Colo. Law. 246 (1989). For article, "Understanding Administrative Fact-Finding", see 20 Colo. Law. 1607 (1991). For article, "Legislative Sunset of Administrative Rules", see 21 Colo. Law. 2191 (1992). For article, "Guidelines for Negotiated Rulemaking", see 25 Colo. Law. 21 (Jan. 1996).

Section constitutional. Subsection (10) does not violate § 21 of art. VI, Colo. Const. People v. Bobian, 626 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981).

The basic purpose of subsection (10) is public policy rather than simply a legislative attempt to regulate the day-to-day procedural operation of the courts. People v. Bobian, 626 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981).

Section is not applicable to board of regents of university of Colorado. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).

Section is not applicable to suspension of medical license. Section 24-4-104 (4), dealing with the procedure for the issuance, suspension, revocation, or renewal of licenses, is the authority for the state board of medical examiners to summarily suspend a license to practice medicine pending a full hearing; this section and § 12-36-101 et seq., dealing with medical practice, do not apply. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 191 Colo. 158, 551 P.2d 194 (1976).

Apparent purpose of the 1977 amendment was to formalize, to a limited degree, the agency rule-making process by requiring a brief explanation of the reasoning process underlying an administrative regulation, and by requiring that the regulation be based upon and tied to the administrative record. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).

Rationale for requirement of statement of basis and purpose. The statement of basis and purpose assures that the administratively perceived necessity for the rule will be explicated, and serves to provide a reference point against which the validity of the rule can be measured. It removes the review process from the realm of speculation and provides a context within which meaningful judicial review can occur. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).

Where agency, in rule-making, fails to maintain an appropriate record of the public hearing because of a malfunctioning tape recorder, improperly compiles the rule-making record by introducing documents from outside of the rule-making procedures, and fails to maintain the rule-making record by failing to include and maintain all written submissions and comments received by the agency prior to the hearing, the agency has failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Studor v. Examining Bd. of Plumbers, 929 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1996).

The reason for the prehearing statement of basis and purpose under subsection (2.5)(a) is to provide public notice of what the agency is considering. The reason for requiring that rules incorporate by reference a written concise general statement of their basis, specific statutory authority, and purpose under subsection (4)(c) is to assist in appellate review. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).

Agency substantially complied with the requirement of APA of providing a statement of basis and purpose. Here, regulation at issue was not based on findings of fact obtained from evidence presented at the hearing or otherwise. Instead, it was based almost entirely on policy considerations. In addition, the purpose of the regulation is self-explanatory. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).

State pharmacy board (Board) substantially complied with APA requirements of maintaining an adequate and appropriate record of the rulemaking hearing proceeding. Maintaining an adequate record provides a rationale and support for agency decisions, allows for public inspection of the agency's actions, and establishes a record that an appellate court may use to evaluate the basis of the agency's conclusions. Here, the Board substantially complied with APA hearing procedure requirements where (1) although the tape recording of the hearing contains inaudible and unreconstructed portions, the substance of and core testimony at the hearing appears to be intact and sufficient for public inspection and appellate review, (2) written comments were included in the record that address many of the items discussed at the hearing, (3) comments and questions made by Board members during the testimony are sufficient to convey the Board's thought processes and reasoning, and (4) the record sufficiently indicates that a majority of Board members voted in favor of the rule. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).

State pharmacy board (Board) did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating rule prohibiting pharmacists from dispensing prescription drugs resulting from internet-based questionnaires, internet-based consultation, or telephonic consultation without a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship. Court rejects appellants' claims that a determination of whether a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship (1) necessarily involves knowledge of the Medical Practice Act and the rules promulgated by the state board of medical examiners (BME), (2) is beyond the expertise of individual pharmacists and the Board, and (3) improperly injects the Board into areas that are properly regulated by the BME. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).

Fiscal impact determination not based on record before agency. Subsection (8)(d) does not require that the fiscal impact determination be based upon or supported by the record before the administrative agency. Rather, the administrative agency should conduct such investigations and research as are reasonably necessary to arrive at an estimate of fiscal impact or to determine that such impact cannot reasonably or reliably be quantified. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).

Fiscal impact statement requirement relates to the substance of new or amended regulations and not to their form. If the amendment is one of substance which has fiscal implications, then the fiscal impact statement is required. Conversely, if the change is not substantive and does not affect the fiscal impact of the regulation as it is written, then no fiscal impact statement is required. Dept. of Natural Res. v. Clark Gen. Store, Inc., 658 P.2d 1385 (Colo. App. 1983) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).

Simple renumbering of preexisting regulation does not constitute an amendment such as would require a fiscal impact statement under subsection (8)(d). Dept. of Natural Res. v. Clark Gen. Store, Inc., 658 P.2d 1385 (Colo. App. 1983) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).

Review of fiscal impact statements is limited. The role of the court in reviewing the sufficiency of fiscal impact statements is limited. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).

Only where the statement of fiscal impact is clearly inadequate may the court intervene. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).

Lack of bona fide emergency. Rule not invalid for lack of emergency where challenge was merely procedural and where notice and an opportunity to be heard were given. Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 598 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1984).

Issue of validity of emergency regulations not considered when the new regulations, if invalidly promulgated, would have left identical prior regulations in effect. Nat. Advert. v. Dept. of Highways, 718 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1986).

Rule-making quasi-legislative in character. Rule-making conducted in accordance with this section is quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, in character. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).

An administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to this section is a quasi-legislative action subject to review by a declaratory judgment. Clasby v. Klapper, 636 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1981).

Legislative delegation of rule-making and regulatory authority to an administrative agency must provide both sufficient standards for rational and consistent rule-making and adequate procedural safeguards for effective judicial review of administrative action. Orsinger Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Dept. of Hwys., 752 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1988); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

The general assembly need not adopt a specific formula to guide agency rule-making if the agency can find general guidance, through the legislative intent, in the purposes and overall scheme of an act. Ettelman v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 849 P.2d 795 (Colo. App. 1992).

While the construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its enforcement should be given deference by the courts, the courts have a duty to invalidate administrative regulations which conflict with the design of a statute because they are in excess of the administrative authority granted. Ettelman v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 849 P.2d 795 (Colo. App. 1992).

Board's rules were not abolished by legislation abolishing existing board and immediately creating a newly constituted one, nor was board required to re-enact, ratify, or promulgate new rules, since annual legislation by the general assembly specifically postponing the expiration of the board's rules effectively postponed the rules of the "old" board and continued their application under the "new" board. 1st Am. Sav. Bank v. Boulder County, 888 P.2d 360 (Colo. App. 1994).

Secretary of state was not required to promulgate rules under the APA in order to implement the reporting requirement for games of chance suppliers and manufacturers under § 12-9-107.5. Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995) (decided prior to 2017 amendments relocating article 9 of title 12 to part 6 of article 21 of title 24).

Counties not "persons" or "parties". There is nothing in the context of this section that includes counties as "persons" or "parties" entitled as of right to be admitted to agency hearings. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. State Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974).

Department proposing a regulation has no affirmative duty to offer supporting evidence. Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980).

Study or findings are not required to support rules based primarily on policy considerations if reasoning process leading to rules is defensible. Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 598 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1984).

Racing commission was not precluded from making financial irresponsibility grounds for discipline, even though such grounds were not enumerated in § 12-60-507, since the rule was in the interests of the public and reasonable and was fully consistent with the commission's authority to promulgate rules. Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

Submissions by interested persons not controlling. Although subsection (4) provides that the agency "shall consider all submissions", it does not provide that such submissions shall be controlling, even when unrebutted. Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980).

Definition of "rule". The numerical point system formulated by a peer review organization was not a rule but a general statement of policy which did not establish a binding norm nor finally determine issues or rights. Therefore no publication of the point system was required. Meyer v. State Dept. of Soc. Servs., 758 P.2d 192 (Colo. App. 1988).

Division of labor's requirement that self-insured employers use payroll statement to calculate the tax owed amounted to a "rule" as defined in subsection (15) of § 24-4-102. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Division of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).

Promulgated and effective rule deemed "final" and subject to review. Once a commission's rule or regulation has been promulgated and is in effect, the agency action is "final" as to that particular regulation and subject to review under this article. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

Properly filed and indexed rules introduced in evidence. In effect, the general assembly stated in this section that, in order to have a rule introduced in evidence, the filing authority shall index and number the set of rules involved, shall keep amendments and repealed rules in a separate permanent file, and shall cross-index with up-to-date rules any amended or repealed rules. People v. Williams, 197 Colo. 559, 596 P.2d 745 (1979).

When rule may be introduced into evidence. An administrative rule which does not satisfy the public notice requirements of this section may not be introduced as evidence in criminal proceedings. People v. More, 668 P.2d 968 (Colo. App. 1983).

A party to judicial proceedings has the right to require an adverse party seeking to introduce an administrative rule into evidence to establish compliance with the applicable provisions of this section. People v. More, 668 P.2d 968 (Colo. App. 1983).

Statute governing admission of administrative rules and regulations into evidence against an accused in a criminal trial requires only a showing of proper publication and public availability of the rules. No showing need be made that there has been compliance with the provisions of the statute governing other aspects of issuance or promulgation of the rules. People v. Gallegos, 692 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1984) (limiting People v. More cited in the previous paragraphs).

Standard of review specified in subsection (6) correctly applied where termination was reversed without an explicit finding that agency action was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law. Kinchen v. Dept. of Insts., 867 P.2d 8 (Colo. App. 1993).

Conviction based on regulation not available to public is reversed. Where, in order to show that defendant received aid to the blind benefits to which he was not entitled, the department of social services had to both cite and rely on a regulation which had not been made available to the public in violation of this section, the defendant's conviction for welfare fraud had to be reversed. People v. Bobian, 626 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981).

Administrative law judge (ALJ) violated subsection (10) where the numerical point system formulated by the department of social services was utilized by the ALJ as the sole criterion upon which to determine petitioners' continuing eligibility for benefits but had never been made the subject of a formally adopted rule or regulation nor had claimant been given proper notice of its preeminent significance in determining benefit eligibility. Weaver v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 791 P.2d 1230 (Colo. App. 1990).

The use of unpublished criteria in a scoring system used to evaluate the plaintiff's eligibility for home- and community-based services was not in violation of the APA because the scoring system serves only to facilitate the evaluation process for certain applicants and is not the final factual determination of eligibility. Morgan v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 56 P.3d 1136 (Colo. App. 2002).

Agency rule-making conducted in accordance with this section is quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, in character. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, 919 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1996).

Rules that are interpretive in nature fall within the express exception to the notice and hearing requirements of this section. Regular Rt. Com. Carrier Conf. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 761 P.2d 737 (Colo. 1988).

Agency's rule, which provides minimum guidelines as to how the discovery process will be conducted with respect to that agency, is an interpretive rule and falls within the express exception to the notice and hearing requirements of this section. Colo. Motor Vehicle v. Northglenn, 972 P.2d 707 (Colo. App. 1998).

Whether a rule is legislative or interpretive depends on its effect. It is legislative if it establishes a norm that commands a particular result in all applicable proceedings; it is interpretive if it establishes guidelines that do not bind the agency to a particular result. Hammond v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 219 P.3d 426 (Colo. App. 2009).

A policy is an interpretative rule and not subject to the rulemaking requirements of the APA if it serves the advisory function of explaining the meaning of a word or phrase in statute and describes the type of factors that an agency will consider in future administrative proceedings without binding the agency to a particular result. Doe v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.

Emergency rule-making was within authority of department of social services and in accordance with the APA and the Medicaid Act. Health Care of Colo. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 842 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1988).

Fiscal impact statement is not required to contain a description of the types of persons the rule will injure. The paragraph of the rule only requires a description of those types of persons or groups who will bear the costs of the rule and, for purposes of this paragraph, costs means fiscal costs. Urbish v. Lamm, 761 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1988) (decided under law in effect prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).

Rules published in the code of Colorado regulations are a fit subject for judicial notice. Westfall v. Town of Hugo, 851 P.2d 299 (Colo. App. 1993).

Where an agency's interpretation of law established agency policy and procedure, compliance with the APA was required and, where the APA requirements were not met, the rule was not enforceable. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Division of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).

It was permissible for the trial court to consider the commission's deliberations in the rule-making proceeding, in conjunction with the rest of the record, in conducting the court's review. The transcripts of the commission's deliberations are analogous to legislative history concerning a statute. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 809 P.2d 1107 (Colo. App. 1991).

A regulation may not modify or contravene an existing statute, and any regulation that is inconsistent with or contrary to statute is void. Ettelman v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 849 P.2d 795 (Colo. App. 1992); Colo. Consumer Health Initiative v. Colo. Bd. of Health, 240 P.3d 525 (Colo. App. 2010); Hanlen v. Gessler, 2014 CO 24, 333 P.3d 41.

A regulation that states that permits issued pursuant to it shall be binding with respect to "any conflicting local governmental permit or land use approval process" is overly broad and void where it conflicts with law providing that oil and gas rules preempt county regulations only when the operational effect of the county regulations conflicts with the application of the state oil and gas statute or state regulations. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 81 P.3d 1119 (Colo. App. 2003).

District court did not abuse its discretion by entering preliminary injunction against secretary of state enjoining implementation of administrative rule. Proposed rule would force labor and other covered organizations to get written permission before using an individual's dues or contributions to fund political campaigns. Plaintiffs demonstrated reasonable probability of success on the merits in challenging secretary's authority to enact proposed rule. Secretary's "definition" of term "member" in proposed rule is much more than an effort to define term. It can be read effectively to add, modify, and conflict with constitutional provision by imposing new condition not found in text of article XXVIII. Secretary's stated purpose in enacting proposed rule not furthered by "definition" contained in proposed rule. Proposed rule does not further secretary's stated goal of achieving transparency of contributions. Finally, timing and scope of secretary's definition raise constitutional issues with respect to plaintiff's associational rights. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2006).

Although the secretary of state's attempt to conform § 2 (7)(a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution to first amendment standards is understandable, it exceeds his authority to "administer and enforce" the law. Section 2 (7)(a) defines "electioneering communication" to include all communication that "[u]nambiguously refers to any candidate". But the secretary of state's proposed rule, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6, § 1.7, defines it only as communication that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Thus the plain language of the rule restricts the type of communication that would fall in the category of "electioneering communication" because it adds a "functional equivalence" test. Accordingly, the rule is invalid because the constitutional provisions are clear and unambiguous that all communication unambiguously referring to a candidate is electioneering communication, leaving no gap for the secretary to fill. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013 COA 172M, 363 P.3d 727.

Applied in Union P. R. R. v. Heckers, 181 Colo. 374, 509 P.2d 1255 (1973); Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 36 Colo. App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975); United Buying Serv., Inc. v. State Dept. of Rev., 37 Colo. App. 465, 548 P.2d 1286 (1976); Van Pelt v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978); Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 393, 591 P.2d 1323 (1978); A & A Auto Wrecking, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 85, 602 P.2d 10 (1979); Schneider v. Indus. Comm'n, 624 P.2d 371 (Colo. App. 1981); Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982); Geriatrics, Inc. v. Colo. State Dept. of Health, 650 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 699 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1985).

24-4-103.3. Mandatory review of rules by agencies - report on results of review in departmental regulatory agendas.

  1. The department of regulatory agencies shall establish a schedule, in consultation with each principal department, for the review of all of the rules for each principal department. Each principal department shall conduct a review of all of its rules to assess the continuing need for and the appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of its rules to determine if they should be continued in their current form, modified, or repealed. The applicable rule-making agency or official in the principal department shall consider the following:
    1. Whether the rule is necessary;
    2. Whether the rule overlaps or duplicates other rules of the agency or with other federal, state, or local government rules;
    3. Whether the rule is written in plain language and is easy to understand;
    4. Whether the rule has achieved the desired intent and whether more or less regulation is necessary;
    5. Whether the rule can be amended to give more flexibility, reduce regulatory burdens, or reduce unnecessary paperwork or steps while maintaining its benefits;
    6. Whether the rule is implemented in an efficient and effective manner, including the requirements for the issuance of permits and licenses;
    7. Whether a cost-benefit analysis was performed by the applicable rule-making agency or official in the principal department pursuant to section 24-4-103 (2.5); and
    8. Whether the rule is adequate for the protection of the safety, health, and welfare of the state or its residents.
  2. Each rule-making agency or official shall provide public notice on the agency's official website of its review of the rules, give the public an appropriate opportunity to provide input, and notify other state agencies that may have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the rules to allow for collaboration and input. Based on this review, the rule-making agency or official shall determine whether the existing rules should be continued in their current form, amended, or repealed. If the rule-making agency or official decides that a rule should be amended or repealed, the rule-making agency or official shall comply with the notice and hearing requirements of section 24-4-103.
  3. The department of regulatory agencies shall not schedule mandatory review under this section during the year of and during the year following any scheduled sunset review conducted by the department of regulatory agencies pursuant to section 24-34-104.
  4. Each principal department shall include a report on the results of its mandatory review of rules as part of its departmental regulatory agenda that it submits to the staff of the legislative council for distribution to the applicable committee of reference of the general assembly as outlined in section 2-7-203, C.R.S.

Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (SB 14-063), ch. 69, p. 296, § 1, effective March 27.

24-4-103.5. Rule-making affecting small business - procedure. (Repealed)

Source: L. 82: p. 362, § 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 1010, § 1, effective April 16. L. 97: Entire section repealed, p. 525, § 6, effective July 1.

24-4-104. Licenses - issuance, suspension or revocation, renewal.

  1. In any case in which application is made for a license required by law, the agency, with due regard for the rights and privileges of all interested persons, shall set and conduct the proceedings in accordance with this article unless otherwise required by law.
  2. Every agency decision respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license shall be based solely upon the stated criteria, terms, and purposes of the statute, or regulations promulgated thereunder, and case law interpreting such statutes and regulations pursuant to which the license is issued or required. Terms, conditions, or requirements limiting any license shall be valid only if reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes, scope, or stated terms of the statute pursuant to which the license is issued or required.
    1. No revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license by any agency shall be lawful unless, before institution of agency proceedings therefor, the agency has given the licensee notice in writing of objective facts or conduct established upon a full investigation that may warrant such action and afforded the licensee opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments with respect to the facts or conduct and, except in cases of deliberate and willful violation or of substantial danger to public health and safety, given the licensee a reasonable opportunity to comply with all lawful requirements. For purposes of this subsection (3), "full investigation" means a reasonable ascertainment of the underlying facts on which the agency action is based.
    2. The full investigation requirement specified in subsection (3)(a) of this section shall not apply to licenses issued under articles 1.1, 9, 10.1, and 11.5 of title 40 or article 2 of title 42.
    1. Where the agency has objective and reasonable grounds to believe and finds, upon a full investigation, that the licensee has been guilty of deliberate and willful violation or that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action and incorporates the findings in its order, it may summarily suspend the license pending proceedings for suspension or revocation which shall be promptly instituted and determined. For purposes of this subsection (4), "full investigation" means a reasonable ascertainment of the underlying facts on which the agency action is based.
    2. The full investigation requirement specified in subsection (4)(a) of this section shall not apply to licenses issued under articles 1.1, 9, 10.1, and 11.5 of title 40 or article 2 of title 42.
  3. A proceeding for the revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a previously issued license shall be commenced by the agency upon its own motion or by the filing with the agency of a written complaint, signed and sworn to by the complainant, stating the name of the licensee complained against and the grounds for the requested action.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, an agency shall not revoke, suspend, annul, limit, or modify a previously issued license until after holding a hearing as provided in section 24-4-105.
  5. In any case in which the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license or for a new license for the conduct of a previously licensed activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until such application has been finally acted upon by the agency, and, if the application is denied, it shall be treated in all respects as a denial. The licensee, within sixty days after the giving of notice of such action, may request a hearing before the agency as provided in section 24-4-105, and the action of the agency after any hearing shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 24-4-106.
  6. An application for a license shall be acted upon promptly, and, immediately after the taking of action on such application by an agency, a written notice of the action taken by the agency and, if the application is denied, the grounds therefor shall be given to the applicant. The giving of such notice shall be by personal service upon the applicant or by mailing the same to the address of the applicant as shown on the application or as subsequently furnished in writing by the applicant to the agency.
  7. If an application for a new license is denied without a hearing, the applicant, within sixty days after the giving of notice of such action, may request a hearing before the agency as provided in section 24-4-105, and the action of the agency after any hearing shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 24-4-106.
  8. Written notice of the revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license and the grounds therefor shall be served forthwith on the licensee personally or by mailing by first-class mail to the last address furnished the agency by the licensee.
  9. A limitation, unless consented to by the applicant, on a license applied for shall be treated as a denial. A modification, unless consented to by the licensee, of a license already issued shall be treated as a revocation.
  10. In an appropriate case a revoked or suspended license may be reissued.
    1. Any applicant who, under oath, supplies false information to an agency in an application for a license commits perjury in the second degree, as defined in section 18-8-503, C.R.S. Any such application shall bear notice, in accordance with section 18-8-501 (2)(a)(I), C.R.S., that false statements made therein are punishable.
    2. On and after January 1, 1985, an agency shall not require that information contained in an application for a license be affirmed to before a notary.

Source: L. 59: p. 161, § 3. CRS 53: § 3-16-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-3. L. 69: p. 84, § 4. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 1141, § 1, effective April 16. L. 83: (13) added, p. 521, § 4, effective March 15. L. 93: (3) and (7) amended, p. 1327, § 3, effective June 6. L. 2006: (3) and (4) amended, p. 838, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2007: (3)(b) and (4)(b) amended, p. 2033, § 48, effective June 1. L. 2018: (3)(b) and (4)(b) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1705, § 34, effective May 29; (6) amended, (HB 18-1224), ch. 288, p. 1780, § 1, effective May 29.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "A C ritical Evaluation of the Federal Role in Nursing Home Quality Enforcement", see 51 U. C olo. L. Rev. 607 (1980). For article, "Law and Strategy in Licensing Disciplinary Proceedings", see 18 Colo. Law. 647 (1988). For article, "Alternative Dispute Resolution Meets the Administrative Process", see 24 Colo. Law. 1549 (1995). For article, "Right to Cure: The 'One Bite Rule' Is Alive and Well", see 27 Colo. Law. 27 (April 1998).

This section provides an independent right to a hearing in only two areas: Rule-making and licensure. Bazemore v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 64 P.3d 876 (Colo. App. 2002).

Colorado statutory scheme makes adequate provisions for prompt hearing and determination of emergency summary license suspensions to meet due process requirements. Any vagueness in the term "promptly" is adequately cured by licensee's statutory right to request and obtain an "immediate" hearing following an emergency suspension. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Castro, 914 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1996).

Section applicable to suspension of medical license. Subsection (4) is the authority for the state board of medical examiners to summarily suspend a license to practice medicine pending a full hearing; § 12-36-101 et seq., dealing with medical practice, and § 24-4-103, dealing with rule-making procedure, do not apply. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 191 Colo. 158, 551 P.2d 194 (1976).

And to suspension of fireworks licenses by the secretary of state. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986).

Section not applicable to board of accountancy. The notice and hearing requirements of subsection (3) are of no significance where there is a specific statutory provision concerning the notice and hearing requirements in proceedings before the board of accountancy. People ex rel. Bd. of Accountancy v. McFarland, 37 Colo. App. 93, 543 P.2d 112 (1975).

Nor to liquor license suspension proceedings. The provisions of § 12-47-110, not the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), do not apply to liquor license suspension proceedings. Continental Liquor Co. v. Kalbin, 43 Colo. App. 438, 608 P.2d 353 (1977); Chroma Corp. v. Campbell, 44 Colo. App. 387, 619 P.2d 74 (1980).

Nor to the director of the department of revenue's discretionary decision. Because § 39-26-111 makes the authority of the director of the department of revenue to withdraw permission to make returns and pay taxes on the cash basis discretionary, that specific provision controls over the general provisions of this section and § 24-4-105 regarding notice and a hearing upon revocation of a license. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981).

Suspension or revocation hearing is a disciplinary proceeding. An administrative hearing to revoke or suspend a professional license is a disciplinary, not a criminal, proceeding. Commerce City Drug v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 32 Colo. App. 216, 511 P.2d 935 (1973).

License conditions and revocation authorized by law and constitution. The gaming commission was within its statutory authority in conditioning a key employee license on payment of back child support and taxes and revoking such license for failure to comply with such conditions. The gaming commission did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in so revoking the license where the licensee was given a reasonable opportunity to comply with such conditions, failed to provide requested income tax returns, and made false statements of material fact to the investigator regarding the filing of tax returns and where the gaming commission provided the licensee with substantial evidentiary leeway, allowed the licensee to cross-examine and impeach the investigator, and gave the licensee the opportunity to argue the proper standard for license revocation. Feeney v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 890 P.2d 173 (Colo. App. 1994).

When there is a conflict between provisions of the APA and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, the specific statutory provision is deemed controlling in professional disciplinary proceedings before the board of medical examiners. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Reiner, 786 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1989).

Board of chiropractic examiners only has authority to suspend a license summarily in situations involving an emergency, despite the APA's provision allowing summary suspension for either a deliberate or willful violation or an emergency situation, since the more specific statutory provision relating to a particular agency controls. Stjernholm v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 865 P.2d 853 (Colo. App. 1993).

Agency that is given authority to suspend and revoke licenses pursuant to this section is given qualified authority to revoke licenses and not absolute authority. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986).

Because the statutes specific to the state engineer are silent with regard to the procedures applicable to a petition to revoke a groundwater permit, the state engineer must follow the procedures established in this section. V Bar Ranch LLC v. Cotten, 233 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2010).

Agency has no authority to revoke a license unless the licensee is first given a reasonable opportunity to correct such conduct that would justify the revocation of the license, except when it has been determined to have been deliberate and wilful. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000).

A finding that the charges alleged in the notice, which involved fraudulent conduct, had been proven necessarily implied that the respondent acted willfully and deliberately, and thus there was no requirement for a pre-hearing opportunity for compliance. Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000).

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required prior to judicial review when the agency fails to trigger appropriate procedures by issuing the notice required by subsection (3). Golden's Concrete Co. v. State, 937 P.2d 789 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998).

Exhaustion doctrine explained. The principal policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine are to prevent premature interference with agency processes; to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of the agency's experience and expertise; and to compile a record that is adequate for judicial review. Golden's Concrete Co. v. State, 937 P.2d 789 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998).

Exceptions to exhaustion doctrine include situations where only pure questions of law are presented, hence the agency's expertise is of no particular value, and where further administrative proceedings would be futile. Golden's Concrete Co. v. State, 937 P.2d 789 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998).

Summary revocation of fireworks licenses was improper without the secretary of state making an initial finding of deliberate and wilful conduct because the licensee suffers an immediate loss of livelihood without due process protections of prior notice and formal hearing. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986).

"Timely" notice, plus opportunity to submit arguments, is constitutionally required. When the specific time for a hearing is not expressly provided elsewhere, notice of the hearing must be "timely", and the licensee shall have the opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments in order to afford due process. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Palmer, 157 Colo. 40, 400 P.2d 914 (1965).

Although "double" notice not required. In a proceeding to revoke an optometrist's license, neither due process considerations nor this section requires "double" notice, i.e., notice that license revocation proceedings have been initiated, as well as a separate notice of the hearing itself. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Brinker, 39 P.3d 1269 (Colo. App. 2001).

Department of agriculture did not violate notice requirements merely because it failed to provide written notice of plaintiff's right to submit written data, views, and arguments before the filing of the notice of charges. Speer v. Kourlis, 935 P.2d 43 (Colo. App. 1996); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000).

The record did not support that plaintiff's conduct with regard to licensing violations was not willful and deliberate, and therefore plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to comply with the law before licensing sanctions were imposed. Speer v. Kourlis, 935 P.2d 43 (Colo. App. 1996).

It is less than certain that the APA requires the state board for community colleges and occupational education to conduct a predeprivation hearing since it is not clear that a revocation results when an existing certificate merely expires because the renewal application is not sufficient in form or substance as prescribed by § 12-59-108. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991) (decided prior to 2017 amendments relocating article 59 of title 12 to article 64 of title 23).

No conflict between this section and § 12-36-118 of the "Colorado Medical Practice Act" (MPA) since the MPA does not reference summary suspensions. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Court of Appeals, 920 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1996).

Applied in In re Estate of Smith v. O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1983); In re Maul v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 668 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1983).

24-4-104.5. Permits - rules in effect at time of submission of application for a permit control.

  1. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "permit" means a grant of authority by an agency that authorizes the holder of the permit to do some act not forbidden by law but not allowed to be performed without such authority. "Permit" does not include a professional license issued by a licensing board or an agency to conduct a profession or occupation. "Permit" does not include a registration or certification issued by a board or state agency to an individual to pursue a profession, practice, or occupation. "Permit" does not include a water well permit issued by the state engineer pursuant to title 37, C.R.S.
    1. The rules and any written statements of agency interpretation of the statutes of an agency that are in effect on the date that a person applies for issuance or renewal of a permit govern the application process and any permit eligibility requirement. If the rules or any written statements of agency interpretation of the statutes governing the agency's permit process or the requirements to qualify for a permit have been amended, the agency shall process the application under the rules and any written statements of agency interpretation of the statutes in effect on the date of the application, unless the agency determines in writing that:
        1. The new rules materially affect the health and safety of the public; and
        2. Use of the rules in effect on the date of application is likely to result in an unsafe situation if the applicant does not comply with the new rules; or
      1. New rules or new requirements are necessary to ensure that the agency and the permit will be in compliance with the requirements of federal law and federal regulations; or
      2. New rules or new requirements are necessary to ensure that the agency and the permit will not be in conflict with state statutes; or
      3. New rules or new requirements are necessary to ensure that the agency and the permit will be in compliance with the requirements of a court order.
    2. If the agency determines that one of the exceptions to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) will occur if the applicant does not comply with the new rules or new requirements, the agency shall:
      1. Treat the application as pending;
      2. Provide a written notice to the applicant stating the reasons the application is incomplete; and
      3. Give the applicant a reasonable opportunity to comply with the new rules or new requirements.
  2. If an agency adopts or amends rules that govern or impact the application process or any permit eligibility requirements after a person has applied for a permit or renewal of a permit and while the application is pending with the agency, the person shall have the option to have the application processed under the rules in existence at the time of the filing of the application or under the new rules.

Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (HB 12-1002), ch. 249, p. 1241, § 2, effective August 8.

Cross references: In 2012, this section was added by the "Creating Level Expectations for Application Review Act" or the "CLEAR Act". For the short title, see section 1 of chapter 249, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.

24-4-104.6. Analysis of noncompliance with department rules - definition - legislative declaration.

    1. The general assembly hereby finds and declares that this section codifies existing practice, that each agency already knows about and tracks the rule issues described in subsection (2)(a) of this section, and that much of this work is currently completed in the normal course of an agency's business.
    2. The general assembly further finds and declares that it is not the general assembly's intent for an agency to increase its existing rule compliance monitoring.
    1. Each agency shall conduct, within existing resources, an analysis of noncompliance with its rules to identify rules with the greatest frequency of noncompliance, rules that generate the greatest amount of fines, how many first-time offenders were given the opportunity to cure a minor violation, and those factors that contribute to noncompliance with rules by regulated businesses. The analysis will guide each department on how to improve its education and outreach to regulated businesses on compliance with the department's rules. The agency shall consider and review:
      1. Whether the rule is unclear and should be rewritten;
      2. Whether more education or training of the regulated businesses would be likely to achieve better compliance with the rule; and
      3. The enforcement level and any appropriate fines for noncompliance with the department's rules.
    2. Any principal department that conducts an analysis of noncompliance with rules adopted by agencies within its department pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this section shall forward that analysis to the department of regulatory agencies, which shall compile and summarize those analyses into one combined analysis of noncompliance with rules. The department of regulatory agencies shall include the compiled analysis in its departmental presentation to its oversight legislative committee of reference made pursuant to section 2-7-203 of the "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act".

Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (HB 18-1250), ch. 195, p. 1286, § 1, effective August 8.

24-4-105. Hearings and determinations - repeal.

  1. In order to assure that all parties to any agency adjudicatory proceeding are accorded due process of law, the provisions of this section shall be applicable.
    1. In any such proceeding in which an opportunity for agency adjudicatory hearing is required under the state constitution or by this or any other statute, the parties are entitled to a hearing and decision in conformity with this section. Any person entitled to notice of a hearing shall be given timely notice of the time, place, and nature thereof, the legal authority and jurisdiction under which it is to be held, and the matters of fact and law asserted. Unless otherwise provided by law, such notice shall be served personally or by mailing by first-class mail to the last address furnished the agency by the person to be notified at least thirty days prior to the hearing. In fixing the time and place for a hearing, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties and their representatives.
    2. Any person given such notice shall file a written answer thirty days after the service or mailing of such notice. If such person fails to answer, any agency, administrative law judge, or hearing officer, upon motion, may enter a default. For good cause shown, the entry of default may be set aside within ten days after the date of such entry.
    3. A person who may be affected or aggrieved by agency action shall be admitted as a party to the proceeding upon his filing with the agency a written request therefor, setting forth a brief and plain statement of the facts which entitle him to be admitted and the matters which he claims should be decided. Nothing in this subsection (2) shall prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party to any agency proceeding for limited purposes.
  2. At a hearing only one of the following may preside: The agency, an administrative law judge from the office of administrative courts, or, if otherwise authorized by law, a hearing officer who if authorized by law may be a member of the body which comprises the agency. Upon the filing in good faith by a party of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias of an administrative law judge or a hearing officer or a member of the agency or the agency, the administrative law judge, hearing officer, or agency shall forthwith rule upon the allegations in such affidavit as part of the record in the case. An administrative law judge or a hearing officer may at any time withdraw if he or she deems himself or herself disqualified or for any other good reason in which case another administrative law judge or hearing officer may be assigned to continue the case, and he or she shall do so in such manner that no substantial prejudice to any party results therefrom. An agency or a member of an agency may withdraw for any like reason and in like manner, unless his or her withdrawal makes it impossible for the agency to render a decision.
    1. Any agency conducting a hearing, any administrative law judge, and any hearing officer shall have authority to: Administer oaths and affirmations; sign and issue subpoenas; rule upon offers of proof and receive evidence; dispose of motions relating to the discovery and production of relevant documents and things for inspection, copying, or photographing; regulate the course of the hearing, set the time and place for continued hearings, and fix the time for the filing of briefs and other documents; direct the parties to appear and confer to consider the simplification of the issues, admissions of fact or of documents to avoid unnecessary proof, and limitation of the number of expert witnesses; issue appropriate orders that shall control the subsequent course of the proceedings; dispose of motions to dismiss for lack of agency jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties or for any other ground; dispose of motions to amend or to dismiss without prejudice applications and other pleadings; dispose of motions to intervene, procedural requests, or similar matters; reprimand or exclude from the hearing any person for any improper or indecorous conduct in his or her presence; award attorney fees for abuses of discovery procedures or as otherwise provided under the Colorado rules of civil procedure; and take any other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this article 4 or in accordance, to the extent practicable, with the procedure in the district courts. All parties to the proceeding shall also have the right to cross-examine witnesses who testify at the proceeding. In the event more than one person engages in the conduct of a hearing, such persons shall designate one of their number to perform such of the above functions as can best be performed by one person only, and thereafter such person only shall perform those functions that are assigned to him or her by the several persons conducting such hearing.
        1. The general assembly hereby finds that the mediation process generally saves the state and the licensee time and money. Mediation takes much less time than moving a case through agency proceedings and judicial review. These cases typically take months or years to resolve, but mediation typically achieves a resolution in a matter of hours. Taking less time means expending less money on hourly fees and costs. This benefits both the agency and the licensee, and because the result is attained by the parties working together, compliance with the mediated agreement is usually high. This further reduces costs because agencies do not have to pay an attorney or investigators to force compliance. (b) (I) (A) The general assembly hereby finds that the mediation process generally saves the state and the licensee time and money. Mediation takes much less time than moving a case through agency proceedings and judicial review. These cases typically take months or years to resolve, but mediation typically achieves a resolution in a matter of hours. Taking less time means expending less money on hourly fees and costs. This benefits both the agency and the licensee, and because the result is attained by the parties working together, compliance with the mediated agreement is usually high. This further reduces costs because agencies do not have to pay an attorney or investigators to force compliance.
        2. The general assembly hereby declares that, in order to save time and money, the policy of Colorado is to use mediation whenever appropriate to settle disputes between agencies and licensees.
      1. Upon petition of the agency or licensee after the licensee has received the notice of hearing under subsection (2)(a) of this section, the hearing officer or administrative law judge shall order mediation between the agency and the licensee unless the license was summarily suspended in accordance with section 24-4-104 (4). When mediation is ordered, the agency shall:
        1. Assign a person with authority to make prehearing decisions concerning disposition of the matter to be present during meetings related to settlement communications or mediation communications and to be included in any material settlement communications with the licensee or the licensee's representative over the matter; and
        2. Upon the licensee's request, allow a private or public mediator chosen by the licensee to be present during meetings related to mediation and to be included in any material settlement communications with the licensee or the licensee's representative over the matter. If the mediator is privately retained, the licensee must pay the mediator's reasonable fees, and the agency need not pay the privately retained mediator's fees.
      2. To the extent feasible, for the purpose of carrying out this subsection (4):
        1. Administrative law judges shall make themselves available as public mediators without cost to the licensee;
        2. The members of any governing body that regulates the licensee shall make a member or other person available for mediation as a person with authority to make prehearing decisions concerning disposition of the matter.
      3. If an agency fails to comply with an order of mediation, a licensee adversely affected by the failure may petition the administrative law judge or hearing officer to suspend the proceedings and require compliance with the order, to be completed in good faith as soon as practicable, under the administrative law judge's or the hearing officer's supervision.
      4. If mediation fails, the agency shall notify the administrative law judge or the hearing officer, and the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall lift the suspension and proceed with the hearing.
      5. When determining the place to hold the mediation, the agency shall give due consideration to the location of the licensee's occupation or residence, the availability of an administrative law judge to mediate, and the availability of a member of the governing body that regulates the licensee to be a person with authority to make prehearing decisions concerning disposition of the matter.
      6. This subsection (4)(b) applies only to agency proceedings that concern an individual who is licensed to practice an occupation or profession; except that this subsection (4)(b) does not apply to a commercial driver's license issued under part 4 of article 2 of title 42.
      7. This subsection (4)(b) does not apply if a license has been summarily suspended because the agency finds, in accordance with section 24-4-104 (4), that the licensee is guilty of a deliberate and willful violation or that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action and incorporates the findings in the agency's order. Nothing in this subsection (4)(b) prohibits an agency and licensee from voluntarily agreeing to a mediation following a summary suspension.
      8. By January 1, 2022, the office of administrative courts and the division of professions and occupations in the department of regulatory agencies shall issue a joint report to the judiciary committee and the state, veterans, and military affairs committee of the house of representatives and the judiciary committee and the state, veterans, and military affairs committee of the senate or their successor committees. This subsection (4)(b)(IX) is repealed, effective July 1, 2022. The report must contain the following:
        1. The number of hearings affecting licenses held between July 1, 2016, and July 1, 2018;
        2. The number of hearings affecting licenses held between July 1, 2019, and July 1, 2021;
        3. The number of mediations held between July 1, 2016, and July 1, 2018;
        4. The number of mediations held between July 1, 2019, and July 1, 2021;
        5. The number of proceedings in which the licensee and agency agreed to settle the proceedings between July 1, 2016, and July 1, 2018; and
        6. The number of proceedings in which the licensee and agency agreed to settle the proceedings between July 1, 2019, and July 1, 2021.
  3. Subpoenas shall be issued without discrimination between public and private parties by any agency or any member, the secretary, or chief administrative officer thereof or, with respect to any hearing for which an administrative law judge or a hearing officer has been appointed, the administrative law judge or the hearing officer. A subpoena shall be served in the same manner as a subpoena issued by a district court. Upon failure of any witness to comply with such subpoena, the agency may petition any district court, setting forth that due notice has been given of the time and place of attendance of the witness and the service of the subpoena; in which event, the district court, after hearing evidence in support of or contrary to the petition, may enter an order as in other civil actions compelling the witness to attend and testify or produce books, records, or other evidence, under penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply with the order of the court and may award attorney fees under the Colorado rules of civil procedure. A witness shall be entitled to the fees and mileage provided for a witness in a court of record.
  4. No person engaged in conducting a hearing or participating in a decision or an initial decision shall be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions for the agency.
  5. Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of an order shall have the burden of proof, and every party to the proceeding shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral and documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. Subject to these rights and requirements, where a hearing will be expedited and the interests of the parties will not be substantially prejudiced thereby, a person conducting a hearing may receive all or part of the evidence in written form. The rules of evidence and requirements of proof shall conform, to the extent practicable, with those in civil nonjury cases in the district courts. However, when necessary to do so in order to ascertain facts affecting the substantial rights of the parties to the proceeding, the person so conducting the hearing may receive and consider evidence not admissible under such rules if such evidence possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and shall be noted in the record. The person conducting a hearing shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law. He may exclude incompetent and unduly repetitious evidence. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of a copy or excerpt if the original is not readily available; but, upon request, the party shall be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original. An agency may utilize its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of the evidence presented to it.
  6. An agency may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within its knowledge, but only if the fact so noticed is specified in the record or is brought to the attention of the parties before final decision and every party is afforded an opportunity to controvert the fact so noticed.
    1. Any party, or the agent, servant, or employee of any party, permitted or compelled to testify or to submit data or evidence shall be entitled to the benefit of legal counsel of his or her own choosing and at his or her own expense, but a person may appear on their own behalf. An attorney who is a witness may not act as counsel for the party calling the attorney as a witness. Any party, upon payment of a reasonable charge therefor, shall be entitled to procure a copy of the transcript of the record or any part thereof. Any person permitted or compelled to testify or to submit data or evidence shall be entitled to the benefit of legal counsel of such person's own choosing and, upon payment of a reasonable charge therefor, to procure a copy of the transcript of such person's testimony if it is recorded.
      1. Except as provided in subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (b), no attorney shall submit a document concerning an adjudicatory proceeding after January 1, 1994, unless such document is submitted on recycled paper. The provisions of this section shall apply to all papers appended to each such document.
        1. Any state agency that adopts policies, procedures, rules, or regulations for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this section shall ensure that the conduct of state business is not impeded and that no person is denied access to the services or programs of a state agency as a result of such implementation.
        2. No document shall be refused by a state agency solely because it was not submitted on recycled paper.
      2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to:
        1. Photographs;
        2. An original document that was prepared or printed prior to January 1, 1994;
        3. A document that was not created at the direction or under the control of the submitting attorney;
        4. Facsimile copies concerning an adjudicatory proceeding otherwise permitted to be filed in lieu of the original document; however, if the original is also required to be filed, such original shall be submitted in compliance with this section;
        5. Existing stocks of nonrecycled paper and preprinted forms acquired or printed prior to January 1, 1994.
      3. The provisions of this section shall not be applicable if recycled paper is not readily available.
      4. For purposes of this paragraph (b), unless the context otherwise requires:
        1. "Attorney" means an attorney-at-law admitted to practice law before any court of record in this state.
        2. "Document" means any pleading or any other paper submitted as an appendix to such pleading by an attorney, which document is required or permitted to be filed with a state agency concerning any action to be commenced or which is pending before such agency.
        3. "Recycled paper" means paper with not less than fifty percent of its total weight consisting of secondary and postconsumer waste and with not less than ten percent of such total weight consisting of postconsumer waste.
  7. Every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it with due regard for the convenience of the parties or their representatives, giving precedence to rehearing proceedings after remand by court order. Prompt notice shall be given of the refusal to accept for filing or the denial in whole or in part of any written application or other request made in connection with any agency proceeding or action, with a statement of the grounds therefor. Upon application made to any court of competent jurisdiction by a party to any agency proceeding or by a person adversely affected by agency action and a showing to the court that there has been undue delay in connection with such proceeding or action, the court may direct the agency to decide the matter promptly.
  8. Every agency shall provide by rule for the entertaining, in its sound discretion, and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory orders to terminate controversies or to remove uncertainties as to the applicability to the petitioners of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency. The order disposing of the petition shall constitute agency action subject to judicial review.
  9. Nothing in this article shall affect statutory powers of an agency to issue an emergency order where the agency finds and states of record the reasons for so finding that immediate issuance of the order is imperatively necessary for the preservation of public health, safety, or welfare and observance of the requirements of this section would be contrary to the public interest. Any person against whom an emergency order is issued, who would otherwise be entitled to a hearing pursuant to this section, shall be entitled upon request to an immediate hearing in accordance with this article, in which proceeding the agency shall be deemed the proponent of the order.
  10. The administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall cause the proceedings to be recorded by a reporter or by an electronic recording device. When required, the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall cause the proceedings, or any portion thereof, to be transcribed, the cost thereof to be paid by the agency when it orders the transcription or by any party seeking to reverse or modify an initial decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer. If the agency acquires a copy of the transcription of the proceedings, its copy of the transcription shall be made available to any party at reasonable times for inspection and study.
    1. For the purpose of a decision by an agency that conducts a hearing or an initial decision by an administrative law judge or a hearing officer, the record must include: All pleadings, applications, evidence, exhibits, and other papers presented or considered, matters officially noticed, rulings upon exceptions, any findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by any party, and any written brief filed. The agency, administrative law judge, or hearing officer may permit oral argument. The agency, the administrative law judge, or the hearing officer shall not receive or consider ex parte material or representation of any kind offered without notice. The agency, an administrative law judge, or hearing officer, with the consent of all parties, may eliminate or summarize any part of the record where this may be done without affecting the decision. In any case in which the agency has conducted the hearing, the agency shall prepare, file, and serve upon each party its decision. In any case in which an administrative law judge or a hearing officer has conducted the hearing, the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall prepare and file an initial decision that the agency shall serve upon each party, except where all parties with the consent of the agency have expressly waived their right to have an initial decision rendered by such administrative law judge or hearing officer. Each decision and initial decision must include a statement of findings and conclusions upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented by the record and the appropriate order, sanction, relief, or denial. An appeal to the agency must be made as follows:

      (I) With regard to initial decisions regarding agency action by the department of health care policy and financing, the state department of human services, or county department of human or social services, or any contractor acting for any such department, under section 26-1-106 (1)(a) or 25.5-1-107 (1)(a), by filing exceptions within fifteen days after service of the initial decision upon the parties, unless extended by the department of health care policy and financing, or the state department of human services, as applicable, or unless a review has been initiated in accordance with this subsection (14)(a)(I) upon motion of the applicable department within fifteen days after service of the initial decision. In the event a party fails to file an exception within fifteen days, the applicable department may allow, upon a showing of good cause by the party, for an extension of up to an additional fifteen days to reconsider the final agency action.

      (II) With regard to initial decisions regarding agency action of any other agency, by filing exceptions within thirty days after service of the initial decision upon the parties, unless extended by the agency or unless review has been initiated upon motion of the agency within thirty days after service of the initial decision.

      1. In the absence of an exception filed pursuant to subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (14), the executive director of the department of health care policy and financing shall review the initial decision regarding agency action by such department in accordance with a procedure adopted by the medical services board pursuant to section 25.5-1-107 (1), C.R.S.
      2. In the absence of an exception filed pursuant to subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (14), the executive director of the state department of human services shall review the initial decision regarding agency action by such department in accordance with a procedure adopted by the state board of human services pursuant to section 26-1-106 (1), C.R.S.
      3. In the absence of an exception filed pursuant to subparagraph (II) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (14), the initial decision of any other agency shall become the decision of the agency, and, in such case, the evidence taken by the administrative law judge or the hearing officer need not be transcribed.
    2. Failure to file the exceptions prescribed in this subsection (14) shall result in a waiver of the right to judicial review of the final order of such agency, unless that portion of such order subject to exception is different from the content of the initial decision.
    1. Any party who seeks to reverse or modify the initial decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall file with the agency, within twenty days following such decision, a designation of the relevant parts of the record described in subsection (14) of this section and of the parts of the transcript of the proceedings which shall be prepared and advance the cost therefor. A copy of this designation shall be served on all parties. Within ten days thereafter, any other party or the agency may also file a designation of additional parts of the transcript of the proceedings which is to be included and advance the cost therefor. The transcript or the parts thereof which may be designated by the parties or the agency shall be prepared by the reporter or, in the case of an electronic recording device, the agency and shall thereafter be filed with the agency. No transcription is required if the agency's review is limited to a pure question of law. The agency may permit oral argument. The grounds of the decision shall be within the scope of the issues presented on the record. The record shall include all matters constituting the record upon which the decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer was based, the rulings upon the proposed findings and conclusions, the initial decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer, and any other exceptions and briefs filed.
    2. The findings of evidentiary fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of fact, made by the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall not be set aside by the agency on review of the initial decision unless such findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight of the evidence. The agency may remand the case to the administrative law judge or the hearing officer for such further proceedings as it may direct, or it may affirm, set aside, or modify the order or any sanction or relief entered therein, in conformity with the facts and the law.
    1. Each decision and initial decision shall be served on each party by personal service or by mailing by first-class mail to the last address furnished the agency by such party and, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (16), shall be effective as to such party on the date mailed or such later date as is stated in the decision.
    2. Upon application by a party, and prior to the expiration of the time allowed for commencing an action for judicial review, the agency may change the effective date of a decision or initial decision.

Source: L. 59: p. 162, § 4. CRS 53: § 3-16-4. L. 61: p. 138, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-4. L. 69: p. 85, § 5. L. 76: (13) and (14) amended and (15) R&RE, pp. 583, 584, §§ 16, 17, effective May 24. L. 77: (14) amended, pp. 1137, 1145, §§ 2, 2, effective June 19. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 1134, § 3, effective June 6. L. 87: (3), (4), (5), (13), (14), and (15) amended, p. 961, § 66, effective March 13. L. 93: (14) amended, p. 426, § 3, effective April 19; (2), (4), (5), (14), (15)(a), and (16) amended, p. 1327, § 4, effective June 6; (9) amended, p. 624, § 3, effective July 1; (9)(b)(V)(B) amended, p. 1798, § 107, effective July 1. L. 94: (14)(a)(I) and (14)(b) amended, p. 2692, § 228, effective July 1. L. 95: (14)(a)(I) and (14)(b) amended, p. 902, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2005: (3) amended, p. 857, § 21, effective June 1. L. 2018: (4) amended, (HB 18-1224), ch. 288, p. 1780, § 2, effective May 29; IP(14)(a) and (14)(a)(I) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 440, § 96, effective August 8. L. 2019: (4)(b)(IX) amended, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3469, § 26, effective August 2.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (14) by Senate Bill 93-133 and House Bill 93-1001 were harmonized.

Cross references: (1) For mileage allowances and fees of witnesses, see §§ 13-33-102 and 13-33-103.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Analysis

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For article, "Discovery and Judicial Review in State Administrative Practice", see 10 C olo. Law. 2490 (1981). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth C ircuit decision dealing with Miranda rights in administrative proceedings, see 61 Den. L. J. 131 (1984). For article, "General Principles of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 16 Colo. Law. 1983 (1987). For article, "Hearsay Evidence and the Residuum Rule in Colorado", see 17 Colo. Law. 651 (1988). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with fifth amendment rights and administrative proceedings, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 379 (1988). For article, "Challenges to Agency Rules in Adjudicatory-Type Hearings", see 17 Colo. Law. 1991 (1988). For article, "Law and Strategy in Licensing Disciplinary Proceedings", see 18 Colo. Law. 647 (1988). For article, "Practicing Law Before Part-Time Citizen Boards and Commissions", see 18 Colo. Law. 1133 (1989). For article, "Alternative Dispute Resolution Meets the Administrative Process", see 24 Colo. Law. 1549 (1995). For article, "Appealing an Administrative Order: The Exceptions Process", see 30 Colo. Law. 91 (Sept. 2001). For article "Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test Evidence in Colorado-The Framework under Campbell v. People", see 49 Colo. Law. 23 (June 2020).

Annotator's note. Cases included in the annotations to this section which refer to a hearing officer were decided prior to the enactment of 1987 House Bill No. 1049 which changed the title of hearing officers to administrative law judges.

Purpose of section. These statutory provisions are designed to assure that administrative adjudicatory proceedings are conducted in accordance with due process and will be expedited in the interest of the parties so that no party will be substantially prejudiced thereby. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).

Authority of state personnel board hearing officer with respect to hearing procedures is established by this section in accordance with Art. XII, §§ 13 and 14, of the state constitution. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).

Under the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an administrative agency has authority and, in certain situations, the duty to issue subpoenas. Nye v. State, Dept. of Rev., 902 P.2d 959 (Colo. App. 1995).

Whether to apply the fifth amendment adverse inference in a civil proceeding and what weight to give that adverse inference in an agency's determination is an ultimate conclusion of fact. Romero v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 2 018 COA 2 , 417 P.3d 914.

In its final decision, the department is required to make a determination of whether to apply the adverse inference, and state what weight it held, if any, in its determination. Romero v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 2 018 COA 2 , 417 P.3d 914.

Section not applicable to the director of the department of revenue's discretionary decision. Because § 39-26-111 makes the authority of the director of the department of revenue to withdraw permission to make returns and pay taxes on the cash basis discretionary, that specific provision controls over the general provisions of § 24-4-104 and this section. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981).

Nor to water commissioners supplying customers outside city. Denver's action in supplying customers outside the city does not subject the board of water commissioners to the notice and hearing requirements of this section. Cottrell v. City & County of Denver, 636 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1981).

Nor to delays prior to hearing. This section deals with the progress of proceedings before an agency after commencement thereof, and not with delays prior to hearing. Berry v. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982).

Nor do subsection (14) requirements apply to the initiative title setting review board when it holds a meeting for designating and fixing a title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary. Specific process and procedure is set out in the initiative and referendum statutes. Matter of Title, Ballot Title et al., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1992).

Subsection (14) requirements do not apply to the board of equalization in light of the specific hearing and appellate provisions set out in the property tax statutes. Carrara Place v. Bd. of Equaliz., 761 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1988).

The APA does not bar a dual role as a fact witness at one step of the proceedings and a member of a reviewing body at another step in the proceedings. Leonard v. Bd. of Dirs., 673 P.2d 1019 (Colo. App. 1983).

The APA contains no statutory provision indicating that the director of the motor vehicle division of the department of revenue is one who is "engaged in the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions" of the department. Cordova v. Mansheim, 725 P.2d 1158 (Colo. App. 1986).

Subsection (6), which requires separation of prosecutorial and judging functions, is only applicable when the statutory scheme requires both a prosecutor and a hearing examiner. When the statutory scheme provides for a nonadversarial, show cause proceeding, which does not require the participation of a prosecutor, subsection (6) does not apply. Woodrow v. Wildlife Comm'n, 206 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2009).

Subsection (6) is not violated simply because a hearing officer is a member of the relevant agency. Woodrow v. Wildlife Comm'n, 206 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2009).

Disqualification of hospital board members. The withdrawal of hospital board members for reason of alleged bias would make it impossible to decide the question of a physician's medical staff privileges where the board is the only body empowered under the bylaws to make such a decision. Disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises. Leonard v. Bd. of Dirs., 673 P.2d 1019 (Colo. App. 1983).

Suspension or revocation hearing is a disciplinary proceeding. An administrative hearing to revoke or suspend a professional license is a disciplinary, not a criminal, proceeding. Commerce City Drug v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 32 Colo. App. 216, 511 P.2d 935 (1973).

License revocation proceeding is civil in nature, not criminal. Thus, the right to counsel is not constitutional, but rather is governed by statute. Bedell v. Dept. of Rev., 655 P.2d 849 (Colo. App. 1982).

Although the public utilities commission (PUC) has broad power to issue declaratory orders and to initiate various types of proceedings, where a declaratory order is in essence a rule, the commission is bound by the procedural requirements pertaining to rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).

A hearing on a contested permit application under the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act is an agency adjudicatory proceeding subject to this section. Grand Valley Citizens v. Colo. Oil & Gas, 298 P.3d 961 (Colo. App. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 2012 CO 52, 279 P.3d 646.

Due process rights in a liquor licensing hearing are diluted by strong state interest in liquor control and safeguards provided by judicial review. Therefore, where plaintiff had notice of issue and knowledge of contents of documents, failure to give him documents did not violate his due process rights. Fueston v. City of Colo. Springs, 713 P.2d 1323 (Colo. App. 1985).

Secretary of state need not hold public hearing regarding revocation of liquor license, but may rely on investigation reports and the hearing record of the local licensing authority, which by law must conduct a hearing. Potter v. Anderson, 155 Colo. 25, 392 P.2d 650 (1964).

A quasi-judicial hearing must be conducted strictly in accordance with requirements of section. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).

It is within the discretion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) to decide, prior to issuing a decision which constitutes the final agency action in a particular matter, when that decision will become effective. Bethesda Found. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 877 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1994).

Administrative remedies available must be exhausted prior to seeking judicial relief. Leete v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 807 P.2d 1249 (Colo. App. 1991).

There is no requirement that proceedings to review a hearing officer's initial decision concerning disciplinary actions be recorded. Ranum v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 713 P.2d 418 (Colo. App. 1985).

1993 amendment to subsection (4) explicitly authorizing ALJs to award attorney fees was procedural and had no substantive effect on existing authority to award such fees. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bethesda Care Ctr., Inc., 867 P.2d 4 (Colo. App. 1993).

Colorado department of social services is a party for purposes of an administrative proceeding conducted pursuant to this section and as such may be held liable for attorney fees for asserting a frivolous defense. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bethesda Care Ctr., Inc., 867 P.2d 4 (Colo. App. 1993).

Where an agency's interpretation of a regulation clearly contradicts that agency's consistent practice, the agency's practices and not its interpretation should prevail. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 712 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1985).

Applied in Walton v. Banking Bd., 36 Colo. App. 311, 541 P.2d 1254 (1975); Kuiper v. Atchison, T. & S. F., Ry., 195 Colo. 557, 581 P.2d 293 (1978); Johns v. Miller, 42 Colo. App. 97, 594 P.2d 590 (1979); People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 65, 612 P.2d 87 (1980); Macleod v. Miller, 44 Colo. App. 313, 612 P.2d 1158 (1980); Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1981); Stone Envtl. Eng'r Servs., Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 631 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1981); Cavanaugh v. State, Dept. of Soc. Servs., 644 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); Spelts v. Klausing, 649 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1982); Lee v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 654 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1982); World Wide Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Chapman, 665 P.2d 132 (Colo. App. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Banking Bd., 663 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1983); In re Maul v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 668 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1983); Rosenberg v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. District #1, 710 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1985); Platinum Props. v. Assess. App. Bd., 738 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1987); Beardsley v. Colo. State Univ., 746 P.2d 1350 (Colo. App. 1987), cert. discharged, 761 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1988); Lopez-Samoyoa v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 868 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1993); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

II. NOTICE.

Liquor code notice requirements applicable in county proceeding. Since the general assembly has not adopted legislation requiring that license suspension proceedings by a county be conducted pursuant to the APA, and since a county does not have statewide jurisdiction, the notice requirements for a proceeding for the suspension of a liquor license are governed by the Colorado liquor code. Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 36 Colo. App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975).

Test as to whether party is afforded procedural due process is "fundamental fairness" in light of total circumstances. The due process clause does not guarantee any particular mode of procedure, but it does require adequate notice of opposing claims, reasonable opportunity to prepare and meet them in an orderly hearing adapted to the nature of the case, and, finally, a fair and impartial decision. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).

The essence of procedural due process is fundamental fairness. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).

"Timely" notice, plus opportunity to submit arguments, is constitutionally required. When the specific time for a hearing is not expressly provided elsewhere, notice of hearing must be "timely", so that the licensee shall have the opportunity to submit data, views, and arguments in order to afford due process. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Palmer, 157 Colo. 40, 400 P.2d 914 (1965).

Opportunity to be heard, not an actual hearing, is all that due process requires. Where the respondent receives timely notice and elects not to appear, there is no violation. Colo. State Bd. of Nursing v. Geary, 954 P.2d 614 (Colo. App. 1997).

Fundamental fairness embodies adequate advance notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to state action resulting in the deprivation of a significant property interest. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).

It likewise entitles a litigant to timely notice of decisions which have adjudicated his property interests, in relation to available appellate remedies. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).

Where the parties, whether an employee or an employer, are represented in an administrative proceeding under consideration by attorneys of record, notice of decisions affecting the substantial rights of the parties must be given to their attorneys. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).

The requirement of this section that notice of the hearing be made by first-class mail is not satisfied when such notice is sent by certified mail, since the notice will not be delivered by certified mail if the addressee is not present at the time of the attempted delivery. Dodge v. Meyer, 793 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1990).

Party requesting early hearing cannot complain that statutory time period not observed. Where a party has adequate notice of a hearing and its purpose, and where promptness of a hearing is in accordance with that party's request that it be held at "as early a date as possible", the party may not complain that the commission conducting the hearing did not wait the 20 days prescribed in this section. Harbour v. Racing Comm'n, 32 Colo. App. 1, 505 P.2d 22 (1973).

Notice of state pharmacy board's changes in hearing officer's decision not required. Changes made by the state board of pharmacy in a hearing officer's penalty for a pharmacist's violation of § 12-22-124 (now § 12-22-126) rendered without notice to the appellant or without any further hearings following a hearing officer's initial decision and order are quasi-judicial in nature and, thus, neither statutory nor due process principles require that the board issue any notice prior to announcing its final decision. Mitchell v. Klapper, 626 P.2d 1163 (Colo. App. 1980).

Applied in Gessler v. Grossman, 2 015 COA 6 2 , __ P.3d __, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Gessler v. Smith, 2018 CO 48, 419 P.3d 964, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 430, 202 L. Ed. 2d 318 (2018).

III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES.

There is no requirement that a hearing officer be learned in the law. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Officer may be appointed through oral examination. The fact that a hearing officer is appointed on the basis of an oral examination does not invalidate his appointment, because the mode of examination is discretionary with the civil service commission. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

No requirement that officer take oath before entering duties. Since a hearing officer possesses no independent power of his own, his position is that of employee, not that of civil officer; thus, there is no requirement that a hearing officer take an oath of office before entering upon his duties. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Colorado rules of civil procedure offer guidance in deciding issues regarding conduct of hearings under this section. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).

Agency decision making must demonstrate the use of (1) sufficient standards ensuring rational and consistent results in the application of the statute and implementing regulations and (2) adequate procedural safeguards, determinations, and a record enabling judicial review. Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332 (Colo. 1997).

Failure to make timely objection to the appointment of a hearing officer is a waiver, and the objection cannot be raised at a later date. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 650 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 699 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1985).

Affidavit of personal bias required for disqualification of presiding officers. Under subsection (3), a motion seeking to disqualify a hearing officer, a member of the agency, or the agency itself from presiding over an administrative hearing must be accompanied by a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).

Drastic sanctions such as dismissal with prejudice or striking of pleadings should be reserved for only the most flagrant cases in which a party acts deliberately, with rebellious disregard for authority, or with gross negligence and in which such actions result in prejudice to the other party. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).

Substitution of hearing officer following hospitalization constitutional. Where the initial hearing officer is hospitalized at the time further proceedings are scheduled, the substitution of a second hearing officer to hear the remainder of the case satisfies both statutory requirements and due process. Harris v. Charnes, 616 P.2d 996 (Colo. App. 1980).

Hearing where examiner takes active role and where party represented by attorney is constitutional. A hearing conducted under § 42-4-1202 does not violate the requirement of separation of the judicial and executive functions, although the hearing examiner conducts the hearing without a prosecutor and takes an active role in the questioning of the witnesses, where the motorist accused of driving while intoxicated is represented by an attorney. Stream v. Heckers, 184 Colo. 149, 519 P.2d 336 (1974).

Hearing officer abused discretion by rescinding disciplinary action for noncompliance with deadline schedule, where noncompliance was apparently innocent and opposing party was not prejudiced. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).

The power conferred in the ALJ to modify a decision upon a motion for reconsideration encompasses the power to modify the decision's effective date. Bethesda Found. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 877 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1994).

Any error by ALJ in requiring accountant to testify at proceeding to revoke license of physician without counsel was harmless where the essence of accountant's testimony was that he had been able to communicate with physician despite his incarceration in another state, which duplicated administrative clerk's testimony. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Boyle, 924 P.2d 1113 (Colo. App. 1996).

The decision to disqualify an ALJ for personal bias is within the discretion of the ALJ and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Rice v. Dept. of Corr., 950 P.2d 676 (Colo. App. 1997).

IV. EVIDENCE.

Burden is upon the proponent of order of suspension or revocation to prove sufficient grounds therefor, not upon the licensee. People ex rel. Heckers v. District Court, 170 Colo. 533, 463 P.2d 310 (1970); Colo. Real Estate Comm'n v. Bartlett, 272 P.3d 1099 (Colo. App. 2011).

"Proponent of an order" bearing the burden of proof under subsection (7), in the context of an employee's appeal of an allocation decision before the director of personnel, is not the appointing authority which made the decision appealed from, but is instead the employee who seeks an order of the director voiding the decision. Renteria v. State Dept. of Pers., 811 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1991).

The burden of proof is on the certified state employee to prove that she was terminated involuntarily and, once the employee prevails upon that issue, then it will be the appointing authority's burden to prove that the termination imposed was justified by the factual circumstances. Harris v. State Bd. of Agric., 968 P.2d 148 (Colo. App. 1998).

Hearing officer properly placed burden of proof on department of institutions as proponent of order upholding dismissal in proceeding involving state employee's appeal of termination. Kinchen v. Dept. of Insts., 867 P.2d 8 (Colo. App. 1993).

When an agency seeks revocation of an existing license, the agency is the proponent of the order and bears the burden of proof. Q & T Food Stores, Inc. v. Zamarripa, 910 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd, 929 P.2d 1332 (Colo. 1997).

Administrative hearing not bound by strict rules of evidence. A driver's license revocation hearing is an administrative hearing and is not governed by the strict rules of evidence and procedure which obtain in a criminal action. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

The state board of accountancy is not bound by the technical rules on the admission of documentary evidence. Hentges v. Bartsch, 35 Colo. App. 384, 533 P.2d 66 (1975).

A hearing officer has some flexibility in his adherence to the civil rules of evidence in order to promote the fact finding process. Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1982).

The standard to be applied is whether the evidence possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

Hearsay testimony may be allowed and reversal is proper only if otherwise inadmissible hearsay is sole evidence relied upon by trier of fact. Mondragon v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 696 P.2d 831 (Colo. App. 1984).

Hearsay evidence alone may be used to establish an element at a revocation hearing if such evidence is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy, and the evidence possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. Dept. of Rev. v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16 (Colo. 1987); Div. of Rev. v. Lounsbury, 743 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1987); Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1987); Heller v. Velasquez, 743 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1987); Charnes v. Oldna, 743 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1987); Schaffer v. State Dept. of Soc. Servs., 759 P.2d 837 (Colo. App. 1988).

The PUC is allowed to consider a broader range of information in making an adjudicatory decision than that allowed by subsection (14). Colo. Energy Advocacy v. Pub. Serv. Co., 704 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1985).

Factors which provide guidance in determining whether evidence is reliable, trustworthy, and probative for the purposes of an administrative hearing are: (1) Whether the statement was written and signed; (2) Whether the statement was sworn to by the declarant; (3) Whether the declarant was a disinterested witness or had a potential bias; (4) Whether the hearsay statement is denied or contradicted by other evidence; (5) Whether the declarant is credible; (6) Whether there is corroboration for the hearsay statement; (7) Whether the case turns on the credibility of witnesses; (8) Whether the party relying on the hearsay offers an adequate explanation for the failure to call the declarant to testify; and, (9) Whether the party against whom the hearsay is used had access to the statements prior to the hearing or the opportunity to subpoena the declarant. Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Flower Stop, 782 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1989); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

Due process requires that hearsay evidence admitted at an administrative hearing be of a kind commonly relied upon so as to be worthy of belief under similar circumstances and must possess probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. 117th Assoc. v. Jefferson County, 811 P.2d 461 (Colo. App. 1991).

Agencies are not always restricted to litigants' record. Although courts are generally limited to the consideration of the record made by litigants in the trial court, administrative agencies are not always so restricted. City & County of Denver v. Dore, 176 Colo. 367, 490 P.2d 694 (1971).

Therefore, records of the division of motor vehicles are not inadmissible hearsay. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971); Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

Driver's history record is prima facie evidence of its contents. Hoehl v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1980).

Admitting photocopy of blood test into evidence in driver's license revocation was proper. Ellis v. Charnes, 722 P.2d 436 (Colo. App. 1986).

Hearing officer's insistence that witness testify in person, rather than via telephone, was within officer's discretion where credibility was a significant issue. Shaball v. State Compensation Ins. Auth., 799 P.2d 399 (Colo. App. 1990).

ALJ did not abuse her discretion in determining that good cause existed to take telephone testimony because of the limited testimony to be given by the witnesses, the absence of reference in their testimony to exhibits or to demonstrative evidence, and the inconvenience and expense to procure their live testimony. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 547 (Colo. App. 1996).

Rebuttal of driving record's accuracy presents a question of fact. Where evidence is presented which rebuts the accuracy of any item in a person's driving record, there is a fact question to be resolved by the hearing officer. Hoehl v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1980).

Identical copies of cancelled checks from separate disinterested sources is competent evidence. Where two sets of copies of cancelled checks are put into evidence from separate disinterested sources, and the two sets are identical, the evidence is competent under the standards set out in the APA. Hentges v. Bartsch, 35 Colo. App. 384, 533 P.2d 66 (1975).

Court cannot release grand jury documents for use in civil action. The trial court does not have the jurisdiction to order an ex parte release of documents which are being used by a grand jury in a criminal investigation, for use in a civil liquor code violations action. Granbery v. District Court, 187 Colo. 316, 531 P.2d 390 (1975).

Exchanges between tribunal parties cannot be screened from review. Ex parte exchanges between an advocate and the adjudicatory tribunal may not be screened arbitrarily from appellate scrutiny. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).

Findings of evidentiary fact of hearing officer supported ultimate finding of board of medical examiners that physician's actions were a manipulation of a patient for his own personal interest and constituted misconduct. Puls v. People ex rel. Woodard, 722 P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1986).

Limitation on rebuttal evidence authorized and not a violation of due process. Hearing officer's limitation on oral rebuttal testimony did not violate licensee's due process rights to rebut expert witnesses' statements where licensee was given opportunity to present rebuttal evidence through presubmitted written statements and where such procedure was authorized by statute. Bassett v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 727 P.2d 864 (Colo. App. 1986).

In determining eligibility for Medicaid home-based services under § 25.5-6-306, an ALJ is not limited to evidence that the case manager heard on the day of assessment. The ALJ may properly consider any testimony introduced at the hearing concerning the individual's condition as of the date of the level of care assessment. Reiff v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 148 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2006).

Applied in Jimerson v. Prendergast, 697 P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1985).

V. AGENCY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Colorado statutory scheme makes adequate provisions for prompt hearing and determination of emergency summary license suspensions to meet due process requirements. Any vagueness in the term "promptly" is adequately cured by licensee's statutory right to request and obtain an "immediate" hearing following an emergency suspension. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Castro, 914 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1996).

Party status required for judicial review. One must comply with the requirements for obtaining party status in adjudicatory hearings as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review under the APA. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982).

There is no requirement, under the applicable statutes and rules, that the limited gaming control commission hold an evidentiary hearing on petitions for declaratory orders. Purcell v. Colo. Div. of Gaming, 924 P.2d 1203 (Colo. App. 1996).

Order disposing of a petition for a declaratory order under subsection (11) is subject to judicial review only when the order constitutes final agency action within the meaning of § 2 2 24-4-106 (2) or the exception to final agency action in § 24-4-106 (8) applies. Chittenden v. Bd. of Soc. Work Exam'rs, 2012 COA 150M, 292 P.3d 1138.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required by this section with respect to plaintiff's claims that lottery division and lottery commission knew that the last grand prize for a particular scratch game had been claimed, continued to sell tickets for the scratch game, did not inform potential ticket purchasers that the grand prize was no longer available, and continued to represent the availability of the grand prize. The applicable lottery statute does not provide a right to a hearing under this section. Bazemore v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 64 P.3d 876 (Colo. App. 2002).

District court's order can only apply to parties. Unless an agency has adjudicated the rights of a person who is also a party, a district court reviewing the agency action has no authority, sua sponte, to enter its own findings and conclusions of law with regard to that person. N.J. Zinc Co. v. Mined Land Reclamation, 738 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1987).

"Final" agency action required for judicial review. The decision of an agency (other than a remand for further proceedings) described in subsection (15)(b) is the "final" agency action subject to judicial review under § 24-4-106 (2). State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).

A decision and order of a hearing officer or ALJ is an initial decision only, and becomes final only if no exceptions or agency motions have been submitted within the 30-day appeal period. Western Colo. Congress v. Dept. of Health, 844 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1992).

Determination by a division of the department of public health and environment regarding whether documents contained confidential information did not constitute an adjudicatory agency action of the kind addressed in this section. Therefore, the trial court was deciding the dispute between the parties in the first instance and properly resolved the dispute in accordance with the standards applicable to injunctive relief. CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Air Pollution Control Div., 77 P.3d 933 (Colo. App. 2003).

This section contemplates that review of the ALJ's initial order be initiated by the filing of exceptions or upon the motion of the agency within the requisite time. Because exceptions were not timely filed by the agency and because review was not initiated upon motion of the agency within 30 days of service of the ALJ's initial decision, that decision became the agency's final order as a matter of law. Winterhawk Outfitters, Inc. v. Office of Outfitters Registration, 43 P.3d 745 (Colo. App. 2002).

An agency cannot vest final authority in a hearing officer when the regulation relied upon to make the delegation of final decision-making authority is contrary to statute. W. Colo. Congress v. Dept. of Health, 844 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1992).

The department of health improperly denied plaintiff its right to agency review of a hearing officer's order. It was accordingly held that the order never became the decision of the department. W. Colo. Congress v. Dept. of Health, 844 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1992).

An appeal from a decision of the hearing officer must be made within 30 days of the date the initial decision is mailed to the parties, and not within 30 days of the receipt of such decision by the parties. Vendetti v. Univ. of So. Colo., 793 P.2d 657 (Colo. App. 1990).

Dissatisfied party to appeal to agency within 30 days. A party dissatisfied with the rulings of a hearing officer may appeal to the Colorado civil rights commission by filing exceptions within 30 days after service of the initial decision. North Washington St. Water & San. Dist. v. Emerson, 626 P.2d 1152 (Colo. App. 1980); State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 547 (Colo. App. 1996).

Placing exceptions in the mail is not the same as filing. For the purposes of this section, filing requires actual, physical presentation of documents to the appropriate official. State Bd. of Registration v. Brinker, 948 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1997).

Failure to file exceptions as prescribed in subsection (14) results in a waiver of the right to appeal. State Bd. of Registration v. Brinker, 948 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1997).

Exceptions to disciplinary finding were timely filed within 30 days after service of agency decision. State Bd. of Nursing v. Crickenberger, 757 P.2d 1167 (Colo. App. 1988).

The language of subsection (14) is directory and is not intended to limit the jurisdiction of an agency to review an initial decision outside of the 30-day period so long as the agency's motion to review was timely made. Cornell v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 813 P.2d 771 (Colo. App. 1990).

Failure of exceptions to mention a ruling on a motion for a continuance constituted a waiver of any contention of error in the ruling pursuant to subsection (14)(c). State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 547 (Colo. App. 1996).

The term "exception" in subsection (14)(a)(II) is designed to serve the same purpose as common law exceptions acting as a statement of specific formal objections designed to place the agency on notice of the basis for the requested review of the initial decision. Requiring a specific statement furthers the purpose of agency review of initial decisions, providing the agency with an opportunity to correct errors before judicial review is sought in the same way common law exceptions provided the trial court with an opportunity to correct errors and thereby make appellate review unnecessary. Lanphier v. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 179 P.3d 148 (Colo. App. 2007).

Notice of review need not be given. Subsection (15) does not require that notice of the time and place of the agency review be given. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977).

Subsection (15)(a) requires that a party's challenge to the factual findings of the ALJ must be supported by transcripts made available for the agency's review. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Hoffner, 832 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1992).

Party may not decline to request a transcript and then assert, as a matter of law, that the board decided his case without review of a transcript. Tepley v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Ass'n, 955 P.2d 573 (Colo. App. 1997).

When agency seeks to reverse evidentiary facts found by an ALJ, subsection (15)(a) requires a transcript of the hearing. A tape recording of a hearing does not constitute a transcript within the meaning of subsection (15)(a). Rigmaiden v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 155 P.3d 498 (Colo. App. 2006).

Aggrieved party may order hearing transcript from agency at own expense. A party seeking to reverse a hearing officer's decision may, at his or her own expense, order a hearing transcript from the agency involved. Loesch v. Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 169, 570 P.2d 530 (1977).

A court order for transcript is unnecessary. A party desiring a hearing transcript may order it directly from the agency, and a court order would not be necessary absent agency refusal. Loesch v. Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 169, 570 P.2d 530 (1977).

No error resulted from lack of a transcript of the proceedings, because the ALJ's finding were not challenged, and the review was limited to conclusions of law and findings of fact based on undisputed evidentiary facts. Hall v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 876 P.2d 77 (Colo. App. 1994).

Discovery in post-hearing, preappeal administrative proceeding available where party shows impermissible tribunal considerations. In a post-hearing, preappeal administrative proceeding, discovery should be available as a matter of right only if the party alleging procedural irregularities first shows, by affidavit or other substantial factual evidence, that there is good cause to believe that ex parte communications, personal bias, or other impermissible considerations played a part in the tribunal's decision. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).

Subsection (15) expressly makes discretionary with the agency the presentation of oral argument. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977).

There is no constitutional requirement that the agency personally hear the licensee or other witnesses. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977).

Board may review decision and adopt findings different than those of hearing officer where attorney general filed exceptions to decision, complaint charges were not unproven or unfounded, board expressly concluded that findings were contrary to weight of evidence, and decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Robertson, 751 P.2d 648 (Colo. App. 1987); Davis v. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 791 P.2d 1198 (Colo. App. 1989).

Presumption of correct findings. Classification and valuation of property by a county assessor is presumed correct, and in an appeal to the state board of assessment appeals, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to rebut that presumption by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the classification and valuation is incorrect. The determination whether that burden of proof has been met is a question of fact for the board and may not be displaced by a reviewing court. Gyurman v. Weld County Bd. of Equaliz., 851 P.2d 307 (Colo. App. 1993).

Hearing officer's decision held not contrary to weight of evidence and binding upon agency. Brennan v. Dept. of Local Affairs, 786 P.2d 426 (Colo. App. 1989).

Unless contrary to the weight of the evidence, a hearing officer's determinations of evidentiary fact cannot be set aside by a reviewing court. Colo. State Bd. of Nursing v. Geary, 954 P.2d 614 (Colo. App. 1997).

An agency's determination of ultimate fact may be set aside on review if it is unsupported by any reasonable basis. If there is sufficient evidentiary support in the record for that decision, a reviewing court must defer to the decision of an agency as to matters within the agency's discretion. Nat'l Inst. of Nutritional Educ. v. Meyer, 855 P.2d 31 (Colo. App. 1993).

Board exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that nurse was "presently" addicted to or dependent on drug where substantial evidence in the record supported findings that nurse had not used habit forming drugs for a substantial period of time and was not an habitual user of controlled substances at the time of the hearing. Colo. State Bd. of Nursing v. Lang, 842 P.2d 1383 (Colo. App. 1992).

Although an ALJ's finding of evidentiary fact may not be altered by the board if supported by the evidence, the board is not precluded from drawing a different ultimate conclusion therefrom. Puls v. People ex rel. Woodard, 722 P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1986); Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Hoffner, 832 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1992).

In determining eligibility for Medicaid home-based services under § 25.5-6-306, an ALJ is not limited to evidence that the case manager heard on the day of assessment. The ALJ may properly consider any testimony introduced at the hearing concerning the individual's condition as of the date of the level of care assessment. Reiff v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 148 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2006).

Findings of evidentiary fact involve the raw, historical data underlying the controversy. If there is conflicting testimony, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is within the province of the hearing officer. Barrett v. Univ. of Colo., 851 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1993).

Findings of ultimate fact, such as whether particular conduct constitutes "willful misconduct", may be disturbed on appellate review only if it is unsupported by any competent evidence or is based on an incorrect legal conclusion applied to the underlying facts. Barrett v. Univ. of Colo., 851 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1993).

An agency's determination of ultimate facts may be set aside if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Department's decision reversing ALJ determination had no reasonable basis in fact or law and district court erred in upholding that decision. Moczygemba v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 51 P.3d 1083 (Colo. App. 2002).

The distinction between evidentiary facts and ultimate conclusions of fact is not always clear. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994).

Evidentiary facts are detailed factual or historical findings upon which a legal determination rests, such as when a physician made certain entries into a patient's medical records. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994).

Ultimate conclusions of fact involve a conclusion of law, or at least a mixed question of law and fact, and settle the rights and liabilities of the parties. Unlike evidentiary facts, ultimate conclusions of fact usually are phrased in the language of the controlling statute or legal standard. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994).

The standard for setting aside a hearing officer's findings of fact, stated in subsection (15), establishes the assumption that the hearing officer's findings are accurate. If the evidence would equally support alternative findings, the hearing officer's determination may not be set aside. The party challenging the hearing officer's findings has the burden of proving the weight of the evidence. Samaritan Inst. v. Prince-Walker, 883 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1994).

Reversal of a driver's license revocation is warranted where the agency failed to comply with written request to issue a subpoena and this failure caused prejudice to the driver's substantial right to engage in cross-examination of witnesses. Nye v. State, Dept. of Rev., 902 P.2d 959 (Colo. App. 1995).

Remedy for driver who has had his driver's license revoked or suspended may be available pursuant to subsection (10) where the Colorado department of revenue does not hold an administrative hearing prior to the expiration of 60 days as the department is under statutory obligation to hold an administrative hearing within 60 days under either § 42-2-125 or § 42-2-126. Kriz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 916 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1996).

The fact that questions of statutory interpretation have been raised by claims does not exempt the matter from administrative review. Even if pure questions of law are concerned, agency review of the challenged action is desirable in order to provide the court with the benefit of the agency's considered interpretation of its enabling statute. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).

Prevailing party not required to file an appeal to defend the results reached by the hearing officer on any grounds. An appeal need not be filed unless an enlargement of rights under the original decision is sought. Ehrle v. Dept. of Admin., 844 P.2d 1267 (Colo. App. 1992).

There is no provision in subsection (14) for an administrative cross-appeal. Ehrle v. Dept. of Admin., 844 P.2d 1267 (Colo. App. 1992).

Where notice to the respondent did not apprise him of the type of conduct being alleged, the charge must be dismissed. Herein, the dental examiners' charge against respondent dentist was based upon respondent's alleged failure to wear gloves during a procedure but the evidence supported a finding that one of the respondent's assistants had failed to wear gloves during a procedure. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Micheli, 928 P.2d 839 (Colo. App. 1996).

Subsection (15)(b) is a broad grant of authority that permits the agency to enter additional orders as required to bring its prior orders into conformity with the mandate from the appellate court. Rodgers v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 39 P.3d 1232 (Colo. App. 2001).

The district court did not err in considering complainant's claims under the judicial review principles of the APA and in remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. When considered in conjunction with this section, the purpose of § 1-1.5-105 (3)(b) , the so-called "adjudication clause" of the state version of the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA), is to spare the secretary and persons filing administrative complaints under the state HAVA from having to observe the numerous, and somewhat complex, procedural requirements contained in this section, and to curtail the administrative rights and obligations the parties would ordinarily have in adjudicatory proceedings. The court also rejected the secretary of state's assertion that, if a statute precludes the application of the administrative procedures under § 1-1.5-105 it necessarily precludes judicial review under the APA. Accordingly, the district court had plenary authority under § 2 2 24-4-106 (7) to review and remand this case for further proceedings if it concluded that the agency acted contrary to law. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

The exclusive administrative remedy clause under § 1-1.5-105 (3)(c) does not limit an aggrieved party's judicial remedies. The clause does not refer to a complainant's available judicial remedies; it refers only to the procedures that constitute the administrative remedy for a violation of title III of the federal HAVA. The plain meaning of "administrative remedy" does not include a judicial remedy. This interpretation is further supported by the appeals clause in § 1-1.5-105 (4) , which allows a person aggrieved by a final determination of the secretary to appeal the decision to the district court, and thus, potentially obtain a judicial remedy. Marks v. Gessler, 2 013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

Although the APA rules and procedures do not apply to the secretary's resolution of a state HAVA administrative complaint at the agency level, the APA does apply to judicial review in the district court of the secretary's determination. Section 1-1.5-105 (3)(b) and (3)(c) exclude only the administrative procedure provisions set forth under this section. They do not limit the availability of judicial remedies. At the agency level, a person filing a state HAVA administrative complaint is only entitled to administrative procedures and rights included in the state HAVA statute itself and is not entitled to or burdened by the additional administrative procedures, rights, and obligations provided under the APA. Marks v. Gessler, 2 013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

24-4-106. Judicial review.

  1. In order to assure a plain, simple, and prompt judicial remedy to persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions, the provisions of this section shall be applicable.
  2. Final agency action under this or any other law shall be subject to judicial review as provided in this section, whether or not an application for reconsideration has been filed, unless the filing of an application for reconsideration is required by the statutory provisions governing the specific agency. In the event specific provisions for rehearing as a basis for judicial review as applied to any particular agency are in effect on or after July 1, 1969, then such provisions shall govern the rehearing and appeal procedure, the provisions of this article to the contrary notwithstanding.
  3. An action may be commenced in any court of competent jurisdiction by or on behalf of an agency for judicial enforcement of any final order of such agency. In any such action, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by such agency action may obtain judicial review of such agency action.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (11) of this section, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court within thirty-five days after such agency action becomes effective; but, if such agency action occurs in relation to any hearing pursuant to section 24-4-105, then the person must also have been a party to such agency hearing. A proceeding for such review may be brought against the agency by its official title, individuals who comprise the agency, or any person representing the agency or acting on its behalf in the matter sought to be reviewed. The complaint shall state the facts upon which the plaintiff bases the claim that he or she has been adversely affected or aggrieved, the reasons entitling him or her to relief, and the relief which he or she seeks. Every party to an agency action in a proceeding under section 24-4-105 not appearing as plaintiff in such action for judicial review shall be made a defendant; except that, in review of agency actions taken pursuant to section 24-4-103, persons participating in the rule-making proceeding need not be made defendants. Each agency conducting a rule-making proceeding shall maintain a docket listing the name, address, and telephone number of every person who has participated in a rule-making proceeding by written statement, or by oral comment at a hearing. Any person who commences suit for judicial review of the rule shall notify each person on the agency's docket of the fact that a suit has been commenced. The notice shall be sent by first-class certified mail within fourteen days after filing of the action and shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint for judicial review bearing the action number of the case. Thereafter, service of process, responsive pleadings, and other matters of procedure shall be controlled by the Colorado rules of civil procedure. An action shall not be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party until an opportunity has been afforded to an affected party to bring the indispensable party into the action. The residence of a state agency for the purposes of this subsection (4) shall be deemed to be the city and county of Denver. In any action in which the plaintiff seeks judicial review of an agency decision made after a hearing as provided in section 24-4-105, the parties after issue is joined shall file briefs within the time periods specified in the Colorado appellate rules.

    (4.5) Subject to the limitation set forth in section 39-8-108 (2), C.R.S., the board of county commissioners of any county of this state may commence an action in the Denver district court within the time limit set forth in subsection (4) of this section for judicial review of any agency action which is directed to any official, board, or employee of such county or which involves any duty or function of any official, board, or employee of such county with the consent of said official, board, or employee, and to the extent that said official, board, or employee could maintain an action under subsection (4) of this section. In addition, in any action brought against any official, board, or employee of a county of this state for judicial enforcement of any final order of any agency, the defendant official, board, or employee may obtain judicial review of such agency action. In any such action for judicial review, the county official, board, or employee shall not be permitted to seek temporary or preliminary injunctive relief pending a final decision on the merits of its claim.

    (4.7) The county clerk and recorder of any county may commence an action under this section in the Denver district court for judicial review of any final action issued by the secretary of state arising under the "Uniform Election Code of 1992", articles 1 to 13 of title 1, C.R.S. In any such action, the county clerk and recorder may seek temporary or preliminary injunctive relief pending a final decision on the merits of the claim as permitted under this section.

  5. Upon a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result, the agency, upon application therefor, shall postpone the effective date of the agency action pending judicial review, or the reviewing court, upon application therefor and regardless of whether such an application previously has been made to or denied by any agency, and upon such terms and upon such security, if any, as the court shall find necessary and order, shall issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of the agency action or to preserve the rights of the parties pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
  6. In every case of agency action, the record, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, shall include the original or certified copies of all pleadings, applications, evidence, exhibits, and other papers presented to or considered by the agency, rulings upon exceptions, and the decision, findings, and action of the agency. Any person initiating judicial review shall designate the relevant parts of such record and advance the cost therefor. As to alleged errors, omissions, and irregularities in the agency record, evidence may be taken independently by the court.
    1. If the court finds no error, it shall affirm the agency action.
    2. The court shall hold unlawful and set aside the agency action and shall restrain the enforcement of the order or rule under review, compel any agency action to be taken that has been unlawfully withheld or unduly delayed, remand the case for further proceedings, and afford other relief as may be appropriate if the court finds that the agency action is:
      1. Arbitrary or capricious;
      2. A denial of statutory right;
      3. Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
      4. In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, purposes, or limitations;
      5. Not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of this article 4 or as otherwise required by law;
      6. An abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion;
      7. Based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous on the whole record;
      8. Unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole; or
      9. Otherwise contrary to law, including failing to comply with section 24-4-104 (3)(a) or 24-4-105 (4)(b).
    3. In making the findings specified in this subsection (7), the court shall review the whole record or portions of the record cited by any party.
    4. In all cases under review, the court shall determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved and shall apply the interpretation to the facts duly found or established.
  7. Upon a showing of irreparable injury, any court of competent jurisdiction may enjoin at any time the conduct of any agency proceeding in which the proceeding itself or the action proposed to be taken therein is clearly beyond the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency. If the court finds that any proceeding contesting the jurisdiction or authority of the agency is frivolous or brought for the purpose of delay, it shall assess against the plaintiff in such proceeding costs and a reasonable sum for attorney fees (or an equivalent sum in lieu thereof) incurred by other parties, including the state.
  8. The decision of the district court shall be subject to appellate review as may be permitted by law or the Colorado appellate rules, but a notice of intent to seek appellate review must be filed with the district court within forty-nine days after its decision becomes final. If no notice of intent to seek appellate review is filed with the trial court within forty-nine days after its decision becomes final, the trial court shall immediately return to the agency its record. Upon disposition of a case in an appellate court which requires further proceedings in the trial court, the agency's record shall be returned to the trial court. On final disposition of the case in the appellate court when no further proceedings are necessary or permitted in the trial court, the agency's record shall be returned by the appellate court to the agency with notice of such disposition to the trial court or to the trial court, in which event the agency's record shall be returned by the trial court to the agency.
  9. In any judicial review of agency action, the district court or the appellate court shall advance on the docket any case which in the discretion of the court requires acceleration.
    1. Whenever judicial review of any agency action is directed to the court of appeals, the provisions of this subsection (11) shall be applicable except for review of orders of the industrial claim appeals office.
    2. Such proceeding shall be commenced by the filing of a notice of appeal with the court of appeals within forty-nine days after the date of the service of the final order entered in the action by the agency, together with a certificate of service showing service of a copy of said notice of appeal on the agency and on all other persons who have appeared as parties to the action before the agency. The date of service of an order is the date on which a copy of the order is delivered in person or, if service is by mail, the date of mailing.
    3. The record on appeal shall conform to the provisions of subsection (6) of this section. The designation and preparation of the record and its transmission to the court of appeals shall be in accordance with the Colorado appellate rules. A request for an extension of time to transmit the record shall be made to the court of appeals and may be granted only by that court.
    4. The docketing of the appeal and all procedures thereafter shall be as set forth in the Colorado appellate rules. The agency shall not be required to pay a docket fee. All persons who have appeared as parties to the action before the agency who are not designated as appellants shall, together with the agency, be designated as appellees.
    5. The standard for review as set forth in subsection (7) of this section shall apply to appeals brought under this subsection (11).

Source: L. 59: p. 164, § 5. CRS 53: § 3-16-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-5. L. 69: pp. 89, 268, §§ 6, 2. L. 76: (4) amended, p. 584, § 18, effective May 24. L. 79: (4.5) added, p. 843, § 2, effective May 26. L. 81: (4) amended and (11) added, pp. 890, 1134, 1142, §§ 4, 4, 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (11)(a) amended, p. 498, § 117, effective July 1. L. 87: (9) amended, p. 921, § 1, effective June 20. L. 93: (6) amended, p. 1330, § 5, effective June 6. L. 2012: (4) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 880, § 144, effective July 1. L. 2013: (9) and (11)(b) amended, (HB 13-1126), ch. 58, p. 192, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2014: (4.7) added, (HB 14-1354), ch. 159, p. 553, § 2, effective May 9. L. 2018: (7) amended, (HB 18-1224), ch. 288, p. 1783, § 3, effective May 29.

ANNOTATION

Analysis

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For comment, "Standing of State Political Subdivisions to C hallenge State Agency Rulings Under the C olorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 53 Den. L.J. 437 (1976). For article, "Discovery and Judicial Review in State Administrative Practice", see 10 Colo. Law. 2490 (1981). For article, "Property Tax Assessments in Colorado", see 12 Colo. Law. 563 (1983). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with judicial review, see 61 Den. L. J. 121 (1984). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with judicial review, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 18 (1985). For article, "Appealing Property Tax Assessments", see 15 Colo. Law. 798 (1986). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with judicial review, see 64 Den. U.L. Rev. 125 (1987). For article, "Prosecuting an Appeal from a Decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission", see 16 Colo. Law. 2163 (1987). For article, "Winning an Appeal From A Decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission", see 17 Colo. Law. 1529 (1988). For article, "Challenges to Agency Rules in Adjudicatory-Type Hearings", see 17 Colo. Law. 1991 (1988). For article, "Legislative and Judicial Oversight of Rulemaking", see 18 Colo. Law. 246 (1989). For article, "Can Colorado Administrative Agencies Settle Judicial Review Actions", see 19 Colo. Law. 835 (1990). For article, "Appellate Advocacy in Administrative Law Cases", see 22 Colo. Law. 27 (1993). For article, "Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as an Offensive Tool", see 38 Colo. Law. 53 (Oct. 2009). For article, "Staying Enforcement of a Judgment Pending Appeal", see 48 Colo. Law. 30 (May 2019).

Subsection (4) is not violative of § 21 of art. VI, Colo. Const., since this section does not impinge on the supreme court's rule-making power. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).

Nature of judicial review. Judicial review pursuant to subsection (6) is an original proceeding and not an appeal. Tassian v. People, 696 P.2d 825 (Colo. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 731 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1987).

Subsection (7) gives a court plenary authority to review and remand a case for further proceedings if it concludes that the agency has acted contrary to law. City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 947 P.2d 1373 (Colo. 1997).

Although agency should have adopted a rule pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prior to engaging in unauthorized conduct, that did not remove the jurisdictional requirement that a party seek judicial review of the final agency action within 30 days of an agency's final action. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Div. of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).

When an administrative remedy has not been sought in a timely manner, C.R.C.P. 57 does not provide jurisdiction for judicial review. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Div. of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).

This section governing judicial review of final agency action does not expand power of courts to initiate and compel administrative action beyond that available under C.R.C.P. 106. Jones v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 874 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1994).

Section only addresses procedures of review available once it is established that the dispute is properly brought under some other statutory section. This section alone does not create a legally protected right so as to confer standing to seek judicial review. Dolores Huerta Prep. High v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 215 P.3d 1229 (Colo. App. 2009).

District court has subject matter jurisdiction over appeal of jeopardy assessment made pursuant to § 39-21-111 where no notice of deficiency has been issued. A proceeding under this section was proper because there was no conflict with any other statute and there was final agency action where the tax was determined, a demand for payment was issued, and there were no administrative remedies under § 39-21-101 et seq. to exhaust. Flores v. Dept. of Rev., 802 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1990).

Section applies to review of board of assessment appeals' (BAA) denial of abatement petition. Capital Assoc. Intern. v. Arapahoe Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1180 (Colo. App. 1990).

Mined land reclamation board orders are final and subject to judicial review, notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of such motion by the board. The filing of such a motion is not authorized by law, and does not extend the time within which to seek judicial review of the order. Cheney v. State of Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 826 P.2d 367 (Colo. App. 1991).

Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously within the meaning of subsection (7) in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing upon employee's disagreements with involuntary transfers where the reasons given by the board do not justify its order of denial, where the hearing officer found, based upon information submitted to her, that employee's allegations were facially supported, and where a proper determination of employee's contentions would require factual determinations that could only be made after an evidentiary hearing. Ivy v. State Pers. Bd., 860 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1993).

BAA has no authority to dismiss an administrative appeal based on a taxpayer's failure to comply with non-statutory procedural requirements. Fleisher-Smyth v. Bd. of Assessment App., 865 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1993).

Any right that may have existed to obtain review of a prison disciplinary action under the APA was eliminated by the enactment of § 17-1-111. Crawford v. State Dept. of Corr., 895 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1995).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction in the absence of a specific rule or statute allowing immediate review in that court. A section of the state constitution allowing decisions on campaign finance complaints to be reviewed by the court of appeals was found unconstitutional in federal court. Without that section, there was no statute or rule providing for immediate review in the court of appeals. Therefore, subsection (11) required appeal to the district court. Day v. Chase for Colo., 2 0 2 0 COA 84, 479 P.3d 1.

Applied in Evans v. Simpson, 190 C olo. 4 2 6, 547 P. 2 d 931 (1976); Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 C olo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977); Harris v. Owen, 39 Colo. App. 494, 570 P.2d 26 (1977); Van Pelt v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978); Stortz v. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325, 578 P.2d 229 (1978); Arnold v. Charnes, 41 Colo. App. 338, 589 P.2d 1373 (1978); Marin v. Dept. of Rev., 41 Colo. App. 557, 591 P.2d 1336 (1978); Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Racing Comm'n, 42 Colo. App. 13, 592 P.2d 1341 (1978); Enriquez v. Merit Sys. Council, 197 Colo. 14, 589 P.2d 492 (1979); Nesbit v. Indus. Comm'n, 43 Colo. App. 398, 607 P.2d 1024 (1979); Gilbert v. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 485 F. Supp. 505 (D. Colo. 1980); Red Seal Potato Chip Co. v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 381, 618 P.2d 697 (1980); Hoehl v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1980); Davis v. Dept. of Rev., 623 P.2d 874 (Colo. 1981); Bernstein v. Livingston, 633 P.2d 519 (Colo. App. 1981); Franco v. District Court, 641 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1982); State ex rel. Dept. of Health v. I.D.I., Inc., 642 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1981); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 646 P.2d 393 (Colo. App. 1981); Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982); Crocker v. Dept. of Rev., 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982); Lee v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 654 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1982); BA Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 653 P.2d 80 (Colo. App. 1982); Thompson v. Bd of Educ., 668 P.2d 954 (Colo. App. 1983); Laredo Hous. Apts., Ltd. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 675 P.2d 23 (Colo. App. 1983); Mondragon v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 696 P.2d 831 (Colo. App. 1984); City & County of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 707 P.2d 1008 (Colo. App. 1985), cert. denied, 733 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1987); City Bd. of Equal. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 743 P.2d 444 (Colo. App. 1987); Eckley v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 752 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1988); Farmers Cafe v. State Dept. of Rev., 752 P.2d 1064 (Colo. App. 1988); Golden Gate Dev. v. Gilpin Cty. Bd., 856 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1993); Kelley v. Grand County Bd. of Equaliz., 934 P.2d 929 (Colo. App. 1997); Wildwood Child & Adult Care Program, Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 985 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1999); Schlapp ex rel. Schlapp v. Dept. of Health, 2012 COA 105, 284 P.3d 177; Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, 370 P.3d 272, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 201 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2018).

II. APPLICABILITY.

Section applicable to revocation of driver's license. Appellate review by the district court of a department of revenue order revoking a driver's license is governed by this article. Donelson v. Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 354, 561 P.2d 345 (1976).

The APA and, specifically, this section, constitute the exclusive means through which a person may seek judicial review of the revocation under § 42-4-1202 (3)(f) (now § 42-2-126) of a driver's license. People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 65, 612 P.2d 87 (1980).

A request for extraordinary relief in the form of mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106 was improper to challenge arbitrary action by the department of revenue in revoking a person's driver's license, even though petition was filed on the basis that the department refused to conduct a revocation hearing. The APA provides the proper mechanism for seeking relief based on arbitrary action by an executive agency. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 802 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1990).

And to commission of insurance when functioning in adjudicatory capacity. If the commissioner of insurance holds a hearing pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) upon the application of an "aggrieved" person, insurer, or rating organization to determine whether he shall affirm, reverse, or modify his previous action, he is then functioning in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial capacity and the procedures employed by him must conform to standards prescribed in the administrative code. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).

And to certain actions of state engineer. The modified doctrine of prior appropriation provided for in the Colorado ground water management act applies to nontributary ground water, and rights to such water in designated ground water basins must be obtained through the procedures established in that act. Rights to nontributary ground water not located in a designated basin may be obtained only through application for a well permit from the state engineer under § 37-90-137. Review of the state engineer's action on well permit applications may be obtained under this section, as prescribed by § 37-90-115, for appeals taken before the 1983 revision of § 30-90-115 became applicable. Dept. of Natural Res. v. Sw. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944, 104 S. Ct. 1929, 80 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1984).

Subsection (7) standards do not apply to the initiative title setting review board when it holds a meeting for designating and fixing a title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary. Specific process and procedure is set out in the initiative and referendum statutes. Matter of Title, Ballot Title et al., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1992).

Section is not inapplicable to the adjudication of state water engineers' regulations. Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971).

Nor to insurance commissioner functioning in quasi-legislative capacity. When the commissioner of insurance conducts a hearing, either on his own initiative or at the request of a filing insurer or rating organization, prior to the approval or disapproval by him of a rate filing, he is functioning in a quasi-legislative capacity and the validity of the procedure which he follows is not to be determined by standards provided in the administrative code. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).

Nor to workmen's compensation cases. The appeal procedures under the workmen's compensation act are complete and definitive and constitute an organic act which is self-operational without the need of supplementation from the APA. Zappas v. Indus. Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 319, 543 P.2d 101 (1975).

Nor to order revoking permission to remit sales taxes on cash basis. Section 39-21-105 specifically, and article 21 of title 39 generally, prescribe the procedure for the determination and review of deficiencies in tax payments. So, while this section governs the defendant's appeal of the department's final deficiency determination, it does not govern the defendant's challenge to the order revoking its permission to remit sales taxes on a cash basis. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).

Nor to local licensing authority actions. Because the Denver department of excise and licenses is not a state agency with statewide territorial jurisdiction, the decisions of its director are not within the ambit of review procedures under this section. Two G's, Inc. v. Kalbin, 666 P.2d 129 (Colo. 1983).

Nor to private hospital's peer review process. A private hospital's peer review process is not subject to judicial review under this article. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare, 2 01 2 COA 43, 292 P.3d 1018.

The actions of the approved treatment provider review board within the department of corrections denying a treatment provider as an approved treatment provider for the department is exempt from review under this section. Wisdom Works Counseling v. Dept. of Corr., 2 015 COA 118, 360 P.3d 2 62.

Referring doctors to the Colorado medical board for possible Medical Practice Act violations that the board may then further investigate is not a "proceeding" for the court to enjoin under this section. Doe 1 v. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2 018 COA 106, 454 P.3d 3 2 7, aff'd, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.

Colorado rules of civil procedure provide an available remedy for a prisoner who is still held within the period of his sentence. Peterson v. Ricketts, 495 F. Supp. 312 (D. Colo. 1980).

This section is not applicable to the adjustment of the timing and manner of inmate's restitution payments. Jones v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 53 P.3d 1187 (Colo. App. 2002).

III. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION.

In absence of statutory provision, standing is conferred by implied right of action. Where statutory provisions do not specify what counts as an actionable injury, the law of implied private rights of action furnishes a model for whether the substantive law creates rights the invasion of which confers standing under the APA. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1980).

Nominal availability of judicial review does not preclude action seeking declaratory relief. The nominal availability of judicial review under subsection (4) of this section or C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) does not preclude a C.R.C.P. 57 action seeking declaratory relief if, in the context of a particular controversy, the remedy afforded by this section or by certiorari review would be inadequate. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).

Permissible to join actions. It is permissible to join a § 24-4-106 action and a C.R.C.P. 57 action for purposes of review. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 41 Colo. App. 72, 579 P.2d 96 (1978).

Failure to pursue other remedies may bar declaratory judgment. The plaintiff's failure to pursue remedies provided in this section and in C.R.C.P. 106(a) in a timely manner bars a declaratory judgment action, following an agency's adverse interpretation of a statute. Greyhound Racing Ass'n v. Racing Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 319, 589 P.2d 70 (1978).

Declaratory action is not invariably barred by expiration of this section's filing period. While agency rules and regulations are indeed reviewable under subsection (4), expiration of that subsection's filing period does not invariably bar as untimely a C.R.C.P. 57, action attacking the constitutionality of an administrative regulation promulgated by § 24-4-103 rule-making. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).

A person to whom an agency regulation is allegedly being unconstitutionally applied need not defy that regulation to obtain a judicial determination of its validity, but may instead commence a suit under C.R.C.P. 57 and an action for declaratory relief brought under these circumstances will not be barred because the time period prescribed by subsection (4) has elapsed since the agency regulation under attack became effective. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).

Amendment of pleadings governed by rules of civil procedure. The propriety of amendments to pleadings in actions for judicial review under this section is governed by the rules of civil procedure. People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 65, 612 P.2d 87 (1980).

Amendment allowed where mistaken reference to basis of court's jurisdiction. Where the sole amendment required to bring a cause of action within the APA is a deletion of a mistaken reference to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), as the basis for the court's jurisdiction, and the substitution of a reference to this section, and where in all other respects, the petition states a cause of action under this section, an amendment to the petition should be allowed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 15(a). People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 87, 612 P.2d 87 (1980).

A complaint for judicial review must be filed within 30 days after final agency action even if the claim is a contract claim. Buzick v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Ass'n, 849 P.2d 869 (Colo. App. 1992) (decided under former law).

A complaint in the district court seeking to challenge an administrative ruling concerning attorney fees entered subsequent to a decision on the merits must be filed within 30 days after the ruling. Allen Homesite Group v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32 (Colo. App. 2000) (decided under former law).

Appeal filed within 30 days of service of order from Colorado oil and gas commission timely even if § 34-60-108 (6) provides that such orders are entered as of the date entered into the books of the commission. Richmond Petroleum v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 907 P.2d 732 (Colo. App. 1995) (decided under former law).

Colorado water quality control division's failure to act on a request for a temporary water discharge permit within 180 days constituted final agency action, thereby requiring any district court complaint concerning said action to be filed within 30 days after the end of the 180-day period. Roosevelt Tunnel, LLC v. Norton, 89 P.3d 427 (Colo. App. 2003) (decided under former law).

Motion to amend filed after expiration of 30-day period is allowed. Although a motion to amend is filed approximately one month after the 30-day period prescribed by subsection (4) has expired, leave to amend should be granted under C.R.C.P. 15(a) and where the amended pleading relates back to the date on which the original petition was filed, the pleading, as amended, states a timely claim for judicial review. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1980) (decided under former law).

Filing of motion to reconsider pursuant to subsection (2) does not extend effective date of agency's final decision. Bethesda Found. v. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 867 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993); rev'd on other grounds, 877 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1994).

The plain language of subsection (3) requires a party aggrieved by an agency action to commence an action for review, and failure of the party to commence such action in the appropriate district court precludes review of the agency action by the appellate court. Davila v. Merit Sys. Council, 15 P.3d 781 (Colo. App. 2000).

Burden is on the appellants to make timely filing of their opening brief pursuant to subsection (4) and C.A.R. 31. It is within the court's discretion to dismiss an appeal if the appellant has not complied with the statutory time limitations for filing briefs. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).

Judicial review of agency action pursuant to subsection (4) is subject to the time limitations specified in C.A.R. 31(a). Dismissal for failure to comply with statutory time limitations for filing briefs is left within the trial court's discretion. DuPuis v. Charnes, 668 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1983).

Time for review where no specific decision challenged. Where there is no specific decision being challenged, and consequently no specific date from which to reckon the time for filing for judicial review, the standard must be that the action is to be brought within a reasonable time. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 665 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1983).

Action for review of tenured teacher's dismissal was barred as untimely where it was not filed within the 45 days during which the teacher was required to seek review pursuant to the Teacher Tenure Act and this section and where the teacher received actual notice of the termination. Talbot v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 700 P.2d 919 (Colo. App. 1984).

Although the recognized interpretation of issuance of an order is the date of mailing, the mailing occurs on the date that a letter, property addressed, and bearing proper postage, is deposited in the mails. Where governor's decision was mailed without proper postage, his order is deemed effective when actual notice is received. N. Colo. Consortium v. Rural Job Training, 728 P.2d 744 (Colo. App. 1986).

Time limit in subsection (4) applies to actions under both subsection (2) and subsection (3). Where defendant in enforcement action asserted a counterclaim challenging validity of agency action being enforced, and more than 30 days had elapsed since agency action became effective, court was without jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim. Gibbs v. Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 883 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1994); Allen Homesite Group v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32 (Colo. App. 2000) (decided under former law).

Subsection (4) does not set date by which appellees must object or be deemed to have waived the brief-filing requirements of this section. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).

Trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's judicial review claim as time-barred under subsection (4). Under subsection (4), any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may file an action for judicial review in the district court within 30 days after such agency action becomes effective. Moreover, under subsection (2), "unless the filing of an application for reconsideration is required by the statutory provisions governing the specific agency", judicial review must be sought within the 30-day filing requirement, regardless of whether or not a motion for reconsideration has been filed. There is no authority requiring a reconsideration motion before seeking judicial review of department's decisions concerning medicaid. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration did not extend the deadline for commencing a judicial review action. Bates v. Henneberry, 211 P.3d 68 (Colo. App. 2009) (decided under former law).

IV. FINALITY AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

The parties involved in administrative proceedings are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review in order to avoid encroaching on the executive function. The exception to this rule, however, is stated in subsection (8). A district court may intervene if the agency proceeding or action clearly exceeds the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency and the party seeking to enjoin the proceedings shows that the agency action will cause irreparable injury. Envirotest Sys. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 109 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2005).

The general rule is that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief is a jurisdictional defect. This is especially true in cases involving tax matters, and thus, if there are complete, adequate, and speedy administrative remedies available for alleged tax irregularities, a taxpayer must exhaust them. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).

Right to review arises only after final adverse decision. A statutory provision defining the period within which judicial review can be sought does not become material until after the right to review arises, that is, until after there is a final decision adverse to the claimant. McCartney v. W. Adams County Fire Prot. Dist., 40 Colo. App. 330, 574 P.2d 516 (1978).

Absent final agency action, a district court does not have the authority to interfere with administrative agency proceedings by granting a stay of a public employee's dismissal. State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).

Until an agency makes a determination, any action of the judiciary is premature. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 144, 470 P.2d 864 (1970).

Judiciary cannot interfere even where claim of unconstitutionality. Even a claim that a statute under which the department is proceeding is unconstitutional will not clothe the judiciary with the power to interfere with or control the department in advance of its taking final action. The question of constitutionality is a matter to be raised on appeal after the executive has performed his functions. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 144, 470 P.2d 864 (1970); Chonoski v. Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1985).

The claim of unconstitutionality will not clothe the judiciary with the power to interfere with an administrative agency in advance of its taking final action. Moore v. District Court, 184 Colo. 63, 518 P.2d 948 (1974).

A claim that a statute is unconstitutional does not give the judiciary the power under subsection (8) to interfere with an administrative agency in advance of its taking final action. State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).

Section only addresses procedures of review available once it is established that the dispute is properly brought under some other statutory section. This section alone does not create a legally protected right so as to confer standing to seek judicial review. Dolores Huerta Prep. High v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 215 P.3d 1229 (Colo. App. 2009).

Agency statement on law or policy, or procedure or practice, deemed final action. Whole or part of every agency statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or declaring law or policy, or setting forth procedure or practice requirements of any agency is final agency action subject to judicial review and authority to postpone the effective date of agency action pending review. Colo. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs v. Dixon, 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968).

Agency's decision reviewing hearing officer's decision is final action. The decision of an agency (other than a remand for further proceedings) described in § 24-4-105 (15)(b), is final agency action subject to judicial review under subsection (2). State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).

But individual votes of members of the state personnel board on motions put before the board do not constitute agency actions. Rather, it is the outcome or effect of those votes that is subject to review. Maggard v. Dept. of Human Servs., 226 P.3d 1209 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 248 P.3d 708 (Colo. 2011).

State personnel board order awarding attorney fees, but not establishing the fee amount is a reviewable final agency action. Colo. State Pers. Bd. v. Dept. of Corr., 988 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1999).

Right to review tax exemption arises only upon board of assessment appeals decision. Where a taxpayer initially applies for a tax exemption prior to the effective date of a statutory provision, but the final administrative decision adverse to the claimant is a board of assessment appeals decision after the statute's effective date, the right to district court review does not arise until that latter date. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).

For purposes of timely filing a claim seeking judicial review of the Colorado economic development commission's award of a project pursuant to the Colorado Regional Tourism Act, final agency action, as required by the APA, did not occur until the Colorado economic development commission adopted a resolution memorializing the terms of the regional tourism authority award. 1405 Hotel, LLC v. Colo. Econ. Dev. Comm'n, 2 015 COA 1 2 7, 370 P.3d 309.

In cases arising under the tenure act, the "final order" for judicial review is certainly the "order" of the board of education required by § 22-63-117 (10). Snyder v. Jefferson City Sch. Dist. No. 1, 707 P.2d 1049 (Colo. App. 1985); Lockhart v. Arapahoe County Sch. District No. 6, 735 P.2d 913 (Colo. App. 1986).

Finality of license revocation by division of motor vehicles. An order of revocation issued at the conclusion of a hearing is final. Inasmuch as motor vehicle statutes are specific as to when an order is effective, when it is final, and when a petition for judicial review is to be filed, they are controlling notwithstanding other conflicting provisions of the APA. Houston v. Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1985).

Order of board of health reversing and remanding the determination of the hearing officer is not a reviewable final agency action. Colo. Health Facilities Review Council v. District Court, 689 P.2d 617 (Colo. 1984).

Filing of exceptions to the preliminary recommendations of the administrative law judge does not effect the 45-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal from the date of the final agency action. Hussein v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 124 P.3d 871 (Colo. App. 2005).

A party seeking judicial review of a commission's final order must file a complaint within thirty-five days of the effective date of the order, even if the party first filed a motion to reconsider and the commission declined to reconsider its order. The plain language of the Colorado Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act and the APA requires a finding that a complaint was untimely when a party filed its complaint sixty-nine days after the effective date of a final order. Sterling Ethanol v. Colo. Air Quality, 2 017 COA 2 6, 413 P.3d 215.

Administrative remedies must be exhausted. Before there can be recourse to courts in administrative matters, there must be an exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Auth., 176 Colo. 281, 490 P.2d 299 (1971).

Normally, judicial review of administrative action is available only after an exhaustion of administrative remedies and final agency action. Bd. of Cosmetology v. District Court, 187 Colo. 175, 530 P.2d 1278 (1974); Chonoski v. Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1985).

Exhaustion of the administrative remedy of an appeal to the Colorado civil rights commission from an adverse ruling of a hearing officer is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a court action challenging the hearing officer's ruling. N. Wash. St. Water & San. Dist. v. Emerson, 626 P.2d 1152 (Colo. App. 1980).

The need for application of the rule requiring exhaustion of remedies becomes more persuasive when the matter in controversy raises the precise questions which are within the expertise of the administrative agency, and are of the very nature the agency was designed to resolve. Downey v. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1982).

District court properly dismissed action for lack of jurisdiction since plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them which could have afforded them complete relief in the matter. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).

District court does not have jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to review an interlocutory order of a state administrative agency, absent a showing of irreparable harm from such order. T & S Leasing v. District Court, 728 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1986).

District court lacked authority to issue injunctive relief regarding a hearing officer ruling made during an ongoing administrative hearing. Envirotest Sys. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 109 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2005).

There is an exception to this rule that judicial review is available only after an exhaustion of administrative remedies provided by subsection (8). Bd. of Cosmetology v. District Court, 187 Colo. 175, 530 P.2d 1278 (1974).

Individual may initiate pre-enforcement challenge to regulation's validity. Nothing in the APA denies standing to an individual to initiate a pre-enforcement challenge to the validity of a regulation, if he is subject to its demands. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

Trial court erred in dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the members of the state board for community colleges and occupational education since the availability of judicial review pursuant to this section did not preclude such action. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).

Applied in Envirotest Sys. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 109 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2005).

V. PARTIES.

Counties not included in definition of "party". A county, as an arm of the state board of social services, has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and, hence, does not come within the definition of "party". Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974).

Nor board of county commissioners. The board of county commissioners is an "agency" within the meaning of the administrative code and as such is not the person who may seek review of final agency action. Also, boards of county commissioners have no authority to sue as representatives of taxpayers of their counties. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).

A county and, as such, its board of county commissioners are without standing to challenge an action of the state board of social services, even though they may have been extended the courtesy of presenting evidence at the rule-making hearing. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).

Where the state board of social services is a party to judicial review proceedings, as a result of which a settlement agreement was reached, reinstating an employee suspended by a county department of social services, the county board and the county department, as subordinates of the state agency, are bound by the state department's actions settling the judicial review proceedings. Accordingly, the county board and the county department are without standing to seek judicial review of the merit system council's order implementing the settlement agreement, and, pursuant to subsection (4.5), the board of county commissioners is likewise without standing to seek judicial review. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Merit Sys. Council, 662 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1982).

Nor does a county department of social services have standing to seek judicial review of an action by the state board of social services by the merit system council. Nadeau v. Merit Sys. Council for County Depts. of Soc. Servs., 36 Colo. App. 362, 545 P.2d 1061 (1975) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).

A county department of social services is not an adversely affected or aggrieved "party" empowered to bring an action for judicial review of an agency action within the meaning of this section. Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107, 550 P.2d 864 (1976) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).

A county board of commissioners has standing to review an administrative rule that provided that a permit issued pursuant to the rule shall be binding with respect to any conflicting local governmental permit or land use approval process. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 81 P.3d 1119 (Colo. App. 2003).

Subsection (4) does not grant a county the right to seek judicial review of state department decisions. Romer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1998).

The statute does not confer a substantive legal right on a county to sue for monetary damages. Provisions that include counties within the definition of "person" were not intended to confer substantive rights on counties to sue the state. Romer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1998).

"Party" status required as prerequisite to judicial review. One must comply with the requirements for obtaining "party" status in adjudicatory hearings as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review under the APA. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982).

Right to judicial review is limited to "aggrieved" parties. The right to judicial review of final administrative actions under the APA is limited to those parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges, or duties, as distinct from those of the state, are adversely affected by the decision. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974); Colo.-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 393, 591 P.2d 1323 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

This section, in conjunction with § 34-60-111 , allows challenges to the issuance of an oil and gas drilling permit by persons other than the permit applicant, owners of surface rights, and a local government. Although citizens' and community groups are not entitled to be heard in connection with a permit application, they may be "persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions" within the meaning of this section, following issuance of the permit. Weld Air & Water v. Colo. Oil & Gas, 2 019 COA 86, 457 P.3d 7 2 7.

"Aggrieved" party defined. Those whose activities are exactly those to which a particular regulation apply, and who will be adversely affected by an application of the regulation, are "aggrieved" parties with standing to seek judicial review of the regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

If an administrative rule or order either commands or prohibits action on the part of specific individuals or entities, then those subject to the mandate or prohibition of the rule have sufficient interest and standing to seek judicial review of the administrative action adopting the rule or order under this section. Colo.-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 393, 591 P.2d 1323 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

Party to an adjudicatory determination by an administrative agency may initiate an appeal. Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo. 1992).

"Party" need not file alternative to proposed regulation. Status as a "party" in seeking judicial review of agency action does not require that one have filed an alternative to the proposed regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

Where there is no allegation of "aggrieved" parties, motion for relief denied. Where a motion for relief does not allege the grounds which, if established, would "aggrieve" parties, the commissioner of insurance does not abuse his discretion in denying the motion. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).

Parties held to be aggrieved persons adversely affected by action of board of public welfare (now department of social services). Fields v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 165 Colo. 118, 437 P.2d 538 (1968).

State property tax administrator is an "agency" and therefore is not entitled to appeal an agency action under this section. Maurer v. Young Life, 751 P.2d 653 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1989).

Standing to seek tax refund depends on financial burden suffered. One who does not bear the financial burden of a tax suffers no loss or injury and has no standing to seek a refund under this section. Wash. Plaza Assocs. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 44 Colo. App. 559, 620 P.2d 52 (1980).

Purpose of indispensable party requirement. The purpose of the requirement that every party in the agency action not appearing as a plaintiff shall be made a defendant is to ensure the complete and just adjudication of the rights of those having an interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Cissell v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 560, 564 P.2d 124 (1977).

Joinder of indispensable parties required. An appeal must be perfected--as well as commenced--within the time period established. Part of the perfection of an appeal requires the joinder of indispensable parties. W. Brandt Found., Inc. v. Carper, 44 Colo. App. 137, 608 P.2d 355 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 199 Colo. 334, 608 P.2d 339 (1980).

Joinder of board of assessment appeals required in action for review of a board of assessment appeals' decision. Capital Assoc. Intern. v. Arapahoe Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1180 (Colo. App. 1990); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Huddleston, 28 P.3d 958 (Colo. App. 2000).

C.R.C.P. 19 is inapplicable to proceedings under this article. Because the general assembly specifically has addressed the question of joinder in this section, C.R.C.P. 19 is not applicable in proceedings brought under the APA. Whether a person or organization meets the statutory requirement as a mandatory party in an action for judicial review depends on whether it should have been included in the administrative proceeding. Town of Frederick v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 628 P.2d 129 (Colo. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 641 P.2d 958 (1982).

Language of subsection (4) is mandatory in effect. Cissell v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 560, 564 P.2d 124 (1977); West-Brandt Found., Inc. v. Carper, 199 Colo. 334, 608 P.2d 339 (1980).

Mining reclamation board and the division of mined land reclamation are definite and distinct entities and the designation of the division as a party defendant in lieu of a designation of the board in a challenge to the board's issuance of a mining permit was a failure to join an indispensable party, since the board is an indispensable party to such an action. Cold Springs Ranch v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 765 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1988).

Failure to join indispensable party requires dismissal. The failure to join an indispensable party in an action for review of an administrative proceeding is a defect of constitutional proportion requiring dismissal of the action. Cissell v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 560, 564 P.2d 124 (1977).

University is an indispensable party in employment dispute. The university of Colorado is an indispensable party required by this section to be joined in a suit seeking judicial review of a termination of employment at the university. Ricci v. State Pers. Bd., 44 Colo. App. 9, 605 P.2d 492 (1980).

Erroneous designation of agency, where not technical error, precludes determination of merits. Where a proceeding is not brought against the agency whose action is challenged by its official title, the issue is whether the error in designation is a mere technical error which should not preclude a determination of the issues on the merits. Spahn v. Dept. of Pers., 44 Colo. App. 446, 615 P.2d 66 (1980).

The designation of the state department of personnel instead of the state personnel board as the defendant in a suit by a party who had her employment terminated in a hearing before the state personnel board is not a mere technical error and, therefore, the district court should dismiss the complaint for failure to join an indispensable party. Spahn v. Dept. of Pers., 44 Colo. App. 446, 615 P.2d 66 (1980).

Class action relief can be sought for the first time on appeal where review is pursuant to this section. Rodgers v. Atencio, 43 Colo. App. 268, 608 P.2d 813 (1979).

VI. RELIEF GRANTED.

Section allows for declaratory and injunctive relief from an unconstitutional agency action as part of the APA review. Jeffrey v. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 198 Colo. 265, 599 P.2d 874 (1979).

Colorado department of social services is a party for purposes of an administrative proceeding conducted pursuant to this section and as such may be held liable for attorney's fees for asserting a frivolous defense. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bethesda Care Ctr., Inc., 867 P.2d 4 (Colo. App. 1993).

But assessment of costs against state not allowed. Upon judicial review of administrative action, while subsection (7) permits the court "to afford such other relief as may be appropriate", this provision cannot be construed to authorize the assessment of costs against the state so as to take precedence over C.R.C.P. 54(d). Shumate v. State Pers. Bd., 34 Colo. App. 393, 528 P.2d 404 (1974).

There is no specific statutory provision allowing for the award of costs where an individual pursues his right to judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's actions under § 42-2-127 and this section; such an award is erroneous, because C.R.C.P. 54(d) limits the imposition of costs against the state to "the extent permitted by law". Lucero v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 73, 607 P.2d 405 (1980).

Jurisdiction of court to postpone action's effective date limited. The jurisdiction of a district court to postpone the effective date of an agency action is limited to proceedings taken in conjunction with an action for judicial review filed after final agency action. State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).

There is no constitutional prohibition against requiring irreparable injury showing. Nothing in the constitution of Colorado, or that of the United States, prohibits the general assembly from requiring a showing of irreparable injury as a condition to be met before the postponement of the effective date of agency action shall be brought about. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563 (1961).

Showing of irreparable injury constitutes only prerequisite to entry of stay. Under subsection (5), the only prerequisite to an entry of a stay of agency action is a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).

Where there is no showing of irreparable injury justifying the postponement of the effective date of an order of the director of revenue suspending a driver's license, and no notice to the director of an application for an order commanding him to restore the license pending determination of review proceedings, the district court is without authority to summarily order restoration of the license. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563 (1961).

Section 39-21-105 does not expressly prohibit the entry of a stay as authorized by subsection (5). Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).

Court may provide appropriate temporary relief for driver with suspended license. When a driver whose license has been suspended establishes that irreparable injury would otherwise result if the suspension were effective pending judicial review, a court may provide appropriate relief under subsection (5). Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981).

Court cannot modify administrative relief awarded. To "postpone" the effective date of an agency action means only to hold back to a later time or to defer; it cannot be expanded to include a modification of the administrative relief awarded by substituting a period of restricted driving for a period of full suspension of driving privileges. Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981).

Supreme court not to act as licensing board. It is not within the scope of judicial review for the supreme court to act as a professional licensing board. In re Maul v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 668 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1983).

Insurance companies allowed to increase rates approved by commissioner. Where a suit challenging an insurance premium rate increase has not been determined, companies can increase rates approved by the commissioner, since the commissioner can order refunds if the increase is held invalid, and since insurance companies would otherwise suffer irreparable injury if the increase were upheld. Nat'l Auto. Underwriters Ass'n v. District Court, 160 Colo. 467, 418 P.2d 52 (1966).

No further agency action once judicial review commenced. Once an action for judicial review had been commenced in the district court, the department of revenue has no jurisdiction to enter any further orders in the case until final disposition of the judicial proceedings and a remand of the case to the department, and may not stay an order of license revocation. Marr v. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 36, 598 P.2d 155 (1979).

The district court did not err in considering complainant's claims under the judicial review principles of the APA and in remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. When considered in conjunction with § 2 2 24-4-105, the purpose of § 1-1.5-105 (3)(b) , the so-called "adjudication clause"of the state version of the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA), is to spare the secretary and persons filing administrative complaints under the state HAVA from having to observe the numerous, and somewhat complex, procedural requirements contained in § 24-4-105 , and to curtail the administrative rights and obligations the parties would ordinarily have in adjudicatory proceedings. The court also rejected the secretary of state's assertion that, if a statute precludes the application of the administrative procedures under § 1-1.5-105 , it necessarily precludes judicial review under the state APA. Accordingly, the district court had plenary authority under subsection (7) to review and remand this case for further proceedings if it concluded that the agency acted contrary to law. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

The exclusive administrative remedy clause under § 1-1.5-105 (3)(c) does not limit an aggrieved party's judicial remedies. The clause does not refer to a complainant's available judicial remedies; it refers only to the procedures that constitute the administrative remedy for a violation of title III of the federal HAVA. The plain meaning of "administrative remedy" does not include a judicial remedy. This interpretation is further supported by the appeals clause in § 1-1.5-105 (4) , which allows a person aggrieved by a final determination of the secretary to appeal the decision to the district court, and thus, potentially obtain a judicial remedy. Marks v. Gessler, 2 013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

Although the APA rules and procedures do not apply to the secretary's resolution of a state HAVA administrative complaint at the agency level, the APA does apply to judicial review in the district court of the secretary's determination. Section 1-1.5-105 (3)(b) and (3)(c) exclude only the administrative procedure provisions set forth under § 2 2 4-4-105" target="_self">24-4-105. They do not limit the availability of judicial remedies. At the agency level, a person filing a state HAVA administrative complaint is only entitled to administrative procedures and rights included in the state HAVA statute itself and is not entitled to or burdened by the additional administrative procedures, rights, and obligations provided under the APA. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

Complainant satisfied jurisdictional prerequisites for standing as well as the standing requirements to obtain judicial review of an agency action under the APA and the state HAVA. Complainant had legal standing to maintain her first claim for relief in which she sought judicial review under § 1-1.5-105 (4) and this section of the dismissal of her state HAVA complaint. Because complainant alleged that defendants deprived her of her legally protected interests in using the administrative complaint procedure to remedy violations of the federal HAVA and a hearing on the record in connection with her state HAVA administrative complaint, she has alleged a sufficient injury in fact. Injury in fact is also supported by complainant's allegations in her administrative complaint that she believed violations of title III of the federal HAVA occurred during the 2 010 general election. Marks v. Gessler, 2 013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

Complainant also suffered an injury to a legally protected interest. Section 2 (2 )(b) provides complainant with a right to file a state HAVA complaint and § 1-1.5-105 (2)(g) states that a complainant is entitled to a hearing on the record. In addition, complainant has a right under subsection (2) to seek judicial review of the agency action. Defendants' dismissal of her complaint for lack of standing violated her right to file a state HAVA complaint, and, therefore, she was adversely affected by the decision. Likewise, § 1-1.5-105 (4) also provides complainant with a right to seek judicial review of the decision. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

VII. RECORD ON REVIEW.

No time limitations relating to filing record. Subsection (6) does not contain any time limitations on filing a designation of record, objecting to or supplementing the record designated, or filing the record. Harris v. District Court, 655 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1982).

Party seeking review must order transcript to make it part of record. The party seeking review is required to order and pay for a transcript of an administrative hearing in order to make it part of the record for purposes of judicial review under this section. Harris v. District Court, 655 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1982).

However, when the party seeking review proceeds in forma pauperis, an alternative method of providing a record of the administrative proceedings may be allowed. Schaffes v. District Court, 719 P.2d 1088 (Colo. 1986); Earl v. District Court, 719 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1986).

Review by district court is limited to the record compiled by the agency. Stream v. Heckers, 184 Colo. 149, 519 P.2d 336 (1974).

In certiorari proceedings reviewing an administrative action, the trial court is confined to a review of the record of hearings before the agency. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972).

Remand is mandated where agency order is without findings. Where the civil service commission (now the department of personnel) modifies a dismissal order of the police chief without findings, the district court should remand to the commission (now department) to supply findings, because otherwise there can be no meaningful review on the merits. Lawless v. Bach, 176 Colo. 165, 489 P.2d 316 (1971).

Record may not include post-hearing matters. Complaints about other matters filed after the agency hearing upon which the board based its findings of fact and conclusions of law could not pertain to errors, omissions, and irregularities in the agency record, and may not be included in the record on appeal. Harris v. District Court, 655 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1982).

Hearing transcript made part of record considered. If a hearing transcript is ordered, paid for, and made part of the record on appeal, the reviewing court is required to consider it. Loesch v. Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 169, 570 P.2d 530 (1977).

Appellate court reviews record where lower court reviews only transcript and exhibits. Where a review of a dismissal action in a lower court is only of the transcript and exhibits presented at the agency hearing, the appellate court is in as good a position as the district court to review the record, and it need not remand the case to the lower court for a determination of whether the dismissal was supported by the requisite substantial evidence. Lassner v. Civil Service Comm'n, 177 Colo. 257, 493 P.2d 1087 (1972).

VIII. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Standard of review in the consideration of agency rule-making is reasonableness. Amax, Inc. v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1989); Brown v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 1 P.3d 175 (Colo. App. 1999).

Under the applicable standard of review, the board of assessment appeals' exemption determination must be sustained if it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM Int'l, 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997); Pilgrim Rest Baptist Church, Inc. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 971 P.2d 270 (Colo. App. 1998); EchoStar Satellite, L.L.C. v. Arapahoe County Bd. of Equaliz., 171 P.3d 633 (Colo. App. 2007).

Valuation determinations of the board of assessment appeals will not be disturbed on review if the board's factual findings as to the appropriate valuation of the subject property are supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002).

Rules adopted pursuant to a statutory rulemaking proceeding are presumed valid. Brown v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 1 P.3d 175 (Colo. App. 1999).

Judicial review of state agency action under this section is the counterpart to judicial review of local government action under C.R.C.P. 106. Review of agency action, whether in the district court or the court of appeals, is essentially appellate in nature based on the board's administrative record. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1997).

The board is collaterally estopped from relitigating, in a § 1983 action, the issue of a summary license suspension decided between the same parties in an earlier proceeding in the absence of new circumstances and a finding by the board that an emergency exists. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1997).

Burden on challenging party to establish invalidity of rules adopted pursuant to a statutory rule-making proceeding by demonstrating that the rule-making body acted in an unconstitutional manner, exceeded its statutory authority, or otherwise acted in a manner contrary to statutory requirements. Amax, Inc. v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1989); Wine & Spirits Wholesalers v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 919 P.2d 894 (Colo. App. 1996); Brown v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 1 P.3d 175 (Colo. App. 1999).

Agency rules are presumed valid and a plaintiff challenging a rule must establish the invalidity of the rule by demonstrating that the rule-making body exceeded its statutory authority. An agency's construction of its own governing statute is entitled to great weight. Mile High Greyhound Park v. Racing Comm'n, 12 P.3d 351 (Colo. App. 2000).

A reviewing court may reverse an administrative agency's determination if the court finds that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority. Ohlson v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939 (Colo. App. 1997).

The ultimate determination as to the appropriate classification of property for property tax purposes involves mixed issues of law and fact. Under the applicable standard of review, the board of assessment appeal's property classification determination must be sustained by the appellate court if it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. E.R. Southtech, Ltd. v. Arapahoe County Bd. of Equaliz., 972 P.2d 1057 (Colo. App. 1998); Farny v. Bd. of Equaliz., 985 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1999); Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002).

Board of assessment appeals can consider reasonable inferences and circumstances tending to weaken or discredit uncontroverted evidence of a single party. Weingarten v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 876 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1994).

Board of assessment appeals' property tax classification determination must be sustained if it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Johnston v. Park County Bd. of Equaliz., 979 P.2d 578 (Colo. App. 1999); Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002).

Board of assessment appeals' factual determination as to the appropriate valuation of a parcel may not be disturbed on review where it is supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Steamboat Ski & Resort Corp. v. Routt County Bd. of Equaliz., 23 P.3d 1258 (Colo. App. 2001).

In determining whether an administrative agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court must determine whether a reasonable person, considering all of the evidence in the record, would fairly and honestly be compelled to reach a different conclusion. If not, no abuse of discretion has occurred and the agency decision must be upheld. Ramseyer v. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 895 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1995); WCC v. Umetco Minerals, 919 P.2d 887 (Colo. App. 1996).

District court has no jurisdiction to interfere with officers of the executive branch of government whose duties are imposed by statute, because such action constitutes direct and unjustified judicial interference with a function properly delegated to the executive department. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 144, 470 P.2d 864 (1970).

District courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch of the government in the performance of its statutory duties. Moore v. District Court, 184 Colo. 63, 518 P.2d 948 (1974).

A court cannot substitute its judgment for that of an agency as to what is a reasonable penalty and the power to modify is not given to a reviewing court under subsection (7). Petersen v. Racing Comm'n, 677 P.2d 412 (Colo. App. 1983).

The district court cannot usurp the power of the state banking board to determine whether to grant a bank charter. Banking Bd. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 77, 492 P.2d 837 (1972).

District court cannot substitute its judgment for that of administrative tribunal when there is substantial evidence in record to support tribunal's decision. Inst. for Research v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 748 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1987).

Weighing evidence and resolving conflicts is the task of the administrative agency, not the reviewing court. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1988).

Agency decision may be set aside only upon the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious or it is unsupported by any competent evidence. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1988); Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 802 P.2d 1109 (Colo. App. 1990).

A reviewing court may not reverse the decision of an agency unless the court finds it to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law. Kramer v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 964 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1998).

An agency interpretation that is not only in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions but is reasonably supported by the agency's reasoning and the record is entitled to deference. Dept. of Rev. v. Woodmen of the World, 919 P.2d 806 (Colo. 1996); Kramer v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 964 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1998).

Because the fire and police pension association is not an agency of state government, the standard of review of a decision of the association is not whether there is "substantial evidence" under subsection (7), but rather, whether there is "no competent evidence" under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), to support the decision. Pueblo v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 827 P.2d 597 (Colo. App. 1992); Wine & Spirits Wholesalers v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 919 P.2d 894 (Colo. App. 1996).

Where evidence is conflicting, the hearing officer's finding is binding on appeal, and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Marek v. Dept. of Rev., 709 P.2d 978 (Colo. App. 1985); Glasmann v. Dept. of Rev., 719 P.2d 1096 (Colo. App. 1986).

Record as a whole substantially supported the racing commission's order, and, therefore, the agency's decision must be upheld. Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

Court properly exercised its judicial review function where record of rule-making proceeding supports the adoption of the rule. City of Aurora v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1280 (Colo. 1990).

Administrative decision set aside where unsupported by competent evidence. In order for a court to set aside a decision of an administrative body on the ground that it is arbitrary and capricious, the court must find that the decision is unsupported by any competent evidence. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972); Dolan v. Rust, 195 Colo. 173, 576 P.2d 560 (1978); Noe v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 32, 589 P.2d 483 (1979); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 628 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1981); Mertsching v. Webb, 757 P.2d 1102 (Colo. App. 1988).

A trial court may not set aside the decision of an administrative body as arbitrary and capricious unless the decision is unsupported by competent evidence. Guildner Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 35 Colo. App. 70, 529 P.2d 332 (1974).

Hearing officer wrongly denied licensee access to documents considered by the agency. The state administrative procedure act requires that the record include copies of all exhibits and other papers. Gilbert v. Julian, 230 P.3d 1218 (Colo. App. 2009).

Abuse of discretion by board of assessment appeals exists where board failed to consider evidence of value of similar properties in other counties in Colorado and other states for purposes of property tax assessment. Platinum Props. Corp. v. Bd. of Assess. App., 738 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1987); Sonnenberg & Sons v. Bd. of Assess. App., 768 P.2d 748 (Colo. App. 1988).

Because specialty board certification exceeds the requirements for licensure of a physician, the board of medical examiners acted outside of its statutory authority in imposing such a requirement as a condition of license reinstatement. Lopez-Samoyoa v. Bd. of Med. Exam., 868 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1993).

Courts cannot interfere with zoning decisions unless record shows clear abuse of discretion. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972).

Abuse of discretion not shown where factual question debatable. Where the question of whether the character of a neighborhood has changed sufficiently to justify a change in zoning is fairly debatable and the zoning decision of the board of county commissioners is supported by competent evidence, the record does not show a clear abuse of discretion. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972).

Agency action to be supported by substantial evidence when record considered as whole. This section requires agency action to be supportable by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole; if there is only some evidence in some particulars, it is insufficient to justify an affirmance of discharge of a civil service employee. Lassner v. Civil Service Comm'n, 177 Colo. 257, 493 P.2d 1087 (1972).

The hearing panel's findings of basic facts must be rejected if they are unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole or if they are not supported by competent evidence in the record. Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1981).

Facts were sufficient to support, by a preponderance of the evidence, a finding of child abuse; therefore, record on the whole supports the findings of fact and the district court judgment and final agency order shall not be disturbed on review. M.G. v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 12 P.3d 815 (Colo. App. 2000).

The imposition of sanctions is a discretionary function that cannot be overturned unless it is an abuse of that discretion. As long as the record as a whole provides sufficient evidence that the penalty is not manifestly excessive in relation to the misconduct and the public need, the penalty will be upheld. The "reasonable basis" standard does not apply to the review of an agency's imposition of sanctions. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n v. Hanegan, 947 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1997); Ainsworth v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 45 P.3d 768 (Colo. App. 2001).

Effect of substantial evidence supporting agency action. Where appellate review of the record shows "substantial evidence" to support the decision of an administrative hearing officer, the existence of such evidence renders an appellant's claim of an unduly restrictive standard of review by the district court devoid of merit. DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983).

Doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel applicable. While the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were developed in the context of judicial proceedings, it is now well accepted that in a proper case they may be applied to administrative proceedings as well. Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974).

Where a teacher has a full adversary hearing before a teacher tenure panel, which has the power to determine all his claims of religious discrimination, the doctrine of res judicata operates as a bar to the relitigation of issues before the civil rights commission which the teacher raises or could raise in the hearing before that panel and on judicial review. Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974).

Where an agency's interpretation of a regulation clearly contradicts that agency's consistent practice, the agency's practices and not its interpretation should prevail. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 712 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1985).

Determination held to be supported by substantial evidence. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 650 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 699 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1985); Pub. Emp. Ret. Ass'n v. Stermole, 874 P.2d 444 (Colo. App. 1993).

School board found to have abused its discretion in dismissing teacher. Hudson v. Bd. of Educ., 655 P.2d 853 (Colo. App. 1982).

Whether PUC "regularly pursued its authority" pursuant to subsection (7) depends on several factors including whether: The decision is based on evidence introduced at evidence gathering stage of process; the PUC order is supported by findings of fact; the PUC supplied legislative standards guiding its decision-making function; and the PUC acted within authority conferred on it. Home Builders Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986); Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).

State pharmacy board (Board) did not exceed its statutory authority pursuant to subsection (7) in promulgating rule prohibiting pharmacists from dispensing prescription drugs resulting from internet-based questionnaires, internet-based consultation, or telephonic consultation without a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship. Court rejects appellants' claims that a determination of whether a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship (1) necessarily involves knowledge of the Medical Practice Act and the rules promulgated by the Colorado state board of medical examiners (BME), (2) is beyond the expertise of individual pharmacists and the Board, and (3) improperly injects the Board into areas that are properly regulated by the BME. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).

Department of health care policy and financing's rules denying spouse of institutionalized man a community spouse monthly income allowance are contrary to federal law and, therefore, may not be applied. Koehler v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 252 P.3d 1174 (Colo. App. 2010).

An agency's failure to comply with its own regulations constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct; however, any impropriety in the administrative process will not require reversal unless a plaintiff can demonstrate prejudice. Rags Over Ark. River v. Parks & Wildlife Bd., 2 015 COA 11M, 360 P.3d 186.

District court erred to the extent that it reweighed evidence and made credibility determinations based on information outside an administrative record. The administrative record did not contain any evidence regarding prior condemnation cases involving a municipal water delivery project at issue. Moreover, the state's water quality control commission (commission) and not the district court is tasked with determining the weight and credibility of the evidence. Thus, it was for the commission to determine the weight and impact of any proposed future mitigation efforts agreed to by participants in the project. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2 013 COA 111, 3 2 7 P.3d 290.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's conclusion that a conditional certification of a municipal water delivery project under section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act by the water quality control division (division) meets the federal standard of providing reasonable assurance that the project will be conducted in a manner that will not violate applicable water quality standards. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2 013 COA 111, 3 2 7 P.3d 290.

District court erred in determining that the methodology selected and applied by the division in conditionally certifying a municipal water delivery project under section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, and affirmed by the commission, was arbitrary and capricious. Because commission is the agency tasked with administrative review of section 401 certifications, and given the technical nature of the review, appellate court defers to commission's interpretation of its regulations. Commission's interpretative conclusions are neither unreasonable nor plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 401 certification or antidegradation regulations. Although the district court disagreed with conclusions drawn from evidence presented and appeared not to credit testimony of division employee responsible for certification review, it is not the prerogative of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence. Under subsection (7), it is for the commission to resolve any conflicts in the testimony and to weigh the evidence presented. It is also not the role of the reviewing court to choose among alternative methodologies. That is the function of the commission. Rather, the role of the reviewing court is limited to determining whether the commission's decision is consistent with its regulations and supported by the record. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2 013 COA 111, 3 2 7 P.3d 290.

Administrative record supports findings of commission. There is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support commission's conclusion that the division complied with the public notice requirements specified in the commission's regulations and conducted antidegredation reviews. Consequently, the district court erred in finding that the division failed to conduct antidegradation reviews of the reviewable stream segments. The administrative record demonstrates that the division appropriately interpreted and applied the regulations and guidance governing the methodologies for antidegredation analysis. Commission correctly concluded that the division was not required to develop total maximum daily loads (TDMLs) for certain impaired stream segments before issuing its 401 certification. Accordingly, district court erred in concluding that a TDML was required and that division was required to assess potential impacts of future population growth as part of its section 401 review process. Thus, the commission's finding on these issues were neither arbitrary and capricious nor contrary to law. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2 013 COA 111, 3 2 7 P.3d 290.

24-4-107. Application of article.

This article applies to every agency of the state having statewide territorial jurisdiction except those in the legislative or judicial branches, courts-martial, military commissions, and arbitration and mediation functions. It applies to every other agency to which it is made to apply by specific statutory reference; but, where there is a conflict between this article and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision shall control as to such agency.

Source: L. 59: p. 166, § 6. CRS 53: § 3-16-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-6. L. 69: p. 91, § 7.

ANNOTATION

The State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applies to the review of rules adopted by the ground water commission. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, 919 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1996); Parrish v. Water Quality Control Div., 934 P.2d 913 (Colo. App. 1997).

Notice requirements for county liquor license suspension proceedings governed by state provisions. Since the general assembly has not adopted legislation requiring that license suspension proceedings by a county be conducted pursuant to the APA and since a county does not have statewide jurisdiction, the notice requirements for a county proceeding for the suspension of a liquor license are governed by the state liquor code. Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 36 Colo. App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975).

When there is a conflict between provisions of the APA and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, the specific statutory provision is deemed controlling in professional disciplinary proceedings before the board of medical examiners. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Reiner, 786 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1989).

No conflict is found between §§ 39-21-105 and 24-4-106 (5) where none plainly appears. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).

Air pollution (now air quality) control commission is an "agency" under this section and is subject to the provisions of the APA. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

Fire and police pension association board is not an "agency" for purposes of the APA. Ross v. Fire and Police Pension Ass'n, 713 P.2d 1304 (Colo. 1986).

County cannot challenge rule promulgated by state board of social services. This article is inapplicable in determining whether a county, through its board of commissioners, while not engaged in rule-making, has standing to challenge a rule promulgated by the state board of social services fixing the salaries of county welfare department employees. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974) (decided prior to 1979 amendment of § 24-4-106).

Provisions on marketing orders supersede administrative provisions. The specific procedural requirements for the issuance and administration of marketing orders, as set forth in agricultural marketing act, supersede the general procedure of the administrative code as dictated by stated legislative intent. Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People ex rel. Swisher, 166 Colo. 199, 444 P.2d 277 (1968).

Provisions concerning property tax administration in §§ 39-2-117 and 39-2-125 supersede administrative provisions. Colo. Rocky Mtn. Sch., Inc., v. Shriver, 689 P.2d 651 (Colo. App. 1984).

Where provisions of public utilities law and the APA conflict, the former governs. Home Builders Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986).

The provisions of §§ 1-40-101 and 1-40-102, rather than the provisions of the APA, govern the initiative title setting board's action in fixing the title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary of a proposed initiative measure. In re Proposed Initiative Entitled W.A.T.E.R., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. App. 1992).

The 30-day deadline set forth in § 2 2 25-8-404, rather than the 35-day deadline under the APA, governs the window of time for seeking judicial review of a water quality control order. Peabody Sage v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health, 2020 COA 127, __ P.3d __.

The initiative title setting review board is not acting in an adjudicative or rule-making capacity when it holds a meeting for designating and fixing a title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary. In this context, it is a special statutory body governed by initiative and referendum statutes rather than the APA. Matter of Title, Ballot Title et al., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1992).

Administrative provisions inapplicable to board of accountancy proceedings. The notice and hearing requirements of § 24-4-104 (3) are of no significance where there is a specific statutory provision concerning the notice and hearing requirements in proceedings before the board of accountancy. People ex rel. Bd. of Accountancy v. McFarland, 37 Colo. App. 93, 543 P.2d 112 (1975).

Former § 12-2-125 (2) (now repealed) required that the person charged be served at least 30 days before the hearing with a written notice stating the nature of the charges against the accused and the time and place of the hearing before the board on such charges. This provision was in conflict with the more detailed notice requirements of the APA. Therefore, the notice requirements of the former provision controlled. Hentges v. Bartsch, 35 Colo. App. 384, 533 P.2d 66 (1975).

And to city's supplying out-of-city customers with water. Denver's action in supplying customers outside the city does not subject the board of water commissioners to the notice and hearing requirements of § 24-4-105. Cottrell v. City & County of Denver, 636 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1981).

The APA does not apply to a board of county commissioners when the board does not have statewide territorial jurisdiction and no statute explicitly states that APA requirements apply to the board. Moss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Boulder County, 2 015 COA 35, 411 P.3d 918.

Review of quasi-judicial action would ordinarily be brought pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) and not the APA. Moss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Boulder County, 2 015 COA 35, 411 P.3d 918.

The department of state clearly meets APA's definition of a state agency. Marks v. Gessler, 2 013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.

Applied in Lontine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981); Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982); Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).

24-4-108. Legislative consideration of rules.

  1. Unless extended by the general assembly acting by bill, all of the rules and regulations of the principal departments shall expire on the dates specified in this section.
  2. The rules and regulations of the following principal departments shall expire on July 1, 1980:
    1. Repealed.
  3. The rules and regulations of the following principal departments shall expire on July 1, 1981:
    1. Repealed.
  4. The rules and regulations of the following principal departments shall expire on July 1, 1982:
    1. Repealed.
  5. The rules and regulations of the following principal departments shall expire on July 1, 1983:
    1. Repealed.
  6. The rules and regulations of the following principal departments shall expire on July 1, 1984:
    1. Department of the treasury;
    2. Repealed.
    3. Office of state planning and budgeting;
    4. Repealed.

    (6.1) Repealed.

  7. The general assembly, in its discretion, may postpone by bill the expiration of rules and regulations, or any portion thereof. Nothing in this section shall prohibit any action by the general assembly pursuant to section 24-4-103 (8)(d). The postponement of the expiration of a rule shall not constitute legislative approval of the rule nor be admissible in any court as evidence of legislative intent. The committee on legal services is authorized to establish procedures for the implementation of review of rules and regulations contemplated by this section including, but not limited to, a procedure for annual review of rules and regulations which may conflict with statutes or statutory changes adopted subsequent to review of a department's rules and regulations pursuant to this section.
  8. This section does not apply to rules of an agency in the department of regulatory agencies, which rules are subject to the provisions of section 24-34-104 (6)(b).

Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p. 846, § 3, effective July 1. L. 80: (2)(c) repealed, p. 289, § 3, effective April 13; (2)(b) repealed, p. 292, § 3, effective April 16; (6)(g) added and (2)(a) repealed, p. 287, §§ 2, 3, effective April 16. L. 81: (3)(a) repealed and (6.1) added, p. 1148, §§ 3, 2, effective April 24; (3)(d) repealed and (6.1) added, p. 1149, §§ 3, 2, effective May 28; (3)(b) repealed, p. 272, § 2, effective June 5; (7) amended and (3)(c), (6)(f), (6)(g), (6)(h), and (6.1) repealed, pp. 1145, 1146, §§ 1, 7, effective July 1; (8) amended, p. 1178, § 7, effective July 1. L. 82: (4)(a) repealed, p. 199, § 2, effective March 11; (4)(b) repealed, p. 201, § 2, effective April 27; (4)(c) repealed, p. 203, § 2, effective March 13. L. 83: (5)(b) repealed, p. 304, § 2, effective May 20; (5)(a) repealed, p. 306, § 2, effective May 25; (5)(c) repealed, p. 309, § 2, effective May 26; (5)(d) repealed, p. 308, § 2, effective June 1. L. 84: (6)(b) repealed, p. 260, § 2, effective March 29; (6)(e) repealed, p. 259, § 2, effective April 5; (6)(d) repealed, p. 258, § 2, effective April 9. L. 2016: (8) amended, (HB 16-1192), ch. 83, p. 234, § 16, effective April 14.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Legislative Oversight of Regulatory Agencies: The C olorado Sunset Experience", see 18 C olo. Law. 2129 (1989).

24-4-109. State engagement of disproportionately impacted communities - definitions - repeal.

  1. Goal. The goal of outreach to and engagement of disproportionately impacted communities is to build trust and transparency, provide meaningful opportunities to influence public policy, and modify proposed state action in response to received public input to decrease environmental burdens or increase environmental benefits for each disproportionately impacted community.
  2. Definitions.
      1. The environmental justice action task force created in section 25-1-133 will recommend to the general assembly potential modifications to the definitions established in this subsection (2). The definitions established in this subsection (2) apply unless and until the general assembly acts by bill to modify one or more of the definitions.
      2. This subsection (2)(a) is repealed, effective September 1, 2024.
    1. As used in this section and sections 25-1-133, 25-1-134, and 25-7-105 (1)(e), unless the context otherwise requires:
      1. "Agency" means the air quality control commission created in section 25-7-104.
      2. "Disproportionately impacted community" means a community that is in a census block group, as determined in accordance with the most recent United States census, where the proportion of households that are low income is greater than forty percent, the proportion of households that identify as minority is greater than forty percent, or the proportion of households that are housing cost-burdened is greater than forty percent; or is any other community as identified or approved by a state agency, if: The community has a history of environmental racism perpetuated through redlining, anti-Indigenous, anti-immigrant, anti-Hispanic, or anti-Black laws; or the community is one where multiple factors, including socioeconomic stressors, disproportionate environmental burdens, vulnerability to environmental degradation, and lack of public participation, may act cumulatively to affect health and the environment and contribute to persistent disparities. As used in this subsection (2)(b)(II), "cost-burdened" means a household that spends more than thirty percent of its income on housing, and "low income" means the median household income is less than or equal to two hundred percent of the federal poverty guideline.
      3. "Proposed state action" means:
        1. Rule-making proceedings held pursuant to section 24-4-103;
        2. Licensing proceedings, including the issuance and renewal of permits, held pursuant to section 24-4-104; and
        3. Adjudicatory hearings held pursuant to section 24-4-105.
  3. Engagement.
    1. To promote the goal of state engagement of disproportionately impacted communities, an agency shall strive to create new ways to gather input from communities across the state, using multiple languages and multiple formats and transparently sharing information about adverse environmental effects from its proposed state action.
    2. When conducting outreach to and engagement of disproportionately impacted communities regarding a proposed state action, the agency shall:
      1. Schedule variable times of day and days of the week for opportunities for public input on the proposed state action, including at least one weekend time, one evening time, and one morning time for public input;
      2. Provide notice at least thirty days before any public input opportunity or before the start of any public comment period;
      3. Utilize several different methods of outreach and ways to publicize the proposed state action, including disseminating information through schools, clinics, social media, social and activity clubs, local governments, tribal governments, libraries, religious organizations, civic associations, community-based environmental justice organizations, or other local services;
      4. Provide several methods for the public to give input, such as in-person meetings, virtual and online meetings, online comment portals or e-mail, and call-in meetings;
      5. Consider using a variety of locations for public input on the proposed state action, including meeting locations in urban centers, in neighborhoods whose populations are predominantly Black, Indigenous, or people of color and have an average income below the state's average, and in rural locations in various regions of the state; and
      6. Create outreach materials concerning the proposed state action in layperson's terms, translated into the top two languages spoken in a community, that inform people of opportunities to provide input on the proposed state action, their rights, the possible outcomes, and the upcoming public input process.
  4. The division of parks and wildlife created in section 33-9-104 shall, in conducting public outreach regarding the keep Colorado wild pass pursuant to section 33-12-108 (7):
    1. Include outreach to and engagement of disproportionately impacted communities with a goal to build trust and transparency, provide meaningful opportunities to influence public policy, and modify proposed state action in response to public input received to decrease environmental burdens or increase environmental benefits for each disproportionately impacted community; and
    2. Engage disproportionately impacted communities in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsection (3) of this section.

Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1266), ch. 411, p. 2725, § 3, effective July 2; (4) added, (SB 21-249), ch. 273, p. 1587, § 2, effective September 7.

Editor's note: (1) Section 24 of chapter 411 (HB 21-1266), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act adding this section applies to conduct occuring on or after July 2, 2021.

(2) Section 11(3) of chapter 273 (SB 21-249), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act adding subsection (4) of this section applies to conduct occuring on or after September 7, 2021.

Cross references: For the short title ("Environmental Justice Act") and the legislative declaration in HB 21-1266, see sections 1 and 2 of chapter 411, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

PART 2 MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL STREAMLINING

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 16-1197, see section 1 of chapter 190, Session Laws of Colorado 2016.

24-4-201. Definitions.

As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. "Authority to practice" or "authorized to practice" means the holding of a currently valid license to practice in an occupation or a currently valid certification or registration necessary to practice in an occupation if the person is licensed, certified, or registered.
  2. "Military occupational specialty" means the category or categories of special duties a member of the United States armed forces is trained to perform.
  3. "Occupation" means an occupation or profession that is licensed, certified, or registered under state statute.
  4. "State agency" means any department, division, board, or other agency of the state of Colorado that certifies, licenses, or registers an occupation.

Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 675, § 2, effective August 10.

24-4-202. Legislative declaration - reports - repeal.

  1. The general assembly intends that:
    1. Each state agency that authorizes more than ten occupations to practice or oversees other agencies that authorize more than ten occupations to practice should have implemented this part 2 for:
      1. At least twenty-five percent of the occupations by December 30, 2018;
      2. At least fifty percent of the occupations by December 30, 2020; and
      3. All of the occupations by December 30, 2022;
    2. Each state agency that authorizes ten or fewer occupations to practice or oversees other agencies that authorize ten or fewer occupations to practice should have implemented this part 2 for:
      1. At least fifty percent of the occupations by December 30, 2018; and
      2. All of the occupations by December 30, 2020.
    1. Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11), each state agency that authorizes an occupation to practice shall provide by June 30, 2017, and by June 30 of each year thereafter until June 30, 2023, a written report of its progress in implementing this part 2 to each member of: The general assembly; the business affairs and labor committee of the house of representatives; the business, labor, and technology committee of the senate; the state, veterans, and military affairs committees of the house of representatives and the senate, or their successor committees.
    2. This subsection (2) is repealed, effective July 1, 2023.

Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 675, § 2, effective August 10.

24-4-203. Evaluation and implementation.

  1. Each agency shall:
    1. Document the following results and publish a summary of pathways available to a veteran to obtain authorization to practice an occupation:
      1. Evaluate the extent to which military training meets all or part of the state requirements to be authorized to practice an occupation;
      2. Identify reciprocity mechanisms with other states; and
      3. Determine if an occupational exam is available to authorize a veteran to practice an occupation;
    2. Consult with community colleges and other post-secondary educational institutions with regard to:
      1. Courses or programs to cover the gap between military occupational specialty training and the training required to be authorized to practice an occupation; and
      2. Refresher courses for the reinstatement of lapsed civilian credentials; and
    3. Consider adopting a national credentialing exam.

Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 676, § 2, effective August 10.

24-4-204. Consultation - cooperation.

  1. Each state agency may consult with any federal or state military official or agency, state agency, or post-secondary educational institution to determine how best to implement this part 2.
  2. Nothing in this part 2 gives a state agency authority to determine curriculum, programs, or courses offered at any post-secondary education institution.

Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 676, § 2, effective August 10.

ARTICLE 4.1 CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION AND VICTIM AND WITNESS RIGHTS

Cross references: For restitution as a condition of probation, see § 18-1.3-205; for restitution to victims of crime generally, see article 28 of title 17; for the "Colorado Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1984", see part 7 of article 8 of title 18; for restitution by delinquent children under the "Colorado Children's Code", see § 19-2-918; for assistance to victims of and witnesses to crimes, see article 4.2 of this title.

Section

PART 1 CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION ACT

24-4.1-100.1. Short title.

This part 1 shall be known and may be cited as the "Colorado Crime Victim Compensation Act".

Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 364, § 1, effective March 22. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 657, § 5, effective May 14.

24-4.1-101. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly hereby finds that an effective criminal justice system requires the protection and assistance of victims of crime and members of the immediate families of such victims in order to preserve the individual dignity of victims and to encourage greater public cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of criminal defendants. The general assembly hereby intends to provide protection and assistance to victims and members of the immediate families of such victims by declaring and implementing the rights of such persons and by lessening the financial burden placed upon victims due to the commission of crimes. This article shall be liberally construed to accomplish such purposes.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1135, § 5, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 415, § 1, effective January 14, 1993.

Cross references: For constitutional provisions relating to the rights of crime victims, see § 16a of article II, Colo. Const.; for statutory provisions relating to the rights of victims of and witnesses to crimes, see part 3 of this article.

24-4.1-102. Definitions.

As used in this part 1, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. "Applicant" means any victim of a compensable crime who applies to the fund for compensation under this part 1. In the case of such victim's death, the term includes any person who was his dependent at the time of the death of that victim.

    (1.3) "Assault by strangulation" means assault as described in section 18-3-202 (1)(g) or 18-3-203 (1)(i).

  2. "Board" means the crime victim compensation board in each judicial district.
  3. "Child" means an unmarried person who is under eighteen years of age. The term includes a posthumous child, a stepchild, or an adopted child.
    1. "Compensable crime" means:
      1. An intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act of a person or any act in violation of section 42-4-1301 (1) or (2), C.R.S., that results in residential property damage to or bodily injury or death of another person or results in loss of or damage to eyeglasses, dentures, hearing aids, or other prosthetic or medically necessary devices and which, if committed by a person of full legal capacity, is punishable as a crime in this state; or
      2. An act in violation of section 42-4-1402, C.R.S., that results in the death or bodily injury of another person or section 42-4-1601, C.R.S., where the accident results in the death or bodily injury of another person.
    2. "Compensable crime" includes federal offenses that are comparable to those specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) and are committed in this state.
    1. "Dependent" means relatives of a deceased victim who, wholly or partially, were dependent upon the victim's income at the time of death or would have been so dependent but for the victim's incapacity due to the injury from which the death resulted.
    2. "Dependent" also means the child or spouse of the accused or other person in an intimate relationship, as defined in section 18-6-800.3, C.R.S., with the accused, if the accused provided household support to the dependent.
  4. "Economic loss" means economic detriment consisting only of allowable expense, net income, replacement services loss, and, if injury causes death, dependent's economic loss. The term does not include noneconomic detriment.
  5. "Fund" means the crime victim compensation fund as established in each judicial district.

    (7.5) "Household support" means the monetary support that a dependent would have received from the accused for the purpose of maintaining a home or residence.

  6. "Injury" means impairment of a person's physical or mental condition and includes pregnancy.

    1. (8.5) (a) "Property damage" means damage to windows, doors, locks, or other security devices of a residential dwelling and includes damage to a leased residential dwelling.
    2. "Property damage" also includes expenses related to the rekeying of a motor vehicle or other locks necessary to ensure a victim's safety.
  7. "Relative" means a victim's spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half brother, half sister, or spouse's parents. The term includes said relationships that are created as a result of adoption. In addition, "relative" includes any person who has a family-type relationship with a victim.
    1. "Victim" means any of the following persons who suffer property damage, economic loss, injury, or death as a result of a compensable crime perpetrated or attempted in whole or in part in this state:
      1. Any person against whom a compensable crime is perpetrated or attempted. Such person shall be referred to as a "primary victim".
      2. Any person who attempts to assist or assists a primary victim;
      3. Any person who is a relative of a primary victim.
    2. "Victim" also means a person who suffers injury or death, the proximate cause of which is a compensable crime perpetrated or attempted in the person's presence against a primary victim.
    3. "Victim" also means a person who is a resident of this state and who is a victim of a crime that occurred outside of this state, where the crime would be a compensable crime had it occurred in this state and where the state or country in which the crime occurred does not have a crime victim compensation program for which the person would be eligible.
    4. "Victim" also means a person who is a resident of this state who is injured or killed by an act of international terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. sec. 2331, committed outside of the United States.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1135, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (4) and (10) amended and (8.5) added, pp. 669, 854, 1648, §§ 16, 1, 19, effective July 1. L. 84: IP(1) and (1) amended, p. 657, § 6, effective May 14. L. 85: (1) and (6) amended, p. 792, § 1, effective April 11. L. 90: (10) amended, p. 1179, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (4) amended, p. 2555, § 50, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (8) to (10) amended, p. 1400, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (4) and (10)(c) amended and (10)(d) added, p. 1560, § 3, effective July 1. L. 98: (10)(d) amended, p. 517, § 1, effective April 30. L. 99: (10)(d) amended, p. 58, § 10, effective March 15. L. 2015: (4)(a)(II), (5), and (8.5) amended and (7.5) added, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 143, § 1, effective March 30. L. 2021: (1.3) added, (HB 21-1165), ch. 129, p. 520, § 2, effective May 10.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1165, see section 1 of chapter 129, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

ANNOTATION

With regard to a victim compensation board's payment of a victim compensation claim, the definition of "victim" in this section prevails over the definition of "victim" in the general restitution statute, § 2 18-1.3-60 2 (10), because the definition in this section deals only with restitution payments made to a victim compensation board and is, therefore, the more specific statute. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, 471 P.3d 1159.

24-4.1-103. Crime victim compensation board - creation.

  1. There is hereby created in each judicial district a crime victim compensation board. Each board shall be composed of three members to be appointed by the district attorney. The district attorney shall designate one of the members as chairman. To the extent possible, members shall fairly reflect the population of the judicial district.
  2. The term of office of each member of the board shall be three years; except that, of those members first appointed, one shall be appointed for a three-year term, one for a two-year term, and one for a one-year term. All vacancies, except through the expiration of term, shall be filled for the unexpired term only. Each member may be reappointed once and serve two consecutive terms. A person may be reappointed to the board thereafter if it has been at least one year since such person served on the board.
  3. Members of the board shall receive no compensation but are entitled to be reimbursed for travel expenses at the rate authorized for state employees.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1136, § 5, effective July 1. L. 90: (2) amended, p. 1179, § 2, effective July 1.

24-4.1-104. District attorney to assist board.

The district attorney and his legal and administrative staff shall assist the board in the performance of its duties pursuant to this part 1.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 657, § 7, effective May 14.

24-4.1-105. Application for compensation.

  1. A person who may be eligible for compensation under this part 1 may apply to the board in the judicial district in which the crime was committed. In a case in which the person entitled to apply is a minor, the application may be made on his behalf by his parent or guardian. In a case in which the person entitled to apply is mentally incompetent, the application may be made on his behalf by his parent, conservator, or guardian or by any other individual authorized to administer his estate.
    1. In order to be eligible for compensation under this part 1, the applicant shall submit reports, if reasonably available, from any physician who has treated or examined the victim at the time of or subsequent to the victim's injury or death. The report shall be in relation to the injury for which compensation is claimed. If, in the opinion of the board, reports on the previous medical history of the victim, a report on the examination of the injured victim, or the report on the cause of death of the victim by a medical expert would be of material aid to its determination, the board may order the reports.
    2. In order to be eligible for compensation for property damage under this part 1, the applicant shall submit a report or case number, if reasonably available, from a law enforcement agency which shall set forth the nature of the property damage which is the result of a compensable crime.
  2. If the applicant makes any false statement as to a material fact, he shall be ineligible for an award pursuant to this part 1.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (2) amended, p. 669, § 17, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 657, § 8, effective May 14.

ANNOTATION

A crime victim compensation board (CVCB) is not prohibited from compensating a crime victim for wages the victim expects to lose in the future. A CVCB may reimburse a crime victim for lost wages without specifying whether that amount includes only wages lost in the past, or wages that will be lost in the future. People v. Bohn, 2 015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.

24-4.1-106. Hearings.

  1. The board, in its discretion, may conduct a hearing upon any application submitted to it. All hearings conducted by the board and appeals therefrom shall be held pursuant to sections 24-4-105 and 24-4-106.
  2. The burden of proof is upon the applicant to show that the claim is reasonable and is compensable under the terms of this part 1. The standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.
  3. If a person has been convicted of an offense with respect to an act on which a claim is based, proof of that conviction shall be taken as conclusive evidence that the offense has been committed, unless an appeal or a proceeding with regard to it is pending. The fact that the identity of the assailant is unknown or that the assailant has not been prosecuted or convicted shall not raise a presumption that the claim is invalid.
  4. Orders and decisions of the board are final.
  5. Review of an order or decision of the board may be made in accordance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 658, § 9, effective May 14.

ANNOTATION

A crime victim compensation board (CVCB) is not prohibited from compensating a crime victim for wages the victim expects to lose in the future. A CVCB may reimburse a crime victim for lost wages without specifying whether that amount includes only wages lost in the past, or wages that will be lost in the future. People v. Bohn, 2 015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.

24-4.1-107. Regulations.

In the performance of its functions, the board, pursuant to article 4 of this title, is authorized to make, rescind, and amend regulations prescribing the procedures to be followed in the filing of applications and in proceedings under this part 1.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 658, § 10, effective May 14.

24-4.1-107.5. Confidentiality of materials - definitions.

  1. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. "In camera review" means the judge views the material in private, without either party present.
    2. "Materials" means any records, claims, writings, documents, or information.
  2. Any materials received, made, or kept by a board or a district attorney to process a claim on behalf of a crime victim under this article are confidential. The district attorney shall have standing in any action to oppose the disclosure of any such materials. A board shall not provide through discovery in any civil or criminal action any exhibits, medical records, psychological records, counseling records, work records, criminal investigation records, criminal court case records, witness statements, telephone records, and other records of any type or nature whatsoever gathered for the purpose of evaluating whether to compensate a victim except:
    1. In the event of the review by the court of an order or decision of the board pursuant to section 24-4.1-106, and then only to the extent narrowly and necessary to obtain court review; or
    2. Upon a strict showing to the court in a separate civil or a criminal action that particular information or documents are known to exist only in board records. The court may inspect in camera such records to determine whether the specific requested information exists. If the court determines that the specific information sought exists in the board's records, the documents may then be released only by court order if the court finds as part of its order that the documents will not pose any threat to the safety or welfare of the victim or any other person whose identity may appear in the board's records, or violate any other privilege or confidentiality right.
  3. In a proceeding for determining the amount of restitution, if the defendant's request is not speculative and is based on an evidentiary hypothesis that warrants an in camera review to rebut the presumption established in section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S., the court may release additional information contained in the records of the board only after an in camera review and additionally finding that the information:
    1. Is necessary for the defendant to dispute the amount claimed for restitution; and
    2. Will not pose any threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, or any other person whose identity may appear in the board's records, or violate any other privilege or confidentiality right.

Source: L. 2000: Entire section added, p. 242, § 7, effective March 29. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 144, § 2, effective March 30.

ANNOTATION

Because an in camera review of confidential or privileged records is only required when disclosure is "necessary" to resolve a pending issue, court did not err in denying defendant's request for in camera review of victim's mental health record. Defendant must show that his or her request is not speculative and that an evidentiary hypothesis would disprove all or part of the prosecution's restitution request on the basis that the requested amounts were not proximately caused by defendant's conduct. People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010).

24-4.1-108. Awarding compensation.

  1. A person is entitled to an award of compensation under this part 1 if:
    1. The person is a victim or a dependent of a victim or a successor in interest under the "Colorado Probate Code" of a victim of a compensable crime which was perpetrated on or after July 1, 1982, and which resulted in a loss;
    2. The appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the death of or injury to the victim within seventy-two hours after its perpetration, unless the board finds good cause exists for the failure of notification;
    3. The applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant, or the board has found good cause exists for the failure to cooperate, or, if the applicant is a victim of assault by strangulation, the applicant cooperates with law enforcement by undergoing a medical forensic examination;
    4. Repealed.
    5. The death of or injury to the victim was not substantially attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant; and
    6. The application for an award of compensation under this part 1 is filed with the board within one year of the date of injury to the victim or within such further extension of time as the board, for good cause shown, allows. For purposes of this paragraph (f), "good cause" may include but is not limited to circumstances in which a crime has remained unsolved for more than one year.

    (1.5) A person is entitled to an award of compensation for property damage under this part 1 if:

    1. The person is a victim of a compensable crime which was perpetrated on or after July 1, 1983, and which resulted in property damage;
    2. The appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime causing property damage within seventy-two hours after its perpetration, unless the board finds good cause exists for the failure of notification;
    3. The applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant or the board has found good cause exists for the failure to cooperate; and
    4. The application for an award of compensation for property damage under this part 1 is filed with the board within six months of the date of property damage or within such further extension of time as the board, for good cause shown, allows.
  2. The board may waive any of the requirements set forth in this section, or the limitations set forth in section 24-4.1-109 (1), or order a denial or reduction of an award if, in the interest of justice, it is so required.
  3. Upon a finding by the board that compensation should be awarded, the board shall submit a statement of award to the court administrator who shall remit payment in accordance with the statement of award.
  4. Consistent with approved standards established pursuant to section 24-4.1-117.3 (3) for the administration of crime victim compensation funds, the board may develop policies to ensure that primary victims are compensated and to ensure that available moneys in the fund are not exceeded.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1138, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (2)(a) and (1)(f) amended and (1.5) added, pp. 668, 669, 854, §§ 14, 18, 2, effective July 1. L. 84: IP(1), (1)(f), IP(1.5), and (1.5)(d) amended, pp. 658, 1120, §§ 11, 20, effective May 14. L. 85: (2) amended, p. 792, § 2, effective April 11. L. 89: (1)(d) repealed, p. 1016, § 3, effective April 23. L. 95: (4) added, p. 1401, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2009: (4) amended, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 556, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1)(f) amended, (HB 12-1053), ch. 244, p. 1158, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2021: (1)(c) amended, (HB 21-1165), ch. 129, p. 520, § 3, effective May 10.

Cross references: (1) For the "Colorado Probate Code", see articles 10 to 17 of title 15.

(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1165, see section 1 of chapter 129, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

24-4.1-109. Losses compensable.

  1. L osses compensable under this part 1 resulting from death of or injury to a victim include:
    1. Reasonable medical and hospital expenses and expenses incurred for dentures, eyeglasses, hearing aids, or other prosthetic or medically necessary devices;
    2. L oss of earnings;
    3. Outpatient care;
    4. Homemaker and home health services;
    5. Burial expenses;
    6. Loss of support to dependents;
    7. Mental health counseling;
    8. Household support; except that household support is only available to a dependent when:
      1. The offender is accused of committing the criminally injurious conduct that is the basis of the dependent's claim under this article;
      2. As a result of the criminal event, the offender vacated any home the offender shared with the dependent; and
      3. The dependent provides verification of dependency on the offender at the time of the criminal event.
    1. (1.5) (a) Losses compensable under this part 1 resulting from property damage include:
        1. Repair or replacement of property damaged as a result of a compensable crime; or
        2. Payment of the deductible amount on a residential insurance policy;
      1. Any modification to the victim's residence that is necessary to ensure victim safety; and
      2. The rekeying of a motor vehicle or other lock that is necessary to ensure the victim's safety.
    2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 517, § 2, effective April 30, 1998.)
  2. Compensable losses do not include:
    1. Pain and suffering or property damage other than residential property damage or rekeying a lock pursuant to subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1.5) of this section; or
    2. Aggregate damages to the victim or to the dependents of a victim exceeding thirty thousand dollars.
    3. Repealed.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1138, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (2)(a) and (2)(b) amended and (1.5) added, pp. 670, 854, §§ 19, 3, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 659, § 12, effective May 14. L. 85: (1)(g) added, p. 792, § 3, effective June 6. L. 89: (1.5)(a)(II) amended, p. 1016, § 1, effective April 23. L. 93: (2) amended, p. 2051, § 1, effective June 9. L. 98: (1.5) and (2)(b) amended, p. 517, § 2, effective April 30. L. 2015: (1)(h) and (1.5)(a)(III) added, (1.5)(a)(I)(B), (1.5)(a)(II), (2)(a), and (2)(b) amended, and (2)(c) repealed, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 145, § 3, effective March 30.

ANNOTATION

A crime victim compensation board (CVCB) is not prohibited from compensating a crime victim for wages the victim expects to lose in the future. A CVCB may reimburse a crime victim for lost wages without specifying whether that amount includes only wages lost in the past, or wages that will be lost in the future. People v. Bohn, 2 015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.

Because the general assembly did not include specific language prohibiting a CVCB from paying a claimant for wages that will be lost after the date of the CVCB's payments, the general assembly did not intend to prohibit the payment of future lost wages. People v. Bohn, 2 015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.

24-4.1-110. Recovery from collateral source.

  1. The board shall deduct from compensation it awards under this part 1 any payments received by the applicant from the offender or from a person on behalf of the offender, from the United States or any state, or any subdivision or agency thereof, from a private source, or from an emergency award under this part 1 for injury or death compensable under this part 1, excluding death or pension benefits.
  2. If compensation is awarded under this part 1 and the person receiving it also receives a collateral sum under subsection (1) of this section which has not been deducted from it, he shall refund to the board the lesser of the sums or the amount of compensation paid to him under this part 1 unless the aggregate of both sums does not exceed his losses. The fund shall be the payer of last resort.
  3. If a defendant is ordered to pay restitution under article 18.5 of title 16, C.R.S., to a person who has received compensation awarded under this part 1, an amount equal to the compensation awarded shall be transmitted from such restitution to the board for allocation to the fund.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 670, § 20, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(b) amended, p. 659, § 13, effective May 14. L. 98: (3) amended, p. 823, § 33, effective August 5. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 1051, § 20, effective September 1. L. 2006: (2) amended, p. 422, § 5, effective April 13.

24-4.1-111. Compensation to relatives.

  1. A relative of a victim, even though he was not a dependent of the victim, is eligible for compensation for reasonable medical or burial expenses for the victim, if:
    1. Such expenses were paid by him; and
    2. He files a claim in the manner provided in this part 1.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(b) amended, p. 659, § 14, effective May 14.

24-4.1-112. Emergency awards.

  1. The board may order an emergency award to the applicant pending a final decision in the claim if it appears to the board, prior to taking action upon the claim, that undue hardship will result to the applicant if immediate payment is not made. Awards pursuant to this section are intended to cover expenses incurred by crime victims in meeting their immediate short-term needs. The amount of such award shall not exceed two thousand dollars and shall be deducted from any final award made as a result of the claim.
  2. If the amount of such emergency award exceeds the sum the board would have awarded pursuant to this part 1, such excess shall be repaid by the recipient.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 659, § 15, effective May 14. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 518, § 3, effective April 30. L. 2015: (1) amended, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 146, § 4, effective March 30.

24-4.1-113. Fees.

No fee may be charged to the applicant by the board in any proceeding under this article.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1.

24-4.1-114. Assignment, attachment, or garnishment of award.

No compensation payable under this article, prior to actual receipt thereof by the person or beneficiary entitled thereto or his legal representative, shall be assignable or subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, or any other process, including process to satisfy an order or judgment for support or alimony.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1.

24-4.1-114.5. Limitations on characterization of award as income.

No compensation payable to an applicant under this part 1 shall be included in the applicant's income for purposes of the Colorado income tax imposed in article 22 of title 39, C.R.S.; nor shall it be considered as income, property, or support for the purposes of determining the eligibility of the applicant for public assistance or the amount of assistance payments pursuant to section 26-2-108, C.R.S.

Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 856, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 659, § 16, effective May 14. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1452, § 28, effective June 22.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Trust Protection of Personal Injury Recoveries from Public C reditors", see 19 C olo. Law. 2187 (1990).

24-4.1-115. Survival of rights.

The rights to compensation created by this part 1 are personal and shall not survive the death of the person or beneficiary entitled to them; except that, if death occurs after an application for compensation has been filed with the board, the proceeding shall not abate but may be continued by the legal representative of the decedent's estate.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 660, § 17, effective May 14.

24-4.1-116. Subrogation.

The acceptance of an award made pursuant to this part 1 shall subrogate the state, to the extent of such award, to any right or right of action accruing to the applicant.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 660, § 18, effective May 14.

24-4.1-116.5. Collection actions against crime victims - suspension.

  1. A medical service provider or medical service provider billing agent shall suspend all debt collection actions against the claimant for a compensable loss under section 24-4.1-109 related to the substance of the claim pending a resolution of the claim by the board for a period of ninety days to allow an opportunity for the board to resolve the claim, if, within one hundred eighty days after date of services rendered as part of the criminal episode, the claimant files an application for a claim with the board pursuant to section 24-4.1-105 and:
    1. Provides written notice to the medical service provider or its billing agent that a claim has been submitted to the board, including a crime victim compensation claim number; and
    2. Authorizes the medical service provider or its billing agent to confirm with the board the claimant's claim status and date of resolution as it relates to the medical provider's specific debt.
  2. The provisions of this section apply only to the claimant and not to a collateral source on the claimant's behalf.
  3. The provisions of subsection (1) of this section:
    1. Do not require the deletion of the debt on the claimant's credit report if the debt had already been reported to one or more credit bureaus prior to notice of the victim compensation claim being received by the medical service provider or its billing agent.
    2. Do not apply to any debt where a lawsuit has been commenced against the claimant for the collection of the debt prior to notice of the victim compensation claim being received by the medical service provider or its billing agent.

Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 146, § 5, effective March 30.

24-4.1-117. Fund created - control of fund.

  1. The crime victim compensation fund is hereby established in the office of the court administrator of each judicial district for the benefit of eligible applicants under this part 1.

    (1.5) Repealed.

  2. The fund consists of all money paid as a cost or surcharge levied on criminal actions, as provided in section 24-4.1-119; any federal money available to state or local governments for victim compensation; all money received from any action or suit to recover damages from an assailant for a compensable crime which was the basis for an award of, and limited to, compensation received under this part 1; any restitution paid by an assailant to a victim for damages for a compensable crime which was the basis for an award received under this part 1 and for damages for which the victim has received an award of, and limited to, compensation received under this part 1; money transferred from the marijuana tax cash fund pursuant to section 39-28.8-501 (4.9)(b); and any other money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund.
  3. All moneys deposited in the fund shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account, which shall be no less secure than those used by the state treasurer, and which shall yield the highest interest possible. All interest earned by moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund.
  4. At the conclusion of each fiscal year, all moneys remaining in the fund shall remain in the fund for use the succeeding year.
  5. All moneys deposited in the fund shall be used solely for the compensation of victims pursuant to this part 1; except that the district attorney and the court administrator may use an aggregate of no more than twelve and one-half percent of the total amount of moneys in the crime victim compensation fund for administrative costs incurred pursuant to this part 1. The district attorney shall be permitted to use no more than ten percent of the total amount of moneys in the fund for administrative costs. The court administrator shall be permitted to use no more than two and one-half percent of the total amount of moneys in the fund for administrative costs.
  6. Grants of federal funds that are accepted pursuant to this part 1 for the purpose of assisting crime victims shall not be used to supplant state funds available to assist crime victims.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: (1), (2), and (5) amended, p. 660, § 19, effective May 14. L. 85: (6) added, p. 793, § 4, effective April 11. L. 89: (5) amended, p. 1016, § 2, effective April 23. L. 98: (5) amended, p. 518, § 4, effective April 30. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1112, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2021: (1.5) repealed and (2) amended, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, pp. 3114, 3120, §§ 21, 33, effective July 6.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

24-4.1-117.3. Crime victim services advisory board - creation - duties.

  1. There is hereby created in the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety the crime victim services advisory board, referred to in this section as the "advisory board". The advisory board shall exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions under the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety and the executive director of the department of public safety, referred to in this section as the "executive director", as if the same were transferred to the department of public safety by a type 2 transfer, as such transfer is defined in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title.
    1. The advisory board shall consist of at least seventeen members appointed by the executive director, including but not limited to:
      1. A judge;
      2. An elected district attorney, the assistant district attorney, or a chief deputy district attorney;
      3. A member of a crime victim compensation board created in section 24-4.1-103;
      4. A member of a local victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board created in section 24-4.2-101;
      5. An administrator of crime victim compensation from a district attorney's office;
      6. An administrator of victims and witnesses assistance from a district attorney's office;
      7. A representative of a statewide victims' organization;
      8. A judicial district administrator or judicial district representative;
      9. A representative of a domestic violence program;
      10. A representative of a sexual assault program;
      11. A sheriff or sheriff's representative;
      12. A police chief or police representative;
      13. A deputy district attorney;
      14. A victim of a crime of violence; and
      15. Three members of the community at large.
    2. The executive director may consider geographic diversity when making appointments to the advisory board.
    3. The term of office for each member of the advisory board shall be three years; except that, of the members first appointed, six members shall be appointed to serve one-year terms and six members shall be appointed to serve two-year terms.
    4. Members of the advisory board shall serve at the pleasure of the executive director or until the member no longer serves in the position for which he or she was appointed to the advisory board, at which time a vacancy shall be deemed to exist on the advisory board. If a vacancy arises on the advisory board, the executive director shall appoint an appropriate person to serve for the remainder of the unexpired term.
    5. The executive director shall appoint the initial members of the advisory board on or before August 1, 2009. The executive director may reappoint a person to serve an unlimited number of consecutive terms. The executive director shall annually appoint a chairperson of the advisory board who shall preside over the advisory board's meetings.
    6. Members of the advisory board shall serve without compensation but may be reimbursed for actual travel expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.
  2. The advisory board's powers and duties shall include, but need not be limited to, the following:
    1. To develop and revise, when necessary, standards for the administration of the crime victim compensation fund established in section 24-4.1-117 in each judicial district and the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in section 24-4.2-103 in each judicial district, and to develop, revise when necessary, and impose sanctions for violating these standards;
    2. To review, pursuant to section 24-4.1-303 (17), any reports of noncompliance with this article;
    3. To distribute profits from crime pursuant to section 24-4.1-201;
    4. To advise and make recommendations to the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety concerning the award of grants pursuant to sections 24-33.5-506 and 24-33.5-507; and
    5. To establish subcommittees of the advisory board from within the membership of the advisory board, which subcommittees shall include, but need not be limited to:
      1. A standards subcommittee that shall make recommendations to the advisory board concerning the development and revision, when necessary, of standards and sanctions for the violation of standards to assist the advisory board in implementing paragraph (a) of this subsection (3); and
      2. A victim rights subcommittee that shall review, pursuant to section 24-4.1-303 (17), any reports of noncompliance with this article to assist the advisory board in implementing paragraph (b) of this subsection (3).
  3. The advisory board shall not release to the public any records submitted to or generated by the advisory board or a subcommittee of the advisory board for the purposes of the advisory board's or the subcommittee's review, pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section, of a report of noncompliance with this article until the report of noncompliance has been reviewed and resolved by the advisory board. The advisory board shall redact all victim-identifying information from any document released to the public.

Source: L. 2009: Entire section added, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 553, § 1, effective July 1.

24-4.1-117.5. Standards for administration of funds - sanctions. (Repealed)

Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1180, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 2051, § 2, effective June 9. L. 95: (2)(b)(I) amended, p. 1401, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2009: Entire section repealed, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 558, § 10, effective July 1.

24-4.1-117.7. State crime victims compensation program - creation - appropriation.

There is created in the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety the state victim compensation program. The general assembly shall appropriate money from the economic recovery and relief cash fund, created in section 24-75-228, as enacted by Senate Bill 21-291, enacted in 2021, to the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety to be used for the compensation of victims pursuant to this part 1 that also conforms with the allowable purposes set forth in the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2, as the act may be subsequently amended. The division of criminal justice in the department of public safety shall distribute the money appropriated pursuant to this section based on need.

Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (SB 21-292), ch. 291, p. 1721, § 4, effective June 22.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-292, see section 1 of chapter 291, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

24-4.1-118. Court administrator custodian of fund - disbursements.

The court administrator of each judicial district shall be the custodian of the fund, and all disbursements from the fund shall be paid by him upon written authorization of the board or the court.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1.

24-4.1-119. Costs and surcharges levied on criminal actions and traffic offenses.

    1. Except as provided in subsection (1)(c) of this section, a cost of one hundred sixty-three dollars for felonies, seventy-eight dollars for misdemeanors, forty-six dollars for class 1 misdemeanor traffic offenses, and thirty-three dollars for class 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses is levied on each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence, as provided for in section 18-1.3-102, which criminal action is charged pursuant to state statute. The defendant shall pay these costs to the clerk of the court. Each clerk shall transmit the costs received to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the offense occurred for credit to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district.
    2. The costs required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall not be levied on criminal actions which are charged pursuant to the penalty assessment provisions of section 42-4-1701, C.R.S., or to any violations of articles 1 to 15 of title 33, C.R.S.
    3. A cost of thirty-three dollars is hereby levied on each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence, as provided for in section 18-1.3-102, C.R.S., of a violation of section 42-4-1301 (1) or (2), C.R.S. This cost shall be paid to the clerk of the court, who shall deposit the same in the crime victim compensation fund established in section 24-4.1-117.
    4. Repealed.
      1. A surcharge is hereby levied against each penalty assessment imposed for a violation of a class A or class B traffic infraction or class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense pursuant to section 42-4-1701, C.R.S. The amount of the surcharge shall be one half of the amount specified in the penalty and surcharge schedule in section 42-4-1701 (4), C.R.S., or, if no surcharge amount is specified, the surcharge shall be calculated as thirty-seven percent of the penalty imposed. All moneys collected by the department of revenue pursuant to this paragraph (f) shall be transmitted to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the infraction occurred for credit to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district as provided in section 42-1-217, C.R.S.
      2. All calculated surcharge amounts pursuant to this paragraph (f) resulting in dollars and cents shall be rounded down to the nearest whole dollar.
      3. The surcharges levied pursuant to this paragraph (f) are separate and distinct from surcharges levied pursuant to section 24-4.2-104 for the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund.

    (1.5) A cost or surcharge levied pursuant to this section may not be suspended or waived by the court unless the court determines that the defendant against whom the cost or surcharge is levied is indigent.

  1. For purposes of determining the order of priority for payments required of a defendant pursuant to section 18-1.3-204 (2.5), C.R.S., the payments to the victim compensation fund required under this part 1 shall be the first obligation of the defendant.
  2. The provisions of sections 18-1.3-701 and 18-1.3-702, C.R.S., shall be applicable as to the collection of costs levied pursuant to this part 1.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1. L. 82: (1) amended, p. 364, § 2, effective March 22; (1)(a) amended and (1)(c) added, p. 604, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (1)(a) amended and (1)(d) added, p. 668, § 15, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(a), (2), and (3) amended, pp. 660, 923, 1120, §§ 20, 15, 21, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(a) amended, p. 793, § 5, effective April 11. L. 86: (1)(a) amended and (1)(e) added, p. 871, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(d) and (1)(a) amended and (1)(e) repealed, pp. 819, 1496, 1529, §§ 32, 6, 74, effective July 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 2053, § 3, effective June 9. L. 94: (1)(c) and (1)(d) amended, p. 1637, § 48, effective May 31; (1)(b) and (1)(c) amended, p. 2555, § 51, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (1)(d) amended, p. 1695, § 35, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2002: (1)(a), (1)(c), (2), and (3) amended, p. 1529, § 239, effective October 1. L. 2007: (1)(a) and (1)(c) amended and (1)(f) added, p. 1111, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(f)(II) amended and (1.5) added, (HB 10-1265), ch. 178, p. 641, § 1, effective April 29. L. 2021: (1)(a) amended and (1)(d) repealed, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3108, § 6, effective July 6; (1)(d) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 742, § 107, effective October 1.

Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (1)(c) by Senate Bill 94-001 and Senate Bill 94-206 were harmonized.

(2) Subsection (1)(d) was amended in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. However, those amendments were superseded by the repeal of subsection (1)(d) in HB 21-1315, effective July 6, 2021.

Cross references: (1) For additional costs imposed on criminal actions and traffic offenses, see § 24-4.2-104; for additional costs levied on alcohol- and drug-related traffic offenses, see §§ 42-4-1301 (7)(d) and (7)(g), 42-4-1301.4 (5), and 43-4-402.

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (1)(a), (1)(c), (2), and (3), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

(3) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

ANNOTATION

Payment of victim compensation costs does not violate principles of double jeopardy. Costs are not a form of punishment but are essentially civil and are not traditionally considered to be punishment, and the imposition of costs generally does not serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. People v. McQuarrie, 66 P.3d 181 (Colo. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds in Yeadon v. People, 2020 CO 38, 462 P.3d 1087, and Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, 462 P.3d 1100.

The costs and surcharges levied pursuant to this section apply to juvenile cases as well as those cases against adults. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2 017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.

Only the court can waive costs or surcharges levied pursuant to this section. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2 017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.

Indigence is the only circumstance in which costs or surcharges may be waived. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2 017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.

Court erred in allowing probation department to determine whether to waive costs and surcharges based on defendant's behavior. The absence of language prohibiting a fee waiver for good behavior does not permit such a waiver. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2 017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.

A district court has no authority to collect the fee imposed pursuant to subsection (1)(a) after the completion of a deferred sentence and dismissal of the underlying charges. Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, 403 P.3d 160.

24-4.1-120. Effective dates of provisions of this article.

Sections 24-4.1-117 to 24-4.1-120 originally took effect July 1, 1981. Sections 24-4.1-101 to 24-4.1-116 originally took effect July 1, 1982.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1.

24-4.1-121. Repeal. (Repealed)

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1. L. 85: Entire section repealed, p. 794, § 7, effective April 11.

24-4.1-122. Reports.

On or before October 1, 1985, and on or before each October 1 thereafter, the court administrator of each judicial district shall report to the state court administrator the amount of moneys collected by the judicial district in the prior fiscal year and the amount of moneys distributed to crime victims in the prior fiscal year by the board.

Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 793, § 6, effective April 11.

24-4.1-123. When redistribution of moneys required. (Repealed)

Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 793, § 6, effective April 11. L. 2002: Entire section repealed, p. 48, § 1, effective March 21.

24-4.1-124. State crime victim compensation fund - creation - allocation of moneys. (Repealed)

Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 794, § 6, effective April 11. L. 98: (2) amended, p. 518, § 5, effective April 30. L. 2002: Entire section repealed, p. 48, § 2, effective March 21.

PART 2 COMPENSATION FROM BENEFITS OF CRIME

24-4.1-201. Distribution of profits from crime - escrow account - civil suit by victim - definitions.

  1. The general assembly hereby finds that the state has a compelling interest in preventing any person who is convicted of a crime from profiting from the crime and in recompensing victims of the crime. It is therefore the intent of the general assembly to provide a mechanism whereby any profits from a crime that are received by the person convicted of the crime are available as restitution to the victims of the crime.

    (1.3) For purposes of this part 2, "victim" means any natural person against whom any crime has been perpetrated or attempted, unless the person is accountable for the crime or a crime arising from the same conduct, criminal episode or plan or if such person is deceased or incapacitated, the person's spouse, parent, child, sibling, grandparent, significant other, or other lawful representative. For purposes of this part 2, any person under the age of eighteen years is considered incapacitated, unless that person is emancipated.

    1. (1.5) (a) For purposes of this part 2, "profits from the crime" means:
      1. Any property obtained through or income generated from the commission of the crime of which the defendant was convicted;
      2. Any property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion, or exchange of proceeds of the crime of which the defendant was convicted, including any gain realized by such sale, conversion, or exchange; and
      3. Any property that the defendant obtained or income generated as a result of having committed the crime of which the defendant was convicted, including any assets obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the commission of, or in preparation for the commission of, the crime, as well as any property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion, or exchange of such property and any gain realized by such sale, conversion, or exchange.
      1. Any person who contracts with a person convicted of a crime in this state, or such person's representative or assignee, for payment of any profits from the crime of which such person is convicted shall pay to the crime victim services advisory board created in section 24-4.1-117.3 (1), referred to in this part 2 as the "board", any money that would otherwise by terms of the contract be paid to the convicted person or such person's representatives or assignees. The board shall distribute the money as described in paragraph (b.5) of this subsection (1.5).
      2. Any person or any person's agent or other legal representative who contracts with a convicted person, or the convicted person's representative or assignee, in the manner described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), shall:
        1. Submit a copy of the contract or a summary of the terms of an oral agreement to the board;
        2. Pay over to the board any moneys or consideration not subject to an order of restitution and that by the terms of the contract would be otherwise owing to the convicted person or owing to a representative or assignee of the convicted person.
    2. If there is a court order of restitution in the criminal case resulting from the crime that remains unpaid, any money received under paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5) must first be applied to that order of restitution. If there is no outstanding balance from an order of restitution or there remains additional money, and all victims are identified and can be located, the money received or the remaining portion must be apportioned pro rata to the identified victims. For purposes of this section, "victim" has the same meaning as in section 24-4.1-302 (5). If all victims are not known or cannot be located, the board shall deposit the remaining money in an escrow account for the benefit of the victims.
    3. Upon the establishment of an escrow account, any person who is a victim of the crime from which a convicted person receives profits under paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5) may, within three years of establishment of the escrow account, enforce any judgment entered against the convicted person against the money on deposit in the escrow account. If no judgment has been entered, the victim may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover a judgment against the convicted person or such person's representatives or designees. After all filed claims are established, the board shall distribute the money in the escrow account to satisfy the claims, or such fraction of each claim as can be fulfilled by the available money.
      1. Upon establishing an escrow account pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5), the board shall notify any victims of the crime of which the person was convicted at such victims' last known addresses of the establishment of the escrow account.
      2. Unless all victims have been identified and can be located, the board shall publish at least once annually from the date of the establishment of the escrow account, a notice of the escrow account's establishment in a newspaper having general circulation throughout the county in which the crime was committed. The expenses of notification shall be paid from the amount received in the escrow account. The board, in its discretion, may provide for such additional notice as it deems necessary.
      3. The notice required under subparagraphs (I) and (II) of this paragraph (d) shall specify the existence of the escrow account, the amount on deposit, and the victim's right to execute an order of restitution or bring a civil action to recover against the moneys in the escrow account within three years after the date the escrow account is established.
      1. Any person who knowingly fails to comply with any requirement of subparagraph (II) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5) shall be liable for a civil penalty of not less than ten thousand dollars nor more than three times the contract amount.
      2. If two or more persons are adjudged liable for the civil penalty imposed, such persons shall be jointly and severally liable.
      3. After notice and opportunity to be heard is provided, the court, by order of judgment, may assess the penalty described in this paragraph (e). All moneys received from the payment of these penalties shall be paid over to the board.
      4. In any action or proceeding brought to enforce the contract provisions of this subsection (1.5), the court shall have jurisdiction to grant the attorney general, without bond or other undertaking, any injunctive relief necessary to prevent any payment under a contract that is prohibited under this subsection (1.5).

    (1.7) For purposes of this section, "person" means any natural person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity.

  2. If funds remain in the escrow account after payment of a money judgment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and if no civil actions are pending under this section after three years from the establishment of an escrow account, the board shall notify the department of corrections of the existence of such escrow account. The department of corrections shall certify to the board a statement of the costs of maintenance of the person in the state correctional institution or institutions at which the person was incarcerated. A statement of the cost of maintenance shall be submitted annually for payment to the department of corrections by the board until such time as the person is released from custody of the state. No such payment shall be made upon the dismissal of the charges against any individual whose proceeds are placed in the escrow account.
  3. Upon the dismissal of the charges against any individual whose proceeds are placed in the escrow account or upon a showing by the defendant that three years have elapsed from the establishment of an escrow account and that no civil actions are pending against him or her under this section, the board shall immediately pay any money in the escrow account to the defendant except for funds paid to the department of corrections and anticipated as necessary for future payment to the department of corrections as set forth in subsection (2) of this section.
  4. If an escrow account is established under this section, no otherwise applicable statute of limitations on the time within which civil action may be brought bars action by a victim of a crime committed by the person accused or convicted of the crime, as to a claim resulting from the crime, until three years have elapsed from the time the escrow account was established.

    (4.5) The escrow account shall be established for a period of three years. If an action is filed by a victim to recover the victim's interest in the escrow account within such three-year period, the escrow account shall continue until the conclusion of such action.

  5. The board shall make payments from an escrow account to the accused upon an order of the court after a showing by the accused that:
    1. The money will be used for the exclusive purpose of retaining legal representation at any stage of the civil or criminal proceedings against him, including the appeals process; and
    2. He has insufficient assets, other than funds in the escrow account and assets which could be claimed as exempt from execution under state law, to provide for payment of the expenses of legal representation.
  6. The attorney general, at the request of the board, shall bring an action to cause profits from the crime to be paid over and held in an escrow account established by the board.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 652, § 2, effective May 14. L. 88: (1) amended, p. 890, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (1) amended and (1.5) added, p. 1050, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1.3), (1.5)(e), (1.7), (4.5), and (6) added and (1.5)(b), (1.5)(d), (2), and (3) amended, pp. 239, 238, §§ 2, 1, effective March 29. L. 2009: (1.5)(b)(I) and (1.5)(e)(III) amended, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 556, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2015: (1.5)(b)(I), (1.5)(c), (1.5)(d)(II), (1.5)(d)(III), (2), (3), (4), and (4.5) amended and (1.5)(b.5) added, (HB 15-1070), ch. 43, p. 106, § 1, effective March 20.

24-4.1-202. Notification of board.

It shall be the duty of the victim, the victim's attorney, or the victim's representative to notify the board within thirty days of the filing of any compensable claim under section 24-4.1-201.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 653, § 2, effective May 14.

24-4.1-203. More than one claim.

If more than one claim is filed against the moneys in escrow pursuant to section 24-4.1-201, the board shall disburse payments from the escrow account on a pro rata basis of all judgments obtained, according to the amount of money in the escrow account as compared to the amount of each claim. No compensation shall be disbursed until all pending claims have been settled or reduced to judgment.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 653, § 2, effective May 14.

24-4.1-204. Actions null and void.

Any action taken by a person who is accused or convicted of a crime or who enters a plea of guilty, whether by way of the execution of a power of attorney, the creation of corporate entities, or any other action, to defeat the purpose of this part 2 shall be null and void as against the public policy of this state.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 653, § 2, effective May 14.

24-4.1-205. Interest on moneys in the account.

Interest earned on the moneys deposited in the escrow account pursuant to section 24-4.1-201 shall accrue to the benefit of the payee of the account.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 2, effective May 14.

24-4.1-206. Annual reports of funds.

No later than February 15 of each year, the board shall make available a report to the general assembly for the previous calendar year of an accounting of all funds received and disbursed under this part 2. The board shall notify, in the most cost-effective manner available, each member of the general assembly of the availability of such report and offer to provide each member with a copy of the report.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 2, effective May 14. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 686, § 2, effective August 4.

24-4.1-207. Applicability.

This part 2 shall apply to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1985.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 2, effective May 14.

PART 3 GUIDELINES FOR ASSURING THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF AND WITNESSES TO CRIMES

Cross references: For constitutional provisions relating to the rights of crime victims, see section 16a of article II of the Colorado constitution.

Law reviews: For article, "Adult Parole in C olorado: An Overview", see 44 C olo. Law. 37 (May 2015).

24-4.1-301. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the full and voluntary cooperation of victims of and witnesses to crimes with state and local law enforcement agencies as to such crimes is imperative for the general effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice system of this state. It is the intent of this part 3, therefore, to assure that all victims of and witnesses to crimes are honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protection afforded criminal defendants.

Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 3, effective May 14.

24-4.1-302. Definitions.

As used in this part 3, and for no other purpose, including the expansion of the rights of any defendant:

  1. "Crime" means any of the following offenses, acts, and violations as defined by the statutes of the state of Colorado, whether committed by an adult or a juvenile:
    1. Murder in the first degree, in violation of section 18-3-102 , C.R.S.;
    2. Murder in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-103 , C.R.S.;
    3. Manslaughter, in violation of section 18-3-104 , C.R.S.;
    4. Criminally negligent homicide, in violation of section 18-3-105 , C.R.S.;
    5. Vehicular homicide, in violation of section 18-3-106 , C.R.S.;
    6. Assault in the first degree, in violation of section 18-3-202 , C.R.S.;
    7. Assault in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-203 , C.R.S.;
    8. Assault in the third degree, in violation of section 18-3-204 , C.R.S.;
    9. Vehicular assault, in violation of section 18-3-205 , C.R.S.;
    10. Menacing, in violation of section 18-3-206 , C.R.S.;
    11. (Deleted by amendment, L . 95, p. 1256, § 22, effective July 1, 1995.)
    12. First degree kidnapping, in violation of section 18-3-301 , C.R.S.;
    13. Second degree kidnapping, in violation of section 18-3-302 , C.R.S.;
      1. Sexual assault, in violation of section 18-3-402 , C.R.S.; or
      2. Sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of section 18-3-402 , C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;
    14. Sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-403 , C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;
      1. Unlawful sexual contact, in violation of section 18-3-404 , C.R.S.; or
      2. Sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of section 18-3-404 , C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;
    15. Sexual assault on a child, in violation of section 18-3-405 , C.R.S.;
    16. Sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, in violation of section 18-3-405 .3, C.R.S.;
    17. Sexual assault on a client by a psychotherapist, in violation of section