Cross References.

State historical society,§ 67-4123 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 143, in subsection (3), inserted “or persons” and deleted the former second sentence, which read: “If no such designation is made by the public agency or independent public body corporate and politic, then custodian means any public official having custody of, control of, or authorized access to public records and includes all delegates of such officials, employees or representatives”.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 338, added the last sentence in subsection (13).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 9-337.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Appointed Position.

The exemption from disclosure did not apply to an applicant for appointment as a local governmental official; the name and resume of an applicant to be appointed to a city council are not exempt from disclosure. Federated Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 915 P.2d 21 (1996).

Custodian.

E-Mails.

Identification of a custodian has no bearing on whether documents are exempt from disclosure; therefore, it was irrelevant whether the Idaho state department of agriculture was the custodian of nutrition management plans or not in the determination of whether or not they were exempt from disclosure to a conservation league. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep’t of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 146 P.3d 632 (2006). E-Mails.

E-mail correspondence between a county employee and the county prosecutor were public records, and the public had a legitimate interest in these communications because the prosecutor defended the employee’s management of a county program when an investigation of the program’s finances was started by the board of county commissioners. Cowles Publ’g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 144 Idaho 259, 159 P.3d 896 (2007).

Investigatory Records.

Where forms containing corrections officers’ personal information were disclosed to an inmate during criminal proceeding discovery, the invasion of privacy claims failed because (1) the public defender and the inmate were entitled to the unredacted forms in order to authenticate them and defend against any restitution claim, (2) the information was an investigatory record and certain defendants were law enforcement agencies, (3) these records were exempt from public disclosure, and (4) none of the state defendants publicly disclosed private information. Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007).

So long as the prosecutor’s office is engaged in an ongoing review of investigatory records in good faith, those records are active for purposes of§ 9-335 [now§ 74-124]. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

List of Certain Taxpayers.

The legislature intended the definition of “public record” to be broad enough to include a list of names obtained by an agency in the normal course of carrying out its duties; in addition, the language of this section clearly evidenced an intent by the legislature to create a very broad scope of government records and information accessible to the public. Thus, a list of names of dairy product producers who paid the taxes levied by§ 25-3117, which list was compiled by the Idaho dairy products commission, fell within the purview of such “public records and other matters,” and was subject to inspection by a private citizen. Dalton v. Idaho Dairy Prods. Comm’n, 107 Idaho 6, 684 P.2d 983 (1984).

Public Record.

A writing is subject to the public records act, if it (1) contains information relating to the conduct or administration of the public’s business and (2) was prepared, owned, used or retained by a governmental agency. Ward v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., Inc., 150 Idaho 501, 248 P.3d 1236 (2011).

A contract executed by a county, a county prosecuting attorney, and a city, under which the prosecuting attorney would perform prosecutorial services for the city using county employees, is a public record subject to disclosure under the public records act. Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho 155, 267 P.3d 1270 (2012).

Disclosure as Evidence.

Public records that are exempt from public disclosure are nevertheless subject to disclosure in a judicial or administrative proceeding if they are subject to disclosure under the laws or rules of evidence and discovery governing those proceedings.OAG 95-6.

Effect of Exemption.

A document’s lack of availability under the public records act, is not a valid basis to refuse to honor an administrative subpoena.OAG 95-6.

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 143, added subsection (16).

Compiler’s Notes.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 338, rewrote subsection (4), which formerly read: “A public agency or independent public body corporate and politic may require that a request for public records be submitted to it in a writing that provides the requester’s name, mailing address, e-mail address and telephone number. A request for public records and delivery of the public records may be made by electronic mail.” Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 9-338.

The term “this act” at the end of subsection (6) originally appeared in the enactment of former§ 9-338 and was a reference to S.L. 1990, chapter 213, which enacted former§§ 9-337 to 9-348 and amended numerous other sections in the Idaho Code. The term was retained in this section in the revision of the code sections relating to public records by S.L. 2015, chapter 140, which enacted all of title 74, Idaho Code. The term should probably read “this chapter,” being chapter 1, title 74, Idaho Code.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Administrative Review.

Because of the presumption of this section that all public records are open unless expressly otherwise, since the administrative review of a shooting incident involving Boise police officers prepared by a police lieutenant was not a personnel record, personnel information, or a personnel evaluation, and because all of the information that would have constituted an invasion of the officers’ privacy was contained in the investigation report which had been disclosed pursuant to a court order, the administrative review was not exempt from disclosure; city was required to disclose administrative review upon request of publisher. Federated Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 915 P.2d 21 (1996).

Custodian.

Identification of a custodian has no bearing on whether documents are exempt from disclosure; therefore, it was irrelevant whether the Idaho state department of agriculture was the custodian of nutrition management plans or not in the determination of whether or not they were exempt from disclosure to a conservation league. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep’t of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 146 P.3d 632 (2006).

Determination of Status.

The determination of whether a document qualifies as a public record is based on the content of the document and surrounding circumstances as they existed at the time a request for that record was made. Ward v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., Inc., 150 Idaho 501, 248 P.3d 1236 (2011).

District court engages in the same analysis as the custodian when determining whether or not the records are exempt from disclosure. Thus, both the district court and the public agency in custody of the requested record have a duty to examine the documents subject to the request and separate the exempt and nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material available for examination. This obligation exists even if exempt material is contained in the same public record as nonexempt material. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Disclosure Mandatory.

Because former laws providing for the inspection of public records by private citizens were mandatory, there were no exceptions to the rule of disclosure and the courts could not apply a balancing test to determine whether or not to allow disclosure. Dalton v. Idaho Dairy Prods. Comm’n, 107 Idaho 6, 684 P.2d 983 (1984).

The Idaho dairy products commission’s duty, power and authority to take such action as the commission deemed necessary or advisable in order to stabilize and protect the dairy industry of the state and the health and welfare of the public was clearly limited by the legislature’s express statutory language in former section mandating that the public records and other matters be open to the inspection of the public; accordingly, the commission’s list of dairy product producers, who paid the taxes levied by§ 25-3117 to dairy product dealers, was subject to disclosure, even though the dealer gave the names of the producers to the commission in confidence. Dalton v. Idaho Dairy Prods. Comm’n, 107 Idaho 6, 684 P.2d 983 (1984).

E-Mails.

E-mail correspondence between a county employee and the county prosecutor were public records, and the public had a legitimate interest in these communications because the prosecutor defended the employee’s management of a county program when an investigation of the program’s finances was started by the board of county commissioners. Cowles Publ’g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 144 Idaho 259, 159 P.3d 896 (2007).

Nutrition Management Plans.

Two nutrition management plans (NMP) of certain feedlots were subject to disclosure because they were public records that were not exempt; however, two other NMPs that were filed via a state computer system were not subject to disclosure because they were exempt. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep’t of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 146 P.3d 632 (2006).

Physical Handling of Document.

Private Photocopying of Records.

Even if the public is entitled to know the contents of a document when it has been filed, this entitlement does not necessarily extend to the physical handling of the document; to allow physical handling of an original document before it becomes an official record upon microfilming would carry a potential for abuse, because, if the document were altered or damaged, the public record would be affected; moreover, private rights or obligations could be put in doubt if an original document were altered or damaged after it was microfilmed but before it was returned to the proper party. Adams County Abstract Co. v. Fisk, 117 Idaho 513, 788 P.2d 1336 (Ct. App. 1990). Private Photocopying of Records.

Title company’s desire to avoid increases in fees charged by the recorder does not outweigh the recorder’s duty to protect the safety of documents entrusted to his care, nor does it diminish the recorder’s power to control the orderly function of his office, and, accordingly the recorder cannot be compelled to allow private photocopying of public records in the courthouse. Adams County Abstract Co. v. Fisk, 117 Idaho 513, 788 P.2d 1336 (Ct. App. 1990).

Public Record.

So long as a document qualifies as a public record at the time of a request and is not subject to any exemptions, its subsequent transfer to a nongovernmental entity does not affect its status as a public record. Ward v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., Inc., 150 Idaho 501, 248 P.3d 1236 (2011).

Raw Notes.

Trial court erred in holding that as a matter of law “raw notes” (“handwritten notes,” “raw minutes”), taken by clerk of the board of county commissioners during meetings of the county board of commissioners, could not be public writings. Fox v. Estep, 118 Idaho 454, 797 P.2d 854 (1990).

ALR.

Construction and application of public interest fee waiver provision of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). 47 A.L.R. Fed 2d 263.

Construction and Application of Public Domain Doctrine Allowing Courts to Disregard FOIA Law Enforcement Exemption Based on Prior Public Release of Requested Records. 3 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5.

Construction and Application of Public Domain or Official Acknowledgment Doctrine Allowing Courts to Disregard FOIA Exemption, Other Than Law Enforcement Exemption, Based on Prior Public Release of Requested Records. 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 9-339.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 9-340A.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

A.L.R.

Construction and Application of Public Domain or Official Acknowledgment Doctrine Allowing Courts to Disregard FOIA Exemption, Other Than Law Enforcement Exemption, Based on Prior Public Release of Requested Records. 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1.

Cross References.

Commission on aging,§ 67-5001 et seq.

Commission on human rights,§ 67-5901 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Idaho industrial commission,§ 72-501 et seq.

Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Industrial indemnity fund,§ 72-323.

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 164, rewrote paragraph (4)(b), which formerly read: “Records of buildings, facilities, infrastructures and systems held by or in the custody of any public agency only when the disclosure of such information would jeopardize the safety of persons or the public safety. Such records may include emergency evacuation, escape or other emergency response plans, vulnerability assessments, operation and security manuals, plans, blueprints or security codes. For purposes of this section “system” shall mean electrical, heating, ventilation, air conditioning and telecommunication systems”.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 279, added subsection (17).

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 275, added subsection (18).

This section was amended by two 2020 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 128, substituted “paragraph” for “section” near the beginning of the third sentence in paragraph (4)(b); substituted “sexual offender management board” for “sexual offender classification board” in subsection (5); and, in subsection (18), added the present introductory paragraph and paragraph (a), redesignating the former text as paragraph (b), and, in paragraph (b), in the first sentence, deleted “by” following “information protected” and deleted “by, or” preceding “under rules” near the middle, and deleted “as” preceding “attorney-client” near the end.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 239, added subsection (19).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 9-340B.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2016, ch. 164 declared an emergency. Approved March 23, 2016.

Section 2 of S.L. 2017, ch. 275 declared an emergency. Approved April 6, 2017.

Section 2 of S.L. 2020, ch. 128 declared an emergency. Approved March 15, 2020.

Construction With Other Law.

Section 9-342(3) [now 74-113(3)] limits the applicability of§ 9-342(1) [now 74-113(1)] by excluding “otherwise exempt investigatory records if the investigation is ongoing,” which implicitly defers to the exemption contained in this section; this section, in turn, defers to§ 9-335 [now 74-124] for a more specific definition of the investigatory records exemption. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 53 P.3d 1211 (2002).

Exempt Records.

Where forms containing corrections officers’ personal information were disclosed to an inmate during criminal proceeding discovery, the invasion of privacy claims failed because; (1) the public defender and the inmate were entitled to the unredacted forms in order to authenticate them and defend against any restitution claim, (2) the information was an investigatory record and certain defendants were law enforcement agencies, (3) these records were exempt from public disclosure, and (4) none of the state defendants publicly disclosed private information. Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007).

A.L.R.

A.L.R. — Construction and application of exemption 7(E) of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E), for records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes to extent that production of such law enforcement records or information would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of law. 70 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 493.

Construction and Application of Public Domain Doctrine Allowing Courts to Disregard FOIA Law Enforcement Exemption Based on Prior Public Release of Requested Records. 3 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Industrial commission,§ 72-501 et seq.

Public employee retirement system,§ 59-1301 et seq. State lottery,§ 67-7401 et seq.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 2016 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 343, substituted “alternatives to discipline” for “continuing education and recordkeeping violations” in subsection (29).

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 359, in subsection (25), substituted “registration application” for “registration card” and “said card” in the first sentence and for “registration card” in the second sentence.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 146, added subsection (34).

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 143, in subsection (1), inserted “including bonuses, severance packages, other compensation or vouchered and unvouchered expenses for which reimbursement was paid” in the first sentence and inserted “social security number, driver’s license number” in the second sentence.

The 2019 amendment, by ch. 290, substituted “time sensitive emergency” for “trauma” in subsection (23); and added “and any notification e-mail addresses submitted as part of a lobbyist’s registration under section 67-6617, Idaho Code, of an employer, client, or designated contact for the purpose of electronic notification of that employer, client, or designated contact of a report filed under section 67-6619, Idaho Code” at the end of subsection (34).

This section was amended by two 2020 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 279, added paragraphs (4)(g) and (4)(h).

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 297, substituted “department of health and welfare” for “secretary of state” near the beginning of subsection (26).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 9-340C.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

The abbreviation enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 10 of S.L. 2016, ch. 359 declared an emergency. Approved April 5, 2016.

E-Mails.

Investigatory Records.

E-mail correspondence between a county employee and the county prosecutor were public records and not exempt from disclosure, where the e-mails were informal communications between an employee and her supervisor, unrelated to personnel administration. Cowles Publ’g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 144 Idaho 259, 159 P.3d 896 (2007). Investigatory Records.

District court erred in concluding that the entire investigatory record was nonexempt, because, even if the records were not exempt under§ 9-335 [now§ 74-124], the applicant’s medical records would be exempt under subsection (13) of this section, but for the fact that the applicant was making the request pursuant to§ 9-342 [now§ 74-113]. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

A.L.R.

§ 74-107. Records exempt from disclosure — Trade secrets, production records, appraisals, bids, proprietary information, tax commission, unclaimed property, petroleum clean water trust fund.

The following records are exempt from disclosure:

1. Trade secrets including those contained in response to public agency or independent public body corporate and politic requests for proposal, requests for clarification, requests for information and similar requests. “Trade secrets” as used in this section means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer program, device, method, technique, process, or unpublished or in-progress research that:
   1. Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
   2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
2. Production records, housing production, rental and financing records, sale or purchase records, catch records, mortgage portfolio loan documents, or similar business records of a private concern or enterprise required by law to be submitted to or inspected by a public agency or submitted to or otherwise obtained by an independent public body corporate and politic. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the use which can be made of such information for regulatory purposes or its admissibility in any enforcement proceeding.
3. Records relating to the appraisal of real property, timber or mineral rights prior to its acquisition, sale or lease by a public agency or independent public body corporate and politic.
4. Any estimate prepared by a public agency or independent public body corporate and politic that details the cost of a public project until such time as disclosed or bids are opened, or upon award of the contract for construction of the public project.
5. Examination, operating or condition reports and all documents relating thereto, prepared by or supplied to any public agency or independent public body corporate and politic responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions including, but not limited to, banks, savings and loan associations, regulated lenders, business and industrial development corporations, credit unions, and insurance companies, or for the regulation or supervision of the issuance of securities.
6. Records gathered by a local agency or the Idaho department of commerce, as described in chapter 47, title 67, Idaho Code, for the specific purpose of assisting a person to locate, maintain, invest in, or expand business operations in the state of Idaho.
7. Shipping and marketing records of commodity commissions used to evaluate marketing and advertising strategies and the names and addresses of growers and shippers maintained by commodity commissions.
8. Financial statements and business information and reports submitted by a legal entity to a port district organized under title 70, Idaho Code, in connection with a business agreement, or with a development proposal or with a financing application for any industrial, manufacturing, or other business activity within a port district.
9. Names and addresses of seed companies, seed crop growers, seed crop consignees, locations of seed crop fields, variety name and acreage by variety. Upon the request of the owner of the proprietary variety, this information shall be released to the owner. Provided however, that if a seed crop has been identified as diseased or has been otherwise identified by the Idaho department of agriculture, other state departments of agriculture, or the United States department of agriculture to represent a threat to that particular seed or commercial crop industry or to individual growers, information as to test results, location, acreage involved and disease symptoms of that particular seed crop, for that growing season, shall be available for public inspection and copying. This exemption shall not supersede the provisions of section 22-436, Idaho Code, nor shall this exemption apply to information regarding specific property locations subject to an open burning of crop residue pursuant to section 39-114, Idaho Code, names of persons responsible for the open burn, acreage and crop type to be burned, and time frames for burning. (10) Information obtained from books, records and accounts required in chapter 47, title 22, Idaho Code, to be maintained by the Idaho oilseed commission and pertaining to the individual production records of oilseed growers.
   1. The original data including, but not limited to, numbers, text, voice, graphics and images;
   2. Analysis, compilation and other manipulated forms of the original data produced by use of the program; or
   3. The mathematical or statistical formulas that would be used if the manipulated forms of the original data were to be produced manually. (16) Active investigative records and trademark usage audits of the Idaho potato commission specifically relating to the enforcement of chapter 12, title 22, Idaho Code, until the commencement of formal proceedings as provided by rules of the commission; purchase and sales information submitted to the Idaho potato commission during a trademark usage audit, and investigation or enforcement proceedings. Inactive investigatory records shall be disclosed unless the disclosure would violate the standards set forth in subsection (1)(a) through (f) of section 74-124, Idaho Code. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the use which can be made, or availability of such information if used, for regulatory purposes or its admissibility in any enforcement proceeding.
   4. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent disclosure of the following information:
      1. Name and mailing address of the property owner;
      2. A parcel number;
      3. A legal description of real property;
      4. The square footage and acreage of real property;
      5. The assessed value of taxable property;
      6. The tax district and the tax rate; and
      7. The total property tax assessed.

(11) Records of any risk retention or self-insurance program prepared in anticipation of litigation or for analysis of or settlement of potential or actual money damage claims against a public entity and its employees or against the industrial special indemnity fund except as otherwise discoverable under the Idaho or federal rules of civil procedure. These records shall include, but are not limited to, claims evaluations, investigatory records, computerized reports of losses, case reserves, internal documents and correspondence relating thereto. At the time any claim is concluded, only statistical data and actual amounts paid in settlement shall be deemed a public record unless otherwise ordered to be sealed by a court of competent jurisdiction. Provided however, nothing in this subsection is intended to limit the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product privilege otherwise available to any public agency or independent public body corporate and politic.

(12) Records of laboratory test results provided by or retained by the Idaho food quality assurance laboratory. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the use which can be made, or availability of such information if used, for regulatory purposes or its admissibility in any enforcement proceeding.

(13) Reports required to be filed under chapter 13, title 62, Idaho Code, identifying electrical or natural or manufactured gas consumption data for an individual customer or account.

(14) Voluntarily prepared environmental audits, and voluntary disclosures of information submitted on or before December 31, 1997, to an environmental agency, which are claimed to be confidential business information.

(15) Computer programs developed or purchased by or for any public agency or independent public body corporate and politic for its own use. As used in this subsection, “computer program” means a series of instructions or statements which permit the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to provide storage, retrieval and manipulation of data from the computer system, and any associated documentation and source material that explain how to operate the computer program. Computer program does not include:

(17) All records copied or obtained by the director of the department of agriculture or his designee as a result of an inspection pursuant to section 25-3806, Idaho Code, except:

(a) Records otherwise deemed to be public records not exempt from disclosure pursuant to this chapter; and

(b) Inspection reports, determinations of compliance or noncompliance and all other records created by the director or his designee pursuant to section 25-3806, Idaho Code.

(18) All data and information collected by the division of animal industries or the state brand board pursuant to the provisions of section 25-207B, Idaho Code, or rules promulgated thereunder.

(19) Records disclosed to a county official by the state tax commission pursuant to subsection (4)(c) of section 63-3029B, Idaho Code.

(20) Records, data, information and materials collected, developed, generated, ascertained or discovered during the course of academic research at public institutions of higher education if the disclosure of such could reasonably affect the conduct or outcome of the research, or the ability of the public institution of higher education to patent or copyright the research or protect intellectual property.

(21) Records, data, information and materials collected or utilized during the course of academic research at public institutions of higher education provided by any person or entity other than the public institution of higher education or a public agency.

(22) The exemptions from disclosure provided in subsections (20) and (21) of this section shall apply only until the academic research is publicly released, copyrighted or patented, or until the academic research is completed or terminated. At such time, the records, data, information, and materials shall be subject to public disclosure unless: (a) another exemption in this chapter applies; (b) such information was provided to the institution subject to a written agreement of confidentiality; or (c) public disclosure would pose a danger to persons or property.

(23) The exemptions from disclosure provided in subsections (20) and (21) of this section do not include basic information about a particular research project that is otherwise subject to public disclosure, such as the nature of the academic research, the name of the researcher, and the amount and source of the funding provided for the project.

(24) Records of a county assessor, the state tax commission, a county board of equalization or the state board of tax appeals containing the following information: (i) lists of personal property required to be filed pursuant to section 63-302, Idaho Code, and operating statements required to be filed pursuant to section 63-404, Idaho Code; and (ii) confidential commercial or financial information including trade secrets. Except with respect to lists of personal property required to be filed pursuant to section 63-302, Idaho Code, and the operator statements required to be filed pursuant to section 63-404, Idaho Code, it shall be the responsibility of the taxpayer to give notice of its claim to exemption by stamping or marking each page or the first page of each portion of documents so claimed. No records that are exempt pursuant to this subsection shall be disclosed without the consent of the taxpayer except as follows: (a) To any officer, employee or authorized representative of the state or the United States, under a continuing claim of confidentiality, as necessary to carry out the provisions of state or federal law or when relevant to any proceeding thereunder.

(b) In the publication of statistics or reports as long as the statistics or reports do not reasonably lead to the identification of the specific taxpayer or information submitted by taxpayers exempt pursuant to this subsection.

(c) To the board of tax appeals or the district court as evidence or otherwise in connection with an appeal of the taxpayer’s property tax assessment, but only if the board or the court, as applicable, has entered a protective order specifying that the taxpayer information may not be disclosed by any person conducting or participating in the action or proceeding, except as authorized by the board or the court in accordance with applicable law.

(25) Results of laboratory tests which have no known adverse impacts to human health conducted by the Idaho state department of agriculture animal health laboratory, related to diagnosis of animal diseases of individual animals or herds, on samples submitted by veterinarians or animal owners unless:

(a) The laboratory test results indicate the presence of a state or federally reportable or regulated disease in animals;

(b) The release of the test results is required by state or federal law; or

(c) The test result is identified as representing a threat to animal or human health or to the livestock industry by the Idaho state department of agriculture or the United States department of agriculture. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the use which can be made, or availability of such information if used, for regulatory purposes or its admissibility in any enforcement proceeding, or the duty of any person to report contagious or infectious diseases as required by state or federal law.

(26) Results of laboratory tests conducted by the Idaho state department of agriculture seed laboratory on samples submitted by seed producers or seed companies. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the use which can be made, or availability of such information pursuant to the provisions of subsections (9) and (10) of section 22-418, Idaho Code.

(27) For policies that are owned by private persons, and not by a public agency of the state of Idaho, records of policies, endorsements, affidavits and any records that discuss policies, endorsements and affidavits that may be required to be filed with or by a surplus line association pursuant to chapter 12, title 41, Idaho Code.

(28) Individual financial statements of a postsecondary educational institution or a proprietary school submitted to the state board of education, its director or a representative thereof, for the purpose of registering the postsecondary educational institution or proprietary school pursuant to section 33-2402 or 33-2403, Idaho Code, or provided pursuant to an administrative rule of the board adopted pursuant to such sections. (29) Information submitted by insurance companies pursuant to section 41-612(17), Idaho Code.

(30) Documents, materials or other information submitted to the director of the department of insurance as provided in chapter 64, title 41, Idaho Code.

(31) Reports, information and other materials exempted by chapter 63, title 41, Idaho Code.

(32) Records that identify the method by which the Idaho state tax commission selects tax returns for audit review.

(33) Records that identify the method by which the administrator of the unclaimed property law set forth in chapter 5, title 14, Idaho Code, selects reports for audit review or conducts audit review of such reports and the identity of individuals or entities under audit.

(34) Underwriting and claims records of the Idaho petroleum clean water trust fund obtained pursuant to section 41-4905, 41-4909, 41-4911A, 41-4912, or 41-4912A, Idaho Code. Provided, however, that this subsection shall not prevent the Idaho petroleum clean water trust fund’s submittal to the Idaho department of environmental quality or other regulatory agencies of information necessary to satisfy an insured’s corrective action requirement under applicable federal or state standards in the event of a release into the environment from a petroleum storage tank; and provided further that nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Idaho petroleum clean water trust fund from providing auditing, reporting, or actuarial information as otherwise required of it pursuant to section 41-4919, 41-4925A, 41-4928, 41-4930, 41-4932, 41-4937, or 41-4938, Idaho Code.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-107, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344; am. 2016, ch. 68, § 3, p. 205; am. 2017, ch. 58, § 37, p. 91; am. 2017, ch. 75, § 3, p. 188; am. 2017, ch. 77, § 3, p. 209; am. 2018, ch. 169, § 24, p. 344; am. 2020, ch. 338, § 3, p. 982.

Cross References.

Industrial special indemnity fund,§ 72-323.

State tax commission, Idaho Const., Art. VII and§ 63-101 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 68, added subsection (29).

This section was amended by three 2017 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 58, rewrote subsection (29), which formerly read: “Information submitted to insurance companies pursuant to section 42-612(17), Idaho Code”.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 75, rewrote subsection (29), which formerly read: “Information submitted to insurance companies pursuant to section 42-612(17), Idaho Code” and added subsection [(31)](30). The 2017 amendment, by ch. 77, rewrote subsection (29), which formerly read: “Information submitted to insurance companies pursuant to section 42-612(17), Idaho Code” and added subsection (30).

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 169, redesignated present subsection (31), resolving a conflict created by multiple 2017 amendments of this section.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 338, added “tax commission, unclaimed property, petroleum clean water trust fund” at the end of the section heading; and added subsections (32) to (34).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 9-340D.

For more information on the Idaho food quality assurance laboratory, referred to in subsection (12), see https://www.agri. idaho.gov/main/laboratories/lab-test-3/ .

For more information on the animal health laboratories, referred to in subsection (25), see https://www.agri.idaho.gov/main/laboratories/animal-health-laboratories .

For more information on the seed testing lab, referred to in subsection (26), see https:// www.agri.idaho.gov/main/laboratories/seed-lab .

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Section 4 of S.L. 2017, ch. 75 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act”.

Section 4 of S.L. 2017, ch. 77 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act”.

Settlement Agreements.

Settlement agreement between a county employee and the county’s insurer was properly sealed, where the settlement was executed in order to conclude any potential claims between the employee and the county. Only statistical data and the actual amount paid to the employee were public records. Cowles Publ’g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 144 Idaho 259, 159 P.3d 896 (2007).

A.L.R.

§ 74-108. Exemptions from disclosure — Archaeological, endangered species, libraries, licensing exams.

The following records are exempt from disclosure:

1. Records, maps or other records identifying the location of archaeological or geophysical sites or endangered species, if not already known to the general public.
2. Archaeological and geologic records concerning exploratory drilling, logging, mining and other excavation, when such records are required to be filed by statute for the time provided by statute.
3. Documents and data related to oil and gas production submitted to the department of lands or the oil and gas conservation commission under the provisions of chapter 3, title 47, Idaho Code, provided that the records qualify for confidential status under section 47-327, Idaho Code, under the conditions and for the time provided by statute.
4. The records of a library which, when examined alone, or when examined with other public records, would reveal the identity of the library patron checking out, requesting, or using an item from a library.
5. The material of a library, museum or archive that has been contributed by a private person, to the extent of any limitation that is a condition of the contribution.
6. Test questions, scoring keys, and other data used to administer a licensing examination, employment, academic or other examination or testing procedure before the examination is given if the examination is to be used again. Records establishing procedures for and instructing persons administering, grading or evaluating an examination or testing procedure are included in this exemption, to the extent that disclosure would create a risk that the result might be affected.
7. Land management plans required for voluntary stewardship agreements entered into pursuant to law and written agreements relating to the conservation of all species of sage grouse entered into voluntarily by owners or occupiers of land with a soil conservation district.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-108, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344; am. 2015, ch. 300, § 1, p. 1181; am. 2017, ch. 271, § 28, p. 677.

Cross References.

Soil conservation districts,§ 22-2705 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 300, added subsection (6).

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 271, added subsection (3), and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-340E.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Section 31 of S.L. 2017, ch. 271 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act”.

Effective Dates.

Section 32 of S.L. 2017, ch. 271 declared an emergency. Approved April 6, 2017.

A.L.R.

§ 74-109. Records exempt from disclosure — Draft legislation, research, personal communications, personally identifying information, work papers, and draft redistricting plans.

The following records are exempt from disclosure:

1. Records consisting of draft legislation and documents related to draft legislation, including requests for research or analysis submitted to the legislative services office by a member of the Idaho legislature and any documents related to such request.
2. Records consisting of personal communication by a member of the Idaho legislature or between members of the Idaho legislature that does not relate to the conduct or administration of the public’s business.
3. Personally identifying information relating to a private citizen contained in a writing to or from a member of the Idaho legislature. As used in this subsection, “private citizen” does not include a lobbyist registered with the office of the secretary of state, a public official, or an individual who is communicating on behalf of an organization. As used in this subsection, “public official” has the same meaning as in section 74-101(12), Idaho Code, except that it does not include elected or appointed members of the Idaho legislature and legislative staff.
4. Records consisting of or that are related to the work papers in the possession of the director of legislative performance evaluations prior to the release of the final performance evaluation.
5. Records consisting of or that are related to the work papers in the possession of the division of legislative audits prior to release of the related final audit.
6. Records consisting of draft congressional and legislative redistricting plans and documents specifically related to such draft redistricting plans or research requests submitted to the commission staff by a member of the commission for reapportionment for the purpose of placing such draft redistricting plan into form suitable for presentation to the full membership of the commission, unless the individual commission member having submitted or requested such plans or research agrees to waive the provisions of confidentiality provided by this subsection.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-109, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344; am. 2020, ch. 338, § 4, p. 982.

Cross References.

Department of environmental quality,§ 39-104.

Director of legislative performance evaluations,§ 67-457.

Legislative service office,§ 67-701 et seq.

State commission,§ 63-101 et seq.

Amendments.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-340F.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

A.L.R.

§ 74-110. Exemption from disclosure — Records of court proceedings regarding judicial authorization of abortion procedures for minors.

In accordance with section 18-609A, Idaho Code, the following records are exempt from public disclosure: all records contained in court files of judicial proceedings arising under section 18-609A, Idaho Code, are exempt from disclosure.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-110, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-340G.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

A.L.R.

§ 74-111. Exemption from disclosure — Records related to the uniform securities act.

Except as otherwise determined by the director of the department of finance pursuant to section 30-14-607(c), Idaho Code, the following records are exempt from disclosure:

1. A record obtained or created by the director of the department of finance or a representative of the director in connection with an audit or inspection under section 30-14-411(d), Idaho Code, or an investigation under section 30-14-602, Idaho Code;
2. A part of a record filed in connection with a registration statement under section 30-14-301, Idaho Code, and sections 30-14-303 through 30-14-305, Idaho Code, or a record under section 30-14-411(d), Idaho Code, that contains trade secrets or confidential information if the person filing the registration statement or report has asserted a claim of confidentiality or privilege that is authorized by law;
3. A record that is not required to be provided to the director of the department of finance or filed under chapter 14, title 30, Idaho Code, and is provided to the director only on the condition that the record will not be subject to public examination or disclosure;
4. A nonpublic record received from a person specified in section 30-14-608(a), Idaho Code; and
5. Any social security number, residential address unless used as a business address, and residential telephone number unless used as a business telephone number, contained in a record that is filed pursuant to chapter 14, title 30, Idaho Code.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-111, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-340H.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

A.L.R.

§ 74-112. Exempt and nonexempt public records to be separated.

If any public record contains material which is not exempt from disclosure as well as material which is exempt from disclosure, the public agency or independent public body corporate and politic shall, upon receipt of a request for disclosure, separate the exempt and nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material available for examination, provided that a denial of a request to copy nonexempt material in a public record shall not be based upon the fact that such nonexempt material is contained in the same public record as the exempt material.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-112, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-341.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Review.

District court engages in the same analysis as a custodian when determining whether or not the records are exempt from disclosure. Thus, both the district court and the public agency in custody of the requested record have a duty to examine the documents subject to the request and separate the exempt and nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material available for examination. This obligation exists even if exempt material is contained in the same public record as nonexempt material. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Cross References.

Commission of pardons and parole,§ 20-210 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-342.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Applicability.

Section 9-335 [now 74-124] controls over provisions, such as§ 9-342(1) [now (1) of this section], that might otherwise provide for disclosure of investigatory records. Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 69 P.3d 1048 (2003).

Construction.

Subsection (3) of this section limits the applicability of subsection (1) of this section by excluding “otherwise exempt investigatory records . . . if the investigation is ongoing,” which implicitly defers to the exemption contained in§ 9-340B [now§ 74-105]; which, in turn, defers to§ 9-335 [now§ 74-124] for a more specific definition of the investigatory records exemption. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 53 P.3d 1211 (2002).

District court may either order disclosure of the public record or uphold the exemption and return the public record, but it may not restrict the manner in which nonexempt records are utilized. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Cross References.

Idaho pollutant discharge elimination system permits,§§ 39-175D and 39-175E.

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 146, inserted “the federal clean water act” in the introductory paragraph of subsection (1) and in present paragraph (1)(h); added paragraphs (1)(c) through (1)(f), and redesignated the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

Federal References.

The federal clean air act, referred to in the introductory paragraph in subsection (1) and in paragraph (1)(h), is codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 7401 et seq.

The federal clean water act, referred to in the introductory paragraph in subsection (1) and in paragraph (1)(h), is codified as 33 U.S.C.S. § 1251 et seq.

The federal resource conservation and recovery act, referred to in the introductory paragraph in subsection (1) and in paragraph (1)(h), is codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 6901 et seq.

United States Code provisions relating to title V operating permits, referred to in paragraph (1)(b), may be found at 42 U.S.C.S. § 7661 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-342A.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-343.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Decisions Under Prior Law

Negligence.

Where forms containing corrections officers’ personal information were disclosed to an inmate during criminal proceeding discovery, there was no negligence per se, because the Idaho public records act was created to allow public access and was not intended to prevent harm caused by public disclosure of private information. Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007).

Retention of Records.

Even if a public agency is sold to a private entity, the agency has an affirmative duty to retain all records during the pendency of a petition to compel production of such records. A public agency shall keep all documents or records in question until the end of the appeal period, until a decision has been rendered on the petition, or as otherwise statutorily provided, whichever is longer. This duty is triggered at the time a petition is filed and continues until the petition is resolved, even if a legitimate sale is in the works. Ward v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., Inc., 150 Idaho 501, 248 P.3d 1236 (2011).

Review.

District court engages in the same analysis as the custodian when determining whether or not the records are exempt from disclosure. Thus, both the district court and the public agency in custody of the requested record have a duty to examine the documents subject to the request and separate the exempt and nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material available for examination. This obligation exists even if exempt material is contained in the same public record as nonexempt material. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Applicability.

Refusal to provide records or documents on the grounds that such records or documents are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the Idaho public records act does not constitute reasonable cause or legal excuse for failing to comply with the department of health and welfare’s administrative subpoena.OAG 95-6.

Public records that are exempt from public disclosure are nevertheless subject to disclosure in a judicial or administrative proceeding, if they are subject to disclosure under the laws or rules of evidence and discovery governing those proceedings.OAG 95-6.

ALR.

§ 74-116. Order of the court — Court costs and attorney fees.

1. Whenever it appears that certain public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public, the court shall order the public official charged with withholding the records to disclose the public record or show cause why he should not do so. The court shall decide the case after examining the pleadings filed by the parties and such oral arguments and additional evidence as the court may allow. The court may examine the record in camera in its discretion.
2. If the court finds that the public official’s decision to refuse disclosure is not justified, it shall order the public official to make the requested disclosure. If the court determines that the public official was justified in refusing to make the requested record available, he shall return the item to the public official without disclosing its content and shall enter an order supporting the decision refusing disclosure. In any such action, the court shall award reasonable costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party or parties, if it finds that the request or refusal to provide records was frivolously pursued.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-116, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-344.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Appeal.

Cost and Fees.

Appeal of an order requiring a county prosecuting attorney’s office to produce investigatory records was not moot, because even though the applicant obtained the records sought after he instituted his lawsuit to compel their production, he did not obtain the records from the prosecuting attorney’s office. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014). Cost and Fees.

District court properly denied the parents’ motion for costs and attorney fees in their action to disclose public records because, while the burden was improperly shifted to the parents to identify the specific records that were withheld, there was substantial and competent evidence that the department did not frivolously claim that producing investigatory records would interfere with enforcement proceedings or disclose investigative techniques and procedures. Hymas v. Meridian Police Dep’t, 159 Idaho 594, 364 P.3d 295 (Ct. App. 2015).

Exclusive Remedy.

This section sets forth the standard for awarding reasonable costs and attorney fees in actions pursuant to the Public Records Act; therefore,§§ 12-117 and 12-121 do not apply. Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho 155, 267 P.3d 1270 (2012).

Investigatory Records.

County prosecuting attorney’s office had to demonstrate a reasonable probability that harm contemplated by paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (1) of§ 9-335 [now§ 74-124] would result through disclosure. The withholding agency has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that disclosure of the requested records would result in a harm listed at the time of the denial of the public records request, rather than at the time of the hearing. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Irrelevant Issue.

Because the Idaho state department of agriculture focused on an irrelevant issue in appealing a determination that it was required to disclose certain nutrition management plans to a conservation league, attorney fees were awarded on appeal; however, due to an association’s role as an intervenor, it was not awarded such fees. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep’t of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 146 P.3d 632 (2006).

Idaho Law Review.

Idaho Law Review. — Attorney Fee Awards in Idaho: A Handbook, Comment. 52 Idaho L. Rev. 583 (2016).

ALR.

§ 74-117. Additional penalty.

If the court finds that a public official has deliberately and in bad faith improperly refused a legitimate request for inspection or copying, a civil penalty shall be assessed against the public official in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), which shall be paid into the general account [fund].

History.

I.C.,§ 74-117, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-345.

The bracketed insertion at the end of the section was added by the compiler to correct the name of the referenced fund. See§ 67-1205.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Negligence.

Where forms containing corrections officers’ personal information were disclosed to an inmate during criminal proceeding discovery, there was no negligence per se, because the Idaho public records act was created to allow public access and was not intended to prevent harm caused by public disclosure of private information. Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007).

ALR.

§ 74-118. Immunity.

No public agency or independent public body corporate and politic, public official, or custodian shall be liable, nor shall a cause of action exist, for any loss or damage based upon the release of a public record governed by the provisions of this chapter if the public agency or independent public body corporate and politic, public official or custodian acted in good faith in attempting to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-118, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-346.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 143, in the first sentence, substituted “January 1, 2019” for “January 1, 2016” at the beginning and inserted “or custodians”; and added the second sentence.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-347.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Cross References.

Department of commerce,§ 67-401 et seq.

Secretary of state,§ 67-901 et seq,

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-348.

The bracketed insertion near the end of subsection (6) was added by the compiler to correct the name of the referenced agency. See http://www.agri.idaho.gov/AGRI/Categories/Marketing/index Marketing.php .

The bracketed insertion at the end of the section was added by the compiler to correct the name of the referenced fund. See§ 67-1205.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-349.

For more information on the Idaho state archives, referred to in paragraph (3)(a), see https://history.idaho.gov/idaho-state-archives .

For more on the society of American archivists, referred to in paragraph (9)(a), see http://www2.archivists.org/ .

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-350.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Idaho code commission,§ 73-201 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-352.

The bracketed insertion at the end of the section was added by the compiler to correct the name of the referenced fund. See§ 67-1205.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

State controller,§ 67-1001 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 252, added paragraph (1)(g).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-335.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Administrative Review.

Appeal.

Because of the presumption of§ 9-338 [now§ 74-102] that all public records are open unless expressly otherwise, since the administrative review of a shooting incident involving Boise police officers prepared by a police lieutenant was not a personnel record, personnel information, or a personnel evaluation, and because all of the information that would have constituted an invasion of the officers’ privacy under this section was contained in the investigation report which had been disclosed pursuant to a court order, the administrative review was not exempt from disclosure; city was required to disclose administrative review upon request of publisher. Federated Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 915 P.2d 21 (1996). Appeal.

Appeal of an order requiring a county prosecuting attorney’s office to produce investigatory records was not moot because, even though the applicant obtained the records sought after he instituted his lawsuit to compel their production, he did not obtain the records from the prosecuting attorney’s office. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Applicability.

This section controls over provisions, such as§ 9-342(1) [now§ 74-113(1)], that might otherwise provide for disclosure of investigatory records. Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 69 P.3d 1048 (2003).

Application.

In the context of exemption from disclosure of investigatory records, under subsection (2) of this section, the definition of “law enforcement agency” specifically includes the Idaho office of the attorney general, and the definition of “investigatory records” is not limited to the confines of an agency’s law enforcement authority; thus, individual’s request directed at gaining access to records that might disclose whether the attorney general was conducting an investigation of him was properly denied. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 53 P.3d 1211 (2002).

Investigatory Records.

Trial court properly affirmed defendant county’s refusal of plaintiffs’ request for certain public records; the documents at issue were exempt from disclosure as “investigatory records.” Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 69 P.3d 1048 (2003).

Where forms containing corrections officers’ personal information were disclosed to an inmate during criminal proceeding discovery, the invasion of privacy claims failed because: (1) the public defender and the inmate were entitled to the unredacted forms in order to authenticate them and defend against any restitution claim; (2) the information was an investigatory record and certain defendants were law enforcement agencies; (3) these records were exempt from public disclosure; and (4) none of the state defendants publicly disclosed private information. Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007).

In refusing a request for disclosure of documents, the withholding agency has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that disclosure of the requested records would result in a harm listed at the time of the denial of the public records request rather than at the time of the hearing. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

District court erred in concluding that investigatory records were inactive because, although the police had completed its investigation into the matter, the county prosecuting attorney’s office was still contemplating prosecution of either the applicant or an officer and was evaluating the information compiled by police; investigatory records under active prosecutorial review are not inactive investigatory records, but are active investigatory records, requiring the application of subsection (1) Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Subsection (1) applies to investigatory records generally, while subsection (3) deals with inactive investigatory records, indicating there is a distinction between active and inactive investigatory records. The legislative intent underlying the section is to prevent the premature disclosure of information that may compromise an investigation, the state’s case in court, or the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014). Burden of demonstrating that disclosure of the records would result in a harm identified by paragraphs (a) to (f) in subsection (1), is the same for each subdivision. The district court is to make this determination in light of the record before it, not based on a generalization of the types of documents withheld, but by a thorough review of the investigatory record and consideration of the likelihood that the harms identified will be realized. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014).

Exemption from Disclosure.

Generally, public records are open to the public; however, subsection (1) of this section exempts from disclosure certain law enforcement investigatory records and documents that might otherwise be subject to disclosure.OAG 86-7.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-336.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Admissibility.

District court erred by denying the state’s motion to admit into evidence at trial a transcript of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness unavailable to testify at trial, because the district court’s finding that defendant did not know that the witness was a confidential informant was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 328 P.3d 504 (2014).

Idaho Rules of Evidence.

Defendant failed to demonstrate, and the court could not see, how this section and Idaho Evid. R. 804(b)(1) were inconsistent. Both allow the use at trial of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who, at the time of trial, is shown to be unavailable. Moreover, the statute is consistent with the inherent policy of Idaho Evid. R. 402. State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1992). To the extent that Idaho Evid. R. 804(b)(1) places greater strictures upon the use of evidence than does this section, the rule must govern. State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1992).

Opportunity.

The “opportunity” requirement of Idaho Evid. R. 804(b)(1) is no different from the same requirement in this section. State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1992).

Where there was no indication in the record that counsel’s opportunity to cross-examine was curtailed in any way by the magistrate, and whether counsel chose to utilize that opportunity fully was more a matter of tactics or strategy than opportunity, district court did not err in deciding that defendant’s counsel had an opportunity to develop the testimony by cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1992).

Preliminary Hearing Testimony.

— Absent Witness.

The right of confrontation is no longer a basis for excluding the prior testimony of an absent witness. State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1992).

Trial court did not err in admitting testimony of witness into evidence through the preliminary hearing transcript where there was no other evidence to support charge of grand theft of certain materials except the testimony of this witness, where the testimony was more probative on the point it was offered than any other evidence which could have been procured through reasonable efforts where substantial efforts were made to locate the witness but such efforts were unsuccessful and where defendant’s counsel during the preliminary hearing cross-examined the witness and where the motive for preliminary hearing cross-examination was similar to the motive she had during the trial as required by Idaho Evid. R. 804(b)(1). State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 935 P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1997).

The trial court erred in finding a witness unavailable and his preliminary hearing testimony admissible where the state failed to use diligent and good faith efforts to locate and secure a witness’ attendance at trial since, after mailing a subpoena to the witness and receiving the receipt, the prosecution lost track of him, and made no effort to use the procedure set forth in§ 19-3005(2) to secure the attendance of the witness. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 978 P.2d 227 (1999).

— Admissibility.

Defendant, who was a convenience store worker, was accused of grand theft; a witness who had the shift after defendant’s, and who discovered money was missing, was slated to testify; however, she was terminally ill and relapsed during the trial. The trial court erred in deciding that the witness was unavailable and in allowing the witness’s preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted because there was insubstantial evidence to support the finding that the witness was unavailable; however, the trial court’s error was harmless in light of the other evidence that was presented against defendant. State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 266, 159 P.3d 903 (Ct. App. 2007). — Admissibility.

The court could not adopt a per se rule that preliminary hearing testimony is inadmissible in light of the explicit statement of policy in this section and the implicit statement of policy in Idaho Evid. R. 402 and 804(b)(1). A case-by-case approach is the better way to determine whether the district court was correct in ruling that the preliminary hearing testimony was admissible. Such an approach would allow the trial court to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the party opposing the use of such testimony had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1992).

Where trial court determines whether party opposing use of preliminary hearing testimony had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, and where such findings are challenged on appeal the court of appeals will apply the “clear error” standard of review. If the factual predicates of Idaho Evid. R. 804 are met, and if there are no other reasons shown under the rules for its exclusion, the court may admit the evidence at trial. State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1992).

The trial court erred in ruling that the jailed witness who refused to testify was in fact an unavailable witness without first bringing him back into court and ordering him to testify under the direct threat of contempt; therefore, the witness was not an unavailable witness as referenced in subdivision 2, and the admission of his preliminary hearing testimony was error. State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2000).

In an aggravated assault case where the victim testified in a preliminary hearing but died before trial, defendant’s confrontation right was not violated by admission of that testimony at trial. Defendant was represented at the preliminary hearing by counsel who engaged the victim in full and effective cross-examination as to his truthfulness, bias, memory, and motive. State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 222 P.3d 471 (Ct. App. 2009).

Standard of Review.

The basis of defendant’s objection to the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, while not set forth specifically as required by Idaho Evid. R. 103(a)(1), appeared to be under this section, and the trial court’s ruling, therefore, would not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 978 P.2d 227 (1999).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 9-351.

The term “this act” throughout this section originally appeared in the enactment of former§ 9-348 and was a reference to S.L. 1990, chapter 213, which enacted former§§ 9-338 to 9-348 and amended numerous other sections in the Idaho Code. The term was retained in this section in the revision of the code sections relating to public records by S.L. 2015, chapter 140, which enacted all of title 74, Idaho Code. The term should probably read “this chapter,” being chapter 1, title 74, Idaho Code.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 67-2340.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Discharge of Commission Director.

There was no merit to the contention that the commission for the blind must have met before the public meeting and decided to fire the director and appoint her replacement, where the new appointee spoke several hours after the motion to terminate had been made and debated, and he qualified his remarks with the comment, “if the board does make the decision to retain.” Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

The fact that the letter of dismissal given to the director of the commission for the blind a very short time after the meeting terminated had “legal type wording” did not prove that the commission had decided to fire her before the public meeting. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

Executive Sessions.

The fact that a locksmith arrived several minutes after the meeting to fire the director of the commission for the blind and appoint her replacement had concluded, in order to change the lock on the door of the director’s office, was not substantial and competent proof that members of the commission met before the meeting and had an agreement to discharge the director. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986). Executive Sessions.

Exclusion of school superintendent from executive sessions of school board, in which superintendent was evaluated and the extension of his contract was discussed, did not violate the open meeting law, where the decision not to offer the superintendent a new contract was made in an open meeting of the board. Gardner v. School Dist. No. 55, 108 Idaho 434, 700 P.2d 56 (1985).

Hospital Board.

The meeting of the county hospital board held at the home of a staff member in December, the date and place for which had been set by action taken by the board at its October meeting, duly recorded in the board’s minutes, and an additional notice or reminder of which was sent to each member three days before the meeting itself, at which a quorum attended and minutes were taken, substantially complied with§ 31-3606, regarding meetings of a county hospital board and with this state’s open meeting law. Harms Mem. Hosp. v. Morton, 112 Idaho 129, 730 P.2d 1049 (Ct. App. 1986).

In General.

The administrative committee of the water resource board is not required to conduct its business subject to open public hearings, because it is not the governing body of the state water resource board. Idaho Water Resource Bd. v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1976).

Open Meetings Required.

Elected officials may discuss potential public policy issues and determine association policy at meetings of the Association of Idaho Cities and Idaho Association of Counties. But local public policy must be determined and adopted only after compliance with Idaho law including the Idaho open meetings law.OAG 89-7.

Repealed effective July 1, 2023.

Cross References.

District magistrates commission,§ 1-2203.

Judicial council,§ 1-2101 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 142, inserted “committee, council” in paragraph (4)(a), inserted “or executive order of the governor” in paragraphs (4)(a) and (4)(d); and added paragraph (4)(e).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 67-2341.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Effective Dates.

Section 4 of S.L. 2018, ch. 142 provided that section 1 of the act (amending this section) should take effect on and after July 1, 2018.

Decisions Under Prior Law

Lawsuit.

City manager had no authority to make the decision to file a lawsuit, because that was a decision that had to be made by the city council, in accordance with the requirements of the open meeting laws. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009).

Meeting.

Where four private “work sessions” were held by the mayor and city council to discuss an annexation proposal prior to voting on the proposals at special public meetings, such work sessions were “meetings” under subsection (6) of this section, which had to be open to the public pursuant to subsection (1) of§ 67-2342 [now§ 74-203]. Failure to provide public notice as required by§ 67-2343 [now§ 74-204] or to take written minutes as required by§ 67-2344 [now§ 74-205] violated the open meetings act. However, since no firm and final decisions were made at the work sessions on the annexation proposal, the subsequent city council vote approving the proposal was not null and void under§ 67-2347 [now§ 74-208]. State ex rel. Roark v. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 633 P.2d 576 (1981). Crop residue disposal program was not a subagency of the Idaho state department of agriculture (ISDA) within the meaning of the open meetings act (act), and the ISDA employees who worked in that program were not a governing body as defined by the act; therefore, the act did not apply to Idaho crop residue disposal program end-of-year meeting. Safe Air for Everyone v. Idaho State Dep’t of Agric., 145 Idaho 164, 177 P.3d 378 (2008).

Open Meeting.

When appellants sought an application to develop a subdivision in an area zoned rural that contained a wetland subject to flooding, the county board of commissioners’ visit to the site of the proposed subdivision was conducted in violation of provision of Idaho’s open meeting laws. While proper notice of the public hearing/site visit was provided, the board acted in bad faith by intentionally avoiding a group that was gathered near the entrance to the site location and precluding interested parties from actually attending. Noble v. Kootenai County, 148 Idaho 937, 231 P.3d 1034 (2010).

Validity of Decisions.

Even though there was evidence that it was common-place for the commissioners to fail to give notice of meetings by posting an agenda in accordance with§ 67-2343(1) [now§ 74-204], such violations did not affect the status of meeting that was conducted in accordance with the open meetings law, and commission’s final decision on selection of new landfill site made at that meeting was not tainted by the impropriety of any preceding actions that were not challenged in a timely manner. Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 938 P.2d 1214 (1997).

Vote for County Action Required.

Decision to stipulate to a judgment concerning a road in a quiet title action was allegedly made by consensus but not at a public meeting, and the settlement was, in this case, a decision that required a vote for county action under§ 67-2341(1) [now§ 74-204], given that, under§ 31-708, a county clerk was to record the vote of each member on any question upon which there was a division, and because§ 31-706 defined a quorum and§ 40-1310(6) provided that any action carried out in litigation was to require a quorum; the executive session exception under§ 67-2345 [now§ 74-206] did not apply because (1) no vote was made in a regular meeting to authorize such a session and (2) no final action or decision could have been made in such a non-public meeting. Farrell v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002), overruled on other grounds, City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012).

Commission of Pardons and Parole.

As a statutory entity with authority to make decisions concerning paroles, pardons and commutations, the commission of pardons and parole is subject to the open meeting law and is required to open all meetings to the public, except those conducted in executive session.OAG 85-9. The commission of pardons and parole may not vote in private; thus, matters discussed in executive session must still be voted upon in public.OAG 85-9.

Idaho Law Review.

Idaho Law Review. — Regulation of Teacher Certification in Idaho: Proceedings Before Idaho’s Professional Standards Commission Concerning the Denial of an Application for or Action Against a Teaching Certificate, John E. Rumel. 53 Idaho L. Rev. 527 (2017).

Am. Jur. 2d.

C.J.S.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 74-202, which comprised I.C.,§ 74-202, as added by S.L. 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344; S.L. 2018, ch. 137, § 1, was repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 142, § 2, effective July 1, 2023.

Compiler’s Notes.

Effective July 1, 2023, S.L. 2018, ch. 142, § 2 repeals a version of this section and S.L. 2018, ch. 142, § 3 enacts a new version. For this section as effective until July 1, 2023, see the preceding section, also numbered§ 74-202.

Effective Dates.

Section 4 of S.L. 2018, ch. 142 provided that sections 2 and 3 of the act (repealing and enacting a new version of this section) should take effect on and after July 1, 2023.

Cross References.

Industrial commission,§ 72-501 et seq.

Public utility commission,§ 61-201 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 67-2342. The term “this act” at the end of the first sentence in subsection (1) refers to S.L. 1974, chapter 187, which enacted former§§ 67-2341 to 67-2345 and 67-2346. The term “this act” near the end of the first sentence in subsection (2) refers to S.L. 1992, chapter 155, which was codified as former§§ 67-2341 o 67-2343 and 67-2347. The term “this act” near the end of subsection (3) refers to S.L. 1998, chapter 305, which is codified as former§ 67-2342. With the revision of the open meetings law by S.L. 2015, chapter 140, these terms should now read “this chapter,” being chapter 3, title 74, Idaho Code.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Annexation Work Sessions.

Where four private “work sessions” were held by the mayor and city council to discuss an annexation proposal prior to voting on the proposals at special public meetings, such work sessions were “meetings” under subsection (6) of§ 67-2341 [now§ 74-202] , which had to be open to the public pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and failure to provide public notice as required by§ 67-2343 [now§ 74-204] or to take written minutes as required by§ 67-2344 [now§ 74-205] violated the open meetings act; however, since no firm and final decisions were made at the work sessions on the annexation proposal, the subsequent city council vote approving the proposal was not null and void under§ 67-2347 [now§ 74-208]. State ex rel. Roark v. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 633 P.2d 576 (1981).

Authority of Governing Board.

The decision to file a lawsuit is not a ministerial or administrative decision but is a policy decision that must be made by the governing board pursuant to the open meeting laws, and the city manager is appointed by the city council as the administrative head of the city government under the direction and supervision of such council, not as the city’s policymaker. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009).

Executive Sessions.

Exclusion of school superintendent from executive sessions of school board, in which superintendent was evaluated and the extension of his contract was discussed, did not violate the open meeting law, where the decision not to offer the superintendent a new contract was made in an open meeting of the board. Gardner v. School Dist. No. 55, 108 Idaho 434, 700 P.2d 56 (1985).

Open Meeting Requirement.

When appellants sought an application to develop a subdivision in an area zoned rural that contained a wetland subject to flooding, the county board of commissioners’ visit to the site of the proposed subdivision was conducted in violation of provision of Idaho’s open meeting laws. While proper notice of the public hearing/site visit was provided, the board acted in bad faith by intentionally avoiding a group that was gathered near the entrance to the site location and precluding interested parties from actually attending. Noble v. Kootenai County, 148 Idaho 937, 231 P.3d 1034 (2010).

Standing.

Plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the agency’s failure to comply with the statutory procedures for conducting open public meetings under this section and§ 67-6509 where the plaintiff did not present any evidence that any of its members are abutting or otherwise affected real property owners and no evidence of a peculiarized harm. Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board of Comm’rs, 133 Idaho 833, 993 P.2d 596 (1999).

Executive Sessions.

Only certain documents which have been excluded from public inspection by clear statutory provision may be considered in executive session.OAG 85-9.

Idaho Law Review.

Idaho Law Review. — Regulation of Teacher Certification in Idaho: Proceedings Before Idaho’s Professional Standards Commission Concerning the Denial of an Application for or Action Against a Teaching Certificate, John E. Rumel. 53 Idaho L. Rev. 527 (2017).

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 223, added the last sentence in subsection (1); in subsection (4), added the present last sentence in the introductory paragraph and added the last two sentences in paragraph(c).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 67-2343.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Decisions Under Prior Law

Annexation Work Sessions.

Where four private “work sessions” were held by the mayor and city council to discuss an annexation proposal prior to voting on the proposals at special public meetings, such work sessions were “meetings” under subsection (6) of§ 67-2341 [now§ 74-201], which had to be open to the public pursuant to subsection (1) of§ 67-2342 [now§ 74-203] and failure to provide public notice as required by this section or to take written minutes as required by§ 67-2344 [now§ 74-205] violated the open meetings act; however, since no firm and final decisions were made at the work sessions on the annexation proposal, the subsequent city council vote approving the proposal was not null and void under§ 67-2347 [now§ 74-208]. State ex rel. Roark v. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 633 P.2d 576 (1981).

Mailed Out by Addressee.

Notice Inadequate.

Where an employee who was fired during a public meeting of the commission for the blind mailed out notice of the meeting herself, and she attended the meeting, she could not argue prejudice as far as any allegation of improper notice was concerned, because it was clear that she was not disadvantaged by any notice deficiency. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986). Notice Inadequate.

Irrespective of the type of meeting in which the Idaho commission of pardons and paroles may have reached its parole decision as to the inmate’s sentence, the inmate was entitled to notice; the inmate presented evidence that he received no such notice. Acheson v. Klauser, 139 Idaho 156, 75 P.3d 210 (Ct. App. 2003).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 67-2344.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Decisions Under Prior Law

Annexation Work Sessions.

Audio Recording.

Where four private “work sessions” were held by the mayor and city council to discuss an annexation proposal prior to voting on the proposals at special public meetings, such work sessions were “meetings” under subsection (6) of§ 67-2341 [now§ 74-201], which had to be open to the public pursuant to subsection (1) of§ 67-2342 [now§ 74-203] and failure to provide public notice as required by§ 67-2343 [now§ 74-205] or to take written minutes as required by this section violated the open meetings act; however, since no firm and final decisions were made at the work sessions on the annexation proposal, the subsequent city council vote approving the proposal was not null and void under§ 67-2347 [now§ 74-208]. State ex rel. Roark v. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 633 P.2d 576 (1981). Audio Recording.

Common, ordinary meaning of the term “written” refers to words or symbols recorded in visual form, and an audio recording is not a “written” record as that term is commonly understood; therefore, the open meeting requirements were violated by county commissioners in a closed session with a city councilman because the recordation requirements were not met where only an audio recording of votes was made. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007).

Raw Notes Taken by Clerk.

Trial court erred in holding that as a matter of law “raw notes” (“handwritten notes,” “raw minutes”) taken by clerk of the board of county commissioners during meetings of the county board of commissioners could not be public writings. Fox v. Estep, 118 Idaho 454, 797 P.2d 854 (1990).

Cross References.

Commission of pardons and parole,§ 20-210.

Custody review board, meetings of,§ 20-533A.

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 271, added “to conduct deliberations concerning labor negotiations or” at the beginning of paragraph (1)(c), added paragraph (1)(j), deleted former subsection (2) , which read: “Labor negotiations may be conducted in executive session if either side requests closed meetings. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 67-2343, Idaho Code, subsequent sessions of the negotiations may continue without further public notice”; and redesignated former subsections (3) and (4) as present subsections (2) and (3).

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 169, substituted “section 74-206A” for “section 67-2345A” in paragraph (1)(j).

The 2019 amendment, by ch. 114, added subsection (4).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was to become null and void, effective July 1, 2020, pursuant to S.L. 2015, ch. 271, § 4. However, S.L. 2019, ch. 85, § 2 repealed the provisions of S.L. 2015, ch. 271, § 4, effective July 1, 2019.

The section is derived from former§ 67-2345.

Section 1 of S.L. 2015, chapter 271 purported to amend§ 67-2345. However, S.L. 2015, chapter 140 repealed§ 67-2345 and enacted a new§ 74-206 that is identical to the former§ 67-2345. To carry out the intent of S.L. 2015, chapter 271, the amendment of§ 67-2345 by that act has been given effect in§ 74-206.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Decisions Under Prior Law

Legal counsel. Recordation of votes.

Closed Session.

Where an executive session is authorized to consider the dismissal of an employee, the deliberating process can be conducted in a closed session. There is no requirement that private discussions of personnel matters must be repeated in public. Nelson v. Boundary County, 109 Idaho 205, 706 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1985).

Decision to stipulate to a judgment concerning a road in a quiet title action was allegedly made by consensus but not at a public meeting, and the settlement was, in this case, a decision that required a vote for county action under§ 67-2341(1) [now§ 74-202], given that, under§ 31-708, a county clerk was to record the vote of each member on any question upon which there was a division, and because§ 31-706 defined a quorum and§ 40-1310(6) provided that any action carried out in litigation was to require a quorum; the executive session exception under§ 67-2345 [now this section] did not apply because (1) no vote was made in a regular meeting to authorize such a session and (2) no final action or decision could have been made in such a non-public meeting. Farrell v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002), overruled on other grounds, City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012).

Commission of pardons and parole was not required to grant petitioner a full, open session hearing regarding his commutation petition. Leavitt v. Craven, 154 Idaho 661, 302 P.3d 1 (2012).

Conflict With Other Statute.

There is a clear and definite conflict between the provisions of this section of the open meetinga law and former§ 31-713 [now 31-710(4)], which requires that all meetings of the board of county commissioners be public; this section, which was enacted later in time, governs. Nelson v. Boundary County, 109 Idaho 205, 706 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1985).

Discharge of Commission Director.

There was no merit to the contention that the commission for the blind must have met before the public meeting and decided to fire the director and appoint her replacement, where the new appointee spoke several hours after the motion to terminate had been made and debated, and he qualified his remarks with the comment, “if the board does make the decision to retain.” Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

The fact that the letter of dismissal given to the director of the commission for the blind a very short time after the meeting terminated had “legal type wording” did not prove that the commission had decided to fire her before the public meeting. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

The fact that a press release stating that the director had been dismissed was handed to the press before the commission for the blind had voted on her dismissal did not prove that the commission had decided to fire her before the public meeting where the press release was not attributable to the commission. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

Equal Protection.

The fact that a locksmith arrived several minutes after the meeting to fire the director of the commission for the blind and appoint her replacement had concluded, in order to change the lock on the door of the director’s office, was not substantial and competent proof that members of the commission met before the meeting and had an agreement to discharge the director. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986). Equal Protection.

A discharged county employee, who argued he had been injured by this section permitting closed meetings of the board of county commissioners for personnel matters, failed to show that his right to equal protection had been infringed where the alleged injury to his reputation stemmed not from the closed meetings, the findings of fact or even the termination itself, but from supposed rumors and gossip aired outside any closed meeting. Nelson v. Boundary County, 109 Idaho 205, 706 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1985).

Legal Counsel.

Executive session may be held: (1) to consider, and advise its legal representatives in, pending litigation; or (2) where there is a general public awareness of probable litigation. The Idaho legislature chose to rely on a “general public awareness” requirement, rather than an attorney presence requirement, to perform the gatekeeping function in such cases. Therefore, county commissioners were not required to have legal counsel present in a case where there was a general public awareness of probable litigation in a closed meeting between the commissioners and a city councilman, regarding tension between the two entities, and whether the state of the meeting qualified under paragraph (1)(f) was a disputed issue of fact not properly disposed of by a motion for judgment on the pleadings. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007).

Recordation of Votes.

Common, ordinary meaning of the term “written” refers to words or symbols recorded in visual form, and an audio recording is not a “written” record as that term is commonly understood; therefore, the open meeting requirements were violated by county commissioners in a closed session with a city councilman, because the recordation requirements were not met where only an audio recording of votes was made. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007).

Scope of Executive Session.

Only certain documents which have been excluded from public inspection by clear statutory provision may be considered in executive session.OAG 85-9.

The executive session exceptions in this section should be interpreted narrowly in order to fulfill the broad public purpose of allowing citizens to observe their governments at work, as provided by the Idaho open meetings act.OAG 08-03.

Corrective action should be taken immediately upon recognition that an executive session has “drifted” from its stated purpose and governing bodies should implement an oversight mechanism to assist in preventing and recognizing “drift.”OAG 08-03.

Hiring.

Subdivision (1)(a) of this section (“the hiring exception”) should be construed to apply only to the narrow situation in which a specific candidate is being considered for a specific position.OAG 08-03.

Idaho Law Review.

Idaho Law Review. — Regulation of Teacher Certification in Idaho: Proceedings Before Idaho’s Professional Standards Commission Concerning the Denial of an Application for or Action Against a Teaching Certificate, John E. Rumel. 53 Idaho L. Rev. 527 (2017).

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 47, redesignated the section from§ 67-2345A and substituted “74-204” for “67-2343” in the first sentence in subsection (3)..

The 2019 amendment, by ch. 85, in subsection (1), substituted “fact finders, mediators or similar labor dispute meeting facilitators when meeting with both parties to the negotiation at the same time” for “mediators or similar labor meeting facilitators” at the end of the third sentence in the introductory paragraph and substituted “Deliberating on” for “Considering” in paragraph (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was to become null and void, effective July 1, 2020, pursuant to S.L. 2015, ch. 271, § 4. However, S.L. 2019, ch. 85, § 2 repealed the provisions of S.L. 2015, ch. 271, § 4, effective July 1, 2019. Section 2 of S.L. 2015, chapter 271 purported to enact§ 67-2345A to immediately follow§ 67-2345. However, S.L. 2015, chapter 140 repealed sections 67-2340 through 67-2347 and enacted new sections 74-201 through 74-208 that are identical to former sections 67-2340 through 67-2347. To carry out the intent of S.L. 2015, chapter 271, the enactment of§ 67-2345A by that act had been given effect as§ 74-206A to immediately follow the identical successor to§ 67-2345. The redesignation of this section, as enacted by S.L. 2015, ch. 271, was made permanent by S.L. 2016, ch. 47, § 41, effective July 1, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is derived from former§ 67-2346.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 346, substituted “two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)” for “fifty dollars ($50.00)” at the end of subsection (2); substituted “one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500)” for “five hundred dollars ($500)” at the end of subsection (3); and in subsection (4), substituted “knowingly violates any provision of this chapter” for “violates any provision of this act” near the beginning, substituted “pursuant to subsection (3) of this section” for “of this act” near the middle, and substituted “two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500)” for “five hundred dollars ($500)” at the end.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 67-2347.

The term “this act” near the end of paragraph (7)(b) was originally added to form§ 62-2347 by S.L. 2009, chapter 161, which was codified as§§ 67-2343 to 67-2345 and 67-2347. The rest of the occurrences of “this act” were originally added to former§ 67-2347 by S.L. 1992, chapter 155, which was codified as former§§ 67-2341 to 67-2343 and 67-2347. With the revision of the open meetings law by S.L. 2015, chapter 140, these terms should now read “this chapter,” being chapter 2, title 74, Idaho Code.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Effect of Informal Meeting.

Where four private “work sessions” were held by the mayor and city council to discuss an annexation proposal prior to voting on the proposals at special public meetings, such work sessions were “meetings” under subsection (6) of§ 67-2341 [now§ 74-202], which had to be open to the public pursuant to subsection (1) of§ 67-2342 [now§ 74-203] and failure to provide public notice as required by§ 67-2343 [now§ 74-204] or to take written minutes as required by§ 67-2344 [now§ 74-205] violated the open meetings act; however, since no firm and final decisions were made at the work sessions on the annexation proposal, the subsequent city council vote approving the proposal was not null and void under this section. State ex rel. Roark v. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 633 P.2d 576 (1981).

Where deliberations are conducted at a meeting violative of the open meetings act, but no firm and final decision is rendered upon the questions then discussed, the impropriety of that meeting will not taint final actions subsequently taken upon questions conscientiously considered at subsequent meetings which do comply with the provisions of the act. Baker v. Independent School Dist., 107 Idaho 608, 691 P.2d 1223 (1984).

Failure to Prove Unlawful Meeting.

There was no merit to the contention that the commission for the blind must have met before the public meeting and decided to fire the director and appoint her replacement, where the new appointee spoke several hours after the motion to terminate had been made and debated, and he qualified his remarks with the comment, “if the board does make the decision to retain.” Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

The fact that the letter of dismissal given to the director of the commission for the blind a very short time after the meeting terminated had “legal type wording” did not prove that the commission had decided to fire her before the public meeting. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

The fact that a press release stating that the director had been dismissed was handed to the press before the commission for the blind had voted on her dismissal did not prove that the commission had decided to fire her before the public meeting where the press release was not attributable to the commission. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 645, 93 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1986).

Knowledge.

This section specifies that an individual must act “knowingly,” so a participant must be aware that a meeting violated the open meeting law; knowledge of a violation may be inferred, but it is a prerequisite to liability. Therefore, judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate in a case where county commissioners contended that they did not know of a violation that occurred during a closed session with a city councilman. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007).

Ratification of Unauthorized Act by City Manager.

Fact that a city manager did not have authority to authorize the commencement of a lawsuit did not require dismissal where the city council later ratified that action in a meeting that complied with the open meeting laws, because there was nothing in the open meeting laws that would prevent a governing board from later ratifying an unauthorized act by its agent. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009).

Time Limitations.

If actions in violation of the open meeting laws were void without a challenge, the provisions of subsection (4) [now (6)] of this section would be meaningless; consequently, actions taken by commissioners in selecting landfill sites that were not challenged within the time provided for in subsection (4) of this section were not void under the open meeting laws. Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 938 P.2d 1214 (1997).

History.

I.C.,§ 74-401, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

CASE NOTES

RESEARCH REFERENCES

History.

I.C.,§ 74-402, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 74-403, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 74-404, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 74-405, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

History.

I.C.,§ 74-406, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-201.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Grants of Franchises.

Where plaintiffs participated in the bidding and award of cable television franchise process by city and no protest was made by the plaintiffs when the several city governments banded together to form the committee to investigate the award and recommend the franchise, and no objection was lodged against the prospect of the various cities granting franchises, the trial court did not err in holding that the plaintiffs were estopped from pursuing collateral attacks upon grant of franchise to others or upon ordinance or upon any other known defect. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 486 P.2d 992 (1971).

Official’s Primary Duty.

Official’s duty is to give to public service the full benefit of a disinterested judgment. McRoberts v. Hoar, 28 Idaho 163, 152 P. 1046 (1915).

Prohibited Contracts.

Contract made between secretary of state and printing company, whereby former is to receive a part of the compensation payable to the latter for printing session laws and legislative journals, is within prohibitions of this section. State ex rel. Anderson v. Lewis, 6 Idaho 21, 52 P. 163 (1898).

Contract with wife of one member of board of school trustees, employing her to teach in a school over which such board has supervision, was void. Nuckols v. Lyle, 8 Idaho 589, 70 P. 401 (1902). Member of board of county commissioners cannot lease or contract with board for the use of real or personal property owned by him. Robinson v. Huffaker, 23 Idaho 173, 129 P. 334 (1912).

Am. Jur. 2d.

C.J.S.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-201A.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-202.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Coroner.

Under this section a county coroner engaged in the undertaking business is not entitled to payment from the county for expenses incurred by him as undertaker in burial of deceased persons who had been a county charge. Benewah County v. Mitchell, 57 Idaho 1, 61 P.2d 284 (1936).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-203.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Void School Board Contract.

Payment under void contract between board of school trustees and wife of a member of board may be enjoined at the suit of any taxpayer of the school district. Nuckols v. Lyle, 8 Idaho 589, 70 P. 401 (1902).

Cross References.

State controller,§ 67-1001 et seq.

State treasurer,§ 67-1201 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-204.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Scope.

This section was a part of an act entitled “An act to prevent officers from dealing in certain securities.” Use of word “dealing” clearly indicates intention of legislature to preclude officers from dealing in such securities in any manner. Libby v. Pelham, 30 Idaho 614, 166 P. 575 (1917).

Am. Jur. 2d.

§ 74-506. Affidavit of nonviolation a prerequisite to allowance of accounts.

Every officer whose duty it is to audit and allow the accounts of other state, county, district, city or precinct officers, must, before allowing such accounts, require each of such officers to make and file with him an affidavit that he has not violated any of the provisions of this chapter.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-506, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-205.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-206.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Official Purchasing as Agent.

Where wife purchased county warrants through husband as agent, who was at that time county commissioner, treasurer is without authority to pay same. Libby v. Pelham, 30 Idaho 614, 166 P. 575 (1917).

Am. Jur. 2d.

§ 74-508. Suspension of settlement or payment — Prosecution of offenders.

Every officer charged with the disbursement of public moneys, who is informed by affidavit that any officer whose account is to be settled, audited, or paid by him, has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, must suspend such settlement or payment, and cause such officer to be prosecuted for such violation.

History.

I.C.,§ 74-508, as added by 2015, ch. 140, § 5, p. 344.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-207.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-208.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-209.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 289, substituted “67-9230” for “67-5726” and “67-9231” for “67-5734.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The section is derived from former§ 59-210.

Section 6 of S.L. 2015, ch. 140 provided: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” refers to S.L. 2018, Chapter 260, which is codified as§§ 74-601 through 74-606.

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the second sentence in subsection (4) refers to S.L. 2018, Chapter 260, which is codified as§§ 74-601 through 74-606.