Chapter 1 Supreme Court

8-1-1. Composition — Effect of resignation or retirement on pending cases.

The supreme court shall consist of a chief justice and four (4) associate justices; provided, however, that whenever any justice of the supreme court shall cease to be a justice thereof by reason of resignation or retirement, the resigned or retired justice shall be eligible to exercise the function of a justice of the supreme court for the purpose of participating in rendering decisions in all causes argued to the court prior to the resignation or retirement of the justice. The provisions of this section shall be interpreted and construed liberally, for the purpose of accomplishing the purpose thereof.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 272, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 322, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 495, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-1 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 14, § 1.

Cross References.

Attorney-general, attendance by, § 42-9-3 .

Clerk of court, § 8-4-1 et seq.

Compensation of judges, R.I. Const., art. X, § 6 .

Election and removal of judges, R.I. Const., art. X, §§ 4 , 5.

Establishment of supreme court, R.I. Const., art. X, § 1 .

Exemption of judges from jury service, § 9-9-3 .

Exemption of judges from militia duty, § 30-1-7 .

Impersonation of judge, penalty, § 11-14-1 .

Justices of court, § 8-3-1 et seq.

Law library, § 29-3-1 et seq.

Secretary and assistant secretary, § 8-5-1 .

Sheriff’s attendance, § 42-29-19 .

Unclassified service, judges in, § 36-4-2 .

Comparative Legislation.

Appellate court of last resort:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-198 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 211, § 1 et seq.

8-1-2. Jurisdiction and powers of court.

The supreme court shall have general supervision of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein when no other remedy is expressly provided; it may issue writs of habeas corpus, of error, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and all other extraordinary and prerogative writs and processes necessary for the furtherance of justice and the due administration of the law; it may entertain informations in the nature of quo warranto and petitions in equity to determine title to any office; it shall have jurisdiction of petitions for trials and new trials, as provided by law, of bills of exceptions, appeals and certifications to the supreme court, and special cases in which parties having adversary interests concur in stating questions for the opinion of the court as provided by law; and it shall by general or special rules regulate the admission of attorneys to practice in all the courts of the state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 272, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 322, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 495, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-2 .

Rules of Court.

For rule providing for judicial conference, see Article VIII of the Supreme Court Rules.

For rules governing attorneys and counsellors, see Articles II through V of the Supreme Court Rules.

For rules governing practice and procedure, see Article I of the Supreme Court Rules.

Cross References.

Appeals in criminal cases, § 12-22-11 et seq.

Constitutional jurisdiction and powers, R.I. Const., amend. XII .

Contempt of court, § 8-6-1 .

Division of motor vehicles, appeals, §§ 31-2-17 , 31-2-19 , 31-3.1-36 , 31-11-15 , 31-31-2 , 39-14-18 .

Election officers, mandamus to compel performance of duties, § 17-24-1 et seq.

Employment security appeals, §§ 28-39-16 , 28-41-27 , 28-42-55 , 28-44-55 .

General power over proceedings, § 8-6-1 .

Habeas corpus, § 10-9-1 et seq.

Mental health certification appeals, §§ 40.1-5-8 , 40.1-5-36 .

Motions in supreme court, § 8-11-3 et seq.

Narcotic addicts, appeal from admission, § 21-28.2-14.1 .

Powers of justice in vacation of superior court, § 8-2-25 .

Practice of law, unauthorized, penalties, § 11-27-1 et seq.

Quo warranto, § 10-14-1 et seq.

Removal of deputy sheriff for misdemeanor in office, § 42-29-10 .

Rules of court, § 8-6-2 .

Sessions of court, § 8-7-1 .

Tax administrator appeals, §§ 3-10-6 , 31-36-9 , 31-36-18 , 44-11-24 , 44-11-35 , 44-11-38 , 44-12-10 , 44-13-22 , 44-13-32 , 44-13-33 , 44-14-26 , 44-14-36 , 44-14-37 , 44-15-15 , 44-15-16 , 44-17-5 , 44-19-18 , 44-19-25 , 44-19-27.4 , 44-20-46 , 44-20-48 , 44-23-24 , 44-23-33 , 44-29-10 , 44-29-13 , 44-30-90 , 44-30-92 .

Traffic offenses, appeals of, §§ 31-41.1-8 , 31-41.1-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bills of Exceptions.

The bill of exceptions given by the statute has practically superseded the writ of error, as by it the record can be brought before the court for examination before the entry of judgment, but the supreme court still has power to issue the writ. Newhall v. Egan, 28 R.I. 584 , 68 A. 471, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1908).

The jurisdiction conferred upon the supreme court by R.I. Const., amend. XII is undoubtedly broad enough to include questions of law arising in a divorce case, the method of presenting such questions being by bill of exceptions. Thrift v. Thrift, 30 R.I. 357 , 75 A. 484, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1910).

The supreme court has jurisdiction of bill of exceptions brought to review an alleged abuse of discretion of superior court in dismissing complaint. Fox v. Artesian Well & Supply Co., 34 R.I. 260 , 83 A. 115, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1912).

A bill of exceptions will not lie from the decision of the justice upon a petition to vacate a divorce decree procured by fraud on the petitioner; an appeal is the correct procedure. Tobin v. Tobin, 70 R.I. 362 , 38 A.2d 756, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1944).

A bill of exceptions is the medium by which rulings and decisions made by the superior court prior to judgment are reviewed by the supreme court and may also be used to review supplementary rulings after judgment, such as one taxing costs. Valentine v. Knox, 45 R.I. 429 , 123 A. 600, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1924), limited, In re Lanni, 47 R.I. 158 , 131 A. 52, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1925).

Bill of exceptions was not proper remedy to review decision of superior court, but in view of fact that case was of first impression, statute provided for no ordinary appellate proceedings, and trial court held different views as to procedure, supreme court would treat bill of exceptions as certiorari and grant relief to which plaintiff was entitled. Carlson v. McLyman, 77 R.I. 177 , 74 A.2d 853, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1950).

Criminal Sentence Review.

Even in the absence of express statutory authority the supreme court has implied statutory and state constitutional power to review a sentence imposed under a sentencing statute. The role in reviewing excessive sentence claims, however, is a limited one; it is to be exercised only in the exceptional instance. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (R.I. 1980).

Original Appellate Jurisdiction.

A portion of the supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court was given to the superior court by C.P.A. 1905, § 12 (§ 8-2-16 ). Higgins v. Tax Assessors, 27 R.I. 401 , 63 A. 34, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1905).

The supreme court was not deprived of its revisory jurisdiction by P.L. 1912, ch. 896, which provided the decree of the superior court confirming a decision of the commission established under said act should be final and binding, since such clause must be construed to mean final in the superior court, but subject to revision by the supreme court. In re Pawtucket & Cent. Falls Grade Crossing Comm'n, 36 R.I. 200 , 89 A. 695, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1914).

Under the provisions of this section where a statute expressly gives original appellate jurisdiction to a court other than the supreme court, such original appellate jurisdiction is exclusive and not in conflict with R.I. Const., amend. XII, § 1 , which gives the supreme court final revisory and appellate jurisdiction; and this final jurisdiction cannot be availed of until rights in the court of original appellate jurisdiction have been exhausted and its requirements met. MacKenzie & Shea v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 45 R.I. 407 , 122 A. 774, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1923).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-53-5 does not provide for a direct appeal from an adverse substantial completeness determination made by the Rhode Island State Housing Appeals Board pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-53-6(f)(1) ; however, pursuant to R.I. Const. art. 10, § 2 , relief may be sought in the Rhode Island Supreme Court by way of a writ of certiorari. New Harbor Vill., LLC v. Town of New Shoreham Zoning Bd. of Review, 894 A.2d 901, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2006).

Petitions in Probate Matters.

Where the original account filed in a probate matter was not a proper accounting and a new trial in the superior court would merely result in a prolongation of the case, the case is one calling for the exercise of the power of the court to reverse the decree of the superior court to the end that an account in proper form may be newly filed in the probate court. Stillman v. Moore, 28 R.I. 548 , 68 A. 726, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1908).

This section did not give supreme court jurisdiction to grant permission to file a belated probate appeal claiming undue influence, lack of capacity and lack of knowledge of probate although residence was known to executors and sole beneficiaries. Walquist v. Hodson, 53 R.I. 322 , 166 A. 546, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 91 (1933).

In will construction under G.L. 1923, ch. 339, § 35 (former § 9-24-28 ) all persons in being having an interest in the income or principal of a trust estate should be made parties, the minor living children should be represented by guardians ad litem, and a suitable disinterested person should be appointed by superior court to represent persons not in being or ascertainable, but supreme court held control by remanding to amend by proceeding as above and allowing necessary pleading and argument. Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 58 R.I. 378 , 192 A. 821, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1937).

After refusal to answer question certified concerning power of superior court to approve compromise of infant’s claim under will, supreme court would not permit filing of original petition by infant’s guardian ad litem for such approval, because such a question would not be a matter of general supervision of a court of inferior jurisdiction under this section. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Davis, 68 R.I. 461 , 29 A.2d 647, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1942).

Power to Issue Writs Generally.

The supreme court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs is not confined to any narrow definition of a particular writ but may adapt or modify any writ suitable for the matter in hand in order to further justice and secure due administration of law. Hyde v. Superior Court, 28 R.I. 204 , 66 A. 292, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1907).

The supreme court has the power to issue a writ restraining the acting secretary of state from issuing a commission and restraining the candidate from acting as judge under such commission when the judge was found not to have been properly elected under the law. Carpenter v. Sprague, 45 R.I. 29 , 119 A. 561, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1923).

The supreme court has authority derived from R.I. Const., amend. XII (see now R.I. Const., art. X, § 2 et seq.) to issue a prerogative writ of injunction, but such authority has never been conferred upon the superior court. Boss v. Sprague, 53 R.I. 1 , 162 A. 710, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1932).

Art. 10, § 2, R.I. Const., vests the Supreme Court with the power to issue prerogative writs. The power to issue such writs is not confined by any narrow definition of a particular writ, and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to adapt, to modify, or to frame new writs to meet the needs of the judicial system. This jurisdiction provides the court with flexibility to further justice which may not be provided in current statutes. Estate of Sherman v. Almeida, 610 A.2d 104, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 148 (R.I. 1992).

Practice of Law.

G.L. 1923, ch. 401, §§ 44-47 (§§ 11-27-5 11-27-19 ) do not comprehend all the many acts which may be done within the practice of law nor set out all acts constituting illegal and unauthorized practice of law. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

It is within power of the court to regulate and control the practice of the law in or out of court, license attorneys, define what constitutes the practice of law and exclude unauthorized persons, notwithstanding exercise by legislature of its power to declare acts of unauthorized practice illegal and punishable by fine or imprisonment, and therefore G.L. 1923, ch. 401, §§ 44-47 (§§ 11-27-5 11-27-19 ) were in aid of the authority of the supreme court. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

The only way to acquire the right to practice law in this state is through the procedure prescribed by the rules of the supreme court. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

Rules governing admission to the practice of law in this state are adopted by the supreme court pursuant to this section, enacted in implementation of the inherent judicial power. In re Nelson, 106 R.I. 355 , 259 A.2d 839, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 635 (1969).

The Professional Service Corporation Act is in aid of the authority of the supreme court under this section to regulate the admission of attorneys to the practice of law and not subversive of it and merely provides a method by which members of the bar, with the permission of the court, may organize under the act and practice law in corporate form. In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 106 R.I. 752 , 263 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 985 (1970).

Statutory Remedy Neglected.

This section did not empower supreme court to grant relief to one who neglected or failed to take advantage of express statutory remedy for review of decisions of administrative officer. Canzano v. McLaughlin, 68 R.I. 22 , 26 A.2d 350, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1942).

Supervision of Inferior Courts.

In its exercise of the general supervisory authority over courts of inferior jurisdiction conferred upon the supreme court by this section, it suggested that the family court promulgate on or before October 2, 1967, a tentative rule delineating the controlling criteria for disposing of questions of waiver of juveniles to courts of adult jurisdiction. Knott v. Langlois, 102 R.I. 517 , 231 A.2d 767, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 722 (1967).

The supreme court has the inherent power without express statutory authority to renew a criminal sentence alleged to be excessive, although within the statutory limits, in exercising its general supervision of inferior courts. State v. Fortes, 114 R.I. 161 , 330 A.2d 404, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1393 (1975).

Where the legislature took no action on the problem of whether the current practice of holding violation of probation and deferred sentencing agreement hearings (see §§ 12- 19-9, 12-19-19 ) prejudiced defendants’ rights, the supreme court proceeded under the broad grant of supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals conferred upon it by amendment 12, § 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution and this section to decide the question. State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1738 (1977).

The Supreme Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to establish a per se rule prohibiting private prosecutions since the legislature has authorized such prosecutions and the plaintiff had complied with the statutory procedure for initiation of such an action. Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 2001).

Rhode Island Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to § 8-1-2 where state legislators and a beneficiary of a government-funded housng program filed suit regarding the governor’s alleged decision to freeze certain spending, and the trial court set the cases for a hearing, ruled the legislators possessed standing to question the legality of the governor’s action, and decided their claims were not moot. Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 201 (R.I. 2002).

Title to Office.

Petitioner in proceeding in nature of quo warranto brought in own interest and not by the attorney-general in the public interest must show that he is entitled to the office in question. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1 , 186 A. 832, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1936).

Writs of Certiorari.

A writ of certiorari was granted by supreme court in a partition proceeding where, after parties had consented to a decree that widow’s dower was to be paid either by a bond or by deposit of money, commissioners were appointed and hearings held, but the superior court set the decrees aside on petition of the widow following protests by some of the heirs, since decrees were interlocutory and furthermore the same process might be repeated and thus postpone an appeal indefinitely. Hyde v. Superior Court, 28 R.I. 204 , 66 A. 292, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1907).

Supreme court would grant certiorari to require bill of particulars where trial justice in superior court abused his judicial discretion in refusing to grant such where facts were known only to plaintiff, even though usual method of review of such decision would be by bill of exceptions. Union Mortgage Co. v. Rocheleau, 51 R.I. 345 , 154 A. 658, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1931).

Supreme court would not grant certiorari to defendant sued on promissory note who contested granting of plaintiff’s motion to amend petition to show allegedly true name of plaintiff corporation, since such ruling was not final determination as to whether new party was being brought in after statute of limitations had run. Cranston Loan Co. v. Byrne, 57 R.I. 482 , 190 A. 464, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1937).

Writ of certiorari will not lie if there is any other remedy. Cranston Loan Co. v. Byrne, 57 R.I. 482 , 190 A. 464, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1937).

Supreme court could grant writ of certiorari to state to review order of trial court to return dredges seized as evidence by the state in criminal case where trial court assumed jurisdiction to act without receiving any legally competent evidence, since review does not go to the merits. State v. Coleman, 58 R.I. 6 , 190 A. 791, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1937).

The writ of certiorari is an original prerogative writ to review the action of an inferior court taken without jurisdiction or in excess of it and does not go to the merits. State v. Coleman, 58 R.I. 6 , 190 A. 791, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1937).

A writ of certiorari is a broader writ than a writ of error and is not a writ of strict right and will be issued by the supreme court in the exercise of its general revisory and appellate jurisdiction to promote justice and prevent harm when no other remedy is available. State v. Coleman, 58 R.I. 6 , 190 A. 791, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1937).

Supreme court exercised its broad discretion under writ of certiorari to bring up issue of constitutionality of statute where trial court refused to certify issue under G.L. 1938, ch. 545, § 1, or under ch. 545, § 2 (former § 12-22-10 ). State v. Fay, 65 R.I. 304 , 14 A.2d 799, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 126 (1940).

The writ of certiorari has been employed by the supreme court in its revisory and appellate jurisdiction to correct errors committed by inferior courts and tribunals in the exercise of their jurisdiction. White v. White, 70 R.I. 48 , 36 A.2d 661, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1944); Levy v. Gerhard, 74 R.I. 288 , 60 A.2d 494, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1948).

Ordinarily, certiorari is not granted where the movant has another adequate remedy whereby his rights can be determined by the Supreme Court, or where the petition seeks a review of an interlocutory decision, or where to grant certiorari will result in bringing a matter before the court in piecemeal fashion, but the Supreme Court will depart from what is customary and usual if there are unusual or exceptional circumstances. Rogers v. Rogers, 98 R.I. 263 , 201 A.2d 140, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 161 (1964).

Where the family court was asserting exclusive jurisdiction to partition real estate, appoint receivers, reach the interest in trust fund estates and order an accounting in a divorce proceeding, this constituted circumstances so unusual and exceptional that the supreme court was warranted in exercising its certiorari jurisdiction to review the interlocutory decree. Rogers v. Rogers, 98 R.I. 263 , 201 A.2d 140, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 161 (1964).

The appeal of a municipality from action of a family court in dismissing its petition to declare a juvenile wayward was in effect a petition for certiorari, pursuant to which the supreme court reversed such action by the family court where it was taken without competent evidence in the record to support it. In re Little, 103 R.I. 301 , 237 A.2d 325, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 796 (1968).

Where the family court awarded the wife temporary support and other temporary relief and the husband was adjudged in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s decrees, and where there was also a basic jurisdictional conflict, the court exercised its discretion to issue the writ of certiorari despite its persistent reluctance to review interlocutory decrees or to permit matters to be brought before it in piecemeal fashion. Meinhold v. Meinhold, 119 R.I. 460 , 379 A.2d 1094, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2009 (1977).

Writ of certiorari challenging a town council’s decision to deny an application to allow landowners to hook into the town’s sewer system was addressed to the sufficiency of the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the council and were properly addressed to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Where the council failed to set any findings of fact in its order and where it failed to reference any town ordinance or any other law as justification for refusing the application, the order was insufficient and a remand to the council for proper findings was made. Cullen v. Town Council, 850 A.2d 900, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 2004).

Writs of Error.

Writ of error was the proper remedy in supreme court to review action of district court in dismissing action solely on a question of law, since a bill of exceptions was not applicable. Vrooman v. Arnold, 29 R.I. 478 , 72 A. 561, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1908).

Writs of Mandamus.

Mandamus will be available only when there is no other adequate remedy at law and justice can only be done by such mandamus; and R.I. Const., amend. XII and this section do not change this rule. Rowe v. Border City Garnetting Co., 40 R.I. 394 , 101 A. 223, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1917).

Supreme court would under its discretion entertain directly, rather than through superior court, petition for mandamus to city vote tabulation committee to open voting machines and make permanent record of votes, because of public interest, first impression and to avoid delay in final vote tabulation, particularly since proceedings indicated committee had not made final decision. Ruerat v. Cappelli, 56 R.I. 480 , 188 A. 637, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1936).

Mandamus will lie to compel an employee’s restoration to public employment, where the factual situation warrants it. Ambrosino v. Bevilacqua, 118 R.I. 369 , 375 A.2d 404, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1470 (1977).

Relief will be granted under a complaint for mandamus only where the plaintiffs have a clear legal right to have the act done which is sought and where the defendants have a ministerial, legal duty to perform such act without discretion to refuse. Warwick Sch. Comm. v. Gibbons, 122 R.I. 670 , 410 A.2d 1354, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1436 (1980).

Writs of Prohibition.

Where after a decision for petitioner in a divorce proceeding, but before entrance of final decree, petitioner filed a notice to discontinue her petition, which the court refused to permit, and respondent moved for entry of judgment, petition for writ of prohibition was a proper medium to bring the matter up to the supreme court. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 44 R.I. 429 , 117 A. 649, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1922).

Collateral References.

Appellate court’s discretion to refuse exercise of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. 165 A.L.R. 1431.

Power of legislature respecting admission to bar. 144 A.L.R. 150.

Superintending control over inferior tribunals. 112 A.L.R. 1351.

8-1-3. Written opinions.

The supreme court shall render written opinions in all cases decided by it wherein points of law, pleading, or practice have arisen which are novel or of sufficient importance to warrant written opinions. A supreme court administrative assistant shall prepare and file with the clerk of the court the original paper copy and an electronic copy of each opinion or rescript; the clerk shall then distribute copies for the use of the reporter, and one for each of the parties involved in the cause in which the opinion or rescript is given not less than two (2) hours prior to the posting of the opinion on the supreme court website. Thereafter, the clerk shall post a copy of the opinion on the supreme court website.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 272, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 322, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 495, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-3 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 273, § 1.

Cross References.

Advisory opinions, R.I. Const., amend. XII, § 2 .

Law Reviews.

For note, “Inviting Injustice: Why the Rhode Island Supreme Court should Publish Opinions for All Criminal Case Decisions,” see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 353 (2003).

8-1-4. Seal of court.

The supreme court shall have a seal, which shall contain the words “SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND”, and such device as the court shall adopt.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 36; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-4 ; P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 1, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 1, effective June 23, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Seal of superior court, § 8-2-12 .

8-1-5. Reporter — Appointment and tenure.

The supreme court shall appoint a reporter of the decisions and opinions of the court, who shall hold office during the pleasure of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 63; G.L. 1909, ch. 277, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 327, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 502, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-5 .

8-1-6. Duties of reporter.

The reporter shall make true reports of all cases in which written opinions have been rendered, and of all decisions and rescripts of the court which he or she may deem to be important and useful, and also all such matters as the court may order to be reported.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 64; G.L. 1909, ch. 277, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 327, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 502, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-6 .

8-1-7. Printing of reports.

The reporter shall, as often as he or she has material for a printed volume of not less than six hundred (600) pages, notify the state purchasing agent, and the agent shall call for competitive bids for printing and binding the volume and shall award the contracts therefor to the lowest responsible bidder, who shall publish the material, with an index prepared by the reporter, in a bound volume to be known as the Rhode Island Reports.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 65; G.L. 1909, ch. 277, § 3; P.L. 1913, ch. 911, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2177, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 327, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 502, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-7 .

8-1-8. Distribution of reports — Payment of cost.

Whenever the reporter shall cause to be published, as provided in § 8-1-7 , an edition of a volume of reports, he or she may retain for his or her own use twenty-five (25) copies. The remainder of the edition he or she shall deliver to the secretary of state, and shall assign to the secretary of state, for the use of the state, the copyright of the volume, if it shall have been copyrighted. Upon the delivery, and upon the assignment in case of a copyright, the state controller shall draw his or her order upon the general treasurer for the cost of the edition upon receipt by him or her of proper vouchers authenticated by the reporter and approved by the state purchasing agent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 68; G.L. 1909, ch. 277, § 6; redesignated § 4 by P.L. 1913, ch. 911, § 2; P.L. 1922, ch. 2177, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 327, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 502, § 4; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 8-1-8 .

8-1-9. Judicial conference of Rhode Island.

There is hereby established a judicial conference to be known as the judicial conference of Rhode Island, consisting of all the justices of the supreme, superior, and district courts and the family court of the state and of such other members as the supreme court may from time to time determine, for the consideration of matters relating to judicial business, the improvement of the judicial system, and the administration of justice. The supreme court shall by rule provide for the organization and conduct of the conference. The general assembly shall annually appropriate such sums as shall be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section, and the state controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his or her order on the general treasurer for the payment of such sum, or so much thereof, as may be required from time to time, upon receipt by him or her of duly authenticated vouchers approved by the presiding justice.

History of Section. G.L., § 8-1-9 , as enacted by P.L. 1962, ch. 12, § 1.

Rules of Court.

For rule governing judicial conference, Article VIII of the Supreme Court Rules.

Chapter 1.1 Selection of Supreme Court Justices [Repealed.]

8-1.1-1 — 8-1.1-9. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 155, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 2, effective upon ratification of a constitutional amendment to R.I. Const., art. X, §§ 4 and 5. The constitutional amendments were ratified by a majority of the voters in the election held November 8, 1994.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 8-1.1-1 — 8-1.1-9 concerned selection of supreme court justices.

Chapter 2 Superior Court

8-2-1. Composition.

There shall be a superior court which shall consist of a presiding justice and twenty-one (21) associate justices.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 1913, ch. 906, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2157, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1554, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2254, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-1 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 85, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 252, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 53, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 404, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 126, art. 24, § 7; P.L. 1993, ch. 99, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 358, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 23, § 1.

8-2-1.1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 126, art. 24, § 7; P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 65, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1993, ch. 99, § 2, effective July 14, 1993.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-2-1.1 concerned vacancy after December 31, 1991.

8-2-1.2. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 358, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 23, § 2, effective July 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-2-1.2 concerned a vacancy in the position of associate justice of the superior court after December 31, 1996.

8-2-2. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 2; P.L. 1930, ch. 1504, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2254, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-2 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 97, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 3, effective June 2, 1994.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-2-2 concerned tenure of justices and filling of vacancies.

8-2-3. Time and place of holding court.

A superior court shall be held at such times and places as shall be appointed by law, by such of the justices thereof as shall be designated from time to time by the presiding justice.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-3 .

Rules of Court.

For hours of court, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 1.3.

Cross References.

Attorney-general, attendance by, § 42-9-3 .

Contempt of court, § 8-6-1 .

General power over proceedings, § 8-6-1 .

Motion days, § 8-7-3 .

Sessions of court, §§ 8-7-2 , 8-7-3 .

Sheriffs’ attendance, § 42-29-19 .

Travel expenses of justices, § 36-6-9 .

Collateral References.

Validity of trial court as affected by place of holding session. 43 A.L.R. 1516, 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

8-2-4. Presiding justice as administrative judge.

The presiding justice of the superior court shall be the administrative judge. He or she shall be the administrative head of the superior court and have supervision and control of the calendars and of the assignment of justices. All court stenographers and secretaries shall be under his or her supervision. It shall be his or her duty to gather such statistics as shall reflect accurately the work of the court for the information of the court and such other use as he or she may deem expedient.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 496, § 3, as enacted by P.L. 1952, ch. 3030, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-4 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 179, § 1.

Rules of Court.

For rule providing for call of trial calendars in Kent, Newport, and Washington Counties, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 2.8.

For rule providing for supervision of the stenographic force of the superior court, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 3.5.

For rule providing that the powers of the administrative judge are unaffected by the Superior Court Rules, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 1.2.

Cross References.

Court reporters and electronic court reporters, § 8-5-3 et seq.

8-2-5. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 496, § 3, as enacted by P.L. 1952, ch. 3030, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-5 ); Repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 5.

8-2-6. Recommendations by administrative judge to chief justice.

The administrative judge shall also be charged with the general responsibility for making any recommendations to the chief justice that he or she may believe important concerning the work of the superior court or any officers in any way connected therewith.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 496, § 3, as enacted by P.L. 1952, ch. 3030, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-6 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 3.

Cross References.

Removal of deputy sheriff for misdemeanor in office, § 42-29-10 .

Rules of court, § 8-6-2 .

8-2-7. Information requests by administrative judge.

The judges of the superior court shall comply with all requests made by the administrative judge for information and statistical data bearing on the state of the dockets of the court and such other information as may reflect the business, and the state of business, transacted by them.

History of Section. G.L. 1938 ch. 496, § 27; P.L. 1952, ch. 3030, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-7 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 3.

8-2-8. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1233, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-8 ; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 222, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 377, § 4, effective June 28, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-2-8 concerned the purchase and use of books of Newport county law library.

8-2-9. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1233, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-9 ; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 222, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 377, § 4, effective June 28, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-2-9 concerned custody of law books and the estimate of funds required.

8-2-10. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1233, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-10 ; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 222, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 377, § 4, effective June 28, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-2-10 concerned appropriations for the Newport law library.

8-2-11. Administrative clerk.

There shall be an administrative clerk in the superior court, who shall be appointed by the presiding justice in his or her capacity as administrative judge and who shall hold office at the pleasure of the administrative judge. The clerk shall perform such duties and attend to such matters as may be assigned to him or her by the administrative judge.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 26; P.L. 1952, ch. 3030, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-11 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 3.

Cross References.

Clerks of court, § 8-4-4 et seq.

Secretary and assistants, § 8-5-2 .

8-2-11.1. Administrator/magistrate.

  1. Any person holding the position of administrative clerk in the superior court who is a member of the bar of Rhode Island may be appointed administrator/magistrate for a term of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified, by the presiding justice, with the advice and consent of the senate, in his or her capacity as administrative judge. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the assignment of an administrator/magistrate to more than one such term, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. Any magistrate in service as of January 1, 2008 who serves at the pleasure of the presiding justice of the superior court may be appointed for a term of ten (10) years with the advice and consent of the senate and until a successor is appointed and qualified.
    1. The administrator/magistrate shall have the power to hear and determine such matters as may be assigned to the administrator/magistrate by the presiding justice all to the same effect as if done by a justice of the superior court.
    2. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing powers and authority, the administrator/magistrate is authorized and empowered to hear and determine motions in civil and criminal proceedings, formal and special causes, to conduct arraignments, to grant or deny bail, to accept pleas of not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere, and to impose sentence on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, all to the same effect as if done by a justice of the superior court.
  2. The administrator/magistrate may be authorized:
    1. To regulate all proceedings before him or her;
    2. To do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his or her duties;
    3. To require the production before him or her of books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings;
    4. To rule upon the admissibility of evidence;
    5. To issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses, to put witnesses on oath, to examine them, and to call parties to the proceeding and examine them upon oath;
    6. To adjudicate a person in contempt and to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a justice of the court, for failure to appear in response to a summons or for refusal to answer questions or produce evidence or for behavior disrupting a proceeding;
    7. To adjudicate a party in contempt and to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a justice of the court, for failure to comply with a pending order to provide payment or to perform any other act; and
    8. To issue a capias and/or body attachment upon the failure of a party or witness to appear after having been properly served and, should the court not be in session, the person apprehended may be detained at the adult correctional institution, if an adult, or at the Rhode Island training school for youth, if a child, until the next session of the court.
  3. A party aggrieved by an order entered by the administrator/magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the superior court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the court, the review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for review of orders entered by the administrator/magistrate, and for enforcement of contempt adjudications of the administrator/magistrate.
  4. Final orders of the superior court entered in a proceeding to review an order of the administrator/magistrate may be appealed to the supreme court.
  5. The administrator/magistrate shall be:
    1. Governed by the commission on judicial tenure and discipline, chapter 16, of this title, in the same manner as justices and judges;
    2. Subject to all provisions of the canons of judicial ethics;
    3. Subject to all criminal laws relative to judges by virtue of §§ 11-7-1 and 11-7-2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 73, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 5; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Magistrate.

Where the magistrate issuing the search warrant had been designated as the “day justice” by the presiding judge of the superior court, the magistrate had power to hear and determine any matter before the magistrate to the same effect as if done by a justice of the superior court, including issue a search warrant. State v. Gordon, 30 A.3d 636, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 133 (R.I. 2011).

8-2-12. Seal of superior court.

The superior court shall have a seal in each of the counties of Providence, Newport, Kent, and Washington, which shall contain the words “SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND”, with the name of the county in which the seal belongs, and also such device as the justices of the court, or a majority of them, shall adopt.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 36; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-12 ; P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 2, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 2, effective June 23, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Seal of supreme court, § 8-1-4 .

8-2-13. Exclusive jurisdiction of equity actions.

The superior court shall, except as otherwise provided by law, have exclusive original jurisdiction of suits and proceedings of an equitable character and of statutory proceedings following the course of equity; provided, however, that every probate court shall have the power, concurrent with the superior court, to replace, remove, or fill any vacancy of any trustee under a trust established under a will, or to effect tax minimization or estate planning under § 33-15-37.1 . If an action is brought in the superior court which represents an attempt in good faith to invoke the jurisdiction conferred by this section, the superior court shall have jurisdiction of all other actions arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, provided the other actions are joined with the action so brought or are subsequently made a part thereof under applicable procedural rules, and the court may retain jurisdiction over the other actions even though the initial action fails for want of equity jurisdiction.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-13 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 2; P.L. 1966, ch. 1, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 2.

Cross References.

Divorce and separation, § 15-5-1 et seq.

Equity practice, § 9-14-1 et seq.

Narcotic addicts, admission, § 21-28.2-7 .

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

Rebecca M. Murphy and Samantha M. Clarke, A New Hope: Tortious Interference with an Expected Inheritance in Rhode Island, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 531 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administrative Proceedings.

The jurisdiction of a court of equity to aid a respondent who claims he is being irreparably harmed by the conduct of administrative proceedings may not be disputed. La Petite Auberge. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (R.I. 1980).

The superior court should sparingly exercise the power to review interlocutory rulings of administrative agencies in order to avoid inundation by preliminary issues that may ultimately be resolved or become moot in the course of litigation at the administrative level. La Petite Auberge. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (R.I. 1980).

The superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a suit contesting the authority of the tax administrator from collecting fees under the fuel-decal fee statute, § 31-36.1-3(a) ; the appropriate route for challenging the actions of the tax administrator is delineated in chapter 35 of title 42, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the appropriate forum for judicial review of a decision by the tax administrator lies in the district court. Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n v. State, 541 A.2d 69, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 1988).

The superior court may exercise its inherent equitable powers for the purpose of administering full relief to the parties before it in a situation where a party in violation of a Coastal Resources Management Council regulation or directive seeks equitable relief in the superior court. Wellington Hotel Assocs. v. Miner, 543 A.2d 656, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1988).

As a city retirement board’s petition seeking to confirm its decision to reduce a former city employee’s pension was brought under an ordinance providing for the reduction of pensions of city employees convicted of charges stemming from their employment, the matter did not properly invoke either the equity or the declaratory judgment jurisdiction of the superior court. Ret. Bd. of the Emples. Ret. Sys. of Providence v. Corrente, 111 A.3d 301, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2015).

Alimony.

In proceeding wherein a divorce had been granted the wife and petition for alimony was pending, the superior court had jurisdiction to make a party to the proceeding a corporation to whom the husband had transferred large tracts of land and to appoint a receiver for the corporation, where the transfers to the corporation were for the fraudulent purpose of preventing wife from recovering alimony. Warren v. Warren, 36 R.I. 167 , 89 A. 651, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1914).

Superior court could make order in divorce action granting custody of child and providing for support since it has exclusive original jurisdiction of petitions for divorce, separate maintenance, alimony and custody of children. Browning v. Browning, 53 R.I. 112 , 164 A. 508, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1933).

A petition originally filed in the supreme court seeking modification of an order for allowance in a divorce case has no standing since exclusive original jurisdiction of divorce and alimony resides in the superior court. Ex parte Asadoorian, 48 R.I. 50 , 135 A. 322, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1926).

Custody of Children.

Superior court could enjoin wife from interfering with husband’s custody of minor children without unfair abridgment of her privilege of visitation in order to enforce divorce decree, since question of custody, whether provided for in final decree or not, continues within the jurisdiction and control of the superior court. Budlong v. Budlong, 51 R.I. 113 , 152 A. 256, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1930).

Where the superior court dismissed the wife’s petition for divorce, it had no jurisdiction to award custody of the minor children to the mother or provide for their support. White v. White, 70 R.I. 48 , 36 A.2d 661, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1944); Rivard v. Rivard, 70 R.I. 305 , 38 A.2d 771, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1944).

— Domestic Partners.

A former domestic partner of a biological parent was entitled, pursuant to this provision, to seek a remedy for an alleged violation of a visitation agreement. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 2000).

Cy Pres Power.

Full equity powers were granted to the court by the statute and the cy pres power could be exercised by the court to the same extent as it was exercised by English chancery courts. Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1884).

An equity court may exercise the cy pres power to the same extent the power was available to English chancery courts without reference to the prerogative power delegated to the English court under the sign manual of the crown. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Olney, 14 R.I. 449 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1884).

Divorce.

On appeal of a divorce proceeding the superior court does not lose jurisdiction to allow attorney fees, and the supreme court in such matters acts only as an appellate court to review alleged errors in specific rulings and decisions under the provisions of G.L. 1923, ch. 348, § 8 (former § 9-24-13 ). Hurvitz v. Hurvitz, 44 R.I. 243 , 116 A. 661, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1922).

Superior court, after denial of petition for divorce, had authority to grant temporary support pending determination of exceptions. Rotondo v. Rotondo, 84 R.I. 476 , 125 A.2d 118, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1956).

Dower.

The superior court has jurisdiction over suits in equity for dower. Sprague v. Stevens, 32 R.I. 361 , 79 A. 972, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1911).

Extension of Powers Granted.

The superior court is statutory in its origin and its powers are defined by statute and cannot be extended by judicial interpretation. Boss v. Sprague, 53 R.I. 1 , 162 A. 710, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1932).

Multiple Claims in Single Complaint.

Where plaintiff ’s complaint stated a claim for deprivation of personal property without due process of law and requested equitable relief in connection with that claim, by virtue of that claim the entire complaint came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Carvalho v. Coletta, 457 A.2d 614, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 836 (R.I. 1983).

Trial court erred in determining, in a conclusory fashion, that it lacked jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-13 over a breach of contract claim by credit-card account holders against a bank, based on the bank’s change in the terms of the credit card agreements, because if the holders proved their claim, they might have been entitled to such equitable relief as an injunction and the court should have been guided by “basic principles of equity and justice”; further, § 8-2-13 contemplated supplemental jurisdiction over non-equitable claims and the holders had made a claim under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act, for which the trial court clearly had jurisdiction. Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A., 844 A.2d 666, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 2004).

Political Controversies.

A court of equity acting within its general powers has no jurisdiction over controversies of a political nature. Boss v. Sprague, 53 R.I. 1 , 162 A. 710, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1932).

Superior court did not have jurisdiction in equity to restrain posting, certifying and placing candidates on the ballot since subject matter was political. Boss v. Sprague, 53 R.I. 1 , 162 A. 710, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1932).

Superior court had jurisdiction under chapter 30 of title 9 and this section to determine whether the governor had complied with the mandate of § 17-7-1 despite the underlying political nature of the issues. Roch v. Garrahy, 419 A.2d 827, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1799 (R.I. 1980).

The determination of whether the governor has obeyed a statutory mandate in appointing members of such an important body as the board of elections comes well within the area of controversy where the statutes of this state provide discoverable and manageable standards for use by courts in determining the legality of an executive act. Roch v. Garrahy, 419 A.2d 827, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1799 (R.I. 1980).

In a political party’s suit against the State Board of Elections seeking to stop the Board from investigating a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-25-10.1 , the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-30-1 , and not R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(a) ; the Board’s powers are explicitly derived from R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-7-8 and are explicitly exempt from the Administrative Procedures Act. R.I. Republican Party v. Daluz, 961 A.2d 287, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2008).

Powers Conferred by Section.

This section does not confer upon the superior court powers in equity beyond those generally exercised by courts of equity. Boss v. Sprague, 53 R.I. 1 , 162 A. 710, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1932).

The Superior Court possesses no specific statutory authority to eradicate entries relating to criminal matters from a Bureau of Criminal Identification report unless the request for relief in that regard falls within the criteria set out by the legislature. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 555, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2000).

Rhode Island Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to § 8-1-2 where state legislators and a beneficiary of a government-funded housing program filed suit regarding the governor’s alleged decision to freeze certain spending, and the trial court set the cases for a hearing, ruled the legislators possessed standing to question the legality of the governor’s action, and decided their claims were not moot. Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 201 (R.I. 2002).

Superior court had jurisdiction over an insured’s suit against an insurer, although the actual damages claimed were less than $5000, as (1) the insured claimed punitive damages in good faith, (2) she sought equitable relief, and (3) she sought a declaration of her rights. Zarrella v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 106 (R.I. 2003).

Replevin.

The replevin statute applies only when the plaintiff seeks pretrial seizure of personal property pending a trial to determine ownership. When the plaintiff brings a civil action seeking a determination of who owns the personal property at issue and prays for an equitable remedy, the trial justice, after a trial on the merits, may exercise the equitable powers conferred upon him or her by this section to grant relief, such as recovery of personal property. Therefore, the plaintiff does not need to file a writ pursuant to the replevin statute to be entitled to a return of its property after the trial on the merits; he need only pray for this equitable remedy in its complaint. Moseman Constr. Co. v. State DOT, 608 A.2d 34, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 1992).

Sale or Exchange of Real Estate.

Under its chancery powers as granted by R.S. 1857, ch. 164, § 8, the supreme court could sanction the sale or exchange of real estate held in trust for charitable uses. Brown v. Meeting St. Baptist Soc'y, 9 R.I. 177 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1869).

Trust Estates.

It is clearly within the power of the superior court under its general equity jurisdiction and as specifically conferred by statute to advise and direct trustees as to the prudent management of trust estates and to enter decrees for that purpose without certification of a cause to the supreme court for determination. Gardner v. Sisson, 49 R.I. 504 , 144 A. 669, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1929).

Notwithstanding the fact the legislature conferred jurisdiction on the family court over resulting and constructive trusts and impression of trusts, jurisdiction over express trusts remains in the superior court, for the jurisdiction of a statutory court cannot be extended by implication. Concannon v. Concannon, 116 R.I. 323 , 356 A.2d 487, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1281 (1976).

Collateral References.

Filing of notice of appeal as affecting jurisdiction of state trial court to consider motion to vacate judgment. 5 A.L.R.5th 422.

8-2-13.1. Retaining equity jurisdiction during arbitration.

Notwithstanding the existence of any agreement providing for the resolution of disputes, contract violations, or grievances by way of arbitration or other statutory means, the superior court shall have equity jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and injunctions to maintain the status quo as it existed prior to the action which is the subject matter of the dispute pending resolution of the matter through arbitration and/or statutory means. The court’s decision to grant or not to grant a temporary restraining order and/or injunction shall not be considered by the arbitrator in resolving the dispute.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 487, § 1.

8-2-14. Jurisdiction of actions at law.

  1. The superior court shall have original jurisdiction of all actions at law where title to real estate or some right or interest therein is in issue, except actions for possession of tenements let or held at will or by sufferance; and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all other actions at law in which the amount in controversy shall exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000); and shall also have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in all other actions at law in which the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) and does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000); provided, that the plaintiff shall not recover costs unless he or she shall recover in such action not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or unless the action is one in which the title to real estate or some right or interest therein is in question, or unless in the discretion of the court, on motion, costs are awarded. If an action is brought in the superior court which is within the jurisdiction conferred by this section, the superior court shall have jurisdiction of all other actions arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, provided the other actions are joined with the action within the jurisdiction conferred by this section or are subsequently made a part thereof under applicable procedural rules.
  2. The superior court shall also have concurrent original jurisdiction, with the probate courts, of the change of names of those persons eighteen (18) years of age or older who have been convicted of any misdemeanor or felony.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 7; P.L. 1929, ch. 1331, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-14 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 3; P.L. 1981, ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 326, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contract Actions.

The Superior Court, through its general equitable and legal powers, maintains the authority to adjudicate all contract actions, regardless of the marital status of the parties. Lubecki v. Ashcroft, 557 A.2d 1208, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1989).

Costs in Small Claim Action.

The superior court had no jurisdiction to award costs to plaintiff on his recovery of damages for less than the statutory amount without a motion therefor by plaintiff. Perri v. Wood, 103 R.I. 53 , 234 A.2d 663, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 575 (1967).

Divorce and Ancillary Matters.

The statutory expansion of Family Court jurisdiction indicates a clear legislative intent to furnish to parties who have filed a petition for divorce, separation, or other relief in the Family Court, a comprehensive resolution of property, contractual, and equitable disputes that have arisen between them. By the same token, the legislature did not intend to diminish the general equitable powers that had been conferred upon the Superior Court from its inception. Lubecki v. Ashcroft, 557 A.2d 1208, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1989).

Expungement of Records.

The Superior Court possesses no specific statutory authority to eradicate entries relating to criminal matters from a Bureau of Criminal Identification report unless the request for relief in that regard falls within the criteria set out by the legislature. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 555, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2000).

Forum Non Conveniens.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear a case, and when trial in the chosen forum would establish oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or when the chosen forum is inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems, the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds, even if jurisdiction and proper venue are established. Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2008).

The forum non conveniens inquiry consists of a two-prong analysis. First, the court must decide whether an alternative forum exists that is both available and adequate to resolve the disputed legal issues. Second, the court must determine the inconvenience of continuing in the plaintiff’s chosen forum by weighing private- and public-interest factors. The defendant carries the burden of persuasion at each stage of the forum non conveniens inquiry. Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2008).

Although jurisdiction and venue existed in Rhode Island as to asbestos litigation cases that were brought by Canadian residents against corporations that did business in Rhode Island, dismissal of the cases was proper because the private-interest and public-interest factors favored the dismissal of the cases under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in spite of the deference to which the alleged victims’ choice of forum was entitled. Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2008).

Jurisdiction.

Based on a car buyer’s consumer fraud claim under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1, a superior court had jurisdiction to hear the car buyer’s class action case regarding a truck’s missing $200 security system which was listed as a standard feature on a window sticker; the “any ascertainable loss” language of the DTPA trumped the “amount in controversy” threshold set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-14(a) . Park v. Ford Motor Co., 844 A.2d 687, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 35 (R.I. 2004).

Hearing justice did not err in refusing to exercise ancillary jurisdiction pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-14 over an individual’s consumer fraud and related claims against an automobile manufacturer where the superior court’s jurisdiction over a claim brought under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 13.1, was based on R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.2-5.2(a). Park v. Ford Motor Co., 928 A.2d 469, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2007).

Customer failed to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for jurisdiction in an action for breach of contract and misrepresentation, where the complaint stated that the customer was overcharged for a clutch assembly by about $ 110, and the customer made no other claim for specific damages arising out of the customer’s failure to go to a job interview and obtain the position and accompanying salary. Chen v. Subaru of Am., 981 A.2d 1018, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 111 (R.I. 2009).

Passenger’s interest claim met the threshold requirement of the subject matter statute because the amount in controversy was over $10,000, plus the superior court had the power to entertain declaratory-judgment actions, and thus the superior court was vested with jurisdiction over the passenger’s claim. DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 102 A.3d 616, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 142 (R.I. 2014).

Replevin Action.

Regardless of the amount of the ad damnum, where the value of goods to be replevied is under the statutory amount, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction of writs of replevin. Mack Motor Truck Co. v. Dorsey, 45 R.I. 65 , 119 A. 756, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1923).

Test of Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is determined by the amount specified in the writ and not the actual value of the matter in controversy. Ryder v. Brennan, 28 R.I. 538 , 68 A. 477, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1908); State Loan Co. v. Barry, 71 R.I. 188 , 43 A.2d 161, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1945).

Where it was clear that the amount in controversy based on the claim brought by the plaintiff was well below the minimum jurisdictional amount set by statute for actions at law to be brought in the superior court as required by this section, plaintiff’s appeal was denied and dismissed. Moretti v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 636 A.2d 1333, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 1994).

In a suit involving consumers (yet-to-be class certified) asserting that a computer business improperly collected a tax from them on service contracts they purchased along with a new computer, the Rhode Island Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action as their claims were being asserted under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-5.2(a) , and common-law negligence, and did not present a tax aggrievement case. As a result, the motion to dismiss filed by the intervening tax administrator for the Rhode Island Division of Taxation was denied. Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 141 (R.I. 2009).

— Punitive Damages.

Where a plaintiff failed to even suggest in his complaint that the defendant acted maliciously, his claim for punitive damages was improper as a matter of law, and his claim for punitive damages could not be used in meeting the amount in controversy requirement for jurisdiction of the superior court. Carvalho v. Coletta, 457 A.2d 614, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 836 (R.I. 1983).

Tide Flow Land.

The superior court has jurisdiction to decide the question of title to tide flow land. Providence & Worcester Co. v. Exxon Corp., 116 R.I. 470 , 359 A.2d 329, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1297 (1976).

Section 46-23-6 , conferring certain powers upon the Coastal Resources Management Council with regard to proceedings involving public rights-of-way to tidal water areas, is not in conflict with this section. Sartor v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 542 A.2d 1077, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 1988).

Trespass and Ejectment Action.

An action of trespass and ejectment to try title was properly brought in the district court. Coates v. Coleman, 72 R.I. 304 , 51 A.2d 530 (1947).

Collateral References.

Filing of notice of appeal as affecting jurisdiction of state trial court to consider motion to vacate judgment. 5 A.L.R.5th 422.

8-2-15. Criminal jurisdiction.

The superior court shall have original jurisdiction of all crimes, offenses, and misdemeanors, except as otherwise provided by law, and shall sentence all persons found guilty before it to the punishment prescribed by law. All indictments found by grand juries shall be returned into the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-15 .

Cross References.

Jurisdiction of municipal court authorized for city of Warwick, § 45-2-19 .

Trial of criminal cases, § 12-17-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

District Courts.

The superior court has no authority in criminal appeals to review and pass on the legality of rulings and decisions made by the justices of the district courts but on appeal hears the case de novo. State v. McGuire, 90 R.I. 301 , 157 A.2d 657, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1960).

Where the offense charged was a felony, the ruling of district court granting motion to suppress evidence, followed by dismissal of complaint charging possession of cannabis (marijuana), was not binding in superior court proceedings after defendant was indicted for the same offense in view of statute vesting original jurisdiction over the offense in the superior court. State v. Conti, 110 R.I. 237 , 291 A.2d 623, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 904 (1972).

Domestic Relations.

The superior court had no jurisdiction to try an indictment for assault with a dangerous weapon where the person assaulted was the defendant’s wife, but had power to transfer such cause to the family court, notwithstanding the fact that the family court had no grand jury. State v. Perry, 103 R.I. 6 , 234 A.2d 115, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 568 (1967).

Expungement of Records.

The Superior Court possesses no specific statutory authority to eradicate entries relating to criminal matters from a Bureau of Criminal Identification report unless the request for relief in that regard falls within the criteria set out by the legislature. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 555, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2000).

Misdemeanors.

A defendant charged with a misdemeanor can be tried in the superior court only if the misdemeanor is properly joined with a felony; otherwise, original jurisdiction over a misdemeanor charge is vested in the district court. State v. Sickles, 470 A.2d 220, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 442 (R.I. 1984).

Motor Vehicle Cases.

The superior court was not divested of motor vehicle cases pending before it prior to the effective date of § 31-43-1 [see now chapter 41.1 of title 31], which gave jurisdiction to hear such cases to the Division for Administrative Adjudication, since the statute was presumed to operate prospectively and it contained neither a saving clause nor a method for transferring pending cases from the superior court to the division. State v. Mulholland, 117 R.I. 321 , 366 A.2d 153, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1632 (1976).

Superior Court.

Because the allegations that defendant committed a felony were sufficient to invoke the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-15 , and because defendant failed to preserve defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Prac. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, defendant was properly convicted of violating a no-contact order and simple assault. State v. Tower, 984 A.2d 40, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 2009).

Territorial Jurisdiction.

A superior court will lack jurisdiction to hear a criminal case if the crime occurred beyond its territorial boundaries. State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1643 (R.I. 1980).

It is sufficient to prove jurisdiction if the evidence, as viewed by the trial justice, indicates that the crime occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1643 (R.I. 1980).

To the extent that the valid exercise of the superior court’s subject matter jurisdiction is dependent on a factual determination of where the crime occurred, the trial justice may await the full development of the state’s evidence before ruling on a motion to dismiss. State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1643 (R.I. 1980).

8-2-15.1. Gun court calendar.

  1. Findings and declarations.  The General Assembly finds that:
    1. There has been significant growth in the use of firearms in the commission of violent crimes.
    2. Many of the shootings are drug or gang related and endanger law abiding citizens.
    3. Many of the gun offenses are committed while individuals are free on bail for other offenses.
    4. The growing number of gun related offenses constitutes a burden upon the state of Rhode Island and threatens the domestic tranquility of the state and its people, especially residents of the urban areas where these crimes are most prevalent.
    5. In order to deter the use of firearms in the commission of violent crime, and to protect the law abiding public, there must be swift disposition of gun related offenses in our courts, and there must be the certain prospect of prison terms for those who are convicted of such crimes.
  2. Declaration of policy.  It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Rhode Island to provide maximum safety and security to its people from unlawful gun related violence and intrusion upon their persons and property by expediting the processing and disposition of such cases and, unless otherwise provided, imposing prison terms that must be served.
  3. Establishment.  To accomplish this purpose in an effort to minimize delay in the processing of criminal cases in the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol relating to the illegal possession and use of guns and other dangerous weapons, there shall be established a separate calendar within the jurisdiction of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol for hearing trial and disposition of actions brought pursuant to §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-5 , 11-47-5.1 , 11-47-8 , 11-47-24 , 12-13-1.2 , and 12-19-21 .
  4. Gun court calendar.
    1. The presiding justice of the superior court shall create a gun court calendar in the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol and shall assign personnel to the extent warranted to exclusively hear and decide all criminal actions involving offenses committed in Providence and Bristol counties and brought pursuant to violations of the provisions of §§ 11-47-5 , 11-47-5.1 , 11-47-8 , and 11-47-24 set forth in subsection (c), and it shall be referred to as the “gun court calendar” of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol.
    2. The “gun court calendar” of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with any other calendar of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol to hear and decide all criminal actions involving offenses brought pursuant to violations of the provisions of §§ 11-47-3 , 12-13-1.2 , and 12-19-21 , so long as the criminal action involves the possession, threatened use, or use of a firearm.
  5. Time for trial.  All trials in the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol involving offenses brought pursuant to the sections as set forth in subsection (c) shall be scheduled for trial on the “gun court calendar” in the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol within sixty (60) days of the completion of discovery. No continuances or postponements shall be granted except for good cause shown. Such continuances as are necessary shall be granted for the shortest practicable time.
  6. Use of section.  Under no circumstances shall the defendant(s) be permitted to use this section as a basis for a dismissal of an action, as this section is enacted for the benefit and convenience of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol in the assignment of its actions for trial.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 267, § 1.

8-2-16. Jurisdiction of motions for new trial and extraordinary writs.

The superior court shall have jurisdiction of such motions for new trials as may be provided by law, and concurrently with the supreme court shall have jurisdiction of writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, and informations in the nature of quo warranto.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-16 .

Rules of Court.

Motions for new trial, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 59.

Cross References.

Habeas corpus, § 10-9-1 et seq.

Quo warranto, § 10-14-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

2005 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Constitutional Law: McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217 (R.I. 2005), see 11 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 787 (2006).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Prerogative Writs.

The clause giving the superior court concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme court to issue prerogative writs does not violate R.I. Const., amend. XII , granting power to the supreme court to issue prerogative writs (see now R.I. Const., art. X, § 2 et seq.), as C.P.A. 1905, § 328 (§ 9-24-1 ) expressly provides that any party aggrieved in a proceeding for a prerogative writ except habeas corpus may appeal to the supreme court. Higgins v. Tax Assessors, 27 R.I. 401 , 63 A. 34, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1905).

The power of the superior court to issue writs of mandamus does not imply a correlative power to issue prerogative writs of injunction. Boss v. Sprague, 53 R.I. 1 , 162 A. 710, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1932).

Quo Warranto.

Section 10-14-1 vests the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain petitions in equity in the nature of quo warranto in the Supreme Court. Fargnoli v. Cianci, 121 R.I. 153 , 397 A.2d 68, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1758 (1979).

Although the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear any proceeding upon a writ of quo warranto or by way of an information in the nature of quo warranto by virtue of this section, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction under § 10-14-1 to entertain petitions in equity in the nature of quo warranto. Such a petition in equity rests on an entirely different basis from the petitioner’s common-law petition for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. State ex rel. Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1991).

Where a petition in equity to challenge the petitioner’s title to the office of mayor of the city of Providence without the intervention of the attorney general seeks to vindicate a purely public right on behalf of the citizens of Providence, and the petitioner makes no claim that he seeks to vindicate a private right on his own behalf by claiming title to the public office in dispute, the petition in equity is denied. State ex rel. Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1991).

Private citizens, even attorneys, did not have standing to seek declaratory relief by means of what was essentially a proceeding in quo warranto, challenging the right of Rhode Island’s chief justice to continue in office after accepting an appointment to a federal military review panel; only the attorney general could pursue such relief, and whether that officer should pursue it was not something that a court could compel. McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2005).

Writs of Mandamus.

In the ordinary case a petition for a writ of mandamus should be addressed in the first instance to the superior court, where a record can be made and appealed, but this does not oust the supreme court of jurisdiction in a proper case. Ruerat v. Cappelli, 56 R.I. 480 , 188 A. 637, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1936).

Writ of common law mandamus to city vote tabulation committee to open voting machines and tabulate results would be confined to specific remedy since separate prayer “for other relief” was a departure from established practice. Ruerat v. Cappelli, 56 R.I. 480 , 188 A. 637, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1936).

A writ of mandamus will issue only where the petitioners have a clear legal right to have the act done which is sought by the writ; and where the respondents have a ministerial, legal duty to perform such act without discretion to refuse; and where the petitioners have no plain and adequate remedy at law. Gormally v. Cannon, 119 R.I. 771 , 383 A.2d 582, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 612 (1978).

The court lacked jurisdiction to grant writ of mandamus relief where a helicopter-ride company failed to exhaust its administrative and legal remedies, including, the highest court’s certiorari power. Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly, 849 A.2d 359, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 111 (R.I. 2004).

— Damages.

The general rule has been adopted that in the absence of a statute no damages are recoverable in a proceeding in mandamus. Gormally v. Cannon, 119 R.I. 771 , 383 A.2d 582, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 612 (1978).

A petitioner may only be awarded damages in a mandamus proceeding in those instances where he would have been entitled to them in a civil action for a false return. Gormally v. Cannon, 119 R.I. 771 , 383 A.2d 582, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 612 (1978).

Collateral References.

Filing of notice of appeal as affecting jurisdiction of state trial court to consider motion to vacate judgment. 5 A.L.R.5th 422.

Recantation of testimony of witness as grounds for new trial — federal criminal cases. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 60.

8-2-17. Jurisdiction of appeals, statutory proceedings, and probate matters.

The superior court shall have jurisdiction of such appeals and statutory proceedings as may be provided by law, and may exercise general probate jurisdiction in all cases brought before it on appeal from probate courts, or when such jurisdiction is properly involved in suits in equity.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-17 .

Cross References.

Criminal appeals from district courts, § 12-22-1 et seq.

Juvenile court, appeals from, § 14-1-52 et seq.

Probate courts, appeals from, § 33-23-1 et seq.

Town council, appeals from, § 45-5-16 , 45-5-17 .

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Actions on Surety Bond.

In actions of debt on bond of surety for guardian, superior court had jurisdiction in law to determine evidence and settle account by chancerizing bond under equitable principles, even though guardian had not filed final account, since court was not exercising general probate jurisdiction. Probate Court v. Higgins, 58 R.I. 58 , 191 A. 260, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1937).

General Probate Jurisdiction.

A superior court has general probate jurisdiction when such jurisdiction is properly involved in suits in equity; however such jurisdiction is concurrent with probate courts and will not be exercised where it has already attached in proceedings in the probate court. McSoley v. McSoley, 79 R.I. 124 , 84 A.2d 798, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1951).

Inventory of Executor.

The superior court had jurisdiction on appeal from the probate court to grant the executor permission to amend his inventory. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Reopening Administration.

Where bank deposits were discovered after estate had been closed with no remaining debts or other duties, the superior court had equity jurisdiction to hear suit by heirs and to distribute funds without reopening administration in probate court. Roberts v. Garbett, 54 R.I. 150 , 171 A. 241, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1934).

8-2-18 — 8-2-22. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 26; P.L. 1935, ch. 2254, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 25; Repealed by P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 20.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 8-2-18 — 8-2-22 concerned domestic relations court.

8-2-23. One justice quorum — Two or more sitting together.

Any one justice of the superior court shall be a quorum for all purposes, except as otherwise provided; but the court may, when so ordered by the presiding justice, be held for any purpose by two (2) or more justices, to be designated as provided in § 8-2-4 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Motion to Reduce Sentence.

The appointment of a three-judge panel for the purpose of hearing a Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence does not breach the jurisdictional parameters of the superior court. State v. Byrnes, 456 A.2d 742, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 810 (R.I. 1983).

The appointment of a three-judge panel to hear a Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence poses no impediments to a defendant’s constitutional rights. State v. Byrnes, 456 A.2d 742, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 810 (R.I. 1983).

For a discussion of the procedures to be followed by a three member panel of superior court justices in deciding a motion filed pursuant to Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 35 to reduce or correct a sentence, see State v. Byrnes, 456 A.2d 742, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 810 (R.I. 1983).

8-2-24. Simultaneous sessions.

Superior courts may be held, with or without juries, by different justices at the same time and in different places in the same county or in different counties.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-24 .

8-2-25. Powers of supreme court justice in vacation.

Any justice of the supreme court may exercise in the vacation of the superior court all the powers which may be exercised during such time by a justice of the superior court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-25 .

Collateral References.

Authority of judge in respect to unfinished business of another judge. 54 A.L.R. 952, 58 A.L.R. 848.

Interlocutory ruling or order of one judge as binding on another in same case. 132 A.L.R. 14.

8-2-26. Power of justice after retirement, resignation, or elevation.

Whenever any justice of the superior court shall cease to be a justice thereof by reason of elevation to the supreme court, resignation, or retirement, he or she shall have the power to exercise the function of a justice of the superior court for the purpose of rendering a decision or completing any matter pending before him or her as justice of the superior court at the time of the elevation, resignation, or retirement. The provisions of this section shall be interpreted and construed liberally, for the purpose of accomplishing the purpose thereof.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 10; P.L. 1935, ch. 2208, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, §§ 10, 11; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-26 .

8-2-27. Venue — Consolidation of actions.

  1. Any civil cause or any question of law or fact therein may, by consent of the parties and with approval of the court, be tried and determined in any county. When civil actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending in different counties, the court may in the interest of convenience order any such action transferred to another county for the purpose of consolidating the actions for trial.
  2. Any civil cause may be referred from one county to another by the presiding justice of the court in the interest of obtaining a more speedy trial.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-27 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 1, § 2; P.L. 1968, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction of Court.

This section did not give superior court power to determine any question of law or fact in a civil case if with consent of the parties and approval of the court, but is intended only to permit transfer of civil case from one county to another. Darman v. Zilch, 63 R.I. 127 , 7 A.2d 699, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1939).

An action filed in the proper county and changed to another county by stipulation of the parties can be tried on the merits in that county. Rowell v. Kaplan, 103 R.I. 60 , 235 A.2d 91, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 576 (1967).

Trial of Only One of Several Pleas.

This section does not allow parties in a negligence action to submit case to trial justice to decide on only one of several special pleas with alleged stipulation between the parties not approved by the justice that defendant could later resubmit general plea. Darman v. Zilch, 63 R.I. 127 , 7 A.2d 699, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1939).

Collateral References.

Right to be tried in county or district where offense was committed, as susceptible of waiver. 137 A.L.R. 686.

Waiver of or estoppel as to venue of action to set aside fraudulent conveyance of real property. 37 A.L.R.2d 568.

8-2-28. Transfer of papers between counties.

The superior court may order the papers in any cause to be sent from one county to another; and in matters heard in any county other than that in which the cause was entered, the court shall certify the proceedings to the clerk of the court in the county in which the cause was entered, and shall send to the clerk all the papers therein to be kept on file in his or her office and there recorded.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-28 .

Rules of Court.

For rule governing transmittal of papers between counties, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77(e).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Motions.

A motion filed after the transmittal of records to another county should nevertheless be filed in the county in which the proceeding was originally brought. Parker v. Superior Court, 40 R.I. 214 , 100 A. 305, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1917).

8-2-29. Grounds for change of venue.

Whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the superior court, as provided in § 8-2-30 , by either party to any civil action, suit, or proceeding now or hereafter pending therein, that by reason of local prejudice or other cause the parties to the action or proceeding, or either of them, cannot have a full, fair, and impartial trial in the court for the county where the action shall have been commenced or shall be pending, the court shall order the cause to be removed for trial to such other county as shall be deemed most fair and equitable for the parties.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 24; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-29 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 326, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Local Prejudice.

When the local prejudice contemplated by this chapter was established in a criminal case by clear convincing evidence which reasonably convinced the court that a fair trial could not be had in the county where the case was commenced, it was the duty of the court in its sound judicial discretion to remove the case, especially in the absence of all proof contradicting defendant’s evidence of local prejudice. State v. Sisson, 58 R.I. 200 , 192 A. 209, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1937).

Generally a change of venue is unjustified unless it reasonably appears from the evidence that public opinion has been so molded to the prejudice of a defendant that he cannot have a fair trial from the residents of the county. State v. Burns, 79 R.I. 130 , 84 A.2d 801, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1951).

In the absence of competent evidence prejudice cannot be inferred from the fact that publicity and public opinion in a single town run against a defendant if the town is not of such size and population as to dominate the entire county. State v. Burns, 79 R.I. 130 , 84 A.2d 801, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1951).

Request Premature.

Where a person charged with a crime has not elected between trial by jury and trial without jury and the case has not been set and is not about to be set for trial, a request for change of venue is premature and should be denied. State v. Burns, 79 R.I. 130 , 84 A.2d 801, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1951).

Unless a case is set or is about to be set for trial the question of protecting a party from prejudice in a trial by jury is premature. State v. Burns, 79 R.I. 130 , 84 A.2d 801, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1951).

Review of Decision.

Supreme court would review decision of superior court refusing change of venue for local prejudice in proper case by certiorari. State v. Sisson, 58 R.I. 200 , 192 A. 209, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1937).

Collateral References.

Binding effect of order on motion for change of venue, where action is dismissed or otherwise terminated other than on merits and reinstituted. 85 A.L.R.2d 993.

Change of venue as justified by fact that large number of inhabitants of local jurisdiction have interest adverse to party to state civil action. 10 A.L.R.4th 1046.

Change of venue of actions or proceedings against public officers. 48 A.L.R.2d 423.

Change of venue on ground of disqualification of judge in proceeding to punish contempt against or involving himself or court of which he is a member. 64 A.L.R.2d 600.

“Civil action” or “civil proceeding,” what is, within statute relating to change of venue. 102 A.L.R. 397.

Construction and effect of statutory provision for change of venue for promotion of convenience of witnesses and ends of justice. 74 A.L.R.2d 16.

Corporations, prejudice against officer, stockholder, or employee of, as ground for change of venue on application of corporation. 63 A.L.R. 1015.

Delay in proceeding to trial, proceedings for change of venue as affecting applicability of statutory requirement or rule of court that action be brought to trial within specified time. 112 A.L.R. 1173.

Different or same venue, or place of trial of proceeding or issue, and effect thereof, in respect to main action and ancillary garnishment or attachment. 139 A.L.R. 1478.

Disqualification of judge in state proceedings to punish contempt against or involving himself in open court and in his actual presence. 37 A.L.R.4th 1004.

Divorce court’s jurisdiction over custody and maintenance of child, exclusion of jurisdiction of other local courts by, as affected by right of change of venue. 11 A.L.R. 147, 78 A.L.R. 317, 146 A.L.R. 1153.

Effect of nonsuit, dismissal or discontinuance of action on prior order changing venue. 11 A.L.R.2d 1407.

Forum non conveniens in products liability cases. 76 A.L.R.4th 22.

Guardian ad litem or next friend, power of, to apply for change of venue. 115 A.L.R. 574.

Lis pendens as affected by change of venue. 71 A.L.R. 1094.

Place where corporation is doing business for purposes of state venue statute. 42 A.L.R.5th 221.

Right of defendant in civil action to change of venue upon motion made after time specified by statute or rule in that regard, as affected by fact that co-defendant had made such a motion within the prescribed period. 141 A.L.R. 1177.

Right of defendant upon motion made or renewed after plaintiff has closed his case without proving liability on part of co-defendant, to change of venue to county or district which would have been the proper venue but for the joinder of the co-defendant. 140 A.L.R. 540.

8-2-30. Petition for change of venue.

Applications for the removal of any civil action, suit, or proceeding, as provided in § 8-2-29 , shall be by petition setting forth the cause or reasons therefor, which petition shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court for the county where the action, suit, or proceeding is pending, and a copy thereof served on the adverse party, or on his or her attorney of record, within ten (10) days after the filing of the petition; and no such petition in any civil cause shall be heard until the expiration of five (5) days after the service of the copy, unless by agreement of the parties.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 25; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 22; P.L. 1928, ch. 1205, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-30 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Review by Supreme Court.

Supreme court would review decision of superior court refusing change of venue for local prejudice in proper case by certiorari. State v. Sisson, 58 R.I. 200 , 192 A. 209, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1937).

Collateral References.

Appearance to apply for change of venue as submission to jurisdiction of court. 111 A.L.R. 934.

What constitutes “initial pleading” for purposes of computing time for removal of civil action from state to federal court under 28 USCS § 1446(b). 130 A.L.R. Fed. 581.

When does period for filing petition for removal of civil action from state court to federal district court begin to run under 28 USCS § 1446(b). 139 A.L.R. Fed. 331.

8-2-31. Order for change of venue.

If, upon hearing the petition and the evidence thereon, the court shall be of opinion that a full, fair, and impartial trial cannot be had in the court for the county where the cause shall have been commenced or is pending, the court shall make an order of removal, directing the clerk of the court where the cause is pending to transmit the record thereof to the clerk of the court for the county named in the order of removal, to which county the cause shall be removed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 26; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-31 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence Supporting Order.

When the local prejudice contemplated by this chapter was established in a criminal case by clear convincing evidence, which reasonably convinced the court that a fair trial could not be had in the county where the case was commenced, it was the duty of the court in its sound judicial discretion to remove the case, especially in the absence of all proof contradicting defendant’s evidence of local prejudice. State v. Sisson, 58 R.I. 200 , 192 A. 209, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1937).

Review of Refusal.

Supreme court would review decision of superior court refusing change of venue for local prejudice in proper case by certiorari. State v. Sisson, 58 R.I. 200 , 192 A. 209, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1937).

Collateral References.

Interlocutory order of one judge concerning change of venue as binding on another judge in the same case. 132 A.L.R. 72.

Withdrawal or modification of order granting change of venue, power as to. 59 A.L.R. 362.

8-2-32. Retention of papers or return to original county.

If an entire cause shall have been removed under the provisions of this chapter, all further proceedings in the cause shall be taken as if the cause had been commenced in the county to which it was removed. If less than the entire cause shall have been removed, then upon determination of the question for which removal was made, the record shall be remitted to the clerk of the court for the county from which the cause was removed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-32 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 1, § 2.

8-2-33. Territorial extent of powers of justices.

Any justice of the superior court may order special service of any process, original or auxiliary, in any proceeding within the jurisdiction of the court, by personal notice, notice by mail, or publication in a newspaper within or without the state, for the purpose of dealing with any property, relation, or person within the state or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and may make orders, decrees, and judgments in one county in cases pending in any other county, which orders and decrees and judgments shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court for the other county.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-33 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 1.

Rules of Court.

For rule governing service of papers, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Dealing.

An order for service on a husband who is out of the state is not proper in an action against the wife where the only purpose of such an order would be to enable the plaintiff to commit the wife on execution, as this is not the type of “dealing” with the person contemplated by the statute. Kelly v. Denniston, 13 R.I. 128 , 1880 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1880).

Substituted Service.

The power of the court to order service on persons out of the state does not depend upon old chancery practices but is dependent upon the statute, and the court had the power to order substituted service. Chapin v. James, 11 R.I. 86 , 1874 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1874).

8-2-34. Impaneling and instruction of grand juries.

All grand juries shall be impaneled by the superior court. They shall be empowered, required, and charged to diligently inquire and make true presentment of all crimes and offenses done or committed within their jurisdiction, and shall, insofar as may be deemed necessary, be instructed by the court in the law relative thereto.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-34 .

Cross References.

Grand juries, § 12-11-1 et seq.

Jury commissioner, § 9-9-5 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Form of Complaint.

Indictment for violation of P.L. 1896, ch. 334, § 2 need not show that complaint was made by secretary of state board of agriculture, as provided in § 3, as the grand jury under common law powers and under this section had full power to find such indictment. State v. Snell, 21 R.I. 232 , 42 A. 869, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1899).

Indictment Found After Arraignment.

Indictment found after defendant had been arraigned and furnished bail under criminal complaint in district court for the same offense would not be quashed, as the grand jury can act independently of preliminary proceedings in lower court. State v. Robbins, 42 R.I. 213 , 106 A. 291, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1919).

Even assuming that the district court lost jurisdiction by adjourning the preliminary examination first for 15 days and then for seven and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to bind the defendant over to the grand jury, the grand jury nevertheless had jurisdiction to indict him. Brady v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 301 , 243 A.2d 906, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 648 (1968).

Collateral References.

Individual’s right to present complaint or evidence of criminal offense to grand jury. 24 A.L.R.4th 316.

Investigating powers of grand jury, matters within. 22 A.L.R. 1356, 106 A.L.R. 1383, 120 A.L.R. 437.

Power of court to control evidence or witnesses going before grand jury. 52 A.L.R.3d 1316.

8-2-35. Arraignment of persons presented — Warrants on indictments or information.

The superior court may arraign all persons presented by a grand jury or charged by information filed by the attorney general, and may require such persons to plead to the indictment against them, if in custody, or if taken while the court is in session; and if not in custody, or taken while the court is in session, may issue warrants on the indictment or information.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-35 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

This section does not limit arraignments to indictments only excluding other accusations. State v. Robalewski, 96 R.I. 296 , 191 A.2d 148, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1963).

Issuance of Capias.

Petitioner in a criminal proceeding was duty bound under §§ 12-10-6 and 12-13-1 to appear in person for arraignment and the superior court’s issuance of a capias for his appearance upon his failure to appear was lawful and the defendant was not entitled to a writ of certiorari to review the action of the lower court. Suitor v. State, 95 R.I. 469 , 187 A.2d 926, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1963).

8-2-36. Admission to bail.

The superior court may admit to bail all persons brought before it for any offense whatsoever.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-36 .

Cross References.

Bail and recognizance, § 12-13-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Civil action or proceeding, right to give bail in. 15 A.L.R. 1079, 149 A.L.R. 787.

Failure to appear, and the like, resulting in forfeiture of bail, as affecting right to second admission to bail in same noncapital case. 29 A.L.R.2d 945.

Rape as bailable offense. 118 A.L.R. 1115.

Right of bail in proceedings in juvenile courts. 53 A.L.R.3d 848.

Waiver of privilege against arrest by giving bail. 8 A.L.R. 757.

8-2-37. Requiring recognizance of criminal complainants.

The superior court may require the complainant in any criminal pleading pending therein to give recognizance with sufficient surety to prosecute his or her complaint, with effect, and in default thereof the court may dismiss the complaint.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 22; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-37 .

8-2-38. Instructions to jury.

In every case, civil and criminal, tried in the superior court with a jury, the justice presiding shall instruct the jury in the law relating to the action, and may sum up the evidence therein to the jury whenever he or she may deem it advisable so to do; but any material misstatement of the testimony by him or her may be excepted to by the party aggrieved.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 23; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 8-2-38 .

Rules of Court.

For instructions to jury, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 51(b).

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Before deliberation the trial court may instruct the jury (1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto, (2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment, (3) that each juror must decide the case for himself or herself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his or her fellow jurors, (4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to re-examine his or her own views and change his or her opinion if convinced it is erroneous, and (5) that no juror should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his or her fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2003).

Appeal.

A trial justice’s refusal to charge the jury is not a proper basis for a motion for a new trial and can be assigned as a ground of appeal only if a request was made to charge differently or if objection was made to the charge as given. Belanger v. Silva, 120 R.I. 19 , 384 A.2d 605, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 629 (1978).

Where no objection is made to instructions before retirement of the jury, the court’s failure to instruct on a particular matter may not be raised on appeal. Procaccianti v. Travelers Ins. Co., 120 R.I. 100 , 385 A.2d 124, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 634 (1978).

In passing on the sufficiency of a trial justice’s instruction, the Supreme Court must determine how a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent persons listening to that instruction at the close of a trial would have appreciated the instructions as a whole. State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1168 (R.I. 1981).

In deciding whether jury instructions meet the standard of due process, the Supreme Court must review them in the context of the entire charge to determine whether the legal principles were properly delineated by the trial justice. State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1168 (R.I. 1981).

Burden of Proof.

Obligation to give clear, adequate instructions extends to the burden of proof. MacAruso v. Massart, 96 R.I. 168 , 190 A.2d 14, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1963).

When the trial court had clearly informed the jury that the state must prove an intentional killing to be entitled to a verdict of first or second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, and also instructed concerning defendant’s claim of accidental homicide, defendant was not entitled to a requested instruction that the state had the burden of disproving accident. State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 14 (R.I. 1998).

Clarity of Instructions.

The concept of a fair trial is conclusive of an obligation on the part of the trial justice to instruct the jury with precision and clarity as to the rule of law applicable to the issues raised at trial. MacAruso v. Massart, 96 R.I. 168 , 190 A.2d 14, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1963).

The trial court’s Allen charge, to the extent preserved, was not illegally coercive or prejudicial, and was worded properly within R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-38 and the evidence did not warrant a lesser-included offense jury instruction, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-14 and R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 31 (c) on second-degree murder, since there was not even minimal evidence that would justify a conviction on a offense of first-degree murder and it was evident that premeditation existed for more than a mere moment. State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2003).

Trial court did not provide the jury with improper instructions in defendant’s trial on a charge of driving under the influence, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2 , where it instructed the jury as to how it should consider the results of the breathalyzer machine, as defendant had made erroneous and misleading contentions as to the validity of the test during his closing, and the trial court merely provided cautionary and correct instructions as to each party’s burden of proof; the trial court judge had the right, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-38 , to sum up and comment on the evidence to the jury. State v. Ensey, 881 A.2d 81, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 175 (R.I. 2005).

Comments on the Evidence.

Where trial justice in his instructions told jurors in perfectly clear language that they were to make determinations about the facts of the case and that their determinations were to be made on the evidence as they recalled it, his comment on the evidence, although erroneous, was cured by such cautionary language and did not require a reversal. State v. Holland, 122 R.I. 339 , 405 A.2d 1211, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2160 (1979).

The trial justice adequately cautioned the jurors about the dangers of identification testimony in a murder trial where he emphasized consideration of the testimony rather than specifying that the testimony be viewed with caution. State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 116 (R.I. 1988).

— Summary by Judge.

If the trial justice chooses to summarize the testimony of the jury, then certain requirements must be met. First, the summary must be completely accurate. Second, such summarization must avoid in any way an invasion of the province of the jury to determine the facts of the case. State v. Dame, 488 A.2d 418, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 444 (R.I. 1985).

The trial justice may not summarize only direct testimony if the testimony on cross-examination is also pertinent to the determination of the issue that is the subject of the request. State v. Dame, 488 A.2d 418, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 444 (R.I. 1985).

Conviction or Acquittal of Joint Defendants.

Where two defendants were charged in a joint indictment the trial judge erroneously charged the jury that they must find both defendants guilty or find them both not guilty. State v. Mastriacchio, 71 R.I. 72 , 42 A.2d 496, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1945).

Credibility and Weight of Evidence.

While it is the right of the trial justice, in the exercise of his discretion, to state to the jury the testimony and other evidence bearing upon the issues, he should always be exceedingly careful not to deprive either party of a fair trial by either consciously or unconsciously conveying to the jury his impression as to the proper weight to be given to any of the testimony. State v. Gallogly, 47 R.I. 483 , 134 A. 20, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1926).

Under this section a trial justice has considerable latitude in commenting to the jury on the evidence if he makes it clear that in arriving at the verdict the responsibility of determining credibility and weight of the evidence is upon them alone. Reynolds v. Davis, 55 R.I. 206 , 179 A. 613, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1935).

Comment by trial justice to jury that both parties are of a “high type” was not prejudicial to the defendant where he clearly placed upon the jury responsibility of determining credibility and weight of the evidence. Reynolds v. Davis, 55 R.I. 206 , 179 A. 613, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1935).

Trial justice’s comment to jury that witness “had no particular reason for observing what took place at that time” was his conclusion as to witness’ credibility and constituted prejudicial error. Flint v. Nicholson, 67 R.I. 513 , 25 A.2d 617, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1942).

Erroneous Instructions.

Trial court erred in granting a new trial to plaintiffs in an auto negligence case based on the giving of erroneous jury instructions; although the trial court erred in giving a rear-end collision instruction, the error was harmless, and the fact that a truck driver was suddenly confronted with a pick-up truck spinning out of control just 360 feet ahead of him constituted a sudden emergency that warranted the sudden emergency instruction given by the court. Maglioli v. J.P. Noonan Transp., Inc., 869 A.2d 71, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2005).

Giving in Open Court.

Instructions to the jury must be given in open court, so that the statute is violated if the jury sends for and is given the statute book. State v. Smith, 6 R.I. 33 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1859).

— Giving Instructions Mandatory.

This statute is mandatory and clearly contemplates that juries shall be given correct instructions as to those rules of law that of necessity must be applied to the issues raised at the trial in order for the parties to secure a fair trial. MacAruso v. Massart, 96 R.I. 168 , 190 A.2d 14, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1963).

Where defendant admittedly pushed deceased, who was intoxicated, to the ground in a sandy lot, more or less littered with debris and rocks, where he subsequently was discovered with fatal head injuries; and where defendant’s testimony, not entirely inconsistent with other evidence, was that deceased attacked her first, that she threw him to the ground as part of her effort to repel such attack, and that she made no other attack on him; defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on the issue of self defense, whether or not the judge believed her testimony. State v. Butler, 107 R.I. 489 , 268 A.2d 433, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 799 (1970).

This section obliges the trial justice to give correct instructions as to those rules of law that of necessity must be applied to the issues raised at the trial in order to secure a fair trial. State v. Butler, 107 R.I. 489 , 268 A.2d 433, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 799 (1970); State v. Arpin, 122 R.I. 643 , 410 A.2d 1340, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1980).

Ability of the defendant to inflict harm on the victim by means of a dangerous weapon was an element of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon and the trial court was obligated to instruct the jury on this element of the offense, and the failure of defendant to request the instruction did not excuse the judge where defendant objected. State v. Milazzo, 116 R.I. 443 , 358 A.2d 35, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1293 (1976).

This section does not require a trial justice to give instructions on the procedure of committing defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. State v. Arpin, 122 R.I. 643 , 410 A.2d 1340, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1980).

A trial justice is not obliged to correct misstatements of the law in a defendant’s request to charge. State v. Arpin, 122 R.I. 643 , 410 A.2d 1340, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1980).

Before jurors can pass upon each element of an offense charged, the trial justice must give them a proper and clear statement of each element that the state must prove. If a trial justice neglects to instruct a jury on every element of the offense, he commits plain error. State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1717 (R.I. 1980).

Instructions Held Proper.

In a declaratory judgment action concerning insurance coverage, the insurer’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 59 (a) motion for a new trial was properly denied. A jury instruction, which stated that an endorsement containing a policy exclusion had to be physically attached to the policy when it was issued to be effective, correctly stated the law and was consistent with the testimony of the insurer’s own underwriter. Children's Friend & Serv. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 893 A.2d 222, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 15 (R.I. 2006), limited, Dulong v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 272 A.3d 120, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 2022).

Defendant’s conviction of first-degree robbery was affirmed, because the trial court’s instruction to the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt satisfied the requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-38 ; the trial judge clearly explained that the burden of proving every element of the offense fell on the State, and clearly stated that defendant was not required to prove or disprove anything, and the fact that the instruction included the term “firm belief” did not render the instruction inadequate because, when considered in its entirety, the instruction did not mislead or confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt. State v. Imbruglia, 913 A.2d 1022, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 2007).

Trial justice did not err by providing the jury with instructions different from those used by the trial justice in defendant’s previous mistrials, and by instructing the jury as to vicarious liability, aiding-and-abetting, and reasonable doubt. State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 848, 129 S. Ct. 99, 172 L. Ed. 2d 82, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6960 (2008).

With regard to defendant’s convictions for second-degree murder and for failing to report a death with the intention of concealing a crime, involving the strangulation death of his wife and concealing her in a padlocked closet in the apartment they had previously rented, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that premeditation was not an element of second-degree murder and by instructing the jury on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense to first-degree murder. State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 114 (R.I. 2008).

Trial justice’s jury instruction in shoplifting case, in which she quoted the language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-20(b)(3) , was correct. State v. Cardin, 987 A.2d 248, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 19 (R.I. 2010).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction as to the withdrawal exception to the initial aggressor rule under a self-defense theory because defendant was the initial aggressor as defendant and others entered a pawnshop armed to rob it. Furthermore, defendant did not show that he had withdrawn or that the dangerous situation that he and his companions had created had dissipated as defendant and a companion continued on with the robbery after the shop owner was shot. State v. Isom, 251 A.3d 1, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 2021).

Law Relating to Case.

This section mandates that a jury be instructed with respect to those rules of law that of necessity must be applied to the issues raised at trial in order for the parties to secure a fair trial. State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1817 (R.I. 1980).

The rules of law applicable to the issues at trial are obligatory upon the trial justice, and they must be given in clear and precise language. State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1168 (R.I. 1981).

A trial justice need only instruct a jury in those rules of law that must be applied to the issue raised at trial. State v. Dellatore, 761 A.2d 226, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 196 (R.I. 2000).

Material Misstatement of Facts.

The justice of the superior court is required to instruct the jury on the law, but comment on the facts is at his discretion, except that he cannot make a material misstatement of facts. Desautelle v. Nasonville Woolen Co., 28 R.I. 261 , 66 A. 579, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1907).

An exception must be sustained where the trial justice made a material misstatement of the testimony of a witness. Scott v. McGroarty, 48 R.I. 79 , 135 A. 481, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1927).

Material misstatement of testimony in charge by the court constituted reversible error, even though objection did not point out definitely the language to which objection was made. Coop v. Frederick H. Bishop Co., 48 R.I. 227 , 136 A. 843, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1927).

Statement by judge to the jury that he remembered certain testimony, which statement of the testimony was incorrect, constituted prejudicial error, since it was not a proper summary of or fair comment on the evidence. Varrecchia v. Plasse, 84 R.I. 422 , 125 A.2d 92, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1956).

Omission of Lesser Included Offense.

Charge of judge to jury that it could return only one of three possible verdicts, first or second degree murder or not guilty, was not objectionable where there was no evidence on which the jury could find manslaughter and where defendant testified he did not injure the decedent in any way as the trial justice is required to instruct the jury only in the law relating to the case. State v. Hathaway, 52 R.I. 492 , 161 A. 366, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1932).

In a trial for murder, it was not error for the court to instruct the jury it was not “a case of manslaughter” where the evidence would not have supported a verdict of provocation sufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter. State v. Goff, 107 R.I. 331 , 267 A.2d 686, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 777 (1970).

A defendant is only entitled to a charge on a lesser degree of homicide when the evidence supports a finding on a lesser degree of the offense. Jefferson v. State, 472 A.2d 1200, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 461 (R.I. 1984).

A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if such an instruction is warranted by the evidence. State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 491 (R.I. 1987).

The trial justice committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault with intent to rob, where there was no dispute as to the essential element of specific intent that distinguished the greater and the lesser offenses. State v. Brown, 549 A.2d 1373, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 1988).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant’s requested instruction for lesser-included offense of second-degree murder since the evidence sufficiently demonstrated more than momentary premeditation; after the first altercation was finished, defendant returned and shot victim. State v. Nunes, 788 A.2d 460, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 10 (R.I. 2002).

Where the evidence did not show that defendant was acting under extreme provocation of fear of violence, and where defendant also had cooling down time between earlier altercations and a final confrontation with the victim, there was no reason to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 209 (R.I. 2003).

Requested Instructions.

The trial justice did not err in rejecting the defendant’s requested instructions since the instructions that were given adequately stated the applicable law and addressed all factual issues, including a potential mistake-of-fact. State v. Dellatore, 761 A.2d 226, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 196 (R.I. 2000).

Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder was affirmed where the court’s instructions to the jury on intent sufficiently covered the subject matter of defendant’s request for a mistake-of-fact instruction such that the court’s refusal to give the latter instruction did not constitute reversible error. State v. Dumas, 835 A.2d 438, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 206 (R.I. 2003).

Given the scant evidence of accident proffered at trial and the fact that defendant did not rely on accident as a defense theory, the trial court did not err under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-38 in declining defendant’s request to give a comprehensive jury instruction on accident, as it included that term while instructing the jury on the elements of the murder charges applicable in defendant’s trial; any further mention of accident in the charge probably would have served only to confuse or mislead the jury. State v. Drew, 919 A.2d 397, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 40 (R.I. 2007).

There was no error by a trial justice in failing to give defendant’s requested accomplice instruction to the jury, as the trial court instructed the jury to consider any witness’s motive to be truthful or untruthful, which was adequate, and there was no requirement of an accomplice instruction; rather, the credibility issues of witnesses were matters that were within counsel’s province to advocate for or against. State v. Drew, 919 A.2d 397, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 40 (R.I. 2007).

Although defendant’s requested jury instruction on the “force or coercion” element of first-degree sexual assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 was refused and the term “lack of consent” was not explicitly utilized, a trial court’s instruction did employ the verb “overcomes,” which, when the instructions were read in their entirety, meant that as a precondition of guilt, the jury had to find a lack of consent by a victim. State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2010).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s request to instruct the jury that it could find him not guilty of disorderly conduct if it found that the police had initiated the disturbance, as this was not a correct statement of the law. State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 2013).

Special Findings.

In action for negligence, where question was submitted to jury for special finding, the court properly informed jury of the legal effect of their answer to such question in relation to the general verdict. Smith v. Rhode Island Co., 39 R.I. 146 , 98 A. 1, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1916).

Stenographic Report.

The court may have the stenographic report read to the jury since this authority is included in the power to sum up the evidence. Alexander Bros. v. Gardiner, 14 R.I. 15 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1882).

Collateral References.

Accused, right to and propriety of instruction as to credibility of. 85 A.L.R. 523.

“Actual doubt,” use of term in instruction on reasonable doubt. 147 A.L.R. 1046.

Admissibility and probative value of admissions of fault by agent on issue of principal’s secondary liability, where both are sued. 27 A.L.R.3d 966.

“And/or,” use of or comment on use of, in instruction. 118 A.L.R. 1376, 154 A.L.R. 866.

Argument of defendant’s counsel in criminal case, criticism of, in judge’s charge to jury. 86 A.L.R. 899.

Comment by court suggesting that jury may take into consideration accused’s failure to testify. 94 A.L.R. 701.

Comments in judge’s charge disparaging expert testimony. 156 A.L.R. 530.

Common knowledge, propriety of instructions on matters of. 144 A.L.R. 932.

Construction of statutes or rules making mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions. 49 A.L.R.3d 128.

Definition or explanation of crime, necessity if request for instruction given. 169 A.L.R. 352.

Degrees of crime or included offenses, duty to charge as to reasonable doubt as between. 20 A.L.R. 1258.

Duty of court, in absence of specific request, to instruct on subject of alibi. 72 A.L.R.3d 547.

Duty of court in civil case to correct, and to give corrected, requested instruction which includes a clerical or inadvertent mistake. 125 A.L.R. 685.

Duty of court in criminal case, in absence of request, to charge with respect to circumstantial evidence. 15 A.L.R. 1049.

Duty of court in instructing jury to explain and define offense charged. 169 A.L.R. 315.

Eminent domain proceeding, propriety and effect of instruction as to landowner’s unwillingness to sell property. 20 A.L.R.3d 1081.

Form of instruction: propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in which they are written. 10 A.L.R.3d 501.

Good or bad character of witnesses, instructions as to effect of, on their credibility. 120 A.L.R. 1443.

Indoctrination by court of persons summoned for jury service. 89 A.L.R.2d 197.

Insanity, instruction in criminal case in which defendant pleads insanity as to his hospital confinement in event of acquittal. 11 A.L.R.3d 737.

Instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal case. 15 A.L.R. 1049, 89 A.L.R. 1379.

Instruction on “unavoidable accident,” “mere accident,” or the like, in motor vehicle cases—modern cases. 21 A.L.R.5th 82.

Instruction or requested instruction which either affirms or denies jury’s right to draw unfavorable inference against party because he invokes privilege against testimony of person offered as witness by the other party or because he fails to call such person as witness, propriety and effect of. 131 A.L.R. 694.

Instructions as affected by court’s order entered after pretrial conference. 22 A.L.R.2d 599.

Instructions as to inferences arising from refusal of witness other than accused to answer question on the ground that the answer would tend to incriminate him. 24 A.L.R.2d 895.

Instructions in criminal case in which defendant pleads insanity as to his hospital confinement in the event of acquittal. 11 A.L.R.3d 737.

Instructions in state criminal case in which defendant pleads insanity as to hospital confinement in event of acquittal. 81 A.L.R.4th 659.

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child’s testimony in criminal case. 32 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Instructions urging dissenting jurors in state criminal case to give due consideration to opinion of majority (Allen charge) — modern cases. 97 A.L.R.3d 96.

Jury trial, statute in relation to subject matter or form of instruction as impairing right to. 80 A.L.R. 906.

Language of statute, use of in explaining and defining offense charged. 169 A.L.R. 331.

Law enforcement, propriety of instruction in criminal case as to importance of, or as to duty of jury in that regard. 124 A.L.R. 1133.

Law, propriety of instruction or requested instruction requiring jury in criminal case to take law from court, or advising them as to their duty in that regard. 72 A.L.R. 899.

Maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,” propriety and correctness of instructions regarding. 90 A.L.R. 74, 4 A.L.R.2d 1077.

Modern status of law regarding cure of error, in instruction as to one offense, by conviction of higher or lesser offense. 15 A.L.R.4th 118.

Modern status of rule regarding necessity of instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal trial — state cases. 36 A.L.R.4th 1046.

Necessity and content of instructions to jury respecting reasons for or inferences from accused’s absence from state criminal trial. 31 A.L.R.4th 676.

Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of warranty, where instruction on strict liability in tort is given in products liability case. 52 A.L.R.3d 101.

Necessity of, and prejudicial effect of omitting, cautionary instruction to jury as to reliability of, or factors to be considered in evaluating, eyewitness identification testimony — state cases. 23 A.L.R.4th 1089.

Oral admissions, propriety of instruction, or requested instruction, in civil case, as to caution in considering testimony of, or as to weight of such admissions in evidence. 126 A.L.R. 66.

Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communications between court officials or attendants and jurors. 31 A.L.R.5th 572.

Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communications between judges and jurors. 33 A.L.R.5th 205.

Prejudicial effect of statement or instruction of court as to possibility of parole or pardon. 12 A.L.R.3d 832.

Prejudicial effect of trial judge’s remarks, during civil jury trial, disparaging litigants, witnesses, or subject matter of litigation — modern cases. 35 A.L.R.5th 1.

“Preponderance or weight of evidence,” instructions defining term. 93 A.L.R. 155.

Presumption or inference from party’s failure to produce witnesses within his control, propriety of instructions as to, as affected by his introduction of some evidence on the matter in question. 135 A.L.R. 1375.

Procedure to be followed where jury requests information as to possibility of pardon or parole from sentence imposed. 35 A.L.R.2d 769.

Propriety and effect of court’s indication to jury that court would suspend sentence. 8 A.L.R.2d 1001.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of comment or instruction by court with respect to party’s refusal to permit introduction of privileged testimony. 34 A.L.R.3d 775.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of informing jury that accused has taken polygraph test, where results of test would be inadmissible in evidence. 88 A.L.R.3d 227.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in which they are written. 10 A.L.R.3d 501.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions on credibility of alibi witnesses. 72 A.L.R.3d 617.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of “on or about” instruction where alibi evidence in federal criminal case purports to cover specific date shown by prosecution evidence. 92 A.L.R. Fed. 313.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of sending written instructions with retiring jury in civil case. 91 A.L.R.3d 336.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of sending written instructions with retiring jury in criminal case. 91 A.L.R.3d 382.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of trial court’s inquiry as to numerical division of jury. 77 A.L.R.3d 769.

Propriety of jury instruction regarding credibility of witness who has been convicted of a crime. 9 A.L.R.4th 897.

Propriety of lesser-included offense charge to jury in federal criminal case — general principles. 100 A.L.R. Fed. 481.

Propriety of reference, in instruction in criminal case, to juror’s duty to God. 39 A.L.R.3d 1445.

Propriety of specific jury instructions as to credibility of accomplices. 4 A.L.R.3d 351.

Propriety under Griffin v. California and prejudicial effect of unrequested instruction that no inferences against accused should be drawn from his failure to testify. 18 A.L.R.3d 1335.

Repeating definition of legal or technical term in different parts of instructions in which it is employed, necessity of. 7 A.L.R. 135.

Right of defendant in prosecution for perjury to have the “two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances,” rule included in charge to jury — state cases. 41 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right of plaintiff in res ipsa loquitur case to an instruction respecting inference of jury. 173 A.L.R. 880.

Right or duty of court to instruct jury as to presumptions. 103 A.L.R. 126.

Sympathy to accused as appropriate factor in jury consideration. 72 A.L.R.3d 842.

Use of word “satisfaction” or a derivative in instructions in civil case relating to degree or amount of proof. 147 A.L.R. 380.

Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors. 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.

Verdict-urging instructions in civil case commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise. 41 A.L.R.3d 845.

Verdict-urging instructions in civil case stressing desirability and importance of agreement. 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.

Violation of federal constitutional rule (Griffin v. California) prohibiting adverse comment by prosecutor or court upon accused’s failure to testify, as constituting reversible or harmless error. 24 A.L.R.3d 1093.

8-2-39. General magistrate — Appointment, duties and powers.

  1. There is hereby created within the superior court the position of general magistrate who shall be appointed by the presiding justice of the superior court, with the advice and consent of the senate, for a term of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the assignment of the general magistrate to more than one such term, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The person appointed to serve as general magistrate shall be a member of the bar of Rhode Island. The powers and duties of the general magistrate shall be prescribed in the order appointing him or her.
    1. The general magistrate shall assist the court in:
      1. The determination of, monitoring, collection, and payment of restitution and court ordered fines, fees, and costs or the ordering of community service in lieu of or in addition to the payment of restitution, fines, fees, and costs, consistent with other provisions of the general laws;
      2. The determination and payment of claims under the violent crimes indemnity fund for the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972, chapter 25 of title 12;
      3. The determination and payment of claims from the Criminal Royalties Distribution Act of 1983, chapter 25.1 of title 12; and
      4. Such other matters as the presiding justice of the superior court determines are necessary.
    2. The chief justice of the supreme court, with the consent of the presiding justice and, if applicable, the chief judge of a particular court, may assign the general magistrate to serve as a magistrate in any court of the unified system. When the general magistrate is so assigned he or she shall be vested, authorized, and empowered with all the powers belonging to the magistrate position to which he or she is specially assigned.
  2. The general magistrate will be empowered to hear all motions, pretrial conferences, arraignments, probable cause hearings, bail hearings, bail and probation revocation hearings, and to review all such matters including, but not limited to the above, and to modify the terms and conditions of probation and other court-ordered monetary payments including, but not limited to, the extension of time for probation and court-ordered monetary payments as provided by law. The general magistrate shall have the power to take testimony in connection with all matters set forth herein.
  3. The general magistrate may be authorized:
    1. To regulate all proceedings before him or her;
    2. To do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his or her duties;
    3. To require the production before him or her of books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings;
    4. To rule upon the admissibility of evidence;
    5. To issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses, to put witnesses on oath, to examine them, and to call parties to the proceeding and examine them upon oath;
    6. To adjudicate a person in contempt and to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a justice of the relevant court, for failure to appear in response to a summons or for refusal to answer questions or produce evidence or for behavior disrupting a proceeding;
    7. To adjudicate a party in contempt and to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a justice of the relevant court, for failure to comply with a pending order to provide payment or to perform any other act; and
    8. To issue a capias and/or body attachment upon the failure of a party or witness to appear after having been properly served and, should the court not be in session, the person apprehended may be detained at the adult correctional institutions, if an adult, or at the Rhode Island training school for youth, if a child, until the next session of the court.
  4. A party aggrieved by an order entered by the general magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the relevant court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the court, such review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for review of orders entered by a general magistrate, and for enforcement of contempt adjudications of a general magistrate.
  5. Final orders of the superior or family court entered in a proceeding to review an order of a general magistrate may be appealed to the supreme court. Final orders of the district court entered in a proceeding to review an order of the general magistrate may be appealed to the superior court.
  6. The general magistrate shall:
    1. Receive all credits and retirement allowances as afforded justices under chapter 3 of this title and any other applicable law, including without limitation, § 8-3-16 ;
    2. Receive a salary equivalent to that of a district court judge;
    3. Be governed by the commission on judicial tenure and discipline, chapter 16, of this title, in the same manner as justices and judges;
    4. Be subject to all provisions of the canons of judicial ethics or code of judicial conduct;
    5. Be subject to all criminal laws relative to judges by virtue of §§ 11-7-1 and 11-7-2 .
  7. The provisions of this section shall be afforded liberal construction.
  8. The presiding justice of the superior court shall initially appoint such support staff as may be necessary, relating to preparation, investigation, and implementation of the  general magistrate’s  functions. Effective November 15, 1993, the support staff shall be placed under the supervision and management of the superior court, and new appointments or personnel changes in the support staff shall be subject to the directions and approval of the superior court, consistent with any applicable collective bargaining agreements. The general magistrate shall have the power and authority to issue subpoenas and to compel the attendance of witnesses at any place within the state, to administer oaths and to require testimony under oath. The  general magistrate, or his or her designee, may serve his or her process or notices in a manner provided for the service of process and notice in civil or criminal actions in accordance with the rules of court.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 1; P.L.1991, ch. 44, art. 73, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 348, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 6; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 9.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Defendant waived the claim that the magistrate in his probation violation case was not statutorily authorized to preside over the probation revocation hearing because the statutory authorization was not constitutional, as defendant did not raise the issue in the trial court and the issue was not novel. Further, defendant could not raise that issue on appeal because defendant did not serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding if defendant intended to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, as was required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-30-11 . ould not raise that issue on appeal because defendant did not serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding if defendant intended to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, as was required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-30-11 . State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 43 (R.I. 2008); ould not raise that issue on appeal because defendant did not serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding if defendant intended to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, as was required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-30-11. State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 43 (R.I. 2008).

8-2-39.1. Special magistrate.

There is hereby created within the superior court the position of special magistrate, who shall be appointed by the presiding justice of the superior court, with the advice and consent of the senate, for a period of ten (10) years, and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the reappointment of a special magistrate for one or more additional ten (10) year terms, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The person appointed to serve as special magistrate shall be a member of the bar of the state of Rhode Island. The special magistrate shall have the duties, responsibilities, powers and benefits as authorized in § 8-2-39 .

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 30, art. 1, § 21; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

8-2-39.2. Drug court magistrate — Appointment, duties and powers.

  1. For the purposes of this chapter:
    1. “Non-violent” means and includes all charges that are not crimes of violence, the following being a list of all charges considered to be crimes of violence for the purposes of this section: murder, manslaughter, first-degree arson, kidnapping with intent to extort, robbery, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, first- and second-degree child molestation, assault, assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to rob, assault with intent to commit first-degree sexual assault, entering a dwelling house with intent to commit murder, robbery, or sexual assault.
    2. “Drug-addicted person” means a person who exhibits a maladaptive pattern of behavior resulting from drug use, including one or more of the following: impaired control over drug use; compulsive use; and/or continued use despite harm, and craving.
  2. There is hereby created within the superior court the position of drug court magistrate who shall be appointed by the presiding justice of the superior court with the advice and consent of the senate. The persons appointed to serve as drug court magistrates shall be members of the bar of Rhode Island. The powers and duties of the drug court magistrate shall be prescribed in the order appointing him or her in addition to those described herein.

    The drug court magistrate’s term shall be ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a drug court magistrate from being reappointed for additional ten-year (10) terms by the presiding justice of the superior court with the advice and consent of the senate. He or she shall receive a salary equivalent to that received by the special magistrate assigned to the superior court. The drug court magistrate shall preside over the adult drug court. The adult drug court program shall combine the coercive powers of the court with a therapeutic regimen in order to rehabilitate drug addicted defendants.

  3. The drug court magistrate shall be empowered to hear and decide as a superior court justice all matters relating to those adult offenders who come before the jurisdiction of the superior court on any offense relating to the offender’s participation in the adult drug court. In addition, the drug court magistrate shall have the power to impose a period of incarceration upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and also have the power to confine any person who has been found to be in violation of any conditions previously imposed by the superior court.
  4. The drug court magistrate shall make the final determination as to whether a defendant is admitted into the program. Individuals meeting the following criteria shall be screened by staff working at the office of the attorney general upon the department’s own referral; upon a request by counsel entered on behalf of a defendant; upon request by a judge of the superior or district court, or, in the case of a person waivable by the family court, by a judge of that court; or the department of corrections for admittance into the adult drug court:
    1. The individual is charged with or convicted of an alcohol- or drug-related offense or with an appropriate non-violent offense.
    2. The individual has no pending charges for felony crimes of violence.
    3. The individual has no pending charges for delivery of a controlled substance.
    4. The defendant is a drug-addicted person.
  5. All individuals accepted into drug court will be bound by a drug court contract, as defined by the adult drug court, that sets forth the court’s expectations; the role and responsibilities of the drug court; the conditions imposed upon and the responsibilities of the defendant; and the treatment plan goals and strategies. If a defendant fails to abide by the drug court conditions and orders, he or she may be terminated from the program by the drug court judge and sentenced as he or she deems appropriate.
  6. The drug court magistrate shall be empowered to hear and decide as a superior court justice all matters that may come before the superior court pursuant to chapter 37.1 of title 11 “sexual offender registration and community notification.”
  7. The drug court magistrate and/or the presiding justice of the superior court may fix the venue of any person who is before the superior court as a participant in the adult drug court or who is alleged to be a sexual predator, and who has filed an objection to community notification.
  8. In addition, at the discretion of the presiding justice of the superior court, the drug court magistrate shall have the duties, responsibilities, and powers authorized in subsections 8-2-39(b) , (c) and (d).
  9. The drug court magistrate shall be governed by the commission on judicial tenure and discipline, chapter 16 of title 8, in the same manner as justices and judges; shall be subject to all provisions of the canons of judicial ethics or code of judicial conduct; and shall be subject to all criminal laws relative to judges by virtue of §§ 11-7-1 and 11-7-2 .
  10. A party aggrieved by an order entered by the drug court magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the superior court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the court, such review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The superior court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for reviews of orders entered by a drug court magistrate, and for enforcement of contempt adjudications of a drug court magistrate.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 595, art. 19, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 343, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 6; P.L. 2012, ch. 401, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 369, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 377, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

P.L. 2017, ch. 369, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 377, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Brendan Horan, Comment: The Ball Is in Whose Court? Rhode Island's Need for an Integrated Domestic Violence Court, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 738 (2021).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sex Offender Registration.

Even if they had been properly preserved, a registrant’s constitutional challenges to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification would fail because the registrant was afforded a meaningful hearing and failed to demonstrate that his right to procedural due process was violated. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (R.I. 2019).

8-2-39.3. Superior court diversion.

  1. In accordance with § 8-6-2 , the superior court may create, with the approval of the supreme court, rules for a superior court diversion program. The presiding justice may assign a justice or magistrate to administer the diversion program. The program is designed to offer an alternative to traditional conviction, sentencing, and incarceration by providing eligible defendants with a framework of supervision and services in lieu of incarceration and/or probation to help them make informed decisions; engage in positive behavior; and reduce the risk of recidivism.
  2. Definitions:
    1. “Disqualifying offense” includes murder; manslaughter; first-degree arson; kidnapping with intent to extort; robbery; felony assault — serious bodily injury; larceny from the person; burglary; entering a dwelling house with intent to commit murder; robbery; sexual assault; any domestic violence offense as defined in chapter 29 of title 12; felony driving while intoxicated; driving while intoxicated — death resulting; driving while intoxicated — serious bodily injury resulting; possession of greater than one ounce (1 oz.) or greater than one kilogram (1 kg.) of a controlled substance, excluding marijuana; possession of greater than five kilograms (5 kg.) of marijuana; any offense requiring sex offender registration pursuant to chapter 37.1 of title 11; and child abuse as defined in § 11-9-5.3 ; and all firearms offenses, as defined in chapter 47 of title 11, with the exception of: § 11-47-6 , mental incompetents and drug addicts prohibited from possession of firearms; § 11-47-8 , license or permit required for carrying pistol — possession of machine gun; and § 11-47-52 , carrying of weapon while under the influence of liquor or drugs. The definition shall also include any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses included in this subsection.
    2. “Eligible defendant” means any person who stands charged in a district court complaint, superior court indictment, or a superior court information for a felony offense or for a misdemeanor offense in violation of § 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i) and:
      1. Has not been previously convicted of or pleaded nolo contendere to a disqualifying offense, as defined in this section;
      2. Has not been previously convicted of or pleaded nolo contendere previously to two (2) or more felony offenses within the last five (5) years (excluding any time during which the offender was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony); and
      3. Has not been charged with a disqualifying offense as defined in this section.
  3. The procedure for referral and admission into the program shall be as follows:
    1. At any time after the arraignment of an eligible defendant, either in the district court or superior court, but prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or the commencement of trial, a referral may be made to the judicial diversion program’s sentencing case manager. The referral may be made by a representative of the department of the attorney general or counsel entered on behalf of a defendant or upon request by a justice of the superior or district court.
    2. The judicial diversion sentencing case manager shall ensure that the individual is an eligible defendant, and satisfies any additional criteria established by the court through its rules and regulations.
    3. The judicial diversion sentencing case manager shall submit his or her report to the justice or magistrate assigned to the program, indicating acceptance or rejection into the program. Upon receipt of the report, the court shall confer with counsel for the defendant and counsel for the state.
    4. Either party may request a hearing on the issue of whether the defendant should be admitted into the program.
    5. The superior court magistrate or justice assigned to the program shall make the final determination as to whether a defendant is admitted into the program.
  4. Notwithstanding the above provisions, if counsel for the department of attorney general and the counsel for the defendant agree that the defendant should be admitted to the program, he or she shall be deemed “eligible” and may be granted admission.
  5. Once the defendant has been accepted into the program, the defendant shall sign a contract. The contract will detail the requirements of the program, which requirements shall be consistent with the rules and regulations promulgated by the court. The defendant will be bound by the terms of the contract, which will set forth the court’s expectations; the conditions imposed upon and the responsibilities of the defendant; and the treatment plan goals and strategies. In addition, by signing the contract, the defendant agrees to waive any applicable statute of limitations and/or right to a speedy trial.
  6. If a defendant fails to abide by the program’s conditions and orders, he or she may be terminated from the program by the magistrate or justice assigned to the program. If a defendant is terminated from the program then he or she shall have his or her case placed on the superior court criminal calendar in the county that the case originated.
  7. The superior court may make such rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of this chapter as it may deem necessary. Provided, further, notwithstanding any provision of the general or public laws to the contrary, the superior court shall have the power to adopt by rule or regulation, in whole or in part, any standards, rules, regulations, or other standards and procedures governing the judicial diversion program.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 279, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 283, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 286, § 1, effective July 9, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 287, § 1, effective July 9, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 279, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 283, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 286, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 287, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Contingent Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 5, provides that this section takes effect upon issuance of applicable rules by the supreme court.

P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 5, provides that this section takes effect upon issuance of applicable rules by the supreme court.

Chapter 3 Justices of Supreme, Superior, and Family Courts

8-3-1. Engagement of office — Restriction on practice of law.

  1. Every justice of the supreme court and of the superior court and of the family court shall, before exercising any of the duties of his or her office, subscribe in duplicate and take the following engagement: “I  _____________________________________ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution and laws of this state; that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me as  _____________________________________  according to the best of my abilities, agreeable to law; so help me God.” (Or, “this affirmation I make and give upon peril of the penalty or perjury.”) One of the engagements shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court of which the justice is a member and entered upon the record thereof, and the other shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state.
  2. A justice of the supreme court, of the superior court, and of the family court shall devote full time to his or her judicial duties. He or she shall not practice law while holding office nor shall he or she be a partner or associate of any person in the practice of law.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 28; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-1 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 57; P.L. 1985, ch. 150, § 14.

Cross References.

Oath of office, R.I. Const., art. III, § 4 .

8-3-2. Precedence of associate justices.

The associate justices shall have precedence in their respective courts according to the dates of their commissions, or when the commission of two or more of them bear the same date, according to their ages.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 31; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-2 .

8-3-3. Vacancy in office or inability of chief justice of supreme court.

Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of chief justice of the supreme court, or whenever the chief justice shall be unable, by reason of illness or absence, to perform the duties of his or her office, the associate justice of the supreme court having precedence who is present and qualified to act shall perform the duties of the office until the vacancy shall be filled or the inability removed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 32; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 5; P.L. 1932, ch. 1878, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-3 .

8-3-4. Vacancy in office, inability, or absence of presiding justice of superior court.

Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of presiding justice of the superior court, or whenever the presiding justice shall be unable by reason of illness to perform the duties of his office, the associate justice of the superior court having precedence who is present and qualified to act shall perform the duties of the office until the vacancy shall be filled or the inability removed. In the event that the presiding justice determines that his or her absence will prevent him or her from performing the duties of his or her office, he or she shall designate an associate justice to perform the duties during the period of his or her absence.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 32; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 5; P.L. 1932, ch. 1878, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-4 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 132, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Disability of justice after trial, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 63.

8-3-5. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 30; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-5 ; Repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, § 2. Section 7 of P.L. 1987, ch. 381 provides that the repeal of this section by that Act shall take effect on the date that Rhode Island Rules of Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court take effect. Those Rules took effect October 1, 1987.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-3-5 concerned disqualification of justices for interest.

8-3-6. Justices as conservators of peace — Powers in criminal cases.

The justices of the supreme and superior court shall, by virtue of their office, be severally conservators of the peace throughout the state, and shall severally have the same power in criminal cases throughout the state that district courts have in their respective districts.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-6 .

Cross References.

Acknowledgment of instruments, authority to take, § 34-12-2 .

Depositions, power to take, § 9-18-1 .

Dispersal of riotous assembly, § 11-38-1 et seq.

Illegal assemblies purporting to exercise governmental powers, dispersal, §§ 11-43-5, 11-43-14.

Marriages, power to solemnize, § 15-3-5 .

Oaths, power to administer, § 36-2-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arrest Warrants.

The practice of allowing Superior Court clerks to issue administrative arrest warrants violates both statutory law and the Superior Court Rules of Procedure. Therefore, warrants so issued are invalid. State v. Santos, 498 A.2d 1024, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 586 (R.I. 1985).

8-3-7. Retirement of justices on reduced pay — Assignment as associate justices.

  1. Whenever any person engaged as a judge:
    1. On or before July 2, 1997 has served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, or any combination thereof for twenty (20) years, or has so served for ten (10) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, that justice may retire from active service and thereafter the justice shall receive annually during life a sum equal to three-fourths (3/4) of the annual salary that the justice was receiving at the time of retirement;
    2. Subsequent to July 2, 1997 and prior to January 1, 2009, has served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court or any combination thereof, for twenty (20) years, or has so served for ten (10) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, said justice may retire from active service and thereafter said justice shall receive annually during life a sum equal to three-fourths (3/4) of his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation;
    3. On or after January 1, 2009, has served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court or any combination thereof, for twenty (20) years, or has so served for ten (10) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, said justice may retire from active service and thereafter said justice shall receive annually during life a sum equal to seventy percent (70%) of his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation.
    4. On or after July 1, 2009, shall have served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, or any of them for twenty (20) years, or has served for ten (10) years, and reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, said justice may retire from regular active service and thereafter said justice shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to sixty-five percent (65%) of his or her average highest five (5) consecutive years of compensation.
  2. Whenever a justice or magistrate shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, such absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  3. Any justice in any of the courts who shall retire in accordance with the provisions of this section or § 36-9-5 may, at his or her own request and at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as an associate justice of the superior court, or the family court, or the district court as the presiding justice of the superior court, or the chief judge of the family court, or the district shall prescribe. When so assigned and performing such service, the justice shall have all the powers and authority of an associate justice of the superior court, the family court, or the district court but otherwise shall have no powers nor be authorized to perform any judicial duties. Such a retired justice shall not be counted in the number of judges provided by law for the superior court, the family court, or the district court.
  4. Any justice of the supreme court who shall retire in accordance with the provisions of this section shall at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as an associate justice of the supreme court as the chief justice of the supreme court shall prescribe. When so assigned and performing such services, the retiree shall have all the powers and authority of an associate justice of the supreme court, but otherwise he or she shall have no powers nor be authorized to perform any judicial duties relating to the supreme court, except as authorized under § 8-1-1 . Such a retired justice shall not be counted in the number of justices provided by law for the supreme court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 29; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 2; P.L. 1917, ch. 1475, § 2; P.L. 1922, ch. 2229, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 2; P.L. 1926, ch. 771, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 2; P.L. 1948, ch. 2084, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3832, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-7 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 2, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 256, § 2; P.L. 1983, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 10.

Cross References.

Exemption from public employees retirement law, § 36-9-5 .

Retirement of justices who have also served as general officers or members of the legislature, § 8-3-12 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Retired Judge.

The authority granted to a retired judge in P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 58 to serve as a judge when assigned, is identical to that granted to successors pursuant to this section. State v. Nunez, 634 A.2d 1167, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 260 (R.I. 1993).

8-3-7.1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 2, effective June 26, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-3-7.1 concerned retirement of justices on reduced pay and assignment as associate justices.

8-3-7.2. No incremental retirement benefit for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice or chief judge.

No increment in salary resulting from any rule or regulation providing for an increment in salary for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice or chief judge shall be construed to add to the annual salary of a judicial officer for purposes of retirement under § 8-3-7 .

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 63, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 95, § 1.

8-3-8. Retirement of justices on full pay — Assignment as associate justices.

  1. Whenever any person engaged as a judge:
    1. On or before July 2, 1997 shall have served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, or any of them for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years, and reached the age of seventy (70) years, that justice may retire from regular active service and thereafter the justice shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to the annual salary the justice was receiving at the time of his or her retirement;
    2. Subsequent to July 2, 1997 and prior to January 1, 2009, shall have served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, or any of them for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years, and reached the age of seventy (70) years, said justice may retire from regular active service and thereafter said justice shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation.
    3. On or after January 1, 2009, shall have served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, or any of them for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years, and reached the age of seventy (70) years, said justice may retire from regular active service and thereafter said justice shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to ninety percent (90%) of his or her average highest three consecutive years of compensation.
    4. On or after July 1, 2009, shall have served as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, or any of them for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years, and reached the age of seventy (70) years, said justice may retire from regular active service and thereafter said justice shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to eighty percent (80%) of his or her average highest five (5) consecutive years of compensation.
  2. Whenever a justice or magistrate shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, such absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  3. Any justice of any of the courts who shall retire in accordance with the provisions of this section shall at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as an associate justice of the superior court, or the family court, or the district court as the presiding justice of the superior court, or the chief judge of the family court, or the district court shall prescribe. When so assigned and performing such service, the retiree shall have all the powers and authority of an associate justice of the superior court, the family court, or the district court but otherwise he or she shall have no powers nor be authorized to perform any judicial duties. Such a retired justice shall not be counted in the number of judges provided by law for the superior court, the family court, or the district court.
  4. Any justice of the supreme court who shall retire in accordance with the provisions of this section shall at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as an associate justice of the supreme court as the chief justice of the supreme court shall prescribe. When so assigned and performing such services, the retiree shall have all the powers and authority of an associate justice of the supreme court, but otherwise he or she shall have no powers nor be authorized to perform any judicial duties relating to the supreme court, except as authorized under § 8-1-1 . Such a retired justice shall not be counted in the number of justices provided by law for the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3633, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-3-8 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 639, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 10.

Law Reviews.

Andre S. Digou, A View of the Rhode Island Pension Landscape: The Potential Reform of Local Pension Plans Under the Preemption Doctrine, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 740 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Termination of Pension Benefits.

The termination of the pension of an active retired justice found guilty of various unethical acts involving the use of his position for financial gain did not constitute a disproportionate remedy in violation of article I, section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The judge’s actions motivated by the desire for personal gain operated to harm the public trust and confidence in the Judiciary as a whole and to affect adversely the honor and integrity of the very position he held and the capacity in which he served. In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375 (R.I. 1992). But see § 36-10.1-1 et seq.

8-3-8.1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 2, effective June 26, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-3-8.1 concerned retirement of justices on full pay and assignment as associate justices.

8-3-8.2. No incremental retirement benefit for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice or chief judge.

No increment in salary resulting from any rule or regulation providing for an increment in salary for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice or chief judge shall be construed to add to the annual salary of a judicial officer for purposes of retirement under § 8-3-8 or 8-3-8 .1.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 229, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 321, § 1.

8-3-9. Computation of service time as to former courts.

For purposes of determining eligibility for retirement under §§ 8-3-7 and 8-3-8 , the years of service of any person who has served as an associate judge of the juvenile court prior to September 1, 1961, or who has served as a judge or clerk of a district court as constituted prior to September 15, 1969, or a judge of the workers’ compensation court, shall be included as if the service had been on the court to which the person may have been subsequently appointed.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 340, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (P.L. 1969, ch. 162, § 1), concerning retirement under certain conditions, was repealed by P.L. 1978, ch. 340, § 1 and the present provision was substituted therefor.

8-3-10. Service after retirement.

Any justice or judge of the supreme court, superior court, family court, or district court who shall retire in accordance with the provisions of § 8-3-7 , 8-3-8 , or 8-3-12 and who shall subsequently be assigned to perform service in accordance with § 8-3-7 or 8-3-8 , when so assigned and performing such service, shall receive in addition to his or her retirement pension the difference in pay and fringe benefits between what he or she was entitled to receive under § 8-3-7, 8-3-8, or 8-3-12 prior to exercising his or her options available under § 8-3-11 and what a judge or justice with comparable state service time is receiving as a justice or judge of the court to which he/she is assigned, or a justice or judge of the court from which he/she retired, whichever is greater.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 19, § 3.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (P.L. 1969, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 163, § 1), concerning service after retirement, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 19, § 2 and the present provision was substituted therefor.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Compensation.

A retired judge who is recalled is entitled, under this section, to receive the same compensation that an active judge, with the same number of years of active state service as the retired judge had accumulated prior to his or her retirement, would receive. The judge’s recalled retired service is not included in his “state service time” since retirement is defined as separation from state service. Bulman v. Kane, 519 A.2d 1123, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 580 (R.I. 1987).

8-3-11. Allowances to surviving spouses, domestic partners or minor children of deceased justices.

  1. Whenever any justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, or the district court who was engaged as a judge prior to January 1, 2009, dies after retirement or during active service while eligible for retirement, or during active service after having served fifteen (15) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter, during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the annual payment that the justice was receiving by way of salary or retirement pay at the time of his or her death. Whenever a justice of any of the courts shall die without having become eligible to retire either under § 8-3-7 or 8-3-8 and has served seven (7) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter, during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, one-third (1/3) of the annual salary that the justice was receiving at the time of his or her death. Whenever a justice of the courts shall die without having become eligible to retire either under § 8-3-7 or 8-3-8 and has not served seven (7) years in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter, during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, one-fourth (1/4) of the annual salary that the justice was receiving at the time of his or her death.
  2. Any justice of the courts who is engaged as a judge on or after January 1, 2009, and prior to July 1, 2009 may elect to receive retirement pay that is reduced by an additional ten percent (10%) of the average of the highest three (3) consecutive years annual compensation (i.e., ninety percent (90%) reduced to eighty percent (80%) or seventy percent (70) reduced to sixty percent (60%)), and where such option is exercised by giving the general treasurer notice in writing thereof within ninety (90) days after the date of his or her retirement his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner or minor children shall receive annually one-half (1/2) of his or her retirement pay during his or her lifetime so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, or the children are under twenty-one (21) years of age provided, however, for any justice engaged on or after July 1, 2009 but prior to July 1, 2012, the reduction shall be based on the average of the highest five (5) consecutive years annual compensation.
    1. Any justice of the courts who is engaged as a judge on or after July 1, 2012 and who elects to receive a retirement pay that is reduced, shall receive a lesser retirement allowance as determined by actuarial calculation, which shall be payable throughout life with the provision that:
      1. Option 1. Upon the justice’s death, the justice’s lesser retirement allowance shall be continued throughout the life of and paid to such person having an insurable interest in the justice’s life, as the justice shall nominate by written designation duly acknowledged and filed with the retirement board at the time of his or her retirement.
      2. Option 2. Upon the justice’s death, one-half (1/2) of the justice’s lesser retirement allowance shall be continued throughout the life of and paid to such person, having an insurable interest in the justice’s life, as the justice shall nominate by written designation duly acknowledged and filed with the retirement board at the time of the beneficiary’s retirement.
    2. For purposes of any election under this section the justice may designate more than one person to receive benefits after his or her death, provided that the designation shall specify the portion of the actuarial equivalent of the justice’s retirement allowance to be paid to each person, and provided further that the aggregate actuarial value of the portions shall not exceed the actuarial equivalent of the justice’s retirement benefit determined in the case of an election under this section as of the date of the justice’s retirement.
    3. A justice selecting more than one person to receive benefits under this section may only select beneficiaries from among his or her children, adopted children, step-children, and/or spouse or domestic partner.
  3. Whenever any justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, or the district court who was engaged as a judge on or after January 1, 2009, dies during active service while eligible for retirement, or during active service after having served fifteen (15) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter, during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the annual payment that the justice was receiving by way of salary.
  4. Whenever a justice of any of the courts who was engaged as a judge on or after January 1, 2009, shall die without having become eligible to retire either under § 8-3-7 or 8-3-8 and has served seven (7) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter, during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, one-third (1/3) of the annual salary that the justice was receiving at the time of his or her death.
  5. Whenever a justice of the courts who was engaged as a judge on or after January 1, 2009, shall die without having become eligible to retire either under § 8-3-7 or 8-3-8 and has not served seven (7) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter, during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, one-fourth (1/4) of the annual salary that the justice was receiving at the time of his or her death.
  6. In the event the deceased justice shall have no surviving spouse or domestic partner, or the surviving spouse or domestic partner should predecease their minor children, then the benefits conferred by this section shall be received in equal shares by the minor children, if any, until each shall attain the age of twenty-one (21) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 300, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 19, § 5; P.L. 1982, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 76, § 1; P. L. 1990, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 13; P.L. 2009, ch. 343, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 344, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 15.

8-3-12. Retirement of judges with general assembly or office service.

Any person, who has served as a member of the general assembly, as a general officer, and as a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, or the district court, whose combined service as a member of the general assembly, a justice, and a general officer is twenty (20) years or more and who has retired, resigned, and completed such service prior to January 1, 2014, shall, upon reaching the age of sixty-two (62) years, receive during life a sum equal to three-fourths (3/4) of the highest annual salary that the person was receiving during such service.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 19, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 408, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 38, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 41, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 38, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 41, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-3-13. Pension for surviving spouses or domestic partners of judges dying prior to May 10, 1974.

Whenever any justice of the superior court, having served as a justice for at least seven (7) years who died prior to May 10, 1974 during active service, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter, during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, an amount equal to one-third (1/3) of the annual payment that the justice was receiving by way of salary or retirement pay at the time of his or her death.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 1.

8-3-14. Applicability of §§ 8-3-12 — 8-3-14.

Sections 8-3-12 8-3-14 shall be applicable to all justices of the supreme court whose retirement, resignation, or death occurred subsequent to January 1, 1963, and prior to May 10, 1974, and the surviving spouses of such justices so long as they remain unmarried. Any surviving spouses of justices eligible for benefits pursuant to this section shall receive benefits hereunder from the time of application therefor, and until their death or remarriage, and such benefits shall not be paid for any time between the death or resignation of such justice and May 10, 1974.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 76, § 1.

8-3-15. Cost-of-living allowance.

  1. All justices of the supreme court, superior court, family court, or district court, or their surviving spouses or domestic partners, who retire after January 1, 1970, and who receive a retirement allowance pursuant to the provisions of this title shall, on the first day of January next following the third anniversary date of retirement, receive a cost-of-living retirement adjustment in addition to his or her retirement allowance in an amount equal to three percent (3%) of the original retirement allowance. In each succeeding year thereafter during the month of January, the retirement allowance shall be increased an additional three percent (3%) of the original allowance, not compounded, to be continued during the lifetime of the justice or his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner. For the purpose of such computation, credit shall be given for a full calendar year regardless of the effective date of the retirement allowance.
  2. Any justice who retired prior to January 31, 1977, shall be deemed for the purpose of this section to have retired on January 1, 1977.
  3. For justices not eligible to retire as of September 30, 2009, and not eligible upon passage of this article, and for their beneficiaries, the cost of living adjustment described in subsection (a) above shall only apply to the first thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) of retirement allowance, indexed annually, and shall commence upon the third (3rd) anniversary of the date of retirement or when the retiree reaches age sixty-five (65), whichever is later. The thirty-five thousand dollar ($35,000) limit shall increase annually by the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumer (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year or three percent (3%), whichever is less. The first thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), as indexed, of retirement allowance shall be multiplied by the percentage of increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year or three percent (3%), whichever is less, on the month following the anniversary date of each succeeding year. For justices eligible to retire as of September 30, 2009, or eligible upon passage of this article, and for their beneficiaries, the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not apply.
  4. This subsection (d) shall be effective for the period July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2015.
    1. Notwithstanding the prior paragraphs of this section, and subject to paragraph (d)(2) below, for all present and former justices, active and retired justices, and beneficiaries receiving any retirement, disability, or death allowance or benefit of any kind, whether provided for or on behalf of justices engaged on or prior to December 31, 1989, as a non-contributory justice or engaged after December 31, 1989, as a contributory justice, the annual benefit adjustment provided in any calendar year under this section shall be equal to (A) multiplied by (B) where (A) is equal to the percentage determined by subtracting five and one-half percent (5.5%) (the “subtrahend”) from the Five-Year Average Investment Return of the retirement system determined as of the last day of the plan year preceding the calendar year in which the adjustment is granted, said percentage not to exceed four percent (4%) and not to be less than zero percent (0%), and (B) is equal to the lesser of the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) of retirement allowance, such twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) amount to be indexed annually in the same percentage as determined under (d)(1)(A) above. The “Five-Year Average Investment Return” shall mean the average of the investment return of the most recent five (5) plan years as determined by the retirement board. Subject to paragraph (d)(2) below, the benefit adjustment provided by this paragraph shall commence upon the third (3rd) anniversary of the date of retirement or the date on which the retiree reaches his or her Social Security retirement age, whichever is later. In the event the retirement board adjusts the actuarially assumed rate of return for the system, either upward or downward, the subtrahend shall be adjusted either upward or downward in the same amount.
    2. Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3), the benefit adjustments under this section for any plan year shall be suspended in their entirety unless the Funded Ratio of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, the Judicial Retirement Benefits Trust, and the State Police Retirement Benefits Trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%) in which event the benefit adjustment will be reinstated for all justices for such plan year. In determining whether a funding level under this paragraph (d)(2) has been achieved, the actuary shall calculate the funding percentage after taking into account the reinstatement of any current or future benefit adjustment provided under this section.
    3. Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(2), in each fifth plan year commencing after June 30, 2012, commencing with the plan year ending June 30, 2017, and subsequently at intervals of five (5) plan years, a benefit adjustment shall be calculated and made in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) above until the Funded Ratio of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, the Judicial Retirement Benefits Trust, and the State Police Retirement Benefits Trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%).
    4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the provisions of this paragraph (d) of § 8-3-15 shall become effective July 1, 2012, and shall apply to any benefit adjustment not granted on or prior to June 30, 2012.
  5. This subsection (e) shall become effective July 1, 2015.
      1. As soon as administratively reasonable following the enactment into law of this subsection (e), a one-time benefit adjustment shall be provided to justices and/or beneficiaries of justices who retired on or before June 30, 2012, in the amount of two percent (2%) of the lesser of either the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) of the justice’s retirement allowance. This one-time benefit adjustment shall be provided without regard to the retiree’s age or number of years since retirement.
      2. Notwithstanding the prior subsections of this section, for all present and former justices, active and retired justices, and beneficiaries receiving any retirement, disability or death allowance or benefit of any kind, whether provided for or on behalf of justices engaged on or prior to December 31, 1989, as a non-contributory justice or engaged after December 31, 1989, as a contributory justice, the annual benefit adjustment provided in any calendar year under this section for adjustments on and after January 1, 2016, and subject to subsection (e)(2) below, shall be equal to (I) multiplied by (II):
        1. Shall equal the sum of fifty percent (50%) of (i) plus fifty percent (50%) of (ii) where:
          1. Is equal to the percentage determined by subtracting five and one-half percent (5.5%) (the “subtrahend”) from the five-year average investment return of the retirement system determined as of the last day of the plan year preceding the calendar year in which the adjustment is granted, said percentage not to exceed four percent (4%) and not to be less than zero percent (0%). The “five-year average investment return” shall mean the average of the investment returns of the most recent five (5) plan years as determined by the retirement board. In the event the retirement board adjusts the actuarially assumed rate of return for the system, either upward or downward, the subtrahend shall be adjusted either upward or downward in the same amount.
          2. Is equal to the lesser of three percent (3%) or the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year. In no event shall the sum of (i) plus (ii) exceed three and one-half percent (3.5%) or be less than zero percent (0%).
        2. Is equal to the lesser of either the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand eight hundred and fifty-five dollars ($25,855) of retirement allowance, such amount to be indexed annually in the same percentage as determined under subsection (e)(1)(B)(I) above. The benefit adjustments provided by this subsection (e)(1)(B) shall be provided to all retirees entitled to receive a benefit adjustment as of June 30, 2012, under the law then in effect, and for all other retirees the benefit adjustments shall commence upon the third anniversary of the date of retirement or the date on which the retiree reaches his or her Social Security retirement age, whichever is later.
    1. Except as provided in subsection (e)(3), the benefit adjustments under subsection (e)(1)(B) for any plan year shall be suspended in their entirety unless the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%) in which event the benefit adjustment will be reinstated for all justices for such plan year. In determining whether a funding level under this subsection (e)(2) has been achieved, the actuary shall calculate the funding percentage after taking into account the reinstatement of any current or future benefit adjustment provided under this section.
    2. Notwithstanding subsection (e)(2), in each fourth plan year commencing after June 30, 2012, commencing with the plan year ending June 30, 2016, and subsequently at intervals of four plan years: (i) A benefit adjustment shall be calculated and made in accordance with paragraph (e)(1)(B) above; and (ii) Effective for members and/or beneficiaries of members who retired on or before June 30, 2015, the dollar amount in subsection (e)(1)(B)(II) of twenty-five thousand eight hundred and fifty-five dollars ($25,855) shall be replaced with thirty-one thousand and twenty-six dollars ($31,026) until the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%).
      1. Effective for members and or beneficiaries of members who have retired on or before July 1, 2015, a one-time stipend of five hundred dollars ($500) shall be payable within sixty (60) days following the enactment of the legislation implementing this provision, and a second one-time stipend of five hundred dollars ($500) in the same month of the following year. These stipends shall be payable to all retired members or beneficiaries receiving a benefit as of the applicable payment date and shall not be considered cost of living adjustments under the prior provisions of this § 8-3-15 .

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 19, § 4; P.L. 1983, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 16, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 15; P.L. 2015, ch. 141, art. 21, § 22; P.L. 2016, ch. 511, art. 1, § 5.

8-3-16. Retirement contribution.

  1. Judges engaged after December 31, 1989, shall have deducted from total salary beginning December 31, 1989, and ending June 30, 2012, an amount equal to a rate percent of compensation as specified in § 36-10-1 relating to member contributions to the state retirement system. Effective July 1, 2012, all active judges, whether engaged before or after December 31, 1989, shall have deducted from compensation as defined in subsection 36-8-1(8) an amount equal to twelve percent (12%) of compensation, except active Supreme Court Judges as of June 30, 2012, who shall have deducted from compensation as defined in section 36-8-1(8) an amount equal to the percent of compensation in effect on June 30, 2012. Proceeds deposited shall be held in trust for the purpose of paying retirement benefits to participating judges or their beneficiaries on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld. The retirement board shall establish rules and regulations to govern the provisions of this section.
  2. The state is required to deduct and withhold member contributions and to transmit same to the retirement system and is hereby made liable for the contribution. In addition, any amount of employee contributions actually deducted and withheld shall be deemed to be a special fund in trust for the benefit of the member and shall be transmitted to the retirement system as set forth herein.
  3. A member of the judiciary who withdraws from service or ceases to be a member for any reason other than retirement, shall be paid on demand a refund consisting of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the judicial retirement benefits account. Any member receiving a refund shall thereby forfeit and relinquish all accrued rights as a member of the system together with credits for total service previously granted to the member; provided, however, that if any member who has received a refund shall subsequently reenter the service and again become a member of the system, he or she shall have the privilege of restoring all money previously received or disbursed to his or her credit as refund of contributions plus regular interest for the period from the date of refund to the date of restoration. Upon the repayment of the refund as herein provided, the member shall again receive credit for the amount of total service which he or she had previously forfeited by the acceptance of the refund.
  4. Whenever any judge dies from any cause before retirement and has no surviving spouse, domestic partner, or minor child(ren), a payment shall be made of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the judicial retirement benefits account. The payment of the accumulated contributions of the judge shall be made to such person as the judge shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the retirement board, or if the judge has filed no nomination, or if the person so nominated has died, then to the estate of the deceased judge.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 15, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 22, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 494, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 37; P.L. 2007, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 274, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 15; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

8-3-17. State contributions.

The state of Rhode Island shall make its contribution for the maintaining of the system established by § 8-3-16 and providing the annuities, benefits, and retirement allowances in accordance with the provisions of this chapter by annually appropriating an amount that will pay a rate percent of the compensation paid after December 31, 1989, to judges engaged after December 31, 1989. The rate percent shall be computed and certified in accordance with the procedures set forth in §§ 36-8-13 and 36-10-2 under rules and regulations promulgated by the retirement board pursuant to § 36-8-3 . The amounts that would have been contributed shall be deposited in a special fund and not used for any purpose on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 494, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 507, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 5, art. 10, § 4; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 10; P.L. 2010, ch. 9, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 10, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 15; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

8-3-18. Calculation of retirement benefits.

For purposes of the calculation of retirement benefits, in the event that any justice or judge of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, or the district court participates or acquiesces in a state shutdown or in a reduced salary or a salary deferral plan consistent with any such plan imposed upon or agreed to by other state employees, his or her annual salary shall be calculated as if he or she had not participated or acquiesced in any such shutdown or plan.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 129, § 4; P.L. 1991 ch. 174, § 4.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USCA § 1001 et seq.) by United States Supreme Court. 150 A.L.R. Fed. 441.

8-3-19. Domestic partner — Definition.

For purposes of this chapter, “domestic partner” shall be defined as a person who, prior to the decedent’s death, was in an exclusive, intimate and committed relationship with the decedent, and who certifies by affidavit that their relationship met the following qualifications:

  1. Both partners were at least eighteen (18) years of age and were mentally competent to contract;
  2. Neither partner was married to anyone else;
  3. Partners were not related by blood to a degree which would prohibit marriage in the state of Rhode Island;
  4. Partners resided together and had resided together for at least one year at the time of death; and
  5. Partners were financially interdependent as evidenced by at least two (2) of the following:
    1. Domestic partnership agreement or relationship contract;
    2. Joint mortgage or joint ownership of primary residence;
    3. Two (2) of: (A) joint ownership of motor vehicle; (B) joint checking account; (C) joint credit account; (D) joint lease; and/or
    4. The domestic partner had been designated as a beneficiary for the decedent’s will, retirement contract or life insurance.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 2.

8-3-20. Severability.

The holding of any section or sections or parts of this chapter to be void, ineffective, or unconstitutional for any cause shall not be deemed to affect any other section or part hereof.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 15.

Chapter 4 Clerks of Supreme and Superior Courts

8-4-1. Clerk of supreme court.

There shall be a clerk of the supreme court, with an office in Providence.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 48; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Clerk of supreme court:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-201 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 221, §§ 1, 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

General Assembly Members.

That the office of clerk of the supreme court is created by the general assembly does not subordinate the office to the general assembly so as to render incompatible the occupancy thereof by a member of the general assembly. McCabe v. Kane, 101 R.I. 119 , 221 A.2d 103, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 362 (1966).

8-4-2. Appointment and term of supreme court clerk.

In the month of April and every five (5) years thereafter, the chief justice of the supreme court with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint a clerk of the supreme court. The person so appointed shall hold office until the first day of May in the fifth year next after his or her appointment and until his or her successor is appointed and qualified.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 24, § 6; P.L. 1901, ch. 809, § 2; C.P.A. 1905, § 1086; G.L. 1909, ch. 30, § 6; P.L. 1914, ch. 1035, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 30, § 3; P.L. 1936 (s.s.), ch. 2442, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 489, § 3; P.L. 1956, ch. 3832, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-2 ; P.L. 2002, ch. 109, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 425, § 2.

Collateral References.

Removal of clerk, court’s power as to. 118 A.L.R. 171.

8-4-3. Vacancy in office of clerk.

In case of a vacancy in the office of the clerk of the supreme court from any cause, the chief justice shall appoint some person to fill such vacancy for the balance of the unexpired term and until his or her successor is appointed and qualified.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 30, § 3; P.L. 1936 (s.s.), ch. 2442, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 489, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-3 ; P.L. 2003, ch. 267, § 1.

8-4-3.1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 266, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 138, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-4-3.1 concerned the chief supervisory clerk of superior court.

8-4-4. Clerks of superior court.

There shall be a clerk of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol, and a clerk of the superior court for each of the counties of Newport, Washington, and Kent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 49; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 2; P.L. 1932, ch. 1856, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-4 .

Rules of Court.

When clerk’s office open, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77(c).

Comparative Legislation.

Superior court clerks:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-51v et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 221, § 3 et seq.

8-4-4.1. Retirement of superior court clerks as clerks emeritus.

Any clerk of the superior court serving on or after May 16, 1984 and who retires from the position of clerk under the state retirement system after having served not less than nine (9) years in the position shall, upon such retirement, be deemed to be clerk emeritus of the superior court, shall retain the authority and power of a clerk of the superior court, including but not limited to the authority and power to join persons in marriage in any city or town in this state, and shall be available, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, for assignment for active duty as clerk of the superior court without additional compensation therefor by the presiding judge thereof.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 435, § 1.

8-4-5. Appointment, terms, and salaries of superior court clerks.

In the month of May, 1971, and in the month of January in 1976 and in every fifth year thereafter, the presiding justice of the superior court, with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint a clerk of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol, and a clerk of the superior court for each of the counties of Newport, Washington, and Kent. The persons so appointed shall hold office until the first day of February in the fifth year next after their appointment and until their successors are appointed and qualified. They shall be entitled to the same longevity salary increases as though they were in the classified service.

History of Section. P.L. 1911, ch. 720, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 30, § 6; P.L. 1932, ch. 1856, § 1; P.L. 1936 (s.s.), ch. 2441, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 489, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-5 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 250, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 209, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 205, art. IX, § 4; P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 1.

Cross References.

Administrative clerk of superior court, § 8-2-11 .

Exemption from jury service, § 9-9-3 .

Exemption from militia duty, § 30-1-7 .

Salaries in lieu of fees, § 36-6-6 .

Unclassified service, clerks and assistants in, § 36-4-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appointment and Confirmation.

There is a distinction between a confirmation of an appointment and the appointment itself. Confirmation is a separate and distinct function that makes the appointment of a qualified candidate valid and final, vesting entitlement to the office for the entire statutory term in that appointed person. However, confirmation is not needed to make a valid appointment, thereby creating a vacancy. Seemann v. Kinch, 606 A.2d 1308, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 1992).

Appointment and Qualification.

An incumbent holds the position for five years and thereafter may continue as a holdover until a successor is both appointed and qualified. Appointing is the executive function of naming a party to the position and is performed by the Governor according to statute. The process of qualification consists of the appointee’s taking the oath of office and posting a bond for the position before entering office. Seemann v. Kinch, 606 A.2d 1308, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 1992).

Collateral References.

Removal of clerk, court’s power as to. 118 A.L.R. 171.

8-4-6. Vacancies in office of superior court clerk.

In case of a vacancy in the office of clerk of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol, or in the office of clerk of the superior court of either of the counties of Newport, Washington, or Kent, from any cause, the presiding justice of the superior court with the advice and consent of the senate shall appoint some person to fill such vacancy for the balance of the unexpired term and until his or her successor is appointed and qualified.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 30, § 6; P.L. 1936 (s.s.), ch. 2441, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 489, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-6 ; P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The legislature evidently intended the words “for the balance of the unexpired term” to limit the authority of the governor to fill a vacancy in the office of the clerk of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol resulting from the death of an incumbent who had been duly appointed or elected to a definite term, and not for the purpose of limiting the time for which such appointee would serve, the word “unexpired” controlling the situation, it preceding in the context the word “term” so as to modify it and not the word “balance.” Casey v. Willey, 89 R.I. 87 , 151 A.2d 369, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1959).

Authority of Governor.

Although the office of the clerk of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol is clearly of that class to which the governor’s constitutional authority relates, he is precluded from making an appointment where the deceased clerk was a holdover, such power being vested in the presiding justice under § 8-4-12 . Casey v. Willey, 89 R.I. 87 , 151 A.2d 369, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1959).

8-4-7. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 50; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-7 ; Repealed by P.L. 1980, ch. 96, § 1. For present law see § 42-20-9 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-4-7 concerned bonds of clerks.

8-4-8. General duties of clerks.

The superior court clerks shall constantly attend the sittings of their respective courts, shall keep the seal, books, and papers thereof, shall collect and receive all fines and costs in criminal cases, and all court fees in civil cases and shall account therefor as required by law, shall make fair entries and records of all the proceedings, judgments, orders, and decrees therein either in writing or by means of an electronic storage system or other data compilation system, shall furnish stationery to be allowed by the court for the use of the court, and shall do and perform all other things which by law or the rules of the court shall appertain to their office.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 51; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-8 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 202, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Duties of superior court clerks, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77.

For rule relating to entry of judgments by superior court clerks, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 58.

For rule relating to minute entries on papers by superior court clerks, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 3.2.

For rule relating to superior court clerk as registrar of the court, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 67(b).

Records of superior court clerks, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 79.

Cross References.

Bond of clerk, § 42-8-5 .

Drafting of instruments by clerks, § 11-27-11 .

Fees turned over to general treasurer, § 36-6-7 .

Information furnished to parole board, § 13-8-22 .

Oaths, power to administer, § 36-2-2 .

Solemnization of marriages, § 15-3-5 .

Subpoena of witnesses, § 9-17-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Matter Required to Be Recorded.

The clerks of the court are required to record proceedings of the court only when the action undertaken by the court therein judicially determines some right or obligation of a party, but the mandate of the statute does not extend to any act of the court other than those involved in an exercise of judicial function. It leaves to the discretion of the clerk the extent to which a record will be made of those actions of the court which do not constitute an exercise of judicial function but are undertaken for administrative purposes. Ambrosino v. Casey, 92 R.I. 114 , 166 A.2d 888, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1961).

Nature of Office.

That the general assembly prescribed certain obligations ministerial in nature to be performed by the clerk does not subordinate the office to the general assembly so as to render incompatible the occupancy thereof by a member of the general assembly. McCabe v. Kane, 101 R.I. 119 , 221 A.2d 103, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 362 (1966).

Collateral References.

Assistance, right of clerk of court to issue writ of. 21 A.L.R. 358.

Civil service laws as applicable to court clerks. 14 A.L.R. 637.

Incompatibility of office of clerk of court and office in military service. 26 A.L.R. 144, 132 A.L.R. 254, 147 A.L.R. 1419, 148 A.L.R. 1399, 150 A.L.R 1444.

Records, discretion of clerk as to permitting examination or use of, by abstracter or insurer of title. 80 A.L.R. 773.

8-4-9. Duty to recite pleadings in record of judgment.

The superior court clerks shall, in the record of every judgment, recite the substance of the pleadings in the cause, except that the court may by general rule, general order, or special order direct in what manner and to what extent, if any, the pleadings in any or all causes which are entered in either of the courts shall be extended upon the records; and whenever, by accident, neglect, or otherwise, except by order of the court, any clerk shall have failed to record the proceedings of the court of which he or she is clerk, in any cause pending before it, the court may direct the acting clerk to record the proceedings, upon such evidence as may be satisfactory to it, giving notice to the parties interested, or their attorneys, whenever from the circumstances of the case the court may deem proper.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 52; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 5; P.L. 1922, ch. 2168, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-9 .

Rules of Court.

For books and records to be kept by clerk, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 79.

For rule specifying matters of record which are not for publication, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 3.3.

8-4-10. Indexing of judgment records.

The superior court clerks shall make or cause to be made two (2) indexes to every current book and electronic storage system or other data compilation system of records of judgments in their offices, one, an alphabetical index of the names of all the plaintiffs, complainants, or petitioners, giving also the names of the defendants or respondents, in each case; and the other, an alphabetical index of the names of all the defendants or respondents, giving also the names of the plaintiffs, complainants, or petitioners, in each case.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 53; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-10 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 203, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Index of civil judgments, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 79(c).

8-4-11. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 54; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-11 ; Repealed by P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 20.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-4-11 concerned report of divorce proceedings to director of health.

8-4-12. Appointment of clerk pro tempore.

In case of the death, resignation, absence, inability, or refusal to serve of any of the superior court clerks, the chief justice, or the presiding justice of the court in which the vacancy, or inability, or refusal to serve occurs, may appoint a clerk pro tempore, who shall hold his or her office until the clerk shall have returned or the inability shall have been removed or another clerk shall have been appointed to fill the vacancy and shall have qualified.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 55; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Filling Vacancy.

This section, and not § 8-4-6 , governs in the filling of a vacancy caused by the death of a clerk who was holding over. Casey v. Willey, 89 R.I. 87 , 151 A.2d 369, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1959).

Temporary Clerk.

Governor is precluded from making an temporary appointment of clerk under Const., art. 7, § 5 since the legislature, by this section, gives such power to the presiding justice. Casey v. Willey, 89 R.I. 87 , 151 A.2d 369, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1959).

8-4-13. Qualification and compensation of clerk pro tempore.

The clerk appointed pursuant to § 8-4-12 shall be sworn and give bond before he or she enters upon the duties of his or her office and shall, during his or her term of service, be entitled to the compensation of the office.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 56; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-13 .

8-4-14. Appointment of deputies.

The clerk of the supreme court, with the approval of the Chief Justice, may appoint one or more deputy clerks, who, being sworn, may discharge all the duties of the clerk appointing them.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 57; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-14 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 266, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 311, § 1.

Collateral References.

Liability of clerk of court, county clerk or prothonotary, or surety on bond, for negligent or wrongful acts of deputies or assistants. 71 A.L.R.2d 1140.

Liability of clerk of court or his bond, for the defaults and misfeasance of his assistants or deputies. 1 A.L.R. 234, 102 A.L.R. 174, 116 A.L.R. 1064.

Liability of clerk of court or surety on bond for negligent or wrongful acts of deputies or assistants. 71 A.L.R.2d 1140.

8-4-15. Removal of deputies — Compensation — Liability for misconduct or neglect.

Each deputy clerk shall be removable at the pleasure of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and the supreme court clerk appointing him or her shall fix the amount of his or her compensation within the amount appropriated therefor and shall be liable for his misconduct or neglect of duty.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 58; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-15 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 266, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 311, § 1.

8-4-16. Assistant supreme court clerks.

The clerk of the supreme court shall appoint, with the approval of the court, not more than two (2) assistant clerks, who shall hold office until removed by the clerk or the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 59; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-16 .

Collateral References.

Liability of clerk of court or surety on bond for negligent or wrongful acts of deputies or assistants. 71 A.L.R.2d 1140.

8-4-17. Appointment of assistant superior court clerks — Employment of clerical assistance by the presiding justice.

  1. The presiding justice shall appoint as many assistant clerks as may be necessary, who shall hold office until removed by the presiding justice.
  2. The presiding justice is hereby authorized and empowered to employ such clerical assistance in addition to assistant clerks as may be required in the clerk’s office in copying, recording, indexing, and attending upon the files of the court, and the general assembly shall annually appropriate such sum as it may deem necessary for this purpose; and the state controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer in payment for such assistance, upon proper vouchers approved and certified by the presiding justice or his or her designee.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 60; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 13; P.L. 1909, ch. 406, § 1; P.L. 1918, ch. 1639, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1850, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2165, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 13; P.L. 1925, ch. 621, § 1; P.L. 1927, ch. 994, § 1; P.L. 1928, ch. 1178, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1543, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 13; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-17 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 266, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 311, § 1.

8-4-18. Powers of assistants in Providence and Bristol counties.

Each of the assistant clerks for the counties of Providence and Bristol shall aid his principal in the discharge of his duties and any act done by him or her, under direction of the clerk, in the line of duty of the clerk, shall have the same force and effect as though done by the clerk; he or she shall have authority to administer oaths to parties, witnesses, and others as required in the conduct of the proceedings of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 61; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 14; P.L. 1930, ch. 1544, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-18 .

8-4-19. Employment of clerical assistants in Kent, Washington, and Newport counties.

The clerks of the superior courts within the counties of Kent, Washington, and Newport may employ such clerical assistance in their respective offices as they may deem necessary, and the general assembly shall annually appropriate such sum as it may deem necessary for this purpose; and the state controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of the sum, or so much thereof as may from time to time be required, upon receipt by him or her of proper vouchers approved by the clerk of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 62; P.L. 1908, ch. 1546, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, §§ 15, 17, 18; P.L. 1915, ch. 1196, § 1; P.L. 1916, ch. 1390, § 1; P.L. 1919, ch. 1731, § 1; P.L. 1919, ch. 1786, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1918, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1934, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, §§ 15, 17, 18; P.L. 1930, ch. 1546, § 1; P.L. 1931, ch. 1708, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 15; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-19 .

8-4-20. Custody of files and records.

The files and records of the supreme court shall be in the custody of the clerk of the supreme court. The files and records now in the offices of the clerks of the superior court in the counties of Providence, Newport, Washington, and Kent, which were transferred to the offices from the appellate division and the common pleas division of the supreme court in those counties, shall be and remain, respectively, in the custody of the clerks of the superior court in each of those counties. The files and records in the office of the clerk of the superior court in Providence, including all books, papers, and records of the office and all other public property, which were transferred from the office of the assistant clerk of the superior court in Bristol to the office in Providence, shall there remain in the custody of the clerk.

History of Section. P.L. 1906, ch. 1327, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 276, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 326, § 16; P.L. 1932, ch. 1856, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 499, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 8-4-20 .

Rules of Court.

For rule providing removal of inactive cases from files of superior court, see Super. Ct. Prac. Rule 3.6.

For rule relating to docketing of cases in superior court, see Super. Ct. Prac. Rule 3.1.

For rule relating to docketing of cases in the supreme court, see Sup. Ct. Rules, Article I, Rule 12.

For rule relating to withdrawal of evidence in superior court proceedings after disposition of case, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 43(i).

For rule requiring flat filing in superior court, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 3.7.

8-4-21. General assistant clerks.

The presiding justice of the superior court shall appoint four (4) general assistant clerks, who shall hold office until removed by the presiding justice. Each of the general assistant clerks may be designated by the presiding justice for service in assisting any of the clerks of the superior court for the several counties throughout the state. When so designated, that general assistant clerk shall aid the clerk of the county or counties where he or she shall be so designated and any act done by him or her, under direction of the clerk of the county, in the line of duty of the clerk, shall have the same force and effect as though done by the clerk; each general assistant clerk shall have the authority in any county to administer oaths to parties, witnesses, and others, as required in the conduct of the proceedings of the court. The general assistant clerks may be advanced to the rank of deputy clerk by appointment of the presiding justice of the superior court and may in their capacities as deputy clerks be designated by the presiding justice for service in assisting any of the clerks of the superior court for the several counties throughout the state and may discharge all of the duties which could be performed by the clerk of the superior court for any county.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 159, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 266, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 311, § 1.

Chapter 4.1 Court Clerks’ Incentive Pay

8-4.1-1. Incentive pay plan.

There is hereby established an incentive pay program in accordance with the provisions of this chapter offering financial compensation to clerks of the supreme, superior, family, and district courts and administrators of the workers’ compensation court for furthering their education in the field of court administration or law enforcement. This incentive program shall apply to clerks who hold this position on July 5, 1994, and shall not apply to any person hired as a clerk after July 5, 1994.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 125, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect.

The court clerks’ incentive pay statute did not create contract rights nor give rise to property interests protected by the takings clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.Perry v. Rhode Island, 975 F. Supp. 418, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11156 (D.R.I. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Rhode Island Laborers' Dist. Council, Local Union 808 v. Rhode Island, 145 F.3d 42, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10902 (1st Cir. 1998).

The court clerks’ incentive pay statute did not create contractual rights or otherwise promise that incentive pay would never be reduced or eliminated. Rhode Island Laborers' Dist. Council, Local Union 808 v. Rhode Island, 145 F.3d 42, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10902 (1st Cir. 1998).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of unmistakability doctrine. 16 A.L.R.7th 1 (2016).

8-4.1-2. Eligibility for plan.

  1. Any full time clerk of the supreme, superior, family, or district court or administrators of the workers’ compensation court shall be eligible for the plan established by this chapter provided he or she:
    1. Has, on or before July 5, 1994, acquired the requisite degree as set forth in § 8-4.1-3 ; or
    2. Has, on or before July 5, 1994, accumulated at least fifty percent (50%) of the credits necessary to receive either degree as set forth in § 8-4.1-3 and thereafter receives that degree; or
    3. Is, on July 5, 1994, enrolled in a degree program, completion of which will entitle him or her to either degree as set forth in § 8-4.1-3, and thereafter receives that degree.
  2. The clerk, within thirty (30) days after July 5, 1994, must submit to the court administrator a certified copy of a transcript from a college or university as evidence of such credits. Provided, however, notwithstanding any general or public law to the contrary, incentive payments shall not be continued to any person in the future when the person no longer holds a clerk position as set forth in this section. Additionally, no clerk hired after July 5, 1994, shall be eligible to receive incentive payments under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 125, 1.

8-4.1-3. Incentive steps.

Advancement to each of the incentive salary steps shall be based on the following accomplishments in either administration of justice or law enforcement, or a baccalaureate degree acceptable for admission to a law school accredited by the council of Legal Education of the American Bar Association.

Incentive Increase Above Degree Steps Basic Salary Required 1 $2,000 Associate Degree 2 $3,200 Baccalaureate Degree

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History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 125, § 1.

8-4.1-4. Eligible education.

No credit shall be granted for any degree other than in the major concentration of court administration or law enforcement or a baccalaureate degree acceptable for admission to a law school accredited by the council of Legal Education of the American Bar Association.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 549, § 1.

8-4.1-5. Appropriation.

The state of Rhode Island shall bear the expense of incentive payments. The general assembly shall annually appropriate such sums as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter; and the controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of such sum or so much thereof as may be required from time to time upon receipt by him or her of duly authenticated vouchers.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 205, § 1.

8-4.1-6. Additional credit for masters degree.

Any other provision of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, every full time clerk of the supreme, superior, family, or district court who earns the degree of master in public administration shall be paid, in addition to basic salary and any other credit to which he or she is entitled hereunder, the additional sum of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) each year.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 409, § 1.

8-4.1-7. Effective date.

Sections 8-4.1-1 8-4.1-3 shall not take effect for any existing court clerks or administrators presently receiving an incentive pay under this chapter until the expiration of any collective bargaining agreement in existence on July 5, 1994. However, upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement which is in effect at the time of July 5, 1994, §§ 8-4.1-1 8-4.1-3 shall apply to all existing clerks receiving an incentive under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 125, § 2.

Chapter 5 Court Secretaries, Court Reporters, and Electronic Court Reporters

8-5-1. Supreme court secretary and assistant.

The supreme court may appoint a secretary and an assistant secretary, each of whom shall hold office during its pleasure and shall perform such duties as may be required by the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 69; G.L. 1909, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1894, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 328, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 503, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-5-1 ; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 6; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 6, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

8-5-2. Superior court secretary and assistants.

The justices of the superior court, or a majority of them, may appoint a secretary of the court and five (5) assistant secretaries, who shall hold office during the pleasure of the court and shall perform such duties as may be required by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 556, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 328, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 503, § 2; P.L. 1952, ch. 3030, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 8-5-2 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 217, § 1.

Cross References.

Appointees in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

8-5-3. Appointment of superior court reporters and electronic court reporters.

  1. The justices of the superior court, or a majority of them, shall appoint competent shorthand writers or stenotypists, known as court reporters, for regular service in the superior court, and one or more such persons for occasional service therein in the absence of other appointees, who shall be known as court reporters. They shall serve during the pleasure of the court and where designated by the presiding justice; provided, that when any justice of the court has retired from active service, and with his or her own consent on request of the presiding justice of the court is assigned to perform service as an associate justice of the court, one of the court reporters or electronic court reporters defined in subsection (b), appointed for occasional service shall, during the time any such justice is so assigned and performing service, be appointed for regular service in the court, and when performing such regular service, shall receive the same compensation authorized to be paid to court reporters or electronic court reporters appointed for regular service.
  2. The presiding justice shall have sole discretion to employ and assign persons to record court proceedings by electronic means as in his or her judgment may be necessary for the conduct of the business of the superior court. Such persons employed and assigned by the presiding justice shall be known as electronic court reporters.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 70; P.L. 1907, ch. 1420, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 278, § 2; P.L. 1913, ch. 907, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2162, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 328, § 3; P.L. 1929, ch. 1401, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1541, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 503, § 3; P.L. 1946, ch. 1668, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-5-3 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 2.

8-5-4. Court reporters and electronic court reporters — Supplies and preservation of notes and other materials.

All books, papers, recording media, and supplies necessary for use by court reporters and electronic court reporters shall be furnished by the state, and the notebooks used and notes and recordings taken by them shall be the property of the state and be deposited with the clerk of the court in Providence county; provided, the clerk shall not be required to preserve the notebooks and notes and recordings beyond the period of fifteen (15) years.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 70; P.L. 1907, ch. 1420, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 278, § 2; P.L. 1913, ch. 907, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2162, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 328, § 3; P.L. 1929, ch. 1401, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1541, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 503, § 3; P.L. 1946, ch. 1668, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-5-4 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 2.

Cross References.

Travel expenses of stenographic clerks, § 36-6-9 .

8-5-4.1. Freelance court reporters and electronic court reporters.

  1. All stenographic notes of freelance court reporters or recordings and notes of freelance electronic court reporters pertaining to all proceedings which have been completely transcribed may be destroyed after seven (7) years, unless otherwise ordered by any court.
  2. Stenographic notes of freelance court reporters and recordings and notes of freelance electronic court reporters, pertaining to all proceedings which have not been transcribed or which have been partially transcribed, may be destroyed after ten (10) years unless otherwise ordered by any court.
  3. Provided, however, depositions taken under the federal rules of civil procedure shall not be destroyed at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 2.

8-5-5. Reports of superior, family and district court and traffic tribunal.

Court reporters shall report stenographically or electronic court reporters or similar recording personnel shall report electronically the proceedings in the trial of every action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in the superior court, family court, district court and traffic tribunal. Each court reporter or electronic court reporter or similar recording personnel shall also, upon the order of any justice of the court, transcribe or otherwise reproduce his or her report to be filed with the papers in the case. He or she shall also make a transcript of or otherwise reproduce the whole or any part of the report upon the written request, filed with the clerk, by either party to the action or proceeding, and when completed and within the time limited by the court for filing the transcript, shall immediately deliver the transcript to the party ordering it, or to the attorney of record of the party, and in the case of transcription by court reporters for such service shall be paid a reasonable compensation, not less than five dollars ($5.00) and not exceeding three dollars ($3.00) per page for originals and one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per page for copies thereof, to be allowed by the court; and, in case the transcript is used in subsequent proceedings in the cause, the cost of the transcript may be allowed as a part of the costs. In the case of electronic court recordings the person making the recordings or another person so designated by the court may be requested or ordered, in lieu of making a transcript, to reproduce the recording and certify its authenticity, and in such case each party requesting the reproduction shall pay to the court the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) per cassette.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 71; G.L. 1909, ch. 278, § 3; P.L. 1909, ch. 421, § 1; P.L. 1916, ch. 1402, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1895, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2041, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2086, § 5; P.L. 1922, ch. 2164, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 328, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 503, § 4; P.L. 1956, ch. 3763, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-5-5 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 1, § 3; P.L. 1972, ch. 29, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 320, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 4; P.L. 1999, ch. 473, § 2.

Rules of Court.

For rule relating to deposit of sum to cover cost of transcription, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 78.

For rule relating to preparation and delivery of transcripts and supervision of the stenographic force, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 3.5.

Cross References.

Stenographic transcripts as evidence of testimony, § 9-19-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Allowance of Cost of Transcript.

Superior court had jurisdiction to allow cost of transcript as part of plaintiff ’s costs where such transcript was certified and transmitted to clerk of supreme court with plaintiff ’s bill of exceptions, even though plaintiff withdrew exceptions before hearing by supreme court. New York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. Superior Court, 39 R.I. 560 , 99 A. 582, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1917).

Amendment of Transcript.

Party has right to rely on presumption that stenographer will properly perform her official duties and where stenographic record was incomplete through no fault of the party supreme court allowed the transcript to be amended. Butler Auto Sales v. Skog, 98 R.I. 63 , 199 A.2d 597, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1964).

Bench Conferences.

Although it is within the discretion of the trial justice to allow or not to allow counsel to raise such material matters as evidentiary objections or objections to the judge’s jury instructions at bench conferences, when convenience and efficiency are served thereby, such conferences may be allowed and should be recorded. State v. D'Alo, 435 A.2d 317, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1334 (R.I. 1981).

When a bench conference involves resolution of such nonmaterial matters as housekeeping problems with exhibits or difficulties with witness availability or other rather inconsequential procedural questions, stenographic recording is clearly unnecessary. State v. D'Alo, 435 A.2d 317, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1334 (R.I. 1981).

Extension of Time for Filing Transcript.

Validity of extension of time for filing of transcript ordered by justice prior to lapse of 40-day period formerly provided for was not affected by the fact that the order was subsequently lost. Hart Wood & Lumber Co. v. Sea View R. Co., 29 R.I. 530 , 72 A. 1104, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1909).

The court at the time of filing of notice of intention to file a bill of exceptions could in its discretion extend the 40-day period formerly provided for filing of transcript if circumstances indicated that the transcript could not be completed within 40-day period. Hart Wood & Lumber Co. v. Sea View R. Co., 29 R.I. 530 , 72 A. 1104, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1909).

Necessity of Transcript.

The stenographer is not so essentially a part of the court machinery that a party desiring to take an appeal and unable, through no fault of his own to obtain a transcript loses his right, and the stenographer’s transcript is not the only method of showing what took place at the trial. McSherry v. Peckham, 50 R.I. 473 , 149 A. 380, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1930).

Not Required to File Transcript.

The stenographer is not required to file the transcript but only to deliver it to the requesting party. Horton v. Amoral, 32 R.I. 10 , 78 A. 265, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1910).

Presence of Reporter During Trial.

Where a jury is given additional instructions without the reporter present or the record otherwise preserved, there is reversible error. Macchia v. Ducharme, 44 R.I. 418 , 117 A. 651, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1922).

Use of Transcript in Subsequent Proceedings.

Where transcript of testimony was filed with clerk of superior court with bill of exceptions, duly allowed and certified, and transmitted to clerk of supreme court, in accordance with statutory method of bringing case before supreme court on exceptions, such transcript was used in subsequent proceedings in said cause within the meaning of this section. New York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. Superior Court, 39 R.I. 560 , 99 A. 582, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1917).

Collateral References.

Failure or refusal of state court judge to have record made of bench conference with counsel in criminal proceeding. 31 A.L.R.5th 704.

8-5-6. Appointing court reporter and electronic court reporter for grand jury proceedings.

Whenever the attorney-general shall make request in writing to the presiding justice of the superior court, he or she shall designate a court reporter or electronic court reporter or similar recording personnel to attend such sittings of any grand jury as the attorney-general may designate and to report stenographically in the case of the court reporter or electronically in the case of an electronic court reporter or similar recording personnel the testimony given before the grand jury, and it shall be lawful for the court reporter or electronic court reporter or similar recording personnel to attend such sittings for such purpose; provided, that the court reporter or electronic court reporter or similar recording personnel shall not be present during the deliberations of the grand jury or other proceedings, except during the taking of testimony. The court reporter or electronic court reporter or similar recording personnel shall, in all cases, before entering upon such duties, be first sworn by the clerk of the court to secrecy. He or she shall transcribe such testimony as the attorney-general may direct, and all such transcripts or recordings shall be delivered forthwith to the attorney-general.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 70; P.L. 1907, ch. 1420, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 278, § 2; P.L. 1913, ch. 907, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2162, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 328, § 3; P.L. 1929, ch. 1401, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1541, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 503, § 3; P.L. 1946, ch. 1668, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-5-6 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The presence of an officially appointed court stenographer, serving within the conditions imposed by the statute which authorizes the use of the stenographer appointed by court under certain circumstances to report stenographically the testimony given before grand jury and to be present only during the taking thereof would not deprive an accused of any rights guaranteed under either the state or federal constitutions. State v. Edwards, 89 R.I. 378 , 153 A.2d 153, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1959).

8-5-7. Appropriations for court reporters and electronic court reporters.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate such sum as it may deem necessary to compensate the stenographers, court reporters, and electronic court reporters and similar recording personnel for their services; and the state controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his or her order upon the general treasurer for the payment of that sum, or so much thereof as may be necessary for that purpose, upon vouchers approved by the clerk of the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 71; G.L. 1909, ch. 278, § 3; P.L. 1909, ch. 421, § 1; P.L. 1916, ch. 1402, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1895, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2041, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2086, § 5; P.L. 1922, ch. 2164, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 328, § 4; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 503, § 4; P.L. 1956, ch. 3763, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-5-7 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 2.

8-5-8. Sign language interpreters/transliterators and Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART) providers for deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind persons.

  1. In all civil and criminal cases, in workers’ compensation, district, family, and superior court proceedings, mental health court competency hearings, state traffic tribunals, and in any case in any municipal court, including, but not limited to, on-site, court-provided, alternative dispute resolution, mediation, arbitration, diversion/intervention program or treatment; and in an administrative, commission, or agency hearing; pursuant to chapter 18 of this title, where a party or a witness is a person who is deaf, hard of hearing, or deaf-blind, or a juvenile whose parent or parents are deaf, hard of hearing, or deaf-blind is brought before a court for any reason, he or she shall have the proceedings accessible to him or her in a language that he or she can understand by a sign language interpreter/transliterator or CART provider appointed by the court. In any case where a sign language interpreter/transliterator or CART provider is required to be appointed by the court under this section, the court shall not commence proceedings until the appointed sign language interpreter/transliterator or CART provider is in court in a position not exceeding ten feet (10´) from, and in full view of the person who is deaf, hard of hearing, or deaf-blind. The sign language interpreter/transliterator or CART provider appointed under the terms of the section shall be required to take an oath that he or she will make a legally equivalent, linguistically true interpretation, transliteration, or transcription for the person who is deaf, hard of hearing, or deaf-blind of all the proceedings or hearings of the case or claim in a language that he or she understands; and will orally transfer the meaning of the answer to questions and any other statements of the person who is deaf, hard of hearing, or deaf-blind to counsel, the court, and jury in the English language with exactitude, while accurately reflecting the form and content of the linguistic and paralinguistic elements of the speaker’s discourse.

    Assistive listening devices, or other reasonable and effective auxiliary aids available, shall be provided for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind who need to maximize their engagement in the proceedings or hearings in addition to the interpreter/transliterator and/or CART providers.

  2. For the purposes of this section, “sign language interpreter/transliterator” means a person who is a certified interpreter as defined in § 5-71-3 in providing the interpreting and transliterating services for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind. “CART provider” means a person who is a qualified communication access realtime translation (CART) service provider certified by the National Court Reporters Association. “Paralinguistic elements” means a non-verbal element of language, including all of the pauses, hedges, self-corrections, hesitations, and emotion as they are conveyed through tone of voice, word choice, level of formality, tone of voice, and intonation. “Assistive listening device (ALD) or assistive listening system (ALS)” means instruments that are designed to improve a person’s ability to hear in specific listening situations. Some ALDs amplify a sound signal, but the primary purpose of an ALD is to make the targeted sound easier to hear by isolating the sound source from surrounding noise. Examples are induction loop systems, frequency-modulated (FM) systems, infrared systems, and personal amplifiers. A sign language interpreter/transliterator, or CART provider shall be deemed qualified in accordance with United States Department of Justice regulations effectuating Title II of the federal “Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,” as from time to time may be amended, Pub. L. 101-336, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., including regulations, analysis, and technical assistance and as determined by the definition of chapter 71 of title 5 and the commission on the deaf and hard of hearing, based upon recommendations from the National Association of the Deaf, the National Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, the National Hearing Loss Association of America, and other appropriate agencies. The commission on the deaf and hard of hearing shall coordinate all requests for qualified sign language interpreters/transliterators and CART providers and shall maintain a list of all such sign language interpreters/transliterators and CART providers from which it shall fill such requests. No sign language interpreter/transliterator or CART provider is precluded from being further examined by the court system.
  3. Sign language interpreters/transliterators and CART providers appointed under the terms of the section shall be paid by the state or municipality a reasonable compensation fixed by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1968, ch. 269, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 96, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 235, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 5; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 5; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 16; P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 71 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on December 31, 2014.

Rules of Court.

Interpreters, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 28.

8-5-8.1. Waiver of interpreter/transliterator and CART provider.

  1. A non-English speaking person may at any point in the proceeding waive the right to the services of an interpreter/transliterator or a CART provider, but only when: (1) The waiver is approved by the appointing authority after explaining on the record to the non-English speaking person through an interpreter/transliterator or a CART provider the nature and effect of the waiver; (2) The appointing authority determines on the record that the waiver has been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and (3) The non-English speaking person has been afforded the opportunity to consult with his or her attorney.
  2. At any point in any proceeding or hearing, for good cause shown, a non-English speaking person may retract his or her waiver and request an interpreter/transliterator or a CART provider.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 3, provides that the enactment of this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 3, provides that the enactment of this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

8-5-8.2. Privileged communications.

In the trial of every cause, both civil and criminal, no interpreter/transliterator for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind shall be competent to testify concerning any statement made to him or her in connection with the interpreter’s or transliterator’s interpretation or transliteration for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind, without the consent of the person making the statement. No duly licensed interpreter/transliterator for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind shall be allowed, in giving testimony to disclose any confidential communication, properly entrusted to him or her in his or her professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable him or her to discharge the functions of his or her office in the usual course of practice or discipline, without the consent of the person making the communication.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 3, provides that the enactment of this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 3, provides that the enactment of this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

8-5-8.3. Visual recording of testimony.

At the request of any party to the proceeding or the hearing or on the appointing authority’s initiative, the appointing authority may order that the testimony of the person who is deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind and the interpretation/transliteration of the proceeding by the qualified interpreter/transliterator be visually recorded for use in verification of the official transcript of the proceeding or hearing.

In any judicial proceeding involving a capital offense, the appointing authority may order that the testimony of the person who is deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind and the interpretation/transliteration of the proceeding or the hearing by the qualified interpreter/transliterator be visually recorded for use in verification of the official transcript of the proceeding or the hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 179, § 3, provides that the enactment of this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 218, § 3, provides that the enactment of this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2014.

8-5-9. Right to stenographic record.

  1. Where not already provided by law, any party to any legal action shall have the right to have a stenographer present provided that the party bears the expense of the stenographer, his or her transcription, and any other expenses incidental thereto. For purposes of this section the term “legal action” shall include all formal proceedings before any court or quasijudicial authority, all administrative hearings described in § 42-35-9 , all zoning hearings, all district court trials, and all workers’ compensation formal proceedings.
  2. It shall be the duty of the party desiring the services of a stenographer to secure the presence of the stenographer, and there shall be no right to a continuance because of the unavailability of a stenographer.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to permit stenographers to attend grand jury proceedings as a matter of right.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 382, § 1.

Chapter 6 General Powers of Supreme and Superior Courts

8-6-1. Judgments, decrees, and orders — Writs and process — Punishment of contempt.

The supreme and superior courts shall have power to enter such judgments, decrees, and orders, and to frame and issue such citations, executions, and other writs and processes, as may be necessary or proper to carry into full effect all the powers and jurisdiction which are or shall be conferred upon them respectively by the constitution or by law. They shall have power to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, all contempts of their authority.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 33; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 8-6-1 .

Rules of Court.

Notice of orders or judgments, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77(d).

Criminal contempt, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 42.

Cross References.

Powers of this section conferred on family courts, § 8-10-38 .

Comparative Legislation.

Writs and process:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 211, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The supreme court may use extraordinary writs in their accepted forms when adapted to the purpose sought, or it may adapt them or modify them, or it may frame new writs and processes as expressly provided. Hyde v. Superior Court, 28 R.I. 204 , 66 A. 292, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1907).

Contempt.

An award of counsel fees to make an innocent party whole is within the discretion of the court finding contempt, and need not be accompanied by an award for compensatory damages as it is independent of other possible sanctions. E.M.B. Assocs. v. Sugarman, 118 R.I. 105 , 372 A.2d 508, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1977).

In a suit filed by a town seeking to enjoin excavation ordinance violations by a limited liability company (LLC) and the LLC’s member, the member was properly held in contempt because the member not only admitted to five separate violations of previous orders, but also agreed that the trial court could institute any penalty found proper, including incarceration, so, by submitting to this order, the member consented to the contempt finding and waived the member’s right to appeal. Town of Coventry v. Baird Props., LLC, 13 A.3d 614, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 156 (R.I. 2011).

— Criminal.

The family court has the power to initiate criminal contempt proceedings for a repeated refusal by any individual, adult or juvenile, to follow an order of the court. In re Price, 645 A.2d 488, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 229 (R.I. 1994).

— Labor Disputes.

In contempt proceeding against union leaders and members for violating an injunction, members could not be adjudged in contempt without being given individual notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard. Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers' Guild AFT 951, 117 R.I. 121 , 363 A.2d 1349, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1607 (1976); School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 117 R.I. 203 , 365 A.2d 499, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1613 (1976).

It is no defense to a subsequent contempt proceeding that a court erred in issuing a preliminary injunction and that therefore compliance was unnecessary. Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers' Guild AFT 951, 117 R.I. 121 , 363 A.2d 1349, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1607 (1976).

In contempt proceeding, mass defiance of labor injunction by union members created inference that union leaders were responsible for the noncompliance. Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers' Guild AFT 951, 117 R.I. 121 , 363 A.2d 1349, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1607 (1976).

Post-injunction news conference restatement by union leaders of “no contract, no work” principle was evidence of concerted activity by the leadership to continue strike in violation of the injunction. School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 117 R.I. 203 , 365 A.2d 499, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1613 (1976).

Family Law.

If it is the duty of the superior court to ascertain the “estate” of the husband in divorce proceedings, then it is within the power of that court to place its hand by means of injunctions and receivers upon that “estate” which lies within its jurisdiction and to prevent its dissipation and diversion to places beyond the jurisdiction, until such time as it can ascertain what the “estate” is and so be enabled to fix the amount of alimony. Warren v. Warren, 36 R.I. 167 , 89 A. 651, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1914).

Where family court had entered interlocutory decree and awarded custody of daughter to husband, it also had authority to enter order finding husband, who traveled to Israel with daughter without notifying wife or court and without attempting to comply with decree provision to effect that parties attempt to arrange reasonable visitation rights, in deliberate contempt of decree and to enjoin and restrain the husband from presenting any final decree of divorce for entry in court until he purged himself of contempt by immediately returning daughter to the state and jurisdiction of court. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 109 R.I. 428 , 286 A.2d 589, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1205 (1972).

Family court properly enjoined husband from proceeding with Maryland divorce suit where the Rhode Island court had obtained personal jurisdiction over him prior to his establishment of foreign domicile and his institution of the foreign action and where the injunction was warranted to prevent multiplicity of suits, conflicting decisions and confusion and to ensure enforcement of existing Rhode Island child support orders. Brown v. Brown, 120 R.I. 340 , 387 A.2d 1051, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 673 (1978).

Garnishments.

This section permits the Family Court to frame and issue such “executions and other writs and processes, as may be necessary or proper to carry into full effect all the powers and jurisdiction” that had been vested in that court by constitution or statute, and garnishment of income from a defaulting obligor of support payments is such a process available to the Family Court under this section. Bowen v. Bowen, 675 A.2d 412, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 146 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Contempt: state court’s power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court’s order — anticipatory contempt. 81 A.L.R.4th 1008.

Profane or obscene language by party, witness, or observer during trial proceedings as basis for contempt citation. 29 A.L.R.5th 702.

8-6-2. Rules of practice and procedure.

  1. The supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court and the workers’ compensation court, by a majority of their members, shall have the power to make rules for regulating practice, procedure, and business therein. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall have the power to make rules for regulating practice, procedure and business in the traffic tribunal. The rules of the superior, family, district court, workers’ compensation court and the traffic tribunal shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court. Such rules, when effective, shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith.
  2. In prescribing such rules, the court shall have regard to the simplification of the system of pleading, practice, and procedure in the courts in which the rules shall apply in order to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits; provided, however, that each respective court shall not in the rules of procedure require a party to a civil action to produce either by discovery, motion, to produce or interrogatory an income tax return, W-2 statement, or copies thereof. The rules presently in effect in the courts of the judicial system shall remain and continue in force and effect until revised, amended, repealed, or superseded by rules adopted in accordance with this section.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 34; G.L. 1909, ch. 274, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 324, § 7; P.L. 1930, ch. 1613, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 7; P.L. 1940, ch. 943, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-6-2 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 2; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 2; P.L. 1971, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 222, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 8; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 29, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 44, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 29, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 44, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Reversal of Fortunato: Textualism Un-Dunn in State v. Dunn , see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 253 (1998).

Matthew D. Provencher, Essay: Burying Evidence’s Dead Hand, 24 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 317 (2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Family Court.

Although there was a rule-making power conferred on the family court by this section, such rules became effective only after approval of the supreme court, which had never approved a $10.00 entry fee for all divorce cases filed, and the duties of the administrator of the family court did not include such a rule-making power. Berberian v. O'Neil, 111 R.I. 354 , 302 A.2d 301, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1210 (1973).

Force and Effect of Rules.

A rule of court, if promulgated under the proper exercise of judicial power to make rules of practice and procedure within that court, is given the same force and effect as a statute. Letendre v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 74 R.I. 276 , 60 A.2d 471, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 74 (1948).

Purpose of Rules.

The evident intent of the legislature was to confer upon the courts power to facilitate progress in the conduct of litigation by the making and promulgating of rules for regulating practice and conducting business. Smith v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 28 R.I. 91 , 65 A. 610, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1906).

Rule Changes.

Superior court properly denied a contractor’s motion to compel, inter alia, the production of all materials and documents developed and considered by a subcontractor’s testifying expert in formulating his written opinions because Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) was confined by its very terms to expert witness discovery through interrogatories or deposition, any change to the rule had to come from the superior court in accordance with this section, and Rhode Island had twice rejected the language in the federal rule requiring disclosure of “the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions.” Cashman Equip. Corp. v. Cardi Corp., 139 A.3d 379, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2016).

Sanctions.

A purchaser of shares in a corporation was entitled to condition his election to purchase upon the selling shareholder’s rightful ownership of the shares, subject to the risk that if his position challenging that ownership turned out to be a frivolous one or one taken in bad faith he would be subject to sanctions. DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc., 755 A.2d 757, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 159 (R.I. 2000).

Superior Court Rules.

The superior court may, from time to time, make and promulgate rules for regulating practice and conducting business therein, in matters not expressly provided for by law, such as the rule of verification of petition and service of notice upon opposite party. Cole v. Davis Auto. Co., 33 R.I. 143 , 80 A. 268, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 112 (1911).

Rule making power of superior court conferred by this section is confined to regulating the pleading, practice and procedure therein. Therefore rule which required notice to adversary of all pleadings, motions “and other paper” could not be construed to extend to a written claim for a jury trial. Dyer v. Keefe, 97 R.I. 418 , 198 A.2d 159, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1964).

Tax Records.

Though, because of this section, no court can promulgate a rule of practice which requires a party to produce income tax returns, a court is not without power to order a party to do so; this section only makes certain that a trial justice will never be able to rely casually on a potential court rule that mandates the production of income tax returns whenever requested. De Biasio v. Gervais Elecs. Corp., 459 A.2d 941, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 908 (R.I. 1983).

Timely Filing.

Under this section the ten-day period for service of a paper provided by Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 59(b) prevails over the seven-day period for filing provided by 9-23-1 (since repealed) and a motion for new trial filed and served more than seven but less than ten days after the entry of judgment was timely. Gilbert v. Girard, 108 R.I. 120 , 272 A.2d 691, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1231 (1971).

Traffic Tribunal.

District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal of a decision of the appeals panel of the Traffic Tribunal; although the General Assembly provided that the chief magistrate can enact rules to regulate the practice, procedure, and business within that tribunal, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-6-2 and 8-8.2-1 , the Traffic Tribunal cannot use its rules to expand its own jurisdiction, and the magistrate does not have the authority to promulgate a rule that expands the jurisdiction of the District Court because that is a right that is solely within the province of the General Assembly. State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 2009).

Collateral References.

Pleading, practice, or procedure, power of court to prescribe rules of. 158 A.L.R. 705, 110 A.L.R. 22.

Violation of court rule by trial court as ground for reversal of new trial. 23 A.L.R. 52.

8-6-3. Filing and publication of rules.

All rules shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state and shall be effective upon filing unless with respect to any rule the court adopting the rule shall specify a later date as the effective date thereof, in which case the rule shall be effective upon the date so specified. With each publication of the public laws as required by § 43-2-7 , the secretary of state shall include all rules adopted since the last prior publication thereof.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 497, § 7; P.L. 1940, ch. 943, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-6-3 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 150, § 15.

8-6-4. Rules of criminal procedure.

The rules of criminal procedure of the superior court and the district court, which are to go into effect on September 1, 1972, shall govern practice and procedure in criminal proceedings in those courts and before justices of the peace and bail commissioners and shall remain and continue in force and effect until revised, amended, repealed, or superseded by rules adopted in accordance with the authority granted to those courts.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 3.

8-6-5. Arbitration of civil actions.

The presiding justice of the superior court may promulgate rules and regulations providing for compulsory and/or noncompulsory nonbinding arbitration of such category or categories of civil actions filed in, or appealed to, the superior court as he or she shall determine. The matter shall be heard by a single arbitrator who shall be selected by mutual agreement of the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s). If, after thirty (30) days, the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) are unable to agree upon the selection of an arbitrator, a justice of the superior court shall select the arbitrator upon request in writing from either party. The costs of arbitration shall be borne by the Rhode Island state court system and a reasonable cost of the arbitration, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) per case, may be assessed and apportioned to each of the parties by the superior court pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the presiding justice of the superior court consistent with § 8-6-6 . The assessed costs received from the parties shall be deposited into the general fund. Any party dissatisfied with the decision of the arbitrator may demand a trial by jury if one was timely claimed in the complaint or answer, or a trial by judge if no jury trial was claimed. The decision of the arbitrator shall not be admissible at the trial. The court may require a party who rejects an arbitrator’s award and demands a trial to post a three hundred dollar ($300) filing fee and pay a technology surcharge in accordance with § 8-15-11 . The filing fee shall be posted with the superior court arbitration office and deposited into an arbitration fund restricted-receipt account established under the control of the state court director of finance. The arbitration funds shall not be subject to the indirect cost recoveries provisions set forth in § 35-4-27 . If more than one party rejects the arbitrator’s award and demands a trial, the filing fee, first received in the arbitration office, shall designate the party rejecting the award. Should the verdict at trial be more favorable to the party than the arbitrator’s award, the filing fee shall be reimbursed to that party. Should the verdict be equal to, or less favorable to, the party than the arbitrator’s award, the filing fee posted shall be forfeited as a sanction. If forfeited as a sanction, the fee shall remain available for program expenses from the arbitration fund restricted-receipt account. The presiding justice of the superior court shall be authorized to retain the services of qualified arbitrators and to direct payment for such services and other related expenses from the arbitration fund restricted-receipt account and may appoint an administrator of the arbitration program for a ten-year (10) term and until a successor is appointed and qualified.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 522, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 429, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 365, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 188, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 70, art. 35, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 119, § 4; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 10, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 293, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 402, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 293, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 402, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-6-6. Filing and publication of rules and regulations.

Upon the approval of the supreme court, all rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to § 8-6-5 shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state and shall be effective upon filing unless with respect to any such rule or regulation the presiding justice of the superior court shall specify a later date as the effective date thereof, in which case the rule or regulation shall be effective upon the date so specified. With each publication of the public laws as required by § 43-2-7 , the secretary of state shall include all such rules and regulations adopted since the last prior publication thereof.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 522, § 1.

Chapter 7 Sessions of Supreme and Superior Courts

8-7-1. Supreme court sessions.

The supreme court shall be in session at Providence from the first Monday in October in each year to the second Monday in July in the succeeding year and at such other times as the court shall deem proper, with a recess from the third Monday in February to the first Monday in March; provided, that the court may hold sessions at other places within the state whenever it may deem advisable.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 37; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Supreme court sessions:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-200.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 213, § 4 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Motions.

The practice of the supreme court in permitting motions to be made returnable on the first Monday of October and to hear other matters which have been assigned to that day is not a formal determination that this was the first day of the session but might have been justified under the provision authorizing sessions at such other times as deemed proper. Frey v. Rhode Island Co., 37 R.I. 96 , 91 A. 1, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1914).

8-7-2. Sessions of superior court.

The superior court shall be in session every year as follows:

  1. At Providence, for the counties of Providence and Bristol, on a continuous basis; provided, that the presiding justice shall determine the duration of the various court calendars;
  2. Within and for the county of Newport, for a period of not less than thirty-six (36) weeks during the court year;
  3. Within and for the county of Kent, for a period of not less than thirty-six (36) weeks during the court year;
  4. Within and for the county of Washington, for a period of not less than thirty-six (36) weeks during the court year;
  5. At such other times and places as the presiding justice shall fix and determine; provided, that the superior court held within and for the counties of Providence and Bristol shall from time to time make up lists of causes to be tried at Woonsocket and shall sit at Woonsocket for a term of not less than twelve (12) weeks during the court year; and provided, further, that any trial in any of the counties commenced within any regular or special session may be continued thereafter with the consent of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 38; P.L. 1907, ch. 1441, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 2; P.L. 1931, ch. 1775, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 704, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3498, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3729, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-2 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 51; P.L. 1971, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 255, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 429, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Court always open for filing of papers, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77(a).

For hours of court, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 1.3.

Matters heard in vacation, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 1.4.

Cross References.

Continuance of criminal jury trial to conclusion, §§ 12-17-5 , 12-17-13 .

Comparative Legislation.

Superior court sessions:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-180 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 213, § 4 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Providence and Bristol Counties.

Under this section, Providence and Bristol counties are treated as one unit so that a grand jury inquiring into crimes in Providence county could properly issue an indictment although the jury contained inhabitants of Bristol county. State v. Pryharski, 83 R.I. 274 , 115 A.2d 529, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1955); State v. Edwards, 89 R.I. 378 , 153 A.2d 153, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1959).

Collateral References.

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

8-7-3. Superior court motion days.

The superior court shall be in session for the purpose of hearing motions in the various counties during the calendar year at such times and places as the presiding justice shall fix and determine.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 40; P.L. 1907, ch. 1441, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 4; P.L. 1931, ch. 1775, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 4; P.L. 1956, ch. 3729, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-3 ; R.P.L. 1957, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 3; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 51.

Rules of Court.

For rules relating to motions, motion days, and motion practice in superior court, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rules 2.4 — 2.9.

Cross References.

Motion days in superior court, §§ 8-11-1 , 8-11-2 .

8-7-4 — 8-7-6. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, §§ 41 — 43; P.L. 1907, ch. 1441, §§ 3, 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, §§ 5 — 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, §§ 5 — 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, §§ 5 — 7; P.L. 1956, ch. 3729, § 2; G.L. 1956, §§ 8-7-4 — 8-7-6; P.L. 1959, ch. 172, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 52.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 8-7-4 — 8-7-6 concerned relocation of sessions of certain superior courts and assignment of causes to special trial lists.

8-7-7. Adjournment in absence of quorum or presiding justice.

In the absence of a quorum of the supreme court, the justices in attendance may adjourn. In case of the absence of any justice of the superior court from any trial pending before him or her, any other justice of the court may adjourn the trial.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 44; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-7 .

8-7-8. Adjournment of superior court by clerk.

Whenever, at any time appointed for the sitting of the superior court, no justice thereof shall be in attendance, the clerk may adjourn the court from day to day until otherwise ordered by a justice of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 45; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-8 .

8-7-9. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 39; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 3; P.L. 1956, ch. 3729, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-9 ; Repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 255, § 1. For related provisions see §§ 8-7-2 , 8-7-3 and 8-7-10 , Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77, Super. Ct. R. Cr. P. Rule 56.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-7-9 concerned superior court vacation.

8-7-10. Superior court always open for business.

The superior court shall be always open for the transaction of all business; but no business shall be transacted on Sunday or on a legal holiday, unless the court shall deem it necessary, with the exception of the twenty-second day of February (as Washington’s birthday) and the fourth day of May (as Rhode Island Independence Day).

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 46; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-10 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 4, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Superior court always open, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77(a).

Court always open, Super. Ct. R. Cr. P. Rule 56.

Court open Washington’s Birthday and Rhode Island Independence Day, Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 87.

8-7-11. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 47; P.L. 1908, ch. 1533, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 275, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 325, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 498, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 704, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-7-11 ; P.L. 1967, ch. 92, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 255, § 1. For present law see RP 1.4.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-7-11 concerned powers of superior court in vacation.

Chapter 8 District Court

8-8-1. District Court established — Chief and associate justices.

There is established a district court for the state of Rhode Island which shall consist of a chief judge and thirteen (13) associate judges. The district court shall be a court of record and shall have a seal with such words and devices as it shall adopt.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 5; P.L. 2015, ch. 141, art. 15, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter, also relating to district courts, was repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4, except for former § 8-8-31 , which was repealed by P.L. 1966, ch. 17, § 3.

Former §§ 8-8-1 through 8-8-23 were based on C.P.A. 1905, §§ 113 to 122, 124 to 127, 136, 138, 139, 144, 148, 517; P.L. 1906, ch. 1313, § 1; P.L. 1906, ch. 1335, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1909, ch. 338, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 280, §§ 1 to 16, 19, 21, 28, 30, 31, 36, 40; impl. am. P.L. 1913, ch. 1012, § 4; P.L. 1922, ch. 2215, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 330, §§ 1 to 16, 19, 28, 30, 35, 36, 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 349, § 21; P.L. 1929, ch. 1325, § 1; P.L. 1929, ch. 1331, § 10; P.L. 1931, ch. 1690, § 1; P.L. 1931, ch. 1732, § 1; P.L. 1932, ch. 1918, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2253, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 500, §§ 1 to 16, 19, 28 to 30, 35, 39; P.L. 1938, ch. 514, § 14; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1956, §§ 8-8-1 to 8-8-23 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 1, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 84, § 6; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 4; P.L. 1967, ch. 12, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 13, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 196, § 1.

Former §§ 8-8-24 through 8-8-30 were based on C.P.A. 1905, §§ 122, 140 to 143, 145, 147; G.L. 1909, ch. 280, §§ 10, 32 to 35, 37, 39; G.L., ch. 280, § 41; P.L. 1914, ch. 1054, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 330, §§ 10, 32 to 35, 37, 39, 41; P.L. 1932, ch. 1918, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 500, §§ 10, 31 to 34, 36, 38, 40; G.L. 1956, §§ 8-8-24 to 8-8-30 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 16, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 17, § 1.

Former § 8-8-31 was based on P.L. 1906, ch. 1335, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 280, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 330, § 17; P.L. 1925, ch. 603, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 500, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 8-8-31 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 161, § 1; P.L. 1964, ch. 191, § 1.

Former §§ 8-8-32 through 8-8-46 were based on C.P.A. 1905, §§ 128 to 135, 146; P.L. 1906, ch. 1320, § 1; P.L. 1906, ch. 1335, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 280, §§ 18, 20 to 27, 38; G.L. 1909, ch. 363, § 8; P.L. 1913, ch. 930, § 1; P.L. 1918, ch. 1620, § 1; P.L. 1919, ch. 1761, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1885, § 1; G.L., ch. 280, § 42, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2061, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2224, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 330, §§ 18, 20 to 27, 38, 42; G.L. 1923, ch. 416, § 6; P.L. 1925, ch. 576, § 1; P.L. 1925, ch. 603, § 1; P.L. 1925, ch. 634, § 1; P.L. 1927, ch. 980, § 1; P.L. 1927, ch. 1000, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1521, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1562, § 1; P.L. 1931, ch. 1690, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; P.L. 1935, ch. 2253, §§ 2, 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 500, §§ 18, 20 to 27, 37, 41, 42; impl. am. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L., ch. 500, § 43, as enacted by P.L. 1952, ch. 3030, § 3; G.L. 1956, §§ 8-8-32 to 8-8-44; R.P.L. 1957, ch. 87, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 29, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 161, § 2; P.L. 1964, ch. 191, § 2; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 4; G.L., §§ 8-8-45, 8-8-46, as enacted by P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 5; P.L. 1966, ch. 17, § 32.

Cross References.

Presiding judge of superior court, duties with respect to district courts, § 8-2-4 et seq.

8-8-1.1. Veterans’ treatment calendar.

  1. Findings and declarations.  The general assembly finds and declares as follows:
    1. Veterans and active military, Reserve, and National Guard service members have provided, or are currently providing, an invaluable service to our country. In doing so, many return and suffer from mental health injuries, including, but not limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, acute stress, and other injuries that may affect brain function and may also suffer drug and alcohol dependency or co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse problems.
    2. The call back to active duty status rate of Rhode Island’s National Guard is the second highest in the entire United States with over ten thousand (10,000) unit deployments.
    3. The number of veterans living in Rhode Island who have served in the Gulf Wars is three (3) times higher than the national per-capita average and is expected to grow as troops continue to withdraw from Afghanistan.
    4. While the vast majority of returning military do not have contact with the justice system and are well adjusted, contributing members of society, there exists a growing number of defendants appearing in the district court who have served in the United States armed forces and are involved in the criminal justice system as a result of the above-referenced diagnoses.
    5. As a grateful state, we must continue to honor the service of these participants by providing them an alternative to incarceration when feasible, permitting them instead to obtain proper treatment for mental health and substance abuse problems that have resulted from military service through a jail diversion program/treatment program that recognizes their special set of circumstances while at the same time providing accountability for their wrong doing and providing for the safety of the public.
  2. Declaration of policy.  It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Rhode Island to successfully rehabilitate participants by providing the tools and skills necessary to address their unique challenges and to develop the insight to reintegrate successfully into society and maintain a productive and law-abiding lifestyle within the community.
  3. Establishment.  To accomplish this purpose in an effort to direct defendants who have served in the United States armed forces into a court program that integrates support and treatment plans with the judicial process that will result in potential jail diversion, possible reduction of charges, or alternatives in sentencing, there shall be established a separate calendar within the jurisdiction of the district court for hearing, trial and disposition of certain offenses.
  4. Veterans’ treatment calendar.  The chief judge of the district court shall create a veterans’ treatment calendar in the district court and shall assign personnel to the extent warranted to exclusively hear and decide all criminal actions involving offenses committed by defendants accepted into the program, and the calendar shall be referred to as the “veterans’ treatment court.”
  5. Use of section.  Under no circumstances shall the defendant(s) be permitted to use this section as a basis for a dismissal of an action, as this section is enacted for the benefit and convenience of the district court.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 141, art. 15, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Brendan Horan, Comment: The Ball Is in Whose Court? Rhode Island's Need for an Integrated Domestic Violence Court, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 738 (2021).

8-8-2. Divisions.

  1. For the distribution of court business, the state is divided into four (4) divisions as follows:
    1. Second division. The second division consists of the city of Newport and the towns of Jamestown, Little Compton, Middletown, Portsmouth, and Tiverton. Appeals and transfers in cases arising in the enumerated cities and towns of the second division shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Second Division District Court to the clerk of the Newport County Superior Court.
    2. Third division. The third division consists of the city of Warwick and the city of Cranston and the towns of Coventry, East Greenwich, Foster, Glocester, Johnston, Lincoln, North Kingstown, North Providence, North Smithfield, Scituate, Smithfield, West Greenwich and West Warwick. Appeals and transfers in cases arising in the enumerated cities and towns of the third division shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Third Division District Court to the clerk of the Kent County Superior Court.
    3. Fourth division. The fourth division consists of the towns of Charlestown, Exeter, Hopkinton, Narragansett, New Shoreham, Richmond, South Kingstown, and Westerly. Appeals and transfers in cases arising in the enumerated cities and towns of the fourth division shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Fourth Division District Court to the clerk of the Washington County Superior Court.
    4. Sixth division. The sixth division consists of the cities of Central Falls, East Providence, Providence, Pawtucket, Woonsocket and the towns of Barrington, Bristol, Burrillville, Cumberland and Warren. Appeals and transfers in cases arising in the enumerated cities and towns of the sixth division shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Sixth Division District Court to the clerk of the Providence County Superior Court.
  2. In each division the place or places for holding court shall be designated by the chief judge.
  3. The district court shall have a seal for each of its divisions, which shall contain the words, “District court of the State of Rhode Island, division.”

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1975, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 80, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 85, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 3, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 3, effective June 23, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 3, and P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Presiding judge of superior court, duties with respect to district courts, § 8-2-4 et seq.

8-8-3. Jurisdiction.

  1. The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of:
    1. All civil actions at law, but not causes in equity or those following the course of equity except as provided in § 8-8-3.1 and chapter 8.1 of this title, wherein the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000);
    2. All actions between landlords and tenants pursuant to chapter 18 of title 34 and all other actions for possession of premises and estates notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (c) of this section;
    3. All actions of replevin where the goods and chattels to be replevied are of the value of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less;
    4. All violations of minimum housing standards whether established by chapter 24.3 of title 45 or by any municipal ordinance, rule, or regulation passed pursuant to the authority granted either by chapter 24.2 of title 45 or by special act of the general assembly governing minimum housing standards; except that in the event the city of Providence or town of North Providence shall by ordinance create a court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction over violations of minimum housing standards, Providence Municipal Zoning Code and the Rhode Island State Building Code, chapter 27.3 of title 23, concerning properties which are not owned by the state, upon enactment of the ordinance, that court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of violations of the above listed codes and standards as defined herein occurring within the city of Providence or the town of North Providence, and the district court shall be without jurisdiction over those actions;
    5. All suits and complaints for offenses against the bylaws, ordinances, and regulations of cities and towns whether passed by the cities or towns or under the law by the properly constituted authorities thereof;
    6. All other actions, proceedings, and matters of whatever nature which are or shall be declared to be within the jurisdiction of the court by the laws of the state.
  2. The district court shall also have any special jurisdiction which is or may be conferred by charter or law upon justices of the peace if no special court exists or is created by charter or law for that purpose.
  3. The district court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the superior court of all civil actions at law wherein the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) and does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000); provided, however, that in any such action, any one or more defendants may in the answer to the complaint demand removal of the action to the superior court, in which event the action shall proceed as if it had been filed originally in the superior court.
  4. The district court shall have special jurisdiction to grant relief as set forth under § 15-15-4(b)(1) .

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1977, ch. 277, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 215, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 150, § 16; P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 200, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 547, § 7; P.L. 1987, ch. 447, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 240, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 285, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 214, § 2.

Cross References.

Criminal jurisdiction, §§ 12-3-1 , 12-3-2 .

Disqualification of town sergeant or constable from serving process, § 45-16-11 .

Division of motor vehicles, appeals, §§ 31-2-17 , 31-2-19 , 31-3.1-36 , 31-11-15 , 31-31-2 , 39-14-18 .

Exemption from jury service, § 9-9-3 .

Exemption from militia duty, § 30-1-7 .

Judges in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

Oaths, power to administer, § 36-2-2 .

Offenses triable by district court, § 12-3-1 .

Small claims cases, jurisdiction, § 10-16-2 .

Subpoena of witnesses, § 9-17-2 .

Traffic offenses, appeals of, §§ 31-41.1-8 , 31-41.1-9 .

Vagrants, jurisdiction to sentence, § 11-45-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeals.

District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal of a decision of the appeals panel of the Traffic Tribunal; although the General Assembly provided that the chief magistrate can enact rules to regulate the practice, procedure, and business within that tribunal, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-6-2 and 8-8.2-1 , the Traffic Tribunal cannot use its rules to expand its own jurisdiction, and the magistrate does not have the authority to promulgate a rule that expands the jurisdiction of the District Court because that is a right that is solely within the province of the General Assembly. State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 2009).

District Court Sitting as Housing Court.

The district court’s jurisdictional limitation of $10,000 does not preclude the court, while sitting as a housing court, from entering a contempt sanction of $245,700. Providence v. Kalian, 542 A.2d 250, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 1988).

Illustrative Examples.

The superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a suit contesting the authority of the tax administrator from collecting fees under the fuel-decal fee statute, § 31-36.1-3(a) ; the appropriate route for challenging the actions of the tax administrator is delineated in chapter 35 of title 42, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the appropriate forum for judicial review of a decision by the tax administrator lies in the district court. Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n v. State, 541 A.2d 69, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 1988).

District court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a city’s suit for a preliminary injunction barring homeless persons from camping on city land, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-3(a)(2) or (5), because (1) the parties had no consensual landlord-tenant relationship, and “other actions for possession of premises and estates” in R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-3(a)(2) meant suits between landlords and tenants, given the definition of “premises” in R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-18-11(12) , and (2) the city did not try to enforce an ordinance. City of Providence v. Doe, 21 A.3d 315, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 82 (R.I. 2011).

Scope of Relief.

The legislature, by vesting the district court with exclusive jurisdiction over tax matters, has implied that the district court is empowered to administer full relief in tax disputes, including adjudication of challenges to the constitutionality of tax statutes and claims for equitable relief. Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n v. State, 541 A.2d 69, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 1988).

Tax Matters.

Superior court properly dismissed a taxpayer’s complaint because the general assembly conferred upon the district court exclusive jurisdiction over “tax matters,” in addition to the authority to adjudicate all claims for relief attached to the underlying matter. Barone v. State, 93 A.3d 938, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2014).

Tenements Let.

District courts have jurisdiction over actions for possession of tenements or estates let, and tenements held at will or by sufferance, whether arising from estates let or otherwise. O'Conner v. O'Brien, 18 R.I. 529 , 28 A. 765, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1894).

After careful consideration of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-8-3(a)(2) and 34-18-9 , the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the superior court hearing justice properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was satisfied that the acts and failings to act alleged in the complaint at issue fell within the statutory criteria and that the hearing justice properly ruled that the complaint should have been originally filed in the district court. Marzett v. Letendre, 246 A.3d 388, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2021).

Test of Jurisdiction.

The debt or damages laid in the writ is the test of jurisdiction, rather than the actual value of the matter in controversy. Ryder v. Brennan, 28 R.I. 538 , 68 A. 477, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1908); State Loan Co. v. Barry, 71 R.I. 188 , 43 A.2d 161, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1945).

Trespass and Ejectment.

An action of trespass and ejectment should be certified to the superior court for jury trial upon claim by either party on entry day. Durfee v. District Court of First Judicial Dist., 44 R.I. 462 , 119 A. 60, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1922).

An action of trespass and ejectment was within the original jurisdiction of the district court as the damages claimed did not exceed the statutory amount. Wattman v. Kelley, 45 R.I. 381 , 123 A. 88, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1924).

An action of trespass and ejectment to try title was properly brought in the district court. Coates v. Coleman, 72 R.I. 304 , 51 A.2d 530 (1947).

— Jurisdiction.

To give jurisdiction to a district court in an action of ejectment, it is necessary to show defendant is or was a tenant of the property, and if tenant has not attorned to the plaintiff and thereby estopped himself from disputing his landlord’s title, the plaintiff must at least prove his title or other right to possession. Rhode Island Marine Transp. Co. v. Interstate Nav. Co., 52 R.I. 143 , 158 A. 370, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1932).

The district court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment actions. Oaks v. District Court of Rhode Island, 631 F. Supp. 538, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27371 (D.R.I. 1986).

— Speedy Trial.

Actions of trespass and ejectment must be tried with the utmost dispatch consistent with the rights of the parties. Rhode Island Marine Transp. Co. v. Interstate Nav. Co., 52 R.I. 143 , 158 A. 370, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1932).

Collateral References.

Civil actions removable from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1443. 159 A.L.R. Fed. 377.

Court’s power to remove judges. 118 A.L.R. 171.

Defective title to office of judge, prosecuting attorney or other officer participating in petitioner’s trial or confinement as ground for habeas corpus. 158 A.L.R. 529.

Right of party, in course of litigation, to challenge title or authority of judge or of person acting as judge. 144 A.L.R. 1207.

8-8-3.1. Equitable powers as to housing matters.

  1. In addition to the powers heretofore exercised, the district court and any court created by municipal ordinance pursuant to § 8-8-3(a)(4) is hereby empowered, in furtherance of its jurisdiction under § 8-8-3(a)(4) , to grant such orders, including temporary restraining orders, and preliminary and permanent injunctions as justice and equity may require.
  2. Any court created by municipal ordinance pursuant to § 8-8-3(a)(4) is hereby empowered in furtherance of its jurisdiction to order a building into receivership pursuant to the provisions of chapter 44 of title 34 (“abandoned property”).

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 277, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 461, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 474, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 461, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 474, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

District Court Sitting as Housing Court.

The district court’s jurisdictional limitation of $10,000 did not preclude the court, while sitting as a housing court, from entering a contempt sanction of $245,700. Providence v. Kalian, 542 A.2d 250, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 1988).

Review of Superior Court Executions.

Although the legislature, by its enactment of this section and chapter 8.1 of title 8, endowed the District Court with equitable powers to handle controversies concerning housing matters and domestic assaults, the legislature did not endow the District Court with the subject-matter jurisdiction that would enable a District Court judge to sit and review executions issued by the Superior Court. Borelli v. Conklin Limestone Co., 569 A.2d 8, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 28 (R.I. 1990).

8-8-3.2. Record and appeal of housing matters.

  1. An electronic record shall be made of the proceedings in the trial or hearing of every action in the district court under the provisions of § 8-8-3(a)(4) . If ordered by the judge trying or hearing the matter a typewritten transcription of the record shall be made and shall be filed with the papers of the case. The transcript shall be completed and filed within the time allowed by the court. A copy of the transcript shall be delivered forthwith to the attorneys of record and for the typing of the transcript a reasonable fee shall be allowed by the court. In the event the typewritten transcription is used in subsequent proceedings the cost of obtaining the transcript shall be allowed as part of the cost of the case.
  2. Any party aggrieved by a final judgment, decree, or order of the district court under § 8-8-3(a)(4) may, within twenty (20) days after entry of judgment, petition the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a writ of certiorari to review any errors involved. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall set forth the errors claimed. Upon the filing of such a petition with the clerk of the supreme court, the supreme court may, if it sees fit, issue its writ of certiorari to the district court to certify to the supreme court the record of the proceedings in the case together with any transcript of the proceedings furnished by the petitioner at his or her expense.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 277, § 2; P.L. 1978, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 134, § 1.

Cross References.

Appeal from board to district court, § 45-24.2-6 .

8-8-3.3. Equitable powers in residential landlord and tenant matters.

In addition to the powers heretofore exercised, the district court is hereby empowered, in furtherance of its jurisdiction under § 8-8-3(a)(2) , to grant such orders, including temporary restraining orders, and preliminary and permanent injunctions as justice and equity may require.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 200, § 5.

8-8-4. Habeas corpus.

The district court may issue writs of habeas corpus to bring before it any person in jail for trial in any civil or criminal case pending in the court, or to bring in any such person to be examined as a witness in a suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending in the court, that the ends of justice may be attained, and for no other purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

Cross References.

Clerks and assistants in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

Habeas corpus generally, § 10-9-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Removal of clerks, court’s power as to. 118 A.L.R. 171.

8-8-5. Contempt of court.

The district court may punish any contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

District Court Sitting as Housing Court.

The district court’s jurisdictional limitation of $10,000 did not preclude the court, while sitting as a housing court, from entering a contempt sanction of $245,700. Providence v. Kalian, 542 A.2d 250, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 1988).

Collateral References.

Commitment for contempt in failing to obey order of court as purging one of contempt. 56 A.L.R. 701.

Contempt: state court’s power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court’s order — anticipatory contempt. 81 A.L.R.4th 1008.

Inability to comply with judgment or order as defense to charge of contempt. 22 A.L.R. 1256, 31 A.L.R. 649, 40 A.L.R. 546, 76 A.L.R. 390, 120 A.L.R. 703.

Judicial officer’s civil liability for ordering arrest for contempt. 13 A.L.R. 1364, 55 A.L.R. 282, 173 A.L.R. 802.

Particular courts having power to punish for contempt. 8 A.L.R. 1545, 54 A.L.R. 321, 73 A.L.R. 1185.

Profane or obscene language by party, witness, or observer during trial proceedings as basis for contempt citation. 29 A.L.R.5th 702.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Separate acts of contempt as punishable in a single contempt proceeding. 160 A.L.R. 1104.

8-8-6. Special service of process.

The district court may order special service of any process, original or auxiliary, in any proceeding within the jurisdiction of the court, by personal notice, notice by mail, or publication in a newspaper within or without the state, for the purpose of dealing with any property, relation, or person subject to the jurisdiction of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

8-8-7. Judges — Temporary service in other courts.

  1. A district court judge shall devote full time to his or her judicial duties. He or she shall not practice law while holding office, nor shall he or she be a partner or associate of any person in the practice of law.
  2. A district court judge shall be eligible to sit in any division, and, on assignment by the chief justice of the supreme court, shall be eligible to sit for temporary periods in the superior and family courts. A district court judge sitting in the superior or family court shall receive the same salary as a superior or family court judge would receive, and if the district court judge sits for only a portion of a two (2) week pay period in those courts, he or she shall be paid for the entire two (2) week period at the higher rate of pay.
  3. A district court judge, subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court, the presiding justice of the superior court and the chief judge of the district court, may serve on the superior court calendar to preside over district court de novo appeals. A district court judge sitting in the superior court presiding over district court de novo appeals shall receive the same salary as a superior court judge would receive.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1971, ch. 169, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 276, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 290, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 150, § 16; P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 4; P.L. 2003, ch. 332, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 403, § 1.

Cross References.

Bond of clerk, § 42-8-5 .

Exemption from jury service, § 9-9-3 .

Exemption from militia duty, § 30-1-7 .

Judges in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Although supreme court will not usually pass on constitutionality unless particular portion of the Constitution involved is specified, it would, in view of public importance and first presentation, pass on the 1935 amendment of the former section, reducing the terms of incumbent judges and clerks, even though petition failed to specify portion of Constitution claimed to have been violated. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1 , 186 A. 832, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1936).

Though the tenure and salaries of supreme court judges are protected by the Constitution, those of judges and clerks of the inferior courts are not, and such judges and clerks have no vested interest in their offices or future emoluments; so the general assembly may, even retrospectively, shorten or terminate the terms of district judges and clerks or reduce their salaries, with or without fault and with or without abolishing the office. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1 , 186 A. 832, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1936).

Collateral References.

Construction and validity of state provisions governing designation of substitute, pro tempore, or special judge. 97 A.L.R.5th 537.

Court’s power to remove judges. 118 A.L.R. 171.

Defective title to office of judge, prosecuting attorney or other officer participating in petitioner’s trial or confinement as ground for habeas corpus. 158 A.L.R. 529.

Right of party, in course of litigation, to challenge title or authority of judge or of person acting as judge. 144 A.L.R. 1207.

Liability of clerk of court on his bond, for the defaults and misfeasance of his assistants or deputies. 1 A.L.R. 234, 102 A.L.R. 174, 116 A.L.R. 1064.

Money paid to clerk of court by virtue of his office, liability for. 59 A.L.R. 60.

Substitution of judge in state criminal trial. 45 A.L.R.5th 591.

8-8-8. Engagement and acceptance of appointment.

Every judge accepting the office shall, within thirty (30) days after appointment, take the engagement provided in § 8-3-1 and shall file a written notice of his or her acceptance, together with proof of his engagement upon his or her commission, with the secretary of state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 118; G.L. 1909, ch. 280, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 330, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 500, § 6; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-8-8 .

Cross References.

Judges’ oath of office, R.I. Const., art. III, § 4 .

8-8-8.1. Administrator/clerk — Magistrate.

  1. Administrator/clerk.  There shall be a district court administrator/clerk who shall be appointed by the chief judge in his or her capacity as administrative head of the court, and who shall hold office at the pleasure of the administrative judge. The administrator/clerk shall perform such duties and attend to such matters as may be assigned to the administrator/clerk by the administrative judge, other than those duties assigned to the chief clerk in § 8-8-19 . Said duties may be assigned by the chief judge.
  2. Magistrate.  Any person holding the position of district court administrator/clerk who is a member of the bar of Rhode Island may be appointed district court magistrate by the chief judge in his or her capacity as administrative head of the court, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The district court magistrate shall hold said office for a term of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified; and the magistrate shall retain whatever right he or she may have to the position of district court administrator/clerk pursuant to this section. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the appointment of the magistrate for more than one term, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. Any person holding office of district court magistrate on July 1, 1999 may continue in full authority in said position until such time as an appointment is made and the nominee qualified pursuant to this subsection.
  3. The district court magistrate shall have the power to hear and determine such matters as may be assigned to the district court magistrate by the chief judge all to the same effect as if done by a judge of the district court, including but not limited to:
    1. Matters relating to the determination of, monitoring, collection, and payment of restitution and court ordered fines, fees, and costs or the ordering of community service in lieu of or in addition to the payment of restitution, fines, fees, and costs, consistent with other provisions of the general laws;
    2. Arraignments and pretrial motions in misdemeanor, petty misdemeanor, violation, and ordinance cases and initial appearances and probable cause hearings in felony cases;
    3. Bail hearings pursuant to R.I. Const., Art. I, Sec. IX and all other bail matters pursuant to chapter 13 of title 12 and the rules of criminal procedure, including but not limited to motions to modify bail, bail revocation hearings, bail forfeiture hearings, and bail source hearings;
    4. All matters relating to fugitives from justice pursuant to chapter 9 of title 12;
    5. Probation revocation hearings;
    6. All matters relating to small claims and consumer claims pursuant to chapter 16 of title 10, including any pretrial motions including motions relating to the special service of process, the entry of defaults and default judgments, the trial of such cases and the entry of judgment after such trials, and all matters relating to the enforcement of such judgments, including but not limited to the ordering of installment payments and trustee process; and
    7. Complaints for judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency pursuant to chapter 35 of title 42 by making proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of the complaints to a judge of the court. Any party may object to any portion of the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations within ten (10) days after receipt of a copy thereof. That party shall file with the clerk of the sixth division of the district court and serve on all parties written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. Absent a timely objection filed in accordance with this subdivision, the proposed prevailing party shall, upon expiration of the ten (10) days following the service of the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations, submit a proposed order for signature of the judge to whom the case has been assigned.
  4. The magistrate may be authorized:
    1. To regulate all proceedings before him or her;
    2. To do all acts necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his or her duties;
    3. To require the production before him or her of books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings;
    4. To rule upon the admissibility of evidence;
    5. To issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses, to put witnesses on oath, to examine them, and to call parties to the proceeding and examine them upon oath;
    6. To adjudicate a person in contempt and to order him or her fined or to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a judge of the court, for failure to appear in response to a summons or for refusal to answer questions or produce evidence or for behavior disrupting a proceeding or other contempt of his or her authority;
    7. To adjudicate a person in contempt and to order him or her fined or to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a judge of the court, for failure to comply with a pending order to provide payment or to perform any other act;
    8. To issue a capias and/or body attachment for the failure of a party or witness to appear after having been properly served or given notice by the court and, should the court not be in session, the person apprehended may be detained at the adult correctional institution, if an adult, or at the Rhode Island training school for youth, if a child, until the next session of the court;
    9. To issue writs of habeas corpus to bring before him or her or a judge of the court any person in jail or in prison to be examined as a witness in a suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending before the court, or whose presence is necessary as a party or otherwise necessary so that the ends of justice may be attained, and for no other purpose; and
    10. To issue warrants of arrest and search warrants to the same extent as an associate judge of the court.
  5. Except as otherwise indicated, a party aggrieved by an order entered by the district court magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order, whether by appeal or otherwise, by a judge of the court. The court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for review of contempt and adjudications of the magistrate.
  6. The magistrate shall be:
    1. Governed by the commission on judicial tenure and discipline, chapter 16 of this title, in the same manner as justices and judges;
    2. Subject to all provisions of the canons of judicial ethics;
    3. Subject to all criminal laws relative to judges by virtue of §§ 11-7-1 and 11-7-2 .
  7. The provisions of this section shall be afforded liberal construction.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 73, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 5; P.L. 1999, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 452, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 7; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 11.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

8-8-9. Vacancies.

  1. Whenever any person appointed to the office of chief judge or associate judge shall fail to accept and qualify for the office or there is a vacancy in the office caused by death, resignation, retirement, removal, or any other cause whatsoever while the senate is in session, the governor shall appoint some person to fill the vacancy, and submit his or her appointment to the senate for confirmation in accordance with the general laws governing judicial selection.
  2. Whenever the chief judge shall be unable, by reason of illness, to perform the duties of his or her office, or there is a vacancy in the office, the associate judge having precedence, who is present and qualified to act, shall perform the duties of the office until the inability is removed or, in the case of a vacancy, until the vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the general laws governing judicial selection. In the event that the chief judge determines that his or her absence will prevent him or her from performing the duties of his or her office, he or she shall designate an associate judge to perform those duties during the period of his or her absence.
  3. The associate judges shall have precedence according to the dates of their commissions, or when the commission of two (2) or more of them bear the same date, according to their ages.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1977, ch. 263, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Removal.

Even if there is no express provision for the removal of an officer other than by impeachment, there is clear implication that they can be removed by other means. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1 , 186 A. 832, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1936).

Collateral References.

Court’s power to remove judges. 118 A.L.R. 171.

8-8-10. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; Repealed by P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 6, effective June 30, 2009.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-8-10 concerned retirement of judges.

8-8-10.1. Retirement contribution.

  1. Judges engaged after December 31, 1989, shall have deducted from total salary beginning December 31, 1989, and ending June 30, 2012, an amount equal to a rate percent of compensation as specified in § 36-10-1 relating to member contributions to the state retirement system. Effective July 1, 2012, all active judges, whether engaged before or after December 31, 1989, shall have deducted from compensation as defined in § 36-8-1(8) an amount equal to twelve percent (12%) of compensation. The receipts collected under this provision shall be deposited in a restricted revenue account entitled “Judicial retirement benefits” on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld. Proceeds deposited in this account shall be held in trust for the purpose of paying retirement benefits to participating judges or their beneficiaries. The retirement board shall establish rules and regulations to govern the provisions of this section.
  2. The state is required to deduct and withhold member contributions and to transmit same to the retirement system and is hereby made liable for the contribution. In addition, any amount of employee contributions actually deducted and withheld shall be deemed to be a special fund in trust for the benefit of the member and shall be transmitted to the retirement system as set forth herein.
  3. A member of the judiciary who withdraws from service or ceases to be a member for any reason other than retirement shall be paid on demand a refund consisting of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the judicial retirement benefits account. Any member receiving a refund shall thereby forfeit and relinquish all accrued rights as a member of the system together with credits for total service previously granted to the member; provided, however, that if any member who has received a refund shall subsequently reenter the service and again become a member of the system, the member shall have the privilege of restoring all money previously received or disbursed to his or her credit as refund of contributions plus regular interest for the period from the date of refund to the date of restoration. Upon the repayment of the refund as herein provided, the member shall again receive credit for the amount of total service which he or she had previously forfeited by the acceptance of the refund.
  4. Whenever any judge dies from any cause before retirement and has no surviving spouse, domestic partner, or minor child(ren), a payment shall be made of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the judicial retirement benefits account. The payment of the accumulated contributions of the judge shall be made to such person as the judge shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the retirement board, or if the judge has filed no nomination, or if the person so nominated has died, then to the estate of the deceased judge.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 15, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 22, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 494, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 507, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 167, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 274, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 16; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 16; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 2, and P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

Cross References.

Public employees retirement law, application to judges and clerks, § 36-9-5 .

8-8-10.2. State contributions.

The state of Rhode Island shall make its contribution for the maintaining of the system established by § 8-8-10.1 and providing the annuities, benefits, and retirement allowances in accordance with the provisions of this chapter by annually appropriating an amount that will pay a rate percent of the compensation paid after December 31, 1989, to judges engaged after December 31, 1989. The rate percent shall be computed and certified in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 36-8-13 and § 36-10-2 under rules and regulations promulgated by the retirement board pursuant to § 36-8-3 and shall be transmitted on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 494, § 4; P.L. 1990, ch. 507, § 4; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 2, and P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

8-8-11. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; Repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, § 3. Section 7 of P.L. 1987, ch. 381 provides that the repeal of this section by that Act shall take effect on the date that Rhode Island Rules of Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court take effect. Those Rules took effect October 1, 1987.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-8-11 concerned disqualification of judges for interest.

8-8-12. Duties of chief judge.

  1. The chief judge shall be the administrative head of the district court and shall be responsible for its operation and the efficient use of its manpower. To this end he or she shall:
    1. Hold court in any division when he or she deems it necessary;
    2. Assign judges to hold court in the various divisions;
    3. Designate the place or places for holding court in each division;
    4. Fix the time for holding court in each division and supervise the calendars;
    5. Report annually to the chief justice of the supreme court on the state of the business of the district court;
    6. Supervise the collection and publication of statistics pertaining to the court;
    7. Supervise the management of the records of the court;
    8. Determine the time of vacations to be taken by the district judges;
    9. Preside over the district court conference and designate the time and place that it shall be held;
    10. Promulgate rules and regulations relating to:
      1. The licensing of constables to serve certain district court civil process; and
      2. The duties and conduct of licensed constables.
  2. The chief judge of the district court may designate an associate judge of the district court as administrative judge of the district court. The administrative judge may exercise such administrative authority as may be delegated to him or her by the chief judge. The administrative judge shall receive an increase in compensation which shall be set pursuant to § 8-15-4 .
  3. The chief judge of the district court shall appoint sufficient court recorders to enable all proceedings to be recorded by electronic means and who shall assist in such other clerical duties subject to the labor laws of this state and applicable collective bargaining agreement as may be prescribed from time to time by the chief judge of the district court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1971, ch. 183, § 4; P.L. 1982, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 5; P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 25, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 154, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 160, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 11.

Cross References.

Clerks and justices of peace authorized to take bail, commit, and issue warrants, § 12-10-2 .

8-8-12.1. Constable regulation program.

  1. Creation of program.  There is hereby created “the district court constable regulation program” which shall be administered under the direction of the chief judge of the district court.
  2. Revenues.  The annual license renewal fee assessed to each district court constable shall be set from time to time by the chief judge. The revenues shall be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 160, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 38.

8-8-13. Sessions of the court.

The district court shall be in continuous session for the transaction of any business that may come before it; provided, however, that the court shall not be in session on Sundays and legal holidays for the transaction of civil business.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

Cross References.

Criminal business, court open at all times, § 12-10-1 .

Legal holidays, § 25-1-1 et seq.

Sheriff’s attendance, §§ 42-29-19 , 42-29-20 .

8-8-14. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4. Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 38, § 1, effective May 21, 2015; P.L. 2015, ch. 40, § 1, effective May 21, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-8-14 concerned rental of courtrooms.

8-8-15. Chief, deputy, and assistant clerks.

  1. There shall be a chief clerk of the district court. In the month of April of 1971 and in each fifth year thereafter, the chief judge of the district court, with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint the chief clerk of the district court who shall hold office until the first day in April in the fifth year next after his or her appointment and until his or her successor is appointed and qualified. In case of a vacancy in the office of clerk of the district court, from any cause, the chief judge of the district court, with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint some person to fill the vacancy for the balance of the unexpired term and until his or her successor is appointed and qualified. In case of the death, resignation, absence, inability, or refusal to serve of the clerk, the chief judge may appoint a clerk pro tempore, who shall hold his or her office until the clerk shall have returned or the inability shall have been removed or another clerk shall have been appointed to fill such a vacancy and shall have qualified.
  2. The chief judge of the district court shall appoint a deputy clerk for each division and assistant clerks in the various divisions of the district court to serve at his or her pleasure. All such clerks and the chief clerk may administer oaths within the state.
  3. The clerks of the court shall devote their full time to their duties. They are not required to be members of the bar of this state, but if a member of the bar of this state is appointed a clerk, he or she shall not practice law during his or her term in office nor shall he or she be a partner or associate of any person engaged in the practice of law.
  4. The chief judge of the district court shall have the power to authorize, with the power to revoke such authorizations, the chief clerk, the deputy clerks, and the assistant clerks of the district court to set and take bail on all complaints bailable before a division of the district court to the same extent and with the same authority as is granted to justices of the peace authorized to set and take bail by § 12-10-2 . The authorizations and revocations shall be recorded with the secretary of state. District court clerks may exercise the authority granted by the chief judge under this section only during the normal working hours of the clerk’s office to which they are assigned. This authority shall be exercised without fee.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1971, ch. 121, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 47, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 396, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 2.

Cross References.

Clerks and assistants in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

Collateral References.

Removal of clerks, court’s power as to. 118 A.L.R. 171.

8-8-16. Duties of district court clerks.

Every clerk of the district court shall record reasonably the judgments and determinations of the court, and account with the state controller and pay over to the general treasurer, as often as by law required, all fines, costs, and other money received by him or her, and also account with and pay over to the town treasurers of the towns in his or her division, as often as by law required, all fines and other money received by him or her belonging to or payable to the town.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1980, ch. 96, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Removal.

Even if there is no express provision for the removal of an officer other than by impeachment, there is clear implication that they can be removed by other means. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1 , 186 A. 832, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1936).

Collateral References.

Court’s power to remove judges. 118 A.L.R. 171.

8-8-16.1. Office of clerk/magistrate — Purpose.

The general assembly hereby finds that there exists a need to further expand the capability of the district court to effectively and expeditiously collect all fines, fees, and costs due to the state, consistent with principles of fairness and due process. Therefore, the general assembly hereby creates the position of district court clerk/magistrate.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 173, § 1.

8-8-16.2. District court clerk/magistrate.

  1. Any person who is a member of the bar of Rhode Island may be appointed district court clerk/magistrate by the chief judge in his or her capacity as administrative head of the court, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The district court clerk/magistrate shall hold that office for a term of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the assignment of the district court clerk/magistrate to more than one such term, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The district court clerk/magistrate shall have the power to hear and determine any matters that may be assigned to the district court clerk/magistrate by the chief judge all to the same effect as if done by a judge of the district court, including, but not limited to, matters relating to the determination of, monitoring, collection and payment of restitution and court ordered fines, fees and costs or the ordering of community service in lieu of or in addition to the payment of restitution, fines, fees and costs, consistent with other provisions of the general laws.
  2. The clerk/magistrate may be authorized:
    1. To regulate all proceedings before him or her;
    2. To do all acts necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his or her duties;
    3. To require the production before him or her of books, papers, vouchers, documents and writings;
    4. To rule upon the admissibility of evidence;
    5. To issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses, to put witnesses on oath, to examine them and to call parties to the proceeding and examine them upon oath;
    6. To adjudicate a person in contempt and to order him or her fined or to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, for failure to appear in response to a summons or for refusal to answer questions or produce evidence or for behavior disrupting a proceeding or other contempt of his or her authority; provided; however, that no such imprisonment shall occur prior to review by a judge of the court.
    7. To adjudicate a person in contempt and to order him or her fined or to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, for failure to comply with a pending order to provide payment or to perform any other act; provided, however, that no such imprisonment shall occur prior to review by a judge of the court.
    8. To issue a capias and/or body attachment for the failure of a party or witness to appear after having been properly served or given notice by the court and, should the court not be in session, the person apprehended may be detained at the adult correctional institutions, if an adult, or at the Rhode Island training school for youth, if a child, until the next session of the court;
    9. To issue writs of habeas corpus to bring before him or her or a judge of the court any person in jail or in prison to be examined as a witness in a suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending before the court, or whose presence is necessary as a party or otherwise necessary so that the ends of justice may be attained, and for no other purpose; and
    10. To issue warrants of arrest and search warrants to the same extent as an associate judge of the court.
  3. Except as otherwise indicated, a party aggrieved by an order entered by the district court clerk/magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order, whether by appeal or otherwise, by a judge of the court. The court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for review of contempt and adjudications of the clerk/magistrate.
  4. The district court clerk/magistrate shall:
    1. Be governed by the commission on judicial tenure and discipline, pursuant to chapter 16 of this title, in the same manner as justices and judges;
    2. Be subject to all provisions of the canons of judicial ethics;
    3. Be subject to all criminal laws relative to judges by virtue of §§ 11-7-1 and 11-7-2 .
    4. Receive any salary that may be established by the state court administrator pursuant to § 8-15-4 . The provisions of this section shall be afforded liberal construction.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 173, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 5; P.L. 2002, ch. 109, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 425, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 7.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

8-8-17. Duties of division clerks.

The clerk of each division of the district court shall:

  1. Keep a docket, and an alphabetical index thereof, either in writing or by means of an electronic information storage system or other data compilation system, of all actions, complaints, or proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, that may be entered or had in the division, and shall note in the docket against each case the decision or determination thereof, all subsequent proceedings, and the judgment therein, and, in all criminal cases, the fines or imprisonment to which the defendant may be sentenced.
  2. Record the decisions, judgments, and proceedings of the division in a book to be kept for that purpose or in an electronic information storage system or any other data compilation system.
  3. Tax costs, including officer’s fees, in all cases, civil or criminal, that may be entered, commenced, or pending in the division; all taxation by the clerk shall be subject to revision by any district judge sitting in the division.
  4. Receive all fines and costs in criminal cases and all court fees in civil cases and account therefor as by law required.
  5. Have custody of the seal of the division.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 1989, ch. 202, § 2.

Rules of Court.

Entry of decisions, judgments and proceedings, see District Court Civil Rule 79(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Duties.

A court record necessarily requires some duly authorized person to record the proceedings and such person in the district court is the clerk. Colagiovanni v. District Court of Sixth Judicial Dist., 47 R.I. 323 , 133 A. 1, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1926).

8-8-18. Failure of clerk to account for fines and costs.

For any willful neglect or refusal of the clerk of the district court to account or for any willful neglect or refusal of any clerk of the district court to pay over all fines and costs received by him or her, he or she shall be fined fifty dollars ($50.00) for each offense and also double the amount of fines and costs received by him or her and so detained.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Removal.

Even though there is no express provision for the removal of an officer other than by impeachment, there is clear implication that they can be removed by other means. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1 , 186 A. 832, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1936).

8-8-19. Duties of chief clerk.

The chief clerk shall have general supervisory power over the clerks of the court and shall be responsible to the chief judge for the proper and efficient operation of their offices. To that end he or she shall:

  1. Temporarily transfer clerks to other divisions outside of their own when he or she deems it necessary. Such transfers shall be subject to the approval of the chief judge.
  2. Procure all necessary papers, books, and other documents as the state controller or as the chief judge may direct, upon which the clerks shall keep their records and make their reports and returns.
  3. Systematize record keeping throughout the divisions.
  4. Gather such statistics as the chief judge shall direct.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

8-8-20. Sale of blank writs prohibited.

No judge or clerk of the district court shall sell any blank writ officially signed by him or her to any person except an attorney at law or deliver to any person other than an attorney at law any such writ with permission, in the absence of the judge or clerk to fill or cause the writ to be filled, under a penalty of ten dollars ($10.00) for each offense and ineligibility to serve as a judge or clerk of the district court after conviction.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

Cross References.

Criminal jurisdiction, §§ 12-3-1 , 12-3-2 .

Disqualification of town sergeant or constable from serving process, § 45-16-11 .

Oaths, power to administer, § 36-2-2 .

Small claims cases, jurisdiction, § 10-16-2 .

Subpoena of witnesses, § 9-17-2 .

Unlawful use of judicial process, § 11-27-7 .

Vagrants, jurisdiction to sentence, § 11-45-1 .

8-8-21. District court conference.

There shall be a district court conference held annually, or more often, at such time and place as shall be designated by the chief judge. This conference shall consist of all the judges of the district court. The chief judge shall preside and the chief clerk shall act as secretary of the conference. The attorney general, or one of his or her assistants, shall attend to aid and advise the conference. The conference shall, with the concurrence of the chief judge, have power to direct in what manner and to what extent entries shall be made of the decisions, judgments, and proceedings of the district court. To the end that the work of the district court shall be efficiently and expeditiously transacted it shall give attention to all matters believed helpful to that end and shall make recommendations regarding procedure and other matters pertaining to the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

Cross References.

Clerk of conference, § 8-2-11 .

Habeas corpus generally, § 10-9-1 et seq.

8-8-22. Statutory references to earlier courts.

Whenever in any statute reference is made to justice courts, trial justices or clerks of the justice courts of the different cities and towns, district courts, justices of district courts, and clerks of district courts, that statute shall be taken and construed to refer to the district court created by this chapter and its judges and clerks. Whenever in any statute reference is made to a particular predecessor court, that statute shall be taken and construed to refer to the division of the district court which embraces the territory of the predecessor court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

Rules of Court.

For procedure in replevin, see Dist. Ct. Civil Rule 64.

Cross References.

Replevin generally, § 34-21-1 et seq.

8-8-23. Savings clause.

The divisions of the district court established in § 8-8-2 shall have custody of all records, books, and papers of the district court of the several judicial districts heretofore existing within their respective geographical limits. All civil actions and criminal proceedings and processes pending in the district courts of the several judicial districts heretofore existing and all writs issued out of and returnable to those courts shall continue with the same force and effect in the district court established by this chapter, within its respective divisions; and all rights and liabilities of the parties to such civil actions and criminal proceedings and processes commenced prior to September 15, 1969, including costs of appeal, shall continue in full force and effect.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 4.

Collateral References.

Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal of charge of contempt of court. 24 A.L.R.3d 650.

Appealability of contempt adjudication or conviction. 33 A.L.R.3d 448.

Commitment for contempt in failing to obey order of court as purging one of contempt. 56 A.L.R. 701.

Contempt adjudication or conviction as subject to review other than by appeal or writ of error. 33 A.L.R.3d 589.

Defense of entrapment in contempt proceedings. 41 A.L.R.3d 418.

Inability to comply with judgment or order as defense to charge of contempt. 22 A.L.R. 1256, 31 A.L.R. 649, 40 A.L.R. 546, 76 A.L.R. 390, 120 A.L.R. 703.

Judicial officer’s civil liability for ordering arrest for contempt. 13 A.L.R. 1364, 55 A.L.R. 282, 173 A.L.R. 802.

Particular courts having power to punish for contempt. 8 A.L.R. 1545, 54 A.L.R. 321, 73 A.L.R. 1185.

Right of injured party to award of compensatory damages or fine in contempt proceedings. 85 A.L.R.3d 895.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Separate acts of contempt as punishable in a single contempt proceeding. 160 A.L.R. 1104.

8-8-24. Tax proceedings to be without jury and de novo — Precedence on calendar.

Each appeal of a final decision of the tax administrator concerning an assessment, deficiency, or otherwise shall be an original, independent proceeding in the nature of a suit in equity to set aside the final decision and shall be tried de novo and without a jury. Every such matter shall have precedence over all other civil cases on the calendar on the date to which it is assigned for trial and shall continue to have precedence on the calendar on a day-to-day basis until it is heard.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

The supreme court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a suit contesting the authority of the tax administrator from collecting fees under the fuel-decal fee statute, § 31-36.1-3(a) ; the appropriate route for challenging the actions of the tax administrator is delineated in chapter 35 of title 42, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the appropriate forum for judicial review of a decision by the tax administrator lies in the district court. Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n v. State, 541 A.2d 69, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 1988).

Superior court properly dismissed a taxpayer’s complaint because the general assembly conferred upon the district court exclusive jurisdiction over “tax matters,” in addition to the authority to adjudicate all claims for relief attached to the underlying matter. Barone v. State, 93 A.3d 938, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2014).

Scope of Relief.

The legislature, by vesting the district court with exclusive jurisdiction over tax matters, has implied that the district court is empowered to administer full relief in tax disputes, including adjudication of challenges to the constitutionality of tax statutes and claims for equitable relief. Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n v. State, 541 A.2d 69, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 1988).

A taxpayer seeking a tax refund after denial of a refund claim may not seek relief by means of a writ of mandamus against the tax administrator since this section requires appeals of a final decision of the tax administrator be tried de novo in the District Court. International Packaging Corp. v. Mayer, 715 A.2d 636, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 260 (R.I. 1998).

8-8-25. Time for commencement of proceeding against the division of taxation.

  1. Any taxpayer aggrieved by a final decision of the tax administrator concerning an assessment, deficiency, or otherwise may file a complaint for redetermination of the assessment, deficiency, or otherwise in the court as provided by statute under title 44.
  2. The complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the mailing of notice of the final decision and shall set forth the reasons why the final decision is alleged to be erroneous and praying relief therefrom. The clerk of the court shall thereupon summon the division of taxation to answer the complaint.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

The district court has sole jurisdiction to entertain a complaint seeking review of final decisions of the tax administrator in regard to any tax that he is authorized to assess, including but not limited to the franchise tax. Old Colony Bank v. Clark, 517 A.2d 249, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 551 (R.I. 1986).

8-8-26. Prepayment as condition precedent to review of tax case.

A taxpayer’s right to file a complaint pursuant to § 8-8-25 for review of a final decision of the tax administrator ordering an assessment, deficiency, or otherwise shall be conditional upon prepayment of all taxes, interest, and penalties set forth in the assessment, deficiency, or otherwise; provided, however, that in lieu of the prepayment, the taxpayer may file together with his or her complaint a motion for an exemption from the prepayment requirement. The taxpayer shall set the motion down for hearing within twenty (20) days after the answer to the complaint is filed; otherwise, the motion shall be deemed to be denied. The court shall grant the motion if it determines both: (1) that the taxpayer has a reasonable probability of success on the merits; and (2) that the taxpayer is unable to prepay all taxes, interest, and penalties set forth in the assessment, deficiency, or otherwise. In making its determination on the issue of ability to prepay, the court shall consider not only the taxpayer’s own financial resources but also the ability of the taxpayer to borrow the required funds. If the motion is denied, the taxpayer shall make prepayment within thirty (30) days of the entry of the court’s order denying the motion; otherwise, the complaint shall be dismissed upon motion of the tax administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The requirements of this section explicitly set forth the statutory prerequisites for review. If the taxpayer fails to comply with these prerequisites, the taxpayer has no right to judicial review of an administrative decision. Gross v. State, 659 A.2d 670, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 160 (R.I. 1995).

Burden of Proof.

Where a taxpayer presented a prima facie case as to whether the provision of videotaped deposition testimony was subject to sales tax, which was an issue of first impression warranting de novo review, the District Court erred in reaching a conclusion on the merits without affording the taxpayer a de novo review with a full evidentiary hearings. White v. Clark, 823 A.2d 1125, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 141 (R.I. 2003).

8-8-27. Refund suits.

  1. Any taxpayer may bring an action for a refund of taxes previously overpaid. The suit for refund may not be brought prior to the date of a final determination by the tax administrator denying the claim for refund. No action for a refund of tax shall be brought after the expiration of thirty (30) days from a notice of final determination of the tax administrator denying the claimed refund.
  2. As used in this section and § 8-8-28 , “tax” includes any surcharge imposed under § 1-6-2 , and “taxpayer” includes an operator as defined in § 1-6-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 424, § 3.

8-8-28. Burden of proof in tax cases.

In all tax cases before the court, and upon appeal therefrom, a preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief and the burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as in other civil litigation. In any proceedings in which the division of taxation alleges fraud or an exception to the normal statute of limitations on assessment, the burden of proof in respect of that issue shall be upon the division of taxation. To be sustained on the issue of fraud, the division of taxation must sustain a burden of clear and convincing proof.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

Cross References.

Unlawful use of judicial process, § 11-27-7 .

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The statutory requirement that fraud be proven by clear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that the legislature intended that a preponderance of the evidence will suffice in determining all other factual issues in a tax case. DeBlois v. Clark, 764 A.2d 727, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2001).

Where a taxpayer presented a prima facie case as to whether the provision of videotaped deposition testimony was subject to sales tax, which was an issue of first impression warranting de novo review, the District Court erred in reaching a conclusion on the merits without affording the taxpayer a de novo review with full evidentiary hearings. White v. Clark, 823 A.2d 1125, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 141 (R.I. 2003).

Domicile.

Domicile for tax purposes is established by a preponderance of the evidence, pursuant to the unambiguous burden of proof established by this section. DeBlois v. Clark, 764 A.2d 727, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2001).

An individual may retain contacts in the state and may even maintain a residence in the state, but still become domiciled in another state provided the prerequisites of domicile are met. DeBlois v. Clark, 764 A.2d 727, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2001).

Form of Writ.

There was no presumption that writ was illegally issued merely because the name of an attorney did not appear thereon, but there was a presumption that it was lawfully obtained and issued. Remington v. Benoit, 19 R.I. 698 , 36 A. 718, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1897).

8-8-29. Court stenographer in tax cases.

Any party may obtain the services of a court stenographer in the district court in a tax case, and that party shall pay all costs of the court stenographer.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

8-8-30. Decision of the court — Form and contents.

The court shall render its decision in writing, including therein a concise statement of the facts found by the court and the conclusions of law reached by the court. The court may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any determination or shall grant such relief, invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders in accordance with its decision as shall be appropriate in a court of general jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

8-8-31. Frivolous appeals.

Whenever it appears to the court that proceedings before it have been instituted by the taxpayer solely for delay and that the taxpayer’s complaint is frivolous and groundless, damages in an amount not in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000) plus costs may be assessed against the taxpayer by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

8-8-32. Review by supreme court.

Any party in interest, if aggrieved by a final judgment rendered in proceedings brought under this chapter, may within twenty (20) days from the date of entry of the judgment petition the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a writ of certiorari to review any questions of law involved. The petition for writ of certiorari shall set forth the errors claimed. Upon the filing of such a petition with the clerk of the supreme court, the supreme court may, if it sees fit, issue its writ of certiorari to the district court to certify to the supreme court the record of the proceeding under review.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 183, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose of Review.

Judicial review by the supreme court of rulings or decisions rendered by the district court ensures litigants that a fair and expeditious method to review tax disputes completely is available. Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n v. State, 541 A.2d 69, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 1988).

Scope of Review.

Because some of the language in this section is identical to the language in § 42-35-16 , cases interpreting the scope of review under § 42-35-16 are applicable in determining the scope of review under this section. Dart Indus. v. Clark, 696 A.2d 306, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 1997).

In a suit involving consumers (yet-to-be class certified) asserting that a computer business improperly collected a tax from them on service contracts they purchased along with a new computer, the Rhode Island Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action as their claims were being asserted under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-5.2(a) , and common-law negligence, and did not present a tax aggrievement case. As a result, the motion to dismiss filed by the intervening tax administrator for the Rhode Island Division of Taxation was denied. Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 141 (R.I. 2009).

8-8-33. Severability.

The holding of any section or sections or parts of this chapter to be void, ineffective, or unconstitutional for any cause shall not be deemed to affect any other section or part hereof.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 17; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 17.

Chapter 8.1 Domestic Assault

8-8.1-1. Definitions.

The following words as used in this chapter shall have the following meanings:

  1. “Cohabitants” means emancipated minors or persons eighteen (18) years of age or older, not related by blood or marriage, who together are not the legal parents of one or more children, and who have resided together within the preceding three (3) years or who are residing in the same living quarters.
  2. “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”
  3. “Courts” means the district court.
  4. “Cyberstalking” means transmitting any communication by computer to any person or causing any person to be contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or her family.
  5. “Domestic abuse” means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between cohabitants or the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between persons who are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year; “domestic abuse” shall be determined by the court’s consideration of the following factors:
    1. The length of time of the relationship;
    2. The type of the relationship;
    3. The frequency of the interaction between the parties;
    4. Attempting to cause or causing physical harm;
    5. Placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm;
    6. Causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force, or duress; or
    7. Stalking or cyberstalking.
  6. “Harassing” means following a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person with the intent to seriously alarm, annoy, or bother the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, or be in fear of bodily injury.
  7. “Sole legal interest” means defendant has an ownership interest in the residence and plaintiff does not; or defendant’s name is on the lease and plaintiff’s is not.
  8. “Stalking” means harassing another person or willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of bodily injury.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 4; P.L. 1990, ch. 390, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 326, § 172; P.L. 2001, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 324, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 652, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 12; P.L. 2021, ch. 111, § 1, effective July 2, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 112, § 1, effective July 2, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 111, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 112, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Domestic Violence Protection Act, § 12-29-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Review of Superior Court Executions.

Although the legislature, by its enactment of § 8-8-3.1 and this chapter, endowed the District Court with equitable powers to handle controversies concerning housing matters and domestic assaults, the legislature did not endow the District Court with the subject-matter jurisdiction that would enable a District Court judge to sit and review executions issued by the Superior Court. Borelli v. Conklin Limestone Co., 569 A.2d 8, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 28 (R.I. 1990).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of expert testimony concerning domestic-violence syndromes to assist jury in evaluating victim’s testimony or behavior. 57 A.L.R.5th 315.

“Cohabitation” for purposes of domestic violence statutes. 71 A.L.R.5th 285.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Cyberstalking Laws. 26 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2018).

8-8.1-2. Filing of complaint.

  1. Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard, and determined in the district court of the division in which the plaintiff resides. Any proceedings under this chapter shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. A party filing a complaint under this chapter may do so without payment of any filing fee. If the plaintiff has left the residence or household to avoid abuse, he or she may bring the action in the court of previous residence or the court of present residence. There shall be no minimum residence requirements for the bringing of an action under this chapter.
  2. Answers to the summons and complaint shall be made within ten (10) days of service upon the defendant and the action shall take precedence on the calendar. If no answer is filed within the time prescribed, judgment shall enter forthwith.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claim Preclusion.

The statutory scheme which provided victims of domestic abuse with protection from immediate physical harm, and which included a provision stating that “proceedings under this chapter shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies,” was just the type of legal proceeding meant to be exempted from claim preclusion rules. Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 448 (D.R.I. 1999).

Given the public policy underlying this statute, it was held that it would be inequitable to maintain that the plaintiff should have joined to a summary protective proceeding all state and federal claims that she might have had, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all counts on the general defense of res judicata was denied. Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 448 (D.R.I. 1999).

8-8.1-3. Protective orders — Penalty — Jurisdiction.

  1. A person suffering from domestic abuse may file a complaint in the district court requesting any order that will protect her or him from the abuse, including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. Ordering that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting, or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff at home, on the street, or elsewhere;
    2. Ordering the defendant to vacate the household forthwith, unless the defendant holds sole legal interest in the household;
    3. Upon motion by the plaintiff, his or her address shall be released only at the discretion of the district court judge;
    4. Ordering the defendant to surrender physical possession of all firearms in his or her possession, care, custody, or control and shall further order a person restrained not to purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, any firearms while the protective order is in effect. The defendant shall surrender the firearms within twenty-four (24) hours of notice of the protective order to the Rhode Island state police or local police department or to a federally licensed firearms dealer.
      1. A person ordered to surrender possession of any firearm(s) pursuant to this section shall, within seventy-two (72) hours after being served with the order, either:
        1. File with the court a receipt showing the firearm(s) was physically surrendered to the Rhode Island state police or local police department, or to a federally licensed firearm dealer; or
        2. Attest to the court that, at the time of the order, the person had no firearms in his or her immediate physical possession or control, or subject to his or her immediate physical possession or control, and that the person, at the time of the attestation, has no firearms in his or her immediate physical possession or control or subject to his or her immediate physical possession or control.
      2. If a person restrained under this section transfers a firearm(s) to a federally licensed firearms dealer pursuant to this section, the person restrained under this section may instruct the federally licensed firearms dealer to sell the firearm(s) or to transfer ownership in accordance with state and federal law, to a qualified named individual who is not a member of the person’s dwelling house, who is not related to the person by blood, marriage, or relationship as defined by § 15-15-1(7) , and who is not prohibited from possessing firearms under state or federal law. The owner of any firearm(s) sold shall receive any financial value received from its sale, less the cost associated with taking possession of, storing, and transferring of the firearm(s).
      3. Every individual to whom possession of a firearm(s) is transferred pursuant to this subsection shall be prohibited from transferring or returning any firearm(s) to the person restrained under this section while the protective order remains in effect and shall be informed of this prohibition. Any knowing violation of this subsection is a felony that shall be punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than five (5) years, or both.
      4. An individual to whom possession of a firearm(s) is transferred pursuant to this subsection shall return a firearm(s) to the person formerly restrained under this section only if the person formerly restrained under this section provides documentation issued by a court indicating that the restraining order issued pursuant to this section that prohibited the person from purchasing, carrying, transporting, or possessing firearms has expired and has not been extended.
  2. After notice to the respondent and after a hearing, which shall be held within fifteen (15) days of surrendering said firearms, the court, in addition to any other restrictions, may, for any protective order issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2017, continue the order of surrender, and shall further order a person restrained under this section not to purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, any firearms while the protective order is in effect.
  3. The district court shall provide a notice on all forms requesting a protective order that a person restrained under this section shall be ordered pursuant to § 11-47-5 , to surrender possession or control of any firearms and not to purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, any firearms while the restraining order is in effect. The form shall further provide that any person who has surrendered their firearms shall be afforded a hearing within fifteen (15) days of surrendering their firearms.
  4. Any firearm surrendered in accordance with this section to the Rhode Island state police or local police department shall be returned to the person formerly restrained under this section upon their request when:
    1. The person formerly restrained under this section produces documentation issued by a court indicating that the restraining order issued pursuant to this section that prohibited the person from purchasing, carrying, transporting, or possessing firearms has expired and has not been extended; and
    2. The law enforcement agency in possession of the firearms determines that the person formerly restrained under this section is not otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm under state or federal law.
    3. The person required to surrender his or her firearms pursuant to this section shall not be responsible for any costs of storage of any firearms surrendered pursuant to this section.
  5. The Rhode Island state police are authorized to develop rules and procedures pertaining to the storage and return of firearms surrendered to the Rhode Island state police or local police departments pursuant to this section. The Rhode Island state police may consult with the Rhode Island Police Chiefs’ Association in developing rules and procedures.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit, expand, or in any way modify orders issued under § 12-29-4 or § 15-5-19 .
  7. Nothing in this section shall limit a defendant’s right under existing law to petition the court at a later date for modification of the order.
  8. The court shall immediately notify the person suffering from domestic abuse whose complaint gave rise to the protective order and the law enforcement agency where the person restrained under this section resides of the hearing.
  9. The person suffering from domestic abuse, local law enforcement, and the person restrained under this section shall all have an opportunity to be present and to testify when the court considers the petition.
  10. At the hearing, the person restrained under this section shall have the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that, if his or her firearm rights were restored, he or she would not pose a danger to the person suffering from domestic abuse or to any other person.
    1. In determining whether to restore a person’s firearm rights, the court shall examine all relevant evidence, including, but not limited to: the complaint seeking a protective order; the criminal record of the person restrained under this section; the mental health history of the person restrained under this section; any evidence that the person restrained under this section has, since being served with the order, engaged in violent or threatening behavior against the person suffering from domestic abuse or any other person.
    2. If the court determines, after a review of all relevant evidence and after all parties have had an opportunity to be heard, that the person restrained under this section would not pose a danger to the person suffering from domestic abuse or to any other person if his or her firearm rights were restored, then the court may grant the petition and modify the protective order and lift the firearm prohibition.
    3. If the court lifts a person’s firearms prohibition pursuant to this subsection, the court shall issue the person written notice that he or she is no longer prohibited under this section from purchasing or possessing firearms while the protective order is in effect.
  11. The prohibition against possessing a firearm(s) due solely to the existence of a domestic violence restraining order issued under this section shall not apply with respect to sworn peace officers as defined in § 12-7-21 and active members of military service, including members of the reserve components thereof, who are required by law or departmental policy to carry departmental firearms while on duty or any person who is required by his or her employment to carry a firearm in the performance of his or her duties. Any individual exempted pursuant to this exception may possess a firearm only during the course of his or her employment. Any firearm required for employment must be stored at the place of employment when not being possessed for employment use; all other firearm(s) must be surrendered in accordance with this section.
  12. Any violation of the aforementioned protective order shall subject the defendant to being found in contempt of court.
  13. No order shall issue under this section that would have the effect of compelling a defendant who has the sole legal interest in a residence to vacate that residence.
  14. The contempt order shall not be exclusive and shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. Any relief granted by the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed three (3) years, at the expiration of which time the court may extend any order upon motion of the plaintiff for such additional time as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse. The court may modify its order at any time upon motion of either party.
  15. Any violation of a protective order under this chapter of which the defendant has actual notice shall be a misdemeanor that shall be punished by a fine of no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
  16. The penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties provided under § 12-29-5 .
  17. “Actual notice” means that the defendant has received a copy of the order by service thereof or by being handed a copy of the order by a police officer pursuant to § 8-8.1-5(d) .
  18. The district court shall have criminal jurisdiction over all violations of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 4; P.L. 1995, ch. 148, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 326, § 7; P.L. 2005, ch. 148, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 153, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 111, § 1, effective July 2, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 112, § 1, effective July 2, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 111, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 112, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-8.1-4. Temporary orders — Ex parte proceedings.

    1. Upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, the court may enter any temporary orders that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse.
    2. If it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff, before notice can be served and a hearing held, the court may enter any temporary order without notice that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff. Every order granted without notice shall expire by its terms within the time after entry, not to exceed twenty-one (21) days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order: (i) by consent, or (ii) due to a failure to make service of process upon the defendant despite diligent efforts, or (iii) for good cause shown and after hearing of argument by the parties or counsel, is extended for an additional period. In case a temporary order is granted without notice, the matter shall be set down for hearing within a reasonable time and shall be given precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character, and when the matter comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary order shall proceed with the complaint for an order pursuant to § 8-8.1-3 , and, if she or he does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary order.
    1. (i) When the court is unavailable after the close of business a complaint may be filed before any available district court judge who may grant relief to the plaintiff under this chapter upon cause shown in an ex parte proceeding.
    2. No temporary order shall be granted pursuant to the provisions of this section unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by the affidavit or by verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and a hearing held.

    (ii) In addition, when there is no district court in session at a location when the family court is in session, the family court judge at that location is authorized to grant relief to the plaintiff under this chapter upon cause shown in an ex parte proceeding.

  1. Any order issued under this section and any documentation in support of an order shall be filed immediately with the clerk of the district court. The filing shall have the effect of commencing proceedings under this chapter and invoking the other provisions of this chapter.
  2. The clerk of the district court shall have a certified copy of any order issued under this chapter forwarded immediately to the law enforcement agency designated by the plaintiff. The clerk shall also provide the plaintiff with two (2) certified copies of any order issued under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 4; P.L. 1989, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 71, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 198, § 1.

8-8.1-4.1. Report to law enforcement agency.

Whenever the court grants a temporary order pursuant to § 8-8.1-4 based on a complaint alleging that a minor is suffering from domestic abuse, the court shall ensure that the appropriate law enforcement agency is notified of the complaint.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 3.

8-8.1-4.2. Return of service — Alternate service.

  1. The complaint and any order issued under this chapter shall be personally served upon the defendant by a deputy sheriff or certified constable except as provided in subsections (c), (d), and (f) of this section. Service shall be made without payment of any fee when service is made by a deputy sheriff. At the election of the plaintiff, service pursuant to this subsection may also be made by a certified constable authorized to serve process of the district court pursuant to § 9-5-10.1 . The certified constable shall be entitled to receive the fee allowed by law for the service of a district court summons.
  2. Return of service shall be forwarded by the deputy sheriff or certified constable to the clerk of court prior to the date set down for hearing on the complaint. If service has not been made, the deputy sheriff or certified constable shall indicate on the summons the reason therefor and the attempts made to serve the defendant.
  3. At the time the return of service is sent to the clerk of the court, the deputy sheriff or certified constable shall cause a copy of the return of service to be sent to the plaintiff and to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
  4. If, at the time of hearing on the complaint, the court determines that after diligent effort the deputy sheriff or certified constable has been unable to serve the defendant personally, the judge may order an alternate method of service designed to give reasonable notice of the action to the defendant and taking into consideration the plaintiff’s ability to afford the means of service ordered. Alternative service shall include, but not be limited to: service by certified and regular mail at defendant’s last-known address (excluding the residence that he or she has been ordered to vacate) or place of employment; leaving copies at the defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein; or by publication in a newspaper for two (2) consecutive weeks. The court shall set a new date for hearing on the complaint and shall extend the temporary order until that date.
  5. If the defendant appears in person before the court, the necessity for further service is waived and proof of service of that order is not necessary.
  6. If the defendant is served notice regarding the complaint and hearing, but does not appear at the hearing, the clerk of the district court shall mail the defendant a copy of the resulting order.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 15; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 7; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 7.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 7, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 7 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

8-8.1-5. Duties of police officers.

  1. Whenever any police officer has reason to believe that a cohabitant or minor has been abused, that officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including:
    1. Remaining on the scene as long as there is danger to the physical safety of the person or until the person is able to leave the dwelling unit;
    2. Assisting the person in obtaining medical treatment necessitated by an assault, including obtaining transportation to an emergency medical treatment facility;
    3. Giving the person immediate and adequate notice of his or her rights under this chapter;
    4. Arresting the person pursuant to the arrest provisions as contained in § 12-29-3 .
  2. Notice by the police officer to the victim shall be by handing the victim a copy of the following statement written in English, Portuguese, Spanish, Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, Vietnamese, and French, and by reading the statement to the person when possible:

    Spouse, former spouse/blood relative/children in common, minor(s) in a substantive dating or engagement relationship, a plaintiff parent’s minor child(ren) to which the defendant is not a blood relative or relative by marriage:

    “If your attacker is your spouse, former spouse, person to whom you are related by blood or marriage, or if you are not married to your attacker, but have a child in common, or if you and/or your attacker are a minor who have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year, you have the right to go to the family court and ask the court to issue an order restraining your attacker from abusing you, your minor child, or a plaintiff parent’s minor child(ren) to which the defendant is not a blood relative or relative by marriage; you have the right to go to the family court and request:

    1. An order restraining your attacker from abusing you, your minor child, or a  plaintiff parent’s minor child(ren) to which defendant is not a blood relative or relative by marriage;
    2. An order awarding you exclusive use of your marital domicile;
    3. An order awarding you custody of your minor child.”

      Unmarried/not related cohabitants within the past three (3) years or substantive dating or engagement relationship within past one year:

      “If you are not married or related to your attacker, but have resided with him or her within the past three (3) years, you have the right to go to the district court and request:

      1. An order restraining your attacker from abusing you;
      2. An order directing your attacker to leave your household, unless she or he has the sole legal interest in the household.”

        “If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to have the officer present obtain transportation to an emergency medical treatment facility.”

        “If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you have the right to have the officer present remain at the scene until you and your children can leave or until your safety is otherwise insured.”

        “You have the right to file a criminal complaint with the responding officer or your local police department if the officer has not arrested the perpetrator.”

  3. A police officer shall ensure enforcement of the terms of the protective order issued pursuant to this chapter including, but not limited to, accompanying a cohabitant to his or her dwelling or residence in order to secure possession of the dwelling or residence when a vacate order against the defendant has been issued.
  4. When service of the temporary order issued pursuant to § 8-8.1-4 has not been made and/or after a permanent order is entered, a police officer shall give notice of the order to the defendant by handing him or her a certified copy of the order. The officer shall indicate that he or she has given notice by writing on plaintiff ’s copy of the order and the police department’s copy of the order the date, and time of giving notice and the officer’s name and badge number. The officer shall indicate on the offense report that actual notice was given.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 63, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 68, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 63, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 68, § 1) as passed by the 2019 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 2, and P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 63, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 68, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-8.1-6. Form of complaint.

  1. A form in substantially the following language shall suffice for the purpose of filing a complaint under this chapter:

    Click to view

  2. A form in substantially the following language shall suffice for the purpose of requesting temporary orders under this chapter:

    Click to view

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF DIVISION : Plaintiff : : VS : NO: : : Defendant : COMPLAINT FOR PROTECTION FROM ABUSE Pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8 I request that the court enter an order protecting me from abuse. (1) My full name, present street address, city and telephone number are as follows: (2) My former residence, at which I resided with the defendant, is as follows (street address and city): (3) My former residence is a house I own Defendant owns We jointly own My former residence is an apartment There is no lease My name is on lease and defendant's is not Defendant's name is on lease and mine is not Both our names are on lease (4) The full name, present street address, city and telephone number of the person causing me abuse (the defendant) are as follows: (5) On or about , without cause or provocation I suffered abuse when the defendant: Threatened or harmed with a weapon: (type of weapon used: ) Attempted to cause me physical harm; Caused me physical harm; Placed me in fear of imminent physical harm; Caused me to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force, or duress specifically, the defendant: (6) I ask that: The court order that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff at home, on the street or elsewhere. The court order the defendant to immediately leave the household which is located at I request that the above relief be ordered without notice because it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that I will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. I understand that the court will schedule a hearing no later than twenty-one (21) days after such order is entered on the question of continuing such temporary order. (7) I have not sought protection from abuse from any other judge of the district court arising out of the same facts or circumstances alleged in this complaint. (Signature)(Date) Subscribed and sworn to before me in in the County of in the state of Rhode Island, this day of A.D. 20. Notary Public Note: If this complaint is filed by an attorney, the attorney's certificate should appear below: ATTORNEY CERTIFICATE Signed: Attorney for Plaintiff Address: Date: , 20 WHITE COPY Court YELLOW COPY Plaintiff PINK COPY Defendant GOLDENROD COPY Police Department

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF DIVISION : Plaintiff : : VS : NO: : : Defendant : (TEMPORARY) ORDER PURSUANT TO CHAPTER OF THE G.L. OF R.I. Upon consideration of plaintiff’s complaint, (and having found that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the plaintiff before a notice can be served and a hearing had thereon) it is ORDERED: That the defendant is restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting, or otherwise interfering with plaintiff at home, on the street or elsewhere. That the defendant vacate forthwith the household located at A hearing on the continuation of this ORDER will be held at the District Court, County, Division, at (A.M.) (P.M.) on . If the defendant wishes to be heard, she/he will be heard at that time. If she/he does not appear at that time, this ORDER shall remain in effect. This ORDER is effective forthwith, and will remain in effect until the time and date of the above-mentioned hearing. A copy of this ORDER shall be transmitted to the appropriate local law enforcement agency forthwith, and shall be served in-hand on the defendant herein. ENTERED as an Order of Court this day of A.D. 20. ENTER: PER ORDER: Judge Clerk Presented by: Attorney for Plaintiff WHITE COPY Court YELLOW COPY Plaintiff PINK COPY Defendant GOLDENROD COPY Police Department

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 4; P.L. 1989, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 145, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 4, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 4, effective June 23, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 4, and P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-8.1-7. Notice of penalties — Notice of renewal.

Each protective order issued under this chapter, including a temporary ex-parte order, shall have the following statements printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters:

A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE GUILTY OF A MISDEMEANOR AND MAY BE PUNISHED BY A FINE OF AS MUCH AS $1,000 AND/OR BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS ONE (1) YEAR, AND MAY BE ORDERED TO ATTEND COUNSELING. IF THE VICTIM WANTS THIS ORDER TO CONTINUE BEYOND THE EXPIRATION DATE, THE VICTIM MUST APPLY FOR A RENEWAL OF THE ORDER BEFORE THE EXPIRATION DATE.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 4; P.L. 1989, ch. 162, § 1.

8-8.1-8. Appeal.

An order granting relief pursuant to § 8-8.1-3 shall remain in effect during the pendency of the appeal to the superior court unless the order is stayed by a justice of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 492, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 213, § 1.

Chapter 8.2 Traffic Tribunal

8-8.2-1. Establishment — Rule-making authority — Adjudication of violations.

  1. There is hereby established a traffic tribunal which shall be charged with the administration and adjudication of traffic violations within its jurisdiction. The traffic tribunal shall be under the supervision of the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal, who shall be the administrative head of the traffic tribunal and shall have the power to make rules for regulating practice, procedure and business within the traffic tribunal. Pursuant to § 8-6-2 , said rules shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court. Such rules, when effective, shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith. Any person who has been a member of the bar of Rhode Island may be appointed chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall be appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court, with the advice and consent of the senate, for a period of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the reappointment of the chief magistrate for one or more ten (10) year terms subject to the advice and consent of the senate. Compensation for the chief magistrate shall be equal to that of an associate judge of the district court.
  2. The judges and magistrates of the traffic tribunal shall hear and determine cases as provided by law. No district court judge appointed pursuant to chapter 8 of this title shall be assigned to perform duties of a judge or magistrate of the traffic tribunal under this chapter. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal may assign a judge or magistrate who is authorized to hear and decide cases in the traffic tribunal to serve as administrative judge or magistrate of the traffic tribunal and the administrative judge or magistrate shall perform such administrative duties as may be delegated to him or her by the chief magistrate. Once assigned to the position, the administrative judge or magistrate shall hold said administrative position for the remainder of his or her respective term as a judge or magistrate of the traffic tribunal.
    1. Those judges of the administrative adjudication court in active service on July 1, 1999 shall serve within the traffic tribunal. Whenever the total number of judges and magistrates in the traffic tribunal exclusive of the chief magistrate shall be less than seven (7), the chief justice of the supreme court, with the advice and consent of the senate, may, as needed, assign a duly qualified member of the bar of this state to act as a magistrate to fill such vacancy and shall submit his or her name to the senate for confirmation. In the event of a vacancy in the position of chief magistrate, the chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint a successor in accordance with subsection 8-8.2-1(a) . Any magistrate assigned under this section shall serve a term of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified, and shall be in the unclassified service of the state. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the assignment of a magistrate to more than one such term, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. Compensation for any such magistrate shall in no event be equal to or more than that of an associate judge of the district court. Magistrates of the traffic tribunal shall participate in the state retirement system in the same manner as all members of the unclassified service.
    2. If any judge of the traffic tribunal shall retire, or a vacancy becomes available through death, disability or any other reason, the position shall be filled by a magistrate consistent with the provisions of this section.
  3. Each judge and magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall devote full time to his or her judicial duties, except as may be otherwise provided by law. He or she shall not practice law while holding office, nor shall he or she be a partner or associate of any person in the practice of law.
  4. Judges and magistrates of the traffic tribunal shall be subject to the provisions of R.I. Const. Art. XI ; to the code of judicial conduct or successor code promulgated by the supreme court of this state, to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline in accordance with chapter 16 of this title; and to the administrative authority and control of the chief justice of the supreme court in accordance with chapter 15 of this title, except that §§ 8-15-3 and 8-15-3 .1 shall not apply to judges of the traffic tribunal.
  5. The traffic tribunal shall be a tribunal of record and shall have a seal with such words and devices as it shall adopt.
  6. Judges and magistrates of the traffic tribunal shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations.
  7. Administrative/supervisory officials.
    1. There shall be an assistant to the administrative magistrate of the traffic tribunal who shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the chief magistrate and who shall perform such clerical and administrative duties as may be assigned to him or her by the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal and the administrative judge or magistrate of the traffic tribunal. The assistant to the administrative judge or magistrate shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations within the state.
    2. There shall be a clerk of the traffic tribunal who shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal; provided, however, that, effective July 1, 1999, the first clerk of the traffic tribunal shall be that person holding the position of administrator/clerk of the administrative adjudication court as of May 1, 1998, and that person shall hold office for the balance of a term of twelve (12) years which began on September 1, 1992, without the necessity of appointment by the governor or advice and consent of the senate. The clerk of the traffic tribunal shall exercise his or her functions under the direction and control of the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal and the administrative judge or magistrate of the traffic tribunal. The clerk of the traffic tribunal shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations within the state.
  8. Clerical Personnel/Court Recorders.
    1. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall appoint deputy clerks and assistance clerks for the traffic tribunal to serve at his or her pleasure. All such clerks may administer oaths and affirmations within the state.
    2. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall appoint sufficient court recorders to enable all proceedings to be recorded by electronic means and who shall assist in such other clerical duties as may be prescribed from time to time by the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal.
    3. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall employ such clerical assistants in addition to deputy clerks as may be required in the traffic tribunal to perform clerical duties.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 4; P.L. 2011, ch. 292, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 13; P.L. 2013, ch. 289, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 401, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 289, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 401, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal of a decision of the appeals panel of the Traffic Tribunal; although the General Assembly provided that the chief magistrate can enact rules to regulate the practice, procedure, and business within that tribunal, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-6-2 and 8-8.2-1 , the Traffic Tribunal cannot use its rules to expand its own jurisdiction, and the magistrate does not have the authority to promulgate a rule that expands the jurisdiction of the District Court because that is a right that is solely within the province of the General Assembly. State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 2009).

8-8.2-2. Jurisdiction.

  1. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, all probationary license hearings as provided in § 31-10-26 , all violations of the department of transportation, department of environmental management or council on postsecondary education regulations regarding parking, standing, or stopping in areas under the jurisdiction of these agencies, all violations of state statutes relating to motor vehicles, littering, and traffic offenses, except those traffic offenses committed in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and except driving so as to endanger resulting in death, driving so as to endanger resulting in personal injury, driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs, driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs resulting in death, driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs resulting in serious bodily injury, reckless driving and other offenses against public safety as provided in § 31-27-4 , eluding a law enforcement officer with a motor vehicle in a high speed pursuit, driving after denial, suspension or revocation of license, and leaving the scene of an accident in violation of § 31-26-1 and § 31-26-2 , and driving without the consent of the owner and possession of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of § 31-9-1 and § 31-9-2 , shall be heard and determined by the traffic tribunal pursuant to the regulations promulgated by the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal; provided, however, the traffic tribunal shall not hear any parking, standing, or stopping violations that occur in any city or town that has established its own municipal court and has jurisdiction over such violations. Nothing contained herein shall abrogate the powers of the Rhode Island family court under the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14.
  2. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, the traffic tribunal shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal, all violations of any ordinances, rules, and regulations governing the public waters and the speed, management, and control of all vessels and the size, type and location and use of all anchorages and moorings within the jurisdiction of the towns of North Kingstown, South Kingstown, Portsmouth, Middletown, Narragansett, and Tiverton enforced and supervised by the harbormaster and referred to the traffic tribunal, and the terms “traffic violations” and “traffic infraction” when used in this chapter shall include the aforesaid violations and the violations shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Nothing contained herein shall abrogate the powers of the Rhode Island coastal resources management council under the provisions of chapter 23 of title 46.
  3. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, the traffic tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the chief magistrate of the Rhode Island traffic tribunal, all civil violations for §§ 20-1-12 , 20-11-20 , 20-13-16 , 20-16-17 , 23-22.5-9 , 32-2-4 , 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(iii) , 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(iv) , and 46-22-19(1) as set forth in § 42-17.10-1 .
  4. A party aggrieved by a final order of the traffic tribunal appeals panel shall be entitled to a review of the order by a judge of the district court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the district court, the review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The district court shall by rules of procedure establish procedures for review of an order entered by the appeals panel of the traffic tribunal.
  5. Violations of any statute, rule, ordinance, or regulation referenced in this section are subject to fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4 , except for violations of §§ 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(iii) and 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(iv) .

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8; P.L. 2007, ch. 253, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 294, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 4; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 12, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 221, § 4; P.L. 2012, ch. 233, § 4; P.L. 2021, ch. 98, § 1, effective July 1, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 99, § 1, effective July 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 221, § 4, and P.L. 2012, ch. 233, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 98, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 99, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2012, ch. 221, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act take effect on April 1, 2013.

P.L. 2012, ch. 233, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act take effect on April 1, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal of a decision of the appeals panel of the Traffic Tribunal; although the General Assembly provided that the chief magistrate can enact rules to regulate the practice, procedure, and business within that tribunal, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-6-2 and 8-8.2-1 , the Traffic Tribunal cannot use its rules to expand its own jurisdiction, and the magistrate does not have the authority to promulgate a rule that expands the jurisdiction of the District Court because that is a right that is solely within the province of the General Assembly. State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 2009).

8-8.2-3. Collection authority — Contempt.

  1. A judge or magistrate shall have the authority to enforce the judgments of the tribunal as authorized by law. The procedure for the collection of costs and fines shall generally follow the course of the collection of civil judgments pursuant to chapters 17 and 28 of title 9 to the extent applicable. A judge or magistrate shall not issue a body attachment for any judgment entered prior to the effective date of this section. All peace officers authorized by the law shall exercise the powers of a constable for purposes of making service of any writ or notice issued by the traffic tribunal pursuant to this collection procedure, including the execution of a body attachment. In the event that a body attachment is executed, the detainee must be brought before a judge or magistrate, or if the traffic tribunal is not in session before a justice of the peace authorized pursuant to § 12-10-2 immediately upon detention or as soon thereafter as is reasonably practicable. The amount of fees and fines due to the traffic tribunal shall be noted on a body attachment issued pursuant to this procedure, and a justice of the peace shall accept said monies and order the release of the detainee if the amount due is tendered. If the detainee claims an inability to pay the full amount due, the justice of the peace shall order the release of the detainee pursuant to reasonable bail. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall issue rules and regulations for the collection process consistent with this section.
  2. A judge or magistrate of the traffic tribunal may adjudicate a person in willful contempt and order him or her fined up to a maximum of five hundred dollars ($500) for each separate offense. Provided further that, if the judge or magistrate determines that the person is unable to pay the fine or judgment, he or she may order partial payments or establish a payment schedule for the payment of the fine or judgment.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8.

8-8.2-4. Subpoena.

  1. The traffic tribunal through its judges, magistrates and clerks is hereby authorized and empowered to summon defendants and issue subpoenas to the same extent as they may be issued by the district court in civil cases in such forms as may be prescribed by rules promulgated by the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal pursuant to § 8-6-2 .
  2. Notaries public and justices of the peace may issue subpoenas returnable before the traffic tribunal to the same extent that they are authorized to do so in civil cases pending before the district court.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8.

8-8.2-5. Security officers — Powers.

  1. All full time security officers employed by the traffic tribunal shall have the same immunities and may exercise all powers of sheriffs, city and town police officers, and constables when the security officers are enforcing the laws of this state, and all rules and regulations of the traffic tribunal upon the lands and buildings owned or occupied by the traffic tribunal upon streets and highways immediately adjacent to those lands or when in attendance with a judge or magistrate.
  2. All security officers shall be required to attend the Rhode Island municipal police academy for a period of forty (40) hours for the purpose of training in law enforcement.
  3. When any person is suspected of having committed a felony the superintendent of state police shall be notified following the suspected felon’s arrest.
  4. When acting as a constable with the authorization of the Chief Magistrate, he or she may exercise all powers under Rhode Island §§ 8-8-12(10) and 8-8-23 .

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 405, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8.

8-8.2-6. Retirement of judges on reduced pay.

  1. Whenever any person engaged as a judge on or before July 2, 1997, has served as a judge of the administrative adjudication court or as a judge of the administrative adjudication court who is reassigned by this chapter to the traffic tribunal for twenty (20) years, or has so served for ten (10) years and has reached the age of sixty five (65) years, the judge may retire from active service and, thereafter, the judge shall receive annually during life a sum equal to three fourths (3/4) of the annual salary that the judge was receiving at the time of retirement; provided, however, any person who has served for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty five (65) years, or has so served for fifteen (15) years and reached the age of seventy (70) years, may retired from active service and, thereafter, the judge shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to the annual salary he or she was receiving at the time of his or her retirement. In determining eligibility under this section, any judge who has served within the judiciary or as a hearing officer or administrative law judge, may include such service as if the service had been on the administrative adjudication court and shall be included under the provisions of § 36-9-5 . Whenever a judge or magistrate shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, such absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  2. Any judge who shall retire in accordance with the provisions of this section may at his or her request, and at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as a judge or magistrate in the traffic tribunal as the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal or the chief justice shall prescribe. When so assigned and performing that service, he or she shall have all the powers and authority of a judge or magistrate. A retired judge shall not be counted in the number of magistrates provided by law for the traffic tribunal nor shall he or she receive any further emolument other than his or her retirement pay for the performance of the aforesaid services.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 2.

8-8.2-7. Retirement contribution.

  1. Judges of the administrative adjudication court engaged after December 31, 1989, who are reassigned by this chapter to the traffic tribunal shall have deducted from their total salary beginning December 31, 1989, and ending June 30, 2012, an amount equal to a rate percent of compensation as specified in § 36-10-1 relating to member contributions to the state retirement system. Effective July 1, 2012, all active judges whether engaged before or after December 31, 1989, shall have deducted from compensation as defined in § 36-8-1(8) an amount equal to twelve percent (12%) of compensation. The receipts collected under this provision shall be deposited in a restricted revenue account entitled “administrative adjudication retirement benefits” on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld. Proceeds deposited in this account shall be used to pay judges’ retirement costs. The retirement board shall establish rules and regulations to govern the provisions of this section.
  2. The state is required to deduct and withhold member contributions and to transmit same to the retirement system and is hereby made liable for the contribution. In addition, any amount of employee contributions actually deducted and withheld shall be deemed to be a special fund in trust for the benefit of the member and shall be transmitted to the retirement system as set forth herein.
  3. A judge of the administrative adjudication court reassigned by this chapter to the traffic tribunal who withdraws from service or ceases to be a member for any reason other than death or retirement, shall be paid on demand a refund consisting of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the administrative adjudication retirement benefits account. Any member receiving a refund shall thereby forfeit and relinquish all accrued right as a member of the system together with credits for total service previously granted to the member; provided, however, that if any member who has received a refund shall subsequently reenter the service and again become a member of the system, he or she shall have the privilege of restoring all moneys previously received or disbursed to his or her credit as a refund of contributions plus regular interest for the period from the date of refund to the date of restoration. Upon the repayment of the refund as herein provided, such member shall again receive credit for the amount of total service which he or she had previously forfeited by the acceptance of the refund.
  4. Whenever any judge of the administrative adjudication court dies from any cause before retirement and has no surviving spouse or domestic partner or minor child(ren), a payment shall be made of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the administrative adjudication court judges’ retirement account. The payment of the accumulated contributions of the judge shall be made to such person as the judge shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the retirement board, or if the judge has no filed nomination, or if the person so nominated has died, then to the estate of the deceased judge.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 167, § 4; P.L. 2007, ch. 274, § 4; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 18; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 18; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 3; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 3, and P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

8-8.2-8. State contributions.

The state of Rhode Island shall make its contribution for maintaining the system established by § 8-8.2-7 and providing the annuities, benefits, and retirement allowances in accordance with the provisions of this chapter by annually appropriating an amount that will pay a rate percent of the compensation paid after December 31, 1989, to judges of the administrative adjudication court engaged after December 31, 1989, who are reassigned by this chapter to the traffic tribunal. The rate percent shall be computed and certified in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 36-8-13 and § 36-10-2 under rules and regulations promulgated by the retirement board pursuant to § 36-8-3 and shall be transmitted on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 3; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 3, and P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

8-8.2-9. Retirement of judges on reduced pay.

  1. Whenever any person first engaged as a judge subsequent to July 2, 1997, has served as a judge of the administrative adjudication court or as a judge of the administrative adjudication court who is reassigned by this chapter to the traffic tribunal for twenty (20) years, or has so served for ten (10) years and has reached the age of sixty five (65) years, the judge may retire from active service and, thereafter, the judge shall receive annually during life a sum equal to three fourths (3/4) of his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation; provided, however any such person who has served twenty (20) years and has reached the age sixty five (65) or has served fifteen (15) years and has reached the age of seventy (70) years, may retire from active service and, thereafter, the judge shall receive annually during life a sum equal to his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation. In determining eligibility under this section, any judge who has served within the judiciary or as a hearing officer or administrative law judge, may include such service as if the service had been on the administrative adjudication court and shall be included under the provision of § 36-9-5 . Whenever a justice or magistrate shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, such absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  2. Any judge who shall retire in accordance with the provisions of this section may at his or her own request, and at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as a magistrate in the traffic tribunal as the chief magistrate or chief justice shall prescribe. When so assigned and performing that service, he or she shall have all the powers and authority of a magistrate. A retired judge shall not be counted in the number of magistrates provided by law for the division of traffic adjudication nor shall he or she receive any further emolument other than his or her retirement pay for the performance of the aforesaid services.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 2.

8-8.2-10. No incremental retirement benefit for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice or chief judge or chief magistrate.

No increment in salary resulting from any rule or regulation providing for an increment in salary for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice or chief magistrate shall be construed to add to the annual salary of a judicial officer for purposes of retirement under § 8-8.2-6 or § 8-8.2-9 .

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8; P.L. 2011, ch. 63, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 95, § 2.

8-8.2-11. Allowance to surviving spouses or domestic partners of deceased judges.

  1. Whenever any judge of the administrative adjudication court or any judge of the administrative adjudication court who is reassigned by this chapter to the traffic tribunal dies after retirement or during active service while eligible for retirement, the judge’s surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, an amount equal to one third (1/3) of the annual payment that the administrative judge was receiving by way of salary or retirement pay at the time of his or her death. Whenever a judge of the administrative adjudication court or any judge of the administrative adjudication court who is reassigned by this act to the traffic tribunal shall die without having become eligible to retire under § 8-8.2-6 and has served ten (10) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter during the spouse’s or domestic partner’s lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, one fourth (1/4) of the annual salary that the judge was receiving at the time of his or her death.
  2. Any judge who retires under the provisions of § 8-8.2-6 may at his or her option elect to receive three fourths (3/4) of his or her retirement pay, and where the option is exercised by giving the general treasurer notice in writing thereof within two (2) years after the date of his or her retirement, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually one half (1/2) of his or her retirement pay during the spouse’s or domestic partner’s lifetime so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 13.

8-8.2-12. Additional benefits payable to retired judges and their surviving spouses or domestic partners.

  1. All judges of the administrative adjudication court and all judges of the administrative adjudication court who have been reassigned to the traffic tribunal, or their surviving spouses or domestic partners, who retire after January 1, 1970 and who receive a retirement allowance pursuant to the provisions of this title, shall, on the first day of January, next following the third anniversary of the retirement, receive a cost of living retirement adjustment in addition to his or her retirement allowance in an amount equal to three percent (3%) of the original retirement allowance. In each succeeding year thereafter during the month of January, the retirement allowance shall be increased an additional three percent (3%) of the original allowance, compounded annually from the year cost of living adjustment was first payable to be continued during the lifetime of the judge or his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner. For the purpose of such computation, credit shall be given for a full calendar year regardless of the effective date of the retirement allowance.
  2. Any judge who retired prior to January 31, 1980, shall be deemed for the purpose of this section to have retired on January 1, 1980.
  3. For judges not eligible to retire as of September 30, 2009, and not eligible upon passage of this article, and for their beneficiaries, the cost of living adjustment described in subsection (a) above shall only apply to the first thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) of retirement allowance, indexed annually, and shall commence upon the third (3rd) anniversary of the date of retirement or when the retiree reaches age sixty-five (65), whichever is later. The thirty-five thousand dollar ($35,000) limit shall increase annually by the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year or three percent (3%), whichever is less. The first thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), as indexed, of retirement allowance shall be multiplied by the percentage of increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year or three percent (3%), whichever is less on the month following the anniversary date of each succeeding year. For judges eligible to retire as of September 30, 2009, or eligible upon passage of this article, and for their beneficiaries, the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not apply.
  4. This subsection (d) shall be effective for the period July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2015. (d) (1) Notwithstanding the prior paragraphs of this section, and subject to paragraph (d)(2) below, for all present and former justices, active and retired justices, and beneficiaries receiving any retirement, disability or death allowance or benefit of any kind, whether provided for or on behalf of justices engaged on or prior to December 31, 1989 as a non-contributory justice or engaged after December 31, 1989 as a contributory justice, the annual benefit adjustment provided in any calendar year under this section shall be equal to (A) multiplied by (B) where (A) is equal to the percentage determined by subtracting five and one-half percent (5.5%) (the “subtrahend”) from the Five-Year Average Investment Return of the retirement system determined as of the last day of the plan year preceding the calendar year in which the adjustment is granted, said percentage not to exceed four percent (4%) and not to be less than zero percent (0%), and (B) is equal to the lesser of the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) of retirement allowance, such twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) amount to be indexed annually in the same percentage as determined under (d)(1)(A) above. The “Five-Year Average Investment Return” shall mean the average of the investment return of the most recent five (5) plan years as determined by the retirement board. Subject to paragraph (d)(2) below, the benefit adjustment provided by this paragraph shall commence upon the third (3rd) anniversary of the date of retirement or the date on which the retiree reaches his or her Social Security retirement age, whichever is later. In the event the retirement board adjusts the actuarially assumed rate of return for the system, either upward or downward, the subtrahend shall be adjusted either upward or downward in the same amount. (2) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3), the benefit adjustments under this section for any plan year shall be suspended in their entirety unless the Funded Ratio of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, the Judicial Retirement Benefits Trust, and the State Police Retirements Benefits Trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%) in which even the benefit adjustment will be reinstated for all justices for such plan year. In determining whether a funding level under this paragraph (d)(2) has been achieved, the actuary shall calculate the funding percentage after taking into account the reinstatement of any current or future benefit adjustment provided under this section. (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(2), in each fifth plan year commencing after June 30, 2012, commencing with the plan year ending June 30, 2017, and subsequently at intervals of five (5) plan years, a benefit adjustment shall be calculated and made in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) above until the Funded Ratio of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, the Judicial Retirement Benefits Trust, and the State Police Retirement Benefits Trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%). (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the provisions of this paragraph (d) of § 8-8.2-12 shall become effective July 1, 2012, and shall apply to any benefit adjustment not granted on or prior to June 30, 2012.
  5. This subsection (e) shall become effective July 1, 2015.
      1. As soon as administratively reasonable following the enactment into law of this subsection (e), a one-time benefit adjustment shall be provided to justices and/or beneficiaries of justices who retired on or before June 30, 2012, in the amount of two percent (2%) of the lesser of either the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) of the justice’s retirement allowance. This one-time benefit adjustment shall be provided without regard to the retiree’s age or number of years since retirement.
      2. Notwithstanding the prior subsections of this section, for all present and former justices, active and retired justices, and beneficiaries receiving any retirement, disability or death allowance or benefit of any kind, whether provided for or on behalf of justices engaged on or prior to December 31,1989 as a non-contributory justice or engaged after December 31, 1989 as a contributory justice, the annual benefit adjustment provided in any calendar year under this section for adjustments on and after January 1, 2016, and subject to subsection (e)(2) below, shall be equal to (I) multiplied by (II):
        1. Shall equal the sum of fifty percent (50%) of (i) plus fifty percent (50%) of (ii) where:
          1. Is equal to the percentage determined by subtracting five and one-half percent (5.5%) (the “subtrahend”) from the five-year average investment return of the retirement system determined as of the last day of the plan year preceding the calendar year in which the adjustment is granted, said percentage not to exceed four percent (4%) and not to be less than zero percent (0%). The “five-year average investment return” shall mean the average of the investment returns of the most recent five (5) plan years as determined by the retirement board. In the event the retirement board adjusts the actuarially assumed rate of return for the system, either upward or downward, the subtrahend shall be adjusted either upward or downward in the same amount.
          2. Is equal to the lesser of three percent (3%) or the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year. In no event shall the sum of (i) plus (ii) exceed three and one-half percent (3.5%) or be less than zero percent (0%).
        2. Is equal to the lesser of either the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand eight hundred and fifty-five dollars ($25,855) of retirement allowance, such amount to be indexed annually in the same percentage as determined under subsection (e)(1)(B)(I) above. The benefit adjustments provided by this subsection (e)(1)(B) shall be provided to all retirees entitled to receive a benefit adjustment as of June 30, 2012, under the law then in effect, and for all other retirees the benefit adjustments shall commence upon the third anniversary of the date of retirement or the date on which the retiree reaches his or her Social Security retirement age, whichever is later.
    1. Except as provided in subsection (e)(3), the benefit adjustments under subsection (e)(1)(B) for any plan year shall be suspended in their entirety unless the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%) in which event the benefit adjustment will be reinstated for all justices for such plan year. In determining whether a funding level under this subsection (e)(2) has been achieved, the actuary shall calculate the funding percentage after taking into account the reinstatement of any current or future benefit adjustment provided under this section.
    2. Notwithstanding subsection (e)(2), effective for members and/or beneficiaries of members who retired on or before June 30, 2015, in each fourth plan year commencing after June 30, 2012, commencing with the plan year ending June 30, 2016, and subsequently at intervals of four plan years: (i) A benefit adjustment shall be calculated and made in accordance with subsection (e)(1)(B) above; and (ii) The dollar amount in subsection (e)(1)(B)(II) of twenty-five thousand eight hundred and fifty-five dollars ($25,855) shall be replaced with thirty-one thousand and twenty-six dollars ($31,026) until the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%).
      1. Effective for members and or beneficiaries of members who have retired on or before July 1, 2015, a one-time stipend of five hundred dollars ($500) shall be payable within sixty (60) days following the enactment of the legislation implementing this provision, and a second one-time stipend of five hundred dollars ($500) in the same month of the following year. These stipends shall be payable to all retired members or beneficiaries receiving a benefit as of the applicable payment date and shall not be considered cost of living adjustments under the prior provisions of this § 8-8.2-12 .

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 16, § 4; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 18; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 18; P.L. 2015, ch. 141, art. 21, § 23.

8-8.2-13. Calculation of retirement benefits.

For the purposes of the calculation of retirement benefits, in the event that any judge of the administrative adjudication court or any judge of the administrative adjudication court who has been reassigned to the traffic tribunal by this chapter participates or acquiesces in a state shutdown or in a reduced salary or salary deferral plan consistent with any plan imposed upon or agreed to by other state employees, his or her annual salary shall be calculated as if she or he had not participated or acquiesced in any shutdown or plan.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1.

8-8.2-14. Transfer of records and other property.

All books, papers, records, current appropriations and relevant property necessary for the functioning of the traffic tribunal shall be transferred thereto from the administrative adjudication court.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1.

8-8.2-15. Transfer of employees.

All employees of the administrative adjudication court deemed by the chief judge of the district court, with the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court, and subject to the labor laws of this state and any applicable collective bargaining agreement, to be essential to the operation of the traffic tribunal are hereby transferred to the said traffic tribunal. The chief judge of the district court shall, subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court, and subject to any applicable collective bargaining agreement, assign appropriate titles and duties to said employees and shall promulgate a listing of said titles and duties within six (6) months from July 1, 1999.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 13.

8-8.2-16. Interpretation.

Whenever, in the general laws, the words administrative adjudication court shall appear, said words shall be construed and interpreted as, and to mean, the traffic tribunal. Whenever, in the general laws, the words administrator/clerk of the administrative adjudication court shall appear, said words shall be interpreted and construed as, and to mean, clerk of the traffic tribunal. Except as provided in §§ 8-8.2-6 , 8-8.2-7 , 8-8.2-8 , 8-8.2-9 , 8-8.2-11 , and 8-8.2-12 , whenever, in the general laws, the words judge of the administrative adjudication court shall appear, said words shall be construed and interpreted as, and to mean, judge or magistrate of the traffic tribunal.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1.

8-8.2-17. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 8, effective August 1, 2007.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-8.2-17 concerned continued service.

8-8.2-18. Custody of records.

The traffic tribunal established by this chapter shall have custody of all records, books, and papers of the administrative adjudication court heretofore existing. All proceedings and processes pending in the administrative adjudication court heretofore existing and shall continue with the same force and effect in the traffic tribunal herein established; and all rights and liabilities of the parties to such actions and proceedings and processes commenced prior to July 1, 1999, including costs of appeal, shall continue in full force and effect.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1.

8-8.2-19. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof shall for any reason be judged invalid, such a judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of the law, but shall be confined in its effect to the provisions or application directly involved in the controversy giving rise to the judgment.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 4, § 1.

8-8.2-20. Domestic partner — Definition.

For purposes of this chapter, “domestic partner” shall be defined as a person who, prior to the decedent’s death, was in an exclusive, intimate and committed relationship with the decedent, and who certifies by affidavit that their relationship met the following qualifications:

  1. Both partners were at least eighteen (18) years of age and were mentally competent to contract;
  2. Neither partner was married to anyone else;
  3. Partners were not related by blood to a degree which would prohibit marriage in the state of Rhode Island;
  4. Partners resided together and had resided together for at least one year at the time of death; and
  5. Partners were financially interdependent as evidenced by at least two (2) of the following:
    1. Domestic partnership agreement or relationship contract;
    2. Joint mortgage or joint ownership of primary residence;
    3. Two (2) of: (A) joint ownership of motor vehicle; (B) joint checking account; (C) joint credit account; (D) joint lease; and/or
    4. The domestic partner had been designated as a beneficiary for the decedent’s will, retirement contract or life insurance.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 4.

8-8.2-21. Abstracts of court records — Traffic tribunal.

A full record shall be kept by the Rhode Island traffic tribunal in this state of every case in which a person is charged with violating subparagraphs 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(iii) and 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(iv) . An abstract of the record shall be retained by the court. The abstract shall be made upon forms prepared by the chief magistrate of the Rhode Island traffic tribunal and shall include all necessary information as to the parties to the cause, the nature of the offense, the date of the hearing, the plea, the decision, the judgment, and the result, and every abstract shall be certified by the clerk of the court. The Rhode Island traffic tribunal shall keep the records and they shall not be open to public inspection. The chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall make the records available to Rhode Island state and local police departments for their inspection of the details of cases which have been heard before the tribunal.

History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 221, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 233, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 221, § 5, and P.L. 2012, ch. 233, § 5 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2012, ch. 221, § 6, provides that this section take effect on April 1, 2013.

P.L. 2012, ch. 233, § 6, provides that this section take effect on April 1, 2013.

Chapter 8.3 Extreme Risk Protection Orders

8-8.3-1. Definitions.

When used in this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings:

  1. “Court” means the superior court in the county in which the respondent resides.
  2. “Extreme risk protection order” means either a temporary order or a one-year order granted under this chapter.
  3. “Family or household member” means present and former family members (as defined in § 15-15-1 ), parents (as defined in § 15-15-1 ), stepparents, legal guardians, persons who are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year (as defined in § 15-15-1), and cohabitants (as defined in § 8-8.1-1 ).
  4. “Firearm” means and includes any machine gun, pistol, rifle, air rifle, air pistol, “blank gun,” “BB gun,” or other instrument from which steel or metal projectiles are propelled, or that may readily be converted to expel a projectile, except crossbows, recurve, compound, or longbows, and except instruments propelling projectiles that are designed or normally used for a primary purpose other than as a weapon. The frame or receiver of the weapon shall be construed as a firearm pursuant to the provisions of this section.
  5. “Law enforcement agency” means the police department of any city or town, and the division of the Rhode Island state police established pursuant to chapter 28 of title 42.
  6. “Law enforcement officer” means a sworn member of a law enforcement agency as defined herein.
  7. “One-year extreme risk protection order” means an extreme risk protection order granted pursuant to the provisions of § 8-8.3-5 or renewed pursuant to the provisions of § 8-8.3-7 .
  8. “Petitioner” means a law enforcement agency that petitions for an order pursuant to this chapter.
  9. “Respondent” means the person who is identified as the respondent in a petition filed pursuant to this chapter.
  10. “Social media” means any cell phone- or internet-based tools and applications that are used to share and distribute information.
  11. “Temporary extreme risk protection order” means an extreme risk protection order issued pursuant to the provisions of § 8-8.3-4 .

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

8-8.3-2. Filing of petition.

Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard, and determined in the superior court of the county in which the respondent resides. Any proceedings under this chapter shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. A party filing a petition under this chapter may do so without payment of any filing fee. There shall be no minimum residence requirements for the filing of a petition under this chapter. All matters filed under this chapter, as well as any documents submitted in conjunction with proceedings under this chapter, shall be maintained as confidential or non-public by the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-3. Contents of petition.

  1. A petition for an extreme risk protection order shall be filed only by a law enforcement agency.
  2. A petitioner may file a petition with the court requesting an extreme risk protection order that shall enjoin the respondent from having in his or her possession, custody, or control any firearms and shall further enjoin the respondent from purchasing, receiving, or attempting to purchase or receive, any firearms while the order is in effect. The petitioner shall concurrently file a sworn affidavit for a search warrant pursuant to chapter 5 of title 12 for the search of any firearms in the possession, custody, or control of the respondent.
  3. A petitioner shall file a petition upon receipt of credible information that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing imminent personal injury to self or others by having in his or her custody or control, or by purchasing, possessing, or receiving, a firearm.
  4. A petition must state the specific statements, actions, or facts that support the belief that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing imminent personal injury to self or others by having in his or her custody or control, or by purchasing, possessing, or receiving, a firearm.
  5. A petition for an extreme risk protection order must be supported by a written affidavit signed by the petitioner under oath. The petitioner may produce sworn statements or testimony of other witnesses to support the petition.
  6. If the petitioner believes there are firearms in the respondent’s current ownership, possession, custody, or control, the petition and search warrant affidavit shall identify the number, types, and locations of all such firearms, if known.
  7. A petitioner for an extreme risk protection order, at the time of the filing, shall identify all known restraining orders, orders of protection, and pending lawsuits, complaints, petitions, or actions pending, active, or filed within one year prior to the petition involving the respondent, including, but not limited to, an order entered pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8 or chapter 15 of title 15.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-4. Temporary orders — Proceedings.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition under this chapter, the court may enter a temporary order if the court finds there is probable cause from specific facts shown by the petition that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing imminent personal injury to self or others by having in his or her custody or control, or by purchasing, possessing, or receiving, a firearm before notice can be served and a hearing held.
  2. If the court finds probable cause under subsection (a) of this section and from the sworn affidavit, a search warrant shall issue pursuant to chapter 5 of title 12 for the search for any firearms in the possession, custody, or control of the respondent. The warrant shall be executed pursuant to chapter 5 of title 12.
  3. When the court is unavailable after the close of business, a petition and affidavit may be filed before any available superior court judge.
  4. Any order and warrant issued under this section, and any documentation in support of an order and warrant, shall be filed immediately with the clerk of the superior court. The filing shall have the effect of commencing proceedings under this chapter and invoking the other provisions of this chapter.
  5. A temporary extreme risk protection order must include:
    1. A statement of the grounds supporting the issuance of the order;
    2. The date and time the order was issued;
    3. A statement that the order shall continue until such time as a court considers the petition pursuant to § 8-8.3-5 at a hearing;
    4. The address of the court that issued the order and in which any responsive pleading should be filed;
    5. The date and time of the scheduled hearing;
    6. The following statement: “To the subject of this protection order: This order will continue until the hearing scheduled on the date and time noted above. If any of your firearms have not been seized by the petitioner, you are under an obligation to immediately contact the petitioner to arrange for the surrender of any other firearms that you own and/or are in your custody, control, or possession, that have not been seized. You must surrender to the petitioner all firearms that you own and/or are in your custody, control, or possession, and also immediately surrender to the licensing authority or the attorney general any concealed carry permit issued to you pursuant to § 11-47-11 or § 11-47-18 . While this order is in effect, it is illegal for you to have any firearm in your possession, custody, or control or for you to purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive any firearm. You may seek the advice of an attorney as to any matter connected with this order. If you believe you cannot afford an attorney, you are hereby referred to the public defender for an intake interview, and if eligible, the court shall appoint an attorney for you.”
    7. Any temporary extreme risk protection order issued pursuant to this section shall continue until the time of the hearing pursuant to § 8-8.3-5 . If the court continues a hearing pursuant to § 8-8.3-5, the temporary order shall remain in effect until the next hearing date.
  6. The court shall schedule a hearing within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of a temporary extreme risk protection order to determine if a one-year extreme risk protection order should be issued under this chapter.
  7. A temporary extreme risk protection order shall be immediately personally served by the petitioner along with supporting documents that formed the basis of the order, the notice of hearing, and the petition for the one-year extreme protection order. Alternative service shall be in accordance with § 8-8.3-6 . Service issued under this section takes precedence over the service of other documents, unless the other documents are of a similar emergency nature. If timely personal service cannot be made, the court shall set a new hearing date and shall require additional attempts at obtaining personal service or permit alternative service as provided in this chapter.
  8. If the court declines to issue a temporary extreme risk protection order, the court shall state in writing the reasons for the denial.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-5. Hearings on petition — Grounds for issuance — Contents of order.

  1. Upon hearing the matter, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing imminent personal injury to self or others by having in his or her custody or control, or by purchasing, possessing, or receiving, a firearm, the court shall issue a one-year extreme risk protection order. An extreme risk protection order issued by the court shall be for a fixed period of one year, at the expiration of which time the court may renew the extreme risk protection order as set forth in § 8-8.3-7 .
  2. In determining whether grounds for an extreme risk protection order exist, the court may consider any or all of the following, including, but not limited to:
    1. A recent act or threat of violence by the respondent against self or others, regardless of whether the act or threat of violence involves a firearm;
    2. A pattern of acts or threats of violence by the respondent within the past twelve (12) months, including, but not limited to, acts or threats of violence against self or others;
    3. The respondent’s mental health history;
    4. Evidence of the respondent’s abuse of controlled substances or alcohol;
    5. Previous violations by the respondent of any court order including, but not limited to, restraining orders, no-contact orders issued pursuant to chapter 29 of title 12, and protective orders issued pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8 or chapter 15 of title 15;
    6. Previous extreme risk protection orders issued against the respondent;
    7. The unlawful, threatening, or reckless use or brandishing of a firearm by the respondent, including, but not limited to, such act taken or displayed through social media;
    8. The respondent’s ownership of, access to, or intent to possess firearms;
    9. The respondent’s criminal history, including, but not limited to, arrests and convictions for felony offenses, crimes of violence as defined in § 11-47-2 , violent misdemeanor offenses, crimes involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 , and stalking;
    10. The history, use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical violence by the respondent against another person, or the respondent’s history of stalking another person, or evidence of cruelty to animals by the respondent, including, but not limited to, evidence of violations or convictions pursuant to the provisions of chapter 1 of title 4; and
    11. Evidence of recent acquisition or attempts at acquisition of firearms by the respondent.
  3. In determining whether grounds for a one-year extreme risk protection order exist, the court may also consider any other relevant and credible evidence presented by the petitioner, respondent, and any witnesses they may produce.
  4. The court may continue a hearing under this section upon a showing of good cause, including, but not limited to, whether service was effectuated less than seven (7) days from the date of the scheduled hearing. If the court continues a hearing under this subsection in a matter in which a temporary extreme risk protection order has been issued under § 8-8.3-4 , the temporary extreme risk protection order shall remain in effect until the next hearing date.
  5. During the hearing the court may consider whether a mental health evaluation or substance abuse evaluation is appropriate, and may recommend that the respondent seek the evaluation if appropriate.
  6. An extreme risk protection order must include:
    1. A statement of the grounds supporting the issuance of the order;
    2. The date and time the order was issued;
    3. The date and time the order expires;
    4. Information pertaining to any recommendation by the court for mental health and/or substance abuse evaluations, if applicable;
    5. The address of the court that issued the order and in which any responsive pleading should be filed; and
    6. The following statement: “To the subject of this protection order: This order will continue until the date and time noted above unless terminated earlier by court order. If any of your firearms have not been seized by the petitioner, you are under an obligation to immediately contact the petitioner to arrange for the surrender of any other firearms that you own and/or are in your custody, control, or possession, that have not been seized. You must surrender to the petitioner all firearms that you own and/or are in your custody, control, or possession, and also immediately surrender to the licensing authority or the attorney general any concealed carry permit issued to you pursuant to § 11-47-11 or § 11-47-18 . While this order is in effect, it is illegal for you to have any firearm in your possession, custody, or control or for you to purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive any firearm. You have the right to request one hearing to terminate this order within each twelve-month (12) period that this order, or any renewal order, is in effect. You may seek the advice of an attorney as to any matter connected with this order. If you believe you cannot afford an attorney, you are hereby referred to the public defender for an intake interview, and if eligible, the court shall appoint an attorney for you.”
  7. Upon the issuance of a one-year extreme risk protection order, the court shall inform the respondent that he or she is entitled to request termination of the order in the manner prescribed by § 8-8.3-7 . The court shall provide the respondent with a form to request a termination hearing. The court shall also schedule a review hearing of the matter, which hearing shall be scheduled within thirty (30) calendar days before the date the one-year extreme risk protection order is set to expire.
  8. If the court declines to issue a one-year extreme risk protection order, the court shall state in writing the particular reasons for the court’s denial and shall also order the return of weapons to the respondent. The return should be effectuated consistent with the provisions of § 8-8.3-8 .

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-6. Service of one-year extreme risk protection orders.

  1. A one-year extreme risk protection order issued under this chapter shall be personally served upon the respondent by the division of sheriffs. Provided, the division of sheriffs may request the assistance of the state police with the service as needed. If the division of sheriffs cannot complete service of the one-year extreme risk protection order upon the respondent within seven (7) days of the order’s issuance, the deputy sheriff shall notify the petitioner and the court. The petitioner shall then seek an order for alternative service pursuant to this chapter.
  2. If the court determines that after diligent effort, personal service on the respondent with or of any documents as required pursuant to this chapter cannot be made, then the court may order an alternative method of service designed to give reasonable notice to the respondent. Alternative service may include, but shall not be limited to: service by certified and regular mail at respondent’s last-known address or place of employment; leaving copies at the respondent’s dwelling or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein; or by affixing a summons to the door of the respondent’s residence. Provided, due to the nature of these proceedings, notice shall not be given by publication in a newspaper.
  3. In the event personal service of any order, notice, or other document issued pursuant to this chapter cannot be obtained, the court shall have discretion to continue any extreme risk protection order, and hearing thereon, as the court deems appropriate, until service can be made upon the respondent.
  4. Upon receipt of alternative service of any order, notice, or other document issued pursuant to this chapter, the respondent shall comply with the order, notice, or document as if personally served.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-7. Termination — Expiration — Renewal of orders.

  1. Termination of order.  The respondent may submit a single written request for a hearing to terminate a one-year extreme risk protection order issued under this chapter within the twelve-month (12) period that the order, or any renewal order, is in effect.
    1. Upon receipt of the request for a hearing to terminate a one-year extreme risk protection order, the court shall set a date for a hearing. The respondent shall cause a copy of the notice of the request to be served on the original petitioner. A hearing on this motion shall be scheduled not later than thirty (30) days from the date of filing the request.
    2. At a hearing to terminate a one-year extreme risk protection order prior to its scheduled date of expiration, the respondent shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent does not pose a significant danger of causing imminent personal injury to self or others by having a firearm in his or her custody or control, or by purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm. The court may consider any relevant evidence, including evidence of the considerations enumerated in § 8-8.3-5 . In addition, the court may consider whether the respondent complied with the court’s recommendation that the respondent undergo a mental health and/or substance abuse evaluation.
    3. If the court finds after the hearing that the respondent has met his or her burden by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall terminate the one-year order and order return of the firearms consistent with the provisions of § 8-8.3-8 .
  2. Notice of impending expiration.  The original petitioner shall notify in writing all interested parties, including but not limited to family or household members of the respondent, of the impending expiration of any one-year extreme risk protection order within fourteen (14) calendar days before the date the order expires.
  3. Motion for renewal of order.  The petitioner may by motion request a renewal of a one-year extreme risk protection order at any time within fourteen (14) calendar days before the date the order expires.
    1. Upon receipt of a motion to renew a one-year extreme risk protection order, the court shall order that a hearing be held not later than fourteen (14) days from the date the motion is filed. The respondent shall be personally served with notice of the motion, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
    2. In determining whether to renew a one-year extreme risk protection order under this section, the court shall consider all relevant evidence presented by the petitioner and follow the same procedures provided in § 8-8.3-5 . The court may also consider whether the respondent complied with any court recommendation for a mental health and/or substance abuse evaluation.
    3. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the requirements for issuance of a one-year extreme risk protection order as provided in § 8-8.3-5 continue to be met, the court shall renew the order for another year. Further, if, after notice, the motion for renewal is uncontested and the petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be renewed on the basis of the petitioner’s motion and affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order that is subject to renewal.
    4. A renewal of a one-year extreme risk protection order shall be for another fixed period of one year, subject to termination as provided in subsection (a) of this section or future renewal by order of the court pursuant to this subsection.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-8. Firearms return — Disposal.

  1. Any firearm seized or surrendered in accordance with this chapter shall be returned to the respondent upon his or her request, within ten (10) days, when:
    1. The respondent produces documentation issued by the court indicating that any extreme risk protective order issued pursuant to this chapter has expired, terminated, or has not been renewed. Respondent shall not be required to acquire any additional court order granting the return of seized or surrendered firearms; and
    2. The law enforcement agency in possession of the firearms conducts a national criminal records check and determines that the respondent is not otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm under state or federal law.
  2. A law enforcement agency shall, if requested by the court or the petitioner, provide prior notice to any interested party, including but not limited to family or household members of the respondent, of the impending return of a firearm to a respondent, in the manner provided in § 8-8.3-6 .
  3. Upon written request of the respondent, any law enforcement agency storing firearm(s) shall transfer possession of the firearm(s) to a federally licensed firearms dealer, who or that may be designated by the respondent if so desired.
    1. The respondent may instruct the federally licensed firearms dealer designated by the respondent where applicable to sell the firearm(s) or to transfer ownership or possession in accordance with state and federal law, to a qualified named individual who is not a member of the person’s dwelling house, and who is not prohibited from possessing firearms under state or federal law. The owner of any firearm(s) sold shall receive any financial value received from its sale, less the cost associated with taking possession of, storing, and transferring of the firearm(s).
    2. Any individual to whom possession of a firearm(s) is transferred pursuant to this subsection shall be prohibited from transferring or returning any firearm(s) to the respondent while the extreme risk protective order is in effect and shall be informed of this prohibition. Any knowing violation of this subsection is a felony that shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
    3. An individual to whom possession of a firearm(s) is transferred pursuant to this subsection shall only return a firearm(s) to the respondent if the respondent provides court documentation that the extreme risk protection order issued pursuant to this chapter has expired or been withdrawn or terminated and has not been renewed.
  4. The Rhode Island state police are authorized to develop rules and procedures pertaining to the storage and return of firearms seized by or surrendered to the local law enforcement agency or the state police pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or chapter 8.1 of title 8. The state police may consult with the Rhode Island Police Chiefs’ Association in developing rules and procedures to effectuate this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-9. Reporting of orders.

  1. The clerk of the court shall enter any one-year extreme risk protection order or temporary extreme risk protection order issued pursuant to this chapter into a statewide judicial information system on the same day the order is issued.
  2. The clerk of the court shall forward a copy of any order issued, renewed, or terminated under this chapter the same day the order is issued to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order and the attorney general.
    1. Upon receipt of the copy of an extreme risk protection order, the attorney general shall enter the order into:
      1. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System, also known as the NICS database;
      2. All federal or state computer-based systems and databases used by law enforcement or others to identify prohibited purchasers of firearms; and
      3. All computer-based criminal intelligence information systems and databases available in this state used by law enforcement agencies.
    2. The order must remain in each system for the period stated in the order, and the law enforcement agency shall only remove orders from the systems upon notice that they have been terminated or expired. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order shall be fully enforceable in any city or town in the state.
  3. The issuing court shall, within three (3) business days after issuance of a one-year extreme risk protection order or temporary extreme risk protection order, forward a copy of the respondent’s driver’s license, or comparable information, along with the date of order issuance, to the attorney general and the appropriate licensing authority. Upon receipt of the information, the attorney general or the appropriate licensing authority shall determine if the respondent has a concealed carry permit. If the respondent does have a concealed carry permit, the attorney general or the appropriate licensing authority shall immediately revoke the license.
  4. If any extreme risk protection order is terminated before its expiration date, the clerk of the court shall forward, on the same day, a copy of the termination order to the office of the attorney general and the petitioner. Upon receipt of the order, the attorney general shall promptly remove the order from any computer-based system into which it was entered pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-10. Penalties.

  1. Any violation of any extreme risk protection order shall subject the violator to being found in contempt of court. The contempt order shall not be exclusive and shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies.
  2. Any violation of an extreme risk protection order issued under this chapter of which the respondent has actual notice shall be a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  3. Filing a petition or providing information pursuant to this chapter knowing the information in or for such petition to be materially false, or with intent to harass the respondent, shall be a felony that shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-11. Liability.

Except as provided in §§ 8-8.3-8 and 8-8.3-10 , this chapter does not impose criminal or civil liability on a law enforcement agency, law enforcement officer, or the attorney general or a member of that department, for acts or omissions related to obtaining any extreme risk protection order including, but not limited to, reporting, declining to report, investigating, declining to investigate, filing, or declining to file a petition under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-12. Required notice on orders — Confidentiality of proceedings.

  1. Any extreme risk protection order form shall include, in a conspicuous location, notice of penalties resulting from violation of the order, and the following statement: “You have the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from violating this order’s provisions. Only the court can change the order and only upon written application.”
  2. All filings, petitions, orders, warrants, affidavits, evidence, and any other document filed pursuant to this chapter shall be deemed confidential documents and shall not be available for public inspection or disclosure absent a court order. This section shall not prohibit the entry of orders into appropriate databases as required pursuant to § 8-8.3-9 .

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-13. Appeal.

Any order under this chapter shall remain in effect during the pendency of an appeal to the supreme court unless the order is stayed by a justice of the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

8-8.3-14. Severability.

If any section of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of the chapter and the application of the section to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected. The invalidity or unconstitutionality of any section or sections or part of any section or sections of this chapter shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this chapter and to this end the sections of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

Chapter 9 Probate Courts

8-9-1, 8-9-2. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, ch. 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 306, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 357, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 568, § 1; G.L., ch. 568, § 7; P.L. 1955, ch. 3499, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 8-9-1 , 8-9-2; Repealed by P.L. 1971, ch. 240, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 8-9-1 and 8-9-2 concerned town councils as probate courts.

8-9-2.1. Probate judges — Qualifications.

No person shall be eligible to serve as a probate judge in any city or town in this state unless he or she has been admitted to practice as an attorney before the Rhode Island supreme court and has been engaged in the active practice of law in this state. Each city or town may establish additional standards as may be determined by city or town ordinance.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 240, § 2.

8-9-2.2. New Shoreham town council as probate court.

The town council of the town of New Shoreham may act as a probate court within its town; the major part of the members elected constitutes a quorum for doing business, and the major part of those present at any legal meeting may decide upon any matter before them.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 219, § 1.

8-9-2.3. Probate judge in town where council sits as probate court.

In any town where the town council regularly sits as the probate court, the town council may appoint annually a member of the bar of the state of Rhode Island to be available to sit as judge of the probate court and may fill any vacancy occurring in the office of that appointee. Whenever a party to any contested matter in the probate court of the town shall so request, the town council acting as the probate court of the town shall designate the appointee to sit as a judge of the probate court to hear and determine that particular contested probate matter and the request and designation shall be recorded in the records of the probate court, and thereupon the appointee shall have the power and be subjected to the duties of the probate court with respect to the matter; provided, however, that if the appointee is a party to or interested in the matter, or is unable to perform his or her duties, no such designation shall be made. The probate clerk shall attend all hearings and record all proceedings before the appointee. The appointee shall not be entitled to any fees of the probate court, and the probate court shall be entitled to the same fees as if the designation had not been made. The appointee shall be entitled to receive from the town such compensation as it may allow.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 219, § 1.

8-9-3. Providence probate court.

The probate court of the city of Providence shall be the probate court for the city.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, ch. 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 306, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 357, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 568, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-3 .

8-9-4. Election and powers of probate judge.

The town council of any town which may, at the regular meeting of the town, have delegated to its town council such power, shall elect a judge of probate for the town, and any city council or any town may at the election of town officers elect a judge of probate for the city or town; and the judge of probate, upon being engaged, shall, instead of the town council, have the power and be subject to the duties of a probate court, and be entitled to the fees of the court and such salary, in addition to or instead of such fees, to be received of the city or town, as the city or town may allow.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, ch. 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 306, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 357, § 3; P.L. 1928, ch. 1233, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 568, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-4 .

8-9-5. Disqualification or inability of probate judge.

Unless otherwise provided, whenever the judge of probate in any city or town is a party or is interested in any case arising in his or her town, or is absent or unable to perform his or her duties, the town council of the town shall perform those duties in the same manner as if no judge of probate had been elected; provided, however, that whenever the judge of probate of the town of Warren is a party or is interested in any proceeding about to be heard in his or her court, or is absent or unable to perform his or her duties, or there is a vacancy in the office, his or her duties shall be temporarily performed by the town solicitor of the town; and the fact of the interest, absence, inability, or vacancy shall be rendered in the records of the court; provided, however, that whenever the judge of probate of the city of Newport or the town of Cumberland or Smithfield is a party or is interested in any proceeding about to be heard in his or her court, or is absent or unable to perform his or her duties, or there is a vacancy in the office, his or her duties shall be temporarily performed by the municipal court judge, if available, if not then the city solicitor of the city of Newport or by the town solicitor of the towns of Cumberland or Smithfield, respectively; and the fact of the interest, absence, inability, or vacancy shall be recorded in the records of the court; provided, however, that whenever the judge of probate of the towns of Hopkinton or West Greenwich is a party or is interested in any proceeding about to be heard in his or her court, or is absent or unable to perform his or her duties, or there is a vacancy in the office, his or her duties shall be temporarily performed by one or more deputy probate judges to be elected by the town council of the towns of Hopkinton and West Greenwich, in the same manner as prescribed for the election of the probate judge in § 8-9-4 , the deputy probate judge(s) to have the same powers and duties as the probate judge and be entitled to the fees of the court as the towns may allow; provided, further, however, that no judge of probate in any city or town shall be permitted to practice or enter his or her appearance or act in any capacity as an attorney in any case before the probate court in his or her city or town.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, ch. 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 306, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 357, § 3; P.L. 1928, ch. 1233, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 568, § 3; P.L. 1948, ch. 2002, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-5 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 96, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 53, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 613, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 225, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 356, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 306, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 307, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 51, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 76, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 51, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 76, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

City Solicitor.

The provision in a city charter providing for the designation of the city solicitor as acting judge of probate in the absence or inability of the judge of probate to so serve is not contrary to the provisions of this section. Ranalli v. Edwards, 98 R.I. 394 , 202 A.2d 516, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1964).

Collateral References.

Disqualification of judge as affecting validity of decision in which other nondisqualified judges participated. 29 A.L.R.5th 722.

Laws governing judicial recusal or disqualification in state proceeding as violating federal or state constitution. 91 A.L.R.5th 437.

Timeliness of affidavit of disqualification of trial judge under 28 USCS § 144. 141 A.L.R. Fed. 311.

8-9-6. Town or city clerk as clerk of court.

The town or city clerk of each town and city, unless special provision is made by law or charter to the contrary, shall be the clerk of the probate court of the town or city.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, ch. 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 306, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 357, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 568, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-6 .

Cross References.

Clerks and assistants in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

Fees of clerks turned over to general treasurer, § 36-6-7 .

Salary of clerk in lieu of fees, § 36-6-6 .

8-9-7. Duties of probate clerk.

The probate clerk shall attend the meetings of the probate court and shall record its proceedings and also all wills, administrations, inventories, accounts, decrees, orders, determinations, and other writings, which shall be made, granted, or decreed upon by the probate court of the town or city, and shall have the custody and safekeeping of the seal of the court and of all the books and papers belonging to the probate office, and of any stenographic or electronic recording of any probate court proceedings made by the probate clerk, and shall not act as attorney before the court of which he or she is clerk. Provided, that the probate clerk shall be required to retain stenographic and electronic recordings of any probate court proceedings only for one year from the date of the hearing.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, ch. 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 306, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 357, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 568, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-7 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 3.

Cross References.

Bond of clerk, § 42-8-5 .

Receipt and handling of wills deposited, § 33-7-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notice of Tax Levy.

Although the probate and record of a will was sufficient to pass title to the devisees and constituted notice to tax assessors and city treasurer of provisions of such will, city treasurer was not required to give personal notice of tax levy and sale to devisees where the will named no particular persons and made no division among them. In re Crafts, 41 R.I. 63 , 102 A. 753, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1918).

8-9-8. Clerk pro tempore in absence of probate clerk.

Whenever the clerk of any probate court shall not appear at the time and place appointed for the meeting of the court, the court may appoint a clerk for the time being, who, after being duly sworn, shall perform all the duties, exercise all the powers, enjoy all the emoluments, and be subject to all the requirements granted to or conferred on or required of clerks of probate courts.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, ch. 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 306, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 357, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 568, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-8 .

8-9-9. General probate jurisdiction.

Every probate court shall have jurisdiction in the town or city in which it is established of the probate of wills; the granting of administration, the appointment of custodians, of administrators, of guardians of persons and estates, or of persons only or of estates only, and of conservators; the accepting and allowing of bonds, inventories, and accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians; the granting of leave to sell at public or private sale, or to mortgage property, as hereinafter provided; of the making of partition of the real estate of deceased persons; of the adoption of persons eighteen (18) years of age or older; of change of names of persons; of the removal or filling of a vacancy of a trustee of any trust established under a will, or the termination of such trust; of setting off and allowing real estate and personal property to widows and surviving husbands; and of all other matters now within the jurisdiction of probate courts. The court shall have power to accept the resignation of, or to remove, any custodian, executor, administrator, or guardian, or any other person appointed by the court, and also power to do and transact all matters and things incidental to the jurisdiction and powers vested in probate courts by law. Every probate court shall have the power to follow the course of equity insofar as necessary to fulfill the mandates of title 33 of the General Laws, specifically: the replacement, removal, or filling of any vacancy of any trustee under a trust established under a will; or tax minimization or estate planning under § 33-15-37.1 . The jurisdiction assumed in any case by the court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, shall not be contested in any suit or proceedings except in the original case or on appeal therein or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 721; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 1; P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-9 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 3.

Cross References.

Appeals to superior court, § 33-23-1 et seq.

Legacies, devises, and inheritance, § 8-9-12 .

Practice in probate courts, § 33-22-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Sections.

Sections 33-5-5 , 33-5-7 , 33-7-8 and this section relate to the making, custody and probate of wills and therefore if there is any ambiguity or inconsistency in their language, the court will give effect to all the clauses as interdependent parts of a composite whole with attention to their titles. Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112 , 10 A.2d 721, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1940).

Contesting Jurisdiction.

The last sentence was apparently designed to avoid litigation as to the jurisdiction of a particular probate court respecting the will of a person who resides at different places in the state from time to time. Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112 , 10 A.2d 721, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1940).

Challenges to decedent’s residence shall be made either by appeal to superior court from decree appointing administrator or executor or by seeking modification or revocation of uncontested petition within specified appeal period. George v. Infantolino, 446 A.2d 757, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 892 (R.I. 1982).

Dismissal of Proceedings.

A probate court has the power to dismiss proceedings for want of jurisdiction if the decedent was an inhabitant and resident of another city or town in Rhode Island and a petition that it should do so is filed before the time has elapsed for taking an appeal from the decree appointing the administrator, but it has no such power where the petition to dismiss is filed after the lapse of such period. Eckilson v. Greene, 61 R.I. 394 , 1 A.2d 117, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1938).

Dower.

An early statute was construed to confer upon the probate courts common law jurisdiction to administer the law of dower. Therefore, proceedings before probate courts to recover dower are, in effect, actions at law. Willock v. Willock, 29 R.I. 511 , 72 A. 817, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1909).

Establishing Lost Will.

Superior court did not have jurisdiction of bill in equity asking that an administrator be enjoined from administering estate and that petitioner be declared entitled to proceeds of estate by virtue of an oral agreement and a lost will, since bill was for the purpose of establishing a lost will and probate court had exclusive jurisdiction. Wayss v. Moakler, 75 R.I. 452 , 67 A.2d 700, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1949).

Guardianships.

An appointment of a guardian for the person’s estate was valid and was not affected by the subsequent appointment of the same guardian for the ward’s person and estate and the latter appointment operated only as an appointment of a guardian for the person. Wakefield Trust Co. v. Whaley, 17 R.I. 760 , 24 A. 780, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1892).

Name Changes.

The general assembly has not indicated an intent to modify the common-law right of an individual to change his or her name as long as it is done with a nonfraudulent purpose; consequently, this section is an optional method that may be employed to change one’s name. Traugott v. Petit, 122 R.I. 60 , 404 A.2d 77, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2064 (1979).

Partition.

The probate court has no statutory authority to partition by sale a ward’s life tenancy and an heir’s remainder interest. De Lisi v. Caito, 463 A.2d 167, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1020 (R.I. 1983).

Payment of Legacies.

Court of probate had no authority over the payment of legacies. Williams v. Herrick, 18 R.I. 120 , 25 A. 1099, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1893). But see § 8-9-12 .

Probate of Wills.

The court’s power to probate a will implies the power to revoke probate, and the court may, in one proceeding, grant probate of a later will and revoke a prior will to the extent necessary to make the two instruments compatible. Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R.I. 112 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1858).

Unless by express language or necessary implication the legislature manifests a different intention, the statutes in relation to wills are to be understood as prescribing a mode for the execution and probating of wills of persons domiciled in this state. Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112 , 10 A.2d 721, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1940).

Procedure.

In light of the inherent power of the probate courts to do all that is necessary and incidental to the jurisdictional powers provided by this section, § 8-9-17 vests the probate court with the authority to permit such limited discovery as it deems just and appropriate. Burford v. Estate of Skelly, 699 A.2d 854, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 254 (R.I. 1997).

Questions of Fraud.

The court of probate, which has no equity jurisdiction, is not adapted to the investigation and determination of questions of fraud. Champlin v. Slocum, 41 R.I. 227 , 103 A. 706, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1918).

Settlement of Estates.

The probate court has full jurisdiction over the settlement of estates and may allow or disallow any charges made against the estate in the administrator’s account, including charges arising during administration from improvements or repairs made to property in the estate, and the probate court’s decree is final unless appealed from. Hall v. Anthony, 13 R.I. 221 , 1881 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1881).

8-9-10. Appointment and supervision of temporary custodians of decedents’ estates.

Every probate court may appoint any suitable person or persons as custodian or custodians to have the charge and care of the real and personal property of deceased persons, the settlement of whose estates is within the jurisdiction of the court, until letters testamentary or of administration are granted; the court may require the custodians to give bond to the court, with or without surety or sureties, in its discretion; the court may also, in its discretion, authorize the custodians to sell any property that may come to their possession by virtue of the appointment, and to take any other action that the court may direct. The custodians shall in all things be subject to the control of the court and act under its direction, and shall receive a reasonable compensation out of the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 722; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 2; GL. 1938, ch. 569, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-10 ; P.L. 2000, ch. 353, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 136, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appointment.

Upon the widow refusing to give bond required by the probate court but appealing therefrom, the probate court properly appointed a custodian of the personal property in order to provide security of all interested therein, as well as for its due care and management. Sarle v. Court of Probate, 7 R.I. 270 , 1862 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1862).

8-9-11. Power to take probate and grant administration of decedents’ estates.

The probate court of any town or city shall take the probate of wills and grant administration on the estate of deceased persons who, at the time of their decease, were inhabitants of or residents in the town or city, and of other persons, not having any residence in this state, who die leaving rights, credits, or estates, real or personal, within the town or city; provided, that the first probate of the will, and the first grant of administration on the estate, of any deceased person who, at the time of his decease, was not an inhabitant of or resident within this state, shall bar any other probate or grant of administration, although the deceased person may have left rights, credits, or estates, real or personal, in any other town or city in this state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 723; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appointment of Administrator.

Administrator could be appointed, even though decedent left no property, where there was bona fide question of validity of inter vivos gifts, since it is not necessary to prove that decedent left assets to be administered as prerequisite to such appointment. Gendreau v. Radtke, 68 R.I. 372 , 27 A.2d 848, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1942).

Dismissal of Proceedings.

A probate court has the power to dismiss proceedings for want of jurisdiction if the decedent was an inhabitant and resident of another city or town in Rhode Island and a petition for dismissal is filed before the time has elapsed for taking an appeal from the decree appointing the administrator, but it has no such power where the petition to dismiss is filed after the lapse of such period. Eckilson v. Greene, 61 R.I. 394 , 1 A.2d 117, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1938).

8-9-12. Payment of legacies.

Probate courts may determine all questions as to the payments of legacies by executors and administrators with the will annexed and may allow such payments in the accounts of executors and administrators.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 724; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-12 .

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Charitable Legacies.

Where probate court determined that charitable legacies were to be paid in full and not reduced, and the United States though given notice of proceeding did not appear or appeal, the estate was entitled to a deduction from federal inheritance tax for payment of charitable legacies in full. Hoxie v. Page, 23 F. Supp. 905, 1938 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2082 (D.R.I. 1938), aff'd, 104 F.2d 918, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 4255 (1st Cir. 1939).

8-9-13. Revocation or modification of warrants and commissions.

Any warrant or commission for the appraisement of an estate, for examining claims against the estate of a deceased person, for the partition of real estate, or for the assignment of dower or other interest in real estate may be revoked by the court for sufficient cause; and the court may thereupon issue a new warrant or commission, or proceed otherwise, as the circumstances of the case shall require, or in the case of death, disability, or resignation of one or more of the appointees may supply vacancies occasioned thereby in such manner as the court shall deem best.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 725; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-13 .

8-9-14. Revocation or modification of orders or decrees.

Any probate court may modify or revoke any order or decree made by it on an uncontested application before appeal therefrom, or, if no appeal is taken, before the time for taking an appeal has expired, and, if made in reference to the settlement of any estate, also before the final settlement thereof, upon the written application of any person interested therein, and after notice of the time and place of hearing thereon appointed by the court, given in the manner prescribed by it, to the person having charge of the estate and to all other interested parties; and upon any modification or revocation, there shall be the same right of and time for appeal as in case of any other order or decree.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 726; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appointment of Guardian or Administrator.

The probate court did not exceed its jurisdiction by the entry of a decree wherein it revoked its former decree appointing a temporary guardian. Estes v. Probate Court, 36 R.I. 57 , 88 A. 977, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1913).

The power of the probate court under this section includes the power to remove an administrator by revoking the decree appointing him. Capwell v. Knight, 48 R.I. 81 , 135 A. 699, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1927).

A probate court could not appoint a new administrator until after notice by advertisement. Capwell v. Knight, 48 R.I. 81 , 135 A. 699, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1927).

Decrees Subject to Revocation or Modification.

Power of probate court to modify or revoke decrees is restricted to appealable orders and decrees. Estes v. Probate Court, 36 R.I. 57 , 88 A. 977, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1913).

Filing of Claims.

The filing of claims against an estate after one year is permissible only if the estate has not been distributed, therefore a petition to vacate decree and for permission to file a claim out of time against estate previously distributed would be denied. Wright v. Roberts, 47 R.I. 306 , 132 A. 875, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1926).

Limitations of Time.

After expiration of 40 days from order admitting will to probate, probate court had no jurisdiction to revoke such order, even though nonresident heir had received no notice of pendency of petition for probate. Rockwell v. Holden, 22 R.I. 243 , 47 A. 543, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1900).

This section clearly expresses two limitations of time for a modification, or revocation of a decree, viz. (1) before the appeal is taken, and (2) if no appeal is taken, then before the time for taking an appeal has expired. Sherman v. Howes, 37 R.I. 260 , 92 A. 564, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1914).

Want of Jurisdiction.

A probate court has the power to dismiss proceedings for want of jurisdiction if the decedent was an inhabitant and resident of another city or town in Rhode Island and a petition for dismissal is filed before the time has elapsed for taking an appeal from the decree appointing the administrator, but it has no such power where the petition to dismiss is filed after the lapse of such period. Eckilson v. Greene, 61 R.I. 394 , 1 A.2d 117, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1938).

Challenges to decedent’s residence shall be made either by appeal to superior court from decree appointing administrator or executor or by seeking modification or revocation of uncontested petition within specified appeal period. George v. Infantolino, 446 A.2d 757, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 892 (R.I. 1982).

8-9-15. Annulment of probate of will.

When it shall appear to a probate court, pending proceedings before it for the settlement of an estate as a testate estate, that the will under which the proceedings were had has been revoked by the testator, the court shall have power to annul any order or decree proving the will so revoked and any other order or decree made by the court in the settlement of the estate under the will. The court shall have power to proceed with the settlement of the estate under a subsequent will, if there is one; or, if there is none, to grant administration on the estate and proceed with the settlement thereof as an intestate estate, after such notice to all parties in interest as the court shall order; but the preceding executor or administrator shall not be personally liable for any thing done by him or her in good faith and in the line of his or her duties before the decree of annulment.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 727; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Revocation by Marriage or Divorce.

Under this section, the court had power to annul the probate of a will revoked by the marriage of the testator subsequently to its execution and it was error to refuse to do so in the case where the will left the estate to a woman who, subsequent to its execution, divorced her husband and married the testator. Lessard v. Lessard, 108 R.I. 127 , 273 A.2d 307, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1232 (1971), overruled, D'Ambra v. Cole, 572 A.2d 268, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 1990).

Collateral References.

Estoppel to contest will or attack its validity by acceptance of benefits thereunder. 78 A.L.R.4th 90.

8-9-16. Confirmation of prior acts and proceedings.

When the validity of an act or proceeding of a probate court, or of a person acting as executor, administrator, or guardian, is called in question by reason of an alleged irregularity, defective notice, or want or improper exercise of authority, any party interested in or affected by the act or proceeding may apply to the probate court having jurisdiction of the subject matter in respect to which the act or proceeding has been had; and the court, after such notice as it may order to all parties interested, may hear and determine the matter and confirm the act or proceeding, in whole or in part, and may authorize and empower the executor, administrator, guardian, or any successor, or other person who may be legally appointed to act in the same capacity, to confirm the act or proceeding and to execute and deliver such deeds, releases, conveyances, and other instruments as may be found necessary for that purpose; but no act or proceeding shall be confirmed which the court might not have authorized in the first instance upon due proceedings.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 728; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Correcting Irregularities.

Considering this section provides for the correction of irregularities, the supreme court would be loath to quash a decree which the probate court is given the power to validate unless the interests of justice should absolutely require it. Bennett v. Randall, 28 R.I. 360 , 67 A. 525, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1907).

This section grants authority to validate a sale of real estate made in good faith by a guardian after authority for the sale had expired, even though the petition is brought long after the guardianship has terminated. CALEF v. STEERE, 47 R.I. 498 , 134 A. 1, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1926).

Remedial Statute.

This section is a remedial statute and, should be given a liberal construction to accomplish the purpose for which the statute was designed. CALEF v. STEERE, 47 R.I. 498 , 134 A. 1, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1926).

Vacating Probate Court Decree.

Where, instead of availing himself of the privilege of calling an alleged irregularity to the attention of the probate court which had the power to ratify its action, the executor appealed from the decree and brought the petition for his removal to the common pleas division for trial de novo, the decree of the probate court had been vacated and the executor having claimed a jury trial must proceed to trial. Fitts v. Probate Court, 26 R.I. 256 , 58 A. 801, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1904).

8-9-17. Power to summon and receive evidence.

Any probate court may require the attendance of any party or person, whom it may see fit to examine or cause to be examined in any proceeding pending in the court, and may examine or cause to be examined on oath parties and witnesses, either orally or on written interrogatories or both, or may receive their affidavits and may require any writings or other evidence pertinent in such proceedings to be produced before itself or otherwise, and may issue writs of subpoena ad testificandum, and of subpoena duces tecum.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 729; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-17 .

Cross References.

Power to administer oaths, § 36-2-2 .

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discovery.

This section vests the probate court with the authority to permit such limited discovery as it deems just and appropriate in the exercise of its sound discretion. To hold otherwise would limit a party’s access to information relevant and often vital to the hearing on the merits. Burford v. Estate of Skelly, 699 A.2d 854, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 254 (R.I. 1997).

Writ of Protection.

A court having the power under this section to require the attendance of any person to be examined has the power to issue a writ of protection to a witness. In re Greene, 35 R.I. 67 , 85 A. 552, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1913).

8-9-17.1. Subpoenas issued by other officials.

Justices of the peace and notaries public may issue subpoenas to witnesses and subpoenas duces tecum in any case pending before any probate court.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 71, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 316, § 1.

8-9-18. Judicial aid in taking possession of property of estates.

If any person has or is suspected of having under his or her control any property or documents belonging to the estate of a deceased person or person under guardianship, or any thing which may tend to disclose the condition of the estate, and on demand therefor by the executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or custodian refuses to deliver them to him or her without legal justification for the refusal; or if the person claims to have a lien thereon and refuses to disclose the amount and particulars of his or her claim; or if any person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the personal estate of the deceased person or ward, the probate court may, upon the written application of the executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or custodian or any other party in interest, cite the person to appear before the court, and may examine him or her on oath concerning the matters complained of; and if he or she refuses to appear or to answer the interrogatories put to him or her by the court, it may adjudge him or her in contempt and may commit him or her therefor to the adult correctional institutions until he or she shall submit to the order of the court or be legally discharged. The person so examined shall not be excused from answering any question on the ground that his or her answer will tend to criminate him or her, but his or her answer shall not be used as evidence against him or her in any criminal prosecution except for perjury.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 730; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 10; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-18 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Action Against Bank.

An action could be maintained by an administrator against a bank to recover deposits made by the testator without first citing the testator’s family to appear and give information about the deposit book. Palmer v. Providence Inst. for Sav., 14 R.I. 68 , 1883 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1883).

Discovery.

Discovery in equity as to assets received and disposed of by deceased executrix would lie, as the remedy provided in this section is not exclusive of right to discovery. Starkweather v. Williams, 21 R.I. 55 , 41 A. 1003, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1898).

8-9-19. Expense of commitment for failure to deliver property of estate.

The probate court shall ascertain the expenses occasioned by commitment as provided in § 8-9-18 , and the executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or custodian of the estate shall pay the expenses; and if the party paying the expenses shall afterwards recover judgment against the person committed, for any property withheld by him or her belonging to the estate, those expenses, as ascertained by the probate court, shall be taxed as part of the costs of the suit; or if the person after being imprisoned shall, without suit, surrender any effects belonging to the estate withheld by him or her, the executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or custodian may recover from him or her the amount of the expenses.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 731; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-19 .

8-9-20. Right to counsel of person suspected of withholding property.

Upon the examination as provided in § 8-9-18 , the person suspected may have counsel, who may examine and cross-examine him or her as to any matter deemed material arising in the course of the investigation.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 732; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-20 .

8-9-21. Contempt of court — Habeas corpus.

Every probate court may punish any contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment or both. Every probate court may issue writs of habeas corpus to bring before it any person in jail to be examined as a witness in any suit or proceeding pending in the court, that the ends of justice may be attained, and for no other purpose.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 733; G.L. 1909, ch. 307, § 13; P.L. 1910, ch. 585, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 358, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 569, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 8-9-21 .

Collateral References.

Contempt: state court’s power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court’s order — anticipatory contempt. 81 A.L.R.4th 1008.

8-9-22. Presumption of death from sea disaster.

If a person shall be lost in a sea disaster, the subject of which has been investigated by the United States Navy, the United States Coast Guard, or a similar agency in a foreign country, and after due and diligent search there was a finding by the Navy, Coast Guard, or similar agency that the person was lost in a sea disaster which finding is supported by testimony given by an eyewitness to the disaster, then any heir of the person may, after six (6) months of the date of the finding by the Navy, Coast Guard, or similar agency, produce the finding in the appropriate probate court and it shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the death of the person so as to allow for administration of his estate. Should more than one person be lost in the sea disaster, the Navy or Coast Guard or similar agency’s finding shall be prima facie evidence of death even if not supported by eyewitness testimony.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 139, § 1.

8-9-23. Missing person — Presumption of death.

If a resident of this state has disappeared and has been absent from his or her usual place of residence and his or her whereabouts has been unknown for more than four (4) years, it shall be prima facie evidence that the person is dead so as to allow for the administration of his or her estate.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 139, § 1.

Chapter 10 Family Court

8-10-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as “The Family Court Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

P.L. 1961, ch. 73 repealed the former chapter, relating to the juvenile court, in its entirety and enacted the present chapter.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Divorce.

Where petition for divorce was brought in superior court, returnable to superior court after establishment of family court, and proceeding was transferred to family court and decision rendered for petitioner when respondent failed to appear, the respondent should have been granted a hearing on her motion, filed within six months of decision, to vacate decision and reinstate cause for hearing on ground that she did not believe the citation returnable to the superior court was valid. Carvalho v. Carvalho, 97 R.I. 132 , 196 A.2d 164, 595, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1963).

8-10-2. Purpose of chapter.

This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that families whose unity or well-being is threatened shall be assisted and protected, and restored, if possible, as secure units of law-abiding members; that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the family court shall receive the care, guidance and control which will conduce to his or her welfare and the best interests of the state; and that when a child is removed from the control of his or her parents, the family court shall secure for him or her care as nearly as possible equivalent to that which his or her parents should have given him or her.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The family court act, as the title clearly indicates, deals exclusively with matters affecting the family unit and the well-being and preservation thereof. A careful reading of the act shows that in establishing that court the legislature intended to transfer to it the duty and responsibility of hearing and determining practically all problems and disputes affecting the family unit. State v. Zittel, 94 R.I. 235 , 94 R.I. 325 , 180 A.2d 455, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1962).

Providing of Post-Secondary Education.

Where no exceptional circumstances existed which would have required a natural parent to provide post-secondary education for petitioner, the family court had no authority to require the Department for Children and Their Families to do so as parens patriae. In re Debra, 445 A.2d 577, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 870 (R.I. 1982).

8-10-3. Establishment of court — Jurisdiction — Seal — Oaths.

  1. There is hereby established a family court, consisting of a chief judge and eleven (11) associate justices, to hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board; all motions for allowance, alimony, support and custody of children, allowance of counsel and witness fees, and other matters arising out of petitions and motions relative to real and personal property in aid thereof, including, but not limited to, partitions, accountings, receiverships, sequestration of assets, resulting and constructive trust, impressions of trust, and such other equitable matters arising out of the family relationship, wherein jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of petitions for divorce, bed and board and separate maintenance; all motions for allowance for support and educational costs of children attending high school at the time of their eighteenth (18th) birthday and up to ninety (90) days after high school graduation, but in no case beyond their nineteenth (19th) birthday; enforcement of any order or decree granting alimony and/or child support, and/or custody and/or visitation of any court of competent jurisdiction of another state; modification of any order or decree granting alimony and/or custody and/or visitation of any court of competent jurisdiction of another state on the ground that there has been a change of circumstances; modification of any order or decree granting child support of any court of competent jurisdiction of another state provided: (1) the order has been registered in Rhode Island for the purposes of modification pursuant to § 15-23.1-611 , or (2) Rhode Island issued the order and has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the parties; antenuptial agreements, property settlement agreements and all other contracts between persons, who at the time of execution of the contracts, were husband and wife or planned to enter into that relationship; complaints for support of parents and children; those matters relating to delinquent, wayward, dependent, neglected, or children with disabilities who by reason of any disability requires special education or treatment and other related services; to hear and determine all petitions for guardianship of any child who has been placed in the care, custody, and control of the department for children, youth, and families pursuant to the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14 and chapter 11 of title 40; adoption of children under eighteen (18) years of age; change of names of children under the age of eighteen (18) years; paternity of children born out of wedlock and provision for the support and disposition of such children or their mothers; child marriages; those matters referred to the court in accordance with the provisions of § 14-1-28 ; those matters relating to adults who shall be involved with paternity of children born out of wedlock; responsibility for or contributing to the delinquency, waywardness, or neglect of children under sixteen (16) years of age; desertion, abandonment, or failure to provide subsistence for any children dependent upon such adults for support; neglect to send any child to school as required by law; bastardy proceedings and custody to children in proceedings, whether or not supported by petitions for divorce or separate maintenance or for relief without commencement of divorce proceedings; and appeals of administrative decisions concerning setoff of income tax refunds for past due child support in accordance with §§ 44-30.1-5 and 40-6-21 . The holding of real estate as tenants by the entirety shall not in and of itself preclude the family court from partitioning real estate so held for a period of six (6) months after the entry of final decree of divorce.
  2. The family court shall be a court of record and shall have a seal which shall contain such words and devices as the court shall adopt.
  3. The judges and clerk of the family court shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations.
  4. The family court shall have exclusive initial jurisdiction of all appeals from any administrative agency or board affecting or concerning children under the age of eighteen (18) years and appeals of administrative decisions concerning setoff of income tax refunds, lottery set offs, insurance intercept, and lien enforcement provisions for past due child support, in accordance with §§ 44-30.1-5 and 40-6-21 , and appeals of administrative agency orders of the department of human services to withhold income under chapter 16 of title 15.
  5. The family court shall have jurisdiction over those civil matters relating to the enforcement of laws regulating child care providers and child placing agencies.
  6. The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of matters relating to the revocation or nonrenewal of a license of an obligor due to noncompliance with a court order of support, in accordance with chapter 11.1 of title 15. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]
  7. Notwithstanding any general or public law to the contrary, the family court shall have jurisdiction over all protective orders provided pursuant to the Rhode Island general laws, when either party is a juvenile.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 85, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 3, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 89, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 319, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 167, § 3; P.L. 1984, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 7; P.L. 1992, ch. 326, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 158, § 2, P.L. 1994, ch. 195, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 263, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 10; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 10; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 23; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 6; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 6; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 9; P.L. 2010, ch. 216, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 236, § 1.

Cross References.

Uniform declaratory judgments acts applicable to family court, § 9-30-1 .

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicable Law.

The supreme court will adjudicate cases under this section according to the law existing at the time of the appellate decision rather than at the time of the judgment below. Richtmyer v. Richtmyer, 461 A.2d 409, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 962 (R.I. 1983).

Authority to Impose Liens.

The family court does have the authority and jurisdictional power to establish a lien against a party for the purpose of securing the performance of an award of alimony or child support. Brierly v. Brierly, 431 A.2d 410, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1177 (R.I. 1981).

Bonds.

A bond may be required to ensure the return of a child whom a noncustodial parent has been allowed to remove temporarily from the state, but each case must stand on its own facts and a bond should not be required absent a showing of need therefor. McCullough v. Hudspeth, 120 R.I. 598 , 389 A.2d 1242, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 706 (1978).

A trial justice should specify in his decision the factors influencing him in deciding whether or not to require a bond for the return of a child as a condition for out-of-state visitation by the noncustodial parent with the child. Absent this requirement, meaningful review of whether that decision constitutes an abuse of discretion would be impossible in most, if not all, cases. McCullough v. Hudspeth, 120 R.I. 598 , 389 A.2d 1242, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 706 (1978).

Contract Actions.

The Superior Court, through its general equitable and legal powers, maintains the authority to adjudicate all contract actions, regardless of the marital status of the parties. Lubecki v. Ashcroft, 557 A.2d 1208, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1989).

While the Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction over an agreement that was incorporated into but not merged with the parties’ divorce, such an agreement was subject to the traditional contract rule that it could not be modified except by the parties; since the former husband consented in court to modification of his obligations, he was bound. Lecours v. Lecours, 792 A.2d 730, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 48 (R.I. 2002).

Family court justice’s powers of oversight to assure equity in property settlement agreements did not encompass a power to modify or reform an agreement not merged into the divorce decree that failed to divide one spouse’s stock bonus plan, referring only to a stock option plan; in the absence of any hint of unethical behavior (there had evidently been some sort of misunderstanding), the proper course was for the trial justice to have withdrawn approval of the agreement and then either direct the parties to renegotiate or proceed with the trial. Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 166 (R.I. 2005).

Jurisdiction.

A family court no longer has jurisdiction over property matters in a divorce action where an interlocutory judgment with a property distribution has been issued, the nisi period elapses, the plaintiff moves for entry of the final judgment, and then the plaintiff dies before the court takes any action. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 1989).

Family courts have the power to award counsel fees during the pendency of an appeal or after the death of a party. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 1989).

Family court has jurisdiction to affect the rights of parties not involved with the controversy pending before the court. Rhode Island Cent. Credit Union v. Pazienza, 572 A.2d 296, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1990).

Family court had no jurisdiction to award custody of orphans after the probate court had appointed a temporary guardian. In re Kimberly, 583 A.2d 877, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 173 (R.I. 1990).

The family court has jurisdiction to award counsel fees when appropriate in child-custody matters. In re Kimberly, 583 A.2d 877, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 173 (R.I. 1990).

Family Court had jurisdiction to enforce a property settlement agreement even after divorce between the parties had become final. Riffenburg v. Riffenburg, 599 A.2d 1365, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 209 (R.I. 1991).

The equitable matters arising out of the family relationship that the Family Court may hear under subsection (a) are limited to those cases that originate in petitions for divorce, bed and board, and separate maintenance. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 2000).

R.I. Fam. Ct. R.P. Dom. Rel. 60(b)(3) did not prevent the ex-wife from bringing a fraud action against the ex-husband as the family court had jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3 and had authority to reopen a final judgment of divorce based upon the ex-wife alleging the ex-husband had committed fraud upon her and the court by not disclosing income and assets at the time of the divorce. Zaino v. Zaino, 818 A.2d 630, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2003).

Family court lacked jurisdiction over a mother’s request to compel the father, who had exclusive control over their daughter’s custodial accounts, to provide an accounting and to deliver possession of the custodial property pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 18-7-20(a)(1) and 18-7-15(b) ; where her motion was not brought within the context of a divorce and separate maintenance pursuant to the requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3 . The probate court had jurisdiction over actions seeking an accounting pursuant to the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act for an account that was established under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-7-23(b) , as was the case here. Hovarth v. Craddock, 828 A.2d 1212, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 131 (R.I. 2003).

Absent a civil certification procedure for a mentally ill child, a family court is without authority to order a child’s confinement in a mental health care facility and has no authority to order placement in a specific facility that is unwilling to accept the patient. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d 985, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 174 (R.I. 2003).

Where a family court ordered a non-party private mental health facility to become the designated treatment facility for three juveniles, and where the court’s orders deviated from the certification procedures for patient admission as required by the Mental Health Law, R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1-5-1 et seq., and because no other statutory authority existed, the family court exceeded its jurisdiction; further, the orders were equitable in nature and the family court had no general equitable powers. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d 985, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 174 (R.I. 2003).

Domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction was inapplicable to the case; as plaintiff’s claims sounded in tort and contract, the state family court did not have any jurisdiction in the case. Norton v. Hoyt, 278 F. Supp. 2d 214, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14027 (D.R.I. 2003), aff'd, 407 F.3d 501, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9042 (1st Cir. 2005).

Subject matter jurisdiction of a family court to enforce an arbitrator’s decision declaring it reasonable for a husband to pay for two years of his son’s high school tuition was not invoked under the Rhode Island Arbitration Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-1 , rather the family court had jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ non-merged property settlement agreement, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3(a) , in which the husband and wife agreed to submit a dispute regarding reasonable tuition expenses to arbitration; the family court did not order the parties to arbitrate nor did it confirm an arbitration award. Vanderheiden v. Marandola, 994 A.2d 74, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 2010).

Trial court properly awarded a wife attorney’s fees because it was not clearly wrong in holding that the property settlement agreement required the husband to notify his wife personally and directly when he obtained new employment and that he failed to do so. Corbin v. Corbin, 152 A.3d 1146, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 15 (R.I. 2017).

In a dispute over a bequest to a former wife in a decedent’s will, a prior family court stipulation did not control because testamentary intent was not before that court and would have exceeded that court’s jurisdiction. Glassie v. Doucette, 159 A.3d 88, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 2017).

— Divorce and Ancillary Matters.

Marital property assigned under § 15-5-16.1 is subject to the jurisdiction of the family court pursuant to subsection (a) of this section when changed circumstances necessitate that the property be transferred from one parent to a new custodial parent for the benefit and use of a child of the broken marriage. Cok v. Cok, 533 A.2d 534, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 560 (R.I. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801, 109 S. Ct. 30, 102 L. Ed. 2d 10, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 3482 (1988).

In general, unless otherwise agreed, the obligation to pay alimony is terminated on the death of either party. However, the death of the obligee does not relieve the obligor of his or her obligation for alimony that accrues before death. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 1989).

The statutory expansion of Family Court jurisdiction indicates a clear legislative intent to furnish to parties who have filed a petition for divorce, separation, or other relief in the Family Court, a comprehensive resolution of property, contractual, and equitable disputes that have arisen between them. By the same token, the legislature did not intend to diminish the general equitable powers that had been conferred upon the Superior Court from its inception. Lubecki v. Ashcroft, 557 A.2d 1208, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1989).

The Family Court must have jurisdiction to set aside a trust established by a marriage partner if it appears that the trust was created with the intent to keep assets from the other marriage partner, and the court should be able to order payments from such a trust to implement an order for support. Pezza v. Pezza, 571 A.2d 1123, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 1990).

Family Court has no jurisdiction to advise and direct the trustee regarding the management of an express trust. Pezza v. Pezza, 571 A.2d 1123, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 1990).

While the family court has jurisdiction to temporarily enjoin a foreclosure sale of a former marital residence, the repeated grant of 30-day stays constitutes an abuse of discretion. Rhode Island Cent. Credit Union v. Pazienza, 572 A.2d 296, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1990).

The family court has no authority to modify a separation agreement which is incorporated by reference but not merged into a final divorce judgment. Riffenburg v. Riffenburg, 585 A.2d 627, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 1991).

Where the Family Court bases its initial grant of jurisdiction on claims by the father that the children are being subjected to physical and emotional abuse by their mother in Florida, these allegations, coupled with the physical presence of the children in Rhode Island, gives the court jurisdiction to decide custody and support issues. Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 1991).

Although the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain a child custody case, its exercise of that jurisdiction is improper, where the court’s action creates a situation that opens the door for jurisdictional conflict while prolonging resolution of a case that was settled in Florida over a decade earlier. Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 1991).

Because the circumstances of the parties had progressed beyond a point contemplated by the original separation agreement and the family court had the power to construe the agreement pursuant to this section, the one-year time limit barring a motion for relief from a judgment or decree pursuant to § 9-21-2(b) and the parallel prohibition pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations were inapplicable. Vickers Antone v. Vickers, 610 A.2d 120, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 167 (R.I. 1992).

Neither this section and § 8-10-3.1 nor Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules of Procedure serves to extend the family court’s jurisdiction into the state of Connecticut so as to permit monitoring conditions of employment of the father in a Connecticut public school system or to permit that school system to intervene and utilize a family court proceeding in this state, in which it has no recognizable interest, as a vehicle through which to obtain evidence for use in its own particular Connecticut proceeding against the father. Almeida v. Almeida, 670 A.2d 1258, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 1996).

Since the family court had subject matter jurisdiction of the property settlement contract entered into by the parties at a time when they were husband and wife, findings of arrearage and an order to pay the arrearage made by the family court justice are proper. Bowen v. Bowen, 675 A.2d 412, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 146 (R.I. 1996).

Where a spouse was attempting to enforce the provisions of a nonmerged property settlement agreement, the initiation of contempt proceedings, instead of a breach of contract action, was not an option available to her, and dismissal without prejudice was required. Attilli v. Atilli, 722 A.2d 268, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 5 (R.I. 1999).

Family Court had the power to modify a property settlement agreement that was not merged into a prior order of divorce and the defendant husband waived his right to appeal the family court’s order modifying the agreement during a contempt proceeding because he did not object to the modifications when the case was heard in Family Court. Lecours v. Lecours, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. Mar. 8, 2002).

Rhode Island legislature has expanded the equity jurisdiction of the Rhode Island family court with the intent to offer parties who have filed a petition for divorce, separation, or other relief in the family court, a comprehensive resolution of property, contractual, and equitable disputes that have arisen between them including the authority to hear and determine disputes arising out of antenuptial agreements. Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 2003).

Rhode Island family court possessed jurisdiction to hear a husband’s breach of contract claim premised on his wife’s alleged breach of their prenuptial agreement under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3 ; therefore, husband’s post-divorce action which related to wife’s failure to allege an ante-nuptial agreement when she filed for divorce, was a compulsory counterclaim and should have been raised in the divorce action and therefore barred by res judicata. Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 2003).

“Marriage” within R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3(a) was not intended to empower the family court to hear and determine petitions for divorce involving two persons of the same sex who were purportedly married in another state. Thus, the family court, a court of limited statutory jurisdiction, was without jurisdiction over the divorce of a same-sex couple purportedly married in Massachusetts. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 123 (R.I. 2007).

It was error for a trial court to dismiss a wife’s divorce complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, when the wife relocated to Pennsylvania after filing the wife’s complaint, because (1) it was undisputed that the trial court had jurisdiction over the complaint when the complaint was filed, due to the wife satisfying statutory residency requirements, and (2) the wife’s relocation to Pennsylvania after filing the complaint did not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction as R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-12(a) did not require that a party remain a domiciled inhabitant or resident of Rhode Island for the petition to be granted, but, rather, referred to the domicile and residence of the plaintiff at the time the divorce complaint was filed. Rogers v. Rogers, 18 A.3d 491, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 46 (R.I. 2011).

To construe R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-12(a) as requiring that a plaintiff who files a divorce complaint remain a ‘domiciled inhabitant‘ until the decree is entered would produce an unjust result, so, once a complaint for divorce properly is filed in Family Court, the Family Court is not divested of subject-matter jurisdiction merely because the plaintiff has moved out of the state and changed his or her domicile, since to hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff who is dissatisfied with the course of the divorce proceeding in Rhode Island to forum shop his or her complaint in another jurisdiction, and whether the party relocates in good faith or otherwise matters naught; a change in domicile does not terminate the jurisdiction of the Family Court to hear and decide the case before the Court. Rogers v. Rogers, 18 A.3d 491, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 46 (R.I. 2011).

Trial court justice had jurisdiction to grant a former wife an absolute divorce over a former husband’s religious objections, because (1) the court was granted such jurisdiction statutorily, and (2) the husband’s counterclaim sought an absolute divorce. Smith v. Smith, 207 A.3d 447, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2019).

Family court properly exercised jurisdiction in both entering and enforcing a consent order because the consent order constituted a contractual amendment to the property settlement agreement; the consent order unambiguously provided that a father’s child support obligations were modified in consideration of his agreeing to pay for one-half of his son’s educational expenses, including college. D'Alessandro v. Caniglia, 252 A.3d 263, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 2021).

— Murder Committed by Defendant as Juvenile.

A defendant who allegedly committed a murder when he was 17 but was not charged until he was 23 is entitled to a de novo waiver hearing to determine whether the family court would have waived jurisdiction under § 14-1-7 . State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 116 (R.I. 1988).

— Title to Real Estate.

The transmittal and docketing of the papers of a case upon appeal divests the lower court of power to act in the case even as to motions pending before it at that time, and where the sale of property incident to a divorce proceeding was sought by motion as if no appeal had even been taken, since the papers had been transmitted and the appeal docketed, the family court was without authority to act on those motions and the decrees it entered for the sale of the property were void. Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 119 R.I. 479 , 380 A.2d 964, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2054 (1977).

The court’s power to partition real estate is exercisable only in those instances where divorce or separation proceedings have been commenced, and an interlocutory decree to partition real estate, being ancillary to the court’s divorce jurisdiction, must abate when the divorce action itself abates. Keidel v. Keidel, 119 R.I. 726 , 383 A.2d 264, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 610 (1978).

Where an interlocutory decree provided for the partition sale of husband’s real estate pursuant to a divorce action, and where husband died during the interlocutory period, the joint tenancy of the parties was not severed by the decree but remained in full force and effect throughout the interlocutory period up until the death of the husband at which time the property passed by right of survivorship. Keidel v. Keidel, 119 R.I. 726 , 383 A.2d 264, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 610 (1978).

A severance of joint tenancy may be effectuated between the entry of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce when the commissioner has been appointed and the decree approving the commissioner’s sale or division of the couple’s real estate has been entered in the family court. Keidel v. Keidel, 119 R.I. 726 , 383 A.2d 264, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 610 (1978).

The family court has no power to vest in one party the title to property of the other or to order one party to convey or transfer certain property to the other. Britt v. Britt, 119 R.I. 791 , 383 A.2d 592, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 615 (1978).

The family court was without jurisdiction to order the wife to convey her legal interest in real estate upon her relocation outside the United States. Britt v. Britt, 119 R.I. 791 , 383 A.2d 592, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 615 (1978).

The family court’s power to partition real estate is exercisable only in those instances where divorce or separation proceedings have been commenced in that tribunal, and this power is ancillary to the court’s divorce jurisdiction. Major v. Major, 121 R.I. 581 , 401 A.2d 1275, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1874 (1979).

Matters in Other States.

Where the parties entered into a private separation agreement providing for custody and support of their minor children and such agreement was not incorporated into or referred to in a decree of divorce obtained in the state of Georgia, the family court had no jurisdiction to enforce such agreement. O'Connell v. O'Connell, 100 R.I. 444 , 216 A.2d 884, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 457 (1966).

Where a Virginia court granted a divorce and awarded custody of the minor daughter of the parties to the wife, after which the father remarried and continued to live in Virginia and the mother moved with the child to Rhode Island, it was not an abuse of discretion, in a hearing on petition of the mother for custody and definition of the father’s visitation rights, for the family court to require as conditions for the father’s visitation rights that he post a bond, that he dismiss pending proceedings in Virginia, and that he never take the child to Virginia or into the company of his second wife. In re Smith, 100 R.I. 663 , 219 A.2d 126, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 494 (1966).

Proceedings Commenced in Other Courts.

The enactment of the family court act giving such court jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relative to paternity of children born out of wedlock and specifying that upon its establishment all actions and proceedings pending and undetermined in the juvenile and superior courts should be heard de novo in the family court did not deprive respondent of his right to an effective appeal from judgment that he was the putative father of two illegitimate children. Surber v. Pearce, 97 R.I. 40 , 195 A.2d 541, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1963).

This section conferred upon the family court no broader authority in the area of paternity than had formerly been exercised by those courts to whose jurisdiction the family court succeeded upon its creation, i. e. determination of paternity only in filiation proceedings, and it was never the practice in this state that the resolution of a paternity issue arising as an incident of litigation properly within the jurisdiction of another tribunal should be deferred by that tribunal pending a referral and a determination of that issue by the family court’s predecessor. Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Isele, 108 R.I. 144 , 273 A.2d 311, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1236 (1971).

Establishment of the family court did not divest the superior court of its jurisdiction, previously acquired in the instant case, to proceed further with husband’s partition suit as the family court’s power in partition and other matters acquired by a 1972 amendment is exercisable only in those instances where divorce or separation proceedings have been commenced. Fox v. Fox, 115 R.I. 593 , 350 A.2d 602, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1563 (1976); Halliwell v. Lippitt Realty Co., 121 R.I. 927 , 394 A.2d 708, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 837 (1978).

Restraining Orders.

The family court has the power to issue a restraining order in respect to funds in the hands of a third party and may join the third party as a party defendant in a petition filed by a husband or a wife for that purpose. Cardenas v. Cardenas, 478 A.2d 968, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 555 (R.I. 1984).

Separate Agreements.

Prior to the 1977 amendment to this section the family court did not have authority to enforce a separate agreement between husband and wife which was not a part of the divorce decree. Abedon v. Abedon, 121 R.I. 366 , 398 A.2d 1137, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1786 (1979).

Where a foreign court of competent jurisdiction entered a final judgment of divorce and where the settlement agreement incorporated by reference in the judgment was executed by the parties in that jurisdiction, a family court in Rhode Island had jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3(a) to decide the former husband’s motion to set aside the Connecticut judgment and settlement agreement; the plain language of § 8-10-3(a) conferred jurisdiction on the family court to hear and determine matters pertaining to custody, support, alimony, visitation, property-settlement agreements, and contracts between persons who at the time of execution were husband and wife even though these orders, agreements, or contracts may have originated or been executed in a foreign jurisdiction. Schwab v. Schwab, 897 A.2d 37, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2006).

Collateral References.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: assumption or denial of jurisdiction of action involving matrimonial dispute. 55 A.L.R.5th 647.

Family court jurisdiction to hear contract claims. 46 A.L.R.5th 735.

8-10-3.1. Magistrates — Appointment, duties, and powers.

  1. The chief judge of the family court may appoint magistrates, with the advice and consent of the senate, to assist the court in the conduct of its business. A person appointed to serve as a magistrate shall be a member of the bar of Rhode Island. The powers and duties of magistrates shall be prescribed in the order appointing them.
  2. In addition, magistrates may assist the court in:
    1. the enforcement and implementation of chapter 23.1 of title 15,
    2. the determination of matters that come before the court pursuant to § 8-10-4 , chapter 1 of title 14, chapters 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 16 of title 15, chapter 19 of title 16, chapter 11 of title 40, and chapter 5 of title 40.1. Magistrates shall be empowered to hear and determine all motions, pretrial conferences, arraignments of juvenile offenders, probable cause hearings, and review of all such matters, including but not limited to, the temporary placement, custody, disposition and adoption of children, orders of support, final divorce decrees, and the taking of testimony in conducting all hearings relative thereto subject to the review provided for in subsection (d).
  3. The magistrates shall serve a term of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified and his or her powers and duties shall be prescribed in the order appointing him or her or in the rules of procedure of the family court. Any magistrate in service as of January 1, 2008 who serves at the pleasure of the chief judge of the family court may be appointed for a term of ten (10) years with the advice and consent of the senate and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the assignment of a magistrate to more than one such term, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The magistrates may be authorized:
    1. To regulate all proceedings before him or her;
    2. To do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his or her duties;
    3. To require the production before him or her of books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings;
    4. To rule upon the admissibility of evidence;
    5. To issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses, to put witnesses on oath, to examine them, and to call parties to the proceeding and examine them upon oath;
    6. To adjudicate a person in contempt and to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a justice of the court, for failure to appear in response to a summons or for refusal to answer questions or produce evidence or for behavior disrupting a proceeding;
    7. To adjudicate a party in contempt and to order him or her imprisoned for not more than seventy-two (72) hours, pending review by a justice of the court, for failure to comply with a pending order to provide support or to perform any other act; and
    8. To issue a capias and/or body attachment upon the failure of a party or witness to appear after having been properly served and, should the family court not be in session, the person apprehended may be detained at the adult correctional institution, if an adult, or at the Rhode Island training school for youth, if a child, until the next session of the family court.
  4. A party aggrieved by an order entered by a magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the family court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the family court, such review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The family court shall by rules of procedure establish procedures for review of orders entered by a magistrate, and for enforcement of contempt adjudications of a magistrate.
  5. Final orders of the family court entered in a proceeding to review an order of a magistrate may be appealed to the supreme court.
  6. The magistrates shall be empowered to hear de novo all applications for income withholding pursuant to chapter 16 of title 15 and appeals of administrative agency orders of the department of human services to withhold income under chapter 16 of title 15.
  7. The magistrates shall be empowered to hear all matters relating to the revocation or nonrenewal of a license of an obligor due to non-compliance with a court order of support, in accordance with chapter 11.1 of title 15.
  8. The magistrates may be authorized by the chief judge to hear those matters on the domestic abuse prevention calendar and the nominal calendar. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 319, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 492, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 10; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 10; P.L. 1996, ch. 267, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 22; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 9; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

Neither § 8-10-3 and this section nor Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules of Procedure serves to extend the family court’s jurisdiction into the state of Connecticut so as to permit monitoring conditions of employment of the father in a Connecticut public school system or to permit that school system to intervene and utilize a family court proceeding in this state, in which it has no recognizable interest, as a vehicle through which to obtain evidence for use in its own particular Connecticut proceeding against the father. Almeida v. Almeida, 670 A.2d 1258, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 1996).

8-10-3.2. General magistrate of the family court.

  1. There is hereby created within the family court the position of general magistrate of the family court who shall be appointed by the chief judge of the family court with the advice and consent of the senate for a term of ten (10) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the assignment of the general magistrate to more than one such term, subject to the advice and consent of the senate.
  2. The general magistrate shall be an attorney at law and a member in good standing of the Rhode Island bar.
  3. The primary function of the general magistrate shall be the enforcement of child support decrees, orders, and law relative to child support. The general magistrate shall have all the authority and powers vested in magistrates by virtue of §§ 8-10-3 , 8-10-3.1 , 9-15-19 , 9-15-21 , 9-14-26 , 9-18-8 , 9-18-9 , and 36-2-3 , and any other authority conferred upon magistrates by any general or public law or by any rule of procedure or practice of any court within the state.
  4. The chief justice of the supreme court with the agreement of the chief judge of the family court may specially assign the general magistrate to any court of the unified judicial system; provided, however, that the general magistrate may be assigned to the superior court subject to the prior approval of the presiding justice of the superior court. When the general magistrate is so assigned he or she shall be vested, authorized, and empowered with all the powers belonging to the magistrates of the court to which he or she is specially assigned.
  5. The general magistrate shall:
    1. Receive all credits and retirement allowances as afforded justices under chapter 3 of this title and any other applicable law;
    2. Be governed by the commission on judicial tenure and discipline, chapter 16 of this title, in the same manner as justices and workers’ compensation judges;
    3. Be entitled to a special license plate under § 31-3-47 ;
    4. Receive a salary equivalent to that of a district court judge;
    5. Be subject to all the provisions of the canons of judicial ethics; and
    6. Be subject to all criminal laws relative to judges by virtue of §§ 11-7-1 and 11-7-2 .
  6. The general magistrate of the family court who shall at the time of passage of this section hold the position of general magistrate, shall upon retirement, at his or her own request and at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as general magistrate of the family court, as the chief judge of the family court shall prescribe. When so assigned and performing such service, the general magistrate shall have all the powers and authority of general magistrate of the family court, but otherwise shall have no powers nor be authorized to perform any judicial duties. For any such service or assignments performed after retirement, the general magistrate shall receive no compensation whatsoever, either monetary or in kind. Such a retired general magistrate shall not be counted in the number of judicial officers provided by law for the family court.
  7. The provisions of this section shall be afforded liberal construction.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 198, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 201, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 9; P.L. 2012, ch. 207, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 236, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

P.L. 2012, ch. 207, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 236, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-10-4. Criminal cases referred to family court.

To the family court shall also be referred for hearing, adjustment, reconciliation, decision, and sentence all causes properly brought in the court or appealed from other courts in which the defendant is accused, as provided by the statutes, of abandonment of his wife or her husband or children, or both, leaving them in danger of becoming public charges; of neglect to provide according to their means for his wife or her husband or children, or both; of neglect or refusal of an habitual drunkard to aid in the support of his or her family; of neglect or refusal by a child over eighteen (18) years of age to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her father or mother; or of threat to commit a crime or offense against the person or property of the defendant’s husband, wife, children, father, or mother.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 88, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 316, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The assaultive conduct described in this section refers to those conditions to which specific reference is made in chapter 5 of title 11. State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614 , 382 A.2d 526, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 600 (1978).

The family court, in a matter involving an information charge of assault with a dangerous weapon upon a mother by her adult son, does not have the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct a criminal trial when the defendant/son so charged is an adult. State v. Kenney, 523 A.2d 853, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 438 (R.I. 1987).

Even though the family court had conducted a criminal trial pursuant to § 14-1-48 on a charge that an adult defendant/son assaulted his mother with a dangerous weapon, it could not retain jurisdiction over the case and proceed to sentence the defendant since the court had no subject-matter jurisdiction of the case. State v. Kenney, 523 A.2d 853, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 438 (R.I. 1987).

For the Family Court to undertake a final dismissal, without notice that affords the state an opportunity to be heard, and in the absence of proper findings, is clear error. The Legislature has seen fit to vest the Family Court with exclusive jurisdiction of a limited class of felony crimes. In exercising that jurisdiction, the Family Court is obliged to comply with the state’s substantive and procedural law. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2008).

Dismissal of Information.

Trial justice committed clear error by sua sponte dismissing a criminal information against defendant as defendant did not file a motion to dismiss, and the trial court failed to follow the procedural rules applicable to dismissals. By prohibiting the Attorney General from fully prosecuting the felony information in violation of R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9 .1, the trial justice clearly erred and deprived the State of a fair proceeding. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2008).

Transfer Not Required.

The family courts do not have jurisdiction over assault upon an infant son which is a misdemeanor since district courts are given original jurisdiction over misdemeanors by § 12-3-1 and there is nothing in family court law to divest district court of such jurisdiction. State v. Zittel, 94 R.I. 235 , 94 R.I. 325 , 180 A.2d 455, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1962).

Where the child involved in a parental assault was emancipated, not subject to parental control or guardianship, and had maintained his own home and supported himself for two years, it was not error to refuse to transfer such criminal case to the family court. State v. McMahon, 110 R.I. 658 , 296 A.2d 28, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 963 (1972); State v. Donato, 516 A.2d 880, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 541 (R.I. 1986).

A criminal prosecution for indecent assault on a child pursuant to § 11-37-6 need not be transferred from the Superior Court to the family court. State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614 , 382 A.2d 526, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 600 (1978).

Transfer Proper.

The superior court properly overruled defendant’s plea in abatement to an indictment charging him with assault with a dangerous weapon upon his wife and transferred the case to the family court, notwithstanding the fact that such charge required indictment or presentment by a grand jury and the family court had no grand jury. State v. Perry, 103 R.I. 6 , 234 A.2d 115, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 568 (1967).

Jurisdiction of superior court was ousted and exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the family court pursuant to this section where it appeared that defendant’s victim in a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon was his wife, notwithstanding that the jurisdictional defect was not raised in the superior court at the time of sentencing. Dutton v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 528 , 247 A.2d 86, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 679 (1968).

Witness Intimidation.

Charge of witness intimidation in domestic assault case was properly heard in the Superior Court, as the Family Court was not vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide criminal cases of witness intimidation, but was authorized to take appropriate steps to prevent witness or victim intimidation with respect to cases over which the court had jurisdiction. State v. Burke, 783 A.2d 917, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 218 (R.I. 2001).

8-10-5. Attempts at reconciliation by family court.

In all the causes in § 8-10-4 , the family court shall seek to reconcile the parties and to re-establish friendly family relations, and to this end may suggest and hold conferences in chambers with the parties interested, and with their counsel, if they are represented by counsel and may have the children of the parties brought before it for examination.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 326, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

For the Family Court to undertake a final dismissal, without notice that affords the state an opportunity to be heard, and in the absence of proper findings, is clear error. The Legislature has seen fit to vest the Family Court with exclusive jurisdiction of a limited class of felony crimes. In exercising that jurisdiction, the Family Court is obliged to comply with the state’s substantive and procedural law. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2008).

8-10-6. Notice to department of human services.

The clerk of the family court shall notify the director of the department of human services of the names and addresses, if known to him or her, of the parties to any proceeding in the court, so that the director, if the parties or any of them are recipients of public assistance, shall make known the interest of his or her department in the proceedings and shall enter an appearance.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-7. Family counselling service.

Within the family court there shall be a family counselling service, consisting of such personnel as the court shall deem necessary to assist the court in advising and counselling the parties and whose qualifications shall be established by the court. The justices of the family court or a majority of them shall be the appointing authority of the family counselling personnel. The court is specifically authorized to make use of existing private and public family and other service agencies in the functioning of the family counselling service. The family counselling service shall, where desirable, possible, and practicable, make use of the counsel and advice of a member of the clergy of the faith of each or all of the parties and shall, where desirable, possible, and practicable, consult the clergy of the parish or congregation of each of the respective parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 309, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 415, § 1.

8-10-8. Medical, psychological, and other expert assistance.

The department of human services shall provide for the family court the services of such physicians, psychiatrists, experts, and consultants approved by the court as shall be necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the court is established.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-9. Assistance of services of department of corrections.

  1. The facilities of the department of corrections shall be available at all times to the court. The director of the department of corrections shall assign to service in the court a supervisor of probation counsellors, probation counsellors, and other workers to carry out the purposes of the court. The supervisor, counsellors, and workers, when so assigned, shall be responsible to the court and shall serve in the court at the pleasure of the chief judge in his or her capacity as administrative judge.
  2. At the request of the court, the director of the department of corrections, his or her assistants, and the bureau of mental hygiene shall make such investigation or examination, or both, as the court or any justice thereof may request of any party within its jurisdiction, and shall file with the court a written report of the investigation or examination, or both, within the time fixed by the court. Any party in interest or his or her counsel shall be entitled to examine the report, and shall be given the opportunity to cross-examine under oath the person who submits the report, and to introduce evidence in support of or in opposition to it before a decision is rendered by the court. The written report of investigation or examination shall not be used as evidence in any criminal matter heard by the court.
  3. At the direction of the court, the supervisor of probation counsellors, probation counsellors, and other workers shall assume responsibility for the enforcement of all preliminary, interlocutory, and decretal orders in cases referred to them by the court. The court may order payments of temporary or permanent alimony for the support of a wife or children, or both, to the supervisor, counsellors, or workers for the account of the wife or children, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-10. Family court registry.

Within the family court there shall be a registry, to be administered by the clerk of the court, which shall receive and disburse all payments made payable to the registry by direction of the court or by voluntary payment.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 22.

8-10-11. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 263, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 5, effective June 2, 1994. For present comparable provisions, see § 8-16.1-1 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-10-11 concerned tenure of justices and filling of vacancies.

8-10-12. Vacancy in office or inability of chief judge of family court.

Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of chief judge of the family court, or whenever the chief judge shall be unable, by reason of illness or absence, to perform the duties of his or her office, the vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as provided in § 8-3-4 for filling a vacancy in the office of presiding justice of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-13. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2010, ch. 231, § 2, and by P.L. 2010, ch. 238, § 2, effective July 25, 2010.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-10-13 concerned unclaimed funds in registry of family court.

8-10-14. Administration of operation of family court.

The chief judge of the family court shall be the administrative judge of the court. He or she shall be the head of the court and have supervision and control of the calendars and of the assignment of the justices. All court stenographers, secretaries, and masters shall be under his or her supervision. It shall be his or her duty to gather such statistics as shall reflect accurately the work of the court, for the information of the court and such other use as he or she may deem expedient. He or she shall also be charged with general responsibility for any recommendations he or she may believe important for the work of the court or any officers in any way connected therewith.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 126, § 1.

8-10-14.1. Powers of justices of the peace.

  1. The chief judge of the family court shall from time to time appoint, with power to revoke such appointments, from those qualified justices of the peace who shall be members of the bar of the state of Rhode Island as many such justices of the peace as he or she may deem necessary who shall be authorized to set and take bail in all complaints bailable before the family court except those offenses punishable by life imprisonment, and, if unable to post bail, to commit to the adult correctional institutions all respondents arrested on such complaints, and the chief judge shall authorize the justices of the peace so appointed by him or her to issue warrants and complaints returnable to the family court, for any offense for which by law a judge of the family court may issue a warrant and complaint, and all warrants so issued, and all warrants and complaints upon which bail is taken or commitments are made shall be forthwith returned to family court; provided, that the justices of the peace shall not in any case or for any purpose have the power to issue search warrants.
  2. In the event that session of family court is not held in any of the counties on the next weekday (Monday thru Friday) after appearance by a respondent before a justice of the peace, then the justice of the peace may schedule the arraignment of the respondent in the closest county (if in session on the next day following) or in Providence county as he or she shall be directed by the administrative orders of the chief judge of the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 97, § 1.

8-10-14.2. Recording and certification of appointments and revocations — Signature of warrants.

The appointments and revocations of justices of the peace shall be recorded in the records of the court and certified, by the chief judge making the appointment and revocation, to the secretary of state, and the judge shall also issue to the justice or justices of the peace his or her warrant under the seal of the court, by which the justice or justices shall be authorized to perform the duties herein specified, and shall also, whenever he or she shall revoke the appointment, notify the justice of the peace in writing of the revocation. Justices of the peace appointed to issue warrants shall sign all warrants by them issued as “justice of the peace authorized to issue warrants.”

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 97, § 1.

8-10-15. Family court administrator.

  1. There shall be a family court administrator who shall be appointed by the chief judge of the family court in his or her capacity as administrative judge of the court, with the advice and consent of the senate, and who shall hold office for a term of five (5) years.
  2. Under the general supervision of the chief judge of the family court, within the policies established by the court, the administrator shall:
    1. Prepare an annual budget for the court;
    2. Formulate procedures governing the administration of court services;
    3. Make recommendations to the court for improvement in court services;
    4. Collect necessary statistics and prepare the annual report of the work of the court;
    5. Provide supervision and consultation to the staff of the court concerning administration of court services, training and supervision of personnel, and fiscal management;
    6. Perform such other duties as the chief judge shall specify;
    7. And further to assume and perform, in addition to any other duties provided by this chapter, the powers, authority, and the duties of the family court clerk, pursuant to the provisions of the general laws, and shall do and perform all other things which by law or the rules of the court shall appertain to the office of clerk.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 4; P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 4; P.L. 2008, ch. 119, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Rules.

Although there was a rule-making power conferred on the family court, such rules became effective only after approval of the supreme court which had never approved a $10.00 entry fee for all divorce cases filed and the duties of the administrator of the family court, as set out in this section, did not include such a rule-making power. Berberian v. O'Neil, 111 R.I. 354 , 302 A.2d 301, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1210 (1973).

8-10-16. Quarters.

The director of administration shall provide the family court with proper quarters and facilities necessary for the performance of the duties of the court. He or she shall also provide the clerk of said court with adequate quarters and facilities necessary for the performance of his or her duties.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-17. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 144, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1991, ch. 6, art. 12, § 1 and P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 71, § 1, effective February 15, 1991 and June 7, 1991, respectively.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-10-17 concerned receiving and screening unit.

8-10-18. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 9, art. 12, § 1, effective May 1, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-10-18 concerned the youth correctional center.

8-10-19. Limitation on transfer or parole of juveniles.

During the period when a juvenile shall be placed in the receiving and screening unit or in the youth correctional center, no transfer or parole of the juvenile shall be made except with the consent of the chief judge of the family court, or, in his or her absence, with the consent of the justice who initially heard, or has pending before him or her, the matter involving such juvenile.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-20. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L., § 8-10-20 , as enacted by P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1975, ch. 247, § 2. For present law, see § 8-15-7 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-10-20 concerned annual reports.

8-10-21. Records of court.

The records of the family court shall be public records, except that records of hearings in matters set forth in § 14-1-5 , together with stenographic notes and transcripts of those hearings, shall not be available for public inspection unless the court shall otherwise order. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the records of the family court in criminal matters involving adults shall be public records. The record of delinquent or wayward adjudications of juveniles may be accessed by law enforcement personnel to be used for law enforcement purposes only and shall remain otherwise confidential. The Attorney General shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to facilitate the purposes of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 220, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 223, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adoption Proceedings.

A natural mother’s desire to contact her child’s adoptive parents with the hope of seeing the child does not constitute good cause for the lifting of the confidentiality curtain which envelopes a family court adoption proceeding. In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203 , 397 A.2d 511, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1008 (1981).

Information concerning the identity and whereabouts of any of the parties to an adoption triangle may be released only under compelling circumstances. In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 531 (R.I. 1986).

In determining whether good cause exists to lift the cloak of confidentiality surrounding an adoption proceeding and the extent of disclosure necessary, courts uniformly balance the following competing interests: (1) The nature of the circumstances dictating the need for release of the identity of the birth parents; (2) the circumstances and desires of the adoptive parents; and (3) the circumstances of the birth parents and their desire or at least the desire of the birth mother not to be identified; and (4) the interests of the state in maintaining a viable system of adoption by the assurance of confidentiality. In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 531 (R.I. 1986).

One seeking access to adoption information bears a heavy burden in establishing the requisite “good cause”. In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 531 (R.I. 1986).

An adopted person’s psychological need to know the identity of his biological parents may constitute good cause to permit adopted adults access to their birth records. In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 531 (R.I. 1986).

Because an adoptee did not prove the existence of good cause for access to the adoption records and because deferring to the adoptee’s religious beliefs would be a preferential treatment by government, in violation of R.I. Const. art. 1, § 3 and the First Amendment of the federal Constitution, the trial court properly denied the adoptee’s petition. In re Philip S., 881 A.2d 931, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 185 (R.I. 2005).

Divorce Records.

Rhode Island’s Privacy Act should not be interpreted to apply to the records of the family court concerning divorce. Doe v. Edward A. Sherman Publ'g Co., 593 A.2d 457, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 139 (R.I. 1991).

The decision by the chief judge that good cause had not been shown for the sealing of financial records from an earlier divorce action was certainly not an abuse of discretion on his part, as the legislative judgment has been made that family court records shall be public. Providence Journal Co. v. Clerk of the Family Court, 643 A.2d 210, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 193 (R.I. 1994).

Public Records.

The statutory right to privacy in Rhode Island does not extend to those records deemed public. Doe v. Edward A. Sherman Publ'g Co., 593 A.2d 457, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 139 (R.I. 1991).

8-10-22. Intake department — Duties.

Within the family court there shall be established an intake department. Its duties shall be to receive applications and complaints relative to juvenile matters presented to the court, to provide for a thorough investigation of the applications and complaints, and to report thereon to the court before formal petition is filed. The intake department shall perform such other duties as shall be assigned to it by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 8-10-11 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-23. Intake supervisors.

The justices of the family court, or a majority of them, shall appoint a chief intake supervisor and two (2) assistant intake supervisors who are qualified by education, training, previous experience in professional social welfare, personality, character, and special aptitude for the work, to serve at the pleasure of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-23.1. Statewide juvenile hearing board.

  1. The chief judge of the family court shall appoint a statewide juvenile hearing board coordinator who is qualified by education, training, previous experience in professional social welfare, personality, character, and special aptitude for the work, to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge. The juvenile hearing board coordinator shall provide education, training, data collection and analysis, coordination, and assistance to cities and towns in the establishment and maintenance of juvenile hearing boards and teen courts. Juvenile hearing boards and/or teen courts shall report any data deemed necessary by the family court to perform the functions of the juvenile hearing board coordinator. No juvenile hearing board or teen court in the State of Rhode Island shall hear, or dispose of offenses that constitute felony offenses if committed by an adult, except by the express written consent of the chief justice of the family court; nor shall any juvenile hearing board or teen court hear or dispose of any offense which has been amended from a felony offense to a misdemeanor offense, except by the express written consent of the chief justice of the family court. Juveniles, wherever they may live, upon a decision to refer the juvenile to the juvenile hearing board or teen court, shall be referred to the hearing board or teen court in the city or town where the offense was committed; provided, however, if the city or town does not have a hearing board or teen court, the juvenile shall be referred to the hearing board or teen court where the juvenile resides. The Statewide hearing board coordinator is responsible for setting up a statewide community service program which may be utilized by any hearing board or teen court.
  2. The position of statewide juvenile hearing board coordinator is a pilot program which shall commence on July 1, 1998 and terminate on June 30, 2001, unless extended by the general assembly.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 397, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 418, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 192, § 1.

8-10-23.2. Creating a juvenile hearing board.

The town of North Kingstown shall have the authority to create a juvenile hearing board subject to the provisions of § 8-10-23.1 , notwithstanding the requirements of the town’s regulations, charter, or ordinances.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 295, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 352, § 1.

8-10-23.3. Jamestown juvenile hearing board.

The town of Jamestown shall have the authority to create a juvenile hearing board subject to the provisions of § 8-10-23.1 , and the requirements of the town’s regulations, charter or ordinances.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 36, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 166, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 239, § 15.

8-10-23.4. North Providence juvenile hearing board.

The town of North Providence shall use the authority to create a juvenile hearing board subject to the provisions of § 8-10-23.1 , notwithstanding the requirements of the town’s regulations, charter or ordinances.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 280, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 239, § 15.

8-10-24. Sessions, motions, assignments, etc.

The provisions of chapter 7 of this title, relating to the superior court, shall apply to the family court, except as the family court may otherwise by rule provide.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-25 — 8-10-27. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 52, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 8-10-25 — 8-10-27 concerned relating generally to the clerk of the family court.

8-10-28. Authority and duties of clerk.

In addition to any other authority or duties provided by this chapter, the clerk of the family court shall have the authority and carry out the duties with respect to the family court that are exercised or performed by the clerks of the superior court for that court pursuant to the provisions of §§ 8-4-8 , 8-4-9 , and 8-4-10 .

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-29. Report of divorce proceedings to director of health.

The clerk of the family court shall make returns to the director of health, on or before the first day of March in each and every year, for the year ending on the thirty-first day of December preceding, of all the applications for divorce, showing the number of applications, the number thereof continued, the number granted, and the causes for which they are granted, but without the names of the parties, in accordance with the blanks which shall be furnished him or her by the director of health.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-30. Appointment of clerk pro tempore.

In case of the death, resignation, absence, inability, or refusal to serve of the clerk, the chief judge of the family court may appoint a clerk pro tempore who shall hold his or her office until the clerk shall have returned or the inability shall have been removed or another clerk shall have been appointed to fill the vacancy and shall have qualified. The clerk so appointed shall be sworn and give bond before he or she enters upon his or her duties and shall, during the term of service, be entitled to the compensation of the office.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-31. Appointment of deputies.

The clerk of the family court, with the approval of the chief judge of the court, may appoint one or more deputy clerks who, being sworn, may discharge all the duties of the clerk until removed by the clerk or the court. The clerk shall fix the compensation of his or her deputies within the amount appropriated therefor and shall be liable for his or her misconduct or neglect of duty.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-32. Employment of clerical assistance by clerk.

  1. The clerk of the family court, with the approval of the chief judge thereof, shall appoint as many assistant clerks as may be necessary, who shall hold office until removal by the clerk or by a majority of the justices.
  2. The clerk is hereby authorized and empowered to employ such clerical assistants, in addition to the assistant clerks, as he or she may require in his or her office in copying, recording, indexing, and attending upon the files of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-33. Powers of assistant clerks of family court.

Each of the assistant clerks of the family court shall aid his or her principal in the discharge of his or her duties, and any act done by him or her, under direction of the clerk, in the line of duty of the clerk shall have the same force and effect as though done by the clerk; he or she shall have authority to administer oaths to parties, witnesses, and others as required in the conduct of the proceedings of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-34. Court secretary and assistant.

The justices of the family court, or a majority of them, may appoint a secretary and an assistant secretary who shall hold office during the pleasure of the court and shall perform such duties as may be required by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-35. Appointment of stenographers.

The justices of the family court, or a majority of them, shall appoint competent shorthand writers or stenotypists for regular service in the court and one or more such writers for occasional service therein in the absence of other appointees, who shall be known as court stenographers. They shall serve during the pleasure of the court and where designated by the chief judge.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1.

8-10-36. Court reporters and court recording clerks — Supplies and preservation of notes and other materials.

All books, papers, recording media, and supplies necessary for the use of the court reporters and court recording clerks or similar recording personnel shall be furnished by the state, and the notebooks used and notes and recordings taken by them shall be the property of the state and be deposited with the clerk of the family court, provided, that the clerks shall not be required to preserve the notebooks and notes and recordings beyond the period of fifteen (15) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 3.

8-10-37. Report of trials — Transcripts.

Subject to the provisions of § 8-10-21 , court reporters shall report stenographically, or court recording clerks or similar recording personnel shall report electronically, the proceedings in the trial of every action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in the family court. Each court reporter or court recording clerk or similar recording personnel shall also, upon the order of any justice of the court, transcribe or otherwise reproduce his or her report to be filed with the papers in the case. He or she shall also make a transcript or otherwise reproduce the whole or any part of the report upon the written request, filed with the clerk, by either party to the action or proceeding, and when completed and within the time limited by the court for filing the transcript, shall immediately deliver the same to the party ordering it, or to the attorney of record of the party, and in the case of transcription by court reporters for such service shall be paid a reasonable compensation, not less than five dollars ($5.00) and not exceeding three dollars ($3.00) per page for originals and one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per page for copies thereof to be allowed by the court; and, in case the transcript is used in subsequent proceedings in the cause, the cost of the transcript may be allowed as part of the costs. In the case of electronic court recordings the person making the recordings or another person so designated by the court may be requested or ordered, in lieu of making a transcript, to reproduce the recording and certify its authenticity, and in such case each party requesting the reproduction shall pay to the court the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) per cassette.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 373, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 206, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 473, § 1.

8-10-38. Judgments, decrees, and orders — Punishment for contempt.

  1. Like powers are hereby conferred upon the family court as are conferred upon the superior court by the provisions of § 8-6-1 .
  2. Provided, however, a justice of the family court shall notify the principal of a school that the court is ordering the placement of a juvenile in the principal’s school. The principal of the school shall have a right to be heard prior to the placement.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 358, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorneys’ Fees.

Where family court had jurisdiction of parties and subject matter, its power to award counsel fees could not be collaterally attacked on appeal from finding of contempt for failure to pay. Hartt v. Hartt, 121 R.I. 220 , 397 A.2d 518, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1766 (1979).

Bonds.

A bond may be required to ensure the return of a child whom a noncustodial parent has been allowed to remove temporarily from the state, but each case must stand on its own facts and a bond should not be required absent a showing of need therefor. McCullough v. Hudspeth, 120 R.I. 598 , 389 A.2d 1242, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 706 (1978).

Contempt.

Where family court had entered interlocutory decree and awarded custody of daughter to husband, it also had authority to enter order finding husband, who traveled to Israel with daughter without notifying wife or court and without attempting to comply with decree provision to effect that parties attempt to arrange reasonable visitation rights, in deliberate contempt of decree and to enjoin and restrain husband from presenting any final decree of divorce for entry in court until he purged himself of contempt by immediately returning daughter to state and jurisdiction of court. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 109 R.I. 428 , 286 A.2d 589, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1205 (1972).

Where respondent, pursuant to an interlocutory divorce decree, was responsible for the maintenance and repair payments for the jointly-owned domicile, and where respondent was in contempt of the family court for his failure to comply with the provisions of that decree, the order of the trial justice requiring respondent to pay one half of the cost of the capital improvements to the domicile was in the nature of a sanction imposed to enable respondent to purge himself of the contempt, and therefore within the sound discretion of the trial justice. Marek v. Marek, 119 R.I. 841 , 383 A.2d 1031, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 621 (1978).

Detention of a juvenile nonoffender at a training school based on a family court justice’s finding of civil contempt for violating prior placement orders of the court was a violation of § 14-1-11 . In re Dina N., 455 A.2d 318, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 794 (R.I. 1983).

The Family Court, although a statutory court, has inherent power to punish contempt of its authority. Porter v. Porter, 684 A.2d 259, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 260 (R.I. 1996).

Prior finding that a confined juvenile who refused to participate in required psychiatric treatment was in civil contempt did not preclude, on double jeopardy grounds, a later prosecution for criminal contempt based on continued noncompliance; furthermore, the prosecution was not untimely, because there were repeated orders that the juvenile comply with the treatment plan, all of which were ignored. State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 2003).

Family court did not abuse its discretion in finding a mother in contempt of an earlier order awarding a father physical custody of the parties’ children because the mother sought and obtained protective orders from a Massachusetts court that directly impacted the father’s access to the children and the mother’s claims that served the basis for the protective orders were pretextual; the children’s home state was Rhode Island. Ayriyan v. Ayriyan, 994 A.2d 1207, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 2010).

— Criminal.

The family court has the power to initiate criminal contempt proceedings for a repeated refusal by any individual, adult or juvenile, to follow an order of the court. In re Price, 645 A.2d 488, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 229 (R.I. 1994).

Motion for acquittal on charge of criminal contempt was properly denied where it was based on defendant’s argument that noncompliance with court order to cooperate in a psychiatric treatment plan occurred on the advice of counsel. State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 2003).

Continuance.

The family court has authority to continue a case for review once it has adjudicated the issue presented for trial, since the power to continue is inherent in the authority of a court to hear and determine the cases before it. Brandt v. Brandt, 119 R.I. 607 , 381 A.2d 1047, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 591 (1978).

Where the family court did not finally dispose of the support issue before it, it retained jurisdiction and thus had the authority to continue the case for review within the discretion of the court, but such discretion was abused where the case was continued five times within one year even though the master found that there had been no change in defendant’s financial circumstances. Brandt v. Brandt, 119 R.I. 607 , 381 A.2d 1047, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 591 (1978).

Injunctions.

Family court properly enjoined husband from proceeding with Maryland divorce suit where the Rhode Island court had obtained personal jurisdiction over him prior to his establishment of foreign domicile and his institution of the foreign action and where the injunction was warranted to prevent multiplicity of suits, conflicting decisions and confusion and to ensure enforcement of existing Rhode Island child support orders. Brown v. Brown, 120 R.I. 340 , 387 A.2d 1051, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 673 (1978).

Collateral References.

Contempt: state court’s power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court’s order — anticipatory contempt. 81 A.L.R.4th 1008.

8-10-38.1. Imprisonment for contempt.

The justices of the family court or its magistrate(s) are hereby empowered, when ordering a noncomplying parent to the adult correctional institution or the women’s reformatory for contempt, to order immediate work release status for him or her.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 406, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 2.

8-10-39. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L., § 8-10-39 , as enacted by P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-10-39 concerned rules of practice and procedure.

8-10-40, 8-10-41. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1990, ch. 203, § 2, effective July 9, 1990. For present similar provisions see chapter 14 of this title.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 8-10-40 and 8-10-41 concerned transfer, storage, and management of inactive family court records.

8-10-42. Engagement — Precedence — Retirement and powers of justices.

Those provisions of chapter 3 of this title, which relate to superior court justices, shall apply to the chief judge and associate justices of the family court and, for purposes of eligibility for retirement under § 8-3-7 as amended by chapter 2 of the public laws, 1959, service as a chief judge or associate judge of the juvenile court prior to September 1, 1961 shall be included as if the service had been on the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 3.

8-10-42.1. Service after retirement.

Any justice of the family court who shall resign in accordance with the provisions of § 8-3-9 may, at his or her own consent and on request of the chief judge of the court, be assigned to perform service as an associate justice thereof. When so assigned and performing such service, he or she shall have all the powers and authority of an associate justice of the family court, but otherwise he or she shall have no such powers nor be authorized to perform any judicial duties. Such a retired justice shall not be counted in the number of judges provided by law for the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 162, § 2.

8-10-43. References to family court — Powers and duties.

Wherever in any general or public law the words “juvenile court,” “judge of juvenile court,” or “chief judge of the juvenile court” shall appear, the terms shall mean and include “family court,” “justice of family court,” or “chief judge of the family court.” Wherever in any general or public law the words “domestic relations court,” “court of domestic relations,” or “judge of domestic relations court” shall appear, the terms shall mean and include “family court” or “chief judge or any associate justice of family court.” Wherever in title 15 reference is made to the superior court or the court of domestic relations, that reference shall mean and include the family court. In addition to the powers and authority specifically granted in this chapter, the justices of the family court shall have, insofar as they are applicable, the same obligations and duties as superior court justices, and in all matters within the jurisdiction of the court shall be vested with all of the prerogatives and authority of associate justices of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Provision in this section that references to the superior court or court of domestic relations shall mean and include family court does not mean that such references should cease to apply to the superior court, but that such reference should mean and include the family court. In re Opinion to Governor, 93 R.I. 211 , 172 A.2d 596, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1961).

Certification to Supreme Court.

This section makes § 9-24-27 , providing for certification of questions of great doubt or importance to the supreme court for decision before further proceedings in the trial court, applicable to the family court, at least when exercising juvenile jurisdiction. In re Correia, 104 R.I. 251 , 243 A.2d 759, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 641 (1968).

This section authorizes Family Court justices, like their Superior and District Court counterparts, to certify questions to the state Supreme Court where those questions so affect the merits of the controversy that they ought to be determined by that court prior to further proceedings. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 2000).

8-10-43.1. Venue of criminal offenses.

The chief judge of the family court or his or her designee shall fix the venue for trial of any person accused of any criminal offense which is subject to the jurisdiction of the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 345, § 1.

8-10-44. Annual appropriations.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate such sums as shall be necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter; and the state controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his or her order on the general treasurer for the payment of such sum, or so much thereof as may be required from time to time, upon receipt by him or her of duly authenticated vouchers approved by the chief judge of the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 15.

8-10-45. Severability.

The provisions of this chapter are severable, and if any of its provisions shall be held unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, the decision of that court shall not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 19.

Chapter 11 Motion Days and Terms of Court

8-11-1. Assignment or motion day falling on holiday.

If any assignment day or any motion day occurs on a legal holiday, the assignment day or motion day shall be the following week day.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 265; G.L. 1909, ch. 285, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 335, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 504, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-11-1 .

Cross References.

Legal holidays, § 25-1-1 et seq.

Motion days in superior court, § 8-7-3 .

8-11-2. Number of sessions on motion days.

The superior court shall hold so many sessions upon motion days as may be necessary for the purpose of hearing motions for new trial and other motions and for hearing interlocutory matters in equity.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 342; G.L. 1909, ch. 290, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 340, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 504, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-11-2 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 4.

8-11-3. Filing and notice of motions in supreme and superior courts.

All motions in the supreme or superior court shall be in writing and, except ex parte motions, shall be filed at least sixty (60) hours, exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays, before being called for hearing; and, except in ex parte motions, notice in writing shall be served upon the attorney or solicitor of record of the opposite side, or, if there is no such attorney or solicitor of record, upon the adverse party, at least forty-eight (48) hours, exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays, before being called for hearing, unless a different time for the filing and service is fixed ex parte by a justice of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A 1905, § 343; G.L. 1909, ch. 290, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 340, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 504, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-11-3 .

Rules of Court.

For form and manner of filing motions in superior court, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 7(b).

For rule governing motions in supreme court, see Sup. Ct. Rules, Article 1, Rule 28.

Motion days, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 2.5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Assessment of Damages.

Defendant in a defaulted answered case was entitled to notice before assessment of damages, but failure to give notice was not fatal where defendant delayed 22 months before filing petition for certiorari. Sahagian v. Superior Court, 47 R.I. 85 , 129 A. 813, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1925).

Plaintiff who secured judgment in answered defaulted case was required to give notice of motion to assess damages, and upon failure to do so the defendant was entitled to an injunction restraining sale of defendant’s property to satisfy alias execution where he acted promptly upon learning of assessment of money damages. Sahagian v. Sahagian, 48 R.I. 267 , 137 A. 221, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1927).

Assignment for Hearing.

While G.L. 1938, ch. 525, § 8 (§ 9-12-11 ) provides that an action of trespass and ejectment is “in order for assignment forthwith” irrespective of the ordinary assignment day by complying with requirements of this section as to form of motion, the defendant has a right to be heard as to the time of trial. Union Trust Co. v. National Coal Co., 65 R.I. 255 , 14 A.2d 506, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1940).

Ex Parte Motions.

Notice of motion for issuance of commission to take deposition without the state, pursuant to G.L. 1896, ch. 244, § 27, was not required by this section, as such motion is ex parte. Putnam v. MacLeod, 23 R.I. 373 , 50 A. 646, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 153 (1901).

Oral or Written Motions.

Where the statute provided for a motion for judgment by the plaintiff in an appeal of a trespass and ejectment action upon proof that the defendant is in default of rent payments, and the statute did not specify the motion must be in writing, the motion could be oral or written if the case was at issue and all parties were before the court. Gardilone v. Superior Court, 79 R.I. 256 , 87 A.2d 497, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1952).

Vacating Motions.

Assignment for trial of ejectment suit in Providence county made on ex parte motion by plaintiff without hearing should have been vacated on oral motion of defendants when case was called for trial even though defendants had written notice of assignment. Union Trust Co. v. National Coal Co., 65 R.I. 255 , 14 A.2d 506, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1940).

8-11-4. Docketing and calling of motions — Calendar.

All motions shall be docketed as filed, and shall be called in the order of filing, and, if not disposed of on motion day, shall be continued. A calendar shall be made up for each motion day.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 344; G.L. 1909, ch. 290, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 340, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 504, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 8-11-4 .

Rules of Court.

Motion calendars for Providence and Bristol Counties, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 2.3.

Motion days in Kent, Newport and Washington Counties, see Super. Ct. R. Prac. Rule 2.5.

Written order from motion calendar, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 77(f).

8-11-5. Business continued by adjournment.

All writs, actions, pleas, processes, precepts, recognizances, and other things whatsoever, returnable or having day in any court, shall stand, abide, and continue unto any adjournment made according to law and be held, deemed, and adjudged to be as effectual and available in law to all intents and purposes as if the court had been held on the day appointed for holding the court and no adjournment of the court had been made.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 263; G.L. 1909, ch. 285, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 335, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 505, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-11-5 .

8-11-6. Continuance of business when court fails to meet.

If from any cause any court in this state shall not be held at the time appointed by law, or to which it may have been adjourned, all business pending therein shall be proceeded with when the court next meets.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 264; G.L. 1909, ch. 285, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 335, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 505, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-11-6 .

8-11-7. Postponement of hearing.

Whenever provision is made for the hearing of a matter on a day certain, it may be heard then or on some future day to which the court may assign the hearing, or on which all the parties in writing may agree and to which the court may assent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 346; G.L. 1909, ch. 290, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 340, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 505, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 8-11-7 .

Chapter 12 Conditional Escheat of Unclaimed Funds in Court Registries

8-12-1. Report of unclaimed funds in court registries.

  1. The clerks of the supreme, superior, family, district, workers’ compensation courts and the traffic tribunal shall, every year during the month of July, return to the state court administrator those funds which have been on deposit in the registry of the respective court for a period of five (5) years or more as of the last business day of June of that year. A sworn statement listing all money or funds shall also be submitted.
  2. The statement shall contain as to each deposit or fund:
    1. The number and title of the case and the date of the order entered on the case in accordance with which the money was paid into the registry of the court;
    2. The name and address of the person, persons, firm, or corporation who paid the money into the registry of the court so far as the name and address appears of record;
    3. The name and address of the person, persons, firm, or corporation entitled to the money in the registry so far as the name and address appear of record in the case or are otherwise known to the clerk;
    4. The amount and date of the deposit in the registry of the court and the amount including accretions from interest or otherwise at the date of the statement; and
    5. An assertion as to whether or not any claim to the deposit or fund or portion thereof is being actively prosecuted by any person and/or whether such claim has been made during the five (5) years prior to the last business day of June of that year.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 100, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 452, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 238, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter (P.L. 1932, ch. 1916, §§ 1 to 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 26, §§ 1 to 4; G.L. 1956, §§ 8-12-1 to 8-12-7), consisting of §§ 8-12-1 — 8-12-7 and concerning unclaimed funds in court registries, was repealed by P.L. 1968, ch. 256, § 4.

Cross References.

Unclaimed property held by courts and public agencies, § 33-21.1-13 .

8-12-2. Deposit of unclaimed funds.

If, upon examination of the sworn statement required to be filed by the several clerks under the provisions of § 8-12-1 , it appears to the state court administrator that there are deposits in the registry of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, the workers’ compensation court and/or the traffic tribunal that have been unclaimed by any person prima facie entitled to the deposits, or his or her or its representative, for a period of five (5) years preceding the last business day of June of the then current year, then all of those unclaimed deposits in the registry of the applicable court, together with any interest on the deposit, shall be paid to the general fund to be held and used by the administrator of the state courts as approved by the chief justice of the supreme court subject to being repaid to the person(s), firm(s) or corporation(s) who may subsequently establish a lawful right to the deposit as provided in § 8-12-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 100, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 326, §§ 9, 10; P.L. 2000, ch. 452, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 238, § 1.

8-12-3. Claim for escheated funds.

  1. Any person who claims a right to money or funds paid to the general fund by the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, the workers’ compensation court and/or the traffic tribunal pursuant to § 8-12-2 , may file a complaint in the superior court within and for the county of Providence within three (3) years after the funds are deposited in the general fund. The complaint shall be subject to the superior court rules of civil procedure and shall follow the course of equity. The complaint shall be filed against the state, and service of process shall be made upon the administrator of the state courts in person or at his or her respective office with someone in charge of the office. The attorney general shall appear and represent the state in the action. The superior court shall hear the complaint, and in case the final determination of the complaint is in favor of the plaintiff, the court shall enter its judgment directing the administrator of the state courts to repay to the plaintiff so much of the fund as the plaintiff has shown himself or herself entitled to receive, together with interest at a rate not to exceed six percent (6%) per annum on that amount, together with the costs of the action as taxed, in accordance with the rules of civil procedure. The interest shall begin to accumulate on the date the sum is received by the general fund and shall cease on the earlier of fifteen (15) years following receipt or the date on which payment is made to the owner. Upon issuance of the order, the clerk shall immediately forward to the administrator of the state courts the execution based upon the judgment and including costs as taxed. The general fund will pay the amount named in the execution to the party entitled to the amount.
  2. In case the action is determined in favor of the state, the determination shall operate as a final bar against the claimant or his or her or its representatives. In the event the action is decided in favor of the claimant, review may be had by the supreme court in its discretion on petition for writ of certiorari, which must be filed within twenty (20) days by the attorney general following the judgment of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 100, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 452, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 238, § 1.

Chapter 13 Judicial Council

8-13-1. Creation — Composition.

A judicial council is hereby created for the study of the organization of the judicial system of the state and all matters relating to the administration of the system and its several departments of service. The judicial council shall consist of six (6) members of the bar of this state, who shall be appointed by the governor.

History of Section. P.L. 1939, ch. 699, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-13-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Judicial council:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 221, § 34A et seq.

8-13-2. Appointment of members — Vacancies.

In the month of January in each year, the governor shall appoint two (2) persons, qualified as provided in § 8-13-1 , to succeed the members of the council whose offices shall next expire, to hold office for three (3) years and until their respective successors shall be appointed and qualified. Any vacancy that shall occur in the membership of the council shall be filled by another appointment by the governor for the remainder of the term.

History of Section. P.L. 1939, ch. 699, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-13-2 ; P.L. 1997, ch. 326, § 11.

8-13-3. Officers of council.

The members of the council shall annually choose from their own membership a chairperson and a secretary.

History of Section. P.L. 1939, ch. 699, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-13-3 .

8-13-4. Powers and duties.

The judicial council may from time to time submit for the consideration of the justices of the various courts such suggestions in regard to the judicial system of the state as it may deem advisable, and it shall report annually to the governor on or before December the fifteenth upon such matters as it desires to bring to his or her attention or to the attention of the general assembly.

History of Section. P.L. 1939, ch. 699, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 8-13-4 .

8-13-5. Compensation of secretary — Expenses of council.

The secretary of the council shall receive annually the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) as compensation for his or her services and the other members of the council shall serve without compensation but shall be allowed their necessary travel, clerical, and other expenses, and the general assembly shall annually appropriate such sum as it may deem necessary in carrying out the provisions of this chapter; and the state controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of such sum, or so much thereof as may from time to time be required, upon the receipt by him or her of proper vouchers approved by the chairperson of the council.

History of Section. P.L. 1939, ch. 699, § 3; P.L. 1952, ch. 2993, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 8-13-5 .

Chapter 14 Inactive Records

8-14-1. Management, storage, and disposition of state court records.

There shall be created a committee within the state court system with responsibility for the management, storage, and disposition of all state court records, including inactive records. The committee shall be composed of the following members: the chief justice of the supreme court or his or her designee, the presiding justice of the superior court or his or her designee, the chief judge of the family court or his or her designee, the chief judge of the district court or his or her designee, the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court or his or her designee, the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal or his or her designee, one clerk from each of the respective state courts as designated by the chief or presiding justice or chief judge of each state court, and the head of the state court record center or his or her designee. The committee shall meet as required to revise the state courts’ records retention policy or at the request of the state court administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 203, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 311, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 473, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 6; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 6.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 8-14-1 (P.L. 1957, ch. 21, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 6), concerning transfer of superior and district court records, was repealed by P.L. 1990, ch. 203, § 3, effective July 9, 1990.

8-14-2. Attorney records.

After a period of seven (7) years or more has lapsed since the disposition of a civil case or matter, an attorney may destroy his or her records relative to the case.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 203, § 4.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 8-14-2 (P.L. 1957, ch. 21, § 2), concerning management of inactive superior court records, was repealed by P.L. 1990, ch. 203, § 3, effective July 9, 1990.

8-14-3 — 8-14-5. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1957, ch. 21, §§ 3, 4; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 6; P.L. 1985, ch. 338, §§ 1, 2; Repealed by P.L. 1990, ch. 203, § 3, effective July 9, 1990. For present similar provisions see this chapter.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 8-14-3 — 8-14-5 concerned disposition of record management of inactive district court records, and attorney records.

Chapter 15 Court Administration

8-15-1. Unified system.

The supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, the workers’ compensation court, and the traffic tribunal shall constitute a unified judicial system for purposes of administration.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 453, § 13; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 8.

8-15-2. Executive head of system.

The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the executive head of the judicial system.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 1.

8-15-2.1. Powers of the chief justice to ensure court operations.

  1. The chief justice of the supreme court may, by order, take any action necessary to ensure the continued and efficient operation of the courts of the unified judicial system. Such necessary actions may include, but are not limited to:
    1. Establishing alternative locations to conduct judicial business in the event that one or more court locations cannot be utilized;
    2. Enlarging, extending, tolling, or suspending any filing, appeal, or other applicable deadline or statute of limitation in the event of the closure or curtailment of court operations or other circumstances as is necessary, in the opinion of the chief justice, to ensure the fair administration of justice;
    3. In the event of a court closure or curtailment of court operations, suspending any judicial business that is deemed not essential by the chief justice; and
    4. Taking any other appropriate action necessary to ensure that judicial business is effectively conducted by the courts of the unified judicial system for the duration of the order.
  2. Any order of the chief justice closing or curtailing the operation of any court within the unified judicial system and setting forth the necessary response(s) thereto shall specify:
    1. The nature, time period, and duration of the circumstances giving rise to the order;
    2. The court(s) and court location(s) affected by the order;
    3. The action(s) to be undertaken to redress the circumstances giving rise to the order; and
    4. Any other relevant information needed to effectively respond to the circumstances giving rise to the order and ensure the continued and efficient operation of the unified judicial system for the duration of the order.
  3. The order closing or curtailing the operation of any court within the unified judicial system shall be limited to an initial duration of not more than thirty (30) days; provided, however, that the order may be modified or extended for additional periods of thirty (30) days each at the discretion of the chief justice. Any modification or extension of the initial order shall contain the same information required for the issuance of the initial order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
  4. In the event that the office of the chief justice is vacant, or the chief justice is unable, by reason of illness or absence, to perform his or her duties, the associate justice of the supreme court having precedence who is present and qualified, as determined by §§ 8-3-2 and 8-3-3 , shall have the power to issue an order under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 139, § 1, effective July 3, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 3, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 140, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

8-15-3. Power to assign judges.

In order to aid in the prompt disposition of judicial business, the chief justice shall have power to assign a judge of any trial court to sit in any other trial courts, subject to the approval of the presiding justice or the chief judge of both the sending and the receiving courts and with the consent of the judge to be assigned; the assignment to be for a designated period which designated period shall be determined by the chief justice subject to the approval of the presiding justice or the chief judge of both the sending and receiving courts and with the consent of the judge to be assigned; provided however, that if the designated period shall expire during a trial the justice may sit until the trial is completed; and, provided further, that the justice shall have the power to sit and exercise the function of a justice of the receiving court for the purpose of rendering a decision or completing any matter pending before him or her as a justice of the receiving court at the expiration of the period. Included in these matters shall be the hearing of motions for new trials, sentencing, and any and all other functions necessary to the conclusion of cases heard before him or her as a justice of the receiving court. The provisions of this section shall be interpreted and construed liberally for the purpose of accomplishing the purpose of this section. No other judge may be assigned to another court other than as provided in this section. The chief justice may terminate the temporary assignment sooner than as agreed upon if he or she determines that the need for the assignment no longer exists.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 1; P. L. 1970, ch. 212, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 216, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Temporary Assignment of Chief Judge.

Temporary assignment of the chief judge of the district court to the family court was permissible and not in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-15-3 . State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 92 (R.I. 2007).

8-15-3.1. Chief justice — Power to assign magistrates.

The Chief justice of the supreme court has the power to assign any magistrate of the superior court, family court, district court, or traffic tribunal to any court or tribunal of the unified judicial system with the consent of the presiding justice, chief judge, and/or chief magistrate of the relevant courts. When a magistrate is so assigned, he or she shall be vested, authorized, and empowered with all the powers belonging to the magistrates of the court to which he or she is specially assigned.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 415, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 197, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 10; P.L. 2011, ch. 292, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 4, provided: “It is the intent of the General Assembly to reform and make uniform the process of the selection of magistrates and the terms and conditions under which they shall serve. The provisions in this Act which establish a ten (10) year term, shall apply to any vacancy which occurs after the date of passage [July 1, 2007] and shall also apply to any magistrate position which completes its statutory term after the date of passage of this Act. Any magistrate in service as of the effective date of this Act who was appointed to his or her position with life tenure or for a term of years shall continue to serve in accordance with the terms of that appointment. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act shall determine the rights and duties of court magistrates superseding any act or rule in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”

8-15-4. Appointment of court administrator and assistants.

  1. The chief justice shall appoint a court administrator and such assistants as he or she deems necessary to aid in the administration of the judicial system. The administrator and his or her assistants shall serve at the pleasure of the chief justice.
  2. The court administrator shall, under the direction of the chief justice, prepare an annual budget for the judicial system and submit the budget to the department of administration and perform all other necessary functions relating to the administration of the courts thereof.
  3. It shall be the responsibility of the court administrator, under the direction of the chief justice, to act upon all administrative matters affecting the operation of the judiciary, including, but not limited to:
    1. The preparation of the judicial payrolls;
    2. The control of judicial appropriations for all state courts, except those as provided otherwise by law;
    3. The procuring of office space, supplies, equipment, and professional and technical assistants for the judiciary; and
  4. The court administrator, with the written approval of the chief justice, is authorized and empowered to adopt any rules and regulations that are deemed necessary to accomplish the purposes of this section, a copy of which rules and regulations shall be filed with the secretary of state and available for public inspection. In the formation of these rules and regulations, the judiciary shall take into consideration and conform to, where practicable, existing policies governing financial and personnel practices within the executive branch of government.
  5. The court administrator shall, under the direction of the chief justice, assume control of and supervise the maintenance and repair of all buildings housing the supreme and several inferior courts of justice throughout the state of Rhode Island. The general assembly shall appropriate sufficient amounts in the court budget to enable the court administrator to implement the provisions of this section.
  6. The preparation of the annual budget for the judiciary and all state courts including salaries.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 362, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 595, art. 45, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Court Personnel.

Executive director of the statewide judicial information system was not entitled to full status as executive director under the general statute, R.I. Gen. Stat. § 36-4-59 because the trumping-specific provision in R.I. Gen. Stat. § 8-15-4 stated that assistants to the court administrator served at the pleasure of the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Plunkett v. State, 810 A.2d 787, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 222 (R.I. 2002).

8-15-4.1. Deposit of proceeds.

The state court administrator may receive the proceeds of any contract entered into by him or her for the sale, lease, or transfer of any computer hardware, software, or related services produced, maintained, or developed by the administrative office of state courts. Such proceeds shall be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 270, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 39.

8-15-5. Advisory board.

The chief justice shall appoint an advisory board to consult with him or her on administrative matters. The board shall include the four (4) associate justices of the supreme court, the presiding justice of the superior court, the chief judge of the family court, the chief judge of the district court, and the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 453, § 13; P.L. 1995, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 8.

8-15-6. Internal administration of courts not affected.

The presiding judge of the superior court, the chief judge of the family court, the chief judge of the district court, the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court, and the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal shall have the power to administer the affairs of their respective courts; to establish calendars and to assign magistrates and judges to those calendars; to appoint administrative and clerical personnel for their courts; to act as authorized agent for their court; and to make rules for the conduct of their business, not inconsistent with the rules promulgated for the courts pursuant to § 8-6-2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 8; P.L. 2004, ch. 595, art. 45, § 5; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 7.

8-15-7. Annual report of the judiciary.

Under the direction of the chief justice, the court administrator appointed pursuant to § 8-15-4 shall prepare annually a report to the legislature, which report shall contain appropriate statistics bearing on the condition of the dockets of state courts and such other information as may reflect the administration of the state court system. This information shall be furnished on forms provided by the state court administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 247, § 1.

8-15-8. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 250, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 293, § 4; Repealed by P.L. 2006, ch. 366, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 476, § 2. The repeal was contingent on approval of an amendment to Article 2, § 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution, which was approved at the general election on November 7, 2006.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-15-8 concerned reporting of felony sentencing to the secretary of state.

8-15-9. Supervision of court imposed and court related costs, fines, restitution, and other payments, deposits, and receipts.

Within the administrative office of the state courts there shall be a finance section. The director of the finance section shall be appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court, and approved by a majority vote of the advisory board. The director of the finance section shall monitor the handling, collection, receipt, and disbursement of all court imposed or court related fees, fines, costs, assessments, charges, and other monetary payments, deposits, and receipts, including, but not limited to, filing fees, court costs and fees, bail, fines, judgments, awards, restitution payments, registry of court accounts, restricted receipts accounts, child support and other support orders, and court stenographers’ accounts. The director shall be responsible for all bookkeeping and accounting of money collected or received by the clerks of the various state courts including, but not limited to, §§ 8-4-8 , 8-8-16 , 8-8-17 , 8-8.2-3 and 8-10-10 . The director shall formulate and publish a policy which shall standardize the procedures for the handling, collection, receipt, and disbursement of court imposed or court related monetary payments, deposits, and receipts. The court may require all persons who enter into a payment plan for the payment of court imposed or court related fees, fines, court costs, assessments, charges and/or any other monetary obligations to provide a valid social security number, valid driver’s license number, and date of birth at the time they enter into said payment plan. Provided, however, social security numbers and driver’s license numbers shall not be part of the public record and shall be used for collection purposes only.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 8; P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 25, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 154, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 160, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 294, § 4.

8-15-9.1. Payment by credit card.

  1. The director of the finance section of the state courts shall establish procedures, in conjunction with the state controller and general treasurer, by which court imposed fines and costs may be paid by credit card presented at the offices of the court clerks. These procedures may include the imposition of a surcharge on the credit card user for each transaction. This surcharge shall not exceed the amount charged to the state by the credit card contractor for the corresponding transaction. Nothing contained in this section shall require justices of the peace acting as bail commissioners to accept credit cards during the hours when the clerk’s offices are closed.
  2. No person making any payment by credit card shall be relieved from liability for the underlying obligation except to the extent that the state realizes final payment of the underlying obligation in cash or the equivalent. If final payment is not made by the credit card issuer or other guarantor of payment in the credit card transaction, then the underlying obligation shall survive and the state shall retain all remedies for enforcement which would have applied if the credit card transaction had not occurred. No contract may modify the provisions of this subsection.
  3. Credit card account numbers in the possession of a state or local government are confidential and shall not be deemed public records.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 28.

8-15-9.2. Information to be provided to State Controller.

Each quarter the director of finance shall remit to the state controller within the department of administration data that would be necessary to enhance efforts to collect unpaid court imposed or court related fees, fines, court costs, assessments, charges and/or any other monetary obligations due and owing to the state which have been outstanding for a period of at least ninety (90) days from the date the amount was due and are not the subject of a court-ordered payment plan in good standing, or are not the subject of an appeal. This data shall include the social security numbers, valid driver’s license number, and date of birth, of the persons owing the outstanding amounts, if available. Provided, however, social security numbers and driver’s license numbers shall not be part of the public record and shall be used for collection purposes only.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 25, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 154, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 160, § 2.

8-15-9.3. Public inspection of court payments owed.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the director of the finance section on a quarterly basis shall prepare a list of the one hundred (100) delinquent persons who owe the largest amount of court-imposed or court-related fees, fines, court costs, assessments, charges, and/or any other monetary obligations due and owing to the state that have been unpaid for a period in excess of ninety (90) days from the date that any such amounts were due and are not the subject of a court-ordered payment plan in good standing. (The above fees are hereinafter referred to as “overdue court fees.”) The list shall contain the name, city or town, and state of each person who owes overdue court fees as of the end of the quarter, together with the total amount owed, and the date of disposition. No person owing overdue court fees shall be included on such list if the underlying matter in which overdue court fees were imposed, or the amount of the fees, is the subject of an appeal.
  2. [Deleted by P.L. 2016, ch. 35, § 1 and P.L. 2016, ch. 36, § 1].
  3. Any such list prepared by the director of finance shall be available to the public for inspection and shall be published on the website that is maintained by the courts; provided, however, that any such list prepared by the director shall not include any individual’s social security number or driver’s license number.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 25, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 154, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 160, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 36, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 70, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 35, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 36, § 1 enacted nearly identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 65, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 70, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-15-10. Receipt and use of funds.

There is hereby established in the judicial department a restricted receipt account referred to as “Third Party Grants.” The judicial department shall have the authority to receive and expend monies from gifts, devises, grants, bequests, or donations. The judicial department is authorized to enter into any contracts necessary to obtain and expend those funds.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 16, § 2.

8-15-11. Electronic filing and online payments.

  1. In addition to any other filing fees or court costs required by law or court rule, parties to any court matter may be required to pay a technology surcharge or fee not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00) at the inception or the conclusion of any case, or upon making any electronic payment online to any of the courts within the unified judicial system. Such surcharges or fees shall be determined by the state court administrator with the approval of the chief justice.
  2. The collection of technology surcharges shall be monitored and supervised by the judiciary’s director of finance and shall be deposited into a restricted receipt account designated as “Rhode Island judiciary technology surcharge account,” the proceeds of which shall be solely for use by the judiciary in support of its technology infrastructure and case management system. On or before January 15, 2015, and annually thereafter on or before January 15, the judiciary’s director of finance shall file a report with the governor, the speaker of the house, and the president of the senate detailing: (1) The total amount of funds collected and deposited into the judiciary technology surcharge account for the most recently completed fiscal year; (2) The fund balance as of the date of the report; (3) An itemization of all expenditures and other uses of said funds from said account for the most recently completed fiscal year; and (4) An annual evaluation as to the appropriateness of the amount of the technology surcharge or fee.
  3. The implementation of electronic court records shall not alter the application of § 38-2-5 to any judicial records, whether in paper or electronic format.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 16 Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline

8-16-1. Composition — Appointment.

  1. There is hereby created a commission to be known as the commission on judicial tenure and discipline, hereinafter referred to as the commission. The commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members: three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate, none of whom need be attorneys; three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the governor from a list of attorneys provided by the Rhode Island bar association with the advice and consent of the senate, that list of attorneys to include five (5) names for each member to be appointed by the governor; one attorney or public member to be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one attorney or public member who shall be appointed by the house minority leader, one attorney or public member to be appointed by the president of the senate; and one attorney or public member to be appointed by the senate minority leader; six (6) members of the judiciary appointed by the supreme court, one each from the superior, family, district, workers’ compensation courts, traffic tribunal and one at large member from any of the aforementioned courts shall be chairperson.
  2. No member of the commission, except the appointed members of the judiciary, shall, while serving as a member thereof, hold any public office, or be in the employ of the state of Rhode Island.
  3. The chairperson of the commission shall direct the performance of such administrative duties as may be required for the effective discharge of the obligations herein made incumbent upon the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1983, c. 26, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 13; P.L. 1991, ch. 132, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 205, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 5; P.L. 2007, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 121, § 1.

Law Reviews.

For article, “Appointments by the Legislature Under the Rhode Island Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of a Road Less Traveled,” see 1 R.W.U.L. Rev. 1 (1996).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

The legislature has carefully crafted a method of investigating and adjudicating complaints against members of the judiciary, seeking to create a careful balance between the right of the public to know and the right of the judge to confidentiality. Operation Clean Gov't v. Rhode Island Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 741 A.2d 257, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 209 (R.I. 1999).

Constitutionality of Composition.

Since the Supreme Court is evenly divided on the constitutionality of the composition of the commission as to membership by members of the Legislature, the presumption of constitutionality prevails. In re Commission on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 670 A.2d 1232, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 1996).

8-16-2. Terms of the commissioners.

Except as otherwise provided, the members of the commission shall serve for terms of three (3) years; provided, however, that the initial appointments shall be so staggered that one of each class of members so appointed shall serve for a term of one year, one for two (2) years, and one for three (3) years. The appointment by the supreme court of the member of the judiciary at large shall be for a term of three (3) years. No member shall be eligible for reappointment to another term if he or she has served more than six (6) consecutive years. Vacancies other than those arising through the expiration of a term shall be filled for the unexpired portion of the term in the same manner as vacancies due to the expiration of the term.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 62, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 94, § 1.

8-16-3. Meetings of the commission — Compensation.

  1. The commission shall meet at such times and places as are necessary to discharge the duties made incumbent upon it under the provisions of this chapter. It shall meet at least once a year in the month of May and shall make an annual report of expenditures to the governor. Nine (9) members shall constitute a quorum of the commission and determinations shall be made by a majority vote of those present, except that recommendations to the supreme court shall be made by an affirmative vote of at least nine (9) members of the commission.
  2. All commissioners shall serve without compensation; provided, however, that while away from their homes or regular places of employment and engaged in carrying out their duties as members of the commission, they shall be allowed travel expenses, including meals and lodging, that are authorized by law for persons in the service of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 319, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 63, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 171, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 63, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 171, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Review.

The appellate court declined to peruse a schedule of the defendant’s activities in light of the statutory provision requiring confidentiality until a proceeding becomes the subject of testimony at a public hearing. Operation Clean Gov't v. Rhode Island Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 741 A.2d 257, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 209 (R.I. 1999).

8-16-4. Employment of personnel — Investigation of unfitness.

  1. The commission is empowered hereby to engage the services of legal, secretarial, clerical, and investigative employees and to make such other expenditures as are necessary for the effective performance of its functions.
  2. The commission, upon receiving from any person a verified statement, not unfounded or frivolous, alleging facts indicating that a justice of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, the workers’ compensation court, or the traffic tribunal, or a probate judge in any city or town in the state is guilty of a violation of the canons of judicial ethics, or of willful or persistent failure to perform his or her duties, disabling addiction to alcoholic beverages, drugs, or narcotics, or conduct that brings the judicial office into serious disrepute, or that such a judge has a physical or mental disability that seriously interferes and will continue to interfere with the performance of his or her duties, shall make a preliminary investigation to determine whether formal proceedings shall be instituted and a hearing held. The commission may, on its initiative, make a preliminary investigation, without receiving a verified statement, to determine whether formal proceedings shall be instituted and a public hearing held.
  3. If the preliminary investigation discloses that a charge of judicial unfitness of the kind mentioned in this section is supported by substantial evidence, it shall direct that a public hearing thereon be held, and the judge shall be notified of the investigation, the nature of the charge, and the time and place set for a hearing thereon. The judge shall have the right to counsel and to confront witnesses against him or her and shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present such matters in defense as he or she may choose. The notice shall be given by prepaid registered or certified mail addressed to the judge at his or her chambers or his or her last known place of residence. The judge shall file a written answer to the charges within twenty (20) days after the notice has been served upon him or her. Allegations contained in the notice that are not denied in the answer shall be deemed admitted. The notice and the answer shall be public documents. The judge shall attend the public hearing without the necessity of a subpoena being served upon him or her; and, if he or she is called as a witness by the commission at the public hearing, he or she shall take the witness stand and shall testify in the same manner as if under subpoena.
  4. If the preliminary investigation discloses that there exists a violation of the canons of judicial ethics and that violation is not one of a serious nature, the commission may in its discretion issue a private reprimand to the judge. The private reprimand shall caution the judge that the conduct complained of, if continued, may be the cause for discipline. The private reprimand shall include a statement of the facts found by the commission, as a result of the preliminary investigation, and may issue confidential suggestions and recommendations with respect to the judge. Any judge issued a private reprimand shall have the right to appeal the private reprimand within ten (10) days and request a hearing before the commission with the same rights accorded by this section; provided, however, that the hearing shall not be open to the public, and all evidence and proceedings relating to the private reprimand shall be kept confidential.
  5. Upon completion of the hearings, the commission may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of proof or may recommend to the supreme court the censure, suspension, immediate temporary suspension, reprimand, retirement, or removal from office of the judge under investigation; provided, however, that the recommendation for the removal of a justice of the supreme court shall be subject to the provisions of § 8-16-7(b) . For the purposes of this chapter, wherever the word “judge” appears, it shall be construed to include probate judges in the cities and towns of this state.
  6. The commission shall have the same authority to temporarily exclude all spectators from the public hearing as is possessed by justices of the superior court in criminal cases.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 312, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 257, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 2, § 2; P.L. 1987, ch. 99, § 2; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 13; P.L. 1991, ch. 132, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 205, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 312, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 334, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 402, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Balancing of Rights.

The legislature has carefully crafted a method of investigating and adjudicating complaints against members of the judiciary, seeking to create a careful balance between the right of the public to know and the right of the judge to confidentiality. Operation Clean Gov't v. Rhode Island Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 741 A.2d 257, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 209 (R.I. 1999).

Effect of Judge’s Resignation.

A judge or judicial officer who has removed himself or herself from judicial office by resignation is not by that fact immune from action by the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, which may recommend some sanction other than removal. In re Fuyat, 578 A.2d 1387, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 150 (R.I. 1990).

Public Hearings.

Whenever a judicial officer elects to admit to allegations or violations and to consent to the disciplinary commission’s recommended sanction, the Supreme Court’s approval of the commission’s proposed waiver of the public hearing must be obtained before any closed hearing may proceed. In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 2001).

Public hearing was properly waived upon the petition of the Commission on Judicial Tenure & Discipline and the respondent, a magistrate judge, because the magistrate admitted to the allegations and agreed with the recommended sanction of public censure. In re Yashar, 885 A.2d 152, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 186 (R.I. 2005).

Procedures of the Rhode Island Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline do not result in a merger of investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions such that judges’ rights to due process are denied. In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 916 A.2d 746, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2007).

Recommendations.

Included in the plenary authority to impose sanctions upon members of the bar is the authority to modify the disciplinary commission’s proposed disposition and to impose sanctions that the court deems more appropriate, including ones that are not statutorily specified. In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 2001).

Though a judge violated defendant’s constitutional rights by offering him a plea bargain on condition that he not seek legal counsel, in violation of R.I. Sup. Ct. art. VI, Canons 2A, and 3B.8, public censure was not appropriate because this was an isolated incident of misconduct and the judge had an exemplary record. In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 916 A.2d 746, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2007).

Termination of Pension Benefits.

The termination of the pension of an active retired justice found guilty of various unethical acts involving the use of his position for financial gain did not constitute a disproportionate remedy in violation of article I, section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The judge’s actions motivated by the desire for personal gain operated to harm the public trust and confidence in the Judiciary as a whole and to affect adversely the honor and integrity of the very position he held and the capacity in which he served. In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375 (R.I. 1992). But see § 36-10.1-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Abuse or misuse of contempt power as ground for removal or discipline of judge. 76 A.L.R.4th 982.

8-16-4.1. Subpoena powers of commission.

The members of the commission are hereby severally authorized and empowered to administer oaths; and the commission, in all cases of every nature pending before it, is hereby authorized and empowered to summon and examine witnesses and to compel the production and examination of papers, books, accounts, documents, records, certificates, and other legal evidence that may be necessary or proper for the determination and decision of any question before or the discharge of any duty required by law of the commission. All subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum shall be signed by the chairperson or, in the absence or disqualification of the chairperson, by any other member thereof, shall be served as subpoenas are now served in civil cases in the superior court; and witnesses so subpoenaed shall be entitled to the same fees for attendance and travel as are now provided for witnesses in civil cases in the superior court. If any person fails to obey the command of any such subpoena without reasonable cause, or if a person in attendance before the commission shall, without reasonable cause, refuse to be sworn, or to be examined, or to answer a legal and pertinent question, the commission may apply to any justice of the superior court, upon proof by affidavit of the fact, for a rule or order, returnable in not less than two (2) or more than five (5) days, directing the person to show cause why he or she should not be adjudged in contempt. Upon the return of the order, the justice before whom the matter is brought for a hearing shall examine under oath the person and such person shall be given an opportunity to be heard, and if the justice shall determine that the person has refused without reasonable cause or legal excuse to be examined, or to answer a legal and pertinent question, or to produce books, accounts, papers, records, and documents material to the issue which he or she was ordered to bring or produce, he or she may forthwith commit the person to the adult correctional institutions, there to remain until he or she submits to do the act which he or she was so required to do, or is discharged according to law. If an application for contempt pursuant to this section relates to the actions of a witness at a public hearing, then the papers filed with and proceedings before the court shall be open to the public; otherwise, such papers and proceedings shall be confidential.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 312, § 2; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

8-16-4.2. Discovery.

After the commission institutes formal proceedings and schedules a public hearing, the commission and the judge shall be entitled to conduct discovery in the same manner as litigants in civil cases in the superior court, and the superior court rules of civil procedure shall govern all such discovery. Except as provided in § 8-16-13 , all discovery proceedings and all materials obtained by either side through discovery shall be kept confidential. Any disputes concerning discovery shall be heard on motion before the presiding justice of the superior court; provided, however, that if the presiding justice is the subject of the commission proceeding in question, then such motions shall be heard before the senior associate justice of the superior court. All papers filed with and proceedings before the superior court pursuant to this section shall be confidential.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 13.

8-16-4.3. Compelling evidence in commission proceedings — Immunity.

Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his or her privilege against self-incrimination, to answer a question or to produce other evidence of any kind during a preliminary investigation or at a deposition or at a public hearing, the chairperson may, upon a majority vote of a quorum of the commission, submit a written request to the presiding justice of the superior court to order the witness to answer the question or produce the evidence; provided, however, that if the presiding justice is the subject of the commission proceeding in question, then the request shall be made to the senior associate justice of the superior court. The court, in its discretion, after notice to the witness, may order the witness to answer the question or produce the evidence. The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his or her privilege against self-incrimination, but the witness shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for, or on account of, any transaction or matter regarding which, in accordance with the order, he or she gave answer or produced evidence; and no testimony or other evidence compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony or other evidence, shall be used against the witness in any criminal case, except he or she may be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed in answering or failing to answer, or in producing or failing to produce evidence, in accordance with the order. If a request for an order pursuant to this section relates to the refusal of a witness at a public hearing to answer a question or to produce evidence, then the papers filed with and proceedings before the court shall be open to the public; otherwise, such papers and proceedings shall be confidential. No order entered pursuant to this section shall operate to vacate, modify, or otherwise prevent the enforcement of any conviction, judgment, or sentence entered by any court against the witness prior to the grant of immunity, unless the order entered pursuant to this section expressly so provides.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

8-16-5. Certification of recommendations to supreme court.

Whenever the commission shall make a determination recommending the reprimand, censure, suspension, immediate temporary suspension, removal, or retirement of a member of the judiciary, it shall file forthwith a copy of the recommendation, certified by the chairperson, together with the transcript and the findings and conclusions, with the chief justice of the supreme court, and the commission shall forthwith give the member of the judiciary written notice of the filing, together with a copy of its findings and recommendations. The notice shall be mailed to the chambers of the judge or to his or her last known place of residence or may be personally delivered to him or her by a member of the commission. The transcript and the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the commission shall be public documents, except when they relate to a hearing concerning a private reprimand pursuant to § 8-16-4(d) , in which case they shall be kept confidential.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 312, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

8-16-6. Review of commission’s recommendations by supreme court.

  1. The supreme court may on its own motion and shall upon petition of a judge who has been adversely affected by a recommendation of the commission review the record of the commission’s proceedings on the law and on the facts and may, for the purposes of the review, permit the introduction of additional evidence and shall have the power to subpoena witnesses and administer oaths. The supreme court may, upon review of a recommendation of censure, suspension, immediate temporary suspension, reprimand, retirement, or removal, affirm, modify, or reject the recommendation of the commission.
  2. A petition to the supreme court to modify or reject the recommendation of the commission for reprimand, censure, suspension, immediate temporary suspension, removal, or retirement of a judge shall be filed with the chief justice of the supreme court and the chairperson of the commission within twenty (20) days after the filing of a certified copy of the recommendation of the commission. The petition shall be verified, shall specify the grounds relied upon, and shall be accompanied by a brief. Within twenty (20) days of the filing of the petition, the commission may file a respondent’s brief with the chief justice of the supreme court and the petitioner within ten (10) days after service of respondent’s brief, the petitioner may file a reply brief, of which one copy shall be served on the commission. Petitions and briefs filed pursuant to this section shall be public documents.
  3. The supreme court may hold such hearings as it deems necessary when reviewing recommendations of the commission, and where the review is conducted pursuant to a petition therefor, its decision shall be rendered not later than ninety (90) days after the filing of that petition. Hearings before the supreme court pursuant to this section shall be open to the public, and the court’s decision shall be public and shall be published in the same manner as other decisions of the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 312, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Balancing of Rights.

The legislature has carefully crafted a method of investigating and adjudicating complaints against members of the judiciary, seeking to create a careful balance between the right of the public to know and the right of the judge to confidentiality. Operation Clean Gov't v. Rhode Island Comm'n on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 741 A.2d 257, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 209 (R.I. 1999).

Recommendations.

The commission is empowered to conduct investigations and issue findings and recommendations, but its findings and recommendations are in no way exhaustive or binding upon the Supreme Court, and therefore do not usurp the court’s inherent power. In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375 (R.I. 1992). But see § 36-10.1-1 et seq.

A recommendation that a judge reimburse the state for time for which he was paid when he was not at work amounted to a civil sanction that was consistent with the disciplinary commission’s authority and did not amount to a monetary sanction that was punitive in nature or to a fine. In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 2001).

8-16-6.1. Suspension of judge pending review.

Whenever the supreme court reviews a commission recommendation for the suspension, immediate temporary suspension, removal, or retirement of a judge other than a justice of the supreme court, the commission may, in its discretion, order the suspension of the judge pending the completion of the review. The suspension shall be without loss of compensation.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

8-16-7. Power of the supreme court to discipline, suspend, or remove judges.

  1. Whenever the commission shall have recommended reprimand, censure, suspension, immediate temporary suspension, removal, or retirement of a judge from office and filed its findings and recommendations with the chief justice of the supreme court, and those recommendations have been affirmed or modified, after compliance has been had with the provisions of § 8-16-6 providing for a review of the recommendations by the supreme court, that court shall and hereby is empowered to take such action and to issue such process as may be required to give effect to the recommendations of the commission as affirmed or modified. Orders entered by the supreme court pursuant to this subsection shall be public and shall be published in the same manner as other orders of the supreme court.
  2. Whenever the commission shall recommend the removal of a justice of the supreme court from office and the recommendation has been approved after compliance has been had with the provisions of § 8-16-6 providing for a review of the recommendations by the supreme court, that court shall thereupon transmit its findings and recommendation to the speaker of the house of representatives recommending therein the initiation of proceedings for the removal of the justice of the supreme court pursuant to the provisions of article X, § 4, and article XI of the constitution of this state, providing for the impeachment or removal of justices of the supreme court.
  3. Whenever the supreme court shall, upon review, reject a recommendation of the commission, it shall set forth its reasons therefor in a written decision which shall be public and shall be published in the same manner as other decisions of the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 312, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Termination of Pension Benefits.

The termination of the pension of an active retired justice found guilty of various unethical acts involving the use of his position for financial gain did not constitute a disproportionate remedy in violation of article I, section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The judge’s actions motivated by the desire for personal gain operated to harm the public trust and confidence in the Judiciary as a whole and to affect adversely the honor and integrity of the very position he held and the capacity in which he served. In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375 (R.I. 1992). But see § 36-10.1-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of rule of necessity in judicial actions, providing that a judge is not disqualified to try a case because of personal interest if case cannot be heard otherwise. 27 A.L.R.6th 403.

Disciplinary action against judge for engaging in ex parte communication with attorney, party, or witness. 82 A.L.R.4th 567.

Disqualification of judge for bias against counsel or litigant. 54 A.L.R.5th 575.

Disqualification of judge under 28 U.S.C.S. § 455(b)(4), providing for disqualification where judge has financial or other interest in proceeding. 163 A.L.R. Fed. 575.

Judge’s previous legal association with attorney connected to current case as warranting disqualification. 85 A.L.R.4th 700.

Removal or discipline of state judge for neglect of, or failure to perform, judicial duties. 87 A.L.R.4th 727.

Timeliness of affidavit of disqualification of trial judge under 28 USCS § 144. 141 A.L.R. Fed. 311.

8-16-7.1. Confidentiality of supreme court review of recommendation of private reprimand.

Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 8-16-6 and 8-16-7 , all papers filed with, proceedings before, and decisions of the supreme court on review of a commission recommendation of a private reprimand pursuant to § 8-16-4(d) shall be kept confidential.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

8-16-8. Discipline of judges upon indictment or conviction for a crime.

  1. The supreme court on its own motion shall suspend, pending the prosecution of an appeal, any judge of any court when it is shown by the certified record of a court of competent jurisdiction that he or she either pleaded guilty or no contest or was found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States, or of any other crime that involves moral turpitude. The suspension shall be without compensation, except where the judge involved is a justice of the supreme court. Whenever, upon appeal, the conviction is reversed, the suspension shall terminate and the judge involved shall be paid the salary that would have been paid him or her during the period of suspension.
  2. Where, after an appeal, a conviction has become final, the judge involved shall be removed from office either by the supreme court in appropriate cases or, in the case of a justice of the supreme court, by action pursuant to the provisions of § 8-16-7(b) .
  3. A judge is hereby disqualified and prohibited from performing his or her judicial duties while there is pending against him or her an indictment charging him or her with the commission of a crime punishable as a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States. The suspension shall be without loss of compensation.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1.

8-16-9. Retirement of judges for incapacity or disability.

  1. Whenever the commission shall, after investigation and hearing, determine that a judge has a physical or mental disability that seriously interfered and will continue to interfere with the performance of his or her duties, it may recommend to the supreme court the retirement of the judge, saving to the judge all retirement benefits that have accrued to him or her, if any. The investigation, hearing, and recommendation shall be confidential. A justice of the supreme court may not be retired under this section without his or her consent, and where consent to the retirement is withheld, a further recommendation shall be made to the speaker of the house of representatives to initiate proceedings for the removal of the judge pursuant to the provisions of article X, § 4 of the constitution.
  2. Whenever any judge has served in judicial office without having reached the prescribed age that would entitle him or her to retirement benefits, the commission, proceeding pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may recommend to the supreme court that the judge be retired and that his or her pension rights be accelerated to become effective as of the date of his or her retirement. The supreme court may endorse the recommendation and may forward the recommendation to the general assembly for appropriate legislative action in order that his or her pension rights be so accelerated. Judges retired under this section shall be deemed to have retired voluntarily. Any judge shall be disqualified and prohibited from acting in his or her judicial capacity while any recommendation for his or her retirement, based upon physical or mental disability, is pending before the supreme court; provided, however, that the disqualification shall be without loss of compensation.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 204, § 2; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 30, § 3.

8-16-10. Disqualification from acting as a commissioner.

  1. No judge who is a member of the commission or of the supreme court shall participate as a member of the commission or the supreme court in any proceeding regarding his or her removal, suspension, immediate temporary suspension, reprimand, retirement, or censure.
  2. No member of the commission or of the supreme court shall participate in any decisions of the commission or the supreme court involving the removal, suspension, immediate temporary suspension, reprimand, retirement, or censure of a judge who is related to him or her within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity or where the one complaining of the actions of a judge against whom proceedings are being taken is related to the member of the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 312, § 1.

8-16-11. Papers and testimony privileged.

The filing of papers with or the giving of testimony before the commission or supreme court shall be privileged in any action for defamation. No other publication of such papers or proceedings shall be so privileged, except any record, pleading, or brief filed by the commission in the supreme court continues to be privileged.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1.

8-16-12. Rules of practice and procedure — Confidentiality of proceedings.

The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the practice and procedure under this chapter before the commission, and the supreme court shall insure the confidentiality of all proceedings involving complaints against a member of the judiciary, except for those proceedings that are expressly made public by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Confidentiality.
— Waiver.

The Chief Justice, by agreeing to accept a censure and other disciplinary action by the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, in effect waived the confidentiality provisions set forth in this section. In re Inquiry Pursuant to House Resolution 86-H-7080 Impeachment of Bevilacqua, 512 A.2d 877, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 589 (R.I. 1986).

8-16-13. Closed meetings of the commission — Public hearings — Evidence to remain confidential until made public at hearing.

The commission is hereby expressly authorized and permitted to conduct closed meetings for the conduct of all of its business other than public hearings held pursuant to § 8-16-4(c) . All evidence obtained by the commission, and all evidence that the judge obtains from the commission through discovery or otherwise, shall remain confidential until it becomes the subject of testimony at the public hearing or is introduced into evidence at the public hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 13; P.L. 1996, ch. 312, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Public Hearings.

Disciplinary commission meetings and/or hearings held in connection with its preliminary investigations of complaints against members of the judiciary or in connection with private reprimands are not open to the public. In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 2001).

8-16-13.1. Related judicial proceedings — Confidentiality.

Judicial proceedings in aid of or ancillary to a public hearing of the commission shall be open to the public, and all papers filed in connection with such judicial proceedings shall be public documents. All other judicial proceedings in aid of or ancillary to a commission proceeding, and all papers filed in connection with such judicial proceedings, shall be confidential.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 492, § 1.

8-16-14. Reasonable counsel fees.

Any judge who has been complained against under the provisions of this chapter and who has engaged the services of counsel to respond to the complaint, and where the complaint has been dismissed by the commission, shall be entitled to have his or her reasonable counsel fees paid by the state for those legal services rendered after October 1, 1983.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 396, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 312, § 1.

Chapter 16.1 Judicial Selection

8-16.1-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings:

  1. “Attorney” means a resident of the state of Rhode Island who is licensed to practice law in the state of Rhode Island and who is a current member in good standing of the Rhode Island bar association; and
  2. “Member of the general public” means a person who is a resident of the state of Rhode Island and who is not a licensed member of any bar association.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 1.

Law Reviews.

For Essay, “Rhode Island’s New Judicial Merit Selection Law,” see 1 R.W.U.L. Rev. 63 (1996).

For essay, “Rhode Island’s Judicial Nominating Commission: Can ‘Reform’ Become Reality?”, see 1 R.W.U.L. Rev. 87 (1996).

8-16.1-2. Judicial nominating commission.

  1. There is hereby established an independent nonpartisan judicial nominating commission which shall consist of nine (9) members, all of whom shall be residents of the state of Rhode Island, and who shall be appointed as follows:
    1. Within seven (7) days after June 2, 1994:
      1. The speaker of the house of representatives shall submit to the governor a list of at least three (3) attorneys;
      2. The president of the senate shall submit to the governor a list of at least three (3) persons who may be attorneys and/or members of the public;
      3. The speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate shall jointly submit to the governor a list of four (4) members of the public;
      4. The minority leader of the house of representatives shall submit to the governor a list of at least three (3) members of the public; and
      5. The minority leader of the senate shall submit to the governor a list of at least three (3) members of the public.
    2. Within fourteen (14) days after June 2, 1994, the governor shall appoint to the commission:
      1. One person from each of the lists submitted in accordance with subsection (a)(1) of this section;
      2. Three (3) attorneys, without regard to any of the lists; and
      3. One member of the public, without regard to any of the lists.
    3. The governor and the nominating authorities hereunder shall exercise reasonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic, and gender diversity within the commission.
  2. Members of the commission shall serve for terms of four (4) years, except that, of the members first appointed:
    1. The individual appointed from the list submitted by the minority leader of the house of representatives and one of the attorneys appointed by the governor without regard to any of the lists shall serve for one year;
    2. The individual appointed from the list submitted by the minority leader of the senate and one of the attorneys appointed by the governor without regard to any of the lists shall serve for two (2) years;
    3. The individual appointed from the list submitted jointly by the speaker of the house of representatives and by the president of the senate and the member of the public appointed by the governor without regard to any of the lists shall serve for three (3) years; and
    4. The individuals appointed from the lists submitted by the president of the senate and by the speaker of the house of representatives and one of the attorneys appointed by the governor without regard to any of the lists shall serve for four (4) years.
  3. No person shall be appointed at any time to serve more than one term as a member of the commission; provided, however, that a person initially appointed to serve twelve (12) months or less of a full four (4) year term may, upon expiration of that term, be reappointed to serve one full term; and provided further, however, that each member shall continue to serve until his or her successor is appointed and qualified. No commission member shall be a legislator, judge, or elected official, or be a candidate for any public office, or hold any compensated federal, state, or municipal public office or elected office in a political party during his or her tenure or for a period of one year prior to appointment. No member of the commission may hold any other public office (except that of notary public) under the laws of the United States, of this state, or of any other governmental entity for which monetary compensation is received. No members shall be eligible for appointment to a state judicial office during the period of time he or she is a commission member and for a period of one year thereafter. No two (2) or more members of the commission shall be members or employees of the same law firm, or employees of the same profit or nonprofit corporation. Vacancies other than those arising through the expiration of a term shall be filled for the unexpired portion of the term in the same manner as vacancies due to the expiration of a term.
  4. A quorum consisting of five (5) members shall be necessary in order for the commission to conduct any business. All names submitted to the governor by the commission shall be approved by at least five (5) members of the commission voting in favor of each selection.
  5. The commission shall have the power to adopt rules and procedures which aid in its selection of the most highly qualified nominees for judicial office. The governor shall designate a member of the commission to serve as chairperson, who shall serve in that capacity for the duration of his or her tenure. All meetings of the commission shall be subject to the open meetings law as defined in chapter 46 of title 42.
  6. The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to investigate the personal background of each nominee as it relates to a determination of judicial fitness through the Rhode Island state police and the attorney general’s office, and to require full financial disclosure under the provisions of chapter 14 of title 36.
  7. The commission shall direct the performance of such administrative duties as may be required for the effective discharge of the obligations granted to the commission, and is hereby empowered to engage the services of legal, secretarial, clerical, and investigative employees and to make such other expenditures as are necessary for the effective performance of its functions. Expenses for office space, staffing, and necessary monetary outlays shall be provided by the department of administration as a separate line item in the state budget under the term “judicial nominating commission.”
  8. Each person appointed to the commission shall, prior to exercising any authority or assuming any duties as a member of the commission, take an engagement of office in accordance with § 36-1-2 . The governor may remove a commission member from office for neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or conviction of a criminal offense. After a commission member is notified of any allegations against her or him in writing, the commission member shall be entitled to one public hearing prior to removal by the governor.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 6; P.L. 2001, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 447, § 1.

Law Reviews.

For Essay, “Rhode Island’s New Judicial Merit Selection Law,” see 1 R.W.U.L. Rev. 63 (1996).

For essay, “Rhode Island’s Judicial Nominating Commission: Can ‘Reform’ Become Reality?”, see 1 R.W.U.L. Rev. 87 (1996).

8-16.1-3. Reimbursement.

Members of the commission shall not be compensated but shall be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the carrying out of their official duties by the department of administration.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 1.

8-16.1-4. Criteria for selection of best qualified nominees.

  1. The commission shall consider, but is not limited to, the following factors in selecting the best qualified nominees: intellect, ability, temperament, impartiality, diligence, experience, maturity, education, publications, and record of public, community, and government service. Every person shall, at the time of consideration by the commission, be an attorney and licensed to practice law in the state of Rhode Island and be a current member of the Rhode Island bar association in good standing.
  2. The commission shall exercise reasonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic, and gender diversity within the judiciary of this state. To further this goal, on an annual basis, the commission shall report to the general assembly and to the governor on (i) the statistics regarding the race, ethnicity and gender of applicants considered by the commission in the previous year and (ii) efforts made by the commission during the previous year to encourage racial, ethnic and gender diversity within the judiciary of this state. The form of the report and the means by which the commission shall request the necessary information from applicants shall be determined by the commission pursuant to its rule-making authority, except that no applicant shall be required to provide the information as a prerequisite to consideration, and the identifying information with respect to race, ethnicity and gender shall be collected anonymously from applicants. The report shall be made available to the public. The commission shall also consider the candidate’s sensitivity to historically disadvantaged classes, and may disqualify any candidate with a demonstrated history of bias towards any of these classes.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 385, § 1.

8-16.1-5. Nomination and appointment of supreme court justices.

  1. The governor shall immediately notify the commission of any vacancy or prospective vacancy of a justice of the Rhode Island supreme court. The commission shall advertise for each vacancy and solicit prospective candidates and shall consider names submitted from any source. Within ninety (90) days of any vacancy the commission shall publicly submit the names of not less than three (3) and not more than five (5) highly qualified persons for each vacancy to the governor. The governor shall fill any vacancy of any justice of the Rhode Island supreme court by nominating one of the three (3) to five (5) highly qualified persons forwarded to him or her by the commission for the court.
  2. The governor shall fill any such vacancy within twenty-one (21) days of the public submission by the commission.
  3. Each nomination shall be forwarded forthwith to the senate and to the house of representatives, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and by and with the separate advice and consent of the house of representatives, each nominee shall be appointed by the governor to serve subject to the general laws. The senate and the house of representatives shall, after seven (7) calendar days of receipt of the nomination, separately consider the nomination, but if either house fails within sixty (60) days after the submission to confirm the nominee, the governor shall appoint some other person to fill the vacancy and shall submit his or her appointment to the senate and to the house of representatives for confirmation in like manner until the senate and the house of representatives shall each separately confirm the nomination. If the nominee is rejected by either house, the commission shall submit a new list of three (3) to five (5) candidates to the governor for the purpose of nomination in accordance with this chapter. Any new list may include but need not be limited to the names of any candidates who were previously submitted to the governor by the commission but who were not forwarded to the senate and to the house of representatives for their advice and consent.
  4. During the time for consideration of the nominees by the senate and by the house of representatives, the judiciary committee of each house shall separately conduct an investigation and public hearing on the question of the qualifications of the nominee or nominees. At the public hearings, the testimony of every witness shall be taken under oath and stenographic records shall be taken and maintained. Further, the judiciary committees shall during the course of their investigations and hearings have the power upon majority vote of the committee members present to issue witness subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, and orders for the production of books, accounts, papers, records, and documents which shall be signed and issued by the chairperson of the committee, or the person serving in his or her capacity. All such subpoenas and orders shall be served as subpoenas in civil cases in the superior court are served, and witnesses so subpoenaed shall be entitled to the same fees for attendance and travel as provided for witnesses in civil cases in the superior court. If the person subpoenaed to attend before the committee fails to obey the command of the subpoena without reasonable cause, refuse to be sworn, or to be examined, or to answer a legal and pertinent question, or if any person shall refuse to produce books, accounts, papers, records, and documents material to the issue, set forth in an order duly served on him or her, the committee by majority vote of the committee members present may apply to any justice of the superior court, for any county, upon proof by affidavit of the fact, for a rule or order returnable in not less than two (2) nor more than five (5) days, directing the person to show cause before the justice who made the order or any other justice of the superior court, why he or she should not be adjudged in contempt. Upon the return of the order, the justice before whom the matter is brought on for hearing shall examine under oath the person, and the person shall be given an opportunity to be heard, and if the justice shall determine that the person has refused without reasonable cause or legal excuse to be examined or to answer a legal and pertinent question, or to produce books, accounts, papers, records, and documents material to the issue which he or she was ordered to bring or produce, he or she may forthwith commit the offender to the adult correctional institution, there to remain until the person submits to do the act which he or she was so required to do, or is discharged according to law.
  5. The judiciary committees shall, for the purpose of investigating the qualifications of the nominee or nominees, be furnished with a report compiled by the state police in conjunction with the attorney general’s office indicating the determinations and findings of the state police and attorney general’s office investigations concerning the background of the nominee or nominees, and the report shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
    1. Whether the nominee has ever been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor or felony in this or any other state or foreign country;
    2. Whether the nominee has ever filed a personal bankruptcy petition or an assignment for the benefit of creditors in this or any other state or foreign country; and whether the nominee has ever been a partner in, held ten percent (10%) or more of stock in, or held office in any sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation that has been involved in bankruptcy or receivership actions as a debtor or because of insolvency at the time the nominee was a partner in, held ten percent (10%) or more stock in, or held office in any such sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation;
    3. Whether the nominee has ever had a civil judgment rendered against him or her arising out of an allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, libel, slander, professional negligence, or any intentional tort in this state or any other state or foreign country;
    4. The state police in conjunction with the attorney general’s department shall provide in their report the names and addresses of each and every source of their information.
  6. The reports set forth in this section shall be delivered to the chairpersons and members of the judiciary committees in addition to the nominee or nominees only prior to the commencement of the public hearings. Provided, however, that if the nominee or nominees withdraw or decline the appointment prior to the public hearings then the report or reports shall be returned to the chairpersons of the judiciary committees and destroyed.
  7. The committees shall also require a financial statement to be submitted by each nominee, prior to the public hearing, to the chairperson of the committee, to investigate each nominee to determine his or her compliance with the provisions of chapter 14 of title 36.
  8. Any associate justice of the supreme court who is appointed to serve as the chief justice of that court on an interim basis shall retain his or her status as an associate justice until the appointment to chief justice is made permanent.
  9. In case a vacancy shall occur when the general assembly is not in session, the governor shall appoint some person from a list of three (3) to five (5) persons submitted to the governor by the commission to fill the vacancy until the general assembly shall next convene, when the governor shall make an appointment as provided in this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 97, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Death of Nominee.

In the case of the death or disability of a nominee, a new list is not required by this section. Assuming that the approval or disapproval of the Legislature would not have been ascertained prior to the death or disability of a nominee, the integrity of the judicial selection process would be maintained by the Governor’s selection of a different nominee from the same list that contained the deceased or disabled nominee. In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Comm'n), 668 A.2d 1246, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 1996).

Rejection.

In subsection (c), rejection would connote an actual vote not to confirm a nominee; in other words, a roll call vote of the House or Senate in which a majority of either chamber votes in opposition to the nominee. In such a case of rejection of the Governor’s nominee, a “new list” of three to five names must be provided to the Governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission which list may, but need not, include names from the previous list submitted by the Commission to the Governor. In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Comm'n), 668 A.2d 1246, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 1996).

— Failure to Act.

A failure to act is a de facto rejection by the Legislature, albeit one without a recorded vote. When a nominee has been rejected by such legislative inaction, the Governor’s replacement nominee must be derived from a new list of three to five names submitted to the Governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission. In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Comm'n), 668 A.2d 1246, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 1996).

— Withdrawal.

Documented, legislative opposition sufficient to result in a nominee’s withdrawal presents a situation that is tantamount to rejection. Thus, subsection (c) requires a new list from the Judicial Nominating Commission. The Commission may fulfill this responsibility by submitting to the Governor three, four or five names that may include none, some or all of the names that have been submitted previously but not selected by the Governor. In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Comm'n), 668 A.2d 1246, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 1996).

8-16.1-6. Nomination and appointment of judges.

  1. The governor shall immediately notify the commission of any vacancy or prospective vacancy of a judge of any state court other than the Rhode Island supreme court. The commission shall advertise for each vacancy and solicit prospective candidates and shall consider names submitted from any source. Within ninety (90) days of any vacancy, the commission shall publicly submit the names of not less than three (3), and not more than five (5), highly qualified persons for each vacancy to the governor. The governor shall fill any vacancy of any judge of the Rhode Island superior court, family court, district court, workers’ compensation court, or any other state court that the general assembly may, from time to time, establish, by nominating one of the three (3) to five (5) highly qualified persons forwarded to him or her by the commission for the court where the vacancy occurs.
  2. The governor shall fill any vacancy within twenty-one (21) days of the public submission by the commission.
  3. Each nomination shall be forwarded forthwith to the senate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, each nominee shall be appointed by the governor to serve subject to the general laws. The senate shall, after seven (7) calendar days of receipt of the nomination consider the nomination, but if the senate fails within ninety (90) days after the submission to confirm the nominee, or if the senate does not, by a majority vote of its members, extend the deliberation an additional seven (7) calendar days, the governor shall appoint some other person to fill the vacancy and shall submit his or her appointment to the senate for confirmation in like manner until the senate shall confirm the nomination. If the nominee is rejected by the senate, the commission shall submit a new list of three (3) to five (5) candidates to the governor for the purpose of nomination in accordance with this chapter. Any new list may include, but need not be limited to, the names of any candidates who were previously submitted to the governor by the commission but who were not forwarded to the senate for its advice and consent.
  4. During the time for consideration of the nominees by the senate, the senate judiciary committee shall conduct an investigation and public hearing on the question of the qualifications of the nominee or nominees. At the public hearing, the testimony of every witness shall be taken under oath and stenographic records shall be taken and maintained. Further, the senate judiciary committee shall, during the course of its investigation and hearing, have the power upon majority vote of the committee members present to issue witness subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, and orders for the production of books, accounts, papers, records, and documents that shall be signed and issued by the chairperson of the committee, or the person serving in his or her capacity. All such subpoenas and orders shall be served as subpoenas in civil cases in the superior court are served, and witnesses so subpoenaed shall be entitled to the same fees for attendance and travel as provided for witnesses in civil cases in the superior court. If the person subpoenaed to attend before the committee fails to obey the command of the subpoena without reasonable cause; refuse to be sworn; or to be examined; or to answer a legal and pertinent question; or if any person shall refuse to produce books, accounts, papers, records, and documents material to the issue, set forth in an order duly served on him or her; the committee by majority vote of the committee members present may apply to any justice of the superior court, for any county, upon proof by affidavit of the fact, for a rule or order returnable in not less than two (2), nor more than five (5), days, directing the person to show cause before the justice who made the order or any other justice of the superior court, why he or she should not be adjudged in contempt. Upon the return of the order, the justice before whom the matter is brought on for hearing shall examine under oath the person, and the person shall be given an opportunity to be heard, and if the justice shall determine that the person has refused without reasonable cause or legal excuse to be examined, or to answer a legal and pertinent question, or to produce books, accounts, papers, records, and documents material to the issue that he or she was ordered to bring or produce, he or she may forthwith commit the offender to the adult correctional institutions, there to remain until the person submits to do the act which he or she was so required to do, or is discharged according to law.
  5. The committee shall, for the purpose of investigating the qualifications of the nominee or nominees, be furnished with a report compiled by the state police in conjunction with the attorney general’s office indicating the determinations and findings of the state police and attorney general’s office investigations concerning the background of the nominee or nominees, and the report shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
    1. Whether the nominee has ever been convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, a misdemeanor or felony in this or any other state or foreign country;
    2. Whether the nominee has ever filed a personal bankruptcy petition or an assignment for the benefit of creditors in this or any other state or foreign country; and whether the nominee has ever been a partner in, held ten percent (10%) or more of stock in, or held office in any sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation that has been involved in bankruptcy or receivership actions as a debtor or because of insolvency at the time the nominee was a partner in, held ten percent (10%) or more stock in, or held office in any such sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation;
    3. Whether the nominee has ever had a civil judgment rendered against him or her arising out of an allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, libel, slander, professional negligence, or any intentional tort in this state or any other state or foreign country;
    4. The state police, in conjunction with the attorney general’s department, shall provide in their report the names and addresses of each and every source of their information.
  6. The reports set forth in this section shall be delivered to the chairperson and members of the senate judiciary committee in addition to the nominee or nominees only prior to the commencement of the public hearing. Provided, however, that if the nominee or nominees withdraw or decline the appointment prior to the public hearing, then the report or reports shall be returned to the chairperson of the judiciary committee and destroyed.
  7. The committee shall also require a financial statement to be submitted by each nominee, prior to the public hearing, to the chairperson of the senate judiciary committee, to investigate each nominee to determine his or her compliance with the provisions of chapter 14 of title 36.
  8. Any associate justice of any state court who is appointed to serve as the chief or presiding justice of that court on an interim basis shall retain his or her status as an associate justice until the appointment to chief or presiding justice is made permanent.
  9. In case a vacancy shall occur when the senate is not in session, the governor shall appoint some person from a list of three (3) to five (5) persons submitted to the governor by the commission to fill the vacancy until the senate shall next convene, when the governor shall make an appointment as provided in this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 97, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 334, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 402, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 91, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 230, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 328, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 224, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 251, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 287, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 328, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 383, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 178, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 224, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 287, § 2, provides: “For purposes of providing clarity, the expressed legislative intent of this act is that any individual on a list of judicial candidates as of June 30, 2014, shall remain on that list until June 30, 2015, unless that individual is actually confirmed as a judge prior to June 30, 2015.”

P.L. 2014, ch. 251, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 287, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 178, § 2, provides that the amendment of this section by that act takes effect on July 11, 2013 and shall be applied retroactively to June 29, 2013. For purposes of providing clarity, the expressed legislative intent of this act is that any individual on a list of judicial candidates as of June 29, 2013, shall remain on that list until June 30, 2014, unless that individual is actually confirmed as a judge prior to June 30, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 224, § 2, provides that the amendment of this section by that act takes effect on July 11, 2013 and shall be applied retroactively to June 29, 2013. For purposes of providing clarity, the expressed legislative intent of this act is that any individual on a list of judicial candidates as of June 29, 2013, shall remain on that list until June 30, 2014, unless that individual is actually confirmed as a judge prior to June 30, 2014.

8-16.1-7. Tenure of justices.

The justices of the supreme court, the superior court, the family court, the district court, the workers’ compensation court, and the traffic tribunal shall hold office during good behavior.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 334, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 402, § 2.

Chapter 17 Retired Justice Trial Act

8-17-1. Retired justice program.

There is hereby authorized and established a program of litigating civil trials, including domestic relations matters, whereby the litigants, by agreement, may retain the services of any retired justice of the supreme court or superior court or retired judge of the family court or district court to hear the merits of the issues before the court, all without a jury. Such trials shall be conducted in private, the cost of the proceedings shall be borne by the parties, and any judgments issued thereunder shall have the same effect as judgments of a court of competent jurisdiction and may be appealed to the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 412, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 327, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 232, § 1.

Chapter 18 State and Municipal Court Compact

8-18-1. Legislative findings.

It is hereby found and declared as follows:

  1. The general assembly has authorized the establishment of municipal courts, in order to promote the health and safety of the residents of each city or town and to insure compliance with any and all local ordinances.
  2. In furtherance of this finding there is hereby created a compact between the state courts and agencies and the local municipal courts to establish and define jurisdictional responsibility for law enforcement powers within the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 650, § 1.

8-18-2. Universal summons.

All state agencies and municipalities that have law enforcement powers shall be issued and authorized a form for summons and complaint to be used for all violations specified in chapters 27, 41.1 and 41.2 of title 31 and no other summons shall be substituted except as provided by § 31-12-12 . All fines, assessments, fees, and other financial charge or any other responsibility not changed by the following shall be deemed enforceable even when the summons is issued by a municipality and adjudicated by a municipal court, or issued by state agencies or a municipality without a court and adjudicated by the traffic tribunal. All summonses, once issued, must be recorded by the traffic tribunal prior to a hearing, arraignment, or trial. If the summons is answered by payment without personal appearance pursuant to § 31-41.1-2 , it shall be recorded by the traffic tribunal upon return from the financial institution.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 9, § 12; P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 48.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 71 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on December 31, 2014.

8-18-3. Jurisdiction for certain violations.

  1. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, jurisdiction over the adjudication of matters relating to violations enumerated in the following sections of the general laws is hereby conferred upon the municipal courts and the traffic tribunal:

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  2. Except as provided in §§ 8-18-9 , 8-18-10 , and 31-41.1-11 jurisdiction over violations enumerated in subsection (a) shall be exercised as follows:
    1. By the traffic tribunal over all violations for which the summons is issued by a state agency;
    2. By the traffic tribunal over all violations for which the summons is issued by a city or town which has not established a municipal court; and
    3. By the municipal court over all violations for which the summons is issued by a city or town which has established a municipal court.

31-13-4 31-13-9 31-13-11 31-14-3 31-14-9 31-15-1 31-15-3 31-15-4 31-15-5 31-15-6 31-15-7 31-15-9 31-15-1 1 31-15-12 31-15-13 31-16-1 31-16-2 31-16-4 31-16-5 31-16-7 31-16-9 31-17-1 31-17-2 31-17-4 31-17-6 31-17-7 31-18-12 31-20-1 31-20-2 31-20-9 31-21-4 31-22-2 31-22-4 31-22-5 31-22-6 31-22-7 31-22-8 31-22-9 31-23-1 31-23-8 31-23-13 31-23-14 31-23-15 31-24-1 31-24-4 31-24-5 31-24-7 31-24-12 31-38-4 31-12-12 37-15-7 31-3-29 31-3-30 31-3-34 31-3-35 31-8-1 31-10-32 31-10.1-1 31-10.1-4 31-10.1-5 31-10.1-6 31-13-6 31-15-8 31-23-45 31-14-1 31-17-3 31-23-4 31-23-10 31-23-17 31-23-19 31-23-20 31-23-26 31-23-27 31-23-40 31-23-42.1 31-3-18 31-10-27 31-18-3 31-10.1-7 31-38-3 31-14-12 31-17-5 31-25-9 31-25-11 31-25-12 31-25-12.1 31-25-10 31-22-1 31-24-34 31-27-9 31-3-9 31-15-10 31-18-8 31-25-17 31-10.1-4 31-23-43 31-23-29 31-24-4 5 31-17-8 31-24-1 0 31-23-4 7 31-12-9 31-15-16 24-10-18 31-19-5 31-3-12 31-24-9 31-22-2 2 31-28-7 31-28-7.1 31-3-32 31-18-4 24-10-18 31-18-5 31-18-15 31-18-18 31-21-14 31-22-3 31-23-16 31-24-6 31-24-8 31-24-31 31-27-16 31-22-23 31-10-30 31-10-10 31-19-3 31-3-40 31-22-24 31-23-51 31-7-1 31-15-2 31-15-12.1 31-16-8 31-20-17 31-24-16 31-24-17 31-24-20 31-24-22 31-24-23 31-24-24 31-24-25 31-24-26 31-24-27 31-24-28 31-24-29 31-24-30 31-24-32 31-24-33 31-24-36 31-24-38 31-24-39 31-24-40 31-24-41 31-24-42 31-24-43 31-24-46 31-24-49 31-24-5 1 31-24-53 31-26-3.1 31-27-17 31-27-19 31-33-2 31-45-1 4-1-26 31-10.1-2 31-20-10 31-22-13 31-24-13 31-27-10 31-41.1-4 (Speeding (A)).

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 650, § 1.

Collateral References.

Criminal jurisdiction of municipal or other local court. 102 A.L.R.5th 525.

8-18-4. Adjudication of summonses by municipal courts.

  1. All summonses to be adjudicated by a municipal court shall be forwarded to the municipal court.
  2. Summonses to be adjudicated by a municipal court shall be adjudicated by a judge of the municipal court pursuant to § 31-41.1-6 and the rules established by the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal subject to the approval of the supreme court pursuant to § 8-6-2 . Municipal courts shall have jurisdiction over matters brought pursuant to § 31-41.1-7 .
  3. If a motorist fails to appear to answer a summons before a municipal court, the municipal court may proceed pursuant to § 31-41.1-5 to enter a default judgment and determine whether the charges have been established. Where a determination is made that a charge has been established, an appropriate order shall be entered and the motorist’s license and registration privileges may be ordered by the municipal court to be suspended by the division of motor vehicles as provided by law.
  4. All summonses which have been adjudicated by the municipal court and entered into the data electronic system shall be returned to the traffic tribunal for storage as required by § 8-14-1 .
  5. All municipal courts shall be courts of record, shall tape record all sessions, maintain dockets, and adjudicate all violations on the summonses and shall be responsible for data entry into an electronic data processing system of all citations heard and decided by said municipal courts pursuant to procedures and rules promulgated by the chief magistrate of the Rhode Island traffic tribunal subject to the approval of the supreme court pursuant to § 8-6-2 .
  6. Municipal court judges may, in their discretion, order driver retraining courses in appropriate cases.
  7. A thirty-five dollar ($35.00) hearing fee shall be assessed by both municipal courts and the traffic tribunal against each person pleading guilty to or found guilty of a traffic offense or violation, as provided in the general laws. In no case shall any municipal court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter impose or assess any fees or costs except as expressly authorized by state law.
  8. If a payment for any fine assessed in the municipal court for any violation is attempted with a check written against insufficient funds, then an additional penalty not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00) may be added to the amount due.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 1, § 8; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 12, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 14.

8-18-5. Administration of funds.

The cities and towns and the state shall enter into an agreement which will authorize the transfer of funds and guarantee against misuse, misdirection, and nontransference of funds owed to the appropriate jurisdiction by means of a financial institution compact.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1.

8-18-6. Joint violation fines — Distribution of funds.

Cities or towns with municipal courts shall dedicate four dollars ($4.00) for reimbursement from each summons to the general fund. Cities or towns without a municipal court shall dedicate six dollars ($6.00) for reimbursement from each summons to the general fund. State agencies shall dedicate twenty-two dollars ($22.00) from each summons to the general fund. Provided that cities, towns and state agencies shall also dedicate all revenues generated directly as a result of fee increases effective July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2008 to the general fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 23; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 12, § 1.

8-18-7. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1999 ch. 218, § 2, effective July 1, 1999.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 8-18-7 concerned mandatory court appearance.

8-18-8. Judicial conduct.

All judges of any municipal court which exercises jurisdiction under the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to and governed by the canons of judicial ethics or code of judicial conduct in effect at the time, as prescribed by the Rhode Island supreme court, and the provisions of chapter 16 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1.

8-18-9. Appeals.

Any person desiring to appeal from an adverse decision of a municipal court pursuant to the provisions of this chapter may seek review thereof pursuant to the procedures set forth in § 31-41.1-8 .

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 1.

8-18-10. Exclusive jurisdiction.

The universal summons shall also be used for any violations of those sections not listed in § 8-18-3 ; provided, however that the following violations shall remain the exclusive jurisdiction of the traffic tribunal or the other state courts and shall not be within the jurisdiction of any municipal court:

31-11-16 31-11-17 31-11-18 31-11-19 31-11-20 31-12-3 31-14-1 31-20-12 31-26-1 31-26-2 31-26-4 31-26-5 31-27-1 31-27-2 31-27-4 31-26-3 31-3-1 31-8-2 31-8-3 31-9-1 31-9-2 31-9-5 31-9-6 31-10-1 31-10-28 31-11-12 3-8-9 31-8-10 31-38-9 31-41.1-1 31-25-13 31-25-4 31-25-5 31-25-6 31-25-7 31-27-6 31-25-24 31-23-37 31-24-37 31-25-20 31-25-3 31-25-16 31-25-19 11-44-29 31-22-21.1 31-27-2.1 11-44-22 31-19.1-2 31-19.2-2 31-9-3 31-10-26 31-27-2 .3 31-36.1-17 31-9-1 31-4-3 31-11-18.1 31-9-11 31-27-1.1 31-27-2.2 31-15-14 31-23-49 31-12-26 31-22-13 31-22-14 31-23-28 31-27-5 31-23-13.1 31-27-2.7 31-27-2.4 31-41.1-4 (Speeding (B)).

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History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 445, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 20.

Collateral References.

Criminal jurisdiction of municipal or other local court. 102 A.L.R.5th 525.

8-18-11. Municipal court adherence to promulgated procedures.

All municipal courts which shall hear and decide traffic matters pursuant to the authority of this chapter shall do so in a manner consistent with the procedures of the traffic tribunal. If it shall appear to the chief magistrate of the traffic tribunal that said procedures are not being followed by any municipal court he or she shall inform the municipal court in question that it appears that it is not in compliance with the procedures of the traffic tribunal. If, thereafter, the chief magistrate is not satisfied that compliance is forthcoming he shall have standing under § 8-1-2 to petition the supreme court for appropriate relief.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 218, art. 5, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 119, § 1.

Chapter 19 Language Interpreters — Use of Language Interpreters in Legal Proceedings

8-19-1. Legislative declaration — Intent.

  1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Rhode Island to guarantee the rights of persons who, because of a non-English speaking background, are unable to readily understand or communicate in the English language, and who consequently need the assistance of an interpreter to be fully protected in legal proceedings in matters before the Rhode Island unified state court system. Court interpretation requires not only a full command of two (2) languages, but also a knowledge of courtroom procedure, legal vocabulary, the overall court and legal systems, and an understanding that the role of an interpreter consists not of abridging or editorializing, but of exactly interpreting every word that is spoken without emendation or amendment.
  2. It is the intent of the legislature, by the enactment of this chapter, to provide interpreters to limited-English-proficient persons in proceedings before the state courts in Rhode Island and to establish a procedure for the certification and appointment of interpreters.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 15; P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Ryan M. Cummins, 2017 Survey, Cases: Criminal Law: Duvere v. State, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 631 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Compliance.

Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief on the basis that his plea of nolo contendere was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given because he lacked the assistance of an interpreter. Defendant had resided and worked in the United States for years, and there was no evidence that he lacked a basic, functional understanding of English; during the hearing, he answered all questions posed and was not confused or unable to understand the colloquy. Duvere v. State, 151 A.3d 314, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2017).

8-19-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. A “limited-English-proficient person” means any person whose primary language is not English and who does not have the ability to adequately understand or communicate effectively in English.
  2. A “qualified interpreter” is a person who is able to interpret simultaneously and consecutively and sight translate from English into a foreign language and from said language into English but who is not certified pursuant to this chapter.
  3. A “certified interpreter” is one who is able to interpret simultaneously and consecutively and sight translate from English to the language of the person needing an interpreter, and from said language to English, and who has been certified pursuant to the provision of § 8-19-5 .
  4. “Legal proceedings” means any proceeding in the Rhode Island state court system.
  5. “Appointing authority” means the judicial officer presiding at a legal proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-19-3. Appointment of certified or qualified interpreters.

  1. When a limited-English-proficient person is a party, or the parent or legal guardian of a party, to a legal proceeding, or an alleged victim in a criminal proceeding, the appointing authority shall appoint a certified interpreter to assist such person during the legal proceeding. The state court administrator’s office shall maintain a list of Rhode Island certified and qualified interpreters from which the appointing authority shall make its appointments.
  2. The appointing authority may appoint a qualified interpreter in place of a certified interpreter when:
    1. A good-faith effort has been made to locate and obtain the services of a certified interpreter and one is not available; and
    2. The appointing authority makes a finding that the proposed qualified interpreter appears to have adequate language skills; knowledge of interpreting techniques; familiarity with interpreting in a court or hearing; and that he/she has read, understands, and will abide by an established code of ethics for language interpreters pursuant to this chapter; and
    3. The proceeding is one of a preliminary nature and of a short duration. Proceedings of a preliminary nature may include but not be limited to:
      1. Arraignments;
      2. Costs, restitution, and/or fine reviews;
      3. Probation reviews;
      4. Preliminary hearings on pretrial motions; and
      5. Appearances before the court on bench warrants or arrest warrants.
  3. If any relationship between the interpreter and any of the parties, attorneys, witnesses, victims, or any other persons involved in the proceeding exists, the nature of that relationship shall be disclosed to the appointing authority on the record and the appointing authority may in its discretion excuse the interpreter from said proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 15; P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Trial justice’s decision to allow an interpreter who was not certified was not error where defendant failed to show that defendant was prejudiced in any cognizable way by the interpreter that the court provided for defendant. State v. Lopez-Navor, 951 A.2d 508, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. 2008).

8-19-4. Compensation of interpreters.

Interpreters appointed pursuant to this chapter shall be paid by the state in accordance with a fee schedule that shall be established by the supreme court. The state court administrator is hereby empowered to establish policies and procedures governing the appointment, service, and payment of interpreters appointed under this chapter and is further empowered to enter into service contracts with certified and qualified interpreters.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-19-5. Certification of interpreters — Establishment and procedure.

The administrative office of state courts, with the approval of the supreme court, shall promulgate standards, criteria, and testing methods for the certification of foreign language interpreters under this chapter. The regulations promulgated shall address but not be limited to:

  1. Developing testing procedures for proficiency in the foreign language for which the interpreter is seeking certification;
  2. Developing testing procedures for proficiency in the English language;
  3. Developing testing procedures for knowledge of legal proceedings and legal terminologies;
  4. Developing standards for the approval of courses and/or curricula at colleges and universities and other institutes of higher learning that wish to offer courses in foreign language interpreting;
  5. Establishing minimum competency requirements for state certification as a foreign language interpreter;
  6. Establishing re-certification procedures and continuing educational requirements for certified and qualified interpreters;
  7. Establishing procedures for the termination, cancellation, or suspension of certificates issued to foreign language interpreters under this chapter;
  8. Establishing a code of ethics for foreign language interpreters;
  9. Establishing procedures for the recognition of foreign language interpreters who have been certified in other states or by the federal court;
  10. Establishing a procedure for the compilation and maintenance of statistics on the frequency and use of foreign language interpreters appointed under this chapter and the need for foreign language interpreters in other languages; and
  11. Establishing a procedure for the creation of a list of the names and contact information of all certified interpreters and qualified interpreters and making said list available to all courts covered by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 79, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 88, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

8-19-6. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 340, § 1.

8-19-7. Confidential communications.

No interpreter/transliterator appointed pursuant to this chapter to interpret or translate for limited-English-proficient persons in proceedings before the state courts in Rhode Island shall be called upon to testify concerning any statement(s) made to them in connection with the interpreter’s or transliterator’s interpretation or transliteration without the consent of the person making the statement or unless compelled by court order.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 270, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 270, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.