Chapter 1 Department of Labor and Training

28-1-1. Annual report of director to general assembly.

The director of labor and training shall collect, arrange, tabulate, and publish, in a report by him or her to be made to the general assembly annually in January, the facts and statistical details in relation to the condition of labor and business in all mechanical, manufacturing, commercial, and other industrial business of the state, and especially in relation to the social, educational, and sanitary condition of the laboring classes, with any suggestions that he or she deems to be proper for the improvement of their condition and the bettering of their advantages for intellectual and moral instruction, together with any other information that he or she deems to be useful to the general assembly in the proper performance of its legislative duties regarding the subjects that he or she is required to report.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 1901, ch. 809, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 80, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 87, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 281, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-1-1 .

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Minimum wage law, enforcement, § 28-12-13 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Department of labor:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-1 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 23, § 1; ch. 149, § 1 et seq.

28-1-2. Duty to give information to director.

Every employer of labor, and every person engaged in any industrial pursuit, shall give the director of labor and training all proper and necessary information to enable him or her to perform the duties required of him or her by law, and in default of that, upon reasonable demand, shall be fined twenty dollars ($20.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 70, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 80, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 87, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 281, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-1-2 .

28-1-3. Administrative assistant to director.

The director of labor and training shall, with the approval of the governor, appoint an administrative assistant, who shall perform those duties that may be prescribed by the director and shall serve at his or her pleasure. The administrative assistant shall be deemed to be employed in a policymaking capacity and shall be in the unclassified service.

History of Section. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 154; P.L. 1946, ch. 1723, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-1-3 .

Cross References.

Administrative assistant in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

28-1-4. Employment of personnel — Expenses.

The director of labor and training may employ assistants and incur expenses incident to the proper discharge of the duties of his or her office, and the general assembly shall annually appropriate an amount that it deems necessary for the purpose of paying those salaries and expenses.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1741, § 5; P.L. 1922, ch. 2160, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 87, § 3; P.L. 1929, ch. 1362, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 281, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-1-4 .

28-1-5. Digital credentialing. [Effective July 1, 2023.]

Effective July 1, 2023, the department of labor and training (“department”) shall require publicly funded workforce and training programs to supplement all paper-based credentials with verified electronic credentials. Credentials include, but are not limited to, certifications, licenses, degrees, and training completion certificates issued by workforce and training programs within the department’s responsibility. An “electronic credential” means an electronic method by which a person may display or transmit to another person information that verifies information about a person such as their licensure, program completion, and verified skills and competencies. The department may use a third-party electronic credential system that is not maintained by the agency. The electronic credential system shall include a verification system that is operated by the agency or its agent on its behalf for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and validity of electronic credentials.

History of Section. P.L. 2022, ch. 115, § 1, effective July 1, 2023; P.L. 2022, ch. 116, § 1, effective July 1, 2023.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2022, ch. 115, § 1, and P.L. 2022, ch. 116, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2022, ch. 115, § 1, provides that this section takes effect on July 1, 2023.

P.L. 2022, ch. 116, § 1, provides that this section takes effect on July 1, 2023.

Chapter 2 Duty to Work in Time of War

28-2-1. Duty to work — Proclamation of governor — Penalty.

It is the duty of every able-bodied male resident of this state between the ages of eighteen (18) and fifty (50) years to be habitually and regularly engaged in some lawful, useful, and recognized business, profession, occupation, trade, or employment. Whenever the governor of this state issues a proclamation determining that employment is necessary and essential for the protection and welfare of this state and of the United States because of the existence of a state of war in which the United States may be engaged, and from that time on until the termination of that war, any able-bodied male resident of this state between the ages of eighteen (18) and fifty (50) who fails or refuses to be employed for at least thirty-six (36) hours per week shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall pay a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100), or be imprisoned for a term not to exceed three (3) months, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-1 .

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute requiring persons, regardless of financial condition, to engage in some business, profession, occupation, or employment. 9 A.L.R. 1366; 25 A.L.R.3d 792.

28-2-2. Possession of property or income not defense.

In no case shall the possession by the accused of money, property, or income sufficient to support himself and those regularly dependent upon him be a defense to any prosecution under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-2 .

28-2-3. Inability to find work as defense.

In no case shall the claim by the accused of his inability to obtain work or employment be a defense to a prosecution under this chapter, unless it is proven that the accused promptly notified the director of labor and training of his inability to obtain employment, requested that work or employment be found for him, that the employment was not furnished, and he holds a certificate from the director of labor and training, or his or her duly authorized subordinate, that the application has been made.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-3 .

28-2-4. Assignment to work of persons unable to find work.

It shall be the duty of the director of labor and training, whenever any person informs him or her of his inability to obtain employment, to register the name of the person in the office of the director of labor and training, together with his address, age, and any other information which he or she deems necessary. The director of labor and training shall then assign, or cause to be assigned, and, if necessary, reassign or cause to be reassigned, the person to lawful, useful, and recognized occupations carried on by the state or any county or municipality of the state, or by private employers, engaged in agricultural, industrial, or other occupations of that character, and who accept the services of those persons; provided, that no person shall be required to work under this chapter any greater number of hours per day than lawfully constitutes a day’s work in the occupation in which the person is required to engage. In the event the director of labor and training is unable to procure employment for the person applying, it shall then be the duty of the director of labor and training, or his or her duly authorized subordinate, to so certify to the person in writing.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-4 .

28-2-5. Compensation of persons assigned to work.

All persons required to work under this chapter shall receive compensation of not less than the wage or salary paid to others engaged in the same nature of work to which each person is assigned. If any person is assigned to work for any department, board, division, or commission of the state, then the compensation of the person shall be paid to him by the department, board, division, or commission out of the appropriation made to it by the state. If any person is assigned to work for any county or for any municipality, or for any private employer, then the compensation of the person shall be paid to him by the county or municipality, or by the private employer, accepting his services.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-5 .

Cross References.

Minimum wages, § 28-12-1 et seq.

28-2-6. Penalty for failure to do assigned work.

Any person failing or refusing to do, or to continue to do, the work assigned to him, or who, in the meanwhile, has not become regularly or continuously employed in some lawful, useful, and recognized business, occupation, trade, profession, or employment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall pay a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100), or be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three (3) months, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-6 .

28-2-7. Rules and regulations for assignment — Circumstances to be considered.

As soon as the proclamation has been issued as provided in § 28-2-1 , it shall be the duty of the director of labor and training to prepare and publish any rules and regulations governing the assignment of persons to work under this chapter as will assure that all persons similarly circumstanced are, as far as it is possible to do so, treated alike. In assigning anyone to work, the director of labor and training shall take into consideration the age, physical condition, and any other appropriate circumstances of the person so assigned, and the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the director of labor and training, under the provisions of this chapter, shall make allowances for those facts and circumstances.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-7 .

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

28-2-8. Duty of law enforcement officers to seek unemployed persons.

After the issuance of the proclamation in § 28-2-1 , it shall be the duty of a member of the division of sheriffs and of any other officer, state, county, or municipality charged with enforcing the law, to seek and continue to seek diligently the names and places of residence of able-bodied male persons within their respective jurisdictions between the ages of eighteen (18) and fifty (50) not regularly or continuously employed.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-8 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 54.

28-2-9. Employment of personnel — Assistance by other agencies.

The director of labor and training is authorized to appoint or employ any employees that may be necessary, and to use any agencies that may be available and appropriate, to aid him or her in carrying out the provisions of this chapter, and the director may delegate any and all of his or her powers and duties prescribed by the provisions of this chapter to the division of employment service.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-9 .

28-2-10. Exemption of temporarily unemployed and students.

The provisions of this chapter do not apply to persons temporarily unemployed by reason of differences with their employers, to bona fide students during the school term, or to persons preparing themselves to engage in trade or industrial pursuits.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-10 .

28-2-11. Persons deemed residents — Habitual loiterers.

For the purposes of this chapter, any male person described in § 28-2-1 found in this state shall be deemed a resident, and in any prosecution under this chapter proof that the accused habitually loiters in idleness in streets, roads, depots, poolrooms, saloons, hotels, stores, or other places shall be prima facie evidence of the failure or refusal of the person to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1918, ch. 1661, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 90, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 288, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-2-11 .

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

Chapter 3 Employment of Children

28-3-1. Places and times where employment of children prohibited.

No child under fourteen (14) years of age shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work at any time in any business or industrial establishment in this state. No child under sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work at any time in any factory, mechanical, or manufacturing establishment within this state. A child who has reached the fourteenth (14th) birthday, but has not reached the sixteenth (16th) birthday, may be employed only between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m; except that a child who has reached the fourteenth (14th) birthday, but has not reached the sixteenth (16th) birthday, may be employed until 9:00 p.m. but only during school vacations; and except as provided in § 28-3-3 no child under sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work in any business establishment within this state. Every person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be fined as provided in § 28-3-20 .

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-1 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 309, § 1.

Cross References.

Exemption of specified occupations from minimum wage law, § 28-12-2 .

Exploitation of children for commercial purposes, § 11-9-1 et seq.

Industrial homework by child under age 16 prohibited, § 28-18-11 .

Workers’ compensation of minors employed in violation of law, § 28-33-22 .

Comparative Legislation.

Employment of children:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-12 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 56 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Fellow Servant Rule.

Employer could not invoke fellow servant rule in action for injuries by minor employed in violation of former statute. Huling v. Finn, 67 R.I. 369 , 24 A.2d 620, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1942).

Recovery of Wages.

Minor employed in violation of former statute could not recover wages even though he had completely executed contract. Birkett v. Chatterton, 13 R.I. 299 , 1881 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1881).

Workers’ Compensation.

Minor illegally employed would not be sui juris within the meaning of § 28-29-18 even though the employment would have been legal but for the want of a certificate. Taglinette v. Sydney Worsted Co., 42 R.I. 133 , 105 A. 641, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1919).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of child labor laws. 12 A.L.R. 1216; 21 A.L.R. 1437.

Constitutionality of statute limiting hours of labor of children and women in private industry. 90 A.L.R. 815.

Lawn mowing by minors as violation of child labor statutes. 56 A.L.R.3d 1166.

Manufacturing establishment, what is, within meaning of child labor laws. 96 A.L.R. 1353.

Minor illegally employed, extra compensation in case of injury to. 142 A.L.R. 1018.

Streets, construction and application of statutes or ordinances relating to child labor in. 152 A.L.R. 579.

Workers’ compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor’s tort action. 77 A.L.R.4th 844.

28-3-2. Production of certificate of age on demand by compliance inspector.

Whenever any truant officer or compliance inspector has reason to doubt that any child employed in any factory, mechanical, manufacturing, or business establishment has reached the age of sixteen (16) years, the compliance inspector shall demand of the child’s employer that the employer shall furnish him or her within ten (10) days a certificate of age issued by the department of elementary and secondary education. If the employer refuses or fails to produce the certificate within ten (10) days, or in case the certificate does not show that the child has completed sixteen (16) years of life, the employer shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be subject to a fine of twenty dollars ($20.00). For the purpose of this chapter, the department of elementary and secondary education shall determine the age of the child on the presentation of a birth certificate, baptismal certificate, passport, or other evidence satisfactory to it.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2752, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-2 .

Cross References.

Industrial inspection, § 28-20-12 et seq.

Truant officers, inspection and reports of places of employment of minors, § 16-19-5 .

28-3-3. Issuance of limited permits for work by children.

The school committee of each city or town, or any person who the school committee may designate, may issue for any child who has completed fourteen (14) years of age a special limited permit to work, permitting the employment of the child on days on which schools are not in session, and on school days at hours in which schools are not in session, at any legal employment and subject to the requirements of law limiting the employment of children, but not for employment in factories or in mechanical or manufacturing establishments. The permits to work shall be uniform throughout the state, and the permit to work form shall be prescribed and provided by the department of labor and training. A child must certify to the department that they have successfully completed a training program created by the department that would address workers’ rights, workplace health and safety, and workers’ compensation before a permit can be issued. The program shall be no longer than three (3) hours and shall be available virtually. The content, cost, and funding for this training program shall be determined by rules and regulations promulgated by the department of labor and training. The school committee of each city or town, or any person who the school committee may designate to issue the permits to work provided for in this section, shall keep on file a copy of each permit to work granted, together with the evidence on which the permit to work was granted.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2752, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-3 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 205, § 2; P.L. 2022, ch. 81, § 1, effective June 15, 2022; P.L. 2022, ch. 82, § 1, effective June 15, 2022.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2022, ch. 81, § 1, and P.L. 2022, ch. 82, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 28-29-18 .

Minor was sui juris within the meaning of § 28-29-18 despite the fact that certificate was signed by wrong parent where the certificate was properly issued by the school committee and not invalid on its face. Taglinette v. Sydney Worsted Co., 42 R.I. 133 , 105 A. 641, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1919).

28-3-3.1. Work experience program.

The school committee of each city and town is authorized to adopt and implement a school-supervised and school-administered work experience and career exploration program (WECEP), under which students who have completed fourteen (14) years of age may be enrolled, notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, in a work experience career exploration program (WECEP) as approved by the wage/hour administrator of the United States Department of Labor in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and 29 C.F.R. 570.1 et seq. (child labor regulations).

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 210, § 1.

28-3-3.2. Revocation or suspension of permit.

The permit of any child issued pursuant to § 28-3-3 may be revoked or suspended by the school committee that issued the permit if upon the recommendation of the principal of the school that the child attends, to the school committee, that the issuance of the permit appears detrimental to the well-being of the student, detrimental to the academic success of the student, or the student has failed to comply with all of the legal requirements concerning school attendance. The child shall be afforded written notice and a hearing before the school committee before any revocation or suspension takes effect. All hearings pursuant to this chapter shall be closed in accordance with the provisions of §§ 42-46-4 and 42-46-5(a)(1) . The refusal of any child to surrender his or her permit after it has been revoked shall be a violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 308, § 1.

28-3-3.3. Manufacturing and industrial pre-apprenticeship and internships.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preclude any manufacturing or industrial pre-apprenticeship or internship program, provided that the child is sixteen (16) years of age or older and that the pre-apprenticeship or internship program complies with the career and technical education regulations promulgated by the board of education pursuant to § 16-45-1 et seq.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 122, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 128, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 122, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 128, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-3-4. Return of permit on termination of employment.

The permit shall, within five (5) days after termination of the employment of the child, be returned by the employer to the school committee that issued it, or to any person who the committee shall designate, and shall be kept on file until the official authorized to issue the certificate has received a written statement that the child will be employed in accordance with the provisions of law and that upon the termination of that employment, that permit will be disposed of.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-4 .

28-3-5. Proof of age for employment certificate.

If it appears to the satisfaction of the school committee, or person authorized to give the certificate, that neither the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, nor passport of the child can be produced, the age and employment certificate may be granted on other evidence satisfactory to the department of elementary and secondary education.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2752, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-5 .

28-3-6. Certificates and permits kept by employer.

All certificates of age and permits required by this chapter relating to the qualification of children employed in any factory, or manufacturing, or business establishment coming under the provisions of this chapter, shall be kept by the employer at the place where the child is employed, and shall be shown to the compliance inspectors provided for by chapter 20 of this title, or either or any of them, on demand by the inspector or inspectors, and the proprietor or manager of any factory or manufacturing or business establishment who shall fail to produce or shall refuse to show to any compliance inspector any certificate or permit when demand is made therefore, shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-6 ; P.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 1.

28-3-7. Cancellation of erroneously issued certificates.

If, after investigation, the inspector finds that the certificate or permit should not have been issued to the child under the provisions of this chapter, then he or she shall: (1) Deliver the certificate or permit to the person who issued it; (2) Order it to be cancelled; and (3) Notify the employer that the child must no longer be employed. Every employer or proprietor or manager of any factory or manufacturing or business establishment who continues to employ the child after receiving the notice from any compliance inspector shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be subject to the penalty imposed by § 28-3-20 .

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-7 .

28-3-8. Employment subject to provisions.

Every person, firm, or corporation doing business within this state employing five (5) or more persons, or employing any child under sixteen (16) years of age, shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 28-3-1 28-3-20 whatever the business conducted by the person, firm, or corporation; provided, that the provisions of §§ 28-3-1 28-3-20 do not apply to children employed in household service or in agricultural pursuits; and provided, further, that the provisions do not apply to the employment of children in the vocation, occupation, or service of rope or wire walking, or as gymnasts, wrestlers, contortionists, equestrian performers, or acrobats, riders upon bicycles, or mechanical contrivances, or in any dancing, theatrical, or musical exhibition, but the employment of children in any vocation, occupation, or service enumerated in this proviso shall continue to be governed by the provisions of §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 .

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-8 .

Collateral References.

Exhibitions or entertainments by children, construction and application of child labor law as regards. 72 A.L.R. 141.

28-3-9. Employment of minors in hazardous places or occupations.

No minor under sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed or permitted to work in operations or operating or assisting in operating any of the following machines: circular or bandsaws, wood shapers, wood jointers, planers, sand paper or wood polishing machinery; picker machines or machines used in picking wool, cotton, fur, hair, or any upholstering material; paper lace machines; burnishing machines in any tannery or leather manufactory; job or cylinder printing presses, having motive power other than foot; wood turning or boring machinery; stamping machines used in sheet metal or tinware manufacturing or in washer and nut factories; machines used in making corrugated rolls; steam boilers, dough brakes, or cracker machinery of any description; wire or iron straightening machinery; rolling mill machinery, power punches, shears, or rolls in rubber manufacturing drop presses; washing, grinding, or mixing machinery; calender rolls in rubber manufacturing; laundering or dry cleaning machinery; or in any capacity in adjusting or assisting in adjusting any belt to any machinery or in oiling or cleaning machinery in motion; or in any capacity in preparing any composition in which dangerous or poisonous acids are used; or in the manufacture or packing of paints, dry colors, or red or white lead; or in dipping, dyeing, or packing matches; or in the manufacture, packing, or storing of powder, dynamite, nitroglycerine compounds, fuses, or other explosives; or in stripping, assorting, manufacturing or packing tobacco; or in a tunnel; or in a pool or billiard room; or upon any railroad, whether steam or electric; or in any foundry; or in any place where dangerous belting or gearing is not provided with proper safeguards; or in any work, occupation, place, or process declared by the department of labor and training to be injurious, dangerous, or hazardous for minors under sixteen (16) years of age; or on any docks, private or public, warehouses and storage rooms; dispensing gasoline or other types of fuel, checking or changing of oil or other fluids, parking lot attendants; car washes either by hand or machine (including drying vehicles by hand.)

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-9 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 517, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Language Mandatory.

This statute clearly did not permit the plaintiff, who was barely over 15 years old and an inmate of the Rhode Island Training School for Boys, to be assigned to operate a printing press even though a protective device was on it, since the language “No minor under 16 years of age shall be employed or permitted to work” cannot be ignored. MacDonald v. State, 95 R.I. 378 , 187 A.2d 519, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1963).

Negligence.

Violation of this statute, which was proximate cause of worker’s injury, was prima facie evidence of liability. Rossi v. Ronci, 63 R.I. 250 , 7 A.2d 773, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1939).

Even though plaintiff-infant knew that the guard was off the press machine he was operating and momentarily forgot and did not withdraw his hand quickly enough, the initial negligence and the responsible cause of the accident was the fact that the man in charge, whose orders plaintiff had to follow — plaintiff not being a free agent — a man cognizant of the danger in operating the printing press, contrary to law, permitted a young and inexperienced boy to operate a press and particularly a press which was deficient in that it was without its usual safety device. MacDonald v. State, 95 R.I. 378 , 187 A.2d 519, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1963).

28-3-9.1. Employment of minors as adult entertainment performers prohibited.

No person under the age of eighteen (18) may work in a commercial adult entertainment establishment.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 219, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 220, § 1.

28-3-10. Declaration of places or occupations as hazardous for minors.

The department of labor and training is empowered and is authorized, under any rules that it may determine, to declare any particular work, occupation, trade, place, or process injurious, dangerous, or hazardous for minors under sixteen (16) years of age. The department of labor and training is also empowered and authorized, under any rules that it may determine, to declare any particular work, occupation, trade, place, or process injurious, dangerous, or hazardous for any particular minor under sixteen (16) years of age, although the work, occupation, trade, place, or process may not have been declared injurious, dangerous, or hazardous for all minors under sixteen (16) years of age. When the rules are determined, it shall be unlawful for the particular minor to be employed or permitted to work in the particular work, occupation, trade, place, or process declared by the department of labor and training to be injurious, dangerous, or hazardous for him or her.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-10 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 13; P.L. 1988, ch. 517, § 1.

28-3-11. Hours of work for children.

  1. No children under sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work more than forty (40) hours in any one week in any business or mercantile establishment within this state, and in no case shall the hours of labor exceed eight (8) hours in any one day. No child under eighteen (18) years of age shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work in any factory, manufacturing, mechanical, business, or mercantile establishment within this state more than forty-eight (48) hours in any one workweek. In no case shall the hours of labor exceed nine (9) hours in any calendar day, except when forty-eight (48) hours are worked in five (5) days, in which case the hours of labor shall not exceed nine and three-fifths (93/5) hours in any calendar day. There shall be an interval (or period of cessation from work) of not less than eight (8) hours between the ending of the period of work on one calendar day and the beginning of a period of work on the subsequent consecutive calendar day.
  2. No minor between the ages of sixteen (16) and eighteen (18) years of age regularly attending a public or approved private day school or institution of higher learning shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work in any factory, manufacturing, mechanical, business, or mercantile establishment within this state before 6:00 a.m. or after 11:30 p.m. of any one day preceding a regularly scheduled school day, except that the minor may be employed or permitted or suffered to work until 1:30 a.m. of any nonregularly scheduled school day.
  3. Any minor between the ages of sixteen (16) and eighteen (18) may be employed during school vacations without limitation as to the total hours to be worked in a given week or calendar day provided the provisions of all other applicable federal and state laws and regulations are complied with. This provision applies as long as it continues to be permitted by federal law and/or regulation.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 4; P.L. 1945, ch. 1625, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2623, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-11 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 205, § 3; P.L. 1980, ch. 34, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 371, § 1.

Cross References.

Hours when work prohibited, § 28-3-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 28-33-22.

Since the minor worked on a shift starting at midnight and ending at 8 a.m., the fact that he was injured at 6:30 a.m. had no bearing on the violation of this statute and § 28-33-22 became applicable to any injury sustained during his employment on that shift. Deignan v. Cowan Plastic Prods. Corp., 99 R.I. 193 , 206 A.2d 534, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 416 (1965).

Evidence.

Testimony that an office clerk was informed at 10:30 p.m. that an accident had occurred and testimony of the employer that he was notified of the accident at 10:45 p.m. were sufficient to sustain the commission’s finding that the accident occurred before 11:00 p.m. and the minor employee was not employed after 11:00 p.m. in violation of this section. Le Blanc v. Balon, 104 R.I. 99 , 242 A.2d 292, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 621 (1968).

Negligence.

Violation of this statute was an element to be considered by jury but did not make employer liable for injuries unless that violation was a proximate cause of the injuries. Rossi v. Ronci, 59 R.I. 307 , 195 A. 401, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 169 (1937).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute limiting hours of labor of children and women in private industry. 90 A.L.R. 815.

Infant’s services, validity, construction and effect of court’s approval of contract for. 3 A.L.R.2d 702.

Manufacturing establishment, what is, within meaning of child labor laws. 96 A.L.R. 1353.

28-3-11.1. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1956, § 28-3-11.1 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 44, § 1) was repealed by P.L. 1974, ch. 205, § 4.

28-3-12. Posting of hours and wage rates.

Every employer shall post, in one or more places in his or her establishment where it may be easily seen and read by all employees employed by him or her, a printed or typewritten notice stating the minimum rates of pay, including hourly rates, or piece rate or both, as the case may be, that the employees are receiving for the various types of work performed in the establishment, and the number of hours’ work required of the person on each day of the week, and the hours of commencing and stopping work. The employment of any minor for a longer time in a period of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours than so stated shall be deemed a violation of § 28-3-11 . The provisions of § 28-3-11 and this section shall not be construed to impair any restriction placed upon the employment of any child by the provisions of chapter 19 of title 16.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 4; P.L. 1945, ch. 1625, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2623, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-12 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 216, § 6.

Collateral References.

Validity of minimum wage statutes relating to private employment of women and minors. 39 A.L.R.2d 744.

28-3-13. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 4; P.L. 1945, ch. 1659, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-13 ) was repealed by P.L. 1975, ch. 205, § 1.

28-3-14. Maximum continuous employment without mealtime.

All employees are entitled to a twenty-minute (20) mealtime within a six-hour (6) work shift, and a thirty-minute (30) mealtime with an eight-hour (8) work shift. An employer shall not be required to compensate an employee for this mealtime. The provisions of this section shall not apply to: (a) An employer of healthcare facilities licensed in accordance with chapter 17 of title 23; or (b) An employer who employs less than three (3) people on any shift at the worksite.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 606, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 28-3-14 (P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 4; P.L. 1945, ch. 1659, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-14 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 161, § 1), relating to maximum continuous employment without mealtime, was repealed by P.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 1, effective July 19, 2005. The section was also amended by P.L. 2005, ch. 227, § 1, effective July 10, 2005. However, due to the repeal of the section, the 2005 amendment is not set out.

28-3-15. Penalty for violation of provisions of this chapter.

Every person who willfully employs or has in his or her employ or under his or her charge any person in violation of the provisions of this chapter, and every parent or guardian who permits any child to be so employed, shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense. The certificates of age and the permits to work required by §§ 28-3-2 and 28-3-3 shall be prima facie evidence of the age of a child upon trial of any person other than the parent or guardian for the violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 5; P.L. 1945, ch. 1659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-15 ; P.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 1.

28-3-16, 28-3-17. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, §§ 6-8; P.L. 1945, ch. 1659, § 2; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-3-16 and 28-3-17), concerning utility employees and messengers, were repealed by P.L. 1975, ch. 203, § 1, and P.L. 1975, ch. 204, § 1.

28-3-18. Enforcement of provisions — Prosecution of violations.

The division of labor standards has full power to enforce §§ 28-3-1 28-3-20 , and has all the powers of the division of compliance inspection insofar as those powers relate to and affect women and children. All actions, suits, complaints, and prosecutions for the violation of any of the provisions of these sections shall be brought by and in the name of the director of labor and training or the chief of the division of labor standards in the department of labor and training; or by and in the name of any duly authorized representative of the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 9; P.L. 1950, ch. 2622, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-18 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 250, § 3.

28-3-19. Posting of copies of law.

A printed copy of §§ 28-3-1 28-3-20 shall be posted by the inspectors in each workroom of every factory, manufacturing, or mercantile establishment where persons are employed who are affected by the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-19 .

28-3-20. Penalty for violations generally.

Except as otherwise specifically provided, any person or corporation who or that: (1) Employs a child under sixteen (16) years of age without the permit required by § 28-3-3 ; (2) Makes a false statement in regard to any part required by the certificate; (3) Violates any of the provisions of §§ 28-3-1 28-3-20 , or suffers or permits any child to be employed in violation of their provisions, shall be fined five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense; provided, however, that if a child employed in violation of the provisions of §§ 28-3-1 28-3-20 is injured or killed in the course of the employment, then the above fine may be increased to five thousand dollars ($5,000); and, provided further, however, that this section does not apply to that portion of § 28-3-6 which fixes the penalty for the refusal to show to the inspector any certificate provided for in that section.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1312, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-20 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 216, § 6.

28-3-21 — 28-3-31. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1915, ch. 1264, §§ 1-11; G.L. 1923, ch. 143, §§ 1-11; P.L. 1928, ch. 1223, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 378, §§ 1-11; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-3-21 —28-3-31), concerning child employment laws, were repealed by P.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 2, effective July 19, 2005.

28-3-32. Immunity from liability for costs.

No police officer, probation officer, truant officer, or principal of a school complaining under any of the provisions of this chapter shall be required to give surety for costs; and no such person shall in any way be liable for any costs that may accrue on the complaint.

History of Section. P.L. 1915, ch. 1264, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 143, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 378, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-3-32 .

Chapter 4 Indenture of Apprentices

28-4-1. Power of minor to execute indenture.

Any minor being sixteen (16) years of age or over, or who, being under sixteen (16) years of age, has a limited permit to work given him or her by or under the direction of the school committee where the minor resides under the provisions of chapter 3 of this title, may, by execution of an indenture, bind himself or herself as provided in this chapter, for a term of service of not less than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 198, §§ 1-3; G.L. 1909, ch. 249, §§ 1-3; G.L. 1923, ch. 91, §§ 1-3; P.L. 1926, ch. 841, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 294, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-4-1 .

Cross References.

Minimum wages for learners and apprentices, § 28-12-10 .

Apprenticeship programs in trade and industry, § 28-45-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Apprentice training:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-22m et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 23, § 11E et seq.

28-4-2. Parties to sign indenture.

Every indenture shall be signed:

  1. By the minor;
  2. By the parents, or either one of them, as the natural guardians or guardian of the minor; or by the duly appointed legal guardian of the person, or of the person and estate of the minor, if any; or by the person having the legal custody of the minor;
  3. By the employer.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 198, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 249, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 91, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1926, ch. 841, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 294, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-4-2 .

28-4-3. Contents of indenture.

Every indenture shall contain:

  1. The names of the parties;
  2. The date of birth of the minor;
  3. A statement of the trade, craft, or business which the minor is to be taught;
  4. An agreement that a certificate shall be given to the apprentice at the conclusion of his or her indenture, stating that he or she has completed the apprenticeship under the indenture.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 91, § 3; P.L. 1926, ch. 841, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 294, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-4-3 .

28-4-4. Deeds in triplicate.

In every case there shall be three (3) deeds in the same form and tenor, executed by all parties, one to be kept by each party.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 198, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 249, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 91, § 4; P.L. 1926, ch. 841, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 294, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-4-4 .

28-4-5. Effect of indenture as against parties.

All indentures made in accordance with the provisions of §§ 28-4-1 28-4-4 shall be good and effectual in law against all parties and the minor engaged by them, according to their tenor, except as to any of their provisions that the court, in which any suit or controversy relating to the articles of indenture may be heard, shall determine to be unjust or unreasonable.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 91, § 5; P.L. 1926, ch. 841, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 294, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-4-5 .

Cross References.

Stealing of indenture as larceny, § 11-41-1 .

28-4-6. Petition or complaint for breach of indenture — Summons.

Whenever a petition or complaint in writing and under oath is made to any judge of the district court that any master or apprentice, within a division where the court is situated, has willfully neglected or refused to comply with or perform the terms and provisions of any indenture, the judge, if satisfied that there is a reasonable cause for the petition or complaint, shall issue a summons requiring the master or apprentice to appear before the court at a time and place named in the summons to answer relative to the petition or complaint. The petitioner or complainant shall cause the summons to be served by some officer qualified to serve civil process upon the person complained of at least six (6) days before the time set for appearance and hearing by reading the summons to the person to be served, or by leaving an attested copy of it with the person to be served in his or her hands and possession, or at his or her last and usual place of abode with some person living there, or if the person to be served is a corporation, then, by leaving an attested copy of the summons with some officer of the corporation or at the office of the corporation with some person employed there.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 91, § 6; P.L. 1926, ch. 841, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 294, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-4-6 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 55.

28-4-7. Determination of petition or complaint — Enforcement of order.

Upon the hearing of a petition or complaint, the court may determine the controversy or matter complained of in a summary way, and discharge either party from the indenture and contract of apprenticeship, and may make any further order in the premises that the case may require and seems proper to the court. Any neglect or failure of any person, against whom any order is made, to do, perform, or comply with the order shall be contempt of court, and the court may enforce its order by proceedings for contempt.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 91, § 7; P.L. 1926, ch. 841, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 294, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-4-7 .

Chapter 5 Fair Employment Practices

28-5-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “State Fair Employment Practices Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-1 .

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Constitutional Law, see 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 646 (2000).

Comparative Legislation.

Fair employment practices:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151B, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The limitations explicitly contained in the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10-5-1 et seq., relating to adequate performance of duties, must be supplied in the Rhode Island statute by construction in order to avoid serious problems of due process. Moran v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 121 R.I. 978 , 404 A.2d 857, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2125 (1979).

The 1992 amendment to this chapter did not create new law. Rather, the amendment was adopted by the General Assembly to clarify existing law. Lieberman-Sack v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 882 F. Supp. 249, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4848 (D.R.I. 1995).

Summary judgment was granted as to a former employee’s claim under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq., because the employee was required to demonstrate that there was a causal connection between a report of discrimination and her termination and the court found that there was no termination. Further, the employee chose to retire when she went on oxygen and stopped working, using sick time until her actual retirement; her discrimination claim was filed 10 months after the employee chose to retire so that the claim could not have been a factor under the Act. Rossi v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3269 (D.R.I. 2005).

— Federal Statute.

A trial court in considering claims brought pursuant to this chapter should look for guidance to decisions of the federal courts in construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm’n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1984).

Adverse Employment Action.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of employer because the employee failed to show an adverse or discriminatory employment action where the employee accepted an attractive offer given by the employer to take sick leave and donated sick leave at full pay for ten months until she was able to receive full retirement benefits; retirement was not itself a prima facie case of discrimination. Rossi v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3269 (D.R.I. 2005).

Age Discrimination.
— Age Discrimination Not Shown.

Job applicant had not met his burden under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis by offering proof that a town’s proffered reason for not hiring him, poor interview performance, was a mere pretext for age discrimination. The reality of the interview process must be considered when analyzing a subjective legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in failure-to-hire cases, and the town’s decisions to hire other applicants because they had more favorable interviews were not accompanied by the suspicion of mendacity that warranted an inference of discrimination. Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 188 (R.I. 2004).

Both the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 , and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 , define “age” as anyone who is at least forty (40) years of age. Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 188 (R.I. 2004).

Employee’s age discrimination in employment claim was not dismissed on summary judgment because (1) the employee’s improved performance ratings and consistent bonuses and salary increases met the employee’s minimal evidentiary burden required for a prima facie case, and (2) a jury had to find whether a supervisor’s remark demonstrated the supervisor’s belief that the employee was too old to do the employee’s job and should be replaced with a younger person. Drumm v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 200, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33464 (D.R.I. 2010).

When an employee sued an employer for age discrimination in employment, the “same actor” inference, based on a theory that the supervisor who fired the employee stepped into the shoes of the person who hired the employee by first urging that the employee not be fired did not entitle the employer to judgment because, even if such an expansion of the “same actor” principle were justified, there was a fact dispute as to whether the employee was in jeopardy of being fired when the supervisor urged the employee’s retention. Drumm v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 200, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33464 (D.R.I. 2010).

When an employee sued an employer for age discrimination in employment, a supervisor’s allegedly discriminatory comment on which the employee based the employee’s claim was not a “stray remark” allowing the employer to be awarded summary judgment because (1) the supervisor was a key decisionmaker, (2) the comment could be interpreted as showing that the supervisor thought the employee could not perform the employee’s job due to the employee’s age, (3) the comment was related to the decisional process, and (4) the comment’s timing, about a month before the employee was fired, made the comment relevant to pretext. Drumm v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 200, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33464 (D.R.I. 2010).

Employer gave legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for firing an employee who alleged age discrimination in employment because, (1) despite the employee’s attacks on evidence showing the employee’s poor performance, there was other, undisputed evidence supporting the employer’s assertion of such performance, and (2) the employer’s burden was limited to one of production. Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2014).

It was no error to find an employee alleging age discrimination in employment did not show an employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for firing the employee were not a pretext for discrimination because (1) a supervisor’s inconsistent affidavit did not show mendacity, and (2) evidence of the employee’s satisfactory performance did not show discrimination, nor did the employer’s failure to use the employer’s discretionary progressive-discipline policy or the employer’s failure to allege poor performance in unemployment compensation forms. Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2014).

Appeal.

Employee’s appeal of summary judgment dismissing the employee’s age discrimination in employment claim was considered despite the employee’s failure to establish a prima facie case because, consistent with the standard applicable on summary judgment, a trial justice assumed, without deciding, that the employee met that burden. Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2014).

Arbitration.

In the context of claims under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act or the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, the presumption in favor of arbitration does not extend beyond the reach of the principal rationale that justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret contracts, but not necessarily state law. Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2014).

Back Pay.

Reduction of a back pay award under the Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 28, ch. 5, was not improper, based on a professor’s own admission that the professor abandoned a “systematic search” for academic positions after three years and credible evidence that ample opportunities existed outside academia. Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2007).

Gender Discrimination.

Where an assistant lacrosse coach claimed a state law gender discrimination-motivated failure to hire her as a head coach, she presented sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of gender discrimination by the town officials; the officials’ sole justification was that the man who was hired “fell into their laps just in time,” but she showed that there was sufficient time before the season began; she also showed that no women had been interviewed for coaching positions in over four years. Colman v. Faucher, 128 F. Supp. 3d 487, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121663 (D.R.I. 2015).

Release and Waiver.

Former employee knowingly and voluntarily released her claims against her employer in exchange for a substantial severance package; she could not void the release because of alleged duress; and the release barred all her claims including those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq.; and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq. Bard v. Mark Steven CVS, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 33, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14606 (D.R.I. 2005).

Former employee did not waive her statutory right to a judicial forum because a collective bargaining agreement did not contain sufficiently precise language indicative of the required clear and unmistakable assent to waive a specific statutory right to a judicial forum that was the employee’s by virtue of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2014).

General arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement which contains no specific reference to the State anti-discrimination statutes does not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of the plaintiff’s right to a judicial forum in which to litigate claims arising under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act or the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2014).

Retaliation.

Professor’s version of the events, along with evidence presented, refuted the alternative reasons a university touted for denying tenure sufficiently to support a finding of retaliation under the Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 28, ch. 5. The professor presented testimony to support the professor’s qualifications for tenure from respected authorities in the field, and the university’s own tenure review committee recommended, albeit without enthusiasm, that the provost should grant tenure. Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2007).

Collateral References.

Award of compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a for violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 154 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

Damages for allegedly wrongful interference with employment rights as received “on account of personal injuries,” so as to be excludible from income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). 106 A.L.R. Fed. 321.

Employee’s protection under § 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). 101 A.L.R. Fed. 220.

Existence and nature of employer’s obligation to remedy unfair labor practices committed by predecessor — modern cases. 102 A.L.R. Fed. 575.

Fair employment statutes designed to eliminate racial, religious, or national origin discrimination in private employment. 44 A.L.R.2d 1138.

Judicial construction and application of state legislation prohibiting religious discrimination in employment. 37 A.L.R.5th 349.

Liability of employer, under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) for sexual harassment of employee by customer, client, or patron. 163 A.L.R. Fed. 445.

Propriety of treating separate entities as one for determining number of employees required by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) for action against “employer”. 160 A.L.R. Fed. 441.

Protection of debtor from acts of discrimination by private entity under § 525(b) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. § 525(b)). 105 A.L.R. Fed. 555.

Punitive damages in actions for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 1981a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 150 A.L.R. Fed. 601.

Sex discrimination in job assignment or transfer as violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 123 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

What constitutes religious harassment in employment in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 149 A.L.R. Fed. 405.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — private employment cases. 162 A.L.R. Fed. 273.

When is supervisor’s hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) imputable to employer. 157 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Who has “participated” in investigation proceeding or hearing and is thereby protected from retaliation under § 704(a) of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). 149 A.L.R. Fed. 431.

28-5-2. Legislative findings.

The practice or policy of discrimination against individuals because of their race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin is a matter of state concern. Such discrimination foments domestic strife and unrest; threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state; and undermines the foundations of a free democratic state. The denial of equal employment opportunities because of such discrimination and the consequent failure to utilize the productive capacities of individuals to their fullest extent deprive large segments of the population of the state of earnings necessary to maintain decent standards of living, necessitates their resort to public relief, and intensifies group conflicts, thereby resulting in grave injury to the public safety, health, and welfare.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-2 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 15; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Right to a judicial forum for claims brought specifically under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) can be waived in a collective bargaining agreement if, and only if, that waiver is clear and unmistakable; the RICRA and FEPA are necessary to militate against grave injury to public safety, health, and welfare, and the General Assembly has sounded neither an uncertain nor a muted trumpet in this domain. Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2014).

Collateral References.

Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) to religious institutions. 136 A.L.R. Fed. 487.

Discrimination against pregnant employee as violation of state fair employment laws. 99 A.L.R.5th 1.

When does adverse employment decision based on person’s foreign accent constitute national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.). 104 A.L.R. Fed. 816.

28-5-3. Declaration of policy.

It is declared to be the public policy of this state to foster the employment of all individuals in this state in accordance with their fullest capacities, regardless of their race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin, and to safeguard their right to obtain and hold employment without such discrimination.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-3 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 15; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 14; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Hybrid Claims.

A claim under the Fair Employment Practices Act, involving not only the adjudication of public rights, but also of a private party’s right to obtain compensatory and/or punitive damages from another private party for a statutory violation, was held to be a hybrid claim outside the public-rights doctrine, but within a litigant’s inviolable constitutional right to a jury trial. FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1999).

Collateral References.

Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) to religious institutions. 136 A.L.R. Fed. 487.

28-5-4. Exercise of police power.

This chapter shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, prosperity, health, and peace of the people of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-4 .

Collateral References.

Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) to religious institutions. 136 A.L.R. Fed. 487.

Application of state law to age discrimination in employment. 51 A.L.R.5th 1.

Judicial construction and application of state legislation prohibiting religious discrimination in employment. 37 A.L.R.5th 349.

28-5-5. Right to equal employment opportunities.

The right of all individuals in this state to equal employment opportunities, regardless of race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin, is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-5 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 15; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The general language of this section declaring the right of all individuals in this state to equal employment opportunities did not prevail over the specific language in the pre-1974 provisions of § 28-5-6(B) (see now § 28-5-6(7) ) which excluded nonprofit educational institutions from the operation of this chapter. Chang v. University of R.I., 118 R.I. 631 , 375 A.2d 925, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1503 (1977).

Purpose.

The workers’ compensation act focuses on the employee and his or her work-related injury while the fair employment practices act and the civil rights act focus on employer conduct that undermines equal opportunity in the workplace. Folan v. State/Department of Children, Youth, & Families, 723 A.2d 287, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1999).

Construction With Other Statutes.

The legislature did not intend the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation act to bar the independent statutory claims created by the fair employment practices act or the civil rights act, since to do so would frustrate a broad, fundamental public policy which fulfills the paramount purpose of preventing discrimination. Folan v. State/Department of Children, Youth, & Families, 723 A.2d 287, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1999).

Construction With State Constitution.

Given the comprehensive remedies for employer discrimination provided by the fair employment practices act and the civil rights act, it is unnecessary to create or recognize a direct remedy pursuant to the state constitution. Folan v. State/Department of Children, Youth, & Families, 723 A.2d 287, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1999).

Unequal Pay.

Female employee’s unequal pay claims were properly dismissed on summary judgment where the employer met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the pay disparity. Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5126 (1st Cir. 2004).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of four-fifths rule for finding evidence of adverse impact in federal employment discrimination cases. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018).

Employee’s unpaid leave as reasonable accommodation under Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Employer’s dress policy as religious discrimination under federal law. 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Employer’s grooming policy as religious discrimination under federal law. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Employment discrimination against obese persons as violation of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 or Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 10 (2015).

Failure to hire deaf or hearing-impaired job applicant as violation of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2016).

Identity of commenter and relationship of remark to employment decision as determinants of relevance of stray remark or comment in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2015).

Individual liability of supervisors, managers, officers or co-employees for discriminatory actions under state civil rights act. 83 A.L.R.5th 1.

National security exception on employment discrimination provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g)). 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Right of labor union to exclude applicants for membership and remedies of applicant so excluded. 33 A.L.R.3d 1305.

Rights of employees with bipolar disorder under Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act. 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Rights of workers with disabilities at sheltered workshops or work activity centers under federal civil rights provisions. 8 A.L.R. Fed 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Stray remark or comment involving general references toward female plaintiffs in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Stray remark or comment involving male plaintiffs in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed 3d Art. 8 (2015).

Stray remark or comment involving overt sexual references toward female plaintiffs in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Stray remark or comment toward female plaintiffs regarding pregnancy, child-rearing, and related references in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 (2015).

Validity, construction, and application of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) exempting activities of religious organizations from operation of Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity provisions. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 6.

28-5-5.1 — 28-5-5.3. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1971, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 167, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-5-5.1 , 28-5-5.2, 28-5-5.3), concerning the addition of the words “sex” and “age” and deletion of the word “handicap” throughout this chapter, were repealed by P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 14, effective June 18, 1986.

28-5-6. Definitions.

When used in this chapter:

  1. “Age” means anyone who is at least forty (40) years of age.
  2. “Because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” includes, but is not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
  3. “Commission” means the Rhode Island commission against discrimination created by this chapter.
  4. “Conviction” means, for the purposes of this chapter only, any verdict or finding of guilt after a criminal trial or any plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal charge.
  5. “Disability” means a disability as defined in § 42-87-1 .
  6. “Discriminate” includes segregate or separate.
  7. “Employee” does not include any individual employed by his or her parents, spouse, or child, or in the domestic service of any person.
    1. “Employer” includes the state and all political subdivisions of the state and any person in this state employing four (4) or more individuals, and any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly.
    2. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to apply to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of its religion to perform work connected with the carrying on of its activities.
  8. “Employment agency” includes any person undertaking, with or without compensation, to procure opportunities to work, or to procure, recruit, refer, or place employees.
  9. “Firefighter” means an employee the duties of whose position include work connected with the control and extinguishment of fires or the maintenance and use of firefighting apparatus and equipment, including an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred or promoted to a supervisory or administrative position.
  10. “Gender identity or expression” includes a person’s actual or perceived gender, as well as a person’s gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression; whether or not that gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s sex at birth.
  11. “Labor organization” includes any organization that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or protection in relation to employment.
  12. “Law enforcement officer” means an employee the duties of whose position include investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the state, including an employee engaged in such activity who is transferred or promoted to a supervisory or administrative position. For the purpose of this subdivision, “detention” includes the duties of employees assigned to guard individuals incarcerated in any penal institution.
  13. “Person” includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
  14. “Religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer, union, or employment agency demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s or union member’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of its business.
  15. “Sexual orientation” means having or being perceived as having an orientation for heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality.
  16. The terms, as used regarding persons with disabilities:
    1. “Auxiliary aids and services” and “reasonable accommodation” shall have the same meaning as those items are defined in § 42-87-1.1 ; and
    2. “Hardship” means an “undue hardship” as defined in § 42-87-1.1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-6 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 245, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 167, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 310, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 362, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2000, ch. 499, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 507, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 96, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 97, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 309, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 413, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 124, § 3, effective July 2, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 125, § 3, effective July 2, 2021.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 309, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 413, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2014.

Cross References.

Discrimination prohibited, § 42-112-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The limitations explicitly contained in the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10-5-1 et seq., relating to adequate performance of duties, must be supplied in the Rhode Island statute by construction in order to avoid serious problems of due process. Moran v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 121 R.I. 978 , 404 A.2d 857, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2125 (1979).

Disability.

Although an employee who suffered from depression alleged that she was disabled as defined by R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6 and that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, she could not state a claim for disparate treatment under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act because she failed to set forth any facts to show that she was treated less favorably than someone outside her protected class. Kelly v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79283 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2008).

Employer.

The general language of § 28-5-5 declaring the right of all individuals in this state to equal employment opportunities did not prevail over the specific language of the pre-1974 provisions of subdivision (B) of this section which excluded nonprofit educational institutions from the operation of this chapter. Chang v. University of R.I., 118 R.I. 631 , 375 A.2d 925, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1503 (1977).

When the governor issued an executive order purporting to give the commission for human rights jurisdiction over the employment practices of the University of Rhode Island, a nonprofit educational corporation, which order directly conflicted with the pre-1974 provision of subdivision (B) of this section (defining “employer”) which excluded nonprofit educational institutions, the governor exceeded his authority. Chang v. University of R.I., 118 R.I. 631 , 375 A.2d 925, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1503 (1977).

Exclusive Jurisdiction.

The Personnel Appeal Board of the state had complete jurisdiction to consider all of the employee’s claims of discrimination, racial and retaliatory, and its decision was final except for appeal to the superior court through the Administrative Procedure Act. The parallel litigation before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights should have terminated upon the filing of the decision by the Personnel Appeal Board. Department of Corrections v. Tucker, 657 A.2d 546, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Discrimination against pregnant employee as violation of state fair employment laws. 99 A.L.R.5th 1.

Propriety of treating separate entities as one for determining number of employees required by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) for action against “employer”. 160 A.L.R. Fed. 441.

What constitutes federal financial assistance for purposes of § 504 of Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), which prohibits any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating on basis of disability. 147 A.L.R. Fed. 205.

What constitutes racial harassment in employment violative of state civil rights acts. 17 A.L.R.6th 563.

What constitutes religious harassment in employment in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 149 A.L.R. Fed. 405.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — Public employment cases. 153 A.L.R. Fed. 609.

Who is “employer” within meaning of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.). 137 A.L.R. Fed. 551.

28-5-7. Unlawful employment practices.

It shall be an unlawful employment practice:

  1. For any employer:
    1. To refuse to hire any applicant for employment because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;
    2. Because of those reasons, to discharge an employee or discriminate against him or her with respect to hire, tenure, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, or any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment. However, if an insurer or employer extends insurance-related benefits to persons other than or in addition to the named employee, nothing in this subdivision shall require those benefits to be offered to unmarried partners of named employees;
    3. In the recruiting of individuals for employment or in hiring them, to utilize any employment agency, placement service, training school or center, labor organization, or any other employee referring source that the employer knows, or has reasonable cause to know, discriminates against individuals because of their race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;
    4. To refuse to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer’s program, enterprise, or business; or
    5. When an employee has presented to the employer an internal complaint alleging harassment in the workplace on the basis of race or color, religion, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or country of ancestral origin, to refuse to disclose in a timely manner in writing to that employee the disposition of the complaint, including a description of any action taken in resolution of the complaint; provided, however, no other personnel information shall be disclosed to the complainant;
    1. For any employment agency to fail or refuse to properly classify or refer for employment or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin; or
    2. For any employment agency, placement service, training school or center, labor organization, or any other employee referring source to comply with an employer’s request for the referral of job applicants if the request indicates, either directly or indirectly, that the employer will not afford full and equal employment opportunities to individuals regardless of their race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;
  2. For any labor organization:
    1. To deny full and equal membership rights to any applicant for membership because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;
    2. Because of those reasons, to deny a member full and equal membership rights, expel him or her from membership, or otherwise discriminate in any manner against him or her with respect to his or her hire, tenure, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, or any other matter directly or indirectly related to membership or employment, whether or not authorized or required by the constitution or bylaws of the labor organization or by a collective labor agreement or other contract;
    3. To fail or refuse to classify properly or refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any member because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin; or
    4. To refuse to reasonably accommodate a member’s or prospective member’s disability unless the labor organization can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the labor organization’s program, enterprise, or business;
  3. Except where based on a bona fide occupational qualification certified by the commission or where necessary to comply with any federal mandated affirmative action programs, for any employer or employment agency, labor organization, placement service, training school or center, or any other employee referring source, prior to employment or admission to membership of any individual, to:
    1. Elicit, or attempt to elicit, any information directly or indirectly pertaining to his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;
    2. Make or keep a record of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;
    3. Use any form of application for employment, or personnel or membership blank containing questions or entries directly or indirectly pertaining to race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;
    4. Print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employment or membership indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based upon race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin; or
    5. Establish, announce, or follow a policy of denying or limiting, through a quota system or otherwise, employment or membership opportunities of any group because of the race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin of that group;
  4. For any employer or employment agency, labor organization, placement service, training school or center, or any other employee referring source to discriminate in any manner against any individual because he or she has opposed any practice forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has made a charge, testified, or assisted in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter;
  5. For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment practice, or to obstruct or prevent any person from complying with the provisions of this chapter or any order issued pursuant to this chapter, or to attempt directly or indirectly to commit any act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment practice;
  6. For any employer to include on any application for employment, except applications for law enforcement agency positions or positions related to law enforcement agencies, a question inquiring or to otherwise inquire either orally or in writing whether the applicant has ever been arrested, charged with or convicted of any crime; provided, that:
    1. If a federal or state law or regulation creates a mandatory or presumptive disqualification from employment based on a person’s conviction of one or more specified criminal offenses, an employer may include a question or otherwise inquire whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any of those offenses; or
    2. If a standard fidelity bond or an equivalent bond is required for the position for which the applicant is seeking employment and his or her conviction of one or more specified criminal offenses would disqualify the applicant from obtaining such a bond, an employer may include a question or otherwise inquire whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any of those offenses; and
    3. Notwithstanding, any employer may ask an applicant for information about his or her criminal convictions at the first interview or thereafter, in accordance with all applicable state and federal laws;
    1. For any person who or that, on June 7, 1988, is providing either by direct payment or by making contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program, benefits in violation with §§ 28-5-6 , 28-5-7 and 28-5-38 , until the expiration of a period of one year from June 7, 1988, or if there is an applicable collective bargaining agreement in effect on June 7, 1988, until the termination of that agreement, in order to come into compliance with §§ 28-5-6 , 28-5-7 and 28-5-38 , to reduce the benefits or the compensation provided any employee on June 7, 1988, either directly or by failing to provide sufficient contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program.
    2. Where the costs of these benefits on June 7, 1988, are apportioned between employers and employees, the payments or contributions required to comply with §§ 28-5-6, 28-5-7 and 28-5-38 may be made by employers and employees in the same proportion.
    3. Nothing in this section shall prevent the readjustment of benefits or compensation for reasons unrelated to compliance with §§ 28-5-6, 28-5-7 and 28-5-38.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 4; P.L. 1951, ch. 2735, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-7 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1, impl. am. P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 245, § 2, impl. am. P.L. 1981, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 15; P.L. 1987, ch. 494, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 310, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 126, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1995, ch. 235, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3; P.L. 2003, ch. 131, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 131, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 173, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 309, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 413, § 2.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 390, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 413, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2014.

Law Reviews.

2005 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Employment law: DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, 875 A.2d 13 (R.I. 2005), see 11 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 867 (2006).

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Employment Law: Neri v. Ross-Simmons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 583 (2007).

Aaron F. Nadich, Comment: Ban the Box: An Employer’s Medicine Masked as a Headache, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 767 (2014).

Jacqueline G. Kelley, Rehabilitate, Don’t Recidivate: A Reframing of the Ban the Box Debate, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 590 (2017).

Kathrine M. Morin, 2017 Survey, Cases: Employment Law: Mancini v. City of Providence, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 677 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section unmistakably forbids individual acts of discrimination as well as patterns of discriminatory practice. Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 632 (R.I. 1984).

Construction.

The limitations explicitly contained in the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, § 10-5-1 et seq., relating to adequate performance of duties, must be supplied in the Rhode Island statute by construction in order to avoid serious problems of due process. Moran v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 121 R.I. 978 , 404 A.2d 857, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2125 (1979).

This section bears a striking resemblance to Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

Because the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act is nearly identical in its remedial provision to its federal analog, Title VII, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has applied the analytical framework developed in federal Title VII cases to actions brought pursuant to the Rhode Island statute. Marley v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 119, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6619 (D.R.I. 1987).

Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) does not preempt state employment discrimination claims. Taylor v. State, Dep't of Mental Health Retardation & Hosp., 726 F. Supp. 895, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14670 (D.R.I. 1989).

— Local Laws.

Police officer who challenged the mandatory retirement provisions of a city retirement act failed to state a valid Fair Employment Practices Act claim because under § 43-3-26 , the act is a “special act” and the Fair Employment Practices Act is a “general” law. Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 170 (R.I. 1990).

Age Discrimination.

When a 53-year-old, salaried female employee alleged age and gender discrimination in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1)(i) -(ii), the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the employer. The employee had failed to cast any meaningful doubt on the employer’s reason for terminating her as part of a staff reduction, even if the employer might have failed to follow its staff reduction policy. Neri v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2006).

Court erred in granting defendant judgment as matter of law in an age discrimination case, as plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination, and the jury could have rejected defendant’s alleged non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring him based on its spoliation of evidence and testimony that it misrepresented that plaintiff was not qualified to teach English. McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2012).

In an age discrimination case, the trial court did not err in granting a defendant a new trial, as it adequately set forth its belief that plaintiff’s claim was not supported by the weight of the evidence, and its determination that the jury gave an inordinate amount of weight and credence to defendant’s missing job interview notes was not clearly erroneous. McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2012).

Employee’s age and gender discrimination claims failed because (1) the employee resigned, instead of being discharged, and the employee did not sufficiently allege constructive discharge, as he did not allege he felt compelled to resign, and (2) the gender discrimination claim did not allege the employer sought a replacement with similar qualifications. Ferreira v. Child & Family Servs. of R.I., 222 A.3d 69, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 143 (R.I. 2019).

Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications.

Employer was justified in terminating an employee where physical examination disclosed existence of prior back injuries and employment requiring heavy lifting would create a serious risk of aggravating the injury. Moran v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 121 R.I. 978 , 404 A.2d 857, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2125 (1979).

Where employee’s heart condition prevented her from working more than 40 hours a week, she was incapable of performing an essential function of her position, and she was not entitled to relief under the Fair Employment Practices Act because of her dismissal from a job for which she was no longer qualified. Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hosp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 125, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8468 (D.R.I. 1998), aff'd, 168 F.3d 538, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2877 (1st Cir. 1999).

Summary judgment was denied to defendant state employer and officers on plaintiff employee’s claim for failure to accommodate a visual impairment under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq., the Rhode Island Civil Rights of Individuals with Handicaps Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-1 et seq., and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq., because in response to employees’ request for accommodation, the employers merely concluded that it involved an essential function of the job, which was not sufficient. Kriegel v. Rhode Island, 266 F. Supp. 2d 288, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9233 (D.R.I. 2003).

Disability Discrimination.

Employee’s disability discrimination claim based on depression failed because working was the only activity that the employee claimed was limited, and her own testimony indicated that she could return to work for someone other than the supervisor. DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 2005).

District court found that an employee who was disabled and receiving long-term disability benefits was not a “qualified individual with a disability” under 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a)(8) and did not state a valid claim alleging that his employer committed illegal discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., when it reduced his benefits. However, the court found that the employee stated valid claims alleging that the employer committed illegal retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 , and R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 when it reduced his benefits fourteen months after it entered an agreement to settle discrimination complaints and a lawsuit the employee filed. Hatch v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 22, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30669 (D.R.I. 2007).

Although an employee who suffered from depression alleged that she was disabled as defined by R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6 and that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, she could not state a claim for disparate treatment under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act because she failed to set forth any facts to show that she was treated less favorably than someone outside her protected class. Kelly v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79283 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2008).

Discrimination Because of Sex.

Failure to provide disability payments and other company benefits to those having pregnancy-related disabilities does not constitute discrimination because of sex within the meaning of subdivision (A) (now subdivision (1)). Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 118 R.I. 457 , 374 A.2d 1022, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1483 (1977).

Where an arbitrator denied the request of a school committee employee for paid sick-leave benefits for a pregnancy-related illness which occurred subsequent to the birth of her child on the basis of a collective-bargaining agreement stipulating that a teacher shall not receive any salary during a maternity leave, and the teachers’ union appealed on the ground that denial of the request for paid sick leave violated the employee’s fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection and the prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex found in subdivision (A) of this section (now subdivision (1)), the Supreme Court denied the appeal, holding that an arbitrator’s mistake of law is not a ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award. Warwick Teachers' Union Local 915 v. School Comm., 121 R.I. 806 , 402 A.2d 1190, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2057 (1979).

Permanent injunction enjoining police academy from refusing to issue female candidate a graduation certificate was affirmed, where the academy offered no explanation why five male candidates were not similarly denied the opportunity to make up one or more failed courses of the program. Vierra v. Rhode Island Mun. Police Academy, 539 A.2d 971, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 46 (R.I. 1988).

An employee who was pregnant at the time of her discharge and who established a prima facie case of discrimination which was successfully rebutted by her employer nevertheless presented sufficient evidence to show that the reasons set forth by the employer in an attempt to justify the termination were in fact pretextual. Center for Behavioral Health v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 171 (R.I. 1998).

A complaint did not fail to allege the elements of a retaliation claim since it explicitly charged sexual discrimination in language that virtually mirrored the words of the statute. Conetta v. Nat'l Hair Care Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.3d 67, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 160 (1st Cir. 2001).

There was more than sufficient evidence to support the trial justice’s denial of a motion for judgment for the defendant as a matter of law since the evidence established that, despite being pregnant at the time of termination, an employee was amply qualified to perform her work, and she was fired approximately two weeks after first informing her employer of her pregnancy and replaced by someone outside the protected class. Accardi v. Full Channel TV, Inc., 771 A.2d 908, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 109 (R.I. 2001).

In granting summary judgment to defendant employer, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden shifting analysis to gender-based claims for failure to promote and unequal pay brought under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq., and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq., and found that plaintiff employee could not rebut the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions: namely, that the employees who were promoted had superior qualifications and the salary guidelines were gender neutral. Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 226, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4713 (D.R.I. 2003), aff'd, 361 F.3d 62, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5126 (1st Cir. 2004).

Trial court properly denied an employer’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding verdict in a discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-7(1) and 42-112-1(a) because the employer’s action in requiring the employee to take maternity leave early and reducing her part-time position to a fill-in position was sufficient to show pregnancy discrimination. Wellborn v. Spurwink/Rhode Island, 873 A.2d 884, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2005).

In a pregnancy discrimination case based on violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1(a) , and R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1) , motions for a new trial and a directed verdict were denied because the evidence showed that an employee was passed over for a promotion, forced to start maternity leave early, and constructively discharged when her position was filled by another person upon her return. Wellborn v. Spurwink/Rhode Island, 873 A.2d 884, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2005).

Trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the employee’s sex discrimination claim because defendants failed to identify a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the employee; the evidence showed that the employer was on notice that the supervisor treated women differently based on previous complaints the employer had received. DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 2005).

“Discrimination” Defined.

“Discrimination” in subdivision (A) (now subdivision (1)) has the commonly accepted meaning. Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 118 R.I. 457 , 374 A.2d 1022, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1483 (1977).

False Answers to Improper Inquiries.

The prohibition against asking about criminal charges in this section does not provide an absolute defense to a charge of filing a false document under § 11-18-1 . The fact that the job application may have contained an improper question did not permit the applicant to lie. State v. Ricci, 668 A.2d 320, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 287 (R.I. 1995).

Although subdivision (7) prohibits an employer from inquiring into an applicant’s arrest history, it does not provide the applicant with an absolute defense to a charge of filing a false document if the applicant gives false information in response to the unlawful question. City of Pawtucket, Police Division v. Ricci, 692 A.2d 678, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 122 (R.I. 1997).

Federal Actions.

Assuming that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in the state forum, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court equal employment opportunity judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged; thus, res judicata would apply where the employee has not reached out to secure state judicial review of agency action, but has been propelled into that forum by the employer’s pursuit of state court relief. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

Federal district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over female state employee’s employment discrimination claim under this section, where federal and state claims arise from the same alleged core of facts and involve the same evidence and witnesses. Taylor v. State, Dep't of Mental Health Retardation & Hosp., 726 F. Supp. 895, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14670 (D.R.I. 1989).

Finding by the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights that a debtor sexually harassed a creditor in violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 , was equivalent to, and sufficient to support a finding of, willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). DeAngelis v. Antonelli (In re Antonelli), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1677 (Bankr. D.R.I. May 19, 2010).

Insurance Coverage.

The “Broad Form Comprehensive General Liability” policy in this case did not provide coverage against a complaint of intentional racial discrimination brought pursuant to this section, and the insurer had no duty to defend and indemnify from such a claim. Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 905 F. Supp. 1139, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17743 (D.R.I. 1995).

Judicial Review.

The standard for judicial review of the administrative determination is sufficiently stringent under § 42-35-15(g)(5) for employees to have plenary opportunity fairly to litigate the merits of their claims of racial discrimination in state proceedings. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

Liability Under Subdivision (6).

Subdivision (6) reaches past employers to forbid discriminatory acts by individual employees. Since the plaintiff has alleged that her supervisors were integral participants in the multiple forms of discrimination she suffered, proof of discrimination under any of her theories imposes individual liability on the supervisors as abettors, or worse. Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7884 (D.R.I. 1996).

This section reaches beyond employers to forbid discriminatory acts by any individual employee. Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15830 (D.R.I. 1998).

In answer to the certified question from the U.S. district court, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(6) does not provide for the individual liability of an employee of a defendant employer. Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 32 (R.I. 2017).

When an officer sought to hold a police chief (chief) individually liable under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(6) , the statute did not provide for individual liability because (1) the statute was ambiguous on the question, and (2) the alleged unlawful employment practice involved the chief’s decision negatively affecting the officer’s chances for promotion, so the chief’s act was the sole alleged unfair employment practice at issue, requiring a finder of fact to determine the chief aided and abetted himself, which unacceptably contorted the statutory language. Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 32 (R.I. 2017).

When considering whether an officer could hold a police chief individually liable under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(6) , it was unnecessary to defer to the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights’ statutory interpretation because (1) there were widely divergent views from courts within and outside Rhode Island, and (2) the issue was a pure question of law, which required no special expertise. Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 32 (R.I. 2017).

Racial Discrimination.

In an employment discrimination action, the trial justice appropriately reasoned that the commission for human rights clearly made an erroneous finding when it determined that the alleged victim of discrimination was more qualified than the white employee who was given the sought-after position; and the justice properly found that the commission was clearly in error in determining that the alleged victim had applied for the vacant position given that the assertion was unsupported by the record. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Berry, 620 A.2d 1255, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 1993).

Questions of fact as to whether race was a motivating factor in the decision of college officials to deny plaintiff a tenure track position precluded summary judgment for defendants. Eastridge v. Rhode Island College, 996 F. Supp. 161, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2562 (D.R.I. 1998).

Former housekeeper’s claims brought under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws , § 28-5-1 et seq., were summarily dismissed because the housekeeper failed to establish a prima facie case of race-based employment discrimination; she could not show that she was performing satisfactorily because she was fired for not changing the bed sheets, after having already been warned once, and she presented no evidence that workers outside her protected class were treated more favorably than she was treated. Ashley v. Paramount Hotel Group, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 319, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67051 (D.R.I. 2006).

Although the fact that a former housekeeper failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination was, alone, a basis for granting summary judgment to hotel employers, the court also found that the hotel employers stated a nondiscriminatory reason for discharging her, namely, that she failed a second time to change the bed sheets after receiving a warning, and she failed to show that the reason for her termination was a pretext for race discrimination; given the vagueness of the allegedly discriminatory comments, as well as the fact that the housekeeper did not report them, even when considered in a light favorable to the housekeeper, she did not raise material issues of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Ashley v. Paramount Hotel Group, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 319, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67051 (D.R.I. 2006).

Sexual Harassment.

A supervisor’s degrading comments about a female employee’s sexual activities would be fully actionable if sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Marley v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 119, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6619 (D.R.I. 1987).

Defendant state employer and officers were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff employee’s claims of disparate treatment and hostile work environment brought under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq., the Rhode Island Civil Rights of Individuals with Handicaps Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-1 et seq., and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq., because the employee offered no evidence of discriminatory animus. Kriegel v. Rhode Island, 266 F. Supp. 2d 288, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9233 (D.R.I. 2003).

A female employee failed to establish a case of same-sex hostile work environment sexual harassment because the complained of acts by the female supervisor, while tasteless, were never threatening and did not intimidate the employee; there were only two incidents of unwanted physical contact, a rub of the head and a touch of the ankle, neither of which came close to being severe enough to be characterized as abusive. Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18587 (D.R.I. 2003).

Spoliation of Evidence.

In an employment discrimination case, disbelief of the defendant’s proffered explanation for the adverse employment action, combined with a suspicion of mendacity in connection with destroyed evidence and the elements of a prima facie case, may be sufficient evidence to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law; however, when the evidence demonstrates that the defendant’s spoliation of evidence was the result of mere negligence, the adverse inference arising from a spoliation instruction, without more, may not be sufficient to establish the elements of the claim. McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2012).

Collateral References.

Accommodation requirement under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap. 76 A.L.R.4th 310.

Action under Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.), to remedy alleged harassment or hostile work environment. 162 A.L.R. Fed. 603.

Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) to religious institutions. 136 A.L.R. Fed. 487.

Application of state law to age discrimination in employment. 51 A.L.R.5th 1.

“Bona fide employee benefit plan” exception to general prohibition of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)) as applied to plans other than early retirement incentive plans. 184 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Can “at-will” employee bring action for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 165 A.L.R. Fed. 143.

Circumstances which warrant finding of constructive discharge in cases under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.). 93 A.L.R. Fed. 10.

Construction and application of four-fifths rule for finding evidence of adverse impact in federal employment discrimination cases. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Construction and application of § 102(d) of Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)) pertaining to medical examinations and inquiries. 159 A.L.R. Fed. 89.

Discrimination against pregnant employee as violation of state fair employment laws. 99 A.L.R.5th 1.

Discrimination “because of handicap” or “on the basis of handicap” under state statutes prohibiting job discrimination on account of handicap. 81 A.L.R.4th 144.

Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018).

Disparate impact claims under Age Discrimination Act of 1967, §§ 2 et seq., (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) 186 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Employee’s retention of benefits received in consideration of promise not to enforce claims under Age Discrimination in Employment Act as ratification of otherwise invalid or voidable waiver under § 7(f)(1) of act (29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)). 128 A.L.R. Fed. 577.

Employee’s unpaid leave as reasonable accommodation under Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Employer’s dress policy as religious discrimination under federal law. 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Employer’s grooming policy as religious discrimination under federal law. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Employer’s unilateral change in work rules or policies as unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act Act § 8(a)(1), (a)(5) (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)). 94 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 383.

Employment discrimination against obese persons as violation of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 or Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 10 (2015).

Failure to hire deaf or hearing-impaired job applicant as violation of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2016).

Identity of commenter and relationship of remark to employment decision as determinants of relevance of stray remark or comment in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2015).

Individual liability of supervisors, managers, officers or co-employees for discriminatory actions under state civil rights act. 83 A.L.R.5th 1.

Judicial construction and application of state legislation prohibiting religious discrimination in employment. 37 A.L.R.5th 349.

Judicial estoppel in civil action arising from representation or conduct in prior administrative proceeding. 99 A.L.R.5th 65.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress — Ethnic, racial, or religious harassment or discrimination. 19 A.L.R.6th 1.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress — Sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, or accusations concerning sexual conduct or orientation. 20 A.L.R.6th 1.

Liability of employer, under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) for sexual harassment of employee by customer, client, or patron. 163 A.L.R. Fed. 445.

Mandatory retirement of public officer or employee based on age. 81 A.L.R.3d 811.

National security exception on employment discrimination provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g)). 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Necessity of, and what constitutes, employer’s reasonable accommodation of employee’s religious preference under state law. 107 A.L.R.5th 623.

Negligent discharge of employee. 53 A.L.R.5th 219.

Preemption of state-law wrongful discharge claim, not arising from whistleblowing, by § 301(a) of Labor-Management Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)). 184 A.L.R. Fed. 241.

Preemption of wrongful discharge cause of action by civil rights laws. 21 A.L.R.5th 1.

Procedural rights of union members in union disciplinary proceedings — modern state cases. 79 A.L.R.4th 941.

Propriety of treating separate entities as one for determining number of employees required by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) for action against “employer”. 160 A.L.R. Fed. 441.

Right of labor union to exclude applicants for membership and remedies of applicant so excluded. 33 A.L.R.3d 1305.

Rights of employees with bipolar disorder under Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act. 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Rights of workers with disabilities at sheltered workshops or work activity centers under federal civil rights provisions. 8 A.L.R. Fed 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Same-sex sexual harassment under state antidiscrimination laws. 73 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sex discrimination in employment advertising. 66 A.L.R.3d 1237.

Stray remark or comment involving general references toward female plaintiffs in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Stray remark or comment involving male plaintiffs in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed 3d Art. 8 (2015).

Stray remark or comment involving overt sexual references toward female plaintiffs in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Stray remark or comment toward female plaintiffs regarding pregnancy, child-rearing, and related references in Title VII action for sex discrimination. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 (2015).

To what extent are federal entities subject to suit under § 504(a) of Rehabilitation Act (42 U.S.C. § 794(a)), which prohibits any program or activity conducted by any executive agency or the postal service from discriminating on basis of disability. 146 A.L.R. Fed. 319.

Validity, construction, and application of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) exempting activities of religious organizations from operation of Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity provisions. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 6.

Validity, construction, and application of state enactment, order, or regulation expressly prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. 82 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity of age requirement for state public office. 90 A.L.R.3d 900.

Visual impairment as handicap or disability under state employment discrimination law. 77 A.L.R.5th 595.

What constitutes direct evidence of age discrimination in action under age discrimination in employment act (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) — Post-Price Waterhouse cases. 155 A.L.R. Fed. 283.

What constitutes employer’s reasonable accommodation of employee’s religious preferences under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 134 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

What constitutes employment discrimination by public entity in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 164 A.L.R. Fed. 433.

What constitutes racial harassment in employment violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.). 156 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

What constitutes religious harassment in employment in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 149 A.L.R. Fed. 405.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — private employment cases. 162 A.L.R. Fed. 273.

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes — Private employment cases. 150 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

What constitutes substantial limitation on major life activity of working for purposes of state civil rights acts. 102 A.L.R.5th 1.

What constitutes termination of employee due to pregnancy in violation of Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 130 A.L.R. Fed. 473.

What constitutes “Willful violation” under age discrimination in employment act (29 U.S.C. §§ 626 et seq.) entitling victim to liquidate damages. 165 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

When does job restructuring constitute reasonable accommodation of qualified disabled employee or applicant. 142 A.L.R. Fed. 311.

When is supervisor’s hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) imputable to employer. 157 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

When is supervisor’s or coemployee’s hostile environment sexual harassment imputable to employer under state law. 94 A.L.R.5th 1.

When must employer offer qualified disabled employee or applicant opportunity to change employee’s workplace or work at home as means of fulfilling reasonable accommodation requirement. 133 A.L.R. Fed. 521.

When must specialized equipment or other workplace modifications be provided to qualified disabled employee or applicant as reasonable accommodation. 125 A.L.R. Fed. 629.

Who, other than specifically excluded persons, is “employee” under § 4(a)(1) of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). 125 A.L.R. Fed. 273.

Who is “supervisor” for purposes of racial harassment claim under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) imputing liability to employer. 92 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 91.

28-5-7.1. Exemption of firefighter and law enforcement officer.

It shall not be unlawful for an employer as defined in § 28-5-6(8)(i) or any agency or instrumentality of the state or a political subdivision of the state to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any person because of the person’s age if the action is taken with respect to the employment of a person as a firefighter or as a law enforcement officer and the person has attained the age of hiring or retirement in effect under any state statute, city or town ordinance, any collective bargaining agreement, or pension plan in effect on March 3, 1983. An employee whose retirement goes into effect shall be allowed to continue his or her employment until the end of the calendar year.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 183 § 2.

Collateral References.

First Amendment protection for publicly employed firefighters subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech. 106 A.L.R. Fed. 396.

28-5-7.2. Proof of unlawful employment practices in disparate impact cases.

  1. An unlawful employment practice prohibited by § 28-5-7 may be established by proof of disparate impact. An unlawful employment practice by proof of disparate impact is established when:
    1. A complainant demonstrates that an employment practice results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the practice is required by business necessity; or
    2. A complainant demonstrates that a group of employment practices results in disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the practices are required by business necessity; provided that:
      1. If a complainant demonstrates that a group of employment practices results in a disparate impact, the complainant shall not be required to demonstrate which specific practice or practices within the group results in the disparate impact; and
      2. If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice within that group of employment practices does not contribute to the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that the practice is required by business necessity.
  2. A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may be used as a defense only against a claim under this section.
  3. As used in this section:
    1. “Complainant” and “respondent” mean those individuals or entities defined as such in § 28-5-17 ;
    2. “Demonstrates” means meets the burdens of production and persuasion;
    3. “Group of employment practices” means a combination of employment practices or an overall employment process; and
    4. “Required by business necessity” means essential to effective job performance.
  4. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as limiting the methods of proof of unlawful employment practices under § 28-5-7 to the methods set in this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 343, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Pleadings.

Although an employee who suffered from depression alleged that she was disabled as defined by R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-6 and that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, she could not state a claim for disparate treatment under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act because she failed to set forth any facts to show that she was treated less favorably than someone outside her protected class. Kelly v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79283 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2008).

Proof Not Found.

The plaintiff faculty members did not establish a prima facie case that the university’s plan of establishing a different schedule of minimum salaries for a humanities tier, a natural sciences tier, and a business tier had a disparate impact on women. Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8829 (D.R.I. 1996), aff'd, 110 F.3d 2, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6493 (1st Cir. 1997).

Collateral References.

Disparate impact claims under Age Discrimination Act of 1967, §§ 2 et seq., (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) 186 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

28-5-7.3. Discriminatory practice need not be sole motivating factor.

An unlawful employment practice may be established in an action or proceeding under this chapter when the complainant demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though the practice was also motivated by other factors. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as requiring direct evidence of unlawful intent or as limiting the methods of proof of unlawful employment practices under § 28-5-7 .

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 343, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 447, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

28-5-7.4. Accommodation of pregnancy-related conditions.

  1. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, as defined in § 28-5-6 , to do the following:
    1. To refuse to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition, including, but not limited to, the need to express breast milk for a nursing child, if she so requests, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the employer’s program, enterprise, or business;
    2. To require an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided to an employee’s condition related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition;
    3. To deny employment opportunities to an employee or prospective employee, if such denial is based on the refusal of the employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition;
    4. To fail to provide written notice, including notice conspicuously posted at an employer’s place of business in an area accessible to employees, of the right to be free from discrimination in relation to pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions, including the right to reasonable accommodations for conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions pursuant to this section to:
      1. New employees at the commencement of employment;
      2. Existing employees within one hundred twenty (120) days after the effective date of June 25, 2015;
      3. Any employee who notifies the employer of her pregnancy within ten (10) days of such notification;
    5. For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment practice; or to obstruct or prevent any person from complying with the provisions of this section or any order issued pursuant to this section; or to attempt directly or indirectly to commit any act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment practice.
  2. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
    1. “Qualified employee or prospective employee” means a “qualified individual” as defined in § 42-87-1(6)(i) ;
    2. “Reasonably accommodate” means providing reasonable accommodations, including, but not limited to, more frequent or longer breaks, time off to recover from childbirth, acquisition or modification of equipment, seating, temporary transfer to a less strenuous or hazardous position, job restructuring, light duty, break time and private non-bathroom space for expressing breast milk, assistance with manual labor, or modified work schedules;
    3. “Related conditions” includes, but is not limited to, lactation or the need to express breast milk for a nursing child;
    4. “Undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense to the employer. In making a determination of undue hardship, the factors that may be considered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
      1. The nature and cost of the accommodation;
      2. The overall financial resources of the employer; the overall size of the business of the employer with respect to the number of employees, and the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
      3. The effect on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the employer.
        1. The employer shall have the burden of proving undue hardship.
        2. The fact that the employer provides, or would be required to provide, a similar accommodation to other classes of employees who need it, such as those who are injured on the job or those with disabilities, shall create a rebuttable presumption that the accommodation does not impose an undue hardship on the employer.
  3. No employer shall be required by this section to create additional employment that the employer would not otherwise have created, unless the employer does so, or would do so, for other classes of employees who need accommodation, such as those who are injured on the job or those with disabilities.
  4. No employer shall be required to discharge any employee; transfer any employee with more seniority; or promote any employee who is not qualified to perform the job, unless the employer does so, or would do so, to accommodate other classes of employees who need it, such as those who are injured on the job or those with disabilities.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to affect any other provision of law relating to sex discrimination or pregnancy, or to preempt, limit, diminish, or otherwise affect any other law that provides greater protection or specific benefits with respect to pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to childbirth.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an individual with a need related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition to accept an accommodation which such individual chooses not to accept.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 129, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 151, § 2.

28-5-8. Rhode Island commission for human rights — Composition.

There is created a commission to be known as the “Rhode Island commission for human rights,” to consist of seven (7) members to be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, one of whom shall be designated by the governor as chairperson. In the appointment of commissioners, the following factors shall be taken into consideration:

  1. A commissioner should have a demonstrated sensitivity to the concerns of the classes protected under this chapter.
  2. A commissioner should have a judicious temperament, analytical ability, and sufficient time to dedicate to commission work.
  3. The commission should reflect the diversity of the state’s population. In attempting to reflect the diversity of the state’s population, the governor should attempt to appoint as at least one of the seven (7) commissioners a person with a background in law, business, and/or real estate.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-8 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 160, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 398, § 3.

Cross References.

Members in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The Commission for Human Rights is a quasi-judicial agency of the state. Department of Corrections v. Tucker, 657 A.2d 546, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 1995).

28-5-9. Terms of commission members.

The five (5) commissioners appointed before July 12, 1990, shall serve the remainder of their terms. One of the two (2) new commissioners to be appointed after July 12, 1990, shall serve for five (5) years and one of the two (2) new commissioners to be appointed after July 12, 1990, shall serve for four (4) years. Thereafter, the members of the commission shall be appointed for terms of five (5) years each, except that any member chosen to fill a vacancy occurring otherwise than by expiration of term shall only be appointed for the unexpired term of the member whom he or she succeeds.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-9 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 398, § 3.

28-5-10. Quorum of commission.

Three (3) members of the commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of conducting its business. A vacancy in the commission does not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the powers of the commission. This section does not preclude one commissioner or a hearing examiner from conducting hearings on any matter within the jurisdiction of the commission; however, a quorum of the commissioners, after having read the full transcript of the hearing, shall be required to reach a decision.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 5, G.L. 1956, § 28-5-10 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 203, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Necessity of Quorum.

At hearings when an employer takes issue with the commission’s charge that the employer has engaged in certain discriminatory practices that are barred by the state Fair Employment Practices Act, a quorum of the five commissioners must be present to examine the facts and reach a conclusion, but the facts may be gathered by less than a quorum of the commission, and those doing the gathering need not be members of the commission. In re Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 472 A.2d 1211, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 470 (R.I. 1984) (decided prior to 1983 amendment).

28-5-11. Compensation of commission members — Reappointment.

Members of the commission shall not be compensated for the discharge of their official duties but shall be entitled to the reimbursement of expenses actually and necessarily incurred by them in the performance of their duties. All members of the commission shall be eligible for reappointment.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-11 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 69, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 21, § 25.

28-5-12. Removal of commission members.

Any member of the commission may be removed by the governor for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misconduct, or malfeasance in office, after being given a written statement of the charges and an opportunity to be publicly heard on them.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-12 .

28-5-13. Powers and duties of commission.

The commission shall have the following powers and duties:

  1. To establish and maintain a principal office in the city of Providence, Rhode Island, and any other offices within the state that it may deem necessary.
  2. To meet and function at any place within the state.
  3. To appoint any attorneys, clerks, and other employees and agents that it may deem necessary, fix their compensation within the limitations provided by law, and prescribe their duties. The provisions of chapter 4 of title 36 shall not apply to this chapter.
  4. To adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of this chapter, and the policies and practice of the commission in connection with this chapter.
  5. To formulate policies to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.
  6. To receive, investigate, and pass upon charges of unlawful employment practices.
    1. In connection with any investigation or hearing held pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer oaths, take the testimony of any person under oath, and, in connection with the investigation or hearing, to require the production for examination of any books and papers relating to any matter under investigation or in question before the commission.
    2. The commission may make rules as to the issuance of subpoenas by individual commissioners.
    3. Contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued pursuant to this section shall constitute a contempt punishable, upon the application of the commission, by the superior court in the county in which the hearing is held or in which the witness resides or transacts business.
  7. Utilize voluntary and uncompensated services of private individuals and organizations as may from time to time be offered and needed.
    1. Create any advisory agencies and conciliation councils, local or statewide, that will aid in effectuating the purposes of this chapter. The commission may itself, or it may empower these agencies and councils to:
      1. Study the problems of discrimination in all or specific fields of human relationships when based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin, and
      2. Foster, through community effort or otherwise, good will among the groups and elements of the population of the state.
    2. The agencies and councils may make recommendations to the commission for the development of policies and procedure in general.
    3. Advisory agencies and conciliation councils created by the commission shall be composed of representative citizens serving without pay, but with reimbursement for actual and necessary traveling expenses.
  8. Issue any publications and any results of investigations and research that in its judgment will tend to promote good will and minimize or eliminate discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin.
  9. From time to time, but not less than once a year, report to the legislature and the governor, describing the investigations, proceedings, and hearings the commission has conducted and their outcome, the decisions it has rendered, and the other work performed by it, and make recommendations for any further legislation, concerning abuses and discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age or country of ancestral origin, that may be desirable.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-13 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 15; P.L. 1991, ch. 149, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 323, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Powers in Connection With Investigations and Hearings.

Subdivision (G) (now subdivision (7)) of this section should not be construed to manifest a legislative intent to sacrifice a respondent’s entitlement to fairness for the sake of informality. La Petite Auberge. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (R.I. 1980).

Opportunities to conduct discovery would appear consistent with the goals of a smoothly conducted and efficient hearing. La Petite Auberge. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (R.I. 1980).

Legislative authorization for whatever system of discovery may be necessary to ensure procedural fairness may be found in subdivision (G) (now subdivision (7)) of this section. La Petite Auberge. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (R.I. 1980).

Subdivision (G) (now subdivision (7)) of this section is broad enough to empower the commission to issue discovery subpoenas at the request of a party to a contested case. La Petite Auberge. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (R.I. 1980).

Nothing in this statute limits its application to the time of the hearing itself. La Petite Auberge. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (R.I. 1980).

28-5-14. Educational program.

In order to eliminate prejudice among the various ethnic groups in this state and to further good will among those groups, the commission and the state council on elementary and secondary education are jointly directed to prepare a comprehensive educational program, designed for the students of the public schools of this state and for all other residents of the state, calculated to emphasize the origin of prejudice based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin; its harmful effects; and its incompatibility with American principles of equality and fair play.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-14 ; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 43.

28-5-15. Acceptance of contributions — Cooperation of private agencies.

The commission is authorized to accept contributions from any person and may seek and enlist the cooperation of private charitable, religious, labor, civic, and benevolent organizations for the purposes of § 28-5-14 . All contributions shall be deposited as general revenues of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-15 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 89.

28-5-16. Power to prevent unlawful practices — Preference for informal methods.

The commission is empowered and directed, as subsequently provided, to prevent any person from engaging in unlawful employment practices, provided that before instituting the formal hearing authorized by §§ 28-5-18 28-5-27 , it shall attempt, by informal methods of conference, persuasion, and conciliation, to induce compliance with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-16 .

28-5-17. Conciliation of charges of unlawful practices.

  1. Upon the commission’s own initiative or whenever an aggrieved individual or an organization chartered for the purpose of combating discrimination, racism, or of safeguarding civil liberties, or of promoting full, free, or equal employment opportunities, that individual or organization being subsequently referred to as the complainant, makes a charge to the commission that any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or person, subsequently referred to as the respondent, has engaged or is engaging in unlawful employment practices and that the unlawful employment practices have occurred, have terminated, or have been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved, whichever is later, within one year, the commission may initiate a preliminary investigation.
  2. If the commission determines after the investigation that it is probable that unlawful employment practices have been or are being engaged in, it shall endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion, including a conciliation agreement. The terms of the conciliation agreement shall include provisions requiring the respondent to refrain from the commission of unlawful discriminatory practices in the future and may contain any further provisions that may be agreed upon by the investigating commissioner and the respondent, including a provision for the entry in superior court of a consent decree embodying the terms of the conciliation agreement. Nothing said or done during these endeavors may be used as evidence in any subsequent proceeding.
  3. If, after an investigation and conference, the commission is satisfied that any unlawful employment practice of the respondent will be eliminated, it may, with the consent of the complainant, treat the charge as conciliated, and entry of that disposition shall be made on the records of the commission.
  4. The commission shall not enter a consent order or conciliation agreement settling claims of discrimination in an action or proceeding under this chapter unless the parties and their counsel attest that a waiver of all or substantially all attorneys’ fees was not compelled as a condition of the settlement.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-17 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 259, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 135, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 343, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 159, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Language of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(d) , is plain and unambiguous; the statute provides that an attestation declaring that a waiver of attorneys’ fees was not compelled as a condition of a settlement is required when a consent order or conciliation agreement is entered by the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights. Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2012).

Applicability.

One year statute of limitations under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 7 applicable to actions brought under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq., is also applicable to actions brought under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq., because to hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff that missed the FEPA deadline to bring the same allegations under RICRA, which would be contrary to public policy. Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 226, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4713 (D.R.I. 2003), aff'd, 361 F.3d 62, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5126 (1st Cir. 2004).

Claims for gender-based promotions upon which plaintiff employee relied as evidence of unequal treatment were discrete acts that fell outside the one-year limitations period and were time-barred; however, the claims for unequal pay were continuing in nature and were not time-barred. Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 226, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4713 (D.R.I. 2003), aff'd, 361 F.3d 62, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5126 (1st Cir. 2004).

One-year statute of limitations under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 7 of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq., also applies to actions brought under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq., and to actions brought under the Rhode Island Civil Rights of Individuals with Handicaps Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-1 et seq. Kriegel v. Rhode Island, 266 F. Supp. 2d 288, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9233 (D.R.I. 2003).

Because an employee’s layoff constituted a discrete act to which the continuing violation exception did not apply and there was no indicia of discriminatory animus based on the employee’s age, the motion justice correctly granted summary judgment to the employer on the employee’s claims under R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) , the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, ch. 112, and R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(a) of the State Fair Employment Practices Act claims, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 28, ch. 5. Croce v. Office of Adjutant Gen., 881 A.2d 75, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 172 (R.I. 2005).

Trial court did not err in granting a former employer summary judgment in a former employee’s action alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) because the provisions of FEPA, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(d) , were inapplicable since a release document the employee executed was not a consent order or conciliation agreement entered by the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights; the release document was part of a settlement agreement between two private parties, and there was no involvement by the Commission. Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2012).

Statute of Limitations.

In a certified question from a federal district court pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct. art. I, R. 6, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds that the one-year statute of limitations of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(a) of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 , applied to employment discrimination cases brought under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq., because (1) as the FEPA and the RICRA are in pari materia with respect to employment discrimination claims, harmonization of the two statutes is best achieved by engrafting onto the RICRA the one-year statute of limitations contained in the FEPA, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(a) ; (2) application of the three-year residual statute of limitations of R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) would in effect render meaningless the one-year statute of limitations of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 7(a) contained in the FEPA by allowing plaintiffs an end run around the limitations provision of the latter statute; and (3) FEPA reflects the Rhode Island General Assembly’s weighing of policy considerations and its legislative judgment that one year is the appropriate amount of time within which claims of employment discrimination should be brought, and the Supreme Court of Rhode Island is unable to perceive any adequate reason for not holding that the same legislative determination should be applied to RICRA, bearing in mind that it is a later-enacted statute and (significantly) is silent as to the limitations issue. Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 87 (R.I. 2007).

While a university’s purported failure to advertise an internal auditor position and its hiring of a white female occurred two years before the employee’s R.I. Gen. Laws 28-5-17 complaint to the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, the case was remanded for further factual findings on the applicability of the discovery rule. Moore v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 18 A.3d 541, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2011).

Hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in dismissing an employee’s complaint because the claims she sought to add via an amended complaint were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the amended complaint sought to add claims arising from entirely different transactions or occurrences than those referenced in the original complaint, and the employee failed to press her motion for recusal any further in the superior court. Henderson v. Fitzgerald, 131 A.3d 172, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 2016).

28-5-18. Complaint and notice of hearing.

  1. If the commission fails to effect the elimination of the unlawful employment practices and to obtain voluntary compliance with this chapter, or, if the circumstances warrant, in advance of any preliminary investigation or endeavors, the commission shall have the power to issue and cause to be served on any person or respondent a complaint stating the charges in that respect and containing a notice of hearing before the commission, a member of the commission, or a hearing examiner at a place fixed in the complaint to be held not less than ten (10) days after the service of the complaint.
  2. Any complaint issued pursuant to this section must be issued within two (2) years after a signed and notarized charge has been filed with the commission pursuant to § 28-5-17 .
  3. No proceeding which was pending under this chapter on April 5, 1996, shall be subject to dismissal on the basis of the commission’s failure to issue a complaint within one year after the alleged unfair employment practice occurred or has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved, where that charge was filed with the commission within one year after the alleged unfair employment practice occurred or has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved, whichever is later, and the respondent had agreed to extend or waive the one-year period of limitations.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-18 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 135, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 343, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 159, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 362, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section is a statute aimed at public officers which affects private rights. Roadway Express v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1659 (R.I. 1980).

Viewed as a whole, this section prescribes an orderly procedure for the issuance of complaints by the commission. Roadway Express v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1659 (R.I. 1980).

The first clause of this section incorporates into the complaint process the legislative preference expressed in § 28-5-17 for consensual elimination of unfair employment practices. Roadway Express v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1659 (R.I. 1980).

A statutorily created right to redress employment discrimination is a property interest protected by U.S. Const., amend. 14. Town of Johnston v. Ryan, 485 A.2d 1248, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 644 (R.I. 1984).

Complaint Against Town.

A sex discrimination complainant was not obligated to comply with § 45-15-5 with respect to her complaint against a town filed with the state commission for human rights, since most of the remedies available to the commission are equitable in nature. Town of Johnston v. Ryan, 485 A.2d 1248, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 644 (R.I. 1984).

Discretion of Commission.

This section does not indicate how extensive informal efforts to conciliate charges must be before those efforts are deemed failed, nor does it indicate what circumstances warrant departure from the preferred sequence of investigation, conciliation, and complaint. Thus, the commission may exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine at what point a complaint should issue. Roadway Express v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1659 (R.I. 1980).

Due Process.

The hearings held before the commission for human rights provide for a full panoply of due process rights, including assistance of counsel, testimony under oath, and the cross-examination of witnesses. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted the legislative panorama under which the commission for human rights operates as providing the contestants with a meaningful hearing. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

A sex discrimination complainant’s due process rights were violated when the trial judge vacated an order of the commission for human rights because the commission itself had failed to initiate proceedings against a town within one year after unfair employment practices were committed, where the complainant had no control over the commission’s inability to satisfy the provisions of this section. Town of Johnston v. Ryan, 485 A.2d 1248, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 644 (R.I. 1984).

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

Police officer who challenged the mandatory retirement provisions of a city retirement act was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, since the retirement board was operating under a mandamus order to retire police personnel, and to require him to bring his claim before the commission would have been a futile effort. Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 170 (R.I. 1990).

Federal Civil Rights Claims.

Employment claims premised on the federal Civil Rights Act must be brought within the 12-month period of this section. Fricker v. Town of Foster, 596 F. Supp. 1353, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517 (D.R.I. 1984).

Summary Judgment.

An employer is entitled to summary judgment as to any claims arising under this chapter when an employee, who neither filed a claim with the commission nor sought its permission to sue the employer in the superior court, fails to comply with the statutory prerequisites to commencing a judicial action. Paulo v. Cooley, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 377, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4562 (D.R.I. 1988).

Time for Complaint.

The procedural protections of this section are designed to provide respondents with adequate time for such matters as scheduling witnesses, hiring lawyers, and gathering and compiling evidence of the alleged violations before witnesses’ memories of the incidents become too obscure. Ferguson Perforating & Wire Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 415 A.2d 1055, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1661 (R.I. 1980).

The legislature, consistent with the language of this section, intended that the one-year issuance period operate as a check on the commission’s broad discretion to select the time to issue complaints. A mandatory time limit promotes prompt investigations and attempts to conciliate alleged violations of the act. If efforts to conciliate have not succeeded within the time provided, the commission must decide whether to initiate formal proceedings. Roadway Express v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1659 (R.I. 1980).

The one-year time limit for the issuance of complaints by the commission, as prescribed in this section, is a mandatory procedure. Wayne Distrib. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1996).

28-5-19. Amendment of complaint and answer — Participation by commissioner assigned to preliminary hearing.

The commission, member of the commission, or hearing examiner conducting the hearing shall have the power to reasonably and fairly amend any written complaint at any time prior to the issuance of an order based on the complaint. The respondent shall have like power to amend its answer to the original or amended complaint at any time prior to the issuance of an order. The commissioner assigned to the preliminary hearing of any complaint shall take no part in the final hearing except as a witness upon competent matters and will have no part in the determination or decision of the case after hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-19 .

28-5-20. Answer to complaint — Respondent’s rights at hearing.

The respondent shall have the right to file an answer to the complaint, and shall appear at the hearing in person, or otherwise, with or without counsel, to present evidence and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-20 .

28-5-20.1. Proceedings before other state administrative agencies.

  1. The commission shall not be precluded from investigating, taking evidence, considering claims or issuing findings on matters that could have been presented to any other state administrative agency, but which were not actually presented and decided in a contested case as defined under the administrative procedures act, chapter 35 of title 42.
  2. To the extent the commission is bound by findings of fact and conclusions of law of another state administrative agency, the commission shall be entitled to grant any relief authorized under this chapter in accordance with those findings to the extent that this relief was not available to, or within the authority of, the other agency to provide.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 284, § 1.

28-5-21. Rules of evidence.

In any proceeding pursuant to this chapter the commission, its member, or its agent shall not be bound by the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-21 .

28-5-22. Evidence of predetermined pattern.

The commission shall, in ascertaining the practices followed by the respondent, take into account all evidence, statistical or otherwise, that may tend to prove the existence of a predetermined pattern of employment or membership. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or require any employer or labor organization to employ or admit applicants for employment or membership in the proportion to which their race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin bears to the total population or in accordance with any criterion other than the individual qualifications of the applicant.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-22 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 15; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

This section establishes that evidence of a predetermined pattern of employment that might otherwise be excluded from consideration by the commission for human rights absent an affirmative direction to the contrary is admissible and relevant, but it does not constitute an additional element of the case of an individual alleging an isolated act of discrimination. Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 632 (R.I. 1984).

Collateral References.

What constitutes direct evidence of age discrimination in action under age discrimination in employment act (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) — Post-Price Waterhouse cases. 155 A.L.R. Fed. 283.

28-5-23. Testimony at hearing.

The testimony taken at the hearing shall be under oath and shall be reduced to writing and filed with the commission. Subsequently, in its discretion, the commission upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-23 .

28-5-24. Injunctive and other remedies — Compliance.

    1. If upon all the testimony taken the commission determines that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in unlawful employment practices, the commission shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the respondent an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the unlawful employment practices, and to take any further affirmative or other action that will effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading of employees with or without back pay, or admission or restoration to union membership, including a requirement for reports of the manner of compliance. Back pay shall include the economic value of all benefits and raises to which an employee would have been entitled had an unfair employment practice not been committed, plus interest on those amounts.
    2. Where an unlawful employment practice has been established under § 28-5-7.3 , the commission need not award hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading with back pay if the respondent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of any unlawful motivating factor.
    3. In appropriate circumstances, attorney’s fees, including expert fees and other litigation expenses, may be granted to the attorney for the plaintiff if he or she prevails. Upon the submission of reports of compliance the commission, if satisfied with the reports, may issue its finding that the respondent has ceased to engage in unlawful employment practices.
  1. If the commission finds that the respondent has engaged in intentional discrimination in violation of this chapter, the commission, in addition, may award compensatory damages. The complainant shall not be required to prove that he or she has suffered physical harm or physical manifestation of injury in order to be awarded compensatory damages. As used in this section, the term “compensatory damages” does not include back pay or interest on back pay, and the term “intentional discrimination in violation of this chapter” means any unlawful employment practice except one that is solely based on a demonstration of disparate impact.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-24 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 323, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 135, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 343, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 447, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Additional Remedies.

Regardless of the scope of an employee’s actual prayer for relief, the state commission for human rights and the superior court possess the power to award the employee remedies in lieu of or in addition to those remedies specifically requested. FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1999).

The compensatory and punitive damages that the human rights commission can award for discrimination claims are not merely “incidental to other relief sought,” but constitute a substantial portion of the basic relief that the commission may award. FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1999).

Because the jury determined that an intentional act of discriminatory retaliation effectively ended a professor’s career at a university, the jury did not need expert medical testimony to ascertain whether the resulting emotional distress the professor described to them was a natural consequence of such a devastating personal and professional blow. Therefore, there was neither an error of law nor abuse of discretion in the trial justice’s refusal to set aside an award of compensatory damages under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-24(b) of the Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 28, ch. 5. Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2007).

Jury Trial.

Since an important and potentially substantial component of the statutory relief available under the Fair Employment Practices Act, namely compensatory and punitive damages, is legal in nature, and since the cause of action itself is more analogous to an action triable before a jury in an 1843 court of law than to any equitable cause of action, the statute triggers employers’ rights to a jury trial. FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1999).

Collateral References.

Additions to back pay awards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.). 146 A.L.R. Fed. 403.

Allowance and rates of interest on back pay award under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 138 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Availability of damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) in actions against persons or entities other than federal government or agencies thereof. 145 A.L.R. Fed. 353.

Availability of nominal damages in action under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 143 A.L.R. Fed. 269.

Award of front pay under state job discrimination statutes. 74 A.L.R.4th 746.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify decrease in attorney’s fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). 151 A.L.R. Fed. 77.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify increase in attorney’s fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). 140 A.L.R. Fed. 301.

Period of time covered by back pay award under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 137 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Private attorney general doctrine — State cases. 106 A.L.R.5th 523.

Reductions to back pay awards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 135 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

28-5-24.1. Proceedings in superior court.

  1. A complainant may ask for a right to sue in state court if not less than one hundred and twenty (120) days and not more than two (2) years have elapsed from the date of filing of a charge, if the commission has been unable to secure a settlement agreement or conciliation agreement and if the commission has not commenced hearing on a complaint. The commission shall grant the right to sue within thirty (30) days after receipt of the request. This shall terminate all proceedings before the commission and shall give to the complainant the right to commence suit in the superior court within any county as provided in § 28-5-28 within ninety (90) days after the granting of the request. Any party may claim a trial by jury.
  2. As to cases pending before the commission on July 8, 1999, in which a finding of probable cause has been made by the commission under § 28-5-18 , or will in the future be made, the commission shall within thirty (30) days of the findings of probable cause or within thirty (30) days after July 8, 1999, whichever is later, notify the respondent of the right to have the complaint heard and decided in the superior court. If within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notification by the respondent the respondent elects in writing to have the case heard in the superior court, the commission shall promptly issue a right to sue letter to the complainant and all proceedings before the commission shall terminate. The complainant shall have the right to commence suit in the superior court within any county as provided in § 28-5-28 within ninety (90) days of the date of the right to sue letter, a copy of which shall be sent to all parties. Either party may claim a trial by jury in the superior court. Notwithstanding the termination of proceedings before the commission upon the granting of the right to sue notice, the parties may agree to have the commission seek to conciliate or mediate settlement of the case within the ninety-day (90) period in which the complainant has the right to commence suit in superior court.
    1. As to cases commenced in the commission after July 8, 1999, the complainant or the respondent may elect within twenty (20) days after receipt of a finding of probable cause to terminate by written notice to the commission all proceedings before the commission and have the case heard in the superior court. In the event of an election to terminate the proceedings, the commission shall issue a right to sue letter to the complainant with a copy of the letter sent to all parties.
    2. The complainant shall have the right to commence suit in the superior court within any county as provided in § 25-5-28 within ninety (90) days of the date of the right-to-sue letter. Either party may claim a trial by jury in the superior court.
    3. Notwithstanding the termination of proceedings before the commission upon the granting of the right-to-sue notice, the parties may agree to have the commission seek to conciliate or mediate settlement of the case within the ninety-day (90) period in which the complainant has the right to commence suit in superior court.
  3. The superior court may make orders consistent with § 28-5-24 ; provided, that the court shall not enter a consent order or judgment settling claims of discrimination in an action or proceeding under this chapter, unless the parties and their counsel attest that a waiver of all or substantially all attorney’s fees was not compelled as a condition of the settlement.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 323, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 31, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 135, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 343, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 496, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

There is absolutely no ambiguity in the statutory language of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-24.1(d) ; § 28-5-24.1(d) applies only in instances where the superior court enters a consent order or a judgment settling a claim based on the FEPA. Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2012).

Election of Remedies.

Election of remedies doctrine was inapplicable to former employer’s declaratory judgment action in superior court concerning the effect of a release agreed to by the employee; it did not matter that a former employer opted not to have the discrimination case removed to superior court under this section since the employer did not commence the litigation before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights and thus did not affirmatively elect any remedy. Consequently, the employer was entitled to have the question of the validity and enforceability of the contractual settlement agreement passed upon by the courts. Family Dollar Stores of R.I., Inc. v. Araujo, 204 A.3d 1089, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 51 (R.I. 2019).

Remedies.

Regardless of the scope of an employee’s actual prayer for relief, the state commission for human rights and the superior court possess the power to award the employee remedies in lieu of or in addition to those remedies specifically requested. FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1999).

Right to Jury Trial.

Although this chapter provides for a jury trial in Rhode Island Superior Court, federal, rather than state, law governs the right to a jury trial on a state-created claim tried in federal court. Taylor v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health Retardation & Hospitals, 736 F. Supp. 15, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5663 (D.R.I. 1990).

Plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial under either Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act or under this chapter, since her request for back pay supplements constituted a request for purely equitable relief. Taylor v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health Retardation & Hospitals, 736 F. Supp. 15, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5663 (D.R.I. 1990).

Although under the state Fair Employment Practices Act both parties were afforded the right to request a jury trial in Rhode Island Superior Court, federal rather than state law governed the right to a jury trial on a state created claim tried in federal court, and since Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. did not afford a jury trial in cases when purely equitable relief is being sought, the plaintiff ’s demand for trial by jury was denied. Noviello v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health Retardation & Hosp., 142 F.R.D. 581, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5081 (D.R.I. 1991).

Statute of Limitations — Tolling.

The 90-day provision in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-24.1 fell under an exception to the tolling provision in R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-19 . Johnson v. Newport County Chapter for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 799 A.2d 289, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 167 (R.I. 2002).

In appropriate circumstances, equitable tolling can serve as an exception to the statute of limitations set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-24.1 for people of unsound mind. Johnson v. Newport County Chapter for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 799 A.2d 289, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 167 (R.I. 2002).

Terminated employee timely commenced an action for violation of the State Fair Employment Practices Act, § 28-5-1 et seq., where there was no dispute that the employee timely requested a right-to-sue letter from the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, the Commission eventually issued the right-to-sue letter, despite the correspondence with the employee, and once the letter was in the employee’s hand, she filed her complaint in court well within the 90 days prescribed by this section. Mokwenyei v. R.I. Hosp., 198 A.3d 17, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2018).

Summary Judgment.

An employer is entitled to summary judgment as to any claims arising under this chapter, where an employee, who neither filed a claim with the commission nor sought its permission to sue the employer in the superior court, fails to comply with the statutory prerequisites to commencing a judicial action. Paulo v. Cooley, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 377, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4562 (D.R.I. 1988).

Trial court did not err in granting a former employer summary judgment in a former employee’s action alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) because the clear and unambiguous language of FEPA, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-24.1(d) , did not apply to the action undertaken by the superior court; the judgment entered for the employer did not “settle” the claims of discrimination, but rather, the judgment constituted a dismissal of the employee’s claims against the employer in the context of a judgment on the merits. Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2012).

Termination of Proceedings.

This section permits the Rhode Island Human Rights Commission to regain jurisdiction over a case in which a notice of right to sue has been granted, but an action has not been commenced by the requesting party within the 90-day limitations period set forth in this section. Rhode Island State Police v. Madison, 508 A.2d 678, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 463 (R.I. 1986).

28-5-25. Order dismissing complaint.

If the commission finds that no probable cause exists for crediting the charges, or, if upon all the evidence it finds that a respondent has not engaged in unfair employment practices, the commission shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the complainant an order dismissing the complaint as to the respondent. A copy of the order shall be delivered in all cases to the attorney general and any other public officers that the commission deems proper.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-25 .

28-5-26. Modification of findings or orders.

Until a transcript of the record in a case is filed in a court as provided in § 28-5-29 , the commission may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in any manner that it deems proper, modify or set aside in whole or in part any of its findings or orders.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-26 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 55.

28-5-27. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-27 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 217, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 276, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-5-27 concerned publicity as to proceedings or unlawful practices.

28-5-28. Right to judicial review or enforcement.

Any complainant, intervener, or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the commission may obtain judicial review of the order, and the commission or any party may obtain an order of court for enforcement of a final order as described in § 28-5-24 , in a proceeding as provided in §§ 28-5-28 28-5-36 . That proceeding shall be brought in the superior court of the state within any county in which the unlawful employment practices that are the subject of the commission’s order were committed or in which any respondent, required in the order to cease and desist from unfair employment practices or to take other affirmative action, resides or transacts business.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-28 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 57, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 30, § 1.

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Actions.

Assuming that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in the state forum, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court equal employment opportunity judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged; thus, res judicata would apply where the employee has not reached out to secure state judicial review of agency action, but has been propelled into that forum by the employer’s pursuit of state court relief. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

28-5-29. Initiation of judicial proceedings — Powers of court.

Judicial proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in the superior court, together with a transcript of the record upon the hearing before the commission, and the service of a copy of the petition upon the commission and upon all parties who appeared before the commission. Upon the filing, the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the questions determined in it, and shall have the power to grant any temporary relief or restraining order that it deems just and proper, and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in the transcript an order enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-29 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 15.

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judicial Review.

The standard for judicial review of the administrative determination is sufficiently stringent under § 42-35-15(g)(5) for employees to have plenary opportunity fairly to litigate the merits of their claims of racial discrimination in state proceedings. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

On appeal, the superior court may grant pendente lite or permanent relief, may hear additional testimony, and may modify, enforce, or set aside an order or decision of the commission for human rights. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16908 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25592 (1st Cir. 1984).

28-5-29.1. Punitive damages.

In addition to the remedies provided in § 28-5-24 , where the challenged conduct is shown to be motivated by malice or ill will or when the action involves reckless or callous indifference to the statutorily protected rights of others, the court may award punitive damages; provided, that punitive damages shall not be available against the state or its political subdivisions.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 343, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Basic Relief.

The compensatory and punitive damages that the human rights commission can award for discrimination claims are not merely “incidental to other relief sought,” but constitute a substantial portion of the basic relief that the commission may award. FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1999).

Evidence was insufficient to impute liability for punitive damages under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-29.1 of the Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 28, ch. 5, against a university, and the trial justice erred in holding the university liable for such damages, in a professor’s discrimnination claim after the denial of tenure. The university provided ample opportunities to the professor to make the professor’s case and the professor failed to demonstrate that either the provost or the president had knowledge of the allegation upon which the jury based an award of punitive damages. Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2007).

Jury Trial.

A claim under the Fair Employment Practices Act, involving not only the adjudication of public rights, but also of a private party’s right to obtain compensatory and/or punitive damages from another private party for a statutory violation, was held to be a hybrid claim outside the public-rights doctrine, but within a litigant’s inviolable constitutional right to a jury trial. FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1999).

28-5-30. Objections not urged before commission.

An objection that has not been urged before the commission, its member, or agent shall not be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge the objection is excused because of extraordinary circumstances.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-30 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-5-31. Additional evidence in court.

If either party applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the commission, its member, or agent, the court may order the additional evidence to be taken before the commission, its member, or agent and to be made a part of the transcript.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-31 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-5-32. Modification of commission’s findings and orders on additional evidence.

The commission may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed. The commission shall file the modified or new findings and its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-32 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-5-33. Exclusive jurisdiction of court — Appeal to supreme court.

The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and order shall be, when necessary, subject to review by the supreme court as provided by law, to which court an appeal from the judgment and order may be made as provided by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-33 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Certiorari.

Because the commission for human rights is not specifically exempted from the Administrative Procedures Act, the sole route for review from superior court decisions on commission rulings is by way of certiorari. City of Newport v. Barbarow, 427 A.2d 1326, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1098 (R.I. 1981).

28-5-34. Commission’s copy of testimony — Hearing on transcript.

The commission’s copy of the testimony shall be available at all reasonable times to all parties without cost for examination and for the purposes of judicial review of the order of the commission. The petition shall be heard on the transcript of the record without requirement of printing.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-34 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-5-35. Commission’s attorneys.

The commission may appear in court by its own attorneys.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-35 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-5-36. Decree for enforcement of commission’s order.

If no proceeding to obtain judicial review is instituted by a complainant, intervener, or respondent within thirty (30) days from the service of an order of the commission pursuant to § 28-5-24 , the commission, or the complainant, may obtain a decree of the court for the enforcement of the order upon showing that respondent is subject to the commission’s jurisdiction, and resides or transacts business within the county in which the petition for enforcement is brought.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-36 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 381, § 1.

Applicability.

P.L. 2004, ch. 381, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect upon passage [July 5, 2004] and shall apply to all cases pending before the commission.

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-5-37. Posting of statutory provisions.

Every employer, employment agency, and labor union subject to this chapter shall post in a conspicuous place or places on his, her, or its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by the commission, that shall set forth excerpts of this chapter and any other relevant information the commission deems necessary to explain the chapter. Any employer, employment agency, or labor union refusing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-37 .

28-5-38. Liberal construction.

  1. The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes of it, and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.
  2. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of any law of this state relating to discrimination because of race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin.
  3. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of any law of this state relating to parental leave.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-38 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 310, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 149, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 323, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 149, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 323, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Trial court did not err in granting a former employer summary judgment in a former employee’s action alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) because the language of FEPA, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-38(a) , was clear and unambiguous, and the language of that statute did not provide any support for the employee’s contention that the superior court rendered FEPA meaningless when ruling that the waiver of attorneys’ fees was not contained in what the statute referred to as a “judgment settling claims.” Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2012).

28-5-39. Severability.

If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance, is, for any reason, adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, that judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of this chapter or its application to other persons or circumstances.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2181, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-5-39 .

28-5-40. Affirmative action report.

  1. On February 1 of each year, the governor shall, in conjunction with the state equal opportunity office, submit to the general assembly a report documenting the status of affirmative action programs for women, persons with disabilities, and minorities in each department and state agency.
  2. At a minimum, the report shall include statistics for each department and state agency, indicating the employment by race, disability, and sex of workers in each job category in the department or agency, and containing a comparison of those statistics with those of the previous year, and shall include the plans each department or state agency has adopted for the forthcoming year to correct any continuing deficiencies in the employment of women, persons with disabilities, and minorities in the workforce.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 536, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 151 § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 149, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 323, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4.

28-5-41. Right to fair employment practices.

Whenever in this chapter there appears the terms, “race or color, religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin” there shall be inserted immediately thereafter the words “sexual orientation.”

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 5; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4.

28-5-41.1. Right to fair employment practices — Gender identity or expression.

Whenever in this chapter there appears the terms “race or color, religion, sex, disability, age, country of ancestral origin, or sexual orientation” there shall be inserted immediately thereafter the words “gender identity or expression.”

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 4.

28-5-42. Receipt of assistance — No estoppel effect.

The fact that an individual has applied for, received, or continues to receive private insurance or government assistance on the basis of a physical or mental impairment shall not, by itself, relieve or excuse any employer, employment agency, or labor organization from its obligations under this chapter, but may be considered as evidence by the commission or court in its determination, nor does such a fact serve as an estoppel or otherwise preclude an individual with a disability from obtaining the protections of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 280, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 4.

28-5-43. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 273, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2016, ch. 114, § 2, effective June 22, 2016; P.L. 2016, ch. 119, § 2, effective June 22, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-5-43 concerned volunteer firefighters and emergency technicians responding to emergencies and the prohibition of discharge from other employment. For comparable provisions, see § 28-6.13-1 et seq.

Chapter 5.1 Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action

28-5.1-1. Declaration of policy.

    1. Equal opportunity and affirmative action toward its achievement is the policy of all units of Rhode Island state government, including all public and quasi-public agencies, commissions, boards, and authorities, and in the classified, unclassified, and nonclassified services of state employment. This policy applies in all areas where the state dollar is spent, in employment, public service, grants and financial assistance, and in state licensing and regulation.
    2. All policies, programs, and activities of state government shall be periodically reviewed and revised to assure their fidelity to this policy.
    3. Each department head shall make a report to the governor and the general assembly not later than September 30 of each year on the statistical results of the implementation of this chapter and to the state equal opportunity office; provided, that the mandatory provisions of this section do not apply to the legislative branch of state government.
  1. The provisions of this chapter shall in no way impair any contract or collective bargaining agreement currently in effect. Any contract or collective bargaining agreements entered into or renewed after July 6, 1994, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 133, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 24, § 1 provides that the compensation paid to commissioners and board members for attendance at board meetings authorized under this section is suspended. Reimbursement for travel costs to the meetings will continue.

28-5.1-2. State equal opportunity office.

  1. There shall be a state equal opportunity office. This office, under the direct administrative supervision of the office of diversity, equity and opportunity, shall report to the governor and to the general assembly on state equal opportunity programs. The state equal opportunity office shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with the requirements of all federal agencies for equal opportunity and shall provide training and technical assistance as may be requested by any company doing business in Rhode Island and all state departments as is necessary to comply with the intent of this chapter.
  2. The state equal opportunity office shall issue any guidelines, directives, or instructions that are necessary to effectuate its responsibilities under this chapter, and is authorized to investigate possible discrimination, hold hearings, and direct corrective action to the discrimination.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 4, § 1.

28-5.1-3. Affirmative action.

  1. The state equal opportunity office shall assign an equal opportunity officer as a liaison to agencies of state government.
  2. Each state department or agency, excluding the legislative branch of state government, shall annually prepare an affirmative action plan. These plans shall be prepared in accordance with the criteria and deadlines set forth by the state equal opportunity office. These deadlines shall provide, without limitation, that affirmative action plans for each fiscal year be submitted to the state equal opportunity office and the house fiscal advisor no later than March 31. These plans shall be submitted to and shall be subject to review and approval by the state equal opportunity office.
  3. Any affirmative action plan required under this section deemed unsatisfactory by the state equal opportunity office shall be withdrawn and amended according to equal opportunity office criteria, in order to attain positive measures for compliance. The state equal opportunity office shall make every effort by informal conference, conciliation and persuasion to achieve compliance with affirmative action requirements.
  4. The state equal opportunity office shall effect and promote the efficient transaction of its business and the timely handling of complaints and other matters before it, and shall make recommendations to appropriate state officials for affirmative action steps towards the achievement of equal opportunity.
  5. The state equal opportunity administrator shall serve as the chief executive officer of the state equal opportunity office, and shall be responsible for monitoring and enforcing all equal opportunity laws, programs, and policies within state government.
  6. No later than July 1 each state department or agency, excluding the legislative branch of state government, shall submit to the state equal opportunity office and the house fiscal advisor sufficient data to enable the state equal opportunity office and the house fiscal advisor to determine whether the agency achieved the hiring goals contained in its affirmative action plan for the previous year. If the hiring goals contained in the previous year’s plan were not met, the agency shall also submit with the data a detailed explanation as to why the goals were not achieved.
  7. Standards for review of affirmative action plans shall be established by the state equal opportunity office, except where superseded by federal law.
  8. For purposes of this section, “agency” includes, without limitation, all departments, public and quasi-public agencies, authorities, boards, and commissions of the state, excluding the legislative branch of state government.
  9. The state equal opportunity office shall continually review all policies, procedures, and practices for tendencies to discriminate and for institutional or systemic barriers for equal opportunity, and it shall make recommendations with reference to any tendencies or barriers in its annual reports to the governor and the general assembly.
  10. Relevant provisions of this section also apply to expanding the pool of applicants for all positions where no list exists. The equal opportunity administrator is authorized to develop and implement recruitment plans to ensure that adequate consideration is given to qualified minority applicants in those job categories where a manifest imbalance exists, excluding those job categories in the legislative branch of state government.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 95, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 133, § 3.

28-5.1-3.1. Appointments to state boards, commissions, public authorities, and quasi-public corporations.

  1. The general assembly finds that, as a matter of public policy, the effectiveness of each appointed state board, commission, and the governing body of each public authority and quasi-public corporation is enhanced when it reflects the diversity, including the racial and gender composition, of Rhode Island’s population. Consequently, each person responsible for appointing one or more individuals to serve on any board or commission or to the governing body of any public authority or board shall endeavor to ensure that, to the fullest extent possible, the composition of the board, commission, or governing body reflects the diversity of Rhode Island’s population.
  2. During the month of January in each year the boards, agencies, commissions, or authorities are requested to file with the state equal opportunity office a list of its members, designating their race, gender, and date of appointment.
  3. Of the candidates considered for appointment by the governor and the general assembly, the governor and the general assembly shall give due consideration to recommendations made by representatives of Rhode Island’s minority community-based organizations. The human resources outreach and diversity office shall act as the liaison with state government and shall forward the recommendations to appointing authorities.
  4. The appointing authority, in consultation with the equal employment opportunity administrator and the human resources outreach and diversity administrator within the department of administration, shall annually conduct a utilization analysis of appointments to state boards, commissions, public authorities, and quasi-public corporations based upon the annual review conducted pursuant to § 28-5.1-3 .
  5. The equal employment opportunity administrator shall report the results of the analysis to the Rhode Island commission for human rights and to the general assembly by or on January 31 and July 31 of each year, consistent with § 28-5.1-17 . The report shall be a public record and shall be made available electronically on the secretary of state’s website.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 275, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 502, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 514, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 4, § 1.

28-5.1-3.2. Enforcement.

  1. The state equal opportunity administrator is authorized to initiate complaints against any agencies, administrators, or employees of any department or division within state government, excluding the legislative branch, who or that willfully fail to comply with the requirements of any applicable affirmative action plan or of this chapter or who or that fail to meet the standards of good faith effort, reasonable basis, or reasonable action, as defined in guidelines promulgated by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as set forth in 29 C.F.R. part 1607.
  2. Whenever the equal employment opportunity administrator initiates a complaint, he or she shall cause to be issued and served in the name of the equal employment opportunity office a written notice, together with a copy of the complaint, requiring that the agency, administrator, agent, or employee respond and appear at a hearing at a time and place specified in the notice. The equal employment opportunity office shall follow its lawfully adopted rules and regulations concerning hearings of discrimination complaints.
  3. The equal employment opportunity office shall have the power, after a hearing, to issue an order requiring a respondent to a complaint to cease and desist from any unlawful discriminatory practice and/or to take any affirmative action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement, transfer, or upgrading employees, with or without back pay, or dismissal, that may be necessary to secure compliance with any applicable affirmative action plan or with state or federal law.
  4. A final order of the equal employment opportunity office constitutes an “order” within the meaning of § 42-35-1 ; is enforceable as an order; is to be rendered in accordance with § 42-35-1 2; and is subject to judicial review in accordance with § 42-35-15 .

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 133, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

The definition of “order,” referred to in subsection (d) of this section, is now designated as § 42-35-1(13) .

Collateral References.

When may person not named as respondent in charge filed with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) be sued under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 121 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

28-5.1-4. Employment policies for state employees.

  1. Each appointing authority shall review the recruitment, appointment, assignment, upgrading, and promotion policies and activities for state employees without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, national origin, or disability. All appointing authorities shall hire and promote employees without discrimination.
  2. Special attention shall be given to the parity of classes of employees doing similar work and the training of supervisory personnel in equal opportunity/affirmative action principles and procedures.
  3. Annually, each appointing authority shall include in its budget presentation any necessary programs, goals, and objectives that shall improve the equal opportunity aspects of their department’s employment policies.
  4. Each appointing authority shall make a monthly report to the state equal opportunity office on persons hired, disciplined, terminated, promoted, transferred, and vacancies occurring within their department.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 5; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 44.

Collateral References.

Necessity of, and what constitutes, employer’s reasonable accommodation of employee’s religious preference under state law. 107 A.L.R.5th 623.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — Public employment cases. 153 A.L.R. Fed. 609.

28-5.1-5. Personnel administration.

    1. The office of personnel administration of the department of administration, in consultation with the office of diversity, equity and opportunity, shall prepare a comprehensive plan indicating the appropriate steps necessary to maintain and secure the equal opportunity responsibility and commitment of that division. The plan shall set forth attainable goals and target dates based upon a utilization study for achievement of the goals, together with operational assignment for each element of the plan to ensure measurable progress.
    2. The office of personnel administration shall:
      1. Take positive steps to ensure that the entire examination and testing process, including the development of job specifications and employment qualifications, is free from either conscious or inadvertent bias; and
      2. Review all recruitment procedures for all state agencies covered by this chapter for compliance with federal and state law, and bring to the attention of the equal opportunity administrator matters of concern to its jurisdiction.
    3. The division of budget shall indicate in the annual personnel supplement progress made toward the achievement of equal employment goals.
    4. The division of purchases shall cooperate in administering the state contract compliance programs.
    5. The division of statewide planning shall cooperate in ensuring compliance from all recipients of federal grants.
  1. The office of labor relations shall propose in negotiations the inclusion of affirmative action language suitable to the need for attaining and maintaining a diverse workforce.
  2. There is created a six-member (6) committee that shall monitor negotiations with all collective bargaining units within state government specifically for equal opportunity and affirmative action interests. The members of that committee shall include the director of the Rhode Island commission for human rights, the associate director of the office of diversity, equity and opportunity, the equal opportunity administrator, the personnel administrator, one member of the house of representatives appointed by the speaker, and one member of the senate appointed by the president of the senate.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 133, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 59; P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 4, § 1.

28-5.1-6. Commission for human rights.

The Rhode Island commission for human rights shall exercise its enforcement powers as defined in chapter 5 of this title and in this chapter, and shall have the full cooperation of all state agencies. Wherever necessary, the commission shall, at its own initiative or upon a complaint, bring charges of discrimination against those agencies and their personnel who fail to comply with the applicable state laws and this chapter. This commission also has the power to order discontinuance of any departmental or division employment pattern or practice deemed discriminatory in intent by the commission, after a hearing on the record, and may seek court enforcement of such an order. The commission shall utilize the state equal opportunity office as its liaison with state government. The Rhode Island commission for human rights is authorized to make any rules and regulations that it deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this chapter, and to establish any sanctions that may be appropriate within the rules and regulations of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1.

28-5.1-7. State services and facilities.

  1. Every state agency shall render service to the citizens of this state without discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, national origin, or disability. No state facility shall be used in furtherance of any discriminatory practice nor shall any state agency become a party to any agreement, arrangement, or plan that has the effect of sanctioning those patterns or practices.
  2. At the request of the state equal opportunity office, each appointing authority shall critically analyze all of its operations to ascertain possible instances of noncompliance with this policy and shall initiate sustained, comprehensive programs based on the guidelines of the state equal opportunity office to remedy any defects found to exist.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 8; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 7.

28-5.1-8. Education, training, and apprenticeship programs.

  1. All educational programs and activities of state agencies, or in which state agencies participate, shall be open to all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, national origin, or disability. The programs shall be conducted to encourage the fullest development of the interests, aptitudes, skills, and capacities of all participants.
  2. Those state agencies responsible for educational programs and activities shall take positive steps to ensure that all programs are free from either conscious or inadvertent bias, and shall make quarterly reports to the state equal opportunity office with regard to the number of persons being served and to the extent to which the goals of the chapter are being met by the programs.
  3. Expansion of training opportunities shall also be encouraged with a view toward involving larger numbers of participants from those segments of the labor force where the need for upgrading levels of skill is greatest.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 8; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 7; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 44.

28-5.1-9. State employment services.

  1. All state agencies, including educational institutions, that provide employment referral or placement services to public or private employees shall accept job orders, refer for employment, test, classify, counsel, and train only on a nondiscriminatory basis. They shall refuse to fill any job order that has the effect of excluding any persons because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, national origin, or disability.
  2. The agencies shall advise the commission for human rights promptly of any employers, employment agencies, or unions suspected of practicing unlawful discrimination.
  3. The agencies shall assist employers and unions seeking to broaden their recruitment programs to include qualified applicants from minority groups.
  4. The department of labor and training, the governor’s commission on disabilities, the advisory commission on women, and the Rhode Island economic development corporation shall fully utilize their knowledge of the labor market and economic conditions of the state, and their contacts with job applicants, employers, and unions, to promote equal employment opportunities, and shall require and assist all persons within their jurisdictions to initiate actions that remedy any situations or programs that have a negative impact on protected classes within the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 8; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 7.

28-5.1-10. State contracts.

The division of purchases shall prepare any rules, regulations, and compliance reports that shall require of state contractors the same commitment to equal opportunity as prevails under federal contracts controlled by federal executive orders 11246, 11625 and 11375. Affirmative action plans prepared pursuant to those rules and regulations shall be reviewed by the state equal opportunity office. The state equal opportunity office shall prepare a comprehensive plan to provide compliance reviews for state contracts. A contractor’s failure to abide by the rules, regulations, contract terms, and compliance reporting provisions as established shall be ground for forfeitures and penalties as established by the department of administration in consultation with the state equal opportunity office.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1.

28-5.1-11. Law enforcement.

The attorney general, the department of corrections, and the Rhode Island justice commission shall stress to state and local law enforcement officials the necessity for nondiscrimination in the control of criminal behavior. These agencies shall develop and publish formal procedures for the investigation of citizen complaints of alleged abuses of authority by individual peace officers. Employment in all state law enforcement and correctional agencies and institutions shall be subject to the same affirmative action standards applied under this chapter to every state unit of government, in addition to applicable federal requirements.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1.

28-5.1-12. Health care.

The state equal opportunity office shall review the equal opportunity activity of all private healthcare facilities licensed or chartered by the state, including hospitals, nursing homes, convalescent homes, rest homes, and clinics. These state-licensed or -chartered facilities shall be required to comply with the state policy of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in patient admissions, employment, and healthcare service. The compliance shall be a condition of continued participation in any state program, or in any educational program licensed or accredited by the state, or of eligibility to receive any form of assistance.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1.

28-5.1-13. Private education institutions.

The state equal opportunity office shall review all private educational institutions licensed or chartered by the state, including professional, business, and vocational training schools. These state-licensed or -chartered institutions shall at the request of the council on of elementary and secondary education be required to show compliance with the state policy of nondiscrimination and affirmative action in their student admissions, employment, and other practices as a condition of continued participation in any state program or of eligibility to receive any form of state assistance.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1.

28-5.1-14. State licensing and regulatory agencies.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “License” means and includes the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval, or similar form of permission required by law, but it does not include a motor vehicle operator’s license as required in chapter 10 of title 31.
    2. “Licensing authority” means any agency, examining board, or other office with the authority to impose and evaluate licensing requirements on any profession.
  2. State agencies shall not discriminate by considering race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, national origin, or disability in granting, denying, or revoking a license or charter, nor shall any person, corporation, or business firm that is licensed or chartered by the state unlawfully discriminate against or segregate any person on these grounds. All businesses licensed or chartered by the state shall operate on a nondiscriminatory basis, according to equal employment treatment and access to their services to all persons, except unless otherwise exempted by the laws of the state. Any licensee, charter holder, or retail sales permit holder who or that fails to comply with this policy is subject to any disciplinary action that is consistent with the legal authority and rules and regulations of the appropriate licensing or regulatory agency. State agencies that have the authority to grant, deny, or revoke licenses or charters will cooperate with the state equal opportunity office to prevent any person, corporation, or business firm from discriminating because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, national origin, or disability or from participating in any practice that may have a disparate effect on any protected class within the population. The state equal opportunity office shall monitor the equal employment opportunity activities and affirmative action plans of all such organizations.
  3. The state agencies, licensing boards, and commissions covered by this section shall include, but not be limited to, those departments enumerated in § 42-6-1 and the state agencies, licensing boards, and commissions under the jurisdiction of those departments.
  4. No person shall be disqualified to practice, pursue, or engage in any occupation, trade, vocation, profession, or business for which an occupational license, permit, certificate, or registration is required to be issued by the state or any of its agencies or any state licensing board or commission, solely or in part, because of a prior conviction of a crime or crimes unless the underlying crime or crimes substantially relate to the occupation to which the license applies. Any other state law to the contrary will be superseded by this provision.
  5. No occupational license, permit, certificate, or registration issued by the state or any of its agencies or any state licensing board or commission shall be suspended or revoked, solely or in part, because of a prior conviction of a crime or crimes unless the underlying crime or crimes substantially relate to the occupation to which the license applies. Any other state law to the contrary will be superseded by this provision.
  6. In determining if a conviction substantially relates to the occupation for which the license is sought, the licensing authority shall consider:
    1. The state’s legitimate interest in equal access to employment for individuals who have had past contact with the criminal justice system;
    2. The state’s legitimate interest in protecting the property and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public; and
    3. The relationship of the crime or crimes to the ability, capacity, and fitness required to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities of the position of employment or occupation.
  7. A person who has been convicted of a crime or crimes that substantially relate to the occupation for which a license is sought shall not be disqualified from the occupation if the person can show competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the occupation for which the license is sought. The licensing authority shall consider the time elapsed since the conviction when determining sufficient rehabilitation, as well as any evidence presented by the applicant regarding:
    1. Completion of a period of at least two (2) years after release from imprisonment, or at least two (2) years after the sentencing date for a probation sentence not accompanied by incarceration, without subsequent conviction or pending criminal charge;
    2. The nature, seriousness, and relevance of the crime or crimes for which convicted;
    3. All circumstances relative to the crime or crimes, including mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime or crimes;
    4. The age of the person at the time the crime or crimes were committed;
    5. Claims that the criminal record information is in error or inadmissible under subsection (h) of this section; and
    6. All other competent evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness presented, including, but not limited to, letters of reference by persons who have been in contact with the applicant since the applicant’s release from any state or federal correctional institution.
  8. The following criminal records may not be used in connection with any application for a license, permit, certificate, or registration:
    1. Juvenile adjudications;
    2. Records of arrest not followed by a valid conviction;
    3. Convictions that have been, pursuant to law, annulled or expunged;
    4. Misdemeanor convictions for which no jail sentence can be imposed;
    5. A conviction that is not related to the occupation for which a license is being sought, as determined by subsection (f) of this section.
  9. If a licensing authority intends to deny, suspend, or revoke an occupational license, permit, or certificate solely or in part because of the individual’s prior conviction of a crime, the licensing authority shall notify the individual in writing of the following prior to the final decision:
    1. The specific conviction(s) that form the basis for the potential denial, suspension, or revocation and the rationale for deeming the conviction substantially related to the occupation;
    2. A copy of the conviction history report, if any, on which the licensing authority relies;
    3. A statement that the applicant may provide evidence of mitigation or rehabilitation, as described in subsection (g) of this section; and
    4. Instructions on how to respond to the potential denial, suspension, or revocation.
  10. After receiving the notice of potential denial, suspension, or revocation, the individual shall have thirty (30) business days to respond.
  11. If a licensing authority denies, suspends, or revokes an occupational license, permit, or certificate solely or in part because of the applicant’s substantially related conviction, the licensing authority shall issue a final written decision that addresses each of the factors enumerated in subsection (f) of this section and that also includes, but is not limited to, the following:
    1. The final decision, including the substantially related conviction(s) that form the basis for denial, suspension, or revocation and the rationale for occupation relatedness;
    2. The process for appealing the decision in accordance with chapter 35 of title 42 enumerated in subsection (g) of this section; and
    3. The earliest date the person may reapply for an occupational license, permit, or certificate, which shall not be longer than two (2) years from the date of the final decision.
  12. Each state agency or licensing body shall issue a report to be made publicly available on the agency or licensing body website one year after the passage of this section and by January 31 of each year thereafter, indicating the following:
    1. The number of initial applicants for every occupational license, permit, or certificate under their jurisdiction within the preceding calendar year, including the number of applicants granted licenses, the number of applicants denied licenses for any reason, and, to the extent available, the demographic breakdown of the applicants, including race, ethnicity, and gender, and city or town of residence; and
    2. The number of applicants denied solely, or in part, because of a criminal conviction.
  13. Unless specifically exempted by reference to this section or otherwise contrary to federal law, any existing or future state law or regulation relating to the granting, denying, suspending, or revoking of a license by a state agency shall be subject to the conditions and procedures established by this section.
  14. If any provision of this section or its application to any individual or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this section that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 5; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 44; P.L. 2020, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 71, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2020, ch. 65, § 1, and P.L. 2020, ch. 71, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2020, ch. 65, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2021.

P.L. 2020, ch. 71, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2021.

28-5.1-15. State financial assistance.

State agencies disbursing financial assistance, including, but not limited to, loans and grants, shall require recipient organizations and agencies to undertake affirmative action programs designed to eliminate patterns and practices of discrimination. At the request of the state equal opportunity office, state agencies disbursing assistance shall develop, in conjunction with the state equal opportunity office, regulations and procedures necessary to implement the goals of nondiscrimination and affirmative action and shall be reviewed for compliance according to state policy.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1.

28-5.1-16. Prior executive orders — Effect.

All executive orders shall, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this chapter, remain in full force and effect.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 149, § 1.

28-5.1-17. Utilization analysis.

    1. The personnel administrator, in consultation with the equal employment opportunity administrator, and the human resources outreach and diversity administrator within the department of administration, shall annually conduct a utilization analysis of positions within state government based upon the annual review conducted pursuant to §§ 28-5.1-3 and 28-5.1-4 .
    2. To the extent the analysis determines that minorities as currently defined in federal employment law as Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians (including Alaskan natives), Asians (including Pacific Islanders), are being underrepresented and/or underutilized, the personnel administrator shall, through the director of administration, direct the head of the department where the under-representation and/or under-utilization exists to establish precise goals and timetables and assist in the correction of each deficiency, to the extent permitted by law and by collective bargaining agreements.
    3. The initial analysis shall be directed toward service-oriented departments of the state, state police, labor and training, corrections, children, youth and families, courts, transportation, and human services.
    4. The equal employment opportunity administrator shall be consulted in the selection process for all positions certified as underrepresented and/or underutilized and shall report the results of progress toward goals to the governor and to the general assembly by January 31 and July 31 of each year. A copy of these results which shall be referred to the Rhode Island commission for human rights which may, in its discretion, investigate whether a violation of chapter 5 of this title has occurred. The results shall be a public record and shall be made available electronically on the secretary of state’s website.
    1. In the event of a reduction in force, the personnel administrator, in consultation with the equal employment opportunity administrator and director of the department(s) where the reduction is proposed, shall develop a plan to ensure that affirmation action gains are preserved to the extent permitted by law and by collective bargaining agreements. A copy of this plan shall be referred to the Rhode Island commission for human rights which may, in its discretion, investigate whether a violation of chapter 5 of this title has occurred. The plan shall be a public record and shall be made available electronically on the secretary of state’s website.
    2. The equal employment opportunity administrator shall report the results of the plans and their subsequent actions to the governor and to the general assembly by January 31 and July 31 of each year, to the Rhode Island commission for human rights. The report shall be a public record and shall be made available electronically on the secretary of state’s website. Consistent with § 28-5.1-6 , the Rhode Island commission for human rights shall have the power to order discontinuance of any department or division employment pattern or practice deemed discriminatory in intent or result by the commission.
    3. The equal opportunity administrator shall notify the commission of reports and results under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 280, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 502, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 514, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 502, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 514, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Chapter 6 Wage Discrimination Based on Sex

28-6-1 — 28-6-16. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1956, ch. 3795, §§ 1-13; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-6-1 28-6-1 6; P.L. 1962, ch. 96, §§ 1-4), concerning age discrimination in employment, were repealed by P.L. 1980, ch. 220, § 1. For present comparable provisions, see § 28-5-1 et seq.

28-6-17. Definitions. [Effective until January 1, 2023.]

  1. “Director” means the director of labor and training.
  2. “Employee” as used in §§ 28-6-17 28-6-21 means any person employed for hire by any employer in any lawful employment, but does not include persons engaged in domestic service in the home of the employer, or employees of any social club, fraternal, charitable, educational, religious, scientific, or literary association, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private individual.
  3. “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly.
  4. “Employment” means any employment under contract of hire, expressed or implied, written or oral, including all contracts entered into by helpers and assistants of employees, whether paid by employer or employee, if employed with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer in which all or the greater part of the work is to be performed within the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-17 .

Collateral References.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — Public employment cases. 153 A.L.R. Fed. 609.

28-6-17. Definitions. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Age” means anyone who is at least forty (40) years of age.
  2. “Comparable work” means work that requires substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility, and is performed under similar working conditions. Determining whether jobs are comparable will require an analysis of the jobs as a whole. Minor differences in skill, effort, or responsibility will not prevent two (2) jobs from being considered comparable.
  3. “Director” means the director of labor and training.
  4. “Employee” means any person as defined in § 28-14-1 .
  5. “Employer” means any person or entity as defined in § 28-14-1 .
  6. “Employment” means any employment under contract of hire, expressed or implied, written or oral, including all contracts entered into by helpers and assistants of employees, whether paid by employer or employee, if employed with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer in which all or the greater part of the work is to be performed within the state.
  7. “Occurrence of discriminatory practice” means whenever a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted; whenever an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice; or whenever an individual is affected by the application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.
  8. “Wage” means all amounts at which the labor or service rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount, and includes benefits. An employer shall not be liable under this chapter for disparities in total gratuities as defined in § 28-12-5 or overtime pay as defined in § 28-12-4.1 or commissions if the disparity is due to a factor over which the employer does not have control.
  9. “Wage history” means the wages paid to an applicant for employment by the applicant’s current employer and/or previous employer or employers. Wage history shall not include any objective measure of the applicant’s productivity, such as revenue, sales, or other production reports.
  10. “Wage range,” as applied to an applicant for employment, means the wage range that the employer anticipates relying on in setting wages for the position and may include reference to any applicable pay scale; previously determined range of wages for the position; the actual range of wages for those currently holding equivalent positions; or the budgeted amount for the position, as applicable. “Wage range,” as applied to a current employee, may include reference to any applicable pay scale; previously determined range of wages for the position; or the range of wages for incumbents in equivalent positions, as applicable.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-17 ; P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 2, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 2, effective January 1, 2023.

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

28-6-18. Wage differentials based on sex prohibited. [Effective until January 1, 2023.]

  1. No employer shall discriminate in the payment of wages as between the sexes or shall pay any female in his or her employ salary or wage rates less than the rates paid to male employees for equal work or work on the same operations.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit a variation in rates of pay based upon either difference in:
    1. Seniority, experience, training, skill, or ability;
    2. Duties and services performed, either regularly or occasionally;
    3. The shift or time of day worked; or
    4. Availability for other operations or any other reasonable differentiation except difference in sex.
  3. Except as provided in this section, any provision in any contract, agreement, or understanding entered into after passage of this act establishing a variation in rates of pay as between the sexes, shall be null and void.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-18 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 45, § 1.

Collateral References.

Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018).

Male and female employees, statute designed to prevent discrimination between, as regards wages. 130 A.L.R. 436; 7 A.L.R. Fed. 707.

28-6-18. Wage differentials based on protected characteristics prohibited. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

  1. No employer shall pay any of its employees at a wage rate less than the rate paid to employees of another race, or color, or religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin for comparable work, except where the employer meets the standards set forth in subsection (b) of this section.
  2. A wage differential is permitted when the employer demonstrates:
    1. The systems as referenced in this section are fair and are not being used as a pretext for an unlawful wage differential;
    2. The differential is based upon one or more of the following factors:
      1. A seniority system; provided, however, that time spent on leave due to a pregnancy-related condition or parental, family, and medical leave shall not reduce seniority;
      2. A merit system;
      3. A system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
      4. Geographic location when the locations correspond with different costs of living; provided, that no location within the state of Rhode Island will be considered to have a sufficiently different cost of living. This clause shall apply at the employer’s discretion and for the limited purpose of determining wage differentials for employees;
      5. Reasonable shift differential, which is not based upon or derived from a differential in compensation based on characteristics identified in subsection (a) of this section;
      6. Education, training, or experience to the extent such factors are job-related and consistent with a business necessity;
      7. Work-related travel, if the travel is regular and a business necessity; or
      8. A bona fide factor other than those characteristics identified by subsection (a) of this section that is not based upon or derived from a differential in compensation based on characteristics identified in subsection (a);  that is job-related with respect to the position in question; and  that is consistent with business necessity. This factor shall not apply if the employee demonstrates that an alternative business practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential and that the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice. A cost prohibitive alternative business practice is not an alternative business practice under this section;
    3. The factor or factors relied upon must reasonably explain the differential; or
    4. Each factor is relied upon reasonably.
  3. An individual’s wage history cannot, by itself, justify an otherwise unlawful wage differential.
  4. An employer who discriminates in violation of this section shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this section, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
  5. The agreement of an employee to work for less than the wage to which the employee is entitled under this chapter is not a defense to an action under this chapter; provided, however, in the event an employer provides health insurance or retirement benefits as a benefit to employees, a difference in such benefits due to an employee’s decision, in writing, to decline such a benefit shall not be considered a violation of this section, as long as the employer provides equal access to such benefit.
  6. No employer shall prohibit an employee from inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing the wages of such employee or another employee or retaliate against an employee who engages in such activities. No employer shall require an employee to enter into a waiver or other agreement that purports to deny an employee the right to disclose or discuss their wages. An employer shall not prohibit an employee from aiding or encouraging any other employee to exercise their rights under this subsection.
    1. Nothing in this subsection shall require an employee to disclose their wages.
    2. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the rights of an employee provided by any other provision of law or collective bargaining agreement.
  7. No employer shall discharge or in any other manner discriminate or retaliate against any applicant for employment or employee because the applicant or employee has opposed a practice made unlawful by this chapter or because the applicant or employee has made a charge or filed any complaint with the employer, the director of labor and training, or any other person, under or related to the provisions of this chapter; has instituted or caused to be instituted any investigation, proceeding, hearing, or any action under or related to the provisions of this chapter; has testified or is planning to testify; or has assisted or participated in any manner in any such investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the provisions of this chapter. No employer shall coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of their having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of their having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by the provisions of this chapter.
  8. Except as provided in this section, any provision in any contract entered into after the effective date of this chapter establishing a variation in rates of pay based on the characteristics identified by  subsection (a) of this section shall be null and void.
  9. Every employer subject to this chapter shall post, in a conspicuous place or places on its premises, a notice to be prepared or approved by the director  that shall set forth excerpts of this chapter and any other relevant information  the director deems necessary to explain the provisions of this chapter to the employees of an employer. Any employer who or that does not comply with the provisions of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-18 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 45, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 2, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 2, effective January 1, 2023.

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

28-6-19. Enforcement of provisions. [Effective until January 1, 2023.]

The director of labor and training shall have the power and it shall be his or her duty to carry out the provisions of §§ 28-6-17 28-6-21 .

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-19 .

28-6-19. Enforcement of provisions. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

  1. The director of labor and training shall have the power and it shall be his or her duty to carry out the provisions of §§ 28-6-17 28-6-24 .
  2. In carrying out these provisions, the director shall have the same powers and duties as set forth in chapter 14 of title 28 to investigate, inspect, subpoena, and enforce any violations through administrative hearing complaints.
  3. The director shall be entitled to the same rights and remedies as set forth in chapter 14 of title 28 for an employer’s effort to obstruct the director and authorized representatives in the performance of their duties.
  4. The department of labor and training and the commission for human rights shall cooperate in the investigation of charges filed under this section, when the allegations are within the jurisdiction of both agencies.
  5. At the request of any party aggrieved by a violation of this chapter, the director of labor and training may take an assignment of the claim in trust for the assigning aggrieved party and may bring any legal action necessary to collect the claim. The director of labor and training shall not be required to pay the filing fee or other costs in connection with any action. The director of labor and training shall have the power to join various claimants against the employer, in one cause of action. If the director of labor and training prevails in an enforcement action, the aggrieved party shall be awarded damages and the department of labor and training shall be awarded penalties in accordance with §§ 28-6-20 and 28-6-21 .
  6. An applicant for employment, an employee, or a former employee aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may file a complaint with the director of labor and training or may file a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain relief.
  7. An aggrieved applicant for employment, employee, or former employee may not file a civil action under this section if they have also filed a complaint with the director of labor and training and the director has issued notice of an administrative hearing pursuant to this section.
  8. The filing of a civil action under this section shall not preclude the director of the department of labor and training from investigating the matter and/or referring the matter to the attorney general.
  9. All claims filed under this chapter shall be filed within two (2) years of when the claimant knew of, or should have known of, the occurrence of a discriminatory practice; provided, however, a claimant may file a sworn complaint demonstrating facts that establish a willful and wanton violation of this chapter within three (3) years of when the claimant knew of, or should have known of, the occurrence of a discriminatory practice; provided, further, that prior to commencing an action alleging a violation of §§ 28-6-18(a) through (e), a claimant shall provide the employer with written notice of the claimant’s intent to commence such action at least forty-five (45) days prior to the commencement of any such action and any such written notice shall include a statement from the claimant indicating the claimant’s belief that an unlawful wage differential exists and that it applies to the claimant.
  10. All claims under this chapter also include each time wages, benefits, or other compensation are paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.
  11. Any party who is aggrieved by a final decision of the department of labor and training is entitled to a trial de novo in superior court in the county having jurisdiction. Proceedings shall be commenced by the aggrieved party by filing a complaint in the superior court within thirty (30) days of the issuance of the final agency decision. The complaint shall name the opposing party. The rules of civil procedure and evidence shall apply to the proceedings. Thereafter, either party shall have the right of appeal to the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-19 ; P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 2, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 2, effective January 1, 2023.

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

28-6-20. Civil liability of employer for sex differential — Actions. [Effective until January 1, 2023.]

An employer who or that violates the provisions of § 28-6-18 shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, and in an additional equal amount of liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or herself or themselves and other similarly situated employees. At the request of any employee paid less than the wage to which he or she is entitled under §§ 28-6-17 28-6-21 , the director of labor and training may take an assignment of the wage claim in trust for the assigning employee and may bring any legal action necessary to collect the claim, and the liquidated damages provided for above. The director of labor and training shall not be required to pay the filing fee or other costs in connection with the action. The director of labor and training shall have the power to join various claimants against the employer in one cause of action.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-20 .

Collateral References.

Availability and Scope of Punitive Damages Under State Employment Discrimination Law. 81 A.L.R.5th 367.

Award of compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a for violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 154 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

Punitive damages in actions for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 1981a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 150 A.L.R. Fed. 601.

Recovery of damages for wrongful discrimination under state or local civil rights provisions. 85 A.L.R.3d 351.

28-6-20. Liability of employer. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

  1. Any employee or former employee aggrieved by a violation of §§ 28-6-18(a) through (i) shall be entitled to the same protections and relief as under § 28-14-19.2(a) .
  2. An employer who violates § 28-6-22 shall be liable for any compensatory damages; or special damages not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000); appropriate equitable relief; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. In setting the amount of damages, the appropriate finder of fact should consider the size of the employer’s business; the good faith of the employer; the gravity of the violation; the history of previous violations; and whether or not the violation was an innocent mistake or willful.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-20 ; P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 2, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 2, effective January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2022, ch. 168, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2022, ch. 169, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

28-6-21. Penalty for violations. [Effective until January 1, 2023.]

Any employer who or that violates any provision of §§ 28-6-17 28-6-21 , or who discharges or in any other manner discriminates against any employee because the employee has made any complaint to his or her employer, the director of labor and training, or any other person, or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to §§ 28-6-17 28-6-21 , or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars ($200) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by both fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-21 .

28-6-21. Penalty for violations. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

  1. In addition to any other relief to which any aggrieved party may be entitled for such a violation, an employer who violates § 28-6-18 or § 28-6-22 may be liable for a civil penalty to be paid to the department of labor and training. That penalty shall be set within the following ranges:
    1. Up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for a first violation;
    2. Up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for a violation where the employer has had one violation of § 28-6-18 or § 28-6-22 within the five (5) years prior to the complaint or action being filed; or
    3. Up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) for a violation where the employer has had two (2) or more violations of § 28-6-18 or § 28-6-22 within the seven (7) years prior to the complaint or action being filed.
  2. In determining the amount of any penalty imposed under this section, the director or the court shall consider the size of the employer’s business; the good faith of the employer; the gravity of the violation; the history of previous violations; and whether or not the violation was an innocent mistake or willful. The director or the court may lower any penalty imposed under this section if the employer demonstrates that they completed a self-evaluation as defined in § 28-6-24 .
  3. No civil penalties shall be assessed from January 1, 2023, to December 31, 2024.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1786, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-6-21 ; P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 2, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 2, effective January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2022, ch. 168, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2022, ch. 169, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2023.

28-6-22. Wage history and wage range. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

  1. No employer shall:
    1. Rely on the wage history of an applicant when deciding whether to consider the applicant for employment;
    2. Require that an applicant’s prior wages satisfy minimum or maximum criteria as a condition of being considered for employment;
    3. Rely on the wage history of an applicant in determining the wages such applicant is to be paid by the employer upon hire; or
    4. Seek the wage history of an applicant.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, after the employer makes an initial offer of employment with an offer of compensation to an applicant for employment, an employer may:
    1. Rely on wage history to support a wage higher than the wage offered by the employer if wage history is voluntarily provided by the applicant for employment without prompting from the employer;
    2. Seek to confirm the wage history of the applicant for employment to support a wage higher than the wage offered by the employer, when relying on wage history as permitted in subsection (b)(1) of this section; and
    3. Rely on wage history in these circumstances to the extent that the higher wage does not create an unlawful pay differential based on the characteristics identified in § 28-6-18(a) .
    4. Nothing in this section shall penalize an employer for having knowledge of an employee’s wage history at that employer if the employee currently works for the employer.
    5. Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall preclude an employer from verifying information voluntarily provided by a job applicant about an applicant’s unvested equity or deferred compensation that an applicant would forfeit or have cancelled by virtue of the applicant’s resignation from  the applicant’s current employer or any voluntary disclosure of non-wage related information. Further, an employer may request a background check that does not affirmatively seek wage history; provided, however, if the background check discloses the applicant’s wage history, such information shall not be relied on for purposes of determining wage, benefits or other compensation for an applicant during the hiring process, including the negotiation for a contract for employment.
  3. Upon the applicant’s request, an employer shall provide an applicant for employment the wage range for the position for which the applicant is applying. The employer should provide a wage range for the position the applicant is applying for prior to discussing compensation. An employer shall provide an employee the wage range for the employee’s position both at the time of hire and when the employee moves into a new position. During the course of employment, upon an employee’s request, an employer shall provide the wage range for the employee’s position.
  4. The department of labor and training may provide guidance to employers for determining the information to be provided pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, and may include information regarding definitions applicable to this chapter.
  5. An employer may not refuse to interview, hire, promote, or employ an applicant for employment or employee and may not retaliate against that individual because he or she did not provide a wage history or because he or she requested the wage range for a position in accordance with this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 3, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 3, effective January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2023.

28-6-23. Regulations. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

The department shall coordinate implementation and enforcement of this chapter and shall promulgate appropriate guidelines or regulations for such purposes.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 3, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 3, effective January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2023.

28-6-24. Self-evaluation by employer. [Effective January 1, 2023.]

  1. Any employer against whom an action is brought alleging a violation of §§ 28-6-18(a) through (e) shall have an affirmative defense to all liability if the employer is able to demonstrate that the employer has conducted a good faith self-evaluation pursuant to the provisions of this subsection of the employer’s pay practices within the previous two (2) years and prior to commencement of the action and can demonstrate that any unlawful wage differentials revealed by its self-evaluation have been eliminated. For purposes of this subsection, an employer’s self-evaluation may be of the employer’s own design or on standard template or form to be issued by the department of labor and training, as long as the scope and detail of the self-evaluation reflects the exercise of due diligence by the employer to identify, prevent, and mitigate violations of this chapter in light of the size of the employer.
    1. In determining whether a self-evaluation reflects the exercise of due diligence by the employer, the factors the court shall consider include, but are not limited to:  whether the evaluation includes all relevant jobs and employees within those relevant jobs; whether the employer’s analysis makes a reasonable effort to identify similar jobs and employees using a consistent, fact-based approach; whether the employer has tested explanatory factors for an unbiased and relevant relationship to pay; whether the evaluation takes into account all reasonably relevant and available information; and whether the evaluation is reasonably sophisticated in its analysis of potentially comparable work, employee compensation, and the application of the permissible reasons for wage differentials set forth in § 28-6-18(b) . If an employer fails to retain the records necessary to show the manner in which it evaluated and applied these factors, it may give rise to an inference that the employer did not exercise due diligence in conducting its self-evaluation.
    2. In determining whether an employer has eliminated an unlawful wage differential revealed by its self-evaluation, the court shall determine whether the employer has adjusted salaries or wages in order that employees performing comparable work are paid equally and whether any salary or wage adjustments have been completed prior to commencement of the action. An employer shall have ninety (90) days from the date of completion of its self-evaluation to adjust wages beginning from the day in the pay period the self-evaluation was completed.
  2. The affirmative defense to liability set forth in subsection (a) of this section shall be available to employers beginning on January 1, 2023, and ending June 30, 2026. Thereafter, an employer who has conducted a self-evaluation and eliminated any unlawful differentials as provided in subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable for liquidated damages or compensatory damages under § 28-6-20 or civil penalties under § 28-6-21 ; provided, however, that nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall prevent an employee aggrieved by an unlawful wage differential from filing a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain unpaid wages and equitable relief; provided, further, that in lieu of an employer being relieved of liability for liquidated damages and compensatory damages under § 28-6-20 or civil penalties under § 28-6-21 , an employer who or that has conducted a self-evaluation and eliminated any unlawful differentials as provided in subsection (a) of this section, and compensated the employee for any unpaid wages, shall have an affirmative defense to all liability.
  3. Evidence that a self-evaluation has been conducted or that remedial steps have been undertaken in accordance with this section is not sufficient evidence, standing alone, to find a violation of §§ 28-6-18(a) through (e) that occurred prior to the date of the completion of the self-evaluation.
  4. An employer who has not completed a self-evaluation shall not be subject to any negative or adverse inference as a result of not having completed a self-evaluation.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 3, effective January 1, 2023; P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 3, effective January 1, 2023.

Legislative Findings.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 1 provide: “Legislative findings and intent. It is the intent of the general assembly to combat wage discrimination based on race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin by strengthening and closing gaps in existing wage discrimination laws.”

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 168, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2023.

P.L. 2021, ch. 169, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2023.

Chapter 6.1 Lie Detector Tests as Conditions of Employment

28-6.1-1. Lie detector tests prohibited.

  1. No employer or agent of any employer shall either orally or in writing request, require, or subject any employee to any lie detector tests as a condition of employment or continued employment.
  2. Written examinations as defined in § 28-6.1-4 may be used as long as the results of the written examinations are not used to form the primary basis for an employment decision.
  3. It is not a valid defense brought under this chapter that the lie detector test was administered outside the state for the purpose of employment within the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1964, ch. 229, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 398, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 159, § 2.

Comparative Legislation.

Lie detector tests of employees prohibited:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51g.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 19B.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This chapter is designed to eliminate polygraphs from the workplace while still allowing employers to use written examinations as a perceived cost-effective tool for ensuring a reliable work force. At the same time, in allowing the use of written examinations, the legislature has admonished employers not to rely inordinately on those permissible examinations in making decisions regarding an employee’s or an applicant’s status. Carr v. Mulhearn, 601 A.2d 946, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 1992).

Employers are prohibited from requesting, requiring, or subjecting an employee to a polygraph examination in connection with a pending allegation and subsequent investigation. Carr v. Mulhearn, 601 A.2d 946, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 1992).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq.). 154 A.L.R. Fed. 315.

Employee’s refusal to take lie detector test as barring unemployment compensation. 18 A.L.R.4th 307.

Refusal to submit to polygraph examination as ground for discharge or suspension of public employees or officers. 15 A.L.R.4th 1207.

Validity and construction of statute prohibiting employers from suggesting or requiring polygraph or similar tests as condition of employment or continued employment. 23 A.L.R.4th 187.

28-6.1-2. Penalty — Exception.

Any employer who subjects any person employed by him or her, or any person applying for employment, to a lie detector test, or causes, directly or indirectly, any employee or applicant to take a lie detector test, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). This section does not apply to lie detector tests administered by law enforcement agencies in the performance of their official duties.

History of Section. P.L. 1964, ch. 229, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 398, § 1.

28-6.1-3. Punitive damages and attorney’s fees.

In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may:

  1. Award punitive damages to a prevailing employee or prospective employee in addition to any award of actual damages; and
  2. Award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing employee or prospective employee.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 398, § 2.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes requiring that percentage of punitive damages awards be paid directly to state or court-administered fund. 16 A.L.R.5th 129.

28-6.1-4. “Lie detector test” defined.

As used in this chapter the term “lie detector test” means any test utilizing a polygraph or any other device, mechanism, instrument, or written examination that is operated or the results of which are used or interpreted by an examiner for the purpose of purporting to assist in or enable the detection of deception, the verification of truthfulness, or the rendering of a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty of an individual.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 159, § 1.

Chapter 6.2 Physical Examination as a Condition of Employment

28-6.2-1. Cost of physical examination.

  1. Whenever any employer requires a physical examination prior to employment, the cost of the examination shall be paid by the employer whether or not the prospective employee is hired.
  2. Any employer who fails to comply with the provisions of this section shall be subject to a fine of two hundred dollars ($200).

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 21, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 259, § 1.

Chapter 6.3 Fees for Employment Applications

28-6.3-1. Employment application fee prohibited.

No employer or agent of any employer shall charge a fee for the filing of an employment application.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 260, § 1.

28-6.3-2. Penalty.

Any employer who charges a fee for the filing of an employment application shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars ($200).

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 260, § 1.

Chapter 6.4 Inspection of Personnel Files

28-6.4-1. Inspection of files.

    1. Every employer shall, upon not less than seven (7) days’ advance notice, holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays excluded, and at any reasonable time other than the employee’s work hours and upon the written request of an employee, permit an employee to inspect personnel files that are used or have been used to determine that employee’s qualifications for employment, promotion, additional compensation, termination, or disciplinary action. This inspection shall be made in the presence of an employer or employer’s designee.
    2. The employee shall not be permitted to make any copies of nor remove his or her personnel file from the immediate place of inspection located on the business premises.
    3. The employer may charge the employee a fee reasonably related to the cost of supplying copies of requested documents.
    4. This section does not apply to records of an employee relating to the investigation of a possible criminal offense or records prepared for use in any civil, criminal, or grievance proceedings, any letter of reference, recommendations, managerial records kept or used only by the employer, confidential reports from previous employers, and managerial planning records.
  1. Employers are not required to permit an inspection of any employee’s personnel file or records on more than three (3) occasions in any calendar year.
  2. An employer that, upon request by a prospective employer or a current or former employee, provides fair and unbiased information about a current or former employee’s job performance is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil liability for the disclosure and the consequences of the disclosure. The presumption of good faith is rebuttable upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the information disclosed was:
    1. Knowingly false;
    2. Deliberately misleading;
    3. Disclosed for a malicious purpose; or
    4. Violative of the current or former employee’s civil rights under the employment discrimination laws in effect at the time of the disclosure.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 302, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 195, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Good Faith Presumption.

When a former employee sued a former employer for defamation regarding a statement the former employer made to a placement agency regarding the employee’s job performance, that statement was covered by the statutory qualified privilege in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1(c) . Since the employee did not prove an exception to that privilege and offered no specific facts in the record demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact as to the employer’s ill will or spite, the employer was entitled to summary judgment. Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2007).

Although it is true that whether ill will or spite is the incentive for a publication by a former employer to a prospective employer about an employee’s job performance is a fact question and is ordinarily for a fact-finder to decide, to overcome a motion for summary judgment based on a qualified privilege, a plaintiff must point to some specific facts in the record that raise a genuine issue relative to the existence of such ill will. Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2007).

Qualified Privilege.

Former employer’s communication to a prospective employer with regard to the work characteristics of a former employee was protected by a qualified privilege where communication concerned employee’s work characteristics wherein the publisher acted in good faith. Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2007).

Summary Judgment.

In a defamation action in which qualified privilege is raised as a defense, as long as there has been ample opportunity for discovery, summary judgment is warranted in those situations in which the party opposing the motion cannot point to any facts at all that raise a genuine issue with respect to the moving party’s state of mind. Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2007).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1(c) requires that if a motion justice finds that a qualified privilege exists in a defamation action with respect to the publication of a particular statement, the justice must presume that the statement was made in good faith, but the presumption is rebuttable; nevertheless, a plaintiff bears the burden of pointing to specific facts that would show that a genuine issue existed with respect to the validity of that presumption, and neither bald assertions nor ephemeral inferences will suffice. Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2007).

28-6.4-2. Violation — Penalties.

Any employer or any agent of an employer who violates the provisions of this chapter without just cause shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 43, § 1.

Chapter 6.5 Urine and Blood Tests as a Condition of Employment

28-6.5-1. Testing permitted only in accordance with this section.

  1. No employer or agent of any employer shall, either orally or in writing, request, require, or subject any employee to submit a sample of his or her urine, blood, or other bodily fluid or tissue for testing as a condition of continued employment unless that test is administered in accordance with the provisions of this section. Employers may require that an employee submit to a drug test if:
    1. The employer has reasonable grounds to believe based on specific aspects of the employee’s job performance and specific contemporaneous documented observations, concerning the employee’s appearance, behavior, or speech that the employee may be under the influence of a controlled substance, which may be impairing his or her ability to perform his or her job;
    2. The employee provides the test sample in private, outside the presence of any person;
    3. Employees testing positive are not terminated on that basis, but are instead referred to a substance abuse professional (a licensed physician with knowledge and clinical experience in the diagnosis and treatment of drug related disorders, a licensed or certified psychologist, social worker, or employee assistance professional with like knowledge, or a substance abuse counselor certified by the National Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Counselors (all of whom shall be licensed in Rhode Island)) for assistance; provided, that additional testing may be required by the employer in accordance with this referral, and an employee whose testing indicates any continued use of controlled substances despite treatment may be terminated;
    4. Positive tests of urine, blood or any other bodily fluid or tissue are confirmed by a federally certified laboratory by means of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry or technology recognized as being at least as scientifically accurate;
    5. The employer provides the test to the employee, at the employer’s expense, the opportunity to have the sample tested or evaluated by an independent testing facility and so advises the employee;
    6. The employer provides the test to the employee with a reasonable opportunity to rebut or explain the results;
    7. The employer has promulgated a drug abuse prevention policy which complies with requirements of this chapter; and
    8. The employer keeps the results of any test confidential, except for disclosing the results of a “positive” test only to other employees with a job-related need to know, and to defend against any legal action brought by the employee against the employer.
  2. Any employer who subjects any person employed by him or her to this test, or causes, directly or indirectly, any employee to take the test, except as provided for by this chapter, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or not more than one year in jail, or both.
  3. In any civil action alleging a violation of this section, the court may:
    1. Award punitive damages to a prevailing employee in addition to any award of actual damages;
    2. Award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing employee; and
    3. Afford injunctive relief against any employer who commits or proposes to commit a violation of this section.
  4. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair or affect the rights of individuals under chapter 5 of this title.
  5. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to:
    1. Prohibit or apply to the testing of drivers regulated under 49 C.F.R. § 40.1 et seq and 49 C.F.R. part 382 if that testing is performed pursuant to a policy mandated by the federal government;
    2. Prohibit an employer in the public utility or mass transportation industry from requiring testing otherwise barred by this chapter if that testing is explicitly mandated by federal regulation or statute as a condition for the continued receipt of federal funds; or
    3. Prohibit an employer in the highway maintenance industry, which shall include the construction, upkeep, maintenance, and repair of the state’s highways, roads, and bridges including the repaving or resurfacing of the same, from requiring testing otherwise barred by this chapter, provided the testing is performed as regulated under 49 C.F.R. part 40.
  6. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this chapter shall not apply to members of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers and its signatory contractors jointly participating in the IMPACT National Substance Abuse Program for purposes of pre-qualifying workers for employment on and ensuring the maintenance of designated drug free work sites; provided, however, that:
    1. Participation by each worker is voluntary; and
    2. Workers who refuse to participate shall not be subjected to any adverse employment action other than an inability to work on a designated drug free work site; and
    3. The penalty for a first “positive” test shall not exceed a thirty-day (30) suspension from work on designated drug free work sites.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 540, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 385, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 136, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 242, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 152, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 221, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 324, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 145, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 494, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Survey Section: Labor Relations, see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 595 (1998).

John W. Caruolo, 2016 Survey, Cases: Labor and Employment Law: Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 842 (2017).

John I. Winn, When the Going Gets Weird, The Weird Turn Pro: Management Best Practices in the Age of Medicinal Marijuana, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 60 (2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Preemption.

This section is impliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act, 49 App. U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., as applied to airline pilots employed by interstate air carriers. French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 2051 (1st Cir. 1989).

Limitations Period.

Violations of the employer drug testing statute (EDTS) result in “injuries to the person” as contemplated by the three-year statute of limitations and, accordingly, are subject to the three-year period in § 9-1-14 rather than the 10-year period in § 9-1-13 ; moreover, actions under § 9-1-2 for civil liability for the victims of criminal offenses, which would include the misdemeanor offense created by the EDTS, are also subject to the three-year statute of limitations. Because an employee filed her action more than three years after the alleged violation of the EDTS, the claims were time-barred. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, 134 A.3d 173, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2016).

Reasonable Grounds.

Evidence supported the trial justice’s conclusion that the employee’s supervisors had reasonable grounds—based on their contemporaneous observations concerning the employee’s appearance, behavior, and speech—to believe that the employee was under the influence of a controlled substance despite the employee’s contentions that he was under the influence of extreme pain from a work-related injury at the time; and thus that the employer was authorized to require the employee to take a drug test and properly terminated the employee for his refusal to do so. Colpitts v. W.B. Mason Co., 227 A.3d 996, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 35 (R.I. 2020).

Collateral References.

Authentication of blood sample taken from human body for purposes other than determining blood alcohol content. 77 A.L.R.5th 201.

Authentication of organic nonblood specimen taken from human body for purposes of analysis. 78 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability for discharge of at-will employee for refusal to submit to drug testing. 79 A.L.R.4th 105.

Private employee’s loss of employment because of refusal to submit to drug test as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 86 A.L.R.4th 309.

Supreme Court’s views on mandatory testing for drugs or alcohol. 145 A.L.R. Fed. 335.

Validity and operation of pre-employment drug testing — State cases. 96 A.L.R.5th 485.

28-6.5-2. Testing of prospective employees.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, an employer may require a job applicant to submit to testing of his or her blood, urine, or any other bodily fluid or tissue if:
    1. The job applicant has been given an offer of employment conditioned on the applicant’s receiving a negative test result;
    2. The applicant provides the test sample in private, outside the presence of any person; and
    3. Positive tests of urine, blood, or any other bodily fluid or tissue are confirmed by a federal certified laboratory by means of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry or technology recognized as being at least as scientifically accurate.
  2. The pre-employment drug testing authorized by this section shall not extend to job applicants for positions with any agency or political subdivision of the state or municipalities, except for applicants seeking employment as a law enforcement or correctional officer, firefighter, or any other position where that testing is required by federal law or required for the continued receipt of federal funds.
  3. An employer shall not be required to comply with the conditions of testing under subsection (a) of this section to the extent they are inconsistent with federal law.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 203, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 152, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity and operation of pre-employment drug testing — State cases. 96 A.L.R.5th 485.

28-6.5-3. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of it to any person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 540, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-6.5-2 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 203, § 2.

Chapter 6.6 Labor Union Affiliation

28-6.6-1. Discrimination prohibited.

  1. No employer or agent of any employer shall refuse to hire any applicant for employment, discharge any employee, or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual’s affiliation as a member or representative of a labor union.
  2. No owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of a public accommodation, as defined in § 11-24-3 , shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person on account of his or her affiliation as a member or representative of a labor union any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the public accommodation.
  3. In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may award damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs to a prevailing plaintiff, and afford injunctive relief against any employer or public accommodation which commits or proposes to commit a violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 180, § 1.

Collateral References.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify decrease in attorney’s fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). 151 A.L.R. Fed. 77.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify increase in attorney’s fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). 140 A.L.R. Fed. 301.

Chapter 6.7 Genetic Testing as a Condition of Employment

28-6.7-1. Genetic testing prohibited.

  1. No employer, employment agency, or licensing agency shall directly or indirectly:
    1. Request, require, or administer a genetic test to any employee, licensee, or applicant for employment or licensure;
    2. Affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or licensure or terminate the employment or licensure of any person who obtains a genetic test;
    3. Deny employment or deny an application for an occupational license, or suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew an occupational license; or take any other action affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment against an employee or a license holder based directly or indirectly on the refusal of the employee, licensee, or applicant for employment or licensure to:
      1. Submit to a genetic test;
      2. Submit a family health history; or
      3. Reveal:
        1. Whether the employee, applicant, or holder has submitted to a genetic test; or
        2. The results of any genetic test to which the employee, applicant, or holder has submitted;
    4. Otherwise use genetic information to adversely affect the employment, licensure, or application for employment or licensure of any individual; or
    5. Reveal genetic information about employees, licensees, or applicants.
  2. No person may sell to or interpret for an employer, employment agency, or licensing agency a genetic test of a current or prospective employee or licensee.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 171, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 49, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

28-6.7-2. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 171, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 49, § 2, effective June 8, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-6.7-2 defined “genetic testing.” For current law, see § 28-6.7-2 .1.

28-6.7-2.1. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Employer” includes the state and all political subdivisions of the state, and any person in this state employing individuals, and any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly.
  2. “Employment agency” includes any person undertaking with or without compensation to procure opportunities to work, or to procure, recruit, refer, or place employees.
  3. “Genetic information” means information about genes, gene product, or inherited characteristics that may derive from the individual or a family member and includes information concerning whether or not the individual or family member has sought or obtained a genetic test.
    1. “Genetic testing” means the analysis of an individual’s DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins and certain metabolites in order to detect heritable disease-related genotypes, mutations, phenotypes or karyotypes for clinical purposes. These purposes include:
      1. Predicting risk of disease;
      2. Identifying carriers;
      3. Establishing prenatal and clinical diagnosis or prognosis;
      4. Prenatal newborn and carrier screening; and
      5. Testing in high-risk families.
    2. Tests for metabolites are covered only when they are undertaken with high probability that an access of deficiency of the metabolite indicates the presence of heritable mutations in single genes.
    3. “Genetic testing” does not mean routine physical measurement, a routine chemical, blood, or urine analysis or a test for drugs or for infections, however, any genetic information, as defined in this section, revealed by such routine tests or examinations is subject to the provisions of this chapter.
  4. “Licensing agency” means a state agency or political subdivision that issues an occupational license.
  5. “Occupational license” means a license, certificate, registration, permit, or other form of authorization required by law or rule that must be obtained by an individual to engage in a particular business or occupation.
  6. “Person” includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
  7. “Political subdivision” means a municipality, county, or special district or authority. The term includes a school district.
  8. “State agency” means a department, board, bureau, commission, committee, division, office, council, or agency of state government.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 49, § 3.

28-6.7-3. Penalties for violations.

In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may:

  1. Award to a prevailing applicant or employee punitive damages in addition to any award of actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and
  2. Afford injunctive relief against any employer who commits or proposes to commit a violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 171, § 1.

28-6.7-4. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of it to any person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 171, § 1.

28-6.7-5. No waiver permitted.

Any contract or agreement, that purports to waive the provisions of this chapter, is null and void as being against public policy.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 49, § 3.

Chapter 6.8 Confidentiality of Employer/Employee Assistance Plans

28-6.8-1. Release of employee names prohibited.

No employer shall release the name, address, or otherwise breach the confidentiality of information obtained through an employee’s participation in an employer assistance program, except where the information is related to a crime that must otherwise be reported by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 344, § 1.

28-6.8-2. Penalties for violations.

In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may:

  1. Award to a prevailing plaintiff punitive damages in addition to any award of actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and
  2. Afford injunctive relief against any employer who commits or proposes to commit a violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 344, § 1.

Chapter 6.9 Tax and Income Information from Job Applicants

28-6.9-1. Requests for tax returns prohibited.

No employer or agent of any employer shall request or require any applicant for employment to provide copies of his or her federal or state income tax return, W-2 statement, or related tax documents as a condition of consideration for employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 269, § 1.

28-6.9-2. Penalties for violations.

In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may:

  1. Award to a prevailing applicant punitive damages in addition to any award of actual damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; and
  2. Afford injunctive relief against any employer or agent of any employer who commits or proposes to commit a violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 269, § 1.

Chapter 6.10 The Temporary Employee Protection Act

28-6.10-1. Statement of policy.

It is declared to be the public policy of this state to foster the employment of all individuals in the state including temporary employees working for any employment agency, placement service, training school or center, labor organization, or any other employee referring source and to safeguard their right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 445, § 1.

28-6.10-2. Definitions.

When used in the chapter:

  1. “Employment agency” includes any person undertaking with or without compensation to procure opportunities to work, or to procure, recruit, refer, or place employees.
  2. “Labor organization” includes any organization that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, terms of conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or protection in relation to employment.
  3. “Temporary employee” includes any person working for or obtaining employment pursuant to an agreement with any employment agency, placement service, training school or center, labor organization, or any other employee referring source.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 445, § 1.

28-6.10-3. Job description notification.

  1. Before any temporary employee is given any new job assignment regardless if the assignment is with the same contracting company, employment agencies shall provide the temporary employee with a copy of a written notice that includes a job description with classification requirements, estimated longevity of the assignment, information concerning any job hazards, anticipated pay rate, benefits, and work schedules. A copy of the job description shall be kept on file for a period of one year by the employment agency and be available to the employee.
  2. A notice of this law must be posted and maintained at all employment agencies where workers can view it.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 445, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 433, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 377, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 392, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 377, § 1, and P.L. 2009, ch. 392, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-6.10-4. Penalty for violations.

Upon determining that an employment agency has violated the provisions of § 28-6.10-3 , the department of labor and training shall send a written notice of the violation to the employment agency containing a description of the fines prescribed in this section. Any employment agency determined by the department to have committed a second violation of the provisions of § 28-6.10-3 , within five (5) years of the first violations, shall be subject to a five-hundred-dollar ($500) fine. Any employment agency determined by the department to have committed a third or subsequent violation of the provisions of § 28-6.10-3, within five (5) years of a previous violation, shall be subject to a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000). A violation occurring more than five (5) years from the date of a previous violation shall be considered a first violation.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 433, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 377, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 392, § 1.

Chapter 6.11 Employer Transportation Service Charge

28-6.11-1. Definitions.

When used in the chapter:

  1. Employee:   For the purpose of this chapter, employee shall be defined as any person working either full or part time for, or obtaining employment pursuant to an agreement with, any temporary placement staffing agency.
  2. Employer:   For the purpose of this chapter, employer shall be defined as any individual, company, corporation, partnership, limited-liability company or limited-liability partnership that operates as a temporary placement staffing agency. The term shall include any employment agency as defined in chapter 6.10 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 23, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 191, § 1.

28-6.11-2. Transportation service charge prohibited.

Except as otherwise provided in § 28-6.11-3 , no employer, as herein defined in § 28-6.11-1 , or agent of a temporary placement staffing agency shall:

  1. Require its employee to provide transportation to other employees as a condition of employment;
  2. Charge an employee for transport services provided to that employee; or
  3. Charge or collect fees from its employees for transportation services provided by other employees, the employer, or by a subcontracted transportation company.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 23, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 191, § 1.

28-6.11-3. Transportation activities not prohibited.

  1. Any employer as defined in § 28-6.11-1 may purchase public transportation bus passes and deduct not more than fifty percent (50%) of the actual cost of the bus pass from an employee’s total daily wages; provided, however, that employee participation in an employer public transportation bus pass program shall be strictly voluntary and shall require the express written authorization of the employee, in the employee’s primary language.
  2. Any employer, as defined in § 28-6.11-1 , may offer transportation services to an employee and charge a fee, payable to the employer only, for such services provided the amount charged is not more than the actual cost to transport such employee and the amount does not exceed three dollars ($3.00) per day. Employee participation in an employer transportation program shall be strictly voluntary and shall require the express written authorization of the employee, in the employee’s primary language.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 23, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 191, § 1.

28-6.11-4. Penalty.

Upon determining that a person or entity has violated this chapter, the director of the department of labor and training shall send a written notice of the violation along with a copy of this section. Upon a determination by the director that a subsequent violation of this chapter by a person or entity has occurred within three (3) years of the first violation, said person or entity shall be subject to a fine of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500). For a third violation within three (3) years, the fine may not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000). Any violations occurring more than three (3) years from the date of a previous violation shall be considered a first violation.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 23, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 191, § 1.

Chapter 6.12 Privacy in Private Spaces

28-6.12-1. Employee privacy protection.

  1. No employer may cause an audio or video recording to be made of an employee in a restroom, locker room, or room designated by an employer for employees to change their clothes, unless authorized by court order.
  2. No recording made in violation of this section may be used by an employer for any purpose.
  3. In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may:
    1. Award damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and cost to a prevailing plaintiff; and
    2. Afford injunctive relief against any employer that commits or proposes to commit a violation of this chapter.
  4. The rights and remedies provided herein shall be in addition to, and not supersede, any other rights and remedies provided by statute or common law.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 131, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 126, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 131, § 1, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Chapter 6.13 The Volunteer Firefighter and Emergency Technician Protection Act

28-6.13-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as “The Volunteer Firefighter and Emergency Technician Protection Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 114, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 119, § 1.

28-6.13-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Responding to an emergency” means responding to, working at the scene of, or returning from a fire, rescue, emergency medical service call, hazardous materials incident, or a natural or man-made disaster, where the emergency occurs during a period other than normal working hours of the employee; and
  2. “Volunteer member” means a volunteer, call, reserve, or permanent-intermittent firefighter or emergency medical technician, but shall not include any person who received compensation for over nine hundred seventy-five (975) hours of services rendered in such capacity over the preceding six (6) months.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 114, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 119, § 1.

28-6.13-3. Employment protection related to rendering of emergency assistance.

  1. Upon prompt notice by an employee, no employer shall discharge or take any other disciplinary action against any employee by reason of failure of that employee to report for work at the commencement of regular working hours wherein the failure is due to responding to an emergency in the capacity as a volunteer member of a fire department or ambulance department; provided, however, that no such employer shall be required to compensate any employee for any period of normal working hours for failure to report for work. At the request of an employer, an employee shall submit a statement signed by the chief of the appropriate fire department or ambulance department certifying the date and time the employee responded to and returned from the emergency. An employee shall inform the employer or immediate supervisor of all reasons for any failure to report to work as required.
  2. Any employee who is terminated or against whom any disciplinary action is taken in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be immediately reinstated to his or her former position without reduction of pay, seniority, or other benefits, and shall receive any lost pay or other benefits during any period for which the termination or other disciplinary action was in effect.
  3. An action to enforce the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one year of the date of the alleged violation in the superior court within the county wherein the action occurred, or wherein the employer resides or transacts business.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 114, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 119, § 1.

Chapter 6.14 Employment Applications Prohibited

28-6.14-1. Criminal history on application for employment.

  1. The director of labor and training shall have the same powers and duties as set forth in chapter 12 and chapter 14 of this title to investigate, inspect, subpoena, and enforce through administrative hearings, complaints that allege that an employer has included on any application for employment, except applications for law enforcement agency positions, or positions related to law enforcement agencies, a question inquiring whether the applicant has ever been arrested, charged with, or convicted of any crime; provided that:
    1. If a federal or state law or regulation creates a mandatory or presumptive disqualification from employment based on a person’s conviction of one or more specified criminal offenses, an employer may include a question whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any of those offenses; or
    2. If a standard fidelity bond or an equivalent bond is required for the position for which the applicant is seeking employment, and the applicant’s conviction of one or more specified criminal offenses would disqualify the applicant from obtaining such a bond, an employer may include a question whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any of those specified criminal offenses.
  2. The department of labor and training and the commission for human rights shall cooperate in the investigation of complaints filed under this section when the allegations are within the jurisdiction of both agencies.
  3. The department of labor and training shall disseminate information to employers and workers about the prohibitions prescribed in this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 402, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 431, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 402, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 431, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Chapter 7 Labor Relations Act

28-7-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited and referred to as the “Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-1 .

Law Reviews.

Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards in Rhode Island, see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 165 (1998).

Comparative Legislation.

Labor relations law:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-101 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150A, § 1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Employer’s duty to furnish information regarding financial status to employees’ representative under National Labor Relations Act. 106 A.L.R. Fed. 694.

Preemption, by § 301(a) of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)), of employee’s state-law action for infliction of emotional distress. 101 A.L.R. Fed. 395.

Suits by union members against union officers under 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). 114 A.L.R. Fed. 417.

What statute of limitations applies to state law action by public sector employee for breach of union’s duty of fair representation. 12 A.L.R.5th 950.

28-7-2. Policy of chapter.

  1. The economic necessity for employees to possess full freedom of association, actual liberty of contract, and bargaining power equal to that of their employers, who are frequently organized in corporate or other forms of association, has long been sanctioned by public opinion, and recognized and affirmed by legislatures and the highest courts. As the modern industrial system has progressed, there has developed between and among employees and employers an ever greater economic interdependence and community of interest which have become matters of vital public concern. Employers and employees have recognized that the peaceable practice and wholesome development of that relationship and interest are materially aided by the general adoption and advancement of the procedure and practice of bargaining collectively as between equals. It is in the public interest that equality of bargaining power be established and maintained. It is likewise recognized that the denial by some employers of the right of employees freely to organize and the resultant refusal to accept the procedure of collective bargaining substantially and adversely affect the interest of employees, other employers, and the public in general. This denial creates variations and instability in competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries and between employees and employers engaged in those industries, and by depressing the purchasing power of wage earners and the profits of business, tends to:
    1. Produce and aggravate recurrent business depressions;
    2. Increase the disparity between production and consumption;
    3. Create unemployment with its attendant dangers to the health, peace and morale of the people; and
    4. Increase public and private expenditures for relief of the needy and the unemployed.
  2. When some employers deny the right of employees to full freedom of association and organization, and refuse to recognize the practice and procedure of collective bargaining, their actions lead to strikes, lockouts, and other forms of industrial strife and unrest which are inimical to the public safety and welfare, and frequently endanger the public health.
  3. Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively removes certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, encourages practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and tends to restore equality of bargaining power between and among employers and employees, thereby advancing the interests of employers as well as employees.
  4. In the interpretation and application of this chapter and otherwise, it is declared to be the public policy of the state to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining, and to protect employees in the exercise of full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purposes of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid and protection, free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of their employers.
  5. All the provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of this purpose.
  6. This chapter shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, prosperity, health, and peace of the people of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Striking and Picketing.

The legislature intended to fully protect the rights of employees to strike and to picket by lawful means for lawful objects. Lindsey Tavern, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 307, 85 R.I. 61 , 125 A.2d 207, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1956).

Supervisory and Managerial Employees.

Superintendent of the Ladd School was unquestionably a supervisory and/or managerial employee and, as such, he was not protected under the State Labor Relations Act and could not be a member of a bargaining unit. State v. Local No. 2883, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 463 A.2d 186, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1034 (R.I. 1983).

Collateral References.

Right of public defenders to join collective bargaining unit. 108 A.L.R.5th 241.

28-7-3. Definitions.

When used in this chapter:

  1. “Board” means the labor relations board created by § 28-7-4 .
  2. “Company union” means any committee employee representation plan or association of employees which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances or terms and conditions of employment, which the employer has initiated or created or whose initiation or creation he or she has suggested, participated in or in the formulation of whose governing rules or policies or the conducting of whose management, operations, or elections the employer participates in or supervises, or which the employer maintains, finances, controls, dominates, or assists in maintaining or financing, whether by compensating any one for services performed in its behalf or by donating free services, equipment, materials, office or meeting space or anything else of value, or by any other means.
    1. “Employees” includes, but is not restricted to, any individual employed by a labor organization; any individual whose employment has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment; and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the chapter explicitly states otherwise;
    2. “Employees” does not include any individual employed by his or her parent or spouse or in the domestic service of any person in his or her home, or any individuals employed only for the duration of a labor dispute, or any individuals employed as farm laborers; provided that, any individual employed by an employer in an industry established or regulated pursuant to chapters 28.6 or 28.11 of title 21 shall be an employee within the meaning of this chapter and shall not be considered a farm laborer.
  3. “Employer” includes any person acting on behalf of or in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, with or without his or her knowledge, but a labor organization or any officer or its agent shall only be considered an employer with respect to individuals employed by the organization.
  4. “Labor dispute” includes, but is not restricted to, any controversy between employers and employees or their representatives as defined in this section concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to negotiate, fix, maintain, or change terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the violation of any of the rights granted or affirmed by this chapter, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
  5. “Labor organization” means any organization which exists and is constituted for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining, or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or protection and which is not a company union as defined in this section.
  6. “Person” includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
  7. “Policies of this chapter” means the policies set forth in § 28-7-2 .
  8. “Representatives” includes a labor organization or an individual whether or not employed by the employer of those whom he or she represents.
  9. “Unfair labor practice” means only those unfair labor practices listed in §§ 28-7-13 and 28-7-13 .1.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-3 ; P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 1; P.L. 2022, ch. 31, § 9, effective May 25, 2022; P.L. 2022, ch. 32, § 9, effective May 25, 2022.

Collateral References.

Increase, or promise of increase, or withholding of increase, of wages as unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act. 137 A.L.R. Fed. 333.

Nonprofit hospitals or other charitable institutions as within contemplation of labor relations acts. 26 A.L.R.2d 1020.

What is a “labor organization” within the provisions of federal Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)) making it unfair labor practice for employer to interfere with labor organization. 75 A.L.R. Fed. 262.

28-7-4. Labor relations board — Creation — Appointment, qualifications, terms, and removal of members.

  1. There is created in the department of labor and training a board to be known as the Rhode Island state labor relations board which shall be composed of seven (7) members who shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. Each member of the board at the time of appointment shall be a citizen of the United States and a resident of the state of Rhode Island, and shall be a qualified elector in the state. Three (3) members of the board shall be representatives of labor, three (3) members shall represent management, including at least one representative of local government, and one member shall be a representative of the public generally.
  2. [Deleted by P.L. 2022, ch. 222, § 1 and P.L. 2022, ch. 310, § 1.]
  3. The members of the board shall be appointed for terms of six (6) years each, except that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed for the unexpired term of the member whom the newly appointed member succeeds.
  4. The governor shall designate one member to serve as chairperson of the board.
  5. Any member of the board may be removed by the governor for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misconduct, or malfeasance in office, and for no other cause, after being given a copy of the charges and an opportunity to be publicly heard in person or by counsel.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-4 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 226, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 30; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 30; P.L. 2022, ch. 222, § 1, effective June 30, 2022; P.L. 2022, ch. 310, § 1, effective July 5, 2022.

28-7-5. Quorum of board — Seal.

A vacancy in the board does not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the powers of the board, and two (2) members of the board, at all times, constitutes a quorum. The board may adopt an official seal and prescribe the purposes for which it is used.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-5 .

28-7-6. Annual report of board — Opinions.

The board shall at the end of every year make a report in writing to the director of labor and training, stating in detail the work it has done in hearing and deciding cases and otherwise. It shall sign and report in full an opinion in every case decided by it. The director shall include the report in his or her annual report to the governor.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-6 .

28-7-7. Compensation and expenses of members — Provision of assistance.

The compensation for members of the board shall be established by the unclassified pay plan board. The director of labor and training is authorized and directed to provide the board with any clerical, legal, and other assistance that shall be necessary to permit the board to perform its duties as provided in this chapter. The reasonable and necessary traveling and other expenses of the members of the board while actually engaged in the performance of their duties shall be paid from the state treasury upon the audit and warrant of the controller, upon vouchers approved by the director of labor and training and the chairperson. The board shall have the authority to select its own legal counsel consistent with available funds and the counsel shall work at the direction of the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; P.L. 1942, ch. 1247, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1946, § 1; P.L. 1948, ch. 2014, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-7 ; P.L. 1967, ch. 83, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 355, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 428, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 226, § 1.

28-7-8. Place of board meetings — Conduct of proceedings by members or agents.

The board may meet and exercise any or all of its powers at any place within the state. The board may, by one or more of its members or by any agents or agencies that it may designate, conduct in any part of this state any proceedings, hearing, investigation, inquiry, or election necessary to the performance of its functions. A member who participates in these proceedings shall not be disqualified from subsequently participating in a decision of the board in the same case.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-8 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 45, § 1.

28-7-9. Rules and regulations.

  1. The board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind any rules and regulations that may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter including the determination of the life of the selected representatives. The rules and regulations shall be effective upon publication in the manner that the board prescribes.
  2. The rules and regulations for state and municipal employees shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
    1. The board shall require a labor organization to submit cards of interest signed by at least thirty percent (30%) of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit indicating a desire to be represented by the labor organization so designated. Cards of interest signed by at least twenty percent (20%) of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit shall be required to intervene. The board shall certify the authenticity of all cards of interest submitted.
    2. The board shall not consider a petition for representation whenever it appears that a collective bargaining agreement is in existence; provided, that the board may consider a petition within a thirty-day (30) period immediately preceding sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement.
    3. A petition for unit clarification may be filed at any time with the board by:
      1. An exclusive bargaining agent;
      2. The applicable municipality; or
      3. The state where appropriate.
    4. In addition to the provisions of § 28-7-22 , the board is empowered to order complete relief upon a finding of any unfair labor practice.
    5. All charges of unfair labor practices and petitions for unit classification shall be informally heard by the board within thirty (30) days upon receipt of the charges. Within sixty (60) days of the charges or petition the board shall hold a formal hearing. A final decision shall be rendered by the board within sixty (60) days after the hearing on the charges or petition is completed and a transcript of the hearing is received by the board.
  3. Insofar as the provisions of this section are inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 11 of title 36 and chapter 9.4 of this title, the provisions of this section are controlling.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent or limit the board or its agents by direction of the board, consistent with published rules and regulations, from dismissing, after investigation and informal hearings, the unfair labor practices charge. All unit classification petitions shall receive a formal hearing if requested by either party. The board or its agents shall maintain a written record of any dismissals.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-9 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 360, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 495, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 283 § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 440, § 1.

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

There is no conflict between the provisions of §§ 28-7-9(b)(5) and 28-7-9(d) , since the latter does not prevent or limit the labor relations board from considering unfair labor practice charges and unit classification petitions after investigation and informal hearings, and it is unequivocally clear that it is only in the event that the board’s preliminary decision is to prosecute the charge or grant the petition that a formal hearing be required. Local 400, Int'l Fed'n of Tech. & Prof'l Eng'rs v. Rhode Island State Labor Rels. Bd., 747 A.2d 1002, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2000).

28-7-10. Mediation in labor disputes by board.

Neither the board nor any of its agents or employees shall engage in any effort to mediate, conciliate, or arbitrate any labor dispute, but nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the board, its agents, or employees from engaging in any effort to obtain voluntary adjustments and compliance with the terms and provisions of this chapter and in accordance with its purposes and policy. Provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the board, its agents, or employees from arbitrating labor disputes that do not originate before the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-10 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 428, § 1.

Cross References.

Mediation and conciliation of labor controversies, § 28-10-1 .

28-7-11. Board’s independence from department of labor and training.

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, neither the director of labor and training nor any board or other agency of the department of labor and training shall in any way direct, review, modify, or reverse any decision or finding of the board; nor shall the director of labor and training or any board or other agency of the department of labor and training supervise or control the board in the exercise of any powers or in the performance of any duties under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-11 .

28-7-12. Rights of employees.

Employees shall have the right of self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations; to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection free from interference, restraint, or coercion from any source. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted to prohibit employees and employers from conferring with each other at any time; provided, that during that conference there is no attempt by the employer, directly or indirectly, to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-12 .

Cross References.

Collective bargaining rights preserved in minimum wage law, § 28-12-22 .

Enforceability of arbitration agreements, § 28-9-1 et seq.

Enforcement of collective bargaining contracts, § 28-8-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Labor Relations Board Hearing.

Where town school committee rejected recommendations of mediator pertaining to contract and union and custodians employed by that school committee brought charges of unfair labor practices under Municipal Employers’ Arbitration Act, state labor relations board had exclusive initial jurisdiction to hear those charges and superior court had no jurisdiction to enjoin school committee from discharging custodians while matter was pending before the board. Paton v. Poirier, 109 R.I. 401 , 286 A.2d 243, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1199 (1972).

Right to Union Representation.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-4 of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights superseded R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-7-12 of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act; thus, a police officer was not entitled to union representation during an interrogation for a police officer’s misconduct, only the right to have an attorney of choice. Town of N. Kingstown v. Local 473, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, N.A.G.E., 819 A.2d 1274, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. 2003).

Collateral References.

Construction of Freedom of Speech and Assembly Provisions of § 101(a)(2) of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)), included in Bill of Rights of Member of Labor Organizations. 143 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Employer’s duty to furnish wage information to employees’ representative under National Labor Relations Act. 112 A.L.R. Fed. 81.

Interference with production by concerted action of employees, short of formal strike, as affected by labor relations acts. 25 A.L.R.2d 315.

Job placement of returning strikers as unfair labor practice under § 8(a) of National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)). 145 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

Procedural rights of union members in union disciplinary proceedings — modern state cases. 79 A.L.R.4th 941.

Right of public defenders to join collective bargaining unit. 108 A.L.R.5th 241.

Union security arrangements in state public employment. 95 A.L.R.3d 1102.

Vacation pay rights of private employees not covered by collective labor contract. 33 A.L.R.4th 264.

28-7-13. Unfair labor practices.

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to:

  1. Spy on or keep under surveillance, whether directly or through agents or any other person, any activities of employees or their representatives in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by § 28-7-12 ;
  2. Prepare, maintain, distribute, or circulate any blacklist of individuals for the purpose of preventing any of the individuals from obtaining or retaining employment because of the exercise of the individuals of any of the rights guaranteed by § 28-7-12 ;
  3. Dominate or interfere with the formation, existence, or administration of any employee organization or association, agency, or plan that exists in whole or in part for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning terms or conditions of employment, labor disputes, or grievances, or to contribute financial or other support to any such organization, by any means, including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. By participating or assisting in, supervising, controlling, or dominating:
      1. The initiation or creation of any employee organization or association, agency, or plan; or
      2. The meetings, management, operation, elections, formulation, or amendment of constitution, rules, or policies of any employee organization or association, agency or plan;
    2. By urging the employees to join any employee organization or association, agency, or plan for the purpose of encouraging membership in the organization or association; or
    3. By compensating any employee or individual for services performed in behalf of any employee organization or association, agency, or plan, or by donating free services, equipment, materials, office or meeting space, or anything else of value for the use of any employee organization or association, agency, or plan; provided, that an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him or her during working hours without loss of time or pay;
  4. Require an employee or one seeking employment, as a condition of employment, to join any company union or to refrain from forming, or joining, or assisting a labor organization of his or her own choosing;
  5. Encourage membership in any company union or discourage membership in any labor organization, by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or in any term or condition of employment; provided that nothing in this chapter precludes an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization requiring membership in that labor organization as a condition of employment, if that labor organization is the representative of employees as provided in §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 ;
  6. Refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of employees, subject to the provisions of §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 , except that the refusal to bargain collectively with any representative is not, unless a certification with respect to the representative is in effect under §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 , an unfair labor practice in any case where any other representative, other than a company union, has made a claim that it represents a majority of the employees in a conflicting bargaining unit;
  7. Refuse to discuss grievances with representatives of employees, subject to the provisions of §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 ;
  8. Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he or she has signed or filed any affidavit, petition, or complaint or given any information or testimony under this chapter;
  9. Distribute or circulate any blacklist of individuals exercising any right created or confirmed by this chapter or of members of a labor organization, or to inform any person of the exercise by any individual of that right, or of the membership of any individual in a labor organization for the purpose of preventing individuals so blacklisted or so named from obtaining or retaining employment;
  10. Do any acts, other than those already enumerated in this section, that interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by § 28-7-12 ; and
  11. Fail to implement an arbitrator’s award unless there is a stay of its implementation by a court of competent jurisdiction or upon the removal of the stay.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-13 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 126, § 1.

Cross References.

Improper influence in elections, § 17-23-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Waiver.

Union waived its right to bargain with a town regarding a police chief’s general order concerning police officers requirement to report and support claims when they were injured on duty because, after meeting with union officials regarding the issue, the union did not request bargaining regarding it and the town did not indicate that it was unwilling to bargain as to the issue. Town of Burrillville v. R.I. State Labor Rels. Bd., 921 A.2d 113, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 2007).

Union waived its right to bargain with a town regarding a police chief’s general order concerning police officers requirement to report and support claims when they were injured on duty and a union official’s subjective belief that the parties would meet again to discuss the order did not amount to competent evidence, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(g) , that the union did not waive its right to bargain. Town of Burrillville v. R.I. State Labor Rels. Bd., 921 A.2d 113, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 2007).

A period of one week between a police chief’s meeting with the union officials and his implementation of a general order was reasonable, under the circumstances, as it was enough time for the union to request bargaining. Town of Burrillville v. R.I. State Labor Rels. Bd., 921 A.2d 113, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 2007).

Collateral References.

Breach of a collective labor contract as an unfair labor practice. 30 A.L.R.3d 431.

Construction of Freedom of Speech and Assembly Provisions of § 101(a)(2) of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)), included in Bill of Rights of Member of Labor Organizations. 143 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Discrimination between union members and nonmembers as to wage increases, vacations, and the like. 41 A.L.R.2d 654.

Increase, or promise of increase, or withholding of increase, of wages as unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act. 137 A.L.R. Fed. 333.

Job placement of returning strikers as unfair labor practice under § 8(a) of National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)). 145 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

“Mass discharge” of employees as evidence of unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1) and (3) of National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3)). 137 A.L.R. Fed. 445.

Validity, construction, and operation of state blacklisting statutes. 95 A.L.R.5th 1.

What constitutes unfair labor practice under state public employee relations acts. 9 A.L.R.4th 20.

28-7-13.1. Unfair labor practices — Public sector employee organizations.

It shall be an unfair labor practice for public sector employee organizations, their agents, or representatives to:

  1. Refuse to meet and bargain collectively with a public employer if the labor organization is the exclusive agent for the public employees in the certified bargaining unit.
  2. Fail to negotiate or bargain in good faith with the duly authorized representatives of the public employer.
  3. Avoid or refuse to comply with any statutory impasse procedures as may be provided in chapters 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 2.

28-7-14. Exclusive representation of employees.

Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for those purposes, or by the majority of the employees voting in an election conducted pursuant to §§ 28-7-15 28-7-19 , shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment; provided, that employees, directly or through representatives, shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Union’s Loss of Representative Status.

Union which struck in violation of contract lost its standing as bargaining agent and employer was free to bargain with any other union chosen by employees. McGee v. Local 682, Bhd. of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 70 R.I. 200 , 38 A.2d 303, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1944).

28-7-15. Determination of bargaining unit.

The board shall decide in each case whether, in order to ensure to employees the full benefit of their right to self organization, to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this chapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or any other unit provided, that in any case where the majority of employees of a particular craft make that decision, the board shall designate the craft as a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-15 .

Collateral References.

Who are supervisors for purposes of bargaining-unit determinations in state public employment labor relations. 96 A.L.R.3d 723.

28-7-16. Controversies as to representation.

  1. Whenever it is alleged by an employee or his or her representative that there is a question or controversy concerning the representation of employees, the board shall investigate the question or controversy and certify in writing to all persons concerned the name or names of the representatives who have been designated or selected.
  2. Whenever it is alleged by an employer or his or her representative that there is a question or controversy concerning the representation of employees, the board shall investigate the question or controversy after a public hearing held upon due notice.
  3. In any investigation the board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under §§ 28-7-21 28-7-25 or otherwise, and may conduct an election by secret ballot of employees, or use any other suitable method to ascertain the representatives either before or after the hearing; provided, that the board does not have authority to investigate any question or controversy between individuals or groups within the same labor organization or between labor organizations affiliated with the same parent labor organization.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Certification Proceeding.

Employer is not bound by certification based on an error of law in a certification proceeding initiated by a union. McGee v. Local 682, Bhd. of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 70 R.I. 200 , 38 A.2d 303, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1944).

Review Under Administrative Procedures Act.

The determination by the state labor relations board that the secretary to the business manager for a school committee should be included in the collective bargaining unit for all secretaries employed by the school committee stemmed from a “contested case” under the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and could be appealed directly to the superior court pursuant to the APA’s provisions for judicial review where there was no opportunity to moot the order through a subsequent representation election because the ruling was in the nature of a post-election challenge. The pre-APA method for securing review of a certification order described in Local 494, Mutual Race Track Employees v. Kelley, 89 R.I. 128 , 151 A.2d 374 (1959), is no longer applicable in light of the APA’s enactment. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1992).

Waiver.

In a dispute concerning the certification of a collective bargaining unit, the school committee did not waive any right to challenge on appeal the state labor board’s inclusion of the position of secretary to the business manager within the bargaining unit by entering into contract negotiations with the union. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1992).

28-7-17. Eligibility to participate in elections — Place and supervision of elections.

The board shall have the power to determine who may participate in the election and to establish the rules governing the election; provided, that no election shall be directed by the board solely because of the request of an employer or of employees prompted to do so by their employer, nor shall any individuals employed only for the duration of a strike or lockout be eligible to vote in the election; and provided, further, that no election shall be conducted under the employer’s supervision, or, except as may be required by the board, on the employer’s property, during working hours, or with his or her participation or assistance.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-17 .

28-7-18. Runoff elections — Term of certification as bargaining representative.

If at an election conducted pursuant to §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 , three (3) or more nominees for exclusive collective bargaining representatives appear on the ballot and no one of them receives a majority of the votes cast at the election, the two (2) nominees who received the highest number of votes shall appear on the ballot of a second election to be conducted under these provisions and the one receiving a majority of the votes cast at the second election shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this chapter, any certification as to the bargaining representatives made pursuant to an election conducted under §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 shall be effective for one year from the date of the election.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-18 .

28-7-19. Unions listed on ballot — Company unions.

A labor organization nominated as the representative of employees shall be listed by name on the ballots authorized by § 28-7-16 . In any investigation conducted by the board pursuant to §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 , the board may make a finding as to whether any committee, employee representation plan, or association of employees involved is a company union, and if any committee, employee representation plan, or association of employees is found to be a company union, it shall not be listed on the ballots, certified, or otherwise recognized as eligible to be the representative of employees under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-19 .

28-7-19.1. Mergers and consolidations of companies.

  1. No business combination transaction shall result in the termination or impairment of the provisions of any labor contract covering persons engaged in employment in the state negotiated by a labor organization or by a collective bargaining agent or other representative. Notwithstanding a business combination transaction, the labor contract shall continue in effect until its termination date or until otherwise agreed by the parties to the contract or their legal successors.
  2. As used in this section, the following words, unless the context clearly required otherwise, have the following meanings:
    1. “Business combination transaction” means any merger or consolidation, any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition, in one transaction or a series of transactions, whether of all or substantially all the property and assets, including its good will, of the business operations that are the subject of the labor contract referred to in subsection (a) of this section or any transfer of a controlling interest in the business operations;
      1. “Employment” means an individual’s entire service, if the service is localized in the state. Service is deemed to be localized in the state if:
        1. The service is performed entirely within the state; or
        2. The service is performed both within and without the state but the service performed without the state is incidental to the individual’s service within the state;
        1. Employment shall include an individual’s service, performed within and without the state, if the service is not localized in any state, but some of the service is performed in the state; and
        2. The individual’s base of operation is in the state; or
        3. If there is no base operations, then the place for which the service is directed or controlled is in the state; or
        4. The individual’s base of operations or place from which the service is directed or controlled is not in any state in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual’s residence is in the state.
  3. In the event that any employee is denied or fails to receive wage, benefits, or wage supplements as a result of a violation of this section, the employee shall have available civil and other remedies available at law or equity. The department of labor and training may take any and all appropriate actions to enforce the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to, injunctions, cease and desist orders, and other penalties provided by law.
  4. Recovery pursuant to a violation of this section shall be applicable to secure recovery against the merged, consolidated, or resulting corporation or other successor employer, notwithstanding anything contained in this section or elsewhere to the contrary.
  5. This section is enacted in order to protect the employment interests of all persons engaged in employment in the state under existing labor contracts and shall be liberally construed in every case in order to achieve that purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 138, § 2.

Collateral References.

Employer’s duty to furnish information regarding financial status to employees’ representative under National Labor Relations Act. 106 A.L.R. Fed. 694.

28-7-19.2. Standards of corporate behavior.

  1. As used in this section, the following words, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, have the following meanings:
    1. “Control” means the beneficial ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of a control transferor; provided, that for the purposes of making percentage calculations, outstanding voting securities includes any voting stock underlying convertible securities.
    2. “Control transferee” means the person or persons who assume control following a transfer of control as defined in subsection (a)(8).
    3. “Control transferor” means the person or persons who exercise control, including the power of hire and fire, before a transfer of control as defined in subsection (a)(8); provided, however, that the person or persons are either:
      1. A corporation to which the provisions of chapters 1.1 and 5.2 of Title 7 apply, a gas or electric company or combined gas and electric company subject to the provisions of chapter 1 of title 39, or an association or trust which pursuant to chapter 1 of title 39 owns beneficially a majority of the common stock of that company; provided, that the corporation employ fifty (50) or more full-time employees, or employees working aggregate hours equal to the sum of hours worked by fifty (50) full-time employees, and has fifty (50) or more shareholders, in the state at some point in the twelve (12) calendar months prior to the transfer of control.
      2. A foreign corporation established, organized, or chartered under laws other than those of this state; provided, that the corporation employs fifty (50) or more full-time employees, or employees working aggregate hours equal to the sum of hours worked by fifty (50) full-time employees, and has fifty (50) or more shareholders, in the state at some point in the twelve (12) calendar months prior to the transfer of control; and provided further, that the corporation is not an out of state banking association or banking corporation or insurance company authorized to transact business in the state.
    4. “Department” means the department of labor and training.
    5. “Director” means the director of the department of labor and training.
    6. “Employee” means any person employed for hire by an employer in any lawful employment.
    7. “Termination of employment” means the involuntary termination of an employee’s employment consistent with the eligibility standards for unemployment benefits under chapter 44 of this title.
    8. “Transfer of control” means a transaction or series of transactions as a result of which any person is or becomes the “beneficial owner,” directly or indirectly, of securities of a control transferor representing fifty percent (50%) or more of the control transferor’s then outstanding voting securities; provided, that a change in control will not be deemed to have occurred solely because of the acquisition of securities as a control transferor, or any related reporting requirements under chapter 11 of title 7, by an employee benefit plan maintained by the control transferor for its employees.
    9. “Weekly compensation” means an employee’s base compensation in effect on the last payroll period ending prior to the transfer of control for eligible employees pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or the time of termination of employment for eligible employees pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
    10. “Year of service” means each full year during which the employee has been employed by the control transferor as defined in subsection (a)(3) of this section.
  2. Any employee of a control transferor whose employment is terminated within twenty-four (24) calendar months after the transfer of control of his or her employer is entitled to a one-time lump sum payment from the control transferee equal to the product of twice his or her weekly compensation multiplied by each completed year of service. This severance pay to eligible employees shall be in addition to any final wage payment to the employee and shall be made within one regular pay period after the employee’s last day of work.
  3. Any employee of a control transferor whose employment is terminated within the shorter of the following periods prior to a control transfer: (i) Twelve (12) calendar months, or (ii) The period of time between which the control transferee obtained a five percent (5%) interest in the voting securities of the control transferor and consummated a control transfer by obtaining a fifty percent (50%) or greater interest pursuant to subsection (a)(8) of this section, is entitled to a one-time lump sum payment from the control transferee equal to the product of twice his or her weekly compensation multiplied by each completed year of service. This severance pay to eligible employees shall be in addition to any final wage payment to the employee and shall be made within four (4) regular pay periods after the transfer of control.
  4. There shall be no liability for the one-time payment to an otherwise eligible employee if:
    1. The employee is covered by an express contract providing for payment in the event of termination of employment equal to or in excess of that provided by this section;
    2. The employee has been employed by the control transferor for less than three (3) years;
    3. A transfer of control as defined in subsection (a)(8) of this section is the result of the transfer of securities or the beneficial interest in it, directly or indirectly, by sale, gift, bequest, or otherwise, in one transaction or a series of transactions, between:
      1. An individual and that individual’s spouse;
      2. An individual and that individual’s sibling or the sibling’s spouse;
      3. An individual and that individual’s lineal descendants or their spouses;
      4. An individual or a fiduciary who holds the securities or the beneficial interest therein for the benefit of any of the foregoing persons; or
    4. The control transferee obtained control through enforcement of rights under pledge or other security interest created in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing the purposes of this chapter or as a result of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, receivership, bankruptcy, enforcement by judicial process, or other similar proceeding, including a transferee obtaining its interest from the person enforcing those rights or in connection with that proceeding.
  5. Upon assuming control, the control transferee shall be responsible for providing written notice to each employee of the control transferor and the collective bargaining representative or representatives, if any, of the rights of employees under this section within thirty (30) days of completion of a transfer of control. The control transferee shall also provide written notice to the department that a control has occurred. The department shall assess a fine in an amount up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for failure to provide the notification.
  6. In the event any eligible employee is denied a lump sum payment as a result of a violation of this section, the employee shall have available all private civil and other remedies at law or equity. The department of labor and training may take any and all appropriate actions to enforce the provisions of this section.
  7. For the purposes of determining eligibility under subsections (b) and (c) of this section, all determinations shall be as of the date of control transfer occurs unless specifically stated otherwise.
  8. The director may promulgate any regulations that may be required for the implementation of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 138, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Preemption.

An examination of the state’s unemployment benefits laws demonstrated that compliance with the tin parachute statute would require employers to assume ongoing administrative obligations that would result in the kind of employee benefit plan preempted by the federal retirement income security statute. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1468 v. Imperial Home Decor Group, 76 F. Supp. 2d 179, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18650 (D.R.I. 1999).

28-7-20. Power of board to prevent unfair practices.

The board is empowered and directed, as provided in this chapter, to prevent any employer, or public sector employee organization as provided in § 28-7-13.1 , from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This power shall not be affected or impaired by any means of adjustment, mediation, or conciliation in labor disputes that have been or may be established by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-20 ; P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 1.

28-7-21. Complaints of unfair practices — Parties to proceedings — Rules of evidence.

Whenever a charge has been made that any employer or public sector employee organization, as provided in § 28-7-13.1 , has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice, the board shall have the power to issue and cause to be served upon the party a complaint stating those charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing before the board at a place fixed in the complaint, to be held not less than seven (7) days after the serving of the complaint. Any complaint may be amended by the board or its agent conducting the hearing at any time prior to the issuance of an order based on the complaint. The person complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint within five (5) days after the service of the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise to give testimony at the place and time set in the complaint. In the discretion of a member or agent conducting the hearing, or of the board, any other person may be allowed to intervene in the proceedings and to present testimony. In any proceeding the board or its agent is not bound by technical rules of evidence prevailing in the courts.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 7; P.L. 1942, ch. 1247, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-21 ; P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Labor Relations Board Jurisdiction.

Where town school committee rejected recommendations of mediator pertaining to contract and union and custodians employed by that school committee brought charges of unfair labor practices under Municipal Employers’ Arbitration Act, state labor relations board had exclusive initial jurisdiction to hear those charges and superior court had no jurisdiction to enjoin school committee from discharging custodians while matter was pending before the board. Paton v. Poirier, 109 R.I. 401 , 286 A.2d 243, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1199 (1972).

28-7-22. Testimony at hearing — Decision and orders.

  1. The testimony shall be taken at the hearing and the board in its discretion may upon notice take further testimony or hear argument. The testimony so taken or heard shall not be reduced to writing unless an appeal is taken as provided in this chapter by an aggrieved party or unless a transcript is required for proceedings in the superior court.
    1. If upon all the testimony taken the board determines that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice, the board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the respondent an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice, and to take any further affirmative or other action that will effectuate the policies of this chapter, including, but not limited to:
      1. Withdrawal of recognition from and refraining from bargaining collectively with any employee organization or association, agency, or plan defined in this chapter as a company union, or established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this chapter as an unfair labor practice;
      2. Awarding of back pay;
      3. Reinstatement with or without back pay of any employee discriminated against in violation of § 28-7-13 , or maintenance of a preferential list from which the employee shall be returned to work; and
      4. Reinstatement with or without back pay of all employees whose work has ceased or whose return to work has been delayed or prevented as the result of the aforementioned or any other unfair labor practice in respect to any employee or employees or maintenance of a preferential list from which the employees shall be returned to work.
    2. The order may further require the person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which the order has been complied with.
  2. If upon all the testimony the board is of the opinion that the person or persons named in the complaint have not engaged in or are not engaging in any unfair labor practice, the board shall make its findings of fact and issue an order dismissing the complaint.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 7; P.L. 1942, ch. 1247, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-22 .

Collateral References.

Additions to back pay awards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.). 146 A.L.R. Fed. 403.

28-7-23. Modification of findings and orders.

Until a transcript of the record in a case has been filed in a court, as provided in this chapter, the board may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in any manner that it deems proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-23 .

28-7-24. Discontinuance of strike or other activity as condition of board action.

The board shall not require as a condition of taking action or issuing any order under this chapter that employees on strike or engaged in any other lawful, concerted activity shall discontinue that strike or that activity.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-24 .

28-7-25. Expedition of proceedings.

The board shall consider all complaints or petitions filed with it and conduct all proceedings under this chapter with all possible expedition.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-25 .

28-7-26. Judicial enforcement of orders.

  1. The board shall have the power to petition the superior court of the state within the county where the unfair labor practice in question occurred or where any person charged with the unfair labor practice resides or transacts business. If that court is on vacation or in recess, then the board may petition to the superior court of any county adjoining the county where the unfair labor practice in question occurred or where any person charged with the unfair labor practice resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of the order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. The board shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, including the pleadings and testimony upon which the order was made and the findings and order of the board.
  2. Upon the filing, the court shall cause notice of the filing to be served on the person, and at that time shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined in the proceeding. The court shall have the power to grant any temporary relief or restraining order that it deems just and proper, and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in the transcript a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside, in whole or in part, the order of the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-26 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Consolidation on Appeal.

All complaints or petitions filed in the superior court that are related to a particular representation controversy are to be consolidated at the time that the first such complaint or petition is heard by the court. At such a consolidated hearing the court is to decide on the merits all of the questions presented in the pertinent complaints or petitions; these determinations shall have a preclusive effect on any similar or substantially related issues that may arise later. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1992).

Examples.

The labor relations board may require a school committee to sign a written agreement formalizing a prior oral agreement reached by the parties at the bargaining table and, upon their refusal, petition the superior court for a decree enforcing that order. Warren Educ. Ass'n v. Lapan, 103 R.I. 163 , 235 A.2d 866, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 592 (1967).

Review.

Town school committee may file a complaint in superior court against the state labor relations board seeking review of an order of the board. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 120 R.I. 470 , 388 A.2d 1369, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 702 (1978).

28-7-27. Proceedings in judicial hearing.

No objection that has not been urged before the board, its member, agent, or agency shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge the objection is excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. If either party applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order the additional evidence to be taken before the board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the transcript. The board may modify its finding as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file the modified or new findings, that, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-27 .

28-7-28. Jurisdiction of court — Appeal to supreme court.

The jurisdiction of the superior court shall be exclusive and its judgment shall be final, except that the judgment shall be subject to review by the supreme court on appeal by either party, irrespective of the nature of the judgment or the amount involved. The appeal shall be taken and prosecuted in the same manner and form and with the same effect as is provided in other cases of appeal to the supreme court. The certified record shall contain all that was before the superior court, and the order of the superior court shall for all purposes, including appeal to the supreme court, be deemed to be a final order in a special proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 8; P.L. 1942, ch. 1247, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-28 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Administrative Procedures Act.

Section 42-35-17 does not supplant the statutory procedure for the enforcement of orders of the labor relations board in §§ 28-7-26 to 28-7-28 . Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd. v. Valley Falls Fire Dist., 505 A.2d 1170, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 431 (R.I. 1986).

28-7-29. Appeal from decision of board.

  1. Any person aggrieved by a final decision of the board, or a final order of the board, granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of the final decision or final order in the superior court of the county where the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or where the person resides or transacts business, by filing in the superior court, within thirty (30) days after the final decision or final order is given by the board, a complaint requesting that the final decision or final order of the board be modified or set aside. If that court is on vacation or in recess, then the person may file to the superior court of any county adjoining the county where the unfair labor practice in question occurred or where the person resides or transacts business.
  2. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the board, and thereupon the aggrieved person shall file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, certified by the board, including the pleading and testimony and order of the board. Upon the filing, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the board under §§ 28-7-20 28-7-25 , and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction to grant to the board any temporary relief or restraining order that it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the final decision or final order of the board. The findings of the board as to the facts shall be conclusive.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 8; P.L. 1942, ch. 1247, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-29 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Certification Proceeding.

An employer may not appeal from certification in proceeding initiated by a union, so it is not bound thereby where the certification was based on an error of law. McGee v. Local 682, Bhd. of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 70 R.I. 200 , 38 A.2d 303, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1944).

28-7-30. Board’s order not stayed by judicial proceedings.

The commencement of proceedings under §§ 28-7-26 and 28-7-29 shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the board’s order.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-30 .

28-7-31. Court not limited by equity jurisdiction.

When granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order, or making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part an order of the board, as provided in §§ 28-7-26 28-7-30 , the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by acts pertaining to equity jurisdiction of courts.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-31 .

28-7-32. Expedition of judicial proceedings.

Petitions filed under this chapter shall be heard expeditiously and shall be considered and determined upon the transcript filed, without requirement of printing. Upon the filing of a record in the superior court, the case shall be heard with greatest possible expedition, and shall take precedence over all other matters except matters of the same character.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-32 .

28-7-33. Access of board to evidence — Subpoena power — Oaths and affirmations.

For the purpose of all hearings and investigations that, in the opinion of the board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by §§ 28-7-14 28-7-25 , the board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination and the right to examine, copy, or photograph any evidence, including payrolls or list of employees, of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. Any member of the board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under investigation or in question before the board, its member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or investigation. Any member of the board, or any agent or agency designated by the board for these purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-33 .

28-7-34. Taking of depositions.

If any witness resides outside of the state, or through illness or other cause is unable to testify before the board or its member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or investigation, his or her testimony or deposition may be taken within or without this state, in any manner and in any form that the board or its member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing may by special order or general rule, prescribe.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-34 .

28-7-35. Judicial enforcement of subpoena.

In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, the superior court of any county within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which the person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the board, shall have jurisdiction to issue to the person an order requiring the person to appear before the board, its member, agent, or agency, to produce evidence if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question. Any failure to obey an order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-35 .

28-7-36. Privilege against self-incrimination.

No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to the subpoena of the board on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him or her may tend to incriminate him or her or subject him or her to a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of the state. No individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he or she is, after having claimed his or her privilege against self-incrimination, compelled to testify or produce evidence, except that the individual testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in testifying.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-36 .

28-7-37. Service of process of board — Witness fees.

Complaints, orders, and other process and papers of the board, its member, agent, or agency may be served either personally or by registered or certified mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual serving the process setting forth the manner of the service shall be proof of the service, and the return post office receipt or telegraph receipt when registered or certified and mailed or telegraphed shall be proof of service of the process. Witnesses summoned before the board, its member, agent, or agency shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of this state, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the person taking the depositions shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 9; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-37 .

28-7-38. Service of judicial process.

All process of any court to which application may be made under this chapter may be served in the county where the person or persons required to be served reside or may be found.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-38 .

28-7-39. Furnishing of public records.

The several departments, commissions, divisions, authorities, boards, bureaus, agencies, and officers of the state or any political subdivision or agency of the state shall furnish the board, upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-39 .

28-7-40. Penalty for violations.

Any person who willfully resists, prevents, impedes, or interferes with any member of the board or any of its agents or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this chapter, or who in any manner interferes with the free exercise by employees of their right to select representatives in an election directed by the board pursuant to §§ 28-7-14 28-7-19 , shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-40 .

28-7-41. Records of proceedings.

Subject to rules and regulations to be made by the board, the complaints, orders, and testimony relating to a proceeding instituted by the board under §§ 28-7-20 28-7-25 may be made public records and be made available for inspection and copying. All proceedings pursuant to §§ 28-7-20 28-7-25 shall be open to the public.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-41 .

28-7-42. Budget estimates — Expenditures.

Prior to the fifteenth (15th) day of November of each year, the director of labor and training shall submit to the director of administration for his or her approval an estimated budget of the administrative expenses of the state labor relations board for the ensuing fiscal year. All moneys appropriated to the department or the board for the use of the board shall be expended and audited in the manner provided for all other expenditures under the supervision of the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 12; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-42 .

28-7-43. Appropriations and disbursements.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sum that it may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter. The controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of the sum, or so much of it as may be required from time to time, upon the receipt by him or her of proper vouchers approved by the director of labor and training and the chairperson of the state labor relations board.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-43 .

28-7-44. Chapter controlling.

Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are inconsistent with the provisions of any other general, special, or local law, the provisions of this chapter shall be controlling.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-44 .

28-7-45. Employees exempt from chapter.

  1. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply: (1) To the employees of any employer who concedes to and agrees with the board that the employees are subject to and protected by the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., or the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; (2) Except as provided in Chapter 11 of title 36 as to employees of the state; (3) Except as provided in chapter 9.4 of this title as to employees of any political or civil subdivision or other agency thereof; (4) Except “firefighters” as defined in chapter 9.1 of this title and “police officers” as defined in chapter 9.2 of this title; or (5) Except “school teachers” as defined in chapter 9.3 of this title; provided, that in the case of firefighters, police officers, and healthcare provider employees, including those of hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory care centers, and orphanages, the provisions of this chapter shall apply, but nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed in any manner to grant to any firefighters, police officers, or healthcare provider employees, including those of hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory care centers, and orphanages, the right to engage in any strike. Any strike by any firefighters, police officers, or healthcare provider employees, including those of hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory care centers, and orphanages, shall be illegal.
  2. When an impasse is reached by an employer and a union representing healthcare provider employees, including those of hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory care centers, and orphanages, the mediation services of the department of labor and training shall be utilized for mediation and factfinding. If the issues remain unresolved, then the parties shall proceed to arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-45 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 147, § 3; P.L. 1972, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 296, § 1.

28-7-46. Right to strike and concerted activities preserved.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed so as to interfere with, impede, or diminish in any way the right of employees to strike or engage in other lawful, concerted activities.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-46 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legislative Intent.

The legislature intended to fully protect the rights of employees to strike and to picket by lawful means for lawful objects. Lindsey Tavern, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 307, 85 R.I. 61 , 125 A.2d 207, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1956).

28-7-47. Severability.

If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is, for any reason, adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, that judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of this chapter and the application of this chapter to other persons or circumstances, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which the judgment has been rendered and to the person or circumstances involved. It is declared to be the legislative intent that this chapter would have been adopted had the invalid provisions not been included.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1066, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 28-7-47 .

28-7-48. Prohibition against economic benefit to an unfair employer.

Except for state payments to healthcare providers pursuant to the medical assistance program in chapter 8 of title 40 and the Rite Start program in § 23-13-18 , the state of Rhode Island or any subsidiary or agency of the state shall not enter into any new contracts with, or provide any new subsidiary, payment, service or state revenue bond money to, nor make any favorable administrative ruling that might reasonably lead to the financial gain of, any employer who or that has been found guilty of any unfair labor practice by an administrative law judge of the National Labor Relations board for the duration of any strike by the employer’s employees.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 169, § 1.

28-7-49. No limitation on healthcare benefit providers.

No collective bargaining agreement covering any group or groups of state employees, public school teachers, or employees of any city or town, ratified after August 1, 2008, shall specify that an employer must procure a healthcare benefit plan from a specific provider of such plans. The technical qualifications of the healthcare benefit plan, to be contracted for, shall not be framed or constructed in a manner designed to identify an exclusive provider of said healthcare services.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 34, § 1.

Chapter 7.1 Health and Welfare Funds, Pension Plans

28-7.1-1. Payments — Penalty.

Whenever any employer has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a labor organization or association of employees providing for payments to a health or welfare fund or pension fund, or other plan for the benefit of employees, it shall be unlawful for the employer to fail to make the payments required by the terms of the agreement. Further, any employer who willfully fails to make payments within sixty (60) days after they become due and payable shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense, and/or imprisoned not exceeding one year for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 367, § 1.

28-7.1-2. Enforcement.

The director of labor and training shall enforce the provisions of § 28-7.1-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 129, § 1.

28-7.1-3. Definitions.

“Health or welfare fund” or “pension fund” or “other plan for the benefit of employees” includes any plan, trust, or fund established by an employer organization, or by an employer and a labor organization, or by an employer and an employee organization, the funds for which are derived in whole or in part from contributions by employers, and that exists for the purpose of paying or providing for employees or their families or dependents medical or hospital care, recreation facilities, pensions, annuities, benefits on retirement, death, or unemployment of beneficiaries, severance pay, compensation for injuries or illness, insurance to provide any of the foregoing, vacation or holiday benefits, apprenticeship training, or life, disability, or sickness or accident insurance.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 367, § 2.

28-7.1-4. Defined benefit plans annual reporting.

  1. All defined benefit plans that are not covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and have two hundred (200) or more plan members shall be required to comply with the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(3).
  2. This section shall not apply to governmental plans as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 67, § 1.

Chapter 8 Actions by Labor Organizations

28-8-1. Capacity to sue on behalf of employees for contract violations.

Suits or actions at law for the violation by an employer of contracts of employment between the employer and his or her employees who are represented by a labor union as their legally constituted bargaining agent, and whose rights and duties as employees are set forth in a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and labor union, as the legal representative of the employees, may be brought in the name of the union for the benefit of the employees. This section applies to any previous violation or violation which may be made in the future by the employer; provided, that any action at law brought by the labor union for the benefit of the employees shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 9-1-15 9-1-24 .

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3513, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-8-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Consent of Union Members.

Although there was nothing in the record to show which of the individual members had given consent to union to sue for vacation and holiday pay, it was assumed that those who participated in trial as witnesses had given their consent. United Textile Workers v. Lister Worsted Co., 91 R.I. 15 , 160 A.2d 358, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1960).

Plaintiff-union, suing on behalf of its members under the provisions of this section for holiday and vacation pay owed to employees, was required to show that it had been expressly authorized to sue by the persons for whose benefit they were suing. United Textile Workers v. Lister Worsted Co., 91 R.I. 15 , 160 A.2d 358, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1960).

Resolution adopted at union meeting authorizing union to sue for vacation and holiday pay did not amount to consent for the union to sue by those not participating in meeting. United Textile Workers v. Lister Worsted Co., 91 R.I. 15 , 160 A.2d 358, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1960).

Union representing correctional officers did not have standing to bring individual breach of contract claims against the state because the statute referred to individual contracts between an employer and an employee, rather than to a contractual obligation under a collective bargaining agreement; furthermore, the union failed to allege in its complaint that it had attained the correctional officers’ consent to bring suit. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers v. Rhode Island, 264 F. Supp. 2d 87, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8899 (D.R.I. 2003), aff'd, 357 F.3d 42, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1266 (1st Cir. 2004).

Contractual Bargaining Mechanisms.

When parties have bargained for and agreed upon a mechanism for resolving contract disputes, they have no recourse but to pursue the remedy for which they contracted. Romano v. Mancini, 122 R.I. 746 , 412 A.2d 1131, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1468 (1980).

If one of the parties refuses to submit to the agreed-upon procedure for resolving contractual disputes, the opposing party may sue for enforcement of the contract. Romano v. Mancini, 122 R.I. 746 , 412 A.2d 1131, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1468 (1980).

Federal Causes of Actions.

Since this section presents the most analogous cause of action under Rhode Island law to an ERISA action to compel contributions to a pension fund, and since this section does not provide for a limitations period, the 10-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-13(a) for contract actions would govern an action under this section and is thus the statute of limitations period for ERISA claims in Rhode Island. Trustees of the Local Union No. 17 Sheet Metal Workers' Apprenticeship Fund v. May Eng'g Co., 951 F. Supp. 346, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 635 (D.R.I. 1997).

28-8-2. Suit in superior court.

Labor organizations may sue as a legal entity for the benefit and on behalf of the employees whom they represent in the superior court of the state of Rhode Island having jurisdiction of the parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3513, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-8-2 .

28-8-3. Remedy cumulative.

This chapter is not in substitution of any remedies that are now available to the employer or employee, but is cumulative to those remedies.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3513, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-8-3 .

Chapter 9 Arbitration of Labor Controversies

28-9-1. Enforceability of agreement to arbitrate any controversy.

A provision in a written contract between an employer and an association of employees, a labor union, trade union, or craft union, or between an association of employers and an association of employees, labor unions, trade unions, or craft unions, to settle by arbitration any controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon any grounds that exist in law or in equity for the revocation of the contract; provided, that the provisions of this chapter apply but are not limited to controversies respecting terms and conditions of employment. Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing that the arbitrator shall have no authority to modify the penalty imposed by the employer in the arbitration of matters relating to the disciplining of employees, including, but not limited to, termination, suspension, or reprimand, the arbitrator shall have the authority to modify the penalty imposed by the employer and/or otherwise fashion an appropriate remedy.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-1 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 378, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch 227, § 1.

Cross References.

General arbitration law inapplicable, § 10-3-2 .

Mediation and conciliation, § 28-10-1 .

Law Reviews.

Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards in Rhode Island, see 3 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 165 (1998).

Comparative Legislation.

Arbitration:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-91 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150C, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The legislative mandate for good-faith bargaining is broad and unqualified and the court will not limit its thrust in the absence of an explicit statutory provision which specifically bars a school committee from making an agreement as to a particular term or condition of employment. Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 , 346 A.2d 124, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1155 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S. Ct. 1466, 47 L. Ed. 2d 736, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 309 (1976).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-1 allows employers’ penalties in disciplinary matters to be modified by an arbitrator, but an arbitrator lacked the authority to modify the decision of the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections to terminate a correctional officer because § 28-9-1 had been harmonized with R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-10 to preclude the disciplinary decisions of the Director from being usurped by arbitrators. State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 819 A.2d 1286, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 2003) .

Applicability.

This section is applicable to the School Teachers’ Arbitration Act and gave teachers’ union the right to provide in its contract with the school committee for the arbitration of grievances arising out of the contract. Thus, the school committee was bound to submit a “severance” pay dispute to the arbitration as provided by the contract. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. School Comm., 108 R.I. 444 , 276 A.2d 762, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1288 (1971).

The requirement in § 28-9-21 that notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served within three months is applicable to the occupational arbitration acts, including the Policemen’s Arbitration Act, § 28-9.2-1 et seq. City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Lodge No. 4, Fraternal Order of Police, 545 A.2d 499, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1988).

The director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, unlike other agencies affected by R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-1 , is not in the position to delegate disciplinary functions to an arbitrator, as the discipline of employees in a correctional facility is a highly specialized function of the Director; the Director, alone, must decide disciplinary actions in correctional facilities; harmonizing R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-10 with R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-1 it is the intent of the legislature to preserve the disciplinary functions of the Director over the broad powers given to arbitrators. State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 819 A.2d 1286, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 2003).

Authority of Arbitrator.

Arbitrator did not have the authority to alter the discipline imposed by the director of corrections, since the responsibility of a correctional officer could not be compromised by an illicit relationship with a prison inmate, and to excuse that conduct with a mere 60-day suspension instead of termination was an irrational result. State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 819 A.2d 1286, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 2003).

Jurisdiction.

The court erred in remanding a matter to an arbitrator before conducting a hearing and making a factual determination as to whether the dispute in question related to the implementation of an arbitration agreement, over which the arbitrator had specifically retained jurisdiction, or enforcement of the agreement, over which the superior court possesses subject matter jurisdiction. School Comm. v. Independent Ass'n of Employees, Local #7, 658 A.2d 913, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 168 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Bargainable or negotiable issues in state public employment labor relations. 84 A.L.R.3d 242.

Breach or repudiation of collective labor contract as subject to, or as affecting right to enforce, arbitration provision in contract. 29 A.L.R.3d 688.

Collective labor contract, matters subject to arbitration under provisions thereof. 24 A.L.R.2d 752.

Construction and application of provisions of general arbitration statutes excluding from their operation contracts for labor or personal services. 64 A.L.R.2d 1336.

Construction and Effect of Severance or Dismissal Pay Provisions of Employment Contract or Collective Labor Agreement. 85 A.L.R.6th 323.

Power of arbitrators to award injunction. 70 A.L.R.2d 1055.

Validity of state statutory provisions for arbitration of labor disputes, as against the objection of delegation of legislative power without setting up adequate standards to guide the administrative agency. 9 A.L.R.2d 871.

28-9-2. Enforceability of agreement to arbitrate existing or prior controversy.

An agreement in writing between an employer and an association of employees, a labor union, trade union, or craft union, or between an association of employers and an association of employees, labor unions, trade unions, or craft unions, to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them prior to and at the time of the agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon any grounds that exist in law or in equity for the revocation of the contract.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-2 .

28-9-3. Enforceability of agreement to arbitrate new contract.

A provision in a written contract between an employer and an association of employees, a labor union, trade union, or craft union, or between an association of employers and an association of employees, labor unions, trade unions, or craft unions, to submit to arbitration any and all controversies relative to the execution of a new contract upon the termination of an existing contract, as provided for in writing in the existing contract, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon any grounds that exist in law or in equity for the revocation of the contract; and it is not a defense to the enforceability of the provision to submit to arbitration that the issue or issues that the arbitrator or arbitrators must decide is not one that could have formed the basis of an action at law or suit in equity.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-3 .

28-9-4. Stay of judicial proceedings on arbitrable issue.

If any suit or proceedings is brought on any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for the arbitration, the court in which the suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the suit or proceedings is referable to arbitration under an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties, stay the trial of the action until the arbitration has been held.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Waiver of Grievance Procedure.

Defendant waived its right to invoke the grievance clause of a collective-bargaining agreement by manifesting a desire to have a judicial resolution by not seeking a stay. North Smithfield Teachers Ass'n v. North Smithfield Sch. Comm., 461 A.2d 930, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 973 (R.I. 1983).

28-9-5. Superior court order of arbitration.

  1. The making of an agreement for arbitration shall be deemed a consent of the parties to the arbitration to the jurisdiction of the superior court of this state to enforce the agreement. A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect, or refusal of another to perform under a contract or submission providing for arbitration, may petition the superior court, or a judge of that court, for an order directing that the arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in the contract or submission.
  2. Five (5) days’ notice in writing of the application shall be served upon the party in default. Service shall be made in the manner specified in the contract or submission, and if no manner of service is specified, then in the manner provided by law for personal service of a summons, within or without the state, or substituted service of a summons, or upon satisfactory proof that the aggrieved party has been or will be unable with due diligence to make service in any of the previously mentioned manners, then the notice shall be served in the manner that the court or judge directs.
  3. A judge of the superior court shall hear the parties and upon being satisfied that there is no substantial issue as to the making of the contract or submission or the failure to comply with it, the court or the judge hearing the application shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract or submission.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitrable Disputes.

A dispute involving the alleged addition of work hours to a teacher’s day would necessitate interpretation of specific articles of the employment contract and was thus arbitrable under the terms of the contract. School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance AFT Local 930, 120 R.I. 810 , 390 A.2d 386, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 718 (1978).

Procedure.

Once substantive arbitrability is established, issues of procedural arbitrability should be left to the arbitrator. School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance AFT Local 930, 120 R.I. 810 , 390 A.2d 386, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 718 (1978).

Collateral References.

Consolidation of arbitration proceedings by state court. 31 A.L.R.6th 433.

Power of court to resubmit matter to arbitrators for correction or clarification, because of ambiguity or error in, or omission from, arbitration award. 37 A.L.R.3d 200.

28-9-6. Trial of issue as to existence of agreement to arbitrate or failure to comply.

  1. If evidentiary facts are set forth raising a substantial issue as to the making of the contract or submission or the failure to comply with it, the court or the judge shall immediately proceed to the trial of the issue.
  2. If no jury trial is demanded by either party, the court or the judge shall hear and determine the issue.
  3. Where this issue is raised, any party may, on or before the return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of the issue, and if a demand is made, the court or the judge shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by law for referring to a jury issues in an equity action.
  4. Whenever an immediate trial is ordered, the order shall provide that, if the court, or where a jury has been demanded, the jury, finds that a written contract providing for arbitration was made or a submission was entered into, and that there was a failure to comply with the contract, the parties shall proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract or submission, and the order shall provide that if the court or jury, finds that there was no contract or submission or failure to comply with the contract, then the proceeding shall be dismissed.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-6 .

28-9-7. Selection of arbitrators.

If in the contract for arbitration or in the submission, provision is made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, that method shall be followed, but if no method is provided in the contract, the parties to the contract or submission shall agree to the method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire. If the parties fail to agree, then the director of labor and training, upon application of either of the parties after due notice to the other party, shall appoint an arbitrator to hear the dispute.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-7 .

Cross References.

Arbitration by labor relations board prohibited, § 28-7-10 .

28-9-8. Hearings by arbitrators.

Subject to the terms of the submission or contract, if any are specified in the contract, the arbitrators selected as prescribed in this chapter must appoint a time and place for the hearing of the matters submitted to them, and must cause notice thereof to be given to each of the parties. They, or a majority of them, may adjourn the hearing from time to time on the application of either party for good cause shown or on their own motion, but not beyond the day fixed in the submission if a date has been set in the contract or submission for rendering their award, unless the time fixed is extended by the written consent of the parties to the submission or contract or their attorneys, or the parties have continued with the arbitration without objection to the adjournment.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-8 .

Collateral References.

Arbitrator's power to award punitive damages. 83 A.L.R.3d 1037.

28-9-9. Court order directing arbitrators to proceed promptly.

The court shall have the power to direct the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and determination of the controversy.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-9 .

28-9-10. Oath of arbitrators.

Before hearing any testimony, arbitrators selected as prescribed in this chapter must be sworn, by an officer authorized by law to administer an oath, faithfully and fairly to hear and examine the matters in controversy and to make a just award according to the best of their understanding, unless the oath is waived by the written consent of the parties to the submission or contract or their attorneys, or the parties have continued with the arbitration without objection to the failure of the arbitrators to take the oath.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-10 .

28-9-11. Summons of witnesses — Attendance by arbitrators — Majority required for award.

The arbitrator or arbitrators selected as prescribed in this chapter may require any person to attend before them as a witness; and he or she and they have, and each of them has, the same powers with respect to all the proceedings before them that are conferred upon a board or a member of a board authorized by law to hear testimony. All the arbitrators selected as prescribed in this chapter must meet together and hear all the allegations and proofs of the parties, but an award by a majority of them is valid unless the concurrence of all is expressly required in the submission or contract.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Unanimity.

Where there was no specific provision in the contract for unanimity in arbitrators’ award, award in severance pay dispute was not invalid because it lacked unanimity. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. School Comm., 108 R.I. 444 , 276 A.2d 762, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1288 (1971).

Collateral References.

Concurrence of all arbitrators as condition of binding award under private agreement not specifying unanimity. 83 A.L.R.3d 996.

28-9-12. Arbitrators’ fees.

  1. In any proceeding under this chapter, unless the parties agree to the arbitrator’s or arbitrators’ fees, those fees shall be fixed by the director of labor and training who shall require equal payment of the arbitrators’ fees by both parties.
  2. If a party to the arbitration is a department or division of state government, the director of labor and training shall inform the office of budget of the amount of the arbitrator’s fee attributable to the department or division. The office of budget shall charge to the account of the department or division the amount of the arbitrator’s fees attributable to it. In addition, the office of budget shall also charge to the account of the department or division any and all other costs, including, but not limited to, witness fees and attorney’s fees incurred by the department or division in connection with the arbitration proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-12 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 344, art. 12, § 1.

Collateral References.

Awarding attorneys’ fees in connection with arbitration. 60 A.L.R.5th 669.

28-9-13. Validity of arbitration without judicial order — Grounds for attack.

An award shall be valid and enforceable according to its terms and under the provisions of this chapter without previous adjudication of the existence of a submission or contract to arbitrate, subject to the provisions of this section:

  1. A party who has participated in any of the proceedings before the arbitrator or arbitrators may object to the confirmation of the award only on one or more of the grounds specified in this section, provided that he or she did not continue with the arbitration with notice of the facts or defects on which his or her objection is based, because of a failure to comply with § 28-9-8 or with § 28-9-10 , or because of the improper manner of the selection of the arbitrators.
  2. A party who has not participated in any of the proceedings before the arbitrator or arbitrators and who has not made or been served with an application to compel arbitration under § 28-9-5 may also put in issue the making of the contract or submission or the failure to comply with it, either by a motion for a stay of the arbitration or in opposition to the confirmation of the award. If a notice has been personally served on the party of an intention to conduct the arbitration pursuant to the provisions of a contract or submission specified in the notice, the issues specified in this subdivision may be raised only by a motion for a stay of the arbitration, notice of which motion must be served within ten (10) days after the service of the notice of intention to arbitrate. The notice must state in substance that unless within ten (10) days after its service the party served shall serve a notice of motion to stay the arbitration, he or she shall subsequently be barred from putting in issue the making of the contract or submission or the failure to comply with it. The arbitration hearing shall be adjourned upon service of the notice pending the determination of the motion. Where the opposing party, either on a motion for a stay or in opposition to the confirmation of an award, sets forth evidentiary facts raising a substantial issue as to the making of the contract or submission or the failure to comply with it, an immediate trial of the issue shall be had. In the event that the opposing party is unsuccessful, he or she may, nevertheless, participate in the arbitration if the arbitration is still being carried on. Any party may, on or before the return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of the issue.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-13 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitrable Disputes.

A dispute involving the alleged addition of work hours to a teacher’s day would necessitate interpretation of specific articles of the employment contract and was thus arbitrable under the terms of the contract. School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance AFT Local 930, 120 R.I. 810 , 390 A.2d 386, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 718 (1978).

— State Medical and Mental Health Workers.

The department’s power to establish a maximum-consecutive-work-hours cap for those health-care employees who work with its custodial patients is not properly arbitrable because arbitration conflicts with the nondelegable managerial duties of the department and its director to provide for the safety and the welfare of the disabled, custodial patients and for the protection of the public health. Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 1997).

The arbitrator in this case exceeded his powers not only because the dispute at issue was nonarbitrable but also that the submission of such a dispute to arbitration constituted an usurpation of the exclusive statutory authority of the department and its director “to insure the comfort and promote the welfare of the patients.” Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 1997).

Procedure.

Once substantive arbitrability is established, issues of procedural arbitrability should be left to the arbitrator. School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance AFT Local 930, 120 R.I. 810 , 390 A.2d 386, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 718 (1978).

Collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between a housing authority and a union was found to be enforceable because the housing authority limited the arguments that the housing authority was able to bring and impacted the housing authority’s burden of proof by first challenging the validity of the CBA at arbitration. Thus, the appellate court accepted the arbitrator’s finding that the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate and perceived no error in the trial justice’s denial of the housing authority’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. West Warwick Hous. Auth. v. RI Council 94, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 70 (R.I. July 1, 2022).

Submission or Contract.

A “contract” is a predispute agreement to arbitrate and a “submission” is a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Comm., 440 A.2d 124, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 785 (R.I. 1982).

A “submission” is an agreement to arbitrate entered into after a particular dispute has arisen. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Comm., 440 A.2d 124, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 785 (R.I. 1982).

Submission to Arbitration Not Binding.

City was not bound by school board’s submission of a dispute to arbitration since, when the city council rejected the collective-bargaining agreement between the school board and the teachers union, the board thereafter had no authority, real or apparent, to submit disputes arising from the rejected contract to arbitration. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 388, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 1997).

Because it was undisputed that the city, which did not participate in the arbitration proceedings, was not served with notice of intention to arbitrate, the city could not be bound by the school board’s submission of a dispute pursuant to an arbitration clause in an unratified contract. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 388, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Evidence, briefs or arguments on particular issues, refusal to receive as grounds for relief from award. 75 A.L.R.3d 132.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators. 66 A.L.R.5th 611.

28-9-14. Arbitration as special proceeding — Jurisdiction of superior court.

Arbitration of a controversy under a contract or submission described in this chapter shall be deemed a special proceeding, of which the superior court for the county in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration was held, shall have jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-14 .

28-9-15. Application treated as motion.

Any application to the court or a judge of the court under this chapter shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-15 .

28-9-16. Prerequisites to enforceability of award.

To entitle the award to be enforced, as prescribed in this chapter, it must be in writing; within the time limited in the submission or contract, if any; subscribed by the arbitrator or arbitrators making it; and either filed in the office of the clerk of the court having jurisdiction as provided in § 28-9-14 or delivered to one of the parties or his or her attorney.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-16 .

Collateral References.

Time for impeaching arbitration award. 85 A.L.R.2d 779.

28-9-17. Order confirming award.

At any time within one year after the award is made as prescribed in § 28-9-16 , any party to the controversy that was arbitrated may apply to the court having jurisdiction as provided in § 28-9-14 for an order confirming the award. Upon that application, the court must grant the order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in §§ 28-9-18 and 28-9-19 , or unless the award is unenforceable under the provisions of § 28-9-13 . Notice of the motion must be served upon the adverse party or his or her attorneys, as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion upon an attorney in an action in the same court.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-17 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judicial Review.

Trial court properly confirmed an arbitration award for a union in dispute over weapons training for correctional officers (COs) and refused to vacate the award where: (1) the director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections’ (DOC) duty and authority under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-10(14) to establish training programs for correctional officers (COs) was not exclusive; (2) the union was entitled to negotiate over matters that directly affected its members’ work and welfare; (3) § 42-56-10(14) did not prevent the DOC director from exercising his power in consultation with the union; (4) the dispute was arbitrable; and (5) the arbitrator’s reading of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-17 as meaning that COs had to undergo weapons qualification at least every two years, and prescribing a maximum time period, rather than a minimum or fixed time period, within which COs had to complete weapons qualification was passably plausible. State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 64 A.3d 734, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 2013).

Waiver.

Appeal waiver in a collective bargaining agreement between a union and a city was largely immaterial because under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-17 , the union’s motion to confirm an arbitrator’s award, standing alone, was sufficient to trigger the superior court’s review of the award, and the city’s objection constituted an “application” to the reviewing court and provided sufficient grounds to justify a continuation, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18 , of the inquiry that the motion to confirm set in motion under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-17 . City of E. Providence v. USW, Local 15509, 925 A.2d 246, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2007).

28-9-18. Grounds for vacating award.

  1. In any of the following cases the court must make an order vacating the award, upon the application of any party to the controversy that was arbitrated:
    1. When the award was procured by fraud.
    2. Where the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
    3. If there was no valid submission or contract, and the objection has been raised under the conditions set forth in § 28-9-13 .
  2. A motion to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitrator’s award shall not be entertained by the court unless the award is first implemented by the party seeking its vacation, modification, or correction; provided, the court, upon sufficient cause shown, may order the stay of the award or any part of it upon circumstances and conditions that it may prescribe.
  3. If the motion to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitrator’s award is denied, the moving party shall pay the costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees of the prevailing party.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-18 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 126, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Trevor T. Bernard, 2015 Survey, Cases: Labor Law. State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 767 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

As long as an award draws its essence from the contract and is based upon a passably plausible interpretation thereof, it is within the arbitrator’s authority. Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907 , 391 A.2d 1173, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 739 (1978); National Ass'n of Nurses, Local No. 79 v. State, 614 A.2d 782, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 186 (R.I. 1992).

Courts are powerless to disturb arbitration awards for reasons other than those enumerated in this section. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Comm., 440 A.2d 124, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 785 (R.I. 1982).

An arbitrator may not substitute his or her judgment for an appointing authority in selection of discipline. Rhode Island Laborers' Dist. Council v. State, 592 A.2d 144, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 1991).

Applicability of Administrative Procedure Act.

The standards contained in this section are to be observed and not those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, § 42-35-15 , where the arbitration panel is convened and its hearings are to be governed by the State Police Arbitration Act, chapter 9.5 of title 28. State v. Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25, 544 A.2d 133, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 1988).

Arbitration Award Overturned.

An arbitrator exceeded his authority by directing a monetary award to a union where the arbitrator himself admits that the specific individuals entitled to compensation cannot be identified; the award to the union is an inappropriate creation of a beneficiary not drawn from the essence of the contract and must be vacated. City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Lodge No. 4, Fraternal Order of Police, 545 A.2d 499, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1988).

Trial justice properly vacated arbitrators’ award, where the award was not within the arbitrators’ authority because the award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and was not based upon a passably plausible interpretation of the agreement. Town of Coventry v. Turco, 574 A.2d 143, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 96 (R.I. 1990).

Award is vacated in part, where the arbitrator’s decision to reduce an insubordinate employee’s discharge to a six-month suspension is based on a manifest disregard of the collective-bargaining agreement, constitutes an irrational result, fails to draw its essence from the collective-bargaining agreement, and is not based upon a passably plausible interpretation thereof. Rhode Island Laborers' Dist. Council v. State, 592 A.2d 144, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 1991).

Where a collective bargaining agreement did not contain a past-practice provision or a savings clause evidencing the mutual intent of the parties to establish certain benefits as past practices, the arbitrator exceeded his powers by basing his decision upon the existence of a past practice and vacation of the award was required. Town of Smithfield v. Local 2050, 707 A.2d 260, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 1998).

An arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding an issue involving a nondelegable-nonmodifiable-statutory mandate for the human services department to exclude paid sick-leave hours when computing whether its employees were entitled to overtime compensation during any given pay period. State v. Rhode Island Alliance of Social Servs. Emples., Local 580, 747 A.2d 465, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 2000).

The Superior Court correctly ruled that an arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding overtime pay based on a computation which included sick-leave hours as hours worked, since such an award not only manifestly disregarded the applicable terms of the workers’ compensation statute, but also overrode those provisions in the parties’ own collective bargaining agreement that barred such a result. State v. Rhode Island Alliance of Social Servs. Emples., Local 580, 747 A.2d 465, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 2000).

An arbitrator’s award should not have been confirmed by the trial court where the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the clear and unambiguous language of a collective bargaining agreement. City of Newport v. Lama, 797 A.2d 470, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 133 (R.I. 2002).

Officer was not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18(c) and was not entitled to an award of attorney fees where the collective bargaining agreement provided that the union would represent the officer’s interests and the union did so. City of Woonsocket v. Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 404, 839 A.2d 516, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 225 (R.I. 2003).

Arbitrator impermissibly substituted his judgment for that of the Department of Corrections in regard to the Department terminating an employee, since, while the Department lacked a specific policy prohibiting the use of the towels and linens, that did not equate with permission to remove them from departmental premises. Dep't of Corr. v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 867 A.2d 823, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 2005).

It was no error to vacate an arbitration award because the arbitrator did not base the arbitrator’s decision on the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) despite the existence of pertinent CBA provisions, contrary to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18(a)(2) . State Dep't of Corr. v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 115 A.3d 924, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2015).

In a dispute under a CBA, the superior court erred by denying the town’s motion to vacate the arbitration award under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18 because the arbitrator’s decision lacked a basis in the essence of the CBA and produced completely irrational results. The plain language of the forty-five-day provision in the CBA reserved the town’s right to exercise its managerial prerogative not to fill a vacancy by providing that the forty-five-day clock begins to run only once the town “recognizes” the vacancy; because the CBA plainly required some affirmative action by the town to recognize the vacancy, mere notice of the creation of a vacancy by the retirement of a detective was not enough under the terms of the CBA. Town of N. Providence v. FOP, 276 A.3d 1281, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2022).

Arbitration Award Upheld.

The court erred in vacating an arbitration reinstatement award, because the question of the justification of an employee’s termination for allegedly violating a personnel rule promulgated pursuant to § 36-4-8(a) was clearly an arbitrable grievance under an existing collective bargaining agreement. Rhode Island Bhd. of Correctional Officers v. State, 643 A.2d 817, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 200 (R.I. 1994).

The city’s failure to timely respond to an officer’s injury claim precluded it from contesting whether the officer suffered an on-duty injury. City of Woonsocket v. Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 404, 839 A.2d 516, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 225 (R.I. 2003).

As abitrator’s award of damages to a state employee who had her car stolen from the workplace parking lot was “drawn from the essence” of broad language regarding the state’s obligations for the health and safety of its employees, the award did not exceed the arbitrator’s powers under R.I. Gen. Law § 28-9-18(a)(2) . State v. R.I. Alliance of Soc. Serv. Emples., Local 580, 861 A.2d 455, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 2004).

Collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was unambiguous and the arbitrator’s award was valid where the arbitrator’s adoption of a revised method of calculation was plausible and “drew its essence” from the CBA and led to a rational result. Pawtucket FOP Lodge #4 v. City of Pawtucket, 869 A.2d 67, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2005).

Trial court properly found an arbitrator did not exceed his authority, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18 , in ascertaining parties’ intentions from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and determining a school committee’s salary placements for teachers were correct because the CBA failed to explain the transitioning of teachers from a twelve-step salary schedule to a ten-step salary schedule; the arbitrator concluded the committee’s position best expressed the intent of the contracting parties and was more in keeping with their mutual understanding concerning the overall cost of the CBA. Cumberland Teachers Ass'n v. Cumberland Sch. Comm., 45 A.3d 1188, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 101 (R.I. 2012).

Collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between a housing authority and a union was found to be enforceable because the housing authority limited the arguments that the housing authority was able to bring and impacted the housing authority’s burden of proof by first challenging the validity of the CBA at arbitration. Thus, the appellate court accepted the arbitrator’s finding that the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate and perceived no error in the trial justice’s denial of the housing authority’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. West Warwick Hous. Auth. v. RI Council 94, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 70 (R.I. July 1, 2022).

Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

Firefighter had to pay a city’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees because the city’s motion to dismiss was granted, and the firefighter’s motion to vacate an arbitrator’s award was denied for lack of standing; the firefighter, in his individual capacity, brought the motion to vacate the arbitration award and he was thus the “moving party.” Gannon v. City of Pawtucket, 200 A.3d 1074, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 2019).

Challenge Based on Arbitrability of Controversy.

A party who has participated in arbitration proceedings cannot later seek to vacate the award on the ground that the controversy was not arbitrable. Coventry Teachers' Alliance v. Coventry Sch. Comm., 417 A.2d 886, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1721 (R.I. 1980), limited, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 1997).

The department’s power to establish a maximum-consecutive-work-hours cap for those health-care employees who work with its custodial patients is not properly arbitrable because arbitration conflicts with the nondelegable managerial duties of the department and its director to provide for the safety and the welfare of the disabled, custodial patients and for the protection of the public health. Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 1997).

The arbitrator in this case exceeded his powers not only because the dispute at issue was nonarbitrable but also that the submission of such a dispute to arbitration constituted an usurpation of the exclusive statutory authority of the department and its director “to insure the comfort and promote the welfare of the patients.” Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 1997).

When a union member sought arbitration regarding the state hiring a non-union member for a job vacancy, the issue was not arbitrable because the member’s argument was based on a contract which did not apply to him, as he was not a member of a bargaining unit to which a collective bargaining agreement containing a preference for union members in filling vacancies applied, so an arbitration award finding that the issue was arbitrable had to be vacated under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18(a)(3) . Dep't of Corr. v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 866 A.2d 1241, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2005).

Arbitration award reinstating a police officer who was terminated for failing to attend the municipal police academy or obtain a waiver from attendance was properly vacated; such attendance or waiver prior to the expiration of the officer’s probation was a statutory condition of the officer’s employment as a permanent officer subject to a union’s collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator lacked the authority to reinstate the officer to a position he could not legally hold. The matter was nonarbitrable ab initio, and the arbitrator exceeded his powers by arbitrating it. Cmty. College of R.I. v. CCRI Educ. Support P.A./NEARI, 184 A.3d 220, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2018).

Failure to Participate in Arbitration.

A party cannot avoid arbitration of disputes properly before an arbitration panel by failing to appear at or participate in the proceedings. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Comm., 440 A.2d 124, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 785 (R.I. 1982).

Framing of Arbitration Issue by Arbitrator.

Where a city argues that there is no valid submission because the issue framed by the arbitrator is different from the issue stated in the demand for arbitration, the trial justice may properly conclude that the arbitrator is justified in framing the precise issue. City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Lodge No. 4, Fraternal Order of Police, 545 A.2d 499, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1988).

Judicial Review.

Nothing in this chapter suggests or implies that the general assembly ever intended that there be dual standards of judicial review under this section, one for the public sector and another for the private sector. Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907 , 391 A.2d 1173, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 739 (1978).

By reviewing an arbitrator’s decision on the merits in order to implement the rather vague restrictions of a “no addition or modification” clause in the arbitration agreement, a court would be overstepping the limitations imposed by statute, since the court has no authority to make the necessary inferences of contractual intent. Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907 , 391 A.2d 1173, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 739 (1978).

Where the arbitrator’s award “drew its essence” from the contract and was based upon a “passably plausible” interpretation of the contract, the trial justice’s vacation of the arbitrator’s award upon a finding that the due process and contractual rights of the parties had been violated or overlooked was overturned; as absent a manifest disregard of the contractual provisions, or a completely irrational result, the courts have no authority to vacate the arbitrator’s award. Burns v. Segerson, 122 R.I. 123 , 404 A.2d 500, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2074 (1979).

As a general rule, when a party claims that the arbitrators have exceeded their authority, the claimant bears the burden of proving this contention, and every reasonable presumption in favor of the award will be made. Coventry Teachers' Alliance v. Coventry Sch. Comm., 417 A.2d 886, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1721 (R.I. 1980), limited, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 1997).

Judicial authority to review or to vacate arbitration awards is limited. Absent a manifest disregard of the contractual provisions, or a completely irrational result, the courts have no authority to vacate the arbitrator’s award. State v. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees Local No. 79, 544 A.2d 117, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 1988).

The arbitrator exceeded his authority by reducing the discharge of an employee-nurse to a suspension, where the sanction of discharge imposed by the appointing authority is provided for in the collective-bargaining agreement. Hence, the superior court judge correctly concluded that such a contract provision cannot be disregarded in the arbitration process and his vacation of the reduction is affirmed. State v. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees Local No. 79, 544 A.2d 117, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 1988).

Absent a manifest disregard of a contractual provision or a completely irrational result, the award will be upheld; an arbitrator has the inherent power to fashion an appropriate remedy as long as the award draws its essence from the contract and is based upon a “passably plausible” interpretation of the contract. City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Lodge No. 4, Fraternal Order of Police, 545 A.2d 499, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1988).

Appeal waiver in a collective bargaining agreement between a union and a city was largely immaterial because under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-17 , the union’s motion to confirm an arbitrator’s award, standing alone, was sufficient to trigger the superior court’s review of the award, and the city’s objection constituted an “application” to the reviewing court and provided sufficient grounds to justify a continuation, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18 , of the inquiry that the motion to confirm set in motion under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-17 . City of E. Providence v. USW, Local 15509, 925 A.2d 246, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2007).

Trial court properly confirmed an arbitration award for a union in dispute over weapons training for correctional officers (COs) and refused to vacate the award where: (1) the director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections’ (DOC) duty and authority under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-10(14) to establish training programs for correctional officers (COs) was not exclusive; (2) the union was entitled to negotiate over matters that directly affected its members’ work and welfare; (3) § 42-56-10(14) did not prevent the DOC director from exercising his power in consultation with the union; (4) the dispute was arbitrable; and (5) the arbitrator’s reading of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-17 as meaning that COs had to undergo weapons qualification at least every two years, and prescribing a maximum time period, rather than a minimum or fixed time period, within which COs had to complete weapons qualification was passably plausible. State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 64 A.3d 734, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 2013).

Union lacked standing to pursue a grievance on behalf of retirees, regarding a school board’s change in the retirees’ healthcare costs, because the collective bargaining agreement plainly excluded retirees from the bargaining unit, the union’s jurisdiction, and the definition of “teacher,” and there was a lack of a “community of interests” between active teachers and retirees; the arbitrator exceeded his powers by rendering an award in favor of the union because the grievance was not arbitrable. Providence Sch. Bd. v. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958, 68 A.3d 505, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2013).

Limitations on Vacation of Award.

The superior court’s power to vacate an arbitration award is limited to three grounds and as a mistake of law is not one of those grounds an award cannot be challenged on that basis. Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 , 346 A.2d 124, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1155 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S. Ct. 1466, 47 L. Ed. 2d 736, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 309 (1976); Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907 , 391 A.2d 1173, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 739 (1978).

An alleged misconstruction of the contract is not a sufficient basis for vacating an arbitration award. Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907 , 391 A.2d 1173, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 739 (1978).

This section does not include the existence of procedural defects as a basis for overturning awards. Burns v. Segerson, 122 R.I. 123 , 404 A.2d 500, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2074 (1979).

Judicial authority to vacate arbitration awards is limited. Absent a manifest disregard of a contractual provision or a completely irrational result, the award will be upheld. Town of Coventry v. Turco, 574 A.2d 143, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 96 (R.I. 1990).

No Valid Contract.

Subsection (a)(3) gives the state courts the authority to vacate an arbitrators award when it is not based on a valid contract. Without a contract between the parties there can be no arbitration. Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n, Local 40 v. Contracting Plasterers, 619 A.2d 838, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 1993).

Submission to Arbitration Not Binding.

City was not bound by school board’s submission of a dispute to arbitration since, when the city council rejected the collective-bargaining agreement between the school board and the teachers union, the board thereafter had no authority, real or apparent, to submit disputes arising from the rejected contract to arbitration. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 388, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Awarding attorneys’ fees in connection with arbitration. 60 A.L.R.5th 669.

Power of court to resubmit matter to arbitrators for correction or clarification, because of ambiguity or error in, or omission from, arbitration award. 37 A.L.R.3d 200.

Vacating on public policy grounds arbitration awards reinstating discharged employees. 142 A.L.R. Fed. 387.

28-9-19. Rehearing after vacation of award.

Where an award is vacated, the court, in its discretion, may direct a rehearing either before the same arbitrator or arbitrators or before a new arbitrator or arbitrators to be chosen in the manner provided in the submission or contract for the selection of the original arbitrator or arbitrators or as provided for in § 28-9-7 . Any provision limiting the time in which the arbitrator or arbitrators may make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new arbitration and shall commence from the date of the court’s order.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-19 .

28-9-20. Modification or correction of award.

In any of the following cases, the court must make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitrated controversy:

  1. Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any persons, thing, or property referred to in the award;
  2. Where the arbitrator or arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; or
  3. Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy, and, if it had been a master’s report, the defect could have been amended or disregarded by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-20 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judicial Review.

Trial court properly confirmed an arbitration award for a union in dispute over weapons training for correctional officers (COs) and refused to vacate the award where: (1) the director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections’ (DOC) duty and authority under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-10(14) to establish training programs for correctional officers (COs) was not exclusive; (2) the union was entitled to negotiate over matters that directly affected its members’ work and welfare; (3) § 42-56-10(14) did not prevent the DOC director from exercising his power in consultation with the union; (4) the dispute was arbitrable; and (5) the arbitrator’s reading of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-17 as meaning that COs had to undergo weapons qualification at least every two years, and prescribing a maximum time period, rather than a minimum or fixed time period, within which COs had to complete weapons qualification was passably plausible. State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 64 A.3d 734, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 2013).

28-9-21. Time for motion to vacate, correct, or modify award — Stay of enforcement.

Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party, or his or her attorney, within three (3) months after the award is filed or delivered, as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion upon an attorney in an action; except that in opposition to a motion to confirm an award, any of the grounds specified in § 28-9-18 may be set up. For the purpose of the motion, any judge who might make an order to stay the proceedings in an action brought in the same court may make an order, to be served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of the adverse party to enforce the award.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-21 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Statute of Limitations.

Where the union did not raise the statute of limitations issue in its motion to dismiss, and this issue was neither raised in the trial court nor addressed by the trial justice, the statute of limitations issue could not be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court on appeal. School Comm. v. North Providence Fed'n of Teachers, Local 920, 122 R.I. 105 , 404 A.2d 493, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2072 (1979).

28-9-22. Judgment on confirmation, modification, or correction of award — Costs.

Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award, judgment may be entered in conformity with the order, except as is otherwise prescribed in this chapter. Costs of the application and of the subsequent proceedings, not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) and disbursements, may be awarded by the court in its discretion. If awarded, the amount must be included in the judgment.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-22 .

28-9-23. Papers filed after judgment — Docketing.

  1. Immediately after entering judgment, the clerk must attach together and file the following papers:
    1. The submission or contract, and each written extension of the time, if any, within which to make the award;
    2. The award;
    3. Each notice, affidavit, or other paper used upon an application to confirm, modify, or correct the award, and a copy of each order of the court upon an application; and
    4. A copy of the judgment.
  2. The judgment may be docketed as if it was rendered in an action.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-23 .

28-9-24. Force and effect of judgment.

The judgment so entered has the same force and effect in all respects as, and is subject to all the provisions of law relating to a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-24 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contempt Motion.

A contempt motion is an appropriate means by which a party may seek another’s compliance with a judgment conforming to a confirmed arbitration award. Cranston Teachers Ass'n v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 416 A.2d 1180, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1670 (R.I. 1980).

28-9-25. Appeals.

An appeal may be taken from an order made in a proceeding under this chapter, or from a judgment entered upon an award. The proceedings upon an appeal, including the judgment and the enforcement of the judgment, are governed by the provisions of statute and rule regulating appeal in actions as far as they are applicable.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-25 .

Collateral References.

Power of court to resubmit matter to arbitrators for correction or clarification, because of ambiguity or error in, or omission from, arbitration award. 37 A.L.R.3d 200.

28-9-26. Death or disability of party to proceedings.

Where a party dies after making a submission or contract as prescribed in this chapter or otherwise, the proceedings may be begun or continued upon the application of, or upon notice to, his or her executor or administrator, or a temporary administrator of his or her estate, or, where it relates to real property, his or her distributee or devisee who has succeeded to his or her interest in the real property. Where a committee of the property or of the person of a party to a submission or contract is appointed, the proceedings may be continued upon the application of, or notice to, a committee of the property, but not otherwise. In cases specified in this section, a judge of the court may make an order extending the time within which notice of a motion to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct the award must be served. Upon confirming an award, where a party has died since it was filed or delivered, the court must enter judgment in the name of the original party, and the proceedings are the same as where a party dies after a verdict.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3517, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 28-9-26 .

28-9-27. Use of past practices in arbitration hearings.

  1. An arbitrator shall have the authority to consider the existence of a past practice that may exist between the parties to a collective bargaining agreement only under the following circumstances:
    1. The collective bargaining agreement does not contain an express provision that is the subject of the grievance; or
    2. The collective bargaining agreement contains a provision that is unclear and ambiguous; or
    3. The collective bargaining agreement contains a provision which has been mutually agreed upon by the parties that preserves existing past practices for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement.
  2. A party claiming the existence of a past practice shall be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the practice:
    1. Is unequivocal;
    2. Has been clearly enunciated and acted upon;
    3. Is readily ascertainable;
    4. Has been in existence for a substantial period of time; and
    5. Has been accepted by representatives of the parties who possess the actual authority to accept the practice.
  3. A past practice that may exist between the parties to a collective bargaining agreement may not override any contrary provision of an existing collective bargaining agreement, statute, or ordinance.
  4. A past practice that may exist between the parties to a collective bargaining agreement may not override any contrary provision of any written rule, regulation, or policy that has been promulgated, adopted, and published pursuant to either the administrative procedures act, chapter 35 of title 42, or promulgated and published by the appropriate governing entity in a city or town.
  5. Any party to a collective bargaining agreement may provide written notice to the other party that it no longer intends to be bound by a past practice unless the collective bargaining agreement contains a provision that has been mutually agreed upon by the parties that preserves existing past practices for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement. This notification must describe the past practice and set forth the effective date of the termination of the practice. Neither party is obligated to follow the practice thirty (30) days following this notification.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 412, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 517, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitration Award Upheld.

Arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law or reach an irrational conclusion when he determined that a composition period for English teachers at a high school constituted a past practice because the arbitrator properly looked to the five factors set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-27(b) ; the arbitrator concluded that a union had established, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a long-standing practice, which had been accepted by eight superintendents for more than thirty years. N. Providence Sch. Comm. v. N. Providence Fed'n of Teachers, Local 920, 945 A.2d 339, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2008).

Chapter 9.1 Firefighters’ Arbitration

28-9.1-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Firefighters Arbitration Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Home Rule Provisions.

This chapter supersedes a controverting home rule charter provision. City of Cranston v. Hall, 116 R.I. 183 , 354 A.2d 415, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1263 (1976).

28-9.1-2. Statement of policy.

  1. The protection of the public health, safety, and welfare demands that the permanent uniformed members, rescue service personnel of any city or town, emergency medical services personnel of any city or town, and all employees of any paid fire department in any city or town not be accorded the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. This necessary prohibition does not, however, require the denial to these municipal employees of other well recognized rights of labor such as the right to organize, to be represented by a labor organization of their choice, and the right to bargain collectively concerning wages, rates of pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
  2. It is declared to be the public policy of this state to accord to the permanent uniformed members, rescue service personnel of any city or town, emergency medical services personnel of any city or town, and all employees of any paid fire department in any city or town all of the rights of labor other than the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. To provide for the exercise of these rights, a method of arbitration of disputes is established.
  3. The establishment of this method of arbitration shall not, in any way be deemed to be a recognition by the state of compulsory arbitration as a superior method of settling labor disputes between employees who possess the right to strike and their employers, but rather is solely a recognition of the necessity to provide some alternative mode of settling disputes where employees must, as a matter of public policy, be denied the usual right to strike.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 74, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 69, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Promotion of a firefighter is a bargainable issue and not a management prerogative. City of Cranston v. Hall, 116 R.I. 183 , 354 A.2d 415, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1263 (1976).

When retired fire fighters sued a city and city council over a reduction in their cost of living adjustment, a trial court had exclusive jurisdiction over their claim, because the Fire Fighters Arbitration Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-1 et seq., did not apply to retirees as, inter alia, the reason for enacting this statute did not apply to them because they could not engage in any employment action to assert their demands, nor did they have to be compensated for giving up the right to engage in an employment action. Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2007).

Under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-2(c) , the public policy underlying the Fire Fighters Arbitration Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-1 et seq., was based on a recognition of the necessity to provide some alternative mode of settling disputes where employees had to, as a matter of public policy, be denied the usual right to strike. Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2007).

Ordinary meaning of “firefighter” and the definition included in the Fire Fighters Arbitration Act (FFAA), R.I. Gen. Stat. § 28-9.1-1 et seq., could not reasonably be construed to include retirees because the FFAA defined “firefighter” as the permanent uniformed members, rescue service personnel of any city or town, emergency medical services personnel of any city or town, any fire dispatchers of any city or town, and all employees with the exception of fire chiefs of any paid fire department in any city or town within the state, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-3(2) , and retired firefighters no longer were “permanent uniformed members” of the fire department. Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2007).

Arbitrable Disputes.

Employee pension plans are included in “other terms and conditions of employment.” City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

Retired firefighters’ health insurance dispute had to be resolved, if at all, judicially rather than through arbitration because the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) only allowed the union to submit grievances to arbitration, and the retired firefighters were not included in either the CBA’s definition of firefighter or R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-2(b) . City of Newport v. Local 1080, 54 A.3d 976, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 2012).

Judicial Review.

The court disagreed with petitioner who argued that the statutory grant of power to the board to amend pensions was an invalid delegation of legislative power because the absence of sufficient standards precluded judicial review, reasoning that this section’s statement of the public policy to be served by the legislation provided a sufficient standard. See City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

28-9.1-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter the following terms, unless the context requires a different interpretation, have the following meanings:

  1. “Corporate authorities” means the proper officials within any city or town whose duty or duties it is to establish the wages, salaries, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment of firefighters, whether they are the mayor, city manager, town manager, town administrator, city council, town council, director of personnel, personnel board or commission, or by whatever other name or combination of names they may be designated.
  2. “Firefighter” means the permanent uniformed members, rescue service personnel of any city or town, emergency medical services personnel of any city or town, any fire dispatchers of any city or town, and all employees with the exception of fire chiefs of any paid fire department in any city or town within the state. No assistant chief, deputy chief, battalion chief, captain, or lieutenant shall be excluded from the collective bargaining solely by virtue of his or her title or position.
  3. “Unresolved issues” means any and all contractual provisions that have not been agreed upon by the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities within the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.1-7 . Any contractual provision not presented by either the bargaining agent or the corporate authority within the thirty-day (30) period shall not be submitted to arbitration as an unresolved issue; provided, that if either party or both parties are unable to present their respective proposals to the other party during the thirty-day (30) period, they shall have the opportunity to submit their proposals by registered mail by midnight of the 30th day from and including the date of their first meeting.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 74, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 46, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 69, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 66, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Town.

A financial town meeting has the authority to abolish the positions of all employees in a particular class after having bargained collectively with them in the past and although currently negotiating with them for a new contract. Lime Rock Fire Dist. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 673 A.2d 51, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1996).

Firefighter.

The provisions of the Fire Fighters Arbitration Act apply to the employees of a quasi-municipal fire district created by a special act of the legislature. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd. v. Valley Falls Fire Dist., 505 A.2d 1170, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 431 (R.I. 1986).

Unresolved Issues.

Although the status of the fire fighters’ jobs was clearly an unresolved issue that could have been discussed at a scheduled negotiating session or brought to arbitration directly, the union did not pursue either option. Because the union failed to comply with the provisions of subdivision (3) of this section and § 28-9.1-7 in respect to submitting unresolved issues to arbitration within the designated period, it waived its right to pursue that remedy. Additionally, because arbitration was the sole mechanism provided by the statute, the state labor relations board lacked jurisdiction to consider unfair labor charges brought by the union. Lime Rock Fire Dist. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 673 A.2d 51, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1996).

28-9.1-4. Right to organize and bargain collectively.

The firefighters in any city or town have the right to bargain collectively with their respective cities or towns and be represented by a labor organization in the collective bargaining as to wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Minimum Persons on Duty.

Since there was evidence before the arbitration board which proved that minimum manpower affects both the workload and safety of the firefighter, and since the issues of workload and safety have been held to be terms and conditions of employment, minimum manpower requirements are within the purview of this section and are therefore arbitrable. Town of Narragansett v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1589, 119 R.I. 506 , 380 A.2d 521, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2045 (1977).

Promotions.

Promotion of a firefighter is a bargainable issue and not a management prerogative. City of Cranston v. Hall, 116 R.I. 183 , 354 A.2d 415, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1263 (1976).

Collateral References.

Labor disputes involving public employees. 68 A.L.R.3d 885.

Municipal corporation’s power to submit to arbitration. 20 A.L.R.3d 569.

28-9.1-5. Recognition of bargaining agent.

The labor organization selected by the majority of firefighters in any city or town shall be recognized by the city or town as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all of the members of the city or town fire department unless and until recognition of the labor organization is withdrawn by vote of a majority of the firefighters. The labor organization or city or town may designate any person or persons to negotiate or bargain on its behalf; provided, that the person or persons so designated shall be given authority to enter into and conclude an effective and binding collective bargaining agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 75, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Modification.

Where the firefighters’ union and the city entered into a collective bargaining agreement changing the pension requirements for firefighters, there was no impermissible impairment of the contractual obligations created by various collective bargaining agreements because the modification of the pension plan came about through the action of city council rather than through collective bargaining. Trice v. City of Cranston, 110 R.I. 724 , 297 A.2d 649, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 972 (1972).

Standing.

Firefighter had no individual standing to bring a motion to vacate an arbitrator’s award because he failed to show that the union breached its duty of fair representation; although it was the firefighter’s termination that was at issue in the arbitration proceedings, it was the union that participated in the arbitration, it was the union that was the party to it, and it was the union that had the right to bring the petition to vacate the award. Gannon v. City of Pawtucket, 200 A.3d 1074, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 2019).

28-9.1-5.1. Change of bargaining agent.

In the event a majority of the firefighters in any city or town select a successor and/or a new labor organization as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the members of the city or town fire department, the collective bargaining agreement, entered into and in effect pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, shall be binding on both the successor and/or new bargaining agent and the corporate authority.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 64 § 1.

28-9.1-6. Obligation to bargain.

It shall be the obligation of the city or town, acting through its corporate authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with the representative or representatives of the bargaining agent within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from the bargaining agent of the request for a meeting for collective bargaining purposes. This obligation shall include the duty to cause any agreement resulting from the negotiations to be reduced to a written contract, provided that no contract shall exceed the term of one year, unless a longer period is agreed upon in writing by the corporate authorities and the bargaining agents, but in no event shall the contract exceed the term of three (3) years unless a budget commission or a receiver has been appointed for a municipality or fire district pursuant to chapter 9 of title 45, or if a municipality has a locally administered pension plan in “critical status” and is required to submit a funding improvement plan pursuant to § 45-65-6(2) . In either case, the contract shall not exceed the term of five (5) years. An unfair labor practice charge may be complained of by either the employer’s representative or the bargaining agent to the state labor relations board which shall deal with the complaint in the manner provided in chapter 7 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 67, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 241, art. 22, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 10, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 13, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 31, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 33, § 6; P.L. 2016, ch. 512, art. 1, § 12.

Applicability.

P.L. 2014, ch. 31, § 7, provides: “Pending state judicial receivership proceedings. — The provisions of this act shall apply to any and all state judicial receivership proceedings pending at the time of passage of this act [May 2, 2014]; provided, however, in order to ensure an orderly transition, the superior court shall have limited jurisdiction to ratify the actions taken by any receiver prior to the date of enactment of this legislation at the request of the director of revenue, and to take such further actions as may be necessary to ensure an orderly transition.”

P.L. 2014, ch. 33, § 7, provides: “Pending state judicial receivership proceedings. — The provisions of this act shall apply to any and all state judicial receivership proceedings pending at the time of passage of this act [May 2, 2014]; provided, however, in order to ensure an orderly transition, the superior court shall have limited jurisdiction to ratify the actions taken by any receiver prior to the date of enactment of this legislation at the request of the director of revenue, and to take such further actions as may be necessary to ensure an orderly transition.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agreement on Part of Issues Only.

Where negotiators were able to agree on only part of the issues in dispute, the city was not required to execute a contract embodying the matters upon which agreement had been reached and listing those upon which the parties were still in disagreement. Local 1363, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. DiPrete, 103 R.I. 592 , 239 A.2d 716 (1968).

Contracts Exceeding One Year.

Where an arbitration award attempted to introduce contractual changes over a period of five years, the court viewed the award as severable, gave effect only to those provisions which went into effect in the first year of the contract and voided the remainder. City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

Impairment of Contract Obligations.

Where the firefighters’ union and the city entered into a collective bargaining agreement changing the pension requirements for firefighters, there was no impermissible impairment of the contractual obligations created by various collective bargaining agreements because the modification of the pension plan came about through the action of city council rather than through collective bargaining. Trice v. City of Cranston, 110 R.I. 724 , 297 A.2d 649, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 972 (1972).

Collateral References.

Bargainable or negotiable issues in state public employment labor relations. 84 A.L.R.3d 242.

28-9.1-7. Unresolved issues submitted to arbitration.

In the event that the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities are unable, within thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting, to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration. The parties may agree in writing to extend the thirty-day (30) period.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 315, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Joseph Galindo, 2015 Survey, Cases: Labor Law. Town of N. Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO. 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 756 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agreement on Part of Issues Only.

A city was not required to execute a contract embodying the matters upon which the parties had reached agreement pending the arbitration of the unresolved issues. Local 1363, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. DiPrete, 103 R.I. 592 , 239 A.2d 716 (1968).

Arbitrable Disputes.

An arbitration board may hear and render binding decisions on issues other than wage and hour disputes, including employee pension plans. City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

Timeliness.

Hearing justice correctly found that the union failed to timely submit any unresolved issues pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-7 as the union had not demanded interest arbitration until well beyond the 30-day time frame. Town of N. Kingstown v. Int'l Ass'n, Local 1651, 107 A.3d 304, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2015).

Unresolved Issues.

Although the status of the fire fighters’ jobs was clearly an unresolved issue that could have been discussed at a scheduled negotiating session or brought to arbitration directly, the union did not pursue either option. Because the union failed to comply with the provisions of § 28-9.1-3(3) and this section in respect to submitting unresolved issues to arbitration within the designated period, it waived its right to pursue that remedy. Additionally, because arbitration was the sole mechanism provided by the statute, the state labor relations board lacked jurisdiction to consider unfair labor charges brought by the union. Lime Rock Fire Dist. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 673 A.2d 51, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Bargainable or negotiable issues in state employment labor relations. 84 A.L.R.3d 242.

28-9.1-8. Arbitration board — Composition.

Within five (5) days from the expiration of the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.1-7 , the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities shall each select and name one arbitrator and subsequently shall immediately notify each other in writing of the name and address of the person selected. The two (2) arbitrators so selected and named shall, within ten (10) days from and after the expiration of the five-day (5) period mentioned in this section agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If, on the expiration of the period allowed, the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, the third arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) arbitrators previously selected or selected by the American Arbitration Association, shall act as chair of the arbitration board.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 229, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Delegation of Legislative Authority.

Arbitrator appointed under this section is a public officer, therefore this law does not unlawfully delegate legislative power to private persons. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109 , 256 A.2d 206, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 600 (1969).

28-9.1-9. Hearings.

  1. The arbitration board shall, acting through its chairperson, call a hearing to be held within ten (10) days after the date of the appointment of the chairperson, and shall, acting through its chairperson, give at least seven (7) days’ notice in writing to each of the other two (2) arbitrators, the bargaining agent, and the corporate authorities of the time and place of the hearing. The hearing shall be informal, and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings shall not be binding. Any documentary evidence and other data deemed relevant by the arbitrators may be received in evidence.
  2. The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, records, and other evidence relative or pertinent to the issues presented to them for determination.
  3. The hearing conducted by the arbitrators shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings, the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the issues presented, a copy of which shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the bargaining agent or its attorney or otherwise designated representative and the corporate authorities.
  4. A majority decision of the arbitrators shall be binding upon both the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 150, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agreement on Part of Issues Only.

A collective bargaining agreement will consist of the parties’ mutual understandings on all of the material issues, whether they were agreed upon before arbitration, were determined by the decision of the arbitrators, or were agreed upon in post-arbitration negotiations, and a city is not required to execute a contract composed of matters upon which the parties had reached agreement and listing the unresolved issues. Local 1363, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. DiPrete, 103 R.I. 592 , 239 A.2d 716 (1968).

Collateral References.

Evidence, briefs or arguments on particular issues, refusal to receive as grounds for relief from award. 75 A.L.R.3d 132.

Arbitrator's power to award punitive damages. 83 A.L.R.3d 1037.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators. 66 A.L.R.5th 611.

28-9.1-10. Factors to be considered by arbitration board.

The arbitrators shall conduct the hearings and render their decision upon the basis of a prompt, peaceful, and just settlement of wage or hour disputes between the firefighters and the city or town by which they are employed. The factors, among others, to be given weight by the arbitrators in arriving at a decision shall include:

  1. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the fire department in question with prevailing wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled employees of the building trades and industry in the local operating area involved;
  2. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the fire department in question with wage rates or hourly conditions of employment maintained for the same or similar work of employees exhibiting like or similar skills under the same or similar working conditions in the local operating area involved;
  3. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the fire department in question with wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of fire departments in cities or towns of comparable size;
  4. Interest and welfare of the public;
  5. Comparison of peculiarities of employment in regard to other trades or professions, specifically:
    1. Hazards of employment;
    2. Physical qualifications;
    3. Educational qualifications;
    4. Mental qualifications;
    5. Job training and skills; and
  6. Comparison of community’s ability to pay.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 182, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

There is not an unconstitutional delegation of power by this section. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109 , 256 A.2d 206, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 600 (1969).

Construction.

Although this section set out as guidelines for the arbitration board a comparison of similar fire departments both in cities of “comparable size” and in the “local operating area,” the board did not exceed its authority by interpreting “size” as geographical area instead of population and viewing “local operating area” in metropolitan or regional manner instead of as being territorially coterminous with the geographical boundaries of the municipality involved. City of Providence v. Local 799, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 111 R.I. 586 , 305 A.2d 93, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1250 (1973).

The court read this section in conjunction with §§ 28-9.1-2 and 28-9.1-7 and the legislative history of § 28-9.1-9 and concluded that the Arbitration Act empowers the arbitration board to render binding decisions regarding terms and conditions of employment, including employee pension plans, as well as wage and hour disputes. See City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

28-9.1-11. Fees and expenses of arbitration.

Fees and necessary expenses of arbitration shall be borne equally by the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities. Notwithstanding any other remedies that a court appointed arbitrator appointed by the chief justice pursuant to § 28-9.1-8 may have, an arbitrator or a party who has paid its share of the fees and necessary expenses of a court appointed arbitrator may petition the superior court for sanctions against the party failing to make timely payment of its share of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses, and the superior court is authorized to enforce sanctions against the nonpaying party, including, but not limited to, contempt powers pursuant to § 8-6-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 246, § 1.

28-9.1-12. Collective bargaining contract.

Any agreements actually negotiated between the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities either before or within thirty (30) days after arbitration shall constitute the collective bargaining contract governing firefighters and the city or town for the period stated in the agreement; provided, that the period shall not exceed one year. Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the terms and provisions of this chapter shall specifically provide that the firefighters who are subject to its terms have no right to engage in any work stoppage, slowdown, or strike, the consideration for the provision being the right to a resolution of disputed questions.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agreement on Part of Issues Only.

A collective bargaining contract will consist of the parties’ mutual understandings on all of the material issues, whether they were agreed upon before arbitration, were determined by the arbitrators, or were agreed upon in post-arbitration negotiations, and a city is not required to execute a contract composed of matters upon which the parties had reached agreement and listing the unresolved issues. Local 1363, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. DiPrete, 103 R.I. 592 , 239 A.2d 716 (1968).

Collateral References.

Binding precedential effect of prior arbitrator’s construction of provision of collective bargaining agreement upon subsequent arbitrator construing same issue affecting other parties. 121 A.L.R.Fed. 487.

28-9.1-13. Request for collective bargaining.

Whenever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money by any city or town are included as a matter of collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this chapter, it is the obligation of the bargaining agent to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining on the corporate authorities at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the city or town to cover the contract period that is the subject of the collective bargaining procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Joseph Galindo, 2015 Survey, Cases: Labor Law. Town of N. Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO. 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 756 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Subjects of Bargaining.

For purposes of collective bargaining with its fire department, a town’s decision to implement a three-platoon structure was a management right, but the effects of that decision were subject to the Firefighters Arbitration Act’s bargaining requirements provided the union complied with R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-13 . Town of N. Kingstown v. Int'l Ass'n, Local 1651, 107 A.3d 304, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2015).

Although the union’s failure to comply with § 28-9.1-13 vitiated any obligation of the town to bargain regarding any matter requiring the appropriation of money, the town was still required, upon proper notice, to bargain regarding other matters. Town of N. Kingstown v. Int'l Ass'n, Local 1651, 107 A.3d 304, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2015).

28-9.1-14. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to other persons or circumstances, other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 149, § 1.

28-9.1-15. Writ of certiorari to the supreme court.

The sole avenue of review of a decision of an arbitration panel issued pursuant to this chapter shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court. In the event a decision of the arbitration panel is sought to be reviewed by writ of certiorari to the supreme court, the matter shall be given priority by the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 207, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

The unequivocal language in this section deprives the superior court of jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award of an arbitration panel under this chapter and chapter 9.2 of this title. Providence Lodge No. 3, FOP v. City of Providence, 730 A.2d 17, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 106 (R.I. 1999).

28-9.1-16. Attorneys’ fees — Costs — Interest.

In the event either the bargaining agent or the corporate authorities files a petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a review or modification of a majority decision of the arbitrators, which by the provisions of § 28-9.1-9 is binding upon both the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities, the party against whom the decision of the supreme court is adverse, if the supreme court finds the appeal or petition to be frivolous, shall pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the successful party as determined by the supreme court, and the supreme court shall in its final decision or judgment award costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. If the final decision affirms the award of money, the award, if retroactive, shall bear interest at the rate of eight percentum (8%) per annum from the effective retroactive date.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 74, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 207, § 1.

28-9.1-17. Continuance of contractual provisions.

All contractual provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement entered into pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall continue in the following collective bargaining agreement unless either the bargaining agent or the corporate authority shall, in writing, within the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.1-7 , propose a change in any contractual provision. The parties may agree in writing to continue all contractual provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement until such time as the parties enter into, and have ratified or arbitrated, a successor agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 46, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 15, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 33, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Fact that, under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-9.1-17 and 28-9.2-17 , provisions of a collective bargaining agreement with fire fighters and police officers continued in a following collective bargaining agreement unless a change was proposed, did not mean that the terms of a prior collective bargaining agreement could be grafted onto a non-existent collective bargaining agreement. Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2007).

28-9.1-18. Exclusive bargaining representative obligations.

  1. The exclusive representative shall have the right to act for and negotiate agreements covering all employees in the bargaining unit. Nothing in the provision shall require the exclusive representative to provide representation at any level of the grievance process, including arbitration, in any case on behalf of an employee who has elected not to maintain membership in the employee organization for a period of at least ninety (90) days prior to the events giving rise to the grievance.
  2. An employee who has elected not to maintain membership in the employee organization may, at his or her own expense, pursue a grievance against the employer and have the grievance heard, without intervention by the exclusive representative, provided that the exclusive representative is afforded the opportunity to be present at the grievance/arbitration hearing and that any resolution of the grievance shall not be inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between the employer and the exclusive representative. The exclusive representative shall have no obligation to incur expenses related to a grievance initiated by an employee who has elected not to maintain membership in the employee organization for a period of at least ninety (90) days prior to the events giving rise to the grievance.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 210, § 1.

Chapter 9.2 Municipal Police Arbitration

28-9.2-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Municipal Police Arbitration Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1.

Cross References.

State police arbitration, § 28-9.5-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability of § 28-9-21.

The requirement in § 28-9-21 that notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served within three months is applicable to the occupational arbitration acts, including the Policemen’s Arbitration Act, § 28-9.2-1 et seq. City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Lodge No. 4, Fraternal Order of Police, 545 A.2d 499, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1988).

Authority of Council.

Town council had authority to adopt a resolution granting lifetime disability pay to a retiring police chief, notwithstanding an assertion that the council acted ultra vires in failing to comply with the collective-bargaining process regarding disability benefits. O'Connell v. Finlay, 583 A.2d 546, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 181 (R.I. 1990).

Effect of Chapter.

This chapter mandates municipalities to act through their corporate authorities to meet with representatives of the bargaining agents of the police department and establish wages, salaries, and other conditions of employment. The council has the authority to establish pension benefits pursuant to this chapter. O'Connell v. Finlay, 583 A.2d 546, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 181 (R.I. 1990).

The unequivocal language in § 28-9.1-15 deprives the superior court of jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award of an arbitration panel under this chapter and chapter 9.1 of this title. Providence Lodge No. 3, FOP v. City of Providence, 730 A.2d 17, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 106 (R.I. 1999).

28-9.2-2. Statement of policy.

  1. The protection of the public health, safety, and welfare demands that full-time police officers of any paid police department in any city or town not be accorded the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. This necessary prohibition does not require the denial to these municipal employees of other well recognized rights of labor such as the right to organize, to be represented by an organization of their choice, and the right to bargain collectively concerning wages, rates of pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
  2. It is declared to be the public policy of this state to accord to full-time police officers of any paid police department in any city or town all of the rights of labor other than the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. To provide for the exercise of these rights, a method of arbitration of disputes is established.
  3. The establishment of this method of arbitration shall not in any way be deemed to be a recognition by the state of compulsory arbitration as a superior method of settling labor disputes between employees who possess the right to strike and their employers, but rather is solely a recognition of the necessity to provide some alternative mode of settling disputes where employees must, as a matter of public policy, be denied the usual right to strike.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitrable Disputes.

Employee pension plans are included in “other terms and conditions of employment.” City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

Judicial Review.

The court disagreed with petitioner who argued that the statutory grant of power to the board to amend pensions was an invalid delegation of legislative power because the absence of sufficient standards precluded judicial review, reasoning that this section’s statement of the public policy to be served by the legislation provided a sufficient standard. See City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

28-9.2-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter the following terms, unless the context requires a different interpretation, have the following meanings:

  1. “Corporate authorities” means the proper officials within any city or town whose duty or duties it is to establish the wages, salaries, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment of police officers, whether they are the mayor, city manager, town manager, town administrator, city council, town council, director of personnel, personnel board or commission, or by whatever other name they may be designated, or any combination thereof.
  2. “Police officer” means a full-time police officer from the rank of patrolman up to and including the rank of chief, including policewomen, of any particular police department in any city or town within the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evaluation Standard.

Whether the General Assembly’s inclusion of chiefs of police as members of local police bargaining units violates art. 3, § 7 of the R.I. Constitution must be evaluated in light of a particular chief ’s powers, responsibilities, policy-making authority, and the extent of that chief ’s actual involvement in negotiations. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

The issue of whether a particular application of §§ 28-9.2-3 and 28-9.2-5 violates the constitutional imperative or a provision of the Ethics Code, title 36, chapter 14, must be evaluated with the same factors used in analyzing violations of R.I. Const., art. 3, § 7 ’s directive that public officials and employees avoid the appearance of impropriety. These factors include, but are not limited to, a particular chief ’s powers, responsibilities, policy-making authority, and the extent of that chief ’s actual involvement in negotiations. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

Given the Policemen’s Arbitration Act’s uniform application, its negligible impact on this town’s form of government and the statewide collective importance of municipal police officers, the act as applied in this case did not violate the town’s right to self-government as guaranteed by the Rhode Island Constitution. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

Members of Bargaining Unit.
— Chief of Police.

In light of the strong probability that some communities and some unions will find the function of management to be virtually incompatible with membership in the bargaining agency, the court was of the opinion that the legislature did not intend to place every city and town in a situation in which the three parties for whose benefit the statute had been enacted could not waive that portion which made the chief of police a member of the bargaining unit. See Gallucci v. Brindamour, 477 A.2d 617, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 547 (R.I. 1984).

Section 7, article 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not limit the General Assembly’s power to determine the scope and organization of the bargaining unit representing police officers. Given the varying degrees of power and responsibility chiefs of differing locales possess, by including chiefs of police as members of local town and city police bargaining units, §§ 28-9.2-3 and 28-9.2-5 do not per se violate art. 3, § 7. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

By enacting the Policemen’s Arbitration Act, the Legislature has specifically granted chiefs of police the right to participate in local police bargaining units. Any chief who so chooses must be included in whichever local police officer’s bargaining unit the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board certifies and the board has no unilateral power to exclude or include chiefs from any bargaining unit it ultimately certifies. Indeed, the certification of a police bargaining unit, as it pertains to the inclusion of a chief of police, is merely a perfunctory execution of the General Assembly’s express directives. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

28-9.2-4. Right to organize and bargain collectively.

The police officers in any city or town have the right to bargain collectively with their respective cities or towns and be represented by an organization in the collective bargaining as to wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1.

Collateral References.

Labor disputes involving municipal employees. 68 A.L.R.3d 885.

Municipal corporation’s power to submit to arbitration. 20 A.L.R.3d 569.

28-9.2-5. Recognition of bargaining agent.

The organization selected by the majority of the police officers in any city or town shall be recognized by the city or town as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all of the police officers of the city or town police department unless and until recognition of the organization is withdrawn by vote of a majority of the police of the city or town. The labor organization, or city or town, may designate any person or persons to negotiate or bargain on its behalf; provided, that the person or persons so designated shall be given authority to enter into and conclude an effective and binding collective bargaining agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 190, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evaluation Standard.

Whether the General Assembly’s inclusion of chiefs of police as members of local police bargaining units violates R.I. Const., art. 3, § 7 must be evaluated in light of a particular chief ’s powers, responsibilities, policy-making authority, and the extent of that chief ’s actual involvement in negotiations. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

The issue of whether a particular application of §§ 28-9.2-3 and 28-9.2-5 violates the constitutional imperative or a provision of the Ethics Code, title 36, chapter 14, must be evaluated with the same factors used in analyzing violations of R.I. Const., art. 3, § 7 ’s directive that public officials and employees avoid the appearance of impropriety. These factors include, but are not limited to, a particular chief ’s powers, responsibilities, policy-making authority, and the extent of that chief ’s actual involvement in negotiations. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

Given the Policemen’s Arbitration Act’s uniform application, its negligible impact on this town’s form of government and the statewide collective importance of municipal police officers, the act as applied in this case did not violate the town’s right to self-government as guaranteed by the Rhode Island Constitution. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

Members of Bargaining Unit.
— Chief of Police.

In light of the strong probability that some communities and some unions will find the function of management to be virtually incompatible with membership in the bargaining agency, the court was of the opinion that the legislature did not intend to place every city and town in a situation in which the three parties for whose benefit the statute had been enacted could not waive that portion which made the chief of police a member of the bargaining unit. See Gallucci v. Brindamour, 477 A.2d 617, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 547 (R.I. 1984).

Section 7, article 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not limit the General Assembly’s power to determine the scope and organization of the bargaining unit representing police officers. Given the varying degrees of power and responsibility chiefs of differing locales possess, by including chiefs of police as members of local town and city police bargaining units, §§ 28-9.2-3 and 28-9.2-5 do not per se violate art. 3, § 7. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

By enacting the Policemen’s Arbitration Act, the Legislature has specifically granted chiefs of police the right to participate in local police bargaining units. Any chief who so chooses must be included in whichever local police officer’s bargaining unit the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board certifies and the board has no unilateral power to exclude or include chiefs from any bargaining unit it ultimately certifies. Indeed, the certification of a police bargaining unit, as it pertains to the inclusion of a chief of police, is merely a perfunctory execution of the General Assembly’s express directives. Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 1995).

28-9.2-6. Obligation to bargain.

It shall be the obligation of the city or town, acting through its corporate authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with the designated representative or representatives of the bargaining agent, including any legal counsel selected by the bargaining agent, within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from the bargaining agent of the request for a meeting for collective bargaining purposes. This obligation includes the duty to cause any agreement resulting from the negotiations to be reduced to a written contract, provided that no contract shall exceed the term of one year unless a longer period is agreed upon in writing by the corporate authorities and the bargaining agent, but in no event shall the contract exceed the term of three (3) years unless a budget commission or a receiver has been appointed for a municipality pursuant to chapter 9 of title 45 or if a municipality has a locally administered pension plan in “critical status” and is required to submit a funding improvement plan pursuant to § 45-65-6(2) . In either case, the contract shall not exceed the term of five (5) years. An unfair labor charge may be complained of by either the employer’s representative or the bargaining agent to the state labor relations board which shall deal with the complaint in the manner provided in chapter 7 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 4; P.L. 2012, ch. 241, art. 22, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 10, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 12, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 512, art. 1, § 13.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 10, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 12, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contracts Exceeding One Year.

Where an arbitration award attempted to introduce contractual changes over a period of five years, the court viewed the award as severable, gave effect only to those provisions which went into effect in the first year of the contract and voided the remainder. City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

Vested Rights.

Collective bargaining agreements (CBA) gave retirees of a city a vested right to free lifetime healthcare because this was a proprietary function, rather than governmental function, and the contracts lasted no longer than needed to achieve the CBAs’ goals to settle labor relations for three years. Hebert v. City of Woonsocket, 213 A.3d 1065, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 2019).

Collateral References.

Bargainable or negotiable issues in state public employment labor relations. 84 A.L.R.3d 242.

28-9.2-7. Unresolved issues submitted to arbitration.

In the event that the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities are unable, within thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting, to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration; provided, the parties may agree in writing to extend the thirty-day (30) period as they so desire.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 301, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 314, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitrable Disputes.

An arbitration board may hear and render binding decisions with respect to both state-managed and private pension programs. Town of Barrington v. International Bhd. of Police Officers, Local No. 351, 621 A.2d 716, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 1993).

28-9.2-8. Arbitration board — Composition.

Within five (5) days from the expiration of the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.2-7 , the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities shall each select and name one arbitrator and shall immediately thereafter notify each other in writing of the name and address of the person so selected. The two (2) arbitrators so selected and named shall, within ten (10) days from and after the expiration of the five-day (5) period mentioned in this section, agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If, on the expiration of the period allowed, the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, the third arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) arbitrators previously selected or selected by the American Arbitration Association, shall act as chairperson of the arbitration board.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 151, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 175, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 193, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 229, § 2.

28-9.2-9. Hearings.

  1. The arbitration board shall, acting through its chairperson, call a hearing to be held within ten (10) days after the date of the appointment of the chairperson, and shall, acting through its chairperson, give at least seven (7) days’ notice in writing to each of the other two (2) arbitrators, the bargaining agent, and the corporate authorities of the time and place of the hearing. The hearing shall be informal, and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings shall not be binding. Any documentary evidence and other data deemed relevant by the arbitrators may be received in evidence.
  2. The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, records, and other evidence relative or pertinent to the issues presented to them for determination.
  3. The hearing conducted by the arbitrators shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings, the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the issues presented, a copy of which shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the bargaining agent or its attorney or otherwise delegated representative and to the corporate authorities.
  4. A majority decision of the arbitrators is binding on both the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 151, § 2.

Collateral References.

Evidence, briefs or arguments on particular issues, refusal to receive as grounds for relief from award. 75 A.L.R.3d 132.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators. 66 A.L.R.5th 611.

28-9.2-10. Factors to be considered by arbitration board.

The arbitrators shall conduct the hearings and render their decision on the basis of a prompt, peaceful, and just settlement of wage or hour disputes between the police officers and the city or town by which they are employed. The factors, among others, to be given weight by the arbitrators in arriving at a decision shall include:

  1. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the police department in question with prevailing wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled employees of the building trades and industry in the local operating area involved.
  2. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the police department in question with wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of police departments in cities or towns of comparable size.
  3. Interest and welfare of the public.
  4. Comparison of peculiarities of employment in regard to other trades or professions, specifically:
    1. Hazards of employment;
    2. Physical qualifications;
    3. Educational qualifications;
    4. Mental qualifications; and
    5. Job training and skills.
  5. Comparison of community’s ability to pay.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 182, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The court read this section in conjunction with §§ 28-9.2-2 and 28-9.2-7 and concluded that the Arbitration Act empowers the arbitration board to render binding decisions regarding terms and conditions of employment, including employee pension plans, as well as wage and hour disputes. See City of East Providence v. Local 850, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329 , 366 A.2d 1151, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1634 (1976).

Collateral References.

Arbitrator's power to award punitive damages. 83 A.L.R.3d 1037.

28-9.2-11. Fees and expenses of arbitration.

Fees and necessary expenses of arbitration shall be borne equally by the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities. Notwithstanding any other remedies that a court appointed arbitrator appointed by the chief justice pursuant to § 28-9.2-8 may have, the arbitrator or a party who or that has paid its share of the fees and necessary expenses of a court appointed arbitrator may petition the superior court for sanctions against the party failing to make timely payment of its share of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses, and the superior court is authorized to enforce the sanctions against the nonpaying party, including, but not limited to, contempt powers pursuant to § 8-6-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 246, § 2.

28-9.2-12. Collective bargaining contract.

Any agreements actually negotiated between the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities either before or within thirty (30) days after arbitration shall constitute the collective bargaining contract governing police and the city or town for the period stated in the contract; provided, that the period shall not exceed one year. Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the terms and provisions of this chapter shall specifically provide that the police officers who are subject to its terms shall have no right to engage in any work stoppage, slowdown, or strike, the consideration for the provision being the right to a resolution of disputed questions.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1.

28-9.2-13. Request for collective bargaining.

Whenever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money by any city or town are included as matter of collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this chapter, it is the obligation of the bargaining agent to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining on the corporate authorities at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the city or town to cover the contract period that is the subject of the collective bargaining procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notice.

One hundred twenty day written notice requirement of this section is mandatory rather than directory. Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #23, 118 R.I. 160 , 372 A.2d 1273, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1441 (1977).

“Last day on which money can be appropriated” meant in this case the day on which the financial town meeting was ordinarily held, and where union delivered notice to town less than 120 days prior to May 5 financial town meeting, existence of special procedure for calling extraordinary meeting at any time up to June 30 end of fiscal year did not remedy union’s failure to meet the notice requirements of this section. Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #23, 118 R.I. 160 , 372 A.2d 1273, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1441 (1977).

28-9.2-14. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to other persons or circumstances, other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 54, § 1.

28-9.2-15. Writ of certiorari to the supreme court.

The sole avenue of review of a decision of an arbitration panel issued pursuant to this chapter shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court. If a decision of the arbitration panel is sought to be reviewed by writ of certiorari to the supreme court, the matter shall be given priority by the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 52, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 207, § 2.

28-9.2-16. Attorney’s fees — Costs — Interest.

If either the bargaining agent or the corporate authorities files a petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a review or modification of a majority decision of the arbitrators, which by the provisions of § 28-9.2-9 is binding upon both the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities, the party against whom the decision of the supreme court is adverse, if the supreme court finds the appeal or petition to be frivolous, shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the successful party as determined by the supreme court and the supreme court shall in its final decision or judgment award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. If the final decision affirms the award of money, the award, if retroactive, shall bear interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from the effective retroactive date.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 207, § 2.

28-9.2-17. Continuance of contractual provisions.

All contractual provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement entered into pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall continue in the following collective bargaining agreement unless either the bargaining agent or the corporate authority shall, in writing, within the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.2-7 , propose a change in any contractual provisions.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 271, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Fact that, under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-9.1-17 and 28-9.2-17 , provisions of a collective bargaining agreement with fire fighters and police officers continued in a following collective bargaining agreement unless a change was proposed, did not mean that the terms of a prior collective bargaining agreement could be grafted onto a non-existent collective bargaining agreement. Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2007).

28-9.2-18. Exclusive bargaining representative obligations.

  1. The exclusive representative shall have the right to act for and negotiate agreements covering all employees in the bargaining unit. Nothing in the provision shall require the exclusive representative to provide representation at any level of the grievance process, including arbitration, in any case on behalf of an employee who has elected not to maintain membership in the employee organization for a period of at least ninety (90) days prior to the events giving rise to the grievance.
  2. An employee who has elected not to maintain membership in the employee organization may, at his or her own expense, pursue a grievance against the employer and have the grievance heard, without intervention by the exclusive representative, provided that the exclusive representative is afforded the opportunity to be present at the grievance/arbitration hearing and that any resolution of the grievance shall not be inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between the employer and the exclusive representative. The exclusive representative shall have no obligation to incur expenses related to a grievance initiated by an employee who has elected not to maintain membership in the employee organization for a period of at least ninety (90) days prior to the events giving rise to the grievance.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 144, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 210, § 2.

Chapter 9.3 Certified School Teachers’ Arbitration

28-9.3-1. Declaration of policy — Purpose.

  1. In pursuance of the duty imposed upon it by the constitution to promote public schools and to adopt all means necessary and proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education, the general assembly declares that it recognizes teaching as a profession that requires special educational qualifications and that to achieve high quality education it is indispensable that good relations exist between teaching personnel and school committees.
  2. It is declared to be the public policy of this state to accord to certified public school teachers the right to organize, to be represented, to negotiate professionally, and to bargain on a collective basis with school committees covering hours, salary, working conditions, and other terms of professional employment; provided, that nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to accord to certified public school teachers the right to strike.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

Where town school committee rejected recommendations of mediator pertaining to contract, and union and custodians employed by said school committee brought charges of unfair labor practices, under Municipal Employers’ Arbitration Act, state labor relations board had exclusive initial jurisdiction to hear such charges and superior court had no jurisdiction to enjoin school committee from discharging custodians while matter was pending before the board. Paton v. Poirier, 109 R.I. 401 , 286 A.2d 243, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1199 (1972).

Questions concerning the validity and enforceability of collective bargaining agreements for an expired school year are ordinarily moot and will not be decided barring exceptional circumstances. Casey v. School Comm., 398 A.2d 1148, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2260 (R.I. 1979).

The superior court does not have original jurisdiction to determine what, if any, agreement is in force between the school committee and the teacher’s union, and thus lacked the authority to order a school committee to abide by the terms and conditions of the expired contract with the teachers until a subsequent collective bargaining agreement was reached. If a dispute should arise between the parties concerning the effect of the failure to enter into a new agreement and whether the terms of the expired agreement should be controlling, the tribunal to make such a determination is the State Labor Relations Board pursuant to § 28-9.3-4 . Warwick Sch. Comm. v. Warwick Teachers' Union, 613 A.2d 1273, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 189 (R.I. 1992).

Legislative Intent.

The presence in the Firefighters’ and the Policemen’s Arbitration Acts and the corresponding absence in the School Teachers’ Arbitration Act of specific language, which says that “a method of arbitration of disputes is hereby established,” is attributable solely to difference in legislative drafters and provides no basis for an argument that a prior school committee had no specific legislative authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a provision for binding arbitration. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. School Comm., 108 R.I. 444 , 276 A.2d 762, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1288 (1971).

Although this section contained no specific prohibition against a teachers’ strike, absent a clear and unmistakable declaration by the legislature to depart from the common law, there was no finding of legislative intent granting the right to strike to teachers in this state, and the silence of the legislature on this point could not be looked upon as implicit permission to go on strike. School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 111 R.I. 96 , 299 A.2d 441, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1184 (1973).

The School Teachers’ Arbitration Act did not repeal § 16-7-29 . Berthiaume v. School Comm., 121 R.I. 243 , 397 A.2d 889, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1769 (1979).

Representation.

The union, in a dispute between two of its members, involving a promotion, must make an independent determination as to the merits of the conflicting claims by investigating the case for both sides and must allow each side the opportunity to be heard and submit their qualifications to the union prior to a decision by the union as to which side, if any, the union will take. Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 , 346 A.2d 124, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1155 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S. Ct. 1466, 47 L. Ed. 2d 736, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 309 (1976).

Where the union, in a dispute between two of its members involving a promotion, chose to side with one of the members without making an effort to assess the relative qualifications of the respective candidates, the union breached its duty to represent fairly the interests of all of its members. Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 , 346 A.2d 124, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1155 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S. Ct. 1466, 47 L. Ed. 2d 736, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 309 (1976).

Review of Labor Relations Board Decisions.

Where the school committee was ordered by a state labor relations board decision to execute a contract containing some terms agreed to by the parties and some decided by the arbitration board covering the employment of public school teachers, the proper place for review of that decision was the superior court. Burrillville Sch. Comm. v. Burrillville Teachers' Ass'n, 110 R.I. 677 , 296 A.2d 464, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 965 (1972).

Where there has been a fair hearing before duly appointed arbitrators who have, by whatever means, heard both sides of the controversy and have before them all the relevant information upon which to base a decision, the Supreme Court will not overturn the award. Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 , 346 A.2d 124, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1155 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S. Ct. 1466, 47 L. Ed. 2d 736, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 309 (1976).

28-9.3-2. Right to organize and bargain collectively.

  1. The certified teachers in the public school system in any city, town, or regional school district have the right to negotiate professionally and to bargain collectively with their respective school committees and to be represented by an association or labor organization in the negotiation or collective bargaining concerning hours, salary, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of professional employment.
  2. For purposes of this chapter, “certified teachers” means certified teaching personnel employed in the public school systems in the state of Rhode Island engaged in teaching duties, including support personnel whose positions require a professional certificate issued by the state department of education and personnel licensed by the department of health; or other non-administrative professional employees.
  3. Whenever the word “school committee” is used in this chapter, in a municipality with an appointed school committee, it means the chief executive officer of the municipality.
  4. Superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, and assistant principals, and other supervisors above the rank of assistant principal, are excluded from the provisions of this chapter.
  5. Active employees whose collective bargaining agreements expire on or after September 30, 2011, may, upon expiration of such collective bargaining agreements, receive coverage under benefit plans including, but not limited to, those recommended in accordance with chapter 73 of title 27.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 418, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 366, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 374, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 301, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 124, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 133, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 265, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 265, § 7, provides: “This act shall not effect any municipality in receivership, or the Central Falls school district board of trustees established by section 16-2-34 .”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bargaining Subjects.

Whether course reimbursement and longevity increments were mandatory subjects for collective bargaining should have been determined by considering if they were a part of salary and, if so, they should have been mandatory subjects for bargaining. North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698 , 297 A.2d 342, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 969 (1972).

Where the problem involves both a question of management and a term or condition of employment, it is the duty of the committee to negotiate with the teachers involved. Providence Teachers' Union v. Providence Sch. Comm., 122 R.I. 787 , 412 A.2d 926, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 2105 (1980).

“Certified Teachers.”

Certified teachers with the added duties of “department chairmanships” are within the provisions of this section. Providence Teachers' Union v. Providence Sch. Comm., 122 R.I. 787 , 412 A.2d 926, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 2105 (1980).

Condition of Employment.

Where a town school committee decided to reorganize the junior high school and high school systems, resulting in the elimination of 11 departmental chairmanships and that of athletic director, to be replaced by four positions of “planning and development coordinators,” without consulting with the teachers union, the “condition of employment” of individual teachers within the meaning of this section was substantially altered and adversely affected and presented circumstances compelling negotiation with the union. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 120 R.I. 470 , 388 A.2d 1369, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 702 (1978).

Contract Authority.

As the ultimate arbiter of school expenditures, the council was vested with the final authority to ratify or to reject the contract negotiated by the board and the union. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 384, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 299 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Labor disputes involving municipal employees. 68 A.L.R.3d 885.

Municipal corporation’s power to submit to arbitration. 20 A.L.R.3d 569.

28-9.3-3. Recognition of bargaining agent.

The association or labor organization selected by the certified public school teachers in the public school system in any city, town, or regional school district shall be recognized by the school committee of the city, town, or district as the sole and exclusive negotiating or bargaining agent for all of the public school teachers of the city, town, or regional school district unless and until recognition of the association or labor organization is withdrawn or changed by vote of the certified public school teachers after a duly conducted election, held pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. An association or labor organization or the school committee may designate any person or persons to negotiate or bargain in its behalf.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Duty of Union.

Implicit upon a union, as exclusive bargaining agent, is a statutory duty to fairly and adequately represent the interests of all of those for whom it negotiates and contracts, not only those who are members, but all those who comprise the bargaining unit. Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 , 346 A.2d 124, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1155 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S. Ct. 1466, 47 L. Ed. 2d 736, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 309 (1976).

28-9.3-4. Obligation to bargain.

It shall be the obligation of the school committee to meet and confer in good faith with the representative or representatives of the negotiating or bargaining agent within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from the agent of the request for a meeting for negotiating or collective bargaining purposes. This obligation includes the duty to cause any agreement resulting from negotiations or bargaining to be reduced to a written contract; provided, that no contract shall exceed the term of three (3) years unless a budget commission or a receiver has been appointed for a municipality pursuant to chapter 9 of title 45 or if a municipality has a locally administered pension plan in “critical status” and is required to submit a funding improvement plan pursuant to § 45-65-6(2) . In either case, the contract shall not exceed the term of five (5) years. An unfair labor practice charge may be complained of by either the bargaining agent or the school committee to the state labor relations board which shall deal with the complaint in the manner provided in chapter 7 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 241, art. 22, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 10, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 14, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 512, art. 1, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Agent to Bind Municipality.

One or more members of a negotiating team involved in collective bargaining and negotiations may not bind a school committee in contravention of specific instructions limiting their authority. The authority of a public agent to bind a municipality must be actual. Warwick Teachers' Union Local No. 915 v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 624 A.2d 849, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 1993).

Contract Authority.

As the ultimate arbiter of school expenditures, the council was vested with the final authority to ratify or to reject the contract negotiated by the board and the union. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 384, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 299 (R.I. 1996).

Funding.

A city or town is bound by and must fund the valid collective-bargaining agreements entered into by its school committee. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional Sch. Dist. v. Exeter-West Greenwich Teachers' Ass'n, 489 A.2d 1010, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 440 (R.I. 1985).

Budgets submitted by school committees to the appropriating authority to fund collective-bargaining agreements must be funded. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional Sch. Dist. v. Exeter-West Greenwich Teachers' Ass'n, 489 A.2d 1010, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 440 (R.I. 1985).

Judicial Action.

Notwithstanding the use of the word “may” in the last sentence of this section, before seeking judicial aid, teachers must request the labor relations board to intervene. Warren Educ. Ass'n v. Lapan, 103 R.I. 163 , 235 A.2d 866, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 592 (1967).

The superior court does not have original jurisdiction to determine what, if any, agreement is in force between the school committee and the teacher’s union, and thus lacked the authority to order a school committee to abide by the terms and conditions of the expired contract with the teachers until a subsequent collective bargaining agreement was reached. If a dispute should arise between the parties concerning the effect of the failure to enter into a new agreement and whether the terms of the expired agreement should be controlling, the tribunal to make such a determination is the State Labor Relations Board pursuant to this section. Warwick Sch. Comm. v. Warwick Teachers' Union, 613 A.2d 1273, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 189 (R.I. 1992).

Legislative Authority.

The presence in the Fire Fighters’ and the Policemen’s Arbitration Acts and the corresponding absence in the School Teachers’ Arbitration Act of specific language, which says that “a method of arbitration of disputes is hereby established,” is attributable solely to difference in legislative drafters and provides no basis for an argument that a prior school committee had no specific legislative authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a provision for binding arbitration. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. School Comm., 108 R.I. 444 , 276 A.2d 762, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1288 (1971).

28-9.3-5. Determination of negotiating agent — Elections.

  1. The state labor relations board, upon the written petition for an election signed by not less than twenty percent (20%) of the certified public school teachers of the city, town, or regional school district, indicating their desire to be represented by a particular association or organization or to change or withdraw recognition, shall call and hold an election at which all certified public school teachers shall be entitled to vote.
  2. The association or organization selected by a majority of the certified public school teachers voting in the election shall be certified by the state labor relations board as the exclusive negotiating or bargaining representative of the certified public school teachers of the city, town, or regional school district in any matter within the provisions of this chapter.
  3. Upon written petition to intervene in the election signed by not less than fifteen percent (15%) of the certified public school teachers indicating their desire to be represented by a different or competing association or organization, the name of the different or competing association or organization shall be placed on the same ballot.
  4. If the majority of those voting desire no representation, no association nor labor organization shall be recognized by the school committee as authorized to negotiate or bargain in behalf of its certified public school teachers, and in all elections there shall be provided on the ballot an appropriate designation for such a choice.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

28-9.3-6. Supervision of elections.

The state labor relations board shall prescribe the method of petitioning for an election, the manner, place, and time of conducting the election, and shall supervise all elections to insure against interference, restraint, discrimination, or coercion from any source. Complaints of interference, restraint, discrimination, or coercion shall be heard and dealt with by the labor relations board as provided in chapter 7 of this title. All unfair labor practices enumerated in § 28-7-13 are declared to be unfair labor practices for a school committee.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

28-9.3-7. Certification of negotiating agent.

  1. No association or organization shall be initially certified as the representative of certified public school teachers except after an election.
  2. Teachers shall be free to join or to decline to join any association or organization regardless of whether it has been certified as the exclusive representative of certified public school teachers.
  3. If new elections are not held after an association or labor organization is certified, the association or organization shall continue as the exclusive representative of the certified public school teachers from year to year until recognition is withdrawn or changed as provided in § 28-9.3-5 .
  4. Elections shall not be held more often than once each twelve (12) months and must be held at least thirty (30) days before the expiration date of any employment contract.
  5. Any employees in the bargaining unit, who are not members of the exclusive bargaining representative organization, may be required by the labor or employee organization to pay a reasonable charge for representation in grievances and/or arbitrations brought at the nonmember’s request.
  6. The employer shall notify the exclusive bargaining unit representative organization of the hiring of any employee in the bargaining unit. The notice shall be given promptly after the hiring decision is made but in no event later than the fifth business day following the employee’s start date.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 146, § 1.

28-9.3-8. Request for negotiation or bargaining.

Whenever salary or other matters requiring appropriation of money by any city, town, or regional school district are to be included as a matter of negotiation or collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this chapter, the negotiating or bargaining agent must first serve written notice of request for negotiating or collective bargaining on the school committee at least one hundred forty (140) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the city or town to cover the first year of the contract period which is the subject of the negotiating or bargaining procedure, and the time limit shall be strictly adhered to and shall not be waived. A copy of the written notice of request for negotiating or collective bargaining shall be sent to the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 379, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Advance Notice.
— Purpose.

The purpose of the advance notice of 120 (now 140) days is to allow the town or city to prepare and fund an adequate budget to meet the obligations incurred by the school committee. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional Sch. Dist. v. Exeter-West Greenwich Teachers' Ass'n, 489 A.2d 1010, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 440 (R.I. 1985).

Binding Nature of Contracts.

A school committee binds the municipality it serves by the valid contracts into which it enters. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional Sch. Dist. v. Exeter-West Greenwich Teachers' Ass'n, 489 A.2d 1010, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 440 (R.I. 1985).

28-9.3-9. Unresolved issues submitted to mediation or arbitration.

  1. In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee are unable, within thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting, to reach an agreement on a contract, either of them may request mediation and conciliation upon any and all unresolved issues by the director of labor and training or from any other source. If mediation and conciliation fail or are not requested, at any time after the thirty (30) days, either party may request that any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration by sending the request by certified mail postage prepaid to the other party, setting forth the issues to be arbitrated.
  2. In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee are unable to reach an agreement on a contract thirty (30) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the city and town to cover the first year of the contract period, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to the director of labor and training for compulsory mediation until the date upon which the money is scheduled to be appropriated. The director of labor and training or his or her designee may waive this requirement upon the mutual agreement of the parties.
  3. In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee are unable within ten (10) days of the scheduled close of school in June of the last year of the contract in effect to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to the director of labor and training for compulsory mediation.
  4. If the parties cannot mutually agree upon a mediator within twenty-four (24) hours, the director of labor and training shall select a mediator from a panel previously established by the director comprised of persons knowledgeable in the field of labor management relations to mediate the dispute. The department of labor and training is empowered to compel the attendance of all the parties to any and all meetings it deems necessary until the dispute is resolved.
  5. For any mediation pertaining to unresolved issues that are submitted to compulsory mediation between the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee, pursuant to the provisions of this section, the state shall pay up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) of the cost of the mediation expenses. Any costs above five thousand dollars ($5,000) shall be shared equally between the bargaining unit and the school committee.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 379, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 410, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 415, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 15, § 1.

28-9.3-10. Arbitration board — Composition.

  1. Within seven (7) days after arbitration has been requested as provided in § 28-9.3-9 , the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee shall each select and name one arbitrator and shall immediately notify each other in writing of the name and address of the person so selected. The two (2) arbitrators selected and named shall, within ten (10) days from and after their selection, agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If within the ten (10) days the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, the third arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the rules and procedure of the American Arbitration Association.
  2. If the negotiating or bargaining agent agrees with the school committee to a different method of selecting arbitrators, or to a lesser or greater number of arbitrators, or to any particular arbitrator, or if they agree to have the council on elementary and secondary education designate the arbitrator or arbitrators to conduct the arbitration, the agreement shall govern the selection of arbitrators. However, if the council on elementary and secondary education is unwilling or fails to designate the arbitrator or arbitrators, an alternative method of selection shall be used.
  3. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) previously selected arbitrators, or selected under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, or by the council on elementary and secondary education, or by any other method, shall act as chairperson.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

28-9.3-11. Hearings.

  1. The arbitrators shall call a hearing to be held within ten (10) days after their appointment and shall give at least seven (7) days’ notice in writing to the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee of the time and place of the hearing. The hearing shall be informal, and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings shall not be binding. Any documentary evidence and other data deemed relevant by the arbitrators may be received in evidence.
  2. The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, records, and other evidence relative or pertinent to the issues presented to them for determination.
  3. Both the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee shall have the right to be represented at any hearing before the arbitrators by counsel of their own choosing.
  4. The hearing conducted by the arbitrators shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings, the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the issues presented, a copy of which shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the negotiating or bargaining agent or its attorney or other designated representative and the school committee.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

Collateral References.

Arbitrator's power to award punitive damages. 83 A.L.R.3d 1037.

28-9.3-12. Appeal from decision.

While the parties are engaged in negotiations and/or utilizing the dispute resolution process as required in § 28-9.3-9 , all terms and conditions in the collective bargaining agreement shall remain in effect. The decision of the arbitrators shall be made public and shall be binding on the certified public school teachers and their representative and the school committee on all matters not involving the expenditure of money. Should either party reject the nonbinding matters in the decision of the arbitrators, the binding matters shall be implemented. Following the conclusion of the dispute resolution process as required in § 28-9.3-9 , should the parties still be unable to reach agreement, all contractual provisions related to wages and benefits contained in the collective bargaining agreement, except for any contractual provisions that limit layoffs, shall continue as agreed to in the expired collective bargaining agreement until such time as a successor agreement has been reached between the parties. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the representative of the certified public school teachers and the school committee from mutually agreeing to submit all unresolved issues to binding arbitration pursuant to the procedures set forth in §§ 28-9.3-10 28-9.3-12 . In that case the decision of the arbitrators shall be final and binding on all matters so submitted, including those involving the expenditure of money, and cannot be appealed except on the ground that the decision was procured by fraud or that it violates the law, in which case appeals shall be to the superior court. The school committee shall within three (3) days after it receives the decision send a true copy of the decision by certified or registered mail postage prepaid to the department or agency that appropriates money for the operation of the schools in the city, town, or regional school district involved, if the decision involves the expenditure of money.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 379, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 15, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 16, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Although under normal circumstances, questions concerning the validity and enforceability of collective bargaining agreements for an expired school year are moot, there are two exceptions to this rule: (1) when the parties stipulate that “identical legal questions” apply to the present agreement as well as to the earlier contract, or (2) when the court finds that the question is of significant public interest or that similar occurrences may evade review in the future. Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 595 , 389 A.2d 728, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 703 (1978).

Legislative Intent.

The legislature, in mandating arbitration in conflicts arising in the negotiation process and in declaring arbitration to be final and not appealable unless procured by fraud or in violation of law, intended arbitration to relate only to resolving substantive terms that will be part of a new contract and not to settling controversies relating to the terms of an executed contract. Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 , 346 A.2d 124, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1155 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S. Ct. 1466, 47 L. Ed. 2d 736, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 309 (1976).

Review.

While the statute provides that arbitrator’s decisions can be appealed to the superior court the statute does not provide for judicial review of the action taken in the superior court and therefore the only way such matter can be brought to the Supreme Court is by writ of certiorari. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance v. School Comm., 121 R.I. 385 , 399 A.2d 833, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1791 (1979).

Collateral References.

Evidence, briefs or arguments on particular issues, refusal to receive as grounds for relief from award. 75 A.L.R.3d 132.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators. 66 A.L.R.5th 611.

28-9.3-13. Fees and expenses of arbitration.

Fees and necessary expenses of arbitration shall be borne equally by the negotiating or bargaining agent and the school committee.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

28-9.3-14. Plural and singular usage.

Whenever the word “arbitrators” is used in this chapter it also means arbitrator where applicable.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

28-9.3-15. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

28-9.3-16. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “School Teachers’ Arbitration Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 146, § 1.

Chapter 9.4 Municipal Employees’ Arbitration

28-9.4-1. Declaration of policy — Purpose.

It is declared to be the public policy of this state to accord to municipal employees the right to organize, to be represented, to negotiate, and to bargain on a collective basis with municipal employers, covering hours, salary, working conditions and other terms of employment; provided, that nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to accord to municipal employees the right to strike.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Municipal employees’ arbitration:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-467 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150E, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability of Labor Relations Act.

Controversies related to municipal employee representation are handled by the labor board under the procedures contained in the Rhode Island Labor Relations Act (chapter 7 of title 28) when they do not conflict with the specific provisions of this chapter. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1992).

Jurisdiction.

Where town school committee rejected recommendations of mediator pertaining to contract and union and custodians employed by said school committee brought charges of unfair labor practices under Municipal Employers’ Arbitration Act, State Labor Relations Board had exclusive initial jurisdiction to hear such charges and superior court had no jurisdiction to enjoin school committee from discharging custodians while matter was pending before the board. Paton v. Poirier, 109 R.I. 401 , 286 A.2d 243, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1199 (1972).

28-9.4-2. Definitions.

  1. “Employee organizations” means any lawful association, labor organization, federation, or council having as a primary purpose the improvement of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment among employees of municipal employers.
  2. “Municipal employee” means any employee of a municipal employer, whether or not in the classified service of the municipal employer, except:
    1. Elected officials and administrative officials;
    2. Board and commission members;
    3. Certified teachers, police officers, and firefighters;
    4. Confidential and supervisory employees;
    5. Casual employees, meaning persons hired for an occasional period to perform special jobs or functions;
    6. Seasonal employees, meaning persons employed to perform work on a seasonal basis of not more than sixteen (16) weeks, or who are part of an annual job employment program;
    7. Employees of authorities except housing authorities not under direct management by a municipality who work less than twenty (20) hours per week. The state labor relations board shall, whenever requested to do so, in each instance, determine who are supervisory, administrative, confidential, casual, and seasonal employees.
  3. “Municipal employer” means any political subdivision of the state, including any town, city, borough, district, school board, housing authority, or other authority established by law, and any person or persons designated by the municipal employer to act in its interest in dealing with municipal employees.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 58 § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Confidential Employees.

The superior court did not commit an error of law in utilizing the “labor-nexus” test developed by the national labor relations board to ascertain whether the secretary to the business manager of a school committee was a “confidential employee” precluded from being included in the collective bargaining unit for all secretaries employed by the school committee. The “labor-nexus” test, however, is not necessarily controlling in future cases, as a broader definition of those employees considered to be “confidential” may be desirable in other circumstances. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1992).

The superior court properly concluded that the state labor board’s decision to include the position of secretary to the business manager of the school committee within the collective bargaining unit for all secretaries to the school committee was clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the record concerning the secretary’s substantial and steady access to privileged labor relations materials and the absence of competent evidence in the record considered as a whole to support the labor board’s decision. Barrington Sch. Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1992).

Municipal Employee.

Superior court properly confirmed an arbitrator’s finding that an employee’s dispute with a town regarding elimination of her clerical position was arbitrable by the union, as the employee clearly was a member of the bargaining unit. Although the employee was appointed by the local board of canvassers under R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-8-5(a) , there was nothing to suggest that she was not employed by the town and part of the union’s bargaining unit where the town code’s definition of classified personnel specifically included persons appointed or employed in the service of the town; the CBA, by reference to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.4-2(b) , provided that municipal employees were members of the bargaining unit under the agreement; and allowing the union to arbitrate the employee’s grievance did not infringe on the board’s authority to appoint clerical employees. Town of Johnston v. R.I. Council 94, 159 A.3d 83, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 2017).

Part-Time Employees.

School crossing guards, although working every day in the school year but working approximately only ten hours per week, were part-time employees within the meaning of this section and not entitled to the benefits of the act. North Providence Sch. Comm. v. State Labor Relations Bd., 122 R.I. 415 , 408 A.2d 928, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1555 (1979).

28-9.4-3. Right to organize and bargain collectively.

  1. The municipal employees of any municipal employer in any city, town, or regional school district shall have the right to negotiate and to bargain collectively with their respective municipal employers and to be represented by an employee organization in the negotiation or collective bargaining concerning hours, salary, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of employment.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), for those municipal employees who are employed by school districts, collective bargaining agreements shall not provide for benefits for health care (“benefit plans”) for school district employees unless such benefit plans are authorized in accordance with chapter 73 of title 27. School district employees whose collective bargaining agreements expire on or after September 30, 2011, may, upon expiration of such collective bargaining agreements, receive benefit plans including, but not limited to, those recommended in accordance with chapter 73 of title 27.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 374, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 383, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 301, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 124, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 133, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contract Authority.

As the ultimate arbiter of school expenditures, the council was vested with the final authority to ratify or to reject the contract negotiated by the board and the union. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 384, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 299 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Labor disputes involving public employees. 68 A.L.R.3d 885.

Municipal corporation’s power to submit to arbitration. 20 A.L.R.3d 569.

28-9.4-4. Recognition of bargaining agent.

The employee organization selected by the municipal employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, as determined by the state labor relations board, shall be recognized by the municipal employer or the city, town, or district as the sole and exclusive negotiating or bargaining agent for all of the municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit in the city, town, or school district unless and until recognition of the employee organization is withdrawn or changed by vote of the municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit after a duly conducted election held pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. An employee organization or the municipal employer may designate any person or persons to negotiate or bargain in its behalf.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Limitation of Actions.

A member’s claim that his union failed to properly represent the member under this section is an action for a tortious injury and the limitation of actions appropriate to a tort in § 9-1-14 apply thereto. McDonald v. Rhode Island Gen. Council, 505 A.2d 1176, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 425 (R.I. 1986), limited, Lagana v. IBEW-Local 1274, 767 A.2d 666, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 72 (R.I. 2001).

28-9.4-5. Obligation to bargain.

It shall be the obligation of the municipal employer to meet and confer in good faith with the representative or representatives of the negotiating or bargaining agent within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from the agent of the request for a meeting for negotiating or collective bargaining purposes. This obligation includes the duty to cause any agreement resulting from negotiation or bargaining to be reduced to a written contract; provided, that no contract shall exceed the term of three (3) years unless a budget commission or a receiver has been appointed for a municipality pursuant to chapter 9 of title 45 or if a municipality has a locally administered pension plan in “critical status” and is required to submit a funding improvement plan pursuant to § 45-65-6(2) . In either case, the contract shall not exceed the term of five (5) years. Failure to negotiate or bargain in good faith may be complained of by either the negotiating or bargaining agent or the municipal employer to the state labor relations board, which shall deal with the complaint in the manner provided in chapter 7 of this title. An unfair labor practice charge may be complained of by either the bargaining agent or employer’s representative to the state labor relations board, which shall deal with the complaint in the manner provided in chapter 7 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 241, § 6; P.L. 2012, ch. 241, art. 22, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 10, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 11, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 512, art. 1, § 15.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contract Authority.

As the ultimate arbiter of school expenditures, the council was vested with the final authority to ratify or to reject the contract negotiated by the board and the union. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 384, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 299 (R.I. 1996).

One-Year Contracts.

A one-year contract fits within the parameters of this section. Providence City Council v. Cianci, 650 A.2d 499, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 291 (R.I. 1994).

28-9.4-6. Determination of negotiating agent — Elections.

  1. The state labor relations board, upon the written petition for an election signed by not less than twenty percent (20%) of the municipal employees in an appropriate bargaining unit as determined by the state labor relations board of a city, town, or regional school district indicating their desire to be represented by a particular employee organization or to change or withdraw recognition, shall call and hold an election at which all municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled to vote.
  2. The employee organization selected by a majority of the municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit voting in the election shall be certified by the state labor relations board as the exclusive negotiating or bargaining representative of the municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit of the city, town, or regional school district in any matter within the provision of this chapter.
  3. Upon written petition to intervene in the election signed by not less than fifteen percent (15%) of the municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit indicating their desire to be represented by a different or competing employee organization, the name of the different or competing employee organization shall be placed on the same ballot.
  4. If the majority of those voting desire no representation, no employee organization shall be recognized by the municipal employer as authorized to negotiate or bargain in behalf of its municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, and in all elections there shall be provided on the ballot an appropriate designation of such a choice.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-7. Supervision of elections.

The state labor relations board shall prescribe the method of petitioning for an election, the manner, place, and time of conducting the election, and shall supervise all elections to insure against interference, restraint, discrimination, or coercion from any source. Complaints of interference, restraint, discrimination, or coercion shall be heard and dealt with by the labor relations board as provided in chapter 7 of this title. All unfair labor practices enumerated in § 28-7-13 are unfair labor practices for a municipal employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-8. Certification of negotiating agent.

  1. No employee organization shall be initially certified as the representative of municipal employees in an appropriate bargaining unit except after an election.
  2. Municipal employees shall be free to join or decline to join any employee organization regardless of whether it has been certified as the exclusive representative of municipal employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
  3. If new elections are not held after an employee organization is certified, the employee organization shall continue as the exclusive representative of the municipal employees of the appropriate bargaining unit from year to year until recognition is withdrawn or changed as provided in § 28-9.4-6 .
  4. Elections shall not be held more often than once each twelve (12) months and must be held at least thirty (30) days before the expiration date of any employment contract.
  5. An employee organization designated as the representative of the majority of the municipal employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive bargaining agent for all municipal employees of the unit, and shall act, negotiate agreements, and bargain collectively for all employees in the unit and shall be responsible for representing the interest of all the municipal employees without discrimination and without regard to employee organization membership.
  6. Any employee(s) in the bargaining unit, who are not members of the exclusive bargaining representative organization, may be required by the labor or employee organization to pay a reasonable charge for representation in grievances and/or arbitrations brought at the nonmember’s request.
  7. The employer shall notify the exclusive bargaining unit representative organization of the hiring of any employee in the bargaining unit. The notice shall be given promptly after the hiring decision is made but in no event later than the fifth business day following the employee’s start date.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 146, § 2.

28-9.4-9. Request for negotiation or bargaining.

Whenever salary or other matters requiring appropriation of money by any municipal employer are to be included as matter of negotiation or collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this chapter, the negotiating or bargaining agent must first serve written notice of request for negotiating or collective bargaining on the municipal employer at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the municipal employer to cover the first year of the contract period which is the subject of the negotiating or bargaining procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-10. Unresolved issues submitted to mediation or arbitration.

  1. In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the municipal employer are unable after thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting to reach an agreement on a contract, either of them may request mediation and conciliation upon any and all unresolved issues by the director of labor and training or from any other source. After a request for mediation and conciliation has been made by either party, it shall be the duty and obligation of each party to participate in the mediation and conciliation. If mediation and conciliation fail or are not requested at any time after the thirty (30) days, either party may request that any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration by sending the request by certified mail postage prepaid to the other party, setting forth the issues to be arbitrated.
  2. In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the municipal employer are unable to reach an agreement on a contract thirty (30) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the city or town to cover the first year of the contract period, then any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to the director of labor and training for compulsory mediation until the date upon which the money is scheduled to be appropriated. The director of labor and training, or his or her designee, may waive this requirement upon the mutual agreement of the parties.
  3. In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the municipal employer are unable within ten (10) days of the expiration of the contract to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to the director of labor and training for compulsory mediation, except where the municipal employer is a school board. In the event that the negotiating or bargaining agent and the municipal employer school board are unable within thirty (30) days of the scheduled opening of school to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to the director of labor and training for compulsory mediation.
  4. If the parties cannot mutually agree upon a mediator within twenty-four (24) hours, the director of labor and training shall select a mediator from a panel previously established by the director comprised of persons knowledgeable in the field of labor management relations to mediate the dispute. The department of labor and training is empowered to compel the attendance of all parties to any and all meetings it deems necessary until the dispute is resolved.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 432, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 184, § 1.

28-9.4-11. Arbitration board — Composition.

  1. Within seven (7) days after arbitration has been requested as provided in § 28-9.4-10 , the negotiating agent and the municipal employer shall each select and name one arbitrator and shall immediately thereafter notify each other, in writing, of the name and address of the person selected.
  2. The two (2) arbitrators selected and named shall within ten (10) days from and after their selection agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If within the ten (10) days the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, the third arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the rules and procedure of the American Arbitration Association.
  3. If the negotiating or bargaining agent agrees with the municipal employer to a different method of selecting arbitrators, or to a lesser or greater number of arbitrators, or to any particular arbitrator, or if they agree to have the state director of labor and training designate the arbitrator or arbitrators to conduct the arbitration, the agreement shall govern the selection of arbitrators; provided, that if the state director of labor and training is unwilling or fails to designate the arbitrator or arbitrators, an alternative method of selection shall be used.
  4. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) previously selected arbitrators, or selected under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, or by the state director of labor and training or by any other method, shall act as chairperson.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-12. Hearings.

  1. The arbitrators shall call a hearing to be held within ten (10) days after their appointment and shall give at least seven (7) days’ notice, in writing, to the negotiating or bargaining agent and the municipal employer of the time and place of the hearing.
  2. The hearing shall be informal, and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings shall not be binding. Any and all documentary evidence and other data deemed relevant by the arbitrators may be received in evidence.
  3. The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, records, and other evidence relative or pertinent to the issues presented to them for determination.
  4. Both the negotiating or bargaining agent and the municipal employer shall have the right to be represented at any hearing before the arbitrators by counsel of their own choosing.
  5. The hearing conducted by the arbitrators shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings, the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the issues presented, a copy of which shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the negotiating or bargaining agent or its attorney or other designated representative and the municipal employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

Collateral References.

Arbitrator's power to award punitive damages. 83 A.L.R.3d 1037.

28-9.4-13. Appeal from decision.

  1. While the parties are engaged in negotiations and/or utilizing the dispute resolution process as required in § 28-9.4-10 , all terms and conditions in the collective bargaining agreement shall remain in effect. The decision of the arbitrators shall be made public and shall be binding upon the municipal employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and their representative and the municipal employer on all matters not involving the expenditure of money. Should either party reject the nonbinding matters in the decision of the arbitrators, the binding matters shall be implemented. Following the conclusion of the dispute resolution process as required in § 28-9.4-10 , should the parties still be unable to reach agreement, all contractual provisions related to wages and benefits contained in the collective bargaining agreement, except for any contractual provisions that limit layoffs, shall continue as agreed to in the expired collective bargaining agreement until such time as a successor agreement has been reached between the parties.
  2. The decision of the arbitrators shall be final and cannot be appealed except on the ground that the decision was procured by fraud or that it violates the law, in which case appeals shall be to the superior court.
  3. The municipal employer shall within three (3) days after it receives the decision send a true copy of the decision by certified or registered mail postage prepaid to the department or agency of the municipal employer responsible for the preparation of the budget and to the agency of the municipal employer that appropriates money for the operation of the particular municipal function or service in the city, town, or regional school district involved, if the decision involves the expenditure of money.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 16, § 2.

Collateral References.

Evidence, briefs or arguments on particular issues, refusal to receive as grounds for relief from award. 75 A.L.R.3d 132.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators. 66 A.L.R.5th 611.

28-9.4-14. Fees and expenses of arbitration.

Fees and necessary expenses of arbitration shall be borne equally by the negotiating or bargaining agent and the municipal employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-15. Plural and singular usage.

Whenever the word arbitrators is used in this chapter it also means arbitrator where applicable.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-16. Strikes by municipal employees illegal.

Municipal employees covered by the provisions of this chapter shall not have the right to engage in any strike, work stoppage, or slowdown strike; and any strike, work stoppage, or slowdown strike shall be illegal.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-17. Mediation by director of labor and training and his or her conciliators.

The services of the state director of labor and training and his or her conciliators shall be available to municipal employers and employee organizations for purposes of conciliation of grievances or contract disputes; provided, that nothing in this section prevents the use of the arbitration procedures and arbitration tribunals provided for in §§ 28-9.4-10 28-9.4-15 .

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-18. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

28-9.4-19. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Municipal Employees Arbitration Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 44, § 1.

Chapter 9.5 State Police Arbitration

28-9.5-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “State Police Arbitration Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter (P.L. 1976, ch. 59, § 1), consisting of §§ 28-9.5-1 28-9.5-1 3 and concerning arbitration and collective bargaining for certified administrators in the city of Providence, was repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 229, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability of § 28-9-18 .

The standards contained in § 28-9-18 are to be observed and not those in the Administrative Procedure Act, § 42-35-15 , where the arbitration panel is convened and its hearings are to be governed by the State Police Arbitration Act. State v. Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25, 544 A.2d 133, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 1988).

28-9.5-2. Statement of policy.

  1. The protection of the public health, safety, and welfare demands that the full-time state police officers of the state of Rhode Island not be accorded the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. This necessary prohibition does not require the denial to such state employees of other well recognized rights of labor, such as the right to organize, to be represented by an organization of their choice, and the right to bargain collectively concerning wages, rates of pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
  2. It is declared to be the public policy of this state to accord to the full-time police officers of the state all of the rights of labor other than the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. To provide for the exercise of these rights, a method of arbitration of disputes is established.
  3. The establishment of this method of arbitration shall not in any way, be deemed to be recognition by the state of compulsory arbitration as a superior method of settling labor disputes between employees who possess the right to strike and their employers, but rather is a recognition solely of the necessity to provide some alternative mode of settling disputes where employees must as a matter of public policy be denied the usual right to strike.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the following terms, unless the context requires a different interpretation, have the following meanings:

  1. “State authorities” means the proper officials of the state whose duty or duties it is to establish the wages, salaries, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment of state police.
  2. “State police” means the full-time state police of the state of Rhode Island from the rank of trooper up to and including the rank of sergeant.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-4. Right to organize and bargain collectively.

The state police shall have the right to bargain collectively with the state of Rhode Island and to be represented by an organization in the collective bargaining as to wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-5. Recognition of bargaining agent.

The organization selected by the majority of the state police shall be recognized by the state as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all of the state police unless and until recognition of the organization is withdrawn by vote of a majority of the state police. The labor organization or state may designate any person or persons to negotiate or bargain on its behalf; provided, that the person or persons so designated shall be given authority to enter into and conclude an effective and binding collective bargaining agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-6. Obligation to bargain.

It shall be the obligation of the state, acting through state authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with the designated representative or representatives of the bargaining agent, including any legal counsel selected by the bargaining agent, within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from the bargaining agent of the request for a meeting for collective bargaining purposes. This obligation includes the duty to cause any agreement resulting from the negotiations to be reduced to a written contract; provided, that no contract shall exceed the term of three (3) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-7. Unresolved issues submitted to arbitration.

In the event that the bargaining agent and the state authorities are unable within thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting to reach an agreement on a contract, any unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-8. Arbitration board — Composition.

  1. Within five (5) days from the expiration of the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.5-7 , the bargaining agent and the state authorities shall each select and name one arbitrator and shall immediately notify each other, in writing, of the name and address of the person selected.
  2. The two (2) arbitrators selected and named shall, within ten (10) days from and after the expiration of the five-day (5) period above, agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If, on the expiration of the period allowed, the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, the chief justice of the Rhode Island supreme court shall select a resident of Rhode Island, or a person whose place of business or principal place of employment is in Rhode Island, as the third arbitrator upon request, in writing, from either the bargaining agent or the state authorities.
  3. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) previously selected arbitrators or selected by the chief justice, shall act as chairperson of the arbitration board.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 175, § 3.

28-9.5-9. Hearings.

    1. The arbitration board shall, acting through its chairperson, call a hearing to be held within ten (10) days after the date of the appointment of the chairperson, and shall, acting through its chairperson, give at least seven (7) days’ notice, in writing, to each of the other two (2) arbitrators, the bargaining agent, and the state authorities of the time and place of the hearing.
    2. The hearing shall be informal and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings shall not be binding. Any and all documentary evidence and other data deemed relevant by the arbitrators may be received in evidence.
    3. The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, records, and other evidence relative or pertinent to the issues presented to them for determination.
  1. The hearing conducted by the arbitrators shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings, the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the issues presented, a copy of which shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the bargaining agent or its attorney or otherwise delegated representative and to the state authorities. A majority decision of the arbitrators shall be binding upon both the bargaining agent and the state authorities.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Absence of Stenographic Record.

The absence of a stenographic record of an arbitration hearing under the State Police Arbitration Act does not require the vacating of the arbitration award. State v. Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25, 544 A.2d 133, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 1988).

28-9.5-10. Factors to be considered by arbitration board.

The arbitrators shall conduct the hearings and render their decision upon the basis of a prompt, peaceful, and just settlement of wage or hour disputes between the state police and the state. The factors, among others, to be given weight by the arbitrators in arriving at a decision shall include:

  1. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the state police with prevailing wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled employees of the building trades and industry in the state.
  2. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the state police with wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of state police departments in other states.
  3. Interest and welfare of the public.
  4. Comparison of peculiarities of employment in regard to other trades or professions, specifically:
    1. Hazards of employment;
    2. Physical qualifications;
    3. Educational qualifications;
    4. Mental qualifications; and
    5. Job training and skills.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitration Guidelines Correctly Followed.

See State v. Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25, 544 A.2d 133, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 1988).

28-9.5-11. Fees and expenses of arbitration.

Fees and necessary expenses of arbitration shall be equally borne by the bargaining agent and the state. Notwithstanding any other remedies which a court appointed arbitrator appointed by the chief justice pursuant to § 28-9.5-8 may have, the arbitrator or a party who or that has paid its share of the fees and necessary expenses of a court appointed arbitrator may petition the superior court for sanctions against the party failing to make timely payment of its share of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses, and the superior court is authorized to enforce the sanctions against the nonpaying party, including, but not limited to, contempt powers pursuant to § 8-6-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 246, § 3.

28-9.5-12. Collective bargaining contract.

Any agreements actually negotiated between the bargaining agent and the state authorities either before or within thirty (30) days after arbitration shall constitute the collective bargaining contract governing state police and the state for the period stated in the agreement; provided, that the period shall not exceed three (3) years. Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the terms and provisions of this chapter shall specifically provide that the state police who are subject to its terms shall have no right to engage in any work stoppage, slowdown, or strike, the consideration for the provision being the right to a resolution of disputed questions.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-13. Request for collective bargaining.

Whenever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money by the state are included as a matter of collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this chapter, it is the obligation of the bargaining agent to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining on the state authorities at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the state to cover the contract period that is the subject of the collective bargaining procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-14. Writ of certiorari to the supreme court.

The sole avenue of review of a decision of an arbitration panel issued pursuant to this chapter shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court. In the event a decision of the arbitration panel is sought to be reviewed by writ of certiorari to the supreme court, the matter shall be given priority by the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 207, § 3.

28-9.5-15. Attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest.

In the event either the bargaining agent or the state authorities files a petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a review or modification of a majority decision of the arbitrators, which by the provisions of § 28-9.5-9 is binding upon both the bargaining agent and the state authorities, the party against whom the decision of the supreme court is adverse, if the supreme court finds the appeal or petition to be frivolous, shall pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the successful party as determined by the supreme court, and the supreme court shall in its final decision or judgment award the costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. If the final decision affirms the award of money, the award, if retroactive, shall bear interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from the effective retroactive date.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 207, § 3.

28-9.5-16. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to other persons or circumstances, other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 311, § 1.

28-9.5-17. Affirmative action provisions.

The superintendent of the state police shall include proposals for affirmative action provisions as a subject for all collective bargaining negotiations. The proposals shall include at a minimum, but not limited to, the following personnel actions: recruitment; new hires; promotions; transfers; terminations; training and education; layoffs and return from layoff.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 280, § 5.

Chapter 9.6 911 Employees’ Arbitration

28-9.6-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “911 Employees Arbitration Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242 § 1.

28-9.6-2. Statement of policy.

  1. The protection of the public health, safety, and welfare demands that the full-time 911 employees of the state of Rhode Island not be accorded the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. This necessary prohibition does not require the denial to such state employees of other well recognized rights of labor, such as the right to organize, to be represented by an organization of their choice, and the right to bargain collectively concerning wages, rates of pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
  2. It is declared to be the public policy of this state to accord to the full-time 911 employees of the state all of the rights of labor other than the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. To provide for the exercise of these rights, a method of arbitration of disputes is established.
  3. The establishment of this method of arbitration shall not, in any way, be deemed to be recognition by the state of compulsory arbitration as a superior method of settling labor disputes between employees who possess the right to strike and their employers, but rather is a recognition solely of the necessity to provide some alternative mode of settling disputes where employees must as a matter of public policy, be denied the usual right to strike.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the following terms, unless the context requires a different interpretation, have the following meanings:

  1. “911 employees” means the full-time supervisors, assistant supervisors, and telecommunicators of the 911 statewide uniform emergency telephone system pursuant to chapter 21.1 of title 39.
  2. “State authorities” means the proper officials of the state whose duty or duties it is to establish the wages, salaries, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment of 911 employees.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-4. Right to organize and bargain collectively.

The 911 employees shall have the right to bargain collectively with the state of Rhode Island and to be represented by an organization in the collective bargaining as to wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-5. Recognition of bargaining agent.

The organization selected by the majority of the 911 employees shall be recognized by the state as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all of the 911 employees unless and until recognition of the organization is withdrawn by vote of a majority of the 911 employees. The labor organization or state may designate any person or persons to negotiate or bargain on its behalf; provided, that the person or persons so designated shall be given authority to enter into and conclude an effective and binding collective bargaining agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-6. Obligation to bargain.

It shall be the obligation of the state, acting through state authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with the designated representative or representatives of the bargaining agent, including any legal counsel selected by the bargaining agent, within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from the bargaining agent of the request for a meeting for collective bargaining purposes. This obligation includes the duty to cause any agreement resulting from the negotiations to be reduced to a written contract; provided, that no contract shall exceed the term of three (3) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-7. Unresolved issues submitted to arbitration.

In the event that the bargaining agent and the state authorities are unable within thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-8. Arbitration board — Composition.

  1. Within five (5) days from the expiration of the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.6-7 , the bargaining agent and the state authorities shall each select and name one arbitrator and shall immediately notify each other, in writing, of the name and address of the person selected.
  2. The two (2) arbitrators selected and named shall, within ten (10) days from and after the expiration of the five-day (5) period above, agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If, on the expiration of the period allowed, the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, the chief justice of the Rhode Island supreme court shall select a resident of Rhode Island, or a person whose place of business or principal place of employment is in Rhode Island, as the third arbitrator upon request, in writing, from either the bargaining agent or the state authorities.
  3. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) previously selected arbitrators or selected by the chief justice, shall act as chairperson of the arbitration board.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-9. Hearings.

    1. The arbitration board shall, acting through its chairperson, call a hearing to be held within ten (10) days after the date of the appointment of the chairperson, and shall, acting through its chairperson, give at least seven (7) days’ notice in writing to each of the other two (2) arbitrators, the bargaining agent, and the state authorities of the time and place of the hearing.
    2. The hearing shall be informal and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings shall not be binding. Any and all documentary evidence and other data deemed relevant by the arbitrators may be received in evidence.
    3. The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, records, and other evidence relative or pertinent to the issues presented to them for determination.
  1. The hearing conducted by the arbitrators shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings, the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the issues presented, a copy of which shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the bargaining agent or its attorney or otherwise delegated representative and to the state authorities. A majority decision of the arbitrators shall be binding upon both the bargaining agent and the state authorities.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-10. Factors to be considered by arbitration board.

The arbitrators shall conduct the hearings and render their decision upon the basis of a prompt, peaceful, and just settlement of wage or hour disputes between the 911 employees and the state. The factors, among others, to be given weight by the arbitrators in arriving at a decision shall include:

  1. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the 911 employees with prevailing wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled employees of the building trades and industry in the state.
  2. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of 911 employees with wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of 911 employees in other states.
  3. Interest and welfare of the public.
  4. Comparison of peculiarities of employment in regard to other trades or professions, specifically:
    1. Hazards of employment;
    2. Physical qualifications;
    3. Educational qualifications;
    4. Mental qualifications; and
    5. Job training and skills.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-11. Fees and expenses of arbitration.

Fees and necessary expenses of arbitration shall be equally borne by the bargaining agent and the state. Notwithstanding any other remedies which a court appointed arbitrator appointed by the chief justice pursuant to § 28-9.6-8 may have, the arbitrator or a party who has paid its share of the fees and necessary expenses of a court appointed arbitrator may petition the superior court for sanctions against the party failing to make timely payment of its share of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses, and the superior court is authorized to enforce the sanctions against the nonpaying party, including, but not limited to, contempt powers pursuant to § 8-6-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 246, § 4.

28-9.6-12. Collective bargaining contract.

Any agreements actually negotiated between the bargaining agent and the state authorities either before or within thirty (30) days after arbitration shall constitute the collective bargaining contract governing 911 employees and the state for the period stated in the agreement; provided, that the period shall not exceed three (3) years. Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the terms and provisions of this chapter shall specifically provide that 911 employees who are subject to its terms have no right to engage in any work stoppage, slowdown, or strike, the consideration for the provision being the right to a resolution of disputed questions.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-13. Request for collective bargaining.

Whenever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money by the state are included as a matter of collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this chapter, it is the obligation of the bargaining agent to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining on the state authorities at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the state to cover the contract period which is the subject of the collective bargaining procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-14. Writ of certiorari to the supreme court.

The sole avenue of review of a decision of an arbitration panel issued pursuant to this chapter shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court. In the event a decision of the arbitration panel is sought to be reviewed by writ of certiorari to the supreme court, the matter shall be given priority by the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-15. Attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest.

In the event either the bargaining agent or the state authorities files a petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a review or modification of a majority decision of the arbitrators, which by the provisions of § 28-9.6-9 is binding upon both the bargaining agent and the state authorities, the party against whom the decision of the supreme court is adverse, if the supreme court finds the appeal or petition to be frivolous, shall pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the successful party as determined by the supreme court and the supreme court shall in its final decision or judgment award the costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. If the final decision affirms the award of money, the award, if retroactive, shall bear interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from the effective retroactive date.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

28-9.6-16. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to other persons or circumstances, other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 242, § 1.

Chapter 9.7 Correctional Officers Arbitration

28-9.7-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Correctional Officers Arbitration Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-2. Statement of policy.

  1. The protection of the public health, safety, and welfare demands that the full-time correctional officers of the state of Rhode Island not be accorded the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. This necessary prohibition does not, however, require the denial to such state employees of other well recognized rights of labor, such as the right to organize, to be represented by an organization of their choice, and the right to bargain collectively concerning wages, rates of pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
  2. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state to accord to the full-time correctional officers of the state all of the rights of labor other than the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. To provide for the exercise of these rights, a method of arbitration of disputes is hereby established.
  3. The establishment of this method of arbitration shall not, however, in any way whatever, be deemed to be recognized by the state of compulsory arbitration as a superior method of settling labor disputes between employees who possess the right to strike and their employers, but rather shall be deemed to be a recognition solely of the necessity to provide some alternative mode of settling disputes where employees must as a matter of public policy be denied the usual right to strike.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the following terms shall, unless the context requires a different interpretation have the following meanings:

  1. “Correctional officers” shall mean the full-time correctional officers of the state of Rhode Island.
  2. “State authorities” shall mean the proper officials of the state whose duty or duties it is to establish the wages, salaries, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment of correctional officers.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-4. Right to organize and bargain collectively.

The correctional officers shall have the right to bargain collectively with the state of Rhode Island and to be represented by an organization in the collective bargaining as to wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-5. Recognition of bargaining agent.

The organization selected by the majority of the correctional officers shall be recognized by the state as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all of the correctional officers unless and until recognition of the organization is withdrawn by vote of a majority of the correctional officers. The labor organization or state may designate any person or persons to negotiate or bargain on its behalf; provided, however, that the person or persons so designated shall be given authority to enter into and conclude an effective and binding collective bargaining agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-6. Obligation to bargain.

It shall be the obligation of the state, acting through state authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with the designated representative or representatives of the bargaining agent, including any legal counsel selected by the bargaining agent, within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from the bargaining agent of the request for a meeting for collective bargaining purposes. This obligation shall include the duty to cause any agreement resulting from the negotiations to be reduced to a written contract, provided that no contract shall exceed the term of three (3) years.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-7. Unresolved issues submitted to arbitration.

In the event that the bargaining agent and the state authorities are unable within thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration. The parties may agree in writing to extend the thirty-day (30) period.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 148, § 1.

28-9.7-8. Arbitration board — Composition.

Within five (5) days from the expiration of the thirty-day (30) period referred to in § 28-9.7-7 , unless the parties mutually agree to extend the time to select their arbitrator, the bargaining agent and the state authorities shall each select and name one arbitrator and shall immediately thereafter notify each other in writing of the name and address of the person so selected. The two (2) arbitrators so selected and named shall, within ten (10) days from and after the expiration of the five-day (5) period above, agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If, on the expiration of the period allowed therefor, the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, the chief justice of the Rhode Island supreme court shall select a resident of Rhode Island or a person whose place of business or principal place of employment is in Rhode Island as the third arbitrator upon request in writing from either the bargaining agent or the state authorities. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) arbitrators previously selected or selected by the chief justice, shall act as chair of the arbitration board.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-9. Hearings.

  1. The arbitration board shall, acting through its chair, call a hearing to be held within ten (10) days after the date of appointment of the chairperson, and shall, acting through its chairperson, give at least seven (7) days’ notice in writing to each of the other two (2) arbitrators, the bargaining agent, and the state authorities of the time and place of the hearing. The hearing shall be informal and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings shall not be binding. Any and all documentary evidence and other data deemed relevant by the arbitrators may be received in evidence. The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the production of books, records, and other evidence relative or pertinent to the issues presented to them for determination.
  2. The hearing conducted by the arbitrators shall be concluded within twenty (20) days of the time of commencement, and within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the hearings, the arbitrators shall make written findings and a written opinion upon the issues presented, a copy of which shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the bargaining agent or its attorney or otherwise delegated representative and to the state authorities. A majority decision of the arbitrators shall be binding upon both the bargaining agent and the state authorities.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-10. Factors to be considered by arbitration board.

The arbitrators shall conduct the hearings and render their decision upon the basis of a prompt, peaceful, and just settlement of wage or hour disputes between the correctional officers and the state. The factors among others to be given weight by the arbitrators in arriving at a decision shall include:

  1. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the correctional officers with prevailing wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled employees of the building trades and industry in the state;
  2. Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the correctional officers with wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of correctional officers in other states;
  3. Interest and welfare of the public;
  4. Comparison of peculiarities of employment in regard to other trades or professions, specifically:
    1. Hazards of employment;
    2. Physical qualifications;
    3. Educational qualifications;
    4. Mental qualifications; and
    5. Job training and skills;
  5. Consideration of state’s ability to pay.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-11. Fees and expenses of arbitration.

Fees and necessary expenses of arbitration shall be borne equally by the bargaining agent and the state. Notwithstanding any other remedies which a court-appointed arbitrator appointed by the chief justice pursuant to § 28-9.7-8 may have, the arbitrator or a party who has paid its share of the fees and necessary expenses of a court-appointed arbitrator may petition the superior court for sanctions against the party failing to make timely payment of its share of such arbitrator’s fees and expenses and the superior court is authorized to enforce the sanctions against the nonpaying party, including, but not limited to, contempt powers pursuant to § 8-6-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-12. Collective bargaining contract.

Any agreements actually negotiated between the bargaining agent and the state authorities either before or within thirty (30) days after arbitration shall constitute the collective bargaining contract governing correctional officers and the state for the period stated therein, provided that the period shall not exceed three (3) years. Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the terms and provisions of this chapter shall specifically provide that the correctional officers who are subject to its terms shall have no right to engage in any work stoppage, slowdown, or strike, the consideration for the provision being the right to a resolution of disputed questions.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-13. Request for collective bargaining.

Whenever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money by the state are included as a matter of collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this chapter, it is the obligation of the bargaining agent to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining on the state authorities at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the state to cover the contract period which is the subject of the collective bargaining procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-14. Writ of certiorari to the supreme court.

The sole avenue of review of a decision of an arbitration panel issued pursuant to this chapter shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court. In the event a decision of the arbitration panel is sought to be reviewed by writ of certiorari to the supreme court, then the matter shall be given priority by the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-15. Attorney’s fees, costs, and interest.

In the event either the bargaining agent or the state authorities shall file a petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a review or modification of a majority decision of the arbitrators, which by the provisions of § 28-9.7-9 is binding upon both the bargaining agent and the state authorities, the party against whom the decision of the supreme court shall be adverse, if the supreme court finds the appeal or petition to be frivolous shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the successful party as determined by the supreme court and the supreme court shall in its final decision affirm and award the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; and if the final decision affirms the award of money, the award, if retroactive, shall bear interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from the effective retroactive date.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-16. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to other persons or circumstances, other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

28-9.7-17. Affirmative action provisions.

The state authorities, as defined herein, shall include proposals for affirmative action provisions as a subject for all collective bargaining negotiations. The proposals shall include, at a minimum, but not limited to, the following personnel actions: recruitment, new hires, promotions, transfers, terminations, training and education, layoffs, and return from layoff.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 582, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 592, § 1.

Chapter 10 Labor Disputes

28-10-1. Mediation and conciliation by director.

It shall be the duty of the director of labor and training to do all in his or her power to promote the voluntary mediation and conciliation of controversies and disputes between employers and employees, and to avoid resort to strikes, lockouts, boycotts, blacklists, discriminations, and legal proceedings in or arising out of controversies and disputes and matters of employment. In pursuance of this duty, the director may, whenever he or she deems advisable, but subject to the approval of the governor, appoint a board of mediation and conciliation for the consideration and settlement of controversies and disputes. The director shall prescribe rules of procedure for the mediation and conciliation, and the mediation and conciliation boards shall have the power to conduct investigations, to hold hearings, and to summon witnesses.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1741, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 87, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 281, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-1 .

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Mediation by labor relations board prohibited, § 28-7-10 .

Collateral References.

Employee’s protection under § 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). 101 A.L.R. Fed. 220.

Preemption, by § 301(a) of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (U.S.C. § 185(a)), of employee’s state-law action for infliction of emotional distress. 101 A.L.R. Fed. 395.

28-10-2. Prerequisites and proof required for injunction.

  1. No court of this state shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving a labor dispute, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court to the effect:
    1. That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act except against the person or persons, association, or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the unlawful act after actual knowledge of the unlawful act;
    2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;
    3. That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon the complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting of relief;
    4. That the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
    5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect the complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
  2. The hearing shall be held after due and personal notice has been given, in any manner that the court directs, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public officials of the city or town within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect the complainant’s property; provided, that if a complainant also alleges that, unless a temporary restraining order is issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant’s property will be unavoidable, a temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon a hearing after notice, and a statement of the grounds justifying the issuance of the order shall be made a matter of record by the court; provided, further, that no temporary restraining order shall be issued except upon its also being made to appear to the satisfaction of the court, either from the testimony of witnesses or from written assurances filed by counsel, that:
    1. A principal representative or attorney of the employees or labor organizations participating in the dispute was informed of the time and place at which the application for a temporary restraining order would be presented sufficiently in advance to appear in opposition; or
    2. The complainant made every reasonable effort to comply with subsection (b)(1) of this section but was unable to do so; provided, that notification by mail alone shall not be deemed compliance with this section without proof of receipt.
  3. Testimony or written assurances shall set forth in detail the manner in which the complainant complied with subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section and shall be made part of the record in the case.
  4. If the defendants appear in opposition to the application for a temporary restraining order they shall be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the complainant’s witnesses at any length that is reasonable under the circumstances and a like opportunity to introduce evidence in opposition.
  5. In case a restraining order is granted, the matter shall be returnable at the earliest and most reasonable time, but in no event later than three (3) days from the date of the order, and shall take precedence over all matters, except older matters of the same character. The court shall hear the matters on any day except Saturday and Sunday.
  6. The restraining order shall not be renewable.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2359, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 299, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1950, ch. 2500, § 1; G.L. 1950, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2748, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-2 .

Cross References.

Right to strike preserved in Labor Relations Act, § 28-7-46 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

This law has no application to disputes between the state or its political subdivisions and their employees. City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364 , 141 A.2d 624, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1958).

The dispute of striking teachers with the school committee was not subject to the anti-injunction provisions of this section and, if striking public employees were to be given the advantages of this section, it would have been the result of legislative action rather than judicial construction. School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 111 R.I. 96 , 299 A.2d 441, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1184 (1973).

Findings Required.

Court properly denied temporary injunction where facts mentioned in clauses (b) and (d) (now subdivision (2) and (4)) were not established. Mutuel Clerks' Guild v. Pari Mut. Employees Union, 84 R.I. 258 , 123 A.2d 255, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1956).

Injunction was issued without jurisdiction where court failed to make the findings of fact required by clauses (a), (d) and (e) (now subdivisions (1), (4) and (5)). Lindsey Tavern, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 307, 85 R.I. 61 , 125 A.2d 207, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1956).

The mere illegality of a strike does not warrant an injunction. Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers' Guild AFT 951, 117 R.I. 121 , 363 A.2d 1349, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1607 (1976).

Involving a Labor Dispute.

The term “involving a labor dispute” in this section must be given the same meaning and connotation as the term “involving or growing out of a labor dispute” in 29 U.S.C. § 107. Almac's, Inc. v. R.I. Grape Boycott Comm., 110 R.I. 36 , 290 A.2d 52, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 875 (1972).

Irreparable Harm.

Even though teachers’ dispute with the school committee was not under the anti-injunction statute, that did not mean that a strike by public employees should have been subject to an automatic restraining order without notice unless there was a clear showing that irreparable harm would have resulted before notice could have been served and a hearing held and the fact that school was not held on an appointed day was not sufficient showing of harm since there was flexibility in the calendaring of the school year that permitted the makeup of missed days and negated the necessity of an immediate injunction. School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 111 R.I. 96 , 299 A.2d 441, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1184 (1973).

Teacher strike was properly enjoined where trial judge held hearing and considered the history of the dispute, and found that strike was causing irreparable harm, that it would continue unless enjoined, and that the school committee was likely to prevail in a final hearing. Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers' Guild AFT 951, 117 R.I. 121 , 363 A.2d 1349, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1607 (1976); School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 117 R.I. 203 , 365 A.2d 499, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1613 (1976).

What constitutes irreparable injury is a factual determination to be made on the basis of the particular circumstances of a case. School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 117 R.I. 203 , 365 A.2d 499, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1613 (1976).

Secondary Boycott.

Picketing of retail supermarkets selling grapes by committee formed to boycott grapes in support of organizing efforts of workers employed by grape growers constitutes a secondary boycott and thus is a labor dispute under the definition of § 28-10-3 and the requirements of this section must be strictly complied with before a court may assure jurisdiction and enjoin such activity. Almac's, Inc. v. R.I. Grape Boycott Comm., 110 R.I. 36 , 290 A.2d 52, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 875 (1972).

Collateral References.

Interference with production by concerted action of employees, short of formal strike, as affected by Labor Relations Act. 25 A.L.R.2d 315.

Nonprofit hospital or other charitable institution as within contemplation of statutes regarding injunctions in industrial disputes. 26 A.L.R.2d 1020.

Peaceful picketing, injunction against, as affected by employer’s lack of opportunity to negotiate with union or employees. 11 A.L.R.2d 1069.

Peaceful picketing, injunction against, to force employees to join union or to compel employer to enter into a contract which would in effect compel them to do so, in the absence of a dispute between employer and employees as to terms or conditions of employment. 11 A.L.R.2d 1338.

Picketing, injunction against, by employees of plant where labor dispute exists, at another plant of employer where there is no labor dispute. 37 A.L.R.2d 687.

Public employee’s right to strike or engage in work stoppage. 37 A.L.R.3d 1147.

Refusal of one who does all or part of his own work to join union, or to employ union labor for the work he is doing himself, as justification for picketing, precluding issuance of injunction. 13 A.L.R.2d 642.

Right of third party in area picketed during labor dispute, who has no connection with the dispute, to relief against such picketing. 15 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Validity and construction of statutes regulating and prohibiting coercive action by labor unions in jurisdictional disputes. 33 A.L.R.2d 340.

Who are employees forbidden to strike under state enactments or state common-law rules prohibiting strikes by public employees or stated classes of public employees. 22 A.L.R.4th 1103.

28-10-3. “Labor dispute” defined.

  1. “Labor dispute” includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
  2. “Labor dispute” does not include any controversy arising out of a demand that an employer recognize or bargain with a labor organization while another labor organization is the representative of employees in the unit as certified by the state labor relations commission or the national labor relations board, prior to the conduct of a new investigation and certification of representatives by the commission or board, or when a bona fide union has a valid existing contract made at a time prior to any current dispute when it represented a majority of the employees covered by the contract.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 299, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2748, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-3 .

Cross References.

Controversies as to representation, § 28-7-16 .

Ineligibility of participants for employment security benefits, § 28-44-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bargaining Agent.

Controversy was a labor dispute within the meaning of this section despite the fact that no bargaining unit had been established and despite the fact that union had not been designated as the bargaining agent of the employees. Lindsey Tavern, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 307, 85 R.I. 61 , 125 A.2d 207, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1956).

Secondary Boycott.

Picketing of retail supermarket selling grapes by committee formed to boycott grapes in support of organizing efforts of agricultural workers employed by grape growers constitutes a secondary boycott and as such falls within the definition of a labor dispute in this section and a court’s power to grant injunctive relief from such picketing is thereby limited under § 28-10-2 . Almac's, Inc. v. R.I. Grape Boycott Comm., 110 R.I. 36 , 290 A.2d 52, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 875 (1972).

Collateral References.

Picketing, by employees of a plant where labor dispute exists, at another plant of employer where there is no labor dispute as involving a “labor dispute” within protection of anti-injunction statute. 37 A.L.R.2d 687.

Refusal of one who does all or part of his own work to join union, or to employ union labor for the work he is doing himself, as involving “labor dispute” within anti-injunction statute. 13 A.L.R.2d 642.

Statements regarding labor relations or disputes. 94 A.L.R.5th 149.

28-10-4. Relief denied to complainants in default.

No relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law that is involved in the labor dispute in question, and who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute either by negotiation and with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration when imposed by contract or by law.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 299, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2748, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-4 .

28-10-5. Jury trial of contempts.

In all cases arising under this chapter in which a person is charged with contempt in a court of this state, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; provided, that this right does not apply to contempts committed in the presence of the court or so near to the court as to interfere directly with the administration of justice or to apply to the misbehavior, misconduct, or disobedience of any officer of the court in respect to the writs, orders, or process of the court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 299, § 6; P.L. 1951, ch. 2748, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-5 .

28-10-6. “Person” defined.

Whenever used in §§ 28-10-7 and 28-10-8 , the word “person” means any individual, firm, association, corporation, or law enforcement agency, provided, that the word does not include any member of a city or town police department, any member of the division of state police, deputy sheriff, or any member of the militia of this state while acting in the course of duty and under the direction and order of any superior officer.

History of Section. P.L. 1938, ch. 2619, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 299, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-6 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 219, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 55.

28-10-7. Tear gas prohibited.

It shall be unlawful for any person to use or to cause to be used during the progress of labor strikes or lockouts of any type, any tear gas, brombenzylcyanide, or any other gas that would affect the respiratory organs.

History of Section. P.L. 1938, ch. 2619, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 299, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-7 .

28-10-8. Penalty for use of gas.

  1. Any person violating any of the provisions of § 28-10-7 shall be liable for and required to pay a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) for each and every offense. The civil penalty may be assessed in an action brought on behalf of the state in any court of competent jurisdiction.
  2. Each individual on whom tear gas, brombenzylcyanide, or any other gas is used that would affect respiratory organs shall be considered a separate offense for the purpose of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1938, ch. 2619, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 299, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-8 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 16; P.L. 1991, ch. 219, § 1.

28-10-9. Advertising for employees during labor dispute.

If an employer during the continuance of a strike, lockout, or other labor trouble among his or her employees publicly advertises in newspapers or by posters or otherwise for employees, or by himself or herself or his or her agents solicits persons to work for him or her to fill the places of strikers, he or she shall plainly in type as prominent as the largest printed matter in the body of the advertisement or poster explicitly mention in the advertisement or oral or written solicitations that a strike, lockout, or other labor trouble exists among his or her employees. If any person, firm, association, or corporation violates any provisions of this section, he or she or it shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1940, ch. 896, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1955, ch. 3492, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-10-9 .

Collateral References.

Inviting or soliciting return of striking employees to work as unfair labor practice. 4 A.L.R.2d 1356.

28-10-10. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 200, § 1: P.L. 1988, ch. 545, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 39, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-10-10 concerned the prohibition of recruitment.

28-10-11. Employment of strikebreaker prohibited.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, firm, or corporation, or officer or their agents, involved in a labor strike or lockout knowingly to employ in place of an employee involved in the labor strike or lockout any person who customarily and repeatedly offers himself or herself for employment in the place of employees involved in a labor strike or lockout, or to employ any person in place of an employee involved in a labor strike or lockout who is recruited, procured, supplied, or referred for employment by any person, partnership, agency, firm, or corporation not directly involved in the labor strike or lockout.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any person who customarily and repeatedly offers himself or herself for employment in place of employees involved in a labor strike or lockout to take or offer to take the place in employment of employees involved in a labor strike or lockout.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 200, § 1.

28-10-12. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 200, § 1: P.L. 1988, ch. 545, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 39, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-10-12 concerned agency for procurement.

28-10-13. Notice in advertising.

It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, agency, firm, or corporation, or officer or their agents, to recruit, solicit, or advertise for employees, or refer persons to employment, in place of employees in a labor strike or lockout, without adequate notice to the person or in the advertisement that there is a labor strike or lockout at the place at which employment is offered and that the employment offered is in place of employees involved in the labor strike or lockout. “Adequate notice in an advertisement” means notice of equal prominence with any other matter contained in the advertisement.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 200, § 1.

28-10-13.1. Police and fire services.

  1. Recognizing that police and fire services provided by a municipality during a labor dispute are a public function, and recognizing further the need to secure the rights and safety of all parties to a labor dispute and the rights and safety of the general public, it shall be unlawful for any municipality, agent, servant, or employee of a municipality within the state to accept directly or indirectly from any person, partnership, firm, corporation, or labor union, or any of their officers or agents, involved in a labor strike or lockout compensation or reimbursement for any expense including salaries incurred by the person, partnership, firm, corporation, or labor union, or any of their officers or agents, in connection with the providing of police or fire services during a labor strike or lockout and in connection with the strike or lockout.
  2. For the purposes of this section, an off-duty police officer shall be considered an employee of a municipality within the state. Private security guard services provided by off-duty police officers shall be considered police services that are a function of the municipality and therefore prohibited under this chapter.
  3. It shall also be a violation of this chapter for an employer to compensate any municipality, agent, servant, or employee of a municipality for private security guard services.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 10, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 286, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is unconstitutionally vague, since it is unclear whether security guard services provided by off-duty police officers to a private corporation during a labor dispute are allowed, restricted, or forbidden, because this section does not state whether an off-duty police officer is an agent, servant, or employee, and because it is unclear from the language of the section whether private security guard services provided by off-duty police officers would be considered “police services” and, therefore, a function of the municipality. State v. Alegria, 449 A.2d 131, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 994 (R.I. 1982)(decision under prior law).

Collateral References.

Public employee’s right to strike or engage in work stoppage. 37 A.L.R.3d 1147.

28-10-14. Penalty for violations.

Any person, partnership, agency, firm, or corporation violating § 28-10-11 , § 28-10-13 , or § 28-10-13 .1 is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each person recruited, supplied, procured, referred, or employed, or to suffer imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 10, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 545, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 6.

Chapter 11 Hours of Employment

28-11-1. Standard day’s work.

Except as otherwise provided by law, labor performed in any manufacturing establishment, and all mechanical labor, during the period of ten (10) hours in any one day, shall be considered a legal day’s work, unless otherwise agreed by the parties to the contract for the labor.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 85, § 37; P.L. 1928, ch. 1231, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, § 15; P.L. 1943, ch. 1313, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-11-1 .

Cross References.

Employment of children, § 28-3-1 et seq.

Enforcement of provisions, § 28-20-1 et seq.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Standard day:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-21.

Collateral References.

Employee’s protection under § 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). 101 A.L.R. Fed. 220.

28-11-2. Day’s work for street railway employees.

A day’s work for all conductors and operators now employed, or who may subsequently be employed, in the operation of all street railways of whatever motive power in this state shall not exceed ten (10) hours work, to be performed within twelve (12) consecutive hours. No officer or agent of any corporation operating streetcars of whatever motive power in this state shall on any day exact from any of its employees more than ten (10) hours work within the twenty-four (24) hours of the natural day, and within twelve (12) consecutive hours; provided, that on all legal holidays, and on occasions when an unexpected contingency arises, demanding more than the usual service by the street railway corporation to the public, or from the employees to the corporation, and in case of accident or unavoidable delay, extra labor may be performed for extra compensation.

History of Section. P.L. 1902, ch. 1004, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 218, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 252, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 286, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-11-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contract Impairment.

Exemption of preexisting contracts did not render this section invalid. In re Ten-Hour Law, 24 R.I. 603 , 54 A. 602, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 129 (1902).

Legislative Authority.

This section and §§ 28-11-3 and 28-11-4 are a valid exercise of the police power and of legislative control over public corporations and public franchises. In re Ten-Hour Law, 24 R.I. 603 , 54 A. 602, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 129 (1902).

28-11-3. Contracts varying length of day on street railways.

The true intent and purpose of §§ 28-11-2 28-11-4 is declared to be to limit the usual hours of labor of the conductor and operator employees of street railway corporations, in the absence of agreement as to hours between the employees and their employer, to ten (10) hours actual work a day, to be performed within a period of twelve (12) consecutive hours, whether the employees are employed by the trip or trips, the job, the hour, the day, the week, the month or in any other manner. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to forbid or prevent any employee, being eighteen (18) years of age or upwards, from laboring a greater or lesser number of hours a day in accordance with his or her contract to do so, nor to impose any penalty upon any person or corporation for permitting these employees to labor a greater or lesser number of hours in the performance of the contract.

History of Section. P.L. 1902, ch. 1004, § 2; P.L. 1902, ch. 1045, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 218, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 252, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 286, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-11-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ten-Hour Day.

This section prohibits the making of contracts for a longer day than ten hours. In re Ten-Hour Law, 24 R.I. 603 , 54 A. 602, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 129 (1902).

28-11-4. Penalty for violations by street railways.

Any street railway corporation violating any of the provisions of §§ 28-11-2 and 28-11-3 shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), one-half (1/2) of that amount to the use of the complainant and the other one-half (1/2) to the use of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1902, ch. 1004, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 218, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 252, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 286, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-11-4 .

Chapter 11.1 Part-Time Elected Officials

28-11.1-1. Statement of policy.

  1. The public interest requires that persons engaged in all lawful types of employment be encouraged to serve as elected members of part-time elected bodies. To facilitate this encouragement, it is necessary wherever practical for employers of part-time elected officials to provide flexible work schedules so that those employees serving as part-time elected officials might attend to the business of the people of the state of Rhode Island and its municipalities. The anticipated flexible work schedules shall be within the reasonable operation of the employer’s business.
  2. The public interest also requires that all part-time elected officials of elected bodies be free from undue influence or pressure by their employers as it relates to their decisions and relative to legislation which they might consider or introduce.
  3. No employer shall be permitted to either directly or indirectly use any condition of the part-time elected official’s employment as a means of influencing the legislator’s vote on any legislation or introduction of his or her own legislation.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 138, § 1.

28-11.1-2. Flexible work schedules.

Every employer of a part-time elected official of an elected body shall be required to provide the employee with a flexible work schedule to accommodate the employee’s attendance at the sessions necessary for the part-time elected officials of elected bodies wherever practical within the reasonable operation of the employer’s business. An employer shall not be in violation of this provision if the employer cannot reasonably provide alternate work hours for an employee or if the service of the elected official would necessitate the hiring of additional or replacement employees. All disputes concerning compliance with this section shall be resolved under the provisions of chapter 10 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 138, § 1.

28-11.1-3. Undue influence.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any employer of a part-time elected official of an elected body to:
    1. Fire or threaten to fire the employee based upon his or her activities or decisions as a part-time elected official of an elected body;
    2. Attempt to influence the employee to introduce legislation or vote on any legislation through job discrimination, compensation, or adverse job action; or
    3. Discriminate against an employee in any area of his or her employment because of his or her legislative activities, votes, or business.
  2. All violations of this section shall be referred to the director of the department of labor and training and, if not resolved, shall be referred to the department of the attorney general for prosecution. Any person, firm, or corporation convicted of a violation of this section shall be subject to a fine up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) or up to one year in jail, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 138, § 1.

28-11.1-4. Exemptions.

This chapter shall not apply to any city or town where the holding of public office would violate state or federal law or would violate the charter of the city or town.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 138, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 357, § 1.

Chapter 12 Minimum Wages

28-12-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known as and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Minimum fair wages:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-58 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Private Right of Action.

Plaintiffs, canine corrections officers, could not state a claim for overtime violations because R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-12-1 et seq., provided no private, independent cause of action for an aggrieved employee. The General Assembly did not intend to provide an individual right of action to aggrieved employees by enacting the Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-12-1 et seq.; private right of action provisions in chapter 14 of the Act, read in their appropriate context, only applied to whistleblowing actions. Hauser v. Rhode Island Dep't of Corr., 640 F. Supp. 2d 143, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69198 (D.R.I. 2009).

Collateral References.

Employee’s protection under § 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). 101 A.L.R. Fed. 220.

Validity of minimum wage statutes relating to private employment. 39 A.L.R.2d 740.

What constitutes “preschool” for purposes of § 3(s)(1)(b) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(b)), providing that preschools are subject to wage and hour provisions of act. 131 A.L.R. Fed. 207.

28-12-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Advisory board” means a board created as provided in § 28-12-6 .
  2. “Commissioner” means the minimum-wage commissioner appointed by the director of labor and training as chief of the division of labor standards.
  3. “Director” means the director of labor and training, or his or her duly authorized representative.
  4. “Employ” means to suffer or to permit to work.
    1. “Employee” includes any individual suffered or permitted to work by an employer.
    2. “Employee” shall not include:
      1. Any individual employed in domestic service or in or about a private home;
      2. Any individual employed by the United States;
      3. Any individual engaged in the activities of an educational, charitable, religious, or nonprofit organization where the employer-employee relationship does not, in fact, exist, or where the services rendered to the organizations are on a voluntary basis;
      4. Newspaper deliverers on home delivery, shoe shiners in shoe shine establishments, caddies on golf courses, pin persons in bowling alleys, ushers in theatres;
      5. Traveling salespersons or outside salespersons;
      6. Service performed by an individual in the employ of his or her son, daughter, or spouse and service performed by a child under the age of twenty-one (21) in the employ of his or her father or mother;
      7. Any individual employed between May 1 and October 1 in a resort establishment that regularly serves meals to the general public and that is open for business not more than six (6) months a year;
      8. Any individual employed by an organized camp that does not operate for more than seven (7) months in any calendar year. However, this exemption does not apply to individuals employed by the camp on an annual, full-time basis. “Organized camp” means any camp, except a trailer camp, having a structured program including, but not limited to, recreation, education, and religious, or any combination of these.
  5. “Employer” includes any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any person, or group of persons, acting directly, or indirectly, in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee.
  6. “Occupation” means any occupation, service, trade, business, industry, or branch or group of industries or employment or class of employment in which individuals are gainfully employed.
  7. “Wage” means compensation due to an employee by reason of his or her employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3760, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-2 ; P.L. 1957, ch. 104, §§ 1, 4; P.L. 1962, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 435, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 436, § 1.

28-12-3. Minimum wages.

  1. Every employer shall pay to each of his or her employees: commencing July 1, 1999, at least the minimum wage of five dollars and sixty-five cents ($5.65) per hour. Commencing September 1, 2000, the minimum wage is six dollars and fifteen cents ($6.15) per hour.
  2. Commencing January 1, 2004, the minimum wage is six dollars and seventy-five cents ($6.75) per hour.
  3. Commencing March 1, 2006, the minimum wage is seven dollars and ten cents ($7.10) per hour.
  4. Commencing January 1, 2007, the minimum wage is seven dollars and forty cents ($7.40) per hour.
  5. Commencing January 1, 2013, the minimum wage is seven dollars and seventy-five cents ($7.75) per hour.
  6. Commencing January 1, 2014, the minimum wage is eight dollars ($8.00) per hour.
  7. Commencing January 1, 2015, the minimum wage is nine dollars ($9.00) per hour.
  8. Commencing January 1, 2016, the minimum wage is nine dollars and sixty cents ($9.60) per hour.
  9. Commencing January 1, 2018, the minimum wage is ten dollars and ten cents ($10.10) per hour.
  10. Commencing January 1, 2019, the minimum wage is ten dollars and fifty cents ($10.50) per hour.
  11. Commencing October 1, 2020, the minimum wage is eleven dollars and fifty cents ($11.50) per hour.
  12. Commencing January 1, 2022, the minimum wage is twelve dollars and twenty-five cents ($12.25) per hour.
  13. Commencing January 1, 2023, the minimum wage is thirteen dollars ($13.00) per hour.
  14. Commencing January 1, 2024, the minimum wage is fourteen dollars ($14.00) per hour.
  15. Commencing January 1, 2025, the minimum wage is fifteen dollars ($15.00) per hour.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-3 ; P.L. 1957, ch. 104, § 2; P.L. 1962, ch 105, § 2; P.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 409, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 222, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 7; P.L. 1996, ch. 286, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 294, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 31; P.L. 2000, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 385, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 5, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 338, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 424, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 325, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 72, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 14, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 3, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 15, § 1, effective May 20, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 16, § 1, effective May 20, 2021.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2003, ch. 383, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect September 1, 2003.

P.L. 2003, ch. 385, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect September 1, 2003.

Cross References.

Compensation of persons assigned to wartime work, § 28-2-5 .

Overtime payments by public works contractors, § 37-13-10 .

Prevailing rates paid by public works contractors, §§ 37-13-6 , 37-13-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Employment Contracts.

Neither the Fair Labor Standards Act nor the Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act prescribes a single measuring rod for all covered employees, but rather instructs courts to look to the employment contract between the parties to determine whether the statute has been violated; when employees were paid flat rates for some tasks and hourly rates for others, they failed to state minimum wage claims using the “contract” measuring rod, as they did not claim that additional work was not bargained for in their employment contracts. D'Arezzo v. Providence Ctr., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 224, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147798 (D.R.I. 2015).

28-12-3.1. Wages for minors.

Every minor, fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years of age shall be paid at a rate of not less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the minimum wages as specified in § 28-12-3 ; provided, every minor who works in excess of twenty-four (24) hours in any week shall be paid for all hours worked in that week at the hourly rate provided by § 28-12-3 or § 28-12-5(f) .

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 3; P.L. 1979, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 315, § 1.

28-12-3.2. Wages for failure to furnish shift work.

  1. An employer who requests or permits any employee to report for duty at the beginning of a work shift and does not furnish at least three (3) hours work on that shift shall pay the employee not less than three (3) times the regular hourly rate. Provided, however, that shifts scheduled for less than three (3) hours are permissible when entered into voluntarily and agreed upon by both the employer and employee. In the event that an employee reports for duty at the beginning of a work shift and the employer offers no work for him or her to perform, the employer shall pay the employee not less than three (3) times the regular hourly rate or the amount they would have earned for any shifts consisting of less than three (3) hours, as allowed under this section.
  2. This section shall not apply to students enrolled full-time at colleges or universities located in this state who are also an employee of the college or university they attend, except as follows: a college or university that employs students and requests or permits a student employee to report for duty at the beginning of a work shift, the length of which has been mutually agreed to, and the employer does not furnish work for the student employee to perform, will pay the student for the number of hours of the agreed upon shift.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 3; P.L. 1981, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 32; P.L. 2019, ch. 293, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 305, § 1.

28-12-4. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-4 ; Repealed by P.L. 1962, ch. 105, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-12-4 concerned exclusion of small employers.

28-12-4.1. Overtime pay.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no employer shall employ any employee for a workweek longer than forty (40) hours unless the employee is compensated at a rate of one and one-half (11/2) times the regular rate at which he or she is employed for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. Provided, however, employers who or that pay any delivery drivers or sales merchandisers an overtime rate of compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any one week shall not calculate that overtime rate of compensation by fluctuating workweek method of overtime payment under 29 C.F.R. § 778.114.
  2. In any workweek in which an employee of a retail business is employed on a Sunday or a holiday, or both, at a rate of one and one-half (11/2) times the regular rate at which he or she is employed as provided in § 5-23-2 , the hours worked on the Sunday or holiday, or both, shall be excluded from the calculation of overtime pay as required by this section.
  3. No city, town, or fire district shall employ any “firefighter,” as defined in § 28-9.1-3 , excluding however civilian employees, for an average workweek longer than forty-two (42) hours unless the firefighter is compensated at the rate of one and one-half (11/2) times his or her regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty-two (42) hours based upon an average workweek. An average workweek shall be calculated utilizing the prior consecutive eight-week (8) period, based upon a seven-day (7) workweek. For the purposes of this section, “hours worked” shall include all paid leave.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 4; P.L. 1987, ch. 553, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 257, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 19, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 20, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2010, ch. 254, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on June 1, 2011.

P.L. 2010, ch. 257, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on June 1, 2011.

Applicability.

P.L. 2019, ch. 19, § 2 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [May 17, 2019], except that the terms of current firefighters’ collective bargaining agreement that conflict with this act shall remain in effect until the contract expires when the act shall begin to apply to those covered firefighters.”

P.L. 2019, ch. 20, § 2 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [May 17, 2019], except that the terms of current firefighters’ collective bargaining agreement that conflict with this act shall remain in effect until the contract expires when the act shall begin to apply to those covered firefighters.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sunday Work.

This section and § 5-23-2 are not statutes in pari materia. Narragansett Food Servs. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1815 (R.I. 1980).

Although both this section and § 5-23-2 contain employee premium-compensation provisions, they do not relate to the same subject matter. Narragansett Food Servs. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1815 (R.I. 1980).

The legislature, recognizing that certain employees would receive overtime compensation under this section in addition to premium compensation under § 5-23-2 for the same hours of Sunday and holiday employment, intended to ensure in this section that employees receive a certain minimum wage for overtime and in § 5-23-2 that an additional cost be imposed on employers conducting business on Sundays and holidays in the form of a reward for employees who sacrifice their Sundays and holidays to work. Narragansett Food Servs. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1815 (R.I. 1980).

28-12-4.2. Biweekly overtime pay.

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no employer shall employ any employee on a biweekly basis with hours worked and hourly wages averaged over that period for longer than forty (40) hours per week unless the employee is compensated at a rate of one and one-half (11/2) times the regular rate at which he or she is employed for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Provisions Identical to § 28-12-4.1 .

In this section, the legislature enacted a premium-compensation provision for employees employed on a biweekly basis identical to that provided in § 28-12-4.1 . State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1817 (R.I. 1980).

28-12-4.3. Exemptions.

  1. The provisions of §§ 28-12-4.1 and 28-12-4.2 do not apply to the following employees:
    1. Any employee of a summer camp when it is open no more than six (6) months of the year;
    2. Police officers;
    3. Employees of the state or political subdivision of the state who may elect through a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the employer and representatives of the employees, or if the employees are not represented by an exclusive bargaining agent, through an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the employee prior to the performance of work, to receive compensatory time off for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a week. The compensatory hours shall at least equal one and one-half (11/2) times the hours worked over forty (40) in a week. If compensation is paid to an employee for accrued compensatory time, the compensation shall be paid at the regular rate earned by the employee at the time of payment. At the time of termination, unused accrued compensatory time shall be paid at a rate not less than:
      1. The average regular rate received by the employee during the last three (3) years of the employee’s employment; or
      2. The final regular rate received by the employee, whichever is higher;
    4. Any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity, as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., compensated for services on a salary basis of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) per week;
    5. Any employee as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section unless the wages of the employee, if computed on an hourly basis, would violate the applicable minimum wage law;
    6. Any salaried employee of a nonprofit national voluntary health agency who elects to receive compensatory time off for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week;
    7. Any employee, including drivers, driver’s helpers, mechanics, and loaders of any motor carrier, including private carriers, with respect to whom the United States Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 31502;
    8. Any employee who is a salesperson, parts person, or mechanic primarily engaged in the sale and/or servicing of automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, and is employed by a non-manufacturing employer primarily engaged in the business of selling vehicles or farm implements to ultimate purchasers, to the extent that the employers are exempt under the federal Wage-Hour and Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10); provided, that the employee’s weekly, biweekly, or monthly actual earnings exceed an amount equal to the employee’s basic contractual hourly rate of pay times the number of hours actually worked plus the employee’s basic contractual hourly rate of pay times one-half (1/2) the number of hours actually worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week;
    9. Any employee employed in agriculture; however, this exemption applies to all agricultural enterprises that produce greenhouse crops, fruit and vegetable crops, herbaceous crops, sod crops, viticulture, viniculture, floriculture, feed for livestock, forestry, dairy farming, aquaculture, the raising of livestock, furbearing animals, poultry and eggs, bees and honey, mushrooms, and nursery stock. This exemption also applies to nursery workers; and
    10. Any employee of an air carrier subject to the provisions of 45 U.S.C. § 181 et seq., of the Railway Labor Act when the hours worked by that employee in excess of forty (40) in a workweek are not required by the air carrier, but are arranged through a voluntary agreement among employees to trade scheduled work hours.
  2. Nothing in this section exempts any employee who under applicable federal law is entitled to overtime pay or benefits related to overtime pay.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 4; P.L. 1978, ch. 403, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 22, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 276, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 514, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 148, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 17, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 18, § 1.

Applicability.

P.L. 2019, ch. 17, § 2 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [May 17, 2019], except that the terms of current firefighters’ collective bargaining agreements that conflict with this act shall remain in effect until the contract expires when the act shall begin to apply to those covered firefighters.”

P.L. 2019, ch. 18, § 2 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [May 17, 2019], except that the terms of current firefighters’ collective bargaining agreements that conflict with this act shall remain in effect until the contract expires when the act shall begin to apply to those covered firefighters.”

Collateral References.

Who is “employee employed in agriculture” and therefore exempt from overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act by § 13 (b)(12) of Act (29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12)). 162 A.L.R. Fed. 575.

Who is employed in “executive capacity” within exemption, under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), from minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.). 131 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Who is executive, administrator, supervisor, or the like, under exemption for such employees from state minimum wage and overtime pay statutes. 85 A.L.R.4th 519.

28-12-4.4. Regulations.

The director of labor and training shall by regulations define and delimit the employees designated in § 28-12-4.3 . Before any regulation is adopted, amended, or repealed, there shall be a public hearing on it at which all persons in favor of or opposed to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of the regulation may be heard. Notice of the public hearing shall be published at least once not less than twenty (20) days prior to the hearing in a newspaper or newspapers having aggregate general circulation throughout the state. A record shall be made of all proceedings at the public hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 4.

Cross References.

Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-1 et seq.

28-12-5. Employees receiving gratuities.

  1. Every employer shall pay to each of his, her, or its employees who are engaged in any work or employment in which gratuities have customarily and usually constituted a part of his or her weekly income, the rate as provided by §§ 28-12-3 and 28-12-3 .1.
  2. Allowance for gratuities as part of the hourly wage rate for restaurants, hotels, and other industries, except taxicabs and limited public motor vehicles, shall be an amount equal to the applicable minimum rates as provided by §§ 28-12-3 and 28-12-3 .1 less two dollars and eighty-nine cents ($2.89) per hour. “Gratuities” means voluntary monetary compensation received directly or indirectly by the employee for services rendered.
  3. Each employer desiring to deduct for gratuities as part of the minimum rates as provided in §§ 28-12-3 and 28-12-3 .1 wages paid to an employee shall provide substantial evidence that the amount shall be as set out in the formula in subsection (b) of this section; however, the cash wage shall not be less than two dollars and eighty-nine cents ($2.89) per hour; provided, however, that commencing January 1, 2016, the cash wage shall increase by fifty cents ($.50) to an amount not less than three dollars and thirty-nine cents ($3.39) per hour; provided further, that commencing January 1, 2017, the cash wage shall increase by fifty cents ($.50) to an amount not less than three dollars and eighty-nine cents ($3.89) per hour.
  4. The director of labor and training shall notify employers concerning what type of proof shall be accepted as substantial evidence for the purpose of this subsection. Employees involved shall be entitled to a hearing on the question of the amount of deduction if they so desire.
  5. In cases where wages are figured by the employer on an incentive basis in such a manner that an employee of reasonable average ability earns at least the minimum wage established by §§ 28-12-3 and 28-12-3 .1, it shall be taken that the employer has complied with this statute. It shall be of no concern to the director of labor and training how the employer arrives at its wage scale so long as it is not unreasonable in its demands on the employee.
  6. Where, in the case of the employment of a full-time student who has not attained his or her nineteenth (19th) birthday engaged in the activities of a nonprofit association or corporation, whose aims and objectives are religious, educational, librarial, or community service in nature, the employer-employee relationship does exist, the employer shall pay to each such employee wages at a rate of not less than ninety percent (90%) of the minimum wage as specified in § 28-12-3 . In case of any conflict between provisions of this section and those of § 28-12-3 .1, the provisions of § 28-12-3.1 shall govern.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-5 ; P.L. 1957, ch. 104, § 2; P.L. 1962, ch. 105, § 4; P.L. 1963, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 140, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 152, § 5; P.L. 1975, ch. 302, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 286, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 294, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 32; P.L. 2015, ch. 228, § 1.

28-12-6. Occupational administrative regulations.

  1. For any occupation for which no wage order issued pursuant to chapter 289 of the general laws of 1938, as amended, was in effect on May 2, 1956, the director of labor and training, after consultation with an advisory board appointed by him or her and composed of one representative each of the employer and employees in the affected occupation and of one disinterested person representing the public, shall make any administrative regulations that he or she deems appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chapter or are necessary to prevent the circumvention or evasion of these purposes, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates established by this chapter.
  2. The regulations may include, but are not limited to, regulations defining and delimiting the terms used in this chapter; outside salespersons or traveling salespersons; learners and apprentices, their number, proportion, and length of service. The regulations may also include provisions for special or extra pay for special, overtime, or extra work; no deductions shall be permitted for incentive commissions or bonuses earned by sales personnel.
  3. Regulations issued by the director of labor and training pursuant to this section are effective only after publication and public hearing by the director of labor and training at which hearing any person may be heard.
  4. Neither the director of labor and training, nor the commissioner of minimum wage, nor any advisory board set up under this chapter shall have any right, power, or authority to increase or decrease the minimum fair wage rates designated in § 28-12-3 , nor to permit or authorize deductions to be made from the minimum fair wage rates, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-6 .

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Delegation of judicial power by minimum wage statutes relating to private employment. 39 A.L.R.2d 740.

28-12-7. Revision of regulations.

  1. The director of labor and training may, from time to time, propose modifications of or additions to any administrative regulations issued pursuant to § 28-12-6 , or existing on May 2, 1956, in any mandatory wage order issued under the provisions of chapter 289 of the general laws of 1938, as amended.
  2. Notice shall be given of a public hearing to be held by the director of labor and training not less than thirty (30) days after the publication at which all persons in favor of or opposed to the modifications or additions may be heard.
  3. After the hearing, the director of labor and training may issue an order putting into effect the modifications of or additions to the administrative regulations as he or she deems appropriate; provided, that neither the director of labor and training, nor the commissioner of minimum wage, nor any advisory board set up under this chapter shall have any right, power, or authority to increase or decrease the minimum fair wage rates designated in § 28-12-3 , nor to permit or authorize deductions to be made from the minimum fair wage rates, except as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-7 .

Cross References.

Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-1 et seq.

28-12-8. Judicial review of regulations.

  1. Any interested person in any occupation for which any wage order or any administrative regulation has been issued under the provisions of this chapter who may be aggrieved by any order or regulation may obtain the review of the order or regulation in the superior court for Providence and Bristol counties by filing in the court within thirty (30) days after the date of publication of the order or regulation a written petition praying that the order or regulation be modified or set aside. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the director of labor and training. The findings of facts shall be conclusive upon the court. The court shall determine whether the order or regulation is in accordance with law.
  2. Hearings in the superior court on all appeals taken under the provisions of this chapter shall take precedence over all matters, except matters of the same character. The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final except that the judgment and decree shall be subject to review by the supreme court.
  3. The commencement of proceedings under subsection (a) of this section shall not operate as a stay of a wage order or of an administrative regulation issued under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-8 .

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-12-9. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-9 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 62; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 62; repealed by P.L. 2022, ch. 73, § 1, effective June 15, 2022; repealed by P.L. 2022, ch. 74, § 1, effective June 15, 2022.

28-12-10. Learners and apprentices.

Notwithstanding any order or regulation previously issued under chapter 289 of the general laws of 1938, as amended, the director of labor and training may provide by regulation, after a public hearing at which any person may be heard, for the employment in the occupation at the wages lower than the wage rates applicable under this chapter for learners and apprentices as the director of labor and training finds appropriate to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment, and to safeguard the wage rates applicable under this chapter. No employee shall be employed at wages fixed pursuant to this section except under special license issued under applicable regulation of the director of labor and training. After a learner or apprentice has been employed for ninety (90) days, he or she shall be paid the rate provided in § 28-12-3 , notwithstanding any order or administrative regulation previously issued under chapter 289 of the general laws of 1938.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-10 ; R.P.L. 1957, ch. 104, § 3; P.L. 1962, ch. 105, § 5; P.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 7.

28-12-11. Posting of law and orders.

Every employer subject to any provision of this chapter or of any regulations or orders issued under this chapter shall keep a summary of this chapter, approved by the director of labor and training, and copies of any applicable wage orders and regulations issued under this chapter, posted in a conspicuous and accessible place in or about the premises where any person subject to them is employed. Employers shall be furnished copies of summaries, orders, and regulations by the state on request without charge.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-11 .

28-12-12. Records of employers.

Every employer subject to any provision of this chapter, or of any regulation or order issued under this chapter, shall make and keep for a period of not less than three (3) years in or about the premises where any employee is employed a record of the name, address, and occupation of each of his or her employees, the rate of pay, and the amount paid each pay period to each employee, the hours worked each day and each workweek by the employee, and any other information that the director of labor and training shall prescribe by regulation as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter or the regulations or orders issued under this chapter. The records shall be open for inspection or transcription by the director of labor and training or his or her authorized representative at any reasonable time. Every employer shall furnish to the director of labor and training or to his or her authorized representative on demand a sworn statement of the records and information upon forms prescribed or approved by the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-12 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 44, § 1.

28-12-13. Responsibility for enforcement.

The provisions of this chapter shall be carried out by the division of labor standards and it shall be the duty of the division of labor standards to administer the provisions of this chapter, to administer the labor laws of this state concerning women and children, and in general to be responsible for the welfare of women and children employed in industry in this state. Subject to the rules of civil service, the director of labor and training shall appoint a qualified person to act as chief of the division of labor standards.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-13 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 250, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 17.

28-12-14. Enforcement powers.

The director or the commissioner or any authorized representative of either shall have the authority to:

  1. Investigate and ascertain the wages of persons employed in any occupation in this state;
  2. Enter and inspect the places of business or employment of any employer of employees in any occupation in the state for the purpose of examining and inspecting any or all books, registers, payrolls, and other records of any employer that in any way relate to or have a bearing on the question of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment of any employees, and may question employees for the purpose of ascertaining whether the provisions of this chapter and the orders and regulations issued under this chapter have been and are being complied with;
  3. Require from any employer of employees in any occupation in this state full and correct statements, in writing, including sworn statements with respect to wages, hours, names, addresses, and any other information pertaining to his, her, or its employees and their employment that the director or the commissioner or their authorized representative deems necessary or appropriate;
  4. Administer rules and require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, records, and other evidence relative to any matter under investigation. The subpoena shall be signed and issued by the director or the commissioner and shall be served and have the same effect as if issued out of the superior court;
  5. Cause the depositions of witnesses residing within or outside of the state to be taken in the manner prescribed for like depositions in civil actions in the superior court;
  6. Carry out the provisions of this chapter; and
  7. Bring all actions, suits, complaints, and prosecutions for the violation of any of the provisions of this chapter. Complaints shall be signed and issued by the director or the commissioner or any authorized representative of either.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-14 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 17.

28-12-15. Hindering enforcement — Failure to carry out administrative requirements.

Any employer who or that: (1) Hinders or delays the director of labor and training, or his or her authorized representative, in the performance of his or her duties in the enforcement of this chapter; (2) Refuses to admit the director of labor and training, or his or her authorized representative, to any place of employment; (3) Fails to make, keep, and preserve any records as required under the provisions of this chapter; (4) Falsifies any record; (5) Refuses to make any record accessible to the director of labor and training, or his or her authorized representative, upon demand; (6) Refuses to furnish a sworn statement of the record or any other information required for the proper enforcement of this chapter to the director of labor and training, or his or her authorized representative, upon demand; or (7) Fails to post a summary of this chapter or a copy of any applicable regulation or order as required by § 28-12-11 , shall be deemed in violation of this chapter and shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). Each day of violation shall constitute a separate offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-15 ; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 54.

28-12-16. Discrimination against employees invoking provisions.

Any employer who or that discharges or in any other manner discriminates against any employee because the employee has made any complaint to his or her employer, to the director of labor and training, or to his or her authorized representative because: (1) He or she has not been paid wages in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; (2) The employee has caused to be instituted or is about to cause to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter; (3) The employee has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding; or (4) The employee has served, or is about to serve, on a wage board, shall be deemed in violation of this chapter, and shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-16 .

28-12-17. Payment of substandard wages.

Any employer who or that pays or agrees to pay wages at a rate less than the rate applicable under this chapter shall be deemed in violation of this chapter and shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for not less than ten (10) days nor more than ninety (90) days, or both, and each week for any portion of which the employer failed to pay any employee less than the rate applicable under this chapter shall constitute a separate offense as to each employee.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-17 .

28-12-18. Penalty for other violations.

Any employer who or that otherwise violates any provision of this chapter or of any regulation or order issued under this chapter shall be deemed in violation of this chapter and shall upon conviction be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). Each day of violation shall constitute a separate offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-18 .

28-12-19. Actions for relief.

Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter shall be entitled to relief as provided in chapter 14 of this title (“Payment of Wages”).

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-19 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 1.

28-12-20. Assignment of wage claim and action by department.

At the written request of an employee paid less than the wage to which he or she is entitled under or by virtue of this chapter, the director of labor and training or the commissioner of minimum wage may take an assignment of the employee’s wage claim in trust for the assigning employee and may bring any legal action necessary to collect the claim, and the employer shall be required to pay the costs and any reasonable attorney’s fees that may be allowed by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-20 .

28-12-21. More favorable laws preserved.

Any standards relating to minimum wages, maximum hours, overtime compensation, or other working conditions in effect under any other law of this state that are more favorable to employees than those applicable to those employees under this chapter or the regulations and orders issued under this chapter, shall not be deemed to be amended, rescinded, or otherwise affected by this chapter but shall continue in full force and effect and may be enforced as provided by law unless and until they are specifically superseded by standards more favorable to those employees by operation or in accordance with regulations or orders issued under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-21 ; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 31.

28-12-22. Collective bargaining rights preserved.

Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to interfere with, impede, or in any way diminish the right of employees to bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own choosing in order to establish wages or other conditions of work in excess of the applicable minimum under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-22 .

28-12-23. Annual appropriation.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sum that it deems necessary to provide for an appropriate staff for office and other necessary expenses for the administration and enforcement of this chapter; and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders on the general treasurer for the payment of that sum, or so much of it as may from time to time be required, upon receipt by him or her of proper vouchers, approved by the chief of the division of labor standards and the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-23 .

28-12-24. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and its application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3745, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 28-12-24 .

28-12-25. Uniformity.

No municipality shall establish, mandate, or otherwise require an employer to pay a minimum wage to its employees, other than the state or federal mandated minimum wage, or to apply a state or federal minimum wage law to wages statutorily exempt from a state or federal minimum wage requirement.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 145, art. 11, § 4.

Chapter 13 Measurement of Work in Textile Factories

28-13-1. Posting of job rates — Pick clocks.

  1. The occupier or manager of every textile factory shall post in every room where any employees work by the job, in legible writing or printing, and in sufficient numbers to be easily accessible to those employees, specifications of the character of each kind of work to be done by them and the rate of compensation.
    1. The specifications in the case of weaving rooms shall state the intended and maximum length of a cut or piece, the count per inch of thread, and the number of picks per inch, width of loom, width of cloth woven in the loom, and the price per cut or piece, or per pound; or, if payment is made per pick or per yard, the price per pick or per yard.
    2. Each warp shall bear a designating ticket or mark of identification. In mills operating looms on a piece rate basis, pick clocks shall be placed on each loom in operation, and each weaver shall be paid according to the number of picks registered on the clock.
  2. This chapter shall not apply to so called gang looms or to the weaving of carpets or elastic webbing.
  3. Violation of any provision of this chapter shall for the first offense be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100), for the second offense by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars ($200), and for a subsequent offense by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2291, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 295, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-13-1 .

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Chapter 14 Payment of Wages

28-14-1. Definitions.

Whenever used in this chapter:

  1. “Director” means the director of the department of labor and training or his or her duly authorized representative.
  2. “Employee” means any person suffered or permitted to work by an employer, except that independent contractors or subcontractors shall not be considered employees.
  3. “Employer” means any individual, firm, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, receiver, or other like officer appointed by a court of this state, and any agent or officer of any of the previously mentioned classes, employing any person in this state.
  4. “Wages” means all amounts at which the labor or service rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-1 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 53, § 1.

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Payment of wages:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-70 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 148 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Wages.

Where fishermen worked on voyages from 1993 to 2000 under lay share contracts contravening 46 U.S.C.S. § 10601, a trial court, in applying the doctrine of laches to fashion a remedy under 46 U.S.C.S. § 11107, correctly chose R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-20 as the most analogous statute of limitations and barred claims older than three years as § 28-14-20 covered wages and comported with the hospitable view taken toward seaman; moreover, the lay shares that the fishermen were paid were “wages” within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-1(4) , and the ten-year limitations period for contracts pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a) was too broad. Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 513 F.3d 331, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1436 (1st Cir. 2008).

Collateral References.

Vacation pay rights of private employees not covered by collective labor contract. 33 A.L.R.4th 264.

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on resignation of employee immediately or within specified period. 11 A.L.R.5th 715.

What projects involve work subject to state statutes requiring payment of prevailing wages on public works projects. 10 A.L.R.5th 337.

28-14-2. Payment of wages — Form of payment — Establishment of regular paydays.

Every employer shall establish a regular payday on which wages shall be paid in full in lawful money of the United States, or checks on banks convertible into cash on demand at full face value. Each employee must be notified in writing, or by posted notice that may readily be seen by all employees, of a change in the scheduled payday at least three (3) paydays in advance of a scheduled change. Each scheduled payday shall fall within nine (9) days of the end of the payroll period for which wages are computed unless prevented by inevitable casualty; provided, that if the ninth (9th) day is a holiday, payment upon the next business day shall be deemed a compliance with the terms of this section; and provided, further, that if at any time of payment any employee is absent from his or her place of labor, he or she shall be entitled to payment on demand at any time thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 223, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 2; P.L. 1942, ch. 1237, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-2 ) was repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 223, § 1, and the provisions on the same subject in the present section and §§ 28-14-2 .1 and 28-14-2.2 were substituted for the repealed section.

Cross References.

Payment of wages by public works contractors, § 37-13-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Trial court erred by granting employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial on an employee’s claim for damages against a former employer who allegedly issued two paychecks for work the employee did on jobs financed by the State of Rhode Island and the federal government and then required the employee to return one of his paychecks or risk losing his job. Mello v. DaLomba, 798 A.2d 405, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 138 (R.I. 2002).

Collateral References.

Assignability of statutory claim against employer for nonpayment of wages. 48 A.L.R.2d 1385.

Judgment in action on express contract for labor or services as precluding, as a matter of res judicata, subsequent action on implied contract or vice versa. 35 A.L.R.3d 874.

28-14-2.1. Statement of earnings.

  1. On every regular payday, every employer shall furnish to any employee the following:
    1. A statement of the hours worked by that employee during the applicable pay period; provided, that the statement need not be furnished to an employee described in § 28-12-4.3 ;
    2. A record of all deductions made from that employee’s gross earnings during the pay period together with an explanation of the basis or reason for the deductions; and
    3. For employers engaged only in the commercial construction industry, a record of the employee’s hourly regular rate of pay. As used in this subsection, “commercial construction industry” includes a business that engages in the doing of work or the furnishing of materials, or both, in the building, erection, alteration, or preparation of an improvement on commercial real property.
  2. All statements and records required to be furnished to an employee by this section may be furnished as an electronic record. The employer shall furnish to an employee a printed or handwritten record, in lieu of an electronic record, at no cost to the employee, when a written authorization from such employee is provided to the employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 223, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 18; P.L. 1993, ch. 376, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 96, § 1.

28-14-2.2. Frequency of payment.

  1. Except as provided in §§ 28-14-4 , 28-14-5 and subsections (b) and (c) of this section, every employee other than employees of the state and its political subdivisions and of religious, literary, or charitable corporations shall be paid weekly all due wages from his or her employer, except those employees whose compensation is fixed at a biweekly, semi-monthly, monthly, or yearly rate.
  2. The director may, upon written petition showing good and sufficient reason, permit employers in the state of Rhode Island whose average payroll exceeds two hundred percent (200%) of the state minimum wage as defined in § 28-12-3 to pay wages less frequently than weekly provided:
    1. The employer makes payment of wages regularly on a predesignated date no less than twice per month;
    2. The employer provides proof of a surety bond or other sufficient demonstration of security in the amount of the highest biweekly payroll exposure in the preceding year for the employees subject to the petition; and
    3. If the involved employees are subject to collective bargaining, the employer provides the written consent of the collective bargaining representative for all involved employees.
  3. The director may, upon written petition showing good and sufficient reason, permit employers in the state of Rhode Island whose average payroll is less than two hundred percent (200%) of the state minimum wage as defined in § 28-12-3 to pay wages and salaries of their employees less frequently than weekly provided:
    1. The employer has supplied the department with the following information:
      1. The method through which wages shall be paid;
      2. The requested frequency of payment;
      3. The employer’s designated payday(s);
      4. The classification of the employees involved;
      5. The salary range of the employees involved; and
      6. The employer’s federal identification number;
    2. The employer makes payment of wages regularly on a predesignated date no less than twice per month;
    3. The employer has no history of wage and hour violations;
    4. The employer provides proof of a surety bond or other sufficient demonstration of security in the amount of the highest biweekly payroll exposure in the preceding year for the employees subject to the petition; and
    5. If the involved employees are subject to collective bargaining, the employer provides the written consent of the collective bargaining representative for all involved employees.
  4. If the director approves a written petition under subsection (b) or (c), the permission is valid for an indefinite period of time, provided that:
    1. Payroll is regularly satisfied on the designated payday;
    2. The information provided by the employer to substantiate its request does not change; and
    3. The employer remains in compliance with all other state labor laws.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 223, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 269, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 349, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 269, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2014.

P.L. 2013, ch. 349, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2014.

28-14-3. Deduction and payment of union dues.

Whenever a majority of the members of the duly certified collective bargaining unit in any place of employment requests, in writing, from their employer that their union dues be deducted from their salary, the dues shall be deducted and remitted together with a list of the members whose dues have been deducted and the amount so deducted to the treasurer of the labor union designated by the employee in the request. The deductions shall be taken out according to appropriate payroll periods.

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3559, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-3 .

Cross References.

Certified collective bargaining unit, § 28-7-15 .

28-14-3.1. Payroll deductions.

  1. Subject to any provisions of the general laws or the public laws to the contrary, whenever any employer provides for a payroll deduction for any purpose, the employer shall transfer those funds deducted to the appropriate person, agency, partnership, or corporation entitled to the money deducted, within twenty-one (21) days following the last day of the month in which the deduction is made, except if the person, agency, partnership, or corporation entitled to money deducted permits otherwise in writing.
  2. Any employer who violates the provisions of this section shall be liable to an employee in a civil action brought by the employee for any loss sustained by the employee as a result of a violation.
  3. In addition to the penalty provided by subsection (b) of this section, any employer who fails intentionally, or who fails after written notification by the employee or by the collective bargaining representative of the employee, to transfer funds as required by subsection (a) of this section within thirty (30) days following the last day of the month in which the deduction is made, shall be liable for an additional penalty in the amount of fifty dollars ($50.00) for each day beyond the thirty-day (30) period during which he or she fails to transfer the funds. This additional penalty shall be payable to the employee from whose wages the funds were deducted.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 146, § 1.

28-14-3.2. Deductions not authorized.

  1. No employer shall deduct or withhold from the payment of wages owed to an employee for the performance of work or other reason set forth in this chapter, any monies not authorized by federal or state law or by court order, without first getting written or electronic approval from the employee. However, a deduction shall never be authorized by an employee or deducted by an employer from an employee’s wage for:
    1. Spoilage or breakage;
    2. Shortages or losses; or
    3. Fines or penalties for tardiness, misconduct, or quitting by an employee without notice.
  2. In addition to any other penalty or enforcement provision set forth in this chapter, any employer violating the provisions of this section shall be subject to treble damages, payable to the employee, of the amount not authorized to be deducted or withheld.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 501, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 313, § 1.

28-14-4. Payment on separation by employer.

  1. Whenever an employee separates or is separated from the payroll of an employer, the unpaid wages or compensation of the employee shall become due on the next regular payday and payable at the usual place of payment.
  2. Whenever an employee separates or is separated from the payroll of an employer after completing at least one year of service, any vacation pay accrued or awarded by collective bargaining, written or verbal company policy, or any other written or verbal agreement between the employer and employee shall become wages and payable in full or on a prorated basis with all other due wages on the next regular payday for the employee.
  3. Whenever an employer separates an employee from the payroll as a result of the employer liquidating the business, merging the business, disposing the business, or removing the business out of state, all wages become immediately due and payable within twenty-four (24) hours of the time of separation at the usual place of payment. Additionally, if the employee has completed at least one year of service with the employer, holiday pay, vacation pay in full or on a prorated basis, and insurance benefits due the employee under a collective bargaining agreement, company policy, or other agreement between the employer and employee shall be considered as unpaid wages due and payable within twenty-four (24) hours of the time of separation at the usual place of payment.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1669, § 2; P.L. 1942, ch. 1237, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-4 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 306, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 84, § 1.

Collateral References.

Construction and Effect of Severance or Dismissal Pay Provisions of Employment Contract or Collective Labor Agreement. 85 A.L.R.6th 323.

Liability for breach of employment severance agreement. 27 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on discharge of employee immediately or within specified period. 18 A.L.R.5th 577.

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on resignation of employee immediately or within specified period. 11 A.L.R.5th 715.

28-14-5. Payment in event of industrial dispute.

In the event of the suspension of work as the result of an industrial dispute, the wages and compensation earned and unpaid at the time of the suspension, without abatement or reduction, shall become due and payable at the next regular payday.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 2; P.L. 1942, ch. 1237, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-5 .

28-14-6. Payment of wages of deceased employees.

  1. Any employer, including the state or a municipal corporation, may at any time after thirty (30) days from the death of an employee pay all wages or personal earnings due to the deceased employee, in order of preference, to: (1) The surviving husband or wife; (2) Children eighteen (18) years of age or older in equal shares; (3) Father and mother, or the survivor; (4) Sisters and brothers in equal shares of the deceased employee; or (5) The person who has paid the funeral bill of the deceased employee; provided the employer has no actual notice of the issuance of any letters testamentary or letters of administration upon the estate of the deceased employee, or of the pendency of any petition for them, provided the wages or personal earnings do not exceed the sum of one hundred fifty dollars ($150).
  2. The payment of wages or personal earnings as provided in subsection (a) shall be a full discharge and release to the employer from any claim for those wages or personal earnings by the estate of the deceased employee or any other person.
  3. As a condition of payment, the employer may require satisfactory proof by affidavit or otherwise as to the relationship of the parties and may also require proper receipts or releases for the payment or payments.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 2A; P.L. 1947, ch. 1945, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-6 .

28-14-6.1. Priority of wages due from employer in receivership or insolvency proceedings.

In the event of any distribution of an employer’s assets pursuant to an order of any court under the laws of this state, including receivership, assignment for benefit of creditors, adjudicated insolvency, composition, or similar proceeding, the wages or compensation earned and unpaid not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300) to each wage earner earned within three (3) months of the commencement of the proceeding shall have the same priority in advance of payment of dividends to creditors as is given to wages under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. That amount shall be paid as soon as sufficient sums are available, to employees entitled to the same according to the records of the employer; the employees being relieved of the necessity of filing claims with the receiver, assignee, or trustee unless the amount payable as shown on the books of the employer is not acceptable to any employee, in which case, the employee shall file his or her claim in the same manner as other creditors of the employer.

History of Section. G.L., § 28-14-6.1 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 120, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Claims.

Notwithstanding this section, claims of the federal government have priority over wage claims by unpaid employees. Plantations Indus. Supply v. Ward C. Cramer Assocs., 108 R.I. 189 , 273 A.2d 671, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1246 (1971).

Collateral References.

Allowance and priority of wage claims of employees of operating receiver. 27 A.L.R.2d 720.

28-14-7. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-7 ; Repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 223, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-14-7 concerned the exemption of public employment.

28-14-8. Payment of undisputed amounts in wage disputes.

In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall give written notice to the employee of the amount of wages that he or she concedes to be due and shall pay that amount without condition within the time set by this chapter; provided, that acceptance by the employee of this payment shall not constitute a release as to the balance of his or her claim.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-8 .

28-14-9. Effect of private agreements — Payment of bonuses.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way limit or prohibit the payment of wages or compensation at more frequent intervals, or in greater amounts or in full when or before due, but no provision of this chapter can in any way be contravened or set aside by a private agreement; provided, that no agreement contained in a written contract relating to the payment of any bonus in addition to the payment of wages shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-9 .

Collateral References.

Construction and Effect of Severance or Dismissal Pay Provisions of Employment Contract or Collective Labor Agreement. 85 A.L.R.6th 323.

28-14-10. Wage deductions unaffected.

  1. None of the sections of this chapter shall be applicable to, control, or prohibit the deduction from wages of an employee by an employer in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agent of a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit of employees in which the employee is employed; provided, that the amount deducted from the wages of the employee is to be: (1) Used for the purpose of defraying the costs of legal services, counsel fees, or contribution to a prepaid legal services plan for those employees, their families, and their dependents; or (2) Paid to pension, welfare, vacation, or annuity plans, or an insurance plan for accident, health, disability, or life coverage or similar plans, complete provisions for which are contained in a collective bargaining agreement or a supplemental agreement as provided in them between the employer and the authorized bargaining agent of the employees and those plans are for the benefit of employees, their dependents, and beneficiaries in the bargaining unit, including full-time employees of the labor organization, provided it shall make the same payment for its employees to that plan or plans.
  2. None of the sections of this chapter shall be applicable to, control, or prohibit the deduction from wages of an employee by an employer in accordance with a written request made by the individual employee of:
    1. Trade union or craft dues or other obligations imposed by a collective bargaining contract;
    2. Subscriptions to a nonprofit hospital service corporation or nonprofit medical and/or surgical service corporation;
    3. Contributions to or for the use of a religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational corporation, trust, community chest fund, or foundation;
    4. Payments for the purpose of purchasing obligations of the United States or stock of a corporation pursuant to an employee stock purchase plan;
    5. Contributions to a pension plan in which the employee is a participant not required by a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the authorized collective bargaining representative of an employee and his or her employer;
    6. Contributions to or for insurance or under an insurance plan for accident, health, or life coverage not required by a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the authorized collective bargaining representative of an employee and his or her employer;
    7. Amounts to be credited to a share, deposit, or loan account in any credit union;
    8. Contributions, subscriptions, or payments of a similar nature not connected with past or present indebtedness; or
    9. Payments for participation in a vanpool transportation system where employee participation in the program is not a condition of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 5A; P.L. 1950, ch. 2630, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3273, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-10 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 129, § 1.

Collateral References.

Contract provisions for deduction of union dues from wages of employees and their payment to union as within statute prohibiting or regulating assignment of future earnings or wages. 14 A.L.R.2d 177.

28-14-10.1. Payment of wages directly to employee’s account in financial institution.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon written or electronic request, an employee of a state agency or any other employer may authorize a disbursing officer to make payment by sending to a financial organization designated by the employee a check or credit in the amount of net pay due to the employee drawn in favor of the organization and for credit to the checking account or payroll card of the employee or for deposit in the savings account of the employee or for the purchase of shares for the employee.
  2. If more than one employee to whom a payment is to be made designates the same financial organization, the disbursing officer shall make the payment by sending to the organization a check or credit that is drawn in favor of the organization for the total amount designated by those employees and by specifying the amount to be credited to the account of each of those employees.
  3. “State agency” means any department, agency, board, office, or commission in state government.
  4. “Financial organization” means any bank, savings bank, savings and loan association or similar institution, or federal or state chartered credit union.
  5. “Payroll card account” means an account that is directly or indirectly established through an employer to which transfers of the employee’s wages, salary, or other compensation are made, and that carries the consumer protections that apply to payroll card accounts under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq., and Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Part 1005, as may be amended.
  6. If an employer pays wages to an employee by credit to a payroll account:
    1. Except as provided in subsection (f)(2) of this section, the employee must be able to make at least one withdrawal from the payroll card account in each pay period without charge for any amount up to and including the full amount of the employee’s net wages for the pay period.
    2. If the employee’s wages are paid more frequently than weekly, the employee must be able to make at least one withdrawal from the payroll card account each week without charge for any amount up to and including the full amount of the employee’s net wages for that week.
    3. Employees who receive wages by credit to a payroll card account must be provided with a means of checking their payroll card account balances, either through an automated telephone system or online, through the use of the internet, without cost, irrespective of the number of inquiries made.
  7. The provisions of this section shall be with the consent of the employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 267, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 267, § 1.

28-14-10.2. Deduction of premium for prepaid legal services.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon the written authorization of an employee of any state agency, the disbursing officer shall deduct from the employee’s wages and forward to the designated prepaid legal services plan that employee’s contributions, subscriptions, or premium payments under the plan.
  2. All plans receiving funds under this section shall reimburse the state for the administrative costs of making the deductions.
  3. “State agency” means any department, agency, board, office, or commission in state government.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 336, § 1.

28-14-11. Wages held as garnishee.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any employer to pay to an employee any wages or money which the employer lawfully holds as garnishee under a writ of attachment issued by any court of this state in which the employer is named as garnishee, if the garnishee makes reports of that amount held by him or her as the garnishee to the court to which the writ is returnable.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-11 .

Cross References.

Exemption of wages from process, § 9-26-4 .

Garnishment of wages, § 10-5-8 .

Collateral References.

Employee retirement pension benefits as exempt from garnishment, attachment, levy, execution, or similar proceedings. 93 A.L.R.3d 711.

Garnishee’s duty to give debtor notice of garnishment prior to delivery of money without judgment against the garnishee on the debt. 36 A.L.R.4th 824.

28-14-12. Employment records.

Every employer shall keep a true and accurate record of hours worked and wages paid each pay period to each employee in any form that may be prescribed by the director. The employer shall keep the records on file for at least three (3) years after the entry of the record.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-12 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 121, § 1.

28-14-13. Inspection powers.

The director and his or her authorized representatives shall have the right to enter any place of employment for the purpose of inspecting the employment records required by § 28-14-12 and seeing that all provisions of this chapter are complied with.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-13 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 18.

28-14-14. Obstruction of enforcement.

Any effort of any employer to obstruct the director and his or her authorized representatives in the performance of their duties shall be deemed a violation of this chapter and punishable as such.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-14 .

28-14-15. Subpoena powers.

The director and his or her authorized representatives shall have the power to administer oaths and examine witnesses under oath, issue subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, compel the attendance of witnesses, and the production of papers, books, accounts, records, payrolls, documents, and testimony, and to take depositions and affidavits in any proceeding before the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-15 .

28-14-16. Compelling obedience to subpoenas.

In case of failure of any person to comply with any lawfully issued subpoena, or subpoena duces tecum, or on the refusal of any witness to testify to any matter regarding which he or she may be lawfully interrogated, it shall be the duty of the superior court, or any judge of that court, on application by the director, to compel obedience by proceedings in the nature of those for contempt.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-16 .

28-14-17. Penalty for violations.

  1. Any employer who or that violates or fails to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction of the misdemeanor, the employer shall be punished by a fine of not less than four hundred dollars ($400) for each separate offense, or by imprisonment of up to one year, or by both fine and imprisonment. Each day of failure to pay wages due an employee at the time specified in this chapter shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
  2. Any employer found guilty of violations of this chapter who or that does not pay wages and fines within thirty (30) days of a final decision and after notification by the department of labor and training, may have his, her, or its business license revoked by the state of Rhode Island until he, she, or it pays such wages and fines in full or enters into a payment agreement with which he, she, or it stays in compliance.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-17 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 413, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 449, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 435, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 436, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional in providing imprisonment for violation of § 28-14-2 , since that imprisonment is for the failure to pay wages, not for debt. State v. Feist, 115 R.I. 201 , 341 A.2d 725, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1142 (1975).

28-14-17.1. Administrative assessment.

  1. Any employer found to have violated the provisions of this chapter upon final determination by the department of labor and training, including claims settled via settlement agreement and administrative hearing, shall be assessed an administrative penalty equal to fifteen percent (15%) to twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount of back wages ordered to be paid for a first violation within a three-year (3) period. For subsequent violations within a three-year (3) period, the assessment shall equal twenty-five percent (25%) to fifty percent (50%) of the amount of back wages ordered to be paid.
  2. In determining the amount of any penalty imposed under this section, the director or his or her designee shall consider the good faith of the employer; the gravity of the violation; the history of previous violations; and whether or not the violation was an innocent mistake or willful violation.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 6.

28-14-18. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 179, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 3, effective June 20, 2012.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-14-18 concerned protection for employees who report violations. For current law, see § 28-14-19.3 .

Repealed Sections.

A former § 28-14-18 (P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-18 ), concerning discharge due to assertion of rights under this chapter, was repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 179, § 1, effective July 13, 1992.

28-14-18.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 179, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 3, effective June 20, 2012.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-14-18.1 concerned relief and damages.

28-14-18.2. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 179, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 3, effective June 20, 2012.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-14-18.2 concerned reinstatement.

28-14-18.3. Collective bargaining.

This chapter shall not be construed to diminish or impair the rights of a person under any collective bargaining agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 179, § 2.

28-14-18.4. Extension of protection.

The protections set forth in § 28-14-18 [repealed] and the relief and damages for violations set forth in §§ 28-14-18 .1[repealed] and 28-14-18.2 [repealed] shall also apply to chapters 3, 6, 12, and 18 of this title and to chapter 23 of title 5.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 179, § 2.

28-14-19. Enforcement powers and duties of director of labor and training.

  1. It shall be the duty of the director to ensure compliance with the provisions of this chapter and chapter 12 of this title. The director, or his or her designee, may investigate any violations thereof, institute or cause to be instituted actions for the collection of wages, and institute action for penalties or other relief as provided for within and pursuant to those chapters. The director, or his or her authorized representatives, are empowered to hold hearings and he or she shall cooperate with any employee in the enforcement of a claim against his or her employer in any case whenever, in his or her opinion, the claim is just and valid.
  2. Upon receipt of a complaint or conducting an inspection under applicable law, the director, or his or her appropriate departmental designee, is authorized to investigate to determine compliance with this chapter and chapter 12 of this title.
  3. With respect to all complaints deemed just and valid, the director, or his or her designee, shall order a hearing thereon at a time and place to be specified, and shall give notice thereof, together with a copy of the complaint or the purpose thereof, or a statement of the facts disclosed upon investigation, which notice shall be served personally or by mail on any person, business, corporation, or entity of any kind affected thereby. The hearing shall be scheduled within thirty (30) days of service of a formal complaint as provided herein. The person, business, corporation, or entity shall have an opportunity to be heard in respect to the matters complained of at the time and place specified in the notice. The hearing shall be conducted by the director or his or her designee. The hearing officer in the hearing shall be deemed to be acting in a judicial capacity, and shall have the right to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and examine witnesses. The enforcement of a subpoena issued under this section shall be regulated by Rhode Island civil practice law and rules. The hearing shall be expeditiously conducted and upon such hearing the hearing officer shall determine the issues raised thereon and shall make a determination and enter an order within thirty (30) days of the close of the hearing, and forthwith serve a copy of the order, with a notice of the filing thereof, upon the parties to the proceeding, personally or by mail. The order shall dismiss the complaint or direct payment of any wages and/or benefits found to be due and/or award such other appropriate relief or penalties authorized under this chapter and chapter 12 of this title, and the order may direct payment of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the complaining party. Interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be awarded in the order from the date of the nonpayment to the date of payment.
  4. The order shall also require payment of a further sum as a civil penalty in an amount up to two (2) times the total wages and/or benefits found to be due, exclusive of interest, which shall be shared equally between the department and the aggrieved party. In determining the amount of any penalty to impose, the director, or his or her designee, shall consider the size of the employer’s business, the good faith of the employer, the gravity of the violation, the previous violations, and whether or not the violation was an innocent mistake or willful.
  5. The director may institute any action to recover unpaid wages or other compensation or obtain relief as provided under this section with or without the consent of the employee or employees affected.
  6. No agreement between the employee and employer to work for less than the applicable wage and/or benefit rate or to otherwise work under and/or conditions in violation of applicable law is a defense to an action brought pursuant to this section.
  7. The director shall notify the contractors’ registration board of any order issued or any determination hereunder that an employer has violated this chapter, chapter 12 of this title, or chapter 13 of title 37. The director shall notify the tax administrator of any determination hereunder that may affect liability for an employer’s payment of wages and/or payroll taxes.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-19 ; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 53, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 301, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 2.

Collateral References.

Judgment in action on express contract for labor or services as precluding, as a matter of res judicata, subsequent action on implied contract or vice versa. 35 A.L.R.3d 874.

28-14-19.1. Misclassification of employees.

  1. The misclassification of a worker whether performing work as a natural person, business, corporation, or entity of any kind, as an independent contractor when the worker should be considered and paid as an employee shall be considered a violation of this chapter.
  2. In addition to any other relief to which any department or an aggrieved party may be entitled for such a violation, the employer shall be liable for a civil penalty in an amount not less than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) and not greater than three thousand dollars ($3,000) for each misclassified employee for a first offense and up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each misclassified employee for any subsequent offense, which shall be shared equally between the department and the aggrieved party.
  3. In determining the amount of any penalty imposed under this section, the director, or his or her designee, shall consider the size of the employer’s business; the good faith of the employer; the gravity of the violation; the history of previous violations; and whether or not the violation was an innocent mistake or willful.
  4. A violation of this section may be adjudicated under § 28-14-19 and consolidated with any labor standards violation or under §§ 37-13-14.1 and 37-13-15 and consolidated with any prevailing wage violation.
  5. A violation of this section may be brought or adjudicated by any division of the department of labor and training.
  6. The department shall notify the contractors’ registration board and the tax administrator of any violation of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 4; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 4; P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 7.

28-14-19.2. Private right of action to collect wages or benefits and for equitable relief.

  1. Any employee or former employee, or any organization representing the employee or former employee aggrieved by the failure to pay wages and/or benefits or misclassification in violation of chapter 12 of this title and/or this chapter may file a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain relief. An aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover any unpaid wages and/or benefits, compensatory damages, and liquidated damages in an amount up to two (2) times the amount of unpaid wages and/or benefits owed, as well as an award of appropriate equitable relief, including reinstatement of employment, fringe benefits and seniority rights, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and/or such other appropriate relief or penalties authorized under this chapter and chapter 12 of this title. In determining the amount of any penalty imposed under this section, consideration shall be given to the size of the employer’s business, the good faith of the employer, the gravity of the violation, the history of previous violations, and whether or not the violation was an innocent mistake or willful. Any unpaid fringe benefit contributions owed pursuant to this section in any form shall be paid to the appropriate benefit fund: however, in the absence of an appropriate fund, the benefit shall be paid directly to the aggrieved employee.
  2. An action instituted pursuant to this section may be brought by one or more employees or former employees individually and/or on behalf of other employees similarly situated.
  3. No agreement between the employee and employer to work for less than the applicable wage and/or benefit rate or to otherwise work under terms and/or conditions in violation of applicable law is a defense to an action brought pursuant to this section.
  4. An employer’s responsibility and liability hereunder is solely to the employer’s own employees.
  5. A civil action filed under this section may be instituted instead of, but not in addition to, the director of labor and training enforcement procedures authorized by the above referenced chapters, provided the civil action is filed prior to the date the director of labor and training issues notice of an administrative hearing.
  6. The filing of a civil action under this section shall not preclude the director of labor and training from investigating the matter and/or referring the matter to the attorney general, contractors’ registration board, and/or the tax administrator.
  7. Any claim hereunder shall be forever barred unless commenced within three (3) years after the cause of action accrued.

History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 4; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Statute of Limitations.

Plaintiff, who was entitled to receive payment of his earned commissions as of the end of 2010, was required to file suit for unpaid commissions by December 31, 2013. Because plaintiff’s lawsuit was not filed until June 2014, the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in this section. Bisbano v. Strine Printing Co., 135 A.3d 1202, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2016).

28-14-19.3. Protection from retaliation.

No employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee or any other person for asserting, supporting, reporting, or participating in or being asked to participate in the investigation or determination of claim violation or actionable under this chapter or chapter 12 of this title.

Any person aggrieved by a violation of this section shall be entitled to relief as provided under chapter 50 of this title (“The Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act”), provided, that such action must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued or shall be thereafter barred.

History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 4; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 4.

28-14-20. Filing of claims.

  1. All claims for wages may be filed with the director within three (3) years from the time of services rendered by an employee to his or her employer.
  2. An aggrieved person who alleges a violation of any provision of this chapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages or both within three (3) years after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter.
  3. An action commenced pursuant to subsection (b) may be brought in the court for the county where the alleged violation occurred; the county where the complainant resides; or the county where the employer against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his, her or its principal place of business.
  4. As used in subsection (b), damages include two (2) times the wages owed to the employee for the first offense.
  5. Attorney’s fees, including litigation expenses, may be granted to a prevailing plaintiff.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-20 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 488, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 425, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 301, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 435, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 436, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The cause of action in this section is not analogous to an ERISA claim because this section provides only for recovery of unpaid compensation due an employee, and not for unpaid contributions to a pension fund. Trustees of the Local Union No. 17 Sheet Metal Workers' Apprenticeship Fund v. May Eng'g Co., 951 F. Supp. 346, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 635 (D.R.I. 1997).

Under the laches analysis, the most analogous statute was R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-20 , which applied a three-year period for wage claims, and thus, a presumption of laches attached to the crewmen’s claims for trips made prior to August 31, 1998, and a presumption of timeliness attached to claims for trips after that date. Therefore, the court found that claims for statutory damages under 46 U.S.C.S. § 11107 on the grounds that the owners failed to provide them with written wage agreements prior to their fishing voyages, as required by 46 U.S.C.S. § 10601, dating from before August 31, 1998, were barred by laches in the cases of four crewmen and that the remaining crewmen were entitled to the total difference between what they earned and what a full share would have been for the trips. Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 337, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12126 (D.R.I. 2007), aff'd, 513 F.3d 331, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1436 (1st Cir. 2008).

Applicability.

Where fishermen worked on voyages from 1993 to 2000 under lay share contracts contravening 46 U.S.C.S. § 10601, a trial court, in applying the doctrine of laches to fashion a remedy under 46 U.S.C.S. § 11107, correctly chose R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-20 as the most analogous statute of limitations and barred claims older than three years, as § 28-14-20 covered wages and comported with the hospitable view taken toward seaman; moreover, the lay shares that the fishermen were paid were “wages” within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-1(4) , and the ten-year limitations period for contracts pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a) was too broad. Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 513 F.3d 331, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1436 (1st Cir. 2008).

28-14-21. Acceptance of claims of nonresidents for collection.

The labor relations board shall not accept for collection the unpaid wage claim of any nonresident of this state unless the state of which that nonresident is a citizen accepts for collection the unpaid wage claims of Rhode Island residents.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 3; P.L. 1942, ch. 1237, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-21 .

28-14-22. Duties of attorney general.

It shall be mandatory upon the attorney general of this state to prosecute all civil and criminal cases which shall be referred by the director to the attorney general. It shall be the duty of the attorney general to prosecute actions, both civil and criminal, for those violations of this chapter that come to his or her knowledge and to independently enforce the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-22 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 18.

28-14-23. Assignment of wage claims to director — Prosecution of actions.

The director shall have the power and authority to:

  1. Take assignments of wage claims and rights of action for penalties as provided by §§ 28-14-17 and 28-14-18 [repealed] without being bound by any of the technical rules with reference to the validity of the assignments;
  2. Prosecute actions for the collection of the claims of persons who, in the judgment of the director, have claims which are valid and enforceable in the courts; and
  3. Join various claimants in one preferred claim or lien, and in case of suit to join them in one cause of action.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 9; P.L. 1955, ch. 3588, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-23 .

28-14-24. Setoff of money owed by employee to employer.

  1. In any action for unpaid wages brought under the provisions of this chapter, the employer-debtor shall not deduct as a setoff or counterclaim:
    1. Any money allegedly due the employer as compensation for damages caused to the employer’s property by the negligence of the employee;
    2. Any money allegedly due the employer as rent; or
    3. Any money allegedly owed to the employer by the employee;
  2. Provided, that any employer granting the employee a loan or advance against future earnings or wages may deduct the loan as a setoff or counterclaim if evidenced by a statement in writing signed by the employee. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict in any way any rights which the employer now has to recover, by a separate legal action, any money owed the employer by the employee.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 9A; P.L. 1942, ch. 1237, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-24 .

28-14-25. Court costs.

In all actions brought by the director as assignee under § 28-14-23 , no court costs of any nature shall be required to be advanced nor shall any bond or other security be required from the director in connection with the action.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-25 .

28-14-26. Service of process.

Any deputy sheriff requested by the director to serve summons, writs, complaints, orders, including any garnishment papers and all necessary and legal papers, shall do so without requiring the director to advance the fees or furnish any security or bond.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-26 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 56.

28-14-27. Attachment of property.

Whenever the director requires a deputy sheriff whose duty it is to seize property or levy on property in any attachment proceedings to satisfy any wage claim judgment to perform any duty, the officer shall do so without requiring the director to furnish any security or bond in the action, and the officer in carrying out the provisions of this section shall not be responsible in damages for any wrongful seizure made in good faith.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-27 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 56.

Collateral References.

Effect of anti-alienation provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 105(d)) (ERISA) on rights of judgment creditors. 131 A.L.R. Fed. 427.

Employee retirement pension benefits as exempt from garnishment, attachment, levy, execution, or similar proceedings. 93 A.L.R.3d 711.

28-14-28. Garnishee’s fees.

Any garnishee defendant shall be required to appear and make answer in any action, as required by law, without having paid to him or her in advance garnishee’s fees, but garnishee’s fees shall be included as part of the taxable costs of the action.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-28 .

28-14-29. Order of payment of fees and claims.

Out of any recovery on a judgment in a suit there shall be paid:

  1. First, the garnishee’s and witness fees;
  2. Second, the wage claims involved;
  3. Third, the deputy sheriff’s fees; and
  4. Fourth, the court costs.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-29 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 56.

28-14-30. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1069, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-14-30 .

28-14-31. Wages upon return from layoff.

Whenever an employee who has worked for an employer for more than one year is separated from work by a “layoff,” the employer shall offer to pay to the employee the same wages earned at the time of the separation upon the employee’s later return to work at the same or similar job.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 128, § 1.

Chapter 15 Assignment of Future Wages

28-15-1. “Assignment” defined.

“Assignment,” as used in this chapter, includes every instrument purporting to transfer an interest in or an authority to collect the future earnings of any person.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1551, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 260, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 304, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-1 .

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Assignment of wages:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-68 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 154, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Earnings Subject to Provisions.

Assignment of amounts to become due under building contract was not subject to this chapter. Abbott v. Davidson, 18 R.I. 91 , 25 A. 839, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1892).

Employment Contract.

Assignment was not effective as to wages earned from an employer with whom there was no employment contract at the time of execution of the assignment. Kennedy & Gough v. Tiernay, 14 R.I. 528 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1884).

Fact that assignor was hired by the day did not make assignment invalid where the hiring was continuous. Dolan v. Hughes, 20 R.I. 513 , 40 A. 344, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1898).

Future Loans.

Recorded assignment was effective as to wages required to repay loan made after the assignment. Park Brew Co. v. McDermott, 25 R.I. 95 , 54 A. 924, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1903) (Decision prior to enactment of § 28-15-2 .)

Guaranty Arrangement.

Arrangement whereby employer verbally guaranteed payment of employee’s debt did not constitute an assignment of wages. Browning v. Parker, 17 R.I. 183 , 20 A. 835, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1890).

Rate of Repayment.

A pledge of wages to repay a loan from employer, the employer to deduct as much weekly as it saw fit, was an assignment. Trottier v. Foley, 42 R.I. 422 , 108 A. 498, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1920).

Collateral References.

Contract provisions for deduction of union dues from wages of employees and their payment to the union as within statute prohibiting or regulating assignment of future earnings or wages. 14 A.L.R.2d 177.

Wages or salary, law governing assignment of. 1 A.L.R.3d 927.

28-15-2. Maximum period of assignment — Form and contents.

No assignment of future earnings or wages shall be valid:

  1. For a period exceeding one year from the date of the assignment;
  2. Unless made to secure a debt contracted prior to or simultaneously with the execution of the assignment;
  3. Unless executed in writing in the standard form set forth in § 28-15-3 and signed by the assignor in person and not by attorney; and
  4. Unless the assignment truly states the date of its execution, the money or the money value of goods actually furnished by the assignee and the rate of interest, if any, to be paid on it.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1551, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 260, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 304, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Improper Form.

Unrecorded authorization, not in statutory form, to withhold and pay over union dues for an indefinite period did not qualify as a valid assignment. Shine v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 76 R.I. 71 , 68 A.2d 379, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1949).

28-15-3. Standard form.

The standard form of assignment required by this chapter shall be as follows:

Know All Men and Women by These Presents; That I, in county of for a valuable consideration, to me paid by of the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge, do hereby assign and transfer to said all claims and demands (which I now have, and all) which within a period of from the date hereof I may and shall have against my present employer and against any person whose employ I shall hereafter enter (for all sums of money due and) for all sums of money and demands which, at any time within said period, may and shall become due to me, for services as To have and to hold the same to the said , his or her executors, administrators and assigns, to secure a debt (1) Of dollars (with interest thereon from at the rate of percent per annum), for money (or goods) actually furnished by the assignee amounting to dollars, (2) Contracted prior to the execution of this assignment (or contracted simultaneously with the execution of this assignment). In witness whereof I have set my hand this day of Signed and delivered in presence of:

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History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1551, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 260, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 304, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-3 .

28-15-4. Copy delivered to assignor.

No assignment of future earnings or wages shall be valid unless a copy of it is delivered to the assignor at the date of the execution of the assignment.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1551, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 260, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 304, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-4 .

28-15-5. Recording of assignments.

No assignment of future earnings or wages shall be valid, except as between the parties to the assignment, unless the assignment is recorded within five (5) days after it is signed by the assignor in a book to be kept for that purpose in the office of the recorder of deeds, if there is one, otherwise in the office of the clerk of the town or city in which the assignor resides, if a resident of this state, or in the town or city in which he or she is employed if not a resident of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1551, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 260, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 304, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Earnings Subject to Provisions.

Reference to town where assignor is employed indicates that chapter applies only to wages. Abbott v. Davidson, 18 R.I. 91 , 25 A. 839, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1892).

Failure to Record.

Unrecorded assignment was invalid as against attaching creditor. Trottier v. Foley, 42 R.I. 422 , 108 A. 498, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1920).

Removal of Assignor.

Assignment duly recorded in town where assignor lived was not affected by assignor’s subsequent removal to another town. Garland v. Linskey, 19 R.I. 713 , 36 A. 837, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1897).

28-15-6. Copy of assignment delivered to employer.

No assignment of future earnings or wages shall be in any way binding upon the employer of the assignor until a copy of the assignment and account, which shall conform to the requirements stated in this section, has been delivered to the employer. The account shall be in writing and shall contain a statement of the balance due and of the sums of money received by the assignee, together with the date of every payment, and a statement showing whether the payment is a charge for making or securing the loan or otherwise.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1551, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 260, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 304, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-6 .

28-15-7. Effect of assignment.

An assignment of future earnings or wages made in accordance with all of the provisions of this chapter shall bind all wages earned by the assignor within the period named in the assignment.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1551, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 260, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 304, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Fraudulent Assignments.

Return of part of wages to assignor by assignee was fraudulent as against other creditors. Hickey v. Ryan, 19 R.I. 399 , 36 A. 1132, 1896 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1896).

Fact that assignee permitted assignor to draw wages, then make immediate payment to him, did not make the assignment fraudulent. Dolan v. Hughes, 20 R.I. 513 , 40 A. 344, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1898).

28-15-8. Assignments under small loan law.

All assignments of wages made in accordance with the provisions of chapter 25 of title 19 for the purpose of securing any loan made in accordance with the provisions of that chapter, shall be exempt from provisions of this chapter that are inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 25 of title 19.

History of Section. P.L. 1923, ch. 427, § 23; P.L. 1923, ch. 427, § 25; P.L. 1937, ch. 2496, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-8 .

28-15-9. Wage deductions exempt.

  1. None of the sections of this chapter shall be applicable to, control, or prohibit the deduction from wages of an employee by an employer in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement entered into with the employer by a labor organization that is the authorized collective bargaining agent of a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit of employees in which the employee is employed; provided, that the amount deducted from the wages of the employee is to be: (1) Used for the purpose of defraying the costs of legal services, counsel fees, or contribution to a prepaid legal services plan for those employees, their families, and their dependents; or (2) Paid to pension, welfare, vacation, or annuity plans or an annuity plan or an insurance plan for accident, health, disability, or life coverage or similar plans, complete provisions for which are contained in a collective bargaining agreement or a supplemental agreement as provided in the agreement between the employer and the authorized bargaining agent of the employees and the plans are for the benefit of employees, their dependents, and beneficiaries in the bargaining unit, including full-time employees of the labor organization, provided it shall make the same payment for its employees to the plan or plans.
  2. None of the sections of this chapter shall be applicable to, control, or prohibit the deduction from wages of an employee by an employer in accordance with a written request made by the individual employee of:
    1. Trade union or craft dues or other obligations imposed by a collective bargaining contract;
    2. Subscriptions to a nonprofit hospital service corporation or nonprofit medical and/or surgical service corporation;
    3. Contributions to or for the use of a religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational corporation, trust, community chest, fund, or foundation;
    4. Payments for the purpose of purchasing obligations of the United States or stock of a corporation pursuant to an employee stock purchase plan;
    5. Contributions to a pension plan in which the employee is a participant not required by a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the authorized collective bargaining representative of an employee and his or her employer;
    6. Contributions to or for insurance or under an insurance plan for accident, health, or life coverage not required by a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the authorized collective bargaining representative of an employee and his or her employer;
    7. Amounts to be credited to a share, deposit, or loan account in any credit union; or
    8. Contributions, subscriptions, or payments of a similar nature not connected with past or present indebtedness.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 292, § 9; P.L. 1947, ch. 1944, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2631, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3361, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-15-9 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 206, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 189, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 28-14-2 .

This section did not amend § 28-14-2 by implication with respect to checkoff of union dues. Chabot v. Prudential Ins. Co., 77 R.I. 396 , 75 A.2d 317, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1950). But see §§ 28-14-3 and 28-14-10 .

Chapter 16 Enforcement of Wage and Hour Laws

28-16-1. Power of department to assist in enforcement of federal law.

The Rhode Island department of labor and training is empowered to assist and cooperate with the administrator of the wage and hour and public contracts division and the director of the bureau of labor standards of the United States Department of Labor, in the administration and the enforcement within this state of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The department is further authorized to accept payment and/or reimbursement for its services as provided by that act. Assistance and cooperation may include the designation by the director of the department of labor and training of state employees to investigate federal and state violations of wage, hour, and child labor provisions and regulations and may provide for joint inspection.

History of Section. P.L. 1940, ch. 895, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-16-1 .

28-16-2. Agreements with federal agencies.

The department of labor and training is authorized to enter into agreements with the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions and/or the Bureau of Labor Standards of the United States Department of Labor for assistance and cooperation, and is authorized, from time to time, to amend the agreements; provided, that any agreement or amendment of it shall be subject to the regulations of the administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions and/or the director of the Bureau of Labor Standards of the United States Department of Labor and shall be subject to the approval of the governor.

History of Section. P.L. 1940, ch. 895, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-16-2 .

28-16-3. Receipt and disbursement of federal funds — State appropriations.

The general treasurer shall receive and provide for the proper custody of all funds paid to the state from the federal treasury under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and shall disburse those funds upon orders drawn by the controller upon receipt by him or her of proper vouchers approved by the director of the department of labor and training. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authorizing the department of labor and training to spend in excess of its appropriation from state funds except to the extent that the excess may be paid and/or the appropriation may be reimbursed by the United States Department of Labor through the federal treasury; and, provided, that the payment and request for reimbursement shall be approved by the director of administration.

History of Section. P.L. 1940, ch. 895, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-16-3 .

Chapter 17 Employees’ Trusts

28-17-1. Definitions.

  1. “Employees’ trust” as used in this chapter means any trust created by an employer for the maintenance and regulation of an apprentice training program, and any trust created as part of a stock bonus plan, pension plan, disability or death benefit plan, or profit sharing plan for the exclusive benefit of some or all of his or her employees or their beneficiaries, to which contributions are made by the employer or employees or both, for the purpose of distributing in accordance with the plan to those employees or their beneficiaries the earnings or the principal, or both earnings and principal, of the trust fund, provided that it is impossible under the trust instrument at any time prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries under the trust for any part of the corpus or income to be at any time used for or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of those employees or their beneficiaries.
  2. “Employer” as used in this chapter includes a group of employers or any combination of employers and a labor union creating a combined plan or trust for the benefit of their apprentices, employees, or the beneficiaries of employees.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1346, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-17-1 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 192, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Employees’ trusts:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-508.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151D, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Profit-Sharing Plan.

An employees’ profit-sharing plan which required the employer to contribute periodically to the trust and that the trust corpus and income be used for the sole and exclusive benefit of the corporate employees or their beneficiaries was an “employees’ trust” under this section. Bertozzi v. Kolodziej, 102 R.I. 161 , 229 A.2d 48, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 663 (1967).

Collateral References.

Pension or retirement plan as creating enforceable trust in favor of employees. 46 A.L.R.3d 464.

28-17-2. Accumulation of income — Perpetuities — Suspension of power of alienation.

The income arising from any personal property held in any employees’ trust as defined in § 28-17-1 may be permitted to accumulate in accordance with the terms of the trust and the plan to which the trust forms a part for any time that may be necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the trust has been created. An employees’ trust shall not be deemed to be invalid as violating the rule against perpetuities or any law or rule against perpetuities or the suspension of the power of alienation of title to property, but may continue for any time that may be necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it has been created.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1346, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-17-2 .

28-17-3. Tax exemption.

The intangible personal property held in any employees’ trust as defined in § 28-17-1 shall be exempt from all sales and use taxes and all other state and local taxation so long as it is held in trust and used for the purposes of the trust and of the plan of which the trust forms a part. The right of any employee or beneficiary under the plan to any pension, annuity, or retirement allowance or to the return of contributions, and any other benefit or right accrued or accruing to any person under the terms of the trust or plan shall be exempt from all local taxation and state taxation except for the personal income tax imposed under the provisions of chapter 30 of title 44.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1346, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-17-3 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 496, art. 2, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Real Estate.

Real estate held by the trustees of an employees’ profit-sharing plan and rented to a number of tenants, with the income therefrom accruing to the trust was exempt from local property taxes. Bertozzi v. Kolodziej, 102 R.I. 161 , 229 A.2d 48, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 663 (1967).

28-17-4. Immunity from attachment, process, or assignment.

The interest of any person in any employees’ trust as defined in § 28-17-1 and any pension derivable from that trust shall not be subject to trustee process or liable to attachment on any writ, original, mesne, or judicial, or be taken on execution or any process, legal or equitable; and no assignment of any interest or pension shall be valid.

History of Section. P.L. 1943, ch. 1346, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-17-4 .

Chapter 18 Industrial Homework

28-18-1. Purpose of chapter.

The employment of workers in industry in the state of Rhode Island under conditions resulting in unreasonably low wages and conditions injurious to their health and general welfare is a matter of grave and vital public concern. Any conditions of employment especially fostering such working conditions are therefore destructive of purposes already accepted as sound public policy by the general assembly and should be brought into conformity with that policy. Uncontrolled continuance of homework is such a condition; here wages are notoriously lower and working conditions endanger the health of the worker; the protection of factory industries, which must operate in competition with homework and of the workers employed in homeworking and of the public interest of the community at large in their health and well being, require strict control and gradual elimination of industrial homework.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1946, ch. 1784, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Homework:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-29 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 143 et seq.

Collateral References.

Industrial homeworkers as within Unemployment and Workers’ Compensation Acts. 143 A.L.R. 418.

28-18-2. Definitions.

The following terms as used in this chapter have the following meanings:

  1. “Director” means the director of labor and training.
  2. “Employer” means any person who either directly or through an employee, agent, subcontractor, independent contractor, or any other person delivers, distributes, supplies, or furnishes, or causes to be delivered, distributed, supplied, or furnished, to another person any materials to be processed in a home, including the home of the employer, and that are subsequently to be returned to him or her or to some person acting on his or her behalf, not for the personal use of himself or herself or of a member of his or her family.
  3. “Home” means any dwelling house, tenement house, rooming house, apartment house, or other residential building or any part of these.
  4. “Industrial homework” means the processing in a home, including the home of the employer in whole or in part, of material furnished by an employer of any article or articles to be returned to the employer.
  5. “Industrial homeworker” means any person who processes in a home, in whole or in part, out of material furnished by an employer for industrial homework any article or articles to be returned to the employer directly or indirectly.
  6. “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, firm, trustee, receiver, and assignee for the benefit of creditors or corporations, except charitable organizations.
  7. “Processing” means manufacturing, finishing, repairing, preparing, altering, packing, wrapping, or handling any material.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 2; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-2 .

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

28-18-3. Issuance of homework licenses.

  1. The distribution of industrial homework as defined in § 28-18-2(4) is prohibited except where licenses and certificates have been obtained from the director of labor and training.
  2. The director of labor and training may issue a license as provided in this chapter only if the employer maintains an establishment in this state in which persons are employed on operations the same as or similar to the proposed homework operations and if the homeworker is paid at least the same rate as that paid to workers on the same or similar operations in the establishment.
  3. The director of labor and training shall issue licenses to employers and certificates permitting industrial homework to industrial homeworkers who have reached the age of fifty (50) years or who are physically disabled and not able to go to the employer’s place of business to work.
  4. The director of labor and training shall issue licenses to employers and certificates to industrial homeworkers regardless of whether the homeworkers are physically disabled or have reached the age of fifty (50) years, in any industry where homework is customary in Rhode Island, permitting the industrial homework.
  5. The director of labor and training shall not issue the licenses in any cases or industries:
    1. Where it would unduly jeopardize the factory workers in the industry both as to wages and working conditions;
    2. It would unduly injure the health and welfare of the industrial homeworker;
    3. It would unduly jeopardize the public health and safety to have those industrial homework products distributed; or
    4. In any industry where experience has proven that homework in that industry is not susceptible of effective regulation.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-3 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 63; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 63.

28-18-4. Revocation or suspension of license or certificate.

The director of labor and training may revoke or suspend the license of any employer or the certificate of any industrial homeworker for a violation by that employer or industrial homeworker of the terms of his or her license or certificate or any provisions of this chapter, or of any regulation made by the director of labor and training, or for noncompliance with an order issued by him or her within the time specified in the order. No license or certificate shall be refused, revoked, or suspended unless the holder previously had reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-4 .

28-18-5. Employer’s license and renewal fees.

  1. A fee of three hundred dollars ($300) shall be paid to the director of labor and training on behalf of the state of Rhode Island for the original issuance of an employer’s license.
  2. For each annual renewal of an employer’s license, the employer shall pay to the director of labor and training a fee of:
    1. Forty dollars ($40.00) where the employer is delivering or causing to be delivered industrial homework to five (5) persons or less;
    2. Eighty dollars ($80.00) where the employer is delivering or causing to be delivered industrial homework to from five (5) to twenty (20) persons;
    3. One hundred fifty dollars ($150) where an employer is delivering or causing to be delivered industrial homework to from twenty (20) to one hundred (100) persons;
    4. Three hundred dollars ($300) where an employer is delivering or causing to be delivered industrial homework to more than one hundred (100) persons.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 1945, ch. 1608, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-5 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 74, § 12.

28-18-5.1. Contractor’s permit required.

No person in any industry where experience has proven that homework in the industry is not susceptible of effective regulations shall deliver, distribute, supply, or furnish any materials to be processed by another person unless that person has been issued a contractor’s permit by the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 284, § 1.

28-18-5.2. Permit required to process goods or materials.

No person may perform any process on goods or material owned by another unless the person has been issued a permit by the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 284, § 1.

28-18-5.3. Location of contract shop.

No contract shop may be operated in any home as defined in § 28-18-2(3) .

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 284, § 1.

28-18-5.4. Contractor’s permit fees.

An annual fee of one hundred twenty dollars ($120) shall be paid to the director of labor and training for a contractor’s permit. The proceeds derived under the provisions of this chapter shall be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 284, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 31, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 90; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 6.

28-18-6. Rules and regulations.

The director of labor and training shall issue rules and regulations designed to control and regulate industrial homework where it is permitted, and to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-6 .

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

28-18-7. Investigations and inspections — Communicable diseases.

The director of labor and training shall enforce and administer the provisions of this chapter and the director or his or her authorized representative is directed to investigate and gather data regarding wages, hours, and working conditions in the homework industry in this state and is empowered to enter and inspect those places and records and investigate those matters as he or she deems appropriate to aid in the enforcement of this chapter. The director of labor and training shall inspect every home in which industrial homework is permitted and the materials issued to the industrial homeworker. If the inspection discloses that the home is not clean, the director of labor and training shall order the tenant to immediately clean it. If the inspection discloses that the home is in an unsanitary condition, or that there is an infectious or communicable disease, he or she shall immediately notify the state department of health and the local public health officials. The director of labor and training shall report to each local health officer the names and addresses of all industrial homeworkers in his or her city or town, and the local health officer shall notify the director of labor and training within twenty-four (24) hours of any cases of communicable or infectious disease in the industrial homeworkers’ homes. The director of labor and training shall order employers to suspend the distribution of homework to those homes until further notice.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-7 .

28-18-8. Removal of material processed in unauthorized homework.

The director of labor and training, or his or her authorized representative, may remove any material or article that is being processed in a home in violation of any provision of this chapter and may retain it until claimed by the employer. If the material or article is labeled as required by § 28-18-15 , the director of labor and training shall by registered or certified mail give notice of the removal to the person whose name and address is affixed to the article as provided by § 28-18-15 . Unless the article or material removed is claimed within thirty (30) days thereafter, it may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of; provided, that where the material or article is not so labeled the director may also destroy or otherwise dispose of the material or article after thirty (30) days if no claim is made for it within that period.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 4; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-8 .

28-18-9. Subpoena powers.

In the administration of this chapter the director or his or her authorized representative shall have the power to administer oaths; take affidavits and the depositions of witnesses; and issue subpoenas for and compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, payrolls, documents, records, testimony, and other evidence of whatever description.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-9 .

28-18-10. Reports of homework done — Employee’s certificate required.

No employer shall deliver, or cause to be delivered or received, any articles for, or as a result of, homework processing, unless he or she keeps in any form and forward to the director of labor and training at the intervals that the director may by regulation prescribe on any blanks that he or she may provide, a complete and accurate list of all:

  1. Persons engaged in industrial homework of materials furnished and distributed by that employer;
  2. Places where industrial homeworkers work;
  3. Materials furnished and distributed to industrial homeworkers;
  4. Goods that those industrial workers have processed; and
  5. Rates of wage paid to each of those industrial homeworkers.

    No employer shall deliver, or cause to be delivered or received, any articles for or as the result of, homework processing to any person who has not obtained a certificate from the director of labor and training permitting industrial homework to be done by him or her.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 4; P.L. 1945, ch. 1608, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-10 .

28-18-11. Child labor — Subcontracting — Time allowed for work.

No child under sixteen (16) years of age shall be gainfully employed or otherwise in industrial homework. No industrial homework shall be processed except by a person to whom a certificate has been issued, and no person shall redistribute homework on a subcontractual basis. The employer shall allow the industrial homeworker sufficient time to process the entire amount of homework distributed to him or her in order that the homework may be completed without assistance from other persons and in accordance with the laws of this state limiting the hours of work.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 4; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-11 .

28-18-12. Homeworker’s certificate required.

No person shall do industrial homework unless his or her name is on a homeworker’s certificate issued by the director of labor and training and permitting industrial homework to be done by him or her in the residence and at the address named in the certificate. The certificate shall be shown on demand of the director of labor and training or any of his or her duly authorized agents.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 4; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-12 .

28-18-13. Costs of delivery or return of work.

Any cost of obtaining or returning material for industrial homework or the completed product shall be borne by the employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 4; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-13 .

28-18-14. Compliance with law — Employer’s license — Contractors and distributors.

No person shall carry on industrial homework except in accordance with this chapter and in accordance with the provisions of any other state law or regulation. Every person desiring to employ homeworkers in this state must procure from the director of labor and training an employer’s license. The license shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of § 28-18-3 upon application made on a form prescribed by the director of labor and training, and upon payment of the fee required by § 28-18-5 . No employer shall give out any materials or articles for homework through any homework contractors or distributors except in the case of any charitable or community organizations that the director may approve.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 4; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-14 .

28-18-15. Labeling of homework articles.

No employer shall deliver, or cause to be delivered, any materials or articles to be manufactured by any homeworker unless there has been conspicuously affixed to each article or its container a label or other mark of identification bearing the employer’s name and address, printed or written legibly in English; provided, that if the goods are of a nature that they cannot be individually labeled or identified, then the employer shall conspicuously label the goods or their container in any manner that the director of labor and training may prescribe by rule or regulations.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 4; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-15 .

28-18-16. Penalty for violations.

Any person who violates any provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300) for each offense. Each day any violation occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense.

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any corporation organized for a purpose authorized by § 7-6-4 or to any individual or organization engaged in providing work of a philanthropic, educational, or therapeutic nature.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 5; P.L. 1948, ch. 2110, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-16 .

28-18-17. Nonprofit and charitable organizations exempt.

This chapter does not apply to any corporation organized for a purpose authorized by § 7-6-4 or to any individual or organization engaged in providing work of a philanthropic, educational, or therapeutic nature.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-17 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 380, § 5; P.L. 1984, ch. 444, § 1.

28-18-18. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2328, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 293, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-18-18 .

Chapter 19 Industrial Registration [Repealed.]

28-19-1 — 28-19-14. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This chapter (P.L. 1982, ch. 338, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 19), concerning industrial registration, was repealed by P.L. 2003, ch. 63, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 77, § 1, effective June 27, 2003, and by P.L. 2003, ch. 153, § 1, effective July 10, 2003.

A former chapter (P.L. 1946, ch. 1785, §§ 1-9; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-19-1 28-19-1 6; P.L. 1959, ch. 137, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 1964, ch. 125, § 1), consisting of §§ 28-19-1 — 28-19-16 and concerning industrial safety codes, was repealed by P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 1. For present provisions of law, see § 28-20-1 et seq.

Chapter 20 Division of Occupational Safety

28-20-1. Definitions.

When used in this chapter:

  1. “Amendment” means any modification or change in a code intended to be of universal or general application.
  2. “Code” means a standard body of rules for safety and health formulated, adopted, and issued by the commission under the provisions of this chapter.
  3. “Commission” means the code commission for occupational safety and health created by this chapter.
  4. “Director” means the director of labor and training or his or her duly authorized representative.
  5. “Employ” means the use of any services of an employee for compensation and includes to suffer or permit to work.
  6. “Employee” means an individual who is employed by an employer.
  7. “Employer” means a person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy having one or more persons in his, her, or its employ, a state agency, or an agency of a political subdivision of the state, or any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer.
  8. “Review board” means the occupational safety and health review board created by this chapter.
  9. “Standard” means a federal standard adopted by the United States Secretary of Labor for the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
  10. “Variance” means a limited modification or change in a code which is applicable only to the particular place of employment of the employer or person petitioning for the modification or change.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter (G.L. 1896, ch. 68, §§ 3, 4, 10, 11, 14; P.L. 1899, ch. 708, § 1; P.L. 1901, ch. 809, § 12; C.P.A. 1905, § 1101; P.L. 1905, ch. 1215, §§ 3, 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 78, §§ 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15; P.L. 1910, ch. 576, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1912, ch. 836, § 1; P.L. 1916, ch. 1379, § 1; P.L. 1918, ch. 1676, § 1; P.L. 1919, ch. 1750, § 1; P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, §§ 2, 15; P.L. 1920, ch. 1849, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1902, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2015, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2057, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 85, §§ 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, §§ 2, 15; P.L. 1925, ch. 627, § 1; P.L. 1925, ch. 638, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 785, § 1; P.L. 1928, ch. 1197, § 2; P.L. 1929, ch. 1310, § 1; P.L. 1929, ch. 1311, § 1; P.L. 1929, ch. 1331, § 3; P.L. 1930, ch. 1550, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1553, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, §§ 93, 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, §§ 1-5, 8-12, 15, 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 2, 15; P.L. 1943, ch. 1313, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-20-1 28-20-15 ; P.L. 1964, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 38), was repealed by P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Occupational safety and health, regulatory agencies:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-376.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “willful” violation for purposes of § 17(a) or (e) of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ( 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) or § 666(e)). 161 A.L.R. Fed. 561.

When has employer “repeatedly” violated Occupational Safety and Health Act within meaning of § 17(a) of Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)). 151 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Who is “employer” for purposes of Occupational Safety and Health Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.). 153 A.L.R. Fed. 303.

28-20-2. Division of occupational safety.

  1. The department of labor and training shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of all laws, codes, rules, and regulations pertaining to occupational safety and health as applied to every employer operating in this state, provided that inspection of health hazards shall be made pursuant to the provisions of chapter 1.1 of title 23.
  2. There shall be a division of occupational safety within the department of labor and training that shall have all the powers and duties prescribed by the provisions of this chapter and chapter 19[repealed] of this title and any other duties that may be conferred by law upon the division.
  3. Any reference to the division of industrial inspection in existing laws is amended to mean the division of occupational safety.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 338, §§ 2, 3.

28-20-2.1. Video display terminals — Informational brochure — Training programs.

The department of labor and training is directed to develop an informational brochure relating to the use of video display terminals in the work place. In addition to the brochure, the department shall develop a plan, in cooperation with business, industry, and labor, for the dissemination of the brochure to all concerned parties. The department shall also prepare a plan for a series of training programs and seminars directly relating to the information contained in the brochure.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 51, § 1.

28-20-3. Annual report.

The director shall issue an annual report to the governor and to the general assembly no later than January 10 in each year. He or she shall also submit reports to the United States Secretary of Labor in any form and from time to time that the secretary may require.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Cross References.

Director of health to furnish information concerning division of occupational health to director of labor for annual report, § 23-1.1-3 .

28-20-4. Chief of division — Administrator of occupational safety and health — Compliance inspectors.

  1. The director shall appoint the chief of the division of occupational safety. The appointee shall also serve for the purposes of coordinating and administering the provisions of this chapter and chapter 19[repealed] of this title and of chapter 1.1 of title 23 as the state occupational safety and health administrator. The appointee shall be in the classified service of the state and shall be responsible to and report to the director. Functioning as chief, the appointee shall serve as administrative head of all occupational safety programs in the state. Safety and health programs may include in-service training and other educational programs relating to occupational safety and health. Functioning as state occupational safety and health administrator, the appointee shall administer the code adoption process and perform other duties necessary to coordinate occupational safety and health activities in the state and the inspection provisions under chapter 19[repealed] of this title. He or she shall organize and present to the director by November 15 of each year a program of occupational safety and health inspections for the following fiscal year. The occupational safety and health administrator shall consult with the director of health on matters within his or her jurisdiction during the preparation of the program of inspections prior to submission to the director. The director of labor and training shall submit to the director of health by December 1 of each year the program of occupational safety and health inspections for the following year. The occupational safety and health administrator shall propose all penalties. The basis for each penalty determination shall be a report of noncompliance prepared by a safety or health compliance inspector. Each report of noncompliance shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation including a reference to the provision of the code, rule, regulation, or order alleged to have been violated, and a copy shall be submitted to the occupational safety and health administrator.
  2. The division may apply for and accept grants, or enter into contracts with any governmental agency, federal, state, or local, or any agency branches, or with any foundation, corporation, association, or individual, and may comply with its terms, conditions, and limitations, for any of the purposes of this chapter. Any money so received may be expended by the division, subject to the limitations imposed in the grants or contracts, to effect any of the purposes of the division upon properly authenticated vouchers.
  3. The director shall appoint safety compliance inspectors who shall be in the classified service of the state. Safety compliance inspectors shall perform all duties necessary to determine compliance with the safety provisions of this chapter and shall be referred to as compliance inspectors. The director shall appoint any other employees that are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed as terminating the services of any person now employed within the division of occupational safety who is presently qualified and within the classified service of the state. All such persons shall continue in the service of the division of occupational safety and their titles shall be changed to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3; P.L. 1982, ch. 338, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1983, ch. 199, § 1.

28-20-4.1. Adoption of regulations pertaining to HIV and hepatitis.

The division of occupational safety of the department of labor and training shall adopt the latest regulations of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as they pertain to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and hepatitis and shall, in consultation with the department of health, provide for the enforcement of the regulations for appropriate public sector employees.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 405, § 10.

28-20-5. Devotion to duties — Assignment of compliance inspectors — Other employment.

Compliance inspectors shall devote their entire scheduled work time and attention to the duties of their respective offices. The chief of the division of occupational safety shall assign compliance inspectors to the duties to be performed. No employee of the division of occupational safety shall accept other employment that is in conflict with his or her official duties.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-6. Appropriations.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sums that are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. The state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders on the general treasurer for the payment of the sums so appropriated or so much of it that may be required, upon receipt by him or her of proper vouchers approved by the chief of the division of occupational safety and by the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3.

28-20-7. Applicability and reports of places of business.

This chapter shall apply to every employer now or subsequently doing business in this state and all applicants for industrial registration as provided in chapter 19[repealed] of this title. Each employer or applicant shall furnish the director his, her, or its name; the character of his, her, or its business; the number of employees; the nature of the business; and the address at which it is conducted, and shall report any changes to the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 338, §§ 2, 3.

28-20-8. Employer’s duties.

  1. Each employer shall furnish to each of his or her employees a place of employment that is free from recognized safety and health hazards that are causing, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical harm to the employees.
  2. Each employer shall comply with occupational safety and health codes promulgated under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3.

Cross References.

Violations to be reported by director of health, § 23-1.1-11 .

Collateral References.

Who is “employer” for purposes of Occupational Safety and Health Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.). 153 A.L.R. Fed. 303.

28-20-9. Employee’s duties.

Every employee shall comply with occupational safety and health codes, rules, regulations, and orders issued under the provisions of this chapter that are applicable to his or her actions and conduct.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-10. Applicability to state and municipal employees.

It shall be the responsibility of the head of each state agency and of each agency in the political subdivisions of the state to establish and maintain an effective and comprehensive occupational safety and health program that is consistent with this chapter and with the codes, rules, and regulations promulgated pursuant to it. The head of each agency shall, after consultation with representatives of its employees:

  1. Provide safe and healthful places and conditions of employment consistent with the requirements of this chapter;
  2. Acquire, maintain, and require use of safety equipment, personal protective equipment, and devices necessary to protect employees; and
  3. Keep adequate records of all occupational injuries and illnesses for proper evaluation and necessary action in accordance with the advice of the director of labor and training and the director of health and submit an annual report to the director of labor and training with respect to those occupational accidents and illnesses.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-11. Recordkeeping requirements.

  1. Each employer shall make, keep, preserve, and furnish to the director any records regarding his or her activities relating to this chapter that the director, in cooperation with the United States Secretary of Labor and the United States Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, or their successors, may prescribe by regulation as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of this chapter or for developing information regarding the causes and prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses. In order to carry out the provisions of this subsection, the regulations may include provisions requiring employers to conduct periodic inspections. The director shall also issue regulations requiring that employers, through posting of notices or other appropriate means, keep their employees informed of their protections and obligations under this chapter, including the provisions of applicable codes.
  2. The director of labor and training, in cooperation with the director of health, shall prescribe regulations requiring employers to maintain accurate records of, and to make periodic reports on, work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses other than minor injuries requiring only first aid treatment and that do not involve medical treatment, loss of consciousness, restriction of work or motion, or transfer to another job.
  3. The director of labor and training, in cooperation with the director of health, shall issue regulations requiring employers to maintain accurate records of employee exposures to potentially toxic materials or harmful physical agents that are required to be monitored or measured under the provisions of this chapter and of § 23-1.1-7 . Those regulations shall provide employees or their representatives with an opportunity to observe the monitoring or measuring, and to have access to the records of the monitoring or measuring. Those regulations shall also make appropriate provision for each employee or former employee to have access to any records that will indicate his or her own exposure to toxic materials or harmful physical agents. Each employer shall promptly notify any employee who has been or is being exposed to toxic materials or harmful physical agents in concentrations or at levels that exceed those prescribed by an applicable safety or health code promulgated under this chapter, and shall inform any employee who is being exposed of the corrective action being taken.
  4. Any information obtained by the director or any other state agency under this chapter shall be obtained with a minimum burden upon employers, especially those operating small businesses. Unnecessary duplication of efforts in obtaining information shall be reduced to the maximum extent feasible.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-12. Inspection powers.

  1. The director, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, representative, or agent in charge, is authorized:
    1. To enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site or other area, workplace, or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
    2. To inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials in the place of employment, and to privately question any employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.
  2. If the director is denied entry to any place that he or she has reason to believe has been, is being, or is about to be used as a place of employment, he or she shall make application under oath setting forth the reasons for his or her belief that the place has been, is being, or is about to be used as a place of employment, and the facts concerning his or her denial, to any justice of the superior court. That court shall issue an order ex parte, if it finds that the belief is reasonable, allowing the director to make any entry that is reasonably necessary to conduct the inspection.
  3. In making inspections and investigations under this chapter, the director may require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence under oath. Witnesses shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid to witnesses in the courts of the state. In case of contumacy, failure, or refusal of any person to obey an order, the superior court shall have the jurisdiction to issue to the person an order requiring the person to appear to produce evidence if, as, and when so ordered, and to give testimony relating to the matter under investigation or in question, and any failure to obey that order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of court.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Cross References.

Division of occupational health, director of health denied entry, action by director of labor, § 23-1.1-7 .

28-20-13. Inspection of violations.

  1. Any employee or representative of employees who believes that a violation of a safety or health code exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the director of the violation or danger. Any notice shall be reduced to writing, set forth with reasonable particularity the grounds for the notice, and be signed by the employee or representative of employees. Upon receipt of the notification, the director shall provide a copy to the employer or his or her agent not later than at the time of inspection, except that, upon the request of the person giving the notice, his or her name and the name of the individual employee referred to in the notice shall not appear in copy or on any record published, released, or made available. If upon receipt of the notification the director determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that the violation or danger exists, he or she shall make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as soon as practicable to determine if the violation or danger exists. If the director determines that there are not reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or danger exists, he or she shall notify the employee or representative of the employees in writing of that determination.
  2. Prior to or during any inspection of a workplace, any employee or representative of employees employed in the workplace may notify the director, in writing, of any violation of this chapter that he or she has reason to believe exists in the workplace. The director shall by regulation establish procedures for informal review of any refusal by his or her representative to issue a compliance order as to any alleged violation and shall furnish the employee or representative of employees requesting the review a written statement of the reasons for the director’s final disposition of the case.
  3. A representative of the employer and a representative authorized by the employees shall be given the opportunity to accompany the compliance inspector during a physical inspection of the workplace for the purpose of aiding the inspection. Where there is no authorized employee representative, the compliance inspector shall consult with a reasonable number of employees concerning matters of health and safety in the workplace.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3.

28-20-14. Procedures to counteract imminent dangers.

  1. The superior court shall have jurisdiction, upon petition of the attorney general, to restrain any conditions or practices in any place of employment that are such that a danger exists which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence of the danger can be eliminated through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by this chapter. Any order issued under this section may require any steps to be taken that may be necessary to avoid, correct, or remove the imminent danger and prohibit the employment or presence of any individual in locations or under conditions where the imminent danger exists, except individuals whose presence is necessary to avoid, correct, or remove the imminent danger or to maintain the capacity of a continuous process operation to resume normal operations without a complete cessation of operations, or where a cessation of operations is necessary, to permit the cessation to be accomplished in a safe and orderly manner.
  2. Upon the filing of the petition, the superior court shall have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief or temporary restraining order pending the outcome of an enforcement proceeding pursuant to this chapter. The proceeding shall be as provided by Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65, except that no temporary restraining order issued without notice shall be effective for a period longer than five (5) days and no security as provided in paragraph (c) of Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65 shall be required of the state or its political subdivisions. No action brought under this section shall be construed as affecting a labor dispute as defined in § 28-10-3 , nor shall the action be subject to the provisions of § 28-10-2 or paragraph (e) of Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65.
  3. Whenever and as soon as a compliance inspector concludes that conditions or practices described in subsection (a) of this section exist in any place of employment, he or she shall inform the affected employees and employers of the danger and that he or she is recommending to the director that relief be sought.
  4. If the director arbitrarily or capriciously fails to seek relief under this section, any employee who may be injured by reason of that failure or the representatives of the employees may bring an action against the director in the superior court for the county in which the imminent danger is alleged to exist for a writ of mandamus to compel the director to seek the order and for any further relief that may be appropriate.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3.

Cross References.

Condition of imminent danger found by director of health, action by director of labor, § 23-1.1-9 .

28-20-15. Prosecution of violations.

It shall be the duty of the director to enforce the provisions of this chapter and upon request of the director the attorney general shall prosecute all violations of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Cross References.

Notification of violation by director of health, § 23-1.1-10 .

28-20-16. Compliance orders.

  1. If upon inspection or investigation the director believes that an employer has violated a requirement of § 28-20-8 , or of any code, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to § 28-20-24 , or of any regulation prescribed pursuant to this chapter or chapter 19[repealed] of this title, he or she shall promptly issue a compliance order to the employer. Each compliance order shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation, including a reference to the provision of the law, code, rule, regulation, or order alleged to have been violated. In addition, the compliance order shall fix a reasonable time for the abatement of the violations.
  2. Each compliance order issued under this section or a copy or copies of each order shall be prominently posted as prescribed in regulations issued by the director at or near each place a violation referred to in the compliance order has occurred.
  3. No compliance order may be issued under this section after the expiration of six (6) months following the occurrence of a violation.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3; P.L. 1982, ch. 338, §§ 2, 3.

Cross References.

Notification by director of health of violations, § 23-1.1-11 .

28-20-17. Enforcement procedure.

  1. After the issuance of a compliance order pursuant to § 28-20-16(a) , the director shall, within a reasonable time after the termination of the inspection or investigation, notify the employer by certified mail of the penalty, if any, proposed to be assessed under § 28-20-18 and that the employer has fifteen (15) working days within which to notify the director that he or she wishes to contest the compliance order or proposed assessment of penalty. If, within fifteen (15) working days from the receipt of the notice issued by the director the employer fails to notify the director that he, she, or it intends to contest the compliance order or proposed assessment of penalty, and no notice is filed within that time by any employee or representative of employees under subsection (c) of this section, the compliance order and the assessment, as proposed, shall be deemed a final order of the review board and not subject to review as to any question of fact by any court or agency.
  2. If the director has reason to believe that an employer has failed to correct a violation for which a compliance order has been issued within the period permitted for its correction, which period shall not begin to run until the entry of a final order by the review board in the case of any review proceedings under this section initiated by the employer in good faith and not solely for delay or avoidance of penalties, the director shall notify the employer by certified mail of the failure and of the penalty proposed to be assessed under § 28-20-18 by reason of the failure, and that the employer has fifteen (15) working days within which to notify the director that he, she, or it intends to contest the notification or proposed assessment of penalty. If, within fifteen (15) working days from the receipt of notification issued by the director, the employer fails to notify the director that he, she, or it intends to contest the notification or proposed assessment of penalty, the notification and assessment, as proposed, shall be deemed a final order of the review board and not subject to any review as to any question of fact by any court or agency.
  3. If an employer notifies the director that he, she, or it intends to contest a compliance order issued under § 28-20-16 or notification issued under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or if within fifteen (15) working days of the issuance of a compliance order under § 28-20-16 any employee or representative of employees files a notice with the director alleging that the period of time fixed in the compliance order for the abatement of the violation is unreasonable, the director shall immediately notify in writing the chairperson of the review board of the notification, and the review board shall afford an opportunity for a hearing. The review board shall subsequently issue an order based on findings of fact affirming, modifying, or vacating the director’s compliance order or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriate relief, and the order shall become final thirty (30) days after its issuance. Upon a showing by an employer of a good faith effort to comply with the abatement requirements of a compliance order, and that abatement has not been completed because of factors beyond the employer’s reasonable control, the review board, after an opportunity for a hearing, shall issue an order affirming or modifying the abatement requirements in the compliance order. The rules of procedure prescribed by the review board shall provide the affected employee or representatives of affected employees an opportunity to participate as parties to hearings under this subsection.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3.

28-20-18. Penalties.

  1. Any employer who or that willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of § 28-20-8 , any code, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to § 28-20-24 , or regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each violation.
  2. Any employer who or that has received a compliance order for a serious violation of the requirements of § 28-20-8 , any code, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to § 28-20-24 , or of any other regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, shall be assessed a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation.
  3. Any employer who or that has received a compliance order for a violation of the requirements of § 28-20-8 , any code, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to § 28-20-24 , or of other regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and the violation is specifically determined not to be of serious nature, may be assessed a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation.
  4. Any employer who or that fails to correct a violation for which a compliance order has been issued under § 28-20-16 within the period permitted for its correction, which period shall not begin to run until the date of the final order of the review board in the case of any review proceeding under § 28-20-17 initiated by the employer in good faith and not solely for delay or avoidance of penalties, may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each day during which the failure or violation continues.
  5. Any employer who or that willfully violates any code, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to § 28-20-24 , or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and that violation caused death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both; except that if the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of the employer, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) or by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, or by both.
  6. Any person who gives advance notice of any inspection to be conducted under this chapter without authority from the director shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
  7. Whoever knowingly makes any false statements, representation, or certification in any application, record, report, plan, or other document filed or required to be maintained pursuant to this chapter shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
  8. Any employer who or that violates any of the posting requirements, as prescribed under the provisions of this chapter, shall be assessed a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation.
    1. Any person who obstructs or otherwise interferes with the director of labor and training or the director of health or their representative while engaged in the performance of their duties shall be imprisoned for a period not exceeding one year or be fined a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).
    2. Subdivision (1) of this subsection shall in no way limit the authority of the state to impose any other penalty that may be deemed appropriate for other offenses by any person against any employee or other representative of the division of occupational safety while engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
  9. The review board shall have the authority to assess all civil penalties provided in this section, giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations.
  10. For purposes of this section, a serious violation exists in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition that exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes that have been adopted or are in use in the place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation.
  11. Civil penalties due under this chapter shall be paid to the director for deposit into the treasury of the state of Rhode Island and shall accrue to the state and may be recovered in a civil action in the name of the state brought in the superior court for the county where the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “repeated” or “willful” violation for purposes of state occupational safety and health acts. 17 A.L.R.6th 715.

28-20-19. Occupational safety and health review board.

  1. The occupational safety and health review board is established.
  2. The review board shall be composed of seven (7) members appointed by the governor:
    1. One of whom shall be a qualified member of the occupational safety profession;
    2. One shall be a qualified elevator representative;
    3. One shall be a qualified mechanical representative;
    4. One shall be a qualified electrical representative;
    5. One shall be a qualified operating engineer representative, nominated by the director of labor and training;
    6. One shall be a qualified representative of the occupational health profession, nominated by the director of health; and
    7. One shall be a representative of the public who acts as chairperson of the review board.
  3. The term of office of each member of the review board shall be six (6) years.
  4. The review board shall conduct hearings pursuant to chapter 35 of title 42 in all cases involving contests of the decisions of the director, and the commission for occupational safety and health made pursuant to this chapter and chapter 19[repealed] of this title.
  5. Five (5) members of the review board shall constitute a quorum, and official action can be taken only on the affirmative vote of at least five (5) members. In the event of a lack of a quorum, the director of labor and training shall have the authority to designate an employee of the department of labor and training to serve on the board for purposes of obtaining a quorum only. That employee shall have no voting privileges.
  6. The review board shall set its own rules established pursuant to the requirements of chapter 35 of title 42.
  7. Clerical and other assistance as may be required by the review board shall be furnished by the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 338, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 92, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 99, § 1.

28-20-20. Judicial review.

Any employer, employee, the director, or other individual who or that is aggrieved by any order of the review board may appeal the order pursuant to the provisions of chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3.

28-20-21. Discrimination on account of complaint.

  1. No employer shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding; or because of the exercise by that employee on behalf of himself or herself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.
  2. Any employee who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of this section may, within thirty (30) days after the violation occurs, file a written complaint with the director alleging the discrimination. Upon receipt of the complaint, the director shall cause any investigation to be made that he or she deems appropriate. If upon the investigation the director determines that the provisions of this section have been violated and the employer fails or refuses to take remedial action ordered by the director, he or she shall then bring an action in any superior court against that person. In any action the courts shall have jurisdiction for cause shown to restrain violations of subsection (a) of this section and order all appropriate relief including rehiring or reinstatement of the employee to his or her former position with back pay and any other benefits to which he or she was entitled.
  3. Within ninety (90) days of the receipt of a complaint filed under this subsection the director shall notify the complainant of his or her determination under subsection (b) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Collateral References.

Effectiveness of employer’s disclaimer of representations in personnel manual or employee handbook altering at-will employment relationship. 17 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability for retaliation against at-will employee for public complaints or efforts relating to health or safety. 75 A.L.R.4th 13.

Reductions to back pay awards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 135 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

What constitutes appropriate relief for retaliatory discharge under § 11(c) of Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) ( 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)). 134 A.L.R. Fed. 629.

28-20-22. Code commission for occupational safety and health — Composition, appointment, terms, and removal of members.

There is created within the department of labor and training a code commission for occupational safety and health, consisting of five (5) members, of whom two (2) shall represent industry, two (2) shall represent labor, and one shall represent the public and shall serve as chairperson of the commission. The representatives of industry shall be appointed by the director after he or she has consulted with representatives of industrial, commercial, and trade groups and associations in this state. The representatives of labor shall be appointed by the director after he or she has consulted with representatives of labor organizations in this state. The public representative shall be nominated jointly by the representatives of labor and industry. If the representatives of labor and industry have not nominated a public representative within thirty (30) days after their appointment, then the director shall instead both nominate and appoint the public representative on the commission. The appointment of the members of the commission shall be made by the director with the approval of the governor for a term of five (5) years. For their initial appointment, the representatives of industry shall be appointed for terms of one year and three (3) years, respectively; the representatives of labor shall be appointed for terms of two (2) years and four (4) years, respectively; and the public representative shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years. Vacancies shall be filled by appointments made in the same manner as the original appointments. A member of the commission may only be removed by the governor for cause. The director of labor and training and the director of health shall be ex-officio members of the commission, but shall have no vote and shall serve without additional compensation. Each ex-officio member may designate a subordinate from within his or her department as a substitute member of the commission by filing a written notice of that substitution in the office of the secretary of state. The industrial code commission for safety and health is abolished.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-23. Compensation of commission members — Assistance — Appropriations.

Members of the commission shall receive no salary, but shall receive compensation not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each day spent in the discharge of their official duties, with a maximum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1500) annually. An official meeting of the commission shall be held by request of the director. The director is authorized and directed to provide the commission with the clerical, legal, and other assistance that shall be necessary to permit the commission to perform its duties as provided in this chapter. The reasonable and necessary traveling and other expenses of the members of the commission while actually engaged in the performance of their duties shall be paid from the state treasury and upon receipt of proper vouchers approved by the director and the chairperson of the commission. The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sum that it deems necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-24. Power to adopt codes — Advisory committees — Conformance with national standards.

  1. In addition to any other powers and duties that may be conferred upon it by law, the commission shall have the power and duty to make, amend, and repeal codes for the elimination of safety or health hazards in every employment or place of employment, including the repair and maintenance of places of employment to render them safe. The director of labor and training and the director of health shall each have the right to propose to the commission those codes or amendments to existing codes that they may deem necessary to carry out the intent of this chapter. The commission shall continue to develop, adopt, and amend codes as new or previously unrecognized occupational safety and health hazards are discovered.
  2. In the performance of its duties the commission shall appoint advisory committees, composed of representatives of employers, labor organizations, and experts.
  3. All codes shall, when adopted, be consistent with accepted safety and health standards of nationally recognized standards-producing organizations, which shall be at least as effective as federal standards, which, in themselves, shall be adopted. All codes, when appropriate, shall contain specific provisions for the protection of employees from exposure to hazards by such means as the requirement for use of suitable protective equipment and for control or technological procedures with respect to the hazards, including monitoring or measuring the exposure. No code may apply standards for products distributed or used in interstate commerce that are different from federal standards for those products unless required by compelling local conditions and do not unduly burden interstate commerce.
  4. Any amendments made to any codes by the commission shall be such that, when adopted, the amended codes shall be consistent with existing accepted safety and health standards and at least as effective as federal standards. All new federal standards and revisions or amendments to federal standards shall be adopted as state codes within six (6) months after their publication in the federal register.
  5. The codes adopted under this chapter shall have the force and effect of law, and the commission shall conduct hearings and establish rules and regulations pursuant to provisions of chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 338, § 2.

28-20-25. Hearing on codes.

No code may be adopted, amended, or repealed except pursuant to the provisions contained in chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-26. Effective date of codes and changes.

All codes and all amendments to them and repeals of them shall take effect twenty (20) days after certified copies are filed in the office of the secretary of state.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-27. Publication of codes and changes — Posting of lists — Notice to employees.

  1. Every code adopted and every amendment or repeal of these codes shall be compiled as prescribed in § 42-35-5 and published in the manner and quantity required for reference and enforcement. A printed list of the titles of all codes including their amendments issued and adopted by the commission under the provisions of this chapter, together with the dates of their adoption, shall be posted by the employer in every place of employment.
  2. Where appropriate, codes shall contain provisions for the furnishing to employees of information regarding hazards in the workplace, including information about suitable precautions, relevant symptoms, and emergency treatment in case of exposure, by such means as labeling, posting, and, where appropriate, medical examination at no cost to employees, with the results of the examinations being furnished only to appropriate state officials and, if the employee so requests, to his or her physician.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-28. Temporary codes.

  1. The director of labor and training in cooperation with the director of health shall promulgate, without regard to the requirements of §§ 28-20-24 28-20-26 , an emergency temporary code to take immediate effect upon publication and filing with the secretary of state if he or she determines that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and that the emergency code is required to protect employees from the danger.
  2. A temporary code shall be effective until superseded by a code promulgated in accordance with the procedure prescribed in §§ 28-20-24 28-20-26 , or for a maximum period of one hundred and twenty (120) days.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 3.

28-20-29. Granting of variances — Statement of reasons for various actions by director.

    1. Any employer may apply to the director for a temporary order granting a variance from a code or any provision of a code promulgated under this chapter.
    2. The temporary order shall be granted only if the employer files an application that meets the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and establishes that:
      1. The employer is unable to comply with a code by its effective date because of the unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of materials and equipment needed to come into compliance with the code, or because necessary construction or alteration of facilities cannot be completed by the effective date;
      2. The employer is taking all available steps to safeguard employees against the hazards covered by the code; and
      3. The employer has an effective program for coming into compliance with the code as quickly as practicable.
    3. Any temporary order issued under this subsection shall prescribe the practices, means, methods, operations, and processes the employer must adopt and use while the order is in effect and state in detail his or her program for coming into compliance with the code.
    4. A temporary order may be granted only after notice to employees and an opportunity for a hearing; provided, that the director may issue one interim order to be effective until a decision is made on the basis of the hearing.
    5. No temporary order may be in effect for longer than the period needed by the employer to achieve compliance with the code or one year, whichever is shorter, except that a temporary order may not be renewed more than twice:
      1. So long as the requirements of this subsection are met; and
      2. If an application for renewal is filed at least ninety (90) days prior to the expiration date of the order.
    6. No interim renewal of an order may remain in effect for longer than one hundred and eighty (180) days.
  1. An application for a temporary order under this section shall contain:
    1. A specification of the code or portion of it from which the employer seeks a variance;
    2. A representation by the employer, supported by representations from qualified persons having first-hand knowledge of the facts represented, that the employer is unable to comply with the code or portion of it and a detailed statement of the reasons for the noncompliance;
    3. A statement of the steps the employer has taken and will take, with specific dates, to protect employees against the hazards covered by the code;
    4. A statement of when the employer expects to be able to comply with the code and what steps the employer has taken and what steps the employer will take, with specific dates, to come into compliance with the code; and
    5. A certification that the employer has informed employees of the application by giving a copy of it to their authorized representatives, and by posting a statement giving a summary of the application and specifying where a copy may be examined at the place or places where notices to employees are normally posted, and by other appropriate means. A description of how employees have been informed shall be contained in the certification. The information to employees shall also inform them of their rights to petition the director for a hearing.
  2. The director is authorized to grant a variance from any code or portion of it whenever he or she determines, or the director of health certifies, that the variance is necessary to permit an employer to participate in an experiment approved by him or her or the director of health designed to demonstrate or validate new and improved techniques to safeguard the health or safety of workers.
  3. Any affected employer may apply to the director for a rule or order for a permanent variance from a code promulgated under § 28-20-24 . Affected employees shall be given notice of each application and an opportunity to participate in a hearing. The director shall issue a rule or order if he or she determines on the record, after opportunity for an inspection where appropriate, and a hearing that the proponent of the permanent variance has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions, practices, means, methods, operations, or processes used or proposed to be used by an employer will provide employment and places of employment to the employees that are as safe and healthful as those which would prevail if the employer complied with the code. The rule or order issued shall prescribe the conditions the employer must maintain, and the practices, means, methods, operations, and processes, that the employer must adopt and utilize to the extent they differ from the code in question. The rule or order may be modified or revoked for cause upon application by an employer, employees, or by the director on his or her own motion, in the manner prescribed for its issuance under this subsection at any time after six (6) months from its issuance.
  4. Whenever the director promulgates any code, makes any rule, order, or decision; grants any exemption or extension of time; or compromises, mitigates, or settles any penalty assessed under this chapter or title 23, he or she shall include a statement of the reasons for the action, and a copy of the code, rule, order, or decision shall be filed with the secretary of state pursuant to § 42-35-4 on the day in which it is promulgated.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 2.

28-20-30. Judicial review of code provisions.

Any employer, employee, or other individual who may be adversely affected by any code adopted under this chapter, or any amendment of it, may, within thirty (30) days after its promulgation, commence an action in the superior court against the director to set aside the code or portion of the code on the grounds that it is unlawful or unreasonable, in accordance with the provisions of § 42-35-15 . Any person adversely affected by any code or decision adopted pursuant to chapter 19[repealed] of this title shall first appeal the decision to the occupational safety review board as provided in § 28-19-10[repealed].

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 338, § 2.

28-20-31. Notice of judicial review — Rules of practice.

In any proceedings under § 28-20-30 , the court shall order notice to be given to the commission and to the director in any manner that it shall determine. Any proceeding under § 28-20-30 and the pleadings therein shall be governed by the laws and rules of practice applicable to other civil actions in the superior courts.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-32. Confidentiality of trade secrets.

All information reported to or otherwise obtained by the director in connection with any inspection or proceeding under this chapter that contains or that might reveal a trade secret referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 1905 shall be considered confidential for the purpose of that section, except that the information may be disclosed to other officers or employees concerned with carrying out the provisions of this chapter, or when relevant in any proceeding under this chapter. In any proceeding the director, the review board, or the court shall issue orders as may be appropriate to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Cross References.

Responsibility of director of health concerning trade secrets, § 23-1.1-15 .

28-20-33. Other safety and health laws unimpaired.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to repeal or to limit or restrict in any way present state laws, regulations, or orders governing the safety or health of employees in any place of employment that are not in conflict with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

Cross References.

Laws and regulations governing the health of employees, § 23-1.1-1 et seq.

28-20-34. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of the provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter or the application of the provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid shall not be affected by the invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 260, § 2.

28-20-35. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This section ( P.L. 2000, ch. 515, § 1), relating to the safety awareness program requirement for employees, was repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 593, § 1, effective July 30, 2004.

Chapter 21 Hazardous Substances Right-To-Know Act

28-21-1. Duty of employer.

An employer who uses, transports, stores, or otherwise exposes its employees to toxic or hazardous substances shall obtain, maintain, and make available in each workplace a list of all hazardous substances to which employees are or may be exposed. The lists of all hazardous substances shall be readily available to employees for examination during all hours of operation. In addition, a poster shall be placed at conspicuous locations at each workplace and be readily available to employees for examination during all hours of operation. The poster shall contain the rights of employees under this chapter and in addition shall contain the following language: “For Further Information Concerning Your Rights under the Hazardous Substances Right-To-Know Act contact the department of labor and training at (telephone no.).” The director of labor and training shall design, print, and distribute to all employers subject to this chapter, a poster that complies with the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 498, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter (G.L. 1896, ch. 68, §§ 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13; P.L. 1904, ch. 1142, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1905, ch. 1215, §§ 2, 5; P.L. 1907, ch. 1429, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1907, ch. 1458, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 78, §§ 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 78, § 8; P.L. 1917, ch. 1522, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 78, § 8; P.L. 1918, ch. 1632, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 117, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1911, ch. 701, § 1; P.L. 1916, ch. 1351, § 1; P.L. 1917, ch. 1522, § 1; P.L. 1918, ch. 1616, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1918, ch. 1632, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1907, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 85, §§ 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 34; G.L. 1923, ch. 89, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1926, ch. 761, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1931, ch. 1741, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, §§ 3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17-19; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, §§ 4, 6, 7, 12-14, 16-18; P.L. 1943, ch. 1313, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 287, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1943, ch. 1313, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-21-1 28-21-1 3), concerning general sanitary and safety requirements, was repealed by P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 1.

28-21-2. Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter, the terms defined in this section have the following meanings. Where terms are not defined, the ordinarily accepted meanings within the proper context apply:

  1. “Chemical name” means the scientific designation of a substance in accordance with the nomenclature system developed by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry or the Chemical Abstract Service Rules of Nomenclature.
  2. “Common name” means any designation or identification, such as trade name or number or code name or brand name, used by the employer to identify a substance other than by its chemical name.
  3. “Designated substance” means any substance contained within the list of toxic or hazardous substances covered by this chapter provided they are in quantities exceeding two gallons (2 gals.) or 10 pounds (10 lbs.) of the substance within the workplace, except in the case of carcinogens, mutagen, or teratogen which shall be reported if the concentration is equal to or greater than one part of the substance per ten thousand (10,000) by volume, and provided further that nothing contained in this definition precludes the director of labor and training from establishing more stringent standards pursuant to rules and regulations in conformity with the administrative procedures act, chapter 35 of title 42.
  4. “Employee” means a person who is:
    1. A current employee;
    2. A former employee whose physician has reason to believe that an illness or injury may be related to former employment;
    3. An employee assigned or transferred to work where there will be exposure to designated substances; or
    4. Any worker who may be exposed under normal conditions of use or foreseeable emergency to designated substances; and
    5. Includes employees of the state or one of its political subdivisions.
  5. “Employee representative” means any attorney, physician, or employee organization that represents an employee or employees in a company.
  6. “Employer” includes an individual, partners, associations, corporations, business trusts, or any persons or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
  7. “Expose” or “exposure” means any situation arising from work operation where an employee may ingest, inhale, absorb through the skin or eyes, or otherwise come into contact with a designated substance. The contact shall not be deemed to constitute exposure if the designated substance present is in a physical state, volume, or concentration for which there is no valid and substantial evidence that any adverse acute or chronic risk to human health may occur from the contact.
  8. “Hazardous substance” is any chemical substance listed in the latest edition of the chemical data section of the “Fire Protection Guide on Hazardous Materials” as published by the National Fire Protection Association.
  9. “Immediate use” means the hazardous substance will be under the control of and used only by the person who transfers it from a labeled container and only within the work shift in which it is transferred.
  10. “Mixture” means any solution or intimate admixture of two (2) or more substances that do not react chemically with each other.
  11. “Substance” means any element, entity, compound, combination, or any mixture thereof whether organic or inorganic.
  12. “To store” means to deposit or place a substance in a locale for a period of forty-eight (48) hours or more.
  13. “Toxic substance” is any chemical substance listed in the latest edition of “Threshold Limit Value for Chemical Substance in the Work Environment” as published by the American Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists and the list of carcinogens as published by the International Agency for Research on Cancer.
  14. “Work area” means any room or defined space, whether within or outside of a building or other structure, where toxic or hazardous substances are present.
  15. “Workplace” means an establishment or business at one geographic location containing one or more work areas.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 250, § 1.

28-21-3. Employer notice requirements — Chemical identification lists.

    1. Each employer shall obtain and maintain chemical identification lists containing the following information with regard to the chemical substances:
      1. The common and trade names of all designated substances present in the workplace in alphabetical order, cross referenced to their chemical names;
      2. For mixtures, the list shall contain the chemical and/or trade names of any mixture that contains designated substances present in amounts greater than one percent (1%) of a volume of more than two gallons (2 gals.) or 10 pounds (10 lbs.) within the workplace except in the case of carcinogens, mutagen, or teratogen that shall be reported if they are present in amounts of one part per ten thousand (10,000) by volume or greater; and, provided, that nothing contained in this subdivision precludes the director of labor and training from establishing more stringent standards pursuant to rules and regulations in conformity with the administrative procedures act, chapter 35 of title 42.
    2. The chemical identification list shall include the individual designated substances present in the mixture except as provided in § 28-21-10 .
  1. Each employer shall obtain a material safety data sheet for each designated substance or mixture containing the designated substance that must conform to the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations on preparing material safety data sheets, 29 CF.R. 1910.1200(g).
  2. Upon being advised by an employer that the employer has made efforts to obtain material safety data sheets or other information necessary to determine whether a substance which is in the employer’s workplace is, may be, or may contain a designated substance, which efforts are documented and include, but are not limited to, a certified letter to the manufacturer, supplier, and/or distributor of the substance, and which efforts have resulted in failure to obtain the necessary information, the employer shall advise the department of labor and training of the failure within forty-five (45) days of the date the information was originally requested by the employer. The department of labor and training shall make demand of the manufacturer for the requested information, and shall notify the manufacturer that the manufacturer will be prohibited from selling or distributing the substance to any employer in Rhode Island unless the manufacturer supplies the information within ninety (90) days from the date the employer first requested the information. In the case of a mixture, the department of labor and training shall grant a variance to the employer that shall extend the above time period to one hundred eighty (180) days. The department of labor and training will make every effort to assist the employer in obtaining the necessary information. Until the necessary information is forthcoming from the manufacturer or otherwise obtained, the employer shall treat the mixture for which it has not received or developed the necessary information as a designated substance, until proven otherwise, and will protect employees accordingly, which protection shall include the listing of the mixture as a designated substance.
  3. Each employer covered by this chapter shall annually submit to the department of labor and training:
    1. An updated chemical identification list;
    2. Documentation detailing the nature of training provided employees as called for in § 28-21-9 . The documentation shall be in a standardized form determined by the department.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 542, § 95.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 28-21-3 (P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 269, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 483, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 250, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 308, § 1), concerning the same subject matter, was repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 542, § 94, effective July 10, 1989.

28-21-4. Updating of information by employer.

The chemical and common names of all designated substances introduced into the workplace subsequent to the original listing shall be appended to the chemical identification lists prior to introduction of the substance into the workplace. The original listing and appendages shall be annually revised and alphabetized.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1.

28-21-5. Fire safety.

  1. An employer shall provide to the person responsible for the administration and direction of a fire department in a fire district or municipality, including a fire chief or fire administrator, or that person’s designee:
    1. A list of work areas, sufficiently identified by name and location, where designated substances are present, containing the chemical and common name of each substance regularly present; and
    2. Upon request, material safety data sheets for each hazardous or toxic substance included in this list.
  2. The person responsible for the administration and direction of a fire department in a fire district or municipality, including a fire chief or fire administrator or that person’s designee, shall maintain the information provided by the employer under subsection (a) of this section and shall provide copies of this information:
    1. To fire suppression and fire inspection divisions within the same jurisdiction; and
    2. Upon request, to any fire department employee or an employee representative of a fire department employee.
  3. Currently conducted fire safety inspections may include, at the discretion of the fire chief or the inspector, compliance with the employer notice requirements of this chapter as enumerated in § 28-21-3(a) .

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 269, § 1.

28-21-6. Access to written records — Availability.

Chemical identification lists required by this chapter as defined in § 28-21-1 and/or material safety data sheets shall be made available upon request for examination and copying to any affected employee or employee representative of employee(s) within three (3) working days of the request, not including weekends or holidays. Upon being informed of the failure of an employer to provide the information as required, the director of the department of labor and training shall within seven (7) days make demand upon the employer for the information, and the employer shall subsequently provide the requesting employee or employee representative and the director of the department of labor and training with the information or copies of it within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt of the demand, not including weekends or holidays. Each annual chemical identification list shall be kept by the employer for a period of thirty (30) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1.

28-21-7. Falsification of information.

If any employer or any of its officers or employees fails to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter by knowingly and intentionally misrepresenting, falsifying, concealing, destroying, or failing to retain the information necessary to comply with the provisions of this chapter, they shall be personally liable to any employee injured as a result of the noncompliance, whether or not the employer is a corporation to the extent that the liability may be imposed under the laws of the state of Rhode Island. The dissolution of a corporation shall not discharge an officer’s or employee’s liability for the conduct.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1.

28-21-8. Employee rights.

The following rights are guaranteed to employees:

  1. Refusing to work.  If an employee has requested from his or her employer information about a designated substance or mixture, either in the form of material safety data sheets or the chemical identification list as defined in § 28-21-1 , and has not received this information from the employer within three (3) working days of the date of the request, not including weekends or holidays, the employee may then refuse to work with or be exposed to the designated substance or mixture. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision, if the employer has invoked and complied with the procedures set forth in § 28-21-3(c) , the time period of three (3) working days, not including weekends or holidays, shall be extended to equal any time period provided to the manufacturer or employer under § 28-21-3(c) , or until the information has been received by the employer, whichever is sooner.
  2. Discipline, discrimination prohibited.  An employer may not discharge or otherwise discipline or discriminate against any employee because the employee has exercised his or her right under § 28-21-6 and/or this section, or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding related to this chapter.
  3. Waivers prohibited.  An employer may not request or require any employee to waive any rights under this chapter.
  4. Remedies and complaint procedure for employees.
    1. Any employee who has been discharged, disciplined, or otherwise discriminated against by any employer in violation of this chapter may, within one hundred eighty (180) days after the violation occurs or ninety (90) days after the employee first obtains knowledge that a violation has occurred, commence an action in any appropriate court of law alleging wrongful dismissal in violation of this chapter.
    2. In addition to but not in lieu of the action in paragraph (i) of this subdivision, any employee may commence any action in any appropriate court of law to enforce any obligation, duty, or responsibility imposed upon him or her or the employer under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1.

28-21-9. Training and education program.

  1. Each employer shall provide an employee training and education program prior to an employee’s initial assignment designed to inform employee(s) about the designated substances to which they are exposed. This training shall be repeated annually.
  2. The employer shall provide additional instruction whenever the employee may be routinely exposed to additional designated substances or that requires special precautions or whenever the employee’s potential for exposure is increased. Training shall include, but not be limited to: the nature of the hazards, appropriate work practices, protective measures, and emergency procedures. Training shall be based upon information contained on the material safety data sheets, and any additional information that the employer may have access to.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an employer shall not be required to provide training and education as provided in subsection (a) of this section to the employees of any subcontractor of the employer. Before any employees of any subcontractor commence work on the premises of, or at the direction of, an employer, the employer shall provide to the subcontractor those chemical identification lists and material safety data sheets to which the subcontractor’s employees may be exposed. In addition, the employer shall provide to the subcontractor the lists and data sheets for any new designated substance that is introduced by the employer to which employees of the subcontractor may be exposed prior to the exposure. It shall be the responsibility of the subcontractor to train its employees with regard to these substances, and otherwise comply with its obligations under this chapter, as with any other designated substance to which its employees may be exposed.
    2. In addition, before any subcontractor commences work on the premises of, or in contact with employees of, any other employer, the subcontractor shall supply to the employer chemical information lists and material safety data sheets called for by this chapter for any designated substances that the subcontractor uses on the employer’s premises or in contact with employees of the employer. The subcontractor shall subsequently provide the lists and data sheets for any new designated substance that is introduced by the subcontractor to which employees of the employer may be exposed prior to the exposure. The employer shall then train its employees with regard to these substances, and otherwise comply with its obligations under this chapter, as with any other designated substance to which its employees may be exposed.
  3. Employers shall have, in writing, an outline of the Right-to-Know training program, including how the employer will inform workers of chemical hazards, nature of protective measures adopted for workers’ protection, nature of the Rhode Island Right-to-Know law, and how labeling, lists, and the MSDS material safety data sheet program works. The employer, upon request, shall make copies of the Right-to-Know program available to employees, employee representatives, treating physicians, the local fire department, and the department of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 308, § 1.

28-21-10. Trade secrets.

  1. A manufacturer or employer may withhold the precise chemical name of a chemical if:
    1. The manufacturer or employer can substantiate to the department of labor and training that it is a trade secret;
    2. The chemical is not a carcinogen, mutagen, or teratogen as published in OSHA regulations;
    3. The chemical is identified by a generic chemical classification that would provide useful information to a health professional;
    4. All other information on the properties and effects of the chemical required by this chapter is contained in the material safety data sheet;
    5. The material safety data sheet indicates which category of information is being withheld on trade secret grounds; and
    6. In any event, the withheld information is provided on a confidential basis to a treating physician who states in writing, except in an emergency situation, that a patient’s health problems may be the result of occupational exposure. A statement to this effect with the name of the manufacturer and an emergency telephone number shall be included in the material safety data sheet.
  2. “Trade secrets,” for the purpose of this section, means any formula, plan, pattern, process, production data, information, or compilation of information that is not patented, that is known only to an employer and certain other individuals, and that is used in the fabrication and production of an article of trade or service, and that gives the employer possessing it a business advantage over competitors who do not possess it.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 269, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 483, § 1.

28-21-11. Exclusions.

  1. This chapter does not apply to any designated substance that is a food, drug, cosmetic, or tobacco product if the substance is intended for personal consumption by employees while in the workplace. Additionally, the chapter does not apply to any consumer product and/or food stuff in its finished state packaged for distribution to and intended or retail sale to and use or consumption by the general public.
    1. This chapter does not apply to hazardous or toxic substances being developed or used only in laboratories; “laboratories” include all laboratories except those laboratories that provide quality control or other support to a manufacturing process or laboratories that produce products for commercial purposes; provided, that:
      1. The employer ensures that labels on incoming containers of hazardous or toxic chemicals are not removed or defaced;
      2. The employer maintains any material safety data sheets or other pertinent data for incoming shipments of hazardous or toxic chemicals and ensures that they are readily accessible to laboratory employees; and
      3. The employer shall ensure that laboratory employees are apprised of the hazards of the chemicals in their work place in accordance with subdivision (2) of this subsection.
    2. Laboratory employees information and training.  (i) Employers shall provide all employees including support personnel and students with information and training on hazardous and toxic substances in their work area at the time of their initial assignment and whenever a new hazard is introduced into their work area.

      (ii) New chemicals being developed in research activities are exempt from the requirements of this subdivision.

      (iii) Employees shall be informed of:

      1. The requirements of this section.
      2. Any operations in their work area where hazardous and toxic chemicals are present.
      3. The location and availability of material safety data sheets and other written sources of chemical hazard information.

        (iv) Employee training shall include at least:

        (A) Methods and observations that may be used to detect the presence or release of a hazardous or toxic substance in the work area, such as monitoring conducted by the employer, continuous monitoring devices, visual appearance or odor of hazardous or toxic chemicals when being released, etc.;

        (B) The physical and health hazards of the substances in the work area;

        (C) The measures employees can take to protect themselves from these hazards, including specific procedures the employer has implemented to protect employees from exposure to hazardous or toxic substances, such as appropriate work practices, emergency procedures, and personal protective equipment to be used.

    3. Employers shall provide to the person responsible for the administration and direction of a fire department in a fire district or municipality, including a fire chief or fire administrator or that person’s designee:
      1. A list of storage areas, sufficiently identified by name and location, where hazardous and toxic substances in unit quantities greater than two gallons (2 gals.) or 10 pounds (10 lbs.) are stored, including a full description of the types of hazards present on a generic basis rather than for each individual material.
      2. The person responsible for the administration and direction of a fire department in a fire district or municipality, including a fire chief or fire administrator or that person’s designee, shall maintain the information provided by the employer under paragraph (i) of this subdivision and shall provide copies of this information:
        1. To fire suppression and fire inspection divisions within the same jurisdiction;
        2. Upon request, to any fire department employee or an employee representative of a fire department employee; and
        3. In the event of an emergency, a full list of substances present and involved in the incident shall be made available to fire personnel within forty-eight (48) hours subsequent to the emergency.
    1. This chapter does not apply to any designated substances being transported by truck where the substances are regulated by the United States Department of Transportation under rules and regulations on hazardous and dangerous substances as contained in 49 C.F.R. Compliance with the regulations shall be deemed to satisfy the listing, training, and labeling requirements of this chapter for those employees engaged in the actual transporting of the substance.
    2. For the purposes of this subsection, “transport” means only the actual hauling of manifested products in marked containers.
  2. This chapter does not apply to exposure to any materials removed in actual trash collection. This exclusion shall not apply to substances used in the processing of these waste products.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1.

28-21-12. Physician treating employee — Accessibility to designated substances list.

Any physician who is treating an employee and who believes that the employee has a health problem that may be the result of occupational exposure to a designated substance or substances shall have all rights of access to information afforded to any employee under this chapter, except that the information shall be provided to the physician upon his or her request and without regard to any time periods otherwise specified in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1.

28-21-13. Enforcement of chapter.

  1. The responsibility for enforcement of the provisions of this chapter shall be that of the department of labor and training. In addition to its other obligations, the department shall establish and maintain the list of designated substances, and the list shall be reviewed at intervals of six (6) months. The department will also maintain and make available upon request to the public any available MSDS material safety data sheet. The provisions of chapter 35 of title 42, the administrative procedures act, shall be applicable in determining additions or deletions to the list. The department shall assign chemical abstract series (CAS) numbers to the designated substances to facilitate comparisons with employers’ lists and lists from other states. The department shall also keep a central file of annually updated chemical identification lists per employer. The central file must be cross-referenced by designated substance to facilitate the identification of all firms using a particular designated substance. Access to the central file shall be in accordance with chapter 24.4 of title 23. The list of designated substances shall be available for public inspection during business hours at the office of the director of the department of labor and training. The department shall have all rights of entry and inspection as set out in § 28-20-12 , and shall annually conduct and without notice to the employer, at least two hundred (200) inspections of employing units covered by this chapter to determine compliance.
  2. Upon the finding of a violation arising from an inspection, the employer shall inform the employees and immediately undertake measures for the safety of the employees. The employer shall have ninety (90) days from the date of the finding of a violation to comply with the remaining provisions of this chapter.
  3. The department shall obtain any and all information required by § 28-21-5 from the person responsible for the administration, and direction of a fire department in a fire district or municipality, including a fire chief or fire administrator or that person’s designee, in the event that an employer ceases to do business in the state. The department will keep the information for thirty (30) years and will make the information available, upon request, to employees as defined in § 28-21-2 .
  4. In addition to and not in lieu of the legal remedies available to the employee under § 28-21-8(4) , the department may order an employer to reinstate an employee who was dismissed or disciplined for exercising the right to refuse work as defined in § 28-21-8(1) . In addition, the department may order an employer to reimburse an employee for any monetary losses, plus interest, resulting from the employee’s dismissal or discipline. Upon notification from the department, an employer shall have five (5) business days to show cause why the employer should not comply with the department’s order.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 269, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 483, § 1.

28-21-14. Duties of the department of labor and training.

The director of labor and training is authorized to provide assistance to employers, employee organizations, and employees in the development and conduct of training programs for employees and local public safety personnel, and may provide assistance and consultation to the employer where possible in the completion of material safety data sheets for designated substances and/or mixtures.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 483, § 1.

28-21-15. Common law and other statutory rights of liability preserved.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way be construed to be a substitution for any right of action belonging to any person who may suffer injuries because of any hazardous substance.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1.

28-21-16. Funding — Contracts for services — Exemption for copiers — Appeals.

  1. The director of labor and training shall determine which employers are subject to the provisions of this chapter. No employer shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter unless and until a request for exemption is filed and approval is granted; provided that public and private libraries shall be exempt from this requirement.
  2. The director of labor and training may contract with qualified agencies and/or parties for technical services performed in conjunction with this chapter.
  3. The director of labor and training shall exempt from this chapter all employers whose contact with the designated substances is entirely limited to copier machine powders or liquids where the exposure is incidental to the business operation.
  4. Any employer who contests the determination of the director may appeal the determination under the provisions set forth in §§ 28-20-19 and 28-20-20 .

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 483, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 497, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 91; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 7; P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 9, § 7.

28-21-17. Penalties.

In addition to and not in lieu of the remedies available to employees under § 28-21-8(4) , any employer who shall willfully and intentionally violate the requirements of this chapter shall be subject to a fine imposed by the department of labor and training at the rate of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for every day the violation exists. The department may impose the fines and enforce their collection by means of a civil action against the employer and the responsible officers of the employer. In addition, for any violation of this chapter that is willful and intentional and that is committed with disregard for the safety of employees, the responsible officer or officers of any offending employer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned for a period not to exceed one year for each violation.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1.

28-21-18. Labeling.

  1. The employer shall ensure that each container of designated substances in the workplace as listed in § 28-21-3 is labeled, tagged, or marked with the following information:
    1. Identity of the designated substance; and
    2. Hazard warnings.
  2. When stationary containers in a work area have similar contents and hazards, the employer may post signs or placards to convey the required information rather than affixing labels to each individual container.
    1. The employer shall ensure that each container of designated substance present or leaving the workplace is labeled, tagged, or marked with the following information:
      1. Identity of the designated substance;
      2. Hazard warnings; and
      3. Name and address of the manufacturer or other responsible party who can provide additional information on the designated substance and appropriate emergency procedures, if necessary.
    2. There shall be no conflict with the requirements of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., and regulations issued under that act by the department of transportation.
  3. The employer need not affix new labels to comply with this section if existing labels already convey the necessary information.
  4. The employer is not required to label portable containers into which designated substances are transferred from labeled containers and that are intended only for the immediate use of the employee who performs the transfer.
  5. The employer shall not remove or deface existing labels on incoming containers of designated substances unless the container is immediately marked with the required information.
  6. “Container” as used in this chapter means any receptacle or formed flexible covering, including but not limited to: bags, barrels, boxes, cans, cylinders, drums, cartons, vessels, vats, and stationary or mobile storage tanks used solely for the storage of designated substances, but shall not include containers used as equipment where the designated substances are formulated, chemically reacted, or otherwise processed so long as records are available within the immediate location of the piece of equipment to designate the activity taking place in the container.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1.

28-21-19. Information requirements.

Any requirements contained in this chapter to obtain or modify any information is subject to § 28-21-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1.

28-21-20. Severability.

If any provisions or part thereof of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of those provisions to other persons or circumstances, other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1.

28-21-21. Permanent commission on hazardous substances in the workplace.

  1. There is created a permanent commission on hazardous substances in the workplace whose purpose it shall be to oversee and study the implementation of this chapter and to advise the general assembly with respect to methods of improving the purpose of this chapter. The commission shall annually submit its report to the general assembly not later than January 15 of each year.
  2. The commission shall consist of seventeen (17) members, three (3) of whom shall be from the house of representatives, not more than two (2) of whom shall be from the same political party, to be appointed by the speaker to serve for their legislative term; two (2) of whom shall be from the senate, one from each political party, to be appointed by the president of the senate to serve for his or her legislative term; two (2) representatives of labor, two (2) representatives of business, one member from the department of health, one member from the department of labor and training; four (4) members from the public, one member from the medical profession, and one member from the jewelry industry, all of whom shall be appointed by the speaker, to serve for terms of three (3) years.
  3. During the month of February every year, the speaker shall appoint a member to succeed the members whose term will then next expire, to serve for a term of three (3) years commencing on the first day of March then next following, and until his or her successor is appointed and qualified.
  4. A member shall be eligible to succeed himself or herself.
  5. A vacancy, other than by expiration, shall be filled in like manner as an original appointment, but only for the unexpired portion of the term.
  6. The speaker shall select a chairperson from among the membership of the commission to serve at the pleasure of the speaker.
  7. The membership of the commission shall receive no compensation for their services.
  8. All departments and agencies of the state shall furnish such advice and information, documentary and otherwise, to the commission and its agents as is deemed necessary or desirable by the commission to facilitate the purposes of this section.
  9. The speaker of the house is authorized and directed to provide suitable quarters for the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 105, § 10; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 60.

Chapter 22 Division of Professional Regulation

28-22-1. Division established.

Within the department of labor and training there shall be a division of professional regulation, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 4 of title 36. The division shall act as the administrative agent for the examining boards established by this title and perform such other functions as assigned by this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 6, art. 22, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter (P.L. 1911, ch. 715, §§ 1-5; G.L. 1923, ch. 93, §§ 1-5; G.L. 1923, ch. 93, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1925, ch. 591, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 296, §§ 1-5), consisting of §§ 28-22-1 — 28-22-6 and concerning construction project safety, was repealed by P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 1.

28-22-1.1. Restricted receipts account.

All proceeds of any fees collected pursuant to the provisions of chapter 6 of title 5 entitled “Electricians,” chapter 26 of this title entitled “Hoisting Engineers,” chapter 27 of this title entitled “Pipefitters and Refrigeration Technicians,” chapter 27 of this title entitled “Fire Protection Sprinkler Contractors and Journeypersons Sprinkler Fitters,” chapter 45 of this title entitled “Apprenticeship Programs in Trade and Industry,” chapter 12 of title 37 entitled “Contractors’ bonds,” and chapter 13 of title 37 entitled “Labor and Payment of Debts by Contractors,” shall be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 126, art. 27, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 54, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 92.

Compiler's Notes

The chapter heading for chapter 27 of title 28 was changed to “Mechanical Trades” in 2002. See P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-22-1.2. Professional regulation board — Composition — Appointment of members.

    1. There is hereby created in the division of professional regulation, in the department of labor and training, a professional regulation board that at all times shall consist of seven (7) qualified electors of the state as follows: three (3) members shall represent labor; three (3) members shall represent industry; and one member shall be the director of labor and training or his or her designee.
    2. On or before January 31, the governor shall annually appoint a member or members of the board to succeed the member or members whose term is at that time expiring who shall serve for four (4) years or until his or her successor is elected and qualified. Any vacancy that occurs in the board from any cause shall be filled by the governor for the remainder of the unexpired term.
  1. The board shall supervise the operation of the division in an advisory capacity in promulgating any policy that is necessary to improve the operation of the division in programs contained within this chapter that do not fall within the categories enforced by other licensing boards within the division of professional regulation. The promulgation of that policy is subject to the approval of the director of the department. Members of the board are subject to the provisions of chapter 36 of title 14.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 507, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2007, ch. 507, § 2, provides that this section takes effect January 1, 2008.

28-22-2. Penalties for nonpayment.

  1. Any person who has violated any provisions of chapter 6 of title 5 entitled “Electricians,” chapter 26 of this title entitled “Hoisting Engineers,” chapter 27 of this title entitled “Pipefitters and Refrigeration Technicians, Fire Protection Sprinkler Contractors and Journeyperson Sprinkler Fitters and Oil Heat Contractors,” chapter 70 of title 5 entitled “Telecommunications,” and chapter 20 of title 5 entitled “Plumbers,” whether duly registered with the office of the secretary of state or not, and has been levied a fine by the director of labor and training, is required to submit penalties due to the department of labor and training, division of professional regulation, within thirty (30) days of notice of the fine or penalty or license(s) will be revoked. Reinstatement of these license(s) will require payment of all penalties due to the department of labor and training and a subsequent hearing before the respective board.
  2. Any person who has violated any provisions of chapter 6 of title 5 entitled “Electricians,” chapter 26 of this title entitled “Hoisting Engineers,” chapter 27 of this title entitled “Mechanical Trades,” chapter 70 of title 5 entitled “Telecommunications,” chapter 20 of title 5 entitled “Plumbers,” and chapter 20 of this title entitled “Safety Awareness,” whether duly registered with the office of the secretary of state or not, and has been levied a fine by the director of labor and training, and is not licensed with the department of labor and training, division of professional regulation, is required to submit penalties due to the department of labor and training, division of professional regulation, within thirty (30) days of notice of the fine or penalty, or the director of the department of labor and training shall have the power to institute injunction proceedings in superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 394, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.

The chapter heading for chapter 27 of title 28 was changed to “Mechanical Trades” in 2002. See P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

The chapter heading for chapter 20 of title 5 is now “Plumbers, Irrigators, and Water System Installers” and the chapter heading for chapter 20 of title 28 is “Division of Occupational Safety.”

28-22-3. Picture IDs — Welders.

All structural steel and ornamental steel welders working under the American National Standards Institute Code — AWS D1.1 and AWS D1.5 will have affixed to their personal welding certificate documents, a legible picture to verify the welder’s identity. Said documents shall be kept in the office on all jobsites in which the welder is working.

The affixing of the pictures will be the sole responsibility of the certified welding inspector (CWI), the testing laboratory or engineering firm that originally certified the welder or any firm that is in the business of certifying welders under these codes.

Upon enactment of this amendment, the division of professional regulation will be authorized to monitor the veracity of the certificates and ensure that they are properly updated. This authority also extends to public building inspectors or their representatives.

People or persons, and their primary employer found in violation of this act will be ordered to stop work immediately, and are subject to the following fines payable to the department of labor and training, professional regulation division: two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for a first offense for each day in which the violation exists; five hundred dollars ($500) for a second offense for each day in which the violation exists; and one thousand dollars ($1,000) for a third and/or subsequent offenses for each day in which the violation exists.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 507, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2007, ch. 507, § 2, provides that this section takes effect January 1, 2008.

Chapter 23 Painters’ Rigging and License [Repealed.]

28-23-1 — 28-23-4. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This chapter (P.L. 1941, ch. 1067, §§ 3, 4; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-23-1 — 28-23-4; P.L. 1969, ch. 167, § 2), consisting of §§ 28-23-1 — 28-23-4 and concerning painters’ rigging, was repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 167, § 1, and by P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 1.

Chapter 24 Tunnels and Shafts [Repealed.]

28-24-1 — 28-24-4. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This chapter (P.L. 1951, ch. 2793, §§ 1-4; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-24-1 — 28-24-4), consisting of §§ 28-24-1 — 28-24-4 and concerning tunnels and shafts, was repealed by P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 1.

Chapter 25 Boiler Inspection and Pressure Vessels

28-25-1. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Authorized inspector” means an inspector of boilers and/or pressure vessels employed by the state of Rhode Island or an insurance company authorized to write boiler or pressure vessel insurance or of an authorized owner/user organization.
  2. “Boiler” means a closed vessel in which water or other liquid is heated, steam or vapor generated, steam is superheated, or in which any combination of these functions is accomplished, under pressure or vacuum, for use externally to itself, by the direct application of energy from the combustion of fuels or from electricity or nuclear energy. The term boiler includes fired units for heating or vaporizing liquids other than water where these units are separate from processing systems and are complete within themselves.
  3. “Certificate inspection” means an inspection, the report of which is used by the chief inspector to determine whether or not a certificate as provided by § 28-25-10 may be issued.
  4. “Chief inspector” means the existing position of chief boiler and pressure vessel inspector as appointed by the director of labor and training.
  5. “Code of rules” means the standard code of rules formulated and adopted by the division of occupational safety under the provision of this chapter.
  6. “Heating boiler” means a steam or vapor boiler operating at pressures not exceeding fifteen (15) psig, or a hot water boiler operating at pressures not exceeding one hundred sixty (160) psig or temperatures not exceeding two hundred fifty degrees Fahrenheit (250° F).
  7. “High pressure, high temperature water boiler” means a water boiler operating at pressures exceeding one hundred sixty (160) psig or temperatures exceeding two hundred fifty degrees Fahrenheit (250° F).
  8. “Hot water supply boiler” means a vessel used for the storage and/or supply of hot water to be used externally to itself at pressures not exceeding one hundred sixty (160) psig and/or temperatures not exceeding two hundred fifty degrees Fahrenheit (250° F) at or near the vessel outlet.
  9. “Imminent danger” means a condition or practice that could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the danger can be eliminated through normal enforcement procedures.
  10. “Owner” means any person owning, operating, or in charge or control of any boiler or pressure vessel as defined in this section including the chief administrative officer in the private or public sector.
  11. “Power boiler” means a boiler in which steam or other vapor is generated at a pressure of more than fifteen (15) psig.
  12. “Pressure vessel” means a vessel in which the pressure is obtained from an external source or by the application of heat other than those vessels defined in subsection (7) of this section.
  13. “Safety device” means any valve, plug, or appurtenance attached to any boiler for the purpose of diminishing the danger of accident.
  14. “Water heater” means a closed vessel in which water is heated by the combustion of fuels, electricity, or any source and withdrawn for use external to the system at pressures not exceeding one hundred sixty (160) psig including the apparatus by which heat is generated and all controls and devices necessary to prevent water temperatures from exceeding two hundred ten degrees Fahrenheit (210° F).

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 1928, ch. 1197, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-1 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

Cross References.

Division of occupational safety, § 28-20-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Boiler inspection:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-231 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 146, § 1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Admissibility of experimental evidence as to boiler and steampipe explosions. 76 A.L.R.2d 402.

28-25-2. [Transferred.]

28-25-3. Chief inspector.

The director shall appoint a chief inspector who shall be a citizen of this state to coordinate, administer, and implement the provisions of this chapter. This existing position shall be responsible to and report to the administrator of the division of occupational safety. The appointee will be in the classified service of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-4. Authorized inspectors.

The administrator through the chief inspector of the division of occupational safety may issue a commission to act as an authorized inspector to any person employed by the division of occupational safety or by an insurance company authorized to insure boilers against explosion in this state who holds a certificate of competency having passed a written examination approved by the administrator, or in lieu of the examination, who holds a certificate of competency as an inspector of boilers from a state that has a standard of examination equal to that of this state, or who holds a certificate issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, to the effect that the holder thereof is authorized by it to inspect steam boilers in this state. The fee adopted by the code commission for occupational safety and health for the inspectors’ commission shall be paid to the administrator of the division of occupational safety and shall be valid until termination of the inspectors’ employment. In addition to the authorized inspectors authorized under this section, the administrator shall, upon the request of any company operating pressure vessels in this state for which the owner or user maintains a regularly established inspection service, issue to those persons a commission as an owner/user inspector. Owner/user inspectors shall hold a certificate of competency having passed a written examination approved by the administrator, or in lieu of the examination, who hold a certificate issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors. All authorized inspectors shall register and renew their commission with the administrator of occupational safety on an annual basis. An authorized inspector shall be compensated by the company employing him or her, and the fee provided for in § 28-25-12 shall not be collected by any authorized inspector. If an applicant for a commission to act as an authorized inspector fails to pass the examination, he or she may apply again for examination after a period of three (3) months has elapsed. The administrator of the division of occupational safety may at any time revoke any commission issued by him or her, to act as an authorized inspector for the incompetence or untrustworthiness of the holder of the commission or for willful falsification of any matter or statement contained in his or her application or in a report of any inspection made by him or her. A person whose commission has been suspended shall be entitled to an appeal as provided in § 28-20-19 , and to be present in person and to be represented by counsel at the hearing of the appeal. The administrator of the division of occupational safety may at any time revoke any commission issued by him or her, to act as an authorized inspector for cause shown after a hearing of which the holder of the commission shall receive five (5) days notice in writing.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 2; P.L. 1928, ch. 1197, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-2 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-5. Administration and enforcement.

The administrator of the division of occupational safety shall administer and enforce all provisions of this chapter, in accordance with chapter 20 of this title. Duly authorized inspectors shall inspect all boilers and pressure vessels within this state, except those that are specifically exempted under § 28-25-18 . The administrator shall have in his or her office, and available during business hours for public inspection, a copy of the codes and fee schedule.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-3 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 337, § 1.

Collateral References.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground of liability for damage or injury to third persons. 13 A.L.R.5th 289.

28-25-6. Method of inspection.

The administrator or a duly authorized inspector shall make the required inspection of each boiler or pressure vessel in accordance with the rules and regulations approved by the administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-4 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-7. Access to boilers and pressure vessels — Time of inspection.

The owner of any boiler or pressure vessel, whether or not subject to inspection under the provisions of this chapter, shall allow the inspector free access to it at all reasonable times. The owner of any boiler or pressure vessel subject to inspection shall have the boiler or pressure vessel ready for inspection at such time as shall be fixed by the inspector upon being given not less than two (2) weeks' written notice of the day fixed. In fixing the day, the inspector shall comply with the convenience and business requirements of the owner as far as he or she reasonably can. The chief or the inspector may, in his or her discretion, make any inspection on Sunday.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-5 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-8. Orders to cease operation or repair.

An authorized inspector shall consult with the owner, engineer, or other person in charge of each boiler or pressure vessel as to its condition and operation, and if he or she thereby discovers or in any manner learns of any defect or imperfection in the boiler or pressure vessel or of any dereliction or carelessness on the part of the engineer or other person in charge of the boiler or pressure vessel relative to it, or to its operation, he or she shall, as soon as practicable, give notice of this to the owner of the boiler or pressure vessel. If, as a result of the inspection, the inspector determines that any boiler or pressure vessel is in any condition as to be unsafe and that the danger is imminent, he or she shall notify the jurisdictional authority who may order the operation of the boiler or pressure vessel to be stopped. Upon that notice, operation shall be stopped until the boiler or pressure vessel or its defective part or parts are repaired or renewed and put in safe condition and a certificate to that effect issued. Where there is no imminent danger, the inspector shall notify the owner to remedy the defect or defects within any reasonable time that he or she may prescribe, and if the defect or defects are not remedied within the prescribed time, the use of the boiler or pressure vessel shall be discontinued at the expiration of that time until it is put in a safe condition and a certificate to that effect is issued by the jurisdictional authority.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-6 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 337, § 1.

28-25-9. Formulation and adoption of codes, rules, and regulations.

The code commission for occupational safety and health shall formulate and/or adopt a code of rules and regulations for the construction, installation, inspection, maintenance, repair, alteration, and operation of boilers and pressure vessels. Codes adopted and enforced shall be the standard code of rules as published and enunciated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors and any amendments to them, as were in effect as of January 1, 2007. Subsequent amendments to the state code shall be effective only after complying with the provisions of the Rhode Island administrative procedures act. Codes relating to controls, safety devices, and appurtenances shall follow ASME CSD-1 or the NFPA — 85 Series, as applicable. Additional regulations and standards pursuant to the commissioning of authorized inspectors, formulation of fee structure for inspection and certification of boilers and pressure vessels, and/or review of operations shall be adopted in keeping with the appropriate standards.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-7 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 289, § 1.

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, see chapter 35 of title 42.

Collateral References.

Governmental body or voluntary association, admissibility in evidence, on issue of negligence, of codes or standards of safety issued or sponsored by. 58 A.L.R.3d 148.

28-25-10. Inspection and certification of boilers — Permit to install — Notice, report, and standards for alterations and repairs — Minimum standard.

  1. No boiler or pressure vessel shall be erected within this state unless it is constructed and equipped with safety devices in compliance with the standards and rules set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Any person erecting or installing any boiler or pressure vessel shall notify the division to that effect. Upon that notice, the administrator shall then satisfy himself or herself, by inspection or other evidence satisfactory to him or her, that the boiler complies with the requirements of this chapter. Upon being satisfied, the administrator, upon payments by that person of a fee set by the code commission of occupational safety and health, shall issue a certificate.
  2. Any person erecting or installing a new or second-hand boiler or pressure vessel shall first make application for a permit to install to the division of occupational safety, boiler unit, at a fee established by the code commission. The administrator shall then satisfy himself or herself either by inspection or by other evidence satisfactory to him or her that the boiler or pressure vessel complies with the requirements of this chapter, and upon being satisfied, the administrator shall upon payment of the required fee furnish to the owner of the boiler or pressure vessel a certificate to that effect.
  3. It shall be mandatory that the organization performing the repair/alteration notify the division of occupational safety, boiler unit, or an authorized inspector before initiating any alterations or welded repairs to any boiler or pressure vessel within the state. Upon completion of the alteration or welded repair, a properly executed alteration or welded repair form as outlined in the NBIC shall be filed with the division.
  4. The state adopts the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for new construction and the National Board Inspection Code for repairs and alterations to boilers and pressure vessels. It is mandatory that all repair contractors hold the appropriate ASME certificate of authorization or a valid National Board “R” (repair) or “VR” (safety valve repair) symbol stamp issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, as applicable.
  5. Antique boilers or unfired pressure vessels used in public, nonprofit, engineering, and/or scientific museums operated for educational, historical, or exhibition purposes shall be approved prior to operation in this state on an individual basis. Approval for operation will be given only after satisfactory review of drawings and calculations, application of a hydrostatic test at a pressure deemed necessary by the jurisdictional authority, and the boiler or pressure vessel is equipped with all the approved safety devices as required by the rules and regulations promulgated by the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-8 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 376, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 99, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 337, § 1.

28-25-11. Issuance of certificate — Period of validity — Display.

Whenever: (1) The division has inspected any boiler or pressure vessel and has found it safe for operation; (2) Any repairs required by the division to be made in any boiler or pressure vessel have been completed to its satisfaction; (3) In the case of any boiler or pressure vessel subsequently installed the administrator has satisfied himself or herself by inspection, or otherwise, that it may be safely operated; or (4) In the case of any boiler or pressure vessel subsequently erected, he or she has satisfied himself or herself that the boiler or pressure vessel complies with the standard established under § 28-25-9 , he or she shall, upon payment of the required fee, issue to the owner of the boiler or pressure vessel his or her certificate authorizing the operation of the boiler or pressure vessel and stating the limit of pressure at which the boiler or pressure vessel may be used, and stating the date of issue of the certificate. The date of issue of the certificate shall be the date of approved inspection and the certificate shall be valid for a period of time determined and adopted by the code commission. Each certificate shall be conspicuously posted by the owner of the boiler or pressure vessel. If the boiler or pressure vessel is not located within the building, the certificate shall be posted in a location convenient to the boiler or pressure vessel inspected or in any place where it will be accessible to the interested parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-9 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

Collateral References.

Liability of engineer for improper issuance of certificate. 43 A.L.R.2d 1227.

28-25-12. Inspection fees.

For every inspection made by the division under the provisions of this chapter, the owner shall pay to the administrator of the division the required fee which shall be paid upon the conclusion of the inspection and before a certificate is issued. The proceeds of any fees or fines collected pursuant to this section, shall be deposited as general revenues provided, that no fee shall be paid by any city, town, or fire district, nor by the state; and provided, further, that no fee shall be paid by any religious and/or charitable society whenever the aims, activities, and objectives of the religious or charitable society continue to be strictly religious or charitable in nature.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 8; P.L. 1928, ch. 1197, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 8; P.L. 1945, ch. 1636, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-10 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 74, § 14; P.L. 1976, ch. 63, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 63, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 93.

28-25-13. Reports by authorized inspectors — Certificate — Defective boilers.

When any authorized inspector inspects a boiler or pressure vessel for an insurance company, he or she shall, within a period of twenty-one (21) days, make a report of that inspection on forms approved by the administrator of the division of occupational safety. If the boiler or pressure vessel is adjudged to be in a safe condition and found to conform in all respects with the codes adopted by the code commission under authority of this chapter, the owner shall pay to the administrator the required fee and the administrator shall issue to the owner of the boiler or pressure vessel, a certificate authorizing the operation of the boiler or pressure vessel. This certificate shall be issued in conformity with § 28-25-11 . It shall be the responsibility of the authorized inspection agency doing business in this state to report to the administrator of the division of occupational safety the name of the owner or user and the location of each boiler or pressure vessel on which insurance has been refused, cancelled, or discontinued within ten (10) days of that action. Boilers or pressure vessels upon which insurance has been cancelled or refused due to existing dangerous defects shall be reported immediately to the administrator of the division of occupational safety.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 94, § 8; P.L. 1928, ch. 1197, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 8; P.L. 1945, ch. 1636, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-11 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 74, § 14; P.L. 1976, ch. 48, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 112, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-14. Request for board hearing.

In case any owner of any boiler or pressure vessel is dissatisfied with the decision of the division in any matter, he or she may within two (2) days after the decision demand, in writing, a hearing before the occupational safety and health review board pursuant to chapter 20 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-12 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 303, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 339, § 1.

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

28-25-15. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 15; P.L. 1921, ch. 2015, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 15; P.L. 1925, ch. 627, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1550, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 15; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-13 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2012, ch. 303, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 339, § 2, effective June 20, 2012.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-25-15 concerned appropriations for arbitrators.

28-25-16. Penalty for violations — Complaints.

  1. A person shall be deemed to be in violation of the provisions of this chapter who:
    1. Refuses to have inspected any boiler or pressure vessel requiring inspection under the provisions of this chapter;
    2. Permits any boiler or pressure vessel to operate at a greater pressure than is allowed by the certificate;
    3. Uses any boiler or pressure vessel requiring inspection under the provisions of this chapter before a certificate is issued;
    4. Uses any boiler or pressure vessel after its certificate expires;
    5. Uses any boiler or pressure vessel newly erected or installed before a certificate is furnished by the division; or
    6. Refuses to allow the inspector free access to any boiler or pressure vessel at any reasonable time whether or not the boiler or pressure vessel is subjected to inspection under the provisions of this chapter.
    1. In the event the administrator has reason to believe that the condition of a boiler or pressure vessel threatens physical harm or imminent danger to the community, then the administrator is authorized to prohibit the use of the boiler or pressure vessel by appropriate means after written notification of the nature of the violation and repairs required is presented to the owner, engineer, or other person in charge of the boiler or pressure vessel.
      1. Failure to comply with an order constitutes a violation and is subject to a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each violation imposed by the department of labor and training on the owner/user.
      2. Each day a violation is continued constitutes a separate offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-14 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-17. Judicial enforcement.

The superior court shall have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the provisions of this chapter upon petition being filed by the administrator of the division of occupational safety and notice being given to the person or persons charged with a violation of the provisions of this chapter, and the court may issue process of injunction, mandamus, or otherwise as in the opinion of the court is necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this chapter, but no ex parte restraining order shall be issued unless upon a showing satisfactory to the court that danger to life or property is imminent, and in that case citation to the defendant shall be returnable not more than five (5) days after the ex parte restraining order is entered.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-15 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-18. Exemptions.

  1. This chapter does not apply to the following boilers and pressure vessels:
    1. Boilers and pressure vessels under federal control;
    2. Boilers on motor vehicles, self-propelled boilers, ditching machines, cranes, pile drivers, wreckers, and steam shovels that are owned by railroads or railways;
    3. Boilers on steam locomotives under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Transportation;
    4. Boilers on vessels within the waters of the state;
    5. Pressure vessels used for transportation and storage of compressed or liquefied gases when construction is in compliance with specifications of the United States Department of Transportation and when charged with gas or liquid, marked, maintained, and periodically re-qualified for use, as required by appropriate regulations of the United States Department of Transportation;
    6. Pressure vessels located on vehicles operating under the rules of other state or federal authorities and used for carrying passengers or freight;
    7. Air tanks installed on the right of way of railroads and used directly in the operation of trains;
    8. Pressure vessels that do not exceed an inside diameter, width, height, or cross section of six inches (6") with no limitation on length or pressure;
    9. Pressure vessels having an internal or external working pressure not exceeding fifteen (15) psig, with no limit on size;
    10. Pressure vessels with a nominal water containing capacity of one hundred twenty gallons (120 gals.) or less for containing water under pressure, including those containing air, the compression of which serves only as a cushion; providing the vessels do not exceed three hundred (300) psi and one hundred eighty degrees Fahrenheit (180° F);
    11. Pressure vessels containing water heated by steam or any other indirect means when none of the following limitations are exceeded:
      1. A heat input of two hundred thousand (200,000) BTU per hour;
      2. A water temperature of two hundred ten degrees Fahrenheit (210° F); or
      3. A nominal water containing capacity of one hundred twenty gallons (120 gals.);
      1. Hot water supply boilers that are directly fired with oil, gas, electricity, or solid fuel when none of the following limitations is exceeded:
        1. Heat input of two hundred thousand (200,000) BTU per hour;
        2. Water temperature of two hundred ten degrees Fahrenheit (210° F); or
        3. Nominal water capacity of one hundred twenty gallons (120 gals.)
      2. These exempt hot water supply boilers shall be equipped with ASME-National Board approved safety valves;
    12. Approved pressure vessels (hot water heaters listed by a nationally recognized testing agency), with approved safety devices including pressure temperature relief valve, with a nominal water containing capacity of one hundred twenty gallons (120 gals.) or less having a heat input of two hundred thousand (200,000) B.T.U. per hour or less, used solely for hot water supply at pressure of one hundred sixty (160) pounds per square inch or less, and at temperatures of two hundred ten degrees Fahrenheit (210° F) or less; provided, that such pressure vessels are not installed in places of public assembly such as schools, childcare centers, public and private hospitals, nursing and boarding homes, churches, public buildings, or any similar place of public assembly;
    13. Boilers and pressure vessels in the care, custody, and control of research facilities and used solely for research purposes that require one or more details of non-code construction or which involve destruction or reduced life expectancy of those vessels;
    14. Pressure vessels or other structures or components that are not considered to be within the scope of ASME Code Section VIII; and
    15. Antique boilers and pressure vessels whether or not used in public, nonprofit, engineering, and/or scientific museums and operated for educational, historical, or exhibition purposes with shell diameter less than twelve inches (12") and with a grate surface area of less than one square foot.
  2. The following boilers and pressure vessels are exempt from the requirements of §§ 28-25-11 , 28-25-12 , and 28-25-13 :
    1. Steam boilers used for heating purposes carrying a pressure of not more than fifteen (15) pounds per square inch gauge, and which are located in private residences or in apartment houses of less than six (6) family units provided the boiler heat input does not exceed four hundred thousand (400,000) BTU per hour;
    2. Hot water heating boilers which are located in private residences or in apartment houses of less than six (6) family units provided the boiler heat input does not exceed four hundred thousand (400,000) BTU per hour;
    3. Hot water boilers and hot water heaters operated at pressure not exceeding one hundred sixty (160) pounds per square inch gauge, or temperatures not exceeding two hundred fifty degrees Fahrenheit (250° F). which are located in private residences or in apartment houses of less than six (6) family units provided the boiler or hot water heater is not in a place of public assembly as delineated in subsection (a)(13) of this section;
    4. Pressure vessels on remote oil or gas producing lease locations that have fewer than ten buildings intended for human occupancy per one-quarter (0.25) square mile and where the closest building is at least two hundred twenty (220) yards from any vessel;
    5. Pressure vessels that do not exceed:
      1. Five cubic feet (5 cu. ft.) in volume and twenty-five (25) psig pressure; or
      2. One and one-half cubic feet (1.5 cu. ft.) in volume and six hundred (600) psig pressure;
    6. Air tanks at gas or service stations used for inflation of tires on automobiles or other vehicles.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 12; P.L. 1928, ch. 1197, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-16 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 113, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-19. Inspection of unfired pressure vessels being manufactured.

  1. Manufacturers of unfired pressure vessels in this state shall obtain the services of an authorized inspection agency for shop inspections of unfired pressure vessels being manufactured by them. If manufacturers are unable to obtain the inspection service, they may request that unfired pressure vessels being manufactured by them be inspected by inspectors of the division of occupational safety (holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors). The fee for these inspections by the inspectors shall be established by regulation through the code commission, as shall be the fees for all special inspections, code stamp/certificate of authorization review, and nuclear surveys and reviews that are performed by that division.
  2. All boilers and pressure vessels that are fabricated in accordance with the ASME code and properly identified by ASME code symbol stamping and signed data report shall be registered with the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors in accordance with registration guidelines.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 114, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 337, § 1.

28-25-20. Reports to general assembly and governor.

The administrator of the division of occupational safety shall make a report to the general assembly in January, biennially, in the even years, setting forth the number of boilers inspected by the division and the number of boilers reported to the division and exempted from inspection under the provisions of this chapter, so far as the administrator shall be able to determine the number, and also making any recommendations that he or she shall see fit, for the promotion of public safety. He or she may, in his or her discretion, make more frequent reports to the general assembly and may be required by the governor to make reports to him or her at any time as to any matters pertaining to the duties of the division.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-17 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-21. Local ordinances void.

  1. No city or town shall have the power to make any ordinance, bylaw, or resolution concerning, or to provide for the inspection, or to license the erection or installation of, any boiler or pressure vessel within the limits of the city or town. Any ordinance, bylaw, or resolution previously made or passed or concerning any of the above matters shall be void and of no effect.
  2. Any application made to municipalities shall be immediately forwarded for consideration and inspection to the division of occupational safety.
  3. No municipality shall issue a mechanical permit for work related to installation, repair, or alteration of any boiler or pressure vessel covered under this chapter until the application for the installation, repair or alteration has been approved by the division of occupational safety where applicable.

History of Section. P.L. 1919, ch. 1770, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 94, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 297, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 28-25-18 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-22. Severability.

If any provisions or part of any provisions of this chapter, or application of those provisions to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter, and the application of the provisions to other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 508, § 1.

28-25-23. Relief from personal responsibility.

The director of the department of labor and training, the administrator of the division of occupational safety, the chief boiler and pressure vessel inspector and his or her authorized inspectors charged with the enforcement of this chapter, while acting for the state, shall not thereby render himself or herself liable personally, and he or she is relieved from all personal liability for any act required or permitted in the discharge of his or her official duties. Any suit instituted against any officer or employee because of an act performed by him or her in the lawful discharge of his or her duties and under the provisions of this chapter shall be defended by the legal representative of the state of Rhode Island in the case of the director or his or her agents or representatives, until the final determination of the proceedings. In the case of an authorized insurance inspector, he or she shall be defended by the legal representative selected by his or her employer, until the final determination of the proceedings. In no case shall the director or any of his or her subordinates be liable for costs or damages in any action, suit, or proceeding that may be instituted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. The director or his or her agents acting in good faith and without malice and within the scope of their employment shall be free from liability for acts performed under any provisions or by reason of any act or omission in the performance of his or her official duties in connection with his or her employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 293, § 1.

Chapter 26 Hoisting Engineers

28-26-1. Board of examiners of hoisting engineers.

  1. The board of examiners of hoisting engineers shall consist of seven (7) qualified electors of the state appointed by the governor as follows:
    1. One individual with fifteen (15) years of practical experience as a fully licensed hoisting engineer;
    2. Two (2) individuals who hold full licenses as hoisting engineers;
    3. One person holding at least the minimum endorsement of pay loader/backhoe licensed operator;
    4. Two (2) individuals, each holding a hoisting engineers license with any regular endorsement; and
    5. The director of the department of labor and training or his or her designee who has a construction background.
    1. Each member shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years.
    2. Any vacancy on the board that occurs for any causes shall be filled by appointment of the governor for the remainder of the unexpired term.
  2. The division of professional regulation shall examine and license hoisting operating engineers of steam, internal combustion engines, electric, and compressed air powered machinery.
  3. The board shall supervise the operations of the division in an advisory capacity in promulgating such policy as may be necessary to improve the operation of the division in its area of expertise. The promulgation of that policy shall be subject to the approval of the director of the department.
  4. The members of the board of examiners of hoisting engineers shall elect a chairperson and secretary annually every February. Vacancies arising in the office of chairperson or secretary between regular appointments shall be cared for in a like manner.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1116, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-1 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 360, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 504, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 506, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 152, § 1.

Cross References.

Termination of statutory entities and licensing authorities, § 22-14-5.3 .

Comparative Legislation.

Hoisting operators:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-221 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 146, § 64 et seq.

Collateral References.

Governmental body or voluntary association, admissibility in evidence, on issue of negligence, of codes or standards of safety issued or sponsored by. 58 A.L.R.3d 148.

28-26-1.1. Functions of board of examiners — Code of ethics.

The board of examiners of hoisting engineers shall meet once a month or as deemed necessary to conduct business. The board shall have a policy making role in the preparation and amendment of rules and regulations pertaining to chapter 26 of this chapter, and in the preparation and composition of the examinations to be administered by the division. Subsequent to the administration of the examinations, the board of examiners shall review the examinations to evaluate their effectiveness. The board shall also hold hearings on violations of chapter 26 of this chapter, and make recommendations to the director of labor and training. Members of the board shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 14 of title 36.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 506, § 1.

28-26-2. Licensing section.

  1. The present board of examiners shall constitute a section within the department of labor and training to be known as the “hoisting engineers’ licensing section.”
  2. Chief.   The director of the department of labor and training shall appoint a resident of this state who has fifteen (15) years of practical experience as a hoisting engineer and has possessed a full license for fifteen (15) years, to the position of chief investigator of the hoisting engineers’ licensing section within the division of professional regulations.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 1A; P.L. 1943, ch. 1289, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-2 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 360, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 504, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 164, § 1.

28-26-3. Secretary.

The chief of the section shall appoint one secretary for the hoisting engineers' licensing section who shall be in the unclassified service.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 14; P.L. 1944, ch. 1417, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-3 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1.

Cross References.

Employees in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

28-26-4. Rules and regulations.

The division of professional regulation, subject to the approval of the director shall make suitable rules and regulations for examining and licensing of hoisting engineers.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1942, ch. 1116, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-4 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1.

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality of Rules.

A licensing rule providing for oral examinations which made no provision for the recording of questions and answers violated the guarantees of due process. Millett v. Hoisting Eng'rs' Licensing Div. of Dep't of Labor, 119 R.I. 285 , 377 A.2d 229, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1906 (1977).

Restriction on the ability of aliens to become licensed hoisting engineers is unconstitutional, since the state has no permissible interest in discriminating between aliens and citizens. Millett v. Hoisting Eng'rs' Licensing Div. of Dep't of Labor, 119 R.I. 285 , 377 A.2d 229, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1906 (1977).

28-26-5. License required for operation of hoisting machinery.

    1. No person shall operate or be in direct charge of hoisting or excavation equipment that uses steam, internal combustion engines, electric, or compressed air of five horsepower (5 h.p.) or more and/or can lift more than five hundred pounds (500 lbs.) without obtaining a license to do so as provided in this chapter.
    2. No user or agent of a user of any machinery described in subsection (a)(1) shall permit the machinery to be operated unless it is operated by a duly licensed person as provided in this chapter.
  1. Every contract in the construction of public works by the state or by any city or town, or by persons contracting with the city, town, or state for the construction, shall contain a clause embodying the provision of this section.
  2. In the event of any inconsistencies and/or contradiction between the requirements of this section and those of § 23-33-30 , and/or in any respective rules and/or regulations promulgated pursuant to that section, the provisions of this section and any rules and/or regulations promulgated pursuant to this section shall be deemed to be controlling.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 3; P.L. 1944, ch. 1526, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-5 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 332, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 342, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Denial of license to operate a hoisting crane by a properly constituted board of examiners of hoisting engineers acting under published rules and regulations was not a defense in prosecution against defendant for operation of a crane without a license. State v. Alix, 110 R.I. 350 , 293 A.2d 298, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 921 (1972).

28-26-6. Authorized types of machinery specified to licensees.

Licenses issued under this chapter shall specify the types of equipment that the holder is authorized to operate. The board shall promulgate rules and regulations that specify types of licenses.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 4; P.L. 1945, ch. 1556, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-6 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1.

Cross References.

Exemption from electrician’s license requirement, § 5-6-29 .

28-26-7. Application for license — Examination.

  1. Each person who desires to act as a steam, internal combustion engines, electric, or compressed air hoisting engineer shall make application to the division for a license upon a form furnished to him or her, submit a notarized list of work experience, and shall pass an examination on the construction and operation of steam, electric, internal combustion engines, and compressed air engines and machinery. Applications for examinations must be received fifteen (15) working days prior to the examination date.
  2. Any person applying for a license who knowingly makes any misstatement as to his or her work experience or other qualifications shall be subject to the penalties provided for in § 28-26-11 .
  3. In addition to the requirements for submitting an application for examination, as required in subsection (a) of this section, any person applying for a full license, a hydraulic crane license, or a lattice crane license shall also be required to include a valid medical health card with their application. A separate notarized statement shall also be attached to the application, and shall contain all work-related experience, including all equipment trained on and/or operated.
  4. In addition to the requirements for submitting an application for examination, as required in subsection (a) of this section, any person applying for a construction forklift license or a full license shall also be required to include a copy of their OSHA forklift certification with their application.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1942, ch. 1116, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-7 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 332, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 575, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 506, § 1.

28-26-8. Conduct of examinations — Revocation of license.

The examinations shall be conducted in the manner and under rules and regulations issued by the division. Initial licenses may be subject to a field examination, if deemed necessary by the division of professional regulation, which examination shall be conducted by the chief hoisting engineer investigator, before renewal. Under written charges after notice and hearing, the division may revoke the license of a person guilty of fraud in obtaining his or her license, or who for any reason has become unfit to discharge the duties of a steam, internal combustion engines, electric, or compressed air engineer. Licenses will not be issued to individuals who have not paid their violations in full.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 6; impl. am. P.L. 1942, ch. 1116, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-8 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 332, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 506, § 1.

28-26-9. Renewal of license.

Licenses shall expire biennially on a fixed date or on the licensee’s birthday, as the board may provide in rules and regulations. Upon application, the person to whom a license is issued under this chapter shall be entitled to a renewal, unless the division for a cause named in § 28-26-8 and upon notice and hearing shall refuse renewal. Refusal shall have approval of the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 7; impl. am. P.L. 1942, ch. 1116, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-9 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 257, § 5; P.L. 2009, ch. 258, § 5.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2009, ch. 257, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [November 12, 2009] and provides that for persons born in an even year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2010; for persons born in an odd year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2011.

P.L. 2009, ch. 258, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [November 13, 2009] and provides that for persons born in an even year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2010; for persons born in an odd year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2011.

Cross References.

Veteran’s certificate, renewal on discharge, § 30-20-1 .

28-26-10. License fees.

Each applicant for an examination for a license as an engineer shall pay to the division at the time of application a fee of seventy-five dollars ($75.00), and for each license or renewal of a license a fee at the biennial rate of ninety-six dollars ($96.00) for a full license, eighty-four dollars ($84.00) for a hoisting license, seventy-two dollars ($72.00) for an excavating license, and sixty dollars ($60.00) for a limited license, these fees to be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 8; impl. am. P.L. 1942, ch. 1116, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-10 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 76, § 24; P.L. 1967, ch. 48, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 174, art. VII, § 10; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 126, art. 27, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 370, art. 40, § 94; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 8; P.L. 2004, ch. 595, art. 13, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 257, § 5; P.L. 2009, ch. 258, § 5.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2009, ch. 257, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [November 12, 2009] and provides that for persons born in an even year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2010; for persons born in an odd year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2011.

P.L. 2009, ch. 258, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [November 13, 2009] and provides that for persons born in an even year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2010; for persons born in an odd year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2011.

28-26-11. Penalty for violations.

Whoever, being an engineer or user or agent of steam, internal combustion engines, electric, or compressed air hoisting machinery described in this chapter, violates any provision of this chapter shall be fined not less than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000) per offense. Each day in which a violation occurs shall be deemed a separate offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 9; P.L. 1944, ch. 1417, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-11 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 8; P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 332, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 8; P.L. 2015, ch. 74, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 83, § 1.

Cross References.

Penalties for nonpayment, § 28-22-2 .

28-26-12. Investigation and prosecution of violations.

The chief of the section shall act as an investigator with respect to the enforcement of all provisions of law relative to the licensing of hoisting engineers and to this effect whenever a complaint is made by the chief of the section to the director of labor and training that the provisions of this chapter are being violated, the director of labor and training shall issue an order to cease and desist from the violation and impose the penalties provided in § 28-26-11 against the violator, against the operator, against the contractor, and against the project developers. A cease-and-desist order may also be issued against the owner of equipment, against the contractor, and against the project developers whenever the chief complains to the director that operating equipment does not meet OSHA standards for construction equipment as contained in 29 C.F.R. Part 1910 and 29 C.F.R. 1926.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 9; P.L. 1944, ch. 1417, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-12 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 8; P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 1.

28-26-12.1. Inspection and right of entry.

The division of professional regulation, by and through its hoisting engineer investigators, shall have the right and authority to enter, during times at which hoisting/excavating work is actually being performed, any commercial building, structure, or premises where hoisting/excavating work is being done, except, however, any building, structure, or premises exempt by law, for the purpose of ascertaining compliance with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 2.

28-26-13. Compensation of chief as investigator.

While acting as an investigator under the provisions of this chapter, the chief of the section shall be paid at a rate to be determined by the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 9; P.L. 1944, ch. 1417, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-13 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 2.

28-26-14. Persons and machinery exempt from chapter.

  1. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to engineers under the jurisdiction of the United States, or engineers or operators employed by public utilities, and shall not apply to agriculturists, fishers, horticulturists, and individuals utilizing their personal farm equipment performing volunteer services on land trust property, or to any engine except one that operates a hoist, shovel, crane, or excavator.
  2. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to powered industrial forklift trucks commonly referenced as forklifts, pallet trucks, rider trucks, fork trucks, or lift trucks. Operators of powered industrial forklift trucks (forklifts, pallet trucks, rider trucks, fork trucks, lift trucks) shall be required to possess employer certification or third-party certification in general industry only. This does not apply to the construction field. Operators of powered industrial forklift trucks, in the construction field, shall be required to possess a Rhode Island state hoisting engineer’s license along with an operator’s certification.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-14 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 332, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 74, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 83, § 2.

28-26-15. Appropriation and disbursements.

For the purpose of carrying this chapter into effect, the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) is annually appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated to be expended for the payment of an investigator, secretary, and clerical assistants, and for other necessary expenses incurred by the hoisting engineers’ licensing section in the performance of its duties. The state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders on the general treasurer for payment of the sums so appropriated, or so much of them as may from time to time be required, upon receipt by him or her of proper vouchers approved by the director of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1068, § 13; P.L. 1943, ch. 1289, § 2; P.L. 1944, ch. 1417, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-26-15 .

28-26-16. Appeals.

Any person aggrieved by any decision or ruling of the division may appeal that decision or ruling to the administrator of the division or his or her designee. A further appeal may then be made to the appropriate board of examiners. Any person aggrieved by any decision or ruling of that board may appeal that decision or ruling to the director of the department. Any further appeal from the action of the director shall be in accordance with the provisions of chapter 35 of title 42. The division shall be considered a person for the purpose of any action. Any appeal shall not stay a decision or administrative order made under this chapter. The decision or administrative order shall remain in full force and effect until stayed, modified, or reversed by the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 47, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 211, § 1.

Chapter 27 Mechanical Trades

28-27-1. Purpose.

This chapter is necessary to protect the life, property, safety, and welfare of the people of Rhode Island; to promote conservation of our natural resources used to generate energy; the proper installation of all piping systems and/or equipment used in fire protection systems; and in the generation and consumption of energy used for the purpose of all heating, cooling, and air distribution systems.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter 27 (P.L. 1978, ch. 214, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 392, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 254, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 392, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-27-1 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 55, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 20; P.L. 1987, ch. 422, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 16, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 366, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 126, art. 27, § 4), consisting of §§ 28-27-1 28-27-34 and concerning pipefitter and refrigeration technicians, was repealed by P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 1, effective July 1, 1990.

Comparative Legislation.

Pipefitters and refrigeration technicians:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 146, § 87 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Laws.

Court declared the state’s pipefitter licensing regulations were preempted by state statute and that a provision of the Pipefitters Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-27-1 et seq., exempted the gas company from the regulations, holding that the Pennhurst decision applied to private actions against the state seeking declaratory relief for violations of state law. S. Union Co. v. Lynch, 321 F. Supp. 2d 328, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11239 (D.R.I. 2004).

28-27-1.0. Mechanical board.

There shall be in the department of labor and training, a mechanical board, responsible for the licensing and regulating of masters, journeypersons, and apprentices in the pipefitting, air conditioning/refrigeration, sprinkler fitting and sheet metal trades, hereafter to be referred to as “the mechanical trades.” The board, under the direction and supervision of the division of professional regulation, shall advise the division in the proper installation, modification and disassembly for reuse of process piping systems used in the conveyance and storage of liquids, solids, and industrial type gases, all heating, cooling, air distribution, fire protection systems, and venting systems. It shall exclude those systems that are self-contained home appliances and all piping systems specified under the plumbing law. The board shall advise the division of the proper license needed for layout, on-site fabrication, installation, alteration, testing, or repair of any automatic or manual sprinkler systems designed for the protection of the interior or exterior of a building or structure from fire, or any piping or tubing and appurtenances and equipment pertaining to such system including overhead and underground water mains, fire hydrants and hydrant mains, standpipes and hose connections to sprinkler systems, sprinkler and tank heaters, air lines and thermal systems used in connection with sprinkler and alarm systems connected to them, foam extinguishing systems or special hazard systems including water spray, foam, carbon dioxide, dry chemical systems, halon liquid, or gas fire suppression systems.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 418, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-1.1. Inspection and right of entry.

  1. The division of professional regulation, department of labor and training, has the authority, by its chief administrator or designates, upon proper identification and in the performance of his or her duties, to enter at any reasonable hour any building, structure, or premises where mechanical work is being performed, which work is governed by this chapter, to ascertain compliance with this chapter and the rules and regulations of the division.
  2. If any owner, occupant, or other person refuses, impedes, inhibits, interferes with, restricts, or otherwise obstructs entry and free access to any part of the building, structure, or premises by an authorized investigating official of the division/ mechanical board, the chief administrator may:
    1. Seek from any judge of the district court a search warrant in accordance with chapter 5 of title 12;
    2. Revoke or suspend any license, permit, or other permission regulated by local and state codes, and applicable to this chapter; notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter; and
    3. Seek any other remedy as provided by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-1.2. General license criteria guide.

The mechanical board shall assist the division of professional regulation of the department of labor and training to establish and from time to time update a preliminary criteria guide for the licensing of those persons regulated by this chapter. This guide shall include, but not be limited to, the categories or classes of occupation regulated and the requirements for licensing of each category. The guide and any revision shall be filed by the board with the office of the secretary of state.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 418, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-2. Licensing — Mechanical board of examiners created — Senior chief investigator.

  1. The division of professional regulation with the assistance of the board shall promulgate rules and regulations for the examining and licensing of masters, journeypersons, and apprentices of the mechanical trades.
    1. A state mechanical board is created in the department of labor and training whose duty it shall be to advise the division in its area of expertise in promulgating any policy that may be necessary to improve the operations of the division, and to hold license revocation and violations hearings as described in this chapter. The promulgation of policy shall be subject to the approval of the division.
    2. The board shall consist of eleven (11) qualified electors of the state appointed by the governor as follows:
      1. One member who shall be a master pipefitter at the time of appointment, having at least ten (10) years in business as a master pipefitter.
      2. One member who shall be a refrigeration/air conditioning master at the time of appointment, having at least ten (10) years in business as a refrigeration/air conditioning master.
      3. One member who has been employed as a pipefitter journeyperson for ten (10) years.
      4. One member who has been employed as a refrigeration/air conditioning journeyperson for ten (10) years.
      5. One member who shall be a fire protection sprinkler master at the time of appointment, having at least ten (10) years in business as a fire protection sprinkler master.
      6. One member who has been employed as a journeyperson sprinkler fitter for ten (10) years.
      7. One member shall be the state fire marshal or his or her designee.
      8. Two (2) members to be appointed from a list submitted by the Oil Heat Institute, Inc. and who have been doing business as masters for at least ten (10) years.
      9. One member who shall be a sheet metal master at the time of appointment, having at least ten (10) years in business as a sheet metal master.
      10. One member who has been employed as a journeyperson sheet metal worker for ten (10) years.
    3. Members shall be appointed to serve for three (3) years and their successors shall be appointed for three (3) years.
    4. On the expiration of the term of any master or journeyperson member of the board, the governor shall appoint for a term of three (3) years a master or journeyperson or member having the qualifications required by this chapter to take the place of the master or journeyperson whose term has expired.
    5. Any vacancy that occurs for any cause shall be filled by appointment by the governor for the remainder of the unexpired term.
    6. The board shall have an advisory role in the preparation and composition of the license examinations to be administered by the division. Subsequent to the administration of the examinations, the board of examiners shall review the examinations to evaluate their effectiveness.
    7. A chairperson shall be elected every three (3) years from the members; a majority will constitute a quorum of the full board. The senior chief investigator for the division shall have both a master pipefitter I and master refrigeration I license, with a minimum of five (5) years’ employment in the state of Rhode Island as a journeyperson and five (5) years as a contractor. He or she shall be appointed by the licensing board and the position shall be in the classified service at not less than pay grade 335.
    8. There shall be a chief investigator for the division who shall have both a master pipefitter and master refrigeration license, with a minimum of five (5) years’ employment in the state of Rhode Island as a journeyperson and five (5) years as a contractor. He or she shall be appointed by the director of labor and training, upon recommendation from the licensing board, and this position shall be in the classified service.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 418, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 119, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 370, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-3. Disposition of fees — Annual report.

  1. Annually, after June 30 of each year, the division’s state licensed chief administrator will compile a detailed statement of all income and expenses of the division. Any proceeds from the licensing fees and any other income guaranteed pursuant to this section shall be deposited as general revenues.
  2. Members of the board shall not be compensated for their service on the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 95; P.L. 2003, ch. 202, § 3; P.L. 2003, ch. 426, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 21, § 23.

28-27-4. “Fire protection sprinkler contractor,” “master pipefitting contractor,” “master refrigeration contractor,” and “master sheet metal contractor” defined.

  1. “Fire protection sprinkler contractor” means a person having a regular place of business and who, by himself or herself or a journeyperson sprinkler fitter in his or her employ, performs fire protection sprinkler systems work.
  2. “Master pipefitting contractor” means a person having a regular place of business and who, by him or herself, or a journeyperson pipefitter in his or her employ, performs pipefitting work subject to the provisions of this chapter and the rules and regulations and licensing criteria promulgated under this chapter.
  3. “Master refrigeration contractor” means a person having a regular place of business and who, by him or herself or a journeyperson refrigeration technician in his or her employ, performs refrigeration/air conditioning work.
  4. “Master sheet metal contractor” means a person having a regular place of business and who, by him or herself or a journeyperson sheet metal worker in his or her employ, performs sheet metal work.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-4.1. “Journeyperson refrigeration technician” defined.

“Journeyperson refrigeration technician” means any person who has completed a five-year (5) apprentice program and/or has passed a refrigeration technician examination and who by him or herself does work in refrigeration/air conditioning subject to provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and licensing criteria promulgated hereunder.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 383, § 1.

28-27-4.2. “Journeyperson pipefitter,” “journeyperson sheet metal worker,” and “journeyperson sprinkler fitter” defined.

  1. “Journeyperson pipefitter” means any person who has completed a five-year (5) apprentice program and/or has passed a journeyperson examination and who by himself or herself does work on pipefitting systems subject to provisions of this chapter. The rules, regulations, and licensing criteria guide promulgated under this chapter referencing Class II limited journeyperson licenses shall require completion of an accepted formal technical program approved by the department of labor and training.
  2. “Journeyperson sheet metal worker” means any person who has completed a four-year (4) apprentice program and/or has passed a journeyperson sheet metal worker examination and who by himself or herself does sheet metal work subject to provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and licensing criteria promulgated under this chapter.
  3. “Journeyperson sprinkler fitter” means any person who has completed a four-year (4) apprentice program and/or has passed a journeyperson sprinkler fitter examination and who by himself or herself does work in fire protection sprinkler systems subject to provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and licensing criteria promulgated under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 370, § 1.

28-27-4.3. “Journeyperson sheet metal worker apprentice,” “journeyperson sprinkler fitter apprentice,” “pipefitter apprentice,” and “refrigeration/air conditioning apprentice” defined — Duration of apprentice programs.

  1. “Journeyperson sheet metal worker apprentice” means any person at least eighteen (18) years of age who is learning or working at the businesses of sheet metal work under the direct supervision of a sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker under a registered state sanctioned apprentice program.
  2. “Journeyperson sprinkler fitter apprentice” means any person at least eighteen (18) years of age who is learning or working at the business of fire protection sprinkler systems under the direct supervision of a master or journeyperson sprinkler fitter under a registered state sanctioned apprentice program.
  3. “Pipefitter apprentice” means any person at least eighteen (18) years of age who is learning or working at the business of pipefitting under the direct supervision of a master pipefitter or journeyperson pipefitter under a registered state sanctioned apprentice program.
  4. Pipefitter, refrigeration, sprinkler fitter, and sheet metal worker apprentice programs are of a five-year (5) duration, except as detailed in § 28-27-4.2 , for all Class II limited licenses.
  5. “Refrigeration/air conditioning apprentice” means any person at least eighteen (18) years of age who is learning and working at the business of refrigeration/air conditioning under the direct supervision of a refrigeration/air conditioning master or journeyperson under a registered state sanctioned apprentice program.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 9; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-4.4. “Master mechanical contractor” defined — License fee.

  1. “Master mechanical contractor” means any person who has worked as a contractor and has been associated in both trades of pipefitting and refrigeration for at least ten (10) years as a Rhode Island Licensed Pipefitter Master I and at least ten (10) years as a Rhode Island Licensed Refrigeration Master I, and who shall be designated as a master mechanical contractor subject to provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations and licensing criteria promulgated hereunder.
  2. The license fee for a master mechanical contractor is two hundred forty dollars ($240).

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 370, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 9.

28-27-5. Practices for which master or contractor license required.

  1. No person shall: (1) Engage in this state in the business of the mechanical trades as a master or as an employer of the mechanical trades; (2) Enter into contracts or agreements for the installation, maintenance, repair, or servicing in the mechanical trades; (3) Advertise or represent in any form or matter that they are masters or that they will install pipefitting or refrigeration/air conditioning, or air distribution systems or perform fire protection sprinkler work, unless the person possesses a valid license issued by the department of labor and training under this chapter. All masters shall carry this license on their person at all times while so engaged, and shall affix their master’s license number to any advertisement and/or contract they execute and/or bid they file with any consumer for their professional services and to any applicable permit required for the performance of those services.
  2. A person holding a valid master license under this chapter shall not be required to obtain an additional license under this chapter to perform sheet metal work when AC air handling equipment is ten (10) tons or less or when heating equipment does not exceed 250,000 BTUs. A person holding a valid master license under this chapter can bid or quote or solicit bids for the installation, maintenance, repair and perform all work and the servicing of sheet metal work, but must subcontract the aforementioned work to a properly licensed sheet metal contractor to perform the work only when AC air handling equipment is in excess of ten (10) tons or when heating equipment exceeds 250,000 BTUs. The subcontractor must secure the proper state or municipal permits for the work subcontracted to be performed.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 173, § 1.

Cross References.

Qualifications for master license, § 28-27-10 .

28-27-5.1. Practices for which a journeyperson or apprentice license required.

  1. No person shall engage to work as a pipefitter, refrigeration/air conditioning, or sprinkler fitter journeyperson or apprentice, or journeyperson sheet metal worker or apprentice, or shall advertise or represent in any form or matter that he or she is a journeyperson or apprentice, unless that person possesses and carries on his or her person at all times while so engaged a valid license issued by the department of labor and training qualifying that person as a journeyperson or apprentice.
  2. A person holding a valid license under this chapter shall not be required to obtain an additional license under this chapter to perform sheet metal work when AC air handling equipment is ten (10) tons or less or when heating equipment does not exceed 250,000 BTUs.
  3. A holder of a journeyperson license shall only be entitled to work as an employee of the properly licensed master permit holder in accordance with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 173, § 1.

Cross References.

Qualifications for journeyman and apprentice license, § 28-27-11 .

28-27-5.2. Issuance of P.J.F. journeyperson oil burnerperson’s license.

  1. Any person who has previously qualified for the electrician’s F certificate and the P.J.F. II limited to oil individually, and presently holds both licenses, may convert to the single P.J.F. limited journeyperson II oil burnerperson’s license by application to the division on an approved application and with payment of the applicable fee as detailed in this section. This licensee cannot be self-employed and is limited to domestic oil burner service work, burner, tank, and oil line installation. Persons seeking an initial P.J.F. limited journeyperson II oil burner license must show proof of completion of a trade sponsored program or a trade related program offered by a recognized college. All programs must have prior approval of the department of labor and training before licenses are issued.
  2. The person seeking P.J.F. licensing must be employed by a master pipefitting contractor class II as detailed under § 28-27-4 .
  3. The above provisions are similar for most limited licenses under this chapter.
  4. Fees shall be as follows:
    1. Apprenticeship fee is thirty dollars ($30.00) with birth-month licensing;
    2. License fee is seventy-two dollars ($72.00) with birth-month licensing;
    3. Renewal fee is seventy-two dollars ($72.00) with birth-month licensing;
  5. The fees collected shall be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 95; P.L. 2001, ch. 370, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 9.

28-27-5.3. Oil burnerperson’s limited license.

A P.J.F. limited oil burner serviceperson’s license shall be granted to any person who has passed an examination before the division. It shall specify the name of the person, who shall thereby be authorized to work on and repair electric wiring and equipment located in or on oil burners burning fuel oil no heavier than no. 2 and other equipment serviced by oil burner contractors, only to the extent necessary to service, maintain, and repair the oil burners and equipment. The license shall limit the holder to do work on electric wiring or equipment located between the meter and the oil burners and equipment, but in no event to do any electrical work on burners burning no. 3, 4, 5, or 6 fuel oil.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-6. Corporations and firms engaged in business.

  1. No corporation, firm, association, or partnership shall engage in business, advertise, make application for and take out permits, bid for work, or represent itself as a mechanical contractor, pipefitter, refrigeration/air conditioning, fire protection sprinkler systems master or contractor or sheet metal contractor unless:
    1. A licensed mechanical contractor, pipefitter, refrigeration/air conditioning, fire protection sprinkler systems master, or sheet metal contractor as applicable, as provided in this chapter, is continuously engaged in the supervision of that entity’s installation, maintenance, and repair work and the licensed master is an officer of the corporation, a partner in the partnership, or a similarly authorized principal of any such firm, association, or other entity; or
    2. That entity possesses a valid mechanical contractor, pipefitter, refrigeration-air conditioning, fire protection sprinkler systems contractor’s or sheet metal contractor license, as applicable, duly issued by the department of labor and training as further described in subsection (b) of this section.
  2. Upon application of any of the above entities in form and substance prescribed by the department of labor and training, and receipt of the fee for the application and license that shall be equal to the fee for a mechanical contractor, pipefitter, refrigeration-air conditioning, sheet metal, fire protection sprinkler systems master, or sheet metal contractor license as described in § 28-27-17 , as the same may be amended from time to time, the department of labor and training shall issue the applicant entity a license as a mechanical contractor, as applicable. The contractor’s license shall specify the name of the entity holding the license and shall state that the license holder: (1) Has a masters license in the mechanical trades, as defined in § 28-27-1.0 , and who is continuously engaged in the supervision of the entity’s installation, maintenance, and repair work, and who is an officer of the corporation, a partner in the partnership, or a similarly authorized principal of any such firm, association, or other entity; or (2) Continuously employs at all times while holding this license a person with a masters license in the applicable mechanical trade, as provided in this chapter, who shall be continuously engaged in the supervision of the entity’s installation, maintenance, and repair work. The contractor’s license shall entitle the entity holding the license to engage in business, advertise, bid for work, or represent itself as a mechanical contractor, and also entitles the entity to make application for and take out permits through its duly authorized officer or similarly authorized principal as well as through the duly licensed contractor master as described in this section or the duly licensed master continuously employed by the entity as stated in this section, as the case may be. The contractor’s license shall not, however, in and of itself, permit a principal, officer, employee, or agent of the entity holding the license to individually engage in installation, maintenance, or repair work as described in this section unless the principal, officer, employee, or agent is individually licensed to do so.
  3. Any work engaged in, advertised for, applied for by permit, bid for, or represented to be permissible, shall be solely of the type for which the licensed master or contract master who serves as an officer or similarly authorized principal of the entity or who, in the case of a licensed master, is continuously employed by the entity holding a contractor’s license, is duly licensed to perform.
  4. Any licensed master or contractor master who serves as an officer or similarly authorized principal of such an entity or who, in the case of a licensed master, is continuously employed by an entity holding a contractor’s license, shall represent the interests of one such entity and only one such entity at any given time as described in this section.
  5. If the licensed master or contractor master described in this section ceases to be an officer or similarly authorized principal of one of the entities described in this section or, in the case of a licensed master, ceases to be continuously employed by an entity holding a contractor’s license for any reason whatsoever, the entity shall provide written notice of the cessation of continuous employment to the department of labor and training no more than fourteen (14) days after the effective date of occurrence of the cessation. Any entity so affected shall provide written notice to the department of labor and training specifying the licensed master or contractor master who shall replace the departed licensed master or contractor master, as applicable, referenced in this section no more than forty-five (45) days after the effective date of occurrence of the cessation.
  6. No corporation, firm, association, partnership, or other entity that engages in, offers to engage in, or represents that it engages in the mechanical trades for the purpose of maintenance, or repair work in the state of Rhode Island shall be permitted to incorporate, form, qualify to do business, or otherwise register with the Rhode Island secretary of state’s office until and unless that office has first received a written confirmation from the department of labor and training that all requisite licenses to be issued by the department of labor and training have been issued and remain in good standing.
  7. Any willful violation of this section shall be grounds for revocation of license as further described in § 28-27-21 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 180, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-6.1. Owners’ right to install.

An owner of a single-family domestic dwelling who intends to occupy the premises himself or herself may, after approval by local municipal and/or state authorities and upon receipt of a permit, install pipefitting, refrigeration, sheet metal, or fire protection sprinkler systems work in Rhode Island without being licensed by the division of professional regulation. The work must conform to the best installation practices of the trade and all applicable portions of the B.O.A.C.A. code and procedures adopted by the division of professional regulation.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-6.2. Issuance of contractor master license.

  1. There is created a class of license that shall be known, respectively, as a pipefitter, refrigeration-air conditioning, sheet metal, fire protection sprinkler systems contractor master. This license shall not, in and of itself, permit any holder of it to individually engage in installation, maintenance, or repair as described in this chapter, but may instead only be used in conjunction with a contractor’s license as described in § 28-27-6 .
  2. No application for a license of pipefitter, refrigeration-air conditioning, sheet metal, fire protection sprinkler contractor master shall be filed with the department of labor and training, nor shall any applicant be permitted to take the examination for such a license, unless:
    1. The applicant possesses the requisite skill, expertise, education, experience, training, and other qualities or qualifications to take the examination that the department of labor and training, by the promulgation of regulations, may require;
    2. The application is accompanied by a test fee which shall equal the fee for a Pipefitter Master I as outlined in § 28-27-17 .
  3. Upon passage of the contractor master examination as prepared and administered by the department of labor and training upon recommendation and advice of the board, payment of a license fee which shall equal the fee for a Pipefitter Master I as outlined in § 28-27-17 shall be required and the contractor master license shall be issued as provided in § 28-27-15 .
  4. Applications must be filed with the department of labor and training at least fifteen (15) days prior to the examination date.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-7. Functions of board of examiners.

The board shall act in an advisory capacity to the division of professional regulation in:

  1. Preparing forms for application for examination for licenses.
  2. Preparing subject matter, questions, and all necessary items for examination as provided in this chapter.
  3. Preparation of rules to govern examinations and hearings for revocation and reinstatement of licenses.
  4. The performance of any other duties for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this chapter that are from time to time prescribed by the director of the department.
  5. The adoption and from time to time the revision of any rules and regulations and a licensing criteria guide not inconsistent with the law that may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this chapter subject to the administrative procedures act, chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-8. Duties of director.

The director of the department of labor and training shall:

  1. Prepare license certificates and issue them in conformity with this chapter;
  2. Maintain an up-to-date record specifying the name and address of licensed pipefitters or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractors, and sprinkler fitters masters, journeypersons and sheet metal contractors and journeypersons sheet metal workers of this state. These records shall show dates of issuance of licenses and be open to public inspection. These records shall also show dates of filing of complaints and the nature of the complaints for revocation of license and the date of, as well as the final order upon, those complaints;
  3. Prescribe standards for what constitutes a recognized college or university, and determine the conformance to the standards; and
  4. Prepare a full and complete monthly statement of all receipts derived under this chapter and turn over to the general treasurer all money in possession in the department.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-9. Application for license.

Any applicant for a license as pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor or sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker or sprinkler fitter master or journeyperson in the state shall present his or her application to the department on the printed form provided for the application.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-9.1. Grandfathering — Licensing of sheet metal contractors and sheet metal journeypersons without examination.

    1. After enactment of this chapter and at any time prior to the expiration of twelve (12) months following enactment of this section, the authority shall, without examination, upon payment of the fees required in this chapter issue through the department of labor and training, division of professional regulation, a sheet metal contractor’s license or sheet metal journeyperson’s license to any applicant who currently holds a valid pipefitter or refrigeration license in the state of Rhode Island. A sheet metal journeyperson shall have a minimum of four (4) years of verified experience in the sheet metal business covered by the license, as applicable.
    2. An applicant for a sheet metal contractor’s license under this provision must further provide sworn evidence of satisfactory sheet metal experience for a minimum of five (5) years of verified experience in the sheet metal business covered by such license, as applicable.
  1. Any person qualified to obtain a sheet metal contractor’s license or a sheet metal journeyperson’s license under this section who is prevented from making application herefor by reason of service in the armed forces of the United States during the twelve-month (12) period following enactment of this section [July 7, 2000] shall have three (3) months after discharge or release from active duty to make such application.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-10. License of pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor or sheet metal contractor or sprinkler fitter master — Test fee — License fee — Qualifications — Filing deadline.

  1. No application for a license of a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor or sheet metal contractor or sprinkler fitter master shall be filed by the department nor shall any applicant be permitted to take the examination for a license as a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor or sheet metal contractor or sprinkler fitter master unless:
    1. The test application is accompanied by a test fee as outlined in § 28-27-17 ;
    2. Upon passing of a master test, or contractor test for sheet metal contractor applicants, payment of a license fee as outlined in § 28-27-17 is required and the master license will be issued as provided in § 28-27-15 ; and
    3. The applicant possesses a certificate of license in full force and effect from the department of labor and training specifying that person as a journeyperson licensed as such for a minimum of one year or the application is accompanied by an affidavit or other reasonably satisfactory evidence showing the laws of another state specifying that person as a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor or sprinkler fitter master.
  2. Applications must be filed with the department at least fifteen (15) days prior to the examination date.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

Cross References.

Practices for which master license required, § 28-27-5 .

28-27-11. Journeyperson license — Test fees — License fees and qualifications — Filing deadline for journeyperson.

  1. No application for a journeyperson’s test shall be filed by the department nor shall any applicant be permitted to take the examination for a license as a journeyperson unless:
    1. The test application is accompanied by a test fee as outlined in § 28-27-17 ;
    2. Upon passing of a journeyperson test, payment of a license fee as outlined in § 28-27-17 is required and the journeyperson license will be issued as provided in § 28-27-15 ;
    3. The applicant has possessed for at least five (5) years prior to the filing of the application a certificate of registration in full force and effect from the department of labor and training specifying the person as a registered apprentice, and the application of an applicant:
      1. Is accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits of his or her employer or former employers or other reasonably satisfactory evidence showing that the applicant has been actually engaged in pipefitting or refrigeration/air conditioning, sheet metal or fire protection sprinkler systems work as an apprentice in the state of Rhode Island during those five (5) years;
      2. Is accompanied by an affidavit or other reasonably satisfactory evidence showing that the applicant has been registered as a student in a recognized college, university, or trade school and has pursued a course of pipefitting or refrigeration/air conditioning, sheet metal or fire protection sprinkler systems for at least two (2) academic years or is the recipient of an associate degree in pipefitting or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler systems, and has thereafter been registered by the department of labor and training as an apprentice for at least three (3) years and employed as a registered apprentice by a duly licensed pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler systems master or sheet metal contractors in this state for a period of three (3) years; or
      3. Is accompanied by an affidavit or other reasonably satisfactory evidence showing that the applicant possesses a certificate of license issued under the laws of another state specifying that person as a journeyperson; and
    4. The licensing authority may grant an exemption to the requirements of subsection (a)(3) on the basis of past experience.
  2. The test application is to be filed with the department at least fifteen (15) days prior to the examination date.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

Cross References.

Practices for which a journeyman or apprentice license required, § 28-27-5.1 .

Registration of apprentices, § 28-27-18 .

28-27-12. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 3, effective June 28, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-27-12 concerned license applicants’ bonds.

28-27-13. Change of address.

Any person who holds a certificate of license as a master, journeyperson, or apprentice shall promptly notify the department in the event of a change of address specified on his or her certificate of license. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be assessed the sum of twelve dollars ($12.00) as an administrative fee.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 9.

28-27-14. Examination of applicants.

The department shall provide and conduct examinations three (3) times each year of applicants who have had their application for a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor/sprinkler fitter master or journeyperson or sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker placed on file with the department. All examinations shall be conducted by the division of professional regulation of the department of labor and training with the aid and cooperation of the board of examiners and shall be conducted at places designated by the department within the state consistent with the reasonable convenience of the applicant. All test materials shall be preserved for three (3) months after the date of the test.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-15. Issuance of licensing following examination.

The director of labor and training shall allow or deny applications for master or contractors’ or journeyperson’s license upon the recommendation of the division as soon after the examination as practicable. Each applicant who has successfully passed the examination and has had his or her application allowed shall be issued a certificate of license in the category tested for as a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor/sprinkler fitter master or journeyperson or sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker by the division on payment of the proper fee.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-16. Reexamination of applicants.

Any applicant who has failed an examination shall be permitted to take subsequent examinations at any of the three (3) examinations scheduled during the year as set forth in § 28-27-14 . Every retest shall require payment of a separate test fee.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 262, § 1.

28-27-17. Test fees — License fees — Expiration and renewal of licenses.

  1. All licenses issued to the pipefitters/refrigeration technicians and fire protection sprinkler contractor/sprinkler fitters and sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker detailed in this section shall be paid for as follows:

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  2. Apprenticeship renewal fees shall be paid on an annual basis.
  3. Every license issued by the division of professional regulation to license holders born in odd years shall expire on the birthday of the individual qualifying for the license in odd years and all licenses issued by the division of professional regulation to license holders born in even years shall expire on the birthday of the individual qualifying for the license in even years and all licenses may be renewed on or before their expiration date, upon payment of the appropriate fee. If any credit is due in the initial changeover year the amount of credit shall be determined by the chief administrator of the division.

TEST LICENSE RENEWAL Master Mechanical Contractor — 480.00 480.00 Contractor Master 75.00 240.00 240.00 Pipefitter Master I 75.00 240.00 240.00 Pipefitter Master II 75.00 96.00 96.00 Refrigeration Master I 75.00 240.00 240.00 Refrigeration Master II 75.00 96.00 96.00 Pipefitter Journeyperson I 75.00 72.00 72.00 Pipefitter Journeyperson II 75.00 60.00 60.00 Refrigeration Journeyperson I 75.00 72.00 72.00 Refrigeration Journeyperson II 75.00 60.00 60.00 Apprentices (annual fee) — 24.00 24.00 Fire Protection Sprinkler Fitters Master I 75.00 240.00 240.00 Fire Protection Sprinkler Fitters Journeyperson I 75.00 72.00 72.00 Sheet Metal Contractor 75.00 240.00 240.00 Sheet Metal Worker Journeyperson 75.00 72.00 72.00

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 9; P.L. 2004, ch. 595, art. 13, § 4; P.L. 2009, ch. 257, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 258, § 3.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2009, ch. 257, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [November 12, 2009] and provides that for persons born in an even year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2010; for persons born in an odd year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2011.

P.L. 2009, ch. 258, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [November 13, 2009] and provides that for persons born in an even year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2010; for persons born in an odd year, the provisions of sections 1 through 5 inclusive shall be applied to such persons as of January 1, 2011.

28-27-17.1. Failure to renew license.

Any licensed master, contractor journeyperson, or apprentice who does not renew his or her license on or before his or her birthdate shall be required to pay a twelve-dollar-per-month ($12) administrative assessment fee for the first two (2) years of delinquency, plus outstanding license fees. If a license is not renewed within two (2) years of its expiration it shall result in a forfeiture of the license, notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter. In the case of forfeiture, a license may only be reinstated by the person taking a test for a new license.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 9.

28-27-17.2. Certificates expiring while licensee is in federal service.

Any pipefitter, refrigeration, sprinkler fitter or sheet metal worker license expiring while the holder thereof is in the military, naval, or air service of the United States shall be renewed without further examination, upon payment of the prescribed fee, at any time within four (4) months after that person’s discharge from the service.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 212, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-18. Registration of apprentices.

  1. Any person who has agreed to work under the supervision of a licensed pipefitter, refrigeration/air conditioning, sprinkler fitter, or sheet metal master under a state-sanctioned apprenticeship program shall be registered by the director of labor and training and be issued a certificate of apprenticeship.
  2. The minimum formal training period for a P.J.F. limited class II license shall be one hundred sixty (160) hours of classroom and/or laboratory technical training, approved by the department of labor and training. The fee schedules for the P.J.F. limited license are detailed in § 28-27-5.2 . All other sections of this chapter shall remain in full force and effect.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 9; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 3.

28-27-19. License displayed in place of business.

In every place in this state within and from which a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler systems or air distribution business is conducted as specified for a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor/sprinkler fitter master or sheet metal contractor there shall be at all times a certificate of license as provided in this chapter. The certificate shall contain the name, address, social security number, state license number, classification, and limitations, if any, on the license. All vehicles used in those businesses shall be identified as being regulated by the bureau and will display with no less than three-inch (3) lettering, the contractors category, license number, and company name.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 370, § 1.

28-27-20. State and municipal inspections and installation permits.

Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit any city, town, or the state from providing for a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler systems or air distribution systems inspection or from requiring permits for the installation, maintenance, repair, and servicing of pipefitting or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler systems or air distribution systems and collecting fees thereof. Whenever a permit is required under the provisions of this section, a condition of its issuance shall be that the contractor’s license number and a copy of the contractor’s license first be affixed on the permit which must be signed by the contractor. The permit must be obtained from the state, city, or town prior to the installation. Where equipment and appliance replacements or repairs must be performed in an emergency situation, the permit application shall be submitted within the next business day to the office of mechanical inspection.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 370, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 38, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 143, § 1.

28-27-21. Grounds for revocation of license.

The director of labor and training shall revoke or suspend the license or impose a fine on any pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor/sprinkler fitter master or journeyperson or sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker after hearing before and recommendation of the board, when the weight of the evidence establishes any one or more of the following specific violations:

  1. Obtaining or conspiring with others to obtain a license by inducing the issuance of that license in consideration of the payment of money, or any other thing of value, or by and through a willful or fraudulent misrepresentation of facts or the procurement thereof;
  2. Willfully violating any ordinances or rules of any cities or towns or of any laws in this state regulating the conduct of pipefitting or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler systems or air distribution systems work;
  3. Knowingly hiring, directly aiding or assisting any person to engage in the work specified for a pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor/sprinkler fitter master or journeyperson or sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker when that person does not have a license as provided in this chapter;
  4. Any pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning or fire protection sprinkler contractor/sprinkler fitter master or journeyperson or sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker willfully and fraudulently loaning his or her license to any other person for the purpose of permitting that person to engage in any work in violation of this chapter;
  5. Being convicted of a felony; or
  6. Willfully violating any of the provisions of this chapter including the rules, regulations, and licensing criteria guide promulgated under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-22. Procedure for revocation of license.

  1. No proceedings to revoke a license as provided in this section shall be instituted unless filed with the department of labor and training within one year after the date or dates of violation(s).
  2. No license shall be revoked or cancelled until a full and impartial hearing as provided in this section.
  3. No hearing for the purpose of revoking any license of master or contractor or journeyperson shall be held unless there is first placed on file with the department a verified complaint, in writing, reciting therein with reasonable particularity a statement of facts that, if proved, would be sufficient to constitute a violation of one or more of the specifications as set forth in § 28-27-21 .
  4. Upon the filing of a verified complaint as provided in this chapter, the department shall promptly set a date for the hearing of the charges which shall be held in the city of Providence in this state. The department shall promptly by registered, certified mail forward to the licensee charged in the complaint a true and honest copy of the complaint and notification of the time and place a hearing of the charges shall be held.
  5. At the time and place fixed in the notification, the department shall proceed to a hearing before the board of the charges specified in the complaint. No hearing upon the charges of the complaint shall be had unless the records of the department contain evidence that the licensee charged in the complaint has been served with a copy of the complaint and notification of at least twenty (20) days prior to the date of the hearing; provided, that the appearance of the licensee so charged, either in his or her own behalf or by counsel, shall constitute proof that sufficient notice of hearing was served.
  6. A complaining party by him or herself or by counsel may aid in the presentation of evidence toward sustaining the complaint. Ample opportunity shall be accorded for hearing all evidence and statement of counsel either in support or against the charges of the complaint. Upon good cause shown, the date of the hearing on the complaint may be continued; provided that the licensee and other interested parties shall be reasonably notified about the date of the continuance.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-22.1. Subpoena of a witness.

The department shall have the power to subpoena and bring before it or the board of examiners any witnesses to the testimony either orally or by deposition, or both, with the same fees and mileage and in the same manner as prescribed by law in the judicial procedure in civil cases in the superior court of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-22.2. Subpoena powers.

Prior to or during a hearing the director and division chief shall have the power to administer oaths and examine witnesses under oath, issue subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, compel the attendance of witnesses, and the production of papers, books, accounts, records, payrolls, documents, and testimony and to take depositions and affidavits in any proceeding before the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-23. Administration of oaths.

The director and his or her designees shall have the power to administer oaths to witnesses at a hearing that the department has authorized by law to conduct and any other oaths authorized or administered by the department.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-24. Recommendations of board — Order of the director — Appeal.

  1. The board, upon the completion of any hearing held on a verified complaint, shall present to the director of labor and training a written report of its findings and recommendations. The director shall then order that the license of the licensee charged shall be revoked or suspended, or impose a fine of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) for a first violation and two thousand dollars ($2,000) for any subsequent violation within one year of the first violation, or that the complaint shall be dismissed in accordance with the recommendations. A copy of the order shall be immediately served upon the licensee and/or violator personally or by registered or certified mail. The order of the board is final unless the licensee and/or violator so charged or complainant within twenty (20) days after receipt of the order files an appeal with the director. The appeal will be determined by the administrator of the division or his or her designee. The director may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the recommended order of the board. The order of the director shall be final, and a copy of it shall be immediately served upon the person, firm, or corporation assessed.
  2. The division is considered a person for the purpose of this section.
  3. The chief of the section shall act as an investigator with respect to the enforcement of all the provisions of law relative to the licensing of pipefitting, refrigeration, sprinkler fitting, and sheet metal and, to this effect, whenever a complaint is made by the chief of the section to the department of labor and training director, or designee, that the provisions of this chapter are being violated, the director of the department of labor and training, or designee, may issue an order to cease and desist from that violation and may impose the above penalties against the violator and against the contractor. Each individual person acting in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall constitute a separate offense to any violator and/or contractor assessed a penalty under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 265, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 319, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 407, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 432, § 2.

28-27-24.1. Compelling obedience to subpoenas.

In case of failure of any person to comply with any subpoena lawfully issued or subpoena duces tecum, or on the refusal of any witness to testify to any matter regarding which he or she may be lawfully interrogated, it shall be the duty of the district court or any judge of the district court, on application by the director, to compel obedience by proceedings in the nature of those for contempt.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-25. Judicial review of proceedings.

The superior court of the county where the licensee and/or violator so charged resided shall have the power to review the entire proceedings of any hearing had before the director and to review any order dismissing a complaint or revocation of a license and all questions of law presented by the record provided an appeal is filed pursuant to chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-25.1. Judicial enforcement.

The district court shall have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the provisions of this chapter upon petition being filed by the director of labor and training, or his or her designee, and notice being given to the person or persons charged with a violation of the provisions of this chapter, and it may issue any process of injunction, mandamus, or otherwise that in the opinion of the court is necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this chapter, but no ex parte restraining order shall be issued unless upon showing satisfactory to the court that danger to life or property is imminent, and in that case citation to the defendant shall be returnable not more than five (5) days after the ex parte restraining order is entered.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-26. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 114, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 3, effective June 28, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-27-26 concerned penalties for violations.

28-27-26.1. Enforcement.

  1. It shall be the duty of the director of the department of labor and training and of state and local inspection authorities to enforce the provisions of this chapter. Local building and related inspectors, who are involved in day-to-day inspection, shall have the primary responsibility for enforcing the provisions of this chapter. The above individuals shall have authority to demand the production of the licenses and certificates required by this chapter on any site where work that is the subject of this chapter is occurring, and shall have the authority to investigate and where appropriate make complaints pursuant to § 28-27-21 , § 28-27-28 or § 28-22-2 where sufficient evidence has been obtained to sustain a reasonable belief that a violation of this chapter has occurred.
  2. The state board of examiners shall also have concurrent responsibility to enforce the provisions of this chapter, and shall have the authority to demand the production of the licenses and certificates required by this chapter on any site where work that is the subject of this chapter is occurring, and shall have the authority to investigate and where appropriate make complaints pursuant to § 28-27-21 , § 28-27-28 or § 28-22-2 where sufficient evidence has been obtained to sustain a reasonable belief that a violation of this chapter has occurred. The director of the department of labor and training shall provide identification to the board members for the purposes of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 239, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-27. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 3, effective June 28, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-27-27 concerned prosecution of violations.

28-27-28. Practices for which a license is required.

  1. A license is required for the installation, repair, replacement, servicing, maintenance, and alteration of:
    1. Any devices or accessories for what is normally considered heating/cooling equipment, air distribution equipment, duct work, process piping, power piping, pipefitting, and fire protection sprinkler with no reference to the plumbing industry; and
    2. Vacuum and pneumatic systems, oil and petroleum products, ice making machinery, refrigeration and air conditioning equipment, and piping systems used for the conveyance and storage of liquids, solids, and industrial type gases as per § 28-27-1 , and vacuum piping used for domestic vacuum cleaning systems and natural or manufactured gas piping used for emergency electric generators. Heating piping system does not mean or include, and nothing in the regulation shall be held or construed to have any application to, the installation or servicing as detailed of factory manufactured domestic plug-in units or other package assemblies not requiring special wiring over and above the normal #5 AWG wire used in domestic two hundred twenty (220) volt household duplex receptacles for sixteen (16) AMP branch circuits with two (2) or three (3) outlets, field hook up or checking by qualified licensed pipefitters/refrigeration technicians. “Servicing” as defined for these units means the seasonal filter changes or general cleaning, and shall be made obvious to the consumer by clearly printing on the work order or bills that the consumer is not paying for state licensed masters or journeypersons doing mechanical service work. Commercial applications of domestic units shall be regulated pursuant to § 28-27-1 .
  2. A license is required for any of the following work when, and only when, carried out within a building or structure, or within five feet (5´) of the outer wall of a building or structure: the installation, repair, replacement, alteration, or maintenance of fire protection apparatus within a structure, standpipes that are not connected to sprinkler systems, also including the layout, onsite fabrication, installation, alteration, or repair of any automatic or manual sprinkler system designed for the protection of the interior or exterior of a building or structure from fire, also any piping or tubing and appurtenances and equipment pertaining to the system including overhead and underground water mains, fire hydrants and hydrant mains, standpipes and hose connections to sprinkler systems, sprinkler tank heaters, air lines and thermal systems used in connection with sprinkler and alarm systems, or special hazard systems including water sprays, foam, carbon dioxide or dry chemical systems, halon and other liquid or gas fire suppression systems, and excluding any engineering design work connected with the layout of fire protection sprinkler systems.
  3. A license is required for sheet metal work, which is defined as the manufacturing, fabrication, assembling, handling, erection, installation, dismantling, conditioning, adjustment, alteration, repairing, and servicing of all ferrous or nonferrous metal work and all other materials in lieu thereof and air-handling systems regardless of the material used, including specifically: The handling, fabrication, setting, installation, assembling, dismantling, adjustment, alteration, reconditioning, repairing of all duct work, installation of fans, sheaves, belt guards, dampers, louvers, screens, registers, grills, diffusers, sound traps, attenuators, mixing boxes, access doors to air-handling systems, breaching, hoods and all appurtenances relating to HVAC and exhaust systems and the testing, adjusting, and balancing of all air-handling equipment and duct work. Holders of the NEBB (National Environmental Balancing Bureau), AABC (Associated Air Balancing Council) or a TABB (Testing, Adjusting and Balancing Bureau) certificate are exempt for the purposes of testing and balancing HVAC systems.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 135, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 174, § 2.

28-27-29. Persons and acts exempt.

  1. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to persons classified as maintenance personnel regularly in the employ of a public utility company doing utility company work, hospitals, schools, city, town or state employees regularly employed as maintenance personnel on the premises of the employer, and to any person employed in a plant maintenance department.
  2. “Maintenance” is confined to the specific premise and means preserving or repairing anything that exists and can be maintained by persons regularly employed within a specific building or complex. Normally, city or town permits are not required for this work, nor is a state pipefitters/refrigeration or sheet metal workers license.
  3. “Service work” means work performed by state licensed qualified tradespersons or pipefitters/refrigeration mechanics or sheet metal workers.
  4. “Installation or new construction” means the modification, altering, or installation of any piping/refrigeration or air distribution systems or their components (i.e., boilers, pumps, compressors, circulators, fans, and coils). This work requires state licensed pipefitter/refrigeration workers or sheet metal workers and city and town or state mechanical permits. If boiler installation is over two hundred thousand (200,000) BTU’s on commercial work, a state boiler permit from occupational safety is required.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-30. Enforcement procedures.

Violations of this chapter may be enjoined upon bill of complaint being filed in the superior court for the county in which those violations have been committed by the department of labor and training or by any association of pipefitter or refrigeration/air conditioning masters or journeypersons, licensed pipefitter or refrigeration/air condition masters or journeypersons, or association of sheet metal contractors or journeyperson sheet metal workers, licensed sheet metal contractor or journeyperson sheet metal worker or by any inspector. Injunctions may be granted by the superior court after hearing in open court against any person, firm, corporation, or association that has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, without regard to whether proceedings have been or may have been instituted before the department. No ex parte restraining orders shall be issued in suits brought pursuant to this section. Violators may also be ordered to pay the complaint’s reasonable attorney’s fees.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 1.

28-27-30.1. Severability.

If any provision or part of this chapter, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of this chapter and the application of the provisions to other persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

28-27-31. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 214, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 10, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-27-31 concerned persons exempt because of prior employment.

28-27-32. Discrimination.

The department of labor and training shall not grant, deny, suspend, or revoke the license of any person on the grounds of race, color, religious creed, sex, age, national origin, disability, or ancestry.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 149, § 4; P.L. 1991, ch. 323, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 6.

28-27-33. Investigator’s devotion to duties — Assignment of investigators.

Investigators shall devote their entire scheduled work time and attention to the duties of their respective offices. The administrator of the division of professional regulation shall assign investigators to the duties to be performed. No employee of the division shall do or accept employment with another employer that is in conflict with his or her official duties.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 9; P.L. 2002, ch. 380, § 2.

28-27-34. “Division” and “chief administrator” defined.

  1. “Division” means the division of professional regulation within the department of labor and training as established by § 28-22-1 , in which all bureaus, boards, and commissions will serve and act in an advisory capacity to the director of labor and training in their area of expertise within the division of professional regulation. The division administers chapters 26 and 27 of this title and chapter 6 of title 5.
  2. “Chief administrator” means the person appointed by the director of labor and training under § 28-22-1 to act as his or her liaison with all bureaus, boards, and commissions encompassed by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 102, § 2.

Chapter 28 Investigation of Industrial Fatalities [Repealed.]

28-28-1, 28-28-2. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This chapter (G.L. 1896, ch. 68, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 78, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, § 5; P.L. 1943, ch. 1313, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 285, § 5-A; P.L. 1951, ch. 2814, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2814, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-28-1 , 28-28-2), concerning the investigation of industrial deaths, was repealed by P.L. 1976, ch. 55, § 1.

Chapter 29 Workers’ Compensation — General Provisions

28-29-1. Short title.

Chapters 29 — 38 of this title may be cited as the “Workers’ Compensation Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Workers’ compensation, general provisions:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-275 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Statutes.

Although the Workers’ Compensation Act empowers an arbitrator to modify a penalty imposed by an employer, unless the parties agree in writing that he should have no such authority, that statute must be harmonized with those provisions set forth in § 42-56-10 , which outlines the powers of the director of the Department of Corrections. State Dep't of Corrections v. Rhode Island Bhd. of Correctional Officers, 725 A.2d 296, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 1999).

Where an arbitrator determined there was just cause for disciplinary measures, but substituted his judgment of what the proper disciplinary action should be for that of the director of the Department of Corrections, the trial court correctly determined that the legislature did not intend that the paramount disciplinary function of the director should be subject to the caprice of an arbitrator. State Dep't of Corrections v. Rhode Island Bhd. of Correctional Officers, 725 A.2d 296, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 1999).

Liberal Construction.

The provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act are to be liberally construed to effectuate the benevolent purpose that led to its enactment. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

To effect the general legislative intent, the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act are construed liberally. Volpe v. Stillman White Co., 415 A.2d 1034, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1645 (R.I. 1980).

Nature of Employee’s Rights.

The rights of the employee in compensation are governed by the law in force on the date of his injury, and are substantive rights that vest at the time the agreement is executed and approved. State v. Healy, 122 R.I. 602 , 410 A.2d 432, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1428 (1980).

28-29-1.1. Name change.

Wherever in the general or public laws there appears the word “workmen’s” in relation to workmen’s compensation, it shall be substituted with the word “workers’.”

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 231, § 1.

28-29-1.2. Legislative findings and implementation of reforms.

    1. WHEREAS, the system of workers’ compensation in the state of Rhode Island is presently in a state of crisis; and
    2. WHEREAS, the stability and fiscal health of the overall workers’ compensation system is essential to the delivery of appropriate compensation and health care to the injured worker; and
    3. WHEREAS, all professionals providing services covered under the provisions of this title must take into account, in the performance of their service, the important public policy in favor of a sound and properly functioning workers’ compensation system in this state, and have the duty to protect and maintain the integrity of this system; and
    4. WHEREAS, abuse and misuse of the workers’ compensation system has brought discredit on the system and its participants, including the legitimately injured worker, and has endangered the stability and fiscal health of the system; and
    5. WHEREAS, significant improvement has already been initiated by the general assembly’s 1990 reforms and by the administration of the workers’ compensation court; and
    6. WHEREAS, sweeping additional reform is required to bring the system into balance and eliminate waste and unnecessary costs; and
    7. WHEREAS, additional incentives are necessary to induce insurers adequately and vigorously to manage their cases; to swiftly and fairly identify and remove from the workers’ compensation system employees who are no longer disabled; to swiftly and fairly make appropriate adjustments for employees who are capable of employment; to motivate return to gainful employment in the work force; to improve the safety of the workplace and the rehabilitation to gainful employment in the work force; to improve the safety of the workplace and the rehabilitation to gainful employment of the injured worker; and to ensure that all participants in the system recognize their obligation to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the overall integrity and welfare of the compensation system, and that deviation from that conduct is at their peril.
  1. Any amendment to chapters 29 — 38 of this title that may affect the cost of workers’ compensation to the state of Rhode Island shall have a fiscal note attached.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 1.

28-29-1.3. Jurisdiction of Workers’ Compensation Act.

The provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall apply to any and all employees, as defined in § 28-29-2 , who are injured or hired in the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 8 provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2004.

P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 8 provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Employment in State.

This statute covered an injury received outside the state where the employment relation was entered into within the state Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447 , 98 A. 103, 1918B Ann. Cas. 618 (1916) (decided under prior version of statute).

Maritime Employment.

Statute did not apply to seaman employed on a fishing vessel in Narragansett Bay. Barrett v. Macomber & Nickerson Co., 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 815, 253 F. 205 (D.R.I. 1918) (decided under prior version of statute).

The statute does not cover a stevedore injured on the deck of a vessel moored at a wharf in navigable waters. Duffy v. Providence Teaming Co., 49 R.I. 476 , 144 A. 106, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1929) (decided under prior version of statute).

Employee engaged in oyster cultivation and packing, mainly on land and only occasionally on water, was covered by this statute even though death resulted from accident while on navigable waters. Assellin v. Blount, 65 R.I. 293 , 14 A.2d 696, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1940)(decided under prior version of statute).

Pleading.

Employer which over long period of time treated employee’s claim as being subject to this statute was thereby estopped from asserting that employee was excluded as having been engaged in interstate commerce.Baligian v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 80 R.I. 49 , 98 A.2d 830 (1953) (decided under prior version of statute).

Collateral References.

Application for, or award, denial or acceptance of compensation under state Workers’ Compensation Act as precluding action under Federal Employers Liability Act by one engaged in interstate commerce within that Act. 6 A.L.R.2d 581.

Voluntary payment of compensation under statute of one state as bar to claim or ground for reduction of claim of compensation under statute of another state. 8 A.L.R.2d 628.

28-29-2. Definitions.

In chapters 29 — 38 of this title, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the department of labor and training.
  2. “Director” means the director of labor and training or his or her designee unless specifically stated otherwise.
    1. “Earnings capacity” means the weekly straight-time earnings that an employee could receive if the employee accepted an actual offer of suitable alternative employment. Earnings capacity can also be established by the court based on evidence of ability to earn, including, but not limited to, a determination of the degree of functional impairment and/or disability, that an employee is capable of employment. The court may, in its discretion, take into consideration the performance of the employee’s duty to actively seek employment in scheduling the implementation of the reduction. The employer need not identify particular employment before the court can direct an earnings capacity adjustment. In the event that an employee returns to light-duty employment while partially disabled, an earnings capacity shall not be set based upon actual wages earned until the employee has successfully worked at light duty for a period of at least thirteen (13) weeks.
    2. As used under the provisions of this title, “functional impairment” means an anatomical or functional abnormality existing after the date of maximum medical improvement as determined by a medically or scientifically demonstrable finding and based upon the sixth (6th) edition of the American Medical Association’s Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment or comparable publications of the American Medical Association.
    3. In the event that an employee returns to employment at an average weekly wage equal to the employee’s pre-injury earnings exclusive of overtime, the employee will be presumed to have regained his/her earning capacity.
    1. “Employee” means any person who has entered into the employment of or works under contract of service or apprenticeship with any employer, except that in the case of a city or town other than the city of Providence it shall only mean that class or those classes of employees as may be designated by a city, town, or regional school district in a manner provided in this chapter to receive compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title. Any person employed by the state of Rhode Island, except for sworn employees of the Rhode Island state police, or by the Rhode Island airport corporation who is otherwise entitled to the benefits of chapter 19 of title 45 shall be subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title for all case management procedures and dispute resolution for all benefits.
    2. The term “employee” does not include any individual who is a shareholder or director in a corporation, general or limited partners in a general partnership, a registered limited-liability partnership, a limited partnership, or partners in a registered limited-liability limited partnership, or any individual who is a member in a limited-liability company. These exclusions do not apply to shareholders, directors, and members who have entered into the employment of or who work under a contract of service or apprenticeship within a corporation or a limited-liability company.
    3. The term “employee” also does not include a sole proprietor, independent contractor, or a person whose employment is of a casual nature, and who is employed other than for the purpose of the employer’s trade or business, or a person whose services are voluntary or who performs charitable acts, nor shall it include the members of the regularly organized fire and police departments of any town or city except for appeals from an order of the retirement board filed pursuant to the provisions of § 45-21.2-9 ; provided, however, that it shall include the members of the police and aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) units of the Rhode Island airport corporation.
    4. Whenever a contractor has contracted with the state, a city, town, or regional school district, any person employed by that contractor in work under contract shall not be deemed an employee of the state, city, town, or regional school district as the case may be.
    5. Any person who on or after January 1, 1999, was an employee and became a corporate officer shall remain an employee, for purposes of these chapters, unless and until coverage under this act is waived pursuant to § 28-29-8(b) or § 28-29-17 . Any person who is appointed a corporate officer between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2001, and was not previously an employee of the corporation, will not be considered an employee, for purposes of these chapters, unless that corporate officer has filed a notice pursuant to § 28-29-19(c) .
    6. In the case of a person whose services are voluntary or who performs charitable acts, any benefit received, in the form of monetary remuneration or otherwise, shall be reportable to the appropriate taxation authority but shall not be deemed to be wages earned under contract of hire for purposes of qualifying for benefits under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.
    7. Any reference to an employee who had been injured shall, where the employee is dead, include a reference to his or her dependents as defined in this section, or to his or her legal representatives, or, where he or she is a minor or incompetent, to his or her conservator or guardian.
    8. A “seasonal occupation” means those occupations in which work is performed on a seasonal basis of not more than sixteen (16) weeks.
  3. “Employer” includes any person, partnership, corporation, or voluntary association, and the legal representative of a deceased employer; it includes the state, and the city of Providence. It also includes each city, town, and regional school district in the state that votes or accepts the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title in the manner provided in this chapter or is a party to an appeal from an order of the retirement board filed pursuant to the provisions of § 45-21.2-9 .
  4. “General or special employer”:
    1. “General employer” includes but is not limited to temporary help companies and employee leasing companies and means a person who for consideration and as the regular course of its business supplies an employee with or without vehicle to another person.
    2. “Special employer” means a person who contracts for services with a general employer for the use of an employee, a vehicle, or both.
    3. Whenever there is a general employer and special employer wherein the general employer supplies to the special employer an employee and the general employer pays or is obligated to pay the wages or salaries of the supplied employee, then, notwithstanding the fact that direction and control is in the special employer and not the general employer, the general employer, if it is subject to the provisions of the workers’ compensation act or has accepted that act, shall be deemed to be the employer as set forth in subdivision (5) of this section and both the general and special employer shall be the employer for purposes of §§ 28-29-17 and 28-29-18 .
    4. Effective January 1, 2003, whenever a general employer enters into a contract or arrangement with a special employer to supply an employee or employees for work, the special employer shall require an insurer generated insurance coverage certification, on a form prescribed by the department, demonstrating Rhode Island workers’ compensation and employer’s liability coverage evidencing that the general employer carries workers’ compensation insurance with that insurer with no indebtedness for its employees for the term of the contract or arrangement. In the event that the special employer fails to obtain and maintain at policy renewal and thereafter this insurer generated insurance coverage certification demonstrating Rhode Island workers’ compensation and employer’s liability coverage from the general employer, the special employer is deemed to be the employer pursuant to the provisions of this section. Upon the cancellation or failure to renew, the insurer having written the workers’ compensation and employer’s liability policy shall notify the certificate holders and the department of the cancellation or failure to renew and upon notice, the certificate holders shall be deemed to be the employer for the term of the contract or arrangement unless or until a new certification is obtained.
  5. “Independent contractor” means a person who has filed a notice of designation as independent contractor with the director pursuant to § 28-29-17.1 or as otherwise found by the workers’ compensation court.
    1. “Injury” means and refers to personal injury to an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, connected and referable to the employment.
    2. An injury to an employee while voluntarily participating in a private, group, or employer-sponsored carpool, vanpool, commuter bus service, or other rideshare program, having as its sole purpose the mass transportation of employees to and from work shall not be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. Nothing in the foregoing provision shall be held to deny benefits under chapters 29 — 38 and chapter 47 of this title to employees such as drivers, mechanics, and others who receive remuneration for their participation in the rideshare program. Provided, that the foregoing provision shall not bar the right of an employee to recover against an employer and/or driver for tortious misconduct.
  6. “Maximum medical improvement” means a point in time when any medically determinable physical or mental impairment as a result of injury has become stable and when no further treatment is reasonably expected to materially improve the condition. Neither the need for future medical maintenance nor the possibility of improvement or deterioration resulting from the passage of time and not from the ordinary course of the disabling condition, nor the continuation of a preexisting condition precludes a finding of maximum medical improvement. A finding of maximum medical improvement by the workers’ compensation court may be reviewed only where it is established that an employee’s condition has substantially deteriorated or improved.
  7. “Physician” means medical doctor, surgeon, dentist, licensed psychologist, chiropractor, osteopath, podiatrist, or optometrist, as the case may be.
  8. “Suitable alternative employment” means employment or an actual offer of employment that the employee is physically able to perform and will not exacerbate the employee’s health condition and that bears a reasonable relationship to the employee’s qualifications, background, education, and training. The employee’s age alone shall not be considered in determining the suitableness of the alternative employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 5; P.L. 1920, ch. 1900, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2627, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-2 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 277, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 277, § 3; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 5, § 7; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 32, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 5; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 14, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 3.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 7, and P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 7, state that “This act shall take effect upon passage [July 19, 2005] with the exception of section 28-29-2 (6)(iv) which shall take effect on January 1, 2006.”

Applicability.

P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees; provided, however, that the amendment to this section takes effect upon passage [July 8, 2008] and shall be applied retroactively to December 22, 2007, regardless of the date of injury.

Cross References.

Coverage of City of Providence employees, § 28-31-1.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Exclusion of casual employees was not an unreasonable classification and did not render the statute unconstitutional. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

Burden of Proof.

Claimant had the burden of proof on employment relation. Pasetti v. Brusa, 81 R.I. 88 , 98 A.2d 833, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1953).

Casual Employment.

Employment by street railway company to shovel snow from tracks was for the purpose of the employer’s business. Gibbons v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 48 R.I. 353 , 138 A. 175, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1927).

Casual employee was not excluded where the employment was for the purpose of the employer’s business. Gibbons v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 48 R.I. 353 , 138 A. 175, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1927); Leva v. Caron Granite Co., 84 R.I. 360 , 124 A.2d 534, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1956).

Employment was not casual even though employee was paid by the hour and worked only when not required on another job. Johnson v. Lanifero, 73 R.I. 238 , 54 A.2d 412, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1947).

Factors to be considered in determining whether employment is casual are: whether the services rendered are necessary to the conduct and furtherance of the business, the duration of the employment, the regularity of recurrence, the predictability. DiRaimo v. DiRaimo, 117 R.I. 703 , 370 A.2d 1284, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1741 (1977).

Where plaintiff worked in his father’s store up to six or seven hours a day where otherwise unemployed and where he put in between 20 and 30 hours at the store during the week prior to the mishap, and where his duties included making deliveries, stocking and dusting shelves, including conducting the entire operation of the store when his mother was out, he was not a casual employee. DiRaimo v. DiRaimo, 117 R.I. 703 , 370 A.2d 1284, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1741 (1977).

Earnings Capacity.

Although this section allows computation of a theoretical earnings capacity if an employee has worked at light duty for at least thirteen weeks, actual wages are a more accurate means of comparison than earnings capacity. Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 267 (R.I. 1997).

It is clear from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of this provision that an earnings capacity may be set in many different ways, whether it be by the use of a functional impairment rating or an employee’s actual disability, or both. Star Enters. v. DelBarone, 746 A.2d 692, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2000).

This provision absolves an employer from identifying “particular employment” before the court can direct an earnings capacity adjustment. Star Enters. v. DelBarone, 746 A.2d 692, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2000).

Employee.

The enactment of the Workers’ Compensation Act changed the common-law meaning of the word “employee” and subdivision (b) (now subdivision (4)) is now the definitive test for determining the status of an employee. DiRaimo v. DiRaimo, 117 R.I. 703 , 370 A.2d 1284, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1741 (1977).

An interstate truck driver who worked out of a Rhode Island terminal, but was actually hired in another state could not assert a claim in Rhode Island since his employment contract was not made in Rhode Island. Miles v. Bendix Corp., 492 A.2d 1218, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 508 (R.I. 1985).

The fact that an employee worked part time, was paid less, and was not a carpenter does not preclude his being an employee under the act, nor does it render his employment casual as defined by § 28-29-6 . Laliberte v. Salum, 503 A.2d 510, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 381 (R.I. 1986).

Owner of company which was not a corporation and therefore was not a separate entity could not be the company’s employee. Laliberte v. Salum, 503 A.2d 510, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 381 (R.I. 1986).

A crash-rescue crewmember who is injured while performing his duties is excluded from the Workers’ Compensation Act definition of “employee,” and therefore, the Workers’ Compensation Commission is without jurisdiction to hear such a claim. Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 534 (R.I. 1986).

In order for an employer-employee relationship to exist, the services performed must be voluntary on the part of the employees. Wages must be paid and the two parties must be capable of giving their consent to enter into the relationship. Durand v. City of Woonsocket, 537 A.2d 129, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 29 (R.I. 1988).

An employee is not an insured under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

— Corporate Officer.

Corporate officer and stockholder was an employee while doing nonexecutive work of the type usually done by employees. Sormanti v. Marsor Jewelry Co., 83 R.I. 438 , 118 A.2d 339, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1955).

Officer of corporation who owned 51% of outstanding stock could under the evidence be held to be an employee. Davies v. Stillman White Foundry Co., 91 R.I. 337 , 163 A.2d 44, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1960).

Where the president and sole stockholder of a corporation applied for worker’s compensation, the evidence before the commission was sufficient to establish that there was no one who could exercise control over him, he was not an employee and did not come within the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Cohen v. Best Made Mfg. Co., 92 R.I. 370 , 169 A.2d 10, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1961).

— Physician.

Physician treating an injured employee does not come within the definition of “employee.” Henry v. American Enamel Co., 48 R.I. 113 , 136 A. 3, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1927); Wynne v. Pawtuxet Valley Dyeing Co., 101 R.I. 455 , 224 A.2d 612, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 414 (1966).

The term “employee” does not include his physician. Wynne v. Pawtuxet Valley Dyeing Co., 101 R.I. 455 , 224 A.2d 612, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 414 (1966).

— Police.

Given the exclusion of police officers from the overall scheme of workers’ compensation pursuant to this section, there was no reason to expand the meaning of “compensation” to include a former police officer’s injured-on-duty payments or medical disability pension received as the result of a collective bargaining agreement, and not as “workers’ compensation” proper. Vector Health Sys. v. Revens, 643 A.2d 795, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 191 (R.I. 1994).

General and Special Employers.

Receiver’s employee assigned temporarily to work for receiver as an individual remained an employee of the receiver in his fiduciary capacity where he did not know that the work was for the receiver individually and did not consent to a change of employment. Anderson v. Polleys, 53 R.I. 182 , 165 A. 436, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1933).

Employee was for the purposes of the statute the employee of corporation by which he reasonably understood himself to be employed, even though he worked on project of and was paid by another corporation with the same officers, directors, and offices, where he had no reason to know of and did not consent to transfer. Gaspar v. Callan Constr. Co., 67 R.I. 363 , 23 A.2d 759, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1942).

A person hired by the lessor of a tractor to assist in operating the tractor and handling merchandise in transport for the defendant lessee, is not an employee of the lessee and lessee is therefore not liable for worker’s compensation for injuries received during the trip, the test being whether the lessee has the right to exercise power of control over the person hired. Beany v. Paul Arpin Van Lines Co., 98 R.I. 193 , 200 A.2d 592, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 149 (1964).

Lack of workers’ compensation liability on the part of a general employer because of its not employing the required minimum number of employees does not make the special employer liable. Chartier v. North Central Airways, 102 R.I. 81 , 228 A.2d 539, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 648 (1967).

One who requests the pilot-employee of a general employer from whom he has occasionally borrowed that employee under an arrangement for payment to the general employer to fly a plane to Bridgeport for radio repairs and to take an employee to New Haven on personal business, without any arrangement with that pilot’s general employer is not a special employer of that pilot during the requested flight. Chartier v. North Central Airways, 102 R.I. 81 , 228 A.2d 539, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 648 (1967).

A general employer is liable for workers’ compensation to an employee who is injured while performing work for special employer even if the conduct was specifically prohibited by the general employer where that conduct included the method and manner of doing the job and the employee was reasonably fulfilling duties of his employment. D'Andrea v. Manpower, Inc., 105 R.I. 108 , 249 A.2d 896, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 724 (1969).

A literal application of subsection (3)(C)’s [now see § 28-29- (6)] designation of the general employer as the employer in § 28-29-20 , thereby allowing an employee who has received workers’ compensation benefits to maintain a tort action against his special employer, destroys the compromise that is the foundation of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Such a construction would have the effect of encouraging litigation by employees that have received workers’ compensation benefits, the exact opposite of what the legislature intended. Therefore, a special employer is an entity granted immunity from suit by § 28-29-20 . Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 267 (R.I. 1994).

When an employee assigned by an employment agency to work for an employer was injured on the job, an affidavit from the employer stating that it paid the agency for the employee’s services was sufficient to show the employer contracted with the agency for those services, making the employer a “special employer,” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-2(6)(ii) , so the employer was immune from the employee’s suit, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 , because the immunity the statute provided was intended to apply to special employers. Urena v. Theta Prods., 899 A.2d 449, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2006).

Language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 , making an employer immune from suit when an employee was entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-1 et seq., applied to “employers,” and the legislature intended this term to include both “general employers” and “special employers,” the former term referring to temporary worker agencies, and the latter term referring to the companies that use their services. Urena v. Theta Prods., 899 A.2d 449, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2006).

Nothing in the language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-2 required proof of payment to a general employer by a special employer to establish one’s status as a special employer, as, on the contrary, the plain language of § 28-29-2 said that one’s status as a special employer arose by virtue of a “contract” with the general employer for the “use of an employee,” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-2(6)(ii) . Urena v. Theta Prods., 899 A.2d 449, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2006).

Going and Coming to Work.

The “going-and-coming rule” of workers’ compensation generally operates to deny compensation when injury occurs while the employee is traveling to or from the workplace. It also denies coverage to employees injured on the employer’s premises but before commencement or after completion of the fixed work shift. Branco v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 518 A.2d 621, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 557 (R.I. 1986).

An exception to the “going-and-coming rule” is applied in those situations in which (1) the employer owns and maintains an employee parking area separate from its plant-facility grounds, (2) the employer takes affirmative action to control the route of the employee by directing the employee to park in that separate area, and (3) the employee is injured while traveling directly from the lot to the plant facility. Branco v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 518 A.2d 621, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 557 (R.I. 1986).

An employee failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that her injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment with an employment agency, as her participation in the agency’s vanpool program to a factory job site was voluntary. Claros v. Highland Employment Agency, 643 A.2d 212, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 194 (R.I. 1994).

Independent Contractor.

Whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor must be determined by the common law. Henry v. Mondillo, 49 R.I. 261 , 142 A. 230, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1928).

A carpenter who was paid weekly by the hour, whose work was under the control and direction of the employer, who could be moved from job to job by the employer, who was never consulted about the cost of a job, who ordered materials and had them charged to the employer, but who furnished his own tools and transportation from job to job, from whose pay no income tax or social security tax was deducted, and who paid his own income and social security taxes as a self-employed person was not an employee, but an independent contractor. Di Orio v. R. L. Platter, Inc., 100 R.I. 117 , 211 A.2d 642, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 359 (1965).

Maximum Medical Improvement.

Mere possibility that surgery might improve the employee’s condition did not preclude a finding that the employee had reached maximum medical improvement, because the employee’s refusal to undergo the sole treatment recommended ensured that the employee’s condition had, in all likelihood, become stable. City of Pawtucket v. Pimental, 960 A.2d 981, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 2008).

Personal Errands.

When an employee makes a relatively brief and uncomplicated stop for a personal errand or social purpose in the course of a business journey, once the personal errand is completed and the employee resumes a course that is reasonably related to the employer’s business, he or she returns to the course of employment and injuries sustained thereafter are compensable. LaPlante v. Taylor Box Co., 518 A.2d 911, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 565 (R.I. 1986).

Prison Inmates.

This section does not provide workers’ compensation coverage to inmates performing labor while confined at the adult correction institution, as no employer-employee relationship exists in such circumstances. Spikes v. State, 458 A.2d 672, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 850 (R.I. 1983).

Suitable Alternative Employment.

A seven-year delay in notice was not reasonable where the petitioner had neither refused an offer of suitable alternative employment nor did he request that his employer characterize the offered job as such. Rezendes v. American Insulated Wire, 754 A.2d 110, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 2000).

Collateral References.

Application for, or award, denial or acceptance of compensation under state workers’ compensation act as precluding action under Federal Employers Liability Act by one engaged in interstate commerce within that Act. 6 A.L.R.2d 581.

Compensability under occupational disease statutes of emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli. 113 A.L.R.5th 115.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee’s recovery for medical malpractice from company medical personnel. 73 A.L.R.4th 115.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee’s recovery from employer in tort — modern status. 23 A.L.R.4th 1151.

Eligibility for workers’ compensation as affected by claimant’s misrepresentation of health or physical condition at time of hiring. 12 A.L.R.5th 658.

Employer’s tort liability to worker for concealing workplace hazard or nature or extent of injury. 9 A.L.R.4th 778.

Juror as within coverage of workers’ compensation acts. 13 A.L.R.5th 444.

Modern status of effect of sate workers’ compensation act on right of third-person tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed worker. 100 A.L.R.3d 350.

Ownership interest in employer business as affecting status as employee for workers’ compensation purposes. 78 A.L.R.4th 973.

Presumption or inference that accidental death of employee engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose out of and in course of employment. 47 A.L.R.5th 801.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances. 108 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability. 106 A.L.R.5th 111.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as a result of sudden emotional stimuli involving personnel action. 82 A.L.R.5th 149.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular physical injuries or illnesses. 112 A.L.R.5th 509.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances. 107 A.L.R.5th 441.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability. 13 A.L.R.6th 209.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular injuries and illnesses. 20 A.L.R.6th 641.

What conduct is willful, intentional, or deliberate within Workers’ Compensation Act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct. 96 A.L.R.3d 1064.

When does statute of limitations begin to run upon an action by subrogated insurer against third-party tortfeasor. 91 A.L.R.3d 844.

Workers’ Compensation Act as furnishing exclusive remedy for employee injured by product manufactured, sold, or distributed by employer. 9 A.L.R.4th 873.

Workers’ compensation: compensability of injury during tryout, employment test, or similar activity designed to determine employability. 8 A.L.R.5th 798.

Workers’ compensation: law enforcement officer’s recovery for injury sustained during exercise or physical recreation activities. 44 A.L.R.5th 569.

Workers’ Compensation: Nonathlete Students as Covered Employees. 33 A.L.R.6th 251.

28-29-3. Defenses abrogated as to injuries in course of employment.

In an action to recover damages for personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, connected with and referable to the employment, or for death resulting from personal injury so sustained, it shall not be a defense:

  1. That the employee was negligent;
  2. That the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow employee;
  3. That the employee has assumed the risk of the injury.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2282, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Fact that this section is restricted by § 28-29-4 does not make the statute unconstitutional. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

In General.

Where the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act are without application, certain common law defenses which are available to the employer under laws of master and servant may properly be invoked by defendant. Gentile v. Vecchio, 92 R.I. 38 , 166 A.2d 126, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1960).

Where an employee was injured during “horseplay” with an air hose, the court held that the statutory abolition of the defenses of contributory negligence, negligence of a fellow employee and assumption of the risk allowed the employee to recover for injuries sustained even where he was a participant in the “horseplay,” provided that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Carvalho v. Decorative Fabrics Co., 117 R.I. 231 , 366 A.2d 157, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1617 (1976).

Assumption of Risk.

This section abrogated the defense of contractual assumption of risk as well as that of voluntary assumption. Bay State St. Ry. Co. v. Rust, 253 F. 43, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1526 (1st Cir. 1918).

Control Over Premises.

In workers’ compensation cases absence of proof of employer’s control over premises of accident is not conclusive on the issue of compensability. Bergeron v. Kilnic Co., 108 R.I. 313 , 274 A.2d 753, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1265 (1971).

The question of control over the place of injury, rather than being conclusive of compensability, is only one of the facts or circumstances to be considered on the issue of whether an adequate causal relationship existed between the injury and the employee’s employment. Kyle v. Davol, Inc., 121 R.I. 79 , 395 A.2d 714, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 757 (1978).

Injury sustained by an employee on her way to work in a fall on an icy sidewalk near the entrance to place of employment was not compensable despite evidence that employer exercised control over sidewalk by way of assignment of maintenance personnel to clear the sidewalk of ice and snow. Kyle v. Davol, Inc., 121 R.I. 79 , 395 A.2d 714, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 757 (1978).

Due Course of Employment.

Where second floor of building was hired by employer as tenant and only place of ingress to and egress from his premises for use of employee was staircase leading to driveway alongside of building to public street, and while walking on driveway with longstanding practice to go to her home across street for lunch employee slipped and suffered injuries, such injuries did arise out of and in course of employment. Bergeron v. Kilnic Co., 108 R.I. 313 , 274 A.2d 753, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1265 (1971).

Where machine operator was injured while attempting to extricate trapped animal from loading well a short distance from area in which she and other employees had gathered for coffee break after supervisor had directed her not to retrieve the animal, injury was not sustained in course of employment within meaning of statute. Lussier v. American Textile Co., 110 R.I. 299 , 292 A.2d 226, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 913 (1972).

Where petitioner car salesman went to cafe for lunch and to possibly meet person there to whom he might sell a car, after which petitioner interrupted employment by receiving permission to take the afternoon off, and while on his way home in a car furnished by employer was involved in collision, injury to petitioner was not suffered within scope of employment and was not compensable. Gallagher v. Norwood Motors Co., 110 R.I. 469 , 294 A.2d 184, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 940 (1972).

Small Employers.

This section did not abrogate fellow servant defense as to employer with less than the number of employees specified by § 28-29-5 . Ryan v. Unsworth, 52 R.I. 86 , 157 A. 869, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 113 (1931) (decided under former version of § 28-29-5 ).

Collateral References.

Employer’s right of action for loss of services or the like against third person tortiously killing or injuring employee. 4 A.L.R.4th 504.

Injury to Employee as Arising out of or in Course of Employment for Purposes of State Workers’ Compensation Statute — Effect of Employer-Provided Living Quarters, Room and Board, or the Like. 42 A.L.R.6th 61.

Right to Workers’ Compensation for Injury Suffered by Employee While Driving Employer’s Vehicle. 28 A.L.R.6th 1.

Suicide as compensable under Workers’ Compensation Act. 15 A.L.R.3d 616.

Violation of employment rule barring claim for worker’s compensation. 61 A.L.R.5th 375.

Workers’ compensation: effect of allegation that injury was caused by, or occurred during course of, worker’s illegal conduct. 73 A.L.R.4th 270.

28-29-4. Defenses available in action against employer subject to law — Towns and cities.

The provisions of § 28-29-3 shall not apply to actions to recover damages for personal injuries or for death resulting from personal injuries sustained by an employee of an employer who is subject to or has elected to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, as provided in §§ 28-29-6 28-29-8 , nor to any action brought against a town or city by an employee of a town or city, unless that town or city votes to accept the provisions of those chapters in the manner provided.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art 1, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 28-29-3 .

Fact that this section restricted the provisions of § 28-29-3 did not make that statute unconstitutional. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

Collateral References.

Public officers as within statute. 5 A.L.R.2d 415.

28-29-5. Employers exempt.

The provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall not apply to employers of employees engaged in domestic service; or subject to the provisions of § 28-29-7.2 , to employees engaged in agriculture; except for employers engaged in occupations that the director declares hazardous, but employers not engaged in hazardous occupations may, by complying with the provisions of § 28-29-8 , become subject to the provisions of those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, §§ 2, 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-5 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1997, ch. 155, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 32, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Exemption of small employers is not an unreasonable classification and does not render the statute unconstitutional. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

Determining Exemption.

In determining whether an agricultural enterprise has more than three nonagricultural employees, the controlling criteria are the same as those employed in ascertaining the nature of the work performed by an injured employee, so that the focus must be on the overall nature of the work done by the allegedly nonagricultural workers. Teschner v. Horan, 118 R.I. 237 , 373 A.2d 173, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1451 (1977).

In determining an employer’s entitlement to the agricultural exemption, the focus should be on the kind of work the employee is required to perform; and where the employee’s tasks are varied, the concern should be with the overall nature of his work rather than with the particular task he was performing when injured. Teschner v. Horan, 118 R.I. 237 , 373 A.2d 173, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1451 (1977).

Regular Employment.

Employment of carpenters to construct an addition to an existing building and to erect a new building was a regular employment in the same business within the meaning of the statute. La Croix v. Frechette, 50 R.I. 90 , 145 A. 314, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1929).

28-29-6. Employers subject to law.

Every person, firm, and private corporation, including any public service corporation, including the state, that regularly employs employees in the same business or in or about the same establishment under any contract of hire, express or implied, and a city or town in this state that votes to accept the provisions of those chapters in the manner provided shall constitute an employer subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-6 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 32, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Joint Employment.

Where an employee was injured while doing separate jobs for two employers at the same time, he was not allowed to recover full benefits from both employers under a prior theory of “concurrent” as opposed to “joint” employment. Lupo v. Nursery Originals, 400 A.2d 950, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1803 (R.I. 1979).

Collateral References.

Public officers as within statute. 5 A.L.R.2d 415.

Status, under Workers’ Compensation Act, of gasoline and oil distributor or dealer as agent, employee or independent dealer. 83 A.L.R.2d 1282.

Workers’ compensation immunity as extending to one owning controlling interest in employer corporation. 30 A.L.R.4th 948.

28-29-6.1. Secondary provision of workers’ compensation insurance.

  1. Whenever a general contractor or a construction manager enters into a contract with a subcontractor for work to be performed in Rhode Island, the general contractor or construction manager shall at all times require written documentation evidencing that the subcontractor carries workers’ compensation insurance with no indebtedness for its employees for the term of the contract or is an independent contractor pursuant to the provisions of § 28-29-17.1 . In the event that the general contractor or construction manager fails to obtain the written documentation from the subcontractor, the general contractor or construction manager shall be deemed to be the employer pursuant to provisions of § 28-29-2 .
  2. For the purposes of this section, “construction manager” means an individual corporation, partnership, or joint venture or other legal entity responsible for supervising and controlling all aspects of construction work to be performed on the construction project, as designated in the project documents, in addition to the possibility of performing some of the construction services itself. For the purposes of this section, the construction manager need have no contractual involvement with any of the parties to the construction project other than the owner, or may contract directly with the trade contractors pursuant to its agreement with the owner.
  3. This section only applies to a general contractor, subcontractor, or construction manager deemed an employer subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, as provided in § 28-29-6 .
  4. Whenever the workers’ compensation insurance carrier is obligated to pay workers’ compensation benefits to the employee of an uninsured subcontractor, the workers’ compensation insurance carrier shall have a complete right of indemnification to the extent benefits are paid against either the uninsured subcontractor, uninsured general contractor, or uninsured construction manager.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 385, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 38, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Section.

When general contractors and construction managers fail to get written documentary proof of workers’ compensation insurance when hiring subcontractors, they then become responsible as statutory employers to employees of a subcontractor hired by the general contractor or the construction manager as well as to employees of a sub-subcontractor hired by a subcontractor. Brogno v. W & J Assocs., 698 A.2d 191, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 241 (R.I. 1997).

Liability.

Because the defendant was in charge of supervising and controlling all aspects of the project construction work and also was responsible for engaging the necessary trade contractors needed to perform the work on a project commenced by the owner of the property, the defendant was responsible for plaintiff’s on-the-job injury even though there was no direct contractual relationship between defendant and plaintiff’s immediate employer. The defendant’s failure to obtain written proof of workers’ compensation insurance coverage from plaintiff’s employer made the defendant responsible as plaintiff’s statutory employer. Brogno v. W & J Assocs., 698 A.2d 191, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 241 (R.I. 1997).

Subcontractor.

“Subcontractor” includes sub-subcontractors. Brogno v. W & J Assocs., 698 A.2d 191, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 241 (R.I. 1997).

28-29-6.2. Employers’ mandatory disclosure.

All employers doing business in the state of Rhode Island shall disclose to all prospective employees at the time of application for employment either that the employer is subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title or is exempt from chapters 29 — 38 of this title. The employer shall also disclose the specific type of exemption. The disclosures required under this section are included on the first page of any written employment application. If the employer does not have a written employment application, the disclosure shall be in writing.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 421, § 1.

28-29-7. Domestic and farm laborers.

Domestic servants, farmers, farm laborers, except as defined in § 28-29-7.2 , are not subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-7 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1998, ch. 32, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers and small employers is not an unreasonable classification and does not render this section unconstitutional. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

Evidence Not Supporting Finding of Farm Labor.

Determination that an employee’s work is neither agricultural work nor farm labor is supported by competent legal evidence, where the employee testifies that he spends 85 percent of his time cutting, splitting, stacking, loading, and delivering wood that had been sold and that he spends approximately 45 minutes in the morning tending to animals and that his duties also include planting blueberry bushes. Mercantum Farm Corp. v. Dutra, 572 A.2d 286, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 1990).

Collateral References.

Farming, application to employees engaged in. 7 A.L.R. 1296; 13 A.L.R. 955; 35 A.L.R. 208; 43 A.L.R. 954; 107 A.L.R. 977; 140 A.L.R. 399.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory Provisions Exempting or Otherwise Restricting Farm and Agricultural Workers from Worker’s Compensation Coverage. 40 A.L.R.6th 99.

28-29-7.1. Exemption from workers’ compensation — Certain real estate persons.

A licensed real estate broker or real estate salesperson or a licensed or certified real estate appraiser shall not be considered an employee under the provisions of this chapter if substantially all of the remuneration for the services performed by the broker, salesperson, or appraiser, whether paid in cash or otherwise, is directly related to sales or other output rather than to the number of hours worked, and the services are performed by the broker, salesperson, or appraiser pursuant to a written contract that contains the following provisions:

  1. The broker, salesperson, or appraiser, for purposes of workers’ compensation, is engaged as an independent contractor associated with the person for whom services are performed;
  2. The broker or salesperson shall be paid a commission based on his or her gross sales, if any, without deduction for taxes, which commission shall be directly related to sales or other output;
  3. The broker, salesperson, or appraiser shall not receive any remuneration related to the number of hours worked, and shall not be treated as an employee with respect to the services for the purposes of this chapter;
  4. The broker, salesperson, or appraiser shall be permitted to work any hours he or she chooses;
  5. The broker, salesperson, or appraiser shall be permitted to work out of his or her own home or the office of the person for whom services are performed;
  6. The broker, salesperson, or appraiser shall be free to engage in outside employment; and
  7. The person for whom the services are performed may provide office facilities and supplies for the use of the broker, salesperson, or appraiser, but the broker, salesperson, or appraiser shall otherwise pay his or her own expenses.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 422, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 5; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 5.

28-29-7.2. Farm laborers.

Farmers, nursery operators, or farm laborers are not subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title unless the farmers or agricultural employers employ twenty-five (25) or more farm laborers or agricultural employees for thirteen (13) consecutive weeks. Farmers, nursery operators, or agricultural employers who or that employ twenty-five (25) or more farm laborers or agricultural employees for thirteen (13) consecutive weeks are not subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title if the farmer or agricultural employer maintains health and disability insurance for all of its farm laborers or agricultural employees; provided, that the health and disability insurance premium exceeds the premium for workers’ compensation insurance. Farmers or agricultural employers who or that employ twenty-five (25) or more farm laborers or agricultural employees for thirteen (13) consecutive weeks are subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title for those agricultural enterprises that produce greenhouse crops, fruit and vegetable crops, herbaceous crops, sod crops, viticulture, viniculture, floriculture, feed for livestock, forestry, dairy farming, aquaculture, the raising of livestock, fur-bearing animals, poultry and eggs, bees and honey, mushrooms, and nursery stock.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 155, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 281, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2009, and shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or preexisting agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-29-8. Election by exempt employers to be subject to law.

  1. Employers exempted by § 28-29-7 may come within chapters 29 — 38 of this title by election. The election on the part of the employer shall be made by filing with the director a written statement to the effect that the employer accepts the provisions of those chapters. The filing of this statement shall operate to subject the employer to the provisions of those chapters and all acts amending those chapters for the term of one year from the date of the filing of the statement, and after that, without further act on the employer’s part, for successive terms of one year each, unless the employer shall, at least sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of that first or any succeeding year file with the director a notice, in writing, to the effect that the employer withdraws the election to be subject to the provisions of those chapters, and gives reasonable notice of this to the employer’s workers; provided, that any employer now subject to the provisions of those chapters shall not be required to file a further written statement of acceptance or subsequently post notices of the employer’s acceptance.
  2. Any employer, including any corporation officer, who or that is on December 31, 1998, subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title and who has not waived coverage pursuant to § 28-29-17 or by election, shall continue to be subject to those chapters and amendments to them unless or until the employer withdraws, in writing, the employer’s election to be subject to the provisions of those chapters pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1942, ch. 1193, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-8 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1998, ch. 32, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 1, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 32.

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Notice of acceptance by city or town, § 28-31-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Former provision for election by employer as to whether to accept the statute was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power since if the employer so elected, the employee still had the power to claim his common law rights. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

Acceptance by Corporation.

Acceptance filed by treasurer of corporation was effective, though not formally approved by directors, where the directors had individually approved and did not later disaffirm or disapprove. De Pasquale v. Mason Mfg. Co., 39 R.I. 114 , 97 A. 816, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1916).

Effect of Nonacceptance.

Since the employer did not elect to accept the act he was not entitled to the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, and negligence of fellow servant but was left liable to a suit for damages without the benefit of the aforementioned defenses. Johnson v. Ringuette, 99 R.I. 419 , 208 A.2d 393, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 455 (1965) (Decision under law prior to 1954 amendment.)

Filing of Statement of Election.

Because this section provides that the election “shall be made” by filing a written statement, failure to file that statement prevented the corporation from being subjected to the Workers’ Compensation Act, even though the corporation purchased workers’ compensation insurance and the insurer filed a certificate of insurance pursuant to § 28-36-12 . Nielson v. C & N, Inc., 685 A.2d 282, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 279 (R.I. 1996); Cardinale v. Central Portable Heating Co., 711 A.2d 1128, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 163 (R.I. 1998).

Time of Acceptance.

Acceptance filed after passage but before the effective date of the statute was effective. Coakley v. Mason Mfg. Co., 37 R.I. 46 , 90 A. 1073, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1914).

28-29-9. Service of process on nonresident employers.

Every employer, subject to or who or that elects to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, other than a corporation, who or that is not a resident of the state or an unincorporated association, a firm or a partnership, having no members resident of the state, shall file with the director a duly executed written power appointing some competent person resident in this state as the employer’s agent with authority to accept service of process against the employer in this state and upon whom all process, including the process of garnishment, against the employer in this state may be served, and who, in case of garnishment when the fees for it have been paid or tendered, shall make the affidavit required by law in those cases, and who shall cause an appearance to be entered in like manner as if the employer had resided and been duly served with process within this state. Service of process upon the resident agent shall be deemed sufficient service upon the employer. If the resident agent dies, resigns, or moves from the state, the employer shall file with the director a further written power appointing some other competent person residing in this state as agent for service of process purposes. No power of agency shall be revoked until after a like power has been given to some other competent person resident in this state and filed as provided. Any nonresident employer who or that has duly filed a withdrawal of election to be subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title may revoke power of agency by a written instrument of revocation filed with the director. No revocation shall be effective as to any liability arising out of any act or omission on the part of the employer occurring prior to the time when the withdrawal of acceptance of the provisions of those chapters became effective.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-9 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1.

28-29-10. Certificate of compliance with corporation laws required.

Every employer subject to or who elects to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title that is a corporation shall obtain and file or cause to be obtained and filed with the director a certificate from the secretary of state to the effect that the corporation has in all respects complied with the provisions of chapters 1 — 6 of title 7.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-10 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1.

28-29-11. Annual certificate of compliance.

All corporations that are or may become employers subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall annually in the month of June obtain and file or cause to be obtained and filed with the director a certificate from the secretary of state to the effect that the corporation has in all respects complied with the provisions of chapters 1 — 6 of title 7.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3417, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-11 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4.

28-29-12. Certificate fee.

The secretary of state shall be paid five dollars ($5.00) for each certificate issued pursuant to §§ 28-29-10 and 28-29-11 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-12 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 74, § 15.

28-29-13. Posting of summaries of law.

  1. Every employer subject to or who or that elects to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall display a copy of the summary of the major provisions of the workers’ compensation act in conspicuous places in which workers are employed.
  2. Any employer who or that fails to post the summaries required in this section shall be assessed a penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) per offense.
  3. The director, in his or her discretion, may bring a civil action to collect all penalties assessed. The workers’ compensation court shall have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with any order of the director made pursuant to this section.
  4. All penalties collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the general fund.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1942, ch. 1193, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-13 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 1.

28-29-13.1. Booklets — Information.

  1. In order to ensure that both employers and employees are fully informed as to their rights and responsibilities, the director shall prepare, publish, and distribute an illustrated booklet explaining, in informal and readily understandable language, those rights and responsibilities. The director shall be responsible for periodic revision of the booklet.
  2. The director may present educational seminars and publish a separate volume containing the provisions of the general laws relating to workers’ compensation. All fees received from the seminars and the sale of the publications shall be deposited as general revenues. All booklets and the publications referenced in this chapter shall indicate that they are not official publications of the state of Rhode Island, and they are published merely for the convenience of the public. They shall not be relied upon as authority for what is contained in the general laws.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 17; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 96.

28-29-14. Forms prescribed and furnished.

The director shall prescribe the form of a notice informing employees of their privilege under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and the notice shall be incorporated in the notice prescribed in this chapter. Blank forms of election and withdrawal, as well as summaries as provided by § 28-29-13 , shall be furnished by the director, on request.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1942, ch. 1193, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-14 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4.

28-29-15. Exemption of professional hockey personnel.

Professional ice hockey players, coaches, and trainers employed by a professional ice hockey club, including but not limited to National Hockey League or American Hockey League clubs, shall be exempted from the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title while that employee is temporarily within this state doing work for his or her employer. Professional ice hockey players, coaches, and trainers employed by, or on assignment or transfer from their employer, shall be exempted if the employer has furnished workers’ compensation insurance coverage under the workers’ compensation or similar laws of the other state so as to cover the employee’s employment while in this state; provided, that the extraterritorial provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title are recognized in the other state and provided employers and employees who or that are covered in this state are likewise exempted from the application of the workers’ compensation or similar laws of the other state; provided further that the requirement for recognition in the other state of the extraterritorial provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title and the requirement that employers and employees who or that are covered in this state are likewise exempted from the application of the workers’ compensation or similar laws of the other state shall not apply to any employees who are professional ice hockey players, coaches, and trainers employed by a professional ice hockey club, including, but not limited to National Hockey League or American Hockey League clubs described in this section. The benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act or similar laws of the other state shall be the exclusive remedy against that employer for any injury, whether resulting in death or not, received by any employee while working for that employer in this state.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 7; P.L. 1941, ch. 1052, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-15 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 475, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 2.

28-29-16. Certificate of coverage by another state.

A certificate from the duly authorized officer of the workers’ compensation court or similar department of another state certifying that the employer from that other state is insured in that state and has provided extraterritorial coverage insuring the employer’s employees while working within this state shall be prima facie evidence that the employer carries the compensation insurance.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 8; P.L. 1941, ch. 1052, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-16 .

28-29-17. Waiver of common law rights — Notice of claim of common law right.

Employees or corporate officers of an employer, or managers, managing members, or members of a limited-liability company subject to or who have elected to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title as provided in § 28-29-8 shall be held to have waived his or her right of action at common law to recover damages for personal injuries if he or she has not given his or her employer at the time of the contract of hire or appointment notice in writing that he or she claims that right and within ten (10) days after that has filed a copy of the notice with the director, or, if the contract of hire or appointment was made before the employer became subject to or elected to become subject to the provisions of those chapters, the employee, or corporate officer, or manager, managing member, or member of a limited-liability company must have given notice and filed it with the director within ten (10) days after the filing by the employer who or that is subject to or who or that has elected to become subject to the provisions of those chapters of the written statement as provided. That waiver shall continue in force for the term of one year, and after that, without further act on his or her part, for successive terms of one year each, unless the employee, or corporate officer, or manager, managing member, or member of a limited-liability company, at least sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the first or any succeeding year files with the director a notice in writing to the effect that he or she desires to claim his or her right of action at common law and within ten (10) days thereafter gives notice of this to his or her employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-17 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 1.

Cross References.

Notices to state or municipality as employer, § 28-31-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Provision for waiver of common law rights in absence of claim was not unconstitutional since it left the option with the employee. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

In view of this section, former provision for election by employer as to whether to accept statute was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484 , 96 A. 340, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1916).

Effect of Claiming Common Law Rights.

When a corporate executive filed notice of claim of right of action at common law, he had opted out of coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act and could not seek worker’s compensation benefits for a later injury. Piccirillo v. Avenir, Inc., 517 A.2d 606, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 555 (R.I. 1986).

Summary judgment on plaintiff’s negligence claim was appropriately granted in favor of defendant based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, where plaintiff conceded that he was injured by defendant while on the job site and that defendant was a coemployee of the employer at the time, plaintiff accepted workers’ compensation benefits from the employer, and plaintiff did not notify the employer of his intention to preserve any common-law right to sue in accordance with this section. Mello v. Killeavy, 205 A.3d 454, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2019).

Effect of Waiver.

Election by employee under this section not to claim common law rights binds personal representatives. National India Rubber Co. Kilroe, 54 R.I. 333 , 173 A. 86, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1934).

An employee waives his or her common-law remedy if the employee fails to properly notify the employer of his or her intention to rely on the common law. Lopes v. G.T.E. Prods. Corp., 560 A.2d 949, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1989).

When a hospital employee settled a workers’ compensation claim, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-25.1 , and failed to preserve her common law rights in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-17 , the employee was not entitled to bring a later negligence action against the hospital because the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Law § 28-29-20 , barred any subsequent civil action against the hospital arising from the same incident. Kulawas v. R.I. Hosp., 994 A.2d 649, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 59 (R.I. 2010).

Collateral References.

Pre-emption by workers’ compensation statute of employee’s remedy under state “whistleblower” statute. 20 A.L.R.5th 677.

Workers’ compensation as precluding employee’s suit against employer for sexual harassment in the workplace. 51 A.L.R.5th 163.

28-29-17.1. Notice of designation as independent contractor.

  1. A person will not be considered an “independent contractor” unless that person files a notice of designation with the director, consistent with rules and regulations established by the director, in writing, on a form provided by the director, that the person is an “independent contractor”. The filing of the notice of designation shall be a presumption of “independent contractor” status but shall not preclude a finding of independent contractor status by the court when the notice is not filed with the director. That designation shall continue in force and effect unless the person withdraws that designation by filing a notice with the director, in writing, on a form provided by the director, that the person is no longer an “independent contractor”. Any designation or withdrawal of designation form shall be deemed public information and the director shall furnish copies or make available electronically the forms and designations, upon written request, to any employer or insurer or its authorized representative.
  2. The workers’ compensation court may, upon petition of an employee, the dependents of a deceased employee, or any other party in interest at any time, vacate any “notice of designation” if the “notice of designation” has been improperly procured.
  3. The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall only apply to injuries occurring on and after January 1, 2001.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 9.

28-29-18. Minors deemed sui juris — Claim of common law rights.

A minor working at an age legally permitted under the laws of this state shall be deemed sui juris for the purpose of chapters 29 — 38 of this title and no other person shall have any cause of action or right to compensation for an injury to that minor employee except as expressly provided in those chapters; but if that minor has a parent living or a guardian, that parent or guardian, as the case may be, may give the notice and file a copy of it as provided by § 28-29-17 , and that notice shall bind the minor in the same manner that adult employees are bound under the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title. In case no notice is given, the minor shall be held to have waived his or her right of action at common law to recover damages for personal injuries.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-18 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Minor Without Employment Certificate.

Minor who was old enough to work with an employment certificate but for whom employer had no certificate as required by law would not be deemed sui juris under this section. Taglinette v. Sydney Worsted Co., 42 R.I. 133 , 105 A. 641, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1919).

Collateral References.

Workers’ compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor’s tort action. 77 A.L.R.4th 844.

28-29-19. Waiver of claim of common law rights.

  1. Any employee, or the parent or guardian of any minor employee, who has given notice to the employer that he or she claimed his or her right of action at common law may waive that claim by filing a notice in writing with the director and the employer, or his or her agent, which shall take effect five (5) days after the filing with the director.
  2. Any corporate officer, or manager, managing member, or member of a limited-liability company who has given notice to the employer and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier that they claimed their right of action at common law may waive that claim by filing a notice in writing with the director and the employer or their agent and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier which shall take effect five (5) days after the filing with the director. The insurance carrier shall keep a copy of the notice consistent with the rules and regulations of the department.
  3. Any person who is appointed a corporate officer between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2001, and was not previously an employee of the corporation may elect to become subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title upon filing a notice in writing with the director and his or her employer and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier which notice takes effect five (5) days after the filing of his or her notice.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-19 ; P.L. 1998, ch. 32, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 1.

28-29-20. Rights in lieu of other rights and remedies.

The right to compensation for an injury under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and the remedy for an injury granted by those chapters, shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise against an employer, or its directors, officers, agents, or employees; and those rights and remedies shall not accrue to employees entitled to compensation under those chapters while they are in effect, except as otherwise provided in §§ 28-36-10 and 28-36-15 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 1, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 1, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-20 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Workers’ Compensation/Indemnification, see 4 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 816 (1999).

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

2004 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Products Liability Law, see 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 897 (2005).

Kaitlyn Alger, 2019 Survey: Mello v. Killeavy, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 690 (2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate the First Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, or the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 1994).

Purpose.

This act abolished the employee’s right to maintain a common law action for his injuries against his employer, who in turn was deprived of certain common law defenses previously available to him, in order to provide a simple and expeditious procedure by which an employee or his dependents would receive from his employer compensation for injuries sustained in industrial accidents. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 631, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (1st Cir. 1967).

This section provided that the right to workers’ compensation, which insured a fixed rate of compensation to an injured employee without requiring any showing of employer negligence, was in lieu of all rights and remedies existing, either at common law or otherwise. Cacchillo v. H. Leach Machinery Co., 111 R.I. 593 , 305 A.2d 541, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1251 (1973).

An employee covered under the Workers’ Compensation Act has no common-law right of action against the insurer because the act expressly addresses such claims and thus immunizes the carrier from liability under any common-law suit. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

The workers’ compensation act focuses on the employee and his or her work-related injury while the fair employment practices act and the civil rights act focus on employer conduct that undermines equal opportunity in the workplace. Folan v. State/Department of Children, Youth, & Families, 723 A.2d 287, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1999).

Applicability.

A worker’s compensation carrier is entitled to the protection of the immunity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

By virtue of this section, an injured employee may not maintain a common law action against an employer for his or her injuries. Therefore, since the defendants were the directors, officers, agents and employees of the employer and, as such, have been given immunity from liability by the Legislature via this section, the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff is workers’ compensation. The plaintiff’s theory of dual liability is without merit. Nunes v. Aiello, 664 A.2d 1121, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 214 (R.I. 1995).

The exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act bars a plaintiff from filing a second cause of action on the basis of a different legal theory for the same injuries on which his or her workers’ compensation claim was based. Manzi v. State, 687 A.2d 461, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 18 (R.I. 1997).

Since an injury to reputation is not an injury within the meaning of the workers’ compensation statute, the exclusivity provision did not bar an employee from maintaining a defamation action against her employer and co-workers. Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d 368, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 32 (R.I. 2002).

— Temporary Employees.

Employee assigned by an employment agency to work for a company receives the same immunity from suit as would the company itself pursuant to this section, which gives immunity not only to the employer but also to its directors, officers, agents, or employees. Poirier v. Manpower Inc., 689 A.2d 1036, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 51 (R.I. 1997).

When an employee assigned by an employment agency to work for an employer was injured on the job, an affidavit from the employer stating that it paid the agency for the employee’s services was sufficient to show the employer contracted with the agency for those services, making the employer a “special employer,” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-2(6)(ii) , so the employer was immune from the employee’s suit, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 , because the immunity the statute provided was intended to apply to special employers. Urena v. Theta Prods., 899 A.2d 449, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2006).

Language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 , making an employer immune from suit when an employee was entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-1 et seq., applied to “employers,” and the legislature intended this term to include both “general employers” and “special employers,” the former term referring to temporary worker agencies, and the latter term referring to the companies that use their services. Urena v. Theta Prods., 899 A.2d 449, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2006).

Coemployee.

A coemployee was not a joint tortfeasor against whom contribution could be sought, because the plaintiff lacked a right of action against her pursuant to this section. Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 1994).

Under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff could not sue the defendant, a coemployee, in connection with work-related motor vehicle accident for which he obtained workers’ compensation benefits; therefore, the operator and the owner of the other vehicle involved in the collision could not pursue a claim for contribution against the defendant. Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 1994).

Summary judgment on plaintiff’s negligence claim was appropriately granted in favor of defendant based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, where plaintiff conceded that he was injured by defendant while on the job site and that defendant was a coemployee of the employer at the time, plaintiff accepted workers’ compensation benefits from the employer, and plaintiff did not notify the employer of his intention to preserve any common-law right to sue in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-17 . Mello v. Killeavy, 205 A.3d 454, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2019).

Neither the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 , nor R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-58 provides for a scope-of-employment exception for injuries caused by coemployees. Accordingly, in plaintiff’s case against a coemployee for negligence, the Supreme Court declined to extend the D’Andrea standard to create liability for coemployees where none existed before. Mello v. Killeavy, 205 A.3d 454, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2019).

Contracts.

An injured employee may not maintain an action for breach of contract in addition to relief provided under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Hornsby v. Southland Corp., 487 A.2d 1069, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 438 (R.I. 1985).

Actions against an employer for injuries resulting from a breach of contract are barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Hornsby v. Southland Corp., 487 A.2d 1069, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 438 (R.I. 1985).

Although the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act do not preclude an employee and employer from making an express contract providing for additional damages for an injury otherwise covered by the act, that contract must comply with the provisions of § 28-29-17 . Hornsby v. Southland Corp., 487 A.2d 1069, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 438 (R.I. 1985).

Where a subcontractor’s employee sues the general contractor after receiving workers’ compensation benefits from the subcontractor, and the jury apportions fault between the contractors, the general contractor is entitled to judgment on its cross-claim against the subcontractor, pursuant to an indemnity agreement signed by the subcontractor. Gormly v. I. Lazar & Sons, Inc., 926 F.2d 47, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 2077 (1st Cir. 1991).

Where a general contractor is sued by an employee of the subcontractor under circumstances covered by the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Act (RIWCA) the general contractor can obtain indemnification from a negligent subcontractor only if the contract so provides. In the absence of such a contract, the subcontractor is immune, pursuant to the RIWCA, from tortfeasor liability and from the obligation of contribution. Cosimini v. Atkinson-Kiewit Joint Venture, 877 F. Supp. 68, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2172 (D.R.I. 1995).

Employer.

Accident victim’s negligence action against a tree services company was barred because the victim was employed by the company; an affiliated entity’s role with respect to the victim’s employment was an administrative function of providing paychecks and benefits, such as workers’ compensation benefits, while the company alone had dominion and control over the victim who suffered a personal injury while engaged as a foreman for a tree removal crew. Selby v. Baird, 240 A.3d 243, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 2020).

Exclusivity.

The legislature did not intend the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation act to bar the independent statutory claims created by the fair employment practices act or the civil rights act, since to do so would frustrate a broad, fundamental public policy which fulfills the paramount purpose of preventing discrimination. Folan v. State/Department of Children, Youth, & Families, 723 A.2d 287, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1999).

Church was immune from liability, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 , for injuries to its employee since the church had obtained worker’s compensation benefits through the Diocesan Service Corporation. Deus v. S.S. Peter & Paul Church, 820 A.2d 974, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 101 (R.I. 2003).

Workers’ compensation exclusivity principles did not entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of law in an action raising many claims, such as breach of contract and violation of wiretap statutes, that were not subject to the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Act, so that the superior court properly exercised jurisdiction over the action; exclusivity as to some of the tort claims could have been raised as an affirmative defense, but it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial justice to deny the employer’s motion to amend where it was made well into the litigation and would have greatly prejudiced the former employee. Cady v. IMC Mortg. Co., 862 A.2d 202, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 204 (R.I. 2004).

Hospital employee, who sustained injuries after falling in a hospital corridor and settled a workers’ compensation claim, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-25.1 , was not entitled to bring a later negligence action alleging the hospital failed to maintain the corridor in reasonably safe condition because the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Law § 28-29-20 , barred any subsequent civil action against the hospital arising from the same incident. Kulawas v. R.I. Hosp., 994 A.2d 649, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 59 (R.I. 2010).

Driver was entitled to summary judgment in a negligence action filed by a passenger, because the driver was the passenger’s employer and, as such, entitled to the protections of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 . In addition, the passenger relinquished his right to sue the driver in tort after accepting $41,000 in workers’ compensation benefits from the insurer. Lafreniere v. Dutton, 44 A.3d 1241, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 73 (R.I. 2012).

Gross Negligence.

Gross negligence of employer does not restore common law right of employee. National India Rubber Co. Kilroe, 54 R.I. 333 , 173 A. 86, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1934).

Both the indemnity provision and the insurance procurement obligation in the subcontract between contractor and subcontractor extended only to those damages attributable to subcontractor’s percentage of negligence. Cosimini v. Atkinson-Kiewit Joint Venture, 877 F. Supp. 68, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2172 (D.R.I. 1995).

Intentional Tort Exception.

Neither the legislature nor the Supreme Court has created an intentional tort exception to the mandate of this section. Lopes v. G.T.E. Prods. Corp., 560 A.2d 949, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1989).

There is no intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act as set forth in this section. Coakley v. Aetna Bridge Co., 572 A.2d 295, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 73 (R.I. 1990).

The intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply to the workers’ compensation carrier. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort like any other, and it is clearly compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Thus, this section shields an employer from suit on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising out of workplace sexual harassment and discrimination. Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7884 (D.R.I. 1996).

Pleading.

Defense based on this section could not be asserted under plea of general issue to a common law action but must be specially pleaded. McHugh v. Williams & Payton, 43 R.I. 170 , 110 A. 607, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1920).

Special Employers.

A literal application of § 28-29-2(3)(iii) ’s [now see § 28-29-2(6) ] designation of the general employer as the employer in this section, thereby allowing an employee who has received workers’ compensation benefits to maintain a tort action against his special employer, destroys the compromise that is the foundation of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Such a construction would have the effect of encouraging litigation by employees that have received workers’ compensation benefits, the exact opposite of what the legislature intended. Therefore, a special employer is an entity granted immunity from suit by this section. Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 267 (R.I. 1994).

Stockholders.

A stockholder, in the absence of active negligence on his or its part, is entitled to the benefit of the exclusive-remedy provision of this section. Stockholders, even more than corporate officers, should be entitled to protection against suits for negligence on the part of the corporate employer. Mitchell v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, 673 A.2d 446, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1996).

Suit After Compensation.

An injured employee who is receiving workers’ compensation benefits from a limited partnership is barred by this section from bringing a common-law action against a corporate general partner for the same injuries. Mercier v. Saber, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 27, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2453 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1459, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16889 (1st Cir. 1989).

Where plaintiff ’s husband received workers’ compensation benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act and is therefore barred from pursuing a tort action for physical injuries against his employer, plaintiff is similarly barred from recovering for loss of consortium resulting from those injuries. Sama v. Cardi Corp., 569 A.2d 432, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 1990).

A plaintiff accepting workers’ compensation benefits may not pursue any other right to recovery based on the wrongful conduct of an entity immune from suit under this section. Thus, the plaintiff ’s action against an owner-lessor of a for-hire motor vehicle pursuant to § 31-34-4 is included within the ambit of this prohibition. DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 174 (R.I. 1992).

Where the employer had already paid workers’ compensation benefits to the administratrix, a trailer was not a “motor vehicle” under Rhode Island’s vicarious liability statute and summary judgment was properly entered against the administratrix in an action against the employer that owned a trailer that struck and killed the decedent and an employee. LePage v. Babcock, 839 A.2d 1226, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 12 (R.I. 2004).

Third Parties.

This section does not preclude the possibility that employee may recover damages by common law remedies against a third party and that the third party may then recover from the employer under a right to indemnity. Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., 122 F. Supp. 806, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3316 (D.R.I. 1954).

In suit by painter against owner of property for damages sustained while working on its property it was proper for owner of property to implead certain contractors as third party defendants whose negligence allegedly caused the injury notwithstanding one of such third party defendants was the employer of the painter and such employer had paid workers’ compensation to the painter. Atella v. General Electric Co., 21 F.R.D. 372, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4525 (D.R.I. 1957).

Nothing in the act justifies a conclusion that the legislature conferred immunity from suit at common law for a compensable injury other than on the employer. Colarusso v. Mills, 99 R.I. 409 , 208 A.2d 381, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 454 (1965).

Since a decedent’s estate has no right of action against the decedent’s employer for death allegedly caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of decedent’s employment, a third party defendant whose negligence is alleged to have caused the accident has no right of contribution against the employer as a joint tortfeasor. Rowe v. John C. Motter Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8189 (D.R.I. 1967).

Defendants, owners of dog that bit plaintiff-veterinary assistant, could not implead plaintiff’s employer, where employer had paid workers’ compensation benefits to plaintiff and was thus immune from suit brought by plaintiff-employee. Iorio v. Chin, 446 A.2d 1021, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 895 (R.I. 1982).

A third-party action for contract indemnification from the employer is not an action based upon the employee’s injury but rather is an action for reimbursement based upon an expressed contractual obligation between the employer and a third-party plaintiff; this obligation is independent of any statutory duty the employer may owe an employee, so the action is not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Cosentino v. A.F. Lusi Constr. Co., 485 A.2d 105, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 640 (R.I. 1984).

Plaintiff truck driver who received workers’ compensation benefits from the defendant was barred from filing a subsequent negligence action against the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff ’s actual employer was an independent contractor that supplied the defendant with substitute drivers such as plaintiff. Criner v. North Am. Van Lines, 613 A.2d 1272, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 185 (R.I. 1992).

The defendant in a negligence suit was barred from bringing a third-party action against the plaintiff ’s employer on the grounds that the plaintiff ’s employer, an exterminating company, had a duty to refrain from the negligent action which allegedly caused the plaintiff ’s injuries while he was performing services on the defendant’s premises. To permit indemnity against the employer would have made him liable, in contravention of this section, for compensation beyond those payments already made to the plaintiff pursuant to this Act. Fish v. Burns Bros. Donut Shop, 617 A.2d 874, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 212 (R.I. 1992).

A general construction contractor could not obtain indemnification for alleged negligence at the job site from an injured employee’s subcontractor-employer in the absence of any express agreement between the employer and general contractor providing for such indemnification. Ferguson v. Marshall Contrs., 707 A.2d 660, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 18 (R.I. 1998).

— Truck Driver.

The immunity from suit of the driver of a motor vehicle under the Workers’ Compensation Act precludes a claim against the owner of the vehicle grounded in the negligence of the immune driver. DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 641 A.2d 50, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 139 (R.I. 1994).

Waiver of Common Law Remedy.

An employee waives his or her common-law remedy if the employee fails to properly notify the employer of his or her intention to rely on the common law. Lopes v. G.T.E. Prods. Corp., 560 A.2d 949, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1989).

Collateral References.

Action against fellow employee for injury or death covered by workers’ compensation. 57 A.L.R.4th 888.

Construction and Application of Exclusive Remedy Rule Under State Workers’ Compensation Statutes with Respect to Liability for Injury or Death of Employee as Passenger in Employer-Provided Vehicle — Requisites for, and Factors Affecting, Applicability and Who May Invoke Rule. 42 A.L.R.6th 545.

Construction and Application of Exclusive Remedy Rule under State Workers’ Compensation Statute With Respect to Liability for Injury or Death of Employee as Passenger in Employer-Provided Vehicle — Against Whom May Rule Be Invoked and Application of Rule to Particular Situations and Employees. 43 A.L.R.6th 375.

Construction and Application of Insurance Procurement Contractual Provisions and Clauses — Evidentiary Matters, Damages and Recovery, Contract Language, Status of Claimant, and Other Considerations. 29 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2018).

Construction and Application of Insurance Procurement Contractual Provisions and Clauses — General Considerations, Indemnity Issues, and Nature of Agreement Containing Provisions and Clauses. 29 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Contractual waiver of exclusivity of workers’ compensation remedy. 117 A.L.R.5th 441.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee’s recovery for medical malpractice from company medical personnel. 73 A.L.R.4th 115.

Employee’s action against employer for fraud, false imprisonment, defamation or the like. 46 A.L.R.3d 1279.

Exclusive Remedy Provision of State Workers’ Compensation Statute as Applied to Injuries Sustained During or as the Result of Horseplay, Joking, Fooling, or the Like. 44 A.L.R.6th 545.

Husband or wife of injured employee, compensation act as precluding common law action by. 104 A.L.R. 346.

Insured’s receipt of or right to workers’ compensation benefits as affecting recovery under accident, hospital or medical expense policy. 40 A.L.R.3d 1012.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress — Sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, or accusations concerning sexual conduct or orientation. 20 A.L.R.6th 1.

Malpractice suit against injured employee’s attending physician notwithstanding receipt of workers’ compensation award. 28 A.L.R.3d 1066.

Postaccident conduct by employer, employer’s insurer, or employer’s employees in relation to workers’ compensation claim as waiving, or estopping employer from asserting, exclusivity otherwise afforded by workers’ compensation statute. 120 A.L.R.5th 513.

Right of employee to maintain common law action for negligence against workers’ compensation insurance carrier. 93 A.L.R.2d 598.

Status as Alter Ego of Employer for Purposes of Exclusive Remedy Rule Barring Third Party Action Under Worker’s Compensation Statutes. 27 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2015).

Workmen’s Compensation Act as furnishing exclusive remedy for employee injured by product manufactured, sold, or distributed by employer. 9 A.L.R.4th 873.

28-29-21. Wrongful death law inapplicable.

In all cases where an employer and employee have elected to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, the provisions of chapter 7 of title 10 shall not apply while those chapters are in effect.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 4; P.L. 1953, ch. 3215, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-21 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Election by employee under § 28-29-17 not to claim common law rights precluded wrongful death action by his representatives. National India Rubber Co. Kilroe, 54 R.I. 333 , 173 A. 86, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1934).

Third Parties.

By reason of this section, a third party defendant whose negligence is alleged to have caused death of decedent in an accident arising out of and in the course of decedent’s employment has no right of contribution against that employer as a joint tortfeasor. Rowe v. John C. Motter Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8189 (D.R.I. 1967).

Collateral References.

Right of workers’ compensation insurer or employer paying to a workers’ compensation fund, on the compensable death of an employee with no dependents, to indemnity or subrogation from proceeds of wrongful death action brought against third-party tortfeasor. 7 A.L.R.5th 969.

28-29-22. Agreement for alternative scheme — Approval and certification.

Any employer may enter into an agreement with his or her employees in any employment to which chapters 29 — 38 of this title apply to provide a scheme of compensation, benefit, or insurance in lieu of the compensation provided for in those chapters, subject to the approval of the director and the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court. Approval shall be granted only on condition that the scheme proposed provides as great benefits as those provided by these chapters. If the scheme provides for contributions by employees, it shall confer additional benefits at least equivalent to the contributions. If a scheme meets with the approval of the director, he or she shall issue a certificate enabling the employer to contract with any or all of the employer’s employees in employment to which chapters 29 — 38 of this title apply to substitute that scheme for the provisions of those chapters for a period of not more than five (5) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 4, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 4, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-22 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 118, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 2.

28-29-23. Termination provisions in alternative scheme.

No scheme which provides for contributions by employees shall be certified as provided in § 28-29-22 which does not contain suitable provisions for the equitable distribution of any money or securities held for the purpose of the scheme, after due provision has been made to discharge the liabilities already incurred, if and when that certificate is revoked or the scheme otherwise terminated.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 4, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 4, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-23 .

28-29-24. Revocation of certificate as to alternative scheme.

If at any time the scheme no longer fulfills the requirements of §§ 28-29-22 and 28-29-23 , or is not fairly administered, or any other valid and substantial reason for it exists, the director, on reasonable notice to the interested parties, shall revoke the certificate and the scheme shall be terminated.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 4, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 4, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 4, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-24 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 116, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4.

28-29-25. Penal provisions in other statutes unaffected.

Nothing in chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall affect the liability of an employer to a fine or penalty under any other statute.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-25 .

Collateral References.

Insurance carrier’s liability for part of employer’s liability attributable to violation of law or other misconduct on his part. 1 A.L.R.2d 407.

28-29-26. Supervision of enforcement.

  1. Department of labor and training.  The director as provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title, chapter 53 of this title, and chapter 16.1 of title 42, shall have supervision over the enforcement of the provisions of those chapters, and the director shall have the power and authority to adopt and enforce all reasonable rules, regulations, and orders necessary and suitable to the administration of the department’s responsibilities as described in those chapters.
    1. Workers’ compensation court.  The workers’ compensation court, as provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title, shall have supervision over the enforcement of the provisions of the chapters, and shall have the power and authority to adopt and enforce all reasonable rules, regulations, and orders necessary and suitable to the administration of its responsibilities described in the chapters. In addition to the foregoing, the court shall have the power and authority to hear and decide appeals from the retirement board in accordance with § 45-21.2-9 . The court shall remain judicially and administratively independent. The workers’ compensation court shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions filed pursuant to §§ 28-36-15 and 28-37-28 and pursuant to the provisions of chapter 53 of this title.
    2. Any petition arising from any dispute regardless of date of injury, unless specifically excepted, shall be filed with the court in accordance with chapter 35 of this title and the rules of practice promulgated by the workers’ compensation court.
    3. The enactment of this subsection shall not affect the rights of the parties established by any existing memorandum of agreement, suspension agreement and receipt, preliminary determination of the department of workers’ compensation, order or decree, or any existing right to the payment of compensation acquired pursuant to § 28-29-6 or § 28-35-9 .

History of Section. P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 92; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 5; P.L. 1941, ch. 1053, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-26 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 1, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 32; P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 1.

Applicability.

P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect July 1, 2007, and applies to injuries that occur on or after January 1, 2009.

28-29-27. Appropriations and disbursements.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated any sum that it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders on the general treasurer for the payment of that sum or so much of it as may be from time to time required, upon the receipt by him or her of duly authenticated vouchers.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 10; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-27 .

28-29-28. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 11; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-28 ; Repealed by P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 2, effective June 25, 1986.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-29-28 concerned an annual report to the general assembly.

28-29-29. Severability.

If any section of chapters 29 — 38 of this title is declared unconstitutional or invalid, that unconstitutionality or invalidity shall in no way affect the validity of any other portion of it which can be given reasonable effect without the part declared unconstitutional or invalid.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-29-29 .

28-29-30. Advisory council.

  1. There is created a workers’ compensation advisory council consisting of seventeen (17) members as follows:
    1. The chief judge of the workers’ compensation court and two (2) additional judges of the workers’ compensation court and one member of the bar who primarily represents injured workers before the workers’ compensation court, both to be selected by the chief judge;
    2. The director of business regulation;
    3. The director of administration;
    4. Three (3) representatives from labor appointed by the governor, one of whom shall be an injured worker;
    5. Three (3) representatives from business appointed by the governor, one of whom shall represent cities and towns;
    6. One representative from the general public appointed by the governor;
    7. The chairperson of the senate labor committee, or his or her designee;
    8. The chairperson of the house labor committee, or his or her designee;
    9. The director of labor and training; and
    10. The chief executive officer of the workers’ compensation insurance fund, or his or her designee.
  2. It shall be the duty of the council to advise the governor and the general assembly, on an annual basis, on the administration of the workers’ compensation system.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 11; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 1.

Chapter 30 Workers’ Compensation Court

28-30-1. Court established — General powers.

  1. There is established in the state of Rhode Island a workers’ compensation court consisting of a chief judge and nine (9) associate judges having the jurisdiction that may be necessary to carry out its duties under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, chapters 29 — 38 of this title and the provisions of § 45-21.2-9 , except those provisions of the act that establish violations of the act as crimes, offenses, or misdemeanors. The jurisdiction of those crimes, offenses, or misdemeanors shall remain in the district and superior courts as otherwise provided by law.
  2. The court shall be a court of record with the same authority and power to subpoena and also the same authority and power to cite and punish for civil contempt as exist in the superior court. The court shall have a seal, and the members, administrator, deputy administrator, and assistant clerks of the court shall have the authority and power to administer oaths and affirmations.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-1 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 28, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 132, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 205, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 6; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 4.

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Dispute Resulotion:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-275 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 23E, § 4 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Apportionment of Liability.

The commission had neither express nor necessary implied legislative authority to adjudicate apportionment of liability between two insurance carriers where employee’s work-related disabling condition commenced and advanced while first carrier insured employer, but culminated in incapacity for work and resulted in a claim for compensation only after second carrier had succeeded the first. Home Indem. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 162 , 282 A.2d 594, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1036 (1971).

Contempt.

Power of the commission to cite and punish for contempt under this section is not limited to the enforcement of the right of subpoena but extends to all the orders of the commission. Segrella v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'n, 91 R.I. 282 , 162 A.2d 810, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1960).

Under this section, the commission has power to cite and punish for contempt an employer who fails to make a lump sum payment as ordered. Masi v. A. Gasbarro & Sons, 103 R.I. 136 , 235 A.2d 341, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 586 (1967).

A workers’ compensation commissioner has the power to hold persons in criminal contempt, but only if he can certify that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Kennedy v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 519 A.2d 585, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 393 (R.I. 1987).

Jurisdiction.

The Workers’ Compensation Court has jurisdiction over matters relating to workers’ compensation, including the authority to interpret and apply the Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund Act, chapter 34 of title 27, to the extent necessary to determine the fund’s obligations under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Info. Coordinating Committee/Industry Educ. Council of Labor, 704 A.2d 740, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 315 (R.I. 1997).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-30-1(a) grants the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) jurisdiction that may be necessary to carry out its duties under the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-21.2-9 . For the General Assembly to grant the WCC the jurisdiction necessary to carry out its duties under § 45-21.2-9 , and for the court to interpret R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-21.2-9(f) as providing the WCC with no new jurisdiction under that section, would disregard all sense of legislative intent and would defeat the underlying purpose of the act. Therefore, the General Assembly intended the WCC to have jurisdiction over appeals from adverse decisions rendered by the retirement board when the application was filed pursuant to the time mandate contained in R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-19-1(j). Lang v. Mun. Emples. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 222 A.3d 912, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 144 (R.I. 2019).

Nature of Workers’ Compensation Court.

Within the limits of the jurisdiction granted to it by the legislature, the commission is a court of law in all but name. Varin v. Lymansville Co., 87 R.I. 463 , 143 A.2d 138, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1958).

The jurisdiction of the commission is limited to disputes between the employer and the employee. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. West Warwick, 119 R.I. 458 , 379 A.2d 924, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1951 (1977).

A prior action pending in the Superior Court which raises constitutional questions concerning the application of other statutes imposing assessments upon an insurance company does not oust the Workers’ Compensation Court from jurisdiction. Tammelleo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1327, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 1994).

Collateral References.

Prohibition to control workers’ compensation boards and officers. 115 A.L.R. 32; 159 A.L.R. 627.

28-30-2. Appointment and terms of judges.

  1. Any workers’ compensation commissioner who was appointed and confirmed and who took the oath of that office and is holding that office on July 11, 1990, shall continue to remain in the office of workers’ compensation judge in accordance with the general laws. The appointment and confirmation as workers’ compensation judges and chief judge of those judges who took their oath of office and are holding the office on July 11, 1990, is ratified and confirmed.
  2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of chief judge of the workers’ compensation court, or whenever the chief judge is unable by reason of illness to perform the duties of chief judge, then the chief justice of the Rhode Island supreme court shall designate one of the judges of the workers’ compensation court who is present and qualifies to act to perform the duties of the chief judge until the vacancy is filled or the disability removed. In the event that the chief judge determines that his or her absence for reasons other than illness will prevent him or her from performing the duties of that office, then the chief judge shall designate a workers’ compensation judge to perform those duties during the period of his or her absence. The workers’ compensation judges holding office on July 11, 1990, or subsequently appointed shall have precedence according to the dates of their commissions, or where the commissions of two (2) or more of them bear the same date, according to their ages.
  3. With the approval of the chief judge, the judges of the court may appoint attorneys who are qualified as arbitrators under the court annexed arbitration procedures to act as masters and make findings under the supervision of the appointing judge. With the approval of the chief judge, unless specifically prohibited by chapter 27 of title 11, the judges may authorize the appearance of claims adjusters or lay representatives before the masters.
  4. Whenever any person appointed to the office of the chief judge or associate judge fails to accept and qualify for the office or there is a vacancy in the office caused by death, resignation, retirement, removal, or any other cause whatsoever while the senate is in session, the governor shall appoint some person to fill the vacancy, and submit his or her appointment to the senate for confirmation in accordance with the general laws governing judicial selection, including the provisions of chapter 16.1 of title 8.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-2 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 267, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 2, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 72, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 42, § 6; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 2.

28-30-3. Qualifications of judges — Sessions to hear cases.

  1. A workers’ compensation judge shall be an attorney at law and admitted to the bar. During his or her term of office a judge shall not engage in the practice of law or any other employment and shall not act as counsel or attorney at law.
  2. The workers’ compensation court shall be in session five (5) days a week with all of its members available to hear compensation cases, except during July and August, when at least four (4) judges shall be available to hear workers’ compensation cases. All cases coming before the court shall be heard and decided by any of its members.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 13; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-3 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 267, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 2, § 1.

28-30-4. Workers’ compensation administrator — Appointment — Powers and duties.

  1. There shall be a workers’ compensation administrator who shall be appointed by the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court with the advice and consent of the senate. The chief judge of the workers’ compensation court, with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint a workers’ compensation administrator to serve for a period of five (5) years, and thereafter until his or her successor is appointed and qualified.
  2. The administrator shall:
    1. Supervise the preparation of an annual budget for the workers’ compensation court;
    2. Formulate procedures governing the administration of workers’ compensation court services;
    3. Make recommendations to the workers’ compensation court for improvement in court services;
    4. Collect necessary statistics and prepare the annual report of the work of the workers’ compensation court;
    5. Provide supervision and consultation to the staff of the workers’ compensation court concerning administration of court services, training and supervision of personnel, and fiscal management;
    6. Perform any other duties that the workers’ compensation court specifies;
    7. Have the power to act as a notary public as provided in § 42-30-14 [repealed].

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-4 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 111, § 3; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 2, § 3; P.L. 1983, ch. 28, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 3; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 42-30-14 , referred to in subsection (b)(7) of this section, was repealed by P.L. 2018, ch. 104, § 3 and P.L. 2018, ch. 109, § 3, effective January 1, 2019. For comparable provisions effective January 1, 2019, see § 42-30.1 et seq.

Applicability.

P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 5, and P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 5, provide that the amendments to these acts shall take effect upon passage and shall apply to all appointments made after the effective date of the acts.

Cross References.

Incentive pay plan for administrators, § 8-4.1-1 .

28-30-4.1. Deputy administrator — Appointment and term of office.

There shall be a deputy administrator of the workers’ compensation court who shall be appointed by the administrator of the workers’ compensation court with the approval of a majority of the judges. Beginning in January, 2002, and during the month of January in every fifth (5th) year thereafter, the administrator, with the approval of a majority of the judges, shall appoint a deputy administrator of the court to serve for a period of five (5) years, commencing on the first day of the following February, and thereafter until his or her successor is appointed and qualified.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 267, § 3; P.L. 1979, ch. 111, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, §§ 33, 55; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 2.

28-30-4.2. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 72, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 17, effective May 18, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-30-4.2 concerned fraud prevention unit-appointment, duties, qualifications, and annual report.

28-30-5. Vacancies in office of administrator.

In the event that a vacancy occurs in the office of the administrator, the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court, with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint a duly qualified person to act as administrator under the provisions of this chapter to serve for the balance of the unexpired term and until his or her successor is duly appointed and qualified.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-5 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 111, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 2, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 3.

Applicability.

P.L. 2005, ch. 10, § 5, and P.L. 2005, ch. 21, § 5, provide that the amendments to these acts shall take effect upon passage and shall apply to all appointments made after the effective date of the acts.

28-30-5.1. Vacancy in office of deputy administrator.

In the event that a vacancy occurs in the office of the deputy administrator, the administrator, with the approval of a majority of the judges, shall appoint a duly qualified person to act as deputy administrator under the provisions of this chapter to fill the vacancy for the balance of the unexpired term; provided, further, that the person so appointed shall continue to fill the vacancy until his or her successor is duly appointed and qualified.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 111, § 3.

28-30-6. Administrator and deputy administrator to devote full time to office — Disability of administrator or deputy administrator.

The administrator and deputy administrator shall not be active in determining the policies or conducting the affairs of any employers’ association or labor organization, but they shall impartially devote their full time to the duties of their offices. In the event of sickness, absence, or disability that renders it impossible for the administrator to act, the deputy administrator shall serve until the disability is removed. In the event of sickness, absence, or disability that renders it impossible for the deputy administrator to act, the worker’s compensation court shall appoint a temporary deputy administrator to serve until the disability is removed.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3802, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-6 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 111, § 2.

28-30-7. Clerical assistance to administrator.

The administrator, with the approval of the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court, may employ any clerical assistance that he or she may require for copying, recording, indexing, and attending upon the files of the court, and may appoint additional staff as necessary.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-7 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 111, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 33; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 2.

28-30-8. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-8 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 111, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 3, effective June 9, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 3, effective June 9, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-30-8 concerned declaration of vacancy in office.

28-30-9. Location of court — Place of hearings.

The workers’ compensation court shall be located in Providence and all hearings before the court concerning compensation shall be conducted in Providence, unless the workers’ compensation court otherwise designates.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-9 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 3.

28-30-10. Hearings open — Recording of decisions.

All matters heard by the workers’ compensation court shall be in open session and decisions and decrees shall only be recorded in Providence.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-10 .

28-30-11. Representation of parties before court.

An employee who is a party to any proceeding before the workers’ compensation court may appear before the court on his or her own behalf. An employer who or that is a party to any proceeding before the workers’ compensation court may appear before the court on the employer’s own behalf, or may be represented as provided in § 28-35-63 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-11 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 7, § 9; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 3.

Collateral References.

Handling, preparing, presenting, or trying workers’ compensation claims or cases as practice of law. 58 A.L.R.5th 449.

28-30-12. Forms — Rules of procedure.

The workers’ compensation court, with the approval of the supreme court, shall prescribe forms, make suitable orders, and adopt rules of procedure to secure a speedy, efficient, informal, and inexpensive disposition of its proceedings under chapters 29 — 38 of this title; and in making those orders, the court is not bound by the provisions of the general laws relating to practice. In the absence of those orders, special orders shall be made in each case. The court is authorized to order “last best offer” procedures to apply in its discretion in appropriate cases to encourage resolution of cases. In the event the court orders and implements those procedures in a case, either party’s last best offer, if selected by the judge or master, shall be final and binding on the parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-12 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 29, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 44, § 2.

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Counsel Fees.

This section empowered superior court to award counsel fees for prosecution of contempt citation by claimant. Gobeille v. Ray's, Inc., 65 R.I. 207 , 14 A.2d 241, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1940).

Depositions.

In the absence of rule or order to the contrary, superior court justice could issue dedimus to take deposition. Warner v. Bay View Hotel, 74 R.I. 264 , 60 A.2d 488, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1948).

Evidence.

The workers’ compensation commission is bound by the statutory and common law rules of evidence. Cole v. New England Transp. Co., 88 R.I. 408 , 149 A.2d 352, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1959).

Interlocutory Decree.

The entry of an interlocutory decree when the situation warrants it, which suspends compensation payments until a necessary hearing can be conducted, is an exercise of inherent power. Zecchino v. State, 520 A.2d 139, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 400 (R.I. 1987).

Entry of an interlocutory decree suspending compensation payments was authorized, where there was credible evidence that the employee’s disability had ended and the employee had not been cooperating to complete the hearing on a petition to review with reasonable diligence. Zecchino v. State, 520 A.2d 139, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 400 (R.I. 1987).

Limitation on Rulemaking Powers.

The rulemaking authority conferred by this section is limited to matters procedural, and the commission may not in the exercise of that power effect an enlargement or diminution of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the legislature. United Wire & Supply Corp. v. Frenier, 87 R.I. 31 , 137 A.2d 414, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1958).

Assuming without deciding that this section confers upon the commission the right to establish its own rules of evidence, where it had not been brought to the court’s attention that the commission had ever done so, the statutory and common law rules of evidence were in force. Cole v. New England Transp. Co., 88 R.I. 408 , 149 A.2d 352, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1959).

Simplified Procedure.

Procedure should be simplified and as little time as possible taken up with matters of pleading. Jules Desurmont Worsted Co. v. Julian, 56 R.I. 97 , 183 A. 846, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1936).

The language of this section is designed to expedite procedure and avoid technical pleadings to the end that a hearing might be had without unwarranted delay. Cole v. New England Transp. Co., 88 R.I. 408 , 149 A.2d 352, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1959).

Time for Appeal.

The trial commissioner has the discretion, under §§ 28-30-1 , 28-30-1 2 and Rule 4.2, Workers’ Compensation Commission Rules of Practice, to extend the time in which to claim an appeal. The commissioner’s exercise of this discretion was not improper where the employer’s motion for an extension of time was filed in a timely manner but was inadvertently lost by the commissioner. Sullivan v. Empire Equip. Eng'g Co., 492 A.2d 1212, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 506 (R.I. 1985).

28-30-13. Controversies submitted to court.

  1. Any controversy over which the workers’ compensation court has jurisdiction in accordance with chapters 29 — 38 and chapter 53 of this title, including compensation; reasonableness of medical and hospital bills; degree of functional impairment and/or disability; a dispute between an insurance carrier and an employer under a workers’ compensation insurance contract, except disputes under the jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation appeals board established pursuant to § 27-9-29 ; failure of an employer to secure the payment of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 and chapter 53 of this title and any controversy in which the state or any of its political subdivisions is a party; and appeals from an order of the retirement board pursuant to § 45-21.2-9 shall be submitted to the court in the manner provided in chapters 33 and 35 of this title.
  2. Disputes between an insurance carrier and an employer under a workers’ compensation insurance contract shall not be subject to a pretrial conference in accordance with § 28-35-20 , but shall be assigned consistent with the rules of practice of the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-30-13 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 2.

Applicability.

P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect July 1, 2007, and applies to injuries that occur on or after January 1, 2009.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

The commission is permitted to rely on reasonable inferences derived from legally competent evidence. Bulova Watch Co. v. Cortes, 511 A.2d 984, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 505 (R.I. 1986).

Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the commission is limited to disputes between the employer and the employee. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. West Warwick, 119 R.I. 458 , 379 A.2d 924, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1951 (1977).

Where the injured employee is not involved in a dispute between the employer and its insurer under a workers’ compensation insurance contract, the workers’ compensation commission has no jurisdiction over the dispute, even where the employer is a state or political subdivision. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. West Warwick, 119 R.I. 458 , 379 A.2d 924, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1951 (1977).

Collateral References.

Matters concluded, in action at law to recover for the same injury, by decision or finding made in workers’ compensation proceeding. 84 A.L.R.2d 1036.

28-30-14. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1958, ch. 207, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 3, effective June 9, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 3, effective June 9, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-30-14 concerned clerk/secretary in unclassified service.

28-30-15. Retirement of judges engaged on or before July 2, 1997, on reduced pay.

  1. Whenever any person engaged as a judge on or before July 2, 1997, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years, or has so served for ten (10) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, he or she may retire from active service and subsequently he or she shall receive annually during life a sum equal to three-fourths (3/4) of the annual salary that he or she was receiving at the time of retirement. In determining eligibility under this section, any judge who has served as a general officer may include that service as if that service had been on the workers’ compensation court. Whenever a judge or magistrate shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, the absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  2. Any judge who retires in accordance with the provisions of this section may at his or her own request and at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as a judge on the workers’ compensation court as the chief judge prescribes. When so assigned and performing those services, he or she shall have all the powers and authority of a judge. A retired judge shall not be counted in the number of judges provided by law for the workers’ compensation court. Whenever a judge shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, the absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 203, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 415, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 40, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment deleted “workers’ compensation” preceding “judges” in the section heading.

28-30-15.1. Retirement of judges engaged after July 2, 1997.

  1. Whenever any person first engaged as a judge:
    1. Subsequent to July 2, 1997, and prior to January 1, 2009, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years, or has so served for ten (10) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, he or she may retire from active service and subsequently he or she shall receive annually during life a sum equal to three-fourths (3/4) of his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation;
    2. On or after January 1, 2009, and prior to July 1, 2009, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years or has so served for ten (10) years and reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, he or she may retire from active service and subsequently he or she shall receive annually during life a sum equal to seventy percent (70%) of his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years or compensation; and
    3. On or after July 1, 2009, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years, or has served for ten (10) years, and reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, he or she may retire from regular active service and thereafter said justice shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to sixty-five (65%) percent of his or her average highest five (5) consecutive years of compensation.
  2. In determining eligibility under this section, any judge who has served as a general officer may include that service as if that service had been on the workers’ compensation court. Whenever a judge shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, such absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  3. Any judge who retires in accordance with the provisions of this section may at his or her own request and at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as a judge on the workers’ compensation court as the chief judge prescribes. When so assigned and performing those services, he or she shall have all the powers and authority of a judge. A retired judge shall not be counted in the number of judges provided by law for the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 4; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 7; P.L. 2013, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 40, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 2.

28-30-15.2. No incremental retirement benefit for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice, or chief judge retired pursuant to § 28-30-15 or § 28-30-15.1.

No increment in salary resulting from the temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice, or chief judge shall be construed to add to the annual salary of a judicial officer for purposes of retirement under § 28-30-15 or § 28-30-15 .1.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 2.

28-30-16. Retirement of judges engaged on or before July 2, 1997, on full pay.

  1. Whenever any person engaged as a judge on or before July 2, 1997, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years and reached the age of seventy (70) years, he or she may retire from regular active service and subsequently he or she shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to the annual salary he or she was receiving at the time of his or her retirement. Whenever a judge or magistrate shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, the absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  2. Any judge who retires in accordance with the provisions of this section shall at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform such services as a judge as the chief judge prescribes. When so assigned and performing that service, the retiree shall have all the powers and authority of a judge. The retired judge shall not be counted in the number of judges provided by law for the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 415, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 40, § 1.

28-30-16.1. Salary for service after retirement.

Any workers’ compensation judge who retires in accordance with the provisions of §§ 28-30-15 and 28-30-16 , and who is subsequently assigned to perform services in accordance with §§ 28-30-15 and 28-30-16 , and when so assigned and performing that service, shall receive in addition to his or her retirement pension the difference in pay and fringe benefits between what he or she was entitled to receive under §§ 28-30-15 and 28-30-16 prior to exercising his or her options under § 28-30-17 , and what a judge with comparable state service time is receiving as a judge of the workers’ compensation court to which he or she is assigned.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 415, § 2.

28-30-16.2. Retirement of judges engaged after July 2, 1997, on full pay.

  1. Whenever any person first engaged as a judge:
    1. Subsequent to July 2, 1997, and prior to January 1, 2009, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years and reached the age of seventy (70) years, he or she may retire from regular active service and subsequently he or she shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation;
    2. On or after January 1, 2009, and prior to July 1, 2009, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years and reached the age of seventy (70) years, he or she may retire from regular active service and subsequently he or she shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to ninety percent (90%) of his or her average highest three (3) consecutive years of compensation; and
    3. On or after July 1, 2009, has served as a workers’ compensation judge for twenty (20) years and has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, or has served for fifteen (15) years and reached the age of seventy (70) years, he or she may retire from regular active service and subsequently he or she shall receive annually during his or her life a sum equal to eighty percent (80%) of his or her average highest five (5) consecutive years of compensation.
  2. Whenever a judge or magistrate shall be granted a leave of absence without pay, the absence shall not be credited towards active service time for the purposes of retirement.
  3. Any judge who retires in accordance with the provisions of this section shall at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence be assigned to perform those services as a judge that the chief judge prescribes. When so assigned and performing that service, the retiree shall have all the powers and authority of a judge. The retired judge shall not be counted in the number of judges provided by law for the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 4; P.L. 2007, ch. 126, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 7; P.L. 2013, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 40, § 1.

28-30-16.3. No incremental retirement benefit for temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice, or chief judge retired pursuant to § 28-30-16 or § 28-30-16.2.

No increment in salary resulting from the temporary service as chief justice, presiding justice, or chief judge shall be construed to add to the annual salary of a judicial officer for purposes of retirement under § 28-30-16 or § 28-30-16 .2.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 93, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 2.

28-30-17. Allowance to surviving spouses, domestic partners of deceased judges.

  1. Whenever any judge of the workers’ compensation court who was engaged as a judge prior to January 1, 2009, dies after retirement or during active service while eligible for retirement or during active service after having served fifteen (15) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the annual payment that the judge was receiving by way of salary or retirement pay at the time of his or her death.
  2. For those engaged as a judge on or after January 1, 2009, and prior to July 1, 2009, the judge may elect to receive retirement pay that is reduced by an additional ten percent (10%) of the average of the highest three (3) consecutive years annual compensation (i.e., ninety percent (90%) reduced to eighty percent (80%) or seventy percent (70%) reduced to sixty percent (60%)) and where such option is exercised by giving the general treasurer notice in writing thereof within ninety (90) days after the date of his or her retirement his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner or minor children shall receive annually one-half (1/2) of his or her retirement pay during his or her lifetime so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, or the children are under twenty-one (21) years of age; provided, however, for any judge engaged on or after July 1, 2009, the reduction shall be based upon the average of the highest five (5) years consecutive annual compensation.
    1. Any judge of the courts who is engaged as a judge on or after July 1, 2012, and who elects to receive a retirement pay that is reduced, shall receive a lesser retirement allowance as determined by actuarial calculation, which shall be payable throughout life with the provision that:
      1. Option 1.  Upon the justice’s death, the justice’s lesser retirement allowance shall be continued throughout the life of and paid to such person having an insurable interest in the justice’s life, as the judge shall nominate by written designation duly acknowledged and filed with the retirement board at the time of his or her retirement;
      2. Option 2.  Upon the justice’s death, one-half (1/2) of the judge’s lesser retirement allowance shall be continued throughout the life of and paid to such person, having an insurable interest in the judge’s life, as the judge shall nominate by written designation duly acknowledged and filed with the retirement board at the time of the beneficiary’s retirement.
    2. For purposes of any election under this section the judge may designate more than one person to receive benefits after his or her death, provided that the designation shall specify the portion of the actuarial equivalent of the judge’s retirement allowance to be paid to each person, and provided further that the aggregate actuarial value of the portions shall not exceed the actuarial equivalent of the judge’s retirement benefit determined in the case of an election under this section as of the date of the judge’s retirement.
    3. A judge selecting more than one person to receive benefits under this section may only select beneficiaries from among his or her children, adopted children, stepchildren, and/or spouse or domestic partner.
  3. Whenever a judge of the workers’ compensation court dies without having become eligible to retire either under § 28-30-15 or § 28-30-16 and has served seven (7) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership one-third (1/3) of the annual salary that the judge was receiving at the time of his or her death.
  4. Whenever any judge of the workers’ compensation court who was engaged as a judge on or after January 1, 2009, dies during active service while eligible for retirement or during active service after having served fifteen (15) years or more in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall receive annually thereafter during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the annual payment that the judge was receiving by way of salary or retirement pay at the time of his or her death.
  5. Whenever a judge of the workers’ compensation court dies without having become eligible to retire either under § 28-30-15 or § 28-30-16 and has not served seven (7) years in office, his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner shall subsequently receive annually during his or her lifetime and so long as he or she remains unmarried or not in a domestic partnership, one-fourth (1/4) of the annual salary that the judge was receiving at the time of his or her death.
  6. In the event the deceased judge has no surviving spouse or domestic partner or the surviving spouse or domestic partner predeceases their minor children, the benefits conferred by this section shall be received in equal shares by the minor children, if any, until each attains the age of twenty-one (21) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 27, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 415, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 30, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 7; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 35, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 7, § 14; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 19; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 19.

28-30-18. Additional benefits payable to retired judges and their surviving spouses or domestic partners.

  1. All judges of the workers’ compensation court, or their surviving spouses or domestic partners, who retire after January 1, 1970, and who receive a retirement allowance pursuant to the provisions of this title, shall, on the first day of January next following the third anniversary date of their retirement, receive a cost-of-living retirement adjustment in addition to his or her retirement allowance in an amount equal to three percent (3%) of the original retirement allowance. In each succeeding subsequent year during the month of January the retirement allowance shall be increased an additional three percent (3%) of the original allowance, compounded annually from the year the cost-of-living adjustment was first payable to be continued during the lifetime of that judge or his or her surviving spouse or domestic partner. For the purpose of that computation, credit shall be given for a full calendar year regardless of the effective date of the retirement allowance.
  2. Any judge who retired prior to January 31, 1980, shall be deemed for the purpose of this section to have retired on January 1, 1980.
  3. For judges not eligible to retire as of September 30, 2009, and not eligible upon passage of this article, and for their beneficiaries, the cost-of-living adjustment described in subsection (a) above shall only apply to the first thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) of retirement allowance, indexed annually, and shall commence upon the third (3rd) anniversary of the date of retirement or when the retiree reaches age sixty-five (65), whichever is later. The thirty-five thousand dollar ($35,000) limit shall increase annually by the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year or three percent (3%), whichever is less. The first thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), as indexed, of retirement allowance shall be multiplied by the percentage of increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year or three percent (3%), whichever is less on the month following the anniversary date of each succeeding year. For judges eligible to retire as of September 30, 2009, or eligible upon passage of this article, and for their beneficiaries, the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not apply.
  4. This subsection (d) shall be effective for the period July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2015.
    1. Notwithstanding the prior paragraphs of this section, and subject to subsection (d)(2) below, for all present and former justices, active and retired justices, and beneficiaries receiving any retirement, disability or death allowance or benefit of any kind, whether provided for or on behalf of justices engaged on or prior to December 31, 1989, as a noncontributory justice or engaged after December 31, 1989, as a contributory justice, the annual benefit adjustment provided in any calendar year under this section shall be equal to (A) multiplied by (B) where (A) is equal to the percentage determined by subtracting five and one-half percent (5.5%) (the “subtrahend”) from the five-year average investment return of the retirement system determined as of the last day of the plan year preceding the calendar year in which the adjustment is granted, said percentage not to exceed four percent (4%) and not to be less than zero percent (0%), and (B) is equal to the lesser of the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) of retirement allowance, such twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) amount to be indexed annually in the same percentage as determined under (d)(1)(A) above. The “five-year average investment return” shall mean the average of the investment return of the most recent five (5) plan years as determined by the retirement board. Subject to subsection (d)(2) below, the benefit adjustment provided by this paragraph shall commence upon the third (3rd) anniversary of the date of retirement or the date on which the retiree reaches his or her Social Security retirement age, whichever is later. In the event the retirement board adjusts the actuarially assumed rate of return for the system, either upward or downward, the subtrahend shall be adjusted either upward or downward in the same amount.
    2. Except as provided in subsection (d)(3), the benefit adjustments under this section for any plan year shall be suspended in their entirely unless the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%) in which event the benefit adjustment will be reinstated for all justices for such plan year.

      In determining whether a funding level under this subsection (d)(2) has been achieved, the actuary shall calculate the funding percentage after taking into account the reinstatement of any current or future benefit adjustment provided under this section.

    3. Notwithstanding subsection (d)(2), in each fifth plan year commencing after June 30, 2012, commencing with the plan year ending June 30, 2017, and subsequently at intervals of five (5) plan years, a benefit adjustment shall be calculated and made in accordance with subsection (d)(1) above until the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%).
    4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the provisions of this subsection (d) shall become effective July 1, 2012, and shall apply to any benefit adjustment not granted on or prior to June 30, 2012.
  5. This subsection (e) shall become effective July 1, 2015.
      1. As soon as administratively reasonable following the enactment into law of this subsection (e), a one-time benefit adjustment shall be provided to justices and/or beneficiaries of justices who retired on or before June 30, 2012, in the amount of two percent (2%) of the lesser of either the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) of the justice’s retirement allowance. This one-time benefit adjustment shall be provided without regard to the retiree’s age or number of years since retirement.
      2. Notwithstanding the prior subsections of this section, for all present and former justices, active and retired justices, and beneficiaries receiving any retirement, disability or death allowance or benefit of any kind, whether provided for or on behalf of justices engaged on or prior to December 31, 1989, as a noncontributory justice or engaged after December 31, 1989, as a contributory justice, the annual benefit adjustment provided in any calendar year under this section for adjustments on and after January 1, 2016, and subject to subsection (e)(2) below, shall be equal to (A) multiplied by (B):
        1. Shall equal the sum of fifty percent (50%) of (I) plus fifty percent (50%) of (II) where:
          1. Is equal to the percentage determined by subtracting five and one-half percent (5.5%) (the “subtrahend”) from the five-year average investment return of the retirement system determined as of the last day of the plan year preceding the calendar year in which the adjustment is granted, said percentage not to exceed four percent (4%) and not to be less than zero percent (0%). The “five-year average investment return” shall mean the average of the investment returns of the most recent five (5) plan years as determined by the retirement board. In the event the retirement board adjusts the actuarially assumed rate of return for the system, either upward or downward, the subtrahend shall be adjusted either upward or downward in the same amount.
          2. Is equal to the lesser of three percent (3%) or the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Statistics determined as of September 30 of the prior calendar year. In no event shall the sum of (I) plus (II) exceed three and one-half percent (3.5%) or be less than zero percent (0%).
        2. Is equal to the lesser of either the justice’s retirement allowance or the first twenty-five thousand eight hundred and fifty-five dollars ($25,855) of retirement allowance, such amount to be indexed annually in the same percentage as determined under subsection (e)(1)(ii)(A) above.

          The benefit adjustments provided by this subsection (e)(1)(ii) shall be provided to all retirees entitled to receive a benefit adjustment as of June 30, 2012, under the law then in effect, and for all other retirees the benefit adjustments shall commence upon the third anniversary of the date of retirement or the date on which the retiree reaches his or her Social Security retirement age, whichever is later.

    1. Except as provided in subsection (e)(3), the benefit adjustments under subsection (e)(1)(ii) for any plan year shall be suspended in their entirety unless the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%) in which event the benefit adjustment will be reinstated for all justices for such plan year.

      In determining whether a funding level under this subsection (e)(2) has been achieved, the actuary shall calculate the funding percentage after taking into account the reinstatement of any current or future benefit adjustment provided under this section.

    2. Notwithstanding subsection (e)(2), in each fourth plan year commencing after June 30, 2012, commencing with the plan year ending June 30, 2016, and subsequently at intervals of four plan years: (i) A benefit adjustment shall be calculated and made in accordance with subsection (e)(1)(ii) above; and (ii) Effective for members and/or beneficiaries of members who retired on or before June 30, 2015, the dollar amount in subsection (e)(1)(ii)(B) of twenty-five thousand eight hundred and fifty-five dollars ($25,855) shall be replaced with thirty-one thousand and twenty-six dollars ($31,026) until the funded ratio of the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island, the judicial retirement benefits trust, and the state police retirement benefits trust, calculated by the system’s actuary on an aggregate basis, exceeds eighty percent (80%).
    3. Effective for members and/or beneficiaries of members who have retired on or before July 1, 2015, a one-time stipend of five hundred dollars ($500) shall be payable within sixty (60) days following the enactment of the legislation implementing this provision, and a second one-time stipend of five hundred dollars ($500) in the same month of the following year. These stipends shall be payable to all retired members or beneficiaries receiving a benefit as of the applicable payment date and shall not be considered cost of living adjustments under the prior provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 295, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 7; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 16, § 5; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 19; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 19; P.L. 2015, ch. 141, art. 21, § 24.

Compiler's Notes.

The references in subsection (c) to “upon passage of this article” were added by P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 16, § 5, effective June 12, 2010, which added subsection (c).

28-30-18.1. Retirement contribution.

  1. Workers’ compensation judges engaged after December 31, 1989, shall have deducted from total salary beginning December 31, 1989, and ending on June 30, 2012, an amount equal to a rate percent of compensation as specified in § 36-10-1 relating to member contributions to the state retirement system. Effective July 1, 2012, all active workers’ compensation judges whether engaged before or after December 31, 1989, shall have deducted from compensation as defined in § 36-8-1 an amount equal to twelve percent (12%) of compensation. The receipts collected under this provision shall be deposited in a restricted revenue account entitled “workers’ compensation judges’ retirement benefits” on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld. Proceeds deposited in this account shall be held in trust for the purpose of paying retirement benefits to participating judges or their beneficiaries. The retirement board shall establish rules and regulations to govern the provisions of this section.
  2. The state is required to deduct and withhold member contributions and to transmit same to the retirement system and is hereby made liable for the contribution. In addition, any amount of employee contributions actually deducted and withheld shall be deemed to be a special fund in trust for the benefit of the member and shall be transmitted to the retirement system as set forth herein.
  3. A judge of the court who withdraws from service or ceases to be a judge for any reason other than retirement shall be paid on demand a refund consisting of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the workers’ compensation judges’ retirement benefits account. Any judge receiving a refund shall forfeit and relinquish all accrued rights as a member of the system together with credits for total service previously granted to the judge; provided, that if any judge who has received a refund subsequently reenters the service and again becomes a member of the system, he or she shall have the privilege of restoring all money previously received or disbursed to his or her credit as refund of contributions, together with regular interest for the time period from the date of refund to the date of restoration. Upon the repayment of the refund, the judge shall again receive credit for the amount of total service that he or she had previously forfeited by the acceptance of the refund.
  4. Whenever any judge of the workers’ compensation court dies from any cause before retirement and has no surviving spouse, domestic partner, or minor child(ren), a payment shall be made of the accumulated contributions standing to his or her credit in his or her individual account in the workers’ compensation judges’ retirement account. The payment of the accumulated contributions of the judge shall be made to such person as the judge shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the retirement board, or if the judge has filed no nomination, or if the person so nominated has died, then to the estate of the deceased judge.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 15, § 4; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 22, § 4; P.L. 1989, ch. 494, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 507, § 5; P.L. 2007, ch. 167, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 274, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 19; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 19; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 5; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 5.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

28-30-18.2. State contributions.

The state of Rhode Island shall make its contribution for the maintaining of the system established by § 28-30-18.1 and providing the annuities, benefits, and retirement allowances in accordance with the provisions of this chapter by annually appropriating an amount that will pay a rate percent of the compensation paid after December 31, 1989, to judges engaged after December 31, 1989. The rate percent shall be computed and certified in accordance with the procedures set forth in §§ 36-8-13 and 36-10-2 under rules and regulations promulgated by the retirement board pursuant to § 36-8-3 and shall be transmitted on the date contributions are withheld but no later than three (3) business days following the pay period ending in which contributions were withheld.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 494, § 8; P.L. 1990, ch. 507, § 6; P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 5; P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 5.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 205, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 271, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020.

28-30-19. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 4), providing for an annual report to the general assembly, was repealed by P.L. 2006, ch. 637, § 1, effective July 14, 2006.

28-30-20. Calculation of retirement benefits.

For purposes of the calculation of retirement benefits, in the event that any judge of the workers’ compensation court participates or acquiesces in a state shutdown or in a reduced salary or a salary deferral plan consistent with any plan imposed upon or agreed to by other state employees, his or her annual salary shall be calculated as if he or she had not participated or acquiesced in any shutdown or plan.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 129, § 5; P.L. 1991, ch. 174, § 5.

28-30-21. Name change.

Wherever in the general or public laws there appear the words, “workers’ compensation commission” it shall read “workers’ compensation court.”

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1991, ch. 205, § 5.

28-30-22. Medical advisory board.

  1. The chief judge of the workers’ compensation court, in consultation with the appropriate medical or professional association, shall appoint a medical advisory board that shall serve at the chief judge’s pleasure and consist of eleven (11) members in the following specialties: one orthopedic surgeon; one neurologist; one physiatrist; one chiropractor; one physical therapist; one internist; one psychiatrist or psychologist; and four (4) ad hoc physician members appointed at the discretion of the chief judge. Members of the board shall be reimbursed five hundred dollars ($500) per day served in the discharge of the board’s duties, not to exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000) per member in any year. The chief judge shall designate the chairperson of the board.
  2. The chief judge is authorized, with the advice of the medical advisory board, to do the following:
      1. Adopt and review protocols and standards of treatment for compensable injury, which shall address types, frequency, modality, duration, and termination of treatment, and types and frequency of diagnostic procedures;
      2. Within thirty (30) days of its establishment, the medical advisory board shall prepare a recommended standard for the consideration and weighing by the court of medical evidence, including, but not limited to, medical test results, objective clinical findings, subjective complaints supported by tests for inconsistency, and purely subjective complaints, with the purposes of assuring treatment and compensation for legitimate, compensable injuries; reducing litigation, inefficiency, and delay in court proceedings; and deterring false or exaggerated claims of injury. The standards shall be applicable to proceedings before the workers’ compensation court, including specifically those to determine the nature and extent of injury and the achievement of maximum medical improvement, and shall be effective in all proceedings when adopted by the court;
    1. Approve and promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures concerning the appointment and qualifications of comprehensive, independent healthcare review teams that would be composed of any combination of one or more healthcare provider(s), rehabilitation expert(s), physical therapist(s), occupational therapist(s), psychologist(s), and vocational rehabilitation counselor(s);
    2. Approve and administer procedures to disqualify or disapprove medical service providers and maintain the approved provider list;
    3. Appoint an administrator of the medical advisory board;
    4. Approve and promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures concerning the appointment and qualifications of impartial medical examiners; and
    5. Annually review the performance of each comprehensive, independent healthcare review team and impartial medical examiner.
  3. The administrator of the medical advisory board is authorized and directed to establish terms and conditions for comprehensive, independent healthcare review teams and impartial medical examiners to apply for approval by the medical advisory board and to perform any other duties as directed by the board.
  4. Any reference to an impartial medical examiner in chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be deemed to include the impartial medical examiners and comprehensive, independent healthcare review teams referred to in subsection (b) of this section.
    1. Disqualification of medical-care providers.  Every healthcare provider licensed in the state of Rhode Island shall be presumed to be qualified to provide healthcare services for injuries compensable under this title and may recover costs of treatment consistent with established fee and cost schedules. The administrator of the medical advisory board is thereafter authorized to disqualify and/or suspend any qualified provider based upon one or more of the following:
      1. The violation of the protocols and standards of care established by the medical advisory board;
      2. The filing of affidavits that are untimely, inadequate, incomplete, or untruthful;
      3. The provision of unnecessary and/or inappropriate treatment;
      4. A pattern of violation and/or evasion of an approved fee schedule;
      5. The censure or discipline of the provider by the licensing body of the provider’s profession; or
      6. The billing of, or pursuing collection efforts against, the employee for treatment or diagnostic tests causally related to an injury not deemed noncompensable by the workers’ compensation court.
    2. Upon disqualification or during suspension, the provider shall not be permitted to recover any costs or fees for treatment provided under this title. The appropriate body with professional disciplinary authority over the provider shall be notified of any such action. Appeal of disqualification or suspension shall be to the medical advisory board, with final review by the workers’ compensation court.
    3. If unnecessary or inappropriate treatment is provided by an entity affiliated with the treating physician, the administrator of the medical advisory board may increase the penalty for a violation.
    4. This section shall not prevent the recovery of reasonable costs for immediate emergency care rendered by a provider.
  5. As a guide to the interpretation and application of this section, the policy and intent of this legislature is declared to be that every person who suffers a compensable injury with resulting disability should be provided with high-quality medical care and the opportunity to return to gainful employment as soon as possible with minimal dependence on compensation awards.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 4; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 33; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 1.

28-30-23. Immunity from liability.

Any person serving as a member of the medical advisory board or fee dispute panel, and any medical service provider appointed as an impartial medical examiner, participating on a comprehensive independent healthcare review team, or serving as a member of the medical fee arbitration panel, shall be immune from any civil liability in that capacity so long as that person acts in good faith, without malice, and not for improper personal enrichment.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 4.

28-30-24. Domestic partner — Definition.

For purposes of this chapter, “domestic partner” shall be defined as a person who, prior to the decedent’s death, was in an exclusive, intimate, and committed relationship with the decedent, and who certifies by affidavit that their relationship met the following qualifications:

  1. Both partners were at least eighteen (18) years of age and were mentally competent to contract;
  2. Neither partner was married to anyone else;
  3. Partners were not related by blood to a degree which would prohibit marriage in the state of Rhode Island;
  4. Partners resided together and had resided together for at least one year at the time of death; and
  5. Partners were financially interdependent as evidenced by at least two (2) of the following:
    1. Domestic partnership agreement or relationship contract;
    2. Joint mortgage or joint ownership of primary residence;
    3. Two (2) of: (A) Joint ownership of motor vehicle; (B) Joint checking account; (C) Joint credit account; (D) Joint lease; and/or
    4. The domestic partner had been designated as a beneficiary for the decedent’s will, retirement contract, or life insurance.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 8.

28-30-25. Severability.

The holding of any section or sections or parts of this chapter to be void, ineffective, or unconstitutional for any cause shall not be deemed to affect any other section or part hereof.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 408, § 20; P.L. 2011, ch. 409, § 20.

Chapter 31 Workers’ Compensation — State and Municipal Employees

28-31-1. Acceptance of provisions by town, city, or regional school district — Employees covered.

    1. The acceptance of the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title by a city or town, except for the city of Providence, shall be by vote of the electors of that town qualified to vote on a proposition to impose a tax or for the expenditure of money in town meeting assembled, or by vote of the town council of any town when authorized by their electors to accept the provisions of those chapters in behalf of that town. The acceptance of the provisions of those chapters by a city shall be by vote of the city council of that city.
    2. The acceptance of the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title by a regional school district shall be by vote of the electors of that school district qualified to vote at financial meetings of that district, or by vote of the regional district school committee when authorized by those electors to accept the provisions of these chapters on behalf of that district.
    3. Electors of a town, or the town council authorized as provided in this section, or electors of a regional district or school committee, or the city council of a city, in accepting the provisions of those chapters in behalf of the town or city or regional school district, shall also designate the class of employees or the nature of the employment to which the provisions of those chapters shall apply.
  1. Upon the passage of any vote of acceptance the town or city clerk or regional committee secretary, as the case may be, shall file a certified copy of that vote with the director, and that filing shall be deemed on the part of that town, city, or regional school district a sufficient compliance with the provisions of § 28-29-8 requiring notice of the election of an employer to become subject to its provisions.
  2. If the vote does not designate the class of employees or the nature of the employment to which the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title are to apply, then those provisions shall apply to all employees of the town, city, or regional school district in behalf of which the vote is passed, except those employees who are excluded under the definition of employees set forth in § 28-29-2 .
  3. The filing of a copy of the vote as provided in this section shall render the town, city, or regional school district in behalf of which that vote is filed subject to the provisions of those chapters in accordance with that vote for the term of one year from the date of that filing, and subsequently for successive terms of one year, unless the vote of acceptance is rescinded by the electors or the town council of the town, the city council of that city, or the school committee, and a certified copy of that rescission shall be filed with the director at least sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the first of each succeeding year.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 7, § 1; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-1 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 277, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 277, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 5.

Cross References.

Coverage of City of Providence employees, § 28-31-1.1 .

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Composite Units.

A school district composed of two towns, each of which had complied with this section to accept provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act before establishing the school district, which carried workers’ compensation insurance and included the premium therefor in its annual budget was liable for compensation to an employee disabled by injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by such school district. Horton v. Foster-Glocester Regional Sch. Dist., 103 R.I. 410 , 238 A.2d 53, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1968).

Formal Vote Required.

Where a city council was found to have never taken a formal vote accepting the provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act nor to have taken any steps toward such an adoption which would raise a basis for estoppel, no de facto adoption of the Worker’s Compensation Act was found and petition for relief under the act was denied. Brown v. Izzo, 120 R.I. 480 , 388 A.2d 806, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 692 (1978).

28-31-1.1. Employees of the city of Providence covered.

  1. The city of Providence shall be subject to and accept the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title and shall be governed by the provisions in these chapters; provided, that this section is not subject to §§ 45-13-7 45-13-10 .
  2. The city of Providence may elect to provide its employees benefits in addition to those required under this section.
  3. Any provision of a charter, or of any provision of the general or public laws inconsistent with this section, is repealed.
  4. This section applies to all claims of injuries occurring on or after this section becomes effective for the individual city or town.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 277, § 2.

28-31-2. Notices given to state or municipality as employer.

All notices required to be given by an employee to an employer under the provisions of §§ 28-29-17 28-29-19 and of §§ 28-33-30 28-33-32 , and all other notices required to be given to an employer by an employee under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, if the employer is the state, shall be given to the department of administration, and if the employer is a city or town shall be filed with and given to the treasurer of that city or town.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art 7, § 2; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-2 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 15.

28-31-3. Medical treatment provided by state or municipality as employer.

The medical treatment required to be rendered by an employer to an injured employee under the provisions of § 28-33-5 , if the employer is the state, shall be rendered under the direction of a physician appointed for that purpose by the director of the department of administration. If the employer is a town or city, the medical treatment shall be rendered by a physician appointed for that purpose by the town council of the town or the city council of the city; provided, that in an emergency it shall be the duty of the division, department, officer, or other person having direct charge of an injured employee to see that treatment is promptly provided for the aid of that employee until the physician appointed as provided in this section has notice and can take charge of the case. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit an employee from selecting the physician by whom, or the hospital in which, the employee desires to be treated as provided in § 28-33-8 . All expenses incurred under this section, not exceeding the sum required by law to be expended therefor, shall in the case of the state be certified to the state controller by the department of administration, and in the case of a city or town to the treasurer thereof by the physician appointed as provided in this section, and those expenses shall be paid as is provided for other payments required to be made by the state, a city, or town under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 7, § 2; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-3 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 15.

Cross References.

State police, applicability to, § 42-28-21 .

28-31-4. Settlement of claims.

  1. The department of administration shall have full authority and power to settle any claims an employee may have against the state under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.
  2. When any town or city accepts the provisions of those chapters, the town council of that town and the city council of that city shall appoint some person or persons not exceeding three (3) in number who shall have authority and power to settle any claim that an employee may have against that town or city under those chapters. Names of the persons so appointed shall be recorded in the office of the town clerk or city clerk, as the case may be, and that appointment shall continue in force until revoked by vote of the body by whom the appointments are made.
  3. All payments made by the department of administration shall be certified to the state controller, and all payments made by the persons appointed under this section to act for any town or city shall be certified to the treasurer of that town or city.
  4. Every payment made in behalf of the state or of a town or city is subject to the provisions of §§ 28-35-1 28-35-12 and §§ 28-35-14 28-35-63 .
  5. The statute of limitations shall be tolled while payments are made pursuant to this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 7, § 4; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-4 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 15; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 5.

28-31-5. Payment of benefits for state employees.

  1. The expenses incurred for and in behalf of the state under the provisions of §§ 28-31-3 , 28-33-5 , 28-33-12 , 28-33-16 , 28-33-17 , 28-33-18 , 28-33-19 , 28-33-34 , 28-33-35 , 28-33-36 , 28-33-37 , and 28-33-39 and for benefits similar to the benefits provided for employees of employers other than the state under the provisions of § 28-37-8 as determined by a prior agreement or settled as provided by § 28-31-4 or by the department’s preliminary determination or decree of the workers’ compensation court, shall be paid out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated and the state controller shall draw his or her order or orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of the claim in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, preliminary determination, or decree upon receipt by the controller of a copy of the agreement or preliminary determination certified by the director or of a copy of the decree certified by the administrator of the workers’ compensation court.
  2. Payments for continuing total incapacity until the employee’s total incapacity has ended or until his or her death similar to the payments that are provided for employees of employers other than the state by § 28-37-8 shall in the case of an employee of the state be paid out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated.
  3. Benefits similar to the provisions of § 28-37-8 shall be paid to employees of the state whose final payment attaining the maximum limit for compensation for total incapacity as provided by § 28-33-17 is paid subsequent to January 1, 1969, and who continue to be totally incapacitated for work due to an injury sustained while employed by the state.
  4. The provisions of this section are subject to the provisions of § 28-33-18.2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 7, § 5; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 5; P.L. 1929, ch. 1397, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-5 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 109, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 15; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Seamen.

A plaintiff who has recovered under the Jones Act, 46 USC § 688, may not recover again under the state compensation statute, and does not qualify for recovery under the state workers’ compensation system. Benders v. Board of Governors for Higher Educ., 636 A.2d 1313, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 1994).

28-31-6. Payment of benefits for municipal employees — Action for collection.

    1. The expenses incurred for and in behalf of any town or city under the provisions of §§ 28-31-3 and 28-33-5 28-33-11 , and the amount of compensation due an employee of a town or city as determined by an agreement with or paid by that town or city, or by the department’s preliminary determination or decree of the workers’ compensation court, shall be paid by the treasurer of that town or city out of any money of the town or city in its hands.
    2. The payment shall be made by the treasurer upon receipt by him or her of a certificate of those expenses satisfactory to him or her, or of a certified copy of the agreement, preliminary determination, or decree under which the compensation is to be paid; provided, that he or she shall not make any payment until the payment has been approved by the auditor of the city or town if there is any such officer, and if there is not any such officer, then payment shall first be approved by the mayor of the city or the president of the town council of the town.
    3. If more than one payment of money is made or required by any agreement, preliminary determination, or decree, the payments shall be made in the manner provided in this section as they become due.
    4. If any expenses or compensation required to be paid by a town or city under the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title or any installment of them is not paid within twenty (20) days after the certificate or certified copy is filed with the treasurer of the town or city, the expenses or compensation may be collected in the manner in which a judgment against a town or city may be collected under the provisions of §§ 45-15-5 45-15-7 .
  1. The provisions of this section are subject to the provisions of § 28-33-18.2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 7, § 6; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-6 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 5.

28-31-7. Proceedings involving state or municipality.

Legal proceedings under chapters 29 — 38 of this title between the state, a city, or town as an employer and any employee of them shall be brought in the same manner and with the same force and effect as is prescribed herein for any other employer and employee; provided, that if the state is a party to any proceedings, the proceedings shall be brought for and in behalf of the state in the name of and by or against the department of administration, and service shall be made on the administrator of the division of state employees for workers’ compensation, and if a town or city is a party to any proceedings, the proceedings shall be brought for and in behalf of that town or city in the name of and by or against the treasurer of that town or city, and service shall be made on that treasurer. The department of administration may appear on behalf of the state or engage legal counsel to appear for and represent the state in any proceedings in which the state is a party. The provisions of any other law relating to the filing of claims or demands against a town or a city shall not apply to claims of compensation or legal proceedings arising under chapters 29 — 38 of this title to which a town or city is a party.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 7, § 7; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 7; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-7 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 15; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 22; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 5.

28-31-8. Insurance requirement inapplicable.

The provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title requiring employers to insure against liability to pay compensation arising under the provisions of those chapters shall not apply to the state or any city or town in the state, and the state or any city or town may separately insure against or contract for the provision of any portion of its obligations or liabilities arising under chapters 29 — 38 of this title with parties licensed or qualified to do business in this state. Any party providing, underwriting, or administering the provision of any portion of the obligations or liabilities shall not thereby incur any liabilities or obligations under chapters 29 — 38 of this title beyond those specified by its contract with the state, city, or town, and the party shall not thereby become subject to the regulation and the generally applicable liabilities and obligations of workers’ compensation insurers. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 45-5-20.1 or any other general law, the state, the city of Providence, and any town, city, or regional school district that has accepted the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title pursuant to § 28-31-1 shall be subject to the annual assessment payment to the workers’ compensation administrative fund established by § 28-37-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 7, § 8; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 6; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 8; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-8 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 430, § 1.

28-31-9. Application to national and state guard members.

Members of the national guard and Rhode Island state guard injured in the performance of required, authorized, or permitted duty shall be deemed to be employees of the state, and shall be entitled to all the benefits of chapters 29 — 38 of this title in accordance with the limitations, requirements, and restrictions of those chapters, provided that the duty is state active duty pursuant to § 30-2-6 . Personnel performing duty in any other status shall not be deemed to be employees of the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 10; 1934, ch. 2123, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 10; P.L. 1941, ch. 1060, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-9 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 54, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Clerical Personnel.

Where full-time employee of the state of Rhode Island in a clerical capacity in the office of the Rhode Island National Guard died in the performance of required duty as an enlisted member of the National Guard, he is therefore deemed to have been at the time an employee of the state and as such entitled to all the benefits of this statute. Contois v. State, 95 R.I. 296 , 186 A.2d 741, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 165 (1962).

Federal Service.

This section does not apply to a national guardsman injured while he and his unit were in federal service. Mancini v. Rhode Island Nat'l Guard, 107 R.I. 726 , 271 A.2d 297, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 834 (1970).

28-31-10. Computation of earnings of guard members.

In ascertaining the average weekly wages, earnings, or salary of an injured member of the national guard or the Rhode Island state guard, § 28-33-20 will be followed and for the purpose of that ascertainment, it will be assumed that the injury occurred in the civilian employment of the injured member of the national guard and Rhode Island state guard.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 10; P.L. 1934, ch. 2123, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 10; P.L. 1941, ch. 1060, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-10 .

28-31-11. Effect of federal benefits to guard members.

Where an injured member of the national guard or the Rhode Island state guard receives pay, subsistence, hospitalization, or other benefits from the United States as the result of an injury, those payments shall not affect his or her right to receive compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title. When the payments received from the United States are less than he or she would have been entitled to receive under those chapters, then he or she is entitled to receive all the benefits to which he or she would have been entitled under those chapters less the benefits actually received from the United States.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 7, § 10; P.L. 1934, ch. 2123, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 10; P.L. 1941, ch. 1060, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Credit to State.

Where a national guardsman was injured while on duty and lost an eye and received from the United States regular army pay, subsistence, quarters allowance, medical and surgical treatment, and hospitalization, the state was entitled to credit for federal payments against weekly disability payments but not against the specific loss payment for loss of his eye. Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764 , 263 A.2d 681, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 986 (1970).

Death Benefits.

Since this section is silent as to death benefits, compensation would be payable under the state compensation act for a period of 600 weeks without reference to any amount receivable under any federal law, including certain benefits received by widow and children from the federal government through the veterans administration due to the death of state employee-national guardsman being in the performance of his duty. Contois v. State, 95 R.I. 296 , 186 A.2d 741, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 165 (1962).

28-31-12. Application to disaster response workers.

All members of disaster response forces who are killed or sustain disability or injury while in training for or on disaster response duty shall be construed to be employees of the state and compensated in like manner as state employees are compensated under the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title. All claims shall be filed, prosecuted, and determined in accordance with the procedure set forth in chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 11; P.L. 1952, ch. 2972, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-12 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 11.

28-31-13. Computation of wages of disaster response worker.

If the hourly wages cannot be ascertained, or if no pay has been designated for the required work, the wage for the purpose of calculating compensation under § 28-31-12 shall be taken to be a sum sufficient to guarantee the minimum payments under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 11; P.L. 1952, ch. 2972, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-13 .

28-31-14. Effect of federal benefits to disaster response workers.

Any sums payable under any act of Congress or other federal program as compensation for death, disability, or injury of disaster response workers shall be considered in connection with the determination and settlement of any claim brought under the provisions of §§ 28-31-12 and 28-31-13 . When the payments received from the United States are less than an injured member would have been entitled to receive under §§ 28-31-12 28-31-14 , then the worker shall be entitled to receive all the benefits to which he or she would have been entitled under those sections less the benefits actually received from the United States.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 7, § 11; P.L. 1952, ch. 2972, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-31-14 .

28-31-15. Transfer of functions from the department of labor and training.

There are transferred to the department of administration those functions, powers, duties, and necessary resources relating to claims of state employees that relate to workers’ compensation formerly vested in the department of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 16; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 5.

Chapter 31.1 State Employees’ Compensation Fund

28-31.1-1. Fund established.

  1. There is established in the department of administration of the state of Rhode Island a special account to be known as the state employees’ compensation fund, an account within the general fund. The account, referred to as the “state employees’ compensation fund,” shall consist of payments made to it as subsequently provided, or penalties paid pursuant to this chapter, and of all other money paid into and received by the fund, or property and securities acquired by and through the use of money belonging to the fund, and of interest earned upon the money belonging to the fund. All money in the fund shall be mingled and undivided. The fund shall be administered by the director of administration or the director’s designee.
  2. The fund shall be used for the settlement of claims pursuant to § 28-31-4 .

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 4.

28-31.1-2. Parties to appeals involving fund.

  1. In any appeal taken under chapters 29 — 38 of this title which involves the state employees’ compensation fund, the director shall be a necessary party.
  2. In every case where payments are ordered made from the state employees’ compensation fund, the director shall receive a notice of the order and he or she shall have the right to claim an appeal from the order, if, in his or her opinion, the director believes that the decision is not proper or that the fund is in danger of unwarranted depletion.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 4.

28-31.1-3. Payments into fund by agencies.

For the purposes of administering §§ 28-31-4 and 28-31.1-1(b) , each state agency shall annually make payments to the state employees’ compensation fund as determined by the department of administration.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 4.

Chapter 32 Workers’ Compensation — Report of Injuries

28-32-1. Reports required from employers.

  1. Every employer who is or becomes subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall report to the director, in writing or in any other manner specified by the director, every personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment connected and referable to the employment, if that injury proves fatal or incapacitates the employee from earning full wages for a period of at least three (3) days, or requires medical treatment regardless of the period of incapacity.
  2. If the injury is immediately fatal, the report shall be made within forty-eight (48) hours after it occurs; if it proves fatal later, the report shall be made within forty-eight (48) hours after death occurs and comes to the knowledge of the employer; if the injury is not fatal, the report shall be made within ten (10) days after the injury, or if the incapacity is due to an occupational disease then within ten (10) days after the incapacity shall come to the knowledge of the employer.
    1. The director may by rule, regulation, or order provide for additional interim reports, and at the termination of the period of incapacity, regardless of its duration, a supplementary report, in writing, or as otherwise specified by the director.
    2. Blanks to be supplied by the director shall be expanded to include an explanation, at least to the extent possible, of the cause of the injury, and the duplicate copy shall be made available to the department for data collection.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 6, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 6, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 17; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 6, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2282, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-32-1 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 5; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 6; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 3.

Comparative Legislation.

Injuries reported:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-294b, 31-316.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 6.

Collateral References.

Workers’ compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury. 83 A.L.R.4th 110.

28-32-2. Penalty for failure to report.

  1. Any employer who refuses or neglects to make the reports required by the provisions of § 28-32-1 may be assessed a penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) by the director for each refusal or neglect to make a report.
  2. The workers’ compensation court shall have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with any order of the director made pursuant to this section. The director, in his or her discretion, may bring a civil action to collect all penalties assessed.
  3. All penalties collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the general fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 6, § 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 6, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 6, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-32-2 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 229, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 3; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-32-3. Other reports not required.

No report of injuries to employees other than those required by chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be required by any other department or office of the state from employers to whom the provisions of those chapters apply.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 6, § 3; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 6, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 6, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-32-3 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 73, § 1.

28-32-4. Use of reports as evidence.

No report required by chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be admitted in evidence or referred to at the trial of any action or in any judicial or administrative proceedings, except in prosecutions for the violation of those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 6, § 4; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 6, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 6, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-32-4 .

28-32-5. Disclosure and use of contents of reports.

  1. No report, or part of a copy of a report, shall be open to the public, or shall any of its contents be disclosed in any manner, or be permitted to become known, by any officer or employee of the state or other person having access to it, but the reports shall be used for state investigation, including investigations by the workers’ compensation fraud unit pursuant to section 42-16.1-12 , and statistics only, and those statistics shall in no way disclose the identity of the employer making the report.
  2. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense, and if the offender is an officer or employee of the state, he or she shall be dismissed from the office and shall be subsequently ineligible to hold an office under the state for a period of one year.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 6, § 5; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 6, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 6, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-32-5 ; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 3.

28-32-6. Information as to provisions of law.

Insofar as is not inconsistent with other provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, the director shall have general supervision of the operation of those chapters, and from time to time he or she may furnish employers and employees with the information relative to those chapters as may assist them in an understanding of their rights and obligations under those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 6, § 6; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 6, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 6, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-32-6 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 5.

Chapter 33 Workers’ Compensation — Benefits

28-33-1. Employees entitled to compensation.

If an employee who has not given notice of his claim of common law rights of action, or who has given the notice and has waived the common law rights, as provided in § 28-29-19 , receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, connected and referable to the employment, he or she shall be paid compensation, as hereinafter provided, by an employer subject to or who has elected to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 3; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2282, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-1 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7.

Law Reviews.

Devon Q. Toro, Comment: How Come Mary-Jane is Not on Workers’ Comp?: Requiring Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Insurers to Reimburse Employees for Medical Marijuana, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 500 (2020).

Comparative Legislation.

Workers’ compensation benefits:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-294c et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 26 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Workers’ compensation does not substitute as general health insurance or afford full remuneration for all injuries associated with work. Wright v. Rhode Island Superior Court, 535 A.2d 318, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 2 (R.I. 1988).

Aggravation.

Death from disease was not compensable where accident in employment neither caused nor substantially accelerated the disease nor reduced employee’s ability to work. Keith v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 53 R.I. 160 , 164 A. 907, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1933).

Clubfoot caused by industrial accident followed by excessive marching as a soldier was compensable. Mondillo v. Ward Baking Co., 73 R.I. 473 , 57 A.2d 447, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1948).

Decree denying compensation was justified by evidence that incapacity was due to disease not aggravated by accident. Conti v. Washburn Wire Co., 77 R.I. 31 , 72 A.2d 842, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1950).

Where an incident connected with employment aggravates an existing condition with resulting incapacity for work, an employee is entitled to compensation for that incapacity. Clemm v. Frank Morrow Co., 90 R.I. 37 , 153 A.2d 557, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 111 (1959).

Basically, two types of aggravation are compensable. The first type occurs when the employee is suffering from a pre-existing disease or infirmity, that the employment aggravates or accelerates to produce a disability, for which the employee is not required to show that the original infirmity or disease arose out of or in the course of employment. The second type of aggravation usually occurs when the employee suffers a work-related injury that is aggravated by medical or surgical treatment. Lomba v. Providence Gravure, Inc., 465 A.2d 186, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1079 (R.I. 1983).

Causal Connection.

The right to be compensated for incapacity resulting from an injury accrues to the injured employee upon the establishment of a nexus between the injury and his employment. Tromba v. Harwood Mfg. Co., 94 R.I. 3 , 177 A.2d 186, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1962).

In P.L. 1949, ch. 2282, the act was amended and the phrase “personal injury by accident arising out of the and in the course of his employment” was changed to read “personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment connected therewith and referable thereto” thus deleting the words “by accident” from the act, and since then the words “personal injury” have been given a broader interpretation than the words “personal injury by accident,” the words “personal injury” comprehending a wide range of physical harm. Gartner v. Jackson's, Inc., 95 R.I. 489 , 188 A.2d 85, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1963).

In order to establish the necessary causal connection between an employee’s disability and his employment, the incapacity must be the probable result of the work-related incident, not merely a possible consequence. Natale v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 119 R.I. 713 , 382 A.2d 1313, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 607 (1978).

Where an employee sustained an injury in 1956 for which he entered into a preliminary agreement with his employer for compensation, describing the injury as a “back injury,” sustained a second injury in 1958, for which he entered into a preliminary agreement which stated that the previous injury had been aggravated, and his physician testified that his incapacity in 1963 was due to the 1956 injury and not to the 1958 injury, he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 1963 incapacity was causally connected with the 1958 injury. Roy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 99 R.I. 638 , 210 A.2d 125, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 495 (1965).

An employee’s injury is compensable if the particular facts and circumstances presented establish a “nexus” or a “causal relationship” between the injury and the employment. Bottomley v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 441 A.2d 553, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1165 (R.I. 1982).

To establish a nexus or causal relationship between the injury and his employment, the employee must show that his injury occurred within the period of his employment, at a place where he might reasonably have been, and while either fulfilling the duties of his employment or doing something incidental thereto or to the conditions under which those duties were to be performed. Bottomley v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 441 A.2d 553, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1165 (R.I. 1982).

In workers’ compensation cases, the term “causal relationship” is not to be equated with the term “proximate cause” as found in negligence actions. In workers’ compensation cases, it is enough if the conditions and nature of the employment contribute to the injury. Mulcahey v. New Eng. Newspapers, 488 A.2d 681, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 439 (R.I. 1985).

Employer’s concession that employee suffered from an occupational disease contracted while working that rendered her partially incapacitated amounted to an admission that removed the issue of causation from the area of controversy. Dino v. Arkwright, Inc., 526 A.2d 520, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 510 (R.I. 1987).

Random assault of an employee by a stranger while the employee was returning to his work vehicle, which was parked on the street, was compensable under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-1 , as it was an actual risk of employment under the street-peril doctrine; the denial of workers’ compensation benefits was accordingly error under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-30 . Ellis v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 63 A.3d 510, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 2013).

— Health Conditions.

Hack driver could recover for injuries from fall caused by runaway horses even though dizziness caused by disease contributed to the accident. Carroll v. What Cheer Stables Co., 38 R.I. 421 , 96 A. 208, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1916).

Injuries sustained in fall from great height on employer’s premises were compensable even though fall was caused by a fainting spell not related to employment. Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open), 78 R.I. 264 , 81 A.2d 689, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1951).

— Injury in Treatment.

Injury while visiting physician’s office in connection with a previous compensable injury was not compensable. De Lallo v. Queen Dyeing Co., 73 R.I. 325 , 56 A.2d 174, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 91 (1947).

Course of Employment.
— After Hours.

Accident sustained after quitting work but while retrieving coat while still on the premises was compensable. Distante v. United Elec. Rys., 53 R.I. 258 , 165 A. 772, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1933).

Where, after having rung out, petitioner returned to employer’s building to seek assistance for inoperative car parked on a parking lot maintained solely for employees by employer, and fell down a flight of stairs sustaining serious injury; such fall was an incident of petitioner’s employment since she returned to seek assistance, a known practice encouraged by her employer’s representative, the foreman. Fontaine v. Tupper Co., 94 R.I. 111 , 178 A.2d 452, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1962).

Where claimant was injured on premises after hours, and he testified that there was no reason for his being there at that time, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the injury did not occur in the course of employment. Knowlton v. Porter Trucking Co., 117 R.I. 28 , 362 A.2d 131, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1596 (1976).

— Deviation From Duties.

Deviation from the duties of employment does not in and of itself destroy the causal nexus. However, the deviation must be substantially motivated by influences that originated in the employment. Lomba v. Providence Gravure, Inc., 465 A.2d 186, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1079 (R.I. 1983).

The workers’ compensation commission erred in awarding disability benefits to an employee for an injury that occurred when the employee raised his hand in order to touch a fellow employee. Lomba v. Providence Gravure, Inc., 465 A.2d 186, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1079 (R.I. 1983).

— Going to or From Work.

Accident after leaving place of work, but while on nearby street closed to public and under control of employer for construction work, was compensable. Di Libero v. Middlesex Constr. Co., 63 R.I. 509 , 9 A.2d 848, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 117 (1939).

Where the employee was injured while socializing with a fellow employee before the commencement of his workday outside his employer’s premises, the “going and coming rule” was controlling without exception and the employer was not liable for the employee’s injury. Kesson v. Anthony's Seafood, 519 A.2d 1125, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 399 (R.I. 1987).

The mere fact that at the time of the accident an employee was carrying work proceeds in his personal automobile during his trip home, without some greater degree of employment compulsion and/or control over the travel itself or the necessity for that travel, was insufficient as a causal relationship to trigger workers’ compensation. Jacome v. Bonanza Bus Lines, 527 A.2d 218, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 514 (R.I. 1987).

An employee who is injured while traveling in his or her own vehicle from one job site to another at the employer’s direction even though not compensated for travel time or reimbursed for travel expenses is acting within the scope of employment, thereby entitling the employee to workers’ compensation benefits. Toolin v. Aquidneck Island Medical Resource, 668 A.2d 639, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 301 (R.I. 1995).

Although a demonstration that travel time was paid is one of the most reliable ways for making a case for the compensability of a going-and-coming trip injury and in itself is ordinarily sufficient to support such a finding, the fact that an employee is not paid for his or her travel time does not mean that the trip was not in the scope of employment. Toolin v. Aquidneck Island Medical Resource, 668 A.2d 639, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 301 (R.I. 1995).

Employee, who was on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and used a company-provided cargo van as an office, was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits even though the employee was injured while pushing a vehicle blocking the exit from his apartment parking lot because the employee demonstrated that a causal connection existed between the injury and his employment; the employee was driving to a central location in the city to await a work call, the employer could have expected the employee’s employment activities to begin the moment he got into the cargo van — whether on a public roadway or in the employee’s parking lot, and in attempting to remove the vehicle blocking the exit, the employee was eliminating an obstacle that prevent him from doing the employer’s business. McGloin v. Trammellcrow Servs., 987 A.2d 881, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 18 (R.I. 2010).

In a worker's compensation case involving an employee driver who sustained fatal injuries in a motor vehicle accident while traveling from the employer's facility to a separate parking lot leased by the employer, the employer's ownership and maintenance of the parking lot was not necessary to meet the Branco exception test because the employee’s injury resulted from the parking lot’s location, which could not be changed by its owner or maintainer. Because the employee’s injury resulted from the parking lot’s location and met both other portions of the Branco test, the Branco exception was applicable and the going-and-coming rule did not preclude the petitioner’s recovery. Phillips v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of R.I., LLC, 273 A.3d 609, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 40 (R.I. 2022).

— Incidental Business Purpose.

Injury while returning from social visit with incidental business purpose could be found not to have been in the course of employment. Bride v. Cathedral Art Metal Co., 66 R.I. 331 , 19 A.2d 317, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1941).

Where petitioner based his claim to workers’ compensation benefits on his contention that he was injured while performing certain duties of his employment as an elevator operator, namely, it being his turn to leave the building that Saturday and procure refreshments for his fellow employees, he having to go to a nearby restaurant for the purpose and, while on the way back to the court house while crossing a public highway, being struck and sustaining severe injuries, the petitioner was held to have sustained a compensable injury under the Workers’ Compensation Law, such practice of going to the restaurant for food being a condoned practice and this particular Saturday being designated as petitioner’s Saturday. Sullivan v. State, 89 R.I. 119 , 151 A.2d 360, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1959).

Changing attire during, before, or after termination of services is incidental to the duties of employment. Bottomley v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 441 A.2d 553, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1165 (R.I. 1982).

— Lunch Periods.

An employee injured while playing ball on the employer’s premises during his lunch period, who was permitted to leave the premises during the lunch hour only upon obtaining a gate pass from the foreman, was not injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Long v. Gorham Corp., 100 R.I. 711 , 219 A.2d 214, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 500 (1966).

— Prohibited Acts.

The evidence not only justified the trial commissioner in his finding that the use of the window through which petitioner stepped and thereafter fell breaking her leg, had been forbidden, but also that the order was generally disregarded, further, that her foreman was unaware of the violation of the order by petitioner and other employees. Barras v. Verdun Mfg. Co., 89 R.I. 124 , 151 A.2d 367, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1959).

— Rest Periods.

Injury sustained during permitted rest period while employee was in a permitted place was compensable. Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open), 78 R.I. 264 , 81 A.2d 689, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1951).

— Retirement.

Evidence supported the commission’s finding that employee left work because he had reached retirement age and not because of a work-related injury. Buonauito v. Ocean State Dairy Distribs., 509 A.2d 988, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 476 (R.I. 1986).

Retired employees who sought compensation for alleged disability attributable to asbestosis were not entitled to benefits, where at the time the disease or injury became disabling, each employee had voluntarily retired from the work force and had therefore surrendered the capacity to earn wages. Since each employee did not have a capacity to earn any wages at the time he or she alleged the manifestation of the injury or disease, the threshold fact of whether loss or diminution of earning capacity existed was not presented. Mullaney v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 520 A.2d 141, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 404 (R.I. 1987).

— Social Activities.

Benefits may accrue to an employer from a purely social activity. Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651 , 375 A.2d 920, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1505 (1977).

Factors to be examined in determining whether employment and recreational activity are sufficiently related to warrant an award are: (1) the customary nature of the activity; (2) the employer’s encouragement or subsidization of the activity; (3) the employer’s management or direction of the activity; (4) the presence of substantial pressure or actual compulsion to attend or participate; (5) whether the employer expects or receives a benefit from employee participation in the activity. Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651 , 375 A.2d 920, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1505 (1977).

Where plaintiff was injured at his employer’s Christmas party and the party was held in the company plant during a period usually reserved for work, and for which employees were actually paid, and where attendance was expected by the employer who expected to benefit from the party by an improved working atmosphere, plaintiff was entitled to recover. Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651 , 375 A.2d 920, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1505 (1977).

— Union Meetings.

Injury sustained while employee was attending a union meeting arose out of and in the course of employment where the union activity was to the mutual benefit to both the employer and employee and the employer supported the committee by furnishing a room for the meetings as well as telephone access. D'Alessio v. State, 509 A.2d 986, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 466 (R.I. 1986).

— Voluntary Work.

Employee injured while assisting another employee other than in the performance of his usual duties and without direction from anyone was entitled to compensation where the work was in the interest of the employer and not forbidden by rules. Wegimont v. Argonne Worsted Co., 69 R.I. 360 , 33 A.2d 215, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1943).

Injury sustained while employee was operating a machine not in the course of his regular duties, without authority from the employer, and not in the employer’s interest but for the purpose of gaining experience, was not in the course of employment. Almeida v. United States Rubber Co., 82 R.I. 264 , 107 A.2d 330, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1954).

— Workplace Stress.

The stress that an employee claimed he experienced as a result of his coworkers’ treatment of him after it was determined that he sexually harassed another coworker is not a work-related condition that entitles the employee to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Martone v. State/Registry of Motor Vehicles, 611 A.2d 384, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 165 (R.I. 1992).

Disability.

Compensation is not awarded for disability as such, but for impairment of earning capacity. Weber v. American Silk Spinning Co., 38 R.I. 309 , 95 A. 603, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1915); Catuto v. Monocraft Prods. Co., 105 R.I. 253 , 251 A.2d 165, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 747 (1969); Microfin Corp. v. De Lisi, 111 R.I. 703 , 306 A.2d 797, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1266 (1973); Kilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 R.I. 443 , 379 A.2d 919, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1949 (1977).

A worker who physically recovers sufficiently to resume his or her employment responsibilities without endangering his or her health is not entitled to compensation. Wright v. Rhode Island Superior Court, 535 A.2d 318, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 2 (R.I. 1988).

Employer Liable.

Holding in Brown v. Hope Service Station, Inc., 122 R.I. 74 , 403 A.2d 1387 (1979), that the date that will determine the responsibility of successive insurers is the date of loss of earning capacity rather than the date of injury is disapproved. See Aguiar v. Control Power Indus., 496 A.2d 147, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 564 (R.I. 1985).

Absent a second separate intervening cause of disability, that is, an aggravation of a previous injury, the employer’s insurance carrier on the risk at the time of the original compensable injury remains liable for the employee’s continued disability. Aguiar v. Control Power Indus., 496 A.2d 147, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 564 (R.I. 1985).

The liability of an employer for compensation of an injured employee continues for all disabilities that result from the compensable injury. Aguiar v. Control Power Indus., 496 A.2d 147, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 564 (R.I. 1985).

Evidence.
— Burden of Proof.

Claimant has burden of proof on whether death was caused by injury arising out of employment. Jacquinet v. Woonsocket Spinning Co., 52 R.I. 247 , 160 A. 80, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1932).

Claimant has burden of proof as to causal connection between accident and illness. Silva v. Bristol & Warren Water Works, 55 R.I. 337 , 181 A. 414, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1935); La Point v. Pendleton, 61 R.I. 121 , 200 A. 464, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1938).

Petition for compensation was properly denied where employee failed to show causal connection between original compensable accident and later accident while self-employed. Ferguson v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 98 , 58 A.2d 810, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1948).

A petitioner for compensation has the burden of establishing that he suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, connected therewith and referable thereto. Gaudette v. Glas-Kraft, Inc., 91 R.I. 304 , 163 A.2d 23, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1960).

The employee has the burden of proving that there is a causal connection between the injury sustained and his employment. Natale v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 119 R.I. 713 , 382 A.2d 1313, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 607 (1978).

— Degree Required.

Uncontradicted medical opinion that brain hemorrhage was caused by inhalation of fumes required finding that injury was sustained in course of employment despite possibility that injury may have been caused otherwise. Antonelli v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 72 R.I. 1 , 47 A.2d 863, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1946).

Finding with respect to causation need not be based on proof that establishes cause with scientific certainty. Emma v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., 75 R.I. 94 , 63 A.2d 786, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1949).

Proof is not required that the heart attack for which claimant sought compensation was caused or precipitated by undue or unusual physical exertion. Gartner v. Jackson's, Inc., 95 R.I. 489 , 188 A.2d 85, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1963).

— Inferences.

Where injury did not manifest itself until month after accident, evidence supported inference that injury was recurrence of a previous injury rather than attributable to later accident. De Fusco v. Ochee Spring Water Co., 84 R.I. 446 , 124 A.2d 867, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1956).

— Insufficient.

Where petitioner went to eat lunch and smoked a cigarette in room provided for such purpose and upon finishing cigarette she bent over to dispose of it in a bucket which was provided, when she felt her back snap, there was no causal relation between the employment and her injury. Clarke v. Coats & Clark, 97 R.I. 163 , 196 A.2d 423, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1964).

Where an employee received compensation under agreement for a back injury occurring in 1956 and again under agreement for an injury in 1958 aggravating the previous condition and returned to work at regular wages in 1961, he failed to prove a back disability existing in 1963 due to an injury connected with his employment, where his testimony was that it began with a muscle spasm with which he was stricken while in a parking lot connected with a store. Roy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 99 R.I. 638 , 210 A.2d 125, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 495 (1965).

An employee who had an idiopathic fall while walking to the plant cafeteria and sustained thereby a fractured skull, a subarachnoid hemorrhage, and a cerebral concussion was not entitled to compensation, there being no causal connection between such injuries and his employment. Zuchowski v. United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 165 , 229 A.2d 61, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 664 (1967).

Where an employee suffered an injury from a fall in the course of his employment in 1964, returned to work six weeks later and continually worked as a heavy equipment operator until 1971 when he became totally disabled by a ruptured intervertebral disc and the evidence was in direct conflict as to whether the disabling injury was caused by the 1964 accident, the evidence, particularly the fact that the employee performed heavy construction work from 1965 to 1971 without any medical attention, negated any inference that the employee’s disability resulted from the 1964 accident. Perfetto v. Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co., 114 R.I. 624 , 337 A.2d 791, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1464 (1975).

Where petitioner’s doctor only went so far as to say that petitioner’s heart problem was possibly linked to his history of injury during the course of employment, the testimony was not sufficient to establish a causal connection between the disability and the employment. Natale v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 119 R.I. 713 , 382 A.2d 1313, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 607 (1978).

Testimony of an orthopedist whose services had been engaged by the insurer that claimant’s absence from work was due to his arthritic pain rather than any pain he might have experienced because of the precipitous descent of an overhead door supported a finding that claimant was not entitled to compensation. Meketsy v. Roger Williams Foods, 526 A.2d 1276, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 511 (R.I. 1987).

— Medical Testimony.

Medical testimony was not required to prove causal connection where injury manifested itself in the place that had been struck by falling object within a short time thereafter. Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274 , 75 A.2d 191, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1950).

Where commission considered the conflicting medical testimony together with the other evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom as to whether an unusual physical exercise caused the heart attack, the commission’s findings of fact on the conflicting medical testimony on this issue are conclusive on the supreme court under the statute. Gartner v. Jackson's, Inc., 95 R.I. 489 , 188 A.2d 85, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1963).

Where a doctor had not seen the decedent prior to his death, was not present at the autopsy, and had not reviewed all the medical records, his opinion testimony was admissible although those factors might have affected the weight to be given to his opinion in establishing the cause of death. Parenteau v. Zimmerman Engineering, Inc., 111 R.I. 68 , 299 A.2d 168, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1180 (1973).

Although a causal connection may be proved without medical testimony when a physical injury appears reasonably soon after an accident with symptoms observable to the ordinary person in that part of the body where the force was applied, the determination of what, if any, effect sulfuric-acid fumes had upon employee’s internal anatomy and physiology was a technical determination calling for a specific medical testimony. Hicks v. Vennerbeck & Clase Co., 525 A.2d 37, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 477 (R.I. 1987).

— Sufficient.

Evidence supported finding that accident was not the cause of incapacity. Central Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Rassano, 75 R.I. 108 , 64 A.2d 197, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1949).

Evidence which showed that injury was a strain which resulted from the constant grasping of the golf ball core between the left thumb and index finger for a period of three weeks was sufficient for the finding of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Shoren v. United States Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 319 , 140 A.2d 768, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1958).

Where an employee suffering from noxious fumes emitted by lacquers and thinners she was using went to a restroom for air and, while there, attempted to light a cigarette with the result that her fume-soaked clothing burst into flames and she suffered severe burns, the incident was an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment and her injuries were compensable. Boullier v. Samsan Co., 100 R.I. 676 , 219 A.2d 133, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 496 (1966).

Where an employee strained ligaments in his back in the course of his work with resulting injury to a spinal disk and a subsequent sneeze at home caused the rupture of the disk and consequent disability, such disability arose out of and in the course of his employment. Barber v. Uniroyal, Inc., 107 R.I. 401 , 267 A.2d 697, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 787 (1970).

Excluded.
— Seamen.

A plaintiff who has recovered under the Jones Act, 46 USC § 688, may not recover again under the state compensation statute, and does not qualify for recovery under the state workers’ compensation system. Benders v. Board of Governors for Higher Educ., 636 A.2d 1313, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 1994).

Extraterritorial Application.

The statute covers injury from accident outside the state where the contract of employment was entered and is executed principally within the state. Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447 , 98 A. 103, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1916).

Heart Conditions.

The important factor in heart attack cases is not whether the nature of the work performed by the employee involves usual or unusual physical exertion, but rather whether such work, whatever its nature, caused or precipitated the heart attack. Gartner v. Jackson's, Inc., 95 R.I. 489 , 188 A.2d 85, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1963).

The issue of causal connection between claimant’s heart attack and his work is not an issue of fact and the commission’s findings thereon being supported by the testimony of one doctor, causal connection thus having been determined by the commission on conflicting evidence, the finding of fact on that issue would be binding on the supreme court under the statute. Gartner v. Jackson's, Inc., 95 R.I. 489 , 188 A.2d 85, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1963).

In heart-attack cases, it is immaterial whether the work performed by an employee involved unusual physical exertion. Rather, the crucial issue is whether there is a causal relationship or nexus between the work and the attack. Mulcahey v. New Eng. Newspapers, 488 A.2d 681, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 439 (R.I. 1985).

The principles in workers’ compensation cases involving heart attacks should be applied to other failures of the cardiovascular system. Mulcahey v. New Eng. Newspapers, 488 A.2d 681, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 439 (R.I. 1985).

Joint Employment.

Where an employee was injured while doing separate jobs for two employers at the same time, he was not allowed to recover full benefits from both employers under a prior theory of “concurrent” as opposed to “joint” employment, overruling Gehring v. Nottingham Lace Works, Inc., 82 R.I. 190 , 106 A.2d 923, rehearing denied, 82 R.I. 197 , 108 A.2d 514 (1954). Lupo v. Nursery Originals, 400 A.2d 950, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1803 (R.I. 1979).

Laid off Employees.

An employee who is laid off is within the scope of his or her employment when he or she collects his or her final wages within a reasonable time period at the place of employment and upon the express request of the employer. Sousa v. Providence Subaru Co., 668 A.2d 331, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 294 (R.I. 1995).

The employment contract between the employee and the employer existed at the time the employee’s injury occurred and was not severed by the employee’s having filed for unemployment benefits following a layoff but prior to receipt of a final paycheck; accordingly the employee is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Sousa v. Providence Subaru Co., 668 A.2d 331, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 294 (R.I. 1995).

Personal Injury.

The term “personal injury” under this section should be construed to include dentures which are damaged or destroyed directly by an accident which happens in the course of an employee’s employment. Agostinho v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 94 R.I. 51 , 177 A.2d 630, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1962).

Physical injury caused by mental stimulus is compensable. Mulcahey v. New Eng. Newspapers, 488 A.2d 681, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 439 (R.I. 1985).

Psychic Injury.

If psychic injury is to be compensable under the workers’ compensation law, a dramatically stressful stimulus must be established. Seitz v. L & R Indus. (Palco Products Div.), 437 A.2d 1345, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1413 (R.I. 1981).

Review.

When reviewing a workers’ compensation commission decision, the Supreme Court is bound by the commission’s findings regarding the facts surrounding the accident, and will review those findings only to determine if the record contains competent legal evidence in support thereof. Bottomley v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 441 A.2d 553, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1165 (R.I. 1982).

A question of law regarding the causal connection between injury and employment arises only when the facts as found by the commission and supported by the evidence lead reasonable minds to but one conclusion. Only in that case will the reviewing court substitute its judgment for that of the appellate commission. On the contrary, a finding of fact is solely within the province of the commission, and provided that there is competent legal evidence to support it, the court will not disturb it. Gaines v. Senior Citizens Transp., 471 A.2d 1357, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 458 (R.I. 1984).

Scope of Employment.

Where food and beverage vending machines were kept behind a metal grate type fence which was locked most of the day to prevent theft but it was the practice of employees to reach through the grating and operate the machines and claimant did so but the machine stuck and the claimant then struck the machine with his hand and in doing so struck his arm on the grating injuring his arm such injury was sustained during the course of his employment. DeNardo v. Fairmount Foundries Cranston, Inc., 121 R.I. 440 , 399 A.2d 1229, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1797 (1979).

Use of Employee Assistants in Informal Hearings.

Provisions allowing employee assistants to assist injured employees in informal hearings before the department are not unconstitutional as violative of the Supreme Court’s exclusive power to regulate the practice of law. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Department of Workers' Compensation, 543 A.2d 662, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1988).

Collateral References.

Action by employee for injury as claim or notice of claim. 98 A.L.R. 529.

Application for, or receipt of, unemployment compensation benefits as affecting claim for workers’ compensation. 96 A.L.R.2d 941.

Application of the “mutual benefit” doctrine to workers’ compensation cases. 11 A.L.R.6th 351.

Award of workers’ compensation benefits to professional athletes. 112 A.L.R.5th 365.

Compensability under occupational disease statutes of emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli. 113 A.L.R.5th 115.

Employee’s injuries sustained in use of employer’s restroom as covered by workers’ compensation. 80 A.L.R.5th 417.

Injury caused by food or drink purchased by employee in plant facilities. 50 A.L.R.3d 505.

Injury or death due to storms. 20 A.L.R.5th 346.

Injury while attending employer sponsored social affair as arising out of and in course of employment. 47 A.L.R.3d 566.

Insanity as terminating right to compensation. 6 A.L.R. 570.

Liability of successive employers for disease or condition allegedly attributable to successive employments. 34 A.L.R.4th 958.

Marriage as terminating right to future payments to injured female employee. 96 A.L.R. 976.

Mental disorders as compensable under workmen’s compensation acts. 97 A.L.R.3d 161.

Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claim. 32 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Recovery of workers’ compensation for acts of terrorism. 20 A.L.R.6th 729.

Right of employee to maintain common law action for negligence against workers’ compensation insurance carrier. 93 A.L.R.2d 598.

Right of health or accident insurer to intervene in workers’ compensation proceeding to recover benefits previously paid to claimant or beneficiary. 38 A.L.R.4th 355.

Right to Compensation under State Workers’ Compensation Statute for Injuries Sustained During or as Result of Horseplay, Joking, Fooling, or the Like. 41 A.L.R.6th 207.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 97 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right to workers’ compensation for injuries suffered after termination of employment. 10 A.L.R.5th 245.

Right to workers’ compensation for injury suffered at worker’s home where home is claimed as “work situs”. 4 A.L.R.6th 57.

Right to workers’ compensation for injury suffered by employee while driving employer’s vehicle. 28 A.L.R.6th 1.

Right to workers’ compensation for injury suffered by worker en route to or from worker’s home where home is claimed as “work situs”. 15 A.L.R.6th 633.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular physical injuries or illnesses. 112 A.L.R.5th 509.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 122 A.L.R.5th 653.

Right to Workers’ Compensation for Physical Injury or Illness Suffered by Claimant as Result of Nonsudden Mental Stimuli — Compensability under Particular Circumstances. 39 A.L.R.6th 445.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular injuries and illnesses. 20 A.L.R.6th 641.

Third-party tortfeasor’s right to have damages recovered by employee reduced by amount of employee’s workers’ compensation benefits. 43 A.L.R.4th 849.

Tort liability of workers’ compensation insurer for wrongful delay or refusal to make payments due. 8 A.L.R.4th 902.

Validity and construction of no-fault insurance plans providing for reduction of benefits otherwise payable by amounts receivable from independent collateral sources. 10 A.L.R.4th 996.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act for Additional Compensation Because of Failure To Comply with Specific Requirement of Statute or Regulation by Public for Protection of Workers. 31 A.L.R.6th 199.

What constitutes duress by employer or former employer vitiating employee’s release of employer from claims arising out of employment. 30 A.L.R.4th 294.

Workers’ compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury. 83 A.L.R.4th 110.

Workers’ compensation: compensability of injury during tryout, employment test, or similar activity designed to determine employability. 8 A.L.R.5th 798.

Workers’ compensation: coverage of employee’s injury or death from exposure to the elements—modern cases. 20 A.L.R.5th 346.

Workers’ compensation: coverage of injury occurring between workplace and parking lot provided by employer, while employee is going to or coming from work. 4 A.L.R.5th 585.

Workers’ compensation: coverage of injury occurring in parking lot provided by employer, while employee was going to or coming from work. 4 A.L.R.5th 443.

Workers’ compensation: Lyme disease. 22 A.L.R.5th 246.

Workers’ Compensation: Recovery for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. 14 A.L.R.5th 1.

28-33-1.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 3; P.L. 1986, ch. 1, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1987, ch. 419, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 480, § 13; Repealed by P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 10, effective July 11, 1990.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-33-1.1 concerned early pay systems.

28-33-2. Injuries occasioned by willful intent or intoxication.

No compensation shall be allowed for the injury or death of an employee occasioned by his or her willful intention to bring about the injury or death of himself or herself or another, where it is proved that his or her injury or death was occasioned by that conduct, or that the injury or death resulted from his or her intoxication or unlawful use of controlled substances as defined in chapter 28 of title 21.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-2 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Intoxication.

Act of intoxicated employee in doing a thing the danger of which would have been readily apparent to a sober person precluded compensation where the act resulted in employee’s death. Collins v. Cole, 40 R.I. 66 , 99 A. 830, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1917).

Death caused by intentional drinking of acid was not compensable. Shewczuk v. Contrexeville Mfg. Co., 53 R.I. 223 , 165 A. 444, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 64 (1933), limited, Chirico v. Kappler, 61 R.I. 128 , 200 A. 447, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1938).

— Employer’s Social Activity.

When a recreational activity is sufficiently employment-related to allow recovery and the employer permits the use of alcohol, this section is unavailable to employer to bar employee’s recovery. Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651 , 375 A.2d 920, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1505 (1977).

Collateral References.

Delirium tremens contributing to injury or death, recovery of compensation for. 19 A.L.R. 106; 28 A.L.R. 204; 60 A.L.R. 1299.

Intoxication as serious and willful misconduct of employee barring recovery. 4 A.L.R. 121.

Intoxication of employee, effect of. 43 A.L.R. 421.

Necessity and sufficiency of evidence that delirium tremens suffered by applicant for compensation is attributable to his employment. 20 A.L.R. 26; 73 A.L.R. 488.

Prohibited act, injury received while doing. 23 A.L.R. 1161; 26 A.L.R. 166; 58 A.L.R. 197; 83 A.L.R. 1211; 119 A.L.R. 1409.

Safety appliances, failure to use, as serious and willful misconduct. 4 A.L.R. 121; 9 A.L.R. 1377; 23 A.L.R. 1172; 1186; 26 A.L.R. 167; 169; 119 A.L.R. 1409.

Violation of statute in connection with his employment as affecting status of one as an employee. 128 A.L.R. 1310.

28-33-2.1. Injuries occasioned by employer sponsored, non-work related activities.

No compensation shall be allowed for the injury or death of an employee occasioned by or during his or her voluntary participation in employer sponsored social or non-professional athletic activity; provided, that the foregoing provision shall not bar the right of an employee to recover against an employer for tortious misconduct.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 5, § 6; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3.

28-33-3. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-3 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3), relating to contingent attorneys’ fees, was repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 2, and by P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 2, effective July 2, 2004.

28-33-4. Commencement of compensation.

No indemnity compensation shall be paid under chapters 29 — 38 of this title for any injury which does not incapacitate the employee for a period of at least three (3) days from earning full wages, but, if the incapacity extends beyond the period of three (3) days, compensation shall begin on the fourth day from the date of injury, the first two hundred fifty dollars ($250) of indemnity compensation following the three (3) day period, and the first two hundred fifty dollars ($250) of medical expense for any compensable injury shall, at the discretion of the carrier, be a deductible charged to any employer insured in the residual market, which deductible the insurance carrier shall promptly charge back to the employer. Non-payment by the employer may be grounds for cancellation of the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 4; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 2; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 4; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 4; P.L. 1941, ch. 1055, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-4 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

If disability of injured worker extends beyond two weeks, the compensation paid covers the entire period of disability. Peloquin v. ITT Hammel-Dahl, 110 R.I. 330 , 292 A.2d 237, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 918 (1972).

Three-Day Period.

This section provides for the right to compensation to be paid only when employee has been incapacitated for a period of at least three days from earning full wages and the period so cited shall run consecutively. Girard v. United States Rubber Co., 85 R.I. 477 , 132 A.2d 831, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1957).

In calculating three-day waiting period, the only criterion to be applied is whether on a given day the employee’s earning capacity has been impaired by reason of a work-related injury. If so, it is a day to be included in calculation of waiting period, and once impairment has lasted for three consecutive days, the employee is entitled to benefits from the fourth day on, no matter whether waiting period fortuitously embraces a holiday or any other day on which an employee would not normally be expected to work. Morgan v. Davol, Inc., 458 A.2d 1082, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 860 (R.I. 1983).

This section, which established the three-day incapacity requirement, is not a jurisdictional statute; therefore, employee’s failure to satisfy the three-day incapacity requirement does not raise a jurisdictional question but merely establishes that employee failed to prove he was entitled to benefits for disability. Buonauito v. Ocean State Dairy Distribs., 509 A.2d 988, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 476 (R.I. 1986).

The record supported the commission’s finding that employee failed to meet the three-day incapacity requirement of this section. Buonauito v. Ocean State Dairy Distribs., 509 A.2d 988, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 476 (R.I. 1986).

Although employee did not work for four successive days, these absences did not satisfy the requirement of absence for three consecutive work days, where he was absent on Friday, July 3, 1981, and Monday, July 6, 1981 because of a legal holiday. Wright v. Rhode Island Superior Court, 535 A.2d 318, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 2 (R.I. 1988).

Collateral References.

“Waiting period,” construction of provision of act regarding. 81 A.L.R. 1261.

28-33-5. Medical services provided by employer.

The employer shall, subject to the choice of the employee as provided in § 28-33-8 , promptly provide for an injured employee any reasonable medical, surgical, dental, optical, or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicines, crutches, and apparatus for such period as is necessary, in order to cure, rehabilitate or relieve the employee from the effects of his injury; provided, that no fee for major surgery shall be paid unless permission for it is first obtained from the workers’ compensation court, the employer, or the insurance carrier involved, except where compliance with it may prove fatal or detrimental to the employee. Irrespective of the date of injury, the liability of the employer for hospital service rendered under this section to the injured employee shall be the cost to the hospital of rendering the service at the time the service is rendered. The director, after consultations with representatives of hospitals, employers, and insurance companies, shall establish administrative procedures regarding the furnishing and filing of data and the time and method of billing and may accept as representing the costs for both routine and special services to patients, costs as computed for the federal Medicare program. Each hospital licensed under chapter 16 of title 23 which renders services to injured employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act, chapters 29 — 38 of this title, shall submit and certify to the director, in accordance with requirements of the administrative procedures established by him or her, its costs for those services. The employer shall also provide all medical, optical, dental, and surgical appliances and apparatus required to cure or relieve the employee from the effects of the injury, including but not being limited to the following: ambulance and nursing service, eyeglasses, dentures, braces and supports, artificial limbs, crutches, and other similar appliances; provided, that the employer shall not be liable to pay for or provide hearing aids or other amplification devices.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 6, § 5; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 6, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 6, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-32-5 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

Services provided by state or municipality as employer, § 28-31-3 .

Law Reviews.

Devon Q. Toro, Comment: How Come Mary-Jane is Not on Workers’ Comp?: Requiring Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Insurers to Reimburse Employees for Medical Marijuana, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 500 (2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The context of this section necessarily refers to services, whether specialized or prolonged, which are necessary to cure, rehabilitate or relieve. Trudeau v. United States Rubber Co., 92 R.I. 328 , 168 A.2d 460, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1961).

Pain is not compensable under the compensation statute. Rather, the employee must prove that the disputed treatment would relieve, rehabilitate, or cure his disability. Bissonnette v. Federal Dairy Co., 472 A.2d 1223, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 474 (R.I. 1984).

Appeal.

Appeal was properly before the supreme court for the purpose of determining whether there was any legal evidence to support the findings that the medical bills in question were reasonable since the main contention on appeal was that the decree appealed from was not supported by legal evidence and that it was therefore against law, it being well settled that findings of fact which are not supported by legal evidence amount to errors of law and will be reviewed by the supreme court upon appeal. McCoy v. Cataldo, 88 R.I. 330 , 148 A.2d 267, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1959).

Where trial commissioner (now judge) did not give consideration to the applicability of this section the ends of justice required remanding case to workers’ compensation commission (now court) for the making of such findings of fact as they may deem proper upon reconsideration. Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 97 R.I. 20 , 195 A.2d 238, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1963).

Appliances and Apparatus.

An extra firm mattress purchased by claimant upon advice of physician for relief of a back injury was an apparatus within the meaning of this section. Izzi v. Royal Electric Corp., 100 R.I. 380 , 216 A.2d 363, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 444 (1966).

This section confers on the workers’ compensation commission (now court) authority to require employers to furnish injured employees with surgical appliances or apparatus designed to cure or relieve the effects of the injury. Craven v. United States Rubber Co., 103 R.I. 126 , 235 A.2d 85, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 584 (1967).

Where an employee had purchased a wig to cover a bald spot resulting from a work related injury, she was not entitled to reimbursement from the employer because the wig was not medical in nature although it did contribute to her rehabilitation; however, the court said that had the wig been prescribed by a doctor, it might have qualified as being medical in nature. Lemoine v. Coby Glass Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 86 , 341 A.2d 40, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1122 (1975), overruled, Fallon v. Skin Med. & Surgery Ctrs., 713 A.2d 777, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1998).

Paralyzed claimant’s request that he be provided with an automatic lift or elevator was denied, despite his physician’s testimony that an elevator would relieve him from the effects of his injury, since to be chargeable to the employer under this section benefits must be medical in nature. Savaria v. DiSano, 118 R.I. 357 , 373 A.2d 820, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1467 (1977).

— Reasonableness.

While, under this section, an employer is required to supply a certain type of mattress to an employee with a back injury if it is recommended by the attending physician, he is entitled to a hearing before the commission (now court) on whether the cost of a purchased article is reasonable and whether such item is necessary for the cure, rehabilitation, or relief of his employee, before his liability attaches. Geigy Chemical Corp. v. Zuckerman, 106 R.I. 534 , 261 A.2d 844, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 955 (1970).

— Replacement.

Not only would orthopedic appliances and prostheses be furnished where necessary due to injury of the employee but those destroyed by accidents within the purview of this act would be replaced. Agostinho v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 94 R.I. 51 , 177 A.2d 630, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1962).

Evidence.

The introduction in evidence of medical bills, supported only petitioner’s testimony that he visited the doctors in question because of his back condition, but was not sufficient proof that their services were rendered in order to cure, rehabilitate or relieve him from the effects of the injury described in the preliminary agreement for the payment of which respondent was liable. Gray v. Kagan, 90 R.I. 398 , 158 A.2d 572, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1960).

Jurisdiction of Court.

Nothing in this section in any way inhibits the commission’s (now court’s) jurisdiction to act upon an employee’s petition for medical benefits solely by reason of the fact that her request, although filed when the employer was paying her weekly compensation benefits, was not heard or adjudicated until after the expiration of the obligatory compensation period. Fusaro v. Berkshire Hathaway, 106 R.I. 639 , 262 A.2d 381, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 967 (1970).

The commission (now court) is not prohibited from ordering the employer to pay for treatment in out-of-state facilities. McAree v. Gerber Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 243 , 342 A.2d 608, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1147 (1975).

The requirement of this section for prior approval of major surgery is not exclusive in the sense that it prevents the commission (now court) from giving prior consideration and approval of other forms of treatment. McAree v. Gerber Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 243 , 342 A.2d 608, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1147 (1975).

In cases in which the parties cannot agree on whether medical treatment is necessary, the parties may seek a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Court. Mendes v. ITT Royal Elec., 648 A.2d 1358, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 235 (R.I. 1994).

Medical Treatment.
— Reasonableness.

The standard for determining what a reasonable medical treatment is for purposes of this section should be whether the medical treatment is accepted by doctors at the national level. Pola v. Health-Tex, 605 A.2d 1321, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 1992).

Since thermography is not an accepted medical treatment on the national level, it cannot be a reasonable medical treatment that helps to cure, to rehabilitate, or to relieve an injured worker as required by this section. Therefore, the thermogram is not a medical procedure for which an employer must compensate a doctor who performs such procedure on an injured worker. Pola v. Health-Tex, 605 A.2d 1321, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 1992).

Other Attendance or Treatment.

The term “other attendance or treatment” used in this section did not include a worker in claimant’s home to perform household duties and assist her personally, although such worker was required because of the claimant’s disability. Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429 , 224 A.2d 387, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 411 (1966).

— Services Rendered by Friend.

Compensation for 17 hours a day care of a quadriplegic in injured worker’s home by a friend who was a trained nurse’s aide held reasonable. Bello v. Zavota Bros. Transp. Co., 504 A.2d 1015, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 409 (R.I. 1986).

— Services Rendered by Spouse.

Where plaintiff ’s health and rehabilitation required specialized paramedical and nursing services, the mere fact that these services were performed by his wife does not preclude compensation. Jobin v. American Drilling & Boring Co., 118 R.I. 480 , 374 A.2d 799, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1486 (1977).

Recovery of Payments.

Payments made by an employer’s insurer under this section pursuant to a decree of the commission subsequently reversed may, after such reversal, be recovered in an action for that purpose against the hospital and other persons to whom paid. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Newport Hosp., 108 R.I. 86 , 272 A.2d 329, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1228 (1971).

Collateral References.

Applicability of provisions as to medical or surgical services as affected by the character or qualifications of the person rendering them. 40 A.L.R. 1265.

Impossibility of cure as affecting application of specific provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act relating to duty of employer or insurer as to medical, surgical, or hospital service. 88 A.L.R. 1192.

Liability of employer or insurance company for medical and hospital aid furnished to injured employee. 7 A.L.R. 545.

Malpractice, right of employee who has received award, or employer or insurer, to maintain action against physician for. 28 A.L.R.3d 1066.

Master’s duty and liability under contract to furnish medical treatment to employees, Workers’ Compensation Act as affecting. 33 A.L.R. 1204.

Medical or surgical treatment of employee after injury, Workers’ Compensation Act as affecting liability of or remedy against employer for injury due to. 127 A.L.R. 1108.

Payments, or furnishing medical or hospital services, or burial, by employer or his insurer, to employee after injury, as affecting time for filing claim under Workers’ Compensation Act. 144 A.L.R. 606.

Physician rendering services to injured employee, exclusiveness of remedy of, under Workers’ Compensation Act, precluding recovery in action on contract. 72 A.L.R. 1016; 143 A.L.R. 1264.

Physician’s misstatements to employee as imputable to employer under Workers’ Compensation Act. 129 A.L.R. 344.

Wife’s services as nurse, recovery under Workers’ Compensation Act for. 44 A.L.R. 697.

Workers’ compensation as covering cost of penile or similar implants related to sexual or reproductive activity. 89 A.L.R.4th 1057.

28-33-6. Failure to provide or accept medical services.

In the case of the employer’s neglect or refusal reasonably to do so, the employer shall be liable for the reasonable expense incurred by or on behalf of the employee in providing treatment, and the refusal of the employee to accept treatment reasonably required to lessen or terminate his or her incapacity shall bar the employee from receiving compensation during the period of refusal.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1942, ch. 1226, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1832, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3540, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liability of Employer.

Employer was not liable for medical expense in treating condition not resulting from the compensable accident. Burke v. Fram Corp., 76 R.I. 359 , 70 A.2d 601, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1950).

Where employer was ordered to pay all reasonable medical and hospital bills, such employer was, during the period until the decree could have been appealed, in the position of an employer who refused or neglected to provide medical assistance in accordance with § 28-33-5 and was subject to the provisions of this section. Proulx v. French Worsted Co., 98 R.I. 114 , 199 A.2d 901, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1964).

Requiring Acceptance of Treatment.

Decree cannot order employee to submit to surgery as a condition to continuation of compensation. Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373 , 82 A.2d 390, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1951); E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Andoscia, 79 R.I. 347 , 89 A.2d 179, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1952) (decisions prior to 1954 amendment).

In a proceeding in which an employer gave notice of its intention to suspend compensation payments to its injured employee on the ground that she was able to return to work and which case was heard by a trial commissioner who entered a decree suspending compensation on the ground that the employee refused to accept treatment reasonably required to lessen or terminate her incapacity, there was no evidence to prove that allegation nor any evidence tending to prove employee had refused to accept treatment reasonably required to lessen or terminate her incapacity resulting from her injury which would bar her from receiving compensation, and while medical treatment prescribed might have been an improper treatment the court was reluctant to say the patient must cease such treatment under the circumstances. Gamco, Inc. v. Shea, 88 R.I. 419 , 149 A.2d 346, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1959).

— Employer in Default.

Failure of employee to have operation was excused by his inability to pay the expense and the employer’s denial of liability. Bishop v. Frank Morrow Co., 68 R.I. 518 , 30 A.2d 110, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1943).

Commissioner could refuse to order employee to submit to immediate surgery where the offer to pay for the surgery was first made in the middle of the trial and where employee had personal reason for not desiring immediate surgery. Cabral v. Perry's Express Co., 85 R.I. 47 , 125 A.2d 221, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 120 (1956).

— Enforcement of Order.

Suspension and forfeiture of payments during refusal to accept treatment, rather than discontinuance or termination of payments, was appropriate. Esmond Mills, Inc. v. Mollo, 78 R.I. 27 , 78 A.2d 365, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1951); Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373 , 82 A.2d 390, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1951).

— Medical Prognosis.

Superior court could infer from medical testimony recommending surgery that the witness believed employee in physical condition to undergo surgery. Esmond Mills, Inc. v. Mollo, 78 R.I. 27 , 78 A.2d 365, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1951).

It was an abuse of discretion to order an operation where the chance of improvement after the operation was only slightly greater than the chance of worsening the condition. M. Longo & Sons v. Ianotti, 81 R.I. 406 , 103 A.2d 560, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1954) (decision prior to 1954 amendment).

Supreme court in exercise of its supervisory power modified decree so as to allow employee two months to submit to surgery where there was medical evidence that chance of successful surgery would be improved if patient lost weight prior to surgery. Guild v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, 83 R.I. 497 , 120 A.2d 142, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1956).

Where there was a 15% chance that surgery would result in no improvement or would worsen the employee’s physical condition, refusal to submit to the surgery did not justify suspension of payments. Guilmette v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 114 R.I. 508 , 336 A.2d 553, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1446 (1975).

Collateral References.

Neglect or improper self-treatment as affecting right to or amount of compensation. 54 A.L.R. 637.

What amounts to failure or refusal to submit to medical treatment sufficient to bar recovery of workers’ compensation. 3 A.L.R.5th 907.

Workers’ compensation: reasonableness of employee’s refusal of medical services tendered by employer. 72 A.L.R.4th 905.

28-33-7. Health service provider reimbursement.

  1. Any dispute as to the reasonableness of the amount of any charge and/or payment for medical, dental, or hospital services or for medicines or appliances shall be determined by the workers’ compensation court after a hearing, and the decision shall be final; provided, that the director of the department of labor and training, in consultation with the workers’ compensation court, and representatives of all appropriate medical disciplines practicing within the state of Rhode Island, shall establish a schedule of rates of reimbursement for those medical and dental services, excluding non-physician hospital charges, which are most often provided to employees receiving workers’ compensation. The schedule shall be published by the director utilizing the Physician’s Current Procedure Terminology (CPT) coding system as published by the American Medical Association. The director shall update and revise the schedule as necessary. In setting the rate of reimbursement for any service or procedure, the director shall determine, based upon available data, the ninetieth (90th) percentile of the usual and customary fee charged by health care providers in the state of Rhode Island and the immediate surrounding area, and in no case shall the rate of reimbursement exceed that amount. The liability of the employer or insurer for any charges and/or payment shall be limited to the rates of reimbursement set forth in this schedule including, but not limited to, charges for opinions on loss of use and maximum medical improvement; provided, that petitions may be filed in cases where the reasonableness of a particular rate is questioned, but the court shall be limited to a determination as to whether the rate, as applied in that particular case, is reasonable. The burden shall be upon the petitioner seeking payment of the medical bill to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the rate, as applied, is unreasonable in light of the peculiar nature of the services performed or other circumstances requiring a greater than normal expertise or expenditure of time or effort in providing the service.
  2. Subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, disputes other than those covered in § 28-33-9 pertaining to hospitalizations, medical services, appliances, or medicine shall be heard and determined by the workers’ compensation court in accordance with guidelines and protocols established by the medical advisory board.
  3. With respect to all complaints and charges of unprofessional conduct including, but not limited to, unnecessary or inappropriate treatment and any overcharges against any medical care provider brought to the attention of the workers’ compensation court in the performance of their duties under this title, the court shall report all complaints and charges to the appropriate board of licensure and discipline.
  4. The chief judge is authorized to establish a health care fee arbitration panel and to establish rules and procedure for the panel to make binding decisions in any dispute as to the value of health care services rendered under this title, and to compensate its members in an amount not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200) per day. The panel shall consist of one physician appointed by the president of the Rhode Island Medical Society, one physician who is a member of the Rhode Island Medical Society appointed by the manager of the state workers’ compensation insurance fund, and one physician who is a member of the Rhode Island Medical Society appointed by the chief judge of the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 2; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 4; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 4; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2545, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1941, ch. 1051, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1226, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1832, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3540, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-7 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 4; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 3; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 3, and P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The language of this provision must be read as requiring that the department of labor’s fee schedule serves as a ceiling to reimbursement. Rhode Island Orthopedic Soc'y v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 748 A.2d 1287, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 87 (R.I. 2000).

Burden of Proof.

The ultimate burden of proving reasonableness of charges and necessity of services is upon the employee. Merlino v. Beecroft Chevrolet Co., 488 A.2d 695, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 447 (R.I. 1985).

In the event that the opposing party questions either element, the reasonableness of the charge or the reasonable necessity of the service, then the burden of going forward with the evidence in order to raise such issue is upon such opposing party. Merlino v. Beecroft Chevrolet Co., 488 A.2d 695, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 447 (R.I. 1985).

Commission Hearings.

Where the employer appealed from the decree of the commissioner to the full commission on the ground that there was no legal evidence to support the finding that the charges specified were reasonable, it was error for the full commission to dismiss the appeal without determining whether there was sufficient legal evidence to support the single commissioner’s finding. McCoy v. Cataldo, 90 R.I. 365 , 158 A.2d 271, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1960).

Foundation.

The treating physician may provide an adequate foundation for his bill by testifying that the charges were reasonable and that the services were reasonably necessary. Merlino v. Beecroft Chevrolet Co., 488 A.2d 695, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 447 (R.I. 1985).

28-33-8. Employee’s choice of physician, dentist, or hospital — Payment of charges — Physician reporting schedule.

    1. An injured employee shall initially have freedom of choice to obtain health care, diagnosis, and treatment from any qualified healthcare provider. The initial healthcare provider of record may, without prior approval, refer the injured employee to any qualified specialist for independent consultation or assessment, or specified treatment. If the insurer or self-insured employer has a preferred-provider network approved and kept on record by the medical advisory board, any change by the employee from the initial healthcare provider of record shall only be to a healthcare provider listed in the approved preferred-provider network; provided, however, that any contract proffered or maintained that restricts or limits the healthcare provider’s ability to make referrals pursuant to the provisions of this section; restricts the injured employee’s first choice of healthcare provider; substitutes or overrules the treatment protocols maintained by the medical advisory board; or attempts to evade or limit the jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation court shall be void as against public policy. If the employee seeks to change to a healthcare provider not in the approved preferred-provider network, the employee must obtain the approval of the insurer or self-insured employer. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the treatment, care, or rehabilitation of an employee by more than one physician, dentist, or hospital. The employee’s first visit to any facility providing emergency care or to a physician or medical facility under contract with or agreement with the employer or insurer to provide priority care, shall not constitute the employee’s initial choice to obtain health care, diagnosis, or treatment.
    2. In addition to the treatment of qualified healthcare providers, the employee shall have the freedom to obtain a rehabilitation evaluation by a rehabilitation counselor certified by the director pursuant to § 28-33-41 in cases where the employee has received compensation for a period of more than three (3) months, and the employer shall pay the reasonable fees incurred by the rehabilitation counselor for the initial assessment.
  1. Within three (3) days of an initial visit following an injury, the healthcare provider shall provide to the insurer or self-insured employer, and the employee and his or her attorney, a notification of compensable injury form to be approved by the administrator of the medical advisory board. Within three (3) days of the injured employee’s release or discharge, return to work, and/or recovery from an injury covered by chapters 29 — 38 of this title, the healthcare provider shall provide a notice of release to the insurer or self-insured employer, and the employee and his or her attorney, on a form approved by the division. A thirty dollar ($30.00) fee may be charged by the healthcare provider to the insurer or self-insured employer for the notification of compensable injury forms or notice of release forms or for affidavits filed pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, but only if filed in a timely manner. No claim for care or treatment by a physician, dentist, or hospital chosen by an employee shall be valid and enforceable as against his or her employer, the employer’s insurer, or the employee, unless the physician, dentist, or hospital gives written notice of the employee’s choice to the employer/insurance carrier within fifteen (15) days after the beginning of the services or treatment. The healthcare provider shall, in writing, submit to the employer or insurance carrier an itemized bill and report for the services or treatment and a final itemized bill for all unpaid services or treatment within three (3) months after the conclusion of the treatment. The employee shall not be personally liable to pay any physician, dentist, or hospital bills in cases where the physician, dentist, or hospital has forfeited the right to be paid by the employer or insurance carrier because of noncompliance with this section.
    1. At ten (10) weeks from the date of injury, then every ten (10) weeks thereafter until maximum medical improvement, any qualified physician or other healthcare professional providing medical care or treatment to any person for an injury covered by chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall file an itemized bill and an affidavit with the insurer, the employee and his or her attorney, and the medical advisory board. The affidavit shall be on a form designed and provided by the administrator of the medical advisory board and shall state:
      1. The type of medical treatment provided to date, including type and frequency of treatment(s);
      2. Anticipated further treatment, including type, frequency, and duration of treatment(s), whether or not maximum medical improvement has been reached, and the anticipated date of discharge;
      3. Whether the employee can return to the former position of employment, or is capable of other work, specifying work restrictions and work capabilities of the employee;
    2. The affidavit shall be admissible as an exhibit of the workers’ compensation court with or without the appearance of the affiant.
  2. “Itemized bill,” as referred to in this section, means a completed statement of charges, on a form CMS HCFA 1500, UB 92/94 or other form suitable to the insurer, that includes, but is not limited to, an enumeration of specific types of care provided; facilities or equipment used; services rendered; and appliances or medicines prescribed, for purposes of identifying the treatment given the employee with respect to his or her injury.
    1. The treating physician shall furnish to the employee, or to his or her legal representative, a copy of his or her medical report within ten (10) days of the examination date.
    2. The treating physician shall notify the employer, and the employee and his or her attorney, immediately when an employee is able to return to full or modified work.
    3. There shall be no charge for a health record when that health record is necessary to support any appeal or claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act § 23-17-19.1(16) . The treating physician shall furnish to the employee, or to his or her legal representative, a medical report, within ten (10) days of the request, stating the diagnosis, disability, loss of use, end result and/or causal relationship of the employee’s condition associated with the work-related injury. The physician shall be entitled to charge for these services only as enunciated in the state of Rhode Island workers’ compensation medical fee schedule.
    1. Compensation for medical expenses and other services under §§ 28-33-5 , 28-33-7 , or this section is due and payable within twenty-one (21) days from the date a request is made for payment of these expenses by the provider of the medical services. In the event payment is not made within twenty-one (21) days from the date a request is made for payment, the provider of medical services may add, and the insurer or self-insurer shall pay, interest at the per annum rate as provided in § 9-21-10 on the amount due. The employee or the medical provider may file a petition with the administrator of the workers’ compensation court which petition shall follow the procedure as authorized in chapter 35 of this title.
    2. The twenty-one day (21) period in subsection (f)(1) of this section and in § 28-35-12 shall begin on the date the insurer receives a request with appropriate documentation required to determine whether the claim is compensable and the payment requested is due.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 2; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 4; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 4; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2545, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1941, ch. 1051, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1226, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1832, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-8 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 391, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1989, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 122, § 14; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 512, art. 1, § 16; P.L. 2020, ch. 66, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 72, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2020, ch. 66, § 2, and P.L. 2020, ch. 72, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Selection of physician or hospital by state or municipal employee, § 28-31-3 .

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

Devon Q. Toro, Comment: How Come Mary-Jane is Not on Workers’ Comp?: Requiring Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Insurers to Reimburse Employees for Medical Marijuana, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 500 (2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal.

Where trial commissioner did not give consideration to the applicability of this section the ends of justice required remanding case to workers’ compensation commission for the making of such findings of fact as they may deem proper upon reconsideration. Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 97 R.I. 20 , 195 A.2d 238, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1963).

Construction With Other Statutes.

The limitation in § 28-35-57 applies by analogy to a physician’s claim against employer. Henry v. American Enamel Co., 48 R.I. 113 , 136 A. 3, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1927).

Since the title of a statute may be used as a guide and considered to aid construction but cannot control or vary the meaning of a statute where that statute is unambiguous, a substantive right, in this instance the right to recover costs under § 28-35-32 , cannot be defined as procedural within the meaning of the last sentence of § 28-33-8 simply because it falls within that chapter of the act entitled “Procedure.” Orthopedic Specialists v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 120 R.I. 378 , 388 A.2d 352, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 688 (1978).

“Procedure” is the mode by which legal rights are enforced, and not the law which defines the right. Orthopedic Specialists v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 120 R.I. 378 , 388 A.2d 352, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 688 (1978).

The legislature did not intend to include reports required by this section within the provisions of § 28-35-10 . Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1022 (R.I. 1983).

Employer Refusing to Provide Treatment.

An employer who falls within the provision of § 28-33-6 is not entitled to the consideration provided for in this section to an employer who has complied with § 28-33-5 . Proulx v. French Worsted Co., 98 R.I. 114 , 199 A.2d 901, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1964).

Future Medical Services.

A decree of the commission ordering suspension of “all payment of benefits” referred only to the weekly compensation benefits and did not apply to payment for future necessary medical services. Geigy Chemical Corp. v. Zuckerman, 106 R.I. 534 , 261 A.2d 844, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 955 (1970).

Interest.

Employee’s claim for medical expenses bore interest only from the time of the first demand for reimbursement. Harding v. Imperial Printing & Finishing Co., 45 R.I. 416 , 123 A. 559, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1924).

Jurisdiction.

The commission is not prohibited from ordering the employer to pay for treatment in out-of-state facilities. McAree v. Gerber Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 243 , 342 A.2d 608, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1147 (1975).

In cases in which the parties cannot agree on whether medical treatment is necessary, the parties may seek a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Court. Mendes v. ITT Royal Elec., 648 A.2d 1358, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 235 (R.I. 1994).

Notice of Medical Claim, Reports and Submission of Bill.

Physician’s claim against employer was barred by failure to present a bill within the time required. Henry v. American Enamel Co., 48 R.I. 113 , 136 A. 3, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1927).

Employer was not barred from review of agreement for nonpayment of medical expenses where no bill had been presented for such expenses. Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Macedo, 73 R.I. 157 , 53 A.2d 756, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1947).

In absence of fraud, failure to render bill for services within statutory period was not excused by insurer’s statement that the statutory maximum had been reached even though employee could have initiated proceeding for allowance of excess expenses. Ferguson v. George A. Fuller Co., 78 R.I. 412 , 82 A.2d 856, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1951).

Claimant shall be allowed a doctor, hospital and treatment of his choice and upon petition funds for the payment thereof even though physician had not given personal notice or reported to employer since the petition was filed by claimant. Lambert v. First Nat'l Stores, 85 R.I. 365 , 131 A.2d 811, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1957).

Where a physician, after a long period of faithful adherence to the reporting requirements of this section, through inadvertence or otherwise, fails to furnish an employer with a required statement of the progress of his patient’s condition, the statutory prohibition against enforcement of liability for services extends only to charges for treatment thereafter given and not to those for services previously tendered. Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 659 , 226 A.2d 500, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 816 (1967).

It was error for the commission to disallow payment for medical services performed during certain periods because employee’s physician did not send progress reports and bills to employer in case where employer had informed physician that it would no longer pay for employee’s medical treatment, and commission subsequently found employer liable for such treatment. Banasik v. Tupper Co., 109 R.I. 192 , 283 A.2d 272, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1040 (1971).

An order of a trial commissioner for the employer to pay all reasonable charges for necessary medical services does not relieve the provider of such services from compliance with this section. McAree v. Gerber Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 243 , 342 A.2d 608, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1147 (1975).

— Actual Knowledge by Employer.

Actual knowledge by employer within the required period of the employee’s choice of physician operates as a waiver of written notice. Henry v. American Enamel Co., 48 R.I. 113 , 136 A. 3, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1927).

Knowledge by employer that employee was receiving treatment did not excuse rendering of a bill for services. Ferguson v. George A. Fuller Co., 78 R.I. 412 , 82 A.2d 856, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1951).

Compliance with the notice requirements of this statute by a physician seeking to enforce his derivative claim against an employer is waived or excused to the extent that the employer is in possession of the pertinent knowledge. Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 97 R.I. 20 , 195 A.2d 238, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1963).

The purpose of the notice requirements of this statute is to provide the employer with knowledge that will enable him to ascertain the necessity for medical treatment and the reasonableness of the cost thereof and to whatever extent an employer has actual knowledge concerning these matters, compliance with the pertinent provisions of this statute would serve no useful purpose. Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 97 R.I. 20 , 195 A.2d 238, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1963).

Reimbursement of Employee.

Failure of physician and hospital to give notice as required by this section did not bar employee from recovering from employer after having paid physician and hospital. Harding v. Imperial Printing & Finishing Co., 45 R.I. 390 , 123 A. 81, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1924).

Failure of physician to render bill for services within statutory period bars employee’s claim for reimbursement. Ferguson v. George A. Fuller Co., 78 R.I. 412 , 82 A.2d 856, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1951).

Reimbursement of Physician or Hospital.

The statute did not bar an action in assumpsit in the district court by the physician against the employer based on the promise by the employer. Migliaccio v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 67 R.I. 352 , 23 A.2d 893, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1942).

The employer’s liability for medical services rendered to an injured employee is statutory and the omission from the 1954 amendment of this section of the language which previously made the employer liable for such expense precludes a physician from recovering his fees for such services by proceedings before the workers’ compensation commission. Wynne v. Pawtuxet Valley Dyeing Co., 101 R.I. 455 , 224 A.2d 612, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 414 (1966).

Treatment, Care, or Rehabilitation.

The term “treatment, care, or rehabilitation” used in this section did not include a worker in claimant’s home to perform household and personal services, although such assistance was required because of claimant’s disability. Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429 , 224 A.2d 387, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 411 (1966).

Compensation for 17 hours a day care of a quadriplegic in injured worker’s home by a friend who was a trained nurse’s aide held reasonable. Bello v. Zavota Bros. Transp. Co., 504 A.2d 1015, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 409 (R.I. 1986).

Collateral References.

Physician, surgeon, or hospital, selection or change of. 142 A.L.R. 1205.

28-33-8.1. Managed care programs.

Any employer or insurer may petition the director of labor and training and the director of business regulation for authority to provide health care, diagnosis, and treatment through any health plan, health maintenance organization, or managed care provider licensed in the state. The directors shall have discretion to approve or disapprove the petition, and approval of both directors shall be required to authorize the managed care program. Any such provider, including a nonprofit hospital service corporation or nonprofit medical service corporation, may provide, underwrite, or administer the provision of health care, diagnosis, or treatment arising under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, to the extent specified under the managed care program without incurring any liabilities or obligations under chapters 29 — 38 of this title not specified in the managed care program, and the provider shall not become subject to the regulation and the generally applicable liabilities and obligations of workers’ compensation insurers.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 6; P.L. 1994, ch. 430, § 2.

28-33-9. Order declaring employer liable for medical services.

When an injury results in no incapacity or incapacity of three (3) days or less and a dispute arises between the employee and the employer or insurer as to the payment of medical expenses or other services provided under §§ 28-33-5 , 28-33-7 and 28-33-8 , the employee or the medical provider may file a petition with the workers’ compensation court, which petition shall follow the procedure as outlined in chapter 35 of this title. In no event shall a petition be filed until twenty-one (21) days have elapsed since written demand for payment for the expense or service has been made on the employer or insurer.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1941, ch. 1055, § 2; P.L. 1942, ch. 1226, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1832, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-9 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1989, ch. 161, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Counsel Fees.

The director of labor is therefore empowered to make an award of counsel fees to an employee who successfully defends an award of medical expenses against an employer’s petition for writ of certiorari. Davol, Inc. v. Souza, 492 A.2d 145, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 503 (R.I. 1985).

Medical, Dental, or Hospital Services.

A wig to relieve the embarrassment of a woman employee whose only injury was the pulling out of a portion of her hair by machinery in which it was caught, resulting in baldness over a portion of her scalp, does not come within the purview of medical, dental, or hospital services authorized in this section to be ordered by the director. Craven v. United States Rubber Co., 103 R.I. 126 , 235 A.2d 85, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 584 (1967).

28-33-10. “Dental, hospital, and medical services” defined.

  1. “Dental services” as used in §§ 28-33-5 28-33-9 includes services rendered in making, repairing, and replacing artificial teeth and dentures.
  2. “Hospital services” as used in §§ 28-33-5 28-33-9 includes any and all services normally furnished by the hospital for the care of patients.
  3. “Medical services” as used in §§ 28-33-5 28-33-9 includes palliative care services by a physician licensed by the state for twelve (12) visits, after reaching maximum medical improvement. Additional palliative care must be authorized by the insurer or self-insured employer. A request for additional palliative care must be submitted to the insurer or self-insured employer at least ten (10) working days prior to delivery of the services and shall include a treatment plan, including a time schedule of measurable objectives, a projected termination date of treatment, and an estimated total cost of services. The director shall promulgate rules governing a request for additional palliative care and review of any decision relating to it. Any disputes as to the definition of “palliative care” shall be resolved by the medical advisory board. These limitations on palliative care shall not apply to any conditions for which a contrary treatment protocol has been established by the medical advisory board.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1937, ch. 2545, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1941, ch. 1051, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1226, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1832, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-10 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 2.

28-33-11. Notice of hearings — Time of decision.

No hearing shall be held by the workers’ compensation court or any judge of that court under §§ 28-33-5 28-33-10 unless written notice of the hearing is sent to the employer and employee five (5) days before the time of the hearing. The decision shall be rendered within seventy-two (72) hours after the hearing, unless the parties agree otherwise.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-11 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-33-12. Death benefits payable to dependents.

    1. If death results from the injury, the employer shall pay the dependents of the employee wholly dependent upon his or her earnings for support at the time of his or her injury or death, whichever is the greater in number, a weekly payment equal to the rate that would have been payable for total incapacity to the deceased employee under the provisions of § 28-33-17 , except as provided in this section in case the dependent is the surviving spouse or child under the age of eighteen (18) of that employee.
    2. If the dependent is a surviving spouse, or surviving spouse upon whom there is dependent one or more children of the deceased employee including an adopted child or stepchild under the age of eighteen (18) years or over that age but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, the employer shall pay the surviving spouse the weekly rate for total incapacity the deceased employee would have been entitled to receive under the provisions of § 28-33-17 plus forty dollars ($40.00) per week for each dependent child.
    3. “Child” within the meaning of this section also includes any child of the injured employee conceived but not born at the time of the employee’s injury, and the compensation provided for in this section shall be payable on account of any child from the date of its birth.
  1. Upon the remarriage or death of the surviving spouse or if there is no surviving spouse then upon the death of the injured employee, the compensation payable under this chapter shall subsequently be paid to those dependent child or children of the injured employee, and if there is more than one child the compensation shall be divided equally among them and the compensation shall be not more than the weekly rate for total incapacity due the injured employee under the provisions of § 28-33-17 for the dependent child plus forty dollars ($40.00) for each additional dependent child.
  2. If the employee leaves dependents only partly dependent upon his or her earnings for support at the time of his or her injury or death, the employer shall pay that dependent from the date of the injury or death, whichever is greater in number, a weekly compensation equal to the amount of the average weekly contribution by the employee to the partial dependents, not exceeding the weekly payments provided in this section for the benefit of wholly dependent persons.
  3. When weekly payments have been made to an injured employee before his or her death, the compensation to dependents shall begin from the date of the last of those payments; and provided, that if the deceased leaves no dependents at the time of the injury or death, the employer shall not be liable to pay compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title except as specifically provided in § 28-33-16 .
  4. Except in the case of a dependent child physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, dependency benefits for each child shall terminate when that dependent child attains his or her eighteenth (18th) birthday; provided, that the payment of dependency benefits to a dependent child over the age of eighteen (18) years shall continue as long as that child is satisfactorily enrolled as a full-time student in an educational institution or an educational facility duly accredited or approved by the appropriate state educational authorities at the time of enrollment. Those payments shall not be continued beyond the age of twenty-three (23) years.
  5. When a surviving spouse without dependent children remarries, benefits payable under this section shall cease on the date of the remarriage.
  6. A surviving spouse entitled to benefits under this section shall receive an annual cost of living increase of four percent (4%) on every anniversary of the date of death for so long as he or she is eligible for benefits under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 6; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 5; P.L. 1927, ch. 1058, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 5; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 6; P.L. 1942, ch. 1246, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-12 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 46, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 152, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 268, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 199, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1987, ch. 555, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Apportionment of Benefits.

Insurer could not object to decree apportioning payments among widow and minor children where all concerned were parties and had assented thereto. Loiselle v. Pawtucket Ice Co., 44 R.I. 474 , 118 A. 872, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1922).

Widow is entitled to receive all benefits during her life even though minor child by a previous marriage is living with her mother. Duffy v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 75 R.I. 170 , 64 A.2d 863, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1949).

Computation of Benefits.

Where contributions of employee to support a partial dependent had exceeded compensation that would have been payable to total dependents, the compensation should be the same as to total dependents. Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939).

In determining contributions to support of partial dependent, no allowance need be made for benefits accruing to employee from dependent. Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939).

A dependent widow’s benefits are a continuation of her husband’s benefits and, therefore, are determined by the statute in effect at the time of the husband’s injury, not his death. Cogswell v. Max Silverstein & Sons, 488 A.2d 732, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 455 (R.I. 1985).

Death of Dependent.

Right of dependent mother to compensation terminates on her death during statutory period and does not pass to her representatives. Duffney v. A. F. Morse Lumber Co., 42 R.I. 260 , 107 A. 225, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1919); Botelho v. J. H. Tredennick, Inc., 64 R.I. 326 , 12 A.2d 282, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1940).

Commutation of widow’s compensation would not bind minor children, in the event of her death during the period in which compensation was payable, unless the children were parties to the commutation proceeding. Ciaccia v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 44 R.I. 109 , 115 A. 801, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1922).

If one of two children dies before the end of the period during which compensation is payable, the payments to the other are doubled. Gallagher v. United Elec. Rys., 47 R.I. 458 , 134 A. 8, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1926).

On death of widow, all minor children of employee would be entitled to share in compensation, whether children of the widow or by a previous marriage. Duffy v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 75 R.I. 170 , 64 A.2d 863, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1949).

Dependent Children.

The “compensation payable under this chapter” to any dependent child or children upon the death of an injured employee, in the absence of a surviving spouse, includes the “annual cost of living increase of four percent,” which otherwise would have been payable to a surviving spouse. Billington (Seeker) v. Fairmount Foundry, 724 A.2d 1012, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 1999).

Federal Service Guardsman’s Dependents.

Dependents of a national guardsman injured while he and his unit were in federal service were not entitled to the benefits of this section. Mancini v. Rhode Island Nat'l Guard, 107 R.I. 726 , 271 A.2d 297, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 834 (1970).

Finding of Dependency.

Finding that daughter was dependent on employee was implied in finding that widow was entitled to an amount of compensation that must necessarily have included daughter as a dependent. Erba v. Erba Bros., 77 R.I. 75 , 73 A.2d 697, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1950).

Husband as Dependent.

A husband living with his wife was entitled to compensation for her death from an injury in the course of her employment. Cataldo v. Admiral Inn, 102 R.I. 1 , 227 A.2d 199, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 635 (1967).

Previous Proceedings.

On petition for payments under this section issues determined in previous proceeding brought by employee are res judicata. Card v. Lloyd Mfg. Co., 82 R.I. 182 , 107 A.2d 297, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1954), limited, Di Vona v. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co., 85 R.I. 122 , 127 A.2d 503, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 129 (1956).

Remarriage of Widow.

Widow’s right to compensation is not terminated by her remarriage while receiving payments. Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R.I. 58 , 105 A. 363, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1919).

Standing of Dependent.

Dependent as such had no standing to bring contempt proceedings to enforce an agreement made during employee’s life. American Woolen Co. v. Grillini, 78 R.I. 50 , 78 A.2d 795, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1951).

Collateral References.

Bigamous character of marriage as affecting right of one party thereto to compensation for the death of the other. 80 A.L.R. 1428.

Dependency of alien parent of deceased employee. 30 A.L.R. 1262; 35 A.L.R. 1066; 39 A.L.R. 313; 53 A.L.R. 218; 1066; 62 A.L.R. 160; 86 A.L.R. 865; 100 A.L.R. 1090.

“Dependency” within Workers’ Compensation Act. 13 A.L.R. 686; 30 A.L.R. 1253; 35 A.L.R. 1066; 39 A.L.R. 313; 53 A.L.R. 218; 62 A.L.R. 160; 86 A.L.R. 865; 100 A.L.R. 1090.

Kinship or family relationship between employer and claimant or employee as affecting right to compensation. 33 A.L.R. 585.

Minor employee, rights of beneficiaries of. 14 A.L.R. 826; 33 A.L.R. 337; 49 A.L.R. 1435; 60 A.L.R. 847; 83 A.L.R. 416; 142 A.L.R. 1030.

Nonresident aliens, right to maintain action under Workers’ Compensation Act, based upon death of employee, for benefit of. 138 A.L.R. 695.

Right of woman who marries injured workman to compensation as his widow or surviving wife. 98 A.L.R. 993.

Secondary or deferred class of beneficiaries of death benefits, rights and remedies of, as affected by act or one in primary class of beneficiaries. 105 A.L.R. 1232.

Validity, construction, and application of workers’ compensation provisions relating to nonresident alien dependents. 28 A.L.R.5th 547.

28-33-13. Persons presumed wholly dependent.

The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:

  1. A wife upon a husband with whom she lives, or from whom she was living apart for a justifiable cause, or because he had deserted her, or upon whom she is dependent at the time of his death. The findings of the workers’ compensation court upon the questions of justifiable cause and desertion shall be final for the purposes of this chapter.
  2. A husband upon a wife with whom he lives or upon whom he is dependent at the time of her death.
  3. A child or children, including adopted and stepchildren, under the age of eighteen (18) years, or over that age but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon the parent with whom he or she is or they are living or upon whom he or she is or they are dependent at the time of the death of that parent, there being no surviving dependent parent. In case there is more than one child who is dependent, the compensation hereunder shall be equally divided among them.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 7; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 7; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-13 .

Cross References.

Public and medical assistance, effect of payments on workers’ compensation awards, § 40-6-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

By providing a conclusive presumption that the spouse and children of the deceased are wholly dependent under this section, the legislature clearly indicated its intent to provide benefits to those individuals before allowing recovery to anyone else. Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d 216, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 432 (R.I. 1987).

Burden of Proof.

Contention of petitioner that she was entitled to a decision on the principle of liberal interpretation in view of the observation of the full commission that this was a case where the single commissioner might have found either way, since there was evidence to support both propositions, completely ignored the fundamental rule that she was required to establish her case by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and therefore contention was not sustained. Hurst v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Elec. Co., 95 R.I. 158 , 185 A.2d 100, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 133 (1962).

Children Living Apart.

Children living apart who were partially dependent on employee were conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent. Martin v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 49 R.I. 265 , 142 A. 225, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1928).

On death of widow, all minor children of employee would be entitled to share in compensation, whether children of the widow or by a previous marriage. Duffy v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 75 R.I. 170 , 64 A.2d 863, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1949).

Common Law Wife.

Common law wife was entitled to compensation under this section. Holgate v. United Elec. Rys., 47 R.I. 337 , 133 A. 243, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1926).

Husband.

As to a husband living with his wife, the presumption in subsection (b) of this section is not an evidentiary presumption, but a statement of a substantive rule of law, it being the intention of the legislature, in such a situation, to compensate a surviving husband for the loss of consortium and other conjugal blessings characteristic of a marital union, the status of which establishes it as a basic biosocial unit in our society. Cataldo v. Admiral Inn, 102 R.I. 1 , 227 A.2d 199, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 635 (1967).

Wife Living Apart.

Wife living apart must prove actual dependency even though husband had legal obligation to support. Sweet v. Sherwood Ice Co., 40 R.I. 203 , 100 A. 316, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1917) (decision prior to 1917 amendment).

Wife confined to a mental institution at time of husband’s death was living apart for a justifiable cause even though husband was not at fault. Broughey v. Mowry Grain Co., 61 R.I. 221 , 200 A. 768, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1938).

Superior court could find that wife who had failed to follow her husband to this country because of lack of funds and because of war conditions was living apart for justifiable cause. Erba v. Erba Bros., 77 R.I. 75 , 73 A.2d 697, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1950).

Collateral References.

Adopted or stepchild as dependent. 13 A.L.R. 707; 30 A.L.R. 1253; 35 A.L.R. 1066; 39 A.L.R. 313; 53 A.L.R. 218; 62 A.L.R. 160; 86 A.L.R. 865; 100 A.L.R. 1090.

Children of one with whom deceased workman was living in illicit relations as dependents. 154 A.L.R. 698.

Dependency of wife living apart from husband. 13 A.L.R. 710; 30 A.L.R. 1253; 35 A.L.R. 1066; 39 A.L.R. 313; 53 A.L.R. 218; 62 A.L.R. 160; 86 A.L.R. 865; 100 A.L.R. 1090.

Divorce as affecting right of spouse or child to compensation. 8 A.L.R. 1113; 13 A.L.R. 729.

Posthumous children and children born after accident as dependents. 18 A.L.R.3d 900.

28-33-14. Determination of dependency — Division of payments among dependents.

In all other cases except those provided in § 28-33-13 , questions of entire or partial dependency shall be determined in accordance with the facts as they may have been at the time of the injury. In these other cases, if there is more than one person wholly dependent, the compensation shall be equally divided among them, and persons partly dependent, if any, shall receive no part of it during the period in which compensation is paid to persons wholly dependent. If there is no one wholly dependent and more than one person partly dependent, the compensation shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of their dependency.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 7; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Under this section, persons found partially dependent are not entitled to benefits as long as one or more persons have been wholly dependent. Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d 216, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 432 (R.I. 1987).

Apportionment of Benefits.

Partial dependents are precluded from recovery during the period in which compensation is payable to a person wholly dependent, even though the wholly dependent person has elected to seek damages from a third person rather than statutory compensation from the employer. Corria v. Fink Bros., 45 R.I. 80 , 120 A. 321, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1923).

Pleading.

Claimant alleging total dependency was not required to amend petition where evidence showed partial dependency. McGuinness v. Cornell Constr. Co., 62 R.I. 382 , 6 A.2d 461, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1939).

Review.

The first sentence does not prevent review by the supreme court to determine whether correct principles of law have been applied to the facts to determine dependency. Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Undisputed evidence that the family income prior to the employment of the minor son, who died as the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, was sufficient for all the family needs plus periodic additions to savings, that the standard of living of the family was not changed when this son went to work, and that the family did not lack anything they formerly had after his death was sufficient to sustain a finding of the commission that none of the family were in any degree dependent upon the minor son for support. Le Blanc v. Balon, 104 R.I. 99 , 242 A.2d 292, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 621 (1968).

Collateral References.

Apportionment of award between minor beneficiaries and others. 120 A.L.R. 399.

28-33-15. Relationship and dependency required.

No person shall be considered a dependent unless he or she is a member of the employee’s family or next of kin, wholly or partly dependent upon the wages, earnings, or salary of the employee for support at the time of the injury If there is no person as provided in this section, then the parents of any employee who has not obtained his twenty-first (21st) birthday shall be considered a dependent, regardless of whether dependent on the wages, earnings, or salary of the employee, or not.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 8; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-15 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 226, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Degree of Dependency.

Father was not dependent on minor son where father and mother both worked and their weekly savings exceeded the profit from payments made by son. Dazy v. Apponaug Co., 36 R.I. 81 , 89 A. 160, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1914).

It was sufficient for dependent to show that employee’s contributions were actually expended for living expenses but not that contributions were required for bare necessities of life. Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939).

Member of Family.

Sister who was not next of kin qualified as a member of employee’s family even though she lived in another country. McGuinness v. Cornell Constr. Co., 62 R.I. 382 , 6 A.2d 461, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1939).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

The parents, brother, and sister of a minor dying as the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment were not dependents where their combined incomes sufficed for all the family needs plus periodic additions to savings, and the family standard of living neither improved when the minor went to work nor suffered reduction when he died. Le Blanc v. Balon, 104 R.I. 99 , 242 A.2d 292, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 621 (1968).

Where petitioner and decedent lived together from August 1971 until he died on November 15, 1977, but a common-law marriage could not be created, however, because petitioner was legally married to another during the entire period, as petitioner bore no blood or marital relationship to the deceased, she could not qualify as a dependent under this section. Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d 216, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 432 (R.I. 1987).

Time of Determination.

Dependency is determined as of the time of the employee’s injury and is not affected by subsequent events. Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R.I. 58 , 105 A. 363, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1919).

28-33-16. Burial expenses.

If the employee dies as a result of the injury, the employer shall pay in addition to any compensation provided for in this chapter, the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). This sum shall be paid under the provisions of § 28-33-23 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 9; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 9; P.L. 1941, ch. 1059, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 2952, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-16 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 61, § 12; P.L. 1969, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 32, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 224, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Payment by Third Party.

Payment of burial expenses by stockholders of employer did not remove the employer’s liability under this section. Erba v. Erba Bros., 77 R.I. 75 , 73 A.2d 697, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1950).

Pleading.

Decree could allow burial expenses even though petition was defective in that it did not set out the amount of expense incurred. Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939).

28-33-17. Weekly compensation for total incapacity — Permanent total disability — Dependents’ allowances.

    1. For all injuries on or after January 1, 2022, while the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is total, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty-two percent (62%) of his or her average weekly base wages, earnings, or salary, as computed pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-20 . For all injuries on or before December 31, 2021, while the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is total, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of his or her average weekly spendable base wages, earnings, or salary, as computed pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-20 . The amount may not exceed more than sixty percent (60%) of the state average weekly wage of individuals in covered employment under the provisions of the Rhode Island employment security act as computed and established by the Rhode Island department of labor and training, annually, on or before May 31 of each year, under the provisions of § 28-44-6(a) . Effective September 1, 1974, the maximum rate for weekly compensation for total disability shall not exceed sixty-six and two-thirds percent (662/3%) of the state average weekly wage, as computed and established under the provisions of § 28-44-6(a) . Effective September 1, 1975, the maximum rate for weekly compensation for total disability shall not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of the state average weekly wage, as computed and established under the provisions of § 28-44-6(a). Effective September 1, 2007, the maximum rate for weekly compensation for total disability shall not exceed one hundred fifteen percent (115%) of the state average weekly wage, as computed and established under the provisions of § 28-44-6(a). Effective October 1, 2016, the maximum rate for weekly compensation for total disability shall not exceed one hundred twenty percent (120%) of the state average weekly wage as computed and established under the provisions of § 28-44-6(a), and effective October 1, 2017, the maximum rate for weekly compensation for total disability shall not exceed one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the state average weekly wage, as computed and established under the provisions of § 28-44-6(a). If the maximum weekly benefit rate is not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), then the rate shall be raised to the next higher multiple of one dollar ($1.00).
    2. The average weekly wage computed and established under § 28-44-6(a) is applicable to injured employees whose injury occurred on or after September 1, 2000, and shall be applicable for the full period during which compensation is payable.
      1. “Spendable earnings” means the employee’s gross, average weekly wages, earnings, or salary, including any gratuities reported as income, reduced by an amount determined to reflect amounts that would be withheld from the wages, earnings, or salary under federal and state income tax laws, and under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., relating to Social Security and Medicare taxes. In all cases, it is to be assumed that the amount withheld would be determined on the basis of expected liability of the employee for tax for the taxable year in which the payments are made without regard to any itemized deductions but taking into account the maximum number of personal exemptions allowable.
      2. Each year, the director shall publish tables of the average weekly wage and seventy-five percent (75%) of spendable earnings that are to be in effect on May 10. These tables shall be conclusive for the purposes of converting an average weekly wage into seventy-five percent (75%) of spendable earnings. In calculating spendable earnings, the director shall have discretion to exempt funds assigned to third parties by order of the family court pursuant to § 8-10-3 and funds designated for payment of liens pursuant to § 28-33-27 upon submission of supporting evidence.
    1. In the following cases, it shall, for the purpose of this section, be that the injury resulted in permanent total disability:
      1. The total and irrecoverable loss of sight in both eyes or the reduction to one-tenth (1/10) or less of normal vision with glasses;
      2. The loss of both feet at or above the ankle;
      3. The loss of both hands at or above the wrist;
      4. The loss of one hand and one foot;
      5. An injury to the spine resulting in permanent and complete paralysis of the legs or arms; and
      6. An injury to the skull resulting in incurable imbecility or insanity.
    2. In all other cases, total disability shall be determined only if, as a result of the injury, the employee is physically unable to earn any wages in any employment; provided, that in cases where manifest injustice would otherwise result, total disability shall be determined when an employee proves, taking into account the employee’s age, education, background, abilities, and training, that he or she is unable, on account of his or her compensable injury, to perform his or her regular job and is unable to perform any alternative employment. The court may deny total disability under this subsection without requiring the employer to identify particular alternative employment.
    1. Where the employee has persons conclusively presumed to be dependent upon him or her, or in fact so dependent, the sum of fifteen dollars ($15.00) shall be added to the weekly compensation payable for total incapacity for each person wholly dependent on the employee, except that the sum of forty dollars ($40.00) shall be added for those receiving benefits under § 28-33-12 , but in no case shall the aggregate of those amounts exceed eighty percent (80%) of the average weekly wage of the employee, except that there shall be no limit for those receiving benefits under § 28-33-12 .
    2. The dependency allowance shall be in addition to the compensation benefits for total disability otherwise payable under the provisions of this section. The dependency allowance shall be increased if the number of persons dependent upon the employee increases during the time that weekly compensation benefits are being received.
    3. For the purposes of this section, the following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon an employee:
      1. A wife upon a husband with whom she is living at the time of his injury, but only while she is not working for wages during her spouse’s total disability.
      2. A husband upon a wife with whom he is living at the time of her injury, but only while he is not working for wages during his spouse’s total disability.
      3. Children under the age of eighteen (18) years, or over that age but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, if living with the employee, or, if the employee is bound or ordered by law, decree, or order of court, or by any other lawful requirement, to support the children, although living apart from them. Provided, that the payment of dependency benefits to a dependent child over the age of eighteen (18) years shall continue as long as that child is satisfactorily enrolled as a full-time student in an educational institution or an educational facility duly accredited or approved by the appropriate state educational authorities at the time of enrollment. Those payments shall not be continued beyond the age of twenty-three (23) years. “Children,” within the meaning of this paragraph, also includes any children of the injured employee conceived but not born at the time of the employee’s injury, and the compensation provided for in this section shall be payable on account of any such children from the date of their birth.
  1. “Dependents,” as provided in this section, does not include the spouse of the injured employee except as provided in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section. In all other cases questions of dependency shall be determined in accordance with the facts as the facts may be at the time of the injury.
  2. The court, or any of its judges, may, in its or his or her discretion, order the insurer or self-insurer to make payment of the nine dollars ($9.00) or fifteen dollars ($15.00) for those receiving benefits under § 28-33-12 directly to the dependent.
    1. Where any employee’s incapacity is total and has extended beyond fifty-two (52) weeks, regardless of the date of injury, payments made to all totally incapacitated employees shall be increased as of May 10, 1991, and annually on the tenth of May after that as long as the employee remains totally incapacitated. The increase shall be by an amount equal to the total percentage increase in the annual Consumer Price Index, United States City Average for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, as formulated and computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor for the period of March 1 to February 28 each year.
    2. If the employee is subsequently found to be only partially incapacitated, the weekly compensation benefit paid to the employee shall be equal to the payment in effect prior to his or her most recent cost of living adjustment.
    3. “Index” as used in this section refers to the Consumer Price Index, United States City Average for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, as that index is formulated and computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor.
    4. The May 10, 1991, increase shall be based upon the total percentage increase, if any, in the annual Consumer Price Index for the period of March 1, 1990, to February 28, 1991. Thereafter, increases shall be made on May 10 annually, based upon the percentage increase, if any, in the index for the period March 1 to February 28.
    5. The computations in this section shall be made by the director of labor and training and promulgated to insurers and employers making payments required by this section. Increases shall be paid by insurers and employers without further order of the court. If payment payable under this section is not paid within fourteen (14) days after the employer or insurer has been notified or it becomes due, whichever is later, there shall be added to the unpaid payment an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of that amount, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, the payment.
    6. This section applies only to payment of weekly indemnity benefits to employees as described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, and does not apply to specific compensation payments for loss of use or disfigurement or payment of dependency benefits or any other benefits payable under the workers’ compensation act.
    7. Notwithstanding any other provision of the general laws or public laws to the contrary, any employee of the state of Rhode Island who is receiving workers’ compensation benefits for total incapacity, as a result of brain injury due to a violent assault, on or before July 19, 2005, shall be entitled to receive the health insurance benefit he or she was entitled to at the time of the injury for the duration of the total incapacity or until said employee and his or her spouse are both eligible for Medicare.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 10; P.L. 1919, ch. 1795, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 10; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 10; P.L. 1942, ch. 1246, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2269, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-17 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 45, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 148, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 271, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1987, ch. 305, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 6; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 6; P.L. 2006, ch. 605, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 610, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 2, effective January 1, 2022; P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 2, effective January 1, 2022.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2022.

P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2022.

Cross References.

Employment security benefits, ineligibility when receiving workers’ compensation payments, § 28-44-19 .

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ability to Work.

Evidence that employee was unable to do heavy work because of pain and unable to do light work because of a mental condition caused by the accident justified a finding that employee was totally incapacitated. General Scrap Iron, Inc. v. LaPorte, 68 R.I. 98 , 26 A.2d 618, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1942).

Fact that employee ceased to call on particular physician was not evidence that incapacity had ceased. Egan v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 73 R.I. 399 , 56 A.2d 854, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1948).

Decree terminating compensation was supported by evidence that employee could return to his former work, even though he might have been incapacitated for heavier work. Menzies v. King, 80 R.I. 247 , 95 A.2d 853, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1953).

Evidence that an employee with a back injury had obtained employment as a salesman and bill collector that paid more than the employment in which he was injured was insufficient to sustain a finding of the commission that he was physically fit to return to his former employment as a chemical operator where the only medical evidence was that, while he was physically able to perform the work, doing so would subject him to a real danger of his disk slipping again and a return of his disability. Geigy Chemical Corp. v. Zuckerman, 106 R.I. 534 , 261 A.2d 844, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 955 (1970).

Compensation is awarded only for an injury resulting in loss of “earning capacity,” which term is a theoretical concept which definitionally presupposes an ability to earn, rather than wages actually received. Trzoniec v. General Controls Co., 100 R.I. 448 , 216 A.2d 886, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 458 (1966); Kilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 R.I. 443 , 379 A.2d 919, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1949 (1977).

Alternative Pleadings.

There is no inherent inconsistency in employees petitioning the trial court for a determination of their status under the odd-lot doctrine and also maintaining that relief should be afforded them under this provision since this statute effectively subsumes the same factual circumstances and legal principles that would have triggered odd-lot coverage under the preamendment common law. Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2000).

Computation of Earnings.

In computing an injured employee’s post-injury earnings for the purpose of determining whether his incapacity for work remains total, all of his wages and earnings are to be considered without regard to whether the same were earned in the employment in which he was injured, or in employment of like character or nature, or in the dissimilar or unrelated kinds of employment. Stillwater Worsted Mills v. Beal, 89 R.I. 34 , 150 A.2d 704, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1959).

It was not error to award twenty dollars a week compensation to an employee of a carnival who received each week seven dollars for setting up the rides and seven dollars for taking them down with no evidence as to the amount of time consumed in each operation. McCrudden v. Venditto Bros., 103 R.I. 201 , 235 A.2d 878, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 599 (1967).

Compensation is awarded, not on the basis of physical injuries sustained, but on the basis of the resulting impairment in earning capacity. Brown v. Hope Serv. Station, 122 R.I. 74 , 403 A.2d 1387, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2039 (1979).

A partially disabled employee who has not returned to gainful employment as a result of work-connected injuries receives the same amount of weekly compensation as is payable for total incapacity. Soprano Constr. Co. v. Maia, 431 A.2d 1223, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1184 (R.I. 1981).

Conclusive Presumption of Disability.

Employee who had previously lost the sight of one eye was conclusively presumed to have been permanently and totally incapacitated by accident that resulted in loss of sight of the other eye. In re J. & P. Coats, Inc., 41 R.I. 289 , 103 A. 833, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1918).

Construction With § 28-33-18.

The language of § 28-33-18 leaves no room to construe it as containing by implication the monetary limitation provided for in this section. Pardi v. E. Turgeon Constr. Co., 90 R.I. 269 , 157 A.2d 677, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1960).

Where one received total compensation for both partial and total incapacity the limitation provision is found herein rather than in § 28-33-18 . Kostiv v. Fedorowicz, 99 R.I. 343 , 207 A.2d 387, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 443 (1965).

Construction With § 28-33-19.

In an employee’s petition for specific compensation, where he suffered a permanent loss of the use of both legs as a result of an injury to the spinal cord, this section did not prevent the granting of the specific compensation benefits of § 28-33-19 in this type of case nor was there any reason why this section should be read in conjunction with § 28-33-19 . Thibault v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 111 R.I. 381 , 302 A.2d 755, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1214 (1973).

Cost of Living Adjustments.

Subsection (f) of this section, which provides cost of living adjustments to recipients of more than 52 weeks of workers’ compensation benefits, does not violate the contract or taking clause of the United States Constitution even though it retroactively increases the workers’ compensation benefits an insurer is required to pay pursuant to insurance policies issued before the amendment was enacted. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitehouse, 868 F. Supp. 425, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16869 (D.R.I. 1994) (decided under prior law codified at § 28-33-18.3 ).

An employee who had been rendered totally incapacitated on June 2, 1990, became eligible under this section for a cost of living adjustment (COLA) on May 10, 1992; the trial judge therefore erred in awarding a COLA increase effective June 2, 1991. Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Info. Coordinating Committee/Industry Educ. Council of Labor, 704 A.2d 740, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 315 (R.I. 1997).

The Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund was properly held liable for a 20 percent penalty for failure to pay a cost of living adjustment in a timely manner and for attorney fees. Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Info. Coordinating Committee/Industry Educ. Council of Labor, 704 A.2d 740, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 315 (R.I. 1997).

Dependents.

Where an employer was mistaken as to the number of dependents an employee had, and the employee misunderstood the legal effect in worker’s compensation cases of having dependents, such misunderstanding or lack of awareness of the law is a mistake of law rather than of fact, thus, no mutual mistake of fact as ground for appeal existed. Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

This section when read as a whole implies that dependency benefits shall be suspended when the employee’s child attains the age of 18, the age at which the child is no longer conclusively presumed to be dependent, unless he is incapable of self support by reason of mental or physical disability. Marshall v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 121 R.I. 624 , 402 A.2d 575, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2040 (1979).

An employee receiving total disability benefits whose minor child is presumed to be dependent under this section must file a petition upon the child’s reaching 18 years in the event that he claims continued dependency benefits for that child. He furthermore must bear the burden of establishing a present dependency in order to show entitlement to uninterrupted dependency benefits. Marshall v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 121 R.I. 624 , 402 A.2d 575, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2040 (1979).

A totally incapacitated worker is entitled to a weekly allowance for each dependent, whereas a partially incapacitated employee receives no allowance for dependents. Soprano Constr. Co. v. Maia, 431 A.2d 1223, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1184 (R.I. 1981).

Effect of Amendments.

An employee who affirmatively invoked the provisions of this subsection when he petitioned for total disability benefits in 1995 could not later claim for the first time on certiorari that the statute’s burden-of-proof and “manifest injustice” requirements were inapplicable to his situation in that his particular work-related injury occurred before the 1992 effective date of the amendment that added the new requirements. Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2000).

Effect of Decree.

Employer should not be required, in order to purge itself of contempt, to pay compensation for period when employee was earning more than before the injury even though the decree ordering payment was in full force during that period. Zielonka v. United States Rubber Co., 77 R.I. 167 , 74 A.2d 246, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1950).

Federal Payments to National Guardsman.

Where a national guardsman was injured while on duty and received from the United States regular army pay, subsistence, quarters allowance, medical and surgical treatment, and hospitalization, the state was entitled to credit for such federal payments against the weekly benefits payable under this section. Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764 , 263 A.2d 681, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 986 (1970).

Finding of Incapacity.

Finding of total and permanent incapacity was justified in absence of evidence to the contrary, even in commutation proceeding to permit employee to invest in business for his own support. Gardner v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 60 R.I. 243 , 197 A. 874, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1938).

Claim does not arise under this section until the employee is incapacitated. Rosa v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 215 , 60 A.2d 150, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1948).

Medical testimony that employee was completely disabled supported a finding of total incapacity. Maresca v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 82 R.I. 272 , 107 A.2d 343, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1954).

The relationship between “earnings” and “incapacity” is a practical and reasonable one, and it would be unrealistic and arbitrary to impose upon it a restrictive legalistic definition such as the one sought by petitioner that earnings in a dissimilar employment are not to be considered in rating the incapacity referred to. Stillwater Worsted Mills v. Beal, 89 R.I. 34 , 150 A.2d 704, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1959).

Where vision in the right eye was reduced to 1/200 and the vision in the left eye was reduced to 5/200 unimproved by pinhole or lenses there was a total loss of vision. Koshgarian v. Hawksley, 90 R.I. 293 , 157 A.2d 663, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1960).

Where a finding of partial incapacity was based on the weight of the evidence of conflicting medical testimony, and there was ample evidence to find that total incapacity no longer existed, the commissioner’s finding was conclusive in the absence of fraud. Emma Pendleton Bradley Hosp. v. Agli, 112 R.I. 472 , 311 A.2d 842, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1008 (1973).

Partial incapacity as well as total incapacity were findings to be made by the commission and the fact that the employee’s petition sought only total incapacity benefits did not necessarily preclude the employee from complaining of the commission’s failure to award partial incapacity benefits. Surgento v. American Luggage Works, 114 R.I. 499 , 335 A.2d 634, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1444 (1975).

An attending or treating physician may base his opinion in part upon the statements of other medically trained personnel if they are used to supplement his own observations of the person or situation in question, and an employee was allowed to base a claim of recurring total incapacity on such medical testimony even though based in part on medical reports not in evidence. Rosaki v. School House Candy Co., 122 R.I. 51 , 404 A.2d 75, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2063 (1979).

Inability to Find Work.

Employee who was able to do light work in a line similar to previous employment but who had been unable to retain employment because of unreliability was entitled only to compensation for partial incapacity. Bernier v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 54 R.I. 294 , 173 A. 81, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1934).

“Injury” Defined.

In this section the word “injury” means the incapacity to work and the phrase “date of injury” means the actual date upon which the employee became entitled to benefits. Parkinson v. Leesona Corp., 115 R.I. 120 , 341 A.2d 33, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1129 (1975).

Insurance.

The insurable incident which invokes coverage is the diminution in earning capacity rather than the injury itself which caused that reduction. Brown v. Hope Serv. Station, 122 R.I. 74 , 403 A.2d 1387, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2039 (1979).

Since the crucial date for determining eligibility for compensation is the time of incapacity rather than injury, when an employer purchases workers’ compensation coverage, the insurer assumes the employer’s responsibility to compensate the worker for his or her loss of earning capacity. Brown v. Hope Serv. Station, 122 R.I. 74 , 403 A.2d 1387, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2039 (1979).

— Reimbursement for Medical Expenses.

Compensation payments do not constitute damages from a negligence tortfeasor. Workers’ compensation is a wage-replacement scheme. An injured employee may not therefore rely on the collateral source rule to obtain from her employer personal reimbursement for medical expenses that resulted from her injury, which expenses were paid to the employee’s health-care providers by her private medical insurer. Moniz v. Providence Chain Co., 618 A.2d 1270, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 4 (R.I. 1993).

Limitations of Section.

Claim that the limitation period of § 28-35-57 was tolled for a claim for benefits for minor children under § 28-33-17 was held not to be before the court where the petition for review was filed neither by the employee’s children nor by a legal guardian acting in their behalf but rather by the employee herself in her own name. Yates v. Dr. J. H. Ladd Sch., 120 R.I. 294 , 387 A.2d 1043, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 671 (1978); Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

Where 1,000-week period for receiving benefits (this section prior to 1974 amendment) expired at time when claimant was not totally incapacitated the statute of limitations did not begin to run until claimant again became totally incapacitated. Healy v. DeSano, 121 R.I. 325 , 397 A.2d 1328, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1781 (1979).

Odd-Lot Doctrine.

Merely by stipulating that his petition would be amended to allege total disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine an employee did not thereby signal his abandonment of this provision as the basis for the relief he was requesting. Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2000).

Payment Offered by Employer.

The recovery of compensation benefits will not be precluded if the payments received by an employee are intended as a gesture of gratitude by a grateful employer for past services rendered. Trzoniec v. General Controls Co., 100 R.I. 448 , 216 A.2d 886, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 458 (1966); Kilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 R.I. 443 , 379 A.2d 919, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1949 (1977).

An employee who is incapable by reason of a work-related injury of obtaining a monetary reward for a reasonable use of his mental or physical powers is entitled to weekly compensation benefits notwithstanding that his employer, irrespective of motive, has seen fit during his period of disability to match his pre-injury earnings. Kilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 R.I. 443 , 379 A.2d 919, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1949 (1977).

Second Injuries.

Where employee was partially disabled and later while working for same employer suffered an injury by which he became totally disabled he was not entitled to a separate award for each injury so as to permit payments in excess of the maximum. Scialo v. Luisi, 91 R.I. 86 , 161 A.2d 194, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1960).

In providing for the payment of benefits pursuant to § 28-37-8 from the workers’ compensation administrative account established by § 28-37-1 , the legislature authorized continuance of payments originally made for total incapacity only, and petitioner, who was totally disabled and receiving payments from the fund therefor, was not entitled to additional payments when he subsequently lost 50% use of his left foot as a result of his primary disabilities. Reardon v. Hall, 104 R.I. 591 , 247 A.2d 900, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 689 (1968).

Termination of Benefits.

Under § 28-33-17 , as amended by P.L. 1974, ch. 271, § 1, an employer may unilaterally suspend payment or dependents’ benefits when the dependent child attains the age of 18 years without bringing a petition before the commission to obtain an order formally terminating benefits. Marshall v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 121 R.I. 624 , 402 A.2d 575, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2040 (1979).

Terms of Decree.

Decree could not determine in advance that payments were to cease after a reasonable period of convalescence from surgery. Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373 , 82 A.2d 390, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1951).

Work Offered by Employer.

Suspension of payments for total incapacity was justified by employee’s refusal to accept light work offered by employer where medical evidence was that he was capable of light work. Lorraine Mfg. Co. v. Appolony, 72 R.I. 258 , 50 A.2d 616, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1946).

Compensation would not be terminated for failure of the employee to cooperate in rehabilitation where evidence showed that employer had not permitted part time work in accordance with employee’s capacity. Fulford Mfg. Co. v. Lupoli, 75 R.I. 488 , 67 A.2d 846, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1949).

The trial judge should find that manifest injustice would otherwise result if total disability benefits are not awarded to permanently but partially disabled employees when they show that they are unable on account of their work-related injuries to perform their regular jobs and any alternative employment. Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2000).

Collateral References.

Total incapacity, what amounts to. 67 A.L.R. 785; 98 A.L.R. 729.

Total or partial disability, right to compensation as for, in case of abnormal condition of body or member which results from or is incident to specific injury for which the act makes special allowance. 156 A.L.R. 1344.

28-33-17.1. Employees not entitled to compensation.

  1. An employee shall not be entitled to compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title for any period during which the employee was gainfully employed or found capable of gainful employment at an average weekly wage equal to or in excess of the pre-injury average weekly wage, exclusive of overtime, which he or she was earning at the time of his or her injury, notwithstanding an existing agreement or decree to the contrary.
  2. In the event that any employer or insurer makes payment of compensation benefits to an employee during any period during which the employee was not entitled to be paid in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, the employer shall be entitled to credit for any payment of compensation made during that period of employment against future compensation benefits payable directly to the employee.
  3. An employee shall also not be entitled to compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title for any period during which the employee was imprisoned as a result of a conviction of a criminal offense. Where the disposition of criminal charges results in a conviction and includes credit for time-served, such that the time served becomes a period served as the result of a conviction, the employee shall not be entitled to compensation for that period. If payments were made to the employee for that period, prior to the disposition of the charges, the employer/insurer shall be entitled to a credit for the payments as against any future entitlement to benefits.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 11.

Cross References.

Employees not entitled to compensation for total incapacity where employed at an average weekly wage less than prior wage, § 28-33-18.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Confinement.

Home confinement or community confinement is a form of imprisonment, and therefore, an employee is not entitled to benefits for workers’ compensation during a period of home confinement. State v. Quattrocchi, 687 A.2d 78, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 293 (R.I. 1996).

Outstanding Decrees.

In the absence of any modification pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer’s obligation to pay compensation benefits under an outstanding decree is revived when the employee ceases to be “gainfully employed.” Rathbun v. Leesona Corp., 460 A.2d 931, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 953 (R.I. 1983).

Although this section and § 28-33-18.1 authorized termination of benefits for the period during which the employee is working, these provisions do not provide for automatic termination of any outstanding decrees. Rathbun v. Leesona Corp., 460 A.2d 931, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 953 (R.I. 1983).

Prospective Application.

This section as amended by the legislature has a prospective effect only. State v. Healy, 122 R.I. 602 , 410 A.2d 432, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1428 (1980).

28-33-17.2. Employee’s affirmative duty to report earnings — Penalties for failure to provide earnings report — Civil and criminal liability.

  1. It is the intent of the legislature that the costs resulting from fraud and abuse in the workers’ compensation system be arrested. In order to discourage potential abusers, employees must be aware of the affirmative duty to report earnings and the penalties for any fraud or abuse must be severe and certain.
  2. Any employee entitled to receive weekly workers’ compensation benefits shall have an affirmative duty to report those earnings, including wages or salary remuneration paid for personal services, commissions, and bonuses, including the cash value of all remuneration payable in any medium other than cash, earned from self-employment or from any employer other than the employer in whose employ he or she was injured, so that compensation benefits may be properly computed.
    1. The department of labor and training, employer, or insurer shall notify any employee receiving weekly workers’ compensation benefits, on forms prescribed by the department, of that employee’s affirmative duty to report earnings and shall specifically notify the employee that a failure to report earnings may subject him or her to civil or criminal liability.
    2. The notice by the employer or insurer may be satisfied by printing the notice on the employee payee statement (check stub) portion of indemnity checks sent to the employee, or by incorporating said notice in an agreement for electronic fund transfer or use or issuance of an electronic access device, signed by both the employee and the employer or its insurer.
  3. Any employee entitled to weekly workers’ compensation benefits for any period of time shall, upon written request of the employer or insurer, provide at reasonable intervals to the employer or insurer an earnings report, on forms prescribed by the department, advising the employer or insurer of the exact amount of earnings for each week of his or her entitlement to benefits or advising that no earnings were received for particular weeks, so that the employer or insurer may properly compute the amount of benefits due to the employee.
  4. If any employee refuses to submit an earnings report upon request by the employer or insurer his or her rights to compensation may be suspended and his or her compensation during that period of suspension may be forfeited.
  5. Where any employee is found to be entitled to benefits in excess of fifty-two (52) weeks pursuant to a decision resulting in the entry of an order or decree, he or she shall submit an earnings report as described in subsection (d) of this section. In these cases, the employer or insurer must pay benefits within seven (7) days of receipt of the earnings report; provided, that no petition to enforce shall be allowed nor any penalty for late payment awarded unless payments were not made within seven (7) days after the earnings report has been provided.
  6. The employer or insurer shall be entitled to recover overpayments made to any employee as a result of a violation of the employee’s duty to report earnings by any of the following means:
    1. Upon petition and order of the workers’ compensation court to suspend the employer’s obligation to pay weekly benefits.
    2. By civil action in the district or superior court. Costs and counsel fees for the action may be awarded to the employer or insurer.
  7. Any employee who, by any fraudulent means, obtains, or attempts to obtain, workers’ compensation benefits, whether by failure to report earnings; falsification of the earnings report document; or intentional misrepresentation; may forfeit the right to any future, weekly workers’ compensation benefits as determined by the workers’ compensation court.
  8. Any employee who, by any fraudulent means, obtains, or attempts to obtain, workers’ compensation benefits to which he or she was not entitled, whether by failure to report earnings; falsification of the earnings report; or intentional misrepresentation; shall be deemed guilty of larceny pursuant to § 11-41-4 or other pertinent criminal statutes of the state of Rhode Island. Each occurrence shall constitute a separate and distinct offense.
  9. The administrator of the workers’ compensation court, any workers’ compensation judge, or any representative of an employer may be the party complainant to any complaint and warrant brought to invoke the criminal penalties provided for in this section, and the party complainant shall, except for the representative of the employer, be exempt from giving surety for costs in the action.
  10. All criminal actions for any violation of this section shall be prosecuted by the attorney general.
  11. Where any employer or insurer intentionally and unreasonably utilizes the earnings report required by subsection (d) of this section in order to harass an employee or delay payment of benefits to an employee, a penalty of twenty percent (20%) shall be added to all amounts of weekly compensation benefits due and owing.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1993, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-33-17.3. Fraud and abuse.

    1. The workers’ compensation court is authorized and directed to impose sanctions and penalties necessary to maintain the integrity of, and to maintain the high standards of, professional conduct in the workers’ compensation system. All pleadings related to proceedings under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be considered an attestation by counsel that valid grounds exist for the position taken and that the pleading is not interposed for delay.
    2. If any judge determines that any proceedings have been brought, prosecuted, or defended by an employer, insurer, or their counsel without reasonable grounds, then:
      1. The whole cost of the proceedings shall be assessed upon the employer, insurer, or counsel, whoever is responsible; and
      2. If a subsequent order requires that additional compensation be paid, a penalty of double the amount of retroactive benefits ordered shall be paid to the employee and the penalty shall not be included in any formula utilized to establish premium rates for workers’ compensation insurance.
    3. If any judge determines that any proceedings have been brought or defended by an employee or his or her counsel without reasonable grounds, the whole cost of the proceedings shall be assessed against the employee or counsel, whoever is responsible.
    4. The court shall determine whether an action or defense is frivolous or conduct giving rise to the action or defense was unreasonable. Where the amount at issue is less than the actual attorney’s fees of the parties combined, the court shall exercise particular vigilance. Nothing in this subsection, however, is intended to discourage prompt payment in full of all amounts required to be paid.
    5. The appropriate body with professional disciplinary authority over the attorney shall be notified of the action.
    1. It is unlawful to do any of the following:
      1. Make, or cause to be made, any knowingly false or fraudulent material statement or material representation for the purpose of obtaining or denying any compensation;
      2. Present, or cause to be presented, any knowingly false or fraudulent written or oral material statement in support of, or in opposition to, any claim for compensation or petition regarding the continuation, termination, or modification of benefits;
      3. Knowingly assist, aid and abet, solicit, or conspire with any person who engages in an unlawful act under this section;
      4. Make, or cause to be made, any knowingly false or fraudulent statements with regard to entitlement to benefits with the intent to discourage an injured worker from claiming benefits or pursuing a claim;
      5. Willfully misrepresent or fail to disclose any material fact in order to obtain workers’ compensation insurance at less than the proper rate for the insurance including, but not limited to, intentionally misleading or failing to disclose information to an insurer regarding the appropriate rate classification of an employee;
      6. Willfully fail to provide a lower rate adjustment favorable to an employer as required by an approved experience rating plan or regulations promulgated by the insurance commissioners;
      7. Willfully fail to report or provide false or misleading information regarding ownership changes as required by an approved experience rating plan or regulations promulgated by the insurance commissioner; or
      8. Knowingly assist, aid and abet, solicit, or conspire to coerce an employee to willfully misrepresent an employee’s status as a shareholder, director or officer of a corporation, or as a member or manager of a limited-liability company, or as a partner, in a general or, limited partnership, registered limited-liability partnership or a registered limited-liability limited partnership, or as an independent contractor for the purpose of avoiding the inclusion of that or other employees in a workers’ compensation insurance application, renewal or both.
    2. For the purposes of this section, “statement” includes, but is not limited to, any endorsement of a benefit check; signature on an agreement for electronic fund transfer of compensation benefits or issuance of an electronic access device; application for insurance coverage; oral or written statement; proof of injury; bill for services; diagnosis, prescription, hospital or provider records; x-rays; test results; or other documentation offered as proof of, or in the absence of, a loss, injury, or expense.
    3. If it is determined that any person concealed or knowingly failed to disclose that which is required by law to be revealed; knowingly gave or used perjured testimony or false evidence; knowingly made a false statement of fact; participated in the creation or presentation of evidence which he or she knows to be false; or otherwise engaged in conduct in violation of subdivision (1) of this subsection, that person shall be subject in criminal proceedings to a fine and/or penalty not exceeding fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or double the value of the fraud, whichever is greater, or by imprisonment up to five (5) years in state prison or both.
    4. There shall be a general amnesty until July 1, 1992, for any person receiving compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, to the extent compensation has been voluntarily reduced or relinquished by the employee prior to that date.
  1. The director of labor and training shall establish a form, in consultation with the attorney general, to be sent to all workers who are presently receiving benefits, and those for whom first reports of injury are filed in the future, that shall give the employee notice that the endorsement of a benefit check sent pursuant to § 28-35-39 is the employee’s affirmation that he or she is qualified to receive benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The insurers and self-insured employers are directed to send the form to all workers receiving benefits.
  2. Any employer, or in any case where the employer is a corporation, the president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and other officers of the corporation; or in any case where the employer is a limited-liability company, the managers, and the managing members; or in any case where the employer is a general partnership or a registered, limited-liability partnership; or in the case where the employer is a limited partnership or a registered, limited-liability limited partnership, the partners, who are found to have violated this section or § 28-36-15 , shall be guilty of a felony for failure to secure and maintain compensation, and upon conviction, shall be subject to imprisonment of up to two (2) years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both. In any case where the employer is a corporation, the president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and other officers of the corporation, shall be severally liable for the fine or subject to imprisonment, or both. In any case where the employer is a limited-liability company, the managers and managing members shall be severally liable for the fine or subject to imprisonment, or both. In any case where the employer is a partnership or a registered, limited-liability partnership, the partners shall be severally liable for the fine or subject to imprisonment, or both. In any case where the employer is a limited partnership or a registered, limited-liability limited partnership, the general partners shall be severally liable for the fine or subject to imprisonment, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 7; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 34; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 3; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 3, and P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 3, and P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 2, and P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-33-18. Weekly compensation for partial incapacity.

  1. For all injuries on or after January 1, 2022, while the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty-two percent (62%) of the difference between his or her average weekly base wages, earnings, or salary before the injury as computed pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-20 , and his or her weekly wages, earnings, salary, or earnings capacity after that, but not more than the maximum weekly compensation rate for total incapacity as set forth in § 28-33-17 . For all injuries on or before December 31, 2021, while the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the difference between his or her spendable average weekly base wages, earnings, or salary before the injury, as computed pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-20 , and his or her spendable weekly wages, earnings, salary, or earnings capacity after that, but not more than the maximum weekly compensation rate for total incapacity, as set forth in § 28-33-17 . The provisions of this section are subject to the provisions of § 28-33-18.2 .
  2. For all injuries occurring on or after September 1, 1990, where an employee’s condition has reached maximum medical improvement and the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, while the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to seventy percent (70%) of the weekly compensation rate as set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The court may, in its discretion, take into consideration the performance of the employee’s duty to actively seek employment in scheduling the implementation of the reduction. The provisions of this subsection are subject to the provisions of § 28-33-18.2 .
    1. Earnings capacity determined from degree of functional impairment pursuant to § 28-29-2(3) shall be determined as a percentage of the whole person based on the Sixth (6th) edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Value of Permanent Impairment. Earnings capacity shall be calculated from the percentage of impairment as follows:
      1. For impairment of five percent (5%) or less, earnings capacity shall be calculated so as to extinguish one hundred percent (100%) of weekly benefits.
      2. For impairment of twenty-five percent (25%) or less, but greater than five percent (5%), earnings capacity shall be calculated so as to extinguish one hundred percent (100%) less the percent of impairment of weekly benefits.
      3. For impairment of fifty percent (50%) or less, but greater than twenty-five percent (25%), earnings capacity shall be calculated so as to extinguish one hundred percent (100%) less one point two five (1.25) times the percent of impairment of weekly benefits.
      4. For impairment of sixty-five percent (65%) or less, but greater than fifty percent (50%), earnings capacity shall be calculated so as to extinguish one hundred percent (100%) less one point five (1.5) times the percent of impairment of weekly benefits.
    2. An earnings capacity adjustment under this section shall be applicable only when the employee’s condition has reached maximum medical improvement under § 28-29-2(3)(ii) and benefits are subject to adjustment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
  3. In the event partial compensation is paid, in no case shall the period covered by the compensation be greater than three hundred and twelve (312) weeks. In the event that compensation for partial disability is paid under this section for a period of three hundred and twelve (312) weeks, the employee’s right to continuing weekly compensation benefits shall be determined pursuant to the terms of § 28-33-18.3 . At least twenty-six (26) weeks prior to the expiration of the period, the employer or insurer shall notify the employee and the director of its intention to terminate benefits at the expiration of three hundred and twelve (312) weeks and advise the employee of the right to apply for a continuation of benefits under the terms of § 28-33-18.3 . In the event that the employer or insurer fails to notify the employee and the director as prescribed, the employer or insurer shall continue to pay benefits to the employee for a period equal to twenty-six (26) weeks after the date the notice is served on the employee and the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 11; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 6; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 11; P.L. 1942, ch. 1246, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2628, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3784, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-18 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 92, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 270, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, § 8; art. 6, P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 6; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 6; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 2, effective January 1, 2022; P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 2, effective January 1, 2022.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2022.

P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2022.

Law Reviews.

Survey Section: Workers Compensation, see 3 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 576 (1998).

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Anticipatory Decree.

Decree could not, on the basis of medical prediction, reach into the future to determine when incapacity would cease, particularly where employee had been unable to find light work of nature required for his rehabilitation. Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. D'Ambra, 73 R.I. 37 , 53 A.2d 479, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1947); Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. Champness, 73 R.I. 44 , 53 A.2d 483, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1947).

Burden of Proof.

The burden is clearly on the employee to prove with some specificity his loss of earning capacity. Rodiboux v. Uniroyal, Inc., 121 R.I. 796 , 403 A.2d 262, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1980 (1979).

Claimant has burden of proof to show loss of earning capacity. Weber v. American Silk Spinning Co., 38 R.I. 309 , 95 A. 603, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1915).

The burden is upon the employer to prove the amount, if any, that an employee is able to earn at another occupation that is neither unhealthy nor injurious. Andrade v. Mintell, 102 R.I. 148 , 229 A.2d 50, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 660 (1967).

Calculation of Award.

The Appellate Division was correct in crediting the employer for wages actually earned by the employee, including overtime pay. Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 267 (R.I. 1997).

The Appellate Division did not err in declining to set an earnings capacity for an employee who received variable post-injury wages. Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 267 (R.I. 1997).

Capacity Before Injury.

Employee’s earning capacity should be measured against his capacity before the injury, rather than against what the average man of his age could or should do. Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. Kooharian, 72 R.I. 390 , 51 A.2d 832, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1947).

Commissioner’s Powers.

Factfinding is the sole prerogative of the commission, and evidence concerning “wages” received by an employee on his return to work is relevant on the issue of the extent of the employee’s earning capacity and is entitled to such weight as the commission might choose to give it. Brown v. Hope Serv. Station, 122 R.I. 74 , 403 A.2d 1387, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2039 (1979).

Workers’ Compensation Commission had no power to establish an earning capacity for partially incapacitated employee for purposes of decreasing compensation benefits. Podborski v. Haskell, 109 R.I. 1 , 279 A.2d 914, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1017 (1971).

Partial incapacity as well as total incapacity were findings to be made by the commission and the fact that the employee’s petition sought only total incapacity benefits did not necessarily preclude the employee from complaining of the commission’s failure to award partial incapacity benefits. Surgento v. American Luggage Works, 114 R.I. 499 , 335 A.2d 634, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1444 (1975).

Computation of Earning Capacity.

In enacting this section, the Legislature specifically excluded overtime pay from the calculation of pre-injury earnings but not from the computation of post-injury earnings. The failure specifically to exclude overtime pay from post-injury wages in light of its earlier exclusion from pre-injury earnings is significant and indicative of the Legislature’s intent to include it in the computation of post-injury earnings. Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 267 (R.I. 1997).

Nothing in this provision requires that a trial judge use only a functional impairment rating to establish an earnings capacity. Star Enters. v. DelBarone, 746 A.2d 692, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2000).

Construction With § 28-33-17.

Where one received total compensation for both partial and total incapacity the limitation provision is found in § 28-33-17 rather than herein. Kostiv v. Fedorowicz, 99 R.I. 343 , 207 A.2d 387, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 443 (1965).

Court Costs.

Employee partially successful in appealing from decree of workers’ compensation commission under this section is entitled to his costs, including fees for counsel and expert witnesses. General Road Trucking Corp. v. Pina, 110 R.I. 7 , 289 A.2d 425, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 870 (1972).

Duty to Search for Work.

An employee need not unsuccessfully conduct a bona fide search to find work he is capable of performing, or accept such work from his former employer, as a prerequisite of partial compensation. Cabral v. Converse Rubber Co., 121 R.I. 606 , 401 A.2d 1281, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1878 (1979).

Once an employee has been found to be only partially incapacitated and to have reached maximum medical improvement, the employee should be given a reasonable length of time in which to seek alternative employment before a hearing is held on the reduction mandated by subsection (b). K-Mart v. Whitney, 710 A.2d 667, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1998).

Effect of Decree.

Decree awarding compensation up to a specified date was not res judicata as to the right to compensation after that date. Bernier v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 56 R.I. 438 , 186 A. 479, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 118 (1936).

Employer.

Neither the commission nor an employer has the power to establish an earning capacity for a partially incapacitated worker. Cabral v. Converse Rubber Co., 121 R.I. 606 , 401 A.2d 1281, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1878 (1979).

Regardless of the employer’s good faith or the equity of its formula in practical application, it lacks the authority to unilaterally determine the extent of partial incapacity. Cabral v. Converse Rubber Co., 121 R.I. 606 , 401 A.2d 1281, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1878 (1979).

An employee’s return to work, even though it may signal a reduction in or an end of any impairment of earning capacity, does not entitle the employer to unilaterally modify or terminate its continuing obligation to pay weekly benefits under a preliminary agreement, order or decree. Cabral v. Converse Rubber Co., 121 R.I. 606 , 401 A.2d 1281, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1878 (1979).

Evidence.

Where there was competent evidence which established that injured employee could perform a specific kind of light work and further evidence to establish the wages paid for the various jobs offered, it was within the power of the commission to make finding concerning the extent of the partial incapacity and earning capacity. School House Candy Co. v. Ferrucci, 88 R.I. 109 , 143 A.2d 304, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 93 (1958).

Evidence as to the wages an injured employee earns upon his return to his prior employment is material on the issue of his earning capacity and, when adduced, is entitled to such weight as the commission properly may give it. Tretton v. Atwood Crawford Co., 98 R.I. 346 , 202 A.2d 286, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 179 (1964).

If there is any competent evidence of record, or reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom which supports the findings of the full commission, such findings, absent fraud, cannot be disturbed by the Supreme Court. Hassenfeld Bros. v. Wolowicz, 104 R.I. 620 , 247 A.2d 834, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 695 (1968).

Where salesman was injured in June, 1967, by lifting heavy bag of catalogs into his car, which injury was corrected by an operation and claimant’s physician testified that his total incapacity had ended in October, 1967, and that he would be able to use his car again in about a month, and claimant testified on December 12, 1967, that he was able to work and was looking for a job, the evidence sustained the commission’s denial of compensation benefits for the period subsequent to December 12, 1967. Allison v. Do All Providence Co., 105 R.I. 629 , 254 A.2d 79, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 797 (1969).

Where an injured employee’s physician advised him to seek light work and, on his application to his employer for such work, was advised that the employer did not have any and no evidence was offered to establish the degree of the impairment of the employee’s earning capacity, the record lacked the prerequisite evidentiary basis for a proper award for the partial incapacity and should be returned to the commission for evidence on such subject. Saccoccio v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 107 R.I. 53 , 264 A.2d 905, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 737 (1970).

Where injured employee introduced no evidence of increased incapacity for work in a hearing to secure increased workers’ compensation benefits, the commission did not err in affirming the trial commissioner’s refusal to award the increase. Accioli v. Josal Constr. Co., 112 R.I. 215 , 308 A.2d 498, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 973 (1973).

Final Decree.

The provisions of the workers’ compensation act do not authorize a single commissioner to continue a petition for further hearing after having entered a decree determinative of all the issues raised by the petition. Beacon Milling Co. v. Whitford, 92 R.I. 253 , 168 A.2d 279, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1961).

Finding of Partial Disability.

The testimony of the injured employee, a physician employed by the employer’s insurer, and the reasonable inference of which such testimony was susceptible, absent fraud, provided a proper evidentiary basis for the commission’s finding that the employee was partially incapacitated. Albert Zabbo & Sons v. Zabbo, 122 R.I. 79 , 404 A.2d 487, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2070 (1979).

Where petitioner was working for another employer at lighter work and less wages, a finding of partial disability was proper since the fact that she was laid off by respondent solely on account of lack of work and that union rules prevented rehiring had no bearing on partial disability. Shoren v. United States Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 319 , 140 A.2d 768, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1958).

Increase in Earnings.

Where employee receiving benefits for partial disability on basis of actual earnings failed to report increase in earnings, resulting in overpayment by the employer, commission may grant to such employer credit for overpayment as against future payments to the employee. M. Samas Co. v. Cipriano, 110 R.I. 94 , 290 A.2d 402, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 883 (1972).

Limitation on Amount Paid.

So long as a partially incapacitated employee remains out of work, whatever the reason, he is entitled to the compensation ordinarily paid for total incapacity. Cabral v. Converse Rubber Co., 121 R.I. 606 , 401 A.2d 1281, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1878 (1979).

Loss of Earning Capacity Required.

The right to compensation is predicated upon a reduction in earning capacity caused by an injury, rather than the injury itself. Cabral v. Converse Rubber Co., 121 R.I. 606 , 401 A.2d 1281, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1878 (1979).

This section does not compensate for physical injury unless there is a loss of earning capacity. Weber v. American Silk Spinning Co., 38 R.I. 309 , 95 A. 603, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1915); Grieco v. American Silk Spinning Co., 75 R.I. 356 , 66 A.2d 640, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1949); Nunes v. Davol Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 271 , 140 A.2d 272, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1958); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Dean, 89 R.I. 108 , 151 A.2d 354, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1959); D'Iorio v. United States Rubber Co., 88 R.I. 360 , 148 A.2d 678, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1959); Broadbent v. Providence Gas Co., 91 R.I. 100 , 161 A.2d 204, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1960).

Evidence justified finding that employee had left employment because she did not like the work, rather than because of incapacity. Antosia v. Crown Worsted Mills, 79 R.I. 205 , 86 A.2d 553, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1952).

Embarrassment from skin blemishes could not incapacitate. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp. v. Manocchia, 79 R.I. 466 , 89 A.2d 923, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1952).

Where employee has recovered sufficiently to resume his former occupation, compensation should be terminated even though employee is unable to find light work. E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Barbato, 80 R.I. 230 , 81 R.I. 230 , 101 A.2d 481, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1953).

Evidence that an employee had secured lighter work that paid him more than he was earning in the employment in which he was injured was sufficient to support a commission finding that his incapacity for work had ceased even though his physical condition as a result of his injury was such that it was not safe for him to return to his former employment. Geigy Chemical Corp. v. Zuckerman, 106 R.I. 534 , 261 A.2d 844, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 955 (1970).

Other Payments During Incapacity.

The recovery of benefits will not be precluded if the payments received represent accumulated sick leave and vacation pay. Robidoux v. Uniroyal, Inc., 116 R.I. 594 , 359 A.2d 45, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1311 (1976); Kilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 R.I. 443 , 379 A.2d 919, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1949 (1977).

Retirement benefits paid to an employee shall not be deducted from, credited against, or used as an offset to workers’ compensation benefits due him. BIF v. Des Roches, 117 R.I. 914 , 364 A.2d 1290, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1678 (1976).

Recalculation of Compensation Owed.

Where there is competent evidence to support the appellate commission’s determination that the employee has refused suitable alternative employment, any resulting error in the calculation of partial incapacity benefits is harmless error, and does not require reversal, but only a remand to the commission for a recalculation of the weekly compensation owed to the employee as a result of her refusal to accept suitable alternative employment. Worcester Textile v. McIntosh, 593 A.2d 70, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 129 (R.I. 1991).

Reimbursement for Medical Expenses.

Compensation payments do not constitute damages from a negligence tortfeasor. Workers’ compensation is a wage-replacement scheme. An injured employee may not therefore rely on the collateral source rule to obtain from her employer personal reimbursement for medical expenses that resulted from her injury, which expenses were paid to the employee’s health-care providers by her private medical insurer. Moniz v. Providence Chain Co., 618 A.2d 1270, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 4 (R.I. 1993).

Work After Injury.

Where claimant returned to work, payments were suspended, and evidence failed to prove recurrent or increased incapacity as result of original injury, petition to review consent decree was properly dismissed. Boudreau v. R. J. Mfg. Co., 112 R.I. 683 , 314 A.2d 428, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1489 (1974).

Where injured employee established his own business, the amount that he drew weekly from the business funds was not determinative of his earning capacity. Dorfman v. Rosenthal Ackerman Millinery Co., 64 R.I. 498 , 13 A.2d 268, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1940).

Employee who was unable to resume previous work and who was earning less weekly than before his injury was entitled to compensation based on the difference in weekly earnings, even though his hourly rate was the same as before his injury and the reduction in the number of hours worked per week was due to economic conditions. Rau Fastener Co. v. Carr, 74 R.I. 284 , 60 A.2d 499, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1948).

Decision reducing payments to those for partial incapacity, coupled with agreement for employee to return to light work, made reduction of payments conditional on continuation of offer of light work. Fresselli v. Washburn Wire Co., 75 R.I. 144 , 64 A.2d 686, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1949).

Decree making continuance of payments conditional on return to work should be so framed as to allow for a trial period of work and to leave open the possibility of later determination of the facts. Carl-Art, Inc. v. Cardullo, 78 R.I. 171 , 80 A.2d 188, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1951).

Employee could not be required to return to work which would expose her to risk of recurrence of occupational disease. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp. v. Manocchia, 79 R.I. 466 , 89 A.2d 923, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1952).

Employee who had successfully done light work for a short period and had lost that position for economic reasons only thereby established her earning capacity as at least the amount received for the light work. Panzarella v. United States Rubber Co., 81 R.I. 149 , 99 A.2d 860, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1953).

Agreement for partial incapacity payments varying with employee’s actual earnings while doing light work required that employer pay maximum partial incapacity rate after employee was laid off for economic reasons. Frenier v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 83 R.I. 472 , 119 A.2d 724, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1956).

Where injured workman secured employment elsewhere at equal or greater wage than average income prior to injury he may not recover under original finding for compensation. Thornlimb v. D. F. Farrell & Sons, 85 R.I. 157 , 128 A.2d 333, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1957).

Where respondent conceded that his employment as a factory inspector resulted in a weekly wage slightly in excess of what he was earning before the accident, on this concession the commission correctly granted the employer’s petition for suspension of compensation payments, proof of average weekly wages or earnings equal to or in excess of the average weekly wages or earnings before the accident, regardless of the type of work to which the employee returns, being conclusive that incapacity has ended. Universal Winding Co. v. Parks, 88 R.I. 384 , 148 A.2d 755, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1959).

The words “weekly wages, earnings or salary which he earns thereafter . . .” mean that all earnings for services performed weekly in post-injury employment by a partially incapacitated employee must be computed in determining the amount of compensation payable to such employee weekly, there being no room for a construction different from that which is clearly indicated by the ordinary meaning of the words. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Dean, 89 R.I. 108 , 151 A.2d 354, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1959).

Where petitioner’s average weekly wages were $68.95 before the injury and $64.41 thereafter, the trial commissioner correctly observed he was unable to find the petitioner earned less money subsequent to his injury than he did before by reason of the injury inasmuch as there were so many factors that go to make up the income of the salesmen of used automobiles and he did not believe petitioner had proved that it was due to his injury that he earned less money. Taylor v. Artie's Auto Sales, 89 R.I. 165 , 151 A.2d 380, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1959).

When estimating the earning capacity of a partially-disabled employee who had returned to work after an occupational injury and who thereafter became totally disabled for reasons unconnected with such compensable accident, the workers’ compensation commission, in the interest of justice, fixed the weekly earning capacity on post-injury earnings based on a 40 hour workweek, excluding overtime pay. Rhode Island Tool Co. v. Humphrey, 98 R.I. 283 , 201 A.2d 144, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 162 (1964).

One who has physically recovered to an extent that permits the resumption of his former employment without harmful consequences is not entitled to weekly compensation benefits; but where physical recovery is not complete and residual effects of the injury remain, then the extent of employee’s earning capacity, rather than his physical capabilities, is all important because compensation is paid not for physical disabilities but for an impairment or loss of earning capacity flowing from the injury. Builders Iron Works v. Murphy, 104 R.I. 637 , 247 A.2d 839, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 698 (1968).

While the burden to prove that the incapacity for which an employer is paying compensation has either diminished or ended lies on employer, it is not part of his burden to offer either suitable work or assist in obtaining it elsewhere. Davol Rubber Co. v. Lafoe, 108 R.I. 499 , 277 A.2d 128, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1296 (1971).

Where an employee returned to part-time employment after reaching maximum medical improvement and her wages together with her partial-disability payments, which had been reduced by 30 percent, totaled less than she would have received in partial disability if she had sought but failed to obtain employment, it was error not to rescind the reduction in her benefits. Almacs, Inc. v. Porreca, 702 A.2d 892, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 303 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Temporary total disability, right to compensation for, in addition to compensation for permanent partial disability. 88 A.L.R. 385.

28-33-18.1. Employees not entitled to compensation for total incapacity.

  1. An employee shall not be entitled to be paid compensation for total incapacity under chapters 29 — 38 of this title for any period during which the employee was gainfully employed at an average weekly wage less than that which he or she was earning at the time of his or her injury notwithstanding an existing agreement or decree to the contrary. In that instance, an employee shall be entitled to benefits as provided in § 28-33-18 .
  2. In the event that an employer or insurer has made payment of compensation benefits to an employee during any period during which the employee was not entitled to be paid in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, the employer shall be entitled to credit for any payment of compensation made during that period of employment against future compensation benefits payable directly to the employee.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 232, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Denial of Benefits.

The record on appeal must contain specific findings of fact to support a denial of benefits, and to enable competent review of the decree of the commission. Rodiboux v. Uniroyal, Inc., 121 R.I. 796 , 403 A.2d 262, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1980 (1979).

Loss of Earning Capacity.

Where, during a period of employment following an injury, an employee received weekly wages of $200 which were in excess of his preinjury weekly wage of $136, on the face of this evidence, a rebuttable presumption arose that the employee — whatever his degree of incapacity — had suffered no loss of earning capacity; however, during at least a portion of the period in question, where the evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached that the employee was hospitalized and unable to work, for at least this period the employee met his burden of proving a loss of earning capacity, and was entitled to compensation therefor. Rodiboux v. Uniroyal, Inc., 121 R.I. 796 , 403 A.2d 262, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1980 (1979).

Outstanding Decrees.

In the absence of any modification pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer’s obligation to pay compensation benefits under an outstanding decree is revived when the employee ceases to be “gainfully employed.” Rathbun v. Leesona Corp., 460 A.2d 931, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 953 (R.I. 1983).

Although § 28-33-17.1 and this section authorize termination of benefits for the period during which the employee is working, these provisions do not provide for automatic termination of any outstanding decrees. Rathbun v. Leesona Corp., 460 A.2d 931, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 953 (R.I. 1983).

Prospective Application.

This section as amended by the legislature has a prospective effect only. State v. Healy, 122 R.I. 602 , 410 A.2d 432, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1428 (1980).

28-33-18.2. Suitable alternative employment.

  1. When an employee has sustained an injury which entitles the employee to receive benefits pursuant to § 28-33-18 or 28-34-3 , the employee may become capable of suitable alternative employment as determined by the workers’ compensation court, or may be offered suitable alternative employment as agreed to by the employee and employer with written notice to the director. The employer or insurer shall pay an injured employee that accepts suitable alternative employment a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (662/3%) of the difference between the employee’s average weekly wage, earnings or salary before the injury and his or her weekly wages, earnings or salary from the suitable alternative employment.
  2. The acceptance of suitable alternative employment shall not be mandatory if it results in the inequitable forfeiture or loss of seniority with the employer or a monetary benefit or other substantial benefit including, but not limited to, vested pension and/or profit sharing contributions, arising from the employment relationship.
  3. If suitable alternative employment as determined by the workers’ compensation court has been offered to the employee and the employee has refused to accept the employment, then the workers’ compensation court shall, in fixing the amount of compensation payable subsequent to the refusal, treat earnings capacity as post injury earnings, requiring the employer or insurer to pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (662/3%) of the difference between the employee’s average weekly wage, earnings, or salary before the injury and the weekly earning capacity. In no case shall increases in payments made to an injured employee pursuant to § 28-33-18.3(b)(1) or 28-33-17(f) be considered in the calculation of the weekly compensation due pursuant to this section. The fact that the employee is undergoing rehabilitation does not by itself exempt the employee from the provisions of this subsection.
  4. If the suitable alternative employment is terminated by the employer for reasons other than misconduct by the employee, the injured employee shall be entitled to be compensated from the employer in whose employ he or she was injured at the rate to which the employee was entitled prior to acceptance of the employment after notice by the employee to the employer in whose employ he or she was injured. The payments shall be made no later than fourteen (14) days after the notice. If suitable alternative employment is terminated by the employer for misconduct of the employee, or by the employee, the compensation payable to the employee shall not exceed that payable during continuance of suitable alternative employment. Upon request to the workers’ compensation court, the employee shall have the right to a determination as to whether or not the termination was justified. Any employee who accepts suitable alternative employment with his or her employer of record shall continue to maintain the seniority status and all rights incidental to it that the employee enjoyed prior to his or her injury, except that these rights shall not exceed the current rights of a similar employee with equal seniority.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 7; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 6, § 8; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1987, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 4.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Establishing Capacity for Work-Related Activity.

It is not necessary for an impartial medical examiner to testify that an employee is physically capable of performing the particular job that has been offered as suitable alternative employment. The medical evidence need only address the employee’s physical condition and the capacity of that employee for work-related activity. Worcester Textile v. McIntosh, 593 A.2d 70, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 129 (R.I. 1991).

Establishing Earning Capacity.

Although the intent of the legislature was that this section should be applied retroactively, the only way to reduce an employee’s compensation benefits by establishing the employee’s earning capacity in an alternative job is to show this earning capacity from an actual offer of suitable alternative employment received by the employee. Wayland Health Ctr. v. Lowe, 475 A.2d 1037, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 507 (R.I. 1984).

Forfeiture of Benefits.

Offer of alternative employment would not result in an “inequitable forfeiture of a monetary benefit or other substantial benefits,” even though claimant’s life insurance, pension contribution, profit sharing, and holiday pay would be based upon the reduced wage of his new job as opposed to his preinjury wage. G.W. Dahl Co. v. Wilson, 537 A.2d 123, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 19 (R.I. 1988).

Keeping Jobs Open.

The employer is not required to keep a job open until the matter can be heard by the workers’ compensation commission. To so hold would effectively wipe the statute off the books since employers cannot economically afford to keep such offers available for prolonged periods. Oladapo v. Charlesgate Nursing Corp., 590 A.2d 405, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 1991).

Notice Requirement.

Where plaintiff failed to assert that he complied with the statutory requirement of notice to the director of labor concerning any agreement that they may have made with his employer regarding suitable alternative employment, he was not entitled to the protections of this section. Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 51 (R.I. 1994).

Written notice to the director of labor may be given by either the employer or employee. Riffenburg v. Kent County Mem'l Hosp., 715 A.2d 1281, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 252 (R.I. 1998).

Injured employee who accepted offer of alternative employment and gave written notice to the director after employer refused to do so satisfied the statutory notice requirement. Riffenburg v. Kent County Mem'l Hosp., 715 A.2d 1281, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 252 (R.I. 1998).

The legislature intended that notice to the director accompany mutual assent or, at a minimum, be given within a reasonable time from accepting an offer of a light-duty job. Rezendes v. American Insulated Wire, 754 A.2d 110, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 2000).

A seven-year delay in notice was not reasonable where the petitioner had neither refused an offer of suitable alternative employment nor did he request that his employer characterize the offered job as such. Rezendes v. American Insulated Wire, 754 A.2d 110, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 2000).

Purpose of Statute.

The purpose of the statute is to try to get employees back to work if they are able. Oladapo v. Charlesgate Nursing Corp., 590 A.2d 405, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 1991).

The purpose of the statute is to facilitate a partially disabled employee’s return to employment. Riffenburg v. Kent County Mem'l Hosp., 715 A.2d 1281, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 252 (R.I. 1998).

Recalculation of Compensation Owed.

Where there is competent evidence to support the appellate commission’s determination that the employee has refused suitable alternative employment, any resulting error in the calculation of partial-incapacity benefits is harmless error, and does not require reversal, but only a remand to the commission for a recalculation of the weekly compensation owed to the employee as a result of her refusal to accept suitable alternative employment. Worcester Textile v. McIntosh, 593 A.2d 70, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 129 (R.I. 1991).

Termination.

Employer was no longer obligated to provide an employee with the rights, benefits, and protections afforded her under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18.2 as her suitable alternative employment had been permissibly terminated and as she was no longer entitled to receive weekly compensation benefits. The employer could have terminated the employee’s suitable alternative employment at any time under § 28-33-18.2(d) , and the employee then would have been entitled to receive compensation under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18 had she not already exhausted her partial incapacity benefits; however, the parties stipulated that these benefits had been exhausted. Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 965 A.2d 437, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 2009).

28-33-18.3. Continuation of benefits — Partial incapacity.

    1. For all injuries occurring on or after September 1, 1990, in those cases where the employee has received a notice of intention to terminate partial-incapacity benefits pursuant to § 28-33-18 , the employee, or his or her duly authorized representative, may file with the workers’ compensation court a petition for continuation of benefits on forms prescribed by the workers’ compensation court. In any proceeding before the workers’ compensation court on a petition for continuation of partial-incapacity benefits, where the employee demonstrates by a fair preponderance of the evidence that his or her partial incapacity poses a material hindrance to obtaining employment suitable to his or her limitation, partial-incapacity benefits shall continue. Any period of time for which the employee has received benefits for total incapacity shall not be included in the calculation of the three hundred and twelve-week (312) period.
    2. [Deleted by P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 1 and P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 1].
    1. Where any employee’s incapacity is partial and has extended for more than three hundred and twelve (312) weeks and the employee has proved an entitlement to continued benefits under subsection (a), payments made to these incapacitated employees shall be increased annually on the tenth (10th) day of May thereafter so long as the employee remains incapacitated. The increase shall be by an amount equal to the total percentage increase in the annual Consumer Price Index, United States City Average for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, as formulated and computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor for the period of March 1 to February 28 each year.
    2. “Index,” as used in this section, refers to the Consumer Price Index, United States City Average for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, as that index was formulated and computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor.
    3. The annual increase shall be based upon the percentage increase, if any, in the Consumer Price Index for the month of a given year, over the index for February the previous year. Thereafter, increases shall be made on May 10 annually, based upon the percentage increase, if any, in the Consumer Price Index for the period of March 1 to February 28.
    4. The computations in this section shall be made by the director of labor and training and promulgated to insurers and employers making payments required by this section. Increases shall be paid by insurers and employers without further order of the court. If payment payable under this section is not mailed within fourteen (14) days after the employer or insurer has been notified by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the state it becomes due, there shall be added to the unpaid payment an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of it, to be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, the payment.
    5. This section applies only to payment of weekly indemnity benefits to employees as described in subdivision (b)(1) and does not apply to specific compensation payments for loss of use or disfigurement or payment of dependency benefits or any other benefits payable under the workers’ compensation act.
  1. No petitions for commutation shall be allowed or entertained in those cases where an employee is receiving benefits pursuant to this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 4; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 6; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 6; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 34; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 3; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 3; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 3; P.L. 2006, ch. 605, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 610, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18(d) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of R.I. Const. art. I, § 2 , because it does not infringe upon a fundamental right nor create a suspect class, and the legislature could have had a rational basis for limiting the potentially infinite and burdensome duration of partial incapacity benefits. Nichols v. R&D Constr. Co., 60 A.3d 932, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2013).

Construction With § 28-33-17.

Although these provisions are applicable to a partially disabled employee if he can show that his partial incapacity poses a material hindrance to obtaining suitable employment, there is a key distinction between qualifying for continued partial disability benefits and qualifying for total disability benefits via proof of odd-lot doctrine, which requires a showing that the employee is actually unable to perform his regular job and any alternative employment. Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2000).

“Material Hindrance for Obtaining Employment.”

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18.3(a)(1) does not contemplate the “inability to regain one’s earning capacity” as a basis for a “material hindrance to obtaining employment suitable to his or her limitations” in order for benefits to continue; the partial disability itself must serve as a “material hindrance.” Nichols v. R&D Constr. Co., 60 A.3d 932, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2013).

As a workers’ compensation claimant was able to obtain employment after his injury, although he did not regain his pre-injury earning capacity, he did not meet his burden of proving that his incapacity posed a “material hindrance to obtaining employment suitable to his or her limitations” required in order for his benefits to continue under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-18.3(a)(1) . Nichols v. R&D Constr. Co., 60 A.3d 932, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2013).

Requirements for Enjoining Application of Section.

Workers’ compensation insurer is not entitled to a preliminary injunction barring application of this section on constitutional grounds, where the insurer fails to demonstrate that any possible harm to its business outweighs the adverse impact on the recipients of benefits. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paradis, 764 F. Supp. 13, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7145 (D.R.I. 1991).

28-33-19. Additional compensation for specific injuries.

    1. In case of the following specified injuries there shall be paid in addition to all other compensation provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title a weekly payment equal to one-half (1/2) of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, but in no case more than ninety dollars ($90.00) nor less than forty-five dollars ($45.00) per week. In case of the following specified injuries that occur on or after January 1, 2012, there shall be paid in addition to all other compensation provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title a weekly payment equal to one-half (1/2) of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, but in no case more than one hundred eighty dollars ($180) nor less than ninety dollars ($90.00) per week. Payment made under this section shall be made in a one time payment unless the parties otherwise agree. Payment shall be mailed within fourteen (14) days of the entry of a decree, order, or agreement of the parties:
      1. For the loss by severance of both hands at or above the wrist, or for the loss of the arm at or above the elbow or for the loss of the leg at or above the knee, or both feet at or above the ankle, or of one hand and one foot, or the entire and irrecoverable loss of the sight of both eyes, or the reduction to one-tenth (1/10) or less of normal vision with glasses, for a period of three hundred twelve (312) weeks; provided, that for the purpose of this chapter the Snellen chart reading (20/200) shall equal one-tenth (1/10) of normal vision or a reduction of ninety percent (90%) of the vision. Additionally, any loss of visual performance including, but not limited to, loss of binocular vision, other than direct visual acuity may be considered in evaluating eye loss;
      2. For the loss by severance of either arm at or above the elbow, or of either leg at or above the knee, for a period of three hundred twelve (312) weeks;
      3. For the loss by severance of either hand at or above the wrist for a period of two hundred forty-four (244) weeks;
      4. For the entire and irrecoverable loss of sight of either eye, or the reduction to one-tenth (1/10) or less of normal vision with glasses, or for loss of binocular vision for a period of one hundred sixty (160) weeks;
      5. For the loss by severance of either foot at or above the ankle, for a period of two hundred five (205) weeks;
      6. For the loss by severance of the entire distal phalange of either thumb for a period of thirty-five (35) weeks; and for the loss by severance at or above the second joint of either thumb, for a period of seventy-five (75) weeks;
      7. For the loss by severance of one phalange of either index finger, for a period of twenty-five (25) weeks; for the loss by severance of at least two (2) phalanges of either index finger, for a period of thirty-two (32) weeks; for the loss by severance of at least three (3) phalanges of either index finger, for a period of forty-six (46) weeks;
      8. For the loss by severance of one phalange of the second finger of either hand, for a period of sixteen (16) weeks; for the loss by severance of two (2) phalanges of the second finger of either hand, for a period of twenty-two (22) weeks; for the loss by severance of three (3) phalanges of the second finger on either hand, for a period of thirty (30) weeks;
      9. For the loss by severance of one phalange of the third finger of either hand, for a period of twelve (12) weeks; for the loss by severance of two (2) phalanges of the third finger of either hand, for a period of eighteen (18) weeks; for the loss by severance of three (3) phalanges of a third finger of either hand, for a period of twenty-five (25) weeks;
      10. For the loss by severance of one phalange of the fourth finger of either hand, for a period of ten (10) weeks; for the loss by severance of two (2) phalanges of the fourth finger of either hand, for a period of fourteen (14) weeks; for the loss by severance of three (3) phalanges of a fourth finger of either hand, for a period of twenty (20) weeks;
      11. For the loss by severance of one phalange of the big toe on either foot, for a period of twenty (20) weeks; for the loss by severance of two (2) phalanges of the big toe of either foot, for a period of thirty-eight (38) weeks; for the loss by severance at or above the distal joint of any other toe than the big toe, for a period of ten (10) weeks for each such toe;
      12. For partial loss by severance for any of the injuries specified in paragraphs (1)(i) — (1)(xi) of this subsection, proportionate benefits shall be paid for the period of time that the partial loss by severance bears to the total loss by severance.
    2. Where any bodily member or portion of it has been rendered permanently stiff or useless, compensation in accordance with the above schedule shall be paid as if the member or portion of it had been completely severed; provided, that if the stiffness or uselessness is less than total, then compensation shall be paid for that period of weeks in proportion to the applicable period where the member or portion of it has been completely severed as the instant percentage of stiffness or uselessness bears to the total stiffness or total uselessness of the bodily members or portion of them.
    3. In case of the following specified injuries there shall be paid in addition to all other compensation provided for in chapters 29 — 38 under this title a weekly payment equal to one-half (1/2) of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, but in no case more than ninety dollars ($90.00) nor less than forty-five dollars ($45.00) per week. Payment under this subsection shall be made in a one time payment unless the parties otherwise agree. Payment shall be mailed within fourteen (14) days of the entry of a decree, order, or agreement of the parties:
      1. For permanent disfigurement of the body the number of weeks may not exceed five hundred (500) weeks, which sum shall be payable in a one time payment within fourteen (14) days of the entry of a decree, order, or agreement of the parties in addition to all other sums under this section wherever it is applicable.
      1. Loss of hearing due to industrial noise is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of chapters 29 — 38 of this title and occupational deafness is defined to be a loss of hearing in one or both ears due to prolonged exposure to harmful noise in employment. Harmful noise means sound capable of producing occupational deafness.
      2. Hearing loss shall be evaluated pursuant to protocols established by the workers’ compensation medical advisory board. All treatment consistent with this subsection shall be consistent with the protocols established by the workers’ compensation medical advisory board subject to § 28-33-5 .
      3. If the employer has conducted baseline screenings within one (1) year of exposure to harmful noise to evaluate the extent of an employee’s preexisting hearing loss, the causative factor shall be apportioned based on the employee’s preexisting hearing loss and subsequent occupational hearing loss, and the compensation payable to the employee shall only be that portion of the compensation related to the present work-related exposure.
      4. There shall be payable as permanent partial disability for total occupational deafness of one ear, seventy-five (75) weeks of compensation; for total occupational deafness of both ears, two hundred forty-four (244) weeks of compensation; for partial occupational deafness in one or both ears, compensation shall be paid for any periods that are proportionate to the relation which the hearing loss bears to the amount provided in this subdivision for total loss of hearing in one or both ears, as the case may be. For the complete loss of hearing for either ear due to external trauma or by other mechanism, acuity loss shall be paid pursuant to this subsection.
      5. No benefits shall be granted for tinnitus, psychogenic hearing loss, congenital hearing loss, recruitment or hearing loss above three thousand (3,000) hertz.
      6. The provisions of this subsection and the amendments insofar as applicable to hearing loss shall be operative as to any occupational hearing loss that occurs on or after September 1, 2003, except for acuity hearing loss related to a single event which shall become effective upon passage.
      7. If previous hearing loss, whether occupational or not, is established by an audiometric examination or other competent evidence, whether or not the employee was exposed to assessable noise exposure within one year preceding the test, the employer is not liable for the previous loss, nor is the employer liable for a loss for which compensation has previously been paid or awarded. The employer is liable only for the difference between the percent of occupational hearing loss determined as of the date of the audiometric examination conducted by a certified audiometric technician using an audiometer which meets the specifications established by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI 3.6-1969, ri973) used to determine occupational hearing loss and the percentage of loss established by the baseline audiometric examination. An amount paid to an employee for occupational hearing loss by any other employer shall be credited against compensation payable by the subject employer for the hearing loss. The employee shall not receive in the aggregate greater compensation from all employers for occupational hearing loss than that provided in this section for total occupational hearing loss. A payment shall not be paid to an employee unless the employee has worked in excessive noise exposure employment for a total period of at least one hundred eighty (180) days for the employer for whom compensation is claimed.
      8. No claim for occupational deafness may be filed until six (6) months separation from the type of noisy work for the last employer in whose employment the employee was at any time during the employment exposed to harmful noise.
      9. The total compensation due for hearing loss is recovered from the employer who last employed the employee in whose employment the employee was last exposed to harmful noise and the insurance carrier, if any, on the risk when the employee was last so exposed, and if the occupational hearing loss was contracted while the employee was in the employment of a prior employer, and there was no baseline testing by the last employer, the employer and insurance carrier which is made liable for the total compensation as provided by this section may petition the worker’s compensation court for an apportionment of the compensation among the several employers which since the contraction of the hearing loss have employed the employee in a noisy environment.
  1. Where payments are required to be made under more than one clause of this section, payments shall be made in a one time payment unless the parties otherwise agree. Payment shall be mailed within fourteen (14) days of the entry of a decree, order, or agreement of the parties.
  2. Payments pursuant to this section, except paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section, shall be made only after an employee’s condition as relates to loss of use has reached maximum medical improvement as defined in § 28-29-2(8) and as found pursuant to § 28-33-18(b) .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 12; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 6; P.L. 1927, ch. 1058, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 12; P.L. 1941, ch. 1056, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1941, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1942, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-19 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 1959, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 229, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 161, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1988, ch. 416, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 4, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 4; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Workers’ Compensation, see 4 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 821 (1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Law.

Section 28-35-43 , providing a penalty for the late payment of benefits, does not apply to one-time payments made pursuant to this section for specific injuries because it specifically refers, in its first sentence, only to payments that are made weekly. Bottini v. Shaw's Supermarket, 714 A.2d 595, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 250 (R.I. 1998).

Death of Employee.

Payments under this section cease on the death of the employee from independent cause. George A. Fuller Co. v. Ryan, 69 R.I. 347 , 33 A.2d 188, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1943) (decision prior to 1949 amendment of § 28-33-24 ).

Determination of Benefits.

The amount of benefits granted under this section for a specific condition is reduced by the amount received for the same injury out of which the specific condition arose. Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174 , 250 A.2d 361, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 735 (1969).

A loss compensable under this section is evaluated at that point at which rehabilitative procedures have been completed and functional development of the injured member or sense has reached its maximum potential. Walsh v. Department of Natural Resources, 120 R.I. 367 , 388 A.2d 8, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 681 (1978).

A specific compensation award under this section for employee’s loss of use of extremities and disfigurement was subject to the suspension mechanism of § 28-35-58 ; the amount of the award reduced “on a dollar for dollar basis” the period of time during which the employer’s duty to pay future compensation benefits to the employee would be suspended. Rison v. Air Filter Sys., 707 A.2d 675, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 21 (R.I. 1998).

Disfigurement.

Payment of compensation for disfigurement without requiring a showing that the disfigurement resulted in an impairment of earning capacity of the injured employee constitutes a valid exercise of the police power by a state legislature, and is not unconstitutionally vague. Matthews v. Falvey Linen Supply, 110 R.I. 558 , 294 A.2d 398, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 952 (1972).

Statute requiring that a minor injured while illegally employed be awarded treble damages, § 28-33-22 , was intended to apply to an award of compensation for disfigurement under subsection (n) of this section. Matthews v. Falvey Linen Supply, 110 R.I. 558 , 294 A.2d 398, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 952 (1972).

Where there was evidence that even though employer had furnished employee with an artificial eye, employee had been examined by trial commissioner with and without the eye, that occasional irritation required removal of the eye and wearing of dark glasses for a time, commissioner was justified in finding permanent disfigurement. St. Laurent v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 113 R.I. 10 , 316 A.2d 504, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1130 (1974).

Double Loss.

Loss of phalanges of two toes was compensable for double the period allowed for loss of phalange of one toe. Gibbons v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 48 R.I. 353 , 138 A. 175, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1927) (decision on facts arising prior to 1926 amendment).

Evidence.

December, 1971, finding of 21 percent loss of use of claimant’s hand was irrelevant in measuring extent of claimant’s incapacity in early 1974. Molony & Rubien Constr. Co. v. Segrella, 118 R.I. 340 , 373 A.2d 816, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1465 (1977).

An injured employee claiming loss of hearing is not required to show that he is completely deaf but, rather, he must satisfy the commission that, because of his impaired hearing, he cannot make his way in the work-a-day world. Lamont v. Aetna Bridge Co., 107 R.I. 686 , 270 A.2d 515, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 825 (1970).

Intent.

Benefits paid under this section are intended to compensate an injured worker for the loss of a specific member or sense rather than for the impairment of earning capacity caused by the loss. Walsh v. Department of Natural Resources, 120 R.I. 367 , 388 A.2d 8, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 681 (1978).

Legislative Intent.

Since the legislature considered the use of glasses to relieve the impairment of sight and made no mention of the reduction of a loss of hearing by the use of a hearing aid, the Supreme Court concludes that the legislature intended that specific compensation be awarded a workman for the complete loss of his hearing even though the hearing can be restored with the aid of a hearing aid. Lamont v. Aetna Bridge Co., 107 R.I. 686 , 270 A.2d 515, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 825 (1970).

In an employee’s petition for specific compensation, where he suffered a permanent loss of the use of both legs as a result of an injury to the spinal cord, there was no legislative intent to limit the benefits of this section to the infliction of direct trauma to the affected member, nor was there any intention that this section be read with § 28-33-17(e) as the two sections were irreconcilable and stood alone. Thibault v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 111 R.I. 381 , 302 A.2d 755, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1214 (1973).

Loss of Function of Member.

Loss of piece of bone from side of thumb and loss of tendons and flesh, leaving claimant able to rotate thumb and to press it against other fingers but only lightly, was not equivalent to an amputation. Weber v. American Silk Spinning Co., 38 R.I. 309 , 95 A. 603, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1915).

Compensation could not be awarded under this section for bodily member rendered only partially useless. Vick v. Aubin, 73 R.I. 508 , 58 A.2d 109, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1948); Steele v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., 78 R.I. 272 , 81 A.2d 424, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1951) (decisions on facts arising prior to 1947 and 1954 amendments).

Employee was not entitled to compensation for thumb that had become useless because of loss of other four fingers and part of hand where the thumb itself was not stiff. Walsh v. C. J. Fox Co., 76 R.I. 345 , 70 A.2d 37, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 120 (1949) (decision on facts arising prior to 1947 and 1954 amendments).

Decree denying compensation for a stiff and useless member could not be based on speculation that certain treatment might restore its use. Serrecchia v. Atlantic Mills, 79 R.I. 242 , 87 A.2d 419, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1952).

The word “stiff ” is to be given its ordinary meaning and it is not required that the member be also useless. Landry v. Cornell Constr. Co., 87 R.I. 1 , 137 A.2d 410, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1957).

On appeal from part of decree denying specific compensation for loss of the left hand due to the necessity to surgically fuse a wrist to give it more stability and ease the pain after it had failed to unite after fracture, the court held whether the wrist is considered as a portion of the bodily member or a bodily member in and of itself, that the legislature had made no provision for an award of specific compensation for the loss of a wrist by reason of stiffness rendering it useless. Pearson v. Seaboard Constr. Co., 88 R.I. 345 , 148 A.2d 270, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1959).

If permanent loss of usefulness of a hand or hands can be established, it is immaterial whether the wrists or either of them are involved. Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429 , 224 A.2d 387, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 411 (1966).

The degree of permanent uselessness of an employee’s member will be determined as of the time when remedial surgery shall be reasonably considered to have achieved the maximum possible amelioration of the condition rather than as of the date of the injury. Fogarty v. State, 103 R.I. 228 , 236 A.2d 247, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 603 (1967).

Loss of Hearing.

Where employee sought specific compensation for total loss of hearing in his left ear and the trial commissioner found that the employee had failed to prove that his hearing loss was due to “external trauma” connected with his employment, compensation was denied. Beaupre v. Dynachem Corp., 113 R.I. 612 , 324 A.2d 621, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1216 (1974).

Specific compensation is to be given for the loss of use of the power or sense of hearing rather than for an injury to the physical structure of the ear, and such benefits are to be paid only in a case where there has been a complete loss of hearing. Lamont v. Aetna Bridge Co., 107 R.I. 686 , 270 A.2d 515, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 825 (1970).

Loss of Leg.

Trial judge’s disfigurement award of 140 total weeks of compensation was highly inadequate in light of subsection (a)(14)(B), which affords the judge the discretion to award up to 500 weeks of benefits, especially where the trial judge assessed compensation for the subsequent, secondary amputation at 15 weeks, approximately eight times less than the value of the initial award for originally crushed limbs. Johnson v. State, 634 A.2d 863, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 262 (R.I. 1993).

Loss of Sight.

Where a national guardsman lost an eye while on duty and received from the United States regular army pay, subsistence, quarters allowance, medical and surgical treatment, and hospitalization, the state was not entitled to credit for such federal payments against the specific loss payments under subsection (d) of this section. Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764 , 263 A.2d 681, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 986 (1970).

A worker who suffered an eye injury in the course of employment, but whose vision was correctable to 90 percent of normal with a contact lens and glasses was not entitled to recovery on a claim under subdivision (d) of this section. Walsh v. Department of Natural Resources, 120 R.I. 367 , 388 A.2d 8, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 681 (1978).

If an employee suffers injury which results in loss of a part of the eye but suffers no loss or reduction of sight, he would not be entitled to compensation under subdivision (d) of this section. Walsh v. Department of Natural Resources, 120 R.I. 367 , 388 A.2d 8, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 681 (1978).

The term “glasses” in subdivision (d) of this section includes contact lenses where the lenses perform the same function as eyeglasses. Walsh v. Department of Natural Resources, 120 R.I. 367 , 388 A.2d 8, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 681 (1978).

A clear legislative intent exists to account for losses of vision under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4) of this section, and the term “bodily member” in subsection (a)(13) cannot be applied to visual losses. Anderson v. O'Connell Supply, 649 A.2d 509, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 245 (R.I. 1994).

Employee who lost sight of one eye in accident was entitled to compensation for only one eye even though the sight of the other eye had been lost previously. In re J. & P. Coats, Inc., 41 R.I. 289 , 103 A. 833, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1918).

Decree awarding compensation was not defective for want of an express finding that loss of sight was permanent where there was evidence that loss was permanent. Marszalkowski v. Rusakovich, 84 R.I. 302 , 124 A.2d 244, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1956).

Decree awarding compensation for loss of sight of one eye should specify the eye involved. Marszalkowski v. Rusakovich, 84 R.I. 302 , 124 A.2d 244, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1956).

Notice of Injury.

Where notice of original injury was given under § 28-33-30 , no additional notice was required where subsequent condition developed from injury 15 years later for which claim was made under this section. Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174 , 250 A.2d 361, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 735 (1969).

Second Injury Indemnity Fund.

There is no language in the act which authorizes the commission to grant payments for specific injuries from the second injury indemnity fund. Reardon v. Hall, 104 R.I. 591 , 247 A.2d 900, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 689 (1968).

When a worker sought disfigurement and loss of use benefits, the worker could recover from the workers’ compensation administrative fund and he was entitled to the benefits within the limits of the maximum of the appropriate section. Thomas v. R.I. Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 814 A.2d 335, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 19 (R.I. 2003).

Skin-Graft Surgery.

Skin-graft surgery and a patient’s subsequent recuperation are technical issues calling for specific medical testimony. Donahue v. Washburn Wire Co., 492 A.2d 152, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 504 (R.I. 1985).

Time of Filing Claim.

Statute of limitations on claim for stiffness of arm began to run at time stiffness manifested itself completely rather than at the time of the accident. Larkin v. George A. Fuller Co., 76 R.I. 395 , 71 A.2d 690, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1950) (decision on facts arising prior to 1947 and 1954 amendments).

Where claimant seeking compensation for total deafness as a result of exposure to noise filed claim on May 29, 1959, although he had been partially incapacitated until in March 1959, when he became totally incapacitated, his petition was timely filed. Lozowski v. Nicholson File Co., 92 R.I. 270 , 168 A.2d 143, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1961).

An injury reducing an employee’s vision to 20/200 was sustained at the time his vision became so reduced rather than at the time of the accident from which it resulted and compensation is governed by the statute in effect at the time of the reduction in vision. Sherry v. Crescent Co., 101 R.I. 703 , 226 A.2d 819, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 824 (1967).

Claim for specific compensation for a permanent loss of something less than 25% of the use of a leg which became an end result ten days prior to the entry of a commutation decree cannot be made nine months after the entry of such decree. Sarrasin v. Crescent Co., 104 R.I. 69 , 241 A.2d 818, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 615 (1968).

The amount of benefits under this section are determined at time specific condition manifests itself and not when original injury occurred out of which the specific condition arose. Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174 , 250 A.2d 361, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 735 (1969).

Where employee sustained “tear of rotator cuff left shoulder” on May 12, 1964 in an industrial accident and physician testified that such condition reached a plateau in not less than one year and not more than 18 months subsequent to original injury and trial commissioner on that basis found the condition of the employee’s arm became permanent on or about January 1, 1966, and that the employee’s right of action for specific benefits arose at that time, said employee failed to sustain his burden of proving that he had filed the March 11, 1970 petition within two years of the time he knew or “by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known” that the condition of his shoulder was permanent and of its causal relationship to his employment. Auclair v. American Silk Spinning Co., 109 R.I. 395 , 286 A.2d 253, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1198 (1972).

Where an employee who sustained an eye injury learned that his injury was permanent at some later date than it had been medically ascertained that his condition would not improve, the employee’s weekly payments of compensation should have been computed from the date that his physicians decided that an end result had been reached in the treatment and an increase in weekly payments that had been allowed through a change in the law after that date would not have applied in this situation. Minelian v. Electrolizing Co., 111 R.I. 215 , 301 A.2d 78, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1200 (1973).

Useless Member.

Where, under an agreement, an employee received compensation for the severance of part of four fingers of her right hand and the hand later became useless at the wrist, she was not precluded from then receiving specific compensation for loss of use of the hand, but was entitled to receive such specific compensation less credit for compensation already paid for severance. Mustapha v. Patton-MacGuyer Co., 100 R.I. 493 , 217 A.2d 240, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 466 (1966).

Waiting Period.

The appellate division of the workers’ compensation court erred in retroactively applying the 1990 amendment of subsection (a), which allows a fourteen-day waiting period for specific compensation, to a previously decided decree. Lacroix v. Nulco Mfg. Co., 618 A.2d 1285, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 1993).

Collateral References.

Compensation for loss of impairment of eyesight. 142 A.L.R. 822.

Disfigurement, compensation for. 80 A.L.R. 970; 116 A.L.R. 712.

Injury to or loss of member of body, eye or eyesight as total incapacity. 67 A.L.R. 799; 98 A.L.R. 729.

Limit of compensation fixed by Workers’ Compensation Act as inclusive or exclusive of medical or hospitalization expenses. 128 A.L.R. 136.

Loss of member, what amounts to. 18 A.L.R. 1350.

Operation performed to make use of corrective appliance possible or more effective, award with respect to. 143 A.L.R. 581.

Total or partial disability, right to compensation as for, in case of abnormal condition of body or member which results from or is incident to specific injury for which the act makes special allowance. 156 A.L.R. 1344.

Validity, construction, and application of state workers’ compensation laws specifically providing for facial disfigurement. 11 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2016).

Validity, construction, and application of state workers’ compensation laws to claim for hearing loss — Resulting from long term noise exposure. 99 A.L.R.6th 643.

28-33-20. Computation of earnings.

  1. For the purposes of this chapter, the average weekly wage shall be ascertained as follows:
    1. For full-time or regular employees, by dividing the gross wages, inclusive of overtime pay; provided, that bonuses and overtime shall be averaged over the length of employment but not in excess of the preceding fifty-two (52) week period, earned by the injured worker in employment by the employer in whose service he or she is injured during the thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately preceding the week in which he or she was injured, by the number of calendar weeks during which, or any portion of which, the worker was actually employed by that employer, including any paid vacation time. In making this computation, absence for seven (7) consecutive calendar days, although not in the same calendar week, shall be considered as absence for a calendar week. When the employment commenced otherwise than the beginning of a calendar week, the calendar week and wages earned during that week shall be excluded in making the above computation. When the employment previous to injury as provided above is computed to be less than a net period of two (2) calendar weeks, his or her weekly wage shall be considered to be equivalent to the average weekly wage prevailing in the same or similar employment at the time of injury except that when an employer has agreed to pay a certain hourly wage to the worker, then the hourly wage so agreed upon shall be the hourly wage for the injured worker and his or her average weekly wage shall be computed by multiplying that hourly wage by the number of weekly hours scheduled for full-time work by full-time employees regularly employed by the employer. Where the injured employee has worked for more than one employer during the thirteen (13) weeks immediately preceding his or her injury, his or her average weekly wages shall be calculated upon the basis of wages earned from all those employers in the period involved by totaling the gross earnings from all the employers and dividing by the number of weeks in which he or she was actually employed by any employer, in the same manner as if the employee had worked for a single employer and, except in the case of apportionment of liability among successive employers as provided in § 28-34-8 , the employer in whose employ the injury was sustained shall be liable for all benefits provided by chapters 29 — 38 of this title. A schedule of the computation of the average weekly wage in compliance with this section shall be a necessary part of the memorandum of agreement required by § 28-35-1 . Where the employer has been accustomed to paying the employee a sum to cover any special expense incurred by the employee by the nature of his or her employment, the sum paid shall not be reckoned as part of the employee’s wages, earnings, or salary. The fact that an employee has suffered a previous injury or received compensation for a previous injury shall not preclude compensation for a later injury or for death; but in determining the compensation for the later injury or death, his or her average weekly wages shall be any sum that will reasonably represent his or her weekly earning capacity at the time of the later injury, in the employment in which he or she was working at that time, and shall be arrived at according to, and subject to the limitations of, the provisions of this section. In computing the average weekly wages earned subsequent to the first injury, the time worked and wages earned prior to that injury shall be excluded.
    2. In occupations that are seasonal, the “average weekly wage” means one-fifty second (1/52) of the total wages which the employee has earned during the twelve (12) calendar months immediately preceding the injury.
    3. “Wages of an employee working part-time” means the gross wages earned during the number of weeks so employed, or of weeks in which the employee worked, up to a maximum of twenty-six (26) calendar weeks immediately preceding the date of injury, divided by the number of weeks employed, or by twenty-six (26), as the case may be. “Part-time” means working by custom and practice under the verbal or written employment contract in force at the time of the injury, where the employee agrees to work or is expected to work on a regular basis less than twenty (20) hours per week. Wages shall be calculated as follows:
      1. For part-time employees, by dividing the gross wages, inclusive of overtime pay; provided, any bonuses and overtime shall be averaged over the length of employment but not in excess of the preceding fifty-two (52) week period, earned by the injured worker in employment by the employer in whose service he or she is injured during the twenty-six (26) consecutive calendar weeks immediately preceding the week in which he or she was injured, by the number of calendar weeks during which, or any portion of which, the worker was actually employed by that employer, including any paid vacation time. In making this computation, absence for seven (7) consecutive calendar days, although not in the same calendar week, shall be considered as absence for a calendar week. When the employment commenced otherwise than the beginning of a calendar week, the calendar week and wages earned during that week shall be excluded in making the above computation. When the employment previous to injury as provided above is computed to be less than a net period of two (2) weeks, the weekly wage shall be considered to be equivalent to the average weekly wage prevailing in the same or similar employment at the time of injury except that when an employer has agreed to pay a certain hourly wage to the worker, then the hourly wage so agreed upon shall be the hourly wage for the injured worker and his or her average weekly wage shall be computed by multiplying that hourly wage by the number of weekly hours agreed upon in the contract of hire.
      2. In the event the injured employee had concurrent employment with one or more additional employers at the time of injury, the average weekly wage shall be calculated for the twenty-six (26) calendar weeks preceding the week in which the employee was injured upon the basis of wages earned from all those employers in the period involved by totaling the gross earnings from all the employers and dividing by the number of usable weeks the employee actually was employed by that employer, in the same manner as if the employee had worked for a single employer; provided, in the case of apportionment of liability among successive employers pursuant to § 28-34-8 , the employer in whose employ the injury was sustained shall be liable for all benefits provided by chapters 29 — 38 of this title. In the case that the injured employee’s other employer is a full-time employer, the average weekly wage shall be calculated according to subdivision (1) for the thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately preceding the week in which he or she was injured. Calculations for part-time employment shall be calculated separately for the twenty-six (26) calendar weeks immediately preceding the week of injury. A schedule of computation of the average weekly wage in compliance with this section shall be a necessary part of the memorandum of agreement required by § 28-35-1 .
      3. Where the employer is accustomed to paying the employee a sum to cover any special expense incurred by the employee by the nature of the employment, that sum shall not be reckoned as part of the employee’s wages, earnings, or salary. The fact that an employee has suffered a previous injury or received compensation for a previous injury shall not preclude compensation for a later injury or for death. In determining the compensation for the later injury or death, the average weekly wage shall be any sum that will reasonably represent the employee’s earning capacity at the time of the later injury, in the employment in which he or she was working at that time, and shall be derived according to, and subject to, the limitations of the provisions of this section; provided, that in computing the average weekly wages earned subsequent to the first injury, the time worked and wages earned prior to that injury shall be excluded.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 13; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 13; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 13; P.L. 1941, ch. 1057, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-20 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 145, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 228, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2.

Cross References.

Disaster response worker, computation of earnings, § 28-31-13 .

National or state guardsmen, computation of earnings, § 28-31-10 .

Public and medical assistance, effect of payments on workers’ compensation awards, § 40-6-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

The legislative intent of this section is to provide the employee with an equitable formula for the calculation of benefits while providing a safeguard for the employer against the possibility of excessive claims brought by a newly hired employee. Smith v. Colonial Knife Co., 731 A.2d 724, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 144 (R.I. 1999).

Bonus.

A payment in the nature of a bonus, if proven, will be includable in computing the employee’s average weekly wage. Sullivan v. Empire Equip. Eng'g Co., 492 A.2d 1212, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 506 (R.I. 1985).

Burden of Proof.

Petitioner failed to meet burden of proving the amount and existence of her husband’s supplemental wages where the only evidence introduced were receipts that did not delineate the husband’s profits or earnings, and the petitioner did not introduce her husband’s applicable income tax records. Gardiner v. Arrow Lake Dairy, 476 A.2d 526, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 530 (R.I. 1984).

Calculations.

The Appellate Division acted properly in conducting a de novo review and in modifying the trial court’s calculation on the grounds that the trial court was clearly erroneous in not following the method for computation of wages set forth in this section but instead relying on the petitioner’s own testimony. Forte v. Fernando Originals, 667 A.2d 780, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 279 (R.I. 1995).

Where there was substantial medical evidence in the record to allow the appellate division to determine that an occupational disease arose in the course of the plaintiff’s employment, and where there was an involuntary hiatus in his employment immediately prior to his incapacitation, there was no error in the court’s construction of the workers’ compensation statute to provide that the average weekly wage could be calculated on the basis of the amount the plaintiff earned during the thirteen weeks immediately preceding the last day of his employment. Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 723 A.2d 777, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 1999).

Holiday Pay.

Holiday pay should be included in the calculation of gross wages, since to exclude it would precipitate an inequitable result for the employee who incurs injuries at work during or immediately after a holiday season. Smith v. Colonial Knife Co., 731 A.2d 724, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 144 (R.I. 1999).

Multiple Employers.

This section does not make a specific recommendation for computing the average weekly wage where there has been more than one employer and where the employee has worked at neither job for the statutory period. McCormick v. Ice Cream Mach. Co., 442 A.2d 433, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1164 (R.I. 1982).

Where, during 13 weeks prior to injury, employee worked for two employers, but not for entire 13 weeks in either job, there was no error in computing the employee’s average weekly wage by adding together his average weekly wage while at each job. McCormick v. Ice Cream Mach. Co., 442 A.2d 433, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1164 (R.I. 1982).

Other Employment.

Earnings received from unrelated work for a second employer cannot be included in computation of compensation. De Asis v. Fram Corp., 78 R.I. 249 , 81 A.2d 280, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1951).

Overtime.

There is nothing in the law that would justify the exclusion of overtime from the calculations of an injured worker’s weekly wage. McKenna v. Turnquist Lumber Co., 511 A.2d 298, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 507 (R.I. 1986) (decided prior to 1992 amendment).

Prior to the 1992 amendment pay for overtime work was properly included in ascertaining the average weekly wages of an injured employee, but the 1992 amendment specifically excludes from the calculation of an injured employee’s average weekly wages “overtime pay,” without distinguishing between mandatory as opposed to voluntary overtime pay. Silva v. Stanley-Bostitch, 651 A.2d 1222, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 277 (R.I. 1994).

Part-Time Employees.

The Worker’s Compensation Court erred when it calculated the wages of an insured part-time employee by multiplying the employee’s hourly wage by the number of weekly hours scheduled for full-time employees. A more effective interpretation of the legislative intent behind this section to compensate the insured part-time employee adequately and fairly would be to calculate her average wage on the basis of her actual wages, as evidenced by the record. Bailey v. American Stores, 610 A.2d 117, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 164 (R.I. 1992).

A part-time employee is entitled to have his average weekly wage computed at forty times his hourly rate even though it results in his receiving compensation in excess of his weekly earnings prior to his injury. Gamba v. Testa's Auto Body Works, 103 R.I. 366 , 238 A.2d 618, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 804 (1968).

Period of Earnings.

Superior court was not clearly wrong in basing computation of average earnings on three-month period rather than full year. Johnson v. Lanifero, 73 R.I. 238 , 54 A.2d 412, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1947).

Formula used by commission in determining average weekly wage by taking the average of the weekly wages earned in the four weeks next before being disabled although during part of such time she was employed at a different type of work than at the time of the injury, was not contrary to the law. Shoren v. United States Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 319 , 140 A.2d 768, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1958).

An employee of a carnival who received each week seven dollars for setting up the rides and seven dollars for taking them down without evidence as to the average amount of time consumed in each operation was not entitled to have his average weekly wage computed at forty times the state minimum wage of $1.25. McCrudden v. Venditto Bros., 103 R.I. 201 , 235 A.2d 878, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 599 (1967).

It would have been inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the workers’ compensation statute to conclude that, because the statute did not specifically provide for the situation where an eighteen-year employee involuntarily failed to earn a weekly wage for the thirteen weeks prior to his incapacitation, his claim failed. Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 723 A.2d 777, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 1999).

Stipulations.

Issue of whether or not an employee was a full-time or a part-time employee was not open for consideration because the employee’s stipulation that he was a part-time employee was clearly a factual assertion; as such, the employee was bound by that stipulation. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

Because the stipulation as to an employee having received “unemployment compensation benefits” was a legal conclusion to which the Supreme Court was not bound, its analysis and conclusions were not influenced by the employee having stipulated to receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

Tips.

Tips received by an employee working less than a full week should be projected to a full 40-hour week as a part of the computation of a full week’s earnings. Larochelle v. Hickory House, 80 R.I. 334 , 96 A.2d 830, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1953).

Work-Sharing Benefits.

Determination as to whether or not work-sharing benefits are akin to unemployment compensation benefits and should or should not be taken into account when determining a worker’s average weekly wage is a question of statutory construction, and questions of statutory construction are questions of law. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) properly affirmed the decision of the trial judge of the WCC, which found that work-sharing benefits were properly not included in an employee’s average weekly wage; work-sharing benefits cannot be taken into account when determining the average weekly wage to be used in calculating workers’ compensation benefits. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

This section is not clear and unambiguous because the statute itself is silent as to whether or not work-sharing benefits are part and parcel of the term “wages”; the commonsense understanding of the term “wages” and an examination of the broader statutory schemes lead to the definite conclusion that this section was not intended to take work-sharing benefits into consideration in determining average weekly wage for workers’ compensation purposes. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

Taking into account the definition of “wage” from a respected source, as well as the meaning given to the word “wage” in common parlance, the word refers to payment for labor or services rendered; work-sharing benefits are the antithesis of monies paid for hours worked and are by definition monies paid for hours not worked, and they are monies paid by the state, not by the employer. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

In view of the fact that work-sharing benefits are monies paid by the State for hours not worked, they align with traditional unemployment compensation benefits, which are likewise paid to an individual by the state during times when he or she is not working; work-sharing benefits should be treated like traditional unemployment compensation benefits. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

It is apparent from the broader statutory schemes that work-sharing benefits, at least in the context of this case, are to be treated like traditional unemployment compensation and should not be included in determining average weekly wage for workers’ compensation; such benefits are not included as part of the term “wages” in this section. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

Collateral References.

Anticipation of increase in wages of minor as element in fixing compensation. 21 A.L.R. 1531.

Application for, or receipt of, unemployment, compensation benefits as affecting claim for compensation. 96 A.L.R.2d 941.

Basis of compensation of employee employed by several. 30 A.L.R. 1002; 58 A.L.R. 1395.

Board and lodging as factor in determining amount of compensation. 84 A.L.R. 188.

Capital interest of injured employee in business conducted or served by him after injury as affecting amount of his benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. 88 A.L.R. 633.

Deduction for lost time in computing wages as basis for compensation. 82 A.L.R. 889.

Deduction in computing compensation on account of recovery from third person responsible for injury, construction and application of provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act for. 142 A.L.R. 170.

Deductions allowable in computing earnings as basis for compensation. 22 A.L.R. 864.

Disobedience of servants in doing prohibited act as ground for reducing of compensation. 23 A.L.R. 1172; 26 A.L.R. 166; 58 A.L.R. 197; 83 A.L.R. 1211; 119 A.L.R. 1409.

Expense money as a factor in computing one’s earnings as basis for award. 94 A.L.R. 763.

Future earnings or benefits lost on account of personal injuries, rate of discount to be considered in computing present value of. 105 A.L.R. 234.

Intermittent employment, basis for computation of compensation in case of. 112 A.L.R. 1094.

Medical or surgical treatment, right to compensation for new or aggravated injury as result of. 127 A.L.R. 1108.

Previous loss or mutilation of member as affecting amount or basis of benefits under Workers’ Compensation Act. 30 A.L.R. 979; 96 A.LR. 1080.

Right to compensation as affected by the fact that injured employee earns, or is offered, as much as, or more than, before the injury. 149 A.L.R. 413.

Right to take rise or fall in wages since date of accident into account in fixing amount of benefits. 2 A.L.R. 1642; 92 A.L.R. 1188.

Time as of which earnings are to be considered in computing compensation resulting from causes not immediately operative. 86 A.L.R. 524.

Tips or gratuities as factor in determining amount of compensation. 75 A.L.R. 1223.

Workers’ compensation: bonus as factor in determining amount of compensation. 84 A.L.R.4th 1055.

Workers’ compensation: tips or gratuities as factor in determining amount of compensation. 16 A.L.R.5th 191.

28-33-20.1. Computation of earnings for recurrence — Burden of employee to establish recurrence.

  1. In the event a person collecting benefits under this chapter, regardless of the date of injury, has returned to employment for a period of twenty-six (26) weeks or more and suffers a recurrence of the injury that precipitated the person collecting benefits under this chapter, the average weekly wage shall be ascertained by applying the same formula of § 28-33-20 to the thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately preceding the week in which he or she suffered the recurrence. In making this computation, absence for seven (7) consecutive calendar days, although not in the same calendar week, shall be considered as absence for a calendar week.
  2. For all petitions filed to prove recurrence of incapacity to work, regardless of the date of injury, the employee must document that the incapacity has increased or returned without the need for the employee to document a comparative change of condition.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 34; P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 1, effective July 14, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 1, effective July 14, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burden of Proof.

When an employee files a petition to review, alleging a return of incapacity, he needs to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that his disability returned and resulted in his incapacity to work, and he is not required, in keeping with the clear mandate of subsection (b), to introduce evidence of a comparative change of condition (i.e., he is not required to demonstrate that his condition at the time of the alleged recurrence of incapacity was worse than his condition at the time his original benefits were suspended). Veloso v. Scott Brass, Inc., 680 A.2d 941, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 209 (R.I. 1996).

This section specifically alters the burden of proof required of an employee to prove a recurrence of disability; the employee is not longer required to document a comparative change of condition. Grant v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 692 A.2d 685, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 1997).

Dismissal of the employee’s claim under this section because the employee failed to prove a “worsening” of her condition was erroneous; all that is required is that the employee prove that his or her incapacity has returned and the incapacity is causally related to the earlier work related injury. Grant v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 692 A.2d 685, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 1997).

Elements.

The elements of proving a recurrence of incapacity claim based on a return of a prior incapacity are: (1) The employee must establish a relationship or a nexus between his or her previous incapacity and the alleged recurrence; (2) The employee need not document a comparative change of condition. LaFazia v. D. Moretti Sheet Metal Co., 692 A.2d 1206, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 125 (R.I. 1997).

28-33-21. Savings or other insurance not to be considered.

No savings or insurance of the injured employee, independent of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, shall be taken into consideration in determining the compensation to be paid, nor shall benefits derived from any other source than the employer be considered in fixing the compensation under those chapters, except as provided in § 28-33-45 . Any employer who refuses or delays payment under those chapters on account of the receipt by any injured employee of savings, insurance, or benefits shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be liable to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 14; P.L. 1913, ch. 937, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 14; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-21 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5.

Cross References.

Municipal employees’ retirement allowance, offset against, § 45-21-31 .

Retirement system benefits, reduction by receipt of workers’ compensation benefits, § 36-10-31 .

Temporary disability benefits, effect of workers’ compensation payments on, § 28-41-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Benefits From Other Sources.

Benefits to which this section referred did not include wages or earnings received outside the employment in which the employee was injured. Stillwater Worsted Mills v. Beal, 89 R.I. 34 , 150 A.2d 704, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1959).

Multiple Employers.

Where employee was killed while on trip for concurrent employers, full compensation could be awarded against each employer. Gehring v. Nottingham Lace Works, 82 R.I. 190 , 106 A.2d 923, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1954).

Retirement Benefits.

Retirement benefits paid to an employee shall not be deducted from, credited against, or used as an offset to workers’ compensation benefits due him. BIF v. Des Roches, 117 R.I. 914 , 364 A.2d 1290, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1678 (1976).

Collateral References.

Insured’s receipt of or right to workers’ compensation benefits as affecting recovery under accident, hospital, or medical expense policy. 40 A.L.R.3d 1012.

28-33-22. Minors employed in violation of law.

  1. If, at the time of the injury, the injured employee is a minor employed in violation of any law of this state or of the United States relating to the employment of minors, then the compensation payable shall be treble the amount that would have been payable if that minor had been legally employed.
  2. In fixing the amount of any compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, due allowance shall be made for any sum that the employer may have paid to any injured minor employee or to his dependents on account of the injury, except those sums that the employer may have expended or directed to be expended for medical, surgical, or hospital service.
  3. Whenever the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for the employer is obligated to pay treble the amount that would have been payable if that minor had been legally employed, the workers’ compensation insurance carrier shall have a complete right of indemnification to the extent the additional benefits are paid against the employer for the additional benefits paid above and beyond the usual workers’ compensation indemnity benefit.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 26; P.L. 1917, ch. 1534, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 26; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 26; G.L., ch. 300, art. 2, § 25; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-22 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Disfigurement.

This statute requiring that a minor injured while illegally employed be awarded treble damages was intended to apply to an award of compensation for disfigurement under former § 28-33-19(n)(2) relating to permanent disfigurement about the face, head, neck, hand, or arm. Matthews v. Falvey Linen Supply, 110 R.I. 558 , 294 A.2d 398, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 952 (1972).

Hours of Employment.

Testimony that an office clerk was informed at 10:30 p.m. that an accident had occurred and testimony of the employer that he was notified of the accident at 10:45 p.m. were sufficient to sustain the commission’s finding that the accident occurred before 11:00 p.m. and the minor employee was not employed after 11:00 p.m. in violation of § 28-3-11 . Le Blanc v. Balon, 104 R.I. 99 , 242 A.2d 292, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 621 (1968).

Misrepresentation by Minor.

Misrepresentation of age at the time of employment does not prevent recovery of additional compensation under this section. Deignan v. Cowan Plastic Prods. Corp., 99 R.I. 193 , 206 A.2d 534, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 416 (1965).

Prohibited Employment.

Question of whether minor decedent was a motor vehicle “helper” within the meaning of an order issued by the U.S. secretary of labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and was therefore illegally employed, was a question of fact under such act. Le Blanc v. Balon, 104 R.I. 517 , 247 A.2d 92, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 674 (1968).

Collateral References.

Insurance carrier’s liability for part of employer’s liability attributable to violation of law or other misconduct on his part. 1 A.L.R.2d 407.

Minor illegally employed, extra compensation in case of injury to. 142 A.L.R. 1018.

Workers’ compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor’s tort action. 77 A.L.R.4th 844.

28-33-23. Persons to whom compensation payable in event of death.

  1. The compensation payable under chapters 29 — 38 of this title in case of death of the injured employee shall be paid to his or her legal representatives. If he or she has no legal representative, the amount is payable to his or her dependents entitled to that compensation or, if he or she leaves no dependents, to the person to whom the expenses for the burial and last sickness are due.
  2. If the payment is made to the legal representative of the deceased employee, it shall be paid by the legal representative to the dependents or other persons entitled to it under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 15; P.L. 1949, ch. 2231, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Minor Children.

Legal representative of employee may petition for compensation on behalf of minor children. Johnson v. Lanifero, 73 R.I. 238 , 54 A.2d 412, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1947).

Right to Compensation Personal.

Right of dependent mother to compensation terminates on her death during statutory period and does not pass to her representatives. Duffney v. A. F. Morse Lumber Co., 42 R.I. 260 , 107 A. 225, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1919); Botelho v. J. H. Tredennick, Inc., 64 R.I. 326 , 12 A.2d 282, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1940).

Collateral References.

Survival of right to compensation under Workers’ Compensation Act upon death of the person entitled to the award. 15 A.L.R. 821; 24 A.L.R. 441; 29 A.L.R. 1426; 51 A.L.R. 1446; 87 A.L.R. 864; 95 A.L.R. 254.

28-33-24. Cessation of payments on death of employee.

All payments of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall cease upon the death of the employee from a cause other than or not induced by the injury for which he or she is receiving compensation; provided, that where specific compensation is payable under the provisions of § 28-33-19 , those payments shall be vested and are not to be divested by any subsequent happening or contingency.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 15; P.L. 1949, ch. 2231, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-24 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Commutation Agreements.

The estate of a deceased employee does not succeed to the employee’s rights or benefits under a commutation agreement after the employee’s death that occurs after the agreement is signed but prior to the hearing on the petition for commutation in the Workers’ Compensation Court. Ciambrone ex rel. Ciambrone v. A, C & S, Inc., 649 A.2d 1027, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 264 (R.I. 1994).

28-33-25. Settlement for lump sum or structured-type payment.

    1. The parties may petition the workers’ compensation court for an order approving a settlement of the future liability for a lump sum or structured-type periodic payment over a period of time.
      1. In considering the petition, a judge shall give due weight to the fact that it is the policy of this chapter that compensation be paid weekly.
      2. The petition shall be considered by a judge of the court and may be granted where it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the payment of a lump sum or structured-type payment in lieu of future weekly payments will be in the best interest of all parties including the employee, employer, insurance carrier, and where applicable, the workers’ compensation administrative fund and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as their interests may appear. Any proposed settlement that exceeds one hundred four (104) weeks of compensation for partial incapacity may be rejected by the chief judge in his or her discretion. The employee shall be entitled to a finding amortizing the net settlement over his or her life expectancy.
      3. In determining whether the settlement is in the best interest of all parties, the judge may refer the employee for a rehabilitation evaluation pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-41 .
    2. Upon payment, the employer and insurer shall be entitled to a duly executed release, which fully and finally absolves and discharges the employer and insurer from any and all liability arising out of the injury.
  1. The provisions of this section shall be strictly construed and all hearings for commutation shall be conducted in open session.
  2. No case may be settled to a lump sum or structured-type periodic payment while the Rhode Island temporary disability insurance fund and/or department of human services has a claim for payments made under chapter 41 of this title unless agreement is made to pay any claim from the lump sum or structured-type periodic payments.
  3. Attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the court, but in no event shall any attorney’s fee for representing an employee in connection with a petition brought pursuant to this section exceed a sum equal to twenty percent (20%) of the lump sum or twenty percent (20%) of the structured-type periodic payment reduced to present day value.
  4. No case shall be settled for a lump sum or structured-type periodic payment unless it is placed upon the record in open session, that the employer, if insured, has been advised by the insurer or its agent of the potential effect of the settlement on its workers’ compensation premium, and has the opportunity to appear and state its disapproval of the settlement.
  5. Settlements must be paid within fourteen (14) days of entry of an order to pay or the date(s) upon which payment(s) is/are due pursuant to a court order, and a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) shall be assessed for every day payment is delinquent.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 25; G.L. ch. 300, art. 2, § 24; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-25 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 6, § 8; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 4, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 3, and P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burden of Proof.

Employee seeking commutation of total disability payments has burden of proof as to whether total disability will continue for the full period for which commutation is sought. (But see § 28-33-17(b)(2) ). Lupoli v. Atlantic Tubing Co., 43 R.I. 299 , 111 A. 766, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1920).

Computation.

If statute was not followed in determining amount of commutation remedy was by appeal, and where such remedy was not availed of petitioner cannot at a later date collaterally attack the validity of the decree in another original petition for compensation. Dupere v. Brassard, 87 R.I. 205 , 139 A.2d 879, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1958).

Court must determine the lump sum payment on the basis of the “probable” future payments and not necessarily on the basis of the full period of weekly payments prescribed in the act. Dupere v. Brassard, 87 R.I. 205 , 139 A.2d 879, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1958).

When a claimant received a lump sum workers’ compensation (WC) settlement, which applied prospectively under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-25(a)(1) , the claimant was disqualified from receiving temporary disability insurance (TDI) benefits for the same period because R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-41-6 prohibited a simultaneous award of TDI and WC benefits. Duffy v. Powell, 18 A.3d 487, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 2011).

Effect on Unemployment Compensation.

Plaintiff who had received a lump-sum payment in commutation of her workers’ compensation claim that was based upon an estimated 25 weeks of future payments could not receive unemployment compensation during that period. Almstead v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 478 A.2d 980, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 585 (R.I. 1984).

Evidence.

Finding that commutation was for best interest of recipient could not be based on judgment of counsel but must be based on legal evidence. Harvey v. Brown, 56 R.I. 34 , 183 A. 639, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1936).

Finality of Commutation.

Where commutation to lump sum payment was made under this section and release given by injured person he could not thereafter, when amputation of leg became necessary as result of injury, petition for specific compensation for loss of leg or for review of the commutation decree. Dupere v. Brassard, 87 R.I. 205 , 139 A.2d 879, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1958).

It is for the injured employee at the time of a commutation hearing to make known to the commission every fact lending itself to a just determination of probable future payments and, where such employee may have reason to believe that weekly payments for specific compensation may also be in order in determining the present value of probable future payments, he cannot ignore them at the time of commutation and lay claim to them later. Sarrasin v. Crescent Co., 104 R.I. 69 , 241 A.2d 818, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 615 (1968).

Grounds for Commutation.

Where recipient of compensation would not be inconvenienced by weekly payments, fact that she was removing from the United States was not sufficient ground for commutation. Bacon v. United Elec. Rys., 51 R.I. 84 , 150 A. 818, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1930).

Desire to pay debts was not sufficient reason for commutation. Bacon v. United Elec. Rys., 51 R.I. 84 , 150 A. 818, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1930).

Commutation was justified by showing that employee had opportunity to invest in business for his own support and that there was good prospect of success. Gardner v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 60 R.I. 243 , 197 A. 874, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1938).

Grounds for Denial.

Decree denying commutation was justified by evidence supporting finding that proposed use of the commutation would be an unwise investment. Kosgarian v. Fairmount Foundry Co., 71 R.I. 148 , 42 A.2d 891, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1945); Sangermano v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 84 R.I. 246 , 123 A.2d 137, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1956).

Parties.

Minor children are necessary parties to a widow’s petition for commutation. Ciaccia v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 44 R.I. 109 , 115 A. 801, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1922).

Collateral References.

Commutation of payments under Workers’ Compensation Act, specific grounds for. 69 A.L.R. 547.

Lump sum awards to widows, use of remarriage tables in computing. 25 A.L.R.2d 1464.

Minor beneficiaries, protection of rights of, in proceeding for commutation of award. 120 A.L.R. 402.

Workers’ compensation: reopening lump-sum compensation payment. 26 A.L.R.5th 127.

28-33-25.1. Settlement of disputed cases.

Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 28-33-25 and 28-33-26 , in cases where liability of the employer for payment of workers’ compensation benefits has not been finally established, the parties may submit a settlement proposal to the workers’ compensation court for approval. If, upon consideration, a judge of the workers’ compensation court deems the settlement proposal to be in the best interest of the parties, including the employee, employer, and the insurance carrier, the judge may approve the settlement. Payment by the employer or insurer shall not be deemed to be the payment of workers’ compensation benefits, but shall be considered a compromise payment of a disputed claim. The settlement and payment pursuant to it shall not be subject to liens set forth in § 28-33-27(b) and must be paid within fourteen (14) days of entry of an order to pay or the date(s) upon which payment(s) is/are due pursuant to a court order, and a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) shall be assessed for every day the payment is delinquent. Upon payment, the employer and insurer shall be entitled to a duly executed release that fully and finally absolves and discharges the employer and insurer from any and all liability arising out of the claimed injury.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 8; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 3; P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 1, effective July 14, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 1, effective July 14, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 3, and P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 402, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 403, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Settlement.

Because settlement payments made pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-25.1 were payable under the workers’ compensation scheme, and because statements by a governmental employee that contradicted state law were not made with the purpose of inducing a retired employee to act in reliance on the representation, the offset provisions in R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-10-31 applied. Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 133 (R.I. 2009).

Hospital employee, who sustained injuries after falling in a hospital corridor and settled a workers’ compensation claim, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-25.1 , was not entitled to bring a later negligence action alleging the hospital failed to maintain the corridor in reasonably safe condition because the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Law § 28-29-20 , barred any subsequent civil action against the hospital arising from the same incident. Kulawas v. R.I. Hosp., 994 A.2d 649, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 59 (R.I. 2010).

28-33-26. Waivers of compensation void.

No agreement by an employee, except as provided in §§ 28-29-22 28-29-24 , to waive his or her rights to compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be valid except to the extent permitted by § 28-41-6 or 28-33-25.1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 26; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-26 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Invalid Agreements.

This section renders invalid an attempt by an employee to waive compensation to which he is entitled under a preliminary agreement for total incapacity in full force and effect by later petitioning for partial incapacity benefits. Olbrys v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 89 R.I. 187 , 151 A.2d 684, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1959).

If a delay of three years between the termination of payments and the filing of a petition for the continuation of payments could be construed as a waiver of compensation it would be deemed invalid under this section. Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., 91 R.I. 221 , 162 A.2d 557, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1960).

Valid Agreements.

A computation agreement was not void as being a waiver of the employee’s right to specific compensation. Sarrasin v. Crescent Co., 104 R.I. 69 , 241 A.2d 818, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 615 (1968).

28-33-27. Immunity of claims from assignment or liability for debt.

  1. No claims or payments due for compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title or under any alternative scheme permitted by §§ 28-29-22 28-29-24 shall be assignable, or subject to attachment, or liable in any way for any debts, except as set forth in subsection (b) of this section.
  2. A lien in favor of the department of labor and training and/or the executive office of health and human services shall attach by operation of law to any benefits due and payable under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, or under any alternative scheme by §§ 28-29-22 28-29-24 , to the extent that those payments have been made by the department of labor and training and/or the executive office of health and human services to or on behalf of an injured employee or his or her dependents, but only to the extent that the employee would be entitled to receive benefits under the provision of these chapters. Any such lien is subject to the provisions of § 40-6-10 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 22; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-27 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 2012, ch. 241, art. 11, § 3.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment substituted “department of labor and training” for “department of employment security” in subsection (b).

Cross References.

Benefits exempt from hospital lien provisions, § 9-3-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 28-33-3.

This section is subject to § 28-33-3 and attorney may have a lien against compensation recovered. Carty v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 70 R.I. 472 , 40 A.2d 597, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1944).

Derivative Purchases.

Debtor’s claimed exemption for an automobile which was purchased with proceeds traceable to her worker’s compensation benefits was unauthorized under this section as the exemption ended when debtor received a lump-sum compensation payment for her work-related injury. In re Bonzey, 153 B.R. 105, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 670 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993).

Spousal and Child Support.

Workers’ compensation proceeds in the hands of third persons may be reached for the benefit of wives and children whom the employee has an obligation to support. Cardenas v. Cardenas, 478 A.2d 968, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 555 (R.I. 1984).

Collateral References.

Assignment or release of claim under compensation acts, constitutionality of prohibition. 47 A.L.R. 799.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions. 52 A.L.R.5th 221.

Exemption of workers’ compensation award as affected by deposit thereof. 67 A.L.R. 1205.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutory exemptions of proceeds of workers’ compensation awards. 48 A.L.R.5th 473.

28-33-28. Priority of claim over debts of employer.

The claim for compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title or under any alternative scheme permitted by §§ 28-29-22 28-29-24 , and any determination or decree on any claim shall be entitled to a preference over the unsecured debts of the employer subsequently contracted to the same amount as the wages of labor are now preferred by the laws of this state; but nothing in this section shall be construed as impairing any lien which the employee may have acquired.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 23; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-28 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7.

28-33-29. Exercise of rights or privileges by guardian, conservator, or next friend.

In case an injured employee is mentally incompetent, or, where death results from the injury, in case any of his or her dependents entitled to compensation under this chapter are mentally incompetent or minors at the time when any right, privilege, or election accrues to him or her or them under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, his or her conservator, guardian, or next friend may, in his or her behalf, claim and exercise that right, privilege, or election, and no limitation of time provided in those chapters shall run so long as the incompetent or minor has no conservator or guardian.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 16; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-29 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Employee Suit.

Claim that the limitation period of § 28-35-57 was tolled for a claim for benefits for minor children under § 28-33-17 was held not to be before the court where the petition for review was filed neither by the employee’s children nor by a legal guardian acting in their behalf but rather by the employee herself in her own name. Yates v. Dr. J. H. Ladd Sch., 120 R.I. 294 , 387 A.2d 1043, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 671 (1978); Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

28-33-30. Time for notice of injury to employer.

No proceedings for compensation for an injury under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be maintained unless a notice of the injury has been given to the employer within thirty (30) days after the happening or manifestation of the injury.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 17; P.L. 1941, ch. 1061, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-30 .

Cross References.

Notices to state or municipality as employer, § 28-31-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Second Injury Fund Participation.

Notice is not required to participate in the second injury indemnity fund as the filing of a petition with the director of labor under § 28-37-6 is the initial step. Koshgarian v. Hawksley, 90 R.I. 293 , 157 A.2d 663, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1960).

Subsequent Claims.

Although this section requires that the injured party give notice when the original incapacity first develops, it does not demand that an additional notice be given within 30 days after the condition, which is the basis of a subsequent claim, first manifests itself. Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174 , 250 A.2d 361, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 735 (1969).

Collateral References.

Action by employee for injury as claim or notice of claim. 98 A.L.R. 529.

Infants, provision limiting time for giving notice of injury as applied to. 142 A.L.R. 1035.

Mental incompetence as obviating effect of failure to comply with provisions of compensation act as to giving notice. 91 A.L.R. 1400.

Requirements of Workers’ Compensation Act as to notice of accident or injury. 78 A.L.R. 1232; 92 A.L.R. 505; 107 A.L.R. 816; 145 A.L.R. 1263.

War as suspending time for notice of filing of claim under Workers’ Compensation Act. 137 A.L.R. 1465; 140 A.L.R. 1518; 141 A.L.R. 1511.

28-33-31. Contents of notice to employer.

Notice as required by § 28-33-30 shall state in ordinary language the nature, time, place, and cause of the injury, and the name and address of the person injured, and shall be signed by the injured person, or by a person in his or her behalf, or, in the event of his or her death, by his or her legal representative, or by a person in behalf of either.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 18; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-31 ; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-33-32. Manner of serving notice.

Notice as required by § 28-33-30 shall be served upon the employer, or upon one employer, if there are more employers than one, or if the employer is a corporation, upon any officer or agent upon whom process may be served, by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served, or by leaving it at his or her last known residence or place of business, or by sending it by registered or certified mail addressed to the person to be served, or, in the case of a corporation, to the corporation itself, at his or her or its last known residence or place of business. Mailing of the notice shall constitute completed service.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 19; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-32 .

28-33-33. Inaccuracies in notice — Want of notice as defense.

A notice given under the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason of any inaccuracy in stating the nature, time, place, or cause of the injury, or the name and address of the person injured, if:

  1. It is shown that the employer or his or her agent had actual knowledge of the injury;
  2. The court determines that good cause exists for failure to give notice in a timely manner;
  3. The employer or insurer was not in fact misled by it; or
  4. The employer or insurer does not contest the claim.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 20; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-33 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

This section is to be liberally construed in those cases in which it is not shown that the employer’s interests were prejudiced by lack of proper notice, but it is to be less liberally, or in some circumstances, even strictly construed where such prejudice is shown. Lipscomb v. Halloran Constr. Co., 86 R.I. 159 , 133 A.2d 759, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1957).

Accident, Mistake or Unforeseen Cause.
— Physical Inability.

Physical inability to give written notice within the statutory period was “accident or unforeseen cause” within the meaning of this section. Donahue v. R. A. Sherman's Sons Co., 39 R.I. 373 , 98 A. 109, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1916).

Finding.

Trial justice was not required to make finding on excuse for failure to give notice where no evidence thereon had been presented by claimant. Hind v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 83 R.I. 256 , 115 A.2d 343, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1955).

Knowledge of Employer.

Verbal notice of the injury and that employee was going to the hospital was sufficient knowledge. Gibbons v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 48 R.I. 353 , 138 A. 175, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1927).

Where the evidence clearly showed that the accident occurred in the plant and in the course of employment, failure to give proper notice did not prevent petitioner from recovering, where he had no knowledge that the type of accident would cause the injury which developed until long after the time for notice had expired but two foremen and the plant physician knew of the accident. Guglielmo v. Washburn Wire Co., 94 R.I. 320 , 180 A.2d 598, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1962).

Mental Incapacity.

Epilepsy did not constitute sufficient mental incapacity to excuse notice where employee was competent between attacks. Dunn v. United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co., 164 A. 329, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 160 (R.I. 1933).

— Mistake of Fact.

Employee who believed during first part of statutory period for notice that injury was not serious and who was physically unable to give notice during the latter part of the period was excused by reason of accident, mistake or unforeseen cause. Desrochers v. Atwood-Crawford Co., 47 R.I. 116 , 131 A. 48, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1925).

Failure of employee to connect illness with accident was a mistake excusing notice within the required time. Caspar v. East Providence Artesian Well Co., 49 R.I. 8 , 139 A. 470, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1927).

Where, during the statutory period for giving notice, employee did not recognize that he had sustained a serious injury which would become disabling, and there was no evidence that employer was prejudiced by lack of timely notice, such circumstance would be considered a mistake within the meaning of this section and the action would not be barred. Lipscomb v. Halloran Constr. Co., 86 R.I. 159 , 133 A.2d 759, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1957).

28-33-34. Physical examination by employer’s physician — Report.

The employee shall, after an injury, and at reasonable times during the continuance of his or her disability if so requested by his or her employer, submit himself or herself to an examination by a physician, or rehabilitation counselor certified by the director pursuant to § 28-33-41 in cases where the employee has received compensation for a period of more than three (3) months, furnished and paid for by the employer. The employee shall have the right to have a physician provided by the employee and paid for by the employer present at the examination. The employee shall be entitled to a full, exact, signed duplicate copy of the medical report of the examining physician, which shall be mailed by the employer or carrier to the employee and his or her attorney upon receipt of the original report by the employer or carrier. Failure to do so shall make the report or evidence of the examining physician inadmissible if objection is made by the employee to the admission of the report or evidence. Provided, that at the employee’s or his or her attorney’s request, a judge of the workers’ compensation court shall order the employer or carrier to furnish to the employee a full exact, signed duplicate copy of the medical report of the examining physician. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the employee to be receiving benefits as a condition precedent to the requirement of an examination.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1919, ch. 1795, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1941, ch. 1062, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1194, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2229, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-34 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 127, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1989, ch. 57, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 4; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 3; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attending Physician of Employer.

The plant physician did not stand in the position merely of an examining physician who is obligated to report the result of his examination to the employee or his attorney in accordance with the provisions of this section where it was clear he was the attending physician who treated the petitioner for his injury at the plant and not merely one who conducted an examination; he was the employee’s physician for the purpose of treatment and the employee accepted him as such without objection; the fact that the medical treatment was freely provided by the employer as a service incident to petitioner’s employment and without expense does not make the physician an examining physician within this section. Mis v. Washburn Wire Co., 97 R.I. 11 , 195 A.2d 334, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 126 (1963).

This section applies only in those instances when the medical examination has been made by a physician who has been hired by an employer to determine the extent of his employee’s injuries. Peloquin v. ITT Hammel-Dahl, 110 R.I. 330 , 292 A.2d 237, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 918 (1972).

An attending physician who treated the petitioning employee for his injury was not subject to the provisions of this section even though he was paid by the employer and had furnished medical treatment to the employee as a service incident to the employment. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Puniello, 422 A.2d 746, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1851 (R.I. 1980).

Delinquent Employer.

Employer which was delinquent in compensation payments could not require employee to submit to examination. Hingeco Mfg. Co. v. Haglund, 65 R.I. 218 , 14 A.2d 233, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1940).

Denial of Liability by Employer.

An employer who denies liability for an injury may not require the employee to submit himself to examinations under this section. Saccoccio v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 107 R.I. 53 , 264 A.2d 905, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 737 (1970).

An employer, who had not previously disclaimed liability under the act, may deny liability in reliance on a finding of regained capacity by the trial commissioner without sacrificing its rights under this section and § 28-33-38 . Salvas v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep't, 420 A.2d 74, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1846 (R.I. 1980).

Resumption of benefits for total disability caused by surgery that had been undertaken in an effort to relieve work-related symptoms was not precluded by the injured worker’s failure to keep an appointment made by the employer for an independent medical examination; the employer failed to show prejudice, since its physician was able to testify at the hearing on resumption of benefits, and the tribunal retained discretion to order forfeiture of benefits or not, as it saw fit. Tavares v. Aramark Corp., 841 A.2d 1124, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2004).

Report to Employee.

Delay in sending copy of report to employee did not preclude testimony by author of report where the delay was not unreasonable and did not prejudice employee. Morton C. Tuttle Co. v. Carbone, 84 R.I. 375 , 125 A.2d 133, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 100 (1956).

It was error to permit an examining physician to testify, where the employee was not given a copy of his report until the hearing, but such error was not prejudicial when there was other evidence in the record which supported the commission’s finding. Litchman v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 100 R.I. 352 , 216 A.2d 129, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 440 (1966).

Substantial compliance with the requirement that the employer provide the employee with copies of medical records may be sufficient if the employer can show that it did not act unreasonably and that there was no prejudice to the employee. Astro Plating Works Corp. v. Estrada, 463 A.2d 1309, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1032 (R.I. 1983).

The employer’s failure to comply with the letter of this section is not fatal if it can be shown that the employee’s attorney actually received a copy of the report, whether directly from the employer or from the employee. Astro Plating Works Corp. v. Estrada, 463 A.2d 1309, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1032 (R.I. 1983).

Scope of Examination.

Employee could not be required to undergo a test for diagnostic purposes which involved some risk to his health. Cranston Print Works v. Pascatore, 72 R.I. 471 , 53 A.2d 452, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1947).

Employee could not be required to submit to an exploratory operation which involved some risk. E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Andoscia, 79 R.I. 347 , 89 A.2d 179, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1952).

Contention of respondent that because a doctor had failed to state specifically either in his report or testimony what type of work the respondent was able to perform or that he was able to resume the same type of work he was doing at the time of the accident, such evidence did not support the finding of fact that he was no long incapacitated either totally or partially as a result of the injury and had regained his earning capacity, was held to be without merit on appeal. DeAngelis v. D'Angelo, 95 R.I. 240 , 186 A.2d 347, 727, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 157 (1962).

Collateral References.

Duty of injured employee to submit to examination. 6 A.L.R. 1270; 41 A.L.R. 866.

Employee’s reimbursement for travel expenses incurred in obtaining treatment of work-related injury. 36 A.L.R.5th 225.

28-33-34.1. Schedule of medical review.

  1. On or about twenty-six (26) weeks from the date of a compensable injury, any person obtaining incapacity benefits may be examined and their diagnosis and treatment reviewed by a comprehensive independent healthcare review team or an impartial medical examiner. The comprehensive independent healthcare review team or impartial medical examiner shall be selected through a mechanism to be established by the administrator of the medical advisory board. The results of the examination and review shall be provided to the employee and the insurer or self-insured employer within fourteen (14) days of the examination and a copy shall be filed with the medical advisory board. The comprehensive independent healthcare review team and/or impartial medical examiner shall review the treating physician’s findings and diagnosis and make its own findings of the extent and nature of the claimed disability, the degree of functional impairment and/or disability, the expectation of further medical improvement, any further medical care, treatment, and/or rehabilitation services that may be required to reach maximum medical improvement, type(s) of work that can be performed within existing physical capacity, the degree of disability expected at maximum medical improvement, whether the employee can return to the former position of employment, and compliance of the treating physician with protocols and standards of medical care established by the medical advisory board. The report may be subsequently admissible as a court exhibit. A party may be permitted to cross-examine the author(s) of the report with leave of the court.
  2. On or about thirteen (13) weeks after any examination under this section or § 28-33-35 , a comprehensive independent healthcare review team or impartial medical examiner shall perform a similar review. The same comprehensive independent healthcare review team or impartial medical examiner may not perform more than two (2) consecutive reviews on a particular employee.
  3. Failure to appear for examination under this section shall be grounds for suspension or termination of benefits unless justified by good cause. Residence outside the state does not, by itself, constitute good cause for failure to appear.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 8; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 2, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-33-35. Appointment of impartial medical examiner.

  1. Any judge of the court may, at any time after an injury, on his or her own motion or on the request or petition of the employer or employee, appoint an impartial medical examiner or a comprehensive independent healthcare review team to act as a medical examiner, and the reasonable fee of the medical examiner for examinations under this section and/or § 28-33-34.1 shall be paid by the employer.
  2. Impartial medical examiners and/or comprehensive independent healthcare review teams shall provide guidance and make recommendations with respect to contested or disputed findings of fact concerning health care. Impartial medical examiners and/or comprehensive independent healthcare review teams may also make findings as to compliance of healthcare providers with medical care standards and protocols established by the medical advisory board. Unless previously approved by the board, treatment or diagnostic services that are not consistent with the medical care standards and protocols shall not be charged to the employer or employee. The report of the findings of the impartial medical examiner and/or comprehensive independent healthcare review team may be admissible as an exhibit of the court. The findings of the report shall become final and binding unless either party elects to contest the findings. Notice of the contest must be filed within ten (10) days of receipt of the report required to be provided pursuant to § 28-33-34.1(a) . The contesting party shall pay the cost of the court appearance of the author of the report. In the event that the employee is the prevailing party, the employee shall be reimbursed for the entire amount paid by him or her for the court appearance of the author of the report.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1919, ch. 1795, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1941, ch. 1062, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1194, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2229, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-35 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 154, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With §§ 28-35-22 and 28-35-24.

In addition to the authority contained in this section and § 28-35-24 , authority on the part of the commissioner to order an impartial medical examination of the claimant was also given by § 28-35-22 on claimant employee’s petition to review a preliminary agreement under the workers’ compensation act. Zaccaria v. Paragon Worsted Co., 96 R.I. 105 , 189 A.2d 690, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1963).

Discretion of Commissioner.

The statute authorizing trial commissioners to appoint impartial medical examiners gave commissioners discretion to do so on his motion or on the motion of party. Dart Indus. v. Andrade, 108 R.I. 474 , 276 A.2d 460, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1292 (1971).

Discretion of Court.

Refusal of superior court to appoint as medical examiner a physician who had previously examined claimant was not an abuse of discretion. Oatley v. Callender, McAuslan & Troup Co., 72 R.I. 334 , 51 A.2d 88, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1947).

Failure to Appoint Medical Examiner.

Where record disclosed neither any unusual situation concerning physical condition of claimant for compensation requiring trial commissioner to appoint impartial medical examiner, nor any motion by claimant for such appointment, the employee was not prejudiced by failure of trial commissioner to have appointed medical examiner. Dart Indus. v. Andrade, 108 R.I. 474 , 276 A.2d 460, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1292 (1971).

28-33-36. Payment of medical examiner’s fees.

Whenever, in any case arising under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, any judge of the court shall have, pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-35 , determined and fixed the reasonable fees of any impartial medical examiner, those medical fees shall be paid immediately, and no appeal of any case in which that impartial medical examiner shall have acted taken to any court of this state shall act as a stay of any order fixing the amount of that medical fees and ordering the payment of the fees, unless the appeal is taken for the purpose of having the court determine the reasonableness of the charge made by the impartial medical examiner.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1942, ch. 1194, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-36 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Witness Fees.

The full commission did not err in correcting the error of the trial commissioner with respect to witness fees allowed doctors as expert witnesses of respondent since the trial commissioner had no authority under the act to award such fee and consequently had no jurisdiction of the subject matter over which he purported to exercise his power. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Dean, 89 R.I. 108 , 151 A.2d 354, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1959).

28-33-37. Examination by impartial examiner — Reports.

A medical examiner, once being duly sworn by a judge of the workers’ compensation court appointing him or her to the faithful performance of his or her duties at the inception of his or her designation as an impartial medical examiner, shall at that time and as often as requested in accordance with chapters 29 — 38 of this title, examine injured employees to determine the nature and probable duration of their injuries. This medical examiner shall file a signed report within ninety-six (96) hours of the completion of each and every examination made of those employees with the workers’ compensation court and that report shall indicate the name and the title of the official by whom he or she was sworn in and appointed and shall then be acceptable as proper legal evidence in any hearing or proceedings before the workers’ compensation court to determine the amount of compensation due the employee under the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and the examiner may be summoned for the purpose of cross-examination in proceedings before the court. Copies of those reports shall be furnished to all interested parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1919, ch. 1795, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1941, ch. 1062, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1194, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2604, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-37 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1983, ch. 28, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conclusiveness of Findings.

The trial commissioner remains the ultimate trier of fact and is not required to accept the conclusions of the impartial medical examiner he may appoint. Rhode Island Hosp. v. Kalian, 117 R.I. 227 , 366 A.2d 166, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1616 (1976).

Construction With Former § 28-35-48.

The legislature has seen fit to make a distinction between the status of an impartial medical report when requested at the discretion of the commission as provided in this section and the mandatory requirement of former § 28-35-48 ; any report under this section may be offered in evidence as part of petitioner’s or respondent’s case as each of the parties may deem advisable. Drake Bakeries v. Butler, 94 R.I. 84 , 178 A.2d 295, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1962).

Report.

Report may be received in evidence only if offering party is willing to produce the author for cross-examination if desired. Natalizia v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 81 R.I. 515 , 105 A.2d 190, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 121 (1954).

Swearing-In of Examiner.

The examiner need not be sworn. Natalizia v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 81 R.I. 515 , 105 A.2d 190, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 121 (1954).

Transportation Costs.

Employee’s transportation costs will be paid only when an impartial medical examination has been ordered by the commission or a medical examination requested by the employer. Peloquin v. ITT Hammel-Dahl, 110 R.I. 330 , 292 A.2d 237, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 918 (1972).

28-33-38. Refusal to submit to examination.

If any employee refuses to submit himself or herself for any examination provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title, or in any way obstructs the examination, his or her rights to compensation shall be suspended and his or her compensation during that period of suspension may be forfeited.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1919, ch. 1795, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 2, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1941, ch. 1062, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1194, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2604, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-38 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Employer’s Denial of Liability.

An employer who denies liability is estopped from invoking the forfeiture provisions of this section. Saccoccio v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 107 R.I. 53 , 264 A.2d 905, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 737 (1970).

An employer, who had not previously disclaimed liability under the act, may deny liability in reliance on a finding of regained capacity by the trial commissioner without sacrificing its rights under § 28-33-34 and this section. Salvas v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep't, 420 A.2d 74, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1846 (R.I. 1980).

Failure to Keep Appointment.

An employee was not excused from keeping appointments for medical examinations made for him by his employer by the fact that the examining physician’s office was in another city and the employer refused to reimburse the employee for his expense of travel from his home to the examining physician’s office. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Healey, 104 R.I. 201 , 243 A.2d 741, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 636 (1968). (This decision was prior to the 1968 amendment to § 28-33-39 providing for the payment of traveling expenses to the office of an examiner requested by the employer.)

Resumption of benefits for total disability caused by surgery that had been undertaken in an effort to relieve work-related symptoms was not precluded by the injured worker’s failure to keep an appointment made by the employer for an independent medical examination; the employer failed to show prejudice, since its physician was able to testify at the hearing on resumption of benefits, and the tribunal retained discretion to order forfeiture of benefits or not, as it saw fit. Tavares v. Aramark Corp., 841 A.2d 1124, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2004).

28-33-39. Transportation costs for medical examination.

The reasonable costs of transportation to and from the office of any examiner requested by the employer or of any impartial examiner appointed as provided in § 28-33-35 shall be charged to the employer and, if paid for by the employee, he or she shall be reimbursed in full for this expenditure by his or her employer, upon presentation of a receipt or other evidence of expenditure. The reasonable cost of transportation that occurs on or after July 1, 2016, is the rate equal to the per-mile rate allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for use of a privately owned automobile for business miles driven, as from time to time amended, for a private motor vehicle or the reasonable cost incurred for transportation, from the employee’s point of departure, whether from the employee’s home or place of employment, and return.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1947, ch. 1943, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-39 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appointment of Examiner.

See Notes to Decisions, under heading “4. Transportation Costs.” following § 28-33-37 .

Construction With § 28-33-37.

The inclusion in this section of a provision for the payment by the employer of the claimant’s expenses necessarily incurred in traveling to and from the office of the examining physician shows that the legislature was cognizant of such expense and intentionally omitted such a provision from § 28-33-34 . Ruggieri v. Pearson Corp., 104 R.I. 93 , 242 A.2d 304, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 620 (1968).

28-33-40. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-40 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 194, § 1; Repealed, effective September 1, 1982, by P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-33-40 concerned the workers’ compensation advisory committee.

28-33-41. Rehabilitation of injured persons.

    1. The department and the workers’ compensation court shall expedite the rehabilitation of and the return to remunerative employment of all employees who are disabled and injured and who are subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title.
    2. Rehabilitation means the prompt provision of appropriate services necessary to restore an employee who is occupationally injured or diseased to his or her optimum physical, mental, vocational, and economic usefulness. This may require medical, vocational, and/or reemployment services to restore an employee who is occupationally disabled as nearly as possible to his or her pre-injury status. As a procedure, rehabilitation may include three (3) overlapping and interrelated components:
        1. Medical restorative services.  Medical treatment and related services needed to restore the employee who is occupationally disabled to a state of health as near as possible to that which existed prior to the occupational injury or disease. These services may include, but are not limited to, the following: medical, surgical, hospital, nursing services, attendant care, chiropractic care, physical therapy, occupational therapy, medicines, prostheses, orthoses, other physical rehabilitation services, including psychosocial services, and reasonable travel expenses incurred in procuring the services.
        2. (I) Treatment by spiritual means.  Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an employee who, in good faith relies on or is treated by prayer or spiritual means by a duly accredited practitioner of a well-recognized church, to undergo any medical or surgical treatment, and weekly compensation benefits may not be suspended or terminated on the grounds that the employee refuses to accept recommended medical or surgical benefits. The employee shall submit to all physical examinations as required by chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

          (II) However, a private employer, insurer, self-insurer, or group self-insurer may pay or reimburse an employee for any costs associated with treatment by prayer or spiritual means.

      1. Vocational restorative services.  Vocational services needed to return the employee with a disability to his or her pre-injury employment or, if that is not possible, to a state of employability in suitable alternative employment. These services may include, but are not limited to, the following: psychological and vocational evaluations, counseling, and training.
      2. Reemployment services.  Services used to return the employee who is occupationally disabled to suitable, remunerative employment as adjudged by his or her functional and vocational ability at that time.
    1. Any employer or any injured employee with total disability or permanent, partial disability to whom the insurance carrier or certificated employer has paid compensation for a period of three (3) months or more, and to whom compensation is still being paid, or his or her employer or insurer may file a petition with the workers’ compensation court requesting approval of a rehabilitation program or may mutually agree to a rehabilitation program. Determinations shall be rendered by the workers’ compensation court in accordance with this section and as provided in chapters 29 — 38 of this title and the rules of practice of the Rhode Island workers’ compensation court.
    2. Action shall be taken as in the judgment of the workers’ compensation court shall seem practicable and likely to speed the recovery and rehabilitation of injured workers. However, rehabilitative services shall be appropriate to the needs and capabilities of injured workers.
  1. Compensation payments shall not be diminished or terminated while the employee is participating in a rehabilitation program approved by the workers’ compensation court or agreed to by the parties. Provided, that compensation payments shall be suspended while an injured employee willfully refuses to participate in a rehabilitation program approved by the workers’ compensation court or agreed to by the parties. When the employee has completed an approved rehabilitation program, the rehabilitation provider shall recommend, in the instance of vocational rehabilitation, an earnings capacity, or in the instance of physical rehabilitation provided or prescribed by a physician, a degree of functional impairment, and the employee shall be referred to the court for an earnings capacity adjustment to benefits, unless the employee has returned to gainful employment.
  2. The employer shall bear the expense of rehabilitative services agreed to or ordered pursuant to this section. If those rehabilitative services require residence at or near or travel to a rehabilitative facility, the employer shall pay the employee’s reasonable expense for board, lodging, and/or travel. The reasonable cost of transportation on or after July 1, 2016, is the rate equal to the per-mile rate allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for use of a privately owned automobile for business miles driven, as from time to time amended, for a private motor vehicle or the reasonable cost incurred for transportation, from the employee’s point of departure, whether from the employee’s home or place of employment, and return.
  3. Except for the provisions of this section, the provisions of § 28-33-8 shall remain in full force and effect.
  4. For the purposes of this section, the director shall promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to chapter 35 of title 42 for certifying rehabilitation providers, evaluators, and counselors, and the director shall maintain a registry of those persons so certified. No plan of rehabilitation requiring the services of a rehabilitation counselor shall be approved by the workers’ compensation court or agreed to by the parties unless the counselor is certified by the director. Any requests for approval of a rehabilitation plan pending before the director prior to September 1, 2000, will remain at the department for determination. All requests after this date will be heard by the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-41 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 337, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 64; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 64; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4; P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment redesignated subsections (d) through (f).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Vocational rehabilitation, §§ 42-12-8 , 42-12-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notification of Proposed Program.

The trial court erred in applying subsection (b)(3) of this section retroactively; by obtaining the approval of the Division of Rehabilitative Services prior to undertaking the rehabilitation program, the petitioner complied with the law as it existed at the time of the request. Simpson v. Dytex Chem. Co., 667 A.2d 1229, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 252 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Operation performed to make use of corrective appliance possible or more effective, award with respect to. 143 A.L.R. 581.

Vocational retraining or reeducation, allowance for cost of. 85 A.L.R. 169.

28-33-41.1. Review of rehabilitative program upon request or petition by employer.

An employer may petition the workers’ compensation court for a review, to be performed at the Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan Rehabilitation Center, of any injured employee’s progress toward rehabilitation. After that review, the Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan Rehabilitation Center shall report to the court on the effectiveness of the present rehabilitative program that the employee is undertaking and the injured employee’s ability to return to employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 5, § 6; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2017, the compiler twice substituted “Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center” for “Donley Rehabilitation Center” in this section, pursuant to § 28-38-24 .

28-33-42. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 21; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-33-42 ; Repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 132, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-33-42 concerned reports and treatments of back injuries.

28-33-43. Employer liability for property damage.

When an employee sustains property damage to eyeglasses, dentures, or artificial prosthesis arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, regardless of whether or not he or she suffered personal injury or loss of time, he or she may file a petition with the workers’ compensation court, and he or she shall be paid the reasonable value of the property or the reasonable expense of repairing the property by an employer subject to or who has elected to become subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title. The petition shall be prosecuted in the same manner as other petitions for compensation before the court. In hearings before the court, counsel and witness fees shall be awarded for the successful prosecution of a petition under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1968, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 5, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-33-44. Continuation of health insurance benefits.

  1. No employer shall cancel but shall be obligated to continue to provide any employee’s health insurance benefits for a period of two (2) years from the date of the employee’s receiving weekly compensation benefits pursuant to a preliminary determination or a decision of the workers’ compensation court, or the filing at the department of a memorandum of agreement or notice of direct payment for injuries occurring on or before February 28, 1986. The provisions of this section shall not apply if:
    1. The employee is no longer receiving compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination or a decision of the workers’ compensation court;
    2. Has accepted suitable alternative employment;
    3. Fails to pay any contribution toward the healthcare benefits that he or she was required to pay prior to the injury;
    4. A petition for a commutation or a structured settlement, as defined in § 28-33-25 , is granted;
    5. The employee is a beneficiary of an equivalent health insurance policy of his or her spouse; or
    6. The employee is employed in the construction industry and is a participant in a multi-employer welfare plan as defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 et seq., and which the Internal Revenue Service has determined under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., is tax exempt as to contributions received and as to benefits received by its participants.
  2. In the event any employer fails to comply with the provisions of this section, and not its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, then the employer shall be liable for hospital and medical costs that would have been paid by the hospital or medical insurance plan afforded the employee had he or she been covered by the plan.
  3. The provisions of this section shall only apply to claims for injuries sustained on or after July 1, 1984.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 5, § 6; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 425, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 7; P.L. 1987, ch. 242, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 4; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 5; P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Preemption.

This section is preempted by provisions of the federal bankruptcy code giving priority to “allowed unsecured claims for contributions to employee benefit plans” which arose 180 days before the date of the filing of the petition and subject to a $2,000 per employee limit. In re National Bickford Foremost, Inc., 116 B.R. 351, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1983 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990).

28-33-45. Coordination of benefits.

  1. The department of labor and training shall immediately promulgate rules and regulations concerning the offset of workers’ compensation benefits and retirement benefits. It is the intention of the general assembly that at retirement a person receiving benefits under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall receive compensation and retirement benefits in a sum equal to the greater of the compensation or retirement benefits for which that person was otherwise eligible, however, not including retirement benefits to the extent derived exclusively from employee contributions.
  2. The offset provided for pursuant to this section shall not be applicable to those collecting retirement benefits while collecting compensation benefits for an injury sustained before the age of fifty-five (55) years and more than five (5) years prior to the date of retirement.
  3. An employee shall not collect any indemnity benefits after his or her retirement for any injury sustained less than two (2) years prior to his or her retirement.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 36-10-31 .

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 36-10-31 and 28-33-45 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, that is, both §§ 36-10-31 and 28-33-45 govern the treatment of workers’ compensation benefits at the time an employee retires; these statutes must therefore be considered together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope. Tiernan v. Magaziner, 270 A.3d 25, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 2022).

Offsetting Benefits.

Trial court did not err in upholding the decision of the Employees’ Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island (ERSRI) to offset workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee against disability retirement benefits payable to her; the mandate of R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-10-31 , which requires ERSRI to offset any amount paid under the workers’ compensation laws against a member’s disability retirement pension, applies to workers’ compensation awarded under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-45 . Tiernan v. Magaziner, 270 A.3d 25, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 2022).

Because a State employee retired on an accidental disability pension provided under R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-10-14 , the Employees’ Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island calculated her pension under R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-10-15(a) ; the coordination-of-benefits provision at issue, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-45 , was contained in the workers’ compensation laws, and therefore, the workers’ compensation benefits paid to the employee fell squarely within the ambit of R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-10-31 . Tiernan v. Magaziner, 270 A.3d 25, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 2022).

28-33-46. Anniversary review.

Any employee receiving weekly benefits fifty-two (52) weeks after a compensable injury shall undergo an anniversary review by the court at which, unless waived by the employer, the court shall make findings as to whether maximum medical improvement has been reached, as to the degree of functional impairment and/or disability of the employee, and as to whether the employee should be classified as partially disabled or totally disabled. Temporary total disability shall not last beyond the anniversary review. Unless waived by the employer, an anniversary review shall be conducted annually thereafter. The court shall perform this anniversary review of cases where injury occurs after May 18, 1992.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 10.

28-33-47. Reinstatement of injured worker.

  1. A worker who has sustained a compensable injury shall be reinstated by the worker’s employer to the worker’s former position of employment upon written demand for reinstatement, if the position exists and is available and the worker is not disabled from performing the duties of the position with reasonable accommodation made by the employer in the manner in which the work is to be performed. A workers’ former position is “available” even if that position has been filled by a replacement while the injured worker was absent as a result of the worker’s compensable injury. If the former position is not available, the worker shall be reinstated in any other existing position that is vacant and suitable. A certificate by the treating physician that the physician approves the worker’s return to the worker’s regular employment or other suitable employment shall be prima facie evidence that the worker is able to perform the duties.
  2. The right of reinstatement shall be subject to the provisions for seniority rights and other employment restrictions contained in a valid collective bargaining agreement between the employer and a representative of the employer’s employees, and nothing shall exempt any employer from or excuse full compliance with any applicable provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and chapter 87 of title 42.
  3. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section:
    1. The right to reinstatement to the worker’s former position under this section terminates upon any of the following:
      1. A medical determination by the treating physician, impartial medical examiner, or comprehensive independent healthcare review team that the worker cannot, at maximum medical improvement, return to the former position of employment or any other existing position with the same employer that is vacant and suitable;
      2. The approval by the workers’ compensation court of a vocational rehabilitation program for the worker to train the worker for alternative employment with another employer;
      3. The worker’s acceptance of suitable employment with another employer after reaching maximum medical improvement;
      4. The worker’s refusal of a bona fide offer from the employer of light duty employment or suitable alternative employment, prior to reaching maximum medical improvement;
      5. The expiration of ten (10) days from the date that the worker is notified by the insurer or self-insured employer by mail at the address to which the weekly compensation benefits are mailed that the worker’s treating physician has released the worker for employment unless the worker requests reinstatement within that time period;
      6. The expiration of thirty (30) days after the employee reaches maximum medical improvement or concludes or ceases to participate in an approved program of rehabilitation, or one year from the date of injury, whichever is sooner, provided, in the event a petition to establish liability for an injury is filed, but not decided within one year of the date of injury, within twenty-one (21) days from the first finding of liability. Notwithstanding the foregoing, where the employee is participating in an approved program of rehabilitation specifically designed to provide the employee with the ability to perform a job for which he or she would be eligible under subsection (a) of this section, the right of reinstatement shall terminate when the employee concludes or ceases to participate in the program or eighteen (18) months from the date of injury, whichever is sooner;
      7. Except where otherwise provided under a collective bargaining agreement, the approval by the court of a settlement pursuant to chapters 29 — 38 of this title.
    2. The right to reinstatement under this section does not apply to:
      1. A worker hired on a temporary basis;
      2. A worker employed in a seasonal occupation;
      3. A worker who works out of a hiring hall operating pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement;
      4. A worker whose employer employs nine (9) or fewer workers at the time of the worker’s injury;
      5. A worker who is on a probationary period of less than ninety-one (91) days.
  4. Any violation of this section is deemed an unlawful employment practice. If the employee applies for reinstatement under this section and the employer in violation of this section refuses to reinstate the employee, the workers’ compensation court is authorized to order reinstatement and award back pay and the cost of fringe benefits lost during the period as appropriate. Determinations of reinstatement disputes shall be rendered by the workers’ compensation court in accordance with this section and chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and the rules of practice of the workers’ compensation court.
  5. When an employee is entitled to reinstatement under this section, but the position to which reinstatement is sought does not exist or is not available, the employee may file for unemployment benefits as if then laid off from that employment, and unemployment benefits shall be calculated pursuant to § 28-42-3(4) ; provided, that an employee cannot collect both workers’ compensation indemnity benefits and unemployment benefits under this section.
  6. The education division of the department of labor and training shall provide information to employees who receive benefits under this title of the provisions of this section.
  7. Any requests for reinstatement determinations pending before the director prior to September 1, 2000, will remain at the department for resolution. Any requests after this date will be heard by the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 11; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 3; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 410, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitration.

Union necessarily sought an employee’s reinstatement under the collective bargaining agreement rather than under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-47(d) . Because the union did not bring the employee’s grievance in reliance on the statute, the statute had no bearing on the decision to arbitrate the dispute. Town of Cumberland v. Cumberland Town Emples. Union, 183 A.3d 1114, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2018).

Review of Director’s Determination.

In reversing a decision of the director that an employee forfeited his right to reinstatement by refusing an offer of light employment, the Appellate Division erred in its conclusion that evidence must be presented which establishes that the employee is physically capable of performing such light duty, and erred as a matter of law by substituting its own judgment for that of the director on factual issues entitled to deference. Poisson v. Comtec Info. Sys., 713 A.2d 230, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 201 (R.I. 1998).

Collateral References.

Reductions to back pay awards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 135 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

When does job restructuring constitute reasonable accommodation of qualified disabled employee or applicant. 142 A.L.R. Fed. 311.

When must employer offer qualified disabled employee or applicant opportunity to change employee’s workplace or work at home as means of fulfilling reasonable accommodation requirement. 133 A.L.R. Fed. 521.

Chapter 34 Workers’ Compensation — Occupational Diseases

28-34-1. Definitions.

Whenever used in this chapter:

  1. “Disability” means the state of being disabled from earning full wages at the work at which the employee was last employed;
  2. “Disablement” means the event of becoming disabled as defined in subdivision (1) of this section;
  3. “Occupational disease” means a disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process, or employment.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-1 .

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Occupational diseases:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-40a, 31-306, 31-396.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Occupational Disease.

A herniated disc of the lumbar spine is not a disease. Cruso v. Yellow Cab. Co., 82 R.I. 158 , 106 A.2d 734, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1954).

Because the plaintiff’s carpal tunnel injury can be characterized as an occupational disease arising from any cause connected with or arising from the peculiar characteristics of the plaintiff’s employment, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation. Vater v. HB Group, 667 A.2d 283, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 258 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Disease contracted by employee while on street or in traveling, workers’ compensation as covering. 141 A.L.R. 806.

Disease resulting from unsanitary conditions not peculiar to kind of employment as occupational disease. 105 A.L.R. 1411.

Liability of successive employers for disease or condition allegedly attributable to successive employments. 34 A.L.R.4th 958.

Pleading aggravation of a preexisting physical condition in workers’ compensation cases. 32 A.L.R.2d 1459.

When statute of limitations begins to run as to cause of action for development of latent industrial or occupational disease. 1 A.L.R.4th 107.

Workers’ Compensation Act as furnishing exclusive remedy for master’s failure to inform servant of disease or physical condition disclosed by medical examination. 69 A.L.R.2d 1218.

28-34-2. Occupational diseases listed — Treatment as compensable injury.

The disablement of any employee resulting from an occupational disease or condition described in the following schedule shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury, as defined in § 28-33-1 , within the meaning of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and the procedure and practice provided in those chapters shall apply to all proceedings under this chapter, except where specifically provided otherwise in this chapter:

  1. Anthrax.
  2. Arsenic poisoning or its sequelae.
  3. Brass or zinc poisoning or its sequelae.
  4. Lead poisoning or its sequelae.
  5. Manganese poisoning.
  6. Mercury poisoning or its sequelae.
  7. Phosphorous poisoning or its sequelae.
  8. Poisoning by wood alcohol.
  9. Poisoning by carbon bisulphide, methanol, naphtha, or volatile halogenated hydrocarbons, or any sulphide, or its sequelae.
  10. Poisoning by benzol, or nitro-, hydro-, hydroz-, amido derivatives of benzol (dinitrobenzol, anilin, and others), or its sequelae.
  11. Poisoning by carbon monoxide.
  12. Poisoning by nitrous fumes or its sequelae.
  13. Poisoning by nickel carbonyl or its sequelae.
  14. Dope poisoning (poisoning by tetrachlormethane or any substance used as or in conjunction with a solvent for acetate or cellulose or nitrocellulose or its sequelae).
  15. Poisoning by formaldehyde and its preparations.
  16. Chrome ulceration or its sequelae or chrome poisoning.
  17. Epitheliomatous cancer or ulceration of the skin, or of the corneal surface of the eye, due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil, or paraffin or any compound, product, or residue of any of these substances.
  18. Glanders.
  19. Compressed air illness or its sequelae.
  20. Miner’s disease, including only cellulitis, bursitis, ankylostomiasis, tenosynovitis, and nystagmus.
  21. Cataract in glassworkers.
  22. Radium poisoning or disability due to radioactive properties of substances or to Roentgen rays (X-rays).
  23. Methyl chloride poisoning.
  24. Poisoning by sulphuric, hydrochloric, or hydrofluoric acid.
  25. Respiratory, gastrointestinal, or physiological nerve and eye disorders due to contact with petroleum products and their fumes.
  26. Disability arising from blisters or abrasions.
  27. Hernia, clearly recent in origin and resulting from a strain arising out of and in the course of employment and promptly reported to the employer.
  28. Infection or inflammation of the skin or eyes or other external contact surfaces or oral or nasal cavities due to oils, cutting compounds, or lubricants, dusts, liquids, fumes, gases, or vapors.
  29. Dermatitis (venenata).
  30. Disability arising from bursitis or synovitis.
  31. Disability arising from frostbite.
  32. Disability arising from silicosis or asbestosis.
  33. Disability arising from any cause connected with or arising from the peculiar characteristics of the employment.
  34. Disability arising from any cause connected with or arising from ionizing radiation.
  35. Disability arising from pneumoconiosis caused by the inhalation of metallic minerals or mineral particles.
  36. The disablement of an employee resulting from mental injury caused or accompanied by identifiable physical trauma or from a mental injury caused by emotional stress resulting from a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees encounter daily without serious mental injury shall be treated as an injury as defined in § 28-29-2(7) .

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 2; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2253, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2282, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-2 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 166, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 8.

Cross References.

Physician’s duty to report, § 23-5-5 et seq.

Rights as to diseases not covered by chapter, § 28-34-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Carpal Tunnel Injuries.

Because the plaintiff ’s carpal tunnel injury can be characterized as an occupational disease arising from any cause connected with or arising from the peculiar characteristics of the plaintiff’s employment, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation. Vater v. HB Group, 667 A.2d 283, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 258 (R.I. 1995).

Claim Not Barred.

Employee’s claim for disability from exposure to a noxious gas in 1979 was not barred or otherwise affected by the fact that she did not file a claim for disabilities that occurred from exposure to the gas in earlier years. Souza v. Raytheon Co., 490 A.2d 500, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 484 (R.I. 1985).

Heart Disease.

Where cardiologist testified that stress had probably contributed to employee’s heart attack, but on cross-examination could not tie employee’s condition to employment, it was not error to deny benefits. LaRose v. State Inst. of Mental Health, 504 A.2d 472, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 404 (R.I. 1986).

Hernia.

The fact that hernia resulting from strain is listed under this section indicates that it is to be treated as a disease rather than as an accident. Condon v. First Nat'l Stores, 65 R.I. 129 , 13 A.2d 684, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1940).

— Appeal.

Workers’ compensation commission’s finding that a claimant had failed to sustain his burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that an incident of strain resulting from his employment had caused a hernia to develop was binding and conclusive on the state supreme court because it was based upon legally competent evidence. Cousineau v. ITT Royal Elec., 484 A.2d 884, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 629 (R.I. 1984).

— Prompt Report.

Clause 27 does not require that a hernia be reported until it has become disabling. Condon v. First Nat'l Stores, 65 R.I. 129 , 13 A.2d 684, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1940).

What is a prompt report within the meaning of clause 27 is a question of fact to be determined by the trial justice on the evidence. Condon v. First Nat'l Stores, 65 R.I. 129 , 13 A.2d 684, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1940).

Notice of hernia given within the time allowed by § 28-34-9 was timely. Panzarella v. United States Rubber Co., 81 R.I. 149 , 99 A.2d 860, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1953).

— Recent Origin.

Evidence of previous statements of employee to the effect that he had a hernia sustained finding that hernia was not of recent origin. George v. Lamson Oil Corp., 69 R.I. 81 , 30 A.2d 856, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1943).

— Variance of Proof.

Proof of hernia was not fatal variance from allegations of strain in same region. Panzarella v. United States Rubber Co., 81 R.I. 149 , 99 A.2d 860, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1953).

Mental Injury.

Where employee was terminated from his job after 25 years of satisfactory employment, the firing occurred on an hour’s notice, the reason for firing was blatantly untruthful, and soon after the firing the employee was hired back and restored to all benefits except a pension of which he would have to start from scratch, the employee’s resultant nervous breakdown and disability were caused by stress that exceeded the intensity normally encountered in the workplace and the employee was entitled to the protections and benefits of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Rega v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 475 A.2d 213, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 504 (R.I. 1984).

Occupational Disease.

The term “occupational disease” means simply one of the injuries set forth in this section. It does not carry with it the common lay definition. Souza v. Raytheon Co., 490 A.2d 500, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 484 (R.I. 1985).

In an appeal filed by a firefighter pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-21.2-9 , the Workers’ Compensation Court properly ensured its jurisdiction by looking to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-2(33) to determine that occupational cancer is a compensable injury, and to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-6 to determine the date of disability. Lang v. Mun. Emples. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 222 A.3d 912, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 144 (R.I. 2019).

Collateral References.

Artificial temperature, illness or injury due to, as compensable. 41 A.L.R. 1124; 53 A.L.R. 1095; 61 A.L.R. 218.

Contagious disease, right to compensation for results of exposure to. 11 A.L.R. 790; 57 A.L.R. 631.

Contaminated water, compensation for illness or injury from. 141 A.L.R. 1490.

Dust or other material incident to work, condition of bodily organs due to particles of, as compensable. 62 A.L.R. 1460; 97 A.L.R. 1412.

External infection as accident or an accidental injury. 39 A.L.R. 871.

Freezing, recovery for injury from. 13 A.L.R. 975; 16 A.L.R. 1038; 25 A.L.R. 146; 40 A.L.R. 400; 46 A.L.R. 1218; 53 A.L.R. 1084; 82 A.L.R. 234; 83 A.L.R. 235.

Heart disease, death from, caused by breathing impure air or dust. 19 A.L.R. 112; 60 A.L.R. 1314.

Heat or sun stroke. 13 A.L.R. 979; 16 A.L.R. 1039; 25 A.L.R. 146; 40 A.L.R. 400; 46 A.L.R. 1218; 53 A.L.R. 1084; 82 A.L.R. 234; 83 A.L.R. 236.

Hernia as result of sudden strain as accident or accidental injury. 98 A.L.R. 205.

Hernia, construction and application of provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act. 114 A.L.R. 1337.

Injury from fumes or gases as accident or occupational disease. 6 A.L.R. 1466; 23 A.L.R. 335; 90 A.L.R. 619.

Lead or other occupational poisoning as within compensation statute. 29 A.L.R. 691; 44 A.L.R. 371.

Mental state or nervous condition following injury as compensable. 44 A.L.R. 500; 67 A.L.R. 805; 86 A.L.R. 961.

Muscle or nerve injury attributable to occupation, but not due to a sudden event, as within Workers’ Compensation Act. 29 A.L.R. 510.

Pleading aggravation of a preexisting physical condition in workers’ compensation cases. 32 A.L.R.2d 1459.

Preexisting hernia or physical condition tending to produce it as affecting right to compensation. 19 A.L.R. 102; 28 A.L.R. 204; 60 A.L.R. 1299.

Preexisting influenza or typhoid fever as affecting right to compensation. 19 A.L.R. 107; 28 A.L.R. 204; 60 A.L.R. 1299.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 122 A.L.R.5th 653.

Typhoid fever, compensation for. 141 A.L.R. 1490.

Workers’ Compensation Act as furnishing exclusive remedy for master’s failure to inform servant of disease or physical condition disclosed by medical examination. 69 A.L.R.2d 1218.

28-34-3. Benefits available to victims of disease.

If an employee is disabled or dies and his disability or death is caused by one of the diseases mentioned in the schedule contained in § 28-34-2 , and the disease is due to the nature of the employment in which that employee was engaged and was contracted in, he or she or his or her dependents shall be entitled to compensation for his or her death or for his or her disablement, and he or she shall be entitled to be furnished with medical and hospital services, as provided in chapter 33 of this title, except as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 3; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-3 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 8.

Cross References.

Public and medical assistance, effect of payments on workers’ compensation awards, § 40-6-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claimants.

Widow could properly be substituted under the provisions of § 28-35-56 for employee who died pending determination of a claim. Gosselin v. Parker Brass Foundry, 83 R.I. 463 , 119 A.2d 189, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1955).

Disability.

Trial justice was not required, before complete cure, to order return to work in which there was some risk of new exposure to disease. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp. v. Manocchia, 79 R.I. 466 , 89 A.2d 923, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1952).

Evidence.

Claimant’s testimony that he was unable to do any work was sufficient for finding of total incapacity despite unanimous medical testimony of ability to do light work. Leva v. Caron Granite Co., 84 R.I. 360 , 124 A.2d 534, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1956).

It was error for the board to find that petitioner “has been able to earn wages at other occupations such as baby sitting, operating an elevator, ‘light housekeeping’ which are neither unhealthy nor injurious to her and to earn the sum of not less than $50.00 weekly,” without competent evidence in the record that such types of employment were available to the petitioner, that they would not tend to be injurious, and the amount the petitioner could earn at such work. Andrade v. Mintell, 102 R.I. 148 , 229 A.2d 50, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 660 (1967).

Multiple Employers.

The statute does not authorize the apportionment of compensation among two or more employers of the employee, but the employee’s right to compensation from each employer is a separate and independent claim. Andrade v. Mintell, 102 R.I. 148 , 229 A.2d 50, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 660 (1967).

28-34-4. Relationship of disease to employment — Time of bringing suit.

Neither the employee nor his or her dependents shall be entitled to compensation for disability or death resulting from an occupational disease, unless that occupational disease is due to the nature of his or her employment and was contracted in that employment. The time limit for bringing suit under this section shall be two (2) years from the date of disablement.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 4; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 4; P.L. 1950, ch. 2626, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-4 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 151, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Causal Connection.

Fact that hernia could have arisen outside employment did not preclude a finding that it actually was caused by employment. Panzarella v. United States Rubber Co., 81 R.I. 149 , 99 A.2d 860, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1953).

— Evidence.

Evidence supported finding that skin disease was not due to employment. Blau v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 73 R.I. 27 , 53 A.2d 330, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1947).

Some legal evidence is required to show that the conditions of employment were such as to expose the employee to the possibility of the disease. Perez v. Columbia Granite Co., 74 R.I. 503 , 62 A.2d 658, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1948).

— Previous Employment.

Fact that disease was originally contracted in a previous employment does not preclude recovery against the last employer where the last employment was such as to continue exposure thereto. Gosselin v. Parker Brass Foundry, 83 R.I. 463 , 119 A.2d 189, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1955).

Time of Bringing Suit.

An amendment (§ 28-35-57 ) enacted subsequent to the incurring of disease is substantive and not procedural, therefore petitioner’s claim for compensation was timely filed although more than 24 months from disablement when it was filed as soon as petitioner knew his condition was directly attributable to his employment. Britto v. Fram Corp., 93 R.I. 426 , 176 A.2d 81, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1961).

Collateral References.

Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing actions to enforce workers’ compensation benefits. 48 A.L.R.2d 1094.

When limitation period begins to run against claim under workers’ compensation or occupational diseases act for contracting of disease. 11 A.L.R.2d 297.

28-34-5. Examination and report by physician.

The court may appoint one or more impartial physicians whose duty it shall be to examine any claimant under this chapter and to make a report in any form that the court may require.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 5; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-5 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 5.

28-34-6. Date of disablement.

For the purpose of this chapter the date of disablement for an occupational disease shall be the date of partial or total incapacity to work as a result of the disease.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 6; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-6 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 8; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal Under § 45-21.2-9 .

In an appeal filed by a firefighter pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-21.2-9 , the Workers’ Compensation Court properly ensured its jurisdiction by looking to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-2(33) to determine that occupational cancer is a compensable injury, and to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-6 to determine the date of disability. Lang v. Mun. Emples. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 222 A.3d 912, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 144 (R.I. 2019).

28-34-7. Concealment of previous disease — Occupational disease as partial cause.

No compensation shall be payable for an occupational disease if the employee, at the time of entering into the employment of the employer by whom the compensation would otherwise be payable, or thereafter, willfully and falsely represents in writing that he or she has not previously had the disease which is the cause of the disability or death. Where an occupational disease is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity, not itself compensable, or where disability or death from any other cause, not itself compensable, is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational disease, the compensation payable shall be the proportion only of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of the disability or death as that occupational disease, as a causative factor, bears to all the causes of that disability or death, the reduction in compensation to be effected by reducing the number of weekly payments or the amounts of the payments, as under the circumstances of the particular case may be for the best interests of the claimant or claimants.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 7; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 7; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-7 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 65; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 65.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Apportionment.

Employer cannot be justly charged with the obligation to pay all of the petitioner’s medical and hospital expenses regardless of whether such expenses include treatment of other ailments not compensable under the statute, and in the absence of statute guidance the court was of the opinion that justice to the parties will be more nearly approximated if such expenses are apportioned in the same manner as compensation, in other words, employer paying for 50% of the cost. Shurick v. Ames Am. Co., 96 R.I. 181 , 190 A.2d 217, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1963).

Burden of Proof.

The employee is not required to show that the original infirmity or disease arose out of or in the course of his employment, he must merely demonstrate that the work-related injury aggravated the preexisting condition. Carter v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 503 A.2d 122, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 383 (R.I. 1986).

Factors Contributing to Disability.

In the absence of evidence as to the relative weight of two factors contributing to death, trial court could decree payments of 50% of the payments that would have been due if occupational disease had been the sole cause of death. Hunt v. Builders Iron Foundry, 76 R.I. 152 , 68 A.2d 96, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1949).

Inquiries by Employers.

Employee who had not been refused work because of previous occupational disease could not have total incapacity payments continued on the ground that she would have to reveal disease history to prospective employers. Hemphill Co. v. Provencher, 74 R.I. 173 , 59 A.2d 540, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1948).

Failure of employer to ask about previous occupational disease does not bar recovery against former employer in an apportionment under § 28-34-8 . Esmond Mills v. American Woolen Co., 76 R.I. 214 , 68 A.2d 920, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1949).

28-34-8. Apportionment of liability among successive employers.

The total compensation due shall be recovered from the employer who last employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due and in which it was contracted. If, however, the disease was contracted while the employee was in the employment of a prior employer, the employer who is made liable for the total compensation as provided by this section may petition the workers’ compensation court for an apportionment of the compensation among the several employers who since the contraction of the disease have employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due. The apportionment shall be proportioned to the time the employee was employed in the service of the employers and shall be determined only after a hearing, notice of the time and place of which shall have been given to every employer alleged to be liable for any portion of the compensation. If the court finds that any portion of the compensation is payable by an employer prior to the employer who is made liable for the total compensation as provided by this section, it shall make an award accordingly in favor of the last employer, and that award may be enforced in the same manner as an award for compensation.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 8; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 8; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-8 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 8; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

This provision serves two purposes in that it provides for monetary assistance to a qualified employee in a speedy manner and also provides for successive hearings, if necessary, to apportion liability among the potentially liable employers. American Power Conversion v. Benny's, Inc., 740 A.2d 1265, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1999).

Liability Despite Previous Compensation.

Previous employer is not excused from liability under this section by fact that he made payments during previous period of disability in the absence of evidence that the disease was completely cured after the first disability. Esmond Mills v. American Woolen Co., 76 R.I. 214 , 68 A.2d 920, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1949).

“Made Liable.”

The “made liable” language of this section contemplates the possible use of a memorandum of agreement to make the last employer liable for the total compensation due to a disabled employee because of an occupational disease, but does not contain mandatory language requiring the workers’ compensation court to adjudicate liability before the last employer will be deemed “made liable.” American Power Conversion v. Benny's, Inc., 740 A.2d 1265, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1999).

Manifestation of Condition.

In order for a disease to be contracted while in the employ of a prior employer it is not necessary that there should have been a symptomatic manifestation of the disease or a disabling effect while employed by such prior employer. Morgan v. Stillman White Foundry Co., 87 R.I. 408 , 142 A.2d 536, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 74 (1958).

Primary Liability of Last Employer.

The remedy given by this section indicates that employer could be held primarily liable if employment contributed to disease even though the disease originated in previous employment. Gosselin v. Parker Brass Foundry, 83 R.I. 463 , 119 A.2d 189, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1955).

In cases involving disability because of occupational diseases incurred while working for multiple employers, the employer is liable either if (a) the employee’s work with the last employer caused an aggravation of the prior condition or (b) the last employment (no matter how brief) was of the same nature and type in which the disease was first contracted, regardless of whether the last employment aggravated the prior condition. Tavares v. A.C. & S., Inc., 462 A.2d 977, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1025 (R.I. 1983).

The employee does not have to prove that he contracted the disease at the last place of employment. Tavares v. A.C. & S., Inc., 462 A.2d 977, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1025 (R.I. 1983).

Fact that an employee worked as a welder at employer one, just as he had at employers two and three, was not enough to hold employer one liable to pay benefits for his occupational disease as his “last employer” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-8 ; he did not contract mesothelioma because he was a welder, but because the conditions in which he was welding exposed him to asbestos. Gallagher v. Nat'l Grid USA, 44 A.3d 743, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2012).

As employee who contracted mesothelioma unequivocally testified that he was exposed to asbestos while working for employers two and three, while his testimony about his exposure while working for employer one was mere speculation, the Workers’ Compensation Court’s decree finding employer one liable as the “last employer” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-8 was properly vacated. Gallagher v. Nat'l Grid USA, 44 A.3d 743, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2012).

Where an employee testified that he was exposed to asbestos while working for his last employer, the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court did not erroneously find the testimony inadmissible under R.I. R. Evid. due to his lack of personal knowledge of the matter; rather, it found his testimony speculative and not probative on the issue of whether the conditions while working for the employer were of the same type or nature in which he first contracted the disease. Gallagher v. Nat'l Grid USA, 44 A.3d 743, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2012).

Collateral References.

Effect of workers’ compensation act on right of third-person tortfeasor to recover contribution from employer of injured or killed worker. 90 A.L.R.2d 350.

28-34-9. Notice to employer of claim.

The employer to whom notice of death or disability is to be given, or against whom claim is to be made by the employee, shall be the employer who last employed the employee during the thirty-six (36) months in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due, and that notice and claim shall be deemed seasonable as against prior employers. The requirements as to notice as to occupational disease and death resulting from it and the requirements as to the bringing of proceedings for compensation for disability or death resulting from the occupational disease shall be the same as required in chapter 33 of this title, except that the notice shall be given to the employer within ninety (90) days after disablement.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 9; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 9; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-9 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 151, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Actual Knowledge.

Formal notice to the employer was not required where the employer had actual knowledge thereof. Leva v. Caron Granite Co., 84 R.I. 360 , 124 A.2d 534, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1956).

Construction With § 28-34-2.

Notice of hernia given within the time allowed by this section met the requirement of § 28-34-2 for prompt notice. Panzarella v. United States Rubber Co., 81 R.I. 149 , 99 A.2d 860, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1953).

Collateral References.

Computation of period for filing death claim under compensation statute. 119 A.L.R. 1158.

Requirements as to time of notice. 78 A.L.R. 1239; 92 A.L.R. 505; 107 A.L.R. 816; 145 A.L.R. 1263.

War as suspending time for notice or filing of claim under Workers’ Compensation Act. 137 A.L.R. 1465; 140 A.L.R. 1518; 141 A.L.R. 1511.

28-34-10. Information as to previous employers.

The employee, or his or her dependents, if so requested, shall furnish the last employer or the director or the workers’ compensation court with any information as to the names and addresses of all his or her other employers during the twenty-four (24) months that he or she or they possess. If that information is not furnished, or is not sufficient to enable the last employer to take proceedings against a prior employer under § 28-34-8 , unless it is established that the occupational disease actually was contracted while the employee was in his or her employment, the last employer shall not be liable to pay compensation, or, if that information is not furnished or is not sufficient to enable the last employer to take proceedings against the other employers under § 28-34-8 , the last employer shall be liable only for that part of the total compensation as under the particular circumstances the workers’ compensation court deem just; but a false statement in the information furnished shall not impair the employer’s rights unless the last employer is prejudiced by it.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 10; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 10; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-10 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Apportionment.

Because the plaintiff’s prior employers are outside of the state and not subject to the jurisdiction of Rhode Island courts, the trial court properly concluded that the part of compensation which was the responsibility of the last employer was governed by this section and that the disability which was the responsibility of the last employer was only for that part of the total compensation that the evidence of the case deemed just. Vater v. HB Group, 667 A.2d 283, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 258 (R.I. 1995).

Last Employer’s Liability Where Previous Employer Immune.

Fact that previous employer was not subject to provisions of the statute did not relieve the last employer of duty to pay full compensation. Leva v. Caron Granite Co., 84 R.I. 360 , 124 A.2d 534, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1956).

28-34-11. Rights as to diseases not covered by chapter.

Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rights of an employee, or his or her dependents, to recover compensation in respect to a disease to which this chapter does not apply, if the disease, apart from this chapter, is one for which compensation is payable under the other provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 11; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 11; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-11 .

28-34-12. Diseases contracted before effective date of chapter.

This chapter does not apply to cases of occupational disease in which the last injurious exposure to the hazards of the disease occurred prior to the fifteenth day of September 1936.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 8, § 12; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 8, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-34-12 .

Chapter 35 Workers’ Compensation — Procedure

28-35-1. Filing of memorandum of agreement.

  1. If the employer makes payments of compensation to an employee or those entitled to compensation on account of the death of an employee under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, a memorandum of that agreement signed by the employer or the employer’s insurer shall be filed with the department which shall immediately docket it in a book kept for that purpose.
  2. The memorandum shall include:
    1. The names of the employee, employer and insurance carrier;
    2. The date, place, nature, and location of the injury on the employee’s body;
    3. The names of the employee’s other employers, if any, or a statement that there is no multiple employment, if that is the case;
    4. The rate upon which the compensation is based;
    5. Any other information required by the director; and
    6. The average weekly straight time earnings earned by the employee for the thirteen (13) weeks prior to injury and the amount of overtime pay included in calculating the employee’s average weekly wage.
  3. The employer shall send a copy of the memorandum and any amendments to it to the employee and his or her attorney or the representative of the decedent and its attorney either with the payment of compensation made under § 28-35-40 or by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the same time as it is filed with the department.
  4. The employer shall file a memorandum pursuant to this section within ten (10) days of the initial payment by the employer or insurer.
  5. Upon the filing of the memorandum of agreement with the department, the memorandum shall be as binding on the party filing the memorandum as a preliminary determination, order, or decree.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 7; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-1 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1988, ch. 452, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 5.

Cross References.

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Procedure:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-284 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 5 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Laws.

The “made liable” language of § 28-34-8 contemplates the possible use of a memorandum of agreement to make the last employer liable for the total compensation due to a disabled employee because of an occupational disease, but does not contain mandatory language requiring the workers’ compensation court to adjudicate liability before the last employer will be deemed “made liable.” American Power Conversion v. Benny's, Inc., 740 A.2d 1265, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1999).

Director’s Approval Mandatory.

Where agreement to suspend workers’ compensation benefits was in conformity with all requirements of law and was duly filed with department of labor but lacked approval by director of labor, agreement was to be given full effect since language of § 28-35-3 [repealed] that director “shall so approve” such agreements was mandatory. Iacovelli v. P. F. Indus., 451 A.2d 282, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1062 (R.I. 1982).

Necessity for Filing.

There is no provision requiring or compelling either party to file agreements and consequently the commission lacks power to adjudge parties in contempt for failing to do so. Cinquanto v. American Silk Spinning Co., 86 R.I. 111 , 134 A.2d 137, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1957).

In requiring that, if an employer makes payments of compensation to an employee, a memorandum of such agreement, including details of the injury sustained, must be filed with the department, the legislature provided the only means by which an employee could preserve a clear record of agreement with respect to his/her legal rights throughout his/her workers’ compensation case. Caddick v. Bostitch/Div. of Textron, 519 A.2d 584, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 390 (R.I. 1987).

Powers of Director.

This section does not authorize the director of labor to decline to accept and docket a memorandum of agreement on the ground that he is withholding approval of such agreement. Gomes v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 94 R.I. 500 , 182 A.2d 318, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 112 (1962).

Statute of Limitations.

Dependent’s claim was independent of agreement with another dependent and was barred by statute of limitations, even though the agreement referred to such claim, where the claimant was not a party to such agreement. Giannotti v. Giusti Bros., 41 R.I. 122 , 102 A. 887, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1918).

28-35-2. Scope of memorandum of agreement with dependents of deceased employee.

When death has resulted from the injury and the dependents of the deceased employee entitled to compensation are, or the apportionment of compensation among them is, in dispute, the memorandum of agreement may relate only to the amount of compensation and to the persons to whom that compensation is payable.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 7; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, § 1; G.L. 1949, ch. 300, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-2 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10.

28-35-3, 28-35-4. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-3 ; P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 7; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-4), concerning filing statement concerning accident and approval of compensation agreements, were repealed, effective September 1, 1982, by P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 9. For current provisions concerning filing of injury statements, see § 28-35-1 .

28-35-5. Appeals from memorandum of agreement.

Any employer or insurer who has made payment to an injured employee or those entitled to compensation on account of the death of an employee which payment has been procured by fraud, coercion, or mutual mistake of fact; or any injured employee or those entitled to compensation on account of the death of an employee who has been aggrieved by a memorandum of agreement in that it: (1) fails to correctly diagnose the injury; (2) fails to set out correctly all the injuries received by the injured employee; (3) fails to set out all parts of the body affected by injuries; fails to correctly set the rate of compensation; or (5) in any other way is affected by error; upon petition to the court setting forth all the additional facts, filed by the aggrieved party and served in the same manner as is provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title, the workers’ compensation court shall hear any and all those matters and make their decision in accordance with those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 7; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3803, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-5 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendment of Agreement.

Where employer contests petition to amend agreement on ground of faulty diagnosis, the evidence in support of the petition must be clear to convince the court that amendment should be ordered. De Fillipo v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 79 R.I. 462 , 89 A.2d 848, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1952).

Amendment of agreement to specify tuberculosis rather than bursitis was proper on showing of faulty diagnosis. Bobola v. Royal Elec. Co., 84 R.I. 267 , 123 A.2d 250, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1956).

Petition to amend preliminary agreement on grounds of omitted injury due to improper diagnosis put burden of proof upon claimant where lack of legal evidence was issue raising the appeal. De Conti v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., 85 R.I. 424 , 132 A.2d 74, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1957).

Commission had no jurisdiction to amend a preliminary agreement on ground that under a certain construction as to the effective date of an amendment to the statute the weekly payments should have been larger. Landry v. Cornell Constr. Co., 87 R.I. 1 , 137 A.2d 410, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1957).

Where eleven days after her injury an employee entered into a compensation agreement which described her injuries as “undisplaced fractures — last sacral and first coccygeal segments” and it subsequently developed that she had a ruptured disc by which her nerve roots had been irritated, the commission did not err in amending the agreement to include the term “back injury” in the description of her injuries. United States Rubber Co. v. Curis, 101 R.I. 627 , 226 A.2d 410, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 811 (1967).

An employee must be allowed to petition to amend a memorandum of agreement (MOA) without any limitations period if the purpose of such a petition is merely to include in the MOA another part of the body that was injured at the same time as the injury specified therein but which was omitted from the MOA for any of the specified reasons. Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2000).

Once an amendment to a memorandum of agreement (MOA) is granted for any reason set forth in this section, an employee may be awarded compensation benefits retroactively based upon that later-included injury only if the claim or issue is not precluded because of res judicata or collateral estoppel as those doctrines are applied in workers’ compensation cases, the employee proves by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that he is incapacitated based upon an injury described in the amended MOA as of a specific date, and the retroactive compensation claim is filed within the limitations period. Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2000).

Appeal From Agreement.

Appeal could not be taken from agreement until appellant had filed in the director’s office and obtained a ruling on a petition for review setting forth fraud or coercion in the original agreement. Capobianco v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 77 R.I. 474 , 77 A.2d 534, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1950).

Employer was bound by failure to appeal a decision denying motion to dismiss appeal from approval of agreement on the ground of failure to allege fraud or coercion. Virgilio v. United States Rubber Co., 85 R.I. 136 , 127 A.2d 863, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 131 (1956).

The legislative intent in the Workers’ Compensation Act is that agreements are to be treated as final and are to be subject to appeal only for the three explicit reasons set out in this section. Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

Where an employer was mistaken as to the number of dependents an employee had, and the employee misunderstood the legal effect in worker’s compensation cases of having dependents, such misunderstanding or lack of awareness of the law is a mistake of law rather than of fact, thus, no mutual mistake of fact as ground for appeal existed. Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

This section does not provide a remedy or right of appeal to a third party who fails to qualify as either an employer, an insurer, an injured employee, or one entitled to compensation upon the death of the injured employee. Babbitt v. Saccoccio, 592 A.2d 847, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 1991).

Estoppel.

The Workers’ Compensation Act itself imposes no original duty on the employer to aid an employee in asserting her rights under the act, and the court would not imply such a duty absent circumstances requiring the employer to speak lest its silence would reasonably mislead the employee to rely thereon to her detriment, thus, there was no ground for a claim of estoppel against the employer in asserting the statute of limitations. Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

Review of Agreement.

Where petition to amend and petition to review were heard together and amendment was proper, commission could hear evidence and make finding on issue that would be proper under the agreement as amended. Bobola v. Royal Elec. Co., 84 R.I. 267 , 123 A.2d 250, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1956).

In a petition by employer to the commission for a review of a preliminary agreement which established the employee’s average weekly wage to determine compensation, this section not only provided the commission with authority to review erroneous computations of the average weekly wage but also gave them jurisdiction to order a correction of any error, and there was no legislative intent to limit the scope of review of such an agreement which had been approved by the director of labor to those where there was an allegation that the agreement had been procured by fraud, coercion or mutual mistake. Damiano Bros. Welding Co. v. Poulos, 111 R.I. 539 , 304 A.2d 889, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1242 (1973).

Where petitioner had settled workers’ compensation claim at the rate in effect at date of injury, the commission was without jurisdiction to re-open settlement absent allegation of fraud, coercion or mutual mistake. De Berardis v. Davol, Inc., 112 R.I. 746 , 316 A.2d 337, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1501 (1974).

Collateral References.

Fraud or mistake respecting amount of compensation to which employee was entitled as ground for release from settlement or compromise of claim. 121 A.L.R. 1270.

Time and jurisdiction for review, reopening, modification, or reinstatement of agreement. 165 A.L.R. 9.

28-35-6. Notice of amendments to memorandum of agreement.

  1. If the workers’ compensation court makes any amendment or addition to the memorandum of agreement, the workers’ compensation court shall immediately notify the department of the changes in the agreement.
  2. If an employer or insurer and an employee and his or her attorney, if represented, reach an agreement, subsequent to the filing of a memorandum of agreement, order, or decree, as to any issue, the parties shall file a written agreement and receipt with the department, signed by the parties, and on a form prescribed by the department. A copy of any agreement and receipt shall be delivered to each of the parties. Upon the filing of the agreement and receipt with the department, it shall be as binding upon both parties as a preliminary determination order or decree.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 7; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, § 1; G.L. 1949, ch. 300, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-6 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-35-7. Enforcement of memorandum of agreement.

Any memorandum of agreement shall be enforceable by a suitable action or proceeding brought by either of the parties to it before the workers’ compensation court, including executions against goods, chattels, and real estate, and including proceedings for contempt for willful failure or neglect to obey the provisions of the memorandum of agreement, and in cases involving future payments of compensation aggregating not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) the attorney general shall at the written request of the director prosecute a suitable action or proceeding for the court in the name of the director to compel either party to the agreement to comply with its terms.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 764, § 7; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-7 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Counsel Fees.

Court could allow employee counsel fees for prosecution of contempt proceedings under this section. Gobeille v. Ray's, Inc., 65 R.I. 207 , 14 A.2d 241, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1940).

Defenses in Contempt Proceedings.

That disability had ceased was not a good defense to contempt proceedings under this section where employer had not secured a review of the agreement before terminating payments. Carpenter v. Globe Indem. Co., 65 R.I. 194 , 14 A.2d 235, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1940); Gobeille v. Ray's, Inc., 65 R.I. 207 , 14 A.2d 241, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1940).

Employer was not in contempt for termination of payments on execution of settlement receipt even though the settlement was not approved until some time later. Virgilio v. United States Rubber Co., 85 R.I. 136 , 127 A.2d 863, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 131 (1956).

Jurisdiction.

A dispute as to whether certain treatment is included in an agreement between the employer and the employee that the employer will pay for reasonable treatment is a proper subject for determination by the commission. McAree v. Gerber Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 243 , 342 A.2d 608, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1147 (1975).

Where a preliminary agreement was executed after injury and, thereafter upon return to work, a suspension agreement was entered into and when employee became incapacitated again a second preliminary agreement was entered into for the same injury, but no suspension agreement was entered into after employee again returned to work, and after employee again became incapacitated a third preliminary agreement was entered into, employee could not obtain enforcement of the second preliminary agreement for the time during which he had returned to work on ground that there was no suspension agreement since commission had no jurisdiction to review any agreement other than the last agreement. Marabello v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 121 R.I. 15 , 393 A.2d 1105, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 747 (1978).

Parties to Proceedings.

Widow as such has no standing to bring contempt proceeding for default with respect to agreement entered into with employee during his life. American Woolen Co. v. Grillini, 78 R.I. 50 , 78 A.2d 795, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1951).

A physician, not a party to a nonprejudicial agreement for payment of compensation, cannot enforce payment of his fee by action directly against the employer under this section. Wynne v. Pawtuxet Valley Dyeing Co., 101 R.I. 455 , 224 A.2d 612, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 414 (1966).

Prohibition of Proceedings.

Prohibition would not be granted to restrain superior court from entertaining contempt proceedings that were the same as proceedings already pending except for the lapse of additional time without payments. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 65 R.I. 243 , 14 A.2d 247, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1940).

Remedies Denied Employer in Default.

Employer who had failed to carry out agreement could not require employee to undergo physical examination. Hingeco Mfg. Co. v. Haglund, 65 R.I. 218 , 14 A.2d 233, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1940).

Employer in default on payments could not obtain review of agreement. Hingeco Mfg. Co. v. Haglund, 65 R.I. 218 , 14 A.2d 233, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1940).

28-35-7.1. Suspension agreement and receipt.

If an employer or insurer and an employee reach an agreement in regard to the discontinuance or suspension of workers’ compensation benefits, the parties shall file a written suspension agreement and receipt with the department, signed by the parties, and on a form prescribed by the department. A copy of any agreement and receipt shall be delivered to each of the parties. Upon the filing of the agreement and receipt with the department, it shall be as binding upon both parties as a preliminary determination, order, or decree.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 452, § 2.

28-35-8. Filing of non-prejudicial memorandum of agreement.

  1. Notwithstanding § 28-35-1 , if the employer files a memorandum of agreement but specifically designates that agreement as a “non-prejudicial” or “without prejudice,” the employer may pay weekly compensation benefits not exceeding thirteen (13) weeks. In these cases, the employer shall send a copy of the non-prejudicial memorandum and any amendments to it to the employee and his or her attorney or the representative of the decedent and his or her attorney by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the same time as it is filed with the department in the same manner as if it were a memorandum of agreement. The non-prejudicial memorandum of agreement shall contain all information as directed by § 28-35-1 . Having done so, the non-prejudicial memorandum of agreement and any action taken pursuant to it shall be without prejudice to any party subsequently maintaining any position as to employer liability for payments under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, maintainable in the absence of an agreement. If at any time within or at the close of the thirteen-week period after payments of compensation have commenced the employer or insurer terminates weekly payments to the employee or to those entitled to payments on account of death of an employee, the employer or insurer shall notify the employee and his or her attorney or the representative of the decedent employee and his or her attorney within ten (10) days on a form prescribed by the department that:
    1. Payments have terminated;
    2. The claim has not been formally accepted; and
    3. The employee has the right to file a petition, within the two (2) year limitation as set forth in § 28-35-57 , to formally establish liability of the employer or insurer.
  2. If the employer or insurer makes payments of weekly benefits to the employee or to those entitled to payments on account of death of an employee for more than the thirteen (13) week period, the payments shall constitute a conclusive admission of liability and ongoing incapacity as to the injuries set forth in the non-prejudicial memorandum of agreement. The employer or insurer shall within ten (10) days of making additional payments file a memorandum of agreement pursuant to § 28-35-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 9; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 28-35-8 (G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1), concerning agreements without prejudice, was repealed, effective September 1, 1982, by P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 9.

28-35-9. Payment of weekly benefits — Admission of entitlement to compensation — Payment of compensation without agreement.

  1. In the event that an employer or insurer makes payment of weekly benefits to an employee without filing a memorandum of agreement or a non-prejudicial memorandum of agreement with the department the payment shall constitute a conclusive admission of liability and ongoing incapacity and that the employee is entitled to compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title and the employer or insurer shall not be entitled to any credit for the payment if the employee is awarded compensation in accordance with these chapters. The employer or insurer shall not file a petition to suspend or reduce payments until a memorandum has been filed with the department.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-9 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 1, § 5; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Employer Refusal to Pay.

An employer was justified in refusing to pay compensation and medical expenses by the employee’s refusal to sign an agreement without altering it to include an injury for which the employer was not liable, as the subsequent award of such compensation and medical expense by the commission might have forced the employer to pay such items twice. Peloquin v. ITT Gen. Controls, 104 R.I. 257 , 243 A.2d 754, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 642 (1968).

Gratuity.

Where employer continued to pay employee his regular salary during periods of disability when he was unable to work, the court ruled that employee’s earning capacity had in fact been diminished and the salary payments were deemed a gratuity rather than “compensation” within the meaning of this section. Natale v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 119 R.I. 713 , 382 A.2d 1313, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 607 (1978).

Medical Bills.

While employer’s payment of injured employee’s medical bills was not conclusive proof of employee’s entitlement to workers’ compensation, it was a factor to be weighed in determining whether employee sustained his burden of proving entitlement. Andreozzi v. D'Antuono, 113 R.I. 155 , 319 A.2d 16, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1152 (1974); Buonauito v. Ocean State Dairy Distribs., 509 A.2d 988, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 476 (R.I. 1986).

Compensation within the meaning of the act included medical payments made by an employer on his injured employee’s behalf. Andreozzi v. D'Antuono, 113 R.I. 155 , 319 A.2d 16, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1152 (1974).

Payment After Expiration of Agreement.

Where employer, through its carrier, entered into a nonprejudicial agreement with injured employee pursuant to former § 28-35-8 to pay her $45.00 per month, and continued to pay such amount for some time after the 90-day expiration of the agreement, employer was nevertheless entitled to a credit against employee’s subsequent award for the full amount paid to employee, since this section refers to a payment of compensation without any agreement. Crisostomi v. Zayre of Providence, 109 R.I. 251 , 283 A.2d 678, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1049 (1971).

Resumption of Payments.

Where preliminary agreement provided for the payment of compensation to employee for total incapacity, after which employee was able to return to work but later became totally disabled again, resumption of payments was not payment without an agreement under this section. Durante v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 110 R.I. 465 , 294 A.2d 190, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 939 (1972).

Salary Payment as Advance Against Compensation Payments.

Where an employee injured in the course of her employment was paid her full salary by the employer for eight months while she was unable to return to work and the employer advised her she would be expected to reimburse the employer for the salary paid to the extent of any compensation benefits awarded her, but no written memorandum of agreement was executed as required by this section, the salary payments constituted “payment of compensation” and the employer was not entitled to credit therefor against any subsequent award of compensation for the employee’s loss of earning capacity. Rickey v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 114 R.I. 672 , 337 A.2d 528, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1468 (1975).

28-35-10. Duplicates of documents furnished to employee — Inadmissibility of documents when copies not furnished.

Where an employer, his insurer, or the agents or independent contractors of either obtains from an injured employee any paper, document, report, statement, or agreement, including hospital records, nurses’ notes, personnel records, reports, or statements by forepersons or any other supervisory employees at the injured employee’s place of employment, whether signed or unsigned, and regardless of the mode of obtaining it, concerning compensation, the injured employee shall receive an exact duplicate original copy of that paper, document, report, statement, or agreement, including hospital records, nurses’ notes, personnel records, reports, or statements by forepersons or any other supervisory employees at the injured employee’s place of employment which shall be signed by a duly authorized agent or the employer or his or her insurer. The paper, document, report, statement, or agreement, including hospital records, nurses’ notes, personnel records, reports, or statements by forepersons or any other supervisory employees at the injured employee’s place of employment, shall be furnished to the employee at the time it is obtained, and a copy shall also be furnished to the employee’s attorney immediately upon request by that attorney. If a copy of a paper, document, report, statement, or agreement, including hospital records, nurses’ notes, personnel records, reports, or statements by forepersons or any other supervisory employees at the injured employee’s place of employment is not furnished strictly in accordance with this section, nothing contained in it may be used by an employer or his or her insurer or attorney for direct or cross-examination of the employee. The individual obtaining it may not testify in any proceeding and the paper, document, report, statement, or agreement, including hospital records, nurses’ notes, personnel records, reports, or statements by forepersons or any other supervisory employees at the injured employee’s place of employment shall be inadmissible in any proceeding, if objection by the employee to its admission is made.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2606, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-10 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 201, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 46.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The statute contemplates that any time an employee reports to his employer or its representatives and makes a statement about any injury, disease or condition which is work-related, then at that time he is entitled to duplicate of original and if it is not furnished, the exclusionary provisions of section may come into play. Giordiano v. Uniroyal, Inc., 108 R.I. 226 , 273 A.2d 855, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1252 (1971).

Coemployee’s Statement.

The status of a coemployee fails to meet the definition of foreman or other supervisory employee at the injured employee’s place of employment, copies of whose statements or reports would be required to be furnished to the injured employee on pain of having them excluded from evidence provided the appropriate objection to its admission was made by the employee. Afonso v. Pierce Buick, 478 A.2d 560, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 548 (R.I. 1984).

Construction With § 28-33-8.

The legislature did not intend to include reports required by § 28-33-8 within the provisions of this section. Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1022 (R.I. 1983).

Investigator’s Report.

Once the investigator furnished a report of his doings to the employer, the provisions of this section were triggered since a “statement concerning compensation” was reduced to writing; consequently, evidence of the conversations between the investigator and the employee should have been excluded from evidence as the requisite copy was not furnished in accordance with this section. Worcester Textile Co. v. Morales, 468 A.2d 279, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1107 (R.I. 1983).

Oral Statements.

The commission did not err in admitting the oral testimony of the employer’s safety inspector which was not furnished to the employee prior to trial, since this section governs only written statements and materials. Felicio v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 492 A.2d 1228, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 514 (R.I. 1985).

28-35-11. Questions determined by court.

All questions arising under chapters 29 — 38 of this title and § 45-21.2-9 shall, except as otherwise provided, be determined by the workers’ compensation court in accordance with the provisions of those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, §§ 3, 17; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-11 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

Clearly, the General Assembly intended to provide the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) with jurisdiction over all appeals arising under § 45-21.2-9 , unless the General Assembly explicitly provided otherwise; and thus the General Assembly intended to include occupational cancer as an injury in the WCC appeal provision provided for in § 45-21.2-9 (f). Lang v. Mun. Emples. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 222 A.3d 912, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 144 (R.I. 2019).

Review.

The Supreme Court is empowered to review the commission’s decree on questions of law and the appropriate standard in reviewing the commission’s decree is analogous to that applied on an appellate court’s direct review of a jury’s verdict in a negligence case. DeNardo v. Fairmount Foundries Cranston, Inc., 121 R.I. 440 , 399 A.2d 1229, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1797 (1979).

Subject of Dispute.

A dispute as to whether certain treatment is included in an agreement between the employer and the employee that the employer will pay for reasonable treatment is a proper subject for determination by the commission. McAree v. Gerber Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 243 , 342 A.2d 608, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1147 (1975).

In cases in which the parties cannot agree on whether medical treatment is necessary, the parties may seek a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Court. Mendes v. ITT Royal Elec., 648 A.2d 1358, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 235 (R.I. 1994).

28-35-12. Petition for determination of controversy — Contents and filing.

  1. In all disputes between an employer and employee in regard to compensation or any other obligation established under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and when death has resulted from the injury and the dependents of the deceased employee entitled to compensation are, or its apportionment among them is, in dispute, any person in interest, or his or her duly authorized representative, may file with the workers’ compensation court a petition, prescribed by the court, setting forth the names and residences of the parties; the facts relating to employment at the time of injury; the cause, extent, and character of the injury; the amount of wages, earnings, or salary received at the time of the injury; and the knowledge of the employer of notice of the occurrence of the injury; and any other facts that may be necessary and proper for the information of the court; and shall state the matter in dispute and the claims of the petitioner with reference to it; provided, that no petition shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days of the date of the injury and no petition regarding any other obligation established under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be filed until twenty-one (21) days after written demand for payment upon the employer or insurer or written notice to the employer or insurer of failure to fulfill the obligation, except that any petition alleging the non-payment or late payment of weekly compensation benefits, attorney’s fees, and costs, may be filed after fourteen (14) days from the date the payment is due as set forth in §§ 28-35-42 , 28-35-43 , and 28-35-20(c) . All demands seeking payment of bills for medical services rendered shall include reference to a claim number or a legible copy of the agreement, order, and/or decree, if appropriate, establishing liability. Medical bills for services ordered paid by decree or pretrial order shall be paid within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the decree or order. In the event that the bills are not paid within the fourteen-day (14) period, a petition may be filed to enforce said order or decree without any additional written notice to the employer or insurer.
    1. If one or more claims are filed for an injury and there are two (2) or more insurers, any one of which may be held to be liable to pay compensation, and the judge determines that the injured employee would be entitled to receive compensation but for the existence of a controversy as to which one of the insurers is liable to pay compensation, one of the insurers shall be selected by a judge of the workers’ compensation court, to pay to the injured employee the compensation, pending a final decision of the workers’ compensation court as to the matter in controversy, and that decision shall require that the amount of compensation paid shall be deducted from the award if made against another insurer and shall be paid by that other insurer to the insurer selected by the judge.
    2. The workers’ compensation court shall award compensation, costs, and attorney’s fees in its discretion if one of the insurers is held to be liable following the hearing.
  2. If any determination of the workers’ compensation court entitles an employee to retroactive payment of weekly benefits, the court shall award to the employee interest at the rate per annum provided in § 9-21-10 on that retroactive weekly payment from six (6) months subsequent to the date that the employee first filed a petition for benefits to the time when that retroactive payment is actually made. If the proceedings are unduly delayed by or at the request of the employee or his or her attorney, the judge may reduce or eliminate interest on retroactive payment; provided, that the provisions of this section as they relate to interest shall apply only to petitions filed on or after July 1, 1984.
  3. Any fine, penalty, or interest expense incurred by an insurer under this section may not be used as an expense for the purpose of seeking a rate increase before the department of business regulation.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1928, ch. 1207, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-12 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 1, § 6; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 4, § 4; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 6; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 6; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 4; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 4, and P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 4, enacted identical amendments to this section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Worker’s compensation petitions follow the course of equity. Ochoa v. Union Camp Corp., 120 R.I. 898 , 391 A.2d 123, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 736 (1978).

Construction.

The language of subsection (c) is mandatory rather than permissive. Conrad v. State - Medical Ctr. Gen. Hosp., 592 A.2d 858, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 126 (R.I. 1991).

Appeal of Agreement.

Approval of an agreement does not furnish the basis of an appeal on the ground of fraud or coercion unless the issue has been presented to and adjudicated by the director. Capobianco v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 77 R.I. 474 , 77 A.2d 534, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1950).

Award of Interest on Compensation.

Subsection (c) mandates that statutory interest be awarded to petitioners pursuant to their individual awards of workers’ compensation benefits, absent any findings that various delays in the proceedings constitute undue delays or are directly attributable to petitioners. Conrad v. State - Medical Ctr. Gen. Hosp., 592 A.2d 858, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 126 (R.I. 1991).

Subsection (c) of this section makes an award of interest pursuant to § 9-21-10 applicable to judgments of the workers’ compensation court when awarding retroactive payment of weekly benefits, but alters the time frame for which interest may be awarded and provides for circumstances in which an award of interest may be reduced or altogether eliminated. Donnelly v. Town of Lincoln, 730 A.2d 5, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 110 (R.I. 1999).

In consequence of the unambiguous statutory language of subsection (c), a petitioner need not request interest in order to receive it. Donnelly v. Town of Lincoln, 730 A.2d 5, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 110 (R.I. 1999).

Consideration of Previous Injuries.

The proximity in time between first and second disabilities is a relevant factor in deciding whether the first injury was a material contributing cause or a substantial factor in causing the second injury, and because it is only one factor to be considered, even a great distance in time between injuries will not preclude a finding that one was causally related to the other. Blackwell v. Bostitch, Div. of Textron, 591 A.2d 384, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 1991).

Even though an employee completely recovers from an injury, he or she could be left in a condition where he or she is more susceptible to having another injury, or that a later injury will be of a more serious nature because of the original injury. In either case an employee’s original disability could be said to be a material contributing factor to a later injury. Blackwell v. Bostitch, Div. of Textron, 591 A.2d 384, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 1991).

Whether an employee has completely recovered at the time he or she returns to work after suffering a compensable injury is relevant to the question of whether that injury materially contributed to causing a subsequently occurring injury. Blackwell v. Bostitch, Div. of Textron, 591 A.2d 384, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 1991).

Defects in Petition.

Relief could be granted employee in the same manner as if he had petitioned under this section even though the petition was erroneously designated a petition for review. Lopes v. B. B. & R. Knight, Inc., 50 R.I. 16 , 144 A. 439, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1929); Esposito v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 74 R.I. 31 , 58 A.2d 402, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1948).

Failure of the petition to set out the amount expended for burial did not preclude an award for such expenses where there was no dispute as to the amount and the employer was not surprised by the evidence. Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939).

Effect of Previous Proceedings.

Settlement entered into at time total disability ended and employee returned to light work was a settlement only as to total disability and did not preclude later petition under this section as to partial incapacity. Lopes v. B. B. & R. Knight, Inc., 50 R.I. 16 , 144 A. 439, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1929); Bernier v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 56 R.I. 438 , 186 A. 479, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 118 (1936); Esposito v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 74 R.I. 31 , 58 A.2d 402, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1948).

Parties.

Administratrix of deceased employee could petition under this section for benefit of dependents. Johnson v. Lanifero, 73 R.I. 238 , 54 A.2d 412, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1947).

A physician seeking payment of his fee is not among those authorized by this section to file a petition with the commission. Wynne v. Pawtuxet Valley Dyeing Co., 101 R.I. 455 , 224 A.2d 612, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 414 (1966).

The jurisdiction of the commission is limited to disputes between the employer and the employee. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. West Warwick, 119 R.I. 458 , 379 A.2d 924, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1951 (1977).

Where the injured employee is not involved in a dispute between the employer and its insurer under a workers’ compensation insurance contract, the commission has no jurisdiction over the dispute, even where the employer is a state or political subdivision. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. West Warwick, 119 R.I. 458 , 379 A.2d 924, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1951 (1977).

Proof Conforming to Allegations.

Proof of injuries must reasonably conform to the allegation of injuries in the petition. Enos v. Industrial Trust Co., 62 R.I. 263 , 4 A.2d 915, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1939).

Retroactive Compensation Benefits.

Appellate division of the workers’ compensation court acted within its discretion in not awarding 12% interest on retroactive compensation benefits to plaintiff, where the record showed that an approximately six-month delay in removing the action from the nisi calendar was attributable to the plaintiff. Beaulieu v. State Dep't of Educ., 598 A.2d 1375, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 198 (R.I. 1991).

Although the statute provides that the court may reduce or eliminate interest on retroactive payment where the delay is due to the employee or his or her attorney, where a lengthy delay in the court rendering its decision arose out of the death of the original trial court judge, the amount of interest was reduced to a time frame when the parties might reasonably have expected to have received a decision from the supreme court. Bienkowski v. Derecktor, 651 A.2d 1241, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 308 (R.I. 1994).

28-35-12.1. Prompt decision required.

The judge who hears a case pursuant to § 28-35-12 shall render his or her decision no later than thirty (30) days after each party has completed presenting its case. This provision shall not apply in any case for which the judge has shown just cause, as determined by rules of practice of the workers’ compensation court adopted pursuant to the authority granted to the court by § 28-29-26 , for delay beyond thirty (30) days.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 12; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-35-13. Insurance commissioner as agent to receive process.

Every employer subject to or who elects to become subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title and/or his or her insurer shall be deemed to have appointed the insurance commissioner of this state or his or her successor in office to be his or her true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes, petitions, and notices in any action or proceeding against the employer and/or insurer, wherever that service is provided for in §§ 28-35-14 28-35-28 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 9, § 9; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-13 .

28-35-14. Copies of petition to respondents.

Upon filing with the workers’ compensation court of any petition, stating the general nature of any claim as to which any dispute or controversy may have arisen, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition and its attachments on the respondent or respondents in accordance with the workers’ compensation court rules of practice.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1950, ch. 2625, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-14 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6; P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 2, and P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Service.

Service day before filing of petition was not effective. Geyer v. Callan Const. Co., 80 R.I. 247 , 81 R.I. 247 , 101 A.2d 876, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1954).

28-35-15. Service on parties outside state.

In case an interested party is located out of the state, and has no post office address within this state, a copy of the petition and copies of all notices shall be filed by the petitioner in the office of the insurance commissioner and shall also be sent by registered or certified mail to the last known post office address of that party. This filing and mailing shall constitute sufficient service, with the same force and effect as if served upon a party located within the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-15 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 23; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-35-16. Filing of answer — Additional parties.

Within ten (10) days of the filing of the petition, the respondent or respondents shall file an answer to the petition with the workers’ compensation court and send a copy of it to the petitioner, identifying the specific issues disputed by the respondent or respondents with reference to the matter in dispute as disclosed by the petition. No pleadings other than the petition and answer shall be required to bring the matter to a final determination. If the respondent or respondents does not file an answer, the matter shall proceed as though the allegations of the petition had been denied. The workers’ compensation court may bring in additional parties by service of a copy of the petition by registered or certified mail.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1928, ch. 1207, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1942, ch. 1236, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1870, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2368, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-16 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-35-17. Notice and conduct of hearings.

  1. Upon the filing of any petition the court shall assign the matter to a judge. The court shall issue notice at that time, advising the parties of the judge to whom the case has been assigned and the date for pretrial conference in accordance with § 28-35-20 .
  2. Upon filing of any claim for a trial, following the pretrial conference held in accordance with § 28-35-20 , the judge shall fix a time for trial and give notice of it in accordance with the rules of practice promulgated by the court but the initial hearing shall be fixed not later than thirty (30) days next after filing the claim for a trial. The court shall cause notice of the trial to be given to each interested party in accordance with the rules of practice promulgated by the court. The judge shall proceed to hear the matter as the justice of the case may require, and may allow amendments to the petition and the answer at any stage of the proceedings. Hearings may be adjourned from time to time for just and sufficient cause, and hearings may be held at the places that the workers’ compensation court shall designate.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3, P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-17 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Stenographic report of hearings, § 28-35-28.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendment of Petition.

On hearing of an employee’s petition to review and/or amend a decree concerning reputation, it was not error for the commission, during the testimony of a physician, to amend the employee’s petition for review to read “injury to right arm; right buttock, and back injury” and later to further amend it by adding “ruptured disc at 4th lumbar space” to conform to the physician’s testimony. O'Neil v. M & F Worsted Mills, 100 R.I. 647 , 218 A.2d 666, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 492 (1966).

The commissioner did not err in allowing the amendment of the employee’s petition near the conclusion of the hearing to show the accident to have occurred on July 25, 1968, instead of “on or about July 24, 1968,” where the employer did not express surprise or request a continuance to present additional evidence to meet the changed date. Saccoccio v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 107 R.I. 53 , 264 A.2d 905, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 737 (1970).

The commission has broad statutory authority to allow amendments to a petition and the court will construe that authority liberally when to do so does not conflict with legislature’s intent to assist employees with job-related injuries. Silva v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 524 A.2d 571, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 461 (R.I. 1987).

Collateral References.

Decision of commission as affected by nonparticipation of one or more members because of death, absence, or resignation. 148 A.L.R. 327.

Rules for examination of witnesses which obtain in court trials, disregard of, as affecting conclusiveness of decision of commissioner or arbitrator. 87 A.L.R. 777.

28-35-17.1. Assessment of costs of delay.

  1. With respect to any delay or continuance of any matter or proceeding before the workers’ compensation court, the court shall have the discretion to determine whether the delay or continuance was due to action or inaction, without just cause, on the part of an employer, employee, insurance carrier, or attorney or other representative of an employer, employee, or insurance carrier.
  2. Upon determination of the responsibility for any delay or continuance, the court shall have the authority to assess all direct costs or expenses incurred by any party or by the court as a result of the delay or continuance, or an appropriate penalty, including reasonable attorney’s fees, upon the responsible employer, employee, insurance carrier, or attorney or other representative. All costs, expenses, reasonable attorney’s fees, and/or penalties so assessed upon any delaying person or entity shall be disbursed as justice requires pursuant to the discretion of the court except attorney’s fees, which shall be paid to the attorney for the non-delaying party.
  3. The workers’ compensation court shall, pursuant to § 28-30-12 , promulgate rules and regulations to enforce this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Intentional Tort Exception.

The intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply to the workers’ compensation carrier. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

Jurisdiction.

This section and its enforcement through Rule 2.29 of the Worker’s Compensation Court Rules of Practice embody the intention on the part of the Legislature that the forum for resolution of allegations of improper delay of a workers’ compensation claim should remain with the Workers’ Compensation Court. Both the statute and the rule provide the exclusive remedy and penalty under the act for assessing the costs of delay. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

28-35-18. Hearings by compensation agencies of other states or territories.

The workers’ compensation court may also arrange to have hearings held by the workers’ compensation court officer or tribunal having authority to hear cases arising under the workers’ compensation law of any other state, of the District of Columbia, or of any territory of the United States, the testimony and proceedings at any this hearing to be reported to the workers’ compensation court and to be part of the record in the case. Any evidence so taken shall be subject to rebuttal upon final hearing before the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-18 .

Collateral References.

Voluntary payment of compensation under statute of one state as bar to claim or ground for reduction of claim of compensation under statute of another state. 8 A.L.R.2d 628.

28-35-19. Hearing initiated by workers’ compensation court — Petition to enforce.

  1. If the workers’ compensation court has reason to believe that the payment of compensation has not been made, although it should have been made, it may on its own motion give notice to the parties of a time and place when a hearing will be had before the court for the purpose of determining facts and making an order. The notice shall contain a statement of the matter to be considered. Subsequently, all other provisions governing proceedings before the court shall attach insofar as they may be applicable.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any memorandum of agreement, preliminary determination, order, or decree shall be enforceable by a suitable action or proceeding brought by either of the parties to it before the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-19 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5.

28-35-20. Informal pretrial conference.

  1. Before any case shall proceed to a trial, the judge shall conduct a mandatory pretrial conference within twenty-one (21) days of the date of filing with a view to expediting the case and reducing the issues in dispute to a minimum, notice of which shall be sent by the administrator to the parties or to their attorneys of record. The conference shall be informal and no oral testimony shall be offered or taken. Any statement then made by either party shall in the absence of agreement be without prejudice, but any agreement then made shall be binding.
  2. Within a reasonable time of receipt, all medical reports and documentary evidence which the parties possess and which the parties intend to present as evidence at the pretrial conference shall be provided to the opposing party.
  3. At the pretrial conference, the judge shall make every effort to resolve any controversies or to plan for any subsequent trial of the case. The judge shall render a pretrial order immediately at the close of the pretrial conference. The pretrial order shall be set forth in a simplified manner on forms prescribed by the workers’ compensation court. It may reflect any agreements reached between the parties, but shall grant or deny, in whole or in part, the relief sought by the petitioner. Subject to the provisions of § 45-21.2-9(j) , the pretrial order shall be effective upon entry. Any payments ordered by it including, but not limited to, weekly benefits, medical expenses, costs, and attorney’s fees, shall be paid within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the order.
  4. Any party aggrieved by the entry of the order by the judge may claim a trial on any issue that was not resolved by agreement at the pretrial conference by filing with the workers’ compensation court within five (5) days of the date of the entry of the order, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, a claim for a trial on forms prescribed by the workers’ compensation court. If no timely claim for a trial is filed or is filed and withdrawn, the pretrial order shall become, by operation of law and without further action by any party, a final decree of the workers’ compensation court.
  5. All trials shall be assigned for hearing and decision to the same judge who presided over the pretrial of the matter. Notice of the trial shall be sent by the workers’ compensation court to the parties and to their attorneys of record. All trials shall be de novo, except that issues resolved by agreement at the pretrial conference may not be reopened. Any other case or dispute under chapters 29 — 38 of this title that arises during the pendency of this trial, shall be forwarded immediately to the same judge for pretrial in accordance with this section and for any subsequent trial.
  6. If after trial and the entry of a final decree, it is determined that the employee or medical services provider was not entitled to the relief sought in the petition, the employer or insurer shall be reimbursed from the workers’ compensation administrative fund, described in chapter 37 of this title, to the extent of any payments made pursuant to the pretrial order to which there is no entitlement.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-20 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 4, § 4; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 1, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 4, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Court and its Appellate Division lacked the authority to award attorney’s fees and costs in a successful appeal from a decision of a retirement board regarding an accidental disability retirement claim because there was no statutory authority providing for the award of attorney’s fees in a successful appeal of an accidental disability retirement claim. Koback v. Mun. Emples. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 252 A.3d 1247, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 72 (R.I. 2021).

Award of Benefits.

An employer who is required to pay workers’ compensation benefits as the result of a pretrial conference is not denied due process where it is afforded sufficient opportunity to present evidence and arguments. John J. Orr & Sons v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 566 (R.I. 1984).

Effect of Agreement.

Where, in a pretrial conference, both sides agreed that the petitioner had suffered compensable injuries, it was error for the commission, in an appeal by the employer in which such question was not raised, to find that the record did not contain sufficient evidence that the petitioner had suffered a compensable injury. Lamont v. Aetna Bridge Co., 107 R.I. 686 , 270 A.2d 515, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 825 (1970).

The “made liable” language of § 28-34-8 contemplates the possible use of a memorandum of agreement to make the last employer liable for the total compensation due to a disabled employee because of an occupational disease, but does not contain mandatory language requiring the workers’ compensation court to adjudicate liability before the last employer will be deemed “made liable.” American Power Conversion v. Benny's, Inc., 740 A.2d 1265, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1999).

Reduction of Benefits.

Pretrial order reducing the employee’s worker’s compensation benefit based on a finding that the employee had reached maximum medical improvment did not violate due process, because it was not effective for five months and retroactive relief was available. City of Pawtucket v. Pimental, 960 A.2d 981, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 2008).

28-35-21. Admissibility of medical and wage records.

  1. The certified copy of the record of a licensed health care facility as defined in chapter 17 of title 23 or of any health care provider or medical personnel licensed to practice under title 5 shall be admissible as evidence in any workers’ compensation proceeding. The determination of the admissibility of such evidence shall be made pursuant to the provisions of §§ 9-19-27 and 9-19-39 and the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.
  2. The contents of wage records of a claimant employee signed by his or her employer or by the person having charge of those records may be admitted in evidence in any workers’ compensation proceeding.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3593, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-21 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 453, § 1.

Cross References.

Occupational disease reports not evidence, § 23-5-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cross Examination.

This section authorizing the admission of wage records cannot take away the right of cross-examination but where opposing party did not claim such right there was no error in the admission of such record as evidence. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Dean, 91 R.I. 364 , 163 A.2d 47, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1960).

28-35-22. Inspection of premises — Examination of wage records — Medical examination.

The workers’ compensation court may, with notice to all parties, cause testimony to be taken or an inspection of the premises where the injury occurred, to be had, or cause the time books and payroll records of the employer to be examined by any judge of the workers’ compensation court or any examiner appointed by it, and may from time to time direct any employee claiming compensation to be examined by an impartial physician as defined in § 28-35-24 ; the testimony so taken and the results of any inspection or examination, to be reported to the workers’ compensation court for its consideration upon any hearing.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-22 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 154, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Medical Examination.

In addition to the authority contained in §§ 28-33-35 and 28-35-24 , authority on the part of the commissioner to order an impartial medical examination of the claimant was also given by this section, on claimant employee’s petition to review a preliminary agreement under the workers’ compensation act. Zaccaria v. Paragon Worsted Co., 96 R.I. 105 , 189 A.2d 690, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1963).

Where record disclosed neither any unusual situation concerning physical condition of claimant for compensation requiring trial commissioner to appoint impartial medical examiner, nor any motion by claimant for such appointment, the employee was not prejudiced by failure of trial commissioner to have appointed medical examiner. Dart Indus. v. Andrade, 108 R.I. 474 , 276 A.2d 460, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1292 (1971).

Where the evidence at a hearing was squarely in conflict on the issue of the causal connection between the disability and the employment connected accident and the commission failed to appoint an impartial medical examiner, the court held that the authority granted by this section is purely discretionary and the commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint an examiner. Perfetto v. Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co., 114 R.I. 624 , 337 A.2d 791, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1464 (1975).

28-35-23. Ex parte testimony.

All ex parte testimony taken by the workers’ compensation court shall be reduced to writing and either party shall have opportunity to rebut it at any hearing where introduced.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-23 .

Collateral References.

Dead man’s statute, competency of witness in proceeding for death under workers’ compensation act as affected by. 77 A.L.R.2d 680.

28-35-24. Examination by or opinion of impartial physician.

  1. Whenever the testimony presented at any hearing indicates a dispute, or creates doubt, as to the extent, nature, or cause of disability or death, the workers’ compensation court may direct that the injured employee be examined, or may obtain an opinion without examination of an impartial, competent physician designated by the workers’ compensation court who is not under contract with or regularly employed or regularly retained by a compensation insurer or self-insured employer.
  2. The expense of the examination shall be paid by the employer. The report of the examination shall be transmitted to the workers’ compensation court and a copy of it shall be furnished by the workers’ compensation court to each party who shall have an opportunity to rebut it on further hearing.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-24 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 154, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appointment of Physician.

The statute authorizing trial commissioners to appoint impartial medical examiners gave commissioner discretion to do so on his motion or on the motion of party. Dart Indus. v. Andrade, 108 R.I. 474 , 276 A.2d 460, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1292 (1971).

Where the evidence at a hearing was squarely in conflict on the issue of the causal connection between the disability and the employment connected accident and the commission failed to appoint an impartial medical examiner, the court held that the authority granted by this section is purely discretionary and the commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint an examiner. Perfetto v. Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co., 114 R.I. 624 , 337 A.2d 791, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1464 (1975).

Phrase “regularly employed” is not to be equated with constant employment but is to be determined by considering the frequency and regularity with which the compensation insurer has called upon the expertise of the physician in the past. New Eng. Elec. Co. v. Freeman, 453 A.2d 756, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1113 (R.I. 1982).

Competency of Testimony.

In action on widow’s petition for death benefits, although employer contended that the testimony of the impartial physician appointed under this section did not show that the blow decedent received caused his death and that his opinion as to causation that if decedent had neck pain over a reasonable time after the accident then the injury was the cause of the death was speculative in nature, such arguments went to the weight of the doctor’s testimony and not to the admissibility or competence and commissioner’s finding that petitioner’s testimony was competent evidence to support this finding was not error. Parenteau v. Zimmerman Engineering, Inc., 111 R.I. 68 , 299 A.2d 168, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1180 (1973).

Construction With §§ 28-33-35 and 28-35-22.

In addition to the authority contained in this section and § 28-33-35 , authority on the part of the commissioner to order an impartial medical examination of the claimant was also given by § 28-35-22 on claimant employee’s petition to review a preliminary agreement under the workers’ compensation act. Zaccaria v. Paragon Worsted Co., 96 R.I. 105 , 189 A.2d 690, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1963).

Examination Expenses.
— Second Injury Cases.

Where second injury indemnity funds are involved, the expense of an impartial physical examination ordered by the director of labor should be charged against the fund. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

Expert Opinion.

While this section did not make the impartial medical examiner the final trier of fact, an expert might have rendered an opinion on an issue of fact within his area of expertise in a proper case. Parenteau v. Zimmerman Engineering, Inc., 111 R.I. 68 , 299 A.2d 168, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1180 (1973).

Medical Records.

Where the commissioner only sent a portion of the medical record to the doctor appointed under this section, his authority was implicit in the language of this section to send whatever records he deemed appropriate, and when employer failed to show that there had been an abuse of such discretion or that an essential fact had been omitted from the record supplied the impartial doctor, there was no error. Parenteau v. Zimmerman Engineering, Inc., 111 R.I. 68 , 299 A.2d 168, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1180 (1973).

Transmittal of Information to Physician.

The parties to a workers’ compensation dispute should not be allowed to furnish information of their own choosing to the impartial physician. The sole transmitting authority should be the trial commissioner. LaFazia v. Connecticut Seafood Producers, 538 A.2d 670, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 1988).

Weight of Evidence.

There was no merit in employee’s contention that the testimony of the treating physician should be afforded greater weight and probative value than that of impartial medical examiner appointed under this section. Grimes Box Co. v. Miguel, 509 A.2d 1002, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 481 (R.I. 1986).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of opinion evidence as to employability on issue of disability in health and accident insurance and workers’ compensation cases. 89 A.L.R.3d 783.

Neutral physician appointed in proceedings under workers’ compensation act, rights as to examination or cross-examination of, and as to opportunity to introduce further testimony to controvert or support his testimony. 109 A.L.R. 598.

28-35-25. Disobedience of subpoena.

Any person subpoenaed who willfully and unlawfully fails or neglects to appear or to testify or to produce books, papers, and records as required, shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions not longer than thirty (30) days. Each day a person shall so refuse or neglect shall constitute a separate offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-25 .

28-35-26. Appointment of guardian.

The workers’ compensation court may require the appointment of a guardian for any person who is mentally incompetent or a minor to act for and on behalf of that employee within the meaning of chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1928, ch. 1207, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, §§ 3, 4; P.L. 1942, ch. 1236, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1870, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2368, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-26 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5.

28-35-27. Decision of controversies — Decree.

  1. In any controversy over which the workers’ compensation court has jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter and § 45-21.2-9 , any judge of that court shall, pursuant to §§ 28-35-11 28-35-28 , and the rules of practice of the court, hear all questions of law and fact involved in the controversy and presented by any party in interest, and he or she shall within ten (10) days after the hearing, unless the parties otherwise agree, decide the merits of the controversy pursuant to the law and the fair preponderance of the evidence and the court shall immediately notify the parties.
  2. Within seventy-two (72) hours of notice, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, the judge shall enter a decree upon the decision, which shall contain findings of fact, but within that time any party may appear and present a form of decree for consideration.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1928, ch. 1207, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, §§ 3, 4; P.L. 1942, ch. 1236, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1870, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2368, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-27 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 4, § 5; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 5; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burden of Proof.

Allegation that claimant had failed to use proper care in treatment of his injury is a matter of defense and doubts should be resolved in favor of claimant. GORRAL v. WILLIAM H. HAMLYN & SON, 38 R.I. 249 , 94 A. 877, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1915), limited, Campbell v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 72 R.I. 358 , 51 A.2d 530, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1947).

Claimant has burden of proof as to incapacity. Weber v. American Silk Spinning Co., 38 R.I. 309 , 95 A. 603, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1915); Rosewater v. Jean's, Inc., 72 R.I. 489 , 53 A.2d 490, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1947); Wareham v. United States Rubber Co., 73 R.I. 207 , 54 A.2d 372, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1947); Pearl v. Builders Iron Foundry, 73 R.I. 304 , 55 A.2d 282, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1947); Baccari v. W. T. Grant Co., 73 R.I. 376 , 56 A.2d 552, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1948); Ferguson v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 98 , 58 A.2d 810, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1948); De Fusco v. Ochee Spring Water Co., 84 R.I. 446 , 124 A.2d 867, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1956).

Claimant has burden of proof as to causal connection. Keith v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 53 R.I. 160 , 164 A. 907, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1933); Shewczuk v. Contrexeville Mfg. Co., 53 R.I. 223 , 165 A. 444, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 64 (1933), limited, Chirico v. Kappler, 61 R.I. 128 , 200 A. 447, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1938); La Point v. Pendleton, 61 R.I. 121 , 200 A. 464, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1938); Campbell v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 72 R.I. 358 , 51 A.2d 530, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1947); Esposito v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 74 R.I. 31 , 58 A.2d 402, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1948); Colaluca v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 62 , 58 A.2d 560, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1948); Bahry v. City Fabrics, 80 R.I. 411 , 97 A.2d 589, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1953).

Employer has burden of proof as to want of notice of medical expenses. Garabedian v. Gorham Mfg. Co., 63 R.I. 452 , 9 A.2d 46, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1939).

Claimant has burden of proof as to dependency. Botelho v. J. H. Tredennick, Inc., 64 R.I. 326 , 12 A.2d 282, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1940).

On petition for discontinuance of compensation employer has burden of proof that employee can get suitable work. (But see § 28-33-17(b)(2) ). Olneyville Wool Combing Co. v. Di Donato, 65 R.I. 154 , 13 A.2d 817, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1940).

Claimant has burden of proof as to whether accident occurred. Parmentier v. Moore Fabric Co., 71 R.I. 369 , 45 A.2d 876, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1946).

On petition for review to reduce or terminate compensation, employer has burden of proof as to diminution or cessation of incapacity. Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. D'Ambra, 73 R.I. 37 , 53 A.2d 479, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1947).

Claimant has burden of proof as to employment relationship. Pasetti v. Brusa, 81 R.I. 88 , 98 A.2d 833, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1953).

The party asserting the affirmative in an original petition for compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the allegations in his petition. Mazzarella v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 120 R.I. 333 , 388 A.2d 4, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 680 (1978).

Decree.
— Amendment.

Where there was only one issue of fact, failure to include a finding thereon in the decree did not prejudice the parties and the decree would not be reversed but amendment to include finding would be permitted. Turner Constr. Co. v. Simone, 51 R.I. 210 , 153 A. 364, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1931).

Where rescript contained findings of fact and parties were not prejudiced by omission of findings from decree, decree would not be reversed but case would be remanded for amendment of decree to incorporate findings. Simone v. W. & H. Jewelry Co., 58 R.I. 348 , 192 A. 807, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1937); Di Robbio v. Firesafe Builders Prods. Corp., 74 R.I. 337 , 60 A.2d 724, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1948).

— Finality of Determination.

Statement in decree that employer’s liability is finally determined thereby is neither necessary nor proper. Simone v. W. & H. Jewelry Co., 58 R.I. 348 , 192 A. 807, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1937).

In compensation cases, the findings of the commission are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive upon the court if in the record there is any competent legal evidence from which those findings could properly be made. Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283 , 387 A.2d 1034, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 669 (1978).

— Interest.

Interest on payments decreed runs only from the time of the decree and not from the time of the decision. Campbell v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 78 R.I. 290 , 81 A.2d 684, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1951).

— Petition for Review.

After decision on a petition for review under § 28-35-45 court should enter a decree as provided by this section. Jules Desurmont Worsted Co. v. Julian, 56 R.I. 97 , 183 A. 846, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1936).

— Presence of Parties.

Entry of decree in absence of one of the parties was not good practice but was not ground for appeal where the party was not prejudiced. Simone v. W. & H. Jewelry Co., 58 R.I. 348 , 192 A. 807, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1937).

— Time of Entry.

Entry of decree after time prescribed by this section did not invalidate proceedings before commissioner. Morton C. Tuttle Co. v. Carbone, 84 R.I. 375 , 125 A.2d 133, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 100 (1956).

Evidence.

Where petition in former proceeding had been received as evidence, supreme court would presume that trial justice had considered such evidence even though he did not mention it in his decision. Garabedian v. Gorham Mfg. Co., 63 R.I. 452 , 9 A.2d 46, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1939).

Trial justice could believe part of claimant’s testimony and disbelieve other parts. Di Libero v. Middlesex Constr. Co., 63 R.I. 509 , 9 A.2d 848, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 117 (1939).

Uncorroborated evidence of a back injury, as could satisfy a rational mind, though given by the injured employee alone, is sufficient to support a finding of total incapacity. Costa v. Cars, Inc., 96 R.I. 396 , 192 A.2d 1, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1963).

Decisions of an administrative agency are without probative value in hearings before the commission. Denisewich v. Abbott Glass Co., 98 R.I. 182 , 200 A.2d 455, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1964).

Where testimony of claimant’s witness on subject of causation supporting compensability of claimant’s injuries was uncontradicted, but the noncompensability of such injuries could reasonably be inferred from other portions of his testimony, the commissioner was free to draw such inferences and his finding against claimant will not be set aside on that ground. Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, 100 R.I. 203 , 214 A.2d 193, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 374 (1965).

Although petitioner claimed the commissioner erred in finding that he failed to prove incapacity on the basis of the uncontradicted evidence he presented, the trial commissioner might have accepted all or none of the testimony presented as a matter of fact, and the affirmance of the finding by the full commission indicated that such a finding was not clearly wrong and was not disturbed. Duarte v. Union Wadding Co., 111 R.I. 546 , 305 A.2d 107, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1244 (1973).

Independent evidence of the reasonableness of charges is required before recovery can be had for the costs of medical services. Mastronardi v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 859 , 391 A.2d 112, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 734 (1978).

Since reasonableness of the charges for medical services was part of the employee’s prima facie case, an employer’s failure to object to testimony regarding those charges did not relieve the employee of her obligation to establish that element of her case. Mastronardi v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 859 , 391 A.2d 112, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 734 (1978).

Findings of Fact.

Decree not containing findings of fact was a nullity. Dodge v. Barstow Stove Co., 40 R.I. 191 , 100 A. 245, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1917).

A trial commissioner may reject some or all of a witness’ testimony as being unworthy of belief and such evaluation is a finding of fact that, if supported by competent evidence, is not reviewable by the Supreme Court. Delage v. Imperial Knife Co., 121 R.I. 146 , 396 A.2d 938, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1755 (1979).

— Inferences.

Superior court may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Jillson v. Ross, 38 R.I. 145 , 94 A. 717, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1915); Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Macedo, 73 R.I. 157 , 53 A.2d 756, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1947); Burns v. Rhode Island Tool Co., 79 R.I. 169 , 85 A.2d 925, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1952); Antosia v. Crown Worsted Mills, 79 R.I. 205 , 86 A.2d 553, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1952); Imperial Knife Co. v. Calise, 80 R.I. 428 , 97 A.2d 579, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1953); Chase v. General Elec. Co., 83 R.I. 269 , 115 A.2d 683, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1955).

— Insufficiency.

Where the trial court incorporated only three findings of fact into the decree and review of that decree left the trial court unable to reach the merits of plaintiff ’s contentions because these findings were insufficient to support the ultimate conclusion, intelligent review of the trial court’s decision was rendered impossible, and the case was properly remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Court. Cunha v. Carol Cable Co., 634 A.2d 1171, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 267 (R.I. 1993).

— Ultimate Facts.

Findings to be included in the decree are the conclusions as to the issuable or ultimate facts and need not include a statement of the evidence or findings as to probative facts. Jillson v. Ross, 38 R.I. 145 , 94 A. 717, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1915); General Scrap Iron, Inc. v. LaPorte, 68 R.I. 98 , 26 A.2d 618, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1942).

Inclusion of findings which were not of ultimate fact did not render decree erroneous. Emma v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., 75 R.I. 94 , 63 A.2d 786, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1949).

Decree summarizing all the findings of fact into one inclusive finding was defective. Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. Della Morte, 76 R.I. 325 , 69 A.2d 689, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1949).

— Uncertainty.

Finding by superior court that future earning capacity was uncertain was in effect a declaration of inability to make a finding thereon. Weber v. American Silk Spinning Co., 38 R.I. 309 , 95 A. 603, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1915).

Finding in decree that petitioner had not established that employee had ceased to be totally incapacitated was sufficient in form. General Scrap Iron, Inc. v. LaPorte, 68 R.I. 98 , 26 A.2d 618, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1942).

Procedure.

Although the legislature intended that procedures provided in the workers’ compensation act were to follow the practice in equity, this rule is not absolute and does not preclude the legislature from prescribing specific procedures contrary to equity practices governing similar situations. Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, 97 R.I. 487 , 199 A.2d 24, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1964).

The procedure prescribed in this section is mandatory. Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, 97 R.I. 487 , 199 A.2d 24, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1964).

Where the trial commissioner did not issue a decision within the ten days after the hearing required by this section, his failure to perform his duty did not void the award for employee. Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651 , 375 A.2d 920, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1505 (1977).

Reopening Case.

Superior court could permit claimant to reopen case to show notice to employer of injury after conclusion of all the evidence. Campisani v. Sun Dial Optical Co., 80 R.I. 307 , 96 A.2d 582, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1953).

Although the trial commissioner has no jurisdiction to reopen a compensation proceeding once a decision has been made, the fact that the decision may be made at any time within a ten-day period is significant of a legislative intent to provide for reopening of the hearing prior to the entry of decision on a motion therefor addressed to the sound discretion of the trial commissioner. Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, 97 R.I. 487 , 199 A.2d 24, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1964).

While, in a case where the commissioner does not enter his decision until more than a year after conclusion on the original petition, orderly procedure will be better served by filing a motion to reopen the proceeding for presentation of matters occurring in the interim, when such matters are presented in a petition for review, the original decree will be treated as relating back to the date when the hearing was concluded. Costa v. Cars, Inc., 100 R.I. 682 , 219 A.2d 122, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 497 (1966).

Representation by Counsel.

Fact that employee was not represented by counsel before department of labor did not invalidate proceedings where she was not denied counsel there and where she actually had counsel in superior and supreme courts. Berkshire Fine Spinning Assocs. v. Label, 74 R.I. 6 , 60 A.2d 871, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1948).

Written Decision.

Failure of superior court justice to file written decision did not invalidate the decree where he had orally announced his conclusions on the issues and where the appellant was not prejudiced by the absence of a written decision. Jillson v. Ross, 38 R.I. 145 , 94 A. 717, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1915); Turner Constr. Co. v. Simone, 51 R.I. 210 , 153 A. 364, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1931).

Collateral References.

“And/or,” used in finding. 118 A.L.R. 1376; 154 A.L.R. 866.

Decision of commission as affected by nonparticipation of one or more members because of death, absence, or resignation. 148 A.L.R. 327.

Findings of fact, necessity, form, and contents of, to support administrative determinations relating to workers’ compensation. 146 A.L.R. 123.

Matters concluded, in action at law to recover for the same injury, by decision or finding made in workers’ compensation proceeding. 84 A.L.R.2d 1036.

Necessity of some evidence at hearing to support decision of commission. 123 A.L.R. 1349.

Notice of accident or injury, finding as to. 78 A.L.R. 1281; 92 A.L.R. 505; 107 A.L.R. 816; 145 A.L.R. 1263.

Personal injury, effect of finding or order on claim for, in proceedings on claim for compensation for death. 88 A.L.R. 1179.

Res judicata as regards decisions under Workers’ Compensation Act. 122 A.L.R. 550.

Rules for examination of witnesses which obtain in court trials, disregard of, as affecting conclusiveness of decision of commissioner or arbitrator. 87 A.L.R. 777.

28-35-28. Appeal to appellate division.

  1. Any person aggrieved by the entry of a decree by a judge may appeal to the appellate division established pursuant to this section by filing with the court within five (5) days of the date of the entry of a decree, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, a claim of appeal and, subject to the rules of practice of the court, by filing a request for a transcript of the testimony and ruling or any part thereof desired. Within any time that a judge shall fix, either by an original fixing or otherwise, the appellant shall file with the court reasons of appeal stating specifically all matters determined adversely to him or her which he or she desires to appeal, together with so much of the transcript of testimony and rulings as he or she deems pertinent, and within ten (10) days after that the parties may file with the court those briefs and memoranda that they may desire concerning the appeal. The chief judge shall appoint appellate panels of three (3) members of the court to hear any claim of appeal and the decision of the appellate panel shall be binding on the court. The three (3) members of the appellate panel shall immediately review the decree upon the record of the case and shall file a decision pursuant to the law and the fair preponderance of the evidence within ten (10) days of the expiration of the time within which the parties may file briefs and memoranda. Upon consideration of the appeal, the appellate panel shall affirm, reverse, or modify the decree appealed from, and may itself take any further proceedings that are just, or may remand the matter to the trial judge for further consideration of any factual issue that the appellate division may raise, including the taking of additional evidence or testimony by the trial judge. It shall be within the prerogative of the appellate panel to remand a matter to the trial judge. If the decision requires the entry of a new decree, notice shall be given the parties, and the new decree shall be entered in the same manner as the original decree, but if the decision of two (2) appellate panel judges does not require the entry of a new decree, the decree shall be affirmed. Any member of the appellate panel may, for cause, disqualify himself or herself from hearing any appeal that may come before the appellate panel.
  2. The findings of the trial judge on factual matters shall be final unless an appellate panel finds them to be clearly erroneous. The court may award costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to the prevailing party when the appellate panel finds there was complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1928, ch. 1207, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, §§ 3, 4; P.L. 1941, ch. 1054, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1236, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1870, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2368, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3724, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-28 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 267, § 4; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1983, ch. 25, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appellate Judges.

When three judges elect to sit and hear an appeal, only those judges who actually hear the case, whether as show cause panel judges or appellate panel judges, should be able to participate in the show cause or appellate panel’s decision. Durkin-Kenney v. State, 685 A.2d 275, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 303 (R.I. 1996).

There is no provision in the Workers’ Compensation Court Rules of Practice comparable to Rule 63 of the Superior Court Rules of Procedure or the Family Court Rules of Procedure relating to the inability of a justice or judge to proceed in a case. Durkin-Kenney v. State, 685 A.2d 275, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 303 (R.I. 1996).

Basis for Appeal to Supreme Court.

Accuracy of commission’s record may not be challenged before supreme court unless question has first been raised before commission. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R.I. 335 , 116 A.2d 181, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1955).

Supreme court would not consider questions not raised before full commission. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R.I. 335 , 116 A.2d 181, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1955); Sangermano v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 84 R.I. 246 , 123 A.2d 137, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1956).

Appeal to the supreme court from a decree of a single commissioner ruling that the commission had no jurisdiction would not lie without an appeal under this section. Savage v. Mark Elevator Co., 83 R.I. 401 , 117 A.2d 547, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1955).

Where there is a failure to set out a claim of error in the reasons of appeal to the full commission, the appellant is precluded from raising the question in the supreme court. United Wire & Supply Corp. v. Frenier, 87 R.I. 31 , 137 A.2d 414, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1958).

Construction With Other Sections.

Section 28-35-43 must be considered in conjunction with this section and § 28-35-33 . Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2d 1147, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 952 (R.I. 1982).

Error for Commission.

Where the trial commissioner believed that no further evidence would be presented except the deposition which he considered in the course of his decision, but in fact the employee had not rested, she should have been given the opportunity to present further evidence on one of the dates to which the case had been continued. Basso v. Brown Univ., 121 R.I. 598 , 401 A.2d 1279, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1877 (1979).

Failure to File Brief or Memorandum.

Neither the filing of briefs nor oral argument before the full commission (now appellate commission) are required. Mazzarella v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 120 R.I. 333 , 388 A.2d 4, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 680 (1978).

Finding of Clear Error.

Where the trial judge rejected the defendant’s affirmative defense of res judicata, explicitly finding that the injury underlying the petition for review was different from that underlying the plaintiff’s previous petitions for review, and the appellate division did not make a finding that the trial judge was clearly wrong in relying on a certain expert opinion before overruling that trial judge’s finding as to the difference in issues, the appellate division erred, and remand for further consideration was required. Lavoie v. Victor Elec., 732 A.2d 52, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 142 (R.I. 1999).

Findings of Fact on Appeal.

On appeal the full commission shall review the decree upon the record of the case and make their decision; they are at liberty to make their own findings of fact and are not bound to adopt any finding in the trial commissioner’s decree when such decree has been appealed from on the ground that it is against the evidence and weight thereof. Sorafine v. York Decorators Co., 90 R.I. 374 , 158 A.2d 264, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1960).

On appeal from trial commissioner to full commission question whether other findings suggested by petitioner should have been included was for the full commission to finally determine. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Pompei, 91 R.I. 139 , 161 A.2d 566, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1960).

It is the duty of the full commission, when a case is appealed to it, to weigh the evidence and to decide the case according to the fair preponderance of the evidence. Otis Co. v. Condon, 92 R.I. 384 , 169 A.2d 5, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1961).

Although the trial commissioner failed to make a factual determination as to whether employee made a bona fide attempt to find work, this did not deny the full commission its power to decide a case according to a fair preponderance of the evidence as to bona fide effort and to alter the decree of the trial commissioner. Harmony Serv. v. Mason, 111 R.I. 85 , 299 A.2d 162, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1182 (1973).

The full commission is not bound to accept any finding of the trial commissioner, but may on review make its own findings if there is evidence in the record to support and justify those findings. Moretti v. Turin, Inc., 112 R.I. 220 , 308 A.2d 500, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 974 (1973).

Testimony of experts was competent evidence upon which the commission could modify the decree of the trial commissioner as to the period of disability. Murray v. Lloyd Mfg. Co., 114 R.I. 192 , 330 A.2d 413, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1397 (1975).

Where there was sufficient evidence in the record to establish the fact that the plaintiff’s disease was at least partially and possibly substantially occupational, the appellate division’s assessment of fifty percent responsibility for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to the employer rested on competent evidence, and was upheld. Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 723 A.2d 777, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 1999).

Powers of Full Commission.

The full commission has been vested with jurisdiction to enter its own decree on an appeal when the entry of a new decree is essential to achieve justice, even though it is in complete agreement with the findings of the single commissioner. Corrado v. Brown Univ., 98 R.I. 256 , 201 A.2d 29, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 156 (1964).

Where the trial commissioner had considered a notice question to be dispositive but the hearing before him was concerned with a larger, more general question raised by the employee’s claim for compensation and since the employee had the burden of proving the allegations contained in her petition claiming compensation, the fact that the trial commissioner believed that the notice issue was controlling did not preclude the full commission (now appellate commission) from examining the record and determining whether the employee had in fact proven her entitlement to compensation. Mastronardi v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 859 , 391 A.2d 112, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 734 (1978).

Procedural Issues.

Commissioner who originally heard the case was not thereby disqualified from participating in the proceedings under this section. Cairo v. Sayles Finishing Plants, 83 R.I. 297 , 116 A.2d 188, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1955).

Respondent was not prejudiced by his case first being heard by one commissioner and later by another commissioner, since neither an employer nor an employee is entitled to a particular commissioner any more than a party in the superior court is entitled to select a particular justice for the trial of his case. DeAngelis v. D'Angelo, 95 R.I. 240 , 186 A.2d 347, 727, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 157 (1962).

Since appellate jurisdiction has been conferred only on the full commission, the contention of respondent that he was denied an impartial hearing when he came before the full commission since two of the three commissioners had previously found against him and should have been disqualified, was without merit under the law. DeAngelis v. D'Angelo, 95 R.I. 240 , 186 A.2d 347, 727, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 157 (1962).

This section does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14 by not prohibiting the trial commissioner from participating in the appeal to the full commission. Chmielewski v. Rhode Island Diesel Serv., 99 R.I. 574 , 209 A.2d 451, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 483 (1965).

A decision of the appellate commission in which only two members participated was null and void. Gardner v. Davol, Inc., 525 A.2d 904, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 486 (R.I. 1987).

An appeal argued pursuant to a show-cause order must be before a panel of three judges of the workers’ compensation court. If fewer than three judges participate, the appeal must be reheard before a panel of three judges. MacGibbon v. Tollgate Radiology, 618 A.2d 1282, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 14 (R.I. 1993).

Questions on Appeal.

The authority of the commission to review a decree of the trial commissioner upon appeal is limited to a review upon the record as it was established at the hearing before him and the full commission has no authority to amend or enlarge that record either by remanding it to the trial commissioner or by other procedure. United States Rubber Co. v. Dymek, 87 R.I. 310 , 140 A.2d 507, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1958); Larose v. Warwick Brass Foundry, 97 R.I. 459 , 198 A.2d 668, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1964).

The statutory requirement that the full commission review a decree of a trial commissioner on the record contemplates a record containing only legal evidence lawfully obtained, and the statute does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the full commission power to correct the errors of a trial commissioner by expunging from such record evidence unlawfully admitted thereto. Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, 97 R.I. 487 , 199 A.2d 24, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1964).

It was error for the commission to include in its decree a finding that a preliminary agreement between the employer and employee accurately described the employee’s injuries where the employee did not raise that question in his appeal from the trial commissioner to the commission. Peloso v. Peloso, Inc., 107 R.I. 365 , 267 A.2d 717, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 782 (1970).

In an appeal by the employer from the trial commissioner to the full commission, it was error for the commission to find that the record did not contain sufficient evidence that the employee had suffered a compensable injury when that question was not raised by the employer in its appeal but had stipulated before the trial commissioner that the employee had received a compensable injury. Lamont v. Aetna Bridge Co., 107 R.I. 686 , 270 A.2d 515, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 825 (1970).

Although petitioner raised the question of whether the trial commissioner erred in finding petitioner failed to prove that he was wholly incapacitated at the time of the hearing and then did not brief this point in his memorandum to the full commission, this does not mean that he waived the question and the question was included in petitioner’s reasons of appeal to the full commission and considered by them. Duarte v. Union Wadding Co., 111 R.I. 546 , 305 A.2d 107, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1244 (1973).

An employee seeking to amend an agreement to include dependents’ benefits was precluded from asserting a contention which was neither raised before the commission nor included in the reasons of appeal filed either with the full commission or with the court. Yates v. Dr. J. H. Ladd Sch., 120 R.I. 294 , 387 A.2d 1043, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 671 (1978).

Failure to set forth a claim of error in reasons for appeal before the trial commissioner or on appeal before the full commission precludes it being raised in the Supreme Court. Da Rosa v. Carol Cable Co., 121 R.I. 194 , 397 A.2d 506, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1762 (1979).

The Supreme Court will not consider reasons of appeal not presented for review to the full commission or a tardy submission of additional reasons of appeal that are filed without a reason for the out-of-time filing. Scott v. State, 507 A.2d 1355, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 455 (R.I. 1986).

Even though an award of two cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) was not appealed by the parties, the appellate division had jurisdiction to modify the decree to eliminate the award of one of the COLAs because it was not made in compliance with § 28-33-17 . Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Info. Coordinating Committee/Industry Educ. Council of Labor, 704 A.2d 740, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 315 (R.I. 1997).

Reasons of Appeal.

Where the employee’s reasons of appeal are nothing more than general recitations that the decree is against the law and the evidence and that the trial commissioner placed an untenable burden on the employee, the reasons of appeal filed by the employee are without merit. Bissonnette v. Federal Dairy Co., 472 A.2d 1223, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 474 (R.I. 1984).

The appellate commission’s recognition of the general result desired by the petitioner does not relieve her of the burden of specifying in what manner or where in the record the trial commissioner allegedly erred. Falvey v. Women & Infants Hosp., 584 A.2d 417, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 1991).

List of conclusory statements attacking a workers’ compensation court finding in favor of the employer on the issue of whether the employee was still disabled and whether further surgery was required was not an adequate statement of reasons of appeal, nor did it meet the requirements for the type of supporting material required to be submitted under R.I. Workers’ Comp. Ct. R. Prac. 4.5; nonetheless, summary dismissal of the employee’s appeal was an unduly harsh sanction. Impulse Packaging, Inc. v. Sicajan, 869 A.2d 593, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 2005).

Scope of Review.

Appellate commission’s review of a decree of the worker’s compensation commission is limited to the record made before the trial commissioner and the appellate commission lacks authority to enlarge or amend the record. Whittaker v. Health-Tex, 440 A.2d 122, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 783 (R.I. 1982).

This section gives the workers’ compensation commission a de novo standard of review. Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1022 (R.I. 1983).

When reviewing findings based on credibility determinations, the workers’ compensation commission must first find the trial commissioner’s findings clearly wrong or that the trial commissioner misconceived or overlooked material evidence in arriving at his determinations before independently weighing the evidence or finding where the fair preponderance lies. Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1022 (R.I. 1983).

Where the workers’ compensation commission conducted a de novo review of each doctor’s testimony without any regard to the trial commissioner’s findings, the commission exceeded its scope of review. Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1022 (R.I. 1983).

Even though this section purports to give the appellate commission the ability to reject factual findings made by a trial commissioner de novo, the commission, before disturbing findings based on credibility determinations, must first find that the trial commissioner was clearly wrong either because the commissioner was obviously mistaken in his or her judgment of the credibility of the witnesses or overlooked or misconceived material evidence in arriving at the conclusion reached. Mulcahey v. New Eng. Newspapers, 488 A.2d 681, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 439 (R.I. 1985).

The duty of the court on appeal is to review the record to determine whether any legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of fact made by the commission. Carter v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 503 A.2d 122, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 383 (R.I. 1986).

The commission exceeds its scope of review when it undertakes a de novo review of conflicting medical testimony without first finding that the trial commissioner was clearly wrong. Grimes Box Co. v. Miguel, 509 A.2d 1002, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 481 (R.I. 1986).

The appellate division shall review the decree by the commissioner upon the record of the case and shall file a decision pursuant to the law and the fair preponderance of the evidence, thereby giving the division a de novo standard of review. There must be a finding that the trial commissioner was clearly wrong or misconceived or overlooked material evidence before such a de novo review occurs. Blecha v. Wells Fargo Guard-Company Serv., 610 A.2d 98, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 124 (R.I. 1992).

The appellate division, in employing the de novo standard of review under subsection (b), is limited to the record made at trial before the trial court and may not undertake a de novo review of conflicting medical testimony and reject the trial court’s finding thereon without first making a finding that the trial court was clearly wrong. Diocese of Providence v. Vaz, 679 A.2d 879, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 215 (R.I. 1996).

While this statute does not expressly grant to the appellate division the authority to interpret the workers’ compensation act, it does so implicitly by the phrase, “may itself take such further proceedings as just.” Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 723 A.2d 777, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 1999).

Time for Appeal.
— Extension.

The trial commissioner has the discretion, under §§ 28-30-1 , 28-30-1 2 and Rule 4.2, Workers’ Compensation Commission Rules of Practice, to extend the time in which to claim an appeal. The commissioner’s exercise of this discretion was not improper where the employer’s motion for an extension of time was filed in a timely manner but was inadvertently lost by the commissioner. Sullivan v. Empire Equip. Eng'g Co., 492 A.2d 1212, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 506 (R.I. 1985).

Time Limit for Decision.

Where the commission did not issue its decision within the time limits set by this section, its failure to perform its duty did not void the award for employee. Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651 , 375 A.2d 920, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1505 (1977).

Weight of Evidence.

Even in the absence of conflicting testimony on the issue of causation, the commission was not required to accept testimony which it found lacking in credibility. Mazzarella v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 120 R.I. 333 , 388 A.2d 4, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 680 (1978).

Where medical testimony is based to a large extent on statements of medical history by the employee whose credibility carries little if any weight with the commission, it is open to evaluation, and the commission is justified in not accepting it, even in the absence of conflicting evidence. Mazzarella v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 120 R.I. 333 , 388 A.2d 4, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 680 (1978).

28-35-28.1. Reports of hearings — Transcripts.

  1. Hearings reporters, or electronic court reporters, shall report stenographically, or electronically, the proceedings in the trial of every action or proceeding in the workers’ compensation court. Electronic court reporting shall be used only when hearings reporters are unavailable for any reason.
  2. Each hearings reporter, or electronic court reporter, shall also, upon the order of any judge in the court, transcribe his or her report to be filed with the court. He or she shall also make a transcript of the whole or any part of that report upon request, filed with the court, by either party to the action or proceeding, and when completed and within the time limited by the court for filing the transcript, shall immediately deliver it to the party ordering it, or to the attorney of record of that party. For this service, the reporter shall be paid a reasonable compensation, not less than five dollars ($5.00), and not exceeding three dollars ($3.00) per page for originals and one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per page for copies of it, to be allowed by the court. If the transcript is used in subsequent proceedings in the cause, the cost of it may be allowed as a part of the costs.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 307, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 174, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-35-29. Review by supreme court — Procedure.

  1. Any person aggrieved by a final decree of the appellate division of the workers’ compensation court rendered pursuant to § 28-35-28 may, within twenty (20) days from the entry of the final decree, petition the supreme court for a writ of certiorari to review the decree on the grounds specified in § 28-35-30 .
  2. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall set forth the errors claimed.
  3. Upon the filing of a petition with the clerk of the supreme court, the supreme court may, if it sees fit, issue its writ of certiorari to the workers’ compensation court to certify to the supreme court the record of proceedings before the appellate division, together with any additional record of the proceedings before the trial judge.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 7; P.L. 1921, ch. 2086, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-29 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 29; P.L. 1984, ch. 162, § 1.

Cross References.

Judicial review under Administrative procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Certiorari.

Certiorari would lie to quash a portion of a superior court decree that was beyond the power of the court. Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373 , 82 A.2d 390, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1951).

Decree From Which Appeal Taken.

Findings in rescript on petition for review would not furnish basis for appeal without decree. Jules Desurmont Worsted Co. v. Julian, 56 R.I. 97 , 183 A. 846, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1936).

Employer could not, after failing to appeal from original decree, appeal from modifying decree on grounds that were determined by the original decree but were not involved in the modification. Cresci v. Home for Aged Women, 83 R.I. 70 , 112 A.2d 874, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1955).

In view of the provisions of this section providing that the reasons of appeal may be amended in the supreme court, indicating a legislative intention to avoid invalidating appeals on technical grounds, the supreme court was persuaded that the appeal in the instant case being from the decree of a single commissioner instead of the final decree of the full commission was properly before it, but the court stated it did not approve of such departure from the recognized procedure in the prosecution of appeals before it. Drake Bakeries v. Butler, 94 R.I. 84 , 178 A.2d 295, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1962).

Unless there is a decree, there is nothing from which to appeal. Thompson v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 105 R.I. 214 , 251 A.2d 403, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 743 (1969).

Where single commissioner granted only part of the claims sought by employee and employee appealed to full commission, decree of full commission denying and dismissing appeal was a decree by which employer was aggrieved with respect to that part of claim granted and by failure to appeal as provided in the section he was precluded from questioning the correctness of such finding. Thompson v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 105 R.I. 214 , 251 A.2d 403, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 743 (1969).

Persons Aggrieved.

Persons who had failed to establish dependency were not persons aggrieved within the meaning of this section. Corria v. Fink Bros., 45 R.I. 80 , 120 A. 321, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1923).

Questions Before Full Commission.

Supreme court cannot consider questions that were not raised before the full commission. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R.I. 335 , 116 A.2d 181, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1955); Marszalkowski v. Rusakovich, 84 R.I. 302 , 124 A.2d 244, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1956); De Fusco v. Ochee Spring Water Co., 84 R.I. 446 , 124 A.2d 867, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1956).

Decision of single commissioner that commission has no jurisdiction must be appealed to full commission before appeal to supreme court will lie. Savage v. Mark Elevator Co., 83 R.I. 401 , 117 A.2d 547, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1955).

It is well established that commission’s findings of fact, when there is any evidence on which they could base their finding are final and conclusive and cannot be disturbed by supreme court. Fox Point Chem. Co. v. Pacheco, 91 R.I. 106 , 161 A.2d 207, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1960).

Reasons of Appeal.

Ruling during the course of the trial could not be considered on appeal unless made specifically a reason of appeal. Wanskuck Co. v. Puleo, 78 R.I. 447 , 82 A.2d 872, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 100 (1951); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R.I. 335 , 116 A.2d 181, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1955).

Reason of appeal must state specifically the ruling appealed from. Campisani v. Sun Dial Optical Co., 80 R.I. 307 , 96 A.2d 582, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1953).

The authority of the supreme court to permit the amendment of reasons of appeal in workers’ compensation cases is limited to specifications of error set out as reasons of appeal within the time in which the appeal was required to be perfected. Warwick Brass Foundry Co. v. Universal Winding Co., 97 R.I. 474 , 199 A.2d 29, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 111 (1964).

Provisions of the statute concerning the specification of error in the form of reasons of appeal requires substantial particularity as to the adverse ruling an appellant desires to challenge, and general reasons of appeal are not sufficient to bring before the court specific errors of law that occurred during the hearing below. Warwick Brass Foundry Co. v. Universal Winding Co., 97 R.I. 474 , 199 A.2d 29, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 111 (1964).

Reason of appeal in a workers’ compensation proceeding stating that the commission “erred in interpreting the appropriate provisions . . . respecting contribution and apportionment,” fell short of compliance with the statutory requirement that the question decided adversely to the appellant be stated specifically, and, therefore, this reason of appeal did not raise the question of whether the commission apportioned the contribution on the basis of a formula not contemplated by the act. Warwick Brass Foundry Co. v. Universal Winding Co., 97 R.I. 474 , 199 A.2d 29, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 111 (1964).

An employee seeking to amend an agreement to include dependents’ benefits was precluded from asserting a contention which was neither raised before the commission nor included in the reasons of appeal filed either with the full commission or with the court. Yates v. Dr. J. H. Ladd Sch., 120 R.I. 294 , 387 A.2d 1043, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 671 (1978).

Court will not consider reasons of appeal not presented for review to the full commission (now appellate commission). Mazzarella v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 120 R.I. 333 , 388 A.2d 4, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 680 (1978).

Where the employee’s reasons of appeal are nothing more than general recitations that the decree is against the law and the evidence and that the trial commissioner placed an untenable burden on the employee, the reasons of appeal filed by the employee are without merit. Bissonnette v. Federal Dairy Co., 472 A.2d 1223, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 474 (R.I. 1984).

Time of Claiming Appeal.

Time for claiming appeal begins to run from the entry of a decree by the full commission and not from the entry of a decision affirming the decree of the single commissioner. Perri v. Scott Testers, Inc., 84 R.I. 91 , 121 A.2d 644, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1956).

Transcript.

Transcript is required where question is raised as to whether there was legal evidence to support the findings. Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., 72 R.I. 487 , 53 A.2d 529, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1947).

Whether superior court was justified in dismissing an appeal from the director of labor on the ground of failure to file a transcript was a pure question of law and could be brought to the supreme court without a transcript of the superior court proceedings. New Eng. Transp. Co. v. Rodrigues, 80 R.I. 411 , 80 R.I. 414 , 98 A.2d 264, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1953).

Superior court could not dismiss an appeal from the director of labor on the ground of failure to file a transcript where one of the reasons of appeal raised a pure question of law and did not require reference to the transcript. New Eng. Transp. Co. v. Rodrigues, 80 R.I. 411 , 80 R.I. 414 , 98 A.2d 264, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1953).

Where respondent in workers’ compensation proceeding had transcript prepared on appeal from single commissioner and full commission reversed the decree of the single commissioner and petitioner appealed to the supreme court petitioner was not required to apply and pay for and file another transcript since the transcript prepared on appeal from the single commissioner by the respondent became a part of the record. D'Iorio v. United States Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 380 , 142 A.2d 62, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1958); Fish v. United States Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 383 , 142 A.2d 63, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1958).

— Extension of Time.

Trial court abused discretion in refusing to extend time for filing of transcript where conditions for extension were met. Priscilla Worsted Mills v. Vizzacco, 79 R.I. 217 , 86 A.2d 655, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1952).

Collateral References.

Right of one who is excluded or ignored by bureau’s award of compensation to another, to appeal therefrom. 128 A.L.R. 1490.

28-35-30. Grounds for review by supreme court.

  1. Upon petition for certiorari, the supreme court may affirm, set aside, or modify any decree of the appellate commission of the workers’ compensation court only upon the following grounds:
    1. That the workers’ compensation court acted without or in excess of its authority;
    2. That the order, decree, or award was procured by fraud; or
    3. That the appellate division erred on questions of law or equity, the petitioner first having had his objections noted to any adverse rulings made during the progress of the hearing at the time the rulings were made, if made in open hearing and not otherwise of record.
  2. Review shall not be granted by the supreme court except as provided in this section, and the supreme court shall disregard any irregularity or error of the appellate division or trial judge unless it affirmatively appears that the petitioner was damaged by the irregularity or error.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-30 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 162, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conditions Precedent to Appeal.

Full compliance with the decree of the full commission is a condition precedent to prosecute an appeal and upon petitioner’s motion to dismiss appeal respondent’s request for stay heard on day certain will be denied. Bishop v. Chauvin Spinning Co., 85 R.I. 255 , 129 A.2d 543, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1957).

Failure to comply with decree which the commission lacked authority to make is not ground for dismissal of appeal. McCoy v. Cataldo, 88 R.I. 330 , 148 A.2d 267, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1959).

Judicial Notice.

Supreme court will not take judicial notice or examine medical treatises to determine the cause of a disease. Russell v. Liberman, 71 R.I. 448 , 46 A.2d 858, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1946).

Modification of Decree.

The supreme court may delete from the commission’s decree its finding that the preliminary agreement contained an accurate description of the employee’s injuries where the employee did not appeal from the failure of the trial commissioner to consider such question. Peloso v. Peloso, Inc., 107 R.I. 365 , 267 A.2d 717, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 782 (1970).

The appellate court was barred from setting aside or modifying a decree where the petitioner failed to note his objection to the trial judge’s ruling on the record. Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2000).

New Theory on Appeal.

Claim could not be examined on appeal on the basis of new injury after it had been tried on basis of recurrence of old injury. Ruggiero v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 71 R.I. 178 , 43 A.2d 51, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1945).

Where evidence showed the disability to be the result of an aggravation of a previous condition rather than a new injury but petition did not allege aggravation and respondent was not prejudiced by such failure to allege and would not have been prejudiced had petition been amended during proceedings to allege aggravation under § 28-35-17 it amounted to an irregularity which would be disregarded. Blanchette v. R.I. Pastry Co., 87 R.I. 329 , 140 A.2d 703, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1958).

The reason assigned by petitioner for appeal that the decision of the commission was illegal in that it violated petitioner’s constitutional right to a decision by the full commission, though not included in petitioner’s appeal to the full commission, since it could not have been included as petitioner did not have knowledge of the circumstances of the conduct of the commission in passing on her appeal from the decree of the single commissioner, constitutes an exception to the general rule. Hurst v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Elec. Co., 95 R.I. 158 , 185 A.2d 100, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 133 (1962).

Questions of Fact.

Removal of questions of weight and sufficiency of the evidence from consideration by the supreme court does not deprive the court of any of its constitutional jurisdiction. Jillson v. Ross, 38 R.I. 145 , 94 A. 717, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1915).

Supreme court cannot review the weight and sufficiency of the evidence if there is legal evidence to support the findings of fact. Jillson v. Ross, 38 R.I. 145 , 94 A. 717, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1915); GORRAL v. WILLIAM H. HAMLYN & SON, 38 R.I. 249 , 94 A. 877, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1915), limited, Campbell v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 72 R.I. 358 , 51 A.2d 530, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1947); Weber v. American Silk Spinning Co., 38 R.I. 309 , 95 A. 603, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1915); Donahue v. R. A. Sherman's Sons Co., 39 R.I. 373 , 98 A. 109, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1916); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R.I. 335 , 116 A.2d 181, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1955); Fiore v. Wanskuck Co., 83 R.I. 344 , 116 A.2d 186, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1955); Coppa v. M. A. Gammino Constr. Co., 95 R.I. 1 , 182 A.2d 322, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1962); Perfetto v. Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co., 114 R.I. 624 , 337 A.2d 791, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1464 (1975).

In the absence of fraud, findings of fact by the commission are conclusive and cannot be disturbed by the supreme court. Trotta v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 86 R.I. 247 , 134 A.2d 173, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1957); School House Candy Co. v. Ferrucci, 88 R.I. 109 , 143 A.2d 304, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 93 (1958); Grassel v. Garde Mfg. Co., 90 R.I. 1 , 153 A.2d 527, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1959); Gaboriault v. Stoddard, 94 R.I. 331 , 180 A.2d 596, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1962); McDonald v. John J. Orr & Son, 94 R.I. 428 , 181 A.2d 241, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1962); Romano v. Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 98 R.I. 432 , 204 A.2d 298, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 187 (1964).

Matters of fact finding is vested exclusively in the commission and all the supreme court may do is to examine the record and decide whether there is any evidence upon which the commission’s decree could reasonably be based. Guilherme v. Olney & Payne Bros., 87 R.I. 62 , 138 A.2d 328, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1958).

Findings of the trial commissioner affirmed by the full commission will not be disturbed by the supreme court. Nunes v. Davol Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 271 , 140 A.2d 272, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1958).

Appeal was properly before the supreme court for the purpose of determining whether there was any legal evidence to support the findings that the medical bills in question were reasonable since the main contention on appeal was that the decree appealed from was not supported by legal evidence and that it was therefore against law, it being well settled that findings of fact which are not supported by legal evidence amount to errors of law and will be reviewed by the supreme court upon appeal. McCoy v. Cataldo, 88 R.I. 330 , 148 A.2d 267, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1959).

— Accident or Unforeseen Cause.

Whether in a particular case there was such illness as to constitute accident or unforeseen cause was a question of fact. Donahue v. R. A. Sherman's Sons Co., 39 R.I. 373 , 98 A. 109, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1916).

— Admissibility of Evidence.

In determining whether there was legal evidence to support the findings, supreme court will not rule out evidence that was admitted without objection. Ostby & Barton Co. v. Curcio, 75 R.I. 82 , 63 A.2d 784, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1949).

Where the full commission expressly found that a hypothetical question propounded by the trial commissioner to a medical witness was based upon facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, such ruling will not be disturbed except for abuse of discretion. Araujo v. Technical Casting Co., 100 R.I. 90 , 211 A.2d 645, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 356 (1965).

— Burden of Proof.

Where statement in rescript indicated that trial justice may have applied incorrect rule as to burden of proof, supreme court remanded for new trial. Campbell v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 72 R.I. 358 , 51 A.2d 530, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1947).

The petitioner has the burden of proof to establish his case by credible evidence of probative force, and on review such evidence will not be weighed or the credibility of witnesses be passed upon. Costa v. Cars, Inc., 96 R.I. 396 , 192 A.2d 1, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1963).

— Cause for Living Apart.

Finding that wife had justifiable cause for living apart would not be disturbed where supported by legal evidence. Broughey v. Mowry Grain Co., 61 R.I. 221 , 200 A. 768, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1938); Erba v. Erba Bros., 77 R.I. 75 , 73 A.2d 697, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1950).

— Commutation Proceedings.

Supreme court would not review denial of commutation where commission had not abused its discretion in determining that investment was unwise. Sangermano v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 84 R.I. 246 , 123 A.2d 137, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1956).

— Dependency.

Definition of dependency is question of law and supreme court will review case to determine whether trial court applied the correct rule of law in making ultimate finding as to dependency. Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939).

Finding as to dependency would not be disturbed where based on a determination as to the weight and credibility of evidence. Botelho v. J. H. Tredennick, Inc., 64 R.I. 326 , 12 A.2d 282, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1940).

— Employment Relationship.

Employment relationship was not purely question of law where facts were disputed as to measure of control. Pasetti v. Brusa, 81 R.I. 88 , 98 A.2d 833, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1953).

— Factual Issue Amounting to Error of Law.

Supreme court may reverse where there is no legal evidence to support a finding. Martin v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 49 R.I. 265 , 142 A. 225, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1928); Correia v. McCormick, 51 R.I. 301 , 154 A. 276, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1931); Foy v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., Atl. Mills Div., 63 R.I. 233 , 7 A.2d 670, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1939); Mondillo v. Ward Baking Co., 73 R.I. 473 , 57 A.2d 447, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1948); Fulford Mfg. Co. v. Lupoli, 75 R.I. 488 , 67 A.2d 846, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1949); Interlaken Mills v. Poling, 80 R.I. 309 , 81 R.I. 309 , 102 A.2d 710, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1954); Catoia v. Eastern Concrete Prods. Co., 84 R.I. 402 , 124 A.2d 864, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1956); Barber v. Uniroyal, Inc., 107 R.I. 401 , 267 A.2d 697, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 787 (1970).

Supreme court reversed where finding apparently rejected unimpeached testimony that was neither contradicted nor inherently improbable. Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. Della Morte, 76 R.I. 325 , 69 A.2d 689, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1949).

A question as to the legal effect of undisputed facts is a question of law and may furnish ground for reversal. Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open), 78 R.I. 264 , 81 A.2d 689, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1951).

Supreme court could direct modification of decree to omit findings of fact on matters outside the scope of the proceedings. Priscilla Worsted Mills v. Vizzacco, 80 R.I. 342 , 96 A.2d 835, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1953).

Where the commission’s findings were based on some legal evidence, they were not disturbed by the court on appeal. Microfin Corp. v. De Lisi, 111 R.I. 703 , 306 A.2d 797, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1266 (1973).

— Failure to Appeal.

Appellee who did not appeal is precluded from questioning findings. Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open), 78 R.I. 264 , 81 A.2d 689, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1951).

All reasons given on appeal by respondent not briefed and argued are considered waived. Costa v. Cars, Inc., 96 R.I. 396 , 192 A.2d 1, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1963).

— Inferences.

Supreme court may not reverse on the basis of its own inferences even where the evidence is undisputed. St. Goddard v. Potter & Johnson Mach. Co., 69 R.I. 90 , 31 A.2d 20, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1943); Davis v. Monowatt Elec. Corp., 78 R.I. 284 , 81 A.2d 701, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1951).

Conclusion by way of inference from other facts is a question of fact. Pearl v. Builders Iron Foundry, 73 R.I. 304 , 55 A.2d 282, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1947); Antosia v. Crown Worsted Mills, 79 R.I. 205 , 86 A.2d 553, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1952); Chase v. General Elec. Co., 83 R.I. 269 , 115 A.2d 683, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1955).

Where symptoms of injury were sketchy supreme court could not say that commission erred in failing to draw an inference which would establish a causal connection between such symptoms and loss of earning capacity. Denisewich v. Abbott Glass Co., 98 R.I. 182 , 200 A.2d 455, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1964).

Where a possible inference from the evidence in the record is possessed of probability to such a degree as to negate that drawn by the trial commissioner the decree of the commission will be reversed. Barber v. Uniroyal, Inc., 107 R.I. 401 , 267 A.2d 697, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 787 (1970).

The testimony of the injured employee, a physician employed by the employer’s insurer, and the reasonable inference of which such testimony was susceptible, absent fraud, provided a proper evidentiary basis for the commission’s finding that the employee was partially incapacitated. Albert Zabbo & Sons v. Zabbo, 122 R.I. 79 , 404 A.2d 487, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2070 (1979).

— Negative Findings.

Rule as to conclusiveness of findings applies equally to negative findings. Fossum v. George A. Fuller Co., 70 R.I. 191 , 38 A.2d 148, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1944); Pearl v. Builders Iron Foundry, 73 R.I. 304 , 55 A.2d 282, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1947); De Fusco v. Ochee Spring Water Co., 84 R.I. 446 , 124 A.2d 867, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1956).

Finding that evidence was not sufficient to carry the burden of proof would not be reviewed even though there was no directly conflicting evidence. Parmentier v. Moore Fabric Co., 71 R.I. 369 , 45 A.2d 876, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1946); Baccari v. W. T. Grant Co., 73 R.I. 376 , 56 A.2d 552, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1948); Capasso v. Firesafe Builders Prods. Corp., 74 R.I. 458 , 62 A.2d 201, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 1 00 (1948).

— Report of Examination.

Whether employer complied with § 28-33-34 in mailing copy of report of physical examination to employee is a mixed question of fact and law and may be reviewed by supreme court. Morton C. Tuttle Co. v. Carbone, 84 R.I. 375 , 125 A.2d 133, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 100 (1956).

— Weight and Credibility of Evidence.

Weight of evidence was for the trial justice or commission. Natalia v. United Elec. Rys., 54 R.I. 183 , 171 A. 632, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1934); Enos v. Industrial Trust Co., 62 R.I. 263 , 4 A.2d 915, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1939); Marconi v. Bartlett Scrap Iron Co., 66 R.I. 409 , 19 A.2d 766, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1941); Rosewater v. Jean's, Inc., 72 R.I. 489 , 53 A.2d 490, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1947); Pearl v. Builders Iron Foundry, 73 R.I. 304 , 55 A.2d 282, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1947); Ostby & Barton Co. v. Curcio, 75 R.I. 82 , 63 A.2d 784, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1949); Central Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Rassano, 75 R.I. 108 , 64 A.2d 197, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1949); Meierovitz v. George A. Fuller Co., 75 R.I. 378 , 67 A.2d 45, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1949); Ottone v. Franklin Process Co., 76 R.I. 431 , 71 A.2d 780, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1950); Bahry v. City Fabrics, 80 R.I. 411 , 97 A.2d 589, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1953); Imperial Knife Co. v. Calise, 80 R.I. 428 , 97 A.2d 579, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1953); E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Barbato, 80 R.I. 230 , 81 R.I. 230 , 101 A.2d 481, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1953); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R.I. 335 , 116 A.2d 181, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1955); Fiore v. Wanskuck Co., 83 R.I. 344 , 116 A.2d 186, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1955); Leva v. Caron Granite Co., 84 R.I. 360 , 124 A.2d 534, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1956); Northrop v. Uncas Mfg. Co., 84 R.I. 418 , 124 A.2d 876, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1956); Cabral v. Perry's Express Co., 85 R.I. 47 , 125 A.2d 221, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 120 (1956); Veloso v. Lebanon Knitting Mills, 111 R.I. 41 , 298 A.2d 804, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1176 (1973).

Credibility of witnesses was for the trial justice or commission. Simone v. W. & H. Jewelry Co., 58 R.I. 348 , 192 A. 807, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1937); Parmentier v. Moore Fabric Co., 71 R.I. 369 , 45 A.2d 876, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1946); Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. Yeager, 72 R.I. 298 , 50 A.2d 776, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1947); Baccari v. W. T. Grant Co., 73 R.I. 376 , 56 A.2d 552, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1948); Capasso v. Firesafe Builders Prods. Corp., 74 R.I. 458 , 62 A.2d 201, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 1 00 (1948); Grieco v. American Silk Spinning Co., 75 R.I. 356 , 66 A.2d 640, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1949); Di Fiore v. United States Rubber Co., 78 R.I. 124 , 79 A.2d 925, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1951); Antosia v. Crown Worsted Mills, 79 R.I. 205 , 86 A.2d 553, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1952); Chase v. General Elec. Co., 83 R.I. 269 , 115 A.2d 683, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1955); Fiore v. Wanskuck Co., 83 R.I. 344 , 116 A.2d 186, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1955).

Where petition in previous proceeding had been received as evidence, supreme court would presume that trial justice had considered such evidence even though he did not mention it in his decision. Garabedian v. Gorham Mfg. Co., 63 R.I. 452 , 9 A.2d 46, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1939).

Trial justice could believe part of claimant’s testimony and disbelieve other parts. Di Libero v. Middlesex Constr. Co., 63 R.I. 509 , 9 A.2d 848, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 117 (1939).

Testimony of physicians who had examined claimant one year before the trial was not ipso facto valueless. AMERICAN TEXTILE CO. v. DEANGELO, 81 R.I. 163 , 100 A.2d 216, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1953).

Supreme court will assume, in the absence of indications to the contrary, that the commission applied the fair preponderance of evidence rule. Fiore v. Wanskuck Co., 83 R.I. 344 , 116 A.2d 186, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1955).

Where commission had in effect rejected medical testimony that claimant was able to work at the time of an examination, it could not use the same testimony to support a finding that claimant was able to work at a later time when there had been no subsequent examination at the later time. Catoia v. Eastern Concrete Prods. Co., 84 R.I. 402 , 124 A.2d 864, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1956).

Where the only question before the court was the legal effect of petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony as to whether he sustained a compensable injury while performing one of the duties of his employment, this was a question of law which was subject to review on appeal. Sullivan v. State, 89 R.I. 119 , 151 A.2d 360, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1959).

Where medical testimony was in direct conflict, one doctor giving it as his opinion that claimant’s effort in doing his work of sanding machinery, preparing it for painting, contributed to bringing on the particular attack which he experienced on May 29, the other doctor being of the opinion that the work was in no way a cause and that the heart attack might as well have occurred while claimant was at home, the finding of the commission that claimant had failed to prove his employment contributed to his heart attack was supported by the evidence. Warren v. Gelfuso, 96 R.I. 7 , 188 A.2d 461, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1963).

Since the statute expressly provides that the commissioner’s findings of fact shall be final, the supreme court was precluded from considering whether evidence given by one doctor that claimant was able to work or that given by another doctor that claimant was disabled due to a sprain of the right shoulder muscle, was more credible on appeal. Barnes v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 96 R.I. 469 , 194 A.2d 675, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 112 (1963).

In the same manner as the supreme court is precluded from weighing the evidence, it is also not warranted in finding a single commissioner erred in his evaluation of the medical evidence or opinions of the doctors as given as to the cause of death of injured employee. Durfee v. Nugent, 97 R.I. 303 , 197 A.2d 302, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1964).

The process of weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses is a matter entrusted exclusively to the commission; and where the weight of legally competent evidence has been determined by the commission, its action therein will not be reviewed. Mazzarella v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 120 R.I. 333 , 388 A.2d 4, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 680 (1978).

Appellate Division of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Court properly denied an employee’s claim for a neck injury because there was legally competent evidence to support the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the testimony of the employee’s doctor was inconsistent and that the trial judge did not err in finding the opinion of another doctor was more persuasive. Thompson v. Millard Wire Co., 234 A.3d 948, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2020).

Scope of Review.

In passing on an appeal from a final decree of the full commission, the court must determine whether the findings of fact set forth therein are supported by any competent legal evidence. Mazzarella v. ITT Royal Elec. Div., 120 R.I. 333 , 388 A.2d 4, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 680 (1978).

Where an employee’s injury was compensable was a question of law for the commission as applied to uncontradicted and unimpeached facts, and the resolution thereof, unlike determination of factual controversies, is subject to review on appeal. Kyle v. Davol, Inc., 121 R.I. 79 , 395 A.2d 714, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 757 (1978).

The ability of the Supreme Court to review a decree of the commission denying benefits on the ground that the employee’s injury did not arise out of the employment rests on a characterization of that determination as a question of law or fact. DeNardo v. Fairmount Foundries Cranston, Inc., 121 R.I. 440 , 399 A.2d 1229, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1797 (1979).

A question of law is presented in reviewing whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment when the facts, as found by the commission and supported by competent legal evidence, permit reasonable men to draw only one conclusion. DeNardo v. Fairmount Foundries Cranston, Inc., 121 R.I. 440 , 399 A.2d 1229, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1797 (1979).

If competent evidence in support of the workers’ compensation commission’s findings can be found, the commission’s findings, absent fraud, are conclusive upon the Supreme Court and the decree of the commission must be sustained. Ignagni v. Davol, Inc., 121 R.I. 593 , 401 A.2d 1276, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1875 (1979); Davol, Inc. v. Romanowicz, 414 A.2d 469, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1556 (R.I. 1980).

Findings of fact that are affirmed by the appellate commission will not be disturbed by the supreme court so long as they are supported by legally competent evidence. Maynard v. Rhode Island Hosp., 536 A.2d 532, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 14 (R.I. 1988).

Review by the Supreme Court of the appellate division’s decree in a case under this section is limited to determining whether the court erred in deciding a question of law. Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 51 (R.I. 1994).

Pursuant to a petition for certiorari review under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-25-30, an employee was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because in light of the peculiar circumstances of the employee’s employment, the employee satisfied the three Di Libero criteria for establishing a nexus between the injury and his employment; the employee was on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and used a company-provided cargo van as his office. McGloin v. Trammellcrow Servs., 987 A.2d 881, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 18 (R.I. 2010).

Random assault of an employee by a stranger while the employee was returning to his work vehicle, which was parked on the street, was compensable under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-1 , as it was an actual risk of employment under the street-peril doctrine; the denial of workers’ compensation benefits was accordingly error under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-30 . Ellis v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 63 A.3d 510, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 2013).

Collateral References.

Dependency of beneficiary, review of finding as to. 13 A.L.R. 722; 30 A.L.R. 1253; 35 A.L.R. 1066; 39 A.L.R. 313; 53 A.L.R. 218; 62 A.L.R. 160; 86 A.L.R. 865; 100 A.L.R. 1090.

Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing actions to enforce workers’ compensation benefits. 48 A.L.R.4th 1094.

Notice of injury, review of finding as to excuse for failure to give, or as to prejudice to employer because of failure to give. 78 A.L.R. 1281; 92 A.L.R. 505; 107 A.L.R. 816; 145 A.L.R. 1263.

Serious and willful misconduct of employee as question of law or fact. 4 A.L.R. 127.

28-35-31. Transcript on appeal.

  1. Upon the filing of reasons of appeal and transcript, the workers’ compensation court shall present the transcript to the judge who heard the cause, and in case of vacancy in office, or for any cause where the court is unable to present the transcript to the judge who heard the cause, then the transcript shall be presented to any other judge, and that other judge shall have full power to examine and pass upon and allow the transcript. The judge to whom the transcript has been presented shall, after examination, restore the transcript to the files with a certificate of his or her action.
  2. Upon an appeal being taken and the transcript of the testimony as may be required being allowed and returned, the workers’ compensation court shall immediately certify the cause and all the papers of it to the supreme court.
  3. In case of failure to allow and return the transcript within twenty (20) days from its filing a hearing may be had on the question of the correctness of the transcript before the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 31, art. 3, § 7; P.L. 1921, ch. 2086, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-31 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-35-32. Costs — Counsel and witness fees.

Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, the workers’ compensation court shall be allowed a filing fee of twenty dollars ($20.00) for the filing of a petition under chapters 29 — 38 of this title and a filing fee of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for the filing of an appeal under § 28-35-28 , which sums shall be deposited to provide additional funding to the uninsured employers fund as established by chapter 53 of this title. The workers’ compensation court may charge fees for certified copies of decrees and copies of transcripts. In addition to the fees set forth herein, the workers’ compensation court shall apply a technology surcharge on all petitions and appeals in accordance with § 8-15-11 . In proceedings under this chapter, and in proceedings under chapter 37 of this title, costs shall be awarded, including counsel fees and fees for medical and other expert witnesses, including interpreters, to employees who successfully prosecute petitions for compensation; petitions for medical expenses; petitions to amend a preliminary order or memorandum of agreement; and all other employee petitions, except petitions for lump-sum commutation; and to employees who successfully defend, in whole or in part, proceedings seeking to reduce or terminate any and all workers’ compensation benefits; and to medical services providers who successfully prosecute petitions for the payment of medical expenses, except that medical services providers shall not be paid expert witness fees for testimony in support of petitions filed in their behalf. These costs shall be assessed against the employer by a single judge, by an appellate panel, and by the supreme court on appeal consistent with the services rendered before each tribunal and shall be made a part of the decree. No employee’s attorney shall accept any other or additional fees for his services for the particular petition for which the fees are awarded in each tribunal.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-32 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 45, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 226, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 37, § 4; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 43, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 8; P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 8.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 8, and P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 8 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect July 1, 2007, and applies to injuries that occur on or after January 1, 2009.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section gives costs to the employee in certain circumstances but in no circumstances to the employer, and the court held that this was not an improper classification, and that there was no improper or unreasonable inequality of treatment of employers and employees since the employers were treated alike and all employees were treated alike; and that, while the two groups were treated differently, it is because, generally speaking, they are different. Gomes v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 95 R.I. 126 , 184 A.2d 787, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 131 (1962).

Whether an employee has successfully prosecuted or defended such action is a question to be determined in the first instance by the respective tribunals in each case, therefore, the petitioner’s contention of unconstitutionality on the ground of lack of discretion of the respective tribunals was without merit. Drake Bakeries v. Butler, 95 R.I. 143 , 185 A.2d 108, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1962).

Construction With Other Sections.

Although an action was commenced by the filing of an employer’s notice of intention to discontinue, suspend or reduce payments under former § 28-35-46 , the proceeding is in substance an employer’s petition to review respondent’s capacity to work and was so treated by this court. Drake Bakeries v. Butler, 95 R.I. 143 , 185 A.2d 108, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1962).

Since the title of a statute may be used as a guide and considered to aid construction but cannot control or vary the meaning of a statute where that statute is unambiguous, a substantive right, in this instance the right to recover costs under this section cannot be defined as procedural within the meaning of the last sentence of § 28-33-8 simply because it falls within that chapter of the act entitled “Procedure.” Orthopedic Specialists v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 120 R.I. 378 , 388 A.2d 352, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 688 (1978).

Counsel Fees.

Where there was nothing in the record to show that the question of counsel fees was in issue before the single commissioner or that any ruling had been made thereon the issue was not properly before the supreme court. Trotta v. General Elec. Co., 86 R.I. 254 , 134 A.2d 177, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 100 (1957).

It is to be emphasized that the final determination of the amount of an attorney’s fee lies with the court. Gomes v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 95 R.I. 126 , 184 A.2d 787, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 131 (1962).

The provision that the counsel fee be assessed consistently with the services performed before each tribunal confers discretion upon the tribunal in which the litigation terminated to remand, in appropriate cases to a subordinate tribunal for assessment of a fee consistent with the services therein performed. Capaldi v. Liberty Tool & Gage Works, 99 R.I. 236 , 206 A.2d 639, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 423 (1965).

By providing in this section for the payment by an employer of a fee to the attorney of an employee who has successfully defended in whole or in part an employer’s petition to review, the general assembly has effectively forestalled any undue harassment of an employee that might occur by an employer’s persistent and indiscriminate filing of petitions to renew. Kleistone Rubber Co. v. Roderick, 101 R.I. 606 , 225 A.2d 792, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 807 (1967).

An employee who failed to raise the question of counsel fees before the trial commissioner or the full commission is precluded from raising the question in the supreme court, but may move for an award of fees for the services performed by his counsel in that court. Cabral v. Hall, 102 R.I. 320 , 230 A.2d 250, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 689 (1967).

As chapter 35 of title 28 refers to both accidents and occupational diseases the authority contained herein to pay counsel fees and fees of expert medical witnesses applies to occupational disease cases. Andrade v. Mintell, 102 R.I. 148 , 229 A.2d 50, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 660 (1967).

Since the statutory right to recover costs such as counsel and witness fees does not exist at common law, the rights provided are exclusive to the class of persons to whom granted, and may not be extended to any other class of persons not specifically included. Orthopedic Specialists v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 120 R.I. 378 , 388 A.2d 352, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 688 (1978).

Mere stipulation by an employer early in the hearing before the trial commissioner that its insurance carrier would pay certain bills was not a successful prosecution of a petition within the reasonable intendment of this section so as to warrant the award of counsel fees to the employee. Mastronardi v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 859 , 391 A.2d 112, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 734 (1978).

— Amount.

Award of costs by superior court would not be reviewed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Gomes v. John J. Orr & Son, 78 R.I. 96 , 79 A.2d 618, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1951); Ferguson v. George A. Fuller Co., 78 R.I. 412 , 82 A.2d 856, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1951).

The statute is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the single commissioner, the full commission on appeal and the supreme court on appeal to award the costs and fix the amount thereof according to the merits and circumstances of the particular case before each of the tribunals. Drake Bakeries v. Butler, 95 R.I. 143 , 185 A.2d 108, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1962).

Although the court believed the more orderly procedure would be better served by disposing of the question of costs, including counsel fees, prior to the entry of a decree by respective tribunals, there is nothing in the statute depriving this court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion to assess costs for the services of respondent’s attorney after the entry of the decree in question. Drake Bakeries v. Butler, 95 R.I. 143 , 185 A.2d 108, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1962).

Five hundred dollars was a reasonable fee for attorneys who spent a total of 35 hours in a trial before a single commissioner and in the briefing and arguing of their contentions first before the full commission and then before the supreme court in connection with an employee’s petition for $275.00 for the medical services of three physicians, where the court disallowed the claims for two physicians and allowed $45.50 for the third. Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 220 , 229 A.2d 620, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 674 (1967).

In determining a fair and reasonable counsel fee chargeable as costs against the employer the fee should not in all events be proportionate to the amount involved or a fixed percentage of the amount recovered nor based solely on the time spent by counsel, but the court will consider all the elements which properly enter into the fee-setting process, giving each such weight as may be appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of the case. Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 220 , 229 A.2d 620, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 674 (1967).

If counsel for an employee looks to an assessment of a fee that is reasonably commensurate with the services performed, he has the burden of making known to the tribunal before whom he appears the extent and nature of the work involved in preparation. Hassenfeld Bros. v. Wolowicz, 104 R.I. 620 , 247 A.2d 834, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 695 (1968).

Award of $50 counsel fee to employee’s attorney for work involving two hearings before single commission and $50 for appeal to full commission was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary, notwithstanding such attorney had submitted no evidence as to the amount of time spent on case. Hassenfeld Bros. v. Wolowicz, 104 R.I. 620 , 247 A.2d 834, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 695 (1968).

The elements to be considered in the fee setting process include the amount in issue, the questions of law involved (whether they are unique or novel), the hours worked and the diligence displayed, the result obtained, and the experience, standing, and ability of the attorney who rendered the services. Each of these factors is important, but no one is controlling. Annunziata v. ITT Royal Elec. Co., 479 A.2d 743, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 598 (R.I. 1984).

The trial judge’s conclusory statement that she “reviewed the counsel fee affidavit in accordance with the provisions of Annunizata [sic],” and her consideration of the degree of success achieved by counsel in prosecuting the employee’s original petition, did not show that she properly exercised her discretion in setting the counsel fee. Fallon v. Skin Med. & Surgery Ctrs., 713 A.2d 777, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1998).

— Award Improper.

The awarding of petitioner’s request for an expert medical witness was not within any of the categories for which the successful prosecution of a petition would entitle the petitioner to a counsel fee within the reasonable intendment of the statute. Picozzi v. Nugent, 99 R.I. 398 , 208 A.2d 99, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 452 (1965).

Where, on an employer’s petition to review a consent decree awarding an employee compensation for total disability, the commission found that the employee was no longer totally incapacitated and reduced his compensation from $40 a week to $22 a week, the employee was not entitled to counsel fees and expert witness’ fees for his defense of such petition. Litchman v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 100 R.I. 352 , 216 A.2d 129, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 440 (1966).

Where, an attorney, after a partial success in an appeal from the workers’ compensation commission to the Supreme Court, accepted a fee from his client, he cannot be awarded a fee for his services in the Supreme Court, but will be entitled to a fee for his services before the commission and trial commissioner. Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 102 R.I. 617 , 232 A.2d 593, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 737 (1967).

An employee was not entitled to attorney’s fees where the commission’s award was only of that which the employer had offered to pay voluntarily. Peloquin v. ITT Gen. Controls, 104 R.I. 257 , 243 A.2d 754, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 642 (1968).

Award of fees and costs was inappropriate, even though an employee succeeded in having a summary dismissal of an appeal quashed, where the dismissal was set aside only as unduly harsh, but not because the Appellate Division had acted illegally in dismissing, since the employee’s failure to comply with statutory and rules of procedure in preparing the appeal could be grounds for such a dismissal. Impulse Packaging, Inc. v. Sicajan, 869 A.2d 593, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 2005).

— Award Proper.

The supreme court felt that a fee of $200 was a fair and reasonable one where attorney had successfully defended in this court the petitioner’s petition in review to discontinue payment on the ground that attorney’s client was able to return to work. Drake Bakeries v. Butler, 95 R.I. 143 , 185 A.2d 108, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1962).

An employee who successfully defended an appeal by the employer from a decree by the commission amending the award is entitled to a fee for her counsel. O'Neil v. M & F Worsted Mills, 100 R.I. 647 , 218 A.2d 666, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 492 (1966); Roy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 101 R.I. 53 , 220 A.2d 512, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 352 (1966).

Where respondent appealed a trial commission’s award of attorney fees and petitioner defended in this appeal successfully, he was entitled to attorney fees for this appeal. Dziekiewicz v. George Arpin & Sons, 105 R.I. 549 , 254 A.2d 76, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 786 (1969).

Where employee prevailed in his appeal from commission’s order requiring him to make a bona fide attempt to obtain suitable work for which he was able to perform, he was entitled to a fair and reasonable counsel fee under the provisions of this section. Desjardin v. Miller Elec. Co., 110 R.I. 184 , 291 A.2d 420, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 897 (1972).

The Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund was properly held liable for a 20 percent penalty for failure to pay a cost of living adjustment in a timely manner and for attorney fees. Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Info. Coordinating Committee/Industry Educ. Council of Labor, 704 A.2d 740, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 315 (R.I. 1997).

— Awards for Partial Success.

Where petition sought either discontinuance or diminution of compensation payments on the grounds that total incapacity had ended or diminished and the employee was partially successful in the hearing before the single commissioner in that compensation payments were reduced but not discontinued, but counsel fee was not ordered and an appeal was prosecuted to the full commission in order to obtain an award of such fee and such appeal was successful in part in that the employee was awarded a fee for services before the trial commissioner, such employee was also entitled to fee for counsel services on appeal. United States Rubber Co. v. Marino, 97 R.I. 142 , 196 A.2d 169, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1964).

Where both employer and employee appealed to the full commission, but the employer failed to file either brief or memorandum, as provided by § 28-35-28 , and the commission denied both appeals, the employee, on a partially successful appeal to the supreme court was not entitled to a counsel fee for successfully resisting the employer’s appeal to the full commission, but was entitled to such a fee for his appeal to the supreme court. Bahry v. Masonwear Co., 101 R.I. 402 , 224 A.2d 316, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 407 (1966).

Employee entitled to fee for her counsel for services in Supreme Court where her appeal was partially successful. Hassenfeld Bros. v. Wolowicz, 104 R.I. 620 , 247 A.2d 834, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 695 (1968).

Under this section employee partially successful in appeal from workers’ compensation commission order under § 28-33-18 is entitled to his costs, including fees for counsel and expert witnesses. General Road Trucking Corp. v. Pina, 110 R.I. 7 , 289 A.2d 425, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 870 (1972).

The employer is liable for the employee’s attorney’s fees in an action instituted by the employee only where the employee is completely successful in the action. Lemoine v. Coby Glass Prods. Co., 115 R.I. 86 , 341 A.2d 40, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1122 (1975), overruled, Fallon v. Skin Med. & Surgery Ctrs., 713 A.2d 777, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1998).

This section clearly differentiates between an employee who is only partially successful in prosecuting his petition and an employee who is only partially successful in defending against an employer’s petition, and it does not permit recovery of costs where the employee has initiated the proceedings and failed to be wholly successful. Natale v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 119 R.I. 713 , 382 A.2d 1313, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 607 (1978).

The wording of this section pertaining to the award of a counsel fee to an attorney who successfully prosecutes an employee’s original petition for benefits authorizes a fee award whenever the benefits or relief sought by the petitioner is granted, whether in whole or in part. Previous distinctions between complete success and partial success are done away with. Fallon v. Skin Med. & Surgery Ctrs., 713 A.2d 777, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 1998).

— Successful Prosecution.

The right to counsel fees is predicated upon the successful prosecution of petitions for compensation. Stone v. State, 510 A.2d 961, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 494 (R.I. 1986).

Successfully preserving the determination of an assault issue for a more appropriate forum does not constitute a successful prosecution within the reasonable intendment of this section so as to warrant the award of counsel fees to the employee. Stone v. State, 510 A.2d 961, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 494 (R.I. 1986).

Transcript Costs.

The term “cost” in this section may include a transcript cost. Natale v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 119 R.I. 713 , 382 A.2d 1313, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 607 (1978).

Witness Fees.

Witness fees are payable only for medical and expert witnesses, and not for wife of injured employee. Peloquin v. ITT Hammel-Dahl, 110 R.I. 330 , 292 A.2d 237, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 918 (1972).

Testimony is “expert” when its subject matter is of a mechanical, scientific, professional or like nature, none of which is within the understanding of laymen of ordinary intelligence. Mastronardi v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 859 , 391 A.2d 112, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 734 (1978).

Commission did not err in refusing to award an employee witness fees for a doctor’s appearance where his testimony as to when he had begun treating the employee, whether he had sent the required notices to the employer and how much his bill totaled did not amount to expert testimony. Mastronardi v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 859 , 391 A.2d 112, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 734 (1978).

Collateral References.

Attorneys’ fee awards under 5 USCS § 7701(g), which allows award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing employee for appeal to merit systems protection board from adverse employment decision. 143 A.L.R. Fed. 145.

28-35-33. Finality of decree — Stay of decree.

Any decree entered by the workers’ compensation court acting within its powers shall in the absence of fraud be final, and shall take effect immediately upon being entered, and enforcement of the decree shall not be stayed pending appeal. If benefits have been ordered to be paid, reduced, discontinued, or suspended, the terms of the decree shall be followed until reversed. If compensation payments have been ordered by the workers’ compensation court, those payments shall be made and continued until reversal, and if payments have not been ordered and the decree is reversed, retroactive payments shall be made from the date provided for in the decision of the supreme court. Provided, that an employee shall not be required to make restitution to the employer for any benefits paid regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-33 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 47, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Sections.

Section 28-35-43 must be considered in conjunction with § 28-35-28 and this section. Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2d 1147, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 952 (R.I. 1982).

Finality of Decree.

Finding of partial incapacity and causation by the commission when supported by evidence and in the absence of any proof of fraud are binding on supreme court. D'Iorio v. United States Rubber Co., 88 R.I. 360 , 148 A.2d 678, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1959).

Noncompliance With Decree Pending Appeal.

Even after supreme court affirmance of superior court decree terminating compensation, claimant could bring contempt for failure of employer to continue compensation pursuant to previous agreement pending appeal of termination decree. American Textile Co. v. De Angelo, 83 R.I. 234 , 115 A.2d 349, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1955).

Appeal would be dismissed for failure of appellant to comply with decree of full commission pending appeal even though motion to stay decree was filed in supreme court. GIRARD v. UNITED STATES RUBBER CO., 84 R.I. 319 , 127 A.2d 242, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1956).

Failure to comply with decree which the commission lacked authority to make is not ground for dismissal of appeal. McCoy v. Cataldo, 88 R.I. 330 , 148 A.2d 267, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1959).

Recovery of Compensation.

Employer was not entitled to credit on future payments for compensation paid pending the appeal of a termination decree even though the decree was subsequently affirmed. Catanese v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., 84 R.I. 450 , 125 A.2d 123, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1956).

The commission has no jurisdiction to order the repayment of compensation payments made pursuant to an award pending its appeal to the Supreme Court by reason of that court’s reversal of such decree, but the employer’s only remedy is a civil suit for unjust enrichment to recover the amounts so paid. Woods v. Safeway Sys., 102 R.I. 493 , 232 A.2d 121, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 719 (1967).

Although an employer was required by law to continue making payments of compensation during an appeal from an order suspending payments, the affirmance of such order by the Supreme Court on appeal would require the employee to make restitution of such payments as had been paid. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Healey, 104 R.I. 201 , 243 A.2d 741, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 636 (1968).

An insurer who has, pursuant to a decree of the commission, made payments to a hospital and an orthopedist for services rendered to the employee, is entitled, after reversal of that decree by the supreme court, to recover such payments in an action for that purpose against the hospital and orthopedist. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Newport Hosp., 108 R.I. 86 , 272 A.2d 329, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1228 (1971).

Specific Compensation.

The provisions with respect to decrees of the full commission apply to decrees for specific compensation under § 28-33-19 as well as to decrees for other compensation. Berditch v. James Hill Mfg. Co., 85 R.I. 69 , 125 A.2d 204, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1956).

Stay of Decree by Supreme Court.

This section does not prevent the supreme court from staying a decree of the commission pending appeal in a proper case. Girard v. United States Rubber Co., 84 R.I. 230 , 122 A.2d 747, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1956).

Only upon appeal to the full board may there be a stay of compliance of the findings and since decree of full board is final there can be no stay upon appeal therefrom. Bishop v. Chauvin Spinning Co., 85 R.I. 255 , 129 A.2d 543, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1957).

While this section provides that an appeal from a decree of the workers’ compensation commission will not stay the effect of the decree, it does not prevent the supreme court from staying the decree of the commission pending an appeal. Silva v. Devine, 90 R.I. 120 , 155 A.2d 605, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1959).

A workers’ compensation court has no power to stay its own decision. The only tribunal which is capable of ordering a stay of payment of benefits pursuant to a decree of the workers’ compensation court is the Supreme Court in furtherance of its constitutional power to review all decisions of lower tribunals and to protect the rights of the parties pending such review. Dunbar v. Tammelleo, 673 A.2d 1063, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 1996).

28-35-34. Default in appellate procedure.

As provided in this chapter, the claim of appeal shall not suspend the operation of the decree appealed from, but, in case of default in taking the procedure required, the workers’ compensation court upon motion of any party may proceed as if no claim of appeal had been made, unless it is made to appear to the workers’ compensation court that the default no longer exists.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 7; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-34 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate Amendment XII, § 1, of the Rhode Island Constitution since the pertinent provisions of Art. III, §§ 4 and 7, do not purport to limit or challenge the authority of the supreme court upon the issue of staying the effects of a decree of the commission. Bishop v. Chauvin Spinning Co., 85 R.I. 255 , 129 A.2d 543, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1957) (decided under former Constitution).

28-35-35. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 8; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-35 ; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 7, effective June 9, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 7, effective June 9, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-35 concerned motion day in Supreme Court.

28-35-36. Action by supreme court.

The supreme court after hearing any appeal shall determine the appeal, and affirm, reverse, or modify the decree appealed from, and may itself take, or cause to be taken by the workers’ compensation court any further proceedings that shall seem just. If a new decree is necessary, it shall be framed by the supreme court for entry by the workers’ compensation court. At that time, the cause shall be remanded to the workers’ compensation court for any further proceedings that shall be required.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 9; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-36 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Framing of Decree.

Where question of interest awarded by superior court had not been raised on appeal, supreme court would frame new decree to include same interest provisions as in superior court decree. Harding v. Imperial Printing & Finishing Co., 45 R.I. 416 , 123 A. 559, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1924).

On affirmance of decree requiring employee to submit to surgery supreme court would with employer’s consent allow 30 days from new decree for such submission to surgery. Esmond Mills, Inc. v. Mollo, 78 R.I. 27 , 78 A.2d 365, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1951).

Modification Without Appeal.

Supreme court could modify a decree in favor of a minor even though the guardian took no appeal in his behalf. Martin v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 49 R.I. 265 , 142 A. 225, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1928).

Remand for New Evidence.

Where evidence of loss of earning capacity was indefinite and insufficient, supreme court remanded to allow the taking of additional evidence with respect thereto. Dorfman v. Rosenthal Ackerman Millinery Co., 64 R.I. 498 , 13 A.2d 268, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1940).

Remand for New Findings.

Where there was evidence to support the findings but statements in the rescript indicated that the trial justice might have misapplied rules of law in arriving at the findings, supreme court remanded for reconsideration of the findings. Zielonka v. United States Rubber Co., 74 R.I. 82 , 58 A.2d 627, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1948).

Where there was evidence to support the findings but the rescript indicated that the trial justice might have erroneously considered excluded evidence, supreme court remanded for new trial. Jacob v. Moshassuck Transp. Co., 84 R.I. 514 , 125 A.2d 184, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1956).

28-35-37. Delay of process for execution of decree.

No process for the execution of any decree of the workers’ compensation court from which an appeal may be taken shall issue until the expiration of the appeal period, unless all parties against whom the decree is made, file with the court a waiver of appeal or by causing an entry thereof to be made on the docket.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 10; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-37 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 11, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-35-38. Certification of questions to supreme court.

If, in the course of the proceedings in any cause, any question of law arises which in the opinion of the workers’ compensation court is of such doubt and importance, and so affects the merits of the controversy, that it ought to be determined by the supreme court before further proceedings, the workers’ compensation court may certify that question to the supreme court for that purpose, and stay all further proceedings except those that are necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; G.L. 1938, art. 3, § 11; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-38 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Certification Requirements.

There is no warrant to certify a question to the Supreme Court unless, at the time of the certification, a decision or ruling on a particular phase of the case necessarily involves a determination of the question of law certified. Empire Equip. Eng'g Co. v. Sullivan, 565 A.2d 527, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 150 (R.I. 1989).

28-35-39. Payment of compensation.

Compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be paid by check as defined in § 6A-3-104(f) and not by draft, or if mutually agreed upon by both the employee and the employer or its insurer in accordance with § 28-35-40 , by electronic fund transfer, or by electronic access device, at no cost to the employee, with the exception of any third-party transactional fees incurred by the employee and shall be paid promptly and directly to the person entitled to it. The check shall contain the following language: “I understand that endorsement hereon or deposit to my accounts constitutes my affirmation that I am receiving these workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to law, that I have made no false claims or statements or concealed any material fact, in order to receive these benefits and that doing so would make me liable for civil and criminal penalties, including jail.” If paid by electronic fund transfer or by electronic access device, said notice shall be satisfied in accordance with § 28-33-17.2(c)(2) . The insurer/employer and/or its third-party administrator shall not have, or be entitled to gain, access to the details of electronic transactions without the express written consent of the employee or court order from a court of competent jurisdiction.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-39 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 4, § 1; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 1993, ch. 119, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 3, and P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Form of Payment.

An employee must be able to convert into cash a negotiable instrument that is used to pay workers’ compensation benefits within a reasonable time after receipt of such instrument. Matias v. Davol, Inc., 457 A.2d 1063, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 846 (R.I. 1983).

Collateral References.

Conservatorship or receivership of employer as affecting claims by employees of corporation for workers’ compensation benefits. 111 A.L.R. 328.

Insolvency of insurer as affecting liability for compensation. 8 A.L.R. 1346.

Seller or purchaser of business or plant, responsibility for employees’ claims for workers’ compensation. 131 A.L.R. 1362.

28-35-40. Delivery of weekly compensation.

Whenever the employee is entitled to weekly compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, the employer, and/or insurance carrier, until further order of the workers’ compensation court, shall cause to be paid by electronic fund transfer; or issued as an electronic access device; or mailed first-class mail to the employee, addressed to his or her last known residence; each week the amount of compensation payable to the employee as it may be due. Electronic fund transfer payments or issuance of an electronic access device shall be permitted if mutually agreed upon by the employee and the employer or its insurer on forms provided by the department of labor and training, which may be rescinded at will by either party on forms provided by the department of labor and training and filed with the department.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2, § 11; P.L. 1952, ch. 2992, § 1; G.L., ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-40 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 3, and P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-35-41. Time for payment or notification to employee of controverted question.

For all injuries occurring on or before February 28, 1986, within twenty-one (21) days after the employer has notice of an injury or death as provided in chapters 29 — 38, of this title and has received the initial medical report referred to in § 28-35-9 , the employer or employer’s insurer shall either immediately begin the payment of compensation, or advise the director and the employee or his or her representative that the right to benefits under those chapters is controverted. In the event that the employer or his or her insurer does not immediately begin the payment of compensation to the employee, or does not notify the director and the employee that the right to benefits under those chapters is controverted, within the time prescribed by this section, the employer or employer’s insurer may be required to pay to an employee who successfully prosecutes a petition for workers’ compensation an additional fifty dollars ($50.00), which is to be awarded to that employee by the workers’ compensation court in its discretion and added to his or her first week’s compensation.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-41 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 1, § 8.

28-35-42. Penalty for delinquency in payment.

If any payment of compensation is not paid within fourteen (14) days after it becomes due, there shall be added to that unpaid payment an amount equal to ten percent (10%) of it, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, that payment, unless the nonpayment is excused by the workers’ compensation court after a showing by the employer or his or her insurer that owing to conditions over which he or she had no control the payment could not be paid within the period prescribed for the payment. However, if within one year next preceding the due date of any payment which is not paid within fourteen (14) days after it becomes due, two (2) or more payments payable under the terms of the agreement have not been paid within fourteen (14) days after those payments have become due, it shall be conclusively presumed that the failure of the employer to make the instant payment was owing to conditions over which the employer had control.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-42 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Form of Payment.

An employee must be able to convert into cash a negotiable instrument that is used to pay workers’ compensation benefits within a reasonable time after receipt of such instrument. Matias v. Davol, Inc., 457 A.2d 1063, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 846 (R.I. 1983).

28-35-43. Time payments due under order or decree — Penalty for delinquency.

Payment of compensation under a decision of the court becomes due upon the effective date of the order and weekly thereafter on the same day. If any payment payable under the terms of an order or decree is not paid within fourteen (14) days after it becomes due there shall be added to that unpaid payment an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) thereof, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, that compensation unless the nonpayment is excused by the workers’ compensation court after a showing by the employer or insurer that owing to conditions over which he or she had no control the payment could not be paid within the period prescribed for payment. However, if within one year next preceding the due date of any payment which is not paid within fourteen (14) days after it becomes due, two (2) or more payments payable under the terms of the order or decree have not been paid within fourteen (14) days after the payments have become due, it shall be conclusively presumed that the failure of the employer to make the instant payment was owing to conditions over which he or she had control. Any order or decree of the worker’s compensation court shall be enforceable by suitable action or proceeding brought by either of the parties to it before the court, including executions against goods, chattels, and real estate, and including proceedings for contempt for willful failure or neglect to obey the provisions of the order or decree.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-43 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bankruptcy.

Where an employer was adjudged a bankrupt two days after the issuance of a mittimus ordering him committed for failure to pay an award with 20% penalty, it was proper for the commission to revoke the order for a mittimus, but it was without jurisdiction to vacate the award, which had previously been affirmed by the supreme court. Ferrucci v. Segrella, 99 R.I. 658 , 210 A.2d 143, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 498 (1965).

Computation of Interest.

Interest should be computed under the general interest statute from the time of the decree. Gomes v. John J. Orr & Son, 78 R.I. 96 , 79 A.2d 618, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1951); Campbell v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 78 R.I. 290 , 81 A.2d 684, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1951).

Construction With Other Law.

This section does not apply to one-time payments made pursuant to § 28-33-19 for disfigurement benefits because it specifically refers, in its first sentence, only to payments that are made weekly. Bottini v. Shaw's Supermarket, 714 A.2d 595, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 250 (R.I. 1998).

Construction With Other Sections.

This section must be considered in conjunction with §§ 28-35-28 and 28-35-33 . Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2d 1147, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 952 (R.I. 1982).

The appellate division of the workers’ compensation court erred in retroactively applying the 1990 amendment of § 28-33-19(a) , which allows a fourteen-day waiting period for specific compensation, to a previously decided decree. Lacroix v. Nulco Mfg. Co., 618 A.2d 1285, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 1993).

Contempt.

Although testimony of employer as to his inability to pay was uncontradicted court could find him in contempt where the evidence taken as a whole was susceptible to reasonable inferences tending to support a finding of ability to pay. Ferrucci v. Segrella, 98 R.I. 88 , 199 A.2d 732, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 131 (1964).

Effective Date of Order.

Effective date of order occurs when statutory appeal period has expired. Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2d 1147, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 952 (R.I. 1982).

Form of Payment.

An employee must be able to convert into cash a negotiable instrument that is used to pay workers’ compensation benefits within a reasonable time after receipt of such instrument. Matias v. Davol, Inc., 457 A.2d 1063, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 846 (R.I. 1983).

Lump Sum Commutations.

This section applies only to weekly compensation payments ordered by the commission and is not applicable to lump sum commutations. Masi v. A. Gasbarro & Sons, 103 R.I. 136 , 235 A.2d 341, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 586 (1967).

Stay of Decree.

Under special circumstances and upon timely filing of motion for stay the supreme court may grant the motion but petitioner must comply with the decree until the stay is actually granted. Bishop v. Chauvin Spinning Co., 85 R.I. 255 , 129 A.2d 543, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1957).

Termination or Modification.

An employee’s voluntary return to work, although it may signal a reduction in, or an end of, any impairment of earning capacity, does not entitle or justify the employer’s unilateral modification or termination of its continuing obligation to pay weekly compensation benefits. Lavey v. Thomas Olean & Sons, 502 A.2d 344, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 608 (R.I. 1985).

Unjustified Delay.

Where decree for workers’ compensation was entered April 3, 1981, awarding the employee weekly compensation benefits for an occupational disease, and employer’s insurance carrier did not make payments in accordance with decree until June 3, 1981, the failure of the insurance company to start payment within 14 days of the decree without valid excuse for such delay entitled employee to 20 percent penalty. Clemm v. C.I. Hayes, Inc., 474 A.2d 1254, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 508 (R.I. 1984).

28-35-44. Monthly or quarterly payments to nonresidents.

If an employee receiving a weekly payment under chapters 29 — 38 of this title ceases to reside in the state, or if his or her residence at the time of accident is in an adjoining state, the workers’ compensation court, upon the application of either party, may, in its discretion, having regard to the welfare of the employee and the convenience of the employer, order that payment to be made monthly or quarterly instead of weekly.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 16; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-44 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5.

28-35-45. Review and modification of decrees.

  1. At any time after the date of the approval of any agreement or at any time after the date of the entry of any decree concerning compensation, and if compensation has ceased under the agreement or decree, within ten (10) years after that, any agreement, award, order, finding, or decree may be from time to time reviewed by the workers’ compensation court, upon its own motion or upon a petition of either party upon forms prescribed by the court, after due notice to the interested parties:
    1. Upon the ground that the:
      1. Incapacity of the injured employee has diminished, ended, increased, or returned;
      2. Employee has recovered from the effects of his or her work-related injury and is disabled only as a result of a preexisting condition;
      3. Employee is able to return to the same work which he or she performed at the time of his or her injury;
      4. Employee has refused an offer of suitable employment; or
      5. Weekly compensation payments have been based upon an erroneous average weekly wage; or
    2. Regarding any other obligation established under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.
  2. Upon this review the workers’ compensation court may decrease, suspend, increase, commence, or recommence compensation payments in accordance with the facts, or make any other order that the justice of the case may require. No review shall affect the agreement, award, order, finding, or decree as regards money already paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and except that if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of injury, and any payments made prior thereto in excess of the decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in the manner and by the methods that may be determined by the workers’ compensation court.
  3. Relief on review shall not be denied an employee or granted an employer or his or her insurer on the grounds that the employee is incapacitated by an injury or disease which is different from the one for which the employee was paid compensation if the injury or disease incapacitating the employee results from an injury or disease for which the employee was paid compensation.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 14; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 13; P.L. 1935, ch. 2204, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 13; P.L. 1941, ch. 1064, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2274, § 1; G.L. 1949, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-45 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

If an original injury is different from the one specified in a decree or in a memorandum of agreement and does not “flow from” the original injury, even though this different injury also arises from the same work-related activity or accident, this section is inapplicable, and a second original petition must be filed within the limitations period set forth in § 28-35-57 . Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2000).

Ability to Work.

Evidence that employee had not returned to work but that he might be able to do light work supported dismissal without prejudice of a petition for reduction or termination of total disability compensation. Collyer Insulated Wire Co. v. Hockenson, 71 R.I. 415 , 46 A.2d 545, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1946).

Where respondent conceded that his employment as a factory inspector resulted in a weekly wage slightly in excess of what he was earning before the accident, on this concession the commission correctly granted the employer’s petition for suspension of compensation payments, proof of average weekly wages or earnings equal to or in excess of the average weekly wages or earnings before the accident, regardless of the type of work to which the employee returns, being conclusive that incapacity has ended. Universal Winding Co. v. Parks, 88 R.I. 384 , 148 A.2d 755, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1959).

Employee who is receiving compensation for total disability in accordance with the terms of a preliminary agreement is not required to seek employment elsewhere, and being adjudged partially incapacitated on an employer’s petition for review of incapacity is entitled to continue to receive compensation for total disability pending a reasonable opportunity to obtain suitable work elsewhere. Beacon Milling Co. v. Whitford, 92 R.I. 253 , 168 A.2d 279, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1961).

On employee’s petition to review an agreement for suspension of compensation where two physicians testified that there was no change in the employee’s capacity to work, there was sufficient evidence to warrant the commissioner in finding there was no change in the employee’s capacity to work since the suspension agreement. Vigneau v. Grinnell Corp., 100 R.I. 453 , 216 A.2d 891, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 459 (1966).

Evidence that an injured employee who possessed highly specialized knowledge and skill in the type of work performed by him and who, upon his release from the hospital, began performing work in the employer’s office, such as taking orders, keeping records, giving estimates, and advising by telephone, from time to time, another as to the best methods of handling problems arising in the performance of the employee’s former duties was sufficient to sustain a finding by the commission that the employee’s earning capacity had been restored. Peloso, Inc. v. Peloso, 103 R.I. 294 , 237 A.2d 320, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 795 (1968).

Appeal From Decree.

Decree after review under this section is subject to suspension on claim of appeal in the manner provided by § 28-35-33 . Dunn v. Broomfield, 74 R.I. 27 , 58 A.2d 254, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1948).

Motion to amend petition for review could not be entertained by supreme court. Meierovitz v. George A. Fuller Co., 75 R.I. 378 , 67 A.2d 45, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1949).

Burden of Proof.

On petition for discontinuance of compensation employer has burden of proving that employee can get suitable work. (But see § 28-33-17(b)(2) ). Olneyville Wool Combing Co. v. Di Donato, 65 R.I. 154 , 13 A.2d 817, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1940).

On petition to reduce or terminate compensation employer has burden of proof as to diminution or cessation of incapacity. Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. D'Ambra, 73 R.I. 37 , 53 A.2d 479, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1947).

On petition to increase compensation claimant has burden of proof as to incapacity. Leonardo v. Uncas Mfg. Co., 77 R.I. 245 , 75 A.2d 188, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 82 (1950); Hagopian v. American Woolen Co., 80 R.I. 468 , 98 A.2d 368, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1953); Ryan v. Grinnell Corp., 117 R.I. 114 , 362 A.2d 127 (1976).

In proceedings to review agreement petitioner had burden of proving that incapacity due to injury had returned. Gray v. Kagan, 87 R.I. 264 , 140 A.2d 269, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1958).

The party asserting the affirmative in his petition has the burden to establish by legal evidence the essential elements which entitle him to relief. Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283 , 387 A.2d 1034, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 669 (1978).

The burden of proving the allegations set forth in a petition for review of a compensation decree lies with the employee. Coletta v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 437 A.2d 1380, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1418 (R.I. 1981).

A petitioner seeking compensation benefits for a recurring incapacity must present competent evidence establishing that an incapacity for work recurred after the suspension decree and that the recurrence of incapacity was causally related to the original and previously compensated injury. Faria v. Carol Cable Co., 527 A.2d 641, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1987).

The burden of proving the allegations set forth in a petition for review lies with the employee. Alterio v. Cherry Hill Manor Nursing Home, 537 A.2d 416, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 1988).

On a petition for a review of a compensation decree on the grounds that an employee’s incapacity has diminished, ended, increased, or returned, the petitioning party bears the burden of proving the essential elements of the claim by competent evidence. C.D. Burnes Co. v. Guilbault, 559 A.2d 637, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1989).

Certiorari.

In the absence of statutory provisions for the review of a decree terminating compensation, certiorari was proper. Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373 , 82 A.2d 390, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1951).

Compensation.

The term “compensation” in this section includes payment of medical services. Thompson v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 105 R.I. 214 , 251 A.2d 403, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 743 (1969).

Decree Required.

Decree should be entered as prescribed by § 28-35-27 after review under this section. Jules Desurmont Worsted Co. v. Julian, 56 R.I. 97 , 183 A. 846, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1936).

Effect of Decision or Decree.

Decision that did not specifically vacate agreement, but permitted suspension or reduction of compensation as measured by employee’s earnings, left the agreement in effect so that when employee was discharged for economic reasons, compensation under the agreement would resume. Lawrence v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 70 R.I. 186 , 38 A.2d 139, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1944).

Decree awarding compensation for maximum partial disability but not specifying amount continued in effect the amount awarded by previous decree for maximum partial disability. Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., 80 R.I. 397 , 97 A.2d 439, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 82 (1953).

The provisions of the act do not authorize a single commissioner to continue a petition for further hearing after having entered a decree determinative of all the issues raised by the petition. Beacon Milling Co. v. Whitford, 92 R.I. 253 , 168 A.2d 279, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1961).

The right to further litigation following agreement of a worker’s compensation claim necessitates a curbing of the doctrine of res judicata, but such curbing does not allow the introduction of medical evidence which does not show a change in condition following the date of the original settlement. Belanger v. Weaving Corp. of Am., 120 R.I. 348 , 387 A.2d 692, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 667 (1978).

The power of the commission to adjust weekly compensation payments is limited to the contingencies specified in the section and is not available for any purpose not so included. Yates v. Dr. J. H. Ladd Sch., 120 R.I. 294 , 387 A.2d 1043, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 671 (1978).

Effect of Previous Settlements and Decrees.

Decision suspending payments on return of employee to work did not bar a later review on the ground that employee was no longer able to work. Pepe v. American Silk Spinning Co., 70 R.I. 309 , 38 A.2d 474, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1944).

Settlement receipt terminating compensation did not bar later review after increase of incapacity. Starnino v. George A. Fuller Co., 72 R.I. 91 , 48 A.2d 361, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1946).

Decree awarding compensation in a specific amount for maximum partial disability made the amount due for maximum partial disability res judicata and, where not appealed, precluded raising the issue on later review. Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., 80 R.I. 397 , 97 A.2d 439, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 82 (1953).

Decree finding that incapacity has ceased does not make the issue res judicata so as to preclude later review on a condition that existed at the time of the decree but that was not then alleged to be incapacitating. Di Vona v. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co., 85 R.I. 122 , 127 A.2d 503, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 129 (1956).

Where, following employee’s injury the parties entered into a preliminary agreement which was approved by the deputy director of labor on July 31, 1947, under which three payments were made, and where on September 21, 1954, although employer was not relieved of its obligation to make such payments, employee petitioned commission to hear and consider the question of his present disability on the ground that the employer refused to pay compensation, the court held such petition could not be construed as a petition to review within the meaning of this section, therefore consent decree of 1954 finding petitioner partially disabled since 1947 and ordering payments of compensation retroactively to 1947 in the amount of $2.25 weekly was not authorized. Olbrys v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 89 R.I. 187 , 151 A.2d 684, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1959).

Where the commissioner concluded the hearing of testimony on the original petition on September 5, 1961, but did not enter his decision until November 5, 1962, on a petition for review filed August 27, 1963, the original decree will be considered as relating back to September 5, 1961, and facts occurring subsequently to that date will be considered on the petition for review. Costa v. Cars, Inc., 100 R.I. 682 , 219 A.2d 122, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 497 (1966).

Because this section provides that a compensation agreement or decree may be reviewed at any time compensation is being paid, the doctrine of res judicata is not strictly applicable to compensation cases; and a worker’s claim that a 1971 finding of 21 percent loss of use of his hand barred a later finding that the impairment had decreased was meritless. Molony & Rubien Constr. Co. v. Segrella, 118 R.I. 340 , 373 A.2d 816, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1465 (1977).

Upon approval of the director of labor, an agreement between parties for workers’ compensation benefits has the full force and effect of a decree and in the absence of fraud or coercion, the doctrine of res judicata applies. Airedale Worsted Mills v. Cote, 75 R.I. 361 , 66 A.2d 802, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1949); Ottone v. Franklin Process Co., 76 R.I. 431 , 71 A.2d 780, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1950); Trudeau v. United States Rubber Co., 92 R.I. 328 , 168 A.2d 460, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1961); Belanger v. Weaving Corp. of Am., 120 R.I. 348 , 387 A.2d 692, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 667 (1978).

Before the commission could weigh the evidence or determine where its fair preponderance lies, it must first find that the trial commissioner was clearly wrong in his determination of a witness’ credibility. Cambrola v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 416 A.2d 694, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1711 (R.I. 1980).

A trial commissioner is ordinarily precluded from considering at a review hearing medical evidence of a change in the employee’s capacity for work occurring before the entry of the last unappealed decree. Martinez v. Bar-Tan Mfg., 521 A.2d 134, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 420 (R.I. 1987).

When an employee’s capacity for work changes after the conclusion of a hearing but before the entry of the decree thereon and procedural rules prevent the reopening of the hearing to present evidence of that change, a trial commissioner may consider evidence of the alleged change at a subsequent review hearing. Martinez v. Bar-Tan Mfg., 521 A.2d 134, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 420 (R.I. 1987).

A consent agreement between the parties has the full force and effect of a decree and is res judicata. However, when an employer alleges that disability has ended, prior matters settled in the consent decree will not be relitigated because the employer does not question the validity of the prior decree but merely contends an end of the prior incapacity. C.D. Burnes Co. v. Guilbault, 559 A.2d 637, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1989).

Evidence.

In order to testify in review proceedings, a witness need not have examined the claimant at the time of the previous hearing, so long as he can compare claimant’s condition at that time and as it now exists, based either on his examination of claimant’s medical records or on his response to properly posed hypothetical questions. Ryan v. Grinnell Corp., 117 R.I. 114 , 362 A.2d 127 (1976).

Physician’s testimony as to claimant’s total disability was admissible, despite its being unchanged from that given and rejected by the commission at the previous hearing, where other evidence indicated a subsequent change in the claimant’s condition. Ryan v. Grinnell Corp., 117 R.I. 114 , 362 A.2d 127 (1976).

Doctor’s testimony of petitioner’s condition prior to date of an approved agreement was not admissible to prove an increase in incapacity where there was no later evidence for comparison. Belanger v. Weaving Corp. of Am., 120 R.I. 348 , 387 A.2d 692, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 667 (1978).

An expert witness possessing no knowledge of the employee’s prior condition and testifying solely to the employee’s present condition is not competent to render an opinion that the employee’s incapacity for work has recurred. Martinez v. Bar-Tan Mfg., 521 A.2d 134, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 420 (R.I. 1987).

An expert who fails to take into account the employee’s condition at the time of the suspension decree and who testifies solely to the employee’s present condition has not laid the necessary foundation to render an opinion that an incapacity has recurred. Faria v. Carol Cable Co., 527 A.2d 641, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1987).

An expert witness possessing no knowledge of the employee’s prior condition and testifying solely to the employee’s present condition is not competent to render an opinion that the employee’s incapacity for work has recurred. Martinez v. Bar-Tan Mfg., 521 A.2d 134, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 420 (R.I. 1987).

An expert who fails to take into account the employee’s condition at the time of the suspension decree and who testifies solely to the employee’s present condition has not laid the necessary foundation to render an opinion that an incapacity has recurred. Faria v. Carol Cable Co., 527 A.2d 641, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1987).

An expert who renders an opinion that the employee’s incapacity has recurred must demonstrate that the opinion rests upon medical findings different from those supporting the suspension decree. Faria v. Carol Cable Co., 527 A.2d 641, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1987).

For an employee to prove an increase in incapacity, the evidence must be comparative in nature and should not pertain solely to an existing condition. Alterio v. Cherry Hill Manor Nursing Home, 537 A.2d 416, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 1988).

Where an expert witness compares the employee’s condition at the time benefits were terminated with the employee’s present condition and renders an opinion whether the incapacity has recurred, there is an absolute necessity for a comparison, and any expert testimony that cannot document a change is not competent evidence of the alleged recurrence of incapacity to work. Alterio v. Cherry Hill Manor Nursing Home, 537 A.2d 416, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 1988).

An employer who asserts complete recovery must provide credible and competent medical evidence that the employee is no longer disabled and is able to return to work. C.D. Burnes Co. v. Guilbault, 559 A.2d 637, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1989).

Both an employee and an employer must present competent medical evidence to prove their claim set forth in the petition to review. C.D. Burnes Co. v. Guilbault, 559 A.2d 637, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1989).

In a review petition brought one month after the suspension of benefits the employee must present competent evidence that establishes that the recurrence of the incapacity happened after the suspension decree and that such recurrence was causally related to the original compensated injury. Failure to advance medical evidence specifically comparing his original and subsequent conditions on the occasions of benefits suspension and disability recurrence will deny petitioner review. Costello v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 623 A.2d 441, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 119 (R.I. 1993).

Evidence insufficient to support allegation that employee’s psychic flow-through injury was of continuing nature. Diocese of Providence v. Vaz, 679 A.2d 879, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 215 (R.I. 1996).

Form of Petition.

Petition for review would not be dismissed on grounds that is was not sufficiently specific where the respondent was not surprised thereby and did not question the petition below. Mondillo v. Ward Baking Co., 73 R.I. 473 , 57 A.2d 447, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1948).

A petition, on a form furnished by the commission, seeking payment of claimant’s medical and hospital bills in an amount exceeding the legal maximum, was not denied even though captioned as a petition to review, for it is the substance which is to be considered and not the form. Proulx v. French Worsted Co., 98 R.I. 114 , 199 A.2d 901, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1964).

Grounds for Review.

This section does not provide for review on the ground of change in dependency. Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R.I. 58 , 105 A. 363, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1919).

Employee may petition for review on ground of diminution of incapacity. Starnino v. George A. Fuller Co., 72 R.I. 91 , 48 A.2d 361, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1946).

Refusal of employee to submit to operation was not an independent ground for review but would be considered as an allegation under previously pleaded ground of diminution or cessation of incapacity. E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Andoscia, 79 R.I. 347 , 89 A.2d 179, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1952).

Commission had no jurisdiction to amend a preliminary agreement on ground that under a certain construction as to the effective date of an amendment to the statute the weekly payments should have been larger. Landry v. Cornell Constr. Co., 87 R.I. 4 , 137 A.2d 412, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 135 (1957).

Where employer in petition claimed that disability arising from injury described in workers’ compensation agreement had ceased, employee on appeal from decree holding such disability had ceased, could not claim that injury was misdescribed in agreement. Kleistone Rubber Co. v. Audette, 105 R.I. 258 , 251 A.2d 525, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 748 (1969).

This section does not provide for review on ground that the employee, having reached the required age and completed the necessary years of service, has voluntarily retired from his employment and is receiving pension benefits from his employer under a noncontributory pension agreement. BIF v. Des Roches, 116 R.I. 280 , 355 A.2d 404, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1277 (1976).

Review of a decree cannot be granted under this section because of a pre-existing injury different from and unrelated to the injury described in the original decree. Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283 , 387 A.2d 1034, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 669 (1978).

Where a knee injury sought to be reviewed was different from and unrelated to a coccyx injury described in the original decree, there was no basis for review and modification of the original decree, and the proper course of action was an original petition based upon the separate injury. Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283 , 387 A.2d 1034, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 669 (1978).

Persons Eligible to Petition.

Employer in default on payments under agreement cannot obtain review under this section. Hingeco Mfg. Co. v. Haglund, 65 R.I. 218 , 14 A.2d 233, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1940); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Giacoppa, 69 R.I. 378 , 33 A.2d 419, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1943); Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co. v. Carvahlo, 83 R.I. 58 , 112 A.2d 878, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1955).

Employer was not barred from review for failure to pay medical expenses where no bills for such expense had been presented. Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Macedo, 73 R.I. 157 , 53 A.2d 756, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1947).

An employer who is in default of a preliminary agreement is not entitled to relief until he has removed the default by making the payments which are due. Olbrys v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 89 R.I. 187 , 151 A.2d 684, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1959).

Procedure Generally.

Proceedings for review of decrees are subject to same limitations as laid down in cases concerning review of agreements. Ricci v. United States Rubber Co., 88 R.I. 149 , 143 A.2d 691, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1958).

There is no provision within the workers’ compensation statute limiting the number of petitions alleging a recurrence of incapacity. Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2000).

Recovery by Employer.

Where employee receiving workers’ compensation benefits for partial disability on basis of actual earnings failed to report increase in earnings, resulting in overpayment by the employer, the commission under this section and § 28-33-18 may grant the employer credit for such overpayments as against future payments to the employee. M. Samas Co. v. Cipriano, 110 R.I. 94 , 290 A.2d 402, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 883 (1972).

Review Required.

Employer cannot unilaterally terminate compensation under an agreement without a review under this section even though disability has actually ceased. Carpenter v. Globe Indem. Co., 65 R.I. 194 , 14 A.2d 235, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1940); Gobeille v. Ray's, Inc., 65 R.I. 207 , 14 A.2d 241, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1940).

Employer cannot unilaterally terminate compensation under an agreement without a review under this section even though employee has returned to work and is earning as much as before his injury. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Giacoppa, 69 R.I. 378 , 33 A.2d 419, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1943); Lichtenstein v. Parness, 81 R.I. 135 , 99 A.2d 3, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1953).

Under § 28-33-17 , as amended by P.L. 1974, ch. 271, § 1, an employer may unilaterally suspend payment or dependents’ benefits when the dependent child attains the age of 18 years without bringing a petition before the commission to obtain an order formally terminating benefits. Marshall v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 121 R.I. 624 , 402 A.2d 575, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2040 (1979).

Scope of Review.

Correctness of weekly earnings before the injury as set forth in agreement could not be reviewed in proceedings based on allegations of cessation or diminution of incapacity. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co. v. Silke, 74 R.I. 15 , 58 A.2d 395, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1948).

Erroneous wage rate in agreement could be reviewed under this section. De Asis v. Fram Corp., 76 R.I. 331 , 69 A.2d 818, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 118 (1949).

Commission has authority to review a decree in cases where infliction of injury to employee was not followed immediately by compensable incapacity but which developed thereafter. Ricci v. United States Rubber Co., 88 R.I. 149 , 143 A.2d 691, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1958).

Contention of the petitioner that the instant proceeding in which it filed notice of intention to discontinue payments together with a wage transcript should be treated as a petition to review the question of total incapacity, in view of the legislative mandate contained in former § 28-35-51 could not be so considered since the commission was only empowered to consider whether the employee had returned to work at a wage equal to or in excess of that which he was earning at the time of his injury and if this contention be unfounded, to order the resumption of payments. Enterprise Dye Works v. Guilfoyle, 94 R.I. 139 , 178 A.2d 441, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1962).

The trial commissioner has jurisdiction to review an injury which is different from the one for which the employee was paid compensation under the original decree only if it resulted from the original injury. Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283 , 387 A.2d 1034, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 669 (1978).

Preliminary agreements may be reviewed for the specific purposes set forth in this section. Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

When reviewing the commission’s decision, the Supreme Court determines if there is competent legal evidence supporting the commission’s findings, leaving the findings of fact to the province of the commission. C.D. Burnes Co. v. Guilbault, 559 A.2d 637, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1989).

The trial commissioner is not required to base a decision of total recovery on comparative evidence, and his finding that the disability has ended is properly based upon a determination of the credibility of medical witnesses and cannot be overturned by the appellate commission, unless found by the appellate commission to be clearly wrong. C.D. Burnes Co. v. Guilbault, 559 A.2d 637, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1989).

This section, as amended in 1990 to permit review within 10 years “regarding any other obligation established under chapters 29 — 38, inclusive, of this title,” could not apply retroactively to an injury sustained prior to the amendment since it affected substantive rights. Salazar v. Machine Works, 665 A.2d 567, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 223 (R.I. 1995).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-45(b) indicated that it was only when one of the enumerated grounds in § 28-35-45(a) was present that the Workers’ Compensation Court may decrease, suspend, increase, commence, or recommence compensation payments in accordance with the facts; the employee presented no evidence to suggest that her situation fell within the ambit of any of these grounds for review or modification of workers’ compensation benefits; she conceded that she remained totally disabled and unable to work. Ruggiero v. City of Providence, 889 A.2d 691, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 224 (R.I. 2005).

— Amendment of Agreement.

Amendment of agreement on ground of fraud could not be granted in review on allegation of cessation of disability. Airedale Worsted Mills v. Cote, 75 R.I. 361 , 66 A.2d 802, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1949).

Amendment of agreement to include new injuries could not be granted in review on allegation of cessation or diminution of disability. Colored Worsted Mill v. Persechino, 80 R.I. 30 , 81 R.I. 30 , 98 A.2d 859, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1953).

Since the claim asserted in the amendment clearly arose out of the same occurrence that was set forth in the original pleading—namely, the hernia he suffered earlier—the trial commissioner correctly permitted the amendment to relate back. Silva v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 524 A.2d 571, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 461 (R.I. 1987).

— Injuries Covered.

On petition to review agreement relating to specific injury separate unnamed injuries from the same accident could not be considered. Meierovitz v. George A. Fuller Co., 75 R.I. 378 , 67 A.2d 45, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1949); Manville Jenckes Corp. v. Lubinski, 76 R.I. 36 , 68 A.2d 107, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1949); Peters v. Monowatt Elec. Corp., 78 R.I. 134 , 79 A.2d 922, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1951); Day v. Almac's, Inc., 79 R.I. 357 , 88 A.2d 925, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1952); A. D. Juilliard & Co. v. De Conti, 80 R.I. 260 , 81 R.I. 260 , 102 A.2d 116, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1954).

Injury not named in the agreement but resulting from an injury named therein could be considered on petition to review. Stillwater Worsted Mills v. Mehegan, 80 R.I. 449 , 98 A.2d 267, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1953).

Where injury was misdescribed in original decree commission had authority to review the decree because of incapacity of employee which developed and finding in such decree concerning true nature of injury did not constitute a redecision of the original decree. Ricci v. United States Rubber Co., 88 R.I. 149 , 143 A.2d 691, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1958).

Commission has jurisdiction under this section to review incapacity arising not only from the actual injury or disease described in the decree which is subject matter of petition for review, but also to grant relief in cases where the incapacity to work is due to an injury or disease resulting from, growing out of, or caused by such injury or disease. Varin v. Lymansville Co., 88 R.I. 169 , 143 A.2d 705, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1958).

Where disability resulted from same injury described in original decree review under this section was proper but if disability resulted from a different injury although caused by same accident the provisions of this section would not apply. Varin v. Lymansville Co., 88 R.I. 169 , 143 A.2d 705, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1958).

Where a preliminary agreement specifically described the injuries for which the employee first received compensation, the trial commissioner could not consider a different injury sustained in the same accident on a petition for review under this section unless the claimant demonstrates that this injury resulted from an injury described in the preliminary agreement. Coletta v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 437 A.2d 1380, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1418 (R.I. 1981).

Without evidence linking a new injury to one for which the employee originally received compensation, this section does not apply; the employee’s remedy would be an original petition for compensation based on the new injury. Coletta v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 437 A.2d 1380, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1418 (R.I. 1981).

This section grants the Workers’ Compensation Commission jurisdiction to review incapacity arising not only out of the injury or disease described in the original decree but also out of a different injury or disease that results from an injury or disease for which the employee was paid compensation. Coletta v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 437 A.2d 1380, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1418 (R.I. 1981).

Time for Filing of Petition.

Rescript and findings of fact after review under this section did not start a new period of limitations for later reviews. Jules Desurmont Worsted Co. v. Julian, 56 R.I. 97 , 183 A. 846, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1936).

Entry of decree after review under this section starts a new period of limitations for later review. Jules Desurmont Worsted Co. v. Julian, 56 R.I. 97 , 183 A. 846, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1936).

Petition would not be dismissed for prematurity, even though filed while petitioner was in military service, where it was filed apparently to protect petitioner’s rights and did not prejudice respondent. Mondillo v. Ward Baking Co., 73 R.I. 473 , 57 A.2d 447, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1948).

A claim may be made under this section where weekly compensation has ended more than ten years prior to its initiation where medical expenses were paid within the ten year period. Thompson v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 105 R.I. 214 , 251 A.2d 403, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 743 (1969).

Where the commission found that “petitioner became totally incapacitated for work on January 7, 1969, and so remained until at least July 2, 1969,” it was error to provide in the order that petitioner might file a petition to review the decree in order to establish the extent of his loss of earning capacity, if any, after July 2, 1969, and the commission was without jurisdiction to terminate or reduce payments subsequent to July 2, 1969, only on a petition filed by the respondent under this section. Barber v. Uniroyal, Inc., 108 R.I. 691 , 279 A.2d 448, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1324 (1971).

Collateral References.

Change of status as regards relationship or dependents after injury as ground for modification of amount of compensation to employee. 73 A.L.R. 1016.

Inability to obtain work because of an injury as ground for modification of original award. 33 A.L.R. 115.

Time and jurisdiction for review, reopening, modification, or reinstatement of award. 165 A.L.R. 9.

Workers’ compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury. 83 A.L.R.4th 110.

Workers’ compensation: reopening lump-sum compensation payment. 26 A.L.R.5th 127.

28-35-46. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-46 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 430, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 322, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 3, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 3, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-46 concerned notice of intent to discontinue, suspend, or reduce payments; filing; form.

28-35-46.1. Termination of payment — Accounting.

Within sixty (60) days after the discontinuance or suspension of compensation payments under § 28-33-18(d) , the employer and/or insurer shall file with the director of labor and training, with a copy to the employee and his or her attorney, and also to the employer if filed by the insurer, an itemized statement of the total amount of compensation, medical expenses, and other expenses paid to or on behalf of the employee. This itemized statement shall be on a form prepared by the director of labor and training for that purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 12; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 4; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 4, and P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 4, enacted identical amendments to this section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

28-35-47. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-47 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 117, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 3, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 3, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-47 concerned wage transcript supporting allegation of return to work.

28-35-48. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-48 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 3, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 3, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-48 concerned medical report on ability to return to work.

28-35-49. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-49 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 3, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 3, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-49 concerned medical examination on ability to return to light work.

28-35-50. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-50 ; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 3, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 3, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-50 concerned resumption of payments on change of status.

28-35-51. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-51 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 218, § 3, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 248, § 3, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-51 concerned review of discontinuance, suspension, or reduction; disputed cases.

28-35-51.1, 28-35-52. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

Former §§ 28-35-51.1 and 28-35-52 (G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-52; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 11), concerning a special calendar; and discontinuance, suspension, or reduction of payments, were repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 15, effective May 18, 1992.

28-35-53. Payment when due as condition to relief to employer.

The employer shall not be entitled to any relief granted by §§ 28-35-39 — 28-35-52, if payments in accordance with the existing agreement or decree are not paid in full to the date of the filing of the petition or notice, or the date of the hearing before the commission, or if payments are not made in accordance with the terms of chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-53 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Employer in default on payments under agreement cannot obtain review under § 28-35-45 . Hingeco Mfg. Co. v. Haglund, 65 R.I. 218 , 14 A.2d 233, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1940); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Giacoppa, 69 R.I. 378 , 33 A.2d 419, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1943); Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co. v. Carvahlo, 83 R.I. 58 , 112 A.2d 878, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1955).

Disputes as to Employer Compliance.

Employer was not barred from review for failure to pay medical expenses where no bills for such expense had been presented. Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Macedo, 73 R.I. 157 , 53 A.2d 756, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1947).

The commission properly denied the employee’s motion to dismiss employer’s petition for review where there was no evidence in the record that any compensation payments were due the employee and the commission found that the employer had paid all compensation due to the date of the hearing on the petition. O. Ahlborg & Sons v. Lato, 101 R.I. 411 , 224 A.2d 376, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 408 (1966).

Where, without presenting evidence of that fact, the employee’s counsel objected to further hearing on the employer’s petition to terminate compensation on the ground that the employer had not complied with the existing compensation order and, upon the assurance of counsel for the employer that anything due the employee would be paid, the commissioner ordered him to proceed with the hearing and counsel for the employee did not pursue the matter further beyond taking an exception, there was no error in continuing with the hearing and granting the employer relief in accordance with the evidence. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bottiglieri, 101 R.I. 501 , 225 A.2d 218, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 423 (1966).

The trial judge did not err in allowing the employer to continue with a de novo hearing, relying upon counsel’s stipulation that bills for overdue medical expenses would be paid. Hasbro, Inc. v. Perez, 600 A.2d 1320, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 1992).

Effect of Settlement Receipt.

Suspension of payments in accordance with the terms of a settlement receipt did not prevent the employer from seeking approval of the receipt. Virgilio v. United States Rubber Co., 85 R.I. 136 , 127 A.2d 863, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 131 (1956).

28-35-54. Certification of papers to court.

Whenever the director certifies to the workers’ compensation court papers, agreements, and documents in any proceedings as are provided in chapters 29 — 38 of this title, he or she shall certify them to the workers’ compensation court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 13; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-54 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-35-55. Filing day or required act falling on weekend or holiday.

Whenever, under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, the day, or the last day, for the filing with the workers’ compensation court, of any original petition or other petition, motion, decree, claim of appeal, reasons of appeal, brief, or other document, or for the doing of any act required or permitted to be done by those chapters, falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, the act or filing may be done on the next succeeding business day.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 15; P.L. 1956, ch. 3723, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-55 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-35-56. Effect of death of petitioner.

No proceedings under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall abate because of the death of the petitioner, but may be prosecuted by his or her legal representative or by any person entitled to compensation by reason of his or her death under those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 14; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-56 .

Collateral References.

Dead man’s statute, competency of witness in proceeding for death under Workers’ Compensation Act as affected by. 77 A.L.R.2d 680.

28-35-57. Limitation of claims for compensation.

  1. An employee’s claim for compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be barred unless payment of weekly compensation has commenced, or a petition, as provided for in this chapter, has been filed within two (2) years after the occurrence or manifestation of the injury or incapacity, or in case of the death of the employee, or in the event of his or her physical or mental incapacity, within two (2) years after the death of the employee or the removal of the physical or mental incapacity.
  2. The time for filing shall not begin to run in cases of latent or undiscovered physical or mental impairment due to injury including disease until:
    1. The person claiming benefits knew, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of the impairment and its causal relationship to his or her employment; or
    2. After disablement, whichever is later.
  3. In any case in which weekly compensation benefits have been paid, pursuant to § 28-35-8 , in which the employer or insurer has failed to file the required notices, the claimant’s right to file a petition for compensation benefits shall be preserved without time limitation.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 17; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 14; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 15; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-57 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The language employed by the legislature in the P.L. 1960, ch. 94 amendment clearly demonstrates that the legislature intended to remedy the circumstances in both § 28-34-4 which specified the time for filing claims for compensation resulting from occupational diseases and in this section for injuries which penalized the incapacitated employee who had no reasonable knowledge that the incapacitating disease or injury was causally connected with his employment, otherwise the phrase of the amendment “including disease” would be rendered meaningless since the time for bringing a suit for compensation resulting from an occupational disease was controlled only by § 28-34-4 . Britto v. Fram Corp., 93 R.I. 426 , 176 A.2d 81, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1961).

This section is properly construed not as a technical statute of limitation but as a statute of repose — the limitation is an express condition of the right to compensation and is intended to bar the claim or right to compensation unless its provisions are complied with; thus the failure of an employee to file a timely claim or to show that the statute of limitations was tolled barred him from recovering compensation despite the fact that the employer did not plead the defense affirmatively. Ochoa v. Union Camp Corp., 120 R.I. 898 , 391 A.2d 123, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 736 (1978).

Abatement of Previous Action.

Section 9-1-22 , providing a new period of limitations after abatement of an action, does not apply to workers’ compensation proceedings so as to permit a petition after abatement of a common-law action. Menna v. Mathewson, 48 R.I. 310 , 137 A. 907, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1927).

Application to Second Injury Fund.

The two-years’ limitation prescribed in this section is an indispensable condition of the right to benefits created by § 28-37-10 and not a mere limitation on the remedy. De Costa v. Devine, 90 R.I. 240 , 157 A.2d 247, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1960).

Claim Not Barred.

Employee’s claim for disability from exposure to a noxious gas in 1979 was not barred or otherwise affected by the fact that she did not file a claim for disabilities that occurred from exposure to the gas in earlier years. Souza v. Raytheon Co., 490 A.2d 500, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 484 (R.I. 1985).

Commencement of Period.

Period of limitations on claim for loss of earning capacity begins to run at the time employee is first incapacitated rather than at the time of the accident. Rosa v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 215 , 60 A.2d 150, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1948); Chicoria v. Kenyon Piece Dyeworks, 74 R.I. 260 , 60 A.2d 492, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1948); Gagne v. Weintraub's Silk & Fabric Shops, Inc., 80 R.I. 498 , 98 A.2d 854, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1953).

Period of limitations on claim for compensation under § 28-33-19 begins to run at the time the member first becomes so useless as to give rise to a claim under that section, rather than at the time of the accident. Larkin v. George A. Fuller Co., 76 R.I. 395 , 71 A.2d 690, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1950).

First period of incapacity from accident starts the period of limitations and bars a petition filed more than two years thereafter even though the first period is of short duration and gives no indication of serious nature of injury. Cruso v. Yellow Cab. Co., 82 R.I. 158 , 106 A.2d 734, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1954).

If it appears from the record before the full board that the manifestation of injury is proved by competent legal evidence it shall be conclusive on appeal and a claim filed within two years of such manifestation is timely. Girard v. United States Rubber Co., 85 R.I. 477 , 132 A.2d 831, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1957).

The statute of limitations begins to run not from the time of the injury but from the date total disability resulting from a compensable injury is determined, either by an agreement entered into between the employer and the employee or by a final decree of the commission. Silva v. Devine, 90 R.I. 120 , 155 A.2d 605, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1959).

Where petitioner testified that he was reading lips for more than five years and doctor testified that petitioner had a total loss of hearing for five to ten years petition seeking compensation for loss of hearing was too late. Lozowski v. Nicholson File Co., 92 R.I. 270 , 168 A.2d 143, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1961).

Petitioner’s claim for compensation was timely filed when it was filed as soon as petitioner knew his condition was directly attributable to his employment. Britto v. Fram Corp., 93 R.I. 426 , 176 A.2d 81, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1961).

Involved in the determination of the time when the statute begins to run against a claim for permanent partial impairment are such conditions as the extent of the healing of scar tissues, improvement of circulation, reasonable minimum tenderness, not to mention such damage to the sensory nerves as time may prove to the irreparable. Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429 , 224 A.2d 387, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 411 (1966).

Where an employee suffered injury to both hands eventually requiring amputation of three fingers from the right hand and four from the left, followed by experiments with plastic surgery, cosmetic hands, and prosthetic devices, the statute began to run at the time that it was sound medical opinion that, independent of prosthetic devices, post-surgery functional development could objectively be said to have reached its potential. Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429 , 224 A.2d 387, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 411 (1966).

Where an accident to an employee occurred January 22, 1952, resultant epileptic seizures began to occur in August, 1952, a physician advised the employee in September, 1960, that his epilepsy was probably caused by the accident, and in September, 1961, after a pneumoencephalogram which the employee had failed to have made a year before, the physician advised him that his epilepsy had been caused by the accident, a petition for compensation filed January 9, 1963, was not filed within the time provided therefor in this section. Rastella v. Department of Pub. Works, 102 R.I. 123 , 229 A.2d 43, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 656 (1967).

A petition for dependency filed more than two years after the petitioner had ceased to receive payments was barred by this section. Moniz v. Hall, 102 R.I. 398 , 230 A.2d 840, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 702 (1967).

Where employee burned hand on X-ray machine in 1947 and later had to have part of thumb amputated in 1957, and then several years later lost 25 per cent use of her hand, she came within two-year statute of limitation of this section for specific benefits where post surgery loss of use of hand can objectively be said to have reached its potential in such period. Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174 , 250 A.2d 361, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 735 (1969).

Where an employee received head injuries more than a year apart and, more than two years later, upon recurrence of his disability, a myelogram revealed a ruptured disk between the fifth and sixth vertebrae, the limitation period of this section did not begin to run until the employee was advised by the report of the myelogram of the true nature of his injury. Provencher v. Glas-Kraft, Inc., 107 R.I. 97 , 264 A.2d 916, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 744 (1970).

Where the employer’s insurer through error continued compensation payments to a worker beyond the maximum period for which benefits were payable, the statute of limitations on the employee’s claim for further payment from the second injury fund began to run from the date of the last payment received and not from the date the maximum amount due had been paid. Church v. Doherty, 107 R.I. 432 , 267 A.2d 693, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 791 (1970).

Where employee sustained “tear of rotator cuff left shoulder” on May 12, 1964 in an industrial accident and physician testified that such condition reached a plateau in not less than one year and not more than 18 months subsequent to original injury and trial commissioner on that basis found the condition of the employee’s arm became permanent on or about January 1, 1966, and that the employee’s right of action for specific benefits arose at that time, said employee failed to sustain his burden of proving that he had filed the March 11, 1970 petition within two years of the time he knew or “by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known” that the condition of his shoulder was permanent and of its causal relationship to his employment. Auclair v. American Silk Spinning Co., 109 R.I. 395 , 286 A.2d 253, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1198 (1972).

Claimant must have known or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of his disability, and he is considered aware if, as a reasonable man, he would have believed that he was afflicted due to work related injury, before statute of limitations begins to run. McCaughey v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 116 R.I. 672 , 360 A.2d 561, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1323 (1976).

The statute of limitations begins to run upon the end result of permanent disability and the end result is reached when sound medical opinion could conclude that any improvement from treatment had reached its potential. McCaughey v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 116 R.I. 672 , 360 A.2d 561, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1323 (1976).

Claimant’s disfigurement petition, filed three years after amputation of an arm but within one year of an unsuccessful operation to excise painful nerve tissue from the stump, was not barred by the statute of limitations, as the time for filing such a petition runs from the final treatment for the restoration of the disfigured claimant’s psychological self-image rather than from the date of amputation. Jones v. Grinnell Corp., 117 R.I. 144 , 362 A.2d 139 (1976).

A reasonable person, when informed by physicians of a probable causal relationship between an injury and his employment, may be charged with knowledge of that casual relationship; and claimant’s petition was properly dismissed where claimant was so informed in January, 1972, but did not file her petition until March, 1974. Boudreau v. American Luggage Works, 117 R.I. 548 , 368 A.2d 1189, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1725 (1977).

The filing of a claim within the limitation period did not render the statutory bar ineffective as to related claims for dependents’ benefits which were filed subsequent to the running of the statutory period. Yates v. Dr. J. H. Ladd Sch., 120 R.I. 294 , 387 A.2d 1043, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 671 (1978).

Claim that the limitation period of this section was tolled for a claim for benefits for minor children under § 28-33-17 was held not to be before the court where the petition for review was filed neither by the employee’s children nor by a legal guardian acting in their behalf but rather by the employee herself in her own name. Yates v. Dr. J. H. Ladd Sch., 120 R.I. 294 , 387 A.2d 1043, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 671 (1978); Vieira v. Davol, Inc., 120 R.I. 944 , 392 A.2d 375, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 742 (1978).

The purpose of requiring claims to be brought within a specific time limit is to protect the employer from stale claims too old to be successfully or adequately investigated and properly defended, and this objective is not satisfied merely by giving notice to an employer of a claim against it. Ochoa v. Union Camp Corp., 120 R.I. 898 , 391 A.2d 123, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 736 (1978).

As to statutes of limitations, a dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as if the action had never been brought; for example, the complaining party must file his claim in a timely manner without regard to his previous claim, and if the second claim is subject to a statute of limitations it must be filed within the time set by that statute or be barred. Ochoa v. Union Camp Corp., 120 R.I. 898 , 391 A.2d 123, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 736 (1978).

Where period of time for which compensation payments could be made expired at a time when claimant was not totally incapacitated, period of limitations did not begin to run until claimant again became totally incapacitated from the same injury. Healy v. DeSano, 121 R.I. 325 , 397 A.2d 1328, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1781 (1979).

Where physician testified that injured employee’s disabling and disfiguring impairments had reached end result at such time as to place his claim filing beyond the limitation period, appellate division of Workers’ Compensation Commission was not justified in vacating award of benefits absent a further showing that employee knew or should have known that end result had been reached. Rainville v. King's Trucking Co., 448 A.2d 733, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 973 (R.I. 1982).

— Payments Under Federal Act.

Payments voluntarily made by an employer under the Federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) tolled the statute of limitations for filing a petition under this chapter until the date of the last LHWCA payment. Young v. General Dynamics, 494 A.2d 100, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 532 (R.I. 1985).

— Preliminary Agreement.

The entry into a preliminary agreement in respect to compensation for incapacity did not have any effect upon and did not toll the statute of limitations in respect to the filing of a claim for disfigurement and loss of use. Carter v. Lang Jewelry Co., 492 A.2d 1231, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 516 (R.I. 1985).

Computation of Benefits.

The fact that this section prevents the statute of limitations from running until claimant has learned that he has received a compensable injury does not permit claimant to have benefits based on law in force at time extent of injury was learned rather than at time of accident. Harding v. Rhode Island Hosp., 110 R.I. 89 , 290 A.2d 406, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 882 (1972).

Once an amendment to a memorandum of agreement (MOA) is granted for any reason set forth in § 28-35-5 an employee may be awarded compensation benefits retroactively based upon that later-included injury only if the claim or issue is not precluded because of res judicata or collateral estoppel as those doctrines are applied in workers’ compensation cases, the employee proves by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that he is incapacitated based upon an injury described in the amended MOA as of a specific date, and the retroactive compensation claim is filed within the limitations period. Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2000).

Where an employee alleged that a memorandum of agreement (MOA) should be amended to include an additional original injury, he was required to do so within the limitations period to obtain any additional benefits that might be due from such a disabling injury retroactive to the date of the MOA, since otherwise benefits were payable, if at all, only from the date of a proven recurrence of his disability after the MOA had been amended to include that omitted injury. Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2000).

Construction With Other Laws.

Because § 28-35-61 is not a statute of limitation, the applicable statute for determining the timeliness of an original claim for workers’ compensation benefits is § 28-35-57 , and the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff was required to file a petition to change the nature and location of the injuries set forth in the pretrial order within six months of the date of entry. Brooks v. Dockside Seafood, 740 A.2d 1277, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 220 (R.I. 1999).

Effect of Prior Agreement.

Petition of one dependent was, for the purposes of this section, independent of an agreement with another dependent, even though the agreement referred to and saved any right that the first dependent might have. Giannotti v. Giusti Bros., 41 R.I. 122 , 102 A. 887, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1918).

Petition for partial incapacity payments after period of total incapacity covered by agreement was for the purposes of this section a petition to review, so was not barred by this section, even though designated and referred to as an original petition. Balon v. General Cable Corp., 76 R.I. 206 , 68 A.2d 44, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1949).

Estoppel to Assert Statute.

Insurer which, both before and after expiration of the period of limitations, required employee to submit to physical examinations but did not either disclaim liability nor show willingness to settle despite numerous conferences was estopped from asserting statute of limitations. Shea v. Gamco, Inc., 81 R.I. 12 , 98 A.2d 864, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1953).

Employer which made payments all during the period of limitations as if an agreement had been filed, but which did not obtain or file an agreement, was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. Baligian v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 80 R.I. 49 , 81 R.I. 49 , 98 A.2d 830, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1953).

An employer who continued an injured employee’s full salary and provided him with all necessary medical services during the entire period of his disability was not estopped to assert the statute against a claim filed within a few weeks after the termination of his employment but more than three years after the termination of his disability. Trzoniec v. General Controls Co., 100 R.I. 448 , 216 A.2d 886, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 458 (1966); Aragao v. American Emery Wheel Works, 453 A.2d 762, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1119 (R.I. 1982).

Mental Incapacity.

Epilepsy was not such mental incapacity as to extend the period of limitations where attacks were not continuous and claimant was otherwise competent. Dunn v. United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co., 164 A. 329, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 160 (R.I. 1933).

Physician’s Claim.

Although this section does not specifically apply to a physician’s direct claim against the employer, equity requires the application of the same period of limitations where proceedings are brought in equity under the act. Henry v. American Enamel Co., 48 R.I. 113 , 136 A. 3, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1927).

Retroactive Application.

The 1978 amendment to this section changing the statute of limitations for filing petitions from two to three years cannot be applied retroactively. Emmett v. Town of Coventry, 478 A.2d 571, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 577 (R.I. 1984).

There is no evidence that the Legislature sought to give retroactive effect to the 1978 amendment to this section that changed the two-year limitation to a three-year limitation. Donahue v. Washburn Wire Co., 492 A.2d 152, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 504 (R.I. 1985).

Second Injuries Arising From Same Incident.

If an original injury is different from the one specified in a decree or in a memorandum of agreement and does not “flow from” the original injury, even though this different injury also arises from the same work-related activity or accident, § 28-35-45 is inapplicable, and a second original petition must be filed within the limitations period set forth in this section. Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2000).

What Constitutes Agreement.

The filing of an agreement sufficient to comply with this section is the filing with the director of labor of a memorandum of an agreement between the parties and signed by them. Gomes v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 94 R.I. 500 , 182 A.2d 318, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 112 (1962).

Where a preliminary agreement designated “nonprejudicial three month agreement” and a suspension agreement for periods of incapacity were submitted to the director of labor, these constituted the filing of a memorandum of agreement within the purview of § 28-35-1 , and since the director had no authority to decline to docket such a memorandum the fact that such agreements were returned to the employer, with the notation “these agreements cannot be approved” was a nullity, and such submission of the memorandum constituted a compliance with the provisions of this section so that employee was not barred from claiming compensation. Gomes v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 94 R.I. 500 , 182 A.2d 318, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 112 (1962).

Collateral References.

Computation of period for filing death claim under compensation statutes. 119 A.L.R. 1158.

Date of accident or date when injury becomes manifest as time from which period for filing claim commences to run. 108 A.L.R. 316.

Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing actions to enforce workers’ compensation benefits. 48 A.L.R.4th 1094.

Effect of injured employee’s proceedings for workers’ compensation benefits on running of statute of limitations governing action for personal injury arising from same incident. 71 A.L.R.3d 849.

Infants, provision limiting time for presenting claim as applied to. 142 A.L.R. 1035.

Limitation of time for filing claim under Workers’ Compensation Act as jurisdictional. 78 A.L.R. 1294.

Occupational or industrial disease, when prescriptive period begins to run in case of. 86 A.L.R. 572; 11 A.L.R.2d 297.

Payments, or furnishing medical or hospital services, or burial, by employer after injury as affecting time for filing claim under Workers’ Compensation Act. 144 A.L.R. 606.

Secondary or deferred class of beneficiaries of death benefits, rights of, as affected by failure of one in primary class of beneficiaries, to assert her rights within time limited by statute. 105 A.L.R. 1232.

War as suspending time for notice or filing of claim under Workers’ Compensation Act. 137 A.L.R. 1465; 140 A.L.R. 1518; 141 A.L.R. 1511.

When limitation period begins to run against claim under workers’ compensation or occupational diseases act for contracting of disease. 11 A.L.R.2d 297.

When limitations period begins to run as to claim for disability benefits for contracting of disease under Workers’ Compensation or Occupational Diseases Act. 86 A.L.R.5th 295.

When time period commences as to claim under workers’ compensation or occupational diseases act for death of worker due to contraction of disease. 100 A.L.R.5th 567.

28-35-57.1. Bar of claims.

An employee’s claim for compensation from an employer under chapters 29 to 38 of this title shall be barred from the date the employee commences employment for a period of two (2) years in the event the employee has willfully provided false information as to his or her ability to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations, on an employment application requesting that information, if the information is directly related to the personal injury which is the basis of the new claim for compensation. This section shall not apply unless the employment application advises the employee of the substance of this section. Nothing in this section shall exempt any employer from or excuse full compliance with any applicable provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and chapter 87 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 1992, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 12, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 422, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 14, § 7.

28-35-58. Liability of third person for damages.

  1. Where the injury for which compensation is payable under chapters 29 — 38 of this title was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages in respect of the injury, the employee may take proceedings, both against that person to recover damages and against any person liable to pay compensation under those chapters for that compensation, and the employee shall be entitled to receive both damages and compensation. The employee, in recovering damages either by judgment or settlement from the person so liable to pay damages, shall reimburse the person by whom the compensation was paid to the extent of the compensation paid as of the date of the judgment or settlement and the receipt of those damages by the employee shall not bar future compensation. An insurer shall be entitled to suspend the payment of compensation benefits payable to the employee when the damages recovered by judgment or settlement from the person so liable to pay damages exceeds the compensation paid as of the date of the judgment or settlement. The suspension paid shall be that number of weeks which are equal to the excess damages paid divided by the employee’s weekly compensation rate; however, during the period of suspension the employee shall be entitled to receive the benefit of all medical and hospital payments on his or her behalf. If the employee has been paid compensation under those chapters, the person by whom the compensation was paid shall be entitled to indemnity from the person liable to pay damages, and to the extent of that indemnity shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee to recover those damages. When money has been recovered either by judgment or by settlement by an employee from the person liable to pay damages, by suit or settlement, and the employee is required to reimburse the person by whom the compensation was paid, the employee or his or her attorney shall be entitled to withhold from the amount to be reimbursed that proportion of the costs, witness expenses, and other out-of-pocket expenses and attorney fees which the amount which the employee is required to reimburse the person by whom compensation was paid bears to the amount recovered from the third party.
  2. In any case in which the employee or, in case of death, the administrator of the employee’s estate neglects to exercise the employee’s right of action by failing to file a lawsuit against such third person within two (2) years and eight (8) months after the injury, the self-insured employer or the employer’s insurance carrier may so proceed and shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured employee or, in case of death, to the rights of the administrator to recover against such person; provided, that no subrogation action shall commence unless at least twenty-six (26) weeks prior to the expiration of the two (2) years and eight (8) months the self-insured employer or the employer’s insurance carrier has notified the employee or in the case of death, the administrator of the employee’s estate, in writing by personal service or certified mail, that failure to commence such action within two (2) years and eight (8) months after the injury will operate as an assignment of the right of action to the self-insured employer or the employer’s insurance carrier. Upon filing the lawsuit the attorney for the self-insured employer or the employer’s insurance carrier shall notify the employee in writing by personal service or certified mail of the action and the name of the court where it was filed and the employee may join as a plaintiff in the action within thirty days after the notification, and, if the employee fails to join, the right of joinder shall abate. The right of the employee, or in case of death, the administrator of the employee’s estate, to be fully compensated for the damages sustained shall be fully preserved as outlined in subsection (a) of this section.
  3. If the self-insured employer or the employer’s insurance carrier recovers from these other personal damages or benefits, after expenses and costs of action have been paid, in excess of the amount of the lien as defined in this section, then that excess shall be paid to the injured employee or, in the case of death, to the administrator of the employee’s estate for distribution.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 17; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 14; P.L. 1936, ch. 2358, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 15; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-58 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 119, § 4; P.L. 2002, ch. 280, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Workers’ Compensation, see 4 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 821 (1999).

Kaitlyn Alger, 2019 Survey: Mello v. Killeavy, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 690 (2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agents.

Although this section provides for the deduction from any payment to the compensation carrier of costs, witness fees and other out-of-pocket expenses and attorney’s fees, it does not vest an employee’s attorney with authority to settle the lien or endorse a draft, and without evidence showing that the compensation carrier actually authorized the attorney to perform any acts of an agent, no inference of agency can be drawn. American Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 120 R.I. 441 , 388 A.2d 14, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 683 (1978).

Asserting Post-Settlement Lien on Recovery.

Administrator of the Rhode Island employees’ compensation fund may not assert a post-settlement lien on a seaman’s recovery under the Jones Act because such a lien would take away the seaman’s right to damages received under the federal admiralty and maritime laws. Benders v. Board of Governors, 728 F. Supp. 839, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 502 (D.R.I. 1990).

Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses.

An employee’s attorney who follows a course of conduct that is contrary to the interest of the compensation carrier waives his right to expenses and fees pursuant to this section. Commercial Union Cos. v. Graham, 495 A.2d 243, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 546 (R.I. 1985).

It is clear from the provision in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-58 that provides for reimbursement of a worker’s compensation lien that an employer or insurer is not entitled to reap the benefit of the employee’s recovery without bearing its share of the cost. McCarthy v. Envtl. Transp. Servs., 865 A.2d 1056, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 14 (R.I. 2005).

Considering the policies that underlie the Worker’s Compensation Act, the term “excess damages,” for purposes of calculating benefits suspension periods under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-58 , means that amount of damages actually received by the injured employee, after reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs have been paid. McCarthy v. Envtl. Transp. Servs., 865 A.2d 1056, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 14 (R.I. 2005).

Coemployee.

Neither the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20 , nor R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-58 provides for a scope-of-employment exception for injuries caused by coemployees. Accordingly, in plaintiff’s case against a coemployee for negligence, the Supreme Court declined to extend the D’Andrea standard to create liability for coemployees where none existed before. Mello v. Killeavy, 205 A.3d 454, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2019).

Compensation After Damage Payment.

An injured employee who has obtained damages from a third-party tortfeasor by way of settlement, in the absence of fraud, is presumed to have been fully compensated for his injury and may not thereafter obtain compensation from his employer for the same injuries. Travis v. Rialto Furniture Co., 101 R.I. 45 , 220 A.2d 179, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 349 (1966).

An employee who settled with the tortfeasor her claim for damages for injuries other than those for which she claimed workers’ compensation benefits was not precluded by this section from receiving continuing compensation and medical expenses from the workers’ compensation administrative account under § 28-37-1 . Romano v. Hall, 102 R.I. 430 , 231 A.2d 5, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 709 (1967).

For the purposes of the workers’ compensation commission, the release of all claims against a third-party tortfeasor constitutes a settlement in full for the injury out of which the employee’s alleged incapacity for earnings arose and amounts to an election under this section. Boccarossa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 104 R.I. 711 , 248 A.2d 593, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 711 (1968).

Where employee injured by third-party tortfeasor executed a release of all claims against such tortfeasor for a cash settlement and subsequently petitioned for compensation under the act, workers’ compensation commission had no jurisdiction to determine the validity of such release. Boccarossa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 104 R.I. 711 , 248 A.2d 593, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 711 (1968).

The employee should not be allowed to recover both compensation and damages for the aggravation of an injury through malpractice; however, compensation which was paid previous to the aggravation or for the primary ailment should not be reimbursed to the employer out of the malpractice recovery. Roy v. Providence Metalizing Co., 119 R.I. 630 , 381 A.2d 1051, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 593 (1978).

It was impermissible for the employer to terminate unilaterally all compensation payments upon learning that the employee had received a settlement in a malpractice suit against the physician and hospital involved in the treatment of his injury, since it is first necessary for the commission to make a determination as to what amount of the compensation paid was attributable to aggravation of the injury through malpractice, and whether the employee is entitled to continued compensation based on his original injury. Roy v. Providence Metalizing Co., 119 R.I. 630 , 381 A.2d 1051, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 593 (1978).

A specific compensation award under § 28-33-19 for an employee’s loss of use of his extremities and disfigurement was subject to the suspension mechanism of this section, the amount of the award reducing on a “dollar for dollar” basis the period of time during which the employer’s duty to pay future compensation benefits to the employee would be suspended. Rison v. Air Filter Sys., 707 A.2d 675, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 21 (R.I. 1998).

City properly reduced the amount of a retiree’s disability pension, as a city ordinance authorized the city to reduce the disability pension by the amount of workers’ compensation payable to the retiree, even though the city has suspended workers’ compensation payments pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-58(a) based on a settlement received by the retiree in a tort action. Ruggiero v. City of Providence, 893 A.2d 235, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 28 (R.I. 2006).

Person Other Than Employer.

The employer’s compensation insurance carrier could not be held liable as a third-party tortfeasor to the injured employee on the theory that the insurance carrier had breached its duty to inspect and provide safety measures in the operation and maintenance of the employer’s plant and machinery, as a result of which the employee, a power press operator in the plant was severely injured. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 631, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (1st Cir. 1967).

Throughout the act the words “employer” and “insurer” are used interchangeably, thus denoting an equating of the two; hence the employer’s compensation insurer cannot be “some person other than the employer” and liable in tort to the employee for damages for negligence in voluntarily making safety inspections of the employer’s machinery and plant. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 631, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (1st Cir. 1967).

While workers’ compensation insurers enjoy immunity from tort liability under this section, such immunity attaches only to activities undertaken in the insurer’s role as compensation carrier. Latour v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 528 F. Supp. 231, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16614 (D.R.I. 1981).

Where employee, prior to filing his petition for workers’ compensation, released all claims against a third-party tortfeasor, but subsequently contested the validity of such release in a superior court action against such tortfeasor, the commission should have held the compensation case in abeyance pending final adjudication as to the validity of the release. Boccarossa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 104 R.I. 711 , 248 A.2d 593, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 711 (1968).

Right of Action.

Receipt of compensation from employer does not bar action against third person for damages where employee has agreed to repay compensation to employer if he recovers against third person. Mingo v. Rhode Island Co., 41 R.I. 423 , 103 A. 965, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1918); McArthur v. Dutee W. Flint Oil Co., 50 R.I. 226 , 146 A. 484, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1929).

Payment of workers’ compensation by employer did not bar third party against whom damages had been recovered in an action at law from bringing action against employer for indemnity pursuant to contract. Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., 122 F. Supp. 806, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3316 (D.R.I. 1954).

It is clear from the language of this section that no right of action has been provided against the employee, therefore, it would be an unwarranted intrusion into the legislative field if the court were to sanction one in the case at bar, which was an action of assumpsit brought by compensation insurer against employee to recover amount of compensation paid him out of sums allegedly received by employee from third person tortfeasor. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Lubash, 95 R.I. 311 , 186 A.2d 722, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 161 (1962).

The employer may be subrogated to the employee’s rights in a malpractice suit to the extent that the compensation paid or payable is attributable to the malpractice itself. Roy v. Providence Metalizing Co., 119 R.I. 630 , 381 A.2d 1051, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 593 (1978).

Subrogation.

Dependent solely upon statute, if plaintiff compensation insurer has a justiciable right and a remedy to enforce it, that must be found in the statute, and a careful analysis fails to disclose any right of subrogation against employee for compensation paid nor is such a right in the court’s opinion necessarily implied therein. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Lubash, 95 R.I. 311 , 186 A.2d 722, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 161 (1962).

Dismissal by trial justice of workers’ compensation carrier’s action to recover compensation benefits as subrogee must be sustained by findings of fact sufficient to indicate court’s factual basis for sustaining motion to dismiss, and conclusion of ultimate fact without any subsidiary or basic finding of fact upon which the conclusion is based will not suffice. American Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 R.I. 518 , 359 A.2d 37, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1301 (1976).

Rule of Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Lubash, 95 R.I. 311 , 186 A.2d 722 (1962) that an insurer paying workmen’s compensation may not exercise his subrogation rights against an employee’s recovery against a third-party tortfeasor once the employee has received payment of damages did not apply where damages were placed in escrow awaiting determination of insurer’s subrogation rights. Commercial Union Cos. v. Graham, 495 A.2d 243, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 546 (R.I. 1985).

Under this section, the insurer is entitled only to indemnification for its payments, and to the extent of that indemnity the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the injured employee. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Lundy & Rogerson Masonry Contracting, 502 A.2d 823, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 387 (R.I. 1986).

Supreme Court of Rhode Island will not interpret the suspension formula under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-58 in such a way that an employee is forced to accept a lesser total benefit because he endeavored to allocate liability to a culpable party. McCarthy v. Envtl. Transp. Servs., 865 A.2d 1056, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 14 (R.I. 2005).

— Coemployee.

Under the provisions of § 28-29-20 , the plaintiff could not sue the defendant, a coemployee, in connection with a work-related motor vehicle accident for which he obtained workers’ compensation benefits; therefore, the operator and the owner of the other vehicle involved in the collision could not pursue a claim for contribution against the defendant. Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 1994).

Suit After Compensation.

Where an injured employee received compensation from his employer’s insurance carrier, then sued the third-party tortfeasor, eventually settling the case for a certain amount of money, the insurance carrier was entitled to what the wrongdoer owed the employee, at least up to the amount that the carrier paid. Matteson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 738 F.2d 619, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 20329 (1st Cir. 1984).

A prior recovery of compensation benefits by an injured worker will not prohibit suit against the wrongdoer if he can establish either that he has agreed with his employer to reimburse him out of any recovery or that his employer has refused to enter into any such agreement; in the latter event, however, any ultimate recovery should be reduced by the amount of the compensation benefits received. Colarusso v. Mills, 99 R.I. 409 , 208 A.2d 381, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 454 (1965).

Where the defendant, a third-party tortfeasor, alleged in his answer that plaintiff was barred from recovery of damages for personal injuries by the fact that he had received workers’ compensation from his employer for the injury in question and plaintiff replied that he had an agreement with his employer to reimburse him for such compensation from the proceeds of the damage action, it was not error to permit cross-examination of plaintiff as to his receipt of such compensation. Storin v. Masterson, 103 R.I. 246 , 236 A.2d 249, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 607 (1967).

Summary judgment for defendants was proper where plaintiff sued corporate officers and supervisors acting in their managerial capacity for injuries due for failure to provide a safe place of employment where employee was compensated for damages under the workers’ compensation scheme. Greco v. Farago, 477 A.2d 98, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 540 (R.I. 1984).

An injured employee who is receiving workers’ compensation benefits from a limited partnership is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of § 28-29-20 from bringing a common-law action against a corporate general partner for the same injuries. Mercier v. Saber, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 27, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2453 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1459, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16889 (1st Cir. 1989).

A subcontractor who had paid workers’ compensation benefits to its injured employee is not required to indemnify a third-party general contractor for the settlement amount it paid to the injured worker. A & B Constr. v. Atlas Roofing & Skylight Co., 867 F. Supp. 100, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15079 (D.R.I. 1994).

— Repayment Agreement.

The repayment agreement between employee and insurer is required to protect the third-party tortfeasor; absent the agreement the insurer would have a right of subrogation against the third-party tortfeasor. Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 119 R.I. 14 , 376 A.2d 1058, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1879 (1977).

Since the second injury fund under § 28-37-4 is administered by the state, not a private compensation carrier, the court does not insist on an explicit agreement or refusal to agree on the state’s part, so long as the injured employee has agreed to repay second injury fund benefits. Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 119 R.I. 14 , 376 A.2d 1058, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1879 (1977).

The repayment agreement is not required to be in writing, to be signed by either the injured employee or by the insurer, nor to be made at any specific time. Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 119 R.I. 14 , 376 A.2d 1058, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1879 (1977).

Where employee spoke to insurer about repayment, and subsequently sent a letter stating the agreement to insurer during trial and insurer placed the letter in its files, and insurer testified through an adjustor that there was an agreement, the facts were sufficient to establish a repayment agreement. Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 119 R.I. 14 , 376 A.2d 1058, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1879 (1977).

Collateral References.

Attorney’s fee or other expenses of litigation incurred by employee in action against third-party tortfeasor as charge against employer’s distributive share. 74 A.L.R.3d 854.

Claim or action against one as third party as precluding action or claim against him as employer. 98 A.L.R. 416.

Contribution or indemnity from employer or insurer, right to, of one other than employer or insurer liable under act. 66 A.L.R. 1433.

Indemnity from manufacturer or vendor for liability under Workers’ Compensation Act for injury to employee by defective machine furnished employer. 37 A.L.R. 853.

Matters concluded, in action at law to recover for the same injury, by decision or finding made in workers’ compensation proceeding. 84 A.L.R.2d 1036.

Remedy as between subcontractor and principal contractor (or independent contractor or contractee) in respect of workers’ compensation paid by one to employee injured through other’s negligence, where injured employee had no remedy apart from the act. 166 A.L.R. 1221.

Right as between employer primarily responsible under the Workers’ Compensation Act and employer secondarily liable under that act where injury was due to the latter’s negligence. 117 A.L.R. 571.

Right to subrogation under specific provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act in relation to employees of independent contractors or subcontractors. 58 A.L.R. 892; 105 A.L.R. 593.

Third person responsible for injury, construction and application of provision of act for deduction on account of recovery from. 142 A.L.R. 170.

Third person’s negligence, rights and remedies where employee was injured by. 19 A.L.R. 766; 27 A.L.R. 493; 37 A.L.R. 838; 67 A.L.R. 249; 88 A.L.R. 665; 106 A.L.R. 1040.

Status as Alter Ego of Employer for Purposes of Exclusive Remedy Rule Barring Third Party Action Under Worker’s Compensation Statutes. 27 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2015).

28-35-59. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 3, § 22; P.L. 1913, ch. 936, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 3, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 19; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-59 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 9; Repealed by P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 5, effective July 16, 2013; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 5, effective July 16, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-35-59 concerned records of proceedings.

28-35-60. Copies of decisions and decrees to director.

Copies of decisions, opinions, rescripts, and decrees, when issued by the workers’ compensation court and supreme court involving workers’ compensation cases, shall be promptly sent by the administrator to the director.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 3, § 22; P.L. 1941, ch. 1058, § 1; G.L. 1941, ch. 300, art. 3, § 20; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-35-60 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 10; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 5; P.L. 1993, ch. 328, § 1.

28-35-61. Decrees procured by fraud.

  1. The workers’ compensation court may, upon petition of an employee, the dependents of a deceased employee, an employer, an insurance carrier, or any other party in interest, vacate, modify, or amend any final decree entered within a period of six (6) months of the date such decree was entered, either by a single judge or by the full court, if it appears that the decree:
    1. Has been procured by fraud; or
    2. Does not accurately and completely set forth and describe the nature and location of all injuries sustained by the employee.
  2. The petition shall be served in the same manner as is provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title for all other petitions.
  3. The workers’ compensation court shall hear any and all petitions and make its decision in accordance with those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1958, ch. 122, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 13; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 6, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Commission.

While this section is remedial in nature and affords a wide latitude to the commission to amend a final decree where the full nature and extent of the injury sustained is not accurately and completely set forth and described, its latitudinous nature is not so broad as to permit relitigation of issues raised and determined at a prior proceeding under the guise of a statutory petition to amend. Luzzi v. Imondi, 97 R.I. 463 , 198 A.2d 671, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1964).

Incorrect Statement of Injuries.

Where, in a hearing on an employee’s petition to amend a consent decree to include a back injury, the employee gave contradictory testimony as to how his back injury occurred, it was not error for the commission to deny such petition and to find that the petitioner had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decree did not accurately and correctly set forth all injuries received. Litchman v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 100 R.I. 352 , 216 A.2d 129, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 440 (1966).

Where, on a petition describing the employee’s injuries as being to her “back and right hip,” the commission found that her injuries were to her “right arm and right buttock” and subsequently she was found to have a “ruptured disc at the fourth lumbar space on the right,” it was not error for the commission, on petition, to amend the decree by adding a finding of the ruptured disc. O'Neil v. M & F Worsted Mills, 100 R.I. 647 , 218 A.2d 666, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 492 (1966).

It is clear that, rather than a statute of limitation or repose, this section is more in the nature of a vehicle of convenience for the court and the parties in its provision of a mechanism for the workers’ compensation court to amend a decree that misdescribes, misstates, or omits any injury suffered by the employee. Brooks v. Dockside Seafood, 740 A.2d 1277, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 220 (R.I. 1999).

Timeliness.

Because § 28-35-61 is not a statute of limitation, the applicable statute for determining the timeliness of an original claim for workers’ compensation benefits is § 28-35-57 , and the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff was required to file a petition to change the nature and location of the injuries set forth in the pretrial order within six months of the date of entry. Brooks v. Dockside Seafood, 740 A.2d 1277, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 220 (R.I. 1999).

28-35-62. Reproduction of documents.

  1. Reproduction of documents, papers, or records docketed, filed, or in the custody of the department by photograph, photocopy, photostat, or similar process shall in all respects and for all purposes be equivalent to and have the same effect and force as the documents, papers, or records docketed, filed, or in the custody of the department.
  2. A reasonable charge may be collected for reproductions and certification.

History of Section. P.L. 1960, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 8.

28-35-63. Representation of employers.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any proceeding before the worker’s compensation court an employer may be represented by an attorney at law or by any officer or employee of the employer who has been specifically registered by the employer with the permission of the court as a representative of the employer for those proceedings.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 4, § 3; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Representation by Injured Employee.

An injured employee cannot also represent his employer before the commission. This is a patent conflict of interest. Empire Equip. Eng'g Co. v. Sullivan, 565 A.2d 527, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 150 (R.I. 1989).

Chapter 36 Workers’ Compensation — Insurance

28-36-1. Insurance or filing of bond required.

  1. Every employer subject to or who has elected to become subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title as provided in § 28-29-8 shall secure in one of the following ways the compensation for which he or she is or may become liable under those chapters:
    1. By insuring and keeping insured against liability to pay the compensation in any stock or mutual company, or association, authorized and qualified to do business in this state and to take those risks in this state;
      1. By furnishing to the director of labor and training satisfactory proof of his or her financial ability to pay directly to injured employees or their dependents the compensation, and by furnishing security, indemnity, or a bond in kind and in amount satisfactory to the director. The bond shall run to the director for the benefit of the employees and their dependents and with the indemnity or security shall be deposited with him or her;
      2. Should the self-insured employer be unable to pay claims then the director shall call on the security, indemnity or bond in kind. If these funds are deposited in a state account the account shall be an interest bearing account and all accrued interest shall only be for the benefit of employees and dependents of the self-insured employer.
      1. By a combination of subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, the employer may self-insure for a sum certain by furnishing security, indemnity or a bond in kind and amount equal to the sum certain, together with insurance for loss in excess of the sum certain.
      2. The provisions of subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection shall apply upon compliance with the reasonable criteria and rules and regulations as established by the director to qualify and safeguard the underlying amounts of self-insurance; or
    2. By becoming a member of an authorized group self-insurance fund pursuant to chapter 47 of this title.
    1. All employers who apply for approval to self insure for all or part of their liability, pursuant to subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section, shall pay an application fee based upon the number of employees located at the employer’s place(s) of business in Rhode Island. The fees for new applications are set in accordance with the following schedule:
    2. There is established a restricted receipt account within the department of labor and training into which shall be deposited the application fees set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection and the revenue derived from the assessment set forth in subdivision (3) of this subsection. This account shall be used solely for the payment of the expenses of the department of labor and training in performing its duties under §§ 28-36-1 and 28-36-2 . If an employer receives approval to self-insure from the director for all or part of its liability pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section, the application fee paid by that employer shall be applied as a credit to reduce the amount of the assessment apportioned to that employer pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection.
    3. The director of labor and training and the department of administration, annually, as soon as practicable prior to the start of the fiscal year, in each succeeding year, shall ascertain the total amount of expenses, including in addition to the direct costs of personal services, (i) the cost of maintenance and operation, (ii) the cost of retirement contributions made and workers’ compensation premiums to be paid by the state for or on account of personnel, (iii) rentals for space to be occupied in state owned or state leased buildings, and (iv) all other direct or indirect costs to be incurred by the department of labor in the next fiscal year in carrying out its responsibilities under §§ 28-36-1 and 28-36-2 . Those expenses shall be assessed against all employers who self-insure for all or part of their liability under chapters 29 — 38 of this title. The basis of apportionment of the assessment against each employer shall be that proportion of those expenses that the penal sum of the surety bond, indemnity, or security of each employer at the close of the preceding fiscal year bears to the total of the penal sum of all bonds, indemnity, or security for all employers.
      1. In addition to current classified positions in the department of labor and training self-insurance unit, consisting of administrator, hearing officer, supervising trainer, and senior clerk stenographer, there shall be funded as unclassified positions:
        1. Two (2) administrative aide positions; and
        2. Two (2) financial evaluator analysts.
      2. This staff’s and/or any consultant’s studies on feasibility and/or audits, as assessed by the administrator according to the rules of the department at the expense of any self-insured or proposed self-insured entity, shall be reported to the director of the department in the course of the department operations on the administration of the self-insurance unit. All funds are from the restricted receipt account of the department as collected by the self-insurance unit pursuant to subdivisions (1) — (3) of this subsection.
    Click to view

Number of Employees Fee 1-249 $300 250-499 $350 500-749 $400 750-999 $450 1,000 or more $500

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 1941, ch. 1063, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-1 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 238, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 12; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 9; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 10; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 6; P.L. 1993, ch. 271, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 7; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 7; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 6.

Cross References.

Evidence of insurance in another state, § 28-29-16 .

Exemption of state and municipalities from insurance requirement, § 28-31-8 .

Department of labor and training, § 14-16.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Insurance:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-328 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 52 et seq.

Collateral References.

Noninsurance or self-insuring employers, construction of provisions directed against. 18 A.L.R. 267.

28-36-1.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 40, § 1; Repealed, effective May 6, 1982, by P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-36-1.1 concerned hospitals as self-insurers. For current provisions concerning group self-insurance plans, see § 28-47-1 et seq.

28-36-2. Certificate of compliance by employer.

  1. Whenever an employer has complied with the requirements of §§ 28-36-1 (a)(2) or (a)(3), and with any other reasonable requirements that the director shall make, the director shall issue to the employer a certificate, which shall remain in force for a period fixed by the director, but no longer than one year, and the director may, upon at least sixty (60) days’ notice and a hearing to the employer, revoke the certificate upon satisfactory evidence for the revocation having been presented. Every employer who has been certified pursuant to the requirements of § 28-36-1 and this section, must apply for renewal of its certificate annually, within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of its current certificate. To qualify for renewal of its certificate, the employer must demonstrate continued compliance with § 28-36-1(a)(2) or (a)(3) and any other reasonable requirements the director may impose at the time of renewal. Upon proof of compliance the director shall issue to the employer a new certificate.
  2. Failure to comply with the requirements pertaining to the renewal process or failure to provide any required data on a renewal application prior to renewal date shall automatically act as non-renewal. Renewal is not automatic, but must be applied for and processed by the department of labor and training as stipulated in rules and regulations in force. Only when revocation of a certificate is to be made prior to the expiration date, shall a hearing be granted on a revocation process.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 1941, ch. 1063, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-2 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 6; P.L. 1992, ch. 69, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 271, § 1.

28-36-3. Appeal of unreasonable demands.

Any party aggrieved by any unreasonable requirement or demand made by the director, pursuant to this chapter may appeal to the workers’ compensation court, and § 28-36-10 shall not apply while the appeal is pending.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 1; P.L. 1941, ch. 1063, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-3 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 10.

28-36-4. Notice of jurisdiction and effect of orders and decrees.

Every policy subsequently written insuring the payment of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall contain provisions to the effect that as between the employee and the insurer notice to and knowledge of the occurrence of injury on the part of the employer shall be deemed notice and knowledge on the part of the insurer that:

  1. Jurisdiction of the employer for the purposes of those chapters shall be jurisdiction of the insurer; and
  2. The insurer shall in all things be bound by and subject to the determinations, findings, judgments, orders, and decrees rendered against the employer for the payment of compensation under those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-4 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 10.

Cross References.

Exemption of policies from accident and sickness insurance law, § 27-18-19 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liability of Insurer Not Party to Proceedings.

Court could not adjudicate liability of an insurer not made a party to the proceedings. Milner v. 250 Greenwood Ave. Corp., 78 R.I. 5 , 78 A.2d 358, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1951).

Collateral References.

Insurance carrier as bound by findings upon claim for compensation. 28 A.L.R. 882.

Insurance under compensation act, proper tribunal for determination of questions relating to. 127 A.L.R. 473.

Notice of accident, claim, etc., provision of workers’ compensation insurance policy with respect to. 76 A.L.R. 23; 123 A.L.R. 950; 18 A.L.R.2d 443.

28-36-5. Policy provisions as to liability of employer and insurer.

Every policy shall cover the entire liability of the employer under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, except for appeals from an order of the retirement board filed pursuant to the provisions of § 45-21.2-9 , and shall contain an agreement by the insurer to the effect that the insurer shall be directly and primarily liable to the employee and, in the event of his death, to his or her dependents, to pay to him, her, or them the compensation, if any, for which the employer is liable.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 3; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-5 ; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 6.

Cross References.

Casualty insurance rating, § 27-9-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Jessie M. Reniere, 2017 Survey, Cases: Workers’ Compensation: Ajax Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 755 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

An employee is not an insured under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

The plain language of the statute merely grants to the employee the ability to pursue the insurer for any funds due the employer when the employer is liable to the employee. Thus, it is clear that this section equates the liability of an employer and an insurer but does not equate an employee with the employer as insured. Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1995).

When an employee hired in Rhode Island, who primarily worked in Massachusetts, was injured in Massachusetts but filed a workers’ compensation claim in Rhode Island, the phrase “entire liability of the employer” in this section was meant to ensure that an employer obtained coverage for all of its employees, not that it had to do so with a single policy. The statutory language did not require an insurer whose policy excluded coverage for Massachusetts injuries to pay benefits solely because the claim was filed in Rhode Island. Instead, the employer’s other insurer, whose policy covered Massachusetts employees, was alone responsible to pay benefits. Ajax Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 A.3d 913, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 2017).

Third-Party Liability of Insurer.

The legislature did not specifically grant immunity to a compensation insurer from being amenable to suit as a third-party tortfeasor, but this section and other provisions equating such insurer with the employer negative an intent to hold it, the insurer, liable to suit as a third party. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 631, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (1st Cir. 1967).

Collateral References.

Antedating policy of compensation insurance as affecting liability for loss that had already occurred. 132 A.L.R. 1325.

Injuries for which assured is liable in representative capacity only as within coverage of policy issued to him in another capacity. 78 A.L.R. 1333.

Insurance carrier’s liability for part of employer’s liability attributable to violation of law or other misconduct on his part. 1 A.L.R.2d 407.

Insurance under Workers’ Compensation Act as co-extensive with insured’s liability under the act. 45 A.L.R. 1329; 108 A.L.R. 812.

Liability of insurance carrier where because of relationship between employer and employee recovery would inure to employer. 147 A.L.R. 115.

Partnership of which he is a member, policy of compensation insurance issued to individual as covering employees of. 114 A.L.R. 724.

28-36-6. Employee’s lien on insurer’s liability — Direct payment in event of insolvency.

Every policy shall also provide that the employee or, in the event of his death, his or her dependents, shall have a first lien upon any amount which shall become owing on account of that policy to the employer from the insurer because of any personal injury, as defined in § 28-33-1 , to that employee, and that in case of the legal incapacity or inability of the employer to receive the amount and pay it over to the employee or his or her dependents, the insurer may and shall pay the amount directly to the employee or his or her dependents, thereby discharging to the extent of that payment the obligation of the employer to the employee or his or her dependents. No policy shall contain any provisions relieving the insurer from payment because of the employer’s inability to pay on account of insolvency, bankruptcy, or otherwise, during the period that the policy is in force or the compensation remains owing.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 4; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2282, § 4; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-6 .

Collateral References.

Insolvency of insurer or employer, provisions as to effect of. 8 A.L.R. 1346.

28-36-7. Proceedings by employee against insurer or employer.

Any employee entitled to compensation from his or her employer under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall, irrespective of any insurance contracts, have the right to recover compensation directly from the employer or the insurer in the manner provided in those chapters and, additionally, the right to enforce in his or her own name, in the manner provided in those chapters, either by making the insurer or the employer a party to proceedings to an original petition, at the court or by filing against either a separate petition, to determine the liability of any insurer who may have insured the employer against liability for the compensation, or to determine the liability of the employer for the compensation; provided, that payment in whole or in part of the compensation by either the employer or insurer shall, to the extent of the payment be a bar to recovery against the other of the amount paid. As between the employer and the insurer, payment by either directly to any employee shall be subject to the conditions of the insurance contract between them.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 5; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 5; P.L. 1950, ch. 2603, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-7 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Estoppel to Deny Liability.

Insurer which had furnished certificates of insurance to employer and general contractor for full year and which had failed to notify commissioner of labor that its policy was to run for only ten days was estopped, as against employee, to assert that policy had expired after ten days. Paola v. Kennedy, 59 R.I. 270 , 195 A. 221, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 159 (1937).

Insurer as Third-Party Tortfeasor.

The legislature did not specifically grant immunity to a compensation insurer from being amenable to suit as a third-party tortfeasor, but this section and other provisions equating such insurer with the employer negative an intent to hold it, the insurer, liable to suit as a third party. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 631, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (1st Cir. 1967).

Insurer Not Party to Proceedings.

Examination of witness by leave of court by counsel for insurer did not make it a party to the proceeding so as to empower the court to adjudicate its liability. Milner v. 250 Greenwood Ave. Corp., 78 R.I. 5 , 78 A.2d 358, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1951).

Failure of employee to join insurers as parties respondent prevents insurers from obtaining adjudication in that proceeding of their respective liabilities. Milner v. 250 Greenwood Ave. Corp., 78 R.I. 5 , 78 A.2d 358, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1951).

Collateral References.

Refusal of workers’ compensation insurer to act upon claim against employer, or delay or repudiation of liability in that regard, as justifying payment or compromise by employer without complying with provisions of policy that make judgment against employer or agreement with insurer’s consent a condition of its liability. 128 A.L.R. 565.

Voluntary payment or other relief by insurance carrier as estoppel to deny issuance of policy or that case is within coverage. 91 A.L.R. 1530.

28-36-8. Subrogation of insurer to rights of employer.

When any employer is insured against liability for compensation and the insurer has paid any compensation for which the employer was liable, or has assumed the liability of the employer, the insurer shall be subrogated to all the rights and duties of the employer and may enforce those rights in its own name.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 6; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 6; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Third-Party Liability of Insurer.

The legislature did not specifically grant immunity to a compensation insurer from being amenable to suit as a third-party tortfeasor, but this section and other provisions equating such insurer with the employer negative an intent to hold it, the insurer, liable to suit as a third party. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 631, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (1st Cir. 1967).

Collateral References.

Contribution or indemnity from employer or insurer, right to, of one other than employer or insurer liable under the act. 66 A.L.R. 1433.

Malpractice, right of employer or insurer who has paid award to employee to maintain action against physician for. 28 A.L.R.3d 1066.

Right of workers’ compensation insurer or employer paying to a workers’ compensation fund, on the compensable death of an employee with no dependents, to indemnity or subrogation from proceeds of wrongful death action brought against third-party tortfeasor. 7 A.L.R.5th 969.

28-36-9. Insurance agreements subject to statutory provisions.

Every contract subsequently made for the insurance of the compensation provided for in chapters 29 — 38 of this title or against liability for it shall be deemed to be made subject to the provisions of those chapters, and all provisions of policies inconsistent with those chapters shall be void.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 7; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 7; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-9 .

28-36-10. Liability of non-complying employers.

Any employer subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title who fails to comply with this chapter, and any employer who has elected to become subject to chapters 29 — 38 of this title in accordance with §§ 28-29-6 and 28-29-8 , who fails to comply with this chapter within ten (10) days after that election, shall be liable for compensation to any injured employee or his or her dependents according to chapters 29 — 38 of this title, or for damages in the same manner as if the employer had not elected to become subject to, or was not subject to, those chapters, at the option of the employee or his dependents; provided, that the option shall be exercised and notice of it in writing given to the employer within ninety (90) days after the injury to the employee. The employer shall otherwise be liable only for the compensation payable under those chapters by employers subject to or who have elected to become subject to those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 8; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 8; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-10 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 5; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Church was not liable, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-36-10 , for injuries to its employee since the church had obtained worker’s compensation benefits through the Diocesan Service Corporation. Deus v. S.S. Peter & Paul Church, 820 A.2d 974, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 101 (R.I. 2003).

28-36-11. Direct liability of insurers other than under workers’ compensation law.

  1. Every policy subsequently written insuring against liability for personal injuries to employees, other than payment of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, shall contain provisions to the effect that the insurer shall be directly liable to the injured party and, in the event of his or her death, to the party entitled to sue, to pay him or her the amount of damages for which the insured is liable. The injured party or, in the event of his or her death, the party entitled to sue, in his or her suit against the insured, may join the insurer as a defendant or, in case of suit versus the insurer, may join the insured or the employer, in which case judgment shall bind either or both the insured and the insurer; or the injured party, or in the event of his or her death, the party entitled to sue, after having obtained judgment against the insured or the insurer alone, may proceed on the judgment in a separate action against the insured or insurer. Payment in whole or in part of that liability by either the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent of the payment, be a bar to recovery against the other of the amount so paid. In no case shall the insurer be liable for damages beyond the amount of the face of the policy. This section shall not apply to policies of insurance against loss from explosion of boilers or flywheels or other similar single catastrophic hazards.
  2. All policies made for the insurance against liability described in this section shall be deemed to be made subject to the provisions of this section and all provisions of those policies inconsistent with this section shall be void.
  3. Notwithstanding any provision of law or any regulation to the contrary, no workers’ compensation insurer which primarily writes insurance to agricultural employers shall be assessed charges or premiums for an assigned risk pool. For purposes of this section, “agricultural employer” includes any employer which receives eighty percent (80%) or more of its gross income from farming.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 9; P.L. 1915, ch. 1268, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 9; P.L. 1950, ch. 2603, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-11 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 348, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14, § 1, or R.I. Const., art. I, § 10 . Morrell v. Lalonde, 44 R.I. 20 , 114 A. 178, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1921).

Limit of Insurer’s Liability.

Where insurer is joined as defendant, trial court should instruct jury to return special finding on insurer’s liability if its general verdict exceeds the face amount of the policy. Bell v. Weiner, 46 R.I. 478 , 129 A. 339, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1925).

Collateral References.

Scope of provision in liability policy issued to municipal corporation or similar governmental body limiting coverage to injuries arising out of construction, maintenance, or repair work. 30 A.L.R.5th 699.

28-36-12. Notice of issuance, cancellation, or failure to renew policies.

  1. Every insurance company having written a policy insuring against liability for personal injuries to employees shall notify the director of the issuance of the policy within five (5) days of the effective date of this policy in a manner determined by the director. Upon the cancellation of the policy or failure to renew it, every insurance company having written the policy shall immediately notify the director of the cancellation or failure to renew. The director shall have discretion to assess an administrative penalty of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) per offense against any insurance company that fails to notify the director as required in this section. The director, in his or her discretion, may bring a civil action to collect all assessed civil penalties. The workers’ compensation court shall have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with any order of the director made pursuant to this section. Additionally, any insurance company that willfully fails to notify the director as required in this section shall be subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each offense. All criminal actions for any violation of this section shall be prosecuted by the attorney general at the request of the director.
  2. Cancellation of the policy or non-renewal shall not be deemed effective until written notice of the cancellation or non-renewal is received by the director.
  3. All penalties and fines collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the general fund.
  4. Except for workers’ compensation insurance coverage verification, all information required to be provided to the director under chapter 36 of title 28 shall be considered confidential under § 38-2-2(4)(B) .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 10; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 10; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-12 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 9; P.L. 1992, ch. 74, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 7; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 7; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 6; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 7; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 7; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 161, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 161, § 1) passed by the 2010 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict, the section is set out as amended by all four acts

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 3, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2010, ch. 149, § 1, and P.L. 2010, ch. 161, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Estoppel.

Insurer which issued a certificate not specifying period of coverage but which later gave notice that policy had covered only a ten-day period was estopped to deny liability on an accident occurring after the ten-day period but before filing of notice as to period of coverage. Paola v. Kennedy, 59 R.I. 270 , 195 A. 221, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 159 (1937).

Time for Notice.

Insurer which gave notice of nonrenewal at a time later than that required by the statute was not liable for injuries incurred after notice was actually filed. Anderson v. Polleys, 54 R.I. 296 , 173 A. 114, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1934).

Collateral References.

Cancelation or attempt at cancelation of insurance under Workers’ Compensation Act. 107 A.L.R. 1514.

Jurisdiction of question as to reformation or cancelation of policy. 127 A.L.R. 476.

28-36-13. Information furnished by insurers or self-insurers on request of director.

  1. Any employer, insurance company, self-insurer or group self-insurer insuring employers against liability for personal injuries to employees shall fill out all blanks and answer all questions submitted to it by the director, relating to classifications, premium rates, amount of compensation paid, and any other information that the director may deem important either for the proper administration of chapters 29 — 38 of this title or for statistical purposes. The director shall have the authority and the jurisdiction that may be necessary to carry out duties pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, including with cause the power to subpoena. The director shall have discretion to assess an administrative penalty of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) per offense against any employer, insurance company, self-insurer or group self-insurer that fails to provide information requested by the director under this section. Any employer, insurance company, self-insurer or group self-insurer that willfully fails to notify the director as required in this section shall be subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each offense. All criminal actions for any violation of this section shall be prosecuted by the attorney general at the request of the director.
  2. Any employer, insurance company, self-insurer or group self-insurer that willfully fails to apply the proper classification based on a ruling of the classification appeals board or to timely adjust incurred losses shall be subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each offense. All criminal actions for any violation of this section shall be prosecuted by the attorney general at the request of the director. Additionally, the director shall have discretion to assess an administrative penalty of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) per offense against any employer, insurance company, self-insurer or group self-insurer that violates this section.
  3. The director in his or her discretion, may bring a civil action to collect all penalties assessed pursuant to this section. The workers’ compensation court shall have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with any order of the director made pursuant to this section.
  4. All fines or penalties collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the general fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 11; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 11; P.L. 1941, ch. 1063, § 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-13 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 9; P.L. 1992, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 5; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 7; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 7; P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 6; P.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 7; P.L. 2001, ch. 355, § 7.

28-36-14. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 5, § 12; P.L. 1921, ch. 2095, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 12; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-14 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 9; P.L. 1988, ch. 229, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 71, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 491, § 8, effective July 20, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-36-14 concerned enforcement of compliance.

28-36-15. Penalty for failure to secure compensation — Personal liability of corporate officers.

  1. Any employer required to secure the payment of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title who knowingly fails to secure that compensation shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to imprisonment for up to two (2) years. In addition to the foregoing, the employer shall be subject to a civil penalty punished by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each day of noncompliance with the requirements of this title. The director shall institute any and all reasonable measures to comprehensively monitor, investigate, and otherwise discover all employer noncompliance with this section and shall establish rules and regulations governing these measures. Each day shall constitute a separate and distinct offense for calculation of the penalty. Where that employer is a corporation, the president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and other officers of the corporation shall be severally liable for the fine, penalty or imprisonment as provided in this section for the failure of that corporation to secure the payment of compensation. The president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and other officers of the corporation shall also be severally personally liable, jointly with the corporation for any compensation or other benefit that may accrue under those chapters in respect to any injury that may occur to any employee of that corporation while it fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by those chapters.
  2. Where the employer is a limited-liability company, the managers and managing members who knowingly fail to secure the payment of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to imprisonment for up to two (2) years. The managers and managing members shall also be severally liable for the fine, penalty, or imprisonment as provided in this section for the failure of that company to secure the payment of compensation. The managers and managing members shall be severally personally liable, jointly with the company, for any compensation or other benefit that may accrue under those chapters in respect to any injury that may occur to any employee of that company while it fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by those chapters.
  3. Where the employer is a partnership, or a registered limited-liability partnership, the partners who knowingly fail to secure the payment of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to imprisonment for up to two (2) years. The partners shall also be severally liable for the fine, penalty, or imprisonment as provided in this section for the failure of that partnership to secure the payment of compensation. The partners shall be severally personally liable, jointly with the partnership, for any compensation or other benefit that may accrue under those chapters in respect to any injury that may occur to any employee of that partnership while it fails to secure the payment as required by those chapters.
  4. Where the employer is a limited partnership or a registered limited-liability limited partnership, the general partners who knowingly fail to secure the payment of compensation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to imprisonment for up to two (2) years. The general partners shall also be severally liable for the fine, penalty, or imprisonment as provided in this section for the failure of that limited partnership to secure the payment of compensation. The general partners shall be severally personally liable, jointly with the limited partnership, for any compensation or other benefit that may accrue under those chapters in respect to any injury that may occur to any employee of that partnership while it fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by those chapters.
  5. All criminal actions for any violation of this section shall be prosecuted by the attorney general. The attorney general shall prosecute actions to enforce the payment of penalties and fines at the request of the director. The workers’ compensation court shall have jurisdiction over all civil actions filed pursuant to this section.

    The court shall consider the following factors in assessing a civil penalty: gravity of offense; resources of the employer; effect of the penalty on employees of the company; the reason for the lapse in coverage; and the recommendation of the director. Following a review of the factors set forth above, the court may suspend all or a part of a civil penalty or shall establish a time table for compliance with any court order.

    1. As soon as practicable after the director receives notice of noncompliance under this section, the director shall determine whether cause exists for the imposition of a civil penalty. Unless the director determines that the noncompliance was unintentional or the result of a clerical error and subject to the administrative proceedings under subsection (g) of this section, the director shall commence an action in the workers’ compensation court to assess a civil penalty against the employer as set forth in subsection (a) of this section and shall refer the matter to the attorney general for prosecution of criminal charges.
    2. The director shall bring a civil action in the workers’ compensation court to collect all payments and penalties ordered and not paid. All civil actions for any violations of this chapter or of any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the director, or for the collection of payments in accordance with § 28-37-13 , 28-33-17.3(a)(2) , or 28-33-17.3(a)(3) , or civil penalties under this chapter, shall be prosecuted by any qualified member of the Rhode Island bar whom the director may designate, in the name of the director, and the director is exempt from giving surety for costs in any proceedings.
  6. In the case of unintentional noncompliance or noncompliance resulting from clerical error where the uninsured period is less than one year from the date of discovery and there were no employees injured during the uninsured period and the employer has not been subject to any other findings of noncompliance with these chapters, the director shall assess an administrative penalty of not less than the estimated annual workers’ compensation insurance premium for that employer and not more than triple that amount. Any party has the right to appeal the orders of the director. The appeal shall be to the workers’ compensation court in the first instance and thereafter from the workers’ compensation court to the Rhode Island supreme court in accordance with § 28-35-30 .
  7. The director shall collect all payments under this chapter under the rules and regulations that may be set forth by the director. All fines collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited to a restricted receipt account to be administered by the director of the department of labor and training in his or her sole discretion to carry out chapters 29 — 38 of this title.
    1. In that the operation of a commercial enterprise without the required workers’ compensation insurance is a crime and creates a clear and present danger of irreparable harm to employees who are injured while the employer is uninsured, the director shall suspend the operation of the business immediately and until workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurance is secured consistent with these chapters. The director shall lift the suspension upon receipt of satisfactory proof of insurance and evidence sufficient to satisfy the director that the employer is in full compliance with these chapters. Any party has the right to appeal the suspension to the workers’ compensation court where the matter shall proceed pursuant to the workers’ compensation court rules of procedure.
    2. In the event that the employer shall fail to comply with the director’s order of suspension, the director may apply immediately to the workers’ compensation court for an order directing the employer to comply with the director’s prior orders.
    3. Actions filed with the workers’ compensation court pursuant to this section shall be subject to a pretrial conference in accordance with § 28-35-20 and shall be assigned consistent with the workers’ compensation court rules of practice.
    4. Interest shall accrue on unpaid penalties during the pendency of any appeal at the rate per annum provided in § 9-21-10 .
  8. These provisions shall take effect upon passage except § 28-29-2(6)(iv) which shall take effect on January 1, 2006.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 92, art. 5, § 13; P.L. 1936, ch. 2290, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 13; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-15 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 561, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 80, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 5; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 6; P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 4; P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 4; P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 5; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 5; P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 4; P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 4; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 3; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 8; P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 8; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 3; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 5, and P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 5, enacted identical amendments to this section.

In 2003, the compiler substituted “28-33-17.3(a)(2) or 28-33-17.3(a)(3) ” for “28-33-17.3(2) or 28-33-17.3(3)” in subdivision (b)(2), and made stylistic changes throughout the section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

P.L. 2004, ch. 273, § 4, and P.L. 2004, ch. 293, § 4, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 3, and P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

In 2005, the compiler redesignated the subsections.

P.L. 2014, ch. 78, § 8, and P.L. 2014, ch. 87, § 8 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 3, and P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

Law Reviews.

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Bankruptcy Law/Workers’ Compensation Law: Department of Labor and Training v. Michael A. Derderian , 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 472 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bankruptcy Applications.

Although an employer’s failure to carry workers’ compensation insurance may constitute negligence, this does not, per se, meet the “willful and malicious” standard required by the Bankruptcy Code. Tiberi v. Annan (In re Annan), 161 B.R. 872, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1965 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993).

28-36-16. Fraudulent conveyances by uninsured employer.

  1. Any uninsured employer, who knowingly transfers, sells, encumbers, assigns, or in any manner disposes of, conceals, secretes, or destroys any property belonging to that employer, after one of his employees has been injured, within the purview of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and with intent to avoid the payment of compensation under those chapters to that employee or his or her dependents, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each day of willful noncompliance with the requirements of this title. Each day shall constitute a separate and distinct offense for calculation of the fine. Provided, that in no case shall the fine exceed an amount determined to be three (3) times the premium required as determined by the payroll audit required, for the time period in which the employer was required to secure the payment of compensation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both fine and imprisonment, and in any case where that employer is a corporation, the president, secretary, and treasurer shall be also severally liable to the penalty of imprisonment as well as jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the fine. The director has discretion to assess an administrative penalty and/or to bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction, or to refer the matter to the attorney general for prosecution of criminal charges.
  2. As soon as practicable after a complaint under this section is filed, the director shall examine the complaint to determine whether cause exists for further inquiry. Should the director find cause, the director shall then give the parties to the complaint not less than ten (10) days’ notice by mail of the time and place of the hearing. After the hearing, parties to the complaint shall be given notice by mail by the director of his or her determination of the controversy, including the amount of the payment the director recommends as a bond or penalty. Any party shall have the right to appeal from any determination or order made under this chapter. Any appeal authorized under this chapter shall be made to the workers’ compensation court in the first instance, and from the workers’ compensation court to the supreme court in accordance with § 28-35-30 . The director, in his or her discretion, may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction. All civil actions for any violations of this chapter or of any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the director, or for the collection of payments in accordance with § 28-37-13 or penalties hereunder, shall be prosecuted by any qualified member of the Rhode Island bar whom the director may designate, in the name of the director, and the director shall be exempt from giving surety for costs in any proceedings.
  3. The director shall collect all payments under this chapter under any rules and regulations that may be set forth by the director. All fines collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited to a restricted receipt account to be administered by the director of the department of labor and training in his or her sole discretion to carry out the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 13; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-16 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 5; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 6.

28-36-17. Liability of employer unimpaired.

Sections 28-36-15 and 28-36-16 shall not affect any other liability of the employer under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 5, § 13; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-36-17 .

28-36-18. Safety inspections.

  1. Subject to the limitations set forth in subsection (b) of this section any insurance company which provides workers’ compensation insurance to an employer who pays annual premiums in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for that insurance shall, within sixty (60) days of a written request by the insured employer, inspect the employer’s site or sites of employment. The insurance company shall make recommendations in writing to the employer for enhancing the safety and health of the employees on the site or sites.
  2. No employer shall be entitled to request more than two (2) safety inspections in any one calendar year; and no employer whose annual workers’ compensation insurance premiums are less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or whose experience modification is less than one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) shall be entitled to request more than one safety inspection in any one calendar year.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 427, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 178, § 1.

Chapter 37 Workers’ Compensation Administrative Fund

28-37-1. Establishment — Sources — Administration.

  1. There is established in the department of labor and training a special account to be known as the workers’ compensation administrative account, an account within the general fund. This account, referred to as the “workers’ compensation administrative account,” shall consist of payments made to it as provided in this chapter, or penalties paid pursuant to this chapter, and of all other moneys paid into and received by the fund, of property and securities acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging to the fund, and of interest earned upon the moneys belonging to the fund. All moneys in the fund shall be mingled and undivided. The fund shall be administered by the director of labor and training or his or her designee.
  2. The purposes for which this fund shall be used are as follows:
    1. To provide funds to the Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center for suitable structures, personnel, and equipment necessary for the rendering of rehabilitative services, including, but not limited to, physical therapy, psychotherapy, and occupational therapy to injured workers coming within the purview of chapters 29 — 38 of this title;
    2. To provide funds for all expenditures of the education unit created pursuant to § 42-16-4 and all expenditures of the workers’ compensation fraud prevention unit created pursuant to § 42-16.1-12 ;
    3. To provide funds for all expenditures of the workers’ compensation court. The administrator of the fund shall on July 1st of each fiscal year transfer those funds that are reasonable and necessary to fund all expenditures of the workers’ compensation court for the fiscal year from the administrative account, to a restricted receipt account to be established in the judicial department. The administrator of the workers’ compensation court is authorized to draw funds from the restricted receipt account for all court expenditures;
    4. To provide funds to the department of labor and training for all expenditures incurred in administering its responsibilities under chapters 29 — 38 of this title;
    5. To provide funds to the department of labor and training for all expenditures incurred in investigating and processing or otherwise administering its responsibilities regarding claims for benefits or payments under §§ 28-35-20 , 28-37-4 , and 28-37-8 ;
    6. To provide funds to the department of labor and training for the maintenance and operation of a system of data collection as provided for in § 28-37-31 . The director shall be authorized to purchase and/or lease equipment necessary to effectuate the purposes of § 28-37-31 ;
    7. To provide funds for loans to the state compensation insurance fund as provided in §§ 27-7.2-19 and 27-7.2-20.1; and
    8. To provide funds for the payment or reimbursement of actual incremental costs of COLA increases mandated by § 28-33-17 respecting injuries occurring prior to September 1, 1990, in such amounts as the director, in his or her sole discretion, deems appropriate. These amounts may be paid out of the fund by order of the director and shall be made by order drawn on the general treasury to be charged against the fund.
    9. To provide funds to the workers’ compensation advisory council created pursuant to the provisions of § 28-29-30 for expenditures to carry out its responsibilities.
    10. To provide funds to the department of business regulation relating to the evaluation of rate filings, reviews, and pricing procedures pursuant to the provisions of § 27-9-52 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 1; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-1 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 11; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 76, § 8; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 20; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 55, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 7; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 8; P.L. 1997, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 31, art. 8, § 4; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 8; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 8; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 35.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2017, the compiler substituted “Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center” for “Dr. John E. Donley rehabilitation center” in subsection (b)(1), pursuant to § 28-38-24 .

Law Reviews.

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Bankruptcy Law/Workers’ Compensation Law: Department of Labor and Training v. Michael A. Derderian , 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 472 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The Second Injury Indemnity Fund is in the nature of a trust fund having as its trustees the director, the General Treasurer, and the Attorney General. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

Counsel Fees.

The legislature has made no provision for award of counsel fees to an employee who successfully prosecutes a petition for benefits from the second injury indemnity fund. Reardon v. Hall, 104 R.I. 591 , 247 A.2d 900, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 689 (1968).

Physical Examinations.

Since this section gives the director the primary responsibility for administering this trust, the director-trustee has the implicit power to require a physical examination before he makes a definite finding about a claimant’s eligibility. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

The director’s failure to make a timely request for the examination cannot preclude the commission from making an independent determination on this issue. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

When Second Injury Indemnity Funds are involved, the expense of an impartial physical examination ordered by the Director of Labor should be charged against the fund. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

28-37-2. Custodian — Orders for payments.

The general treasurer shall be the custodian of the fund; and the state controller is authorized and empowered to draw orders upon the general treasurer upon the receipt of duly authenticated vouchers. The general treasurer shall give bond with corporate security conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in an amount specified by the director of administration. All premiums upon bonds required pursuant to this chapter shall be paid from the worker’s compensation administrative fund.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 2; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-2 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

General Treasurer as Party.

While the general treasurer may be considered a proper party in a petition for benefits he is not a necessary party. Koshgarian v. Hawksley, 90 R.I. 293 , 157 A.2d 663, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1960).

28-37-3. Investment of surplus funds.

The general treasurer as custodian of this fund is authorized to invest any moneys not immediately necessary for the execution of the purposes of this fund in the class of securities legal for the investment of public moneys of this state; provided, that the investment shall at all times be so made that all the assets of the fund shall always be readily convertible into cash when needed for disbursements as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 3; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-3 .

Cross References.

State investment commission, § 35-10-1 et seq.

28-37-4. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 14; P.L. 1985, ch. 49, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 16; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 4), concerning second injury payments, was repealed by P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 5, effective July 3, 1998, and by P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 5, effective July 21, 1998.

P.L. 1998, ch. 105, § 7, and P.L. 1998, ch. 404, § 7, provide that the repeal of this section shall apply to all claims for reimbursement against the fund in which the director of the department of labor and training has not accepted liability nor has been adjudged liable for reimbursement; provided, that the repeal shall not abrogate or impair any substantive rights or preexisting agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees between the director and any employer, employee or insurer under which the director has accepted liability or has been adjudged liable under the terms of the repealed section.

A former § 28-37-4 (G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 4; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2282, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-4 ), concerning the method of making second injury fund payments, was repealed, effective September 1, 1982, by P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 13.

28-37-5. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 24; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-5 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 15; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 93; Repealed by P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 94, effective July 6, 2001.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-37-5 concerned payments to be made pursuant to § 28-37-4 .

28-37-6. Filing of claim — Hearing on questioned claim.

Any party claiming to be entitled to the benefits of this chapter or § 28-35-20 shall file a request with the director, for a determination of his or her claim. If the director denies the claim, the party may file a petition at the workers’ compensation court that shall follow the procedure as outlined in chapter 35 of this title. In every case where payments may be ordered to be made from the workers’ compensation administrative fund, the director shall be a necessary party.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 5; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-6 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Commencement of Period.

Where the employer’s insurer through error continued compensation payments to a worker beyond the maximum period for which benefits were payable, the statute of limitations on the employee’s claim for further payment from the second injury fund began to run from the date of the last payment received and not from the date the maximum amount due had been paid. Church v. Doherty, 107 R.I. 432 , 267 A.2d 693, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 791 (1970).

Legislative Intent.

In enacting this section, the General Assembly had two specific goals in mind: (1) to ensure that the director, as the administrator of the Second Injury Indemnity Fund, had proper notice of all claims against the fund and (2) to avoid needless and oftentimes lengthy litigation before the commission when the claimant is obviously entitled to the statutory benefits. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

Notice.

Notice is not required to participate in the second injury indemnity fund as the filing of a petition with the director of labor and training is the initial step. Koshgarian v. Hawksley, 90 R.I. 293 , 157 A.2d 663, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1960).

Physical Examinations.

Since § 28-37-1 gives the director the primary responsibility for administering this trust, the director-trustee has the implicit power to require a physical examination before he makes a definite finding about a claimant’s eligibility. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

The director’s failure to make a timely request for the examination cannot preclude the commission from making an independent determination on this issue. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

When Second Injury Indemnity Funds are involved, the expense of an impartial physical examination ordered by the Director of Labor should be charged against the fund. Fontaine v. Caldarone, 122 R.I. 768 , 412 A.2d 243, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1457 (1980).

Time for Filing Claim.

An employee claiming benefits is required by this section to file a petition therefor with the director of labor and such claim shall be barred unless filed within two years after the occurrence or manifestation of the injury. De Costa v. Devine, 90 R.I. 240 , 157 A.2d 247, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1960); Koshgarian v. Hawksley, 90 R.I. 293 , 157 A.2d 663, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1960). See also Koshgarian v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 94 R.I. 123 , 178 A.2d 446, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1962).

28-37-7. Cessation of payments on death.

When death occurs, all compensation payments from the workers’ compensation administrative fund shall cease; provided, that if it is proved that the death resulted from the last compensable injury the employer shall not be relieved of liability as provided in chapter 33 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 6; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-7 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-8. Continuance of payments to totally incapacitated persons.

In addition to any other payments authorized to be made from the fund established under § 28-37-1 , payments from the fund shall be made for the continuance of compensation and medical expenses at his or her prevailing rate to any employee who subsequent to January 1, 1940 has suffered an injury resulting in his or her receiving compensation payments for total incapacity and that incapacity has continued or will continue beyond the maximum period of payment for total incapacity provided under chapters 29 — 38 of this title. The payments for continuing total incapacity shall be made from the fund until the employee’s total incapacity has ended or the employee’s claim has been settled pursuant to § 28-35-20 or until his or her death. No payment shall be made under this section to an employee whose future payments of compensation have been commuted to a lump sum. The death of the employee from any cause terminates the right to any further compensation under this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 26; P.L. 1951, ch. 2726, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-8 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Continuance of Compensation and Medical Expenses.

The words “for the continuance of compensation and medical expenses at his or her prevailing rate” do not limit payment of medical expenses from the fund to a continuation of payment of medical expenses already being paid and preclude payment for new medical expenses, but the fund is chargeable with expenses initiated after the employee became eligible for compensation from the fund. Cabral v. Hall, 102 R.I. 320 , 230 A.2d 250, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 689 (1967).

Limitations.

The inadvertence of the employer’s insurance carrier in continuing payment of benefits to the totally disabled employee for more than two years after he had received the maximum to which he was entitled did not bar the employee’s claim to benefits from the second injury indemnity fund, but the statute of limitations on such claim began to run, not when he had received the maximum to which he was entitled, but when payments to him ceased. Church v. Doherty, 107 R.I. 432 , 267 A.2d 693, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 791 (1970).

When a worker sought disfigurement and loss of use benefits, the worker could recover from the workers’ compensation administrative fund and he was entitled to the benefits within the limits of the maximum of the appropriate section. Thomas v. R.I. Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 814 A.2d 335, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 19 (R.I. 2003).

Prevailing Rate.

To carry out the legislative purpose, the words “for the continuance of compensation and medical expenses at his or her prevailing rate” should be read “for the continuance of compensation at his or her prevailing rate and medical expenses.” Cabral v. Hall, 102 R.I. 320 , 230 A.2d 250, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 689 (1967).

Res Judicata.

Where an employee was awarded compensation for total disability resulting from multiple sclerosis and, when such disability continued after he had drawn the maximum compensation, petitioned for compensation from the second injury fund, the cause of his disability was res judicata. Ricci v. Hall, 101 R.I. 677 , 226 A.2d 692, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 820 (1967).

Settlement With Tortfeasor.

An employee who settled with the tortfeasor her claim for damages for injuries other than those for which she claimed workers’ compensation benefits was not precluded thereby from receiving continuing compensation and medical expenses from the second injury indemnity fund under this section. Romano v. Hall, 102 R.I. 430 , 231 A.2d 5, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 709 (1967).

Specific Injuries.

In providing for the payment of benefits pursuant to this section from the second injury indemnity fund, the legislature authorized continuance of payments originally made under § 28-33-17 for total incapacity only, and petitioner, who was totally disabled and receiving payments from the fund therefor, was not entitled to additional payments when he subsequently lost 50% use of his left foot as a result of his primary disabilities. Reardon v. Hall, 104 R.I. 591 , 247 A.2d 900, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 689 (1968).

To be entitled to compensation from the Second Injury Fund, a claimant must be totally incapacitated as a direct result of a compensable injury and have exhausted all other benefits due him. Bottiglieri v. Caldarone, 486 A.2d 1085, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 431 (R.I. 1985).

This section does not provide for benefit payments upon a showing of partial incapacity and an inability to find gainful employment. Bottiglieri v. Caldarone, 486 A.2d 1085, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 431 (R.I. 1985).

28-37-9. Payments and reimbursement of payments to totally incapacitated persons.

The payments provided for under § 28-37-8 shall be made by the insurance carriers or certified employers and they shall be reimbursed out of the fund established by § 28-37-1 after furnishing the director a quarterly statement setting forth the names and addresses of the injured workers entitled to payments under § 28-37-8 and the basis upon which those payments were made. Those sums shall be paid out of the workers’ compensation administrative fund by order of the director and shall be made by the director by order drawn on the general treasurer to be charged against the workers’ compensation administrative fund. Whenever an insurance carrier or certified employer, obligated to continue payments under this section, becomes insolvent or is no longer in business, continuance of payments out of the workers’ compensation administrative fund shall be made directly by the director.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 27; P.L. 1951, ch. 2726, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-9 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 121, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 11; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

Cross References.

Investment by state investment commission, § 35-10-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

General Treasurer’s Duties.

Fact that insurance carrier failed to make payments in accordance with decree of workers’ compensation commission (now director) did not prevent appeal by state officer having custody of second injury fund since such state officer has not failed to comply with the decree, he not being obligated to pay until director of labor has information as to payments by carrier and orders such officer to reimburse the carrier. Koshgarian v. Hawksley, 89 R.I. 252 , 152 A.2d 214, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1959).

Order Void for Untimely Filing.

When order of commission (now director) for payment from second injury fund was void as not having been filed in time, insurer could not be held in contempt for failure to make payments under order although only general treasurer and not insurer appealed from order. Koshgarian v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 94 R.I. 123 , 178 A.2d 446, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1962).

28-37-10. Dependents’ allowances to totally incapacitated persons.

Whenever an injured employee suffering total incapacity ceases to receive payment under the Rhode Island Temporary Disability Insurance Act, chapters 39 — 41 of title 28, he or she shall receive compensation in addition to compensation for total incapacity, not exceeding five dollars ($5.00) per week for each child wholly or partially dependent upon the wages, earnings, or salary of the employee, including an adopted or stepchild, under the age of eighteen (18) years, or over that age but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, but not exceeding a total of fifteen dollars ($15.00) per week, which additional compensation shall be paid out of the fund established under § 28-37-1 ; provided, that any injured employee suffering total incapacity as the consequence of an injury sustained on or after September 1, 1969, shall not be eligible for this additional compensation.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 30; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-10 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 45, § 2; P.L. 1968, ch. 294, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 151, § 1.

Cross References.

Benefits under temporary disability act, § 28-41-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Eligibility.

Where a petitioner has never received temporary disability payments he is not entitled to dependency benefits under this act. Pacheco v. Lachapelle, 91 R.I. 359 , 163 A.2d 38, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1960).

The occurrence of total incapacity after the payments payable under the temporary disability fund cease is sufficient to establish eligibility for dependency benefits. Suffoletta v. Hall, 103 R.I. 709 , 241 A.2d 228, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 853 (1968).

Limitations.

The two-year limitation prescribed in § 28-35-57 is an indispensable condition of the right to benefits created by this section and not a mere limitation on the remedy. De Costa v. Devine, 90 R.I. 240 , 157 A.2d 247, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1960).

A petition for dependency benefits under this section filed more than two years after the petitioner ceased to receive payments was barred by this section. Moniz v. Hall, 102 R.I. 398 , 230 A.2d 840, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 702 (1967).

28-37-11. Parties to appeals involving fund.

  1. In any appeal taken under chapters 29 — 38 of this title which involves the workers’ compensation administrative fund, the director shall be a necessary party.
  2. In every case where payments are ordered made from the workers’ compensation administrative fund, the director shall receive a notice and he or she shall have the right to claim an appeal from the order if, in his or her opinion the director believes that the decision is not proper or that the fund is in danger of unwarranted depletion.
  3. In every case, where reimbursement from the workers’ compensation administrative fund is ordered pursuant to § 28-35-20(f) , in which the employee’s incapacity has been determined to have been misrepresented pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-17.1 28-33-17.3 or 28-33-18.1 , the director may, in his or her discretion, bring suit or charges against the appropriate party in any court having jurisdiction over the matter.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 7; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-11 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 258, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 11; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Commutation of Compensation.

On a petition for dependency benefits under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act where, while petition was pending, petitioner was granted a commutation of all probable future payments of compensation to a lump sum, the attorney general had the authority, upon decree being made ordering payment of such benefits, to appeal from such decree asking the instant motion to stay the effect of that decree when in attorney general’s (now director’s) opinion such decree was threatening the second injury indemnity fund with unwarranted depletion. De Costa v. Devine, 89 R.I. 162 , 151 A.2d 486, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1959).

Legislative Intent.

In enacting this section the legislature clearly intended to confer upon the attorney general (now director) the peculiar right of appeal in the case of decrees involving payments from the second injury indemnity fund when, in his opinion, the fund was thereby threatened with unwarranted depletion. De Costa v. Devine, 89 R.I. 162 , 151 A.2d 486, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1959).

28-37-12. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 8; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-12 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 6; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 6; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; Repealed by P.L. 2003, ch. 388, § 6, effective July 31, 2003; P.L. 2003, ch. 395, § 6, effective July 31, 2003.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-37-12 concerned commutation of workers’ compensation payments.

28-37-13. Payments into fund by insurers and employers.

  1. For the privilege of writing or renewing workers’ compensation insurance or employer’s liability insurance in this state, every mutual association or stock company so authorized, to be referred to as “insurers,” and for the privilege of being authorized, to make payments of workers’ compensation directly to its employees, and every employer so authorized, to be referred to as “certified employers,” shall annually make the following payments to the workers’ compensation administrative fund:
    1. In the case of an insurer, an amount measured by the percentage of return as certified by the director pursuant to subsection (c) of this section of the gross premiums received for workers’ compensation insurance or employer’s liability insurance written or renewed by it during the preceding calendar year on risks within this state, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100); and
    2. In the case of a certified employer, an amount measured by the percentage of return as certified by the director pursuant to subsection (c) of this section of the premium which the employer would have had to pay to obtain workers’ compensation insurance or employer’s liability insurance for the preceding calendar year, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100), which amount shall be determined by the director.
  2. Every certified employer and every insurer shall also pay into the workers’ compensation administrative fund the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) for every case of injury causing death in which there is no person entitled to compensation.
  3. The director is obligated to determine on or before July 15 of each year, after taking into account projected expenditures for the current fiscal year and for the next fiscal year, what percentage of return, referred to as the “assessment,” is needed to provide sufficient funds, in conjunction with appropriations from the general fund, if any, to fulfill the purposes enumerated in § 28-37-1(b) and shall certify this assessment to the governor and the general assembly. This assessment may be separately determined for insurers and for certified employers. The payments, due within sixty (60) days of notice each year pursuant to §§ 28-37-15 and 28-37-16 , shall be made based upon the certified assessment.
    1. In recognition of the continued utilization of the workers’ compensation system by insurers who have discontinued writing workers’ compensation policies in the state, if any insurer company, deemed by the director of the department of business regulation to have been licensed on January 1, 1991, to write workers’ compensation policies, discontinues the issuance of workers’ compensation policies, such insurer shall be and remain obligated to pay the workers’ compensation administrative fund assessment for a period of six (6) years subsequent to its discontinuation of the issuance of such policies.
    2. In calculating the amount due by these insurance companies on the due date, as defined in subsection (c) of this section, of the year after which it discontinues writing policies in this state (the base year) the director of labor and training will calculate an amount equal to the assessment in effect on the last date the insurer issued workers’ compensation policies multiplied by the gross premiums received for workers’ compensation insurance or employers’ liability insurance written or renewed by it during the base year on risks within this state, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100) each year.
    3. The basis for the calculation of the assessment in each succeeding year shall be a reduction of the base year assessment by increments of sixteen and two-thirds percent (162/3%) per each succeeding year.
  4. All penalties collected for any violation under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be paid into this fund.
  5. Any employer, insurer, self-insurer, or group self-insurer who has not paid assessments or who is not current with payment of assessments into this fund shall not be permitted to place a claim against the fund. Reimbursement to any employer, insurer, self-insurer, or group self-insurer who is not current with payment of assessments into this fund shall be suspended immediately as of the first date of arrearage.
  6. To be eligible to use any of the services funded by the workers’ compensation administrative fund an employer, insurer, self-insurer, or group self-insurer shall pay a fee of one thousand dollars ($1,000) per claim, per month into the fund until the arrearage is paid in full in addition to any other interests or penalties.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 9; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 38-37-13; P.L. 1965, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 269, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 4; P.L. 1984, ch. 245, art. 18, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1988, ch. 80, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 228, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 229, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 485, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 54, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 56, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 7; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 8; P.L. 1999, ch. 31, art. 8, § 5; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 8; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 8; P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 4; P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 342, § 4, and P.L. 2005, ch. 403, § 4, enacted identical amendments to this section.

In 2005, the compiler corrected the spelling of “policies” in subdivision (d)(1).

28-37-14. Computation of gross premiums.

  1. Gross premiums shall include all premiums, premium deposits, and assessments on all policies, certificates, and renewals written during the preceding calendar year, covering workers’ compensation risks within the state or subject to the jurisdiction of this state, and on all policies subsequently cancelled and reinsurance assumed, whether those premiums, premium deposits, and assessments are in the form of money, notes, credits, or other substitutes for money, after deducting from these gross premiums the amount of return premiums on those contracts covering workers’ compensation risks within this state or subject to the jurisdiction of this state and the amount of premiums for reinsurance assumed of those risks. Mutual companies and companies which transact business on the mutual plan shall also be allowed to deduct from premiums, premium deposits, and assessments, the so-called dividends or unused or unabsorbed portion of the premiums, premium deposits, and assessments applied in part payment of premiums, premium deposits, and assessments or returned to policyholders in cash or credited to policyholders during the preceding calendar year.
  2. Except as specifically set forth in § 28-33-4 , in the case of a policy which contains deductible claim payment provisions either on the basis of per claim and/or claims in the aggregate, the gross premium shall be based on the premium the employer would have had to pay to obtain the policy without such deductible provisions and without the application of any deductible premium credit.
  3. Gross premiums shall be reported annually to the department of business regulation and to the director of labor and training pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
  4. Regulation and enforcement of subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be vested in the director of labor and training. The director of labor and training is empowered to bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to give effect to the provisions of subsections (a) — (c) of this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 10; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-14 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 4.

28-37-15. Returns and payments by insurers.

Every insurer shall, within sixty (60) days of notice, file with the director, in any form and containing any information that he or she may prescribe, a return under oath or affirmation signed by a duly authorized officer or agent of the insurer, and shall at the same time make the payment to the director of the amount due in accordance with this chapter.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 11; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-15 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 4.

28-37-16. Returns and payments by certified employers.

Every certified employer shall, on or before May 15 of each year, except for the period ending June 30, 2000 when such return shall be due September 15, file with the director, in any form and containing any information that he or she may prescribe, a return under oath or affirmation signed by a duly authorized officer or agent of the company. The director shall then determine the payment to be made by each employer under this chapter and shall mail a notice of the amount of this payment to each certified employer. The determined amount shall be due and payable within sixty (60) days of notice.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 12; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-16 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1993, ch. 474, § 4; P.L. 1999, ch. 31, art. 8, § 6; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 8; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 8.

28-37-17. Examination of returns — Hearings on amount due.

As soon as practicable after the return is filed, the director shall examine it and determine the correct amount due and in case any error is disclosed by that examination he or she shall notify the insurer. The director shall then give the insurer not less than ten (10) days’ notice by mail of the time and place of the hearing upon the question of the correct amount of the payment. After the hearing, the insurer shall be given notice by mail by the director of his or her determination of the correct amount of the payment.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 13; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-17 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-18. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 28; P.L. 1951, ch. 2726, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-18 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 82, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 269, § 2; Repealed, effective September 1, 1982, by P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 17.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-37-18 concerned suspension of payments from second injury fund.

28-37-19. Right of appeal.

Any insurer or certified employer shall have the right to appeal from any determination or order made under § 28-37-13 , 28-37-16 , 28-37-17 , or §§ 28-37-24 28-37-26 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 14; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-19 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal Not Initiated by Insurer.

Although insurance carrier did not appeal, after petitioner upon his application received an award for benefits under the second injury fund but the general treasurer as custodian of the fund did appeal and on his appeal it was decided that the workers’ compensation commission was without authority to act in this instance insurer was not in contempt for noncompliance with such order and for failure to pay such award since such decree was null and void in that the commission had acted without jurisdiction, this being true regardless of the fact that the insurance carrier had not itself appealed. Koshgarian v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 94 R.I. 123 , 178 A.2d 446, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1962).

28-37-20. Course of appeals.

Any appeal authorized under this chapter shall be made to the workers’ compensation court, and from the workers’ compensation court, to the supreme court in accordance with § 28-35-30 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 15; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-20 .

28-37-21. Determination of amount due without return.

If any certified employer or insurer fails to file a return within the time and as required in this chapter, the director shall determine the amount of payment due from any information that he or she may obtain.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 16; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-21 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-22. Extension of time for filing of return.

The director may grant a reasonable extension of time for filing any return required under this chapter. Whenever an extension of time is granted the insurer shall be required to pay, as part of any payment due, interest on the amount at the rate of one percent (1%) per month from the date payment under this chapter is due. Whenever an extension is granted any certified employer, the time for making any payment required by this chapter shall not be extended thereby.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 17; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-22 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-23. Interest on delinquent payments.

If any payment required of any insurer or certified employer by this chapter is not made when due, the insurer or the certified employer shall be required to pay, as part of that payment, interest on it at the rate of one percent (1%) per month from the due date.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 18; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-23 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-24. Suspension of right to write insurance.

  1. If the director or any appellate tribunal determines after a hearing that any insurer has failed to make any payment required by this chapter or has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, that insurer shall not write or renew workers’ compensation insurance or employer’s liability insurance on risks in this state or subject to the jurisdiction of this state. Any suspended insurer writing or renewing workers’ compensation insurance or employer’s liability insurance shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  2. If the director determines at any time that any insurer has fully complied with all the provisions of this chapter, that insurer may again write or renew workers’ compensation insurance or employer’s liability insurance.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 19; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-24 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-25. Suspension of certification of employer.

If any certified employer violates any of the provisions of this chapter or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the director of labor and training, the director of labor and training may suspend the privilege of that certified employer to make workers’ compensation payments directly to his or her or its employees, in accordance with § 28-36-1 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 20; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-25 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-26. Penalty for false return.

If any insurer or certified employer willfully delivers or causes to be delivered to the director any false or fraudulent return or information upon which the payment due under this chapter is based, the director shall add to the total payment due fifty per cent (50%) of the amount of the payment due.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 21; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-26 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-27. Collection and transmission of payments.

The director shall collect all payments under this chapter under the rules and regulations that may be set forth by the director, and all payments shall immediately be transmitted by the director to the general treasurer.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 22; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-27 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7.

28-37-28. Prosecution of actions.

All actions for any violations of this chapter or of any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the director, or for the collection of payments in accordance with § 28-37-13 or § 28-53-9 or other penalties under this chapter, shall be prosecuted by any qualified member of the Rhode Island bar whom the director may designate, in the name of the director, and the director shall be exempt from giving surety for costs in any proceedings. The workers’ compensation court shall have jurisdiction over all civil actions filed pursuant to this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 23; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-28 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1992, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 5.

Applicability.

P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 6, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect July 1, 2007, and applies to injuries that occur on or after January 1, 2009.

28-37-29. Severability.

If any provisions of this chapter, or their application to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter and application of those provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 2-A, § 25; P.L. 1943, ch. 1363, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-37-29 .

28-37-30. Cost of living increase.

  1. Payments made to injured employees pursuant to § 28-37-8 shall be increased effective May 10 of each year by an amount equal to the total percentage increase in the most recently published annual consumer price index, United States city average for urban wage earners and clerical workers, as formulated and computed by the bureau of labor statistics of the United States department of labor for the period March 1 to February 28 each year. An injured employee must be in receipt of benefit payments pursuant to § 28-37-8 for a period of at least twelve (12) consecutive months to be eligible for the annual increase.
  2. This section shall apply to all existing and future claims for reimbursement pursuant to § 28-37-8 .
  3. The computations in subsection (a) of this section shall be made by the director and promulgated to insurers making payments required by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 241, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 421, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 13.

28-37-31. Data collecting.

    1. Recognizing the need for collection, analysis, and utilization of quantifiable data to provide the basis for recommendations to improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of the workers’ compensation system, the director of the department of labor and training will be responsible to coordinate a comprehensive program of data collection, in accordance with the standards or recommendations of the international association of industrial accident boards and commissions or the national association of insurance commissioners, that can be utilized to analyze and provide guidance for the improvement of the system through legislation or administrative action.
    2. This analysis will be based on the collection of quantifiable data with emphasis on the actuarial assumptions and projections utilized for the basis of enactment of this section to effect economies in the overall system. The data collection will include, but not be limited to, injury statistics by type of industry and job classification as well as ergonomic statistics and analysis that will assist in the development of safety training programs and rehabilitation programs. Reports will be compiled and submitted to all interested parties enumerated in the section on an annual basis to allow for executive or legislative action to correct or improve on the efficiency of the system.
    3. The director of labor and training will coordinate and distribute statistical analysis to all state departments and agencies impacted by the workers’ compensation system, to include the:
      1. Governor;
      2. Workers’ compensation advisory council;
      3. Workers’ compensation court;
      4. Department of business regulation;
      5. State compensation fund; and
      6. Other agencies and branches requesting dissemination of information.
    4. The director will also be responsible to recommend sufficient appropriations from his annual budget to meet the expenses of the collection and analysis of data as described in this section.
  1. The director shall promulgate regulations pursuant to § 28-29-26 requiring the provision of any information regarding workers’ compensation claims that he or she deems necessary and useful, provided that this information shall be furnished in a form that will not identify, directly or indirectly, any individual employers or employees in any manner.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 14; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 10; P.L. 1990, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 3, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 7; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 14; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 8; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 8.

Chapter 38 Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan Rehabilitation Center

28-38-1 — 28-38-18. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

Sections 28-38-1 28-38-1 8 (G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 10, § 1—18; P.L. 1943, ch. 1362, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2271, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-38-1 — 28-38-18; P.L. 1966, ch. 45, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 11; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 12; P.L. 1988, ch. 229, § 4; P.L. 1989, ch. 62, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 65, art. 75, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 1, § 12; P.L. 1990, ch. 332, art. 2, § 2.), concerning the Dr. John E. Donley Rehabilitation Center fund, insurer and employer payments, premium computation, returns and payments by insurers and employers, examination of returns, hearings and appeals, determination of amount due without return, extension of time for return, interest on delinquent payments, suspension of right to write compensation insurance, suspension of certification of employer, penalty for false returns, collection and transmission of payments, prosecution of actions, were repealed by P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 9, effective July 1, 1991.

Section 28-38-1 , was amended by P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 76, § 5, but the amendment of that section by that Act was not given effect due to the repeal of §§ 28-38-1 — 28-38-18 by P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 9.

28-38-19. Establishment.

From the fund created by § 28-37-1 the Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center shall be set up within the department of labor and training.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 10, § 20; P.L. 1943, ch. 1362, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2271, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-38-19 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 11; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 8.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2017, the compiler substituted “Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center” for “Dr. John E. Donley rehabilitation center” in this section, pursuant to § 28-38-24 .

28-38-20. Appointment of administrator and personnel.

The director shall appoint an administrator of the center. The administrator shall appoint all medical and technical personnel and an administrative assistant of the center if this is necessary, with the advice and approval of the director, under the rules of civil service. Clerical and administrative personnel shall be appointed by the director under the rules of civil service.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 10, § 20; P.L. 1943, ch. 1362, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2271, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-38-20 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 12; P.L. 1991, ch. 208, § 8.

28-38-21. Rules and regulations — Utilization of facilities.

  1. The rules and regulations, including manner of admission to the center for treatment, and prices to be charged for treatments, shall be promulgated by the administrator appointed under § 28-38-20 and upon review and approval by the director.
  2. Any state employee, receiving workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to § 28-31-1 et seq., shall be eligible to utilize the treatment facilities at the center. This entitlement shall be effective regardless of the date of injury of the employee.
  3. The treatment rendered at the center shall be considered “medical treatment” within the meaning of §§ 28-33-5 28-33-11 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 10, § 20; P.L. 1943, ch. 1362, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2271, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-38-21 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 381, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 226, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 1, § 16; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 12; P.L. 1989, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 8; P.L. 1992, ch. 75, § 1.

Cross References.

Termination of statutory entities and licensing authorities, § 22-14-5.3 .

28-38-22. Severability.

If any provisions of this chapter, or their application to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter and the application of those provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 300, art. 10, § 21; P.L. 1943, ch. 1362, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3297, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-38-22 .

28-38-23. Name change.

The name of the curative centre in the department shall be the Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 5, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 11; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 36; P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 4; P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2000 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2000 amendment.

P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 4, and P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-38-24. Reference to curative centre.

Wherever in any existing law reference is made to the curative centre, and wherever in an existing law the term “state curative centre” or “curative centre” or “the centre,” “the Donley Center” or “the Dr. John E. Donley Rehabilitation Center,” as variously used, refers to the curative centre in the department, that reference and that term shall be deemed to have reference to the Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 5, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 11; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 36; P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 4; P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 4, and P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-38-25. Effect of change of name.

The change in name pursuant to § 28-38-24 shall in no way affect the powers and duties of the director or the administrator; and those officials shall be responsible for the control, management, and operation of the Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan Rehabilitation Center in the same manner as they have previously been responsible for the control, management, and operation of the center under the name of the curative centre.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 5, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 365, § 11; P.L. 1986, ch. 507, § 12; P.L. 1991, ch. 206, § 8; P.L. 1992, ch. 79, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2017, the compiler substituted “Chief Judge Robert F. Arrigan rehabilitation center” for “Dr. John E. Donley Rehabilitation Center” in this section, pursuant to § 28-38-24 .

28-38-26. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 226, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1982, ch. 414, § 12.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-38-26 concerned termination of the Donley Rehabilitation Center.

Chapter 39 Temporary Disability Insurance — General Provisions

28-39-1. Short title.

Chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall be known and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Temporary Disability Insurance Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-1 .

28-39-2. Definitions.

The following words and phrases, as used in chapters 39 — 41 of this title, have the following meanings unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “Average weekly wage” means the amount determined by dividing the individual’s total wages earned for services performed in employment within his or her base period by the number of that individual’s credit weeks within the base period;
  2. “Base period” with respect to an individual’s benefit year when the benefit year begins on or after October 7, 1990, means the first four (4) of the most recently completed five (5) calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual’s benefit year; provided, that for any individual’s benefit year when the benefit year begins on or after October 4, 1992, and for any individual deemed monetarily ineligible for benefits under the “base period” as defined in this subdivision, the department shall make a re-determination of entitlement based upon an alternate base period which consists of the last four (4) completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the claimant’s benefit year. Notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in this subdivision, the base period shall not include any calendar quarter previously used to establish a valid claim for benefits; provided, however, that the “base period” with respect to members of the United States military service, the Rhode Island National Guard, or a United States military reserve force, and who served in a United States declared combat operation during their military service, who file a claim for benefits following their release from their state or federal active military service and who are deemed to be monetarily ineligible for benefits under this section, shall mean the first four (4) of the most recently completed five (5) calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day the individual was called into that state or federal active military service; provided, that for any individual deemed monetarily ineligible for benefits under the “base period” as defined in this section, the department shall make a re-determination of entitlement based upon an alternative base period which consists of the last four (4) completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day the claimant was called into that state or federal active military service. Notwithstanding any provision of this section of the general or public laws to the contrary, the base period shall not include any calendar quarter previously used to establish a valid claim for benefits;
  3. “Benefit” means the money payable, as provided in chapters 39 — 41 of this title, to an individual as compensation for his or her unemployment caused by sickness;
  4. “Benefit credits” means the total amount of money payable to an individual as benefits, as provided in § 28-41-7 ;
  5. “Benefit rate” means the money payable to an individual as compensation, as provided in chapters 39 — 41 of this title, for his or her wage losses with respect to any week during which his or her unemployment is caused by sickness;
  6. “Benefit year” with respect to any individual who does not already have a benefit year in effect, and who files a valid claim for benefits as of November 16, 1958, or any later date, means fifty-two (52) consecutive calendar weeks, the first of which shall be the week containing the day as of which he or she first files that valid claim in accordance with regulations adopted as subsequently prescribed; provided, that for any benefit year beginning on or after October 7, 1990, the benefit year shall be fifty-three (53) consecutive calendar weeks if the subsequent filing of a new valid claim immediately following the end of a previous benefit year would result in the overlapping of any quarter of the base period of the prior new claim. In no event shall a new benefit year begin prior to the Sunday next following the end of the old benefit year;
    1. For benefit years that begin on or after July 1, 2012, an individual’s benefit year will begin on the Sunday of the calendar week in which an individual first became unemployed due to sickness and for which the individual has filed a valid claim for benefits;
  7. “Board” means the board of review as created under chapter 19 of title 42;
  8. “Calendar quarter” has the same definition as contained in chapter 42 of this title;
  9. “Credit week” means any week within an individual’s base period in which that individual earns wages amounting to at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title, for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title;
  10. “Director” means the director of the department of labor and training;
  11. “Employee” means any person who is or has been employed by an employer subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title and in employment subject to those chapters;
  12. “Employer” means any employing unit that is an employer under chapters 42 — 44 of this title;
  13. “Employing unit” has the same definition as contained in chapter 42 of this title and includes any governmental entity that elects to become subject to the provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title, in accordance with the provisions of §§ 28-39-3.1 and 28-39-3.2 ;
  14. “Employment” has the same definition as contained in chapter 42 of this title;
  15. “Employment office” has the same definition as contained in chapter 42 of this title;
  16. “Fund” means the Rhode Island temporary disability insurance fund established by this chapter;
  17. “Partial unemployment due to sickness.” For weeks beginning on or after January 1, 2006 an individual shall be deemed partially unemployed due to sickness in any week of less than full-time work if he or she fails to earn in wages for services for that week an amount equal to the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment due to sickness to which he or she would be entitled if totally unemployed due to sickness and eligible.
    1. For the purposes of this subdivision and subdivision (22) of this section, “Wages” includes only that part of remuneration for any work, which is in excess of one-fifth (1/5) of the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment, rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00), to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible in any one week, and “services” includes only that part of any work for which remuneration in excess of one-fifth (1/5) of the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment, rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00), to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible in any one week is payable; provided, that nothing contained in this paragraph shall permit any individual to whom remuneration is payable for any work performed in any week in an amount equal to, or greater than, his or her weekly benefit rate to receive benefits under this subdivision for that week.
  18. “Reserve fund” means the temporary disability insurance reserve fund established by § 28-39-7 ;
  19. “Services” means all endeavors undertaken by an individual that are paid for by another or with respect to which the individual performing the services expects to receive wages or profits;
  20. “Sickness.” An individual shall be deemed to be sick in any week in which, because of his or her physical or mental condition, including pregnancy, he or she is unemployed and unable to perform his or her regular or customary work or services;
    1. “Taxes” means the money payments required by chapters 39 — 41 of this title, to be made to the temporary disability insurance fund or to the temporary disability insurance reserve fund.
    2. Wherever and whenever in chapters 39 — 41 of this title, the words “contribution” and/or “contributions” appear, those words shall be construed to mean the “taxes,” as defined in this subdivision, which are the money payments required by those chapters to be made to the temporary disability insurance fund or to the temporary disability insurance reserve fund;
  21. “Wages” has the same definition as contained in chapter 42 of this title; provided, that no individual shall be denied benefits under chapters 39 — 41 of this title because his or her employer continues to pay to that individual his or her regular wages, or parts of them, while he or she is unemployed due to sickness and unable to perform his or her regular or customary work or services. The amount of any payments, whether or not under a plan or system, made to or on behalf of an employee by his or her employer after the expiration of six (6) calendar months following the last calendar month in which the employee performed actual bona fide personal services for his or her employer, shall not be deemed to be wages either for the purpose of paying contributions thereon under chapter 40 of this title, or for the purpose of being used as a basis for paying benefits under chapter 41 of this title; and
  22. “Week” has the same definition as contained in chapter 42 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 2; P.L. 1943, ch. 1367, § 1; P.L. 1944, ch. 1412, § 1; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 2; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2540, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2541, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2842, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3430, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3518, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3673, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-2 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 212, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1962, ch. 58, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1964, ch. 121, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 224, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 91, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 180, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 288, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 289, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 309, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 42, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 288, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 309, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2005, ch. 288, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 289, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 309, § 1.) passed by the 2005 General Assembly. Since the changes made by the acts are not in conflict with each other, this section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2012, ch. 33, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 42, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2005, ch. 309, § 1, provides that this act shall take effect upon passage and the provisions in section 1 regarding subsection 28-39-2 (2) shall be applied retroactively from March 2, 2002.

Cross References.

Definitions under employment security law, § 28-42-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Services Performed in Employment.

Where treasurer of family corporation was paid $60.00 a week such payments were for services currently rendered and when unable to perform his regular services he was entitled to benefits. Fisher v. Board of Review, 91 R.I. 235 , 162 A.2d 551, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1960).

Sickness.

Denial of a claimant’s application for SSI Benefits based on lower back pain and mood disorder was proper because the administrative law judge properly favored an orthopedic consultative evaluation over the other treating, examining, and non-examining opinions of record, especially since one treating doctor’s examination was in the context of a Temporary Disability Insurance claim which assessed the claimant’s ability to return to the claimant’s former work. MacMillan v. Astrue, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104562 (D.R.I. Dec. 29, 2008).

Collateral References.

Construction of incontestable clause applicable to disability insurance. 67 A.L.R.5th 513.

28-39-3. Exemption of governmental entities.

Governmental entities as defined in § 28-42-3(22) shall not be deemed to be employing units subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title and services performed in the employ of those governmental entities shall not be deemed to be employment subject to those chapters; provided, that certain governmental entities may elect to become subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title in accordance with §§ 28-39-3.1 and 28-39-3.2 . Unionized state employees may elect to become subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title through the collective bargaining process.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 20; P.L. 1955, ch. 3555, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-3 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 91, § 2; P.L. 1981, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 149, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(21) was changed to 28-42-3(22) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

28-39-3.1. Employees of certain governmental entities eligible by election.

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title, a governmental entity which is a political subdivision or instrumentality of a political subdivision, or an instrumentality of more than one of them or any instrumentality of them and one or more other political subdivisions, may become subject to those chapters by election. The appropriate political subdivision may for itself or any pertinent instrumentality of it elect that all services performed by individuals or specific classes of individuals in its employ shall be deemed to constitute employment subject to these chapters with exceptions set forth in § 28-39-3.3 ; provided, that if the instrumentality pertains to more than one political subdivision, all those subdivisions shall be required to be parties to the election. Upon the approval of an election as provided in § 28-39-3.2 , the governmental entity shall, for the purposes of these chapters, be deemed to be an employer of the individual or classes of individuals for whom the election is approved. Except as otherwise provided in this title, all other provisions of these chapters shall continue to be applicable in connection with the employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 1977, ch. 91, § 3.

28-39-3.2. Manner of election.

The election shall be made by submitting to the director a duly certified copy of a resolution or act of the legislative body of the political subdivision or subdivisions passed in accordance with their ordinances. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the resolution or act, the director shall specify the date as of which the governmental entity shall become subject to these provisions. Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title to the contrary, any political subdivision or subdivisions in this state may elect in accordance with these provisions that services performed by individuals for its highway department or department of public works, including full-time highway surveyors, whether or not those surveyors are elected, shall be deemed to be in employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 1977, ch. 91, § 4.

28-39-3.3. Exemptions from “employment.”

For the purposes of §§ 28-39-3.1 and 28-39-3.2 “employment” does not include services performed by:

  1. Elected officials;
  2. Individuals on any work-relief project undertaken by governmental entities;
  3. Members of the legislative body, or members of the judiciary of a political subdivision;
  4. Employees serving on a temporary basis in case of fire, storm, snow, earthquake, flood, or similar emergency; or
  5. Positions which, under or pursuant to the laws of this state, are designated as:
    1. Major non-tenured policymaking or advisory positions; or
    2. Policymaking or advisory positions, the performance of the duties of which ordinarily does not require more than eight (8) hours per week.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 95, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 262, § 3; P.L. 1977, ch. 91, § 5.

28-39-4. Creation of fund — Sources.

  1. There is created the temporary disability insurance fund, to be administered by the director, without liability on the part of the state beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the fund. This fund shall consist of:
    1. All payments made subsequent to June 30, 1947, in accordance with § 28-39-29 , and all payments of interest;
    2. All moneys requisitioned from the unemployment trust fund and deposited into this fund;
    3. All moneys that may be allocated to the fund from the temporary disability insurance reserve fund;
    4. All property and securities acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging to the fund; and
    5. Interest earned upon the moneys belonging to the fund.
  2. All moneys in the fund shall be mingled and undivided.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 3; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 3; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-4 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of labor and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Status of Fund.

Invalidated class legislation which had discriminated against women making a dependency claim for children does not enjoy retroactive application immunity under the 11th Amendment, which does not bar the type of relief requested by plaintiffs, to wit, payment of retroactive benefits for dependents, as the fund is independent of the sovereign and does not enjoy its immunities. Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14329 (D.R.I. 1975).

28-39-5. Withdrawals from fund.

The temporary disability insurance fund shall be administered and used solely to pay benefits upon vouchers drawn on the fund by the director pursuant to regulations and no other disbursements shall be made from it except as provided in §§ 28-39-33 , 28-39-34 , and 28-40-6 . Those regulations shall be governed by and be consistent with any applicable constitutional requirements, but the procedure prescribed by those rules shall be deemed to satisfy and shall be in lieu of any and all statutory requirements for specific appropriation or other formal release by state officers of state moneys prior to their expenditure which might otherwise be applicable to withdrawals from the fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 3; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-5 .

28-39-6. Treasurer of fund.

The general treasurer shall be custodian and treasurer of the fund and shall pay all vouchers duly authenticated and drawn upon the fund. He or she shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the fund and not otherwise held or deposited or invested pursuant to chapters 39 — 41 of this title. The general treasurer shall give bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian and treasurer of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in an amount specified by the director and approved by the governor. All premiums upon bonds required pursuant to this section when furnished by an authorized surety company or by a duly constituted governmental bonding fund shall be paid by the state from funds made available for that purpose by the general assembly. The general treasurer shall deposit the moneys in his or her custody subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title. The general treasurer, as treasurer of the fund, shall assign any subordinates or employees to the department of labor and training that he or she deems necessary, and shall be paid out of funds made available to the department for administration purposes.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 3; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2810, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-6 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 427, § 3.

28-39-7. Creation of reserve fund — Sources.

  1. There is created the temporary disability insurance reserve fund, to be administered in the manner subsequently prescribed in this chapter, without liability on the part of the state beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the reserve fund. This reserve fund shall consist of:
    1. All contributions;
    2. All penalties paid subsequent to June 30, 1947, pursuant to §§ 28-39-23 28-39-32 and §§ 28-40-1 28-40-8 ;
    3. All other moneys paid into and received by the reserve fund;
    4. Property and securities acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging to the reserve fund; and
    5. Interest earned upon the moneys belonging to the reserve fund.
  2. All moneys in the reserve fund shall be mingled and undivided.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 3A; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-7 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of labor and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-39-8. Withdrawals from reserve fund.

The reserve fund shall be administered and used in any manner that the general assembly shall from time to time prescribe for purposes designed to benefit individuals prevented by injury or sickness from performing their regular or customary work; provided, that any sums that may be requisitioned from the fund by the director, for the expenses of administering chapters 39 — 41 of this title, may be withdrawn from the reserve fund from time to time for the payment of those expenses in accordance with §§ 28-39-33 and 28-39-34 . In the event that the balance in the temporary disability insurance fund at any time is insufficient to pay benefits under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, the governor, or the governor’s authorized representative, shall cause those sums that may be required for the payment of those benefits to be transferred from the temporary disability insurance reserve fund to the temporary disability insurance fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 3A; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-9 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 399, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 454, § 1.

28-39-9. Custodian of reserve fund.

The general treasurer shall be custodian of the reserve fund, and shall pay all vouchers duly drawn upon the reserve fund and properly authenticated. He or she shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the reserve fund and not otherwise held or deposited or invested pursuant to chapters 39 — 41 of this title. The general treasurer shall give bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in an amount specified by the director and approved by the governor. All premiums upon bonds required pursuant to this section when furnished by an authorized surety company or by a duly constituted governmental bonding fund shall be paid by the state from funds made available for that purpose by the general assembly.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 3A; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-9 .

28-39-10. Responsibility for administration.

Chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall be administered by the department of labor and training. The director and the board of review shall have the same powers and duties with relation to those chapters as they have to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1943, ch. 1369, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2615, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-10 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-39-11. Recommendations to protect fund — Emergency modification of rules.

  1. Whenever the director believes that a change in contribution and/or benefit rates shall become necessary to protect the solvency of the fund, he or she shall at once inform the governor and the general assembly of this and make recommendations accordingly.
  2. In that case the governor may declare an emergency and authorize the director to announce a modified scale of benefits, an increased waiting period, or other changes in rules and regulations regarding eligibility for payment of benefits which the director may deem necessary to assure the solvency of the fund. The modified regulation shall be in effect until the governor declares the emergency at an end, or until further action is taken by the general assembly.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1943, ch. 1369, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2615, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-11 .

28-39-12. Examination of claimants.

The director may require any benefit claimant to submit to a reasonable examination or examinations for the purpose of determining his or her physical or mental condition, the examination or examinations to be conducted by a qualified healthcare provider appointed by the director, and to be made at those times and places that such qualified healthcare provider, with the approval of the director, require.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-12 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 471, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cross Examination.

The report of an examining physician appointed by the director pursuant to this section was admissible in evidence, and, if the claimant desired to cross-examine him, she could subpoena him to the hearing before the board. Massenzio v. Board of Review, 103 R.I. 473 , 238 A.2d 350, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 817 (1968).

28-39-13. Legal representation in actions.

On the request of the director or the board of review, the attorney general shall represent the director or the board of review and the state in any court action relating to chapters 39 — 41 of this title or their administration and enforcement, except as special counsel may be designated by the director with the approval of the governor and except as otherwise provided in those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-13 .

28-39-14. Employers’ records and reports.

Every employer and every employing unit employing any person in employment in this state shall keep true and accurate employment records of all persons employed by him or her, and of the weekly hours worked for him or her by each, and of the weekly wages paid by him or her to each person. Every employer and employing unit shall keep records containing any other information that may be prescribed. Those records shall at all times be available within this state and shall be open to inspection by the director or his or her authorized representatives at any reasonable time and as often as the director deems necessary. The director may require from any employer, or employing unit, employing any person in this state, any reports covering persons employed by him or her, on employment, wages, hours, unemployment, and related matters which the director deems necessary to the effective administration of chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-14 .

28-39-15. Procedural regulations — Record of proceedings and testimony.

The manner in which any disputed claims or any other controversies arising out of the interpretation or application of chapters 39 — 41 of this title are presented, or the manner in which hearings and appeals are conducted, shall be in accordance with the prescribed regulations, whether or not those regulations conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure. A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with a disputed claim. All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed claim shall be recorded but need not be transcribed unless the disputed claim is further appealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Due Process.

The informality of procedure permitted by this section, which places upon a claimant wishing to challenge the contents of a physician’s report to the director of his examination of the claimant the obligation to subpoena the physician as a witness, does not thereby deprive the claimant of due process of law. Massenzio v. Board of Review, 103 R.I. 473 , 238 A.2d 350, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 817 (1968).

28-39-16. Enforcement of subpoenas.

In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any person, pursuant to chapters 39 — 41 of this title, the sixth division of the district court, upon application by the director or the board of review, shall have jurisdiction to issue to that person an order requiring that person to appear before the director or his or her duly authorized representative, or the board of review or its duly authorized representatives, there to produce evidence if so ordered or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question. Any failure to obey that order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of court. A party aggrieved by an order of the court may appeal that order to the supreme court in accordance with the procedures contained in Article I of the Supreme Court Rules.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-16 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 6.

28-39-17. Witness fees.

Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall be allowed fees at a rate fixed by the director. Those fees shall be deemed a part of the expense of administering chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-17 .

28-39-18. Parties to judicial review — Legal representation.

The director or the board of review shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving decisions which have been appealed to the courts and may be represented in any judicial action by any qualified attorney designated by him, her, or it for that purpose, or at his, her, or its request, by the attorney general.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-18 .

28-39-19. Information held confidential.

Every employee of the department of labor and training is expressly prohibited from divulging to any individual not officially connected with the department: (1) any information obtained by the employee in the regular course of duty, or from the records and reports of employing units, or from the permanent records of the department, which would reveal the identity of any individual or employing unit; (2) the number of persons employed by any employing unit; (3) matters relating to employment of any employing unit; (4) the wages earned or paid to any individual; (5) the hours worked by an individual; (6) the type of sickness suffered by any individual; or (7) any other information relative to the temporary disability claim or payment of it; provided, that this prohibition shall not apply to information concerning wages earned or paid requested in a family court proceeding pursuant to §§ 15-5-24 and 15-5-25 or to information concerning wages earned or paid requested in a superior court proceeding pursuant to §§ 12-25-3 and 12-25-7.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1947, ch. 1950, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-19 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 421, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Subpoena.

This section did not prevent the superior court, on request from the individual involved, from subpoenaing records that would be competent evidence on a relevant issue before the court. Powers ex rel. Department of Employment Sec. v. Superior Court, 79 R.I. 63 , 82 A.2d 885, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1951).

28-39-20. Denial of requests for confidential information.

Every request for information relating to the data referred to in § 28-39-19 shall be denied, and the individual making that request shall be informed that all requests for information must be directed to the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1947, ch. 1950, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-20 .

28-39-21. Denial of requests for information from employment reports.

Every request for information directed to the director shall be denied if the request would necessitate that individual to divulge any information that is declared in § 28-42-38 to be held confidential by the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1947, ch. 1950, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-21 .

28-39-22. Agencies entitled to information.

Notwithstanding § 28-39-21 , the director is authorized to divulge the information confidentially held by the department to the agencies enumerated in § 28-42-38 as proper agencies entitled to access to that information relating to the administration of temporary disability insurance.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 9; P.L. 1947, ch. 1950, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-22 .

28-39-23. False representations to obtain benefits.

Whoever knowingly makes a false statement or representation to obtain or increase any benefit or other payment under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, either for himself or herself or for any other person, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than twenty dollars ($20.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00), or by imprisonment not longer than thirty (30) days, or by both that fine and imprisonment; and each false statement or representation shall constitute a separate and distinct offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-23 .

Cross References.

Disqualification from receiving benefits on conviction, § 28-41-14 .

28-39-24. False representations to avoid contributions — Failure to produce evidence — Inducing waiver of rights.

Any individual, or employing unit or its agent, who willfully makes a false statement or representation to avoid becoming or remaining subject thereto, or to avoid or reduce any contribution or other payment required of an employing unit under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or who willfully fails or refuses to appear or to testify or produce records as lawfully required hereunder, or who tries to induce any individual to waive any right under those chapters, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than twenty dollars ($20.00) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200), or by imprisonment not longer than sixty (60) days, or by both that fine and imprisonment. Each false statement or representation, and each day of that failure or refusal, shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. If the employer in question is a corporation, every officer of the corporation who knowingly participates in any violation specified in this section shall be subject to these penalties.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-24 .

28-39-25. Criminal penalty for failure to make contributions or reports.

Any individual, or employing unit or its agent, who knowingly fails or refuses to make any contribution or other payment required of an employing unit under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or who knowingly fails or refuses to make any contribution or report at the time and in the manner required by the rules and regulations, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or by imprisonment not longer than sixty (60) days, or by both that fine and imprisonment, and each day of that failure or refusal shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. If the employer in question is a corporation, every officer of the corporation who knowingly participates in any violation specified in this section shall be subject to these penalties.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-25 .

28-39-26. Pecuniary penalty for failure to make contributions or reports.

An employer who fails to file any report required under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or who fails or refuses to pay any contributions required under those chapters in the manner and at the times required by the laws and regulations or as the director may, in accordance with those laws and regulations, prescribe, shall pay a penalty of ten dollars ($10.00) for each failure or refusal to file, and where any contribution is due, shall pay an additional penalty of ten percent (10%) of the amount due. These penalties shall be paid into the temporary disability insurance reserve fund, and shall be in addition to contributions and interest required to be paid as provided in chapters 39 — 41; provided, that if any employer fails to pay the penalty, when assessed, it shall be collected by civil action as provided in § 28-40-12 .

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1956, ch. 3668, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-26 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 26, § 5; P.L. 1994, ch. 48, § 2.

28-39-27. Penalty for violations generally.

Any violation of any provision of chapters 39 — 41 of this title or of any order, rule, or regulation of the department for which a penalty is neither prescribed above nor provided by any other applicable statute, shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty dollars ($20.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00), or by imprisonment not longer than thirty (30) days, or by both that fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-27 .

28-39-28. Disposition of fines.

All fines specified or provided for in §§ 28-39-23 28-39-32 shall be paid to the temporary disability insurance reserve fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-28 .

28-39-29. Recovery of benefits paid in error.

Any individual who, by reason of a mistake or misrepresentation made by himself or herself or another, has received any sum as benefits under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, in any week in which any condition for the receipt of those benefits imposed by those chapters was not fulfilled by him or her, or with respect to any week in which he or she was disqualified from receiving those benefits, shall in the discretion of the director be liable to have that sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him or her under those chapters, or shall be liable to repay to the director for the temporary disability insurance fund a sum equal to the amount so received and that sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in § 28-40-12 for the collection of past due contributions.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-29 .

28-39-30. Prosecution of actions for penalties.

The director shall be the party complainant to any complaint and warrant brought to invoke the penalties provided for in §§ 28-39-23 28-39-32 and the director shall be exempt from giving surety for costs in any action.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-30 .

28-39-31. Prosecution of criminal actions.

All criminal actions for any violation of chapters 39 — 41 of this title or any rule or regulation of the department shall be prosecuted by the attorney general or by any qualified member of the Rhode Island bar that shall be designated by the director and approved by the attorney general to institute and prosecute that action.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-31 .

28-39-32. Limitation of prosecutions.

No person shall be convicted of any offense for any violation of chapters 39 — 41 of this title or any rule or regulation of the department unless the complaint or warrant for that violation has been issued within five (5) years from the time of the commission of the offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 12; P.L. 1947, ch. 1952, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-32 .

28-39-33. Use of federal funds for administration.

To the extent that funds are made available by the federal government, under title III of the Social Security Act, (42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.), or otherwise for such purpose, the expenses of administering chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall be paid from those funds, provided that this section shall not be considered to permit any expenditure of funds from the employment security administration account contrary to § 28-42-29 . In the event that the Social Security Act is amended to permit funds granted under Title III to be used to pay expenses of administering a sickness compensation law, such as chapters 39 — 41 of this title, then from and after the effective date of that amendment, the expenses of administering those chapters shall be paid out of the employment security administration account or any other account or fund in which funds granted under Title III are deposited.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 15; P.L. 1944, ch. 1481, § 1; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 9; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-33 .

28-39-34. Appropriations for administration.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate a sum sufficient for the payment of expenses of administering chapters 39 — 41 of this title during each fiscal year, which sum shall be payable out of the temporary disability insurance reserve fund; provided, that those sums shall be available to the director for the payment of expenses of administration of those chapters only to the extent that moneys received from the federal government are not available for that purpose as provided in § 28-39-33 .

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 15; P.L. 1944, ch. 1481, § 1; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 9; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-34 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 204, § 1.

28-39-35. Educational program.

The director shall undertake an educational publicity program designed to safeguard the fund created by this chapter. The director shall solicit the co-operation and assistance of labor, industry, and the public generally, in effecting that program. In the exercise of his or her authority under this chapter, the director shall give publicity to the need for accident prevention, and the preservation of health. He or she shall publicize the need for industrial employment to provide the best available safeguards for workers, as well as appropriate sanitary facilities, and he or she shall also publicize the potential results of malingering.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 17; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-35 .

28-39-36. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 204, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 204, § 3, effective June 29, 1990.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-39-36 concerned the commission on state employee participation.

28-39-37. Functions of treasurer and director of administration.

The general treasurer and the state director of administration shall have the same powers and duties with relation to chapters 39 — 41 of this title as they respectively have to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 19; P.L. 1951, ch. 2810, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-37 .

Cross References.

Functions of department of administration with respect to employment security, § 28-42-51 .

28-39-38. Construction of provisions.

Chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose, which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and his family.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 16; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-38 .

28-39-39. Reservation of legislative control.

All the rights, privileges, or immunities conferred by chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or by acts done pursuant to these chapters, shall exist subject to the power of the general assembly to amend or repeal these chapters at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 13; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-39 .

28-39-40. Severability.

If any provision of chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or its application to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapters and the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 14; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-39-40 .

28-39-41. Task force.

  1. There is hereby established a task force on temporary disability insurance fraud and program integrity. The task force shall consist of the following members or their designees:
    1. The director of labor and training or designee;
    2. The secretary of health and human services or designee;
    3. The director of health or designee;
    4. The director of the office of management and budget or designee; and
    5. The attorney general or designee.

      The director of labor and training shall chair the task force.

  2. The task force shall coordinate joint efforts to combat fraud and abuse in the temporary disability insurance program. The task force shall:
    1. Foster appropriate use of the program by both claimants and qualified healthcare providers by educating them about the intent of the program, the benefits provided, acceptable use of benefits, and applicable requirements;
    2. Protect the integrity of the temporary disability insurance fund by performing joint investigations into fraudulent activities; and
    3. Employ best practices, as established by other insurance programs both public and private, to ensure program goals and objectives are aimed at providing efficient and effective services to all customers.
  3. Notwithstanding any other law or regulation to the contrary, the task force shall facilitate timely information sharing between and among task force members, including the establishment of protocols by which participating agencies will advise or refer to other agencies matters of potential interest.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 3, § 2.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 3, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2017.

Chapter 40 Temporary Disability Insurance — Contributions

28-40-1. Amount of employee contributions — Wages on which based.

  1. The taxable wage base under this chapter for each calendar year shall be equal to the greater of thirty-eight thousand dollars ($38,000) or the annual earnings needed by an individual to qualify for the maximum weekly benefit amount and the maximum duration under chapters 39 — 41 of this title. That taxable wage base shall be computed as follows: Every September 30, the maximum weekly benefit amount in effect as of that date shall be multiplied by thirty (30) and the resultant product shall be divided by thirty-six hundredths (.36). If the result thus obtained is not an even multiple of one hundred dollars ($100), it shall be rounded upward to the next higher even multiple of one hundred dollars ($100). That taxable wage base shall be effective for the calendar year beginning on the next January 1.
  2. Each employee shall contribute with respect to employment after the date upon which the employer becomes subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title, an amount equal to the fund cost rate times the wages paid by the employer to the employee up to the taxable wage base as defined and computed in subsection (a) of this section. The employee contribution rate for the following calendar year shall be determined by computing the fund cost rate on or before November 15 of each year as follows:
    1. The total amount of disbursements made from the fund for the twelve (12) month period ending on the immediately preceding September 30 shall be divided by the total taxable wages paid by employers during the twelve (12) month period ending on the immediately preceding June 30. The ratio thus obtained shall be multiplied by one hundred (100) and the resultant product if not an exact multiple of one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) shall be rounded down to the next lowest multiple of one-tenth of one percent (0.1%);
    2. If the fund balance as of the preceding September 30 is less than the total disbursements from the fund for the six (6) month period ending on that September 30, that difference shall be added to the total disbursements for the twelve (12) month period ending September 30 for the purpose of computing the fund cost rate, and if the resulting fund cost rate is not an exact multiple of one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) it shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of one-tenth of one percent (0.1%).

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 3; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2828, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-1 ; P.L. 1964, ch. 138, § 2; P.L. 1972, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 127, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 211, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 351, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 414, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 107, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 58, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 37.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (b).

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Cross References.

Definition of terms, § 28-39-2 .

False representations to avoid contributions, § 28-39-24 .

28-40-2. Exemption of employee dependent on spiritual healing.

An employee who adheres to the faith or teachings of any church, sect, or denomination and in accordance with its creed, tenets, or principles, depends for healing upon prayer or spiritual means in the practice of religion, shall be exempt from chapters 39 — 41 of this title and excluded from these provisions upon the filing with the director and with his or her employer, affidavits, in duplicate, stating that adherence and dependence, and disclaiming any and all benefits under those chapters whether or not arising before the passage of these provisions, and stating the name of the employer of that employee, which affidavits shall contain certifications by the president of the church which that employee attends, or certifications of any practitioner in the state who is authorized to practice healing based upon prayer or spiritual means, stating the adherence and dependence of that employee. Subsequently, that employee and his or her employer shall be exempt from liability for contributions with respect to that employee provided for under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, and the employer shall be entitled to rely upon the affidavit filed with it unless and until it receives notice from the director that these provisions have not been complied with or that the affidavit is not in proper form. In case the employee, after the filing of the affidavits, obtains new employment, he or she must file new affidavits as provided in this section in order to be exempt from chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1943, ch. 1368, § 1; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 3; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2828, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-2 .

28-40-2.1. Exemption of minors fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years of age.

Minors fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years of age shall be exempt from chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 125, § 1.

28-40-2.2. Exemption of certain disabled persons.

Disabled persons employed through a “supported employment” program as described in the federal Rehabilitation Act amendments of 1992 (see 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.) and who are ineligible to receive temporary disability benefits because their pay is too low may elect to be exempt from the provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 155, § 1.

28-40-3. Withholding and disposition of contributions.

Each employer shall withhold in trust contributions from the wages of his or her employees at the time those wages are earned or paid, shall show the deduction on his or her payroll records, and shall furnish to his or her employees any evidence of the deduction as the director may prescribe. Each employer shall transmit all contributions withheld to the temporary disability insurance fund in the manner, at the time, and under the conditions that shall be prescribed by regulations.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 3; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2828, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-3 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 107, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Cross References.

Failure to make contributions or reports, § 28-39-25 .

28-40-3.1. Contributions held in trust for state.

  1. All contributions withheld by any employer from employees in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and all contributions withheld by any employer from employees under color of those provisions, shall constitute a trust fund for the state until paid to the director.
  2. That trust shall be enforceable against:
    1. The employer;
    2. Any officer, agent, servant, or employee of any corporate employer responsible for either the withholding or payment, or both, of the contribution; and
    3. Any person receiving any part of the fund without consideration, or knowing that the employer or any officer, agent, servant, or employee or any corporate employer is committing a breach of trust.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 497, § 1.

28-40-3.2. Notice to segregate trust funds.

If the director believes that the payment to the state of the trust fund established under § 28-40-3.1 will be jeopardized by delay, neglect, or misappropriation, he or she shall then notify the employer that the trust fund shall be segregated, and be kept separate and apart from all other funds and assets of the employer and shall not be commingled with any other funds or assets. That notice shall be given by either hand delivery or by registered mail, return receipt requested. Within four (4) days after the sending of that notice, all taxes which subsequently either become collectible or are collected shall be deposited weekly in any financial institution in the state and those contributions shall be designated as a special fund in trust for the state and payable to the state by the employer as trustee of that fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 497, § 1.

28-40-3.3. Penalty for misappropriation.

Any employer and any officer, agent, servant, or employee of any corporate employer responsible for either the withholding or payment of contributions, who appropriates or converts the contributions withheld to his or her own use or to any use other than the payment of the contributions, to the extent that the money required to be withheld is not available for payment on the due date as prescribed in this chapter, shall upon conviction for each offense be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned for not exceeding one year, or shall be both fined and imprisoned, the fine and imprisonment to be in addition to any other penalty provided by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 497, § 1.

28-40-3.4. Set-off for delinquent contributions.

If the director determines that any individual, or employing unit or its agent, has failed or refused to transmit contributions withheld from the wages of employees in accordance with chapters 39 — 41 of this title, the director shall notify the state controller of this delinquency. The state controller, upon certification of the amount of the delinquency by the director, shall set-off the amount of the delinquency against any payment due that person or entity and the director shall credit that amount against the contributions due. The director may not seek set-off until such time as a delinquency determination for the contributions has been directed to the person or entity. If a person or entity assessed a delinquency determination for contributions has requested a hearing on the assessment within the applicable statutory period, no request for set-off may be made while the matter is pending in the hearing or from any appeal from the hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 301, § 1.

28-40-4. Employer’s liability for contributions not withheld.

If any employer fails to deduct the contributions of any of his or her employees at the time their wages are paid or fails to make a deduction at the time wages are paid for the next succeeding payroll period, he or she alone shall subsequently be liable for those contributions, and, for the purposes of §§ 28-39-23 28-39-32 and 28-40-9 28-40-16 those contributions shall be treated as employers’ contributions required from him or her.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 3; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2828, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-4 .

28-40-5. Adjustment of erroneous deductions or payments.

If more or less than the correct amount of contributions imposed under §§ 28-40-1 28-40-4 is paid with respect to any wage payments, then, under prescribed regulations, proper adjustments with respect to the contributions shall be made, without interest, in computing contributions next due and payable after the discovery of the error with respect to the next subsequent wage payment by the same employer. If more or less than the correct amount of contributions imposed under §§ 28-40-1 28-40-4 is paid with respect to any wage payment, then, under prescribed regulations, proper adjustments with respect to both the contributions and the amount to be deducted shall be made, without interest, in connection with the next wage payment to the same employee by the same employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-5 .

28-40-6. Overpayments.

  1. If an employer or employee makes application for refund or credit of any amount paid as contributions or interest under this title, and the director determines that the amount or any portion of it was erroneously collected, the director shall, in his or her discretion, either allow a credit for it, or by voucher duly drawn by the director in an amount and in any manner that the director may prescribe, direct the general treasurer to pay the amount determined to be erroneously collected from the temporary disability insurance reserve fund.
  2. If, in the discretion of the director, a credit is to be allowed, that credit shall be applied against the payment or payments of contributions next due from that employer subsequent to the determination of the director.
  3. No refund or credit shall be allowed with respect to a payment as contributions or interest, unless an application for it is made in writing on or before whichever of the following dates is later:
    1. One year from the date on which the payment was made; or
    2. Three (3) years from the last day of the period with respect to which the payment was made.
  4. For a like cause and within the same period, a refund may be made, or a credit allowed, on the motion of the director.
  5. No interest shall be allowed or paid with respect to any refund.
  6. No refund or credit shall be allowed if the amount involved is less than one dollar ($1.00).
  7. Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any refund or credit of money due and payable under the law and regulations in effect at the time the money was paid.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3667, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-6 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 1959, ch. 166, § 1.

28-40-6.1. Refunds to disabled persons.

  1. Disabled persons employed through a “supported employment” program as described in the federal Rehabilitation Act amendments of 1992 (see 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.) and who: (1) were or are ineligible to receive temporary disability benefits because their pay is too low and (2) during one or more periods of such ineligibility they made contributions to the temporary disability insurance fund, shall be entitled to a refund of the contributions, without interest.
  2. A person eligible for a refund pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for contributions made during the period commencing three (3) years prior to June 30, 1995, shall be entitled for one year after that date to apply for a refund of the contribution, and shall have one year from the date of contribution to apply for a refund of contributions made after June 30, 1995.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 206, § 1.

28-40-6.2. Set-off for delinquent income taxes.

  1. If the tax administrator determines a person has neglected or refused to pay personal income taxes as defined in chapter 30 of title 44, the tax administrator shall notify the director of labor and training of the delinquency. The director, upon certification of the amount of tax delinquency by the tax administrator, shall set off the amount of the tax delinquency against any temporary disability insurance tax refund due that person and shall forward that amount to the tax administrator.
  2. The tax administrator may not seek such a set-off unless a delinquency determination for the personal income tax has first been directed to the person. Provided, further, that if a person assessed a delinquency determination for the personal income tax has requested a hearing within the statutory period, no request for set off may be made while the matter is pending in hearing or any appeal from the hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 376, art. 32, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2003, the compiler substituted “from the hearing” for “therefrom” at the end of subsection (b) and made a stylistic change in subsection (a).

28-40-7. Appeals to board of review.

Any employer, employee, or other person aggrieved by any decision of fact or law by the director as to his, her, or its liability to make contributions or to withhold and pay contributions, or as to the amount of contributions due from or to be withheld and paid by him, her, or it under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or by any refusal of the director to grant a refund or credit under § 28-40-6 , may, either on behalf of himself or herself, or on behalf of his or her employees or other persons aggrieved by the decision, or on behalf of both himself or herself and those employees or persons, within fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision has been mailed to his, her, or its last-known address, file an appeal in writing with the board of review, setting forth the grounds for the appeal. If an appeal is duly filed, the board of review shall set a time and place to give the appellant an opportunity to show cause as to why the decision of the director should be changed. Following that hearing, the board of review shall, as promptly as possible, notify the appellant and the director of its decision on the appeal. The decision shall become final unless the appellant or the director files an appeal to the courts in accordance with §§ 28-41-26 28-41-29 .

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2276, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-7 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 1964, ch. 112, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 14.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-40-8. Date from which employees become subject to provisions.

If any employing unit which is or becomes an employer subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title within the calendar year 1942, or within any calendar year after that, the employees of that employing unit shall become subject to all the provisions of those chapters from the date upon which that employing unit became an employer subject to the provisions of those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-8 .

28-40-9. Interest on delinquent payments.

Employers who fail to make payment of contributions, as required by chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or by the prescribed rules and regulations, shall be additionally liable to the temporary disability insurance reserve fund for interest on those delinquent payments at the rate of one and one-half percent (11/2%) per month from the date the payment became due until paid.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 6; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-9 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 26, § 3.

28-40-10. Priority of contributions in insolvency or bankruptcy.

In the event of any distribution of an employer’s assets pursuant to an order of any court under the laws of this state, including any receivership, assignment for benefit of creditors, adjudicated insolvency, composition, or similar proceeding, contribution payments then or subsequently due shall have the same priority as given to wage claims of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) to each claimant, earned within six (6) months of the commencement of the proceeding. In the event of an employer’s adjudication in bankruptcy, judicially confirmed extension proposal, or composition, under the federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., contributions then or subsequently due shall be entitled to the priority provided in 11 U.S.C. § 507.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-10 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 24.

28-40-11. Determination of unreported contributions due.

If an employer for any reporting period fails to make any report used for the purpose of determining the amount of contributions payable under chapters 39 — 41 of this title at the time and in the manner required by the prescribed rules and regulations, or if those reports when filed are incorrect or insufficient, and the employer fails to file a corrected or sufficient report within twenty (20) days after the director has required it by written notice, the director shall determine on the basis of such information as the director may be able to obtain, the amount of contributions due from that employer, and the director shall give written notice to any employer of the amount of contributions so determined. That determination shall finally and irrevocably fix the amount of contributions due unless the employer, within twenty (20) days after the giving of that notice, applies to the board of review for a hearing, or unless the director on his or her own volition reduces the amount.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-11 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-40-12. Civil action to recover contributions.

If any employer fails to make any payment of contributions or interest on them at the time and in the manner required by the prescribed rules and regulations, the amount of contributions so due shall be collected by civil action. All civil actions shall be instituted in the name of the director, and he or she shall be exempt from giving any surety for costs. Civil actions brought under this section, to collect contributions or interest on them, shall be heard by the court having jurisdiction at the earliest possible date, and shall be entitled to preference upon the calendar of the court over all other civil actions except petitions for a judicial review under chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1947, ch. 1951, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-12 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 150, § 37.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-40-13. Representation of director in civil actions.

In any civil action brought to enforce chapters 39 — 41 of this title, the director may be represented by any qualified attorney whom the director has designated and employed for this purpose or, at the director’s request, by the attorney general.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-13 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-40-14. Contributions as debt to state — Lien on real estate.

    1. The amount of any contributions, interest, and penalties imposed upon any employer under this chapter shall:
      1. Be a debt due to the state;
      2. Constitute a trust fund for the state until paid to the director;
      3. Be recoverable at law in the same manner as other debts; and
      4. Until collected constitute a lien upon all the real property located in this state of the following persons or entities:
        1. The employer;
        2. Any officer, agent, servant, or employee of any corporate employer responsible for either the withholding or payment, or both, of the contribution; and
        3. Any person receiving any part of the fund without consideration, or knowing that the employer or any officer, agent, servant, or employee or any corporate employer is committing a breach of trust.
    2. The lien shall take precedence over any other lien or encumbrance on that property except as provided in this section. The director may file a notice of that tax lien with the records of land evidence for the city or town where that property is located and it shall be the duty of the recorder of deeds or the city or town clerk having custody of those records to receive, file, and index that notice under the name of the lienee. Any of the preceding provisions of this section to the contrary notwithstanding, the lien imposed by this section shall not be valid with respect to property in any city or town as against any bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or lessee, whose interest in that real property appears of record in that city or town prior to the time of filing of that notice of tax lien in that city or town.
  1. The notice of the tax lien filed shall: (1) be in writing; (2) contain the name and last known address of the lienee, and (3) state that the lienee is indebted to the state under this chapter. The notice need not describe the lienee’s property, or specify the amount of contributions owed, or the period of time covered by the delinquency. When the notice is filed in a city or town by the director, it shall, unless sooner discharged or released, also apply to property in the city or town subsequently acquired by the lienee during a period of six (6) years from the date of filing and that filing need not be repeated for each successive delinquency of the lienee. The notice shall expire six (6) years from the date of filing unless renewed by again filing a similar notice on or before the expiration date. The director shall be obliged to discharge or release the notice of lien when the lienee is no longer delinquent in the payment of any contributions, interest, or penalties, whether incurred prior or subsequent to the date of filing of that notice, or upon request, following the expiration of the statutory lien period, as set forth in this section.
  2. For the filing of a notice of lien or discharge of a lien, the recorder of deeds or the city or town clerk shall be paid, out of any money appropriated for expenses of the director, a fee of four dollars ($4.00) for a completed entry.
  3. The authority granted in this section to the director to file a notice of lien shall not be held to repeal or amend in any other respect § 28-39-19 .

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1956, ch. 3664, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-14 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 94, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-40-15. Notice of transfer of business — Contributions due immediately.

The sale or transfer by any employer other than receivers, assignees under a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, trustees in bankruptcy, or public officers acting under judicial process, of the major part in value of the assets of that employer otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and the regular and usual prosecution of that employer’s business, shall be fraudulent and void as against the state, unless that employer shall, at least five (5) days before the sale or transfer, notify the director of the proposed sale or transfer and of its price, terms, and conditions and of the character and location of those assets. Whenever that employer makes that sale or transfer, all contributions imposed by this chapter shall be paid at the time when the director is so notified or, if he or she is not so notified, at the time when he or she should have been notified.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1956, ch. 3664, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-15 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 281, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-40-16. Collection powers.

  1. The director shall have, for the collection of the contributions imposed by this chapter, all powers as are prescribed for collection of contributions in this title. The director may require any person subject to the taxes imposed by this chapter to file with him or her a bond, issued by a surety company authorized to transact business in this state, in such an amount as the director may fix, to secure the payment of the contributions, penalties, and interest due or which may become due from that employer.
    1. The director may require the employer to deposit with the general treasurer a bond by way of cash or other security satisfactory to the director in an amount to be determined by the director, but not greater than an amount equal to double the amount of the estimated tax that would normally be due from the employer each month under this chapter, but in no case shall the deposit be less than one hundred dollars ($100).
    2. Where an employer who has deposited a bond with the general treasurer under subdivision (1) of this subsection has failed to collect or remit contributions in accordance with this chapter, the director may, upon giving written notice to the employer by registered mail or personal service, apply the bond in whole or in part to the amount that should have been collected, remitted, or paid by the employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1956, ch. 3664, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-16 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 281, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-40-17. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 11; P.L. 1956, ch. 3664, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-40-17 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 7; Repealed by P.L. 1985, ch. 281, § 4, effective June 19, 1985.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-40-17 concerned notice of levy, sale, and execution procedure.

28-40-18. Waiver of contributions and interest under one dollar.

If the total amount due to the department of labor and training from an employer in contributions and/or interest for any period is less than one dollar ($1.00), this amount shall not be assessed.

History of Section. G.L. 1956, § 28-40-18 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 185, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of labor and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Chapter 41 Temporary Disability Insurance — Benefits

28-41-1. Fund from which benefits payable — Agencies through which paid.

Benefits shall be payable from the fund and shall be paid through employment offices, or any other agencies that the director may designate and the federal Social Security Administration may approve, in accordance with prescribed regulations.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2810, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-1 .

Cross References.

Definition of terms, § 28-39-2 .

28-41-2. Wages included for benefit purposes.

Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title to the contrary, “wages” as used in the phrase “wages for employment from employers” means, with reference to the benefits provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title, only those wages which are paid subsequent to the date upon which the employing unit, by whom those wages were paid, has satisfied the conditions of § 28-39-2 (12) with respect to becoming an employer subject to those chapters. No individual shall be denied benefits under chapters 39 — 41 of this title because his or her employer continued to pay to that individual his or her regular wages, or parts of them, while he or she was sick and unable to perform his or her regular or customary work or services. The amount of any payments, whether or not under a plan or system, made to or on behalf of an employee by his or her employer after the expiration of six (6) calendar months following the last calendar month in which the employee performed actual bona fide personal services for that employer, shall not be deemed to be wages for the purpose of being used as a basis for paying benefits under chapter 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2828, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-2 ; P.L. 1964, ch. 121, § 2; P.L. 1971, ch. 95, § 3.

28-41-3. Inclusion of unpaid wages.

Wages earned by an employee for employment from employers, which remain unpaid because the assets of the employer for whom that employment was rendered are in the custody or control of an assignee for the benefit of a creditor, receiver, trustee, or any other fiduciary appointed by or under the control of a court of competent jurisdiction, shall, for all purposes of §§ 28-41-1 28-41-6 and § 28-41-11 , be deemed to be, and shall be treated as though those wages had been paid to that employee during the calendar year within which those wages were earned.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-3 .

28-41-4. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1948, ch. 2176, § 1, ch. 2194, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2843, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3431, § 1; P.L. 1958, ch. 211, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 15, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-41-4 concerned total amount of benefit credits and the benefit year established prior to November 16, 1958.

28-41-5. Weekly benefit rate — Dependents’ allowances.

    1. Benefit rate.  The benefit rate payable under this chapter to any eligible individual with respect to any week of his or her unemployment due to sickness, when that week occurs within a benefit year, shall be, for benefit years beginning on or after October 7, 1990, four and sixty-two hundredths percent (4.62%) of the wages paid to the individual in that calendar quarter of the base period in which the individual’s wages were highest; provided, however, that the benefit rate shall not exceed eighty-five percent (85%) of the average weekly wage paid to individuals covered by chapters 42 — 44 of this title for the preceding calendar year ending December 31. If the maximum weekly benefit rate is not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00) then the rate shall be raised to the next higher multiple of one dollar ($1.00). Those weekly benefit rates shall be effective throughout the benefit years beginning on or after July 1 of the year prior to July of the succeeding calendar year.
    2. The benefit rate of any individual, if not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), shall be raised to the next higher multiple of one dollar ($1.00).
  1. Dependents’ allowances.  An individual to whom benefits for unemployment due to sickness are payable under this chapter with respect to any week, shall, in addition to those benefits, be paid with respect to each week a dependent’s allowance of ten dollars ($10.00) or seven percent (7%), of the individual’s benefit rate, payable under subsection (a) of this section, whichever is greater for each of that individual’s children, including adopted and stepchildren or that individual’s court appointed wards who, at the beginning of the individual’s benefit year, is under eighteen (18) years of age and who is at that time in fact dependent on that individual. A dependent’s allowance shall also be paid to that individual for any child, including an adopted child or a stepchild or that individual’s court appointed ward, eighteen (18) years of age or over, incapable of earning any wages because of mental or physical incapacity, and who is dependent on that individual in fact at the beginning of the individual’s benefit year, including individuals who have been appointed the legal guardian of that child by the appropriate court. However, in no instance shall the number of dependents for which an individual may receive dependents’ allowances exceed five (5) in total. The weekly total of dependents’ allowances payable to any individual, if not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00). The number of an individual’s dependents, and the fact of their dependency, shall be determined as of the beginning of that individual’s benefit year; provided, that only one individual shall be entitled to a dependent’s allowance for the same dependent with respect to any week. Each individual who claims a dependent’s allowance shall establish his or her claim to it to the satisfaction of the director under procedures established by the director.
  2. Any individual’s benefit rate and/or dependents’ allowance in effect for a benefit year shall continue in effect until the end of that benefit year.
  3. Partial unemployment due to sickness.  For weeks beginning on or after January 1, 2006, an individual partially unemployed due to sickness and otherwise eligible in any week shall be paid sufficient benefits with respect to that week, so that his or her wages, rounded to the next higher multiple of one dollar ($1.00), and his or her benefits combined will equal in amount the weekly benefit rate to which he or she would be entitled if totally unemployed due to sickness in that week; provided that an individual must have been totally unemployed due to sickness for at least seven (7) consecutive days prior to claiming partial benefits under this provision; provided, that this provision shall not apply if the individual is entitled to lag day benefits pursuant to § 28-41-9 ; provided, further, that nothing contained herein shall permit any individual to whom remuneration is payable for any work performed in any week in an amount equal to or greater than his or her weekly benefit rate to receive benefits or waiting period credit for that week.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1947, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2194, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2843, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3153, § 4; P.L. 1955, ch. 3431, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-5 ; P.L. 1958(s.s.), ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1960, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 58, § 2; P.L. 1962, ch. 219, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 211, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 357, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 230, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 391, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 272, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 16; P.L. 1997, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 296, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 38; P.L. 2005, ch. 288, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 289, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 309, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 288, § 2, and P.L. 2005, ch. 309, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2005, ch. 288, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 289, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 309, § 2.) passed by the 2005 General Assembly. Since the changes made by the acts are not in conflict with each other, this section is set out as amended by all three acts.

28-41-6. Effect on waiting period credit and benefits of receipt of workers’ compensation payments.

  1. No individual shall be entitled to receive waiting period credit benefits or dependents’ allowances with respect to which benefits are paid or payable to that individual under any workers’ compensation law of this state, any other state, or the federal government, on account of any disability caused by accident or illness. In the event that workers’ compensation benefits are subsequently awarded to an individual, whether on a weekly basis or as a lump sum, for a week or weeks with respect to which that individual has received waiting period credit, benefits, or dependents’ allowances, under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, the director, for the temporary disability insurance fund, shall be subrogated to that individual’s rights in that award to the extent of the amount of benefits and/or dependents’ allowances paid to him or her under those chapters. Provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed to deny benefits or waiting period credit benefits or dependents’ allowances under this chapter to individuals who receive a lump sum settlement pursuant to § 28-33-25 and subsequently apply for benefits under this chapter as long as the sickness or illness is materially different from the one for which the individual was paid workers’ compensation, is not affected by said injury and/or the medical condition did not result from the injury for which the employee was paid workers’ compensation benefits.
    1. Whenever an employer or his or her insurance carrier has been notified that an individual has filed a claim for unemployment due to sickness for any week or weeks under chapters 39 — 41 of this title for which week or weeks that individual is or may be eligible for benefits under chapters 29 — 38 of this title, that notice shall constitute a lien upon any pending award, order, or settlement to that individual under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.
    2. The employer or his insurance carrier shall be required to reimburse the director, for the temporary disability insurance fund, the amount of benefits and/or dependents’ allowances received by the individual under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, for any week or weeks for which that award, order, or settlement is made.
  2. Whenever an individual becomes entitled to or is awarded workers’ compensation benefits for the same week or weeks with respect to which he has received benefits and/or dependents’ allowances under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, and notice of that receipt has been given to the division of workers’ compensation of the department of labor and training and/or the workers’ compensation court, the division or court is required to and shall incorporate in the award, order, or approval of settlement, an order requiring the employer or his or her insurance carrier to reimburse the director, for the temporary disability insurance fund, the amount of any disability benefits and/or dependents’ allowances which may have been paid to the employee for unemployment due to sickness for those weeks under chapters 39 — 41 of this title. Nothing herein shall be construed to deny benefits under this chapter to individuals who receive a lump sum settlement pursuant to § 28-33-25 and subsequently apply for benefits under this chapter as long as the sickness or illness is materially different from the one for which the individual was paid workers’ compensation, is not affected by said injury and/or the medical condition did not result from the injury for which the employee was paid workers’ compensation benefits.
  3. If, through inadvertence, error, or mistake, an individual has received benefit payments and/or dependents’ allowances for any week or weeks under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, and has also received payments for the same week or weeks under any workers’ compensation law of this state, any other state, or of the federal government, he or she shall, in the discretion of the director of the department of labor and training, be liable to have that sum deducted from any benefits payable to him or her under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or shall be liable to repay to the director, for the temporary disability insurance fund, a sum equal to that amount received, and that sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in § 28-40-12 for the collection of past due contributions.
  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no individual who, prior to September 1, 1969, has sustained an injury by reason of which he or she may be eligible for benefits under chapters 29 — 38 of this title shall be deprived of any rights which he or she may have under chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 4; P.L. 1947, ch. 1947, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2194, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2843, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3153, § 4; P.L. 1955, ch. 3431, § 2; P.L. 1956, ch. 3809, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-6 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 211, § 2; P.L. 1959, ch. 151, § 1; P.L. 1960, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 275, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 38; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 4; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 4; P.L. 2012, ch. 439, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 478, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 4, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 4, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2012, ch. 439, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 478, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Lump Sum Settlements.

When a claimant received a lump sum workers’ compensation (WC) settlement, which applied prospectively under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-25(a)(1) , the claimant was disqualified from receiving temporary disability insurance (TDI) benefits for the same period because R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-41-6 prohibited a simultaneous award of TDI and WC benefits. Duffy v. Powell, 18 A.3d 487, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 2011).

28-41-7. Total amount of benefits.

The total amount of benefits payable during a benefit year to any eligible individual shall be an amount equal to thirty-six percent (36%) of the individual’s total wages for employment by employers subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title during his or her base period; provided, that no individual shall be paid total benefits in any benefit year which exceed thirty (30) times his or her weekly benefit rate; provided further, that dependents’ allowances to which he or she might be entitled under § 28-41-5 shall be in addition to these total benefits. If the total amount of benefits is not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), then it shall be raised to the next higher multiple of one dollar ($1.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2853, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-7 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 211, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 357, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 272, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 38.

Cross References.

Additional payments from second injury indemnity fund, § 28-37-10 .

28-41-8. Pregnancy benefits.

An eligible individual who is unemployed due to sickness resulting from pregnancy, childbirth, miscarriage, or abortion shall be entitled to receive those benefits which are regularly provided for unemployment due to sickness in chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2853, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-8 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 154, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 291, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 405, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 211, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 38.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liability Under Civil Rights Act.

Department of employment security and its director were liable under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 for treating pregnancy differently than other disabilities. Barone v. Hackett, 602 F. Supp. 481, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23914 (D.R.I. 1984).

— Relief Granted.

An award of back pay (in the form of retroactive benefits) was amply justified upon finding that the department of employment security was liable under the federal Civil Rights Act for limiting the benefits available to women disabled by pregnancy to a fixed lump sum, rather than computing them in the usual manner provided for the temporary disability provisions. It was incumbent upon individual class members, however, to show that they lost benefits to which they were properly entitled by virtue of the department’s use of the lump sum benefit during the period of their disability. United States v. Rhode Island Dep't of Employment Sec., 619 F. Supp. 509, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16210 (D.R.I. 1985).

28-41-9. Lag day benefits.

  1. An individual who, having been unemployed due to sickness and who is in receipt of benefits under this chapter, returns to work prior to the end of the immediately succeeding week, shall be entitled to one-fifth (1/5) of his or her benefit rate for each day of unemployment due to sickness in which work is ordinarily performed in the occupation in which he or she is employed during the week in which he or she returns to work, figured to the highest dollar, including any holiday when the performance of services is waived by his or her employer; provided, that in no case shall any individual be entitled to more than four-fifths (4/5) of his benefit rate, figured to the highest dollar, for that week.
  2. An individual who, having been unemployed due to sickness at a later date during his or her benefit year, again becomes unemployed due to sickness, and refiles his or her claim for benefits, shall, if his or her first day of unemployment begins on a day subsequent to the first day of any week, be entitled to one-fifth (1/5) of his or her benefit rate for each day in that week in which work is ordinarily performed in the occupation in which he or she was last employed, including any holiday when the performance of services is waived by his or her employer, figured to the highest dollar, if his or her unemployment continues for seven (7) consecutive calendar days, including the first day of unemployment due to sickness for which he or she has refiled his or her claim. In no case shall any individual be entitled to more than four-fifths (4/5) of his or her benefit rate, figured to the highest dollar, for the week in which his or her unemployment begins on a day subsequent to the first day of that week.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1950, ch. 2538, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3153, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-9 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 211, § 3; P.L. 1961, ch. 97, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 25, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 108, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 443, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 33, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 42, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 33, § 2, and P.L. 2012, ch. 42, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2008, ch. 443, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 6, 2008.

28-41-10. Benefits payable for last week of benefit year.

Notwithstanding any provision of chapters 39 — 41 of this title to the contrary, if the benefit year of an individual terminates prior to the end of a week throughout which he or she is unemployed due to sickness and eligible and his or her benefit credits for that benefit year have not been exhausted, then that individual shall be entitled to receive for that week the full amount of benefits which he or she would have received if his or her benefit year had not so terminated; provided, that this shall in no manner affect the establishment of a new base period and benefit year in accordance with § 28-39-2(2) and (6).

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 5; P.L. 1955, ch. 3430, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-10 .

28-41-11. Eligibility.

  1. For benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 1981, and prior to October 7, 1990, an individual shall be deemed eligible for benefits for any given week of his or her unemployment due to sickness only if he or she has, within the base period immediately preceding the benefit year in which that week of unemployment occurs, earned wages amounting to at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title, in each of at least twenty (20) weeks or, in the alternative, in an amount equal to three (3) times the total minimum amount required in this chapter.
  2. In order to be deemed eligible for benefits, an individual whose benefit year begins on or after October 7, 1990: must have been paid wages in:
    1. Any one calendar quarter of the base period which are at least two hundred (200) times the minimum hourly wage, as defined in chapter 12 of this title, and must have been paid wages in the base period amounting to at least one and one-half (11/2) times the wages paid to the individual in that calendar quarter of the base period in which the individual’s wages were highest; provided, that the minimum amount of total base period wages paid to the individual must be at least four hundred (400) times the minimum hourly wage, as defined in chapter 12 of this title. The base period wages must have been paid to the individual for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title; or, in the alternative,
    2. The base period for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title amounting to at least three (3) times the total minimum amount required in subdivision (1) of this subsection.
  3. In addition to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, for benefit years that begin on or after July 1, 2012, an individual must have been unemployed due to sickness for at least seven (7) consecutive days in order to be eligible for benefits.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 6; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 6; P.L. 1947, ch. 1948, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2843, § 2; P.L. 1953, ch. 3153, § 2; P.L. 1955, ch. 3518, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-11 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 211, § 3; P.L. 1981, ch. 211, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 272, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 33, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 42, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 33, § 2, and P.L. 2012, ch. 42, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Examinations.

Denial of a claimant’s application for SSI Benefits based on lower back pain and mood disorder was proper because the administrative law judge properly favored an orthopedic consultative evaluation over the other treating, examining, and non-examining opinions of record, especially since one treating doctor’s examination was in the context of a Temporary Disability Insurance claim which assessed the claimant’s ability to return to the claimant’s former work. MacMillan v. Astrue, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104562 (D.R.I. Dec. 29, 2008).

Liability for Treating Pregnancy Differently.

Department of employment security and its director were liable under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 for treating pregnancy differently than other disabilities. Barone v. Hackett, 602 F. Supp. 481, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23914 (D.R.I. 1984) (decided under prior law).

Part-Time Work.

Eligibility for temporary disability benefits requires that the claimant be unemployed and unable to perform customary work due to sickness as defined by § 28-39-2 and that he satisfy the statutory minimum wage amount under this section, and as long as claimant fulfills these requirements, whether he was employed part-time or full-time when the sickness occurred does not matter, nor is it a precondition to receipt of benefits that claimant be available for full-time work, since the determinative factor is not the number of hours a claimant customarily works or is available to work per week, but whether the claimant is physically able to return to his regular or customary work or services, part-time or full-time, after suffering a disabling sickness. Millerick v. Fascio, 120 R.I. 9 , 384 A.2d 601, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 628 (1978).

28-41-12. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 6; P.L. 1947, ch. 1949, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3429, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-12 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 211, § 4; P.L. 1961, ch. 97, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 356, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 38; P.L. 2008, ch. 443, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2012, ch. 33, § 3, effective July 1, 2012; P.L. 2012, ch. 42, § 3, effective July 1, 2012.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-41-12 concerned waiting period.

28-41-13. Disqualification by receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.

    1. An individual shall be disqualified from receiving benefits during any week with respect to which he or she will receive remuneration in the form of benefits under an unemployment compensation law of any state or of the United States.
    2. Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title to the contrary, an individual receiving unemployment compensation and who is injured while unemployed and who is then denied unemployment compensation as a result of those injuries, shall, if otherwise eligible, be entitled to receive temporary disability insurance benefits without serving a waiting period as required in § 28-41-12 .
  1. Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title to the contrary, if an individual has been determined to have been paid unemployment compensation benefits and/or dependents’ allowances under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, for the same week or weeks with respect to which the individual was entitled to receive temporary disability insurance benefits and/or dependents’ allowances under chapters 39 — 41 of this title, that individual shall, at the discretion of the director, be liable to have that sum deducted from any benefits payable to him or her under chapters 39 — 41 of this title for the same week or weeks, to reimburse the director for the employment security fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 6; P.L. 1943, ch. 1367, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-13 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 302, § 1.

28-41-14. Disqualification by conviction of fraud.

  1. An individual who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of knowingly or fraudulently making a false statement, or knowingly or fraudulently misrepresenting a material fact, with intent to defraud the temporary disability insurance fund of any benefit or wrongfully to obtain or increase any benefit, either for himself or herself or for any other person, shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for a period of one year following that conviction.
  2. This disqualification shall be imposed by the director and shall be in addition to any criminal penalty which may be imposed under any other provision in chapters 39 — 41 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 6; P.L. 1953, ch. 3153, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-14 .

Cross References.

Criminal penalties, § 28-39-23 .

28-41-15. Filing of claims — Restriction on benefits — Copies of law and regulations.

  1. Benefit claims shall be filed pursuant to prescribed regulations.
  2. No individual shall be eligible for benefits under this title for any week of unemployment due to sickness that occurs more than ninety (90) days prior to the time when written notice of his or her claim for benefits is mailed or delivered to the department of labor and training or such other agency as the director may designate. Notwithstanding the above, the director may extend the claim filing period up to twenty-six (26) weeks if the individual can show a good, medical reason for the delay in filing the claim for benefits.
  3. Each employer shall post and maintain printed statements of subsection (b) and of those regulations, in places readily accessible to individuals in his or her service. Those printed statements shall be supplied by the director to each employer without cost to that employer.
  4. Upon the filing of a claim, the director shall promptly mail a notice of the filing of the claim to the claimant’s most recent employer and to all employers for whom the claimant states he or she performed services and earned wages during his or her base period. The employers shall promptly furnish the information required to determine the claimant’s benefit rights. If the claimant’s employer or employers have any information that might affect either the validity of the claim or the right of the claimant to waiting period credit or benefits, the employer shall return the notice with this information. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title, any employer who fails, without good cause as established to the satisfaction of the director, to return the notice within seven (7) working days of its mailing shall pay a penalty of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each failure. This penalty shall be paid into the temporary disability insurance reserve fund and, if any employer fails to pay the penalty, when assessed, it shall be collected by civil action as provided in § 28-40-12 .

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-15 ; P.L. 1964, ch. 115, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 418, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 3, § 3.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 3, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2017.

28-41-16. Determination of claim.

  1. Upon the filing of a claim, the director shall promptly examine the claim and on the basis of facts found by the director and records maintained by the department, the claim shall be determined to be valid or invalid. If the claim is determined to be valid, the director shall promptly notify the claimant as to the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable, and the maximum duration of those benefits. If the claim is determined to be invalid, the director shall likewise notify the claimant and any other interested parties of that determination and the reasons for it. If the processing of the claim is delayed for any reason, the director shall notify the claimant, in writing, within three (3) weeks of the date the application for benefits is filed of the reason for the delay. Unless the claimant or any other interested party, within fifteen (15) days, requests a hearing before the board of review, the determination with reference to the claim is final. However, for good cause shown the fifteen (15) day period may be extended after notification by the director has been mailed to his or her last known address, as provided in this section. At any time within one year from the date of a monetary determination, the director, upon request of the claimant or on his or her own motion, may reconsider his or her determination if he or she finds that an error in computation or identity has occurred in connection with it or that additional wages pertinent to the claimant’s status have become available, or if that determination has been made as a result of a nondisclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact.
  2. If an appeal is duly filed, benefits with respect to the period prior to the final decision, if it is found that those benefits are payable, shall be paid only after the decision. If an appeal tribunal affirms a decision of the director, or the board of review affirms a decision of an appeal tribunal allowing benefits, those benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which may subsequently be taken.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3669, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-16 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 50.

Cross References.

Examination required of claimants, § 28-39-12 .

Recovery of benefits paid in error, § 28-39-29 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence at Hearing.

At a hearing held under this section, the report of an examining physician appointed by the director was admissible in evidence and, if the claimant desired to cross-examine him, she could subpoena him to the hearing. Massenzio v. Board of Review, 103 R.I. 473 , 238 A.2d 350, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 817 (1968).

28-41-17. Appeal tribunals.

To hear and decide disputed claims, the board of review may appoint one or more impartial referees, each of whom shall constitute an appeal tribunal to hear and decide appeals from determinations and re-determinations. The board may make appointments to this tribunal and fix its salaries in accordance with the state civil service law, rules, and regulations. No person shall participate on behalf of the board in any case in which he or she is an interested party.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-17 .

28-41-18. Filing of appeal — Parties — Withdrawal.

Any claimant may file an appeal from the determination of the director to an appeal tribunal within the specified time. The parties to an appeal from a determination shall include all interested parties, including the director. Appeals may be withdrawn at the request of the appellant and with the permission of the appeal tribunal, if the record preceding the appeal and the request for the withdrawal support the correctness of the determination and indicate that no coercion or fraud is involved in the withdrawal.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-18 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 25; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 1.

28-41-19. Hearing by appeal tribunal — Regulations — Record of proceedings.

A reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing shall promptly be afforded all interested parties. An appeal tribunal shall inquire into and develop all facts bearing on the issues and shall receive and consider evidence without regard to statutory and common-law rules. The board of review shall adopt regulations governing the manner of filing appeals and the conduct of hearings and appeals, consistent with chapters 39 — 41 of this title. A record shall be kept of all testimony and proceedings in an appeal, but testimony need not be transcribed unless further review is initiated.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-19 .

28-41-20. Consolidated appeals.

When the same or substantially similar evidence is material to the matter in issue with respect to more than one individual, the same time and place for considering all those cases may be fixed, hearings on the evidence jointly conducted, a single record of the proceedings made, and evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding considered as introduced in the others, provided no party is prejudiced thereby.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-20 .

28-41-21. Decision of appeal tribunal or referee.

  1. After a hearing, an appeal tribunal shall make findings and conclusions promptly and on the basis of the findings and conclusions affirm, modify, or reverse the director’s determination. Each party shall be promptly furnished a copy of the decision and the supporting findings and conclusions. This decision shall be final unless further review is initiated pursuant to § 28-41-22 within fifteen (15) days after the decision has been mailed to each party’s last known address or otherwise delivered to him or her, provided that that period may be extended for good cause.
  2. A decision of the referee of the board of review shall be honored and complied with until or unless modified or overruled by the board or a court of competent jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-21 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 22, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 118, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 311, § 1.

28-41-22. Appeal to and review by board.

Any party in interest, including the director, shall be allowed an appeal to the board of review from the decision of an appeal tribunal. The board on its own motion may initiate a review of a decision or determination of an appeal tribunal within fifteen (15) days after the date of decision. The board may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings or conclusions of the appeal tribunal solely on the basis of previously submitted evidence or upon the basis of such additional evidence as it may direct to be taken.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-22 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 22, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 311, § 1.

28-41-23. Removal to board of cases pending before appeal tribunals.

The board of review may remove to itself or transfer to another appeal tribunal any appeal pending before an appeal tribunal. An appeal so removed to the board before a fair hearing has been completed shall be given a fair hearing by the board, as required by § 28-41-19 with respect to proceedings before an appeal tribunal.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-23 .

28-41-24. Conclusiveness of decisions — Reopening in cases of fraud or coercion.

All final determinations and decisions shall be conclusive upon all parties in interest, including the director. The director, appeal tribunal, or board of review shall reopen a determination or decision or revoke permission for withdrawal of an appeal if:

  1. He, she, or it finds that a worker or employer has been defrauded or coerced in connection with the determination, decision, or withdrawal of the appeal; and
  2. The defrauded or coerced person informs the appropriate officer or body of the fraud or coercion within sixty (60) days after he or she has become aware of the fraud or within sixty (60) days after the coercion has been removed.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-24 .

28-41-25. Rule of decision — Certification of questions to board.

Final decisions of the board of review and the principles of law declared in their support shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings involving similar questions, unless expressly or impliedly overruled by a later decision of the board or of a court of competent jurisdiction. Final decisions of appeal tribunals and the principles of law declared in their support shall be binding on the director and shall further be persuasive authority in subsequent appeal tribunal proceedings. If in any subsequent proceedings, the director or an appeal tribunal has serious doubt as to the correctness of any principles previously declared by an appeal tribunal or by the board, or if there is an apparent inconsistency or conflict in final decisions of comparable authority, then the findings of fact in that case may be certified, together with the question of law involved, to the board. After giving notice and reasonable opportunity for a hearing upon the law to all parties to the proceedings, the board shall certify to the director or appeal tribunal and the parties in interest, its answer to the question submitted, or the board, in its discretion, may remove to itself the entire proceeding as provided in § 28-41-23 and render its decision upon the entire case.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-25 .

28-41-26. Denial of appeal to board deemed decision of board.

For the purposes of judicial review, an appeal tribunal’s decision from which an application for appeal has been denied by the board of review shall be deemed to be the decision of the board, except that the time for initiating judicial review shall run from the date of the mailing or delivery of the notice of the denial of the application for appeal by the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 7; P.L. 1946, ch. 1744, § 7; P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-26 .

28-41-27. Judicial appeals.

Appeals from administrative orders or decisions made pursuant to any provisions of this chapter shall be to the sixth division district court, pursuant to chapter 35 of title 42, the Administrative Procedures Act.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-27 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 8; P.L. 1982, ch. 388, §§ 3, 7.

28-41-28. Parties to review — Service of petition — Certification of record.

The board of review and all parties to the proceedings before it shall be parties to the review proceedings. If the director is a party respondent, the petition shall be served by leaving with him or her, or any representative whom he or she designates for that purpose, as many copies of the petition as there are respondents. Within ten (10) days after filing of the petition, an affidavit of compliance shall be filed with the superior court in which the petition has been filed. The director shall file with the court certified copies of the record of the case together with his or her petition for review or his or her answer to the appellant’s petition. Upon the filing of a petition for review by the director, or upon service of a petition upon him or her, the director shall send a copy of the petition by registered or certified mail to each party and that mailing shall constitute service upon the parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-28 .

28-41-29. Questions reviewed by court — Additional evidence — Precedence — Appeal to supreme court.

The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common-law rules, shall be conclusive. Additional evidence required by the court shall be taken before the board, and the board, after hearing that additional evidence, shall file with the court any additional or modified findings of fact or conclusions that it may make, together with transcripts of the additional record. All proceedings under §§ 28-41-26 28-41-29 shall be summarily heard and given precedence over all other civil cases. Appeals involving benefit rights shall be given precedence over all other cases arising under chapters 39 — 41 of this title. An appeal may be taken from the decision of the superior court to the supreme court in the same manner as an appeal is taken under § 28-35-29 , relating to appeals in cases under the workers’ compensation law.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-29 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Additional Findings Required.

Where the record was not clear as to whether the board of review had considered the report of a physician appointed by the director to examine the claimant, which report was submitted to the director, the superior court properly remanded the cause to the board with directions to hold a further hearing, consider the physician’s report, and file with the clerk of the court such additional or modified findings of fact or conclusions as it might make. Massenzio v. Board of Review, 103 R.I. 473 , 238 A.2d 350, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 817 (1968).

28-41-30. Waiver of rights — Agreement to pay employer’s contributions.

No agreement by any individual to waive his or her right to benefits or any other right under chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall be valid. No agreement by any individual in the employ of any person or concern, to pay all or any portion of the contributions required under these chapters from employers, shall be valid. No employer shall make or require or accept any deduction from wages to finance the contributions required of him or her, or require or accept any waiver by an individual of any right under chapters 39 — 41 of this title. The director shall have power to take any steps necessary or suitable under those chapters to correct or prosecute any violation.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-30 .

28-41-31. Fees charged claimants.

No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind by the director or his or her representative, or by the board of review or its representatives, in any proceeding under chapters 39 — 41 of this title. Any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding or court action may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent. The director shall have the authority to fix the fees of that counsel or other duly authorized agent, but no counsel or agents shall together be allowed to charge or receive for those services more than ten per cent (10%) of the maximum benefits at issue in that proceeding or court action except as specifically allowed by the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-31 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Counsel Fees.

Where petitioner did not point to any specific provision either in Temporary Disability Insurance Act or elsewhere comparable to or which otherwise authorizes the director to use funds for counsel fees, trial court had no authority to tax attorney’s fees, as part of costs of litigation or otherwise. Waite v. Board of Review, 108 R.I. 177 , 273 A.2d 670, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1243 (1971).

28-41-32. Exemption of benefits from assignment or process.

Benefits which are due or may become due under chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall not be assigned, pledged, or encumbered before payment. When awarded, adjudged, or paid, so long as they are not mingled with other funds of the recipient, the benefits shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy now or subsequently provided for recovery or collection of debt, which exemption may not be waived.

History of Section. P.L. 1942, ch. 1200, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2176, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-41-32 .

28-41-33. Legal counsel to board of review.

  1. The board of review shall be empowered to appoint and employ a qualified attorney, who shall act in accordance with any instructions that he or she may receive from the board concerning appeals from its decisions and other related duties, and shall be paid an annual base salary of eleven thousand dollars ($11,000).
  2. Whenever the board becomes a party to court action, the attorney shall represent its interests before the courts.
  3. The duly appointed attorney shall serve in this capacity for a term of three (3) years from the date of his or her appointment by the board, and until his or her successor is appointed.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 287, § 1.

28-41-34. Temporary caregiver insurance.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish, within the state temporary disability insurance program, a temporary caregiver insurance program to provide wage replacement benefits in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, to workers who take time off work to care for a seriously ill child, spouse, domestic partner, parent, parent-in-law, grandparent, or to bond with a new child.

Definitions as used in this chapter:

  1. “Child” means a biological, adopted, or foster son or daughter, a stepson or stepdaughter, a legal ward, a son or daughter of a domestic partner, or a son or daughter of an employee who stands in loco parentis to that child.
  2. “Newborn child” means a child under one year of age.
  3. “Adopted child” means a child adopted by, or placed for adoption with, the employee.
  4. “Bonding or bond” means to develop a psychological and emotional attachment between a child and his or her parent(s) or persons who stand in loco parentis. This shall involve being in one another’s physical presence.
  5. “Parent” means a biological, foster, or adoptive parent, a stepparent, a legal guardian, or other person who stands in loco parentis to the employee or the employee’s spouse or domestic partner when he/she was a child.
  6. “Domestic partner” means a party to a civil union as defined by chapter 3.1 of title 15.
  7. “Spouse” means a party in a common law marriage, a party in a marriage conducted and recognized by another state or country, or in a marriage as defined by chapter 3 of title 15.
  8. “Grandparent” means a parent of the employee’s parent.
  9. “Parent-in-law” means the parent of the employee’s spouse or domestic partner.
  10. “Employee” means any person who is or has been employed by an employer subject to chapters 39 — 41 of this title and in employment subject to those chapters.
  11. “Serious health condition” means any illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, residential healthcare facility, or continued treatment or continuing supervision by a licensed healthcare provider.
  12. “Department” means the department of labor and training.
  13. “Persons who stand in loco parentis” means those with day-to-day responsibilities to care for and financially support a child or, in the case of an employee, who had such responsibility for the employee when the employee was a child. A biological or legal relationship shall not be required.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-41-35. Benefits.

  1. Subject to the conditions set forth in this chapter, an employee shall be eligible for temporary caregiver benefits for any week in which he or she is unable to perform his or her regular and customary work because he or she is:
    1. Bonding with a newborn child or a child newly placed for adoption or foster care with the employee or domestic partner in accordance with the provisions of § 28-41-36(c)(1) ; or
    2. Caring for a child, parent, parent-in-law, grandparent, spouse, or domestic partner, who has a serious health condition, subject to a waiting period in accordance with the provisions of § 28-41-12 [repealed]. Employees may use accrued sick time during the eligibility waiting period in accordance with the policy of the individual’s employer.
  2. Temporary caregiver benefits shall be available only to the employee exercising his or her right to leave while covered by the temporary caregiver insurance program. An employee shall file a written intent with his or her employer, in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the department, with a minimum of thirty (30) days’ notice prior to commencement of the family leave. Failure by the employee to provide the written intent may result in delay or reduction in the claimant’s benefits, except in the event the time of the leave is unforeseeable or the time of the leave changes for unforeseeable circumstances.
  3. Employees cannot file for both temporary caregiver benefits and temporary disability benefits for the same purpose, concurrently, in accordance with all provisions of this act and chapters 39 — 41 of this title.
  4. Temporary caregiver benefits may be available to any individual exercising his or her right to leave while covered by the temporary caregiver insurance program, commencing on or after January 1, 2014, which shall not exceed the individual’s maximum benefits in accordance with chapters 39 — 41 of this title. The benefits for the temporary caregiver program shall be payable with respect to the first day of leave taken after the waiting period and each subsequent day of leave during that period of family temporary disability leave. Benefits shall be in accordance with the following:
    1. Beginning January 1, 2014, temporary caregiver benefits shall be limited to a maximum of four (4) weeks in a benefit year;
    2. Beginning January 1, 2022, temporary caregiver benefits shall be limited to a maximum of five (5) weeks in a benefit year;
    3. Beginning January 1, 2023, temporary caregiver benefits shall be limited to a maximum of six (6) weeks in a benefit year.
  5. In addition, no individual shall be paid temporary caregiver benefits and temporary disability benefits that together exceed thirty (30) times his or her weekly benefit rate in any benefit year.
  6. Any employee who exercises his or her right to leave covered by temporary caregiver insurance under this chapter shall, upon the expiration of that leave, be entitled to be restored by the employer to the position held by the employee when the leave commenced, or to a position with equivalent seniority, status, employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment including fringe benefits and service credits that the employee had been entitled to at the commencement of leave.
  7. During any caregiver leave taken pursuant to this chapter, the employer shall maintain any existing health benefits of the employee in force for the duration of the leave as if the employee had continued in employment continuously from the date he or she commenced the leave until the date the caregiver benefits terminate; provided, however, that the employee shall continue to pay any employee shares of the cost of health benefits as required prior to the commencement of the caregiver benefits.
  8. No individual shall be entitled to waiting period credit or temporary caregiver benefits under this section for any week beginning prior to January 1, 2014. An employer may require an employee who is entitled to leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3 and/or the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act, § 28-48-1 et seq., who exercises his or her right to benefits under the temporary caregiver insurance program under this chapter, to take any temporary caregiver benefits received, concurrently, with any leave taken pursuant to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act and/or the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act.
  9. Temporary caregiver benefits shall be in accordance with the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Pub. L. No. 103-3 and the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act in accordance with § 28-48-1 et seq. An employer may require an employee who is entitled to leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3 and/or the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act, § 28-48-1 et seq., who exercises his or her right to benefits under the temporary caregiver insurance program under this chapter, to take any temporary caregiver benefits received, concurrently, with any leave taken pursuant to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act and/or the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 178, § 1, effective July 6, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 179, § 1, effective July 6, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted nearly identical versions of this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 178, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Federal Act References.

The federal Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, referred to in this section, is codified generally as 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. and 5 U.S.C. § 6381 et seq.

28-41-36. Certification of eligibility for leave.

  1. An individual who exercises his or her right to leave covered by the temporary caregiver insurance program under this chapter shall file a certificate form with all information required by the department.
  2. For leave for reason of caring for a seriously ill family member, an employee shall file a certificate with the department that shall contain:
    1. A diagnosis and diagnostic code prescribed in the international classification of diseases, or where no diagnosis has yet been obtained, a detailed statement of symptoms;
    2. The date if known, on which the condition commenced;
    3. The probable duration of the condition;
    4. An estimate of the amount of time that the licensed qualified healthcare provider believes the employee is needed to care for the family member;
    5. A statement that the serious health condition warrants the participation of the employee to provide care for his or her family member. “Warrants the participation of the employee” includes, but is not limited to, providing psychological comfort, arranging third-party care for the family member as well as directly providing, or participating in the medical and physical care of the patient; and
    6. A certificate filed to establish medical eligibility of the serious health condition of the employee’s family member shall be made by the family member’s treating licensed qualified heath care provider.
    7. In the case of a parent, or persons who are in loco parentis caring for the serious health condition of a foster care child, the employee shall submit all required information in accordance with this section, with a written request to the department of children, youth and families for the release of medical information by the child’s treating licensed qualified healthcare provider. The department of children, youth and families shall transmit the requested medical information, pending all properly submitted forms, to the department of labor and training, within ten (10) business days of request. In the absence of the requested transmitted medical information by the department of children, youth and families within ten (10) business days, the employee may request the licensed qualified healthcare provider to directly transmit the medical eligibility of the serious health condition to the department of labor and training. Payment shall not be delayed, in accordance with all provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title, as a result of delays by the department of children, youth and families in transmitting medical information.
  3. The department shall develop a certificate of eligibility form for leave in the case of bonding as defined herein, for the birth of a newborn child of the employee or the employee’s domestic partner, or the placement of a child with the employee in connection with the adoption or foster care of the child by the employee or domestic partner, or persons in loco parentis. Information shall include the following:
    1. A birth certificate, certificate of adoption, or other competent evidence showing the employee or the employee’s domestic partner, or persons in loco parentis is the parent of the child within twelve (12) months of the child’s adoption, birth or placement for adoption or foster care with the employee.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-41-37. Determination of a claim.

  1. In accordance with § 28-41-16 , upon the filing of a claim, the director shall promptly examine the claim and on the basis of facts found by the director and records maintained by the department, the claim shall be determined to be valid or invalid, if the claim is determined to be valid, the director shall promptly notify the claimant as to the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable, and the maximum duration of those benefits. If the claim is determined to be invalid, the director shall likewise notify the claimant and any other interested parties of that determination and the reasons for it. If the processing of the claim is delayed for any reason, the director shall notify the claimant, in writing, within three (3) weeks of the date the application for benefits is filed of the reason for the delay. Unless the claimant or any other interested party, within fifteen (15) days, requests a hearing before the board of review, the determination with reference to the claim is final. However, for good cause shown the fifteen (15) day period may be extended after notification by the director has been mailed to his or her last known address, as provided in this section. At any time within one year from the date of a monetary determination, the director, upon request of the claimant or on his or her own motion, may reconsider his or her determination if he or she finds that an error in computation or identity has occurred in connection with it or that additional wages pertinent to the claimant’s status have become available, or if that determination has been made as a result of a nondisclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact.
  2. If an appeal is duly filed, benefits with respect to the period prior to the final decision, if it is found that those benefits are payable, shall be paid only after the decision. If an appeal tribunal affirms a decision of the director, or the board of review affirms a decision of an appeal tribunal allowing benefits, those benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which may subsequently be taken.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-41-38. Confidential health information.

Information pursuant to any individual’s temporary disability claim or temporary caregiver insurance claim shall be held confidential in accordance with chapters 39 — 41 of this title, § 28-39-19 , and chapter 37.3 of title 5, and all applicable state and federal regulations.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-41-39. Powers and duties.

The director of the department of labor and training shall have the following powers and duties:

  1. To promulgate regulations relative to the operation of the temporary caregiver insurance program;
  2. To create all necessary applications and certificates to fulfill the purposes of this section;
  3. To disseminate information regarding the program to Rhode Island employers and shall carry out a public education program to inform workers and employers about the availability of benefits under the temporary caregiver insurance program. The director may use a proportion of the funds collected for the temporary caregiver insurance program in a given year to pay for the public education program and/or funding received from other sources for the purpose of educating the public about their benefits. Outreach information shall be available in English and other languages; and
  4. To inform Rhode Island employees of their disability insurance rights and benefits due to the employee’s own sickness, injury, or pregnancy, or the employee’s need to provide care for any sick or injured family member or new child. The notice shall be given by every eligible employer to each new employee hired on or after January 1, 2014, and to each employee taking leave from work on or after January 1, 2014, due to pregnancy or the need to provide care for any sick or injured family member or new child. The director shall require each employer to post and maintain information regarding the program in accordance with § 28-41-15 .

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-41-40. Fraud and misrepresentation of benefits.

  1. The temporary caregiver insurance program shall be part of the temporary disability insurance fund. If the director finds that any individual falsely certifies the medical condition of any person in order to obtain family temporary disability insurance benefits, with the intent to defraud, whether for the maker or for any other person, the director shall assess a penalty against the individual in the amount of twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits paid as a result of the false certification. Unless otherwise specified to the contrary, all of the provisions of chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall apply to the temporary caregiver insurance program.
  2. If a physician or other qualified healthcare provider licensed by a foreign country is under investigation by the department for assisting in the filing of false claims and the department does not have the legal remedies to conduct a criminal investigation or prosecution in that country, the department may suspend the processing of all further certifications until the licensed qualified healthcare provider fully cooperates and continues to cooperate with the investigation. A qualified healthcare provider licensed by and practicing in a foreign country who has been convicted of filing false claims with the department shall be barred indefinitely from filing a certificate in support of a temporary disability insurance or temporary caregiver insurance claim in the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-41-41. Criminal prosecution.

All criminal actions for any violation of chapters 39 — 41 of this title, or any rule or regulation of the department shall be prosecuted by the attorney general, or by any qualified member of the Rhode Island bar, that shall be designated by the director and approved by the attorney general to institute and prosecute that action.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-41-42. Receipt of federal funds.

To the extent that funds are made available by the federal government, under Title III of the Social Security Act, (42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.), or otherwise for such purpose, the expenses of administering chapters 39 — 41 of this title shall be paid from those funds, provided that this section shall not be considered to permit any expenditure of funds from the employment security administration account contrary to § 28-42-29 . In the event that the Social Security Act is amended to permit funds granted under Title III to be used to pay expenses of administering a sickness compensation law, such as chapters 39 — 41 of this title, then from and after the effective date of that amendment, the expenses of administering those chapters shall be paid out of the employment security administration account or any other account or fund in which funds granted under Title III are deposited.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 213, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 42 Employment Security — General Provisions

28-42-1. Short title.

Chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be known and may be cited as the “Employment Security Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

General provisions as to employment security:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-222 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151A, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The Employment Security Act does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Conway, 77 R.I. 48 , 73 A.2d 109, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1950).

Parochial School’s Participation in Unemployment Compensation System.

The imposition of an employment security tax on a Catholic school for payment of benefits to discharged lay teacher does not create an unconstitutional burden on the school’s right to the free exercise of religion, where the school voluntarily elected to participate in the state’s unemployment compensation system even though the services performed for the school are specifically exempt from the provisions of the Employment Security Act. St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray, 557 A.2d 1214, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 1989).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of unemployment insurance legislation. 106 A.L.R. 1531; 109 A.L.R. 1346; 118 A.L.R. 1220; 121 A.L.R. 1002.

Construction and application of unemployment compensation act as affected by terms of Federal Social Security Act or judicial or administrative rulings thereunder. 139 A.L.R. 892.

Insurance, unemployment protection as. 63 A.L.R. 772; 100 A.L.R. 1449; 119 A.L.R. 1241.

28-42-2. Declaration of policy.

Economic insecurity, due to unemployment, being a serious menace to the health, morale, and general welfare of the people of this state, is, therefore, a subject of interest and concern to the community as a whole, warranting appropriate action by the general assembly to prevent its spread and to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and his or her family. According to the report of the joint special commission appointed pursuant to the joint resolutions, the evidence seems conclusive that in the face of recurring periods of business depression, which industry and commerce appear powerless to prevent, the industrial worker’s position is extremely insecure. The individual is as incapable of protecting himself or herself against unemployment, as industry is of preventing it. Experience has shown that if the state delays action until unemployment becomes excessive, it can neither promptly create the organizations necessary to orderly, economical, and effective relief, nor bear the financial burden of relief without disrupting its whole system of ordinary revenues and jeopardizing its credit. Chapters 42 — 44 of this title are designed to meet in some measure this situation by providing for the accumulation of a fund to assist in protecting the public against the ill effects of unemployment which may arise in future years.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-2 ; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Common Paymaster Scheme.

There is neither express authorization nor implied consent to the use of the common-paymaster scheme within the act. Imperial Prods. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Employment Sec., 576 A.2d 1210, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 124 (R.I. 1990).

Federal Preemption.

The court of appeals reversed a federal district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction which would forbid the state from paying striking workers unemployment compensation, holding that the question of whether federal labor policy preempted the state statute was justiciable and that the court should resolve the issue. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11089 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858, 94 S. Ct. 164, 38 L. Ed. 2d 108, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4049 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S. Ct. 59, 38 L. Ed. 2d 124, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4030 (1973).

There is no mandate in the federal statute that would require the states as a matter of federal preemption to apply the common-paymaster system as an acceptable mechanism for calculating state employment-security taxes. Imperial Prods. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Employment Sec., 576 A.2d 1210, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 124 (R.I. 1990).

Purpose of Statute.

It was neither the intent nor the primary purpose of this statute to impinge upon federally established collective bargaining rights and payment of unemployment benefits to striking workers cannot be enjoined on the theory that such payment would have the effect of reallocating the balance of power in such bargaining as contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act. Almacs, Inc. v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11774 (D.R.I. 1970).

The statement of purpose in this section makes clear the general welfare nature of the statute and it must, therefore, be concluded that it was neither the intent nor the primary purpose of the statute as a whole to impinge upon federally established collective bargaining rights. Almacs, Inc. v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11774 (D.R.I. 1970).

28-42-3. Definitions.

The following words and phrases, as used in chapters 42 — 44 of this title, have the following meanings unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “Administration account” means the employment security administration account established by this chapter.
  2. “Average weekly wage” means the amount determined by dividing the individual’s total wages earned for service performed in employment within the individual’s base period by the number of that individual’s credit weeks within the individual’s base period.
  3. “Base period,” with respect to an individual’s benefit year, means the first four (4), of the most recently completed five (5) calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual’s benefit year. For any individual’s benefit year, and for any individual deemed monetarily ineligible for benefits for the “base period” as defined in this subdivision, the department shall make a re-determination of entitlement based upon the alternate base period that consists of the last four (4) completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the claimant’s benefit year. Notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in this subdivision, the base period shall not include any calendar quarter previously used to establish a valid claim for benefits; provided, that notwithstanding any provision of chapters 42 — 44 of this title to the contrary, for the benefit years beginning on or after October 4, 1992, whenever an individual who has received workers’ compensation benefits is entitled to reinstatement under § 28-33-47 , but the position to which reinstatement is sought does not exist or is not available, the individual’s base period shall be determined as if the individual filed for benefits on the date of the injury.
  4. “Benefit” means the money payable to an individual as compensation for the individual’s wage losses due to unemployment as provided in these chapters.
  5. “Benefit credits” means the total amount of money payable to an individual as benefits, as determined by § 28-44-9 .
  6. “Benefit rate” means the money payable to an individual as compensation, as provided in chapters 42 —44 of this title, for the individual’s wage losses with respect to any week of total unemployment.
  7. “Benefit year,” with respect to any individual who does not already have a benefit year in effect and who files a valid claim for benefits, means fifty-two (52) consecutive calendar weeks, the first of which shall be the week containing the day as of which he or she first files a valid claim in accordance with regulations adopted as hereinafter prescribed; provided, that the benefit year shall be fifty-three (53) weeks if the filing of a new, valid claim would result in overlapping any quarter of the base period of a prior new claim previously filed by the individual. In no event shall a new benefit year begin prior to the Sunday next following the end of the old benefit year.
  8. “Calendar quarter” means the period of three (3) consecutive calendar months ending March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31; or the equivalent thereof, in accordance with regulations as subsequently prescribed.
  9. “Contributions” means the money payments to the state employment security fund required by those chapters.
  10. “Credit amount,” effective July 6, 2014, means earnings by the individual in an amount equal to at least eight (8) times the individual’s weekly benefit rate.
  11. “Credit week,” prior to July 1, 2012, means any week within an individual’s base period in which that individual earned wages amounting to at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and for the period July 1, 2012, through July 5, 2014, means any week within an individual’s base period in which that individual earned wages amounting to at least the individual’s weekly benefit rate for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  12. “Crew leader,” for the purpose of subdivision (19) of this section, means an individual who:
    1. Furnishes individuals to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person;
    2. Pays (either on the crew leader’s own behalf or on behalf of that other person) the individuals so furnished by the crew leader for the service in agricultural labor performed by them; and
    3. Has not entered into a written agreement with that other person (farm operator) under which that individual (crew leader) is designated as an employee of that other person (farm operator).
  13. “Director” means the head of the department of labor and training or the director’s authorized representative.
  14. “Domestic service employment.” “Employment” includes domestic service in a private home performed for a person who paid cash remuneration of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more in any calendar quarter in the current calendar year, or the preceding calendar year, to individuals employed in that domestic service.
  15. “Employee” means any person who is, or has been, employed by an employer subject to those chapters and in employment subject to those chapters.
  16. “Employer” means:
    1. Any employing unit that was an employer as of December 31, 1955;
    2. Any employing unit that for some portion of a day on and after January 1, 1956, has, or had, in employment, within any calendar year, one or more individuals; except, however, for “domestic service employment,” as defined in subdivision (14) of this section;
    3. For the effective period of its election pursuant to § 28-42-12 , any other employing unit that has elected to become subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title; or
    4. Any employing unit not an employer by reason of any other paragraph of this subdivision for which, within either the current or preceding calendar year, service is, or was, performed with respect to which that employing unit is liable for any federal tax against which credit may be taken for contributions required to be paid into this state’s employment security fund; or which, as a condition for approval of chapters 42 — 44 of this title for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is required, pursuant to that act, to be an “employer” under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  17. “Employing unit” means any person, partnership, association, trust, estate, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or its legal representative, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, or trustee, or the legal representative of a deceased person, that has, or had, in the unit’s employ, one or more individuals. For the purposes of subdivision (14) of this section, a private home shall be considered an employing unit only if the person for whom the domestic service was performed paid cash remuneration of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more in any calendar quarter in the current calendar year, or the preceding calendar year, to individuals employed in that domestic service in that private home.
    1. “Employment,” subject to §§ 28-42-4 28-42-10 , means service, including service in interstate commerce, performed for wages, or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied; provided, that service performed shall also be deemed to constitute employment for all the purposes of chapters 42 — 44 of this title if performed by an individual in the employ of a nonprofit organization as described in subdivision (25) of this section, except as provided in § 28-42-8(7) .
    2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, “Employment” also means service with respect to which a tax is required to be paid under any federal law imposing a tax against which credit may be taken for contributions required to be paid into this state’s employment security fund or which, as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, is required to be covered under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    3. Employment not to include owners. Employment does not include services performed by sole proprietors (owners), partners in a partnership, limited liability company — single member filing as a sole proprietor with the IRS, or members of a limited liability company filing as a partnership with the IRS.
  18. “Employment — Crew leader.” For the purposes of subdivision (12) of this section:
    1. Any individual who is a member of a crew furnished by a crew leader to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person shall be treated as an employee of that crew leader if:
      1. That crew leader holds a valid certificate of registration under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., or substantially all members of that crew operate or maintain tractors, mechanized harvesting, or crop-dusting equipment, or any other mechanized equipment that is provided by that crew leader; and
      2. That individual is not an employee of the other person within the meaning of subdivision (15) of this section; and
    2. In the case of any individual who is furnished by a crew leader to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person and who is not treated as an employee of that crew leader:
      1. That other person, and not the crew leader, shall be treated as the employer of that individual; and
      2. That other person shall be treated as having paid cash remuneration to that individual in an amount equal to the amount of cash remuneration paid to that individual by the crew leader (either on the crew leader’s own behalf or on behalf of that other person) for the service in agricultural labor performed for that other person.
  19. “Employment office” means a free, public-employment office, or its branch, operated by the director or by this state as part of a system of free, public-employment offices, or any other agency that the director may designate with the approval of the Social Security Administration.
  20. “Fund” means the employment security fund established by this chapter.
  21. “Governmental entity” means state and local governments in this state and includes the following:
    1. The state of Rhode Island or any of its instrumentalities, or any political subdivision of the state, or any of its instrumentalities;
    2. Any instrumentality of more than one of these entities; or
    3. Any instrumentality of any of these entities and one or more other states or political subdivisions.
  22. “Hospital” means an institution that has been licensed, certified, or approved by the department of health as a hospital.
    1. “Institution of higher education” means an educational institution in this state that:
      1. Admits, as regular students, only individuals having a certificate of graduation from a high school, or the recognized equivalent of such certificate;
      2. Is legally authorized within this state to provide a program of education beyond high school;
      3. Provides:
        1. An educational program for which it awards a bachelor’s or higher degree, or a program that is acceptable for full credit toward such a degree;
        2. A program of post-graduate or post-doctoral studies; or
        3. A program of training to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation; and
      4. Is a public or other nonprofit institution.
    2. Notwithstanding any of the preceding provisions of this subdivision, all colleges and universities in this state are institutions of higher education for purposes of this section.
  23. “Nonprofit organization” means an organization, or group of organizations, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), that is exempt from income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 501(a).
    1. “Partial unemployment.” An employee shall be deemed partially unemployed in any week of less than full-time work if the employee fails to earn in wages for that week an amount equal to the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment to which the employee would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible. For weeks beginning on or after May 23, 2021, through June 30, 2023, an employee shall be deemed partially unemployed in any week of less than full-time work if the employee fails to earn wages for that week in an amount equal to or greater than one hundred and fifty percent (150%) of the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment to which the employee would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible.
    2. For the purposes of this subdivision and subdivision (28) of this section, “wages” includes only that part of remuneration for any work that is in excess of one-fifth (1/5) of the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment, rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00), to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible in any one week, and “services” includes only that part of any work for which remuneration in excess of one-fifth (1/5) of the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment, rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00), to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible in any one week is payable; provided, that nothing contained in this paragraph shall permit any individual to whom remuneration is payable for any work performed in any week in an amount equal to or greater than his or her weekly benefit rate to receive benefits under this subdivision for that week.
    3. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for weeks ending on or after May 23, 2021, through June 30, 2023, “wages” includes only that part of remuneration for any work that is in excess of fifty percent (50%) of the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment, rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00), to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible in any one week, and “services” includes only that part of any work for which remuneration in excess of fifty percent (50%) of the weekly benefit rate for total unemployment, rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00), to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed and eligible in any one week is payable. Provided, that, during the period defined in this subdivision, nothing contained in this subdivision shall permit any individual to whom remuneration is payable for any work performed in any week in an amount equal to or greater than one hundred fifty percent (150%) of their weekly benefit rate to receive benefits under this subdivision for that week.
    4. Notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in this subdivision, “services,” as used in this subdivision and in subdivision (28) of this section, does not include services rendered by an individual under the exclusive supervision of any agency of this state, or any of its political subdivisions, by which the services are required solely for the purpose of affording relief, support, or assistance to needy individuals performing those services, or services performed by members of the national guard and organized reserves in carrying out their duties in weekly drills as members of those organizations. “Wages,” as used in this subdivision and in subdivision (28) of this section, does not include either remuneration received by needy individuals for rendering the aforementioned services when that remuneration is paid exclusively from funds made available for that purpose out of taxes collected by this state or any of its political subdivisions, or remuneration received from the federal government by members of the national guard and organized reserves, as drill pay, including longevity pay and allowances.
  24. “Payroll” means the total amount of all wages paid by the employer to the employer’s employees for employment.
  25. “Total unemployment.” An individual shall be deemed totally unemployed in any week in which the individual performs no services (as used in subdivision (26) of this section) and for which the individual earns no wages (as used in subdivision (26) of this section), and in which the individual cannot reasonably return to any self-employment in which the individual has customarily been engaged.
  26. “Wages” means all remuneration paid for personal services on or after January 1, 1940, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash, and all other remuneration that is subject to a tax under a federal law imposing a tax against which credit may be taken for contributions required to be paid into a state unemployment fund. Gratuities customarily received by an individual in the course of the individual’s employment from persons other than the individual’s employing unit shall be treated as wages paid by the individual’s employing unit. The reasonable cash value of remuneration paid in any medium other than cash, and the reasonable amount of gratuities, shall be estimated and determined in accordance with rules prescribed by the director; except that for the purpose of this subdivision and of §§ 28-43-1 28-43-1 4, this term does not include:
    1. That part of remuneration that is paid by an employer to an individual with respect to employment during any calendar year, after remuneration equal to the amount of the taxable wage base as determined in accordance with § 28-43-7 has been paid during that calendar year by the employer or the employer’s predecessor to that individual; provided, that if the definition of “wages” as contained in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is amended to include remuneration in excess of the taxable wage base for that employment, then, for the purposes of §§ 28-43-1 — 28-43-14 , “wages” includes the remuneration as previously set forth, up to an amount equal to the dollar limitation specified in the federal act. For the purposes of this subdivision, “employment” includes services constituting employment under any employment security law of another state or of the federal government;
    2. The amount of any payment made to, or on behalf of, an employee under a plan or system established by an employer that makes provision for employees generally, or for a class or classes of employees (including any amount paid by an employer or an employee for insurance or annuities, or into a fund, to provide for any such payment), on account of:
      1. Retirement;
      2. Sickness or accident disability;
      3. Medical and hospitalization expenses in connection with sickness or accident disability; or
      4. Death; provided, that the employee has not the:
        1. Option to receive, instead of provision for that death benefit, any part of that payment or, if that death benefit is insured, any part of the premiums (or contributions to premiums) paid by the individual’s employer; and
        2. Right, under the provisions of the plan or system or policy of insurance providing for that death benefit, to assign that benefit, or to receive a cash consideration in lieu of that benefit either upon the employee’s withdrawal from the plan or system providing for that benefit or upon termination of the plan or system or policy of insurance, or of the individual’s employment with that employer;
      5. The payment by an employer (without deduction from the remuneration of the employee) of:
        1. The tax imposed upon an employee under 26 U.S.C. § 3101; or
        2. Any payment required from an employee under chapters 42 — 44 of this title;
    3. Any amount paid by an employee, or an amount paid by an employer, under a benefit plan organized under the Internal Revenue Code [26 U.S.C. § 125].
  27. “Week” means the seven-day (7) calendar week beginning on Sunday at 12:01 A.M. and ending on Saturday at 12:00 A.M. midnight.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 3; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 1; P.L. 1944, ch. 1430, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1970, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2173, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2206, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2359, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2536, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2537, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2837, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2839, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2840, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3420, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3422, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3423, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3424, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3550, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-3 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 188, § 1; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 214, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1960, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1975, ch. 21, art. 1, § 1; art. 2, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 295, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 296, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 297, § 2; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 312, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 173, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 18; P.L. 1992, ch. 180, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 17; P.L. 1998, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 294, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 90, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 90; P.L. 2003, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 112, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 17, § 1, effective May 21, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 18, § 1, effective May 21, 2021; P.L. 2022, ch. 117, § 1, effective June 21, 2022; P.L. 2022, ch. 118, § 1, effective June 21, 2022.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

P.L. 2003, ch. 111, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 112, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

The internal subsection references in this section have been updated as a result of the 2014 amendment which renumbered several subsections.

P.L. 2021, ch. 17, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 18, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

P.L. 2022, ch. 117, § 1, and P.L. 2022, ch. 118, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2022, ch. 117, § 1, and P.L. 2022, ch. 118, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Definition of terms for temporary disability insurance law, § 28-39-2 .

Department of labor and training, § 42-16.1-1 et seq.

Private nonvested pension benefits, § 28-46-1 et seq.

Federal Act References.

The bracketed reference to the United States Code in paragraph (29)(iii) was inserted by the compiler.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Benefits.

Because the hospital did not have benefits at issue before the board, as the hospital was never in the position of receiving compensation for lost wages, which was required under the definition of benefits under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-42-3(4) , the amount for purposes of calculation of attorneys fees under R.I. Gen. Laws , § 28-44-57(b) is limited to the amount the claimants collected. Arnold v. R.I. DOL & Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2003).

Employee.

Cab lessees were not employees of the lessor where not subject to the control of the lessor in their operations and not required to account for or report their receipts to the lessor. Mt. Pleasant Cab Co. v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Bd., 73 R.I. 7 , 53 A.2d 485, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1947).

Employing Unit.

Orchestra leader who hired, paid and controlled musicians qualified as an employing unit with respect to the musicians even though the contract with the hotel where the orchestra played described the leader as an employee. Trinity Bldg. Corp. v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Bd., 76 R.I. 408 , 71 A.2d 505, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1950).

Employment.

For Employment Security Act to apply, service or services performed by a person for wages must be performed for an employer with a consequent obligation by the employer to pay the employee therefor. H. J. Bernard Realty Co. v. Director of Employment Sec., 104 R.I. 651 , 248 A.2d 245, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 701 (1968).

Real estate salesmen’s working connection with real estate company was not employment, and sale commissions received by them were not wages within the meaning of subsections (7) and (17), respectively, of this section, where independent salesmen merely received listings and office space from company and, in return, shared portion of their commissions with company. H. J. Bernard Realty Co. v. Director of Employment Sec., 104 R.I. 651 , 248 A.2d 245, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 701 (1968) (decision under section as it existed prior to 1963 amendment to § 28-42-8 which excluded from its operation a real estate salesman whose sole remuneration is the commission he receives on a sale of property).

Services rendered by an officer of a corporation acting within the scope of his office are not compensable in the absence of an agreement providing otherwise, thus, the officer of a corporation who only signed checks discharging corporate liability was not an employee of the corporation for purposes of the Employment Security Act, and was thus not entitled to receive unemployment compensation. Rector v. Director of Dep't of Employment Sec., 120 R.I. 802 , 390 A.2d 370, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 715 (1978).

Self-Employment.

Where the claimant for unemployment benefits owned a business, which made $1460.70 in profits the preceding year, but there was no evidence in the record to show that the claimant received either wages or profits during the period in question, the court found that claimant was not self-employed under subdivision (15) (now see (28)) and that he qualified for benefits. Gesualdi v. Board of Review, 118 R.I. 399 , 374 A.2d 102, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1475 (1977).

Without earning some form of income through wages or profits, a person, even if self-employed, still qualifies as totally unemployed under subsection (15) (now see (28)) of this section. Dumont v. Hackett, 120 R.I. 818 , 390 A.2d 374, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 716 (1978).

Where an applicant for unemployment benefits received no wages or profits from a corporation, even if it is assumed that he was self-employed, he would still qualify for unemployment benefits. Dumont v. Hackett, 120 R.I. 818 , 390 A.2d 374, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 716 (1978).

Services.

Uncompensated work an applicant for unemployment benefits did for a corporation in his fruitless efforts to get it customers was not “services” within the meaning of subsection (15) of this section. Dumont v. Hackett, 120 R.I. 818 , 390 A.2d 374, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 716 (1978).

Taxable Wages.

The definition of taxable wages under this section does not parallel the definition of wages taxable under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Imperial Prods. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Employment Sec., 576 A.2d 1210, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 124 (R.I. 1990).

Total Unemployment.

Where an applicant for unemployment benefits was merely seeking work for his corporation, which was not essentially different from his efforts to find work for himself and for which he received no compensation, he was “totally unemployed” within the requirements of this subsection. Dumont v. Hackett, 120 R.I. 818 , 390 A.2d 374, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 716 (1978).

Where claimant was continually engaged in the practice of law, he was neither unemployed nor available for other employment and therefore was ineligible under the provisions of §§ 28-42-3(15) (now (28)) and 28-44-12 . Berberian v. Department of Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d 480, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1635 (R.I. 1980).

— Timing.

Consistent with the plain language of this section an individual may became totally unemployed as of the date he takes a leave without pay, not as of the date he is subsequently fired from his employment. DePetrillo v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 623 A.2d 31, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 110 (R.I. 1993).

Collateral References.

Alien’s right to benefits. 87 A.L.R.3d 694.

Employment units which are affiliated or under a common control, validity, construction, and application of provisions of unemployment compensation acts as to. 142 A.L.R. 918; 158 A.L.R. 1237.

Insurance agents or salesmen as within coverage. 39 A.L.R.3d 872.

Receiver as within unemployment compensation acts. 143 A.L.R. 984.

What constitutes “agricultural” or “farm” labor within social security or unemployment compensation acts. 60 A.L.R.5th 459.

28-42-4. Services performed partly outside state.

“Employment” includes an individual’s entire service, performed within or both within and without this state, if:

  1. The service is localized in this state; or
  2. The service is not localized in any state but some of the service is performed in this state and
    1. The base of operations, or, if there is no base of operations, then the place from which the service is directed or controlled, is in this state; or
    2. The base of operations or place from which that service is directed or controlled is not in any state in which some part of the service is performed but the individual’s residence is in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 3; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Estoppel.

Where there was evidence that, pursuant to agreement between a representative of the department of employment security and a labor union of which the claimant was a member, claimant had obtained forms from the department to enable his Massachusetts employers to make contributions to the Rhode Island employment security fund and contended that the department was estopped to question the status of his Massachusetts employment as covered employment, the commission should have considered and made a finding on the question of estoppel thus raised. Ferrelli v. Department of Employment Sec., 106 R.I. 588 , 261 A.2d 906, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 960 (1970).

Collateral References.

Unemployment compensation benefits where, during the base year, employee worked in different states for same employer. 9 A.L.R.2d 646.

28-42-5. Localized service defined.

Service is deemed to be localized within a state if:

  1. The service is performed entirely within that state; or
  2. The service is performed both within and out of that state, but the service performed out of that state is incidental to the individual’s service within the state; for example, is temporary or transitory in nature or consists of isolated transactions.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Estoppel.

Where there was evidence that, pursuant to agreement between a representative of the department of employment security and a labor union of which the claimant was a member, claimant had obtained forms from the department to enable his Massachusetts employers to make contributions to the Rhode Island employment security fund and contended that the department was estopped to question the status of his Massachusetts employment as covered employment, the commission should have considered and made a finding on the question of estoppel thus raised. Ferrelli v. Department of Employment Sec., 106 R.I. 588 , 261 A.2d 906, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 960 (1970).

28-42-6. Service by residents performed entirely outside state.

Services not covered under § 28-42-4 and performed entirely out of this state, with respect to no part of which contributions are required and paid under an unemployment compensation law of any other state or of the federal government, shall be deemed to be employment subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title if the individual performing those services is a resident of this state and the director approves the election of the employing unit for whom those services are performed, that the entire service of that individual shall be deemed to be employment subject to those chapters.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-6 .

28-42-6.1. Service by U.S. citizens performed outside United States for American employer.

  1. The services of an individual, who is a citizen of the United States, performed outside the United States (except in Canada) after December 31, 1971, or after December 31, 1977 in the case of the Virgin Islands, in the employ of an American employer (other than service which is deemed “employment” under §§ 28-42-4 28-42-6 , or the parallel provisions of another state’s law) shall be deemed to be employment subject to chapters 42 — 44 if:
    1. The employer’s principal place of business in the United States is located in this state;
    2. The employer has no place of business in the United States, but the employer is:
      1. An individual who is a resident of this state;
      2. A corporation which is organized under the laws of this state; or
      3. A partnership or a trust and the number of the partners or trustees who are residents of this state is greater than the number who are residents of any one other state; or
    3. None of the criteria of subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection is met, but the employer has elected coverage in this state, or the employer having failed to elect coverage in any state, the individual has filed a claim for benefits, based on that service, under the law of this state.
  2. An “American employer,” for the purposes of this section, means a person who is:
    1. An individual who is a resident of the United States;
    2. A partnership if two-thirds (2/3) or more of the partners are residents of the United States;
    3. A trust, if all of the trustees are residents of the United States; or
    4. A corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state.
  3. “United States,” for the purposes of this section, includes the states, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 7; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 2.

28-42-7. Independent contractor and employee distinguished.

The determination of independent contractor or employee status for purposes of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be the same as those factors used by the Internal Revenue Service in its code and regulations.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-7 ; P.L. 1998, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 334, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cab Lessees.

Cab lessees were not made employees by failure to meet the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) where they did not perform services for or receive wages from the lessor. Mt. Pleasant Cab Co. v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Bd., 73 R.I. 7 , 53 A.2d 485, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1947).

Commission Salesmen.

This section had no application where service rendered by real estate salesmen in business connection with real estate company did not fall within the definition of the term “employment” in § 28-42-3(7) (now (17)). H. J. Bernard Realty Co. v. Director of Employment Sec., 104 R.I. 651 , 248 A.2d 245, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 701 (1968) (decision under section as it existed prior to 1963 amendment to § 28-42-8 which excluded from its operation a real estate salesman whose sole remuneration is the commission he receives on a sale of property).

Musicians.

Failure to meet the requirements of paragraph (2) did not make musicians the employees at the hotel where they played, where they were hired and paid by and subject to the control of an independent contractor who qualified as an employing unit under paragraph (5) (now (16)) of § 28-42-3 . Trinity Bldg. Corp. v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Bd., 76 R.I. 408 , 71 A.2d 505, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1950).

Collateral References.

Employee’s control or ownership of corporation as precluding receipt of benefits under state unemployment compensation provisions. 23 A.L.R.5th 176.

Independent contractor distinguished from employee within unemployment compensation act. 124 A.L.R. 682.

Independent contractor or subcontractor, what work of is so related to the trade, business, or occupation of principal employer as to satisfy the condition in that regard of provisions of unemployment compensation act making employer responsible in respect of employees of contractor. 150 A.L.R. 1214.

Independent contractor relationship, tests of. 134 A.L.R. 1029; 147 A.L.R. 828.

Industrial home workers as within unemployment compensation act. 143 A.L.R. 418.

Insurance agents or salesmen as within coverage of social security or unemployment compensation acts. 39 A.L.R.3d 872.

Musicians or other entertainers as employees of hotel or restaurant in which they perform, within the meaning of the unemployment compensation act. 158 A.L.R. 915; 172 A.L.R. 325.

Outside pieceworkers as within unemployment compensation act. 1 A.L.R.2d 555.

Own projects or activities, right to unemployment compensation of one working on. 65 A.L.R.2d 1182.

Salesman on commission as within unemployment compensation act. 29 A.L.R.2d 751; 29 A.L.R.2d 752.

Self-employment provisions of social security or unemployment compensation laws, construction and application. 65 A.L.R.2d 1182.

Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or independent contractor, within social security and unemployment insurance statutes. 10 A.L.R.2d 369.

Trucker as employee or independent contractor for purposes of unemployment compensation. 2 A.L.R.4th 1219.

Vendor-vendee or lessor-lessee relationship, what amounts to, as distinguished from employment or service relation within unemployment compensation act. 152 A.L.R. 520; 164 A.L.R. 1411.

28-42-8. Exemptions from “employment.”

“Employment” does not include:

  1. Domestic service in a private home performed for a person who did not pay cash remuneration of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more in any calendar quarter after December 31, 1977, in the current calendar year, or the preceding calendar year to individuals employed in that domestic service in a private home;
  2. Service performed by an individual in the employ of a sole proprietorship or LLC single member filing as a sole proprietorship with the IRS for his or her son, daughter, or spouse, and service performed by a child under the age of eighteen (18) in the employ of his or her father or mother who is designated as a sole proprietorship or LLC single-member filing as a sole proprietorship with the IRS, and service is performed by an individual under the age of eighteen (18) in the employ of a partnership or LLC partnership consisting only of his or her parents or domestic partners;
  3. Service performed in the employ of any other state, or any of its political subdivisions, the United States government, an instrumentality of any other state or states or their political subdivisions, or of an instrumentality of the United States, except, that if the Congress of the United States permits states to require any instrumentalities of the United States to make payments into an unemployment fund under a state unemployment compensation act, then, to the extent permitted by Congress, and from and after the date as of which permission becomes effective, all of the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be applicable to those instrumentalities and to services performed for those instrumentalities, in the same manner, to the same extent, and on the same terms, as to all other employers, employing units, individuals, and services. If this state is not certified by the Secretary of Labor under 26 U.S.C. § 3304 for any year, then the payments required of those instrumentalities with respect to that year shall be deemed to have been erroneously collected within the meaning of § 28-43-12 and shall be refunded by the director from the fund in accordance with § 28-43-12 ;
  4. Service performed:
    1. In the employ of:
      1. A church or convention or association of churches or
      2. An organization that is operated primarily for religious purposes and that is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church, or convention, or association of churches;
    2. By a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his or her ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by that order;
    3. In a facility conducted for the purpose of carrying out a program of rehabilitation for individuals whose earning capacity is impaired by age, physical or mental deficiency, or injury or providing remunerative work for individuals who, because of their impaired physical or mental capacity, cannot be readily absorbed in the competitive labor market, by an individual receiving that rehabilitation or remunerative work;
    4. As part of an unemployment work relief or work-training program assisted or financed in whole, or in part, by any federal agency or an agency of a state or one of its political subdivisions, by an individual receiving that work relief or work training;
    5. In the employ of a hospital by a patient of the hospital; or
    6. By an inmate of a custodial or penal institution;
  5. Service with respect to which unemployment compensation is payable under an unemployment compensation system established by an act of Congress. The director is authorized and directed to enter into agreements with the proper agencies under that act of Congress, which agreements shall become effective ten (10) days after their publication as in the manner provided in § 28-42-34 , to provide reciprocal treatment to individuals who have, after acquiring potential rights to benefits under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, acquired rights to unemployment compensation under that act of Congress, or who have, after acquiring potential rights to unemployment compensation under that act of Congress, acquired rights to benefits under those chapters;
  6. Service covered by an election duly approved by the agency charged with the administration of any other state or federal employment security law in accordance with an arrangement pursuant to § 28-42-58 during the effective period of that election, except as provided in § 28-42-3(16)(i) ;
  7. Services performed by an individual, in any calendar quarter on or after January 1, 1972, in the employ of any organization exempt from income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (other than services performed for an organization defined in § 28-42-3(25) or for any organization described in 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) or under 26 U.S.C. § 521) if the remuneration for that service is less than fifty dollars ($50.00);
  8. Service that is occasional, incidental, and occurs irregularly, and is not in the course of the employing unit’s trade or business. Service for a corporation shall not be excluded;
  9. Service as a golf caddy, except as to service performed solely for a club with respect to which the club alone bears the expense. A golf caddy, except as in this specifically provided subdivision, shall not be construed to be an “employee” as defined in § 28-42-3(15) ;
  10. Notwithstanding any provisions of titles 5 and 27, service performed by an individual as a real estate salesperson if all the service performed by that individual is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission;
  11. Notwithstanding any provisions of titles 5 and 27, service performed by an individual as an insurance broker, agent, or subagent if all the service performed by that individual is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission. This exemption shall not apply to service performed as industrial and debit insurance agents;
  12. Service performed by an individual who is enrolled at a nonprofit or public educational institution that normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regular organized body of students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are carried on, as a student in a full-time program, taken for credit at that institution that combines academic instruction with work experience, if that service is an integral part of that program, and that institution has so certified to the employer, except that this subdivision shall not apply to service performed in a program established for, or on behalf of, an employer or group of employers;
  13. Service performed by an individual on a boat engaged in catching fish or other forms of aquatic animal life under an arrangement with the owner or operator of that boat pursuant to which:
    1. That individual does not receive any cash remuneration other than a share of the boat’s catch of fish or other forms of aquatic animal life or a share of the proceeds from the sale of that catch; and
    2. The operating crew of that boat is normally made up of fewer than ten (10) individuals;
  14. Services performed by a member of an Americorps program; and
  15. Services performed by a self-employed individual.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 3; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3421, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1955, ch. 3428, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-8 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 27, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 114, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, §§ 3, 4; P.L. 1974, ch. 275, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 3; P.L. 1980, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 61, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 277, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 15, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Internal references to subdivisions in § 28-42-3 have been updated as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Exemptions.
— Religious Organizations.

This section does not manifest any governmental intent or purpose to advance or promote religion. Instead, the statute reflects the wholly secular purpose of the facilitation of the administration of the unemployment benefits programs by excluding employees who are typically not fully active or permanent members of the workforce. Rojas v. Fitch, 928 F. Supp. 155, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8122 (D.R.I. 1996), aff'd, 127 F.3d 184, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27932 (1st Cir. 1997).

There is no fundamental right to the payment of unemployment benefits, and there is no suspect or quasi-suspect classification involved. Accordingly, in order to withstand an equal protection challenge, the exemption for religious organizations in § 28-42-8 need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Rojas v. Fitch, 928 F. Supp. 155, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8122 (D.R.I. 1996), aff'd, 127 F.3d 184, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27932 (1st Cir. 1997).

Collateral References.

“Agricultural labor” or “farm labor,” what constitutes, within Unemployment Compensation. 53 A.L.R.2d 406.

Exemption of corporations or institutions of a religious, charitable, or educational character, construction and application of provisions of unemployment compensation act as to. 155 A.L.R. 369.

Political party liability for contributions. 43 A.L.R.3d 1351.

State banks, insurance companies, or building and loan associations, which are members of federal reserve bank or similar federal agency, or national banks, as within state unemployment compensation acts. 145 A.L.R. 1074; 165 A.L.R. 1250.

Validity and construction of domestic service provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.). 165 A.L.R. Fed. 163.

What constitutes “agricultural” or “farm” labor within social security or unemployment compensation acts. 60 A.L.R.5th 459.

28-42-9. Maritime services.

For the purpose of establishing coverage of maritime services rendered on, or in connection with, vessels, the provisions of §§ 28-42-4 and 28-42-5 and those of the Interstate Maritime Reciprocal Agreement shall apply.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1943, ch. 1365, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-9 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 5.

Collateral References.

Who is “member of a crew” within meaning of social security and unemployment compensation laws. 161 A.L.R. 842.

28-42-10. Services performed by students.

“Employment” does not include services performed in the employ of a school, college, or university, by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at that school, college, or university.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-10 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 103, § 1.

Collateral References.

What constitutes a “part-time worker” school student excluded from coverage of unemployment compensation or insurance acts. 95 A.L.R.3d 891.

28-42-11. Employees of agents and contractors of employing units.

  1. Whenever any employing unit contracts with or has under it any contractor or subcontractor for any work which is part of its usual trade, occupation, profession, or business, unless the employing unit, as well as each contractor or subcontractor, is an employer by reason of § 28-42-3(16) , the employing unit shall for all the purposes of chapters 42 — 44 of this title be deemed to employ each individual in the employ of each contractor or subcontractor for each day during which that individual is engaged in performing that work; except that each contractor who is an employer by reason of § 28-42-3(16) shall alone be liable for contributions measured by wages paid to individuals in his or her employ, and except that any employing unit who becomes liable for and pays contributions with respect to individuals in the employ of any contractor or subcontractor who is not an employer by reason of § 28-42-3(16), may recover the contributions from that contractor or subcontractor.
  2. Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing the work of any agent or employee of an employing unit shall be deemed to be employed by that employing unit for all the purposes of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, whether that individual was hired or paid directly by that employing unit or by that agent or employee, provided the employing unit had actual or constructive knowledge of the work.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 3; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-11 .

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(15) was changed to 28-42-3(16) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Employing Unit.

Orchestra leader was an independent contractor and qualified as an employing unit, so as to relieve the hotel where his orchestra played from liability for contributions for the musicians, where the leader hired, paid and controlled the musicians, even though the contract with the hotel described the leader as an employee. Trinity Bldg. Corp. v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Bd., 76 R.I. 408 , 71 A.2d 505, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1950).

28-42-12. Election by exempt employer to become subject to provisions.

Any employing unit for which services are performed that do not constitute employment as defined in this chapter, may file a written election with the director that all services performed by individuals in its employ in one or more distinct establishments or places of business, shall be deemed to constitute employment for all the purposes of chapters 42 — 44 of this title for not less than two (2) calendar years. Upon the written approval of that election by the director, those services shall be deemed to constitute employment subject to those chapters from the date stated in the approval. Those services shall cease to be deemed employment subject to these chapters as of January 1 of any calendar year subsequent to those two (2) calendar years, only if not later than January 31 of that calendar year, either that employing unit has filed with the director a written notice to that effect, or the director on his or her own motion has given notice of termination of that coverage.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 3; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3422, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-12 .

Collateral References.

Election to be subject to unemployment compensation act by employer otherwise not within act. 158 A.L.R. 601.

28-42-13. State employees.

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the state and its instrumentalities shall be deemed to be employing units and services performed in the employ of the state and its instrumentalities shall be deemed to constitute employment subject to those chapters with the exception set forth in § 28-42-14 . Except as otherwise provided herein, all other provisions of these chapters shall continue to be applicable.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 23; P.L. 1955, ch. 3428, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-13 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 4.

Cross References.

Contributions payable by state, § 28-43-24 .

28-42-13.1. Employees of political subdivisions, their instrumentalities and other governmental entities.

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the political subdivisions of the state and the instrumentalities of those political subdivisions and all other governmental entities as defined in § 28-42-3(22) shall be deemed to be employing units. Service performed in the employ of those governmental entities shall be deemed to constitute employment subject to those chapters with the exception set forth in § 28-42-14 . Except as otherwise provided herein, all other provisions of those chapters shall continue to be applicable.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(21) was changed to 28-42-3(22) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

28-42-14. Employees of governmental entities.

For the purposes of §§ 28-42-13 and 28-42-13.1 , “employment” does not include services performed in the employ of a “governmental entity” as defined in § 28-42-3(22) by an individual in the exercise of duties:

  1. As an elected official;
  2. As a member of a legislative body, or a member of the judiciary of a state or political subdivision;
  3. As a member of the national guard or air national guard;
  4. As an employee serving on a temporary basis in case of fire, storm, snow, earthquake, flood, or similar emergency; or
  5. In a position which, under or pursuant to the laws of this state, is designated as a:
    1. Major non-tenure policymaking or advisory position; or
    2. Policymaking or advisory position, the performance of the duties of which ordinarily does not require more than eight (8) hours per week.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 23; P.L. 1955, ch. 3428, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-14 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 6; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(21) was changed to 28-42-3(22) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

28-42-14.1. Treatment of Indian tribes.

  1. “Employer” includes any Indian tribe for which service in employment as defined under chapters 42 — 44 of this title is performed.
  2. “Employment” includes service performed in the employ of an Indian tribe, as defined in section 3306(u) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. § 3306(u), provided the service is excluded from “employment” as defined in FUTA solely by reason of section 3306(c)(7), FUTA, 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(7), and is not otherwise excluded from “employment” under chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, the exclusions from employment in § 28-42-14 shall be applicable to service performed in the employ of an Indian tribe.
  3. Benefits based on service in employment defined in this section shall be payable in the same amount, on the same terms and subject to the same conditions as benefits payable on the basis of other service required to be covered under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    1. Indian tribes or tribal units (subdivisions, subsidiaries or business enterprises wholly owned by such Indian tribes) subject to the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall pay contributions under the same terms and conditions as all other subject employers, unless they elect to pay into the employment security fund amounts equal to the amount of benefits attributable to service in the employ of the Indian tribe.
    2. Indian tribes electing to make payments in lieu of contributions must make that election in the same manner and under the same conditions as provided in §§ 28-43-24 28-43-31 pertaining to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations subject to the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title. Indian tribes will determine if reimbursement for benefits paid will be elected by the tribe as a whole, by individual tribal units, or by combinations of individual tribal units.
    3. Indian tribes or tribal units will be billed for the full amount of benefits attributable to service in the employ of the Indian tribe or tribal unit on the same schedule as other employing units that have elected to make payments in lieu of contributions.
    4. At the discretion of the director, any Indian tribe or tribal unit that elects to become liable for payments in lieu of contributions shall be required within thirty (30) days after the effective date of its election, to:
      1. execute and file with the director a surety bond approved by the director; or
      2. deposit with the director money or securities on the same basis as other employers with the same election option.
    1. (i) Failure of the Indian tribe or tribal unit to make required payments, including assessments of interest and penalty, within ninety (90) days of receipt of the bill will cause the Indian tribe to lose the option to make payments in lieu of contributions, as described in subsection (d), for the following tax year unless payment in full is received before contribution rates for next tax year are computed.
      1. Failure of the Indian tribe or any of its tribal units to make required payments, including assessments of interest and penalty, after all collection activities deemed necessary by the director have been exhausted, will cause services performed for that tribe to not be treated as “employment” for purposes of subsection (b) of this section.
      2. The director may determine that any Indian tribe that loses coverage under paragraph (i) of this subdivision may have services performed for that tribe again included as “employment” for purposes of subsection (b) of this section if all contributions, payments in lieu of contributions, penalties and interest have been paid.
      3. The director will notify the United States Internal Revenue Service and the United States Department of Labor of any termination or reinstatement of coverage made under paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subdivision.

    (ii) Indian tribe that loses the option to make payments in lieu of contributions due to late payment or nonpayment, as described in paragraph (i) of this subdivision, shall have that option reinstated if, after a period of one year, all contributions have been made timely, provided no contributions, payments in lieu of contributions for benefits paid, penalties or interest remain outstanding.

  4. Notices of payment and reporting delinquency to Indian tribes or their tribal units shall include information that failure to make full payment within the prescribed time frame:
    1. Will cause the Indian tribe to be liable for taxes under FUTA;
    2. Will cause the Indian tribe to lose the option to make payments in lieu of contributions;
    3. Could cause the Indian tribe to be excepted from the definition of “employer,” as provided in subsection (a) of this section, and services in the employ of the Indian tribe, as provided in subsection (b) of this section, to be excepted from “employment.”
  5. Extended benefits paid under the provisions of § 28-44-62 that are attributable to service in the employ of an Indian tribe and not reimbursed by the federal government shall be financed in their entirety by the Indian tribe.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 254, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment restructured the subdivision designations in (e).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2001, ch. 254, § 2, provides that this section shall take effect upon passage [July 13, 2001] and shall be given retroactive effect as of December 21, 2000.

In 2001, the compiler redesignated the paragraphs in subsections (d) and (e) and made stylistic changes throughout the section.

Federal Act References.

The bracketed references to the United States Code in subsections (b) and (f)(1) were inserted by the compiler.

28-42-15 — 28-42-17. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 24; P.L. 1955, ch. 3428, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 6; P.L. 1974, ch. 262, § 1), concerning officers and employees of political subdivisions, were repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 92, §§ 6-8, effective January 1, 1978.

28-42-18. Establishment of fund.

  1. There is created the employment security fund, to be administered by the director without liability on the part of the state beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the fund. This fund shall consist of:
    1. All contributions paid pursuant to §§ 28-43-16 28-43-22 ;
    2. All other moneys paid into and received by the fund;
    3. Property and securities acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging to the fund;
    4. Interest earned upon the money belonging to the fund; and
    5. All money credited to this state’s account in the unemployment trust fund pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1103.
    6. Advances from the general fund, authorized by the governor and the director of administration, for the purpose of repaying loans outstanding from the federal government or for paying unemployment insurance benefits due to avoid borrowing from the federal government in a given fiscal year. However, all such advances made to the fund shall be repaid to the general fund, with interest as determined by the general treasurer, within the same fiscal year.
  2. All moneys in the fund shall be mingled and undivided.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-18 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 25; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 14, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 145, art. 11, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Status of Fund.

Invalidated class legislation which had discriminated against women making a dependency claim for children does not enjoy retroactive application immunity under the 11th amendment to the constitution, which does not constitute a bar to the type of relief requested by plaintiffs, to wit, payment of retroactive benefits for dependents, as the fund is independent of the sovereign and does not enjoy its immunities. Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14329 (D.R.I. 1975).

28-42-19. Disbursements from fund.

The fund shall be administered and used solely to pay benefits upon vouchers drawn on the fund by the director pursuant to regulations adopted as subsequently prescribed and no other disbursement shall be made from them except as provided in §§ 28-42-21 , 28-42-22 , and 28-43-13 . Those regulations shall be governed by and be consistent with any applicable constitutional requirements, but the procedure prescribed by those rules shall be deemed to satisfy and shall be in lieu of any and all statutory requirements for specific appropriation or other formal release by state officers of state moneys prior to their expenditure which might otherwise be applicable to withdrawals from the fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-19 .

28-42-20. Treasurer of fund — Bond — Subordinates or employees.

The general treasurer shall be custodian and treasurer of the fund and shall pay all vouchers duly authenticated and drawn upon the fund. He or she shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the fund and not otherwise held or deposited or invested pursuant to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. The general treasurer shall give bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian and treasurer of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in amount specified by the director and approved by the governor. All premiums upon bonds required pursuant to this section when furnished by an authorized surety company or by a duly constituted governmental bonding fund shall be paid from the employment security administration account. The general treasurer shall deposit the moneys in his or her custody subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For the proper performance of the duties imposed by this section the general treasurer shall assign any subordinates or employees to the department of labor and training that he or she shall deem necessary, which subordinates and/or employees shall be within the classified service and shall be paid out of funds made available to the department for administrative purposes.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2811, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-20 .

28-42-21. Deposits in and requisitions from unemployment trust fund.

All money received by the director for the employment security fund established by this chapter shall, upon receipt, be deposited by the director in a clearance account in a bank, in this state, designated as a federal depositary under regulations adopted as subsequently prescribed. The cleared balances in that account shall be promptly transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the account of this state in the unemployment trust fund established by 42 U.S.C. § 1104, as long as this fund exists. The director shall from time to time requisition from the unemployment trust fund necessary amounts which shall be used solely for the payments of benefits, except that money credited to this state’s account pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1103 may, upon an appropriation duly made by the legislature, be used for the administration of this law, subject to the limitations contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1103, and shall for this purpose be requisitioned as needed for the payment of obligations incurred under that appropriation and deposited in the employment security administration account from which that payment shall be made.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2275, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-21 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 70, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-42-22. Requisitions from trust fund for temporary disability insurance fund.

The director shall also from time to time requisition from the unemployment trust fund any amounts of money that shall be equal to the amount of employee payments already contributed to the fund by employees of the state, and the director shall deposit the moneys upon requisition into the temporary disability insurance fund created under § 28-39-4 , solely for the purpose of payment of cash benefits to individuals with respect to their disability, exclusive of expenses of administration.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2275, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2841, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-22 .

28-42-23. Unclaimed or unpaid moneys from unemployment trust fund.

Any balance of moneys requisitioned from the unemployment trust fund for the payment of benefits which remains unclaimed or unpaid after the expiration of the period for which those sums were requisitioned shall either be deducted from estimates for, and may be utilized for the payment of, benefits during succeeding periods or, in the discretion of the director, shall be re-deposited with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, to the credit of this state’s account in the unemployment trust fund, as provided herein.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2275, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-23 .

28-42-24. Custody and investment of fund or discontinuance of unemployment trust fund.

Sections 28-42-18 28-42-23 , to the extent that they relate to the unemployment trust fund, shall be operative only so long as that unemployment trust fund continues to exist and so long as the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States continues to maintain for this state a separate book account of all funds deposited in that fund by this state for benefit purposes, together with this state’s proportionate share of the earnings of that unemployment trust fund, from which no other state is permitted to make withdrawals. If and when that unemployment trust fund ceases to exist, or the separate book account is no longer maintained, all moneys, properties, or securities in it, belonging to the employment security fund of this state shall be requisitioned by the director, and shall be transferred to the general treasurer as the custodian of the fund, who shall hold, invest, transfer, sell, deposit, and release those moneys, properties, or securities in a manner approved by the director in accordance with chapters 42 — 44 of this title. These moneys shall be invested in the classes of securities legal for the investment of public moneys of this state, and this investment shall at all times be so made that all the assets of the fund shall always be readily convertible into cash when needed for the payment of benefits. The treasurer shall dispose of securities or other properties belonging to the employment security fund only under the direction of the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-24 .

Cross References.

State investment commission, § 35-10-1 et seq.

28-42-25. Creation of administration account — Sources.

For the purpose of carrying out chapters 42 — 44 of this title and chapter 102 of title 42 and providing for the administration of these chapters, there is created within the general fund an employment security administration account, referred to as the “administration account,” to consist of all moneys that may from time to time be appropriated by the general assembly, or received from the Secretary of Labor of the United States, the railroad retirement board, or other agency, or that may be transferred from the employment security tardy account fund, or the job development fund, for the administration of those chapters. Moneys received from the railroad retirement board as compensation either for services or for facilities supplied to that board shall be paid into this account. Notwithstanding any provision of this section, all money received in this account for the payment of expenses incurred pursuant to an appropriation duly made by the legislature in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1103 shall remain part of the employment security fund and shall be used only in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1103.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 16; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 16; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 13; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-25 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 70, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 240, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 1.

28-42-26. Disbursements from administration account — Unexpended balance.

The entire cost of administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, including salaries and other necessary expenditures, shall be paid by the director out of the administration account. The general treasurer shall be custodian of the account and shall pay all vouchers duly drawn by the director upon the account, in any amounts and in any manner that the director may prescribe. Vouchers so drawn upon the account shall be referred to the controller within the department of administration. Upon receipt of those vouchers, the controller shall immediately record and sign them and shall promptly transfer those signed vouchers to the general treasurer; provided, that those expenditures shall be used solely for the purposes specified in chapters 42 — 44 of this title and its balances shall not lapse at any time but shall remain continuously available for expenditures consistent with these provisions.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 16; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 16; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 13; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-26 .

28-42-27. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 16; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 16; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 13; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 2, effective July 1, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-42-27 concerned the security bond from general treasurer.

28-42-28. Federal funds for administration.

All federal moneys allotted or apportioned to the state by the Secretary of Labor of the United States, or other federal agency, for the administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be paid into the employment security administration account, which shall be within the general fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 16; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 16; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-28 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 70, § 4; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 1.

28-42-29. Expenditure of administrative funds authorized by Secretary of Labor.

All moneys received by the director from the Secretary of Labor of the United States under Title III of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., or any unencumbered balance of the employment security administration account except money received for the payment of expenses incurred pursuant to an appropriation duly made by the legislature in accordance with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1103, shall be expended by the director solely for the purposes and in the amounts found by the Secretary of Labor to be necessary for the proper and efficient administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1941, ch. 1023, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-29 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 70, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39.

28-42-30. Replacement of unauthorized expenditures from administration account.

If any money received from the Secretary of Labor under Title III of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., or any unencumbered balances in the employment security administration account as of that date, any moneys granted after that date to this state pursuant to the provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq., or any moneys made available by this state or its political subdivisions and matched by the moneys granted to this state pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq., are found by the Secretary of Labor, because of any action or contingency, to have been lost or been expended for purposes other than, or in amounts in excess of, those found necessary by the Secretary of Labor for the proper administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, it is the policy of this state that those moneys shall be replaced by moneys appropriated for those purposes from the general funds of this state to the employment security administration account for expenditures as provided in § 28-42-29 . Upon receipt of notice of this finding by the Secretary of Labor, the director shall promptly report the amount required for that replacement to the governor and the governor shall, at the earliest opportunity, submit to the legislature a request for the appropriation of that amount. This section shall not be construed to relieve this state of its obligations with respect to funds received prior to July 1, 1941, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1941, ch. 1023, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2275, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-30 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 70, § 6; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39.

28-42-31. Responsibility for administration — General powers of director.

It shall be the duty of the director to administer chapters 42 — 44 of this title subject to the provisions of those chapters; and he or she shall have the power and authority to:

  1. Enforce all the reasonable rules and regulations that may be adopted as provided elsewhere in those chapters and all orders necessary or suitable to that end;
  2. Employ any persons;
  3. Make expenditures;
  4. Require reports; and
  5. Take any other action, within his or her means and consistent with those chapters, necessary or suitable to that end.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3292, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-31 .

28-42-32. Annual report — Recommendations.

Annually, by the first day of April, the director shall submit to the governor and to the general assembly a summary report covering the administration and operation of chapters 42 — 44 of this title during the preceding calendar year and making any recommendations that the director may deem proper.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3292, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-32 .

28-42-33. Modifications to protect fund.

  1. Whenever the director believes that a change in contribution and/or benefit rates will become necessary to protect the solvency of the fund, he or she shall at once inform the governor and the general assembly and make recommendations accordingly. In that case, the governor may declare an emergency and authorize the director to announce a modified scale of benefits, an increased waiting period, or other changes in rules and regulations regarding eligibility for payment of benefits which the director may deem necessary to assure the solvency of the fund. Those modified regulations are to be in effect until the governor declares the emergency at an end, or until further action is taken by the general assembly.
  2. The governor may also request Title XII advances from the federal unemployment account to the account of the State of Rhode Island in the unemployment trust fund in accordance with the provisions of Section 1201 of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. § 1321]. The governor may delegate authority to request funds in this manner to the director, who may request advances in payment as he or she deems necessary, provided that upon making such a request, the director shall notify the governor, the speaker of the house, the senate president, the chairman of the house finance committee and the chairman of the senate finance committee of the action taken.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3292, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-33 ; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 8, § 1.

28-42-34. Rules and regulations.

  1. The board of review shall have the power to adopt, amend, modify, and reject general and special rules and regulations interpreting chapters 42 — 44 of this title and establishing policy relative to administrative procedure as proposed by the director. Those general and special rules shall take effect only after a public hearing on them or public notice of them and after filing with the secretary of state. Regulations shall become effective in the manner and at the same time as prescribed by the board.
  2. The board shall have the power and authority to investigate administrative procedure of the department with respect to decisions rendered by the board and the rules and regulations adopted as prescribed. In furtherance of that power and authority, it shall be the duty of the director to make available to the board, upon its request in writing, the records of the department and any other information and evidence that the board shall deem necessary or advisable.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2615, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-34 .

Cross References.

Procedure for adoption of rules, § 42-35-1 et seq.

28-42-35. Publication of statutory text and supplementary material.

The director shall cause to be printed in proper form for distribution to the public the text of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the general and special rules which shall become effective as specified elsewhere in this chapter, his or her annual report to the governor, and any other material the director deems relevant and suitable, and shall furnish these materials to any person upon application for them. Printing and availability upon application shall be deemed a sufficient publication.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-35 .

28-42-36. Personnel of department.

The director is authorized, within his or her means, and in accordance with the State Merit System Act, chapters 3 and 4 of title 36, rules, and regulations to appoint and fix the compensation of any officers, accountants, and other persons that are necessary in the execution of the functions of his or her department. The director shall not employ or pay any person who is serving as an officer or committee member of any political party organization or who is a member of the general assembly. The director, in accordance with the State Merit System Act, chapters 3 and 4 of title 36, rules, and regulations, shall fix the duties and powers of all persons thus employed, and may authorize any person to do any act or acts which could lawfully be done by the director. The director may in his or her discretion bond any person handling moneys or signing checks under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1952, ch. 2975, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-36 .

28-42-37. Advisory council.

  1. The human resource investment council shall establish a state advisory council of eight (8) members. Four (4) of the members shall be appointed by the governor from recommendations made by the human resource investment council; two (2) of those members shall be persons who, because of vocation, employment or affiliation can be classed as employers and two (2) of those members shall be persons who because of vocation, employment or affiliation can be classed as employees. The chair of the house committee on labor, the chair of the senate committee on labor, the executive director of the economic policy council and the director of the department of labor and training shall serve on the council by virtue of their respective positions. The council shall aid the director of the department of labor and training in formulating policies and solving problems relating to the administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and in assuring impartiality, neutrality, and freedom from partisan influence in the solution of those problems.
  2. The council shall provide on or before March 31 of each year to the governor and the general assembly a written report describing its activities.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 3; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-37 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 72, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 226, § 10; P.L. 1982, ch. 414, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 34, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 1.

Cross References.

Termination of statutory entities and licensing authorities, § 22-14-5.3 .

28-42-38. Records and reports — Confidentiality of information.

  1. Every employer and every employing unit employing any person in employment in this state shall keep true and accurate employment records of all persons employed by him or her, and of the weekly hours worked for him or her by each, and of the weekly wages paid by him or her to each person; and every employer and employing unit shall keep records containing any other information that the director may prescribe. Those records shall at all times be available within this state and shall be open to inspection by the director, or his or her authorized representatives, at any reasonable time and as often as the director shall deem necessary.
  2. The director may require from any employer, or employing unit, employing any person in this state, any reports covering persons employed by him or her, on employment, wages, hours, unemployment, and related matters that the director deems necessary to the effective administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    1. Information obtained, or information contained in other records of the department obtained from any individual pursuant to the administration of those chapters, shall be held confidential by the director and shall not be published or be open to public inspection in any manner revealing the individual’s or employing unit’s identity, but any claimant at a hearing provided for in those chapters shall be supplied with information from those records of the extent necessary for the proper presentation of his or her claim. Any department employee guilty of violating this provision shall be subject to the penalties provided in chapters 42 — 44 of this title; provided, that nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prevent:
      1. The director, or any qualified attorney whom the director has designated to represent him or her in any court of this state, or the attorney general from making any record, report, or other information referred to in this section available in any proceeding before any court of this state in any action to which the director is a party;
      2. The director from making any record, report, or other information referred to in this section available to any agency of this state or any agency of a political subdivision of this state charged with the administration of public assistance within this state, or any of its political subdivisions;
      3. The director from making any record, report, or other information referred to in this section available to the railroad retirement board or to employees of the Internal Revenue Service in the performance of their public duties, and the director shall furnish, at the expense of the railroad retirement board or the Internal Revenue Service, copies of those records, reports, or other information referred to in this section;
      4. The director from making available, upon request and on a reimbursable basis, any record, report, or other information referred to in this section to the federal Department of Health and Human Services in accordance with the provisions of United States Pub. L. No. 100-485, Family Support Act of 1988, or to the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development and to authorized representatives of public housing agencies in accordance with the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq.;
      5. The director from making available to the division of taxation, upon request of the tax administrator, any record, report, or other information referred to in chapter 42 of this title for the purposes of compiling the annual unified economic development budget report and performing the requirements under § 42-142-3(e) ; enforcing the provisions of chapter 42 of this title; and/or performing any of its obligations under title 44. The information received by the division of taxation from the department of labor and training pursuant hereto pertaining to an individual employer shall be held confidential and shall not be open to public inspection. Nothing herein shall prohibit the disclosure of statistics and/or statistical data that do not disclose the identity of individual employers and/or the contents of specific returns;
      6. The director from making, and the director shall make, reports in the form and containing any information that the federal Social Security Administration may, from time to time, require, and complying with any provisions that the federal Social Security Administration may, from time to time, find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of those reports. The director shall make available, upon request, to any agency of the United States charged with the administration of public works or assistance through public employment, the name, address, ordinary occupation, and employment status of each recipient of unemployment compensation and a statement of that recipient’s rights to further compensation under that law;
      7. The director from conducting any investigations he or she deems relevant in connection with these provisions;
      8. The director from conducting any investigations he or she deems relevant in connection with the performance of his or her duties pursuant to the administration of chapters 29, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37 and 41 of this title, or from making any record, report, or other information referred to in this section available to the workers’ compensation fraud prevention unit for use in the performance of its duties under § 42-16.1-12 ;
      9. The director from forwarding, and the director shall forward, to the jury commissioner, the names and addresses of all individuals who are receiving unemployment compensation on a yearly basis in accordance with § 9-9-1(e) ;
      10. The director from providing data on unemployment insurance recipients or any other data contained in departmental records that is obtained from an individual, pursuant to the administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, to the department’s designated research partners for the purpose of its workforce data quality and workforce innovation fund initiatives. The provision of these records will be done in accordance with an approved data-sharing agreement between the department and its designated research partners that protects the security and confidentiality of these records and, through procedures, established by protocols, rules, and/or regulations as determined necessary by the director and appropriately established or promulgated;
      11. The director from making available upon request and on a reimbursable basis to the department of corrections, and solely for the purpose of case management and post-release supervision, any record, report, or other information referred to in chapter 42 of this title relating to wages, earnings, professional licenses, work or vocational skills or training, and work history of offenders under the department of corrections’ supervision for the purpose of case management and post-release supervision. The information received by the department of corrections from the department of labor and training pursuant to this subsection shall be held confidential and shall not be open to public inspection. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the disclosure of statistics and/or statistical data that does not disclose the identity of individuals, nor shall it prevent information referred to in this subsection from being available in any proceeding before any court of this state in an action in which an offender’s conditions of probation or obligation to pay restitution and/or costs and fines are the subject of the court proceedings; or
      12. The director from making any record, report, or other information referred to in this section available to the employees’ retirement system of Rhode Island and the office of the general treasurer for the sole purpose of ensuring compliance with §§ 16-16-19 , 16-16-24 , 36-10-17 , 36-10-36 , 45-21-24 , and 45-21-54 .
    2. The director may publish in statistical form the results of any investigations without disclosing the identity of the individuals involved.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-38 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 233, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 379, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 476, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 216, § 9; P.L. 1999, ch. 384, § 9; P.L. 2003, ch. 430, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 16, § 5; P.L. 2013, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 99, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 319, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2003, the compiler substituted “The director” for “Director” and made a minor punctuation change in paragraph (c)(1)(viii).

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

P.L. 2013, ch. 125, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 133, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 99, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 110, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 189, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 319, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Denial of requests for confidential information, § 28-39-21 .

Disclosure of confidential information, § 28-39-22 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Subpoena of Records.

This section would not prevent the superior court, on request from the individual involved, from subpoenaing records that would be competent evidence on a relevant issue before the court. Powers ex rel. Department of Employment Sec. v. Superior Court, 79 R.I. 63 , 82 A.2d 885, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1951).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of statutory provisions requiring filing of payroll reports or other statistics for purposes of unemployment insurance. 174 A.L.R. 410.

28-42-38.1. Quarterly wage reports.

    1. The department of labor and training is designated and constituted the agency within this state charged with the responsibility of collecting quarterly wage information, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7. Each employer shall be required to submit a detailed wage report to the director, for all calendar quarters within thirty (30) days after the end of each quarter in a form and manner prescribed by the director, listing each employee’s name; social security account number; the total amount of wages paid to each employee; and any other information that the director deems necessary. All reports shall be in addition to those now required by the department.
    2. The department will utilize the quarterly wage information that it collects from employers to establish an individual’s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits and to determine the amount and duration of benefits for all new claims filed.
    3. Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title to the contrary, the department may utilize employee quarterly wage information submitted by employers to measure the progress of the state in meeting the performance measures developed in response to United States Public Law 105-220, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (see 29 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq.), further provided however, that the department may verify certain employee quarterly wage information for the local workforce investment board and provide it with the verified data under procedures established by rules and regulations promulgated by the director. The director shall also make the quarterly wage information available, upon request, to the agencies of other states in the performance of their public duties under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 in that state. This information shall be made available only to the extent required by the Secretary of Labor and necessary for the valid administrative needs of the authorized agencies, and all agencies requesting this data shall protect it from unauthorized disclosure. The department shall be reimbursed by the agencies requesting the information for the costs incurred in providing the information.
    4. Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title to the contrary, the department may provide quarterly wage information to the United States Census Bureau for the purpose of participating in a joint local employment dynamics program with the United States Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
    5. Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title to the contrary, the department may provide employee quarterly wage information to the department’s designated research partners for the purpose of its workforce data quality and workforce innovation fund initiatives. The provision of these records will be done in accordance with an approved data-sharing agreement between the department and its designated research partners that protects the security and confidentiality of these records and through procedures established by protocols, rules and/or regulations as determined necessary by the director and appropriately established or promulgated.
  1. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, an employer who or that fails to file a detailed wage report in the manner and at the times required by subsection (a) of this section for any calendar quarter shall pay a penalty of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each failure or refusal to file. An additional penalty of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be assessed for each month the report is delinquent; provided, that this penalty shall not exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00) for any one report. This penalty shall be paid into the employment security tardy account fund and if any employer fails to pay the penalty, when assessed, it shall be collected by civil action as provided in § 28-43-18 .

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 173, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 96, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39; P.L. 2005, ch. 276, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 20, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 31, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 8.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 20, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 31, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 125, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 133, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Federal Act References.

The Workforce Investment Act of 1998, referred to in subdivision (a)(3), is codified primarily as 29 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq., but affects various sections throughout the United States Code.

The Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq., referred to in subsection (a)(3), was repealed, effective July 1, 2015. For comparable provisions, see the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.

28-42-38.2. Income and eligibility verification.

  1. The department of labor and training will participate in the income and eligibility verification procedures as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1302b-7, which provides for the exchange of information among agencies administering federally assisted programs for aid to families with dependent children, Medicaid, food stamps, supplemental security income, unemployment insurance, and any other state program under a plan approved under Title I, X, XIV, or XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., or 1381 et seq., respectively.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, the director will provide, upon request: (1) quarterly wage information to all authorized agencies for income and eligibility verification purposes and, further, to the appropriate state or local child support enforcement agency operating pursuant to a plan described in 42 U.S.C. § 654 which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2) quarterly wage information for child support enforcement purposes to the Department of Health and Human Services in accordance with United States P.L. 100-485, Family Support Act of 1988; and (3) quarterly wage information to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and to authorized representatives of public housing agencies in accordance with the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq. This information shall be made available only to the extent necessary for the valid administrative needs of the authorized agencies and all agencies requesting this data shall protect it from unauthorized disclosures. The department shall be reimbursed by the agencies requesting the information for the costs incurred in providing the information.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 476, § 1.

28-42-38.3. Penalty for unauthorized disclosure.

Any person releasing or procuring the release of quarterly wage information supplied to the department of labor and training by any employer pursuant to this chapter, except as is otherwise specifically authorized by this chapter, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisonment for a term not to exceed one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 231, § 2.

28-42-39. Reports of contracts for services to be rendered within state.

Whenever any employing unit, subject to the provisions of § 28-42-38 , contracts with any employing unit having its principal office or place of business outside this state, for the performance of any work which would require the services of individuals in employment within this state, the employing unit for whom that work is to be performed, pursuant to that contract, shall render a report to the director, in any manner that the director may prescribe, of the existence of that contract.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-39 .

28-42-40. Legislative recommendations — Research and planning.

The director, at his or her discretion, shall recommend to the governor for transmission to the general assembly any action that will tend to aid and promote the prevention of unemployment and as will effect the regularization of employment. The director shall encourage and recommend methods of vocational training, retraining, and guidance, shall make a study of seasonal employment, and shall recommend measures which will promote the reemployment of unemployed workers throughout the state in every way that may be feasible. The director shall cooperate with the Rhode Island economic development corporation and the department of transportation in planning public works projects to be conducted in times of depression and unemployment, and publish the results of investigations and research studies.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2732, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-40 .

28-42-41. Legal representation of state.

On the request of the director or the board of review, the attorney general shall represent the director or the board and the state in any court action relating to chapters 42 — 44 of this title or their administration and enforcement, except as special counsel may be designated by the director with the approval of the governor and except as otherwise provided in those chapters.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-41 .

28-42-42. Agent for cooperation with federal government, states, and territories.

  1. The director is designated as the agent within this state charged with the responsibility of cooperating in all necessary respects with the appropriate agencies and departments of the federal government in the administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, or in the administration of any law of either this state or the United States relating to free public employment offices, or relating to payment of employment security benefits under any law of the United States.
  2. He or she is further authorized to make those investigations, obtain and transmit that information, make available those services and facilities, including entering into arrangement for them, and exercise those of the other powers provided with respect to the administration of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, as he or she deems necessary or appropriate to facilitate the administration of any state, territorial, or federal unemployment insurance or public employment service law, including the taking of claims and the payment of benefits, and in like manner, accept and utilize information, services, and facilities made available to the state by the agency charged with the administration of any other employment security or public employment service law. The director is authorized and directed, subject to § 28-42-38 , to make all reports requested by any directly interested federal agency or department, and to enter in any agreement with that agency or department, relative to the administration of those laws in this state, and to accept any sums of money, pursuant to those agreements, and to accept any sums of money allotted or appropriated to the director or to this state for that administration, and to comply with all reasonable federal regulations governing the expenditure of that money.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-42 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 108, § 1.

28-42-43. Acceptance of federal provisions.

The state of Rhode Island accepts the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq., in conformity with 29 U.S.C. § 49c, and will observe and comply with the requirements of that Act.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 21; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 14; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-43 .

28-42-44. Cooperation with federal employment service.

The department of labor and training is designated and constituted the agency within this state charged with the responsibility of cooperating with the United States employment service.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 21; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 14; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-44 .

28-42-45. Agreements as to employment offices.

For the purpose of the establishment, maintenance, and use of free public employment offices in this state, the director is authorized to enter into agreements with any agency of the United States charged with the administration of an unemployment compensation law, with any political subdivision of this state, or with any private nonprofit organization, and as part of that agreement the director may accept for his or her use services or quarters, or the director may accept as contributions to the administration account moneys made available to him or her for the purposes of this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-45 .

28-42-46. Maintenance of employment offices.

It shall be the duty of the director to administer a system of public employment offices for the purpose of assisting employers to secure employees and workers to secure employment. The director is given full power to do and perform all things necessary to secure to this state the benefits provided by the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. All duties in connection with the federal act in relation to reemployment, including the establishment and maintenance of a system of employment offices, shall be vested in the director, and the director shall establish and maintain any employment offices in any parts of this state that he or she deems necessary.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-46 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 2, § 3; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3.

Cross References.

Registration required for eligibility for benefits, § 28-44-12 .

28-42-47. Expenditure of federal funds.

All federal funds made available to the director or to this state under the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq., shall be paid into the employment security administration account created by § 28-42-25 , and those funds are made available to the director to be expended as provided by chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 21; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 14; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-47 .

28-42-48. State funds for employment service.

All funds made available by the general assembly for the state employment service shall be paid into the employment security administration account created by § 28-42-25 , and those funds are made available to the director to be expended as provided by chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 21; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 14; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-48 .

28-42-49. Appropriations for employment offices.

The general assembly shall from time to time appropriate any sums of money that may be necessary, out of moneys in the general treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of maintaining the public employment offices created under this chapter, and for the purpose of cooperating with the United States employment service.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 21; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 14; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-49 .

28-42-50. Applicability of administrative provisions.

Sections 35-1-1 , 35-1-2 , 35-3-1 , 35-6-1 , 35-7-10 , 35-7-11 , 37-2-1 37-2-4 , and 44-1-1 44-1-3 shall be applicable to all functions and duties performed by the department of labor and training, its director, or his or her authorized representative; provided, that all those functions and duties as are to be performed under chapters 42 — 44 of this title by the department of administration shall not be inconsistent with and shall conform to the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1951, ch. 2811, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-50 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-42-51. Additional functions and duties of director of administration.

In addition to and/or in lieu of the sections enumerated in § 28-42-50 , the director of administration shall perform, at the department of labor and training, in the manner and to the extent that the director may prescribe, the following functions and duties:

  1. Establish and maintain a current system of internal financial controls and checks necessary to insure the proper handling of accounts in connection with the employment security fund and the employment security administration account created by this chapter, by conducting a continuous pre-audit or a continuous post-audit or by conducting a combination of both (pre-audit or post-audit). The cost of these post-audit activities by the bureau of audits in the department of administration shall be reimbursed in full by the department;
  2. Establish and maintain any methods, procedures, and systems of accounting that may be deemed necessary; those records and accounts to be considered, for all purposes, the official records of the state and department;
  3. Prepare and furnish financial and any other reports that may be required; and
  4. Perform any other related functions and duties that may be required by chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1951, ch. 2811, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-51 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 10, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-42-52. Implementation of administrative functions.

In order to perform the functions and duties as specified under § 28-42-51 , the director of administration is empowered to take any action that shall be deemed necessary and advisable and to assign any subordinates or employees to the department of labor and training that he or she shall deem necessary, which subordinates and/or employees shall be within the classified service and shall be paid out of funds made available to the department for administrative purposes, consistent with the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1951, ch. 2811, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-52 .

28-42-53. Procedural rules and regulations — Record of proceedings.

The manner in which any disputed claims or any other controversies arising out of the interpretation or application of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be presented, or the manner in which hearings and appeals are conducted, shall be in accordance with the regulations adopted as prescribed in these chapters whether or not those regulations conform to common-law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure. A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with a disputed claim. All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed claim shall be recorded but need not be transcribed unless the disputed claim is further appealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-53 .

Collateral References.

Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings in unemployment compensation proceedings. 90 A.L.R.4th 532.

28-42-54. Administration of oaths — Subpoena of witnesses.

In the discharge of their duties under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the director or his or her duly authorized representative, the board of review, an appeal tribunal, or any duly authorized representative of the board of review, shall have power to administer oaths to persons appearing before them, take depositions, certify to official acts, and by subpoenas, served in the manner in which court subpoenas are served, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, documents, and records necessary or convenient to be used by them in connection with any disputed claim or in the administration of those chapters; provided, that no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records before the director or his or her duly authorized representative, the board of review, an appeal tribunal, or any duly authorized representative of the board of review, or in obedience to his, her, or their subpoena in any cause or proceeding before him, her, or them on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him or her may tend to incriminate him or her or subject him or her to a penalty or forfeiture. No individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he or she is compelled, after having claimed his or her privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that an individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-54 .

28-42-55. Enforcement of subpoenas — Appeal.

In case of contumacy by or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, pursuant to § 28-42-54 , the sixth division of the district court, upon application by the director or the board of review shall have jurisdiction to issue to that person an order requiring that person to appear before the director or his or her duly authorized representative, or the board of review or its duly authorized representatives, there to produce evidence if so ordered or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey that order of the court may be punished by that court as a contempt of court. A party aggrieved by an order of the court may appeal that order to the supreme court in accordance with the procedures contained in Art. I of the Supreme Court Rules.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-55 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

District Court Jurisdiction.

The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a defendant who failed to appear before the director of the Department of Employment and Training. Robinson v. Ridlon, 653 A.2d 730, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1995).

28-42-56. Witness fees.

Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to § 28-42-54 shall be allowed fees at a rate fixed by the director. Those fees shall be deemed a part of the expense of administering chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-56 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Nonpayment of Witness Fees.

A witness has an obligation to appear pursuant to a subpoena and is entitled to be paid a fee. However, a witness’ obligation to appear remains separate from the requirement that a witness be paid, and consequently, nonpayment of a witness fee does not justify refusal to appear as ordered. Robinson v. Ridlon, 653 A.2d 730, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1995).

28-42-57. Parties to judicial action.

The director or the board of review shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving decisions which have been appealed to the courts, and may be represented in any judicial action by any qualified attorney designated by him, her, or it for that purpose or, at his, her, or its request, by the attorney general.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 11; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-57 .

28-42-58. Inter-agency arrangements for coverage.

The director is authorized to enter into arrangements with the appropriate and duly authorized agencies of other states, the federal government or its territories, and of foreign governments, whereby, notwithstanding any other provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, service performed by:

  1. An individual for a single employing unit for which service is customarily performed by that individual in more than one state, in one of the states and in a territory, or in one of the states and within the jurisdiction of a foreign government, shall be deemed to be services performed entirely within any one of the jurisdictions in which: (i) any part of the individual’s service is performed; or (ii) the individual has his or her residence; or the employing unit maintains a place of business; provided, that there is in effect, as to that service, an approved election by an employing unit with the acquiescence of that individual, pursuant to which service performed by that individual for that employing unit is deemed to be performed entirely within that jurisdiction; and
  2. Not more than three (3) individuals on any portion of a day but not necessarily simultaneously for a single employing unit which customarily operates in more than one of the jurisdictions set forth in this section shall be deemed to be service performed entirely within the jurisdiction in which that employing unit maintains the headquarters of its business; provided, that there is in effect, as to that service, an appropriate election by the employing unit with the affirmative consent of each individual, pursuant to which service performed by those individuals for that employing unit is deemed to be performed entirely within that jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 12; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2838, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3421, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-58 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 108, § 1.

28-42-59. Inter-agency arrangements for payment of compensation through single agency.

The director shall participate in any arrangements for the payment of compensation on the basis of combining an individual’s wages and employment covered under chapters 42 — 44 of this title with his or her wages and employment covered under the employment security laws of other states which are approved by the United States Secretary of Labor in consultation with the state unemployment compensation agencies as reasonably calculated to assure the prompt and full payment of compensation in those situations and which include provisions for:

  1. Applying the base period of a single state law to a claim involving the combining of an individual’s wages and employment covered under two (2) or more state employment security laws; and
  2. Avoiding the duplicate use of wages and employment by reason of that combining.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 12; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2838, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3421, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-59 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 108, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 6.

28-42-60. Cooperation with foreign governments.

To the extent permissible under the laws and the constitution of the United States, the director is authorized to enter into or cooperate in arrangements with the appropriate and duly authorized agencies of foreign governments whereby facilities and services provided under the employment security law of any foreign government may be utilized for the taking of claims and the payment of benefits under the employment security law of this state or under a similar law of that government.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 12; P.L. 1951, ch. 2838, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3421, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-60 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 108, § 1.

Collateral References.

Alien’s right to benefits. 87 A.L.R.3d 694.

28-42-61. Continuance of arrangements after changes in law.

If after entering into an arrangement provided in §§ 28-42-58 28-42-60 , the director finds that the employment security law of any state or territory, the federal government, or any foreign government, participating in that arrangement has been changed in a material respect, the director shall make a new finding as to whether those arrangements shall be continued with that state or territory, the federal government, or the foreign government involved.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 12; P.L. 1955, ch. 3421, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-61 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 108, § 1.

28-42-62. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 15; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2834, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 158, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-42-62 concerned false representations to obtain benefits. For present comparable provisions, see § 28-42-62.1 .

28-42-62.1. Fraud and abuse.

    1. It shall be unlawful to do any of the following:
      1. Make or cause to be made any knowingly false or fraudulent material statement or material representation for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefits;
      2. Present, or cause to be presented, any knowingly false or fraudulent written or oral material statement in support of, or in opposition to, any claim for benefits or petition regarding the continuation, termination, or modification of benefits;
      3. Knowingly assist, aid and abet, solicit, or conspire with any person who engages in an unlawful act under this section;
      4. Willfully misrepresent or fail to disclose any material fact in order to avoid or reduce any contribution or other payment required of an employing unit under chapters 42 — 44 of this title;
      5. Willfully fail to report or provide false or misleading information regarding ownership changes as required by regulations promulgated by the department.
      6. Willfully make or require any deduction from wages to pay all, or any portion of, the contributions required from employers, or try to induce any individual to waive any right under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    2. For purposes of this section, “statement” includes, but is not limited to, the receipt of unemployment benefits deposited to a direct deposit account or electronic payment card, any endorsement of a benefit check, application for registration, oral or written statement or report, proof of unemployment, or other documentation offered as proof of, or the absence of, entitlement to benefits or the amount of benefits.
    3. If it is determined that any person concealed or knowingly failed to disclose that which is required by law to be revealed; knowingly gave or used perjured testimony or false evidence; knowingly made a false statement of fact; participated in the creation or presentation of evidence which he or she knows to be false; or otherwise engaged in conduct in violation of this section, that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject in criminal proceedings to a fine and/or penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or double the value of the fraud, whichever is greater, or by imprisonment up to one year in state prison, or both.
    4. Beginning October 1, 2013, whenever the director establishes that an erroneous payment was made to an individual due to fraud committed by the individual, that individual will be assessed a penalty equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the amount of the erroneous payment. All penalties assessed and collected under this subsection shall be immediately deposited into the employment security fund.
  1. The director, in consultation with the attorney general, shall establish a form to give notice that the endorsement of a benefit check sent or the receipt of unemployment benefits deposited to a direct deposit account or electronic payment card pursuant to chapter 44 of this title is the endorser’s affirmation that he or she is qualified to receive benefits under the employment security act. The notice shall be sent to all individuals who are presently receiving benefits and given to those who file claims for benefits in the future.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Cross References.

Disqualification from receiving benefits, § 28-44-24 .

Collateral References.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

28-42-63. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 15; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 158, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-42-63 concerned false representations and violations by employers. For present comparable provisions, see § 28-42-62.1 .

28-42-63.1. Suspension or revocation of registration — New registration.

Whenever any employer fails to comply with any provision of this title, the director, upon a hearing, after giving the person at least five-days notice in writing specifying the time and place of the hearing and requiring him or her to show cause why his or her registration or registrations should not be revoked, may revoke or suspend any one or more of the registrations held by the employer. The notice may be served personally or by mail. The director shall not issue a new registration after the revocation of a registration unless he or she is satisfied that the former holder of the registration will comply with this title. In that case the director may require the filing of such a bond with surety or the deposit of the security that he or she deems necessary to assure compliance with this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 279, § 1.

28-42-64. Failure to make contributions or reports.

Any individual, or employing unit, or its agent, who or that knowingly fails or refuses to make any contribution or other payment required of an employing unit under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, or who knowingly fails or refuses to make any contribution or report at the time and in the manner required by the regulations adopted as prescribed in these chapters, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200), or by imprisonment not longer than sixty (60) days, or by both the fine and imprisonment, and each day of that failure or refusal shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. If the employer in question is a corporation, every officer of the corporation who knowingly participates in any violation specified in this section shall be subject to these penalties.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 15; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-64 ; P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 8.

Collateral References.

Construction, application, and effect, with respect to withholding, social security, and unemployment compensation taxes, of statutes imposing penalties for tax evasion or default. 22 A.L.R.3d 8.

28-42-64.1. Injunctive relief.

  1. The superior court shall have jurisdiction to restrain and enjoin any employer from engaging in business as an employer in this state without a registration or registrations or after a registration has been suspended or revoked.
  2. The director may institute proceedings to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter as provided in subsection (a) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 279, § 2.

28-42-65. Pecuniary penalty for failure to file reports or pay contributions.

An employer who fails to file any reports required under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, or who fails or refuses to pay any contributions required under those chapters in the manner and at the times as required by the law and regulations or as the director may, in accordance with these chapters, prescribe, shall pay a penalty of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each failure or refusal to file, and where any contribution is due, shall pay an additional penalty of ten percent (10%) of the amount due. The foregoing penalties shall be paid into the employment security-tardy account fund, and shall be in addition to contributions and interest required to be paid as provided in chapters 42 — 44 of this title. If any employer fails to pay a penalty, when assessed, it shall be collected by civil action as provided in § 28-43-18 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1956, ch. 3670, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-65 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 9; P.L. 1978, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 308, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 26, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 3; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 48, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 8.

28-42-65.1. Engaging in business without registration.

A person who engages in business as an employer in this state without a registration or registrations or after a registration has been suspended or revoked, and each officer of any corporation which so engages in business, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall for each offense be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or be imprisoned for not exceeding one year, or be punished by both the fine and imprisonment. Each day in which that person so engages in business shall constitute a separate offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 279, § 3.

28-42-66. Penalty for violations generally.

Any violation of any provision of chapters 42 — 44 of this title or of any order, rule, or regulation of the board of review after consultation with the director, for which a penalty is neither prescribed above nor provided by any other applicable statute, shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200), or by imprisonment not longer than thirty (30) days, or by both the fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 15; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-66 ; P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 8.

28-42-67. Disposition of fines.

All fines specified or provided for in §§ 28-42-62 28-42-66 shall be paid to the employment security tardy account fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 15; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-67 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 4; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 4.

28-42-68. Recovery of erroneously paid benefits.

  1. Any individual who, by reason of a mistake or misrepresentation made by himself, herself, or another, has received any sum as benefits under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, in any week in which any condition for the receipt of the benefits imposed by those chapters was not fulfilled by him or her, or with respect to any week in which he or she was disqualified from receiving those benefits, shall in the discretion of the director be liable to have that sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him or her under those chapters, or shall be liable to repay to the director for the employment security fund a sum equal to the amount so received, plus, if the benefits were received as a result of misrepresentation or fraud by the recipient, interest on the benefits at the rate set forth in § 28-43-15 . That sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in § 28-43-18 for the collection of past due contributions. All interest received pursuant to this subsection shall be credited to the unemployment security interest fund created by § 28-42-75 .
  2. The department, by agreement with another state or the United States, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 503(g), may recover any overpayment of benefits paid to any individual under the laws of this state or of another state or under an unemployment benefit program of the United States. Any overpayments subject to this subsection may be deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual under the laws of this state or of another state or under an unemployment program of the United States.
  3. Beginning October 1, 2013, whenever the director establishes that an erroneous payment was made to an individual due to fraud committed by the individual, that individual will be assessed a penalty equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the amount of the erroneous payment. All penalties assessed and collected under this subsection shall be immediately deposited into the employment security fund.
  4. There shall be no recovery of payments from any person who, in the judgment of the director, is without fault on his or her part and where, in the judgment of the director, that recovery would defeat the purpose of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-68 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 226, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Voluntary Refusal of Employment.

Claimant was not entitled to benefits and had been overpaid where her decision to voluntarily refuse the jobs offered to her was based on restrictions not bottomed upon good cause and rendered her unavailable pursuant to § 28-44-12 . Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

Collateral References.

Repayment of benefits erroneously paid. 90 A.L.R.3d 987.

28-42-69. Complaints to invoke penalties.

The director shall be the party complainant to any complaint and warrant brought to invoke the penalties provided for in §§ 28-42-62 28-42-66 , and the director shall be exempt from giving surety for costs in any action.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-69 .

28-42-70. Prosecution of criminal actions.

All criminal actions for any violation of chapters 42 — 44 of this title or of any rule or regulation shall be prosecuted by the attorney general or by any qualified member of the Rhode Island bar that shall be designated by the director and approved by the attorney general to institute and prosecute that action.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 15; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 12; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2275, § 4; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-70 .

28-42-71. Repeal or amendment of federal provisions.

In the event that the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., is repealed, amended, or otherwise changed by the Congress of the United States, or is finally adjudged invalid or unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, with the result that no portion of the contributions required by chapters 42 — 44 of this title can be credited against any tax imposed by that act, then upon the date of that repeal, amendment, or change, or upon the date that the act is finally adjudged invalid or unconstitutional, the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title requiring contributions and providing for payment of benefits shall cease to be operative. In that event the director shall immediately requisition from the unemployment trust fund established by 42 U.S.C. § 1103 all moneys in that fund standing to the credit of the state, and shall take any other action that may be necessary to procure those moneys. All those moneys, together with any other moneys in the employment security fund established by § 28-42-18 , shall be held in custody by the general treasurer in a special fund, and unless: (1) the Congress of the United States, prior to the adjournment of its next regular session commencing next after the date the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title requiring contributions and providing for the payment of benefits has ceased to be operative as previously provided, has enacted legislation designed to secure the enactment of unemployment compensation laws in the various states; and (2) the general assembly, within three (3) months after the passage of any such federal legislation, has enacted legislation providing for a system of unemployment compensation and has provided for the application of that special fund to unemployment compensation purposes pursuant to any such state legislation, then those moneys in the special fund subject to the payment of the expenses of making those refunds shall immediately be refunded or repaid, without interest, by the director to the individual employers and employees who have paid contributions under the terms of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, ratably in proportion to the amounts contributed by each employer and employee.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 20; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 20; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-71 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 25.

28-42-72. Legislative control reserved.

All the rights, privileges, or immunities conferred by chapters 42 — 44 of this title, or by acts done pursuant to these chapters, shall exist subject to the power of the general assembly to amend or repeal those chapters at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 17; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-72 .

28-42-73. Construction of provisions.

Chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose, which declared purpose is to lighten the burden that now falls on the unemployed worker and his or her family.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 19; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liberal Construction.

The employment security act is remedial legislation and a liberal construction thereof is required. Charlonne v. Cote, 96 R.I. 318 , 191 A.2d 276, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1963).

The liberal construction of the Employment Security Act does not permit the court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the act, nor warrant an extension of eligibility by the court to any person or class not intended to share in the benefits of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review, 98 R.I. 197 , 200 A.2d 595, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 150 (1964).

Unemployment Due to Labor Dispute.

Where employee is paid wage increase gained in collective bargaining he is directly interested in a labor dispute and cannot draw unemployment compensation during a strike under § 28-44-16 even though he is not a union member since an intent of this act is to restrict drastically the payment of benefits in such cases. Annese v. Board of Review, 105 R.I. 32 , 249 A.2d 46, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 715 (1969).

Vacation Period.

The court will be guided by this section in construing the term “vacation period” with reference to exclusion from the waiting period and construe it to mean the employee’s actual vacation rather than a period in which the company closed the plant for a vacation period. Marinelli v. Board of Review, 99 R.I. 716 , 210 A.2d 599, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 507 (1965).

28-42-74. Severability.

If any provision of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, or its application to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapters and the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 18; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-74 .

28-42-75. Establishment of employment security interest fund — Sources.

    1. There is created as a restricted receipt account within the general fund the employment security interest fund, to be administered by the director without liability on the part of the state beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the fund. This fund shall consist of:
      1. All interest received from employers and paid pursuant to § 28-43-15 ;
      2. All other moneys paid into and received by the fund;
      3. Property and securities acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging to the fund; and
      4. Interest earned upon the moneys belonging to the fund.
    2. All moneys in the fund shall be mingled and undivided.
  1. All moneys received by the director for the employment security interest fund shall, upon receipt, be deposited by the director in a clearance account in a bank in this state and shall be exempt from the provisions of § 35-4-27 .

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-42-76. Disbursements from interest fund — Unexpended balance.

  1. The moneys in the interest fund shall be used solely for the following purposes:
    1. To make refunds of interest erroneously collected and deposited in the fund;
    2. To make payments of interest due on federal advances received from the federal unemployment account under 42 U.S.C. § 1321 et seq., in accordance with federal law and regulations then in effect; and
    3. To maintain essential department programs.
  2. The general treasurer shall pay all vouchers duly drawn by the director upon the interest fund, in any amounts and in any manner that the director may prescribe. Vouchers so drawn upon the interest fund shall be referred to the controller within the department of administration. Upon receipt of those vouchers, the controller shall immediately record and sign them and shall promptly transfer those vouchers so signed to the general treasurer; provided, that those expenditures shall be used solely for the purposes specified in this section and its balances shall not lapse at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 4; P.L. 1987, ch. 400, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 36, § 2.

28-42-77. Treasurer of interest fund — Bond — Investments.

  1. The general treasurer shall be custodian and treasurer of the interest fund. The general treasurer shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the fund and not otherwise held, deposited, or invested pursuant to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  2. The general treasurer shall give bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian and treasurer of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in an amount specified by the director and approved by the governor. All premiums upon bonds required pursuant to this section when furnished by an authorized surety company or by a duly constituted governmental bonding fund shall be paid from the moneys in the employment security administration account. The general treasurer shall deposit the moneys in his or her custody subject to the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  3. The general treasurer, as the custodian of the fund, shall hold, invest, transfer, sell, deposit, and release those moneys, properties, or securities in a manner approved by the director in accordance with chapters 42 — 44 of this title; provided, that those moneys shall be invested in the classes of securities legal for the investment of public moneys of this state, and the investment shall at all times be so made that all the assets of the interest fund shall always be readily convertible into cash when needed for the expenditures specified in § 28-42-76 . All investment earnings derived from interest fund balances shall be deposited into a restricted receipt account within the general fund and shall be exempt from the provisions of § 35-4-27 . These funds are to be used solely to pay for administrative expenses of the department of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 3.

28-42-78. Establishment of employment security tardy account fund — Sources.

    1. There is created as a restricted receipt account within the general fund the employment security tardy account fund, to be administered by the director without liability on the part of the state beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the fund. This fund shall consist of:
      1. All penalties received from employers and paid pursuant to §§ 28-42-62 28-42-66 ;
      2. All other moneys paid into and received by the fund;
      3. Property and securities acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging to the fund; and
      4. Interest earned upon the moneys belonging to the fund.
    2. All moneys in the fund shall be mingled and undivided.
  1. All moneys received by the director for account of the employment security tardy account fund shall, upon receipt, be deposited by the director in a clearance account in a bank in this state and shall be exempt from the provisions of § 35-4-27 .

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 5; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 5; P.L. 1987, ch. 400, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 4; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-42-79. Disbursements from tardy account fund — Unexpended balance.

  1. The moneys in the tardy account fund shall be used solely for the following purposes:
    1. To make refunds of penalties erroneously collected and deposited in the fund; and
    2. To maintain essential department programs.
  2. The general treasurer shall pay all vouchers duly drawn by the director upon the fund, in any amounts and in any manner that the director may prescribe. Vouchers so drawn upon the fund shall be referred to the controller within the department of administration. Upon receipt of these vouchers, the controller shall immediately record and sign them and shall promptly transfer the signed vouchers to the general treasurer. These expenditures shall be used solely for the purposes specified in this section, and its balances shall not lapse at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 6; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 6; P.L. 1987, ch. 400, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 36, § 1.

28-42-80. Treasurer of tardy account fund — Bond — Investments.

  1. The general treasurer shall be custodian and treasurer of the tardy account fund. The general treasurer shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the fund and not otherwise held, deposited, or invested pursuant to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  2. The general treasurer shall give bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian and treasurer of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in amount specified by the director and approved by the governor. All premiums upon bonds required pursuant to this section when furnished by an authorized surety company or by a duly constituted governmental bonding fund shall be paid from the moneys in the employment security administration account. The general treasurer shall deposit the moneys in his or her custody subject to the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  3. The general treasurer, as the custodian of the fund, shall hold, invest, transfer, sell, deposit, and release those moneys, properties, or securities in a manner approved by the director in accordance with chapters 42 — 44 of this title. These moneys shall be invested in the classes of securities legal for the investment of public moneys of this state. This investment shall at all times be so made that all the assets of the fund shall always be readily convertible into cash when needed for the expenditures specified in § 28-42-79 . All investment earnings derived from tardy fund balances shall be deposited into a restricted receipt account within the general fund and shall be exempt from the provisions of § 35-4-27 . These funds are to be used solely to pay for administrative expenses of the department of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 7; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 7; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 5.

28-42-81. Tuition costs.

  1. Any individual who receives any sums as benefits pursuant to chapters 42 — 44 of this title whose household income is less than three (3) times the federal poverty level as established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and who may not be claimed as a dependent for federal income tax purposes, shall be eligible to enroll in any course, for credit, in any college or university operated by the state, without the payment of any tuition or registration fees; provided, that any person eligible for financial aid, as determined by the institution of higher education, shall apply for financial aid. Any financial aid award received by the applicant shall be applied toward the full amount of tuition that would otherwise have been charged by the college or university. This section shall not be applicable in any course without a vacancy, nor shall the registration of any such individual(s) be considered in determining the minimum number of students necessary for a given course to be offered. The enrollment shall not deem the individual to be ineligible for any benefits for which he or she would have otherwise been eligible. Any individual who enrolls in any course pursuant to this section shall still be required to comply with § 28-44-12 .
  2. Any individual who has exhausted benefits within a sixty (60) day period before the start of a class for which that individual has registered in a state college or university shall be eligible for benefits pursuant to this section.
  3. Any individual whose tuition benefits have become exhausted after he or she has started a class in a state college or university, shall be eligible for continuation of tuition benefits pursuant to this section until the completion of the class.

History of Section. G.L. 1956, § 28-42-78 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 374, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 52, § 2.

28-42-82. Job development fund.

Whereas, improvements in the standard of living for all Rhode Islanders, by increasing their prosperity and their opportunities for continued employment and better jobs, is one of the top priorities of state government;

Whereas, the rapidly changing economy requires that the Rhode Island workforce be able to adapt to emerging needs of the workplace;

Whereas, the energies and resources of numerous state agencies and commissions contribute to the state’s overall response to the needs of the workforce and must be coordinated to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness; and

Whereas, the competitiveness of Rhode Island businesses is dependent on a well-skilled, literate, and productive workforce:

Now, therefore, the general assembly declares as follows:

  1. There is a need to stimulate long-term economic development; reconcile the needs of parents, work, and families; better integrate immigrants and minorities fully into the workforce; and improve workers’ educational preparation and skills;
  2. Enhancement of the competitiveness of the state’s businesses and workforce requires state support and encouragement for programs aimed at improving skill levels and expanding opportunities of all segments of the workforce, particularly those in need of customized training or training to upgrade existing skill levels; and
  3. These needs require the establishment of a job development fund pursuant to § 28-42-83 and the establishment of the governor’s workforce board Rhode Island (workforce board) pursuant to chapter 102 of title 42 to administer the fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 68, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 7, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 7, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2015.

28-42-83. Job development fund — Establishment — Sources.

    1. There is created as a restricted receipt account within the general fund called the job development fund, to be administered by the governor’s workforce board Rhode Island (workforce board), without liability on the part of the state beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the fund. This fund shall consist of:
      1. All payments received from employers and paid pursuant to § 28-43-8.5 ;
      2. All other moneys paid into and received by the fund;
      3. Property and securities acquired by, and through the use of, moneys belonging to the fund; and
      4. Interest earned upon moneys belonging to the fund.
    2. All moneys in the job development fund shall be mingled and undivided.
  1. All moneys received by the director for the job development fund shall, upon receipt, be deposited by the director in a clearance account in a bank in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 68, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 296, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 7, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 7, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2015.

28-42-84. Job development fund — Disbursements — Unexpended balance.

  1. The moneys in the job development fund shall be used for the following purposes:
    1. To reimburse the department of labor and training for the loss of any federal funds resulting from the collection and maintenance of the fund by the department;
    2. To make refunds of contributions erroneously collected and deposited in the fund;
    3. To pay any administrative expenses incurred by the department of labor and training associated with the collection of the contributions for employers paid pursuant to § 28-43-8.5 , and any other administrative expenses associated with the maintenance of the fund, including the payment of all premiums upon bonds required pursuant to § 28-42-85 ;
    4. To provide for job training, counseling and assessment services, and other related activities and services. Services will include, but are not limited to, research, development, coordination, and training activities to promote workforce development and business development as established by the governor’s workforce board Rhode Island (workforce board);
    5. To support the state’s job training for economic development;
    6. Beginning January 1, 2001, two hundredths of one percent (0.02%) out of the job development assessment paid pursuant to § 28-43-8.5 shall be used to support necessary core services in the unemployment insurance and employment services programs operated by the department of labor and training;
    7. Beginning January 1, 2011, and ending in tax year 2014, three tenths of one percent (0.3%) out of the fifty-one hundredths of one percent (0.51%) job development assessment paid pursuant to § 28-43-8.5 shall be deposited into a restricted receipt account to be used solely to pay the principal and/or interest due on Title XII advances received from the federal government in accordance with the provisions of Section 1201 of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. § 1321]; provided, however, that if the federal Title XII loans are repaid through a state revenue bond or other financing mechanism, then these funds may also be used to pay the principal and/or interest that accrues on that debt. Any remaining funds in the restricted receipt account, after the outstanding principal and interest due has been paid, shall be transferred to the employment security fund for the payment of benefits; and
    8. Beginning January 1, 2019, and ending December 31, 2019, the amount of the job development assessment paid pursuant to § 28-43-8.5 above nineteen hundredths of one percent (0.19%) shall be used to support necessary core services in the unemployment insurance and employment services programs operated by the department of labor and training.
  2. The general treasurer shall pay all vouchers duly drawn by the workforce board upon the fund, in any amounts and in any manner that the workforce board may prescribe. Vouchers so drawn upon the fund shall be referred to the controller within the department of administration. Upon receipt of those vouchers, the controller shall immediately record and sign them and shall promptly transfer those signed vouchers to the general treasurer. Those expenditures shall be used solely for the purposes specified in this section and its balance shall not lapse at any time but shall remain continuously available for expenditures consistent with this section. The general assembly shall annually appropriate the funds contained in the fund for the use of the workforce board and, in addition, for the use of the department of labor and training effective July 1, 2000, and for the payment of the principal and interest due on federal Title XII loans beginning July 1, 2011; provided, however, that if the federal Title XII loans are repaid through a state revenue bond or other financing mechanism, then the funds may also be used to pay the principal and/or interest that accrues on that debt.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 68, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 15, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 39; P.L. 2000, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 1, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 14, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 145, art. 11, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 11, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 500, § 7, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 551, § 7, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2015.

28-42-85. Job development fund — Treasurer — Bond — Investments.

  1. The general treasurer shall be custodian and treasurer of the job development fund. The general treasurer shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the fund. The general treasurer shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the fund and not otherwise held, deposited, or invested pursuant to chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and chapter 102 of title 42.
  2. The general treasurer shall give bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian and treasurer of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in an amount specified by the governor. All premiums upon the bond required pursuant to this section when furnished by an authorized surety company or by a duly constituted governmental bonding fund shall be paid from the moneys in the employment security administration account. The general treasurer shall deposit the moneys in his or her custody subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and chapter 102 of title 42.
  3. The general treasurer, as custodian of the fund, shall hold, invest, transfer, sell, deposit, and release those moneys, properties, or securities in a manner approved by the governor in accordance with chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and chapter 102 of title 42. Those moneys shall be invested in the classes of securities legal for investment of public moneys of this state, and the investment shall at all times be so made that all assets of the fund shall always be readily convertible into cash when needed for the expenditures specified in § 28-42-84 . All investment earnings derived from job development fund balances shall be deposited into a restricted receipt account within the general fund and shall be exempt from the provisions of § 35-4-27 .

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 55, art. 21, § 7.

28-42-86. Employment security reemployment fund — Legislative findings.

Whereas, improvements in the standard of living for unemployed Rhode Islanders by facilitating their return to work is one of the top priorities of state government; and

Whereas, the state’s low unemployment rate has made it increasingly difficult for employers to find qualified workers to fill their job openings; and

Whereas, the federal government has failed to provide sufficient resources for the state to provide the level of services needed to alleviate these problems; and

Whereas, other states have had success with targeted job matching programs and intensive reemployment services; and

Whereas, such programs can help employers fill job openings more rapidly, accelerate the claimant’s return to work, reduce unemployment costs, and strengthen the state’s economy as a result;

Now, therefore, the general assembly declares that the department of labor and training shall institute a pilot research and demonstration rapid reemployment program. The program shall to include an automated job matching system to match employer job orders with qualified unemployed individuals and an intensive reemployment services project to help those who are not job ready. The reemployment services may include, but not be limited to, focused job search strategies for individuals, resume preparation assistance, job development, interview preparation workshops, and continued job matching and referral.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 382, § 1.

28-42-87. Employment security reemployment fund — Establishment — Sources.

    1. There is created the employment security reemployment fund, to be administered by the department of labor and training, without liability on the part of the state beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the fund. This fund shall consist of:
      1. All payments received from employers and paid pursuant to § 28-43-8.6 ;
      2. All other moneys paid into and received by the fund;
      3. Property and securities acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging to the fund; and
      4. Interest earned upon moneys belonging to the fund.
    2. All moneys in the employment security reemployment fund shall be mingled and undivided.
  1. All moneys received by the director for the employment security reemployment fund shall, upon receipt, be deposited by the director in a clearance account in a bank in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 382, § 1.

28-42-88. Employment security reemployment fund — Disbursements — Unexpended balance.

  1. The moneys in the employment security reemployment fund shall be used for the following purposes:
    1. To make refunds of contributions erroneously collected and deposited in the fund;
    2. To pay any administrative expenses incurred by the department of labor and training associated with the collection of the contributions for employers paid pursuant to § 28-43-8.6 , and any other administrative expenses associated with the maintenance of the fund, including the payment of all premiums upon bonds required pursuant to § 28-42-89 ; and
    3. To pay any administrative expenses incurred by the department of labor and training to implement and operate a three-year pilot research and demonstration rapid reemployment program.
  2. The general treasurer shall pay all vouchers duly drawn by the director upon the fund, in any amounts and in any manner that the director may prescribe. Vouchers so drawn upon the fund shall be referred to the controller within the department of administration. Upon receipt of those vouchers, the controller shall immediately record and sign them and shall promptly transfer those signed vouchers to the general treasurer. Those expenditures shall be used solely for the purposes specified in this section and its balance shall not lapse at any time but shall remain continuously available for expenditures consistent with this section. Effective July 1, 2000 and thereafter, the general assembly shall annually appropriate the funds contained in the fund for the use of the department of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 382, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 1, § 1.

28-42-89. Employment security reemployment fund — Treasurer — Bond — Investments.

  1. The general treasurer shall be custodian and treasurer of the employment security reemployment fund. The general treasurer shall have custody of all moneys belonging to the fund and not otherwise held, deposited, or invested pursuant to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  2. The general treasurer shall give bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties as custodian and treasurer of the fund, in a form prescribed by statute and approved by the attorney general, and in amount specified by the governor. All premiums upon the bond required pursuant to this section when furnished by an authorized surety company or by a duly constituted governmental bonding fund shall be paid from the moneys in the employment security administration account. The general treasurer shall deposit the moneys in his or her custody subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  3. The general treasurer, as custodian of the fund, shall hold, invest, transfer, sell, deposit, and release those moneys, properties, or securities in a manner approved by the governor in accordance with chapters 42 — 44 of this title. Those moneys shall be invested in the classes of securities legal for investment of public moneys of this state, and the investment shall at all times be so made that all assets of the fund shall always be readily convertible into cash when needed for the expenditures specified in § 28-42-88 .

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 382, § 1.

Chapter 43 Employment Security — Contributions

28-43-1. Definitions.

The following words and phrases as used in this chapter have the following meanings, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “Balancing account” means a book account to be established within the employment security fund, the initial balance of which shall be established by the director as of September 30, 1979, by transferring the balance of the solvency account on that date to the balancing account.
  2. “Computation date” means September 30 of each year.
  3. “Eligible employer” means an employer who has had three (3) consecutive experience years during each of which contributions have been credited to the employer’s account and benefits have been chargeable to this account.
  4. “Employer’s account” means a separate account to be established within the employment security fund by the director as of September 30, 1958, for each employer subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title, out of the money remaining in that fund after the solvency account has been established in the fund, by crediting to each employer an initial credit balance bearing the same relation to the total fund balance so distributed, as his or her tax contributions to the fund during the period beginning October 1, 1955, and ending on September 30, 1958, have to aggregate tax contributions paid by all employers during the same period; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to grant to any employer prior claim or rights to the amount contributed by him or her to the fund.
  5. “Experience rate” means the contribution rate assigned to an employer’s account under whichever is applicable of schedules A — I in § 28-43-8 .
  6. “Experience year” means the period of twelve (12), consecutive calendar months ending September 30 of each year.
  7. “Most recent employer” means the last base-period employer from whom an individual was separated from employment and for whom the individual worked for at least four (4) weeks, and in each of those four (4) weeks had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title.
  8. “Reserve percentage” means, in relation to an employer’s account, the net balance of that account on a computation date, including any voluntary contributions made in accordance with § 28-43-5.1 , stated as a percentage of the employer’s twelve-month (12) average taxable payroll for the last thirty-six (36) months ended on the immediately preceding June 30.
  9. “Reserve ratio of fund” means the ratio which the total amount available for the payment of benefits in the employment security fund on September 30, 1979, or any computation date thereafter, minus any outstanding federal loan balance, plus an amount equal to funds transferred to the job development fund through the job development assessment adjustment for the prior calendar year, bears to the aggregate of all total payrolls subject to this chapter paid during the twelve-month (12) period ending on the immediately preceding June 30, or the twelve-month (12) average of all total payrolls during the thirty-six-month (36) period ending on that June 30, whichever percentage figure is smaller.
  10. “Taxable payroll” means, for the purpose of this chapter, the total of all wages as defined in § 28-42-3(29) .
  11. “Tax year” means the calendar year.
  12. “Total payroll” means, for the purpose of this chapter, the total of all wages paid by all employers who are required to pay contributions under the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  13. “Unadjusted reserve ratio of fund” means the ratio which the total amount available for the payment of benefits in the employment security fund on September 30, 1979, or any computation date thereafter, minus any outstanding federal loan balance, bears to the aggregate of all total payrolls subject to this chapter paid during the twelve-month (12) period ending on the immediately preceding June 30, or the twelve-month (12) average of all total payrolls during the thirty-six-month (36) period ending on that June 30, whichever percentage figure is smaller.
  14. “Voluntary contribution” means a contribution paid by an employer to his or her account in accordance with § 28-43-5.1 to reduce the employer’s experience rate for the ensuing tax year.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3551, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-1 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 2; P.L. 1968, ch. 291, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 8; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 305, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 221, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 11, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(28) was changed to 28-42-3(29) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 221, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 239, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Cross References.

Definition of terms, § 28-42-3 .

Comparative Legislation.

Contributions:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-225, 31-225a.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151A, § 13 et seq.

Collateral References.

Incidence of unemployment compensation tax upon employer where during the base year employee worked in different states for same employer. 9 A.L.R.2d 646.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act. 95 A.L.R.3d 891.

Service charges, made by hotels or restaurants and later distributed to waiters or similar employees, as “wages” upon which federal or state unemployment taxes or contributions are required to be paid. 83 A.L.R.2d 1024.

28-43-2. Balancing account — Credits and charges.

Subsequent to the establishment of the balancing account as set forth in § 28-43-1(1) , the credits and charges to that account shall be determined by the director as follows:

  1. Credits to the balancing account:
    1. All interest earnings received by the fund;
    2. All transfers to the credit of the account of this state in the unemployment trust fund under 42 U.S.C. § 903(a);
    3. Any plus balance remaining to the credit of an employer’s account after he or she has ceased to be subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title;
    4. The entire amount credited to the balancing account under § 28-43-9 relating to the balancing rate;
    5. An amount equal to the amount of any restitution by an employee of benefits, whether that restitution is in cash or in the form of offset against benefits otherwise due, when that restitution is made;
    6. Any deposits made by employers in connection with an appeal under § 28-44-39 , which are not returnable;
    7. The amount reimbursed or advanced to this state as the federal share of extended benefits paid to individuals under the provisions of § 28-44-62 ; and
    8. The amount reimbursed to this state in accordance with the provisions of § 121 of United States P.L. 94-566.
  2. Charges to the balancing account:
    1. Any minus balance of an employer’s account after he or she has ceased to be subject to this title, together with an amount equal to benefits subsequently paid based on wages reported by that employer;
    2. Any disbursements from the fund that are not chargeable to employer accounts;
    3. Any benefit payments paid to a claimant and charged to an employer’s account after a hearing in which the employer appeared and contested the award which is subsequently finally disallowed on appeal, which charges to the employer’s account shall be cancelled;
    4. Any benefit payments based on determinations by the administrative agencies of other states;
    5. Dependent’s allowances not otherwise chargeable to an employer’s account paid under § 28-44-6 for benefit years beginning subsequent to September 30, 1985;
    6. Benefits not chargeable to any individual employer’s account;
    7. Any benefit payments paid to an individual who has left his or her employment for reasons which have been determined not to have been connected with the employment; provided, that the benefits paid to an individual who leaves work pursuant to a retirement plan, system, or program in accordance with the provisions of § 28-44-17 of this title shall be charged in accordance with the provisions of § 28-43-3(2)(ii) ;
    8. Any benefits paid for benefit years beginning subsequent to September 30, 1985 to an individual in accordance with the provisions of § 28-44-62 , and not otherwise chargeable to an employer’s account;
    9. The foregoing charges to the balancing account shall be limited to benefits paid based on service with an employer required to pay contributions under the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    10. Any benefits paid for benefit years beginning subsequent to July 7, 1996 to an individual unemployed as a result of physical damage to the real property at the employer’s usual place of business caused by severe weather conditions, including, but not limited to, hurricanes, snowstorms, ice storms or flooding, or fire except where caused by the employer.

History of Section. G.L. 1956, § 28-43-2 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 58, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 2; P.L. 1970 (s.s.), ch. 328, § 2; P.L. 1972, ch. 143, § 2; P.L. 1972 (s.s.), ch. 293, § 2; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 10; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 3; P.L. 1984, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 4; P.L. 1985, ch. 150, § 38; P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 6; P.L. 1985, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 17, § 8; P.L. 1986, ch. 409, § 8; P.L. 1996, ch. 331, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 91.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment redesignated paragraphs (2)(ix) and (2)(x).

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-43-3. Employer’s accounts — Credits and charges.

Subsequent to the establishment of a separate employer’s account for each employer subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title as set forth in § 28-43-1(4) , the credits and charges to each employer’s account, exclusive of the state of Rhode Island, its political subdivisions, and their instrumentalities, shall be determined as follows:

  1. Credits to each employer’s account:
    1. After the September 30, 1958, computation date all contributions required under § 28-43-8 and paid by each employer.
    2. All surcharges required and paid under § 28-43-4 .
    3. All voluntary contributions made by the employer made in accordance with § 28-43-5.1 .
  2. Charges to each employer’s account:
    1. Refunds of overpayments under § 28-43-13 , as of the date refunded;
    2. For benefit years beginning subsequent to September 30, 1993, an amount equal to the benefits provided in §§ 28-44-6(a) and (b), 28-44-7 , and 28-44-8 , and paid to each individual with respect to a benefit year, as of the date paid. Those benefits shall be charged to the account of the most recent base-period employer, as defined in § 28-43-1(7) ; provided, that if a claimant works for two (2) or more employers concurrently, either full-time or part-time, and becomes unemployed on the same day from more than one employer, any benefits paid as a result of the unemployment shall be charged to the employers’ accounts proportionately based upon the ratio of base-period wages paid by each employer to the total base-period wages paid by the concurrent employers from whom the claimant became separated from employment. No charge for benefits paid under § 28-44-7 shall be made against the account of any employer who shows to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has continued to employ the individual during the weeks of his or her claim to the same extent that he or she had employed him or her during that individual’s base period, and those benefits, if not chargeable to the most recent base period employer, shall be charged to the balancing account.
    3. If any base-period employer, whether or not he or she was the most recent, shows to the satisfaction of the director that the individual who is in receipt of benefits became separated from his or her last employment with that employer for reasons that did result or would have resulted in a disqualification under § 28-44-17 or 28-44-18 had that base-period employer been his or her most recent, those benefits shall be charged to the balancing account.
    4. The entire amount charged to the employer’s account under § 28-43-9 relating to the balancing rate.
    5. Whenever the provisions in this section specify that an employer’s account shall not be charged, that non-charging shall be limited to benefits paid based on service with an employer required to pay contributions under the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    6. An amount equal to the benefits provided in § 28-44-62 and paid to each individual with respect to a benefit year as of the date paid minus the proportionate share of those benefits for which the state has been or will be reimbursed by the federal government. The federal share of any payments shall be charged to the balancing account and federal reimbursements shall be credited to the balancing account.
    7. Whenever any benefits are paid for benefit years beginning subsequent to July 7, 1996, to an individual unemployed as a result of physical damage to the real property at the employer’s usual place of business caused by severe weather conditions, including, but not limited to, hurricanes, snowstorms, ice storms or flooding, or fire except where caused by the employer, those benefits shall be charged to the balancing account.
    8. An employer’s account shall not be relieved of charges relating to any benefit payments made if the director establishes on or after October 1, 2013, that the payment was made because the employer, or an agent of the employer, was at fault for failing to respond timely or adequately to the request of the department for information relating to the claim for unemployment benefits that was subsequently overpaid.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 5; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-11 ; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-3 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 57, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 26, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 2; P.L. 1975, ch. 22, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 11; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 4; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 3, § 4; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 194, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 305, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 331, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 221, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 239, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 126, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 131, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 221, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 239, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 126, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 131, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

Cross References.

Failure to make contributions or reports, §§ 28-42-64 , 28-42-65 .

False statements to avoid contributions, § 28-42-62.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Payment of Benefits.

Where claimant leaves voluntarily and without good cause from his base period employer in his benefit year after already having had drawn unemployment compensation for two weeks in his benefit year, and where he works for another employer in his benefit year for six weeks before he is laid off, and then seeks benefits, they will not be charged to his base period employer’s account, but would be paid from the solvency fund. Rosbro Plastics Corp. v. LaMantia, 105 R.I. 719 , 254 A.2d 734, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 810 (1969); Rosbro Plastics Corp. v. Davenport, 105 R.I. 726 , 254 A.2d 737, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 811 (1969).

Collateral References.

Right of successor in business to experience or rating of predecessor for purpose of fixing rate of contributions. 22 A.L.R.2d 673.

28-43-4. Statement of condition of employment security and balancing account.

The director shall publish once a year a statement of the condition of the employment security fund, the reserve ratio, and the balancing account for each twelve (12) month period ending on September 30.

History of Section. P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 5.

28-43-5. Employer’s account — Statement of balance, credits, and charges.

  1. The director shall furnish to each employer not later than April 1 an annual statement showing the employer’s account balance together with the total credits and charges made during the experience year ending on the computation date.
  2. That statement is the director’s determination and is binding on the employer unless an appeal is duly filed within fifteen (15) days of its mailing. All appeals shall follow the provisions of § 28-43-13 .

History of Section. P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 18.

Collateral References.

Right of successor in business to experience or rating of predecessor for purpose of fixing rate of contributions. 22 A.L.R.2d 673.

28-43-5.1. Employer’s account — Voluntary contributions.

Any employer who has been assigned an experience rate, and who has filed all reports required under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and has paid all contributions, interest, and penalties due under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, may make a voluntary contribution to his or her account. Such voluntary contribution shall be paid not later than thirty (30) days after the date on which the department has issued a notice of the employer’s experience rate, or prior to the expiration of one-hundred-twenty (120) days after the start of the calendar year, for which the experience rate is effective, whichever is earlier. Upon timely payment of a voluntary contribution, the contribution shall be credited to the employer’s account balance and that employer shall receive a recomputation of its experience rate for that calendar year. No voluntary contribution shall be refunded in whole or in part.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 221, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 239, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 221, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 239, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-43-6. Notification of benefit payments to employers.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after the end of each calendar quarter, or more frequently if deemed necessary, the director shall furnish to each employer who is charged for benefits paid to claimants under this title during that quarter a notice which shall contain at least the following information:
    1. The name and social security number of the payee;
    2. The amount paid;
    3. The date on which that payment was made;
    4. The calendar week for which that payment is made; and
    5. The name of the chargeable employer and his or her registered account number.
  2. That notification to an employer shall constitute the director’s determination and shall be binding upon the employer unless an appeal is duly filed within fifteen (15) days of its mailing.

History of Section. P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 56, § 1.

28-43-7. Taxable wage base.

  1. The taxable wage base under this chapter for the tax year beginning January 1, 1999, and ending with the tax year 2011 shall be:
    1. Twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) if the amount of the employment security fund, not including any federal disbursements made to the states pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1103, is more than two hundred twenty-five million dollars ($225,000,000);
    2. Fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) if the amount of the employment security fund is more than one hundred seventy-five million dollars ($175,000,000) but less than or equal to two hundred twenty-five million dollars ($225,000,000);
    3. Sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000) if the amount of the employment security fund is more than one hundred twenty-five million dollars ($125,000,000) but less than or equal to one hundred seventy-five million dollars ($175,000,000);
    4. Eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000) if the amount of the employment security fund is less or equal to than one hundred twenty-five million dollars ($125,000,000) but more than seventy-five million dollars ($75,000,000); or
    5. Nineteen thousand dollars ($19,000) if the amount of the employment security is less than or equal to seventy-five million ($75,000,000).
  2. The taxable wage base under this chapter for the tax year beginning January 1, 2012, and all subsequent tax years, shall be equal to forty-six and one-half percent (46.5%) of the average annual wage in covered employment during the calendar year immediately preceding the computation date for the effective tax year; the computed figure shall be rounded upward to the next higher even multiple of two hundred dollars ($200). That taxable wage base shall be computed as follows: On September 30, 2011, and each September 30 thereafter, the total annual wages paid to individuals in covered employment for the preceding calendar year by all employers who are required to pay contributions under the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, shall be divided by the monthly average number of individuals in covered employment during the preceding calendar year, and the quotient shall be multiplied by four hundred sixty-five thousandths (.465). If the result thus obtained is not an even multiple of two hundred dollars ($200), it shall be rounded upward to the next higher even multiple of two hundred dollars ($200). That taxable wage base shall be effective for the tax year immediately following the computation date.
  3. Notwithstanding the above, the taxable wage base for employers with reserve account percentages of negative twenty-four (-24.00) or less for the tax years beginning January 1, 2012, and thereafter, shall be one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) above the taxable wage base computed for all other employers under subsection (b) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 6; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 108, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 109, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 4, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 108, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 109, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

28-43-7.1. Determination of employer’s total taxable wages.

For the purpose of determining each employer’s experience rate for the next succeeding calendar year, the director shall not later than October 31 of each year determine each employer’s total taxable wages paid during the twelve (12) month period ended on June 30, next preceding. If it is found that any employer has not reported his or her taxable wages for any quarter pertinent to that determination, the total amount of taxable wages for that quarter shall be estimated by the director according to prescribed regulations.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-7 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 6.

Collateral References.

Conclusiveness and review of administrative determinations under statutory provisions requiring filing of payroll reports for purposes of unemployment insurance. 174 A.L.R. 410.

28-43-8. Experience rates — Tables.

    1. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is six and four-tenths percent (6.4%) or more of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9) , an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule A in this subsection.
    2. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is five and five-tenths percent (5.5%) but less than six and four-tenths (6.4%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9) , an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule B in this subsection.
    3. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is four and seventy-five hundredths percent (4.75%) but less than five and five-tenths percent (5.5%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9), an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule C in this subsection.
    4. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is four percent (4.0%) but less than four and seventy-five hundredths percent (4.75%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9), an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule D in this subsection.
    5. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is three and twenty-five hundredths percent (3.25%) but less than four percent (4.0%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9), an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule E in this subsection.
    6. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is two and five-tenths percent (2.5%) but less than three and twenty-five hundredths percent (3.25%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9), an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule F in this subsection.
    7. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is one and seventy-five hundredths percent (1.75%)  but less than two and five-tenths percent (2.5%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9), an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule G in this subsection.
    8. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is one percent (1.0%) but less than one and seventy-five   hundredths percent (1.75%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9), an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule H in this subsection.
    9. Whenever, as of September 30, 2016, or any subsequent computation date, the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits is less than one percent (1.0%) of total payrolls as determined in § 28-43-1(9), an experience rate for each eligible employer for the immediately following calendar year shall be determined in accordance with schedule I in this subsection. [See Tax Schedules] Click to view
    10. [Deleted by P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 3]. Click to view
  1. The contribution rate for each employer for a given calendar year shall be determined and the employer notified of it not later than April 1 next succeeding each computation date. That determination shall be binding unless an appeal is taken in accordance with provisions of § 28-43-13 .

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Schedule A Schedule B Schedule C Schedule D Schedule E Schedule F Schedule G Schedule H Schedule I Employer’s Account Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Percentage Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund 6.4% or 5.5% but 4.75% but 4.0% but 3.25% but 2.5% but 1.75% but 1.0% but under more less than less than less than less than less than less than less than 1.0% 6.4% 5.5% 4.75% 4.0% 3.25% 2.5% 1.75% Positive Percentages 21.50 and over 0.21 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 20.00 to 21.49 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 18.50 to 19.99 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.8 17.00 to 18.49 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.1 15.50 to 16.99 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.4 14.00 to 15.49 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.7 12.50 to 13.99 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.4 3.0 11.00 to 12.49 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.3 9.50 to 10.99 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.5 8.00 to 9.49 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.7 6.50 to 7.99 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.9 5.00 to 6.49 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.6 4.1 3.50 to 4.99 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.7 3.9 4.3 2.00 to 3.49 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.6 0.00 to 1.99 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.9 Negative Percentages -0.01 to -1.99 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.5 -2.00 to -3.99 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.8 -4.00 to -5.99 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.8 6.1 -6.00 to -7.99 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.5 -8.00 to -9.99 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.5 6.6 6.9 -10.00 to -11.99 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 6.9 7.0 7.3 -12.00 to -13.99 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.4 7.7 -14.00 to -15.99 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.7 7.8 8.1 -16.00 to -17.99 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.1 8.2 8.5 -18.00 to -19.99 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.5 8.6 8.9 -20.00 to -21.99 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.6 8.9 9.0 9.3 -22.00 to -23.99 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.6 9.0 9.3 9.4 9.7 -24.00 and over 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.6 9.0 9.4 9.7 9.8 10.0

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 5; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2367, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-43-2 , 28-43-5 , 28-43-6 , 28-43-9 ; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-8 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 2; P.L. 1968, ch. 291, § 2; P.L. 1970, ch. 165, § 2; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 8; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 6; P.L. 1984, ch. 130, § 2; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 4; P.L. 1985, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 493, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 8, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 3; P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 3, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 142, art. 3, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 30, 2016.

28-43-8.1. Time and manner of payment of employer contributions.

Contributions required under this chapter for each year shall be paid by each employer in the manner and at the times that the director may prescribe.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 5; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-3 ; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-8.1 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1.

28-43-8.2. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-4 ; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-8.2 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 6; Repealed by P.L. 1981, ch. 26, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-43-8.2 concerned maximum rate applied to delinquent employers. For penalties and interest rates on delinquent payments, see §§ 28-39-26 , 28-40-9 , 28-42-65 , and 28-43-15 .

28-43-8.3. Rate where no experience.

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, each employer who has not been subject to this chapter for a sufficient period of time to be eligible for any experience rate under this chapter shall pay contributions at a rate not exceeding four and two tenths percent (4.2%) that is the higher of one percent (1%) or the state’s five (5) year benefit cost rate for employers not eligible for any experience rate under this chapter. For the purposes of this section, the state’s five (5) year benefit cost rate for employers not eligible for any experience rate under this chapter shall be computed annually and shall be derived by dividing the total dollar amount of benefits charged to employers not eligible for any experience rate under chapters 42 — 44 of this title during the five (5) consecutive experience years immediately preceding the computation year by the total dollar amount of wages paid by employers not eligible for any experience rate under this chapter and subject to contributions under chapters 42 — 44 of this title during the same period.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 8; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 34, § 1.

28-43-8.4. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 22, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 15, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 7, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-8.4 ; Repealed by P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 26, effective June 18, 1986.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-43-8.4 concerned surcharges for the 1975, 1976 and 1977 tax years.

28-43-8.5. Job development assessment.

  1. For the tax years 2011 through 2014, each employer subject to this chapter shall be required to pay a job development assessment of fifty-one hundredths of one percent (0.51%) of that employer’s taxable payroll, in addition to any other payment which that employer is required to make under any other provision of this chapter; provided, that the assessment shall not be considered as part of the individual employer’s contribution rate for the purpose of determining the individual employer’s balancing charge pursuant to § 28-43-9 ; provided, further, upon full repayment of any outstanding principal and/or interest due on Title XII advances received from the federal government in accordance with the provisions of section 1201 of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. § 1321], including any principal and/or interest that accrues on debt from a state revenue bond or other financing mechanism used to repay the Title XII advances, then the job development assessment shall be reduced to twenty-one hundredths of one percent (0.21%) beginning the tax quarter after the full repayment occurs. The tax rate for all employers subject to the contribution provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be reduced by twenty-one hundredths of one percent (0.21%). For tax year 2015 and subsequent years, except tax year 2019, each employer subject to this chapter shall be required to pay a job development assessment of twenty-one hundredths of one percent (0.21%) of that employer’s taxable payroll, in addition to any other payment which that employer is required to make under any other provision of this chapter; provided, that the assessment shall not be considered as part of the individual employer’s contribution rate for the purpose of determining the individual employer’s balancing charge pursuant to § 28-43-9 . The tax rate for all employers subject to contribution provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be reduced by twenty-one hundredths of one percent (0.21%). For tax year 2019, each employer subject to this chapter shall be required to pay a base job development assessment of twenty-one hundredths of one percent (0.21%) of that employer’s taxable payroll, plus a job development assessment adjustment as computed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any other payment which that employer is required to make under any other provision of this chapter; provided, that:
    1. The assessment shall not be considered as part of the individual employer’s contribution rate for the purpose of determining the individual employer’s balancing charge pursuant to § 28-43-9; and
    2. A job development adjustment shall be computed only if tax schedule A through H is scheduled to be in effect for the ensuing calendar year; and
    3. The employment security fund earned interest in the prior calendar year.
  2. On September 30, 2018, the job development assessment adjustment shall be computed to determine the job development assessment that will be in effect during the ensuing calendar year. The adjustment shall be computed by dividing the interest earned by the employment security fund in the prior calendar year by one hundred ten percent (110%) of the taxable wages in the prior calendar year. The result shall be rounded down to the nearest one hundredth of a percent (0.01%).
    1. In no event may the revenues made available to the job development fund by the job development assessment adjustment exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of the interest earned by the employment security fund in the prior calendar year. All revenues collected after seventy-five percent (75%) of the employment security fund’s prior year interest has been deposited into the job development fund shall be deposited into the employment security fund forthwith.
  3. The tax rate for all employers subject to contribution provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be reduced by the total combined job development assessment and adjustment as determined under subsection (b) of this section.
  4. In no event may the job development assessment adjustment negatively impact contributing employers by either preventing the tax schedule to be in effect for the ensuing calendar year from dropping from a higher schedule or causing the tax schedule to be in effect for the ensuing calendar year to be raised to a higher schedule.
    1. If the tax schedule, as determined by the reserve ratio of the employment security fund on September 30, 2018, would be different than the tax schedule determined if the unadjusted reserve ratio of the fund were used to determine the tax schedule for the ensuing calendar year, the department shall do one of the following to ensure that the tax schedule to be in effect for the ensuing calendar year is unaffected by the job development assessment adjustment:
      1. Make any necessary transfers from available job development fund resources to the employment security trust fund to establish a reserve ratio that would represent the ratio that would have been in effect should the job development assessment adjustment not have been performed in the prior year; or
      2. Perform no job development assessment adjustment in the ensuing calendar year.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 240, § 3; P.L. 1993, ch. 296, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 383, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 14, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 145, art. 11, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 11, § 2.

28-43-8.6. Employment security reemployment assessment.

For the tax years 2001, 2002 and 2003 each employer subject to this chapter shall be required to pay an employment security reemployment assessment of three hundredths of one percent (0.03%) of that employer’s taxable payroll, in addition to any other payment which that employer is required to make under any other provision of this chapter. The assessment shall not be considered as part of the individual employer’s contribution rate for the purpose of determining the individual employer’s balancing charge pursuant to § 28-43-9 . The tax rate for all employers subject to the contribution provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be reduced by three hundredths of one percent (0.03%).

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 382, § 2.

28-43-9. Balancing rate.

  1. As of September 30, 1988 and on each subsequent computation date, the director shall determine the balancing rate percentage to be effective for the immediately following tax year in accordance with the Balancing Rate Schedule in this subsection. The director shall charge to the employer’s account and credit to the balancing account in any manner and at any times, quarterly or otherwise, that the director shall prescribe, an amount obtained by multiplying the employer’s taxable wages for the calendar year immediately following the computation date, or any one or more quarters of that calendar year, by the product of the individual employer’s contribution rate for that calendar year and balancing rate percentage corresponding to the tax schedule in effect for the calendar year in accordance with the balancing rate schedule in this subsection:

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  2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, if the balance in the balancing account as of the computation date is greater than or equal to zero (0), then no balance charge shall be made against employer accounts for the immediately following tax year.
  3. Contributions required pursuant to any balancing percentage rate shall not be in addition to other contributions required by chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

Balancing Rate Schedule Tax Schedule Corresponding in Effect Balancing Rates A 4 B 6 C 8 D 10 E 12 F 14 G 16 H 18 I 20

History of Section. P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 2; P.L. 1968, ch. 291, § 3; P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 6; P.L. 1985, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 315, § 1.

28-43-10. Application of predecessor’s payroll record to successor employer.

    1. (i) Whenever any employing unit in any manner succeeds to, or has succeeded to, or acquires, or has acquired, the organization, trade, separate establishment (provided separate payroll reports have been filed with the director for the separate establishment), or business, or substantially all the assets thereof, and whenever the successor was not prior to that acquisition an employing unit as that term is defined in § 28-42-3(17) of another which at the time of the acquisition was an employer subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the predecessor employing unit shall be deemed to have relinquished all rights to have its prior payroll records, or in the case of a separate establishment the prior payroll records of the establishment, used for the purpose of determining experience rates of employer contributions for that predecessor, and the director shall use those prior payroll records for the purpose of determining experience rates of employer contributions for that successor. That successor shall, if not already an employer prior to that acquisition, become an employer on the date of that acquisition, and for the purpose of determining experience rates of employer contributions the director shall hereafter consider those prior payroll records of the predecessor as the payroll records of the successor, and the successor shall assume the position of the predecessor or predecessors with respect to the payroll records of the predecessor or predecessors as if there had been no change in the ownership of the organization, trade, separate establishment, business, or assets. If the successor is an employer prior to the time of the transfer, it may continue to pay employer contributions at the rate applicable to it from the date the transfer occurred until the end of the then current tax year, or it may elect to pay at the rate applicable to its predecessor for the balance of that year. If the successor is not an employer prior to the time of the transfer, it shall pay employer contributions at the rate applicable to the predecessor or, if more than one and the same rate is applicable to both, the rate applicable to the predecessor or predecessors from the date the transfer occurred until the end of the then current tax year. If the successor is not an employer prior to the time of the transfer and simultaneously acquires the businesses of two (2) or more employers to whom different rates of employer contributions are applicable, it shall pay employer contributions at the highest rate applicable to those predecessors from the date transfers occurred until the end of the then current tax year.
    2. A successor to any portion of the business of its predecessor shall have its rate determined  based on its own unemployment experience combined with that portion of the predecessor’s unemployment experience attributable to the share of the trade or business transferred to the successor in the following manner:
      1. The total payroll of the employees on the predecessor’s payroll during the last completed calendar quarter prior to the date of the transfer who are also on the payroll of the successor when the transfer takes effect shall be divided by the predecessor’s total payroll during the last completed calendar quarter prior to the date of the transfer, and that percentage shall be applied to the experience rating balances and payroll of the predecessor as of the end of the experience year used to determine the contribution rate for the tax year in effect at the date of transfer. The resulting amounts shall be subtracted from the experience rating balances and payroll of the predecessor. The predecessor’s remaining experience rating balances and payroll shall be used to determine its contribution rate for the new tax year or for the remainder of the current tax year, whichever is applicable, effective on the first day of the calendar quarter following the date of the transfer; provided, that if the date of the transfer is the first day of the calendar quarter, then the new contribution rate shall take effect on the date of the transfer.
      2. The balances subtracted from the predecessor’s account in subsection (i) of this section, shall be combined with the experience rating balances and payroll of the successor as of the end of the experience year used to determine the contribution rate for the tax year in effect at the date of transfer. Those combined balances shall be used to determine the contribution rate for the successor for the new tax year or for the remainder of the current tax year, whichever is applicable, effective on the first day of the calendar quarter following the date of the transfer; provided, that if the date of the transfer is the first day of the calendar quarter then the new contribution rate shall take effect on the date of the transfer. For successors in business for less than one experience year, their contribution rate for the new tax year or for the remainder of the current tax year, whichever is applicable, shall be computed based on the transferred experience rating balances and payroll of the predecessor and shall take effect on the first day of the calendar quarter following the date of the transfer; provided, that if the date of the transfer is the first day of the calendar quarter then the new contribution rate shall take effect on the date of the transfer.
    (ii) In all cases the rate of employer contributions applicable to the successor for each tax year beginning with the tax year commencing next after the transfer shall be computed on the basis of the combined payroll records of the successor and of the predecessor or predecessors. A successor shall be deemed to be an eligible employer if its experience combined with that of its predecessors meets the requirements of § 28-43-1(3) . As used in this section, “successor” means the employing unit to whom a transfer as provided in this section is made, and “predecessor” means the employer making the transfer and may, if the context so requires, be construed as referring only to the separate establishment transferred in case of the transfer of a separate establishment.
  1. Any determination of the director under this section shall be final unless an appeal from it is filed by the aggrieved party within fifteen (15) days from the date that notice is mailed to the last known address of that party. All appeals shall follow the provision of § 28-43-13 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-8 ; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-10 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 290, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 306, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 290, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 306, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(16) was changed to 28-42-3(17) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2005, ch. 290, § 3, and P.L. 2005, ch. 306, § 3, state that the amendments to this section by those acts take effect on January 1, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Successor Employer.

Company that purchased predecessor company’s machinery presses, equipment, patents, inventory, work in progress, trade name, and accounts receivable, employed most of the same employees, honored outstanding liabilities, and leased the same building was a successor employer and inherited its predecessor’s experience rating. C & J Jewelry Co. v. Department of Empl. & Training, Bd. of Review, 702 A.2d 384, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 297 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of provision of unemployment compensation act subjecting to its provisions an employer purchasing or succeeding to the business of another employer. 4 A.L.R.2d 721.

Successor in business, right to experience or rating of predecessor for purpose of fixing rate of contribution for unemployment compensation. 22 A.L.R.2d 673.

28-43-11. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1956, § 28-43-11 ) was repealed by P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 213, § 2. For present provisions of law, see § 28-43-3 .

28-43-12. Adjustments — Refund of overpayments.

  1. If an employer makes application for refund or credit of any amount paid as contributions or interest under this title and the director determines that the amount or any portion of it was erroneously collected, the director shall, in his or her discretion, either allow a credit for it, or by voucher duly drawn by the director in an amount and in a manner that the director may prescribe, direct the general treasurer to pay the amount determined to be erroneously collected from the clearance account of the employment security fund or, in the event of an overpayment of interest, from the employment security interest fund. If, in the discretion of the director, a credit is to be allowed, that credit shall be applied against the payment or payments of contributions next due from the employer subsequent to the determination of the director. No refund or credit shall be allowed with respect to a payment as contributions or interest, unless an application for it is made in writing on or before whichever of the following dates is later: (1) one year from the date on which the payment was made; or (2) three (3) years from the last day of the period with respect to which the payment was made. For a like cause and within the same period a refund may be made, or a credit allowed, on the motion of the director. If the director determines that contributions or interest were erroneously paid to this state on wages insured under the employment security law of some other state or of the federal government, refund or adjustment of the payment may be made without interest, irrespective of the time limits provided in this section, on the submission of proof satisfactory to the director that contributions or interest on the wages have been paid to the other state or to the federal government. No interest shall be allowed or paid with respect to any refund. No refund or credit shall be allowed if the amount involved is less than one dollar ($1.00). Nothing in this title, or any part of it, shall be construed to authorize any refund or credit of money due and payable under the law and regulations in effect at the time the money was paid, except that refunds to federal instrumentalities may be made in accordance with the terms set forth in § 28-42-8(5) .
  2. Whenever an employer who is liable to provisions of chapters 39 — 44 of this title does not report the correct amount of contributions, an assessment of additional contributions must be made within three (3) years, except in the case of fraud or intent to evade the provision of law, in which case the limitation does not apply.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 5; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-43-12 , 28-43-13 ; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-12 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 24, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 7; P.L. 1998, ch. 234, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 334, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

28-43-13. Appeals to the board of review.

In the event that any application for refund or credit is denied, the director shall notify the applicant in writing of that decision. Unless the applicant, within fifteen (15) days after the notice of denial has been mailed to the applicant’s last known address, files an appeal in writing with the board of review setting forth the grounds for that appeal, the denial shall be final. If an appeal is duly filed, the board of review shall then set a time and place to give the appellant an opportunity to show cause as to why the decision of the director should be changed. Following that hearing, the board of review shall as promptly as possible, notify the appellant and the director of its decision on the application. That decision shall become final unless the appellant or the director files an appeal to the sixth division of the district court in accordance with the provisions of §§ 28-44-51 28-44-55 .

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 5; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2275, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-14 ; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-13 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 10.

28-43-14. Appeals to the board of review on other matters.

Any employer or person aggrieved by any decision of fact or law by the director with reference its or his or her status as an employer or as to whether services performed for it or him or her constitutes employment, or as to any other matter for which an appeal is not otherwise provided in chapters 42 — 44 of this title, may, within fifteen (15) days after notice of that decision has been mailed or otherwise delivered to it or him or her, appeal to the board of review, in writing, stating the grounds upon which that appeal is taken. Unless an appeal is duly filed within the time limit, the decision of the director shall be final. If any appeal is duly filed, the board of review shall then set a time and place to give the appellant an opportunity to show cause as to why the decision of the director should be changed. Following that hearing, the board of review shall, as promptly as possible, notify the appellant and the director of its decision on the appeal. That decision shall become final unless the appellant or the director files an appeal to the courts in accordance with the provisions of §§ 28-44-51 28-44-55 .

History of Section. P.L. 1964, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appealable Decision.

Department of labor and training board of review had subject matter jurisdiction to review the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-57 made by the director of the department of labor and training, as the determination of the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees to award was a decision made by the director within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-43-14 , therefore subjecting that action to the appeals process provided for under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-43-24 . Arnold v. R.I. DOL & Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2003).

28-43-15. Interest on delinquent payments.

Employers who fail to make payment of contributions as required by chapters 42 — 44 of this title or by the regulations adopted as prescribed shall be liable to the employment security interest fund for interest on the outstanding balance of those delinquent payments at the rate of one and one half percent (1.5%) per month from the date the payment became due until paid.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 14; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 11; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 3; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-15 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 12; P.L. 1978, ch. 313, § 2; P.L. 1981, ch. 26, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 282, § 8.

28-43-16. Priority of contributions in bankruptcy or judicial distribution of assets.

In the event of any distribution of an employer’s assets pursuant to an order of any court under the laws of this state, including any receivership, assignment for benefit of creditors, adjudicated insolvency, composition, or similar proceeding, contribution payments then or subsequently due shall have the same priority given to wage claims of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) to each claimant, earned within six (6) months of the commencement of the proceeding. In the event of an employer’s adjudication in bankruptcy, judicially confirmed extension proposal, or composition under the federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., contributions then or subsequently due shall be entitled to the priority as is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 507.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 14; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-16 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Priority of Claim.

In receivership proceedings for dissolution of a corporation, a claim for employer contributions under this chapter ranks behind claims for employee contributions withheld under the state and federal acts but on a par with claims for employer contributions under the federal unemployment compensation act and for other federal taxes. Rivard v. Bijou Furniture Co., 67 R.I. 251 , 21 A.2d 563, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1941), disapproved, Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8, 66 S. Ct. 841, 90 L. Ed. 1049, 1946 U.S. LEXIS 3162 (1946).

Collateral References.

Bankruptcy of employer, unemployment insurance taxes as payable in respect of claims for wages and earned before. 174 A.L.R. 1295.

28-43-17. Determination of contributions without report by employer.

If an employer for any reporting period fails to make any report used for the purpose of determining the amount of contributions payable under chapters 42 — 44 of this title at the time and in the manner required by the regulations adopted as prescribed or if those reports when filed are incorrect or insufficient, and the employer fails to file a corrected or sufficient report within twenty (20) days after the director has required the correction by written notice, the director shall determine on the basis of that information as the director may be able to obtain, the amount of contributions due from the employer, and the director shall give written notice to the employer of the amount of contributions so determined. That determination shall finally and irrevocably fix the amount of contributions due unless the employer shall, within twenty (20) days after the giving of that notice, apply to the board of review for a hearing, or unless the director on his or her own volition reduces the amount.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-17 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-43-18. Civil action to recover contributions.

If any employer fails to make any payment of contributions or interest on them at the time and in the manner required by the regulations adopted as prescribed, the amount of contributions due shall be collected by civil action. All civil actions shall be instituted in the name of the director, and he or she shall be exempt from giving any surety for costs. Civil actions brought under this section to collect contributions or interest on them shall be heard by the court having jurisdiction at the earliest possible date, and shall be entitled to preference upon the calendar of the court over all other civil actions, except petitions for a judicial review under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 14; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-18 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 150, § 38.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Cross References.

Recovery of erroneously paid benefits, § 28-42-68 .

Collateral References.

What amounts to presence of foreign corporation in state, so as to render it liable to action therein to recover unemployment compensation tax. 161 A.L.R. 1068.

28-43-19. Representation of director in civil actions.

In any civil action brought to enforce the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the director may be represented by any qualified attorney whom the director has designated and employed for this purpose, or at the director’s request, by the attorney general.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 11; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-19 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-43-20. Contributions as debt to state — Lien on real estate.

  1. The amount of any contributions, interest, and penalties imposed upon any employer under the provisions of this chapter shall be a debt due from that employer to the state, shall be recoverable at law in the same manner as other debts, and shall until collected constitute a lien upon all the real property of that employer located in this state. That lien shall take precedence over any other lien or encumbrance on that property except as subsequently provided. The director may file a notice of that tax lien with the records of land evidence for the city or town where that property is located and it shall be the duty of the recorder of deeds or the city or town clerk having custody of those records to receive, file, and index that notice under the name of the employer. Notwithstanding any of the preceding provisions of this section to the contrary, the lien imposed by this section shall not be valid with respect to property in any city or town as against any bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or lessee whose interest in that real property appears of record in the city or town prior to the time of filing of the notice of tax lien in that city or town.
  2. The notice of the filed tax lien shall be in writing, shall contain the name and last known address of the employer, and shall state that the employer is indebted to the state of Rhode Island under this chapter for which the director claims a lien; that notice need not describe the employer’s property, or specify the amount of taxes owed, or the period of time covered by the delinquency. When a notice is filed in a city or town by the director, it shall, unless sooner discharged or released, also apply to property in the same city or town subsequently acquired by the employer during a period of six (6) years from the date of filing, and that filing need not be repeated for each successive delinquency of the employer. The notice shall expire six (6) years from the date of filing unless renewed by again filing a notice on or before that expiration date. The director shall discharge or release the notice of lien when the employer is no longer delinquent in the payment of any contributions, interest, or penalties, whether incurred prior or subsequent to the date of filing of the notice, or upon request, following the expiration of the statutory lien period, as set forth in this subsection.
  3. For the filing of a notice of lien or for its discharge, the recorder of deeds or the city or town clerk shall be paid out of any money appropriated for expenses, a fee of four dollars ($4.00) for a completed entry.
  4. The authority granted to the director to file a notice of lien shall not be held to repeal or amend in any other respect the provisions of § 28-42-38 .

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1956, ch. 3665, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-20 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 280, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-43-21. Notice of transfer of business — Contributions due immediately.

The sale or transfer by any employer other than receivers, assignees under a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, trustees in bankruptcy, or public officers acting under judicial process, of the major part in value of the assets of that employer otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and the regular and usual prosecution of that employer’s business shall be fraudulent and void as against the state, unless that employer, at least five (5) days before the sale or transfer, notifies the director of the proposed sale or transfer and of the price, terms, and conditions of the sale and of the character and location of those assets. Whenever that employer makes the sale or transfer, all contributions imposed by this chapter shall be paid at the time when the director is notified, or, if he or she is not notified, at the time when he or she should have been notified.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1956, ch. 3665, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-21 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 280, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Collateral References.

Employer’s unpaid contribution under social security or unemployment compensation acts, rank or priority of lien or claim for. 140 A.L.R. 1042.

28-43-22. Collection powers — Surety bond to pay.

  1. The director shall have for the collection of contributions imposed by this chapter all powers as are prescribed for collection of contributions in this title. The director may require any employer subject to the taxes imposed by this chapter to file with the director a bond, issued by a surety company authorized to transact business in this state, in any amount that the director may fix, to secure the payment of the contributions, penalties, and interest due or which may become due from that employer.
    1. The director may require the employer to deposit with the general treasurer a bond by way of cash or other security satisfactory to the director in an amount to be determined by the director, but not greater than an amount equal to double the amount of the estimated tax that would normally be due from the employer each month under this chapter, but in no case shall the deposit be less than one hundred dollars ($100).
    2. Where an employer who has deposited a bond with the general treasurer under subdivision (1) of this subsection has failed to collect or remit contributions in accordance with this chapter, the director may, upon giving written notice to the employer by registered mail or personal service, apply the bond in whole or in part to the amount that should have been collected, remitted, or paid by the employer.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 14; P.L. 1956, ch. 3665, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-22 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 280, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-43-23. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 4; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 2, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2275, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-42-23 ; Repealed by P.L. 1985, ch. 280, § 4, effective June 19, 1985.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-42-23 concerned unclaimed or unpaid unemployment trust fund moneys.

28-43-24. Contributions payable by governmental entities.

  1. In lieu of contributions required by employers under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, a governmental entity as defined in § 28-42-3(22) may elect to pay to the director for the employment security fund an amount equal to the amount of regular benefits and of one-half (1/2) of the extended benefits paid that are attributable to service in the employ of the governmental entity for weeks of unemployment which begin during the effective period of that election in accordance with the provisions of § 28-43-29 ; provided, that for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after January 1, 1979, governmental entities which have elected reimbursement shall be responsible for reimbursing the fund for the full amount of extended benefits that are attributable to service in the employ of that governmental entity.
  2. If a governmental entity elects to reimburse the fund, reimbursement payments shall be made in accordance with the provisions of § 28-43-30 and the allocation of benefit costs shall be made in accordance with provisions of § 28-43-31 .
  3. If a governmental entity does not elect to reimburse the fund, it shall be required to pay contributions as provided in chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. G.L.1938, ch. 284, § 23; P.L. 1955, ch. 3428, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-43-24 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 57, § 2; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 8; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 13; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 91.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(21) was changed to 28-42-3(22) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

Cross References.

Employment subject to contribution, § 28-42-13 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appealable Decision.

Department of labor and training board of review had subject matter jurisdiction to review the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-57 made by the director of the department of labor and training, as the determination of the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees to award was a decision made by the director within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-43-14 , therefore subjecting that action to the appeals process provided for under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-43-24 . Arnold v. R.I. DOL & Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2003).

28-43-25 — 28-43-27. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1938, ch. 284, §§ 23, 24; P.L. 1955, ch. 3428, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 57, § 3; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 8) were repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 92, §§ 14-16.

28-43-28. Waiver of contributions and interest under one dollar.

If the total amount due to the department of labor and training from an employer in contributions and/or interest for any period is less than one dollar ($1.00), that amount shall not be assessed.

History of Section. G.L. 1956, § 28-43-28 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 182, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-43-29. Liability for contributions and election of reimbursement.

  1. Any nonprofit organization or governmental entity which is or becomes subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title on or after January 1, 1978, shall pay contributions under the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, unless it elects, in accordance with this section, to pay to the director for the employment security fund the full amount of regular benefits paid plus the full amount of the extended benefits paid, less any federal payments to the state under § 204 of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, that are attributable to service in the employ of that nonprofit organization or governmental entity to individuals for weeks of unemployment which begin during the effective period of that election; provided, that for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after January 1, 1979, governmental entities which have elected reimbursement shall be responsible for reimbursing the employment security fund for the full amount of extended benefits paid that is attributable to service in the employ of those entities.
  2. Any nonprofit organization or governmental entity which is or becomes subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title on January 1, 1978, may elect to become liable for payments in lieu of contributions for a period of not less than the 1978 tax year and the next ensuing tax year provided it files with the director a written notice of its election within the thirty (30) day period immediately following January 1, 1978.
  3. Any nonprofit organization or governmental entity which becomes subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title after January 1, 1978, may elect to become liable for payments in lieu of contributions for a period of not less than the balance of the tax year beginning with the date on which that subjectivity begins and the next ensuing tax year by filing a written notice of its election with the director not later than thirty (30) days immediately following the date of the determination of that subjectivity.
  4. Any nonprofit organization or governmental entity which makes an election in accordance with subsection (b) or (c) of this section will continue to be liable for payments in lieu of contributions until it files with the director a written notice terminating its election not later than thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of the tax year for which that termination shall first be effective. The nonprofit organization or governmental entity shall thereafter be liable for the payment of contributions for not less than that tax year and the next ensuing tax year before another election can be exercised.
  5. Any nonprofit organization or governmental entity which has been paying contributions under chapters 42 — 44 of this title for a period subsequent to January 1, 1978, may change to a reimbursable basis by filing with the director not later than thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of any tax year a written notice of election to become liable for payments in lieu of contributions. That election shall not be terminable by the organization or entity for that tax year and for the next ensuing tax year.
  6. The director may for good cause extend the period within which a notice of election, or a notice of termination, must be filed and may permit an election to be retroactive but not any earlier than with respect to benefits paid on or after January 1, 1978.
  7. The director, in accordance with any procedures that he or she may prescribe, shall notify each nonprofit organization or governmental entity of any determination which may be made of its status as an employer and of the effective date of any election which it makes and of any termination of that election. Any determination shall be conclusive on the organization or the entity unless within fifteen (15) days after notice of the determination has been mailed or otherwise delivered to it, an appeal is made to the board of review in writing in accordance with the provisions of § 28-43-14 .

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 9; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 17; P.L. 1991, ch. 101, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 91.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 1 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes or job development fund by the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of employment and training with reference to the collection of revenues shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of employment and training or the director of the department of employment and training shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of employment and training such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Section 1 of P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 3, provides: “Transferring certain revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation, to the Department of Labor and Training.

“In any general or special law of the state of Rhode Island, and specifically in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28, as amended, reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund by the division of taxation within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training. Any reference to the tax administrator within the department of administration, now within the department of revenue, with reference to the collection of temporary disability insurance, employment security taxes, or job development fund revenues shall be construed to refer to the director of the department of labor and training. Any revenue collection duties conferred upon the division of taxation or the tax administrator by chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 shall be construed to refer to the department of labor and training or the director of the department of labor and training.

“The law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services is authorized and empowered to make appropriate changes in chapters 39, 40, 42, and 43 of title 28 and any other section of the laws to carry out the intent of this act.”

28-43-30. Reimbursement payments — Nonprofit organizations and governmental entities.

  1. At the end of each month, the director shall bill each nonprofit organization or group of those organizations or governmental entity which has elected to make payment in lieu of contributions, for an amount equal to the full amount of regular benefits, plus the full amount of extended benefits paid during that month, less any federal payments to the state under section 204 of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, that is attributable to service in the employ of that organization or entity; provided, that for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after January 1, 1979, those governmental entities shall be responsible for reimbursing the employment security fund for the full amount of extended benefits paid that is attributable to service in the employ of those entities. Each nonprofit organization or group of those organizations or governmental entity which has elected to make payment in lieu of contributions, shall also be liable to reimburse the employment security fund for any benefits payments made if the director establishes on or after October 1, 2013 that the payment was made because the employer, or an agent of the employer, was at fault for failing to respond timely or adequately to the request of the department for information relating to the claim for unemployment benefits that was subsequently overpaid.
  2. The amount computed for the state shall be reported monthly to the general treasurer and shall then be paid from the general fund of the state upon approval thereof in accordance with the law in effect, except that to the extent that benefits are paid by the state from special administrative funds, the payment by the state into the employment security fund shall be made from special funds.
  3. The amount so computed for political subdivisions, instrumentalities, and all other governmental entities shall be reported monthly to the financial authorities who shall pay the required amount into the employment security fund in accordance with regulations as prescribed.
  4. Payment of any bill rendered under subsection (a) of this section shall be made not later than thirty (30) days after that bill was mailed to the last known address of the nonprofit organization or governmental entity, or was otherwise delivered to it. The bill rendered to an employer shall constitute the director’s determination and shall be binding upon the employer unless an appeal is duly filed in writing to the board of review in accordance with the provisions of § 28-43-14 , within fifteen (15) days of the mailing or other delivery.
  5. Payments made by any nonprofit organization or governmental entity under the provisions of this section shall not be deducted or deductible, in whole or in part, from the remuneration of individuals in the employ of the organization.
  6. With respect to nonprofit organizations or groups of organizations and governmental entities, past due payments of amounts in lieu of contributions shall be subject to the same interest and penalties that apply to delinquent contributions under §§ 28-42-65 and 28-43-15 .
  7. If any nonprofit organization or governmental entity is delinquent in making payments in lieu of contributions as required under the provisions of this section, the director may terminate that organization’s or entity’s election to make payments in lieu of contributions as of the beginning of the next taxable year and that termination shall be effective for that and the next taxable year.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 9; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 18; P.L. 1978, ch. 313, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 101, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 91; P.L. 2013, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 131, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 126, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 131, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 126, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 131, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

28-43-31. Allocation of benefit costs — Reimbursable employers.

  1. Each employer that is liable for payments in lieu of contributions in accordance with § 28-43-29 shall pay to the director for the fund the full amount of regular benefits paid plus the full amount of extended benefits paid, less any federal payments to the state under § 204 of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, that are attributable to service in the employ of that employer; provided, that for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after January 1, 1979, governmental entities that are liable for reimbursement shall be responsible for reimbursing the fund for the full amount of extended benefits so paid.
  2. Each employer that is liable for payments in lieu of contributions in accordance with § 28-43-29 shall make payments to the director that shall include, but not be limited to, benefits paid but denied on appeal or benefits paid in error that cannot be properly charged against another employer either reimbursable or contributory; provided, that if the benefits that were paid in error are subsequently repaid, those amounts shall be credited to the employer’s account after repayment is actually received by the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 9; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 19; P.L. 1991, ch. 101, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 91; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-43-32. Group accounts.

Two (2) or more employers that have become liable for payments in lieu of contributions, in accordance with the provisions of § 28-43-29 , may file a joint application to the director for the establishment of a group account for the purpose of sharing the cost of benefits paid that are attributable to service in the employ of those employers. Each application shall identify and authorize a group representative to act as the group’s agent for the purposes of this section. Upon approval of the application, the director shall establish a group account for those employers effective as of the beginning of the calendar quarter in which he or she receives the application and shall notify the group’s representative of the effective date of the account. That account shall remain in effect for not less than two (2) tax years and subsequently until terminated at the discretion of the director or upon application by the group. Upon establishment of the account, each member of the group shall be liable for payments in lieu of contributions with respect to each calendar quarter in the amount that bears the same ratio to the total benefits paid in that quarter that are attributable to service performed in the employ of all members of the group as the total wages paid for service in employment by that member in that quarter bear to the total wages paid during that quarter for service performed in the employ of all members of the group. The director shall prescribe any regulations as deemed necessary with respect to applications for establishment, maintenance, and termination of group accounts that are authorized by this section, for addition of new members to, and withdrawal of active members from, those accounts, and for the determination of the amounts that are payable under this section by members of the group and the time and manner of those payments.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 9.

28-43-33. Transition provisions.

Notwithstanding any provisions in §§ 28-43-29 and 28-43-30 , any nonprofit organization or group of organizations not required to be covered pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a)(1) prior to January 1, 1978, and that prior to October 20, 1976, paid contributions required by the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and pursuant to § 28-43-29 , elects within thirty (30) days after January 1, 1978 to make payments in lieu of contributions, shall not be required to make any payments on account of any regular or extended benefits paid on the basis of wages paid by that organization to individuals for weeks of unemployment which begin on or after the effective date of that election until the total amount of those benefits equals the amount of the positive balance in the experience rating account of that organization or group of organizations.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 9; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 20.

28-43-34. Repayment — Federal advances.

  1. If at any time the amount in the employment security fund exceeds the amount of any outstanding balance of this state due to the federal unemployment account in the unemployment trust fund, the governor may, upon recommendation of the director, in accordance with federal law and regulations in effect, cause to be paid from the employment security fund an amount equal to the outstanding balance to the federal unemployment account.
  2. If on June 30, 1985, or on any subsequent June 30, the amount in the employment security fund exceeds the amount of any outstanding balance of this state due to the federal unemployment account in the unemployment trust fund, the governor shall, in accordance with federal law and regulations then in effect, cause to be paid from the employment security fund an amount equal to the outstanding balance to the federal unemployment account; provided, that the remaining balance in the unemployment security fund after that payment will equal or exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount of benefits estimated by the director to be paid in the next succeeding twelve (12) months.
  3. In any calendar year beginning on or after January 1, 1983, The governor may, upon recommendation of the director, cause to be paid from the employment security fund to the federal unemployment account, any amount or amounts if, in accordance with federal laws and regulations then in effect, the governor deems that payment to be in the best interest of this state.
  4. The governor may delegate his or her authority to make voluntary repayments of Title XII advances from the account of the State of Rhode Island in the unemployment trust fund to the federal unemployment account to the director in accordance with the provisions of Section 1202 of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. § 1322]. The director may make voluntary repayments as he or she deems necessary, provided that upon making such a voluntary repayment, the director shall notify the governor, the speaker of the house, the senate president, the chairman of the house finance committee and the chairman of the senate finance committee of the action taken.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 7; P.L. 1983, ch. 67, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 8, § 2.

28-43-35. Special rules regarding transfers of experience and assignment of rates.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the following shall apply regarding assignment of rates and transfers of experience:

  1. If an employer transfers its trade or business, or a portion thereof, to another employer and, at the time of the transfer, there is any common ownership, management, or control of the two (2) employers, then the unemployment experience attributable to the transferred trade or business shall be transferred to the employer to whom such business is so transferred. Furthermore, partial transfers may be made in the absence of common ownership at the discretion of the director.  In determining whether there is any common ownership, management or control, the department may consider the following factors, which include, but are not limited to: any familial relationships, principals or corporate officers, organizational structure, day-to-day operations, assets and liabilities, and stated business purposes. The rates of both employers shall be recalculated in the following manner:
    1. The total payroll of the employees on the predecessor’s payroll during the last, completed calendar quarter prior to the date of the transfer, who are also on the payroll of the successor when the transfer takes effect shall be divided by the predecessor’s total payroll during the last, completed calendar quarter prior to the date of the transfer, and that percentage shall be applied to the experience rating balances and payroll of the predecessor as of the end of the experience year used to determine the contribution rate for the tax year in effect at the date of transfer. The resulting amounts shall be subtracted from the experience-rating balances and payroll of the predecessor. The predecessor’s remaining experience-rating balances and payroll shall be used to determine its contribution rate for the new tax year or for the remainder of the current tax year, whichever is applicable, effective on the first day of the calendar quarter following the date of the transfer; provided, that if the date of the transfer is the first day of the calendar quarter, then the new contribution rate shall take effect on the date of the transfer.
    2. The balances, subtracted from the predecessor’s account in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, shall be combined with the experience-rating balances and payroll of the successors as of the end of the experience year used to determine the contribution rate for the tax year in effect at the date of transfer. Those combined balances shall be used to determine the contribution rate for the successor for the new tax year, or for the remainder of the current tax year, whichever is applicable, effective on the first day of the calendar quarter following the date of the transfer; provided, that if the date of the transfer is the first day of the calendar quarter, then the new contribution rate shall take effect on the date of the transfer. For successors in business for less than one experience year, their contribution rate for the new tax year, or for the remainder of the current tax year, whichever is applicable, shall be computed based on the transferred experience rating balances and payroll of the predecessor and shall take effect on the first day of the calendar quarter following the date of the transfer; provided, that if the date of the transfer is the first day of the calendar quarter, then the new contribution rate shall take effect on the date of the transfer.
    3. A successor shall be deemed to be an eligible employer if its experience combined with that of its predecessors meets the requirements of § 28-43-1(3) . As used in this section, “successor” means the employing unit to whom a transfer as provided in this section is made, and “predecessor” means the employer making the transfer and may, if the context so requires, be construed as referring only to the separate establishment transferred in case of the transfer of a separate establishment.
  2. If, following a transfer of experience under subsection (a) of this section, the director determines that a substantial purpose of the transfer of the trade or business was to obtain a reduced liability for contributions, then the experience-rating accounts of the employers involved shall be combined and the combined rate assigned to each employer account.
  3. Whenever a person who is not an employer under this chapter at the time that person acquires the trade or business of an employer, the unemployment experience of the acquired business shall not be transferred to such person if the director finds that such person acquired the business solely, or primarily, for the purposes of obtaining a lower rate of contributions. Instead, such person shall be assigned the new employer rate under § 28-43-8.3 . In determining whether the business was acquired solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a lower rate of contributions, the director shall use objective factors that may include the cost of acquiring the business, whether the person continued the business enterprise of the acquired business, how long such business enterprise was continued, or whether a substantial number of new employees were hired for performance of duties unrelated to the business activity conducted prior to the acquisition.
  4. Subject to the provisions herein, whenever a person who is not an employer under this chapter at the time that person acquires the trade or business, or a portion thereof, of an employer in insolvency proceedings, including federal bankruptcy courts, state receiverships, masterships, or other insolvency proceedings, the unemployment experience of the acquired business shall not be transferred to such person. Instead, such person shall be assigned the new employer rate under § 28-43-8.3 unless the director finds that, at the time of the acquisition, there is common ownership, management, or control of the two (2) employers, and in such case all of the experience will be transferred.
  5. Subject to the provisions herein, whenever a person who is an eligible employer prior to the time that person acquires the trade or business, or a portion thereof, of an employer in solvency proceeding(s) including federal bankruptcy courts, state receiverships, mastership, or other insolvency proceedings, the unemployment experience of the acquired business shall not be transferred to such person. Instead, such person shall continue to pay employer contributions at the rate applicable to it prior to the date it made such acquisition unless the director finds that, at the time of the acquisition, there is common ownership, management, or control of the two (2) employers, and in such case, all of the experience will be transferred and a new rate computed.
    1. If a person knowingly violates or attempts to violate subsections (a), (b) or (c), or any other provision of this chapter related to determining the assignment of a contribution rate, or if a person knowingly advises another person in a way that results in a violation of such provision, the person shall be subject to the following penalties:
      1. If the person is an employer, then such employer shall be assigned the highest rate assignable under this chapter for the rate year during which such violation, or attempted violation, occurred and the three (3) rate years immediately following this rate year. However, if the person’s business is already at such highest rate for any year, or if the amount of increase in the person’s rate would be less than two percent (2%) for such year, then a penalty rate of contributions of two percent (2%) of taxable wages shall be imposed for such year.
      2. If the person is not an employer, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a civil money penalty of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000). Any such fine shall be deposited in the Rhode Island general fund.
    2. For purposes of this section, the term “knowingly” means having actual knowledge of, or acting with deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard for, the prohibition involved.
    3. For purposes of this section, the term “violates or attempts to violate” includes, but is not limited to, intent to evade, misrepresentation, or willful nondisclosure.
    4. In addition to the penalty imposed by subparagraph (1), any violation of this section may also be prosecuted as a misdemeanor, and for each offense, the person may be subject to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.
  6. The director shall establish procedures to identify the transfer or acquisition of a business for purposes of this section.
  7. For purposes of this chapter:
    1. “Person” shall include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation; and
    2. “Trade or business” shall include the employer’s workforce.
  8. This section shall be interpreted and applied in such a manner as to meet the minimum requirements contained in any guidance or regulations issued by the United States Department of Labor.
  9. Any determination of the director under this section shall be final unless an appeal from it is filed by the aggrieved party within fifteen (15) days from the date that notice is mailed to the last known address of that party. All appeals shall follow the provisions of § 28-43-13 .

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 290, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 306, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 242, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 290, § 2, and P.L. 2005, ch. 306, § 2, enacted identical versions of this section.

In 2005, the compiler made stylistic changes in subsections (a) and (b).

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 242, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 282, § 1) as passed by the 2014 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 242, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 282, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2005, ch. 290, § 3, and P.L. 2005, ch. 306, § 3, state that the newly enacted sections by those acts take effect on January 1, 2006.

Chapter 44 Employment Security — Benefits

28-44-1. Source and manner of payment of benefits — Services covered by federal law.

Benefits shall be payable from the fund and shall be paid through employment offices, or any other agencies that the director may designate, and the federal Social Security Administration may approve, in accordance with any regulations adopted as prescribed. No individual shall have or assert any right to benefits under the employment security law of this state with respect to wages paid for services, as defined in § 28-42-8(5) irrespective of when those services were performed.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 6; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 4; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2811, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-1 .

Cross References.

Definition of terms, § 28-42-3 .

Comparative Legislation.

Benefits:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-227 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151A, § 22 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Preemption.

An examination of the state’s unemployment benefits laws demonstrated that compliance with the tin parachute statute would require employers to assume ongoing administrative obligations that would result in the kind of employee benefit plan preempted by the federal retirement income security statute. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1468 v. Imperial Home Decor Group, 76 F. Supp. 2d 179, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18650 (D.R.I. 1999).

Purpose of Statute.

This statute is part of a broad state-federal cooperative effort to protect citizens against economic vicissitudes and it was neither the intent nor the primary purpose of the statute as a whole to impinge federally established collective bargaining rights. Almacs, Inc. v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11774 (D.R.I. 1970).

Collateral References.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

Declaratory relief. 14 A.L.R.2d 826.

Disqualification for unemployment benefits, power of administrative officer to limit period of. 155 A.L.R. 411.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation of employee who retires voluntarily. 88 A.L.R.3d 274.

Employee’s refusal to take lie detector test as barring unemployment compensation. 18 A.L.R.4th 307.

Federal Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, effect of receipt of subsistence allowance under. 21 A.L.R.2d 1072.

Leaving employment or unavailability for particular job or duties because of sickness or disability, as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 68 A.L.R.5th 13.

Leaving or refusing employment because of allergic reaction as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 12 A.L.R.4th 629.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act. 95 A.L.R.3d 891.

Repayment of unemployment compensation benefits erroneously paid. 90 A.L.R.3d 987.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by claimant’s receipt of holiday pay. 3 A.L.R.4th 557.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by misrepresentation in original employment application. 23 A.L.R.4th 1272.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of pension. 56 A.L.R.3d 520.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of social security benefits. 56 A.L.R.3d 552.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by vacation or holiday or payment in lieu thereof. 30 A.L.R.2d 366.

Right to unemployment compensation or social security benefits of teacher or other school employee. 33 A.L.R.5th 643.

Severance payments as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 93 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Unemployment compensation: burden of proof as to voluntariness of separation. 73 A.L.R.4th 1093.

Unemployment compensation, eligibility as affected by claimant’s insistence upon conditions not common or customary to particular employment. 88 A.L.R.3d 1353.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility where claimant leaves employment under circumstances interpreted as a firing by the claimant but as a voluntary quit by the employer. 80 A.L.R.4th 7.

Validity of governmental requirement of oath of allegiance or loyalty as applied to applicants for unemployment compensation or relief. 18 A.L.R.2d 268.

Vested right of applicant for unemployment compensation in mode and manner of computing benefits in effect at time of his discharge or loss of employment. 20 A.L.R.2d 963.

Workers’ compensation, application for, or receipt of, unemployment compensation benefits as affecting claim for. 96 A.L.R.2d 941.

Worker’s compensation, liability of successive employers for disease or condition allegedly attributable to successive employments. 34 A.L.R.4th 958.

28-44-2. Payment day on holiday.

Whenever the day for payment of weekly benefit under this chapter falls upon a holiday, that weekly payment shall be made on either the day immediately preceding or the day immediately following that holiday.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1949, ch. 2327, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-2 .

Cross References.

Holidays, § 25-1-1 .

28-44-3. Wages considered in computing benefits.

Notwithstanding any provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title to the contrary, “wages” as used in the phrase “wages for employment from employers” means, with reference to the benefit provisions of those chapters, only those wages which are paid subsequent to the date upon which the employing unit, by whom those wages were paid, has satisfied the conditions of § 28-42-3(16) with respect to becoming an employer subject to those chapters.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 4; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3420, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-3 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 10.

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference in this section to subdivision 28-42-3(15) was changed to 28-42-3(16) as a result of the 2014 amendment to that section.

Collateral References.

Severance payments as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 93 A.L.R.2d 1319.

28-44-3.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 21; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 28; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 15, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-44-3.1 concerned wages considered in computing benefits for newly covered workers on the basis of previously uncovered services.

28-44-4. Inclusion of unpaid wages.

Wages earned by an employee for employment from employers which remain unpaid because the assets of the employer for whom that employment was rendered are in the custody or control of an assignee for the benefit of creditors, receiver, trustee, or any other fiduciary appointed by or under the control of a court of competent jurisdiction, shall, for all purposes of §§ 28-44-1 , 28-44-3 , 28-44-6 , and 28-44-11 , be deemed to be and shall be treated as though those wages had been paid to that employee during the calendar year within which those wages were earned.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-4 ; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 92.

28-44-5. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 4; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 2; P.L. 1942, ch. 1192, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2835, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3427, § 1; P.L. 1958, ch. 215, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 19, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-44-5 concerned total amount of benefit credits and the benefit year established prior to November 16, 1958.

28-44-6. Weekly benefits for total unemployment — Year established — Dependents’ allowance.

    1. The benefit rate payable under this chapter to any eligible individual with respect to any week of his or her total unemployment, when that week occurs within a benefit year, shall be, for benefit years beginning on or after October 1, 1989 and prior to July 1, 2012, four and sixty-two hundredths percent (4.62%) of the wages paid to the individual in that calendar quarter of the base period in which the individual’s wages were highest;
    2. The benefit rate payable under this chapter to any eligible individual with respect to any week of his or her total unemployment, when that week occurs within a benefit year, shall be, for benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 2012 and prior to July 1, 2013, four and thirty-eight hundredths percent (4.38%) of the average quarterly wage paid to the individual in the two (2) calendar quarters of the base period in which the individual’s wages were highest;
    3. The benefit rate payable under this chapter to any eligible individual with respect to any week of his or her total unemployment, when that week occurs within a benefit year, shall be, for benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 2013, and prior to July 1, 2014, four and fifteen hundredths percent (4.15%) of the average quarterly wage paid to the individual in the two calendar quarters of the base period in which the individual’s wages were highest;
    4. The benefit rate payable under this chapter to any eligible individual with respect to any week of his or her total unemployment, when that week occurs within a benefit year, shall be, for benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 2014, three and eighty-five hundredths percent (3.85%) of the average quarterly wage paid to the individual in the two calendar quarters of the base period in which the individual’s wages were highest;
    5. Provided, that the benefit rate prior to July 1, 2012, shall not be more than sixty-seven percent (67%) of the average weekly wage paid to individuals in employment covered by the Employment Security Act for the preceding calendar year ending December 31. Provided, further that the benefit rate on or after July 1, 2012, shall not be more than fifty-seven and one-half percent (57.5%) of the average weekly wage paid to individuals in employment covered by the Employment Security Act for the preceding calendar year ending December 31 or the maximum weekly benefit rate that was in effect as of July 1, 2011, whichever is the highest. If the maximum weekly benefit rate is not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), then the rate shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00).
    6. The average weekly wage of individuals in covered employment shall be computed as follows: On or before May 31 of each year, the total annual wages paid to individuals in covered employment for the preceding calendar year by all employers shall be divided by the monthly average number of individuals in covered employment during that preceding calendar year, and the quotient shall be divided by fifty-two (52). That weekly benefit rates shall be effective throughout benefit years beginning on or after July 1 of that year and prior to July 1, of the succeeding calendar year.
    7. The benefit rate of any individual, if not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00).
    1. An individual to whom benefits for total or partial unemployment are payable under this chapter with respect to any week shall, in addition to those benefits, be paid with respect to each week a dependents’ allowance of fifteen dollars ($15.00) or five percent (5%) of the individual’s benefit rate whichever is greater for each of that individual’s children, including adopted and stepchildren, or that individual’s court appointed wards who, at the beginning of the individual’s benefit year, is under eighteen (18) years of age, and who is at that time in fact dependent on that individual, including individuals who have been appointed the legal guardian of such child by the appropriate court. The total dependents’ allowance paid to any individual shall not exceed the greater of fifty dollars ($50) or twenty-five percent (25%) of the individual’s benefit rate. Notwithstanding the above, the total amount of the dependents’ allowance paid to individuals receiving partial unemployment benefits for any week shall be based on the percentage that their partial weekly benefit rate is compared to their full weekly benefit rate.
    2. The dependent’s allowance shall also be paid to the individual for any child, including an adopted child or a stepchild, eighteen (18) years of age or over, incapable of earning any wages because of mental or physical incapacity, and who is dependent on that individual in fact at the beginning of the individual’s benefit year.
    3. In no instance shall the number of dependents for which an individual may receive dependents’ allowances exceed five (5) in total.
    4. The weekly total of dependents’ allowances payable to any individual, if not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00).
    5. The number of an individual’s dependents, and the fact of their dependency, shall be determined as of the beginning of that individual’s benefit year. Only one individual shall be entitled to a dependent’s allowance for the same dependent with respect to any week. As to two (2) or more parties making claim for an allowance for the same dependent for the same week, the benefit shall be provided to the party who has actual custody of the dependent or in the case of joint custody, to the party who has physical possession of the dependent.
    6. Each individual who claims a dependent’s allowance shall establish his or her claim to it to the satisfaction of the director under procedures established by the director.
    7. This subsection shall be effective for all benefit years beginning on or after January 1, 2011.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 6; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 4; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 2; P.L. 1942, ch. 1192, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2835, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3427, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-6 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 1960, ch. 127, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 201, § 3; P.L. 1968, ch. 122, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 181, § 2; P.L. 1975, ch. 21, art. 2, § 2; P.L. 1983, ch. 63, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 207, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 365, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 173, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 296, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 4, § 2.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2011.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The clause “provided, however, where the individual making the claim is a woman, the dependency status of such children shall be established to the satisfaction of the director” in this section prior to the 1973 amendment violated the equal protection clause of U.S. amend. 14 where sex classification was not reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and application of different standards of proof of dependency for women was discrimination absent showing by state of a compelling justification. Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12724 (D.R.I. 1973).

Collateral References.

Private employee’s loss of employment because of refusal to submit to drug test as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 86 A.L.R.4th 309.

28-44-7. Partial unemployment benefits.

For weeks beginning on or after July 1, 1983, an individual partially unemployed and eligible in any week shall be paid sufficient benefits with respect to that week, so that the individual’s week’s wages, rounded to the next higher multiple of one dollar ($1.00), as defined in § 28-42-3(26) , and the individual’s benefits combined will equal in amount the weekly benefit rate to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed in that week. For weeks beginning on or after May 23, 2021, through June 30, 2023, an individual partially unemployed and eligible in any week shall be paid benefits in an amount equal to the weekly benefit rate to which the individual would be entitled if totally unemployed in that week less any wages earned in that week, as defined in § 28-42-3(26) , and the individual’s benefits combined may not exceed in amount one hundred and fifty percent (150%) of the individual’s weekly benefit rate.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 6; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 4; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2539, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2833, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-7 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 63, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 17, § 2, effective May 21, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 18, § 2, effective May 21, 2021; P.L. 2022, ch. 117, § 2, effective June 21, 2022; P.L. 2022, ch. 118, § 2, effective June 21, 2022.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 17, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 18, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2022, ch. 117, § 2, and P.L. 2022, ch. 118, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Eligibility.

School bus drivers who were rendered ineligible to collect benefits pursuant to § 28-44-68 were not entitled to the partial unemployment benefits conferred, and the board was entitled to restitution of the amounts paid. Delicato v. Board of Review, Dep't of Employment & Training, 643 A.2d 216, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 195 (R.I. 1994).

28-44-8. Lag day benefits.

For weeks beginning on or after July 1, 1983, an individual who has been totally unemployed and in receipt of benefits for two (2) or more successive weeks and returns to work prior to the end of the week following that period of two (2) or more successive weeks shall be entitled to one-fifth (1/5) of his or her benefit rate for each lag day of unemployment prior to the first day of his or her initial employment during that first week of reemployment, the resulting total benefits rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00); provided, that benefit payments may be made only for those days of unemployment on which work is ordinarily performed in the occupation in the establishment in which the individual is reemployed. No individual shall in any case be entitled to more than four-fifths (4/5) of his or her benefit rate, rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00), for that week.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1950, ch. 2539, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2833, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-8 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 63, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 93, § 1.

28-44-9. Duration of benefits.

The total amount of benefits payable during a benefit year to any eligible individual whose benefit year begins on or after October 1, 1989, but prior to July 1, 2012, shall be an amount equal to thirty-six percent (36%) of the individual’s total wages for employment by employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title during his or her base period; provided, that the total amount of benefits payable during a benefit year to any eligible individual whose benefit year begins on or after July 1, 2012, shall be an amount equal to thirty-three percent (33%) of the individual’s total wages for employment by employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title during his or her base period; provided, that no individual shall be paid total benefits in any benefit year which exceed twenty-six (26) times his or her weekly benefit rate. Dependents’ allowances to which he or she might be entitled under § 28-44-6 shall be in addition to the total benefits. If the total amount of benefits is not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), then it shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 6; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 4; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 3; P.L. 1947, ch. 1923, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-9 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 173, § 4; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 4, § 2.

28-44-10. Termination of benefit year.

Notwithstanding any provision of chapters 42 — 44 of this title to the contrary, if the benefit year of an individual terminates prior to the end of a week in which he or she is totally or partially unemployed and eligible and his or her benefit credits for that benefit year have not been exhausted, then that individual shall be entitled to receive for that week from those benefit credits the full amount of benefits which he or she would have received if his or her benefit year had not so terminated; provided, that this shall in no manner affect the establishment of a new base period and benefit year in accordance with § 28-42-3(3) and (7).

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 6; P.L. 1955, ch. 3426, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-10 .

28-44-11. Earnings requirement for benefits.

  1. An individual shall be deemed eligible for benefits for any given week of his or her unemployment only if he or she has within the base period immediately preceding the benefit year in which that week of unemployment occurs earned wages amounting to at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title in each of at least twenty (20) weeks, or, in the alternative, in an amount equal to three (3) times the total minimum amount required; provided, that this section as amended by P.L. 1976, ch. 297, § 1 applies only to those individuals whose benefit years begin on or after July 4, 1976 and prior to October 1, 1989.
    1. In order to be deemed eligible for benefits an individual whose benefit year begins on or after October 1, 1989:
      1. Must have been paid wages in any one calendar quarter of the base period which are at least two hundred (200) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title, and must have been paid wages in the base period amounting to at least one and one-half (11/2) times the wages paid to the individual in that calendar quarter of the base period in which the individual’s wages were highest; provided, that the minimum amount of total base period wages paid to the individual must be at least four hundred (400) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title. The base period wages must have been paid to the individual for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title; or
      2. Must have been paid wages in the base period for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title amounting to at least three (3) times the total minimum amount required in paragraph (i) of this subdivision.
    2. Notwithstanding any of the above, no otherwise eligible individual who has received benefits in a preceding benefit year shall be eligible to receive benefits in a succeeding benefit year unless the individual, subsequent to the beginning of the preceding benefit year, has earned wages for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title amounting to at least eighty (80) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 5; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 4; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2835, § 2; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-11 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 21, art. 2, § 3; P.L. 1976, ch. 297, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 173, § 5; P.L. 1991, ch. 92, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 186, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Unpaid Leave.

Where the base period applicable to a plaintiff was one during which he earned no wages because he was on leave without pay, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the earnings requirement found in this section. DePetrillo v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 623 A.2d 31, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 110 (R.I. 1993).

28-44-12. Availability and registration for work.

  1. An individual shall not be eligible for benefits for any week of his or her partial or total unemployment unless during that week he or she is physically able to work full-time and be available for full-time work. To prove availability for work, every individual partially or totally unemployed shall register for work and shall:
    1. File a claim for benefits within any time limits, with any frequency, and in any manner, in person or in writing, as the director may prescribe;
    2. Respond whenever duly called for work through the employment office; and
    3. Make an active, independent search for suitable, full-time work.
  2. If an unemployed individual has been determined to be likely to exhaust regular benefits and to need reemployment services pursuant to a profiling system established by the director, the individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the individual participates in reemployment services, such as job search assistance services, unless the director determines that:
    1. The individual has completed those services; or
    2. There is justifiable cause for the individual’s failure to participate in those services.
  3. No individual shall be eligible for any benefits for any week in which he or she fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirements as set forth above.
  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title to the contrary, individuals with a definite return-to-work date that is within twelve (12) weeks of their last day of physical work, as certified by their employer on the employer separation notice provided to the department, shall be exempt from the work search requirements of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-12 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 180, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 71, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 207, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 209, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to correct a publishing error.

P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 207, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 209, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Employment office, § 28-42-46 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Availability for Work.

Claimant who restricted his registration by indicating that he was unavailable from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on regular business days was not available for work within the meaning of this section even though he had not been offered and had not refused work. Chaharyn v. Department of Employment Sec., 85 R.I. 75 , 125 A.2d 241, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 121 (1956).

Where the referee found, and the board concurred, that an applicant for unemployment benefits was available for employment and, therefore, could not be relied upon to deny him his benefits, and availability was never raised before the superior court as a ground for declining to compensate applicant, the director and the board were not allowed to reintroduce the issue of availability before the Supreme Court. Dumont v. Hackett, 120 R.I. 818 , 390 A.2d 374, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 716 (1978).

Where claimant was continually engaged in the practice of law, he was neither unemployed nor available for other employment and therefore was ineligible under the provisions of §§ 28-42-3(15) (now (28)) and 28-44-12 . Berberian v. Department of Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d 480, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1635 (R.I. 1980).

Claimant was not entitled to benefits and had been overpaid where her decision to voluntarily refuse the jobs offered to her was based on restrictions not bottomed upon good cause and rendered her unavailable pursuant to this section. Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

— Limited Availability.

If restrictions placed on availability for employment, such as availability for only two or three hours out of twenty-four, albeit with good cause, substantially impair claimant’s attachment to the labor market, the claimant is ineligible for benefits; but if, on the other hand, the restrictions do not materially impair the claimant’s attachment to a field of employment wherein his capabilities are reasonably marketable such as unavailability only for two or three hours out of 24 in a multi-shift industry such claimant is not unavailable for work in the terms of the statute. Huntley v. Department of Employment Sec., 121 R.I. 284 , 397 A.2d 902, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1773 (1979).

Parental responsibility may constitute good cause for limiting availability for employment so long as such limitation does not substantially impair a claimant’s attachment to the labor market. Huntley v. Department of Employment Sec., 121 R.I. 284 , 397 A.2d 902, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1773 (1979).

Unpaid Leave Eligibility.

Where an individual takes a leave without pay he has become effectively eligible for benefits, and regardless of his subjective belief to the contrary that his eligibility began as of the subsequent date of his firing, his failure to fully comply with the eligibility requirements of this section as of the date of leave will result in the denial of his claim for benefits. DePetrillo v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 623 A.2d 31, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 110 (R.I. 1993).

Workers’ Compensation.

The mere filing for unemployment benefits does not preclude an employee’s right to receive workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, because the employee had never actually collected any unemployment benefits, this section was not applicable. Sousa v. Providence Subaru Co., 668 A.2d 331, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 294 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Circumstances of abandonment of employment, availability for work, or nature of excuse for refusing reemployment, as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 158 A.L.R. 396; 165 A.L.R. 1382.

Employee’s control or ownership of corporation as precluding receipt of benefits under state unemployment compensation provisions. 23 A.L.R.5th 176.

Employee’s or employer’s removal from place of employment, unemployment compensation as affected by. 13 A.L.R.2d 874.

Leaving employment or unavailability for particular job or duties because of sickness or disability, as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 68 A.L.R.5th 13.

Personal appearance and refusal to comply with requirements as to dress, grooming or hygiene as affecting eligibility. 88 A.L.R.3d 150.

Sickness or disability, leaving employment, or unavailability for particular job or duties because of, as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 14 A.L.R.2d 1308.

Unemployment compensation claimant’s eligibility as affected by loss of, or failure to obtain, license, certificate, or similar qualification for continued employment. 15 A.L.R.5th 653.

Unemployment compensation: Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts. 35 A.L.R.3d 1129.

Unusual conditions of employment not common or customary insisted on by employee as affecting eligibility. 88 A.L.R.3d 1353.

28-44-13. Report of wages received.

In claiming benefits under this chapter an employee shall, during each week of his or her unemployment, correctly report any wages received by him or her during that week and shall make those reports in accordance with the regulations adopted as prescribed.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-13 .

28-44-14. Waiting period.

  1. Subject to the provisions of subsection (e) of this section, the waiting period of any individual shall be either:
    1. Seven (7) consecutive days, commencing with the Sunday of the week in which the claimant filed a claim for benefits, during which that individual is totally unemployed due to lack of work; or
    2. Seven (7) consecutive days, commencing with the Sunday of the week in which the claimant filed a claim for benefits, during which that individual is employed less than full time due to lack of work and during which he or she has earned remuneration for services performed in an amount less than his or her weekly benefit rate; provided, that no waiting period credit can be given in either case if a disqualification has been imposed with respect to the whole or any portion of that seven (7) day period under § 28-44-12 or §§ 28-44-16 28-44-21 .
  2. No waiting period shall be given to any individual unless he or she has filed a valid claim in accordance with regulations adopted as prescribed.
  3. Benefits shall be payable to an eligible individual only for those weeks of his or her unemployment within a benefit year which occur subsequent to one waiting period, which shall be served at any time during the benefit year.
  4. No period of total or partial unemployment shall be counted towards an individual’s required waiting period if, with respect to any portion of that period of unemployment, benefits have been paid under the employment security or temporary disability insurance acts of any other state or of any similar acts of any foreign government, or if benefits have been paid under the Temporary Disability Insurance Act of this state or under any similar acts of the United States.
  5. In the event that an individual’s unemployment is due to a natural disaster or state of emergency, there shall be no waiting period.
  6. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, no waiting period shall be in effect from the date of enactment of this article through June 30, 2009.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 5; P.L. 1940, ch. 811, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2535, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3425, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3658, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-14 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 2; P.L. 1961, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 87, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 5, art. 5, § 1.

Cross References.

Benefits not reduced by holiday pay, § 28-44-61 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administrative Rules.

Insofar as Employment Security Rule XX and the Director’s interpretation of that rule endorse an alternative method of fulfilling the waiting week requirement established in this section, the rule and the interpretation must fall. Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce v. Hackett, 122 R.I. 686 , 411 A.2d 300, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1438 (1980).

Subsequent Claims.

The waiting period mandated by this section must be served on a subsequent unemployment claim during any benefit year when the original filing of a claim was for a period during which the waiting period was suspended under § 28-44-15 (repealed). Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce v. Hackett, 122 R.I. 686 , 411 A.2d 300, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1438 (1980).

28-44-15. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1956, ch. 3658, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-15 ; Repealed by P.L. 1981, ch. 87, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-44-15 concerned requirements for an emergency suspension of waiting period.

28-44-16. Labor disputes.

  1. An individual shall not be entitled to benefits if he or she became unemployed because of a strike or other industrial controversy in the establishment in which he or she was employed. This section shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the director that the claimant is not a member of the organization or group responsible for the labor dispute and is not participating in or financing or in any way directly interested in the labor dispute.
  2. Lockouts.  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, an individual shall be entitled to benefits if his or her unemployment is the result of his or her employer’s withholding of employment for the purpose of resisting collective bargaining demands or gaining collective bargaining concessions, unless:
    1. The claimant’s employer is a member of a multi-employer collective bargaining group and the lockout is in response to a strike at another member of that multi-employer collective bargaining group; or
    2. The claimant’s employer establishes to the satisfaction of the director that it has offered to the labor organization representing the claimant an extension of then existing wages, hours, and working conditions, including enforceable no strike and no lockout prohibitions, for up to three (3) days and the lockout is in response to the labor organization’s refusal to execute the extension.
  3. If the unemployment continues more than one week following the conclusion of a labor dispute, an individual who is otherwise eligible under the terms of this chapter shall be entitled to benefits.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3620, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-16 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 1, § 1; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 194, § 1.

Cross References.

Determinations with respect to labor disputes, § 28-44-41 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Enjoining Payment of Compensation.

Payment of unemployment benefits to striking workers under this section cannot be enjoined on the theory that such payment would have the effect of reallocating the balance of power in collective bargaining negotiations as contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act. Almacs, Inc. v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I. 1970), but see Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, noted below.

The court of appeals reversed a federal district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction which would forbid the state from paying striking workers unemployment compensation, holding that the question of whether federal labor policy preempted the state statute was justiciable and that the court should resolve the issue. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11089 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858, 94 S. Ct. 164, 38 L. Ed. 2d 108, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4049 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S. Ct. 59, 38 L. Ed. 2d 124, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4030 (1973).

Evidence Upholds Finding of Lockout.

An actual physical lockout of union employees took place, within the meaning of subsection (b), where gates were chain locked and barricaded, the entrance to an employee parking lot was blocked off, and the windows of the building where negotiations had taken place were boarded up. Robert Derecktor, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Employment Sec., 572 A.2d 58, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 1990).

Interest in Labor Dispute.

Where employee would be paid wage increase gained in collective bargaining after a strike, he is directly interested in a labor dispute and cannot draw unemployment compensation under this section, even though he is not a union member. Annese v. Board of Review, 105 R.I. 32 , 249 A.2d 46, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 715 (1969).

Interest to Be Protected.

In determining whether there was a compelling state interest in providing unemployment compensation for strikers after the extra six-week waiting period, a court should have considered what interest was being protected, whether this interest was the same as its interest in welfare, and whether the state interest was served by the secondary economic and social effects of unemployment payments or their absence. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11089 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858, 94 S. Ct. 164, 38 L. Ed. 2d 108, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4049 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S. Ct. 59, 38 L. Ed. 2d 124, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4030 (1973).

Preemption by Federal Statutes.

This section of the unemployment compensation statute imposed an additional six-week waiting period for striking claimants, and the question of whether it was preempted by federal labor statutes was a complex but justiciable issue. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11089 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858, 94 S. Ct. 164, 38 L. Ed. 2d 108, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4049 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S. Ct. 59, 38 L. Ed. 2d 124, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4030 (1973).

Termination of Work Stoppage.

The replacement of striking employees terminated the work stoppage due to a labor dispute and made the employees eligible for benefits. Fontaine v. Board of Review, 100 R.I. 37 , 210 A.2d 867, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 350 (1965).

Collateral References.

Disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits because of strike or labor dispute. 63 A.L.R.3d 88.

“Establishment” or “factory, establishment, or other premises” within unemployment compensation statute rendering employee ineligible during labor dispute or strike. 60 A.L.R.3d 11.

General principles pertaining to statutory disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits because of strike or labor dispute. 63 A.L.R.3d 88.

Locked out employee, application of labor dispute disqualification for benefits. 62 A.L.R.3d 437.

Participation or direct interest in, or financing of, labor dispute or strike. 62 A.L.R.3d 314.

Refusal to cross picket line. 62 A.L.R.3d 380.

“Stoppage of work” in statutory provision denying unemployment compensation benefits during stoppage resulting from labor dispute. 61 A.L.R.3d 693.

Striking employee who is laid off subsequent employment during stroke period. 61 A.L.R.3d 766.

Sympathy strike or slowdown. 61 A.L.R.3d 746.

28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause.

  1. For benefit years beginning prior to July 1, 2012, an individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting-period credit, or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred, and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 2012, and prior to July 6, 2014, an individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings greater than, or equal to, his or her weekly benefit rate for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For benefit years beginning on or after July 6, 2014, an individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has, subsequent to that leaving, had earnings greater than, or equal to, eight (8) times his or her weekly benefit rate for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, “voluntarily leaving work with good cause” shall include:
    1. Sexual harassment against members of either sex;
    2. Voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join, or follow his or her spouse to a place, due to a change in location of the spouse’s employment, from which it is impractical for such individual to commute; and
    3. The need to take care for a member of the individual’s immediate family due to illness or disability as defined by the Secretary of Labor; provided that the individual shall not be eligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he or she is able to work and is available for work. For the purposes of this provision, the following terms apply:
      1. “Immediate family member” means a spouse, parents, mother-in-law, father-in-law and children under the age of eighteen (18);
      2. “Illness” means a verified illness that necessitates the care of the ill person for a period of time longer than the employer is willing to grant leave, paid or otherwise; and
      3. “Disability” means all types of verified disabilities, including mental and physical disabilities, permanent and temporary disabilities, and partial and total disabilities.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “voluntarily leaving work without good cause” shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join, or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for that failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-17 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 3; P.L. 1978, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 298, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 33, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 22, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2011.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

To recover under this section an employee must leave both for good cause and voluntarily. Kane v. Women & Infants Hosp., 592 A.2d 137, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 1991).

Burden of Proof.

Finding of director of department of employment security that under this section employee was disqualified from receiving benefits because he had left his work voluntarily without good cause was sustained on appeal, the petitioner’s contentions to the contrary that pushing a cart was not part of his job being without merit. Whitelaw v. Board of Review, 95 R.I. 154 , 185 A.2d 104, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1962).

Good Cause.

In order for the individual to have left work voluntarily “for good cause” it is not necessary that the termination be of a compelling nature. Harraka v. Board of Review, 98 R.I. 197 , 200 A.2d 595, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 150 (1964).

Where petitioner was required to work with chemicals which caused a discoloration of his clothes and skin it cannot be said that he left work without good cause. Harraka v. Board of Review, 98 R.I. 197 , 200 A.2d 595, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 150 (1964).

Petitioner did not have good cause for voluntarily quitting his job; where petitioner had voluntarily terminated after only one day, not by reason of job unsuitability or inability to perform the work, but because his assignment was to drive a truck rather than to deliver mail; and because he was disgruntled when his automobile, parked on employer’s premises, was blocked. Cahoone v. Board of Review, 104 R.I. 503 , 246 A.2d 213, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 672 (1968).

Where petitioner resigned from his job as public relations director after refusing to prepare a dishonest press release as he was ordered to do by his boss, and such a release would have severely and permanently damaged his credibility with the media, the petitioner’s resignation was necessary in order for him to continue to pursue his career in public relations; therefore, the petitioner resigned for good cause and was entitled to unemployment benefits. Powell v. Department of Employment Secur., Bd. of Review, 477 A.2d 93, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 538 (R.I. 1984).

An employee is deemed to leave for good cause when the employee is faced with sufficiently adverse circumstances that are beyond that employee’s control. Kane v. Women & Infants Hosp., 592 A.2d 137, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 1991).

An employee who voluntarily terminates employment to accompany their spouse to another state for relocation purposes has terminated for good cause under this section and is thereby entitled to employment security benefits. Rocky Hill Sch. v. State Dep't of Employment & Training, 668 A.2d 1241, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 283 (R.I. 1995) (Decided prior to 1998 amendment which specified these grounds as leaving employment without good cause.).

Leaving Voluntarily.

Eligibility for benefit payments is not to be forfeited because termination of employment was voluntary but only, if being voluntary, it was without good cause. Harraka v. Board of Review, 98 R.I. 197 , 200 A.2d 595, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 150 (1964).

Where 12 employees, although not belonging to a labor union, stayed away from work by common consent to compel the employer to redress alleged grievances, they were engaged in a strike and not subject to penalty of this section. Fontaine v. Board of Review, 100 R.I. 37 , 210 A.2d 867, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 350 (1965).

Where claimant leaves voluntarily and without good cause from his base period employer in his benefit year after already having had drawn unemployment compensation for two weeks in his benefit year, and where he works for another employer in his benefit year for six weeks before he is laid off, and then seeks benefits, they will not be charged to his base period employer’s account but would be paid from the solvency fund. Rosbro Plastics Corp. v. LaMantia, 105 R.I. 719 , 254 A.2d 734, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 810 (1969); Rosbro Plastics Corp. v. Davenport, 105 R.I. 726 , 254 A.2d 737, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 811 (1969).

Voluntarily leaving one’s employment to marry and reside with one’s spouse in another jurisdiction is not good cause within the meaning of this section. Murphy v. Fascio, 115 R.I. 33 , 340 A.2d 137, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1114 (1975).

Determination of mixed questions of law and fact by the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security that an employee had voluntarily left his position of employment without good cause and was therefore not entitled to employment compensation benefits was not clearly wrong since the employee had failed to provide sufficient evidence that he left his job due to the effect of employer’s false accusations of wrongdoing on employee’s health, where doctor did not advise the employee to leave his job. D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Dep't of Employment Sec., 517 A.2d 1039, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 550 (R.I. 1986).

Claimant was not entitled to benefits and had been overpaid where her decision to voluntarily refuse the jobs offered to her was based on restrictions not bottomed upon good cause and rendered her unavailable pursuant to § 28-44-12 . Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

Offering Choice Between Resignation or Termination.

If an employer tells an employee to resign or else he or she will be terminated for misconduct, such an action is not a voluntary resignation for purposes of this section. Kane v. Women & Infants Hosp., 592 A.2d 137, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 1991).

The record did not support the conclusion that the plaintiff was discharged for misconduct even though the plaintiff was forced to resign rather than be terminated based on negligible discrepancies between timecard records and actual work time, since the plaintiff was never warned that these discrepancies were erosive of the plaintiff’s employee status. Cardoza v. Department of Employment & Training Bd. of Review, 669 A.2d 1165, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Circumstances of abandonment of employment, availability for work, or nature of excuse for refusing reemployment, as affecting right to social security or unemployment compensation. 158 A.L.R. 396; 165 A.L.R. 1382; 13 A.L.R.2d 874; 14 A.L.R.2d 1308.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by claimant’s voluntary separation or refusal to work alleging that the work is illegal or immoral. 41 A.L.R.5th 123.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by voluntary resignation because of change of location of residence. 21 A.L.R.4th 317.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by voluntary resignation because of change of location of residence under statute conditioning benefits upon leaving for “good cause,” “just cause,” or cause of “necessitous and compelling nature”. 25 A.L.R.6th 101.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by voluntary resignation because of change of location of residence under statute denying benefits to certain claimants based on particular disqualifying motive for move or unavailability for. 27 A.L.R.6th 123.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits of employee who attempts to withdraw resignation before leaving employment. 36 A.L.R.4th 395.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation of employee who left employment based on belief that involuntary discharge was imminent. 79 A.L.R.4th 528.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation of employee who retires voluntarily. 75 A.L.R.5th 339.

Leaving employment or unavailability for particular job or duties because of sickness or disability, as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 68 A.L.R.5th 13.

Leaving or refusing employment because of allergic reaction as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 12 A.L.R.4th 629.

Leaving or refusing employment for religious reasons as barring unemployment compensation. 12 A.L.R.4th 611.

Pregnancy resulting in termination of employment as affecting eligibility. 51 A.L.R.3d 254.

Retirement of employee under mandatory plan as affecting eligibility. 50 A.L.R.3d 880.

Retirement of employee voluntarily as affecting eligibility. 88 A.L.R.3d 274.

Right to unemployment compensation of one who quit job because not given enough work to keep busy. 15 A.L.R.4th 256.

Unemployment compensation: burden of proof as to voluntariness of separation. 73 A.L.R.4th 1093.

Unemployment compensation: Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts for domestic or family reasons. 2 A.L.R.5th 475.

Unemployment compensation: Harassment or other mistreatment by coworker as “good cause” justifying abandonment of employment. 121 A.L.R.5th 467.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of education or to attend training as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 47 A.L.R.5th 775.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of other employment as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 46 A.L.R.5th 659.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment to become self-employed or to go into business for oneself as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 45 A.L.R.5th 715.

28-44-17.1. Voluntary leaving as protection from domestic abuse.

  1. An individual shall be eligible for waiting period credit or benefits if that individual voluntarily leaves work due to circumstances directly resulting from domestic abuse, as defined in chapter 8.1 of title 8, and the individual:
    1. Reasonably fears future domestic abuse at or on route to or from the individual’s place of employment;
    2. Wishes to relocate to another geographic area in order to avoid future domestic abuse against the individual or the individual’s family; or
    3. Reasonably believes that leaving work is necessary for the future safety of the individual or the individual’s family.
  2. When determining whether an individual has experienced domestic abuse for the purpose of employment benefits, the department of labor and training shall require that the individual provide documentation of domestic abuse, including, but not limited to, police or court records, or other documentation of domestic abuse from a shelter worker, attorney, member of the clergy, or medical or other professional from whom the individual has sought assistance.
  3. All documentation of evidence shall be kept confidential unless consent for disclosure is given by the individual.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 340, § 1.

28-44-18. Discharge for misconduct.

  1. For benefit years beginning prior to July 1, 2012, an individual who has been discharged for proved misconduct connected with his or her work shall become ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which that discharge occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has, subsequent to that discharge, had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of that eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 2012, and prior to July 6, 2014, an individual who has been discharged for proved misconduct connected with his or her work shall become ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which that discharge occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has, subsequent to that discharge, had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of that eight (8) weeks has had earnings greater than, or equal to, his or her weekly benefit rate for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For benefit years beginning on or after July 6, 2014, an individual who has been discharged for proved misconduct connected with his or her work shall become ineligible for waiting-period credit or benefits for the week in which that discharge occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has, subsequent to that discharge, had earnings greater than, or equal to eight (8) times, his or her weekly benefit rate for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. Any individual who is required to leave his or her work pursuant to a plan, system, or program, public or private, providing for retirement, and who is otherwise eligible, shall under no circumstances be deemed to have been discharged for misconduct. If an individual is discharged and a complaint is issued by the regional office of the National Labor Relations board or the state labor relations board that an unfair labor practice has occurred in relation to the discharge, the individual shall be entitled to benefits if otherwise eligible. For the purposes of this section, “misconduct” is defined as deliberate conduct in willful disregard of the employer’s interest, or a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, provided that such violation is not shown to be as a result of the employee’s incompetence. Notwithstanding any other provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, this section shall be construed in a manner that is fair and reasonable to both the employer and the employed worker.
  2. For the purposes of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, a suspension without pay from work for proved misconduct shall be treated as a discharge for proved misconduct and subject to the same conditions as a discharge for proved misconduct in accordance with subsection (a) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-18 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 295, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 267, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 298, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 33, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section

P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

John Souza, 2017 Survey, Cases: Labor and Employment Law: Beagan v. R.I. Dep’t of Labor & Training, Bd. of Review, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 707 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Discharge” Defined.

As used in this section, the term “discharge” refers to the type of deliberate dismissal of an employee that results in the immediate termination of that employee’s ongoing employment obligations. St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray, 557 A.2d 1214, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 1989).

A Catholic school’s nonrenewal of a lay teacher’s one-year contract after it learned that she intended to marry outside the church does not amount to a “discharge” as contemplated by this section. St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray, 557 A.2d 1214, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 1989).

Misconduct.

Misconduct is limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed “misconduct” within the meaning of this section. Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 479 A.2d 740, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 591 (R.I. 1984).

A lay teacher’s marriage and her announcement to her students that she would not be returning to her position at a Catholic school and that she intended to marry outside the church does not constitute the type of misconduct contemplated by this section. St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray, 557 A.2d 1214, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 1989).

Nurse’s aide is ineligible for benefits, where she does not challenge an assertion that she engaged in misconduct by mishandling infants and yelling at their parents. Kane v. Women & Infants Hosp., 592 A.2d 137, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 1991).

Employee with twenty-four years of service was not guilty of misconduct within the definition of this section when she declined work order which could not be accomplished in the time allowed where employee had to eat at a specified time due to her own medical condition. Cogean v. Department of Employment & Training, Bd. of Review, 658 A.2d 528, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 151 (R.I. 1995).

The employer established that the claimant was discharged for acts of proved misconduct in the course of employment; the employer presented uncontroverted and unrefuted evidence of the claimant’s sale of marijuana and the claimant’s theft of slivers of gold, independent of the missing 600 ounces which the claimant was suspected of taking, whereas the claimant offered no evidence to refute the employer’s case. Consequently, the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board granting compensation was clearly erroneous in view of the substantial, reliable and undisputed evidence on the record. Technic, Inc. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Employment & Training, 669 A.2d 1156, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 1996).

In order to impose a disqualification under the provisions of this section, there must be proof that the discharged person committed an act of misconduct in connection with the employment. An employee’s willful disregard of his supervisor’s instructions rises to the level of misconduct within the meaning of this section. Chartier v. Department of Employment & Training, 673 A.2d 1078, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 96 (R.I. 1996).

— Evidence.

A plea of nolo contendere to job related incidents can be considered as evidence of “proved misconduct.” Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 479 A.2d 740, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 591 (R.I. 1984).

District court erred when it upheld a decision by the Board of Review of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, finding that a teacher who was discharged was eligible for unemployment benefits, because the Board’s decision conflicted with an arbitrator’s finding that a school committee had just cause to discharge the teacher and the arbitrator’s decision was binding on the district court once it was approved by the superior court. Foster-Glocester Reg'l Sch. Comm. v. Bd. of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 156 (R.I. 2004).

Board of Review of Rhode Island’s Department of Labor and Training erred in failing to give collateral estoppel effect to a confirmed labor arbitration award finding that a teacher terminated for inappropriate contact with student had been fired for misconduct, making the teacher ineligible for unemployment benefits; the board also abused its discretion in failing to give any consideration whatsoever to the transcripts of the arbitration proceeding, including testimony by the students in question, which carried the indicia of reliability commonly carried by prior sworn testimony of unavailable declarants. Foster-Glocester Reg'l Sch. Comm. v. Bd. of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 156 (R.I. 2004).

— — Insufficient.

The record did not support the conclusion that the plaintiff was discharged for misconduct in connection with work even though the plaintiff was forced to resign rather than be terminated based on negligible discrepancies between timecard records and actual work time, since the plaintiff was never warned that these discrepancies were erosive of plaintiff’s employee status. Cardoza v. Department of Employment & Training Bd. of Review, 669 A.2d 1165, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 1996).

Claimant employee was not ineligible for unemployment benefits based on a Facebook post critical of defendant employer because no legally competent evidence showed this was connected to the work, as (1) the employee’s manager was blocked from the Facebook page, (2) nothing showed the post was directly accessible by another employee, associate, or customer, (3) it was not alleged that the employee authored the post on the employer’s electronic device, (4) the post’s content was unrelated to the employee’s job performance, (5) no social media policy of the employer was introduced, (6) the employee denied making the post while working, (7) the employee’s statement that the manager had no access to the Facebook page did not show the post was connected to the employee’s work, and (8) finding the employee “baited” the manager to access the post created no workplace nexus. Beagan v. R.I. DOL & Training, Bd. of Review, 162 A.3d 619, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 2017).

— Strikes by Federal Employees.

Where federal air traffic controllers acted in violation of a congressional mandate that expressly prohibited strikes by federal employees, their actions constituted misconduct as a matter of law, and disqualified them from receiving any benefits under the unemployment-compensation laws. Ranone v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 474 A.2d 748, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 487 (R.I. 1984).

“Misconduct” Defined.

“Misconduct” includes a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his or her employee. Bunch v. Board of Review, R.I. Dep't of Empl. & Training, 690 A.2d 335, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Absenteeism or tardiness resulting in discharge as affecting eligibility. 58 A.L.R.3d 674.

Conduct or activities of employees during off-duty hours as misconduct barring unemployment compensation benefits. 35 A.L.R.4th 691.

Discharge for absenteeism or tardiness as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 58 A.L.R.3d 674.

Employee’s use of drugs or narcotics, or related problems, as affecting eligibility for unemployment compensation. 78 A.L.R.4th 180.

Inefficiency or negligence resulting in discharge as affecting eligibility. 26 A.L.R.3d 1356.

Insubordination resulting in discharge as affecting eligibility. 26 A.L.R.3d 1333.

“Misconduct,” what amounts to, precluding unemployment benefits to discharged employee. 146 A.L.R. 243.

Refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts resulting in discharge as affecting eligibility. 35 A.L.R.3d 1129.

Use of employer’s e-mail or internet system as misconduct precluding unemployment compensation. 106 A.L.R.5th 297.

Use of vulgar or profane language as bar to claim for unemployment compensation. 92 A.L.R.3d 106.

Vulgar or profane language resulting in discharge as affecting eligibility. 92 A.L.R.3d 106.

Work-related inefficiency, incompetence, or negligence as “misconduct” barring unemployment compensation. 95 A.L.R.5th 329.

28-44-19. Receipt of compensation.

  1. An individual shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for any week of his or her unemployment occurring within any period with respect to which that individual is currently receiving, or has received, remuneration in the form of:
    1. Compensation for temporary partial disability under a workers’ compensation law of any state or under a similar law of the United States; or
    2. Benefits under an unemployment compensation law of any state or of the United States.
  2. If the remuneration designated in subsection (a) of this section is less than the benefits which would otherwise be due under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, he or she shall be entitled to receive for that week, if otherwise eligible, benefits reduced by the amount of that remuneration.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 5; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 5; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2205, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-19 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Payment in Commutation of Workers’ Compensation Claim.

Plaintiff who had received a lump-sum payment in commutation of her workers’ compensation claim that was based upon an estimated 25 weeks of future payments could not receive unemployment compensation during that period. Almstead v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 478 A.2d 980, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 585 (R.I. 1984).

Collateral References.

Federal Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, effect of receipt of subsistence allowance under. 21 A.L.R.2d 1072.

Retirement of employee under mandatory plan as affecting benefits. 50 A.L.R.3d 880.

Social security benefits as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 56 A.L.R.3d 552.

28-44-19.1. Disqualifying income.

An individual shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for any week of his or her unemployment within any period with respect to which that individual is currently receiving or has received retirement income in accordance with the following provisions:

  1. The amount of compensation payable to an individual for any week which begins in a period with respect to which that individual is receiving a governmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the previous work of that individual shall be reduced, but not below zero, by an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of the amount of that pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or other payment, which is reasonably attributable to that week, if that deduction is required as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq; provided, that if the individual made no contribution to the retirement plan then the amount of compensation payable to the individual shall be reduced, but not below zero, by the full amount of that pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or other payment, which is reasonably attributable to that week.
  2. If at any time following May 3, 1979, subdivision (1) of this section or any provision of it is not required by federal law in order for an eligible employer to qualify for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., then subdivision (1) of this section or the provision of it is no longer required and shall have no force or effect.
  3. Social Security benefits received by an individual shall not be included or considered as disqualifying income under the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 108, § 8; P.L. 1993, ch. 298, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 89, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 77, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 89, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Monetary Contributions.

The Legislature intended “contributions made by an individual for the pension” that are permitted to be considered in offset by 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15) to include monetary contributions only. Cardarelli v. Department of Empl. & Training, 674 A.2d 398, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 125 (R.I. 1996).

Offset of Social Security Pension Payments.

Rhode Island was authorized under federal law to take a dollar-for-dollar offset of Social Security pension payments against unemployment compensation when the unemployment claimant’s base period employer had contributed to the Social Security retirement plan, even though the base period employer was not the employer under which the claimant established his eligibility for pension payments. Bleau v. Hackett, 598 F. Supp. 727, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21657 (D.R.I. 1984).

The 1980 Federal Unemployment Tax Act amendment relaxed the federal requirement of a dollar-for-dollar offset of pension benefits against unemployment benefits and, under subdivision (2) of this section, the change in federal law no longer requiring a full dollar-for-dollar offset automatically took effect in Rhode Island. Inman v. Board of Review, Dep't of Employment & Training, 638 A.2d 543, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 1994).

28-44-20. Refusal of suitable work.

  1. For benefit years beginning prior to July 1, 2012, if an otherwise eligible individual fails, without good cause, either to apply for suitable work when notified by the employment office, or to accept suitable work when offered to him or her, he or she shall become ineligible for waiting-period credit or benefits for the week in which that failure occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has, subsequent to that failure, had at least eight (8) weeks of work and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage, as defined in chapter 12, for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title. For benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 2012, and prior to July 6, 2014, if an otherwise eligible individual fails, without good cause, either to apply for suitable work when notified by the employment office, or to accept suitable work when offered to him or her, he or she shall become ineligible for waiting-period credit or benefits for the week in which that failure occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has, subsequent to that failure, had at least eight (8) weeks of work and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings greater than or equal to his or her weekly benefit rate for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

    For benefit years beginning on or after July 6, 2014, if an otherwise eligible individual fails, without good cause, either to apply for suitable work when notified by the employment office, or to accept suitable work when offered to him or her, he or she shall become ineligible for waiting-period credit or benefits for the week in which that failure occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has, subsequent to that failure, had earnings greater than, or equal to, eight (8) times his or her weekly benefit rate for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

  2. “Suitable work” means any work for which the individual in question is reasonably fitted, that is located within a reasonable distance of his or her residence or last place of work, and is not detrimental to his or her health, safety, or morals. No work shall be deemed suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work, under any of the following conditions:
    1. If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;
    2. If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work are substantially less favorable to the employee than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
    3. If, as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from, or refrain from, joining any bona fide labor organization.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 7; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-20 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 296, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 33, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Nothing in the plain language of the employment security statute permits a stated preference by a claimant to trump the statutory requirement that a claimant accept a position unless that position can be shown to fall within the exceptions stated in this section. Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

Federal Preemption.

In view of the action of congress to insure the compatibility of state unemployment compensation laws such as this section with the National Labor Relations Act, it appeared that congress did not think it necessary to preserve its labor policy by requiring state laws to bar payment of benefits to strikers and the state and federal interests should have been carefully weighed before a finding of preemption. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11089 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858, 94 S. Ct. 164, 38 L. Ed. 2d 108, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4049 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S. Ct. 59, 38 L. Ed. 2d 124, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 4030 (1973).

Legislative Purpose.

A claimant’s voluntary decision to refuse suitable work in another field and to remain unemployed while continuing to collect unemployment benefits is unsupported by the plain language of this section and runs contrary to the public policy design and intent of the statute as a whole. Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

Suitable Alternative Employment.

A mere stated preference for work within a claimant’s field of previous experience did not render other employment opportunities in other fields unsuitable where the position offered the claimant was a trainee position with on-the-job training provided and a pay scale that was commensurate with the position and her past positions, and where there was no evidence that the position was somehow unreasonably fitted, unreasonably located or detrimental to the claimant’s health, safety, or morals. Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

Temporary Workers.

There is no language in this section creating a separate standard for termporary employment agency employees refusing to accept suitable, albeit temporary, work. Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

Collateral References.

Nonunion employment, right to unemployment compensation of claimant who refuses. 56 A.L.R.2d 1015.

Refusal to accept type of work other than that in which employee was formerly engaged as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 97 A.L.R.2d 1125.

Unemployment compensation: Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts for domestic or family reasons. 2 A.L.R.5th 475.

28-44-21. Vacation periods.

An individual who has established eligibility for benefits by conforming to the provisions of §§ 28-44-12 and 28-44-13 and who is otherwise eligible and who files a claim for waiting period credits or unemployment compensation benefits during a bona fide vacation period as determined by the director shall be ineligible for waiting period credits or benefits, unless he or she can show to the satisfaction of the director:

  1. That he or she did not receive and is not entitled to receive directly or indirectly as an incident to a vacation period any vacation pay, remuneration, or similar payment; or
  2. That the vacation pay, remuneration, or similar payment, which the individual receives or is entitled to receive in connection with that vacation period, is less than his or her weekly benefit rate, in which case that individual shall be entitled to waiting period credits or benefits in the same manner as if he or she were partially employed. For the purpose of ascertaining eligibility under this section the total sum of the vacation pay or other allowances shall be apportioned to the weeks of unemployment comprising a vacation period, as shall be determined by regulations adopted as prescribed; and
  3. That the vacation period was not the result of an individual request on his or her part for a vacation during a period where there was work for him or her at the establishment at which he or she was customarily employed and at a time when that establishment was not shut down for a vacation period.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 6; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2277, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-21 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Vacation Period.”

The term “vacation period” as used in this section refers to the employee’s actual vacation and not to a period during which a plant was closed for a company-designated vacation period and, where the company closed the plant for a three-week vacation period, an employee who was only entitled to one week of vacation for which he was paid, was entitled to have only the first week excluded from his waiting period. Marinelli v. Board of Review, 99 R.I. 716 , 210 A.2d 599, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 507 (1965).

Collateral References.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by vacation or holiday or payment in lieu thereof. 30 A.L.R.2d 366.

Severance payments as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 93 A.L.R.2d 1319.

28-44-22, 28-44-23. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1938, ch. 284, §§ 23, 24; P.L. 1955, ch. 3428, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 28-44-22 , 28-44-23), concerning payment for accumulated leave of state and political subdivision employees upon separation, were repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 414, §§ 1, 2, effective June 30, 1987.

28-44-24. Disqualification for fraud.

  1. An individual who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of knowingly or fraudulently making a false statement, or knowingly or fraudulently misrepresenting a material fact, with intent to defraud the employment security fund of any benefit or to wrongfully obtain or increase any benefit, either for himself or herself or for any other person, whether under chapters 42 — 44 of this title or under an employment security law of any other state, of the federal government, or of a foreign government, in regard to which this state acted as agent pursuant to an agreement authorized by chapters 42 — 44 of this title, shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for a period of one year following that conviction.
  2. This disqualification shall be imposed by the director and shall be in addition to any criminal penalty which may be imposed under any other provision in chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 7; P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-24 .

Cross References.

Criminal penalties for fraud, § 28-42-62 .

Recovery of erroneously paid benefits, § 28-42-68 .

Collateral References.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

Fraudulent obtaining of benefits. 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

28-44-25 — 28-44-36. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1941, ch. 1024, § 1; P.L. 1943, ch. 1366, § 1; P.L. 1944, ch. 1465, § 1; P.L. 1945, ch. 1480, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2836, § 2; P.L. 1953, ch. 3117, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3552, § 1) concerning veterans, were repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 19, effective July 5, 1995.

28-44-37. Place of filing claims.

Benefit claims shall be filed pursuant to regulations adopted as prescribed at an employment office or any other agency that the director may designate.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-37 .

28-44-38. Filing of claims — Procedures — Printed copies — Notices.

  1. Claims for waiting period credit and for benefits shall be filed in accordance with regulations adopted as prescribed. Each employer shall post and maintain printed copies or statements of those regulations in places readily accessible to individuals employed by him or her. The director shall supply each employer with copies of those regulations or statements of the regulations without cost to the employers.
  2. The director shall prescribe the type of reports required from employers and the manner in which the reports shall be presented.
  3. Upon the filing of a claim, the director shall promptly notify the most recent employer and all employers for whom the claimant states he or she performed services and earned wages during his or her base period. The employers shall promptly furnish the information required to determine the claimant’s benefit rights. If the claimant’s employer or employers have any information that might affect either the validity of the claim or the right of the claimant to waiting period credit or benefits, he or she shall return the notice with that information. If an employer fails without good cause as established to the satisfaction of the director to return this notice within ten (10) working days of its mailing, the employer shall have no standing to contest any determination to be made by the director with respect to the claim and any benefit charges pursuant to it, and the employer shall be barred from being a party to any further proceedings relating to the claim. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, any employer who fails to return the notice within that time shall pay a penalty of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each failure. The preceding penalty shall be paid into the employment security tardy account fund, and if any employer fails to pay the penalty, when assessed, it shall be collected by civil action as provided in § 28-43-18 .

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-38 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 3; P.L. 1987, ch. 418, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 34, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 101, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 113, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-44-39. Initial determination — Notice — Reconsideration of monetary determination — Reconsideration of initial non-monetary determination — Discovery of issue — Appeal — Interested party.

    1. The director shall promptly determine:
      1. Whether or not the claimant has met the eligibility requirements set forth in § 28-44-11 . Thereupon the director shall promptly notify the claimant in writing of that monetary determination, including the reasons upon which the monetary determination was based. The director may at any time within one year from the date of the monetary determination, either upon request of the claimant or on his or her own motion, reconsider that determination if he or she finds that an error in computation or in identity has occurred in connection with it, or that additional wages pertinent to the status of the claimant have become available, or if that initial monetary determination was made as a result of a non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact. The notice to an eligible claimant shall also include information as to his or her benefit year, his or her weekly benefit amount, his or her augmented weekly benefit amount if he or she has dependents, and the maximum amount of benefit credits to which he or she is entitled for unemployment during his or her benefit year;
      2. Whether or not the claimant is disqualified under any of the provisions of §§ 28-44-7 , 28-44-12 , 28-44-13 , 28-44-16 28-44-21 , 28-44-61 , 28-44-62 , 28-42-62.1 , 28-44-63 , 28-44-66 through 28-44-7 0, and 28-42-68 . If the director determines that the claimant is not eligible to receive waiting period credit or benefits for any week or weeks due to a disqualification imposed under any of the provisions referred to in this subdivision, he or she shall promptly furnish to that claimant and to all interested parties, other than the board of review, written notice of that non-monetary determination together with a statement containing the reasons for the non-monetary determination and the period of disqualification. The director, on his or her own motion, may at any time within one year from the date of the initial non-monetary determination set forth in this subdivision, reconsider the initial non-monetary determination if he or she finds that an error has occurred in connection with it or that the determination was a result of a mistake. If that initial non-monetary determination was made as the result of nondisclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact, then the director may reconsider the initial non-monetary determination within one year from the date of the discovery of the nondisclosed or misrepresented fact; provided, that no issue shall be addressed that is older than six (6) years as of the date of detection of the issue.
    2. If the director determines that the claimant is eligible to receive waiting period credit or benefits, he or she shall promptly furnish a written notice of that determination to the claimant and to all interested parties other than the board of review. All notices issued under this section shall contain a statement of the appeal rights of the parties.
  1. Unless the claimant or any other interested party who is entitled to notice requests a hearing within fifteen (15) days after the notice of determination has been mailed by the director to the last known address of the claimant and of any other interested party, the determination shall be final. For good cause shown the fifteen-day (15) period may be extended.
  2. For the purpose of this chapter, an “interested party” is deemed to be the director, the board of review, the claimant, and any employer or employing unit who or that has furnished information other than wage information in accordance with § 28-44-38(c) .
  3. The director may, upon discovery of a previously undetected or unknown issue under the provisions of, or laws cited in, subdivisions (a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(ii), conduct a fact-finding investigation and may render a monetary or non-monetary initial determination of the issue within one year from the date of discovery of that issue; provided that no issue shall be addressed which is older than six (6) years as of the date of detection of the issue.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 6; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3663, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-39 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 3; P.L. 1960, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 277, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 104, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 311, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 112, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 102, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 112, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-44-40. Payment of benefits pending appeal.

  1. If an appeal is filed by an employer, benefits shall be paid to an eligible claimant until that employer’s appeal is finally determined. If the employer’s appeal is finally sustained, no further benefits shall be paid to the claimant during any remaining portion of the disqualification period. Any benefits paid or payable to that claimant shall not be recoverable unless it is established to the satisfaction of the director that the erroneous payment was the result of fraud committed by the claimant.
  2. If, beginning on or after October 1, 2013, the director establishes that an erroneous payment was made to a claimant due to fraud committed by the claimant, this shall result in a recoverable overpayment and that individual shall also be liable to pay penalties and interest required under §§ 28-42-68(a) and 28-42-68(c) for those erroneous payments.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1940, ch. 812, § 6; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3663, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-40 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 112, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 102, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 112, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2013, ch. 120, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

P.L. 2013, ch. 130, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on October 1, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorney’s Fees.

Where the employer appealed the grant of unemployment benefits to the claimants, and the claimants later sought attorney’s fees for legal representation during the employer’s appeal, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-57 , the claimants were not entitled to attorney’s fees based on benefits paid prior to the pendency of the appeal. Arnold v. R.I. DOL & Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2003).

28-44-41. Determinations with respect to labor disputes.

  1. In any case in which the payment or denial of benefits will be affected by the provisions of § 28-44-16 , the director shall promptly transmit his or her full findings of fact with respect to that section to the board of review or an appeal tribunal designated by it, which, on the basis of the evidence submitted, and that additional evidence as it may require, shall affirm, modify, or set aside those findings of fact and transmit to the director a decision upon the issues involved under that section. Any action by the board of review in that case shall be by the full board of review, or in the absence or disqualification of either the member representing labor, or the member representing industry, that action shall be by the member representing the public generally, acting alone.
  2. In any case involving this section where the board of review has designated an appeal tribunal to hear and decide the case, the determination of the appeal tribunal shall then be subject to appeal, as of right, to the board of review within the same period as that provided for appealing a determination made by the director. If the board of review elects to make a determination, it shall afford all parties a fair hearing as required with respect to proceedings before an appeal tribunal. No further administrative appeal shall be permitted from the determination of the board of review in that case but judicial review may be initiated as otherwise provided for in chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-41 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 142, art. 1, § 2; P.L. 1984 (s.s.), ch. 450, § 3.

28-44-42. Appointment of appeal tribunals.

To hear and decide disputed claims, the board of review may appoint one or more impartial referees each of whom shall constitute an appeal tribunal to hear and decide appeals from determinations and re-determinations. The board of review may make appointments to it and fix the salaries of it in accordance with the state merit system law, rules, and regulations. No person shall participate on behalf of the board of review in any case in which he or she is an interested party.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1952, ch. 2975, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-42 .

28-44-43. Filing of appeals from director — Parties — Withdrawal.

Any claimant or any employing unit or employer who is an interested party as defined in § 28-44-39(c) may file an appeal from the determination of the director within the specified time. The parties to an appeal from a determination shall include all interested parties. Appeals may be withdrawn at the request of the appellant and with the permission of the appeal tribunal, if the record preceding the appeal and the request for the withdrawal support the correctness of the determination and indicate that no coercion or fraud is involved in the withdrawal.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-43 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 3.

28-44-44. Procedure before appeal tribunal — Record.

A reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing shall be promptly afforded all interested parties. An appeal tribunal shall inquire into and develop all facts bearing on the issues and shall receive and consider evidence without regard to statutory and common law rules. The board of review shall adopt regulations governing the manner of filing appeals and the conduct of hearings and appeals, consistent with the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title. A record shall be kept of all testimony and proceedings in an appeal, but testimony need not be transcribed unless further review is initiated.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-44 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

Transcript that was created when a teacher sought arbitration of a school committee’s decision to terminate his employment contained evidence which addressed the issue of whether the teacher had committed acts of misconduct, and the Board of Review of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training erred when it refused to give any evidentiary value to the transcript when it considered the committee’s appeal from the Department’s decision to award unemployment compensation benefits to the teacher. Foster-Glocester Reg'l Sch. Comm. v. Bd. of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 156 (R.I. 2004).

28-44-45. Consolidated appeals.

When the same or substantially similar evidence is material to the matter in issue with respect to more than one individual, the same time and place for considering all those cases may be fixed, hearings jointly conducted, a single record of the proceedings made, and evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding considered as introduced in the others, provided no party is prejudiced by these steps.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-45 .

28-44-46. Decision of appeal tribunal.

After a hearing, an appeal tribunal shall promptly make findings and conclusions and on the basis of those findings and conclusions affirm, modify, or reverse the director’s determination. Each party shall promptly be furnished a copy of the decision and supporting findings and conclusions. This decision shall be final unless further review is initiated pursuant to § 28-44-47 within fifteen (15) days after the decision has been mailed to each party’s last known address or otherwise delivered to him or her; provided, that the period may be extended for good cause.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-46 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 34, § 3.

28-44-47. Appeal to board of review.

Any party in interest, including the director, shall be allowed an appeal to the board of review from the decision of an appeal tribunal. The board of review on its own motion may initiate a review of a decision or determination of an appeal tribunal within fifteen (15) days after the date of the decision. The board of review may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings or conclusions of the appeal tribunal solely on the basis of evidence previously submitted or upon the basis of any additional evidence that it may direct to be taken.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-47 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 98, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 311, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

The board of review is not limited by rules of evidence or the requirement under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act that mandates adherence to the Superior Court rules of evidence in civil cases. Hackett v. Murray, 508 A.2d 649, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 447 (R.I. 1986).

Evidence in addition to that submitted to the referee may be introduced at a board of review hearing. Camille v. Board of Review, Dep't of Employment Sec., 557 A.2d 1234, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 1989).

The procedure followed by the board in reviewing an award of benefits does not comport with due process, where the employer is allowed to present new evidence but the claimant, appearing pro se, is not given a similar opportunity. Camille v. Board of Review, Dep't of Employment Sec., 557 A.2d 1234, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 1989).

Scope of Review.

The board of review is not limited by the evidence or issues considered by the referee or appeal tribunal. Hackett v. Murray, 508 A.2d 649, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 447 (R.I. 1986).

28-44-48. Removal or transfer of pending appeals.

The board of review may remove to itself or transfer to another appeal tribunal any appeal pending before an appeal tribunal. An appeal removed to the board of review before a fair hearing has been completed shall be given a fair hearing by the board of review, as required by § 28-44-44 with respect to proceedings before an appeal tribunal.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 7; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-48 .

28-44-49. Conclusiveness of decisions — Reopening for fraud or coercion.

  1. All final determinations and decisions shall be conclusive upon all parties in interest including the director.
  2. The director, appeal tribunal, or board of review shall reopen a determination or decision or revoke permission for withdrawal of an appeal if:
    1. He or she or it finds that a worker or employer has been defrauded or coerced in connection with the determination, decision, or withdrawal of the appeal; and
    2. The defrauded or coerced person informs the appropriate officer or body of the fraud or coercion within sixty (60) days after he or she has become aware of the fraud or within sixty (60) days after the coercion has been removed.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-49 .

28-44-50. Rule of decision — Certification of questions to board of review.

Final decisions of the board of review and the principles of law declared in their support shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings involving similar questions, unless expressly or impliedly overruled by a later decision of the board of review or of a court of competent jurisdiction. Final decisions of appeal tribunals and the principles of law declared in their support shall be binding on the director and shall be persuasive authority in subsequent appeal tribunal proceedings. If in any subsequent proceedings, the director or an appeal tribunal has serious doubt as to the correctness of any principles previously declared by an appeal tribunal or by the board of review, or if there is an apparent inconsistency or conflict in final decisions or comparable authority, then the findings of fact in that case may be certified, together with the question of law involved, to the board of review. After giving notice and reasonable opportunity for hearing upon the law to all parties to the proceedings, the board of review shall certify to the director or appeal tribunal and the parties in interest its answer to the question submitted, or the board of review, in its discretion, may remove to itself the entire proceeding as provided in § 28-44-48 and render its decision upon the entire case.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-50 .

28-44-50.1. Limits of board of review legal precedent.

Except as provided in § 28-44-50 , the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and determinations of eligibility of the director or the board of review, including decisions reviewed by the district, superior, or supreme courts, shall not be binding upon, or determinative of any issue of fact or law, in any criminal prosecution or civil action or administrative proceeding, other than the proceeding under this chapter in which the said findings, conclusions, or determinations were made. Notwithstanding the foregoing, documents and testimony developed in proceedings before the department, as well as any determinations of eligibility of the director or board of review, shall remain subject to subpoena, discovery, and admission as evidence in other proceedings as determined in those proceedings, including criminal prosecutions, civil actions, and administrative proceedings.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 361, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 404, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 361, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 404, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

28-44-51. Denial of appeal as decision of board of review.

For the purposes of judicial review, an appeal tribunal’s decision from which an application for appeal has been denied by the board of review shall be deemed to be the decision of the board of review, except that the time for initiating judicial review shall run from the date of the mailing or delivery of the notice of the denial of the application for appeal by the board of review.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 8; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 8; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 7; G.L., ch. 284, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-51 .

28-44-52. Finality of board’s decision — Petition for judicial review.

Each party shall be promptly furnished a copy of the decision and the supporting findings and conclusions of the board of review. The decision shall be final unless any party in interest, including the director, initiates judicial review by filing a petition with the clerk of the sixth division of the district court within thirty (30) days as set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42. The petition for review shall state the grounds upon which review is sought but need not be verified. Exceptions taken to the rulings of the board of review shall not be necessary to obtain judicial review nor shall a bond be required either as a condition of initiating a proceeding for judicial review of a determination of benefit rights or of entering an appeal from the decision of the court upon that review.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-52 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 11; P.L. 2002, ch. 243, § 1.

Cross References.

Appeals under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction

Superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider a former employee’s action for review of a decision affirming the denial of unemployment benefits to the employee because the authority to conduct such a review was given to the district courts. Michaud v. R.I. Dep't of Labor & Training, 72 A.3d 870, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2013).

Judicial Review.
— Method of Obtaining.

Proceedings for judicial review of decision of board of review of the department of employment security, claimed under this section, were considered controlled by and as having been brought pursuant to § 42-35-15 because the Administrative Procedure Act governs such appeals. Cahoone v. Board of Review, 104 R.I. 503 , 246 A.2d 213, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 672 (1968).

— Scope.

Judicial review of the board’s decision is authorized by this section, but the scope of such review is defined by § 28-44-54 . Whitelaw v. Board of Review, 95 R.I. 154 , 185 A.2d 104, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1962).

Collateral References.

Conclusiveness and review of administrative determination under statutory provisions requiring filing of payroll reports for purposes of unemployment insurance. 174 A.L.R. 410.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies as prerequisite to declaratory relief in respect to unemployment compensation. 14 A.L.R.2d 826.

28-44-53. Parties to judicial review — Service of petition — Certification of record.

The board of review and all parties to the proceedings before it shall be parties to the review proceedings. If the director is a party respondent, the petition shall be served by leaving with him or her, or any representative whom he or she designates for that purpose, as many copies of the petition as there are respondents. Within ten (10) days after filing of that petition an affidavit of compliance shall be filed with the district court. The director shall file with the court certified copies of the record of the case together with his or her petition for review or his or her answer to the appellant’s petition. Upon the filing of a petition for review by the director, or upon service of a petition upon him or her, the director shall send a copy of the petition by registered or certified mail to each party and that mailing shall constitute service upon the parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-53 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 11.

28-44-54. Scope of judicial review — Additional evidence — Precedence of proceedings.

The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive. Additional evidence required by the court shall be taken before the board of review, and the board of review, after hearing that additional evidence shall file with the court such additional or modified findings of fact or conclusions as it may make, together with transcripts of the additional record. All proceedings under §§ 28-44-52 and 28-44-53 shall be summarily heard and given precedence over all other civil cases. Appeals involving benefit rights shall be given precedence over all other cases arising under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-54 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidentiary Rules.

The board of review should have the broadest range of evidence before it and is not constrained by judicial or Administrative Procedures Act evidentiary rules. Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 479 A.2d 740, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 591 (R.I. 1984).

Scope of Review.

Judicial review of the board’s decision is authorized by § 28-44-52 but the scope of such review is defined by this section. Whitelaw v. Board of Review, 95 R.I. 154 , 185 A.2d 104, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1962).

In proceeding for judicial review of decision of board of review of the department of employment security, considered as controlled by and pursuant to § 42-35-15 , result would have been no different under this section, previously controlling, as this section confines the reviewing court to a consideration of questions of law and makes the findings of fact, in the absence of fraud, conclusive so long as supported by substantial evidence. Cahoone v. Board of Review, 104 R.I. 503 , 246 A.2d 213, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 672 (1968).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of provisions of unemployment compensation acts relating to seasonal employment. 136 A.L.R. 1480.

28-44-55. Appeal to supreme court.

An appeal may be taken from the decision of the district court to the supreme court of Rhode Island in the same manner as an appeal is taken under § 28-35-29 , relating to appeals in cases under the workers’ compensation law.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-55 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 11.

Cross References.

Appeals under Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Standard of Review.

Agency decisions must be reviewed according to the standards contained in the Administrative Procedures Act. Berberian v. Department of Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d 480, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1635 (R.I. 1980).

28-44-56. Waiver of rights void — Agreements to pay employer’s contributions.

No agreement by any individual to waive his or her right to benefits or any other right under chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be valid. No agreement by any individual in the employ of any person or concern to pay all or any portion of the contributions required under those chapters from employers shall be valid. No employer shall make or require or accept any deduction from wages to finance the contributions required of him or her, or require or accept any waiver by any individual of any right under these chapters. The director shall have the power to take any steps necessary or suitable under those chapters to correct or prosecute any violation.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 13; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 13; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-56 .

28-44-57. Fees and costs chargeable.

  1. No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind by the director or his or her representative, or by the board of review or its representatives, in any proceeding under chapters 42 — 44 of this title. Any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding or court action may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent. The director shall have the authority to fix the fees of that counsel or other duly authorized agent, but no counsel or agent shall together be allowed to charge or receive for those services more than ten percent (10%) of the maximum benefits at issue in that proceeding or court action but not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) except as specifically allowed by the superior court.
  2. In any case in which either an employer appeals from a determination in favor of the claimant or a claimant successfully appeals a decision unfavorable to the claimant to an appeals body other than a court of law and the claimant retains an attorney-at-law to represent him or her, the attorney shall be entitled to a counsel fee of ten percent (10%) of the amount of benefits at issue before the appeals body but not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250), which shall be paid by the director out of the employment security administrative funds, within thirty (30) days of the date of his or her appearance.
    1. An attorney-at-law who represents an individual claiming benefits on an appeal to the courts shall be entitled to counsel fees upon final disposition of the case and necessary court costs and printing disbursements as fixed by the court.
    2. The director shall pay those counsel fees, costs, and disbursements out of the employment security administrative funds in each of the following cases:
      1. Any court appeal taken by a party other than the claimant from an administrative or judicial decision favorable in whole or in part to the claimant;
      2. Any court appeal by a claimant from a decision denying or reducing benefits awarded under a prior administrative or judicial decision;
      3. Any court appeal as a result of which the claimant is awarded benefits.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 13; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 13; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1953, ch. 3206, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-57 ; P.L. 1958 (s.s.), ch. 215, § 3; P.L. 1975, ch. 39, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 369, § 3; P.L. 1998, ch. 401, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 14, § 3; P.L. 2018, ch. 318, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 345, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in subdivision (c)(2).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 318, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 345, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeals.

Department of labor and training board of review had subject matter jurisdiction to review the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-57 made by the director of the department of labor and training, as the determination of the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees to award was a decision made by the director within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-43-14 , therefore subjecting that action to the appeals process provided for under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-43-24 . Arnold v. R.I. DOL & Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2003).

District court erred in denying an employee's request for attorney's fees for his earlier appeal to the district court where he had successfully appealed the district court's denial of unemployment benefits to the Supreme Court. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-57 is a remedial statute that must be liberally construed to protect the unemployed and “appeal” in subdivision (c)(2)(iii) encompasses lower court proceedings on the claimant's path to receiving benefits. Beagan v. R.I. Dep't of Labor & Training, 253 A.3d 858, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 82 (R.I. 2021).

Authority to Tax Fees.

Where petitioner did not point to any specific provision either in the Temporary Disability Insurance Act or elsewhere comparable to this section or which otherwise authorized the director to use funds for counsel fees, trial court had no authority to tax attorney’s fees as part of costs of litigation or otherwise. Waite v. Board of Review, 108 R.I. 177 , 273 A.2d 670, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1243 (1971).

Where the claimants sought attorney’s fees for the law firm that represented them in the employer’s appeal from the decision of the director of the department of labor and training granting the claimants unemployment benefits, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-57(b) , the claimants were only entitled to attorney’s fees based on the benefits that were paid to the claimants between the time when the employer filed the appeal and when the claimant’s eligibility for benefits expired, and the board of review committed an error of law under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15 in awarding 50 dollars to each claimant; therefore, the claimants were entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 15 percent of the total of five days worth of benefits that they received during the pendency of the appeal. Arnold v. R.I. DOL & Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2003).

28-44-58. Exemption of benefits from assignment or process.

Benefits which are due or may become due under chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall not be assigned, pledged, or encumbered before payment; and when awarded, adjudged, or paid, so long as they are not mingled with other funds of the recipient, shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy now or subsequently provided for recovery or collection of debt, which exemption may not be waived.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2333, § 13; P.L. 1937, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 284, § 13; P.L. 1939, ch. 670, § 10; P.L. 1949, ch. 2175, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-44-58 .

28-44-58.1. Child support intercept of benefits.

  1. An individual filing a new claim for benefits shall, at the time of filing the claim, disclose whether or not he or she owes child support obligations as defined under subsection (g) of this section. If any individual discloses that he or she owes child support obligations, and is determined to be eligible for benefits, the director shall notify the department of human services, bureau of family support that the individual has been determined to be eligible for benefits.
  2. Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, the director shall deduct and withhold from any compensation payable to an individual that owes child support obligations as defined under subsection (g) of this section:
    1. The amount specified by the individual to the director to be deducted and withheld under this subsection, if neither subdivision (2) nor (3) of this subsection is applicable; or
    2. The amount determined pursuant to an agreement submitted to the director under 42 U.S.C. § 454(20)(B)(i) by the department of human services, bureau of family support, unless subdivision (3) of this subsection is applicable; or
    3. Any amount otherwise required to be deducted and withheld from the benefits pursuant to legal process, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 462(e), properly served upon the director.
  3. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection (b) of this section shall be paid by the director to the department of human services, bureau of family support.
  4. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection (b) of this section shall for all purposes be treated as if it were paid to the individual as benefits under chapters 42 — 44 of this title and paid by that individual to the department of human services, bureau of family support in satisfaction of the individual’s child support obligations.
  5. For purposes of subsections (a) through (d) of this section, “benefits” means any compensation payable under this chapter, including amounts payable by the director pursuant to an agreement under any federal law providing for compensation, assistance, or allowances with respect to unemployment.
  6. This section applies only if appropriate arrangements have been made for reimbursement by the department of human services, bureau of family support for the administrative costs incurred by the director under this section which are attributable to child support obligations being enforced by the department of human services, bureau of family support.
  7. “Child support obligations” is defined for purposes of this section as including only obligations which are being enforced pursuant to a plan described in 42 U.S.C. § 454 which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.
  8. Upon receipt of funds paid by the director under subsection (c) of this section, the department of human services, bureau of family support shall deposit and hold those funds in an escrow account until credit to the individual’s child support obligation is made.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 114, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 28.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

28-44-58.2. Voluntary withholding of income taxes.

  1. An individual filing a new claim for benefits on or after January 1, 1998, shall, at the time of filing that claim, be advised that:
    1. Unemployment compensation is subject to federal and state income tax and requirements exist pertaining to estimated tax payments;
    2. The individual may elect to have federal income tax deducted and withheld from unemployment compensation paid at the rate specified in the federal Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.;
    3. The individual may elect to have state income tax deducted and withheld from unemployment compensation paid at the rate established by the state tax administrator;
    4. The individual shall be permitted to change a previously elected withholding status only once during a benefit year.
  2. Amounts deducted and withheld from unemployment compensation for income taxes shall remain in the employment security fund until transferred to the federal or state taxing authority as a payment of income tax.
  3. Amounts may be deducted and withheld under this section only after amounts are deducted and withheld for any overpayments of unemployment compensation, child support obligations or any other amounts required to be deducted and withheld under the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
  4. The director shall follow all procedures specified by the United States Department of Labor and the federal Internal Revenue Service pertaining to the deducting and withholding of income tax.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 33, § 3.

28-44-59. Severance or dismissal pay allocation.

For benefit years beginning prior to July 1, 2012, for the purpose of determining an individual’s benefit eligibility for any week of unemployment, any remuneration received by an employee from his or her employer in the nature of severance or dismissal pay, whether or not the employer is legally required to pay that remuneration, shall be deemed to be wages paid on the last day of employment for services performed prior to that date. For benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 2012, for the purpose of determining an individual’s benefit eligibility for any week of unemployment, any remuneration received by an employee from his or her employer in the nature of severance or dismissal pay, whether or not the employer is legally required to pay that remuneration, shall be allocated on a weekly basis from the individual’s last day of work for a period not to exceed twenty-six (26) weeks, and the individual will not be entitled to receive benefits for any such week for which it has been determined that the individual received severance or dismissal pay. Such severance or dismissal pay, if the employer does not specify a set number of weeks, shall be allocated using the individual’s weekly benefit rate.

History of Section. P.L. 1958, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 5.

28-44-60. Eligibility for adult basic education or vocational training.

  1. Notwithstanding any provisions of this title to the contrary, a claimant shall not be ineligible for benefits because of his or her regular attendance, whether full-time or part-time, in an adult basic education or a vocational training program as approved by the director and as defined in § 16-63-5(1) and (2); provided, that the director finds that:
    1. The contemplated education or training course will enhance the claimant’s employability in an occupation or skill for which there are, or are expected to be in the immediate future, employment opportunities in the locality;
    2. The contemplated education or training course will be acquired through an entity in the delivery system set forth in § 16-63-9(a) except subdivisions (5) and (10); and
    3. The claimant has the required qualifications and aptitudes to complete the education or training successfully.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, no otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for any week because he or she is in training approved under 19 U.S.C. § 2296(a)(1), nor shall that individual be denied benefits by reason of leaving work to enter that training; provided, that the work left is not suitable employment, or because of the application to any week in training of provisions in this law or any applicable federal unemployment compensation law, relating to availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept work. For purposes of this section, “suitable employment” means, with respect to an individual, work of a substantially equal or higher skill level than the individual’s past adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq., and wages for that work at not less than 80 percent (80%) of the individual’s average weekly wage as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of 1974.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 116, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 485, § 1.

28-44-61. Holiday pay.

Benefits to which an individual is entitled for any week of unemployment shall not be reduced by any holiday pay received by that individual where no services are performed on the holiday for which that payment is made.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 63.1, § 1.

28-44-62. Extended benefits.

  1. Definitions.  As used in this section, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
    1. “Eligibility period” of an individual means the period consisting of the weeks in his or her benefit year which begin in an extended period that is in effect in this state and, if his or her benefit year ends within that extended benefit period, any weeks thereafter which begin in that period.
    2. “Extended benefit period” means a period which:
      1. Begins with the third week after the first week for which there is a state “on” indicator; and
      2. Ends with either of the following weeks, whichever occurs later: (A) the third (3rd) week after the first week for which there is a state “off” indicator; or (B) the thirteenth (13th) consecutive week of that period; provided, that no extended benefit period may begin by reason of a state “on” indicator before the fourteenth week following the end of a prior extended benefit period which was in effect with respect to this state; and provided, further, that no extended benefit period may become effective in this state prior to the sixty-first (61st) day following the date of enactment of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (see 26 U.S.C. §  3304), and that, on and after January 1, 1972, either state or national indicators shall be applicable.
      3. There is a “state ‘on’ indicator” for this state for a week, beginning after September 25, 1982 and prior to December 18, 2010, or beginning on or after January 1, 2012, if:
        1. The director determines, in accordance with regulations of the U.S. Secretary of Labor, that for the period consisting of that week and the immediately preceding twelve (12) weeks, the rate of insured unemployment not seasonally adjusted under this chapter:
          1. Equaled or exceeded one hundred twenty percent (120%) of the average of those rates for the corresponding thirteen (13) week period ending in each of the preceding two (2) calendar years, and
          2. Equaled or exceeded five percent (5%), or
        2. The director determines, in accordance with regulations of the U.S. Secretary of Labor, that for the period consisting of that week and the immediately preceding twelve (12) weeks, the rate of insured unemployment not seasonally adjusted under this chapter equaled or exceeded six percent (6%), regardless of the insured unemployment rate in previous years, or
        3. With respect to benefits for weeks of unemployment beginning after March 6, 1993, and prior to December 18, 2010, or beginning on or after January 1, 2012, the average rate of total unemployment seasonally adjusted, as determined by the United States Secretary of Labor, for the period consisting of the most recent three (3) months for which data for all states are published before the close of that week:
          1. Equals or exceeds 6.5 percent (6.5%), and
          2. Equals or exceeds one hundred ten percent (110%) of such average for either or both of the corresponding three (3) month periods ending in the two (2) preceding calendar years.
        4. Notwithstanding any provision of this subdivision, any week for which there would otherwise be a state “on” indicator shall continue to be such a week and shall not be determined to be a week for which there is a state “off” indicator.
      4. There is a “state ‘on’ indicator” for this state for a week, beginning on or after December 18, 2010, and ending on or before December 31, 2011, if:
        1. The director determines, in accordance with regulations of the U.S. Secretary of Labor, that for the period consisting of that week and the immediately preceding twelve (12) weeks, the rate of insured unemployment not seasonally adjusted under this chapter:
          1. Equaled or exceeded one hundred twenty percent (120%) of the average of those rates for the corresponding thirteen (13) week period ending in each of the preceding three (3) calendar years; and
          2. Equaled or exceeded five percent (5%); or
        2. The director determines, in accordance with regulations of the U.S. Secretary of Labor, that for the period consisting of that week and the immediately preceding twelve (12) weeks, the rate of insured unemployment not seasonally adjusted under this chapter equaled or exceeded six percent (6%), regardless of the insured unemployment rate in previous years; or
        3. With respect to benefits for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after December 18, 2010, and ending on or before December 31, 2011, the average rate of total unemployment seasonally adjusted, as determined by the United States Secretary of Labor, for the period consisting of the most recent three (3) months for which data for all states are published before the close of that week:
          1. Equals or exceeds six and one-half percent (6.5%); and
          2. Equals or exceeds one hundred ten percent (110%) of such average for any or all of the corresponding three (3) month periods ending in the three (3) preceding calendar years.
        4. Notwithstanding any provision of this subdivision, any week for which there would otherwise be a state “on” indicator shall continue to be such a week and shall not be determined to be a week for which there is a state “off” indicator.
        1. There is a state “off” indicator for this state for a week beginning after March 6, 1993 and prior to December 18, 2010, or beginning on or after January 1, 2012, if in the period consisting of the week and the immediately preceding twelve (12) weeks, none of the options specified in subparagraphs (iii)(A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision result in an “on” indicator; or
        2. There is a state “off” indicator for this state for a week beginning on or after December 18, 2010, and ending on or before December 31, 2011, if in the period consisting of the week and the immediately preceding twelve (12) weeks, none of the options specified in subparagraphs (iv)(A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision result in an “on” indicator.
    3. “Extended benefits” means benefits, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and to ex-servicepersons pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq., payable to an individual under the provisions of this section for weeks of unemployment in his or her eligibility period.
      1. “Rate of insured unemployment,” for purposes of paragraph (2)(iii) of this subsection, means the percentage derived by dividing:
        1. The average weekly number of individuals filing claims for regular benefits for weeks of unemployment with respect to the most recent thirteen (13) consecutive week period, as determined by the director on the basis of reports submitted to the Secretary of Labor, by
        2. The average monthly covered employment for the first four (4) of the most recent six (6) completed calendar quarters ending before the end of the thirteen (13) week period.
      2. Computations required by the provisions of this subdivision shall be made by the director, in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.
    4. “Regular benefits” means benefits, including dependents’ allowances, payable to an individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, or under any other state law, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and to ex-servicepersons pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq., other than extended benefits.
    5. “State” includes any state of the United States of America, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
    6. “State law” means the unemployment insurance law of any state, approved by the Secretary of Labor under 26 U.S.C. § 3304.
    7. “Suitable work” means, with respect to any individual, any work that is within that individual’s capabilities; provided, however:
      1. That the gross average weekly remuneration payable for the work must exceed the sum of the individual’s weekly benefit amount as determined under subsection (g) of this section plus the amount, if any, of supplemental unemployment benefits 26 U.S.C. § 50(C)(17)(D) payable to that individual for that week, and
      2. That wages for such work are not less than the higher of:
        1. The minimum wage provided by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) without regard to any exemption, or
        2. The applicable state or local minimum wage.
  2. Effect of state law provisions relating to regular benefits on claims for, and the payment of extended benefits.  Except when the result would be inconsistent with the other provisions of this section and as otherwise provided in the employment security rules, the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title which apply to claims for, or the payment of, regular benefits shall apply to claims for, and the payment of, extended benefits provided under this section.
  3. Eligibility requirements for extended benefits.  An individual shall be eligible to receive extended benefits with respect to any week of unemployment in his or her eligibility period only if the director finds that:
    1. He or she has, prior to that week, exhausted all of his or her rights to regular benefits provided under chapters 42 — 44 of this title because either:
      1. He or she has received all of those benefits that were available to him or her in his or her current benefit year, or
      2. His or her benefit year has expired prior to that week, and he or she has insufficient wages and/or insufficient weeks of employment on which to establish a new benefit year which would include that week; and
    2. With respect to that week of unemployment:
      1. He or she has exhausted all his or her rights to regular benefits available to him or her under any state law, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and ex-servicepersons under § 5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq.;
      2. He or she has no rights to allowances or unemployment benefits under any other federal law, such as the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act [45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.];
      3. He or she has not received unemployment benefits under the law of Canada; and
      4. He or she is not disqualified or ineligible for benefits under any provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, to the extent that those provisions, pursuant to paragraph (ii) of this subdivision or the regulations adopted pursuant to that paragraph, are applicable to the claims for, and the payment of, extended benefits provided under this section; provided, that for purposes of subdivision (1) of this subsection, an individual shall be deemed to have exhausted his or her regular benefit rights with respect to any week of unemployment when he or she may become entitled to regular benefits with respect to that week, or future weeks, but those benefits are not payable at the time he or she claims extended benefits because final action has not yet been taken on a pending appeal with respect to regular benefits based on wages and/or employment which were not considered in the prior determination of his or her benefits.
    3. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an individual filing an initial claim for extended benefits effective March 7, 1993, or after shall not be eligible for extended compensation for any week of unemployment, unless in the base period with respect to which the individual exhausted all rights to regular benefits provided under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the individual:
      1. Had earnings in insured employment under chapters 42 — 44 of this title which equaled or exceeded forty (40) times the individual’s weekly benefit amount, including dependent’s allowance, or
      2. Had been paid wages for insured employment under chapters 42 — 44 of this title which equaled or exceeded one and one-half (11/2) times the individual’s insured wages in the calendar quarter of the base period in which the individual’s insured wages were the highest, or
      3. Had twenty (20) weeks of full-time work in insured employment under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    1. Suitable work and work search requirements for extended benefits.  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, an individual shall be ineligible for payment of extended benefits for any week of unemployment beginning on or after April 1, 1981, if the director finds that during that period:
      1. He or she failed to accept an offer of suitable work as defined under subsection (a) of this section or failed to apply for any suitable work to which he or she was referred by the director; or
      2. He or she failed to actively engage in seeking work as prescribed under subdivision (3) of this subsection;
    2. Any individual who has been found ineligible for extended benefits by reason of the provisions in subdivision (1) of this subsection shall also be denied benefits beginning the first day of the week following the week in which that failure occurred and until he or she has been employed, except in self-employment, in each of four (4) subsequent weeks, whether or not consecutive, and has earned remuneration equal to not less than four (4) times the extended weekly benefit amount. No individual shall be denied extended benefits for failure to accept an offer of or to apply for any job which meets the definition of suitability as described in subsection (a) of this section if:
      1. The position was not offered to that individual in writing or was not listed with the employment service;
      2. The failure would not result in a denial of benefits under the definition of suitable work for regular benefit claimants in § 28-44-20 to the extent that the criteria of suitability in that section are not inconsistent with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section; or
      3. The individual furnishes satisfactory evidence to the director that his or her prospects for obtaining work in his or her customary occupation within a reasonably short period are good. If that evidence is deemed satisfactory for this purpose, the determination of whether any work is suitable with respect to that individual shall be made in accordance with the definition of suitable work for regular benefit claimants in § 28-44-20 without regard to the definition specified by subsection (a) of this section.
    3. For the purpose of paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection, an individual shall be treated as actively engaged in seeking work during any week if:
      1. The individual has engaged in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain work during that week;
      2. The individual furnishes tangible evidence that he or she has engaged in that effort during that week; and
      3. The director shall give written notice of the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy the requirements of this subsection prior to the individual’s exhaustion of regular benefits provided under chapters 42 — 44 of this title.
    4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a)(8) of this section to the contrary, no work shall be deemed to be suitable work for an individual which does not accord with the labor standard provisions required by 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) and set forth under § 28-44-20(a) and (b).
  4. Cessation of extended benefits when paid under interstate claim in a state where extended benefit period is not in effect.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, an individual shall not be eligible for extended benefits for any week beginning on or after June 1, 1981, if:
      1. Extended benefits are payable for that week pursuant to an interstate claim filed in any state under the interstate benefit payment plan; and
      2. No extended benefit period is in effect for that week in that state.
    2. Subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not apply with respect to the first two (2) weeks for which extended benefits are payable, determined without regard to this subsection, pursuant to an interstate claim filed under the interstate benefit payment plan to the individual from the extended benefit account established for the individual with respect to the benefit year.
  5. Suitable work.  The employment service shall refer any claimant entitled to extended benefits under chapters 42 — 44 of this title to any suitable work which meets the criteria prescribed in subsection (a) of this section.
  6. Weekly extended benefit amount.  The weekly extended benefit amount payable to an individual for a week of total unemployment in his or her eligibility period shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefit amount, including dependent’s allowances, payable to him or her for a week of total unemployment during his or her benefit year.
  7. Maximum extended benefit amount.
    1. The maximum extended benefit amount payable to any eligible individual with respect to the applicable benefit year shall be the least of the following amounts, determined on the basis of the specified regular benefit amounts which were payable, or paid, whichever is applicable, to the individual in the benefit year:
      1. Fifty percent (50%) of the maximum potential regular benefits, including dependents’ allowances, which were payable to the individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title in the benefit year, or
      2. Thirteen (13) times the individual’s weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, which was payable to the individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title for a week of total unemployment in the benefit year.
    2. Effective with respect to weeks beginning in a high unemployment period, the maximum extended benefit amount payable to any eligible individual with respect to the applicable benefit year shall be the least of the following amounts, determined on the basis of the specified regular benefit amounts which were payable, or paid, whichever is applicable, to the individual in the benefit year:
        1. Eighty percent (80%) of the maximum potential regular benefits, including dependents’ allowances, which were payable to the individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title in the benefit year, or
        2. Twenty (20) times the individual’s weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, which was payable to the individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title in the benefit year.
      1. For the purposes of this subdivision, the term “high unemployment period” means any period during which an extended benefit period would be in effect if item (a)(1)(iii)(C)(I) or item (a)(1)(iv)(C)(I) of this section were applied by substituting “eight percent” (“8%”) for “6.5 percent” (“6.5%”).
    3. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, if the benefit year of any individual ends within an extended benefit period, the remaining balance of extended benefits that the individual would, but for this subsection, be entitled to receive in that extended benefit period, with respect to weeks of unemployment beginning after the end of the benefit year, shall be reduced, but not below zero (0), by the product of the number of weeks for which the individual received any amounts as trade readjustment allowances within that benefit year, multiplied by the individual’s weekly benefit amount for extended benefits.
  8. Beginning and termination of extended benefit period. Whenever an extended benefit period is to become effective in this state as a result of a state “on” indicator, or an extended benefit period is to be terminated in this state as a result of a state “off ” indicator, the director shall make an appropriate public announcement.
  9. If the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (see 26 U.S.C. § 3304) is amended so as to authorize this state to pay benefits for an extended benefit period in a manner other than that currently provided by this section, then, and in that case, all the terms and conditions contained in the amended provisions of that federal law shall become a part of this section to the extent necessary to authorize the payment of benefits to eligible individuals as permitted under that amended provision.

History of Section. P.L. 1970 (s.s.), ch. 328, § 1; P.L. 1972 (s.s.), ch. 294, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 22; P.L. 1981, ch. 48, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 116, § 2; P.L. 1983, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 295, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 422, § 8; P.L. 1994, ch. 14, § 8; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 20; P.L. 2011, ch. 11, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 12, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 11, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 12, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Suitable Work.

Nothing in the plain language of the employment security statute permits a stated preference by a claimant to trump the statutory requirement that a claimant accept a position unless that position can be shown to fall within the exceptions stated in § 28-44-20 . Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, 749 A.2d 1121, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2000).

28-44-63. Benefit payments for services with nonprofit organizations, higher education institutions, and hospitals.

Benefits based on service in employment for nonprofit organizations, institutions of higher education, and hospitals, as defined in § 28-42-3(23) , (24), and (25), shall be payable in the same amounts on the same conditions as compensation payable on the basis of other services subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title; except that benefits based on service in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity in an institution of higher education as defined in § 28-42-3(24) shall not be paid to an individual for any week of unemployment which begins during the period between two (2) successive academic years, or during a similar period between two (2) regular terms, whether or not successive, or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual’s contract, if the individual has a contract or contracts to perform services in that capacity for any institution or institutions of higher education for both those academic years or both those terms.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 10.

Compiler’s Notes.

The internal references in this section to subdivisions in § 28-42-3 have been updated as a result of the 2014 amendment which renumbered several subdivisions.

28-44-63.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 262, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 23.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-44-63.1 concerned benefit payments to faculty members for services with public schools upon election of coverage by political subdivisions.

28-44-64, 28-44-65. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1972, ch. 143, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 293, § 1) concerning extended benefits continuation and additional benefit payments, were repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 19, effective July 5, 1995.

28-44-66. Athletes.

Benefits shall not be paid to any individual on the basis of any service, substantially all of which consists of participating in sports or athletic events or training or preparing to so participate, for any week which commences during the period between two (2) successive sport seasons or similar periods if that individual performed those services in the first of those seasons or similar periods and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform those services in the later of those seasons or similar periods.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 24.

28-44-67. Denial of unemployment compensation to illegal aliens.

  1. Benefits shall not be payable on the basis of services performed by an alien unless the alien is an individual who was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time the services were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing the services, or was permanently residing in the United States under color of law at the time the services were performed, including an alien who was lawfully present in the United States as a result of the application of the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
  2. Any data or information required of individuals applying for benefits to determine whether benefits are not payable to them because of their alien status shall be uniformly required from all applicants for benefits.
    1. In the case of an individual whose application for benefits would otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to the individual are not payable because of his or her alien status shall be made except upon a preponderance of the evidence.
    2. Any modification to the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14) as provided by United States public law 94-566 which specify other conditions or other effective date than stated in this section for the denial of benefits based on services performed by aliens and which modifications are required to be implemented under state law as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., shall be deemed applicable under the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 25; P.L. 1990, ch. 88, § 1.

Collateral References.

Alien’s right to benefits. 87 A.L.R.3d 694.

28-44-68. Benefit payments for services with nonprofit organizations and educational institutions and governmental entities.

Benefits based on service in employment for nonprofit organizations and educational institutions and governmental entities covered by chapters 42 — 44 of this title shall be payable in the same amounts on the same terms and subject to the same conditions as benefits payable on the basis of other services subject to chapters 42 — 44 of this title, except that:

  1. With respect to services performed after December 31, 1977, in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution (including elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education) benefits shall not be paid based on those services for any week of unemployment commencing during the period between two (2) successive academic years or during a similar period between two (2) regular but not successive terms, or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual’s contract, to any individual if that individual performs those services in the first of such academic years (or terms) and if there is a contract or a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of those academic years or terms. Section 28-44-63 shall apply with respect to those services prior to January 1, 1978.
  2. With respect to services in any other capacity for an educational institution, including elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education, compensation payable for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after April 1, 1984, on the basis of the services shall be denied to any individual for any week which commences during a period between two (2) successive academic years or terms if that individual performs those services in the first of those academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform those services in the second of those academic years or terms, except that if compensation is denied to any individual for any week under this subdivision and the individual was not offered an opportunity to perform the services for the educational institution for the second of the academic years or terms, the individual shall be entitled to a retroactive payment of the compensation for each week for which the individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which compensation was denied solely by reason of this subdivision.
  3. With respect to any services described in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this section, compensation payable for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after April 1, 1984, on the basis of those services shall be denied to any individual for any week which commences during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if that individual performs those services in the period immediately before that vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform those services in the period immediately following that vacation period or holiday recess.
  4. With respect to any services described in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this section, compensation payable for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after April 1, 1984, on the basis of services in that capacity shall be denied as specified in subdivisions (2) or (3) of this section to any individual who performed those services in an educational institution while in the employ of an educational service agency, and for this purpose the term “educational service agency” means a governmental agency or governmental entity which is established and operated exclusively for the purpose of providing those services to one or more educational institutions.
    1. “Reasonable assurance” means a written agreement by the employer that the employee will perform services in the same or similar capacity during the ensuing academic year, term or remainder of a term. Further, reasonable assurance would not exist if the economic terms and conditions of the position offered in the ensuing academic period are substantially less than the terms and conditions of the position in the first period.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 92, § 26; P.L. 1984, ch. 10, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 113, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Clerical Employees.

Clerical and secretarial employees who had been employed for lengthy periods on a 52-week basis and had been provided with very little notice were entitled to unemployment benefits for the contested summer period, since the employees were not subject to the “between terms” disqualifying language of subsection (1) given that reasonable assurance of work, present only if the economic terms and conditions of the job offered are not substantially less than those for the job as a full-time employee, did not exist. Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Department of Employment & Training, 635 A.2d 266, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 269 (R.I. 1993).

Evidence.

The evidence supported the Board of Review’s denial of unemployment benefits to plaintiff school teachers, where the board found that plaintiffs were given reasonable assurances of employment in that they were informed by letter that the school department expected to rehire them in the upcoming year, and where they were also reassured by information concerning vacancies and job prospects. Baker v. Department of Employment & Training Bd. of Review, 637 A.2d 360, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 1994).

Nonrenewal of Teacher’s Contract.

Lay teacher who was hired to work as a teacher in a Catholic school for one year and was notified that her employment contract would not be renewed for the following academic year is without “reasonable assurance” that she is able to “perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution” and is entitled to benefits under this section. St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray, 557 A.2d 1214, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 1989).

Fact that an amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-68 requires reasonable assurance to be provided in a writing does not mean that “reasonable assurance” is a guarantee of future employment to a per-diem substitute teacher. Elias-Clavet v. Bd. of Review, 15 A.3d 1008, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 35 (R.I. 2011).

As there was no showing of bad faith by the employer, or reason to question sincerity of the “reasonable assurance” letter it sent a per diem substitute teacher, she was provided with reasonable assurance of continued employment under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-68(a) and thus was disqualified under § 28-44-68(2) from receiving unemployment benefits. Elias-Clavet v. Bd. of Review, 15 A.3d 1008, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 35 (R.I. 2011).

Reassignment of Teacher.

Subdivision (1) applied when a professor, who previously served as full time lecturer, was given oral and written notification that she would be reassigned to a three-quarter-time teaching job; notice of reassignment gave reasonable assurance that she would return to work in some type of teaching capacity for the upcoming term. University of Rhode Island v. Department of Empl. & Training, 691 A.2d 552, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 59 (R.I. 1997).

School Bus Drivers.

It is incorrect to conclude that, when read in its entirety, this section is not intended to apply to bus drivers, bus monitors, and bus aides because none of these claimants perform services in an educational institution. The term “educational institution” cannot be interpreted to signify merely the physical structure of a building rather than an organization. The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “institution,” as used in subdivision (4), dictates that bus drivers and monitors be included within the scope of this section. Delicato v. Board of Review, Dep't of Employment & Training, 643 A.2d 216, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 195 (R.I. 1994).

School-Lunch Workers.

Workers in a public school-lunch program who had applied for unemployment benefits for days that schools were closed because of teachers’ job actions were ineligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to this section, as the plaintiffs were between school terms and, therefore, precluded from collecting unemployment benefits. Kachanis v. Board of Review, Dep't of Employment & Training, 638 A.2d 553, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 1994).

Vacation Periods.

“Reasonable assurance” may be implied from the facts of each case. Preziosi v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 529 A.2d 133, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 539 (R.I. 1987).

— Teachers.

“Reasonable assurance” does not mean teachers must receive written assurance of future employment. Preziosi v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 529 A.2d 133, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 539 (R.I. 1987).

Long term substitute teachers by appointment and long term substitute teachers “in pool” could be denied unemployment-compensation benefits during the summer months as long as they have reasonable assurance of returning to work during the upcoming year in their capacity as substitutes. Preziosi v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 529 A.2d 133, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 539 (R.I. 1987).

Whether “reasonable assurance” had been supplied to an individual per diem substitute teacher would have to be decided by the department of employment security on a case-by-case basis. Preziosi v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review, 529 A.2d 133, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 539 (R.I. 1987).

Teacher’s aides are not entitled to unemployment compensation when they are laid off for summer recess, where they are given reasonable assurances that they will be recalled for work in the next academic year. Krupa v. Murray, 557 A.2d 868, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1989).

A laid-off teacher was not precluded from receiving unemployment benefits previously awarded to her during school-vacation and regular-school weeks simply because she later obtained part-time employment as a per-diem substitute teacher in an educational institute, although this section does preclude her from receiving additional benefits during such vacations. Brouillette v. Department of Empl. & Training Bd. of Review, 677 A.2d 1344, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Right to unemployment compensation or social security benefits of teacher or other school employee. 33 A.L.R.5th 643.

28-44-69. Work-sharing benefits.

  1. Definitions.  As used in this section, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
    1. “Affected unit” means a specified plant, department, shift, or other definable unit consisting of two (2) or more employees to which an approved work-sharing plan applies.
    2. “Eligible employee” means an individual who usually works for the employer submitting a work-sharing plan.
    3. “Eligible employer” means any employer who has had contributions credited to his or her account and benefits have been chargeable to this account, or who has elected to reimburse the fund in lieu of paying contributions, and who is not delinquent in the payment of contributions or reimbursements as required by chapters 42 — 44, inclusive of this title.
    4. “Fringe benefits” include, but are not limited to, health insurance, retirement benefits, paid vacation and holidays, sick leave, and similar advantages that are incidents of employment.
    5. “Intermittent employment” means employment that is not continuous but may consist of periodic intervals of weekly work and intervals of no weekly work.
    6. “Seasonal employment” means employment with an employer who displays a twenty percent (20%) difference between its highest level of employment and its lowest level of employment each year for the three (3) previous calendar years as reported to the department of labor and training, or as shown in the information that is available and satisfactory to the director.
    7. “Temporary employment” means employment where an employee is expected to remain in a position for only a limited period of time and/or is hired by a temporary agency to fill a gap in an employer’s workforce.
    8. “Usual weekly hours of work” means the normal hours of work each week for an employee in an affected unit when that unit is operating on a full-time basis, not to exceed forty (40) hours and not including overtime.
    9. “Work-sharing benefits” means benefits payable to employees in an affected unit under an approved work-sharing plan.
    10. “Work-sharing employer” means an employer with an approved work-sharing plan in effect.
    11. “Work-sharing plan” means a plan submitted by an employer under which there is a reduction in the number of hours worked by the employees in the affected unit in lieu of layoffs of some of the employees.
    1. Criteria for approval of a work-sharing plan.  An employer wishing to participate in the work-sharing program shall submit a signed, written work-sharing plan to the director for approval. The director shall approve a work-sharing plan only if the following requirements are met:
      1. The plan identifies the affected unit, or units, and specifies the effective date of the plan;
      2. The employees in the affected unit, or units, are identified by name; social security number; the usual weekly hours of work; proposed wage and hour reduction; and any other information that the director shall require;
      3. The plan certifies that the reduction in the usual weekly hours of work is in lieu of layoffs that would have affected at least 10 percent (10%) of the employees in the affected unit, or units, to which the plan applies and that would have resulted in an equivalent reduction in work hours;
      4. The usual weekly hours of work for employees in the affected unit, or units, are reduced by not less than 10 percent (10%) and not more than 50 percent (50%);
      5. If the employer provides health benefits and/or retirement benefits under a defined-benefit plan as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 414(j) of the Internal Revenue Code or contributions under a defined-contribution plan as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) of the Internal Revenue Code to any employee whose workweek is reduced under the program, the employer certifies that such benefits will continue to be provided to employees participating in the work-sharing program under the same terms and conditions as though the workweek of such employee had not been reduced or to the same extent as other employees not participating in the work-sharing program;
      6. In the case of employees represented by a collective bargaining agent or union, the plan is approved in writing by the collective bargaining agents or unions that cover the affected employees. In the absence of any collective bargaining agent or union, the plan must contain a certification by the employer that the proposed plan, or a summary of the plan, has been made available to each employee in the affected unit;
      7. The plan will not serve as a subsidy of seasonal employment during the off season, nor as a subsidy for temporary or intermittent employment;
      8. The employer agrees to furnish reports relating to the proper conduct of the plan and agrees to allow the director, or his or her authorized representatives, access to all records necessary to verify the plan prior to approval and, after approval, to monitor and evaluate application of the plan;
      9. The employer describes the manner in which the requirements of this section will be implemented (including a plan for giving notice, where feasible, to an employee whose workweek is to be reduced) together with an estimate of the number of layoffs that would have occurred absent the ability to participate in the work-sharing program and such other information as the director of the department of labor and training determines is appropriate;
      10. The employer attests that the terms of the employer’s written plan and implementation are consistent with the employer’s obligations under applicable federal and state laws; and
      11. In addition to the matters previously specified in this section, the director shall take into account any other factors that may be pertinent to proper implementation of the plan.
  2. Approval or rejection of the plan.  The director shall approve or reject a plan in writing. The reasons for rejection shall be final and not subject to appeal. The employer shall be allowed to submit another plan for consideration and that determination will be made based upon the new data submitted by the interested employer.
  3. Effective date and duration of the plan.  A work-sharing plan shall be effective on the date that is mutually agreed upon by the employer and the director, which shall be specified in the notice of approval sent to the employer. It shall expire at the end of the twelfth, full-calendar month after its effective date, or on the date specified in the plan if that date is earlier; provided that the plan is not previously revoked by the director. If a plan is revoked by the director, it shall terminate on the date specified in the director’s written order of revocation.
  4. Revocation of approval.  The director may revoke approval of a work-sharing plan for good cause. The revocation order shall be in writing and shall specify the date the revocation is effective and the reasons for it. The revocation order shall be final and not subject to appeal.
    1. Good cause shall include, but not be limited to: (i) Failure to comply with assurances given in the plan; (ii) Unreasonable revision of productivity standards for the affected unit; (iii) Conduct or occurrences tending to defeat the intent and effective operation of the plan; and (iv) Violation of any criteria on which approval of the plan was based.
    2. The action may be taken at any time by the director on his or her own motion; on the motion of any of the affected unit’s employees; or on the motion of the collective bargaining agent or agents. The director shall review the operation of each qualified employer plan at least once during the period the plan is in effect to assure its compliance with the work-sharing requirements.
  5. Modification of the plan.  An operational approved, work-sharing plan may be modified by the employer with the consent of the collective bargaining agent or agents, if any, if the modification is not substantial and is in conformity with the plan approved by the director, provided the modifications are reported promptly to the director by the employer. If the hours of work are increased or decreased substantially beyond the level in the original plan, or any other conditions are changed substantially, the director shall approve or disapprove the modifications without changing the expiration date of the original plan. If the substantial modifications do not meet the requirements for approval, the director shall disallow that portion of the plan in writing. The decision of the director shall be final and not subject to appeal.
  6. Eligibility for work-sharing benefits.  An individual is eligible to receive work-sharing benefits, subsequent to serving a waiting period as prescribed by the director, with respect to any week only if, in addition to meeting other conditions of eligibility for regular benefits under this title that are not inconsistent with this section, the director finds that:
    1. During the week, the individual is employed as a member of an affected unit under an approved work-sharing plan that was approved prior to that week, and the plan is in effect with respect to the week for which work-sharing benefits are claimed.
    2. The individual is able to work and is available for the normal work week with the work-sharing employer.
    3. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter to the contrary, an individual is deemed unemployed in any week for which remuneration is payable to him or her as an employee in an affected unit for less than his or her normal weekly hours of work as specified under the approved work-sharing plan in effect for the week.
    4. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title to the contrary, an individual shall not be denied work-sharing benefits for any week by reason of the application of provisions relating to the availability for work and active search for work with an employer other than the work-sharing employer.
    5. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title to the contrary, eligible employees may participate, as appropriate, in training (including employer-sponsored training or worker training funded under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998) to enhance job skills if such program has been approved by the state agency.
    1. Work-sharing benefits.  The work-sharing weekly benefit amount shall be the product of the regular, weekly benefit rate, including any dependents’ allowances, multiplied by the percentage reduction in the individual’s usual weekly hours of work as specified in the approved plan. If the work-sharing, weekly benefit amount is not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), then the weekly benefit amount shall be rounded down to the next, lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00).
    2. An individual may be eligible for work-sharing benefits or regular unemployment compensation, as appropriate, except that no individual shall be eligible for combined benefits in any benefit year in an amount more than the maximum entitlement established for unemployment compensation, nor shall an individual be paid work-sharing benefits for more than fifty-two (52) weeks, whether or not consecutive, in any benefit year pursuant to an approved work-sharing plan.
    3. The work-sharing benefits paid shall be deducted from the maximum-entitlement amount established for that individual’s benefit year.
    4. If an employer approves time off and the worker has performed some work during the week, the individual is eligible for work-sharing benefits based on the combined work and paid leave hours for that week. If the employer does not grant time off, the question of availability must be investigated.
    5. If an employee was sick and consequently did not work all the hours offered by the work-sharing employer in a given week, the employee will be denied work-sharing benefits for that week.
    6. Claims for work-sharing benefits shall be filed in the same manner as claims for unemployment compensation or as prescribed in regulations by the director.
    7. Provisions applicable to unemployment compensation claimants shall apply to work-sharing claimants to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the established work-sharing provisions. An individual who files an initial claim for work-sharing benefits shall be provided, if eligible for benefits, a monetary determination of entitlement to work-sharing benefits and shall serve a waiting week.
    8. If an individual works in the same week for an employer other than the work-sharing employer, the individual’s work-sharing benefits shall be computed in the same manner as if the individual worked solely with the work-sharing employer. If the individual is not able to work, or is not available for the normal work week with the work-sharing employer, then no work-sharing benefits shall be payable to that individual for that week.
    9. An individual who performs no services during a week for the work-sharing employer and is otherwise eligible shall be paid the full, weekly unemployment compensation amount. That week shall not be counted as a week with respect to which work-sharing benefits were received.
    10. An individual who does not work for the work-sharing employer during a week, but works for another employer and is otherwise eligible, shall be paid benefits for that week under the partial unemployment compensation provisions of this chapter. That week shall not be counted as a week with respect to which work-sharing benefits were received.
    11. Nothing in the section shall preclude an otherwise eligible individual from receiving total or partial unemployment benefits when the individual’s work-sharing benefits have been exhausted.
  7. Benefit charges.  Work-sharing benefits shall be charged to employer accounts in the same manner as regular benefits in accordance with the provisions of §§ 28-43-3 and 28-43-29 . Notwithstanding the above, any work-sharing benefits paid on or after July 1, 2013, that are eligible for federal reimbursement, shall not be chargeable to employer accounts and employers liable for payments in lieu of contributions shall not be responsible for reimbursing the employment security fund for any benefits paid to their employees on or after July 1, 2013, that are reimbursed by the federal government.
  8. Extended benefits.  An individual who has received all of the unemployment compensation or combined unemployment compensation and work-sharing benefits available in a benefit year shall be considered an exhaustee for purposes of extended benefits, as provided under the provisions of § 28-44-62 , and, if otherwise eligible under those provisions, shall be eligible to receive extended benefits.
  9. Severability.  If any provision of this section, or its application to any person or circumstance, is held invalid under federal law, the remainder of the section and the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by that invalidity.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 403, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 40, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 114, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 52; P.L. 2017, ch. 81, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 93, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 102, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 114, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 52) as passed by the 2014 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2014, ch. 179, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 203, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 81, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 93, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 71 provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect on December 31, 2014.

Federal Act References.

The Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq., referred to in subsection (g), was repealed, effective July 1, 2015. For comparable provisions, see the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Workers’ Compensation Average Weekly Wage.

Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) properly affirmed the decision of the trial judge of the WCC, which found that work-sharing benefits were properly not included in an employee’s average weekly wage; work-sharing benefits cannot be taken into account when determining the average weekly wage to be used in calculating workers’ compensation benefits. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

Taking into account the definition of “wage” from a respected source, as well as the meaning given to the word “wage” in common parlance, the word to refers to payment for labor or services rendered; work-sharing benefits are the antithesis of monies paid for hours worked and are by definition monies paid for hours not worked, and they are monies paid by the State, not by the employer. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

In view of the fact that work-sharing benefits are monies paid by the state for hours not worked, they align with traditional unemployment compensation benefits, which are likewise paid to an individual by the state during times when he or she is not working; work-sharing benefits should be treated like traditional unemployment compensation benefits. Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

It is apparent from the broader statutory schemes that work-sharing benefits are to be treated like traditional unemployment compensation and should not be included in determining average weekly wage for workers’ compensation; such benefits are not included as part of the term “wages” in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-20 . Powers v. Warwick Pub. Schs, 204 A.3d 1078, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2019).

28-44-70. Entrepreneurial training assistance program.

  1. Definitions.  As used in this section, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
    1. “Entrepreneurial training assistance program” means a program administered by the director under which an eligible individual may receive employment assistance allowances pursuant to the provisions of this section.
    2. “Employment assistance activities” means activities, including entrepreneurial training, business counseling, and technical assistance, approved by the director in which an individual identified through a worker profiling system as likely to exhaust regular benefits participates for the purpose of establishing a business and become self-employed.
    3. “Employment assistance allowance” means an allowance payable in lieu of regular benefits from the fund or an allowance payable in lieu of emergency unemployment compensation benefits to an individual participating in employment assistance activities who meets the requirements of this section.
    4. “Full-time basis” means that the individual is devoting such amount of time as is customary to establish a business which will serve as a full-time occupation for that individual, but in no case less than thirty-five (35) hours per week.
    5. “Regular benefits” means benefits, including dependents’ allowances, payable to an individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, or under any other state law, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and to ex-service persons pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq., other than additional and extended benefits.
    6. “Emergency unemployment compensation” means benefits, including dependents’ allowances, payable to an individual as authorized by the unemployment compensation extension act of 2008 and in accordance with regulations established by the secretary of labor.
  2. Eligibility requirements for employment assistance allowances.  Employment assistance allowances shall be payable to an individual at the same interval, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions as regular benefits under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, except that:
    1. The requirements of §§ 28-44-12 and 28-44-20 relating to availability for work, active search for work, and refusal to accept suitable work are not applicable to the individual;
    2. The requirements of §§ 28-42-3(26) , 28-42-3(28) and 28-44-7 relating to income are not applicable to income earned from self-employment by the individual;
    3. An individual who meets the requirements of this section shall be considered to be totally unemployed pursuant to § 28-42-3(28) ; and
    4. An individual who fails to participate in employment assistance activities or who fails to actively engage on a full-time basis in activities, which may include training, relating to the establishment of a business and becoming self-employed or who fails to provide information that the director requires shall be disqualified for the week the failure occurs and for each subsequent week until the individual shows to the satisfaction of the director that the individual meets the requirements of this section.
  3. Amount of employment assistance allowance.  The weekly allowance payable under this section to an individual shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, payable to the individual for a week of total unemployment during the benefit year pursuant to § 28-44-6 .
    1. For those individuals participating in the entrepreneurial training assistance program while collecting regular benefits under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, the sum of the allowance paid under this section and regular benefits paid under chapters 42 — 44 of this title to an individual with respect to any benefit year shall not exceed the maximum potential regular benefits, including dependents’ allowances, payable to that individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title with respect to the benefit year.
    2. For those individuals participating in the entrepreneurial training assistance program while collecting emergency unemployment compensation benefits under the unemployment compensation extension act of 2008, the allowance paid under this section to an individual, with respect to any benefit year, shall not exceed an amount equal to twenty-six (26) times the individual’s regular weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, payable to that individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title, with respect to the benefit year. Any individual who chooses to terminate his or her participation in the entrepreneurial training assistance program, or who has completed participation in the program, and who continues to meet the emergency unemployment compensation eligibility requirements, shall be permitted to receive his or her emergency unemployment compensation benefits with respect to subsequent weeks of unemployment.
  4. Termination from the entrepreneurial training assistance program.  The director may terminate any individual from the entrepreneurial training assistance program who fails to meet requirements of the program for three (3) or more weeks. Individuals who are terminated from or voluntarily leave the entrepreneurial training assistance program may receive, if otherwise eligible, regular benefits with respect to the benefit year; provided, that the total amount of regular benefits and employment assistance allowances paid to the individual shall not exceed the maximum potential regular benefits, including dependents’ allowances, payable to that individual under chapters 42 — 44 of this title with respect to the benefit year.
  5. Limitation on receipt of employment assistance allowances.
    1. The aggregate number of individuals receiving employment assistance allowances under this section and under the regular benefits program under chapter 42 — 44 of this title for any week shall not exceed five percent (5.0%) of the total number of individuals receiving regular benefits under chapters 42 — 44 of this title for that week. The director shall, through regulations, prescribe any actions that are necessary to assure the requirements of this subsection are met.
    2. The aggregate number of individuals receiving employment assistance allowances under this section and under the emergency unemployment compensation program for any week shall not exceed one percent (1.0%) of the total number of individuals receiving emergency unemployment compensation benefits.
    3. The director shall, through regulations, prescribe any actions that are necessary to assure the requirements of this subdivision are met.
  6. Financing costs of employment assistance allowances.  Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title, employment assistance allowances paid pursuant to this section shall be paid with money drawn from the fund and the allowances shall be charged in the same manner as provided for regular benefits paid under chapters 42 — 44 of this title. Allowances attributable to federal military or federal civilian service or paid under the unemployment compensation extension act of 2008 shall be charged to the appropriate federal account.
  7. Effective date and termination date.  The provisions of this section shall apply to weeks beginning after June 22, 1994, or to weeks beginning after any plan required by the United States Department of Labor is approved by the department, whichever date is later; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require the director to operate an entrepreneurial training assistance program as allowed under this section. The authority provided by this section shall terminate:
    1. As of the effective date of the withdrawal of approval of any plan required by the United States Department of Labor; or
    2. As of the week containing the date when federal law no longer authorizes the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 32, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 43, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment redesignated subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(5).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 32, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 43, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

The internal references in this section to subdivisions in § 28-42-3 have been updated as a result of the 2014 amendment which renumbered several subdivisions.

28-44-71. Back to Work Rhode Island Program.

  1. Legislative findings and purpose.  The general assembly hereby finds as follows:
    1. As of January 1, 2013, Rhode Island’s unemployment rate is the highest in the New England region and above the national average;
    2. Despite this high unemployment, businesses report difficulties and frustration in locating employment candidates with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities they need;
    3. In an uncertain economy, employers are hesitant to invest in training if there is a risk the investment will not result in a qualified and skilled employee;
    4. Despite the need for skilled employees, job seekers face difficulties in getting their “foot in the door” to demonstrate their value to potential employers;
    5. Statistics indicate that unemployment compensation claimants who participated in employer-partnered, structured training programs return to work more quickly than those who do not, and that such programs have saved significant sums of employment security funds;
    6. The purpose of the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” is to provide claimants with planned, structured, and career-relevant job training to gain new skills and abilities and help increase their prospects for employment, and assist employers in locating and obtaining skilled and well qualified job candidates for open employment positions.
  2. Definitions.  For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
    1. “Claimant” means a person collecting unemployment security benefits under the provisions of chapters 42 — 44 of this title;
    2. “Department” means the Rhode Island department of labor and training;
    3. “Director” means the director of the Rhode Island department of labor and training;
    4. “Participating employer” means an employer who has voluntarily agreed to participate in the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” and meets the criteria for participation established by this section and as determined by the director;
    5. “Program” means the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” established under this section;
    6. “Skill enhancement and job training” means a planned, structured learning environment for the primary benefit of the trainee and from which the participating employer derives no immediate advantage and which is designed to provide the skills and knowledge necessary to meet the employer’s specifications for an occupation or trade.
    7. “Unemployment benefits” means the money payable to a claimant for his or her wage losses due to unemployment, payable pursuant to chapters 42 — 44 of this title, and includes any amounts payable pursuant to an agreement under federal law providing for compensation, assistance, or allowances with respect to unemployment.
  3. Program established.
    1. The “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” is hereby established and shall be administered by the department of labor and training.
    2. The program shall be designed so as to permit a claimant to be matched with an employer participating in the program and be placed in department-approved skill enhancement and job training made available by the employer. Participation by both claimant and employer shall be voluntary. The employer shall provide the claimant with skill enhancement and job training relevant to an open employment position for up to twenty-four (24) hours per week for up to six (6) weeks. Upon completion of the six (6) week period, claimants must be considered for employment by the employer. During the six (6) week period, the employer shall not compensate the claimant in any way other than the training that the claimant receives through participation in the program. Both the employer and the claimant may terminate participation in the program at any time.
    3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title to the contrary, no otherwise eligible individual shall be denied unemployment benefits because of his or her participation in the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program”; provided, however, that contingent upon appropriation, said claimant may receive a reasonable stipend in an amount determined by the director to cover any additional costs associated with their participation in the program, including, but not limited to, transportation or childcare costs.
    4. The department shall notify employers of the availability of the program and shall provide employers with information and materials necessary to participate upon request.
    5. The department shall continuously monitor the program to ensure that participating employers enter the program in good faith with the genuine expectation of hiring for the open position and with the intent and ability to provide relevant skill enhancement and job training.
    6. The department shall develop and conduct an orientation program for participating claimants and employers informing them of the rules, regulations, opportunities, and limitations of the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program.”
    7. A claimant may stay in the program if they exhaust benefits or lose program eligibility prior to the end of the six (6) week period;
    8. Participation in the program by a claimant shall be limited to six (6) weeks in any benefit year. A claimant shall be encouraged to end a training relationship that is not beneficial and shall be encouraged to preserve the remainder of his or her six (6) weeks of training for another training opportunity.
    9. In order to participate, a claimant must be seeking work and must be able to work, available to work, and accept work during the training period.
    10. Interested claimants shall be encouraged, but not required, to find employment opportunities that align with their current job skills, knowledge and experience. Employers shall be encouraged to work with the department to locate claimants with current job skills, knowledge, and experience that align with the requirements of an open employment opportunity;
    11. The claimant and the employer must agree upon a formal training plan and schedule which must be approved by the department and may include on-site training, education, and the application of skills or experiences;
    12. Participation in the program may be limited based on program capacity as determined by the department.
    13. The “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” will begin on October 1, 2013, and will expire on December 31, 2014. New participants will not be enrolled after November 18, 2014.
  4. Eligibility to be a participating employer.
    1. An employer wishing to participate in the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” shall be required to meet the following qualifications, in addition to any further criteria established by the director:
      1. The employer must conduct business in Rhode Island; although, the business need not be domestic to Rhode Island;
      2. The employer must have a full-time position of employment available that the employer is desirous of filling;
      3. The employer must be willing and able to provide a participating claimant with skills enhancement and job training focused toward the position that is available;
      4. The employer must certify that he, she, they, or it will not pay any wages or provide any payment in kind to the claimant during the course of the claimant’s participation in the program;
      5. The employer must certify that he, she, they, or it will, at completion of the training period, consider the claimant for employment in the full time position for which the claimant was trained;
      6. The employer must agree to follow up a claimant’s participation in the program with a performance evaluation of the claimant, regardless of whether or not the claimant is hired for employment;
      7. The employer must agree to provide information as requested by the department and verify that employment of a participating claimant will not displace nor have any impact on a promotion due an existing employee;
      8. The employer must certify that the employment and training opportunity is not due to a lockout, strike, or other labor dispute; and
      9. For employers with employees who are subject to collective bargaining, the written approval by the collective bargaining representative for each affected unit shall be required to be included in the plan for any job training for a position which would otherwise be covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
  5. Eligibility to be a participating claimant.
    1. An individual receiving unemployment benefits and wishing to participate in the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” must meet the following qualifications:
      1. The individual must be eligible to receive Rhode Island unemployment compensation benefits;
      2. The individual must continue to file weekly continued claims to receive benefits unless otherwise exempted;
      3. The individual must continue to look for work and employment opportunities during their participation in the program, unless otherwise exempt;
      4. The individual must certify that he or she understands that participation in the program includes no guarantee of employment;
      5. The individual must attend a mandatory orientation to be offered by the department;
      6. The individual must agree to provide relevant information as requested by the department and to cooperate with requests from the department for the evaluation of aspects of the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program”;
    2. Claimants with a definite recall date within six (6) weeks and those who do not register for employment services are not eligible for the program.
  6. Workers’ compensation.
    1. The department will provide workers’ compensation coverage for participating claimants.
    2. A claimant’s participation in the program does not create an employment relationship with the department for the purposes of chapter 29 of this title.
    3. For the purposes of computing an approved claimant’s wage compensation and benefit amount under chapter 29 of this title, the average weekly wage shall be the claimant’s maximum weekly unemployment compensation benefit rate for the benefit year in effect at the time of injury.
  7. Rules and regulations.  The director shall promulgate such rules and regulations as the director deems necessary to implement the provisions of this section.
  8. Program performance monitoring.  The department shall develop and implement a performance monitoring system which does the following:
    1. Collects critical information on the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” on an annual basis or more frequently as determined by the director, including:
      1. Increases in claimant skills.
      2. Skill training being provided by businesses.
      3. Placement of claimants after training.
      4. Challenges foreseen by businesses.
      5. Business training best practices.
      6. Amount of weeks claimants received unemployment compensation benefits after completion of the training period.
    2. Defines the benefits of the program and its training to businesses, claimants and the Employment Security Fund.
  9. Funding.  Creation of the “Back to Work Rhode Island Program” is contingent upon funding.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 15, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 241, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 15, § 2, P.L. 2013, ch. 181, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 241, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 45 Apprenticeship Programs in Trade and Industry

28-45-1. Purposes.

The purposes of this chapter are:

  1. To encourage employers, associations of employers, and organizations of employees to voluntarily establish apprenticeship programs and the making of apprenticeship agreements;
  2. To create opportunities for young people to obtain employment and adequate training in trades and industry with parallel instructions in related and supplementary education under conditions that will equip them for profitable employment and citizenship;
  3. To cooperate with the promotion and development of apprenticeship programs and systems in other states and with the federal committee on apprenticeship appointed under 29 U.S.C. § 50 et seq.;
  4. To provide for the registration and approval of apprenticeship programs and apprenticeship agreements and for the issuance of state certificates of completion of apprenticeship.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1.

Cross References.

Indenture of apprentices, § 28-4-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Apprenticeship:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-22m et seq.

28-45-2. Apprenticeship council.

  1. The director of labor and training, with the advice and consent of the governor, shall appoint a state apprenticeship council composed of four (4) representatives each, from employer and employee organizations respectively, and one public member. One of the employer representatives shall represent a business employing less than fifty (50) employees. In making the appointments, the director shall give due consideration to include representatives from different types of industries, including those industries participating in non-trade-apprenticeship programs established pursuant to § 42-102-11 . The council shall, by majority vote, elect from its membership a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, and a secretary. The vice-chairperson shall act in the absence or inability of the chairperson.
  2. Upon the expiration of the terms of the council’s present membership, the director of labor and training, with the advice and consent of the governor, shall appoint members to the apprenticeship council for initial terms, and those members shall hold office until their successors are appointed and have qualified, as follows:
    1. One representative each, from employer and employee organizations respectively, for an initial term of one year;
    2. One representative each, from employer and employee organizations respectively, for an initial term of two (2) years;
    3. One representative each, from employer and employee organizations respectively, for an initial term of three (3) years; and
    4. One representative each, from employer and employee organizations respectively, for an initial term of four (4) years.
    5. One public member, representing a community organization, for an initial term of four (4) years.
  3. Upon the expiration of those initial terms, members shall be appointed for terms of four (4) years and shall hold office until their successors are appointed and have qualified. Any vacancy shall be filled by appointments by the director of labor and training, with the advice and consent of the governor, for the unexpired portion of the term. The commissioner of elementary and secondary education and the director of labor and training shall be members of the council, ex-officio, without vote.
  4. The council may, by majority vote, designate any consultants that it may deem necessary and desirable to assist it in the performance of its duties.
  5. Members of the board shall not be compensated for their service on the board.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 72, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 202, § 4; P.L. 2003, ch. 426, § 4; P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 21, § 24; P.L. 2010, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 249, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 482, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 496, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2003 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2003 amendment.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 482, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 496, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-3. Powers and duties.

  1. The department of labor and training is the agency with responsibility and accountability for apprenticeship within Rhode Island for federal purposes. The council shall be a regulatory council and part of the department of labor and training. The council shall promulgate regulations consistent with 29 C.F.R. 29 and 30 at the direction of the director of the department of labor and training and shall provide advice and guidance to the director of the department of labor and training on the operation of the Rhode Island apprenticeship program. Enforcement of apprenticeship rules and regulations shall be the duty of the director of the department of labor and training. In addition, the council shall:
    1. Adopt rules and regulations to insure equality of opportunity in apprenticeship programs pursuant to the Rhode Island state plan for equal opportunity in apprenticeship;
    2. Establish trade, craft, manufacturing, or industrial standards for apprenticeship or training agreements in cooperation with a joint employer and employee groups in conformity with 29 C.F.R. § 29.5;
    3. Establish program performance standards in conformity with 29 C.F.R. § 29.6;
    4. Hold at least four (4) regular public meetings each year; any additional meetings considered necessary shall be held at the call of the chairperson, or at the written request of a majority of the members of the council;
    5. Formulate and publish rules of procedure for the function of local, regional, and state joint apprenticeship committees and for the filling of vacancies on those committees;
    6. Adopt rules and regulations concerning the following:
      1. The contents of apprenticeship agreements in conformity with 29 C.F.R. § 29.7;
      2. Criteria for apprenticeable occupations as provided by 29 C.F.R. § 29.4;
      3. Reciprocal approval for federal purposes to apprentices, apprenticeship programs and standards that are registered in other states by the U.S. department of labor or another state apprenticeship program recognized by the U.S. department of labor if such reciprocity is requested by the apprenticeship program sponsor;
      4. The cancellation and/or deregistration of programs, and for temporary suspension, cancellation, and/or deregistration of apprenticeship agreements as provided in 29 C.F.R. §§ 29.8 and 29.9;
      5. The standards of apprenticeship, program performance standards, apprenticeship agreements, deregistration of registered apprenticeship programs, reinstatement of apprenticeship programs, and reciprocal approval of apprentices from other states.
  2. The department of labor and training in accord with its regulations and this chapter shall:
    1. Encourage the promotion, expansion, and improvement of programs of apprenticeship training and pre-apprenticeship and the making of apprenticeship agreements;
    2. Bring about the settlement of differences arising out of an apprenticeship agreement when those differences cannot be adjusted locally or in accordance with established trade procedure;
    3. Supervise the execution of agreements and maintenance of standards;
    4. Register or terminate or cancel the registration of apprenticeship programs and apprenticeship agreements;
    5. Issue certificates of completion of apprenticeship;
    6. Keep a record of apprenticeship programs and apprentice agreements and their disposition;
    7. Render any assistance and submit any information and data that may be requested by employers, employees, and joint apprenticeship committees engaged in the formulation and operation of programs of apprenticeship, particularly in regard to work schedules, wages, conditions of employment, apprenticeship records, and number of apprentices;
    8. Adopt rules and regulations to insure nondiscrimination in all phases of apprenticeship and employment during apprenticeship;
    9. Register trade, craft, manufacturing, or industrial standards for apprenticeship or training agreements in cooperation with joint employer and employee groups and in conformity with this chapter, or approve and register trade, craft, manufacturing, or industrial standards for agreements submitted which are in conformity with this chapter, and disapprove those standards or agreements submitted which are not in conformity with this chapter, to the extent deemed appropriate;
    10. Establish committees and approve nominations to existing committees which are submitted in conformity with this chapter;
    11. Terminate registration of committees for failure of the committee to abide by the provisions of this chapter; and
    12. Perform any other duties that are described and imposed by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 122, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 128, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 122, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 128, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-4. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 2, effective June 30, 2011.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-45-4 concerned personnel.

28-45-5. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 2, effective June 30, 2011.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-45-5 concerned organization in department of labor and training.

28-45-6. Annual report.

The council shall annually make a report of its activities and progress to the governor; that report shall be contained in the annual report of the department of labor and training.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1.

28-45-7. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 2, effective June 30, 2011.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-45-7 concerned related and supplemental instruction.

28-45-8. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 2, effective June 30, 2011.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-45-8 concerned local, regional, and state joint apprenticeship committees.

28-45-9. Standards of apprenticeship programs.

An apprenticeship program, to be eligible for approval and registration with the department of labor and training, shall conform to regulations issued by the department of labor and training and 29 C.F.R. 29 and 29 C.F.R. 30 and shall conform to the following standards:

  1. The program is an organized, written plan embodying the terms and conditions of employment, training, and supervision of one or more apprentices in the apprenticeable occupation, as defined in this chapter and subscribed to by a sponsor who has undertaken to carry out the apprentice training program.
  2. The program standards contain the equal opportunity pledge prescribed in 29 C.F.R § 30.3(b) and, when applicable, an affirmative action plan in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 30.4, a selection method authorized in 29 C.F.R § 30.5, or similar requirements expressed in a state plan for equal employment opportunity in apprenticeship adopted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Part 30 and approved by the U.S. department of labor, and provisions concerning the following:
    1. The employment and training of the apprentice in a skilled occupation;
    2. A term of apprenticeship not less than two thousand (2,000) hours of work experience, consistent with training requirements as established by industry practice, which for an individual apprentice may be measured either through the completion of the industry standard for on-the-job learning (at least two thousand (2,000) hours) (time-based approach), the attainment of competency (competency-based approach), or a blend of the time-based and competency-based approaches (hybrid approach):
      1. The time-based approach measures skill acquisition through the individual apprentice’s completion of at least two thousand (2,000) hours of on-the-job learning as described in a work process schedule;
      2. The competency-based approach measures skill acquisition through the individual apprentice’s successful demonstration of acquired skills and knowledge, as verified by the program sponsor. Programs utilizing this approach must still require apprentices to complete an on-the-job learning component of registered apprenticeship. The program standards must address how on-the-job learning will be integrated into the program, describe competencies, and identify an appropriate means of testing and evaluation for such competencies;
      3. The hybrid approach measures the individual apprentice’s skill acquisition through a combination of specified minimum number of hours of on-the-job learning and the successful demonstration of competency as described in a work process schedule; and
      4. The determination of the appropriate approach for the program standards is made by the program sponsor, subject to approval by the registration agency of the determination as appropriate to the apprenticeable occupation for which the program standards are registered.
    3. An outline of the work processes in which the apprentice will receive supervised work experience and training on the job, and the allocation of the approximate time to be spent in each major process;
    4. Provision for organized, related, and supplemental instruction in technical subjects related to the trade. A minimum of one hundred forty-four (144) hours for each year of apprenticeship is recommended. This instruction in technical subjects may be accomplished through media, such as classroom, occupational or industry courses, electronic media, or other instruction approved by the department of labor and training; every apprenticeship instructor must:
      1. Meet the Rhode Island department of elementary and secondary education requirements for a vocational-technical instructor, or be a subject matter expert, which is an individual, such as a journey worker, who is recognized within an industry as having expertise in a specific occupation; and
      2. Have training in teaching techniques and adult learning styles, which may occur before or after the apprenticeship instructor has started to provide the related technical instruction.
    5. A statement of the progressively increasing scale of wages to be paid the apprentice consistent with the skill acquired, the entry wage to be not less than the minimum wage prescribed by the federal and state labor standards act, where applicable, unless a higher wage is required by other applicable federal law, state law, respective regulations, or by collective bargaining agreement;
    6. A provision for periodic review and evaluation of the apprentice’s progress in job performance and related instruction, and the maintenance of appropriate progress records;
    7. The numeric ratio of apprentices to journeypersons consistent with proper supervision, training, safety, and continuity of employment, and applicable provisions in collective bargaining agreements, except where the ratios are expressly prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement. The ratio language shall be specific and clear as to application in terms of jobsite, work force, department or plant;
    8. A probationary period reasonable in relation to the full apprenticeship term, with full credit given for the period toward completion of apprenticeship the probationary period shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the length of the program or one year, whichever is shorter;
    9. Adequate and safe equipment and facilities for training and supervision, and safety training for apprentices on the job and in related instruction;
    10. The minimum qualifications required by a sponsor for persons entering the apprenticeship program, with an eligible starting age not less than sixteen (16) years;
    11. The placement of an apprentice under a written apprenticeship agreement that conforms to the requirements of this chapter. The agreement shall directly, or by reference, incorporate the standards of the program as part of the agreement;
    12. The granting of advanced standing or credit for demonstrated competency previously acquired experience, training, or skills for all applicants equally, with commensurate wages for any progression step so granted;
    13. The transfer of an apprentice between apprenticeship programs and within an apprenticeship program must be based on agreement between the apprentice and the affected apprenticeship committees or program sponsors, and must comply with the following requirements:
      1. The transferring apprentice must be provided a transcript of related instruction and on-the-job learning by the committee or program sponsor;
      2. Transfer must be to the same occupation; and
      3. A new apprenticeship agreement must be executed when the transfer occurs between program sponsors.
    14. Assurance of qualified training personnel and adequate supervision on the job;
    15. Recognition for successful completion of apprenticeship evidenced by an appropriate certificate issued by the department of labor and training;
    16. Program standards that utilize the competency-based or hybrid approach for progression through an apprenticeship and that choose to issue interim credentials must clearly identify the interim credentials, demonstrate how these credentials link to the components of the apprenticeable occupation, and establish the process for assessing an individual apprentice’s demonstration of competency associated with the particular interim credential; further, interim credentials must only be issued for recognized components of an apprenticeable occupation, thereby linking interim credentials specifically to the knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with those components of the apprenticeable occupation.
    17. Identification of the department of labor and training as the registration agency;
    18. Provision for the registration, cancellation, and deregistration of the program, and requirement for the prompt submission of any modification or amendment to the department of labor and training for approval;
    19. Provision for registration of apprenticeship agreements, modifications, and amendments; notice to the department of labor and training of persons who have successfully completed apprenticeship programs; and notice of transfers, cancellations, suspensions, and terminations of apprenticeship agreements and a statement of the reasons therefore;
    20. Authority for the cancellation of an apprenticeship agreement during the probationary period by either party without stated cause. Cancellation during the probationary period will not have an adverse impact on the sponsor’s completion rate;
    21. Compliance with 29 C.F.R. 30, including the equal opportunity pledge prescribed in 29 C.F.R. § 30.3(b); an affirmative action plan complying with 29 C.F.R. § 30.4; and a method for the selection of apprentices authorized by 29 C.F.R § 30.5, or compliance with parallel requirements contained in a state plan for equal opportunity in apprenticeship adopted under 29 C.F.R. part 30 and approved by the department. The apprenticeship standards must also include a statement that the program will be conducted, operated and administered in conformity with applicable provisions of 29 C.F.R. part 30, as amended, or if applicable, an approved state plan for equal opportunity in apprenticeship;
    22. Name and address, telephone number and e-mail address (if applicable) of the appropriate authority under the program to receive, process, and make disposition of complaints;
    23. Recording and maintenance of all records concerning apprenticeship as may be required by the office of apprenticeship or the department of labor and training and other applicable law.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-9.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 72, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 97; P.L. 1998, ch. 387, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 10; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 4, effective July 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-45-9.1 concerned apprenticeship programs and fees.

28-45-9.2. Military service apprenticeship qualifications.

  1. Any person, after having been honorably discharged from military service or having been transferred to reserve status or the national guard after active military service, and whose military occupational specialty provided them with the requisite classroom and workplace training as required by the Rhode Island general laws, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to the Rhode Island general laws, shall be eligible to use that classroom and workplace training to fulfill the requirements for apprentices and/or journeypersons for the following skilled trades:
    1. Electricians, as defined in § 5-6-1 et seq.;
    2. Blasters, as defined in § 23-28.28-31 et seq.;
    3. Plumbers and Irrigators, as defined in § 5-20-1 et seq.;
    4. Hoisting Engineers, as defined in § 28-26-1 et seq.; and
    5. Mechanical Trades, as defined in § 28-27-1 et seq.
  2. Persons meeting any requirements through military service as described in subsection (a) remain subject to licensing fees and examinations for the desired trade license.
  3. To the extent that any provisions contained in this section conflict with the requirements for federal-aid contracts, federal law and regulations shall control.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 421, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 445, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 421, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 445, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-45-10. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Apprenticeship agreement” means a written agreement complying with 29 C.F.R. § 29.7 between an apprentice and either the apprenticeship program sponsor, or an apprenticeship committee acting as agent for the program sponsor(s), which contains the terms and conditions of the employment and training of the apprentice.
  2. “Apprenticeable occupation” which possesses all of the following characteristics:
    1. It is customarily learned in a practical way through a structured, systematic program of on the job supervised learning.
    2. It is clearly identified and commonly recognized throughout an industry.
    3. It involves the progressive attainment of manual, mechanical, or technical skills and knowledge, which is in accordance with the industry standard for the occupation, that requires the completion of at least a minimum of two thousand (2,000) hours of on the job learning to attain experience.
    4. It requires related instruction to supplement the on the job learning.
  3. “Council” means the apprenticeship council as established by § 28-45-2 .
  4. “OA” means office of apprenticeship, U.S. department of labor.
  5. “Secretary” means secretary of the U.S. department of labor.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-11. Applicability of chapter.

The provisions of this chapter shall apply to a firm, person, corporation, or organization of employees or an association of employers only after that person, firm, corporation, or organization of employees or association of employers has voluntarily elected to conform to its provisions.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1.

28-45-12, 28-45-12.1. [Repealed.]

Repealed Sections.

Former § 28-45-12 (P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1), concerning appropriations, was repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 72, § 1, effective July 1, 1992.

Former § 28-45-12.1 (P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 72, § 2), concerning a restricted receipts account, was repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 169, effective July 1, 1995.

28-45-13. Standards of apprenticeship agreements.

All apprenticeship agreements submitted for approval and registration with the department of labor and training shall contain explicitly or by reference standards adopted by the council, including:

  1. Names and signatures of the contracting parties (apprentice and the program sponsor or employer), and the signature of a parent or guardian if the apprentice is a minor.
  2. The date of birth of apprentice and on a voluntary basis the social security number of the apprentice.
  3. Name and address of the program sponsor and the registration agency.
  4. A statement of the occupation, trade or craft in which the apprentice is to be trained, and the beginning date and term (duration) of apprenticeship.
  5. A statement showing:
    1. The number of hours to be spent by the apprentice in work on the job in a time-based program or a description of the skill sets to be attained by completion of a competency-based program, including the on-the-job learning component; or the minimum number of hours to be spent by the apprentice and a description of the skill sets to be attained by completion of a hybrid program.
    2. The number of hours to be spent in related and supplemental instruction in technical subjects related to the occupation which is recommended to be not less than one hundred forty-four (144) hours per year.
  6. A statement setting forth a schedule of the work processes in the occupation or industry divisions in which the apprentice is to be trained and the approximate time to be spent at each process.
  7. A statement of the graduated scale of wages to be paid the apprentice and whether or not the required related instruction shall be compensated.
  8. Statements providing:
    1. For a specific period of probation during which time the apprenticeship agreement may be terminated by either party to the agreement upon written notice to the department of labor and training, without adverse impact on the sponsor; and
    2. That, after the probationary period, the agreement may be cancelled at the request of the apprentice, or may be suspended, or terminated by the sponsor, for good cause, with due notice to the apprentice and a reasonable opportunity for corrective action, and with written notice to the apprentice and to the department of labor and training of the final action taken.
  9. A reference incorporating as part of the agreement the standards of the apprenticeship program as it exists on the date of the agreement and as it may be amended during the period of the agreement.
  10. A statement that the apprentice will be accorded equal opportunity in all phases of apprenticeship employment, and training, without discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.
  11. Name and address, phone and e-mail (if applicable) of the appropriate authority, if any, designated under the program to receive, process and make disposition of controversies or differences arising out of the apprenticeship agreement when the controversies or differences cannot be adjusted locally or resolved in accordance with the established procedure or applicable collective bargaining provisions.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 133, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 28-45-9 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-13.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 72, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 292, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 387, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 65, art. 13, § 10; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 302, art. 13, § 4, effective July 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 28-45-13.1 concerned apprenticeship registration and fees.

28-45-14. State EEO plan.

The apprenticeship program shall operate in conformance with state law, including the EEO standards and regulations.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 2.

28-45-15. Deregistration of program.

  1. Deregistration of a program may be effected upon the voluntary action of the sponsor by a request for cancellation of the registration, or upon reasonable cause, by the department of labor and training  instituting formal deregistration proceedings in accordance with provisions of 29 C.F.R. 7.
  2. The department of labor and training may cancel the registration of an apprenticeship program by written acknowledgment of such request stating the following:
    1. The registration is canceled at sponsor’s request, and effective date thereof;
    2. That, within fifteen (15) days of the date of the acknowledgment, the sponsor shall notify all apprentices of such cancellation and the effective date; that such cancellation automatically deprives the apprentice of his/her individual registration; and that the deregistration of the program removes the apprentice from coverage for federal purposes which require the secretary of the U.S. department of labor’s approval of an apprenticeship program.
  3. The department of labor and training shall conduct formal deregistration proceedings as follows:
    1. Deregistration proceedings may be undertaken when the apprenticeship program is not conducted, operated, and administered in accordance with the registered provisions or the requirements of this chapter, except that deregistration proceedings for violation of equal opportunity requirements shall be processed in accordance with the provisions under 29 C.F.R. part 30, as amended;
    2. Where it appears the program is not being operated in accordance with the registered standards or with the requirements of this chapter, the department of labor and training shall so notify the program sponsor in writing;
    3. Notice to the sponsor must contain the following elements:
      1. Be sent by registered or certified mail, with return receipt requested;
      2. State the shortcoming(s) and the remedy required; and
      3. State that a determination of reasonable cause for deregistration will be made unless corrective action is effected within thirty (30) days.
  4. Upon request by the sponsor for good cause, the thirty (30) day term may be extended for another thirty (30) days. During the period for correction, the sponsor shall be assisted in every reasonable way to achieve conformity;

    If the required correction is not effected within the allotted time, the department of labor and training shall send a notice to the sponsor, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, stating the following:

    1. The notice is sent pursuant to this subsection;
    2. Certain deficiencies (stating them) were called to the sponsor’s attention and remedial measures requested, with dates of such occasions and letters; and that the sponsor has failed or refused to effect correction;
    3. Based upon the stated deficiencies and failure of remedy, a determination of reasonable cause has been made and the program may be deregistered unless, within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of this notice, the sponsor requests a hearing;
    4. If a request for a hearing is not made, the entire matter may be decided by the department of labor and training.

      (f) If the sponsor requests a hearing, the department of labor and training shall transmit to the U.S. department of labor, administrator, OA, a report containing all pertinent facts and circumstances concerning the nonconformity, including the findings and recommendation for deregistration, and copies of all relevant documents and records. Statements concerning interviews, meetings and conferences shall include the time, date, place, and persons present. The administrator shall make a final order on the basis of the record before him. The administrator will refer the matter to the office of administrative law judges. An administrative law judge will convene a hearing in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 29.10, and issue a decision as required in 29 C.F.R. § 29.10(c).

      (g) At his/her discretion, the secretary may allow the sponsor a reasonable time to achieve voluntary corrective action. If the secretary’s decision is that the apprenticeship program is not operating in accordance with the registered provisions or requirements of this part, the apprenticeship program shall be deregistered. In each case in which reregistration is ordered, the secretary shall make public notice of the order and shall notify the sponsor.

      (h) Every order of deregistration shall contain a provision that the sponsor shall, within fifteen (15) days of the effective date of the order, notify all registered apprentices of the deregistration apprentice or his/her individual registration; and that the deregistration removes the apprentice from coverage for federal purposes which require the secretary of labor’s approval of an apprenticeship program.

  5. (i) Any apprenticeship program deregistered pursuant to this part may be reinstated upon presentation of adequate evidence that the apprenticeship program is operating in accordance with this part. Such evidence shall be presented to the administrator, OA, if the sponsor had not requested a hearing, or to the secretary, if an order of deregistration was entered pursuant to a hearing.
  6. Within ten (10) days of his/her receipt of a request for a hearing, the administrator of apprenticeship must contact the department of labor’s office of administrative law judges to request a designation of an administrative law judge to preside over the hearing. The administrative law judge shall give reasonable notice of such hearing by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate sponsor. Such notice shall include:
    1. A reasonable time and place of hearing;
    2. A statement of the provisions of this part pursuant to which the hearing is to be held; and
    3. A concise statement of the matters pursuant to which the action forming the basis of the hearing is proposed to be taken.
  7. The administrative law judge shall regulate the course of the hearing. Hearings shall be informally conducted. Every party shall have the right to counsel, and a fair opportunity to present his/her case, including such cross-examination as may be appropriate in the circumstances. Administrative law judges shall make their proposed findings and recommended decisions to the secretary upon the basis of the record before him.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-16. Reciprocity.

  1. When a sponsor of an apprenticeship program which is registered and operating in a neighboring state requests registration from the department of labor and training to train apprentices for work projects in this state, the sponsor shall be granted registration providing the sponsor conforms with the regulations and standards of the state of Rhode Island.
  2. An apprentice registered in an approved registered apprenticeship program in a neighboring state will be awarded certification of registration for state purposes upon request and on the condition that the neighboring state’s sponsorship program is registered with the appropriate state apprentice agency.
  3. The department of labor and training shall have the authority to expand or limit the number of states that are subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section by regulation through the promulgation of rules and regulations.
  4. The department of labor and training shall accord reciprocal approval for federal purposes to apprentices, apprenticeship programs and standards that are registered in other states by the U.S. department of labor or a registration agency recognized by the U.S. department of labor if such reciprocity is requested by the apprenticeship program sponsor; program sponsors seeking reciprocal approval must meet Rhode Island wage and hour provisions and apprentice ratio standards.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 387, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-17. Union participation.

Under a program proposed for registration by an employer or employers’ association, and where the standards, collective bargaining agreement, or other instrument provides for participation by a union in any manner in the operation of the substantive matters of the apprenticeship program, and that participation is exercised, written acknowledgement of union agreement or “no objection” to the registration is required. Where no participation is evidenced and practiced, the employer or employers’ association shall simultaneously furnish to the union, if any, which is the collective bargaining agent of the employees to be trained, a copy of its application for registration and of the apprenticeship program. The department of labor and training shall provide a reasonable time period of not less than thirty (30) days nor more than forty-five (45) days for receipt of union comments, if any, before final action on the application for registration and/or approval.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 75, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-45-18. Vocational school training.

  1. The board of regents for elementary and secondary education may authorize vocational schools to provide apprenticeship classroom training to students subject to the approval of the Rhode Island department of labor and training.
  2. In the event the board of regents authorizes state-certified apprenticeship training under subsection (a), and a student successfully completes the vocational school program, then the student shall receive apprentice credit, to be applied against a state-certified apprenticeship program requirement set forth by the state apprenticeship council pursuant to § 28-45-13 , for one hundred forty-four (144) hours of apprenticeship classroom training.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 291, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 413, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 164, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 179, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Chapter 46 Private Nonvested Pension Benefits

28-46-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Private Non-vested Pension Benefits Protection Tax Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Accrued portion of the normal retirement benefit” means the amount of benefit credited by the employer to the account of an employee participating in a pension plan, or where there is no credit, that portion of the normal retirement benefit to which the director determines actuarially the employee should be entitled based on the covered service of the employee, as of the date of termination of employment.
  2. “Ceases to operate a place of employment” means either the complete termination of operations at a place of employment or a substantial reduction in the number of employees at a place of employment as part of a plan or in connection with an intent to move the business operations at that place of employment outside of the state. Substantial fluctuations in the number of employees of an employer whose business is of a seasonal nature shall not be deemed to be a ceasing to operate a place of employment except to the extent that a substantial reduction in the number of employees of the employer is attributable to a plan or intention to move the business operations of the employer outside of the state. When an employer ceases to operate a place of employment but offers to retain all of the employees at another location within the state, this chapter shall not apply.
  3. “Covered service” means periods of employment with an employer which are recognized under the terms of the employer’s pension plan for the purposes of determining an employee’s eligibility to receive benefits under the plan or the amount of those benefits.
  4. “Director” means the director of labor and training.
  5. “Employee” means any person employed at the place of employment during the year prior to the date when the employer ceases to operate the place of employment.
  6. “Employer” means any person, firm, or corporation who employs ten (10) or more people within this state at any time within one year prior to the date that it ceases to operate a place of employment.
  7. “Non-vested pension benefit” means the accrued portion of the normal retirement benefit of an employee participating in a pension plan to which the employee does not have a vested right.
  8. “Normal retirement benefit” means that benefit payable under a pension plan in the event of retirement at the normal retirement age as prescribed by the plan.
  9. “Pension plan” means any plan, fund, or program established, maintained, or entered into by an employer for the purpose of providing for its employees, or their beneficiaries, retirement benefits.
  10. “Place of employment” means any location within this state at which ten (10) or more persons are employed at any time within one year prior to the date that the employer ceases to operate at that location.
  11. “Vested right” means a non-forfeitable, legal right obtained by an employee participating in a pension plan to that part of an immediate or deferred pension benefit which arises from the employee’s covered service under the plan and is no longer contingent on the employee remaining covered under the plan.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-3. Employer tax.

There is assessed upon every employer who ceases to operate a place of employment within this state a tax which shall be equal to the total amount of non-vested pension benefits of those employees of the employer who have completed fifteen (15) years of covered service under the pension plan of the employer and whose employment was or will be terminated because of the employer’s ceasing to operate a place of employment within this state, and, whose non-vested pension benefits have been or will be forfeited because of that termination of employment, less the amount of those non-vested pension benefits which are compromised or settled to the satisfaction of the director as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-4. Employer’s notice of intent to cease operations.

Any employer who intends to cease to operate a place of employment within this state shall notify the director of that intention not later than six (6) months prior to the date the employer intends to cease to operate its place of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-5. Investigation by director.

Upon receipt of notification, or upon his or her own initiative when that notification is not given as required, the director shall cause an investigation to be made of the employer to determine the number of employees who have completed fifteen (15) years of covered service under the pension plan of the employer and whose employment was or will be terminated because of the employer’s ceasing to operate a place of employment within this state, and whose non-vested pension benefits have been or will be forfeited by that termination of employment, the amounts of any non-vested pension benefits, if any, of those employees, and any other facts or circumstances concerning the employer, the employees, and the pension plan for those employees as may be necessary or useful to the director to carry out his or her duties and responsibilities under this chapter. The investigation, insofar as practicable, shall be conducted at the employer’s place of employment during normal business hours. The employer shall cooperate fully with the director in that investigation, and shall make available to him or her any books, records, or other information necessary or useful to that investigation. To aid in those investigations, the director is authorized to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, records, or other documents. The director may seek, through the attorney general acting on his or her behalf, orders from any court of competent jurisdiction to compel an employer to comply with the provisions of this chapter and to punish disobedience of any subpoena issued pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-6. Compromising non-vested pension benefits.

  1. As part of the investigation of an employer, the director shall determine the amount of non-vested pension benefits which have been compromised or settled to his or her satisfaction.
  2. Non-vested pension benefits may be compromised or settled by:
    1. Agreement between the employer and employee which is mutually understood by both parties to be a complete and final satisfaction of those benefits; or
    2. A provision in a collective bargaining agreement to which both the employer and employee are a party concerning the disposition of pension benefits in case the employer ceases to operate a place of employment or providing a benefit to the employee contingent upon the employer ceasing to operate a place of employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-7. Tax liability and lien.

After the investigation of the employer, the director shall certify to the tax administrator the total amount of non-vested pension benefits that are includable in determining an employer’s tax liability under this chapter and the amount of those benefits which have been compromised or settled to the satisfaction of the commissioner. The tax administrator shall determine the amount of an employer’s tax liability under this chapter and shall notify the employer of the amount of the tax. The tax shall be due and payable to the tax administrator on the date that the employer ceases to operate its place of employment and shall be a lien upon all of the employer’s assets within this state. If the tax is not paid when due, the employer shall be liable for interest on the amount due at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum until the tax and interest are paid.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-8. Employee claims.

The director shall maintain a separate record of each employee of an employer taxed under this chapter who had completed fifteen (15) years of covered service under the pension plan of the employer and whose employment was terminated because of the employer’s ceasing to operate a place of employment within this state and whose non-vested pension benefits were forfeited by that termination of employment and were not compromised or settled. Each employee shall be entitled to make a claim, in the form and manner prescribed by the director, for an immediate payment of the current value of his or her non-vested pension benefits or a deferred pension benefit, and to receive that payment or benefit in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-9. Termination of employees.

For the purposes of this chapter, the employment of any employee terminated within one year, or within any longer period as prescribed by the director when he or she determines that an employer is attempting to evade the provisions of this chapter, of the date an employer ceases to operate a place of employment within this state shall be deemed to have been terminated because of the employer’s ceasing to operate its place of employment, unless the employer can conclusively show that the termination was attributable to some other cause.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-10. Rules and regulations of director.

The director may promulgate rules and regulations to provide for the efficient administration of the provisions of this chapter applicable to him or her, or to clarify those provisions as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter. The director may use the facilities and personnel of the department of labor and training and any appropriations available to carry out his or her duties and responsibilities under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-11. Rules and regulations of the tax administrator.

The tax administrator is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the assessment and collection of the tax imposed by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

28-46-12. Funds not to be attached.

The funds of any employer which are set aside or reserved for benefits under a pension plan of the employer to which employees have a vested right shall not be liable to be seized or taken by virtue of any execution or civil process whatever, issued out of any court of this state, for the collection of the tax imposed by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 295, § 1.

Chapter 47 Workers’ Compensation — Group Self-Insurance

28-47-1. Definitions.

  1. As used in this chapter the term “employers” shall include:
    1. Employers with related activity in a given industry employing persons who perform work in connection with the given industry;
    2. An incorporated or unincorporated association or associations consisting exclusively of those employers provided they employ persons who perform that related work in the given industry; and
    3. A combination of employers as described in subdivision (1) of this subsection and an association or associations of employers as described in subdivision (2) of this subsection.
  2. The “director” is the director of the department of business regulation.
  3. “Employee leasing company” means a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation or other form of business entity whose business consists largely of providing workers to one or more client companies by means of employee leasing arrangements.
  4. “Group self-insurance” as used in this chapter, shall be deemed to be the system of securing compensation as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 299, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment redesignated subsections (c) and (d).

28-47-2. Adoption of plan of group self-insurance.

Any group consisting exclusively of employers may adopt a plan for group self-insurance, as a group, for the payment of compensation under this chapter to their employees. Under that plan the group shall assume the liability of all the employers within the group and pay all compensation for which those employers are liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding the previous provisions, the members of a group self-insurer shall be jointly and severally liable for all of the obligations of the group self-insurer incurred during the period of membership. Where that plan is adopted the group shall furnish satisfactory proof to the director of its financial ability to pay that compensation for the employers in the industry covered by it, its revenues, their source, and assurance of continuance. The director shall require the filing of a bond of a surety company authorized to transact business in the state, trust fund, or other adequate security, in an amount to be determined by the director to secure its liability to pay the compensation of each employer as above provided in accordance with the provisions of § 28-47-10 . That surety bond, trust fund, or security must be approved as to form by the director. The director may also require that any and all agreements, contracts, and other pertinent documents relating to the organization of the employers in the group be filed with him or her at the time the application for group self-insurance is made. That application shall be on a form prescribed by the director. The director shall have the authority to deny the application of the group to pay the compensation or to revoke his or her consent furnished under this section at any time for good cause shown. The director shall have the authority to deny the application of the group or to revoke his or her consent furnished under this section at any time if he or she is not satisfied that the group can provide adequate claims and loss prevention services to each employer in the group either by the staff of the group or through contractual arrangements with a service company competent to provide that claim and loss prevention services. The group qualifying under this section shall be known as a group self-insurer.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art 3, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 299, § 1.

28-47-3. Notice to group — Jurisdiction — Insolvency — Termination.

An employer participating in group self-insurance shall not be relieved from the liability for compensation prescribed by chapters 29 — 38 of this title except by the payment of the compensation by the group self-insurer or by itself. As between the employee and the group self-insurer, notice to or knowledge of the occurrence of the injury on the part of the employer shall be deemed notice or knowledge, as the case may be, on the part of the group self-insurer. Jurisdiction of the employer shall, for the purpose of this chapter, be jurisdiction of the group self-insurer, and that group self-insurer shall in all things be bound by and subject to the orders, findings, decisions, or awards rendered against the participating employer for the payment of compensation under the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title. The insolvency or bankruptcy of a participating employer shall not relieve the group self-insurer from the payment of compensation for injuries or death sustained by an employee during the time the employer was a participant in the group self-insurance. The group self-insurer shall promptly notify the director, on a prescribed form, of the addition of any participating employer or employers. Notice of termination of a participating employer shall not be effective until at least ten (10) days after notice of that termination, on a prescribed form, has been either filed in the office of the director or sent by certified or registered letter, return receipt requested, and also served in like manner upon the employer.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1.

28-47-4. Identifying information.

Each group self-insurer, in its application for group self-insurance, shall set forth the names and addresses of each of its officers, directors, trustees, and general manager. Notice of any change in the officers, directors, trustees, or general manager shall be given to the director within ten (10) days of the change. No officer, director, trustee, or employee of the group self-insurer may represent or participate directly or indirectly on behalf of an injured worker or his or her dependents in any workers’ compensation proceeding. All employees of employers participating in group self-insurance are deemed to be included under the group self-insurance plan.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1.

28-47-5. Termination of group.

If for any reason, the status of a group self-insurer under this chapter is terminated, the surety bond on deposit, trust fund, or other security referred to in § 28-47-2 shall remain in the custody of the director for a period of at least twenty-six (26) months. At the expiration of any time or any further period that the director may deem proper and warranted, he or she may accept in lieu of the bond, and for the additional purpose of securing that further and future contingent liability as may arise from prior injuries to workers and be incurred by reason of any change in the condition of those workers warranting the workers’ compensation court making subsequent awards for payment of additional compensation, a policy of insurance furnished by the group self-insurer, its successors or assigns, or others carrying on or liquidating that self-insurance group. That policy shall be in a form approved by the director and issued by any insurance company licensed to issue this class of insurance in this state. It shall only be issued for a single complete premium payment in advance by the group self-insurer. It shall be given in an amount to be determined by the director and when issued shall not be subject to cancellation for any cause during the continuance of the liability secured and so covered.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 299, § 1.

28-47-6. Rules and regulations.

The director shall promulgate the rules and regulations that may be required to carry out the provisions of this chapter, including, without limitation, rules and regulations pertaining to contracts of group insurance and excess group insurance with retentions and limits to be prescribed.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1.

28-47-7. Classification of group self-insurers.

  1. The director shall administer all matters relating to group self-insurance under this chapter.
  2. The director shall assign each group self-insurer, qualified under this chapter to one of the following groups:
    1. Manufacturing and trade;
    2. Transportation, public utilities, and construction;
    3. Service industry;
    4. Hospitals licensed under the provisions of the health care facility licensing act of Rhode Island which are subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title, and non-business corporations not including educational institutions to which the provisions of chapter 6 of title 7 apply which are subject to the provisions of chapters 29 — 38 of this title and which are operated for the benefit of and in connection with any one or more of the hospitals;
    5. Miscellaneous.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1.

28-47-8. Advisory committee for group self-insurance.

  1. To advise the director, there shall be an advisory committee for group self-insurance which shall consist of seven (7) members appointed by the governor: (1) one of those members shall be named from the manufacturing and trade group of group self-insurance; (2) two (2) from the transportation, public utilities and construction group; (3) two (2) from the services industry; (4) one from health care facilities; and, (5) one member shall be a group self-insurer selected at large by the governor, who shall be vice-chairperson of the advisory committee. The director or his or her designee shall be an additional member of the advisory committee and act as chairperson of the committee. Any member appointed to the advisory committee shall be a group self-insurer or an officer of a group self-insurer or a person who on account of his or her employment or affiliation can be classed as a management representative of a group self-insurer.
  2. The members of the advisory committee for group self-insurance shall be appointed for terms of three (3) years. Vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment by the governor. Members shall continue in office until their successors are appointed. In the event that no appointment is made within three (3) months after a vacancy exists or after the expiration of the term of a member, the remaining members may fill the vacancy by a majority vote. If a member is absent from two (2) consecutive regular meetings without adequate excuse his or her place may be declared vacant by the director.
  3. Members of the advisory committee shall serve without pay, but are entitled to their reasonable and necessary traveling and other expenses incurred in connection with their duties.
  4. Regular meetings of the advisory committee shall be held twice a year on the dates to be fixed by the director. In addition, special meetings shall be held if called by the director or any three (3) members of the committee.
  5. The advisory committee shall have access to all group self-insurance records and shall have the power to require the presence before it of any employee or any group self-insurer. Information obtained by members of the advisory committee shall be deemed confidential unless disclosed by order of the committee.
  6. It shall be the duty of the advisory committee to advise the director on all matters relating to group self-insurance, particularly in respect to rules governing group self-insurance, the deposit or withdrawal of securities, and on such other matters as the director shall request.
  7. The director shall detail to the advisory committee any stenographic or other assistance that may be necessary.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

28-47-9. Audit of group self-insurance.

The director annually, as soon as practicable after April first in each succeeding year, shall ascertain the total amount of expenses, including in addition to the direct costs of personal services, the cost of maintenance and operation, the cost of retirement contributions made and workers’ compensation premiums paid by the state for or on account of personnel, rentals for space occupied in state owned or state leased buildings, and all other direct or indirect costs incurred by the department of business regulation during the preceding calendar year in carrying out the provisions of this chapter. Those expenses shall be assessed against all group self-insurers including for this purpose employers who have ceased to exercise the privilege of group self-insurance but have filed a surety bond, trust fund, or other security. The basis of apportionment of the assessment against each group shall be that proportion of those expenses, excluding any expenses associated with a disbanded group, that the written premium or equivalent premium of each group self-insurer at the close of the preceding calendar year bears to the total premium for all group self-insurers. The department may assess any disbanded group based upon the actual expenses incurred by the department for such group in the preceding fiscal year. For the purpose of this assessment, a “disbanded group” means a group in run-off. All those assessments when collected shall be paid to and for the use of the insurance division of the department of business regulation.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 83, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 53, § 1.

28-47-10. Surety bonds or other security.

For the purpose of this chapter, the amount of surety bond, trust fund, or other adequate security required for group self-insurance plans shall be determined by the director by rule or regulation. If the director requires the group self-insurer to provide security other than a surety bond, the security that the director requires shall reside in Rhode Island and shall be in the form the director requires.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 299, § 1.

28-47-11. Assessment against group self-insurers.

  1. Whenever the director determines that the compensation and benefits provided by this chapter may be unpaid by reason of the default of an insolvent group self-insurance plan, and the penal sum of the surety bond, trust fund, or other security is about to become exhausted, the director shall levy an assessment against all self-insured employers in that group self-insurance plan to assure prompt payment of that compensation and benefits.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, in the event that an employee leasing firm approved under this chapter does not pay the compensation and benefits provided by this chapter by reason of insolvency, and the penal sum of the surety or other security is about to become exhausted, the director shall levy an assessment against all client companies of the employee leasing firm to assure prompt payment of the compensation and benefits.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 299, § 1.

28-47-12. Premium taxes and assessments.

Each group self-insurer, except any group self-insurer composed of the state, municipal governments, governmental authorities of the state or municipalities, or quasi-municipal subdivisions of the state or municipalities, shall pay premium taxes as close as practicable on the same basis as insurers as provided in chapter 17 of title 44. Each group self-insurer shall pay assessments for the workers’ compensation administrative fund pursuant to chapter 37 of this title on the same basis as is practicable as an insurer.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. 3, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 8; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 9.

28-47-13. Reinsurance.

No group may operate as a self-insurer without maintaining both specific and aggregate reinsurance and/or excess insurance in a form and with monetary limits approved by the director and from a reinsurer and/or insurer approved by the director.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 133, § 1.

28-47-14. Form of entity of group self-insurer.

A group self-insurer may constitute itself as any form of legal entity, including, but not limited to, a profit or nonprofit corporation or a partnership. That entity shall not be considered to be carrying on the business of insurance pursuant to § 7-1-5 and shall not be subject to the provisions of title 27.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 133, § 1.

28-47-15. Employee leasing company self-insurance.

An employee leasing company that wishes to self-insure without becoming a member of a group of employers shall be subject to this chapter and may adopt a plan of self-insurance and make application to the director for its approval and, for the purpose of this chapter, the employee leasing company shall be considered the group self-insurer. Provided, that the director shall have the authority to exempt any employee leasing company from the provisions of this chapter as he or she deems reasonable. Nothing in this section shall prevent more than one employee leasing company from making an application to become a group self-insurer under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 299, § 1.

Chapter 48 Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act

28-48-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the following words and terms have the following meanings:

  1. “Director” means the director of the department of labor and training.
  2. “Employee” means any full-time employee who works an average of thirty (30) or more hours per week.
  3. “Employer” means and includes:
    1. any person, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or other business entity that employs fifty (50) or more employees,
    2. the state of Rhode Island, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and any state department or agency that employs any employees,
    3. any city or town or municipal agency that employs thirty (30) or more employees, and
    4. any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer.
  4. “Family leave” means leave by reason of the serious illness of a family member.
  5. “Family member” means a parent, spouse, child, mother-in-law, father-in-law, or the employee himself or herself, and with respect to employees of the state as defined in subsection (3)(ii), shall include domestic partners as defined in § 36-12-1(3) .
  6. “Parental leave” means leave by reason of the birth of a child of an employee or the placement of a child sixteen (16) years of age or less with an employee in connection with the adoption of the child by the employee.
  7. “Serious illness” means a disabling physical or mental illness, injury, impairment, or condition that involves inpatient care in a hospital, a nursing home, or a hospice, or outpatient care requiring continuing treatment or supervision by a healthcare provider.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 380, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 316, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 189, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 316, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Serious Illness.

An employee who was allegedly allowed to begin medical leave and later was told that leave was denied stated a claim under the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-1 et seq. The complaint, although very bare-bones, set forth sufficient factual allegations to make out a claim under the RIFMLA due to the employee’s serious illness, as defined in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-1 (7), in the form of anxiety and depression. Kelly v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79283 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2008).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state family-, parental-, or medical leave acts. 57 A.L.R.5th 477.

Who is eligible employee under § 101(2) of Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)). 166 A.L.R. Fed. 569.

28-48-2. Parental leave and family leave requirement.

  1. Every employee who has been employed by the same employer for twelve (12) consecutive months shall be entitled, upon advance notice to his or her employer, to thirteen (13) consecutive work weeks of parental leave or family leave in any two (2) calendar years. The employee shall give at least thirty (30) days notice of the intended date upon which parental leave or family leave shall commence and terminate, unless prevented by medical emergency from giving the notice. The director shall promulgate regulations governing the form and content of the employee’s notice to the employer.
  2. Parental leave or family leave granted pursuant to this chapter may consist of unpaid leave. If an employer provides paid parental leave or family leave for fewer than thirteen (13) weeks, the additional weeks of leave added to attain the total of thirteen (13) weeks required by subsection (a) of this section may be unpaid.
  3. The employer may request that the employee provide the employer with written certification from a physician caring for the person who is the reason for the employee’s leave, which certification shall specify the probable duration of the employee’s leave.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 380, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Exception to Requirement for Reinstatement.

Where an employee’s heart condition prevented her from performing an essential function of her position, she was not entitled relief under the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act because of her dismissal from a job for which she was no longer qualified. Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hosp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 125, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8468 (D.R.I. 1998), aff'd, 168 F.3d 538, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2877 (1st Cir. 1999).

Notice Inadequate.

Where an employee, who worked at a hospital, was terminated after he left work without notice or explanation for four hours during his shift, the employee’s speculative reference to his bipolar disorder as the cause for his disappearance during the termination meeting was inadequate to have placed the employer on notice of the employee’s need for medical leave under the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act. Martins v. R.I. Hosp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112172 (D.R.I. Aug. 13, 2014).

Collateral References.

Who is eligible employee under § 101(2) of Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)). 166 A.L.R. Fed. 569.

28-48-3. Employment and health benefits protection.

  1. Every employee who exercises his or her right to parental leave or family leave under this chapter shall, upon the expiration of that leave, be entitled to be restored by the employer to the position held by the employee when the leave commenced, or to a position with equivalent seniority, status, employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment, including fringe benefits and service credits that the employee had been entitled to at the commencement of leave.
  2. During any parental leave or family leave taken pursuant to this chapter, the employer shall maintain any existing health benefits of the employee in force for the duration of the leave as if the employee had continued in employment continuously from the date he or she commenced the leave until the date he or she returns to employment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
  3. Prior to commencement of parental leave or family leave, the employee shall pay to the employer a sum equal to the premium required to maintain the employee’s health benefits in force during the period of parental leave. The employer shall return the payment to the employee within ten (10) days following the employee’s return to employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 380, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Money Damages.

When read together, this section, which enumerates the remedies to which an aggrieved employee is entitled, and § 28-48-6 , which specifies the judicial procedures to be followed to enforce those rights, support the premise that an employee is entitled to equitable relief only, and is not entitled to an award of money damages. Reid v. Citizens Sav. Bank/Citizens Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 43, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8027 (D.R.I. 1995).

Restorative Relief Available.

Even though plaintiff did not seek reinstatement following her discharge after returning from maternity leave, and did not make a specific request for “back pay” or “unpaid wages,” her request that the employer “make Plaintiff whole” was sufficient to signify a claim for such restorative relief. Moran v. GTECH Corp., 989 F. Supp. 84, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3257 (D.R.I. 1997).

28-48-4. Effect on existing employment benefits.

  1. The taking of parental leave or family leave pursuant to this chapter shall not result in the loss of any benefit accrued before the date on which the leave commenced.
  2. Except as provided in § 28-48-3(b) , nothing in this chapter shall be construed to entitle any employee who takes parental leave or family leave pursuant to this chapter to any benefit other than benefits to which the employee would have been entitled had he or she not taken the leave.
  3. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect an employer’s obligation to comply with any collective bargaining agreement or employment benefit plan that provides greater parental leave or family leave rights to employees than the rights provided under this chapter.
  4. The parental leave and family leave rights mandated by this chapter shall not be diminished by any collective bargaining agreement or by any employment benefit plan.
  5. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect or diminish the contract rights or seniority status of any other employee of any employer covered by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 380, § 2.

28-48-5. Prohibited acts.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right provided by this chapter.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or in any other manner discriminate against any employee for exercising any right provided by this chapter.
  3. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or in any other manner discriminate against any employee for opposing any practice made unlawful by this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

An employee who was allegedly allowed to begin medical leave and later was told that leave was denied stated a claim under the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-1 et seq. The complaint, although very bare-bones, set forth sufficient factual allegations to make out a claim under the RIFMLA due to the employee’s serious illness, as defined in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-1 (7), in the form of anxiety and depression. Kelly v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79283 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2008).

28-48-6. Judicial enforcement.

A civil action may be brought in the superior court by an employee or by the director against any employer to enforce the provisions of this title or of any order issued by the director pursuant to § 28-48-7 . The court may enjoin any act or practice that violates or may violate any provision of this chapter, and may order any other equitable relief that is necessary and appropriate to redress the violation or to enforce any provision of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Money Damages.

When read together, § 28-48-3 , which enumerates the remedies to which an aggrieved employee is entitled, and this section, which specifies the judicial procedures to be followed to enforce those rights, support the premise that an employee is entitled to equitable relief only, and is not entitled to an award of money damages. Reid v. Citizens Sav. Bank/Citizens Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 43, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8027 (D.R.I. 1995).

Pleadings.

An employee who was allegedly allowed to begin medical leave and later was told that leave was denied stated a claim under the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-1 et seq. The complaint, although very bare-bones, set forth sufficient factual allegations to make out a claim under the RIFMLA due to the employee’s serious illness, as defined in R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-1 (7), in the form of anxiety and depression. Kelly v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79283 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2008).

Restorative Relief Available.

Even though plaintiff did not seek reinstatement following her discharge after returning from maternity leave, and did not make a specific request for “back pay” or “unpaid wages,” her request that the employer “make Plaintiff whole” was sufficient to signify a claim for such restorative relief. Moran v. GTECH Corp., 989 F. Supp. 84, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3257 (D.R.I. 1997).

28-48-7. Enforcement powers of the director.

If, after giving an employer written notice and an opportunity to be heard, the director finds that the employer has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter, the director may issue the orders that he or she deems necessary to protect the rights of any employee. The director shall promulgate the rules and regulations that are necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1.

28-48-8. Civil penalty for violations.

Any employer who violates any provision of this chapter or of any order issued pursuant to § 28-48-7 shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). In the case of a continuing violation, each day’s continuance shall be deemed a separate and distinct offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Payment to Employee.

The plain language of this section does not provide for the payment of the civil penalty to the aggrieved employee, who is limited to equitable relief only. Reid v. Citizens Sav. Bank/Citizens Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 43, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8027 (D.R.I. 1995).

28-48-9. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held to be invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to that end, the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 366, § 1.

28-48-10. Notice.

  1. Each employer shall post and keep posted, in conspicuous places upon its premises where notices to employees and applicants for employment are customarily posted, a notice, to be approved by the agency, setting forth excerpts from, or summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this chapter and information pertaining to the filing of a charge.
  2. Any employer that willfully violates this section shall be assessed a civil money penalty not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100) for each separate offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 380, § 3.

Collateral References.

Adequacy of notice to employer of need for leave under Federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. 184 A.L.R. Fed. 171.

28-48-11. Use of sick leave for adoptive parents.

Any employer who allows sick time or sick leave of an employee to be utilized after the birth of a child shall allow the same time to be used for the placement of a child sixteen (16) years of age or less with an employee in connection with the adoption of the child by the employee.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 202, § 1.

28-48-12. School involvement leave.

  1. An employee who has been employed by the same employer for twelve (12) consecutive months shall be entitled to a total of ten (10) hours of leave during any twelve (12) month period to attend school conferences or other school-related activities for a child of whom the employee is the parent, foster parent or guardian.
  2. The employee must provide twenty-four (24) hours prior notice of the leave and make a reasonable effort to schedule the leave so as not to unduly disrupt the operations of the employer.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the leave be paid; except that under this section, an employee may substitute any accrued paid vacation leave or other appropriate paid leave for any part of the leave.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 186, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Chapter 49 Rhode Island Disaster Service Volunteer Leave Act

28-49-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Disaster Service Volunteer Leave Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 37, § 1.

28-49-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the following words and terms have the following meanings:

  1. “Disaster” means a fire, flood, hurricane, blizzard, tornado, or other such occurrence where the victims cannot recover without assistance. Applicable disasters would be those designated at level II and above in the American National Red Cross regulations and procedures.
  2. “State agency” means any state office, or officer, department, board, commission, institution, bureau, or any agency, division, or unit within any office, department, board, or commission or other state authority.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 37, § 1.

28-49-3. Disaster service voluntary leave.

  1. Any state employee who is a certified disaster volunteer of the American Red Cross may be granted leave work with pay for not more than ten (10) working days each calendar year to participate in specialized disaster relief service for the American Red Cross, upon the request of the American Red Cross through the state office of emergency management. Leave may be taken upon the request of the American Red Cross and upon the approval of the employee’s supervisor, without loss of seniority, pay, vacation leave, compensatory time, personal business leave, sick leave, or earned overtime accumulation. The state agency may compensate an employee granted leave under this section at the employee’s regular rate of pay for those regular work hours during which the employee is absent from work.
  2. An employee deemed to be on leave under this section shall not be deemed to be an employee of the state for purposes of workers compensation. Leave under the chapter shall be granted only for service related to a disaster within the state of Rhode Island. Leave under this chapter shall not be granted for the purpose of obtaining training.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 37, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Chapter 50 The Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act

28-50-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

A discharged government employee did not have a cause of action under this chapter because reporting a violation to a newspaper reporter was not reporting to a public body as defined by § 28-50-2 . Picard v. State, 694 A.2d 754, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 199 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of Whistleblower Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 15 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 315.

What Constitutes Activity of Public or State Employee Protected under State Whistleblower Protection Statute Covering Employee’s “Report,” “Disclosure,” “Notification,” or the Like of Wrongdoing — Nature of Activity Reported. 37 A.L.R.6th 137.

What Constitutes Activity of Private-Sector Employee Protected under State Whistleblower Protection Statute Covering Employee’s “Report,” “Disclosure,” “Notification,” or the Like of Wrongdoing — Nature of Activity Reported. 36 A.L.R.6th 203.

Who are “public employers” or “public employees” within the meaning of state whistleblower protection acts. 90 A.L.R.5th 687.

28-50-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Employee” means a person employed by any employer, and shall include, but not be limited to: at-will employees, contract employees, applicants, prospective employees, and independent contractors.
  2. “Employer” means any person, partnership, association, sole proprietorship, corporation or other business entity, including any department, agency, commission, committee, board, council, bureau, or authority or any subdivision thereof in state or municipal government. One shall employ another if services are performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.
  3. “Person” means an individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, or any other legal entity.
  4. “Public body” means all of the following:
    1. A state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau, board, commission, council, authority, or other body in the executive branch of state government;
    2. An agency, board, commission, council, member, or employee of the legislative branch of state government;
    3. A county, city, town, or regional governing body, a council, school district, or a board, department, commission, agency, or any member or employee of the entity;
    4. Any other body that is created by state or local authority or that is primarily funded by or through state or local authority, or any member or employee of that body;
    5. A law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law enforcement agency;
    6. The judiciary and any member or employee of the judiciary;
    7. Any federal agency.
  5. “Supervisor” means any individual to whom an employer has given the authority to direct and control the work performance of the affected employee or any individual who has the authority to take corrective action regarding the violation of a law, rule, or regulation about which the employee complains.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 329, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 509, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, effective July 13, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1, effective July 13, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Reporting Requirement.

A discharged government employee did not have a cause of action under this chapter because his reporting a violation to a newspaper reporter was not reporting to a public body as defined by this section. Picard v. State, 694 A.2d 754, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 199 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Who are “public employers” or “public employees” within the meaning of state whistleblower protection acts. 90 A.L.R.5th 687.

28-50-3. Protection.

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment nor shall an employer report or threaten to report an employee’s immigration status to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or any other immigration agency or law enforcement agency including local and state police:

  1. Because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report to a public body, verbally or in writing, a violation that the employee knows or reasonably believes has occurred or is about to occur, of a law or regulation or rule promulgated under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States, unless the employee knows or has reason to know that the report is false; or
  2. Because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action; or
  3. Because an employee refuses to violate or assist in violating federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation; or
  4. Because the employee reports verbally or in writing to the employer or to the employee’s supervisor a violation, which the employee knows or reasonably believes has occurred or is about to occur, of a law or regulation or rule promulgated under the laws of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States, unless the employee knows or has reason to know that the report is false. Provided, that if the report is verbally made, the employee must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the report was made.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, effective July 13, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1, effective July 13, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

A jury permissibly could find the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Act applicable to statements made by an employer to a supervisor concerning known or suspected violations of the law. Marques v. Fitzgerald, 99 F.3d 1, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27833 (1st Cir. 1996).

Former employees could not maintain a wrongful termination action alleging that they were terminated for reporting their employer’s environmental violations, where their reporting was anonymous and their firings were remote in time from the eventual prosecution of the employer. Belanger v. A&F Plating Co., 2002 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. June 7, 2002).

Employee failed to state a valid claim under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq., because the alleged actions did not qualify as protected activity; the activity occurred while the employee was not employed by the community college and involved violations of law allegedly committed by a previous employer—an entity that had no nexus with the employee’s employment at the community college. Crenshaw v. State, 227 A.3d 67, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 2020).

Adverse Employment Action.

Placing an employee on administrative leave with pay, even with the requirement that he undergo an independent medical examination, is not a discharge, threat, or discrimination under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq. Russo v. State, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 87 A.3d 399, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2014).

Trial justice erred in determining that placing an employee on paid administrative leave with the requirement that he undergo an independent medical examination was an employment action that fell within the scope of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq., where the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals had used the paid administrative leave to defuse a potentially contentious situation, and the employee’s testimony that he hired an attorney because he felt his job was on the line did not transform an otherwise neutral employment actions into an adverse employment action. Russo v. State, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 87 A.3d 399, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2014).

Burden of Proof.

Employee’s claim failed to survive summary judgment because plaintiff relied on no evidence, and pointed only to allegations contained in an unverified second amended complaint to support his claim. Senra v. Town of Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9091 (1st Cir. 2013).

Superior court erred in dismissing the employee/shareholder’s claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq., because the employee/shareholder reasonably believed that the corporation and its president violated the Business Corporation Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.2-101 et seq., he complained to his supervisors of the alleged violations, and he was subsequently terminated, which he alleged was causally related to his whistleblowing conduct. Rein v. ESS Grp., Inc., 184 A.3d 695, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2018).

Causation.

Plaintiff offered no evidence of causation other than pure speculation to support his claim that he was demoted in violation of Rhode Island’s Whistleblower Protection Act (RIWPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq., in retaliation for reporting subordinates for improperly taking gifts from a federal government employee. The evidence showed that his demotion was in response to his attendance problems that had been occurring for over a two-year period only to culminate in two incidents of not reporting for work for two days, and that he was demoted soon after the second incident. Malone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 610 F.3d 16, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13063 (1st Cir. 2010).

Public Body.

The term “public body” does not include all municipal employees, such as a co-worker, but does include a superior charged with carrying out the policies and decisions of the city. Marques v. Fitzgerald, 99 F.3d 1, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27833 (1st Cir. 1996).

Waiver.

Although the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act grants a civil right of action to an employee who has been damaged by an employer in retaliation for a report of wrongdoing to a state agency or official, where the plaintiff had abandoned prosecution of such a claim by failing to include it in his amended complaint, his action was dismissed. Almeida v. USW, 50 F. Supp. 2d 115, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8540 (D.R.I. 1999).

28-50-4. Relief and damages.

  1. A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or treble damages, or both within three (3) years after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter.
  2. An action commenced pursuant to subsection (a) may be brought in the superior court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has their principal place of business.
  3. As used in subsection (a) of this section, “damages” means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter.
  4. [Deleted by P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 5 and P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 5.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 5; P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, effective July 13, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1, effective July 13, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 306, § 5, and P.L. 2012, ch. 344, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

Collateral References.

Pre-emption by workers’ compensation statute of employee’s remedy under state “whistleblower” statute. 20 A.L.R.5th 677.

28-50-5. Reinstatement.

A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought under this act, shall order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee, the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination of these remedies. A court may also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including attorneys’ fees if the court determines that the award is appropriate.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 190, § 1.

28-50-6. Collective bargaining.

This chapter shall not be construed to diminish or impair the rights of a person under any collective bargaining agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2.

28-50-7. Exemption.

This chapter shall not be construed to require an employer to compensate an employee for participation in an investigation, hearing or inquiry held by a public body in accordance with § 28-50-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2.

28-50-8. Notices posted.

An employer shall post notices and use other appropriate means to keep his or her employees informed of their protections and obligations under this chapter, including posting in prominent locations in all languages known to be spoken by employees.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, effective July 13, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1, effective July 13, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 393, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 394, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-50-9. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid or unconstitutional, the invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without the invalid or unconstitutional provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 308, § 2.

Chapter 51 Sexual Harassment, Education and Training in the Workplace

28-51-1. Definitions.

  1. As used in this chapter, “Employer” means any entity employing fifty (50) or more employees.
  2. As used in this chapter, “Sexual harassment” means any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
    1. Submission to that conduct or those advances or requests is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment; or
    2. Submission to or rejection of the conduct or advances or requests by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting the individual; or
    3. The conduct or advances or requests have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 118, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 300, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2003 Reenactment redesignated subsections (a) and (b).

Collateral References.

Conduct of plaintiff as defense in action for employment discrimination based on sexual harassment under federal civil rights statutes. 145 A.L.R. Fed. 459.

Workers’ compensation as precluding employee’s suit against employer for sexual harassment in the workplace. 51 A.L.R.5th 163.

28-51-2. Adoption of workplace policy and statement.

  1. All employers and employment agencies shall promote a workplace free of sexual harassment.
  2. Every employer shall:
    1. Adopt a policy against sexual harassment that shall include:
      1. A statement that sexual harassment in the workplace is unlawful;
      2. A statement that it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee for filing a complaint of sexual harassment or for cooperating in an investigation of a complaint for sexual harassment;
      3. A description and examples of sexual harassment;
      4. A statement of the range of consequences for employees who are found to have committed sexual harassment;
      5. A description of the process for filing internal complaints about sexual harassment and the work addresses and telephone numbers of the person or persons to whom complaints should be made; and
      6. The identity of the appropriate state and federal employment discrimination enforcement agencies, and directions as to how to contact these agencies.
    2. Provide to all employees a written copy of the employer’s policy against sexual harassment; provided, that a new employee shall be provided such a copy at the time of his or her employment.
  3. Employers are encouraged to conduct an education and training program for new employees and members, within one year of commencement of employment or membership, which includes at a minimum the information set forth in this section. Employers are encouraged to conduct additional training for new supervisory and managerial employees within one year of commencement of employment which shall include at a minimum the information set forth in subsection (b) of this section, the specific responsibilities of supervisory and managerial employees and the methods that these employees should take to ensure immediate and appropriate corrective action in addressing sexual harassment complaints. Employers and appropriate state agencies are encouraged to cooperate in making this training available.
  4. Employers shall provide copies of their written policies on sexual harassment to all employees upon their request.
  5. Employers shall be required to maintain copies of their written policies on sexual harassment at their business premises, and copies of such policies shall be made available to any state or federal employment discrimination enforcement agency upon request.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 118, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 203, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 51.

Collateral References.

Same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII (42 USCS § 2000e et seq.) of Civil Rights Act. 135 A.L.R. Fed. 307.

28-51-3. Education and training programs.

Employers are encouraged to conduct an education and training program on sexual harassment consistent with the aims and purposes of this chapter for all employees, including, but not limited to supervisory or managerial personnel, on or before September 1, 1997.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 118, § 1.

Chapter 52 Workplace Violence Protection

28-52-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as “The Rhode Island Workplace Violence Prevention Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 284, § 1.

28-52-2. Workplace violence protection.

  1. If an employer, or an employer’s employee(s) or invitee(s), have: (1) Suffered unlawful violence by an individual; or (2) Received a threat of violence by an individual that can reasonably be construed as a threat that may be carried out at the worksite; or (3) Been stalked or harassed at the worksite; the employer may (in addition to, or instead of, filing criminal charges against the individual) seek a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and an injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibiting further unlawful acts by that individual at the worksite that shall include any place at which work is being performed on behalf of the employer.
  2. Proof (by affidavit in an ex parte hearing, or by a preponderance of the evidence in any other hearing) of any action described in subsection (a) of this section shall constitute irreparable harm or damage to the employer, or employer’s employee(s) or invitee(s). Upon granting of any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or injunction, the court may, among other appropriate orders:
    1. Order the defendant not to visit, assault, molest, or otherwise interfere with the employer or the employer’s operations, or the employer’s employee(s) or invitee(s) at the employer’s worksite;
    2. Order the defendant to cease stalking the employer’s employee(s) or invitee(s) at the employer’s worksite;
    3. Order the defendant to cease harassment of the employer or the employer’s employee(s) or invitee(s) at the employer’s worksite;
    4. Order the defendant not to abuse or injure the employer, including the employer’s property, or the employer’s employee(s) or invitee(s) at the employer’s worksite;
    5. Order the defendant not to telephone the employer or the employer’s employee(s) or invitee(s) at the employer’s worksite;
    6. Order any other necessary and appropriate relief as deemed appropriate in the discretion of the court.
  3. When necessary to protect the employer or the employer’s employee(s), invitee(s), or property, and when authorized by the court, temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and injunctions granted pursuant to the provisions of this act may be served upon the defendant by a peace officer, sheriff, certified constable, or police officer, or other officer whose duty it is to preserve the peace, with appropriate orders to these officials to enforce the court’s order.
  4. All orders and injunctions issued pursuant to the provisions of this act shall have statewide validity, unless specifically modified or terminated by the issuing judge, and may be enforced by the issuing court for any violation anywhere in the state, and by any court of competent jurisdiction within the state for violations which may occur within that court’s jurisdiction.
  5. An employer and an employer’s agents who or that act in accord with the provisions of this act shall be presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless lack of good faith is shown by clear and convincing evidence, are immune from civil liability for actions taken under this chapter.
  6. Any employer, or its employee(s) or invitee(s), who or that does not utilize the procedures authorized by this act, shall not be liable for negligence nor shall evidence of the same be admissible as evidence of negligence.
  7. In no event shall this chapter be construed to prevent lawful picketing or lawful demonstrations including, but not limited to, those related to a labor dispute.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 284, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 30; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 30.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 30, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 30 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

28-52-3. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held to be invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application; and to that end, the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 284, § 1.

Chapter 53 Rhode Island Uninsured Protection Fund

28-53-1. Preamble and legislative findings.

WHEREAS, The system of workers’ compensation in the state of Rhode Island was once in a state of acute crisis until legislative intervention and oversight produced what is now a nationally recognized model of a well-managed economical program that provides injured workers with appropriate compensation, health care, and rehabilitative services without unduly burdening employers, insurers, and the citizens of Rhode Island; and

WHEREAS, Legislative and policy changes have corrected the abuses and misuse of the workers’ compensation system while assisting injured workers, restoring fiscal stability, and eliminating waste and unnecessary costs; and

WHEREAS, Professionals providing services covered under the provisions of the workers’ compensation act have taken into account, in the performance of their service, the important public policy benefit of a sound and properly functioning workers’ compensation system in this state, and have tirelessly committed themselves to protect and maintain the integrity of this system; and

WHEREAS, Abuse and misuse of the workers’ compensation system by noncomplying employers has been reduced through the state’s mandatory requirement that employers subject to the law either self-insure or maintain a policy of workers’ compensation insurance to ensure that legitimately injured workers receive all the rights and benefits provided in the workers’ compensation act; and

WHEREAS, Substantive efforts have already been undertaken by the general assembly, the workers’ compensation court, and the department of labor and training to eliminate the illegal, irresponsible, and unscrupulous behavior of employers who openly and deliberately operate businesses in Rhode Island without workers’ compensation insurance for their employees; and

WHEREAS, The actions of noncomplying employers are illegal and deprive not only injured employees of the workers’ compensation benefits to which they are entitled but also cause greater social and financial costs to all citizens of Rhode Island including employers and healthcare providers who incur uncompensated expenses in treating the victims of the uninsured employer; and

WHEREAS, Additional reform is required to provide payments to employees who are injured while in the service of uninsured employers and to eliminate the flagrant abuse of the system by illegally uninsured employers by requiring them to accept their legal responsibility to pay the appropriate benefits to their insured employees; now, therefore be it

RESOLVED, That it is declared to be the intent of the legislature that an uninsured protection fund be created to ensure that injured workers who are employed by illegally uninsured employers are not deprived of payments. The fund shall have enforcement mechanisms as are necessary to induce illegally uninsured employers to acknowledge their malfeasance, provide legally mandated payments for injured workers; and to assure that all participants in the system recognize their obligation to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the overall integrity of the compensation system. All amounts owed to the uninsured protection fund from illegally uninsured employers are intended to be excise taxes and as such, all ambiguities and uncertainties are to be resolved in favor of a determination that such assessments are excise taxes.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5, and P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 6, provides that this chapter takes effect July 1, 2007, and applies to injuries that occur on or after January 1, 2009.

28-53-2. Establishment — Sources — Administration.

    1. There shall be established within the department of labor and training a special restricted receipt account to be known as the Rhode Island uninsured protection fund. The department shall maintain the fund for the exclusive purpose of making payments to an injured employee otherwise entitled to benefits pursuant to chapters 29 — 38 of this title, or in the case of death of the injured employee, to person(s) presumed wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee, as defined in § 28-33-13 , and any costs specifically associated therewith, where the employer required to secure payment of the compensation failed to insure or self-insure its liability at the time the injury took place as determined by the director and the workers’ compensation court.
    2. The fund shall be capitalized from excise taxes assessed against uninsured employers pursuant to the provisions of § 28-53-9 and from general revenues appropriated by the legislature. Beginning in state fiscal year ending June 30, 2019, the legislature may appropriate up to two million dollars ($2,000,000) in general revenue funds annually for deposit into the Rhode Island uninsured protection fund.
  1. All moneys in the fund shall be mingled and undivided. The fund shall be administered by the director of the department of labor and training, or his or her designee, but in no case shall the director incur any liability beyond the amounts paid into and earned by the fund.
  2. All amounts owed to the uninsured protection fund from illegally uninsured employers are intended to be excise taxes and as such, all ambiguities and uncertainties are to be resolved in favor of a determination that such assessments are excise taxes.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 4; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 5; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 6; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 4; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 4; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 4; P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 5, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 5, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2012, ch. 149, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 182, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 6, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 4, and P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 4, and P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5, and P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2012, ch. 149, § 2 provides that the amendments to this section by that act take effect upon passage [June 5, 2012] and shall apply retroactively to all claims regardless of the date of injury.

P.L. 2012, ch. 182, § 2 provides that the amendments to this section by that act take effect upon passage [June 8, 2012] and shall apply retroactively to all claims regardless of the date of injury.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-53-3. Powers and duties of the fund.

The fund shall:

  1. Be authorized to pay covered claims as determined by the director and the workers’ compensation court pursuant to the provisions of this section and promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to effectuate the provisions and overall purpose of this chapter. The rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the administrative procedures act, chapter 35 of title 42, and shall include, but not be limited to, the filing of claim forms and other documentation supporting the claim, and proof of dependency, if relevant. All claims must contain a release necessary to allow the director to investigate the claim;
  2. Investigate claims brought against the fund and adjust, compromise, settle, and pay covered claims to the extent of the fund’s allocation;
  3. Establish procedures for managing the assets of the fund;
  4. Sue or be sued; and
  5. Perform any and all acts necessary to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5, and P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-53-4. Payor of last resort.

The fund shall not distribute funds of any kind to any insured, insurer, or self-insured employer and shall not be deemed an insurer for any purpose noted in this act.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1.

28-53-5. Establishment of reserves — Disbursement of excess funds.

When the balance of the fund, following the deduction of operating expenses, reserves, claims, administration costs and all other reasonable and necessary costs and expenses, exceeds the sum of five million dollars ($5,000,000) the director is authorized to determine by experience or other appropriate accounting and actuarial method what percentage of the payment collected by the fund pursuant to the provisions of § 28-53-2(a) is needed to maintain the fund at the five million dollar ($5,000,000) level for the following twelve (12) months and shall certify the same and shall make such calculations on or before May 10 of each year thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1.

28-53-6. Custodian — Orders for payment.

The general treasurer of the State of Rhode Island shall be the custodian of such fund and the state controller is hereby authorized and empowered to draw orders upon the general treasurer upon receipt of duly authenticated vouchers.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2021, “State of Rhode Island” was substituted for “State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations” at the direction of the Law Revision Director to reflect the 2020 amendments to the state constitution that changed the state’s name.

28-53-7. Payments to employees of uninsured employers.

  1. Where it is determined that the employee was injured in the course of employment while working for an employer who fails to maintain a policy of workers’ compensation insurance as required by § 28-36-1 et seq., in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the uninsured protection fund is authorized to pay the benefits to which the injured employee would be entitled pursuant to chapters 29 — 38 of this title subject to the limitations set forth herein.
  2. The workers’ compensation court shall hear all petitions for payment from the fund pursuant to § 28-30-1 et seq.; provided, however, that any petition for the commencement of compensation benefits filed against the uninsured protection fund shall be accompanied or preceded by a separate petition for the commencement of compensation benefits timely filed against the uninsured unless the petition to be filed against the uninsured employer is otherwise enjoined or prevented by law.
  3. Where an employee is deemed to be entitled to benefits from the uninsured protection fund, the fund shall pay benefits for incapacity as provided pursuant to chapters 29 — 38 of this title except that the employee shall not be entitled to receive benefits for medical expenses pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-5 or loss of function and disfigurement pursuant to the provisions of § 28-33-19 from the uninsured protection fund. Nothing herein shall affect an employee’s right to otherwise recover such benefits for medical expenses, loss of function, and disfigurement from an uninsured employer.
  4. The fund shall pay costs, counsel, and witness fees, as provided in § 28-35-32 , to any employee who successfully prosecutes any petitions for payment; petitions to amend a pretrial order; and all other employee petitions; and to employees who successfully defend, in whole or in part, proceedings seeking to reduce or terminate any and all payments; provided, however, that the attorney’s fees awarded to counsel who represent the employee in petitions for lump-sum commutation filed pursuant to § 28-33-25 , or in the settlement of disputed cases pursuant to § 28-33-25 .1, shall be limited to the maximum amount paid to counsel who serve as court-appointed attorneys in workers’ compensation proceedings as established by rule or order of the Rhode Island supreme court. Any payment ordered by the court or due under this section shall not be subject to liens set forth in § 28-33-27(b) , nor shall such payments be assignable or subject to assignment in any way.
  5. In the event that the uninsured employer makes payment of any monies to the employee to compensate the employee in any way for the alleged work injury, the fund may be entitled to a credit for all such monies received by, or on behalf of, the employee, including, but not limited to, monies paid to the employee by any other party for the employee’s lost wages against any future benefits payable directly to the employee. The fund shall be entitled to full reimbursement from the uninsured employer for any and all payments made by the fund to the employee, as well as all costs, counsel, and witness fees paid out by the fund in connection with any claim and/or petition, plus any and all costs and attorney’s fees associated with collection and reimbursement of the fund.
  6. This section shall apply to injuries that occur on or after September 1, 2019.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 4; P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 5; P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 6; P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 6; P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 4; P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 4; P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 4; P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 3; P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5; P.L. 2019, ch. 9, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 10, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 72, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 95, § 5, and P.L. 2010, ch. 121, § 5, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2012, ch. 149, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 182, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 6, and P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 6 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 231, § 4, and P.L. 2014, ch. 289, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 104, § 4, and P.L. 2015, ch. 116, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 470, § 3, and P.L. 2016, ch. 473, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 106, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 266, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5, and P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 9, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 10, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2020, ch. 66, § 1, and P.L. 2020, ch. 72, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2008, ch. 377, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2012, ch. 149, § 2 provides that the amendments to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [June 5, 2012] and shall apply retroactively to all claims regardless of the date of injury.

P.L. 2012, ch. 182, § 2 provides that the amendments to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [June 8, 2012] and shall apply retroactively to all claims regardless of the date of injury.

P.L. 2013, ch. 445, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

P.L. 2013, ch. 475, § 10, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall not abrogate or affect substantive rights or pre-existing agreements, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees.

28-53-8. Limitations on payments to injured employees.

  1. Where the director determines by experience or other appropriate accounting and actuarial methods that the reserves in the fund are insufficient to pay all claims presented or pending, the director shall petition the workers’ compensation court for an order to make appropriate, proportionate reductions in the payments being made to injured employees by the fund or to suspend all payments to injured employees until such time as the reserves maintained by the fund are sufficient to resume the payment of benefits. The matter shall be heard by the chief judge. If the court determines that the monies held by the fund are insufficient to fully make payments as they fall due, the court shall issue an order directing that a proportionate reduction be made in the payments made to those employees receiving payments from the fund. In considering the fund’s request for relief, the court shall give due weight to the policy of the workers’ compensation act that payments are to be paid weekly and that the unwarranted reduction or interruption in the employee’s weekly payment will impose financial hardship upon the injured worker.
  2. The chief judge shall hear the director’s petition within twenty-one (21) days of the date the matter is filed with the court. The petition shall set forth the names and addresses of each employee who may be affected by the reduction in benefits and the court shall provide notice to each employee. The attorney general shall appear on behalf of the employees receiving benefits from the fund and shall take action as he or she feels is necessary to protect the rights of the injured employees.
  3. In the event that the court determines that a reduction or suspension of payments is necessary to maintain the fiscal integrity of the fund, the court shall schedule a mandatory review date to determine whether the financial status of the fund warrants a continuation of the order reducing payments and shall reinstitute payments only upon finding that the reserves maintained by the fund are sufficient to pay all future claims as they fall due.
  4. Payments under this chapter shall not be awarded to any injured employee or dependent if the award would directly or indirectly inure to the benefit of the uninsured employer.
  5. No payment shall be awarded when the director or the court, in its discretion, determines that unjust enrichment to or on behalf of the illegally uninsured employer would result.
  6. No interest shall be included in or added to payments under this chapter.
  7. No payments will be awarded under this chapter to an injured employee, or in the case of death of the injured employee, to person(s) presumed wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee, as defined in § 28-33-13 , in a total amount in excess of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) plus any attorney’s fees awarded in connection with petitions for payment from the fund.
  8. Applications for payment under this chapter shall be filed with the director within the time limits set forth in § 28-35-57 .

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 475, § 19; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5, and P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

28-53-9. Penalties, taxes and assessments against noncomplying employers.

  1. Where it is determined that an employer has failed to maintain a policy of workers’ compensation insurance as required by § 28-36-1 et seq. and that while the employer was uninsured in violation of the statute, an employee suffered a compensable injury, the uninsured protection fund shall commence the payment of weekly payment to the employee as set forth herein, subject to fund availability. On behalf of the fund, the director shall acquire a lien against the goods and chattels of the uninsured employer to the extent of any payments made by it to the injured employee. The lien(s) shall arise and attach as of the date on which the fund makes payment to the injured employee without further action by the fund or the court. The lien shall have priority over all subsequently perfected liens and security interests.
  2. Prior to the lien being filed with the office of the secretary of state, the employer shall be notified by certified mail, return receipt requested, that a lien will be filed against all goods situated in the state if the outstanding tax is not paid within seven (7) business days of receipt of the notice.
  3. The liens shall become perfected at the time when a notice of lien is filed pursuant to the filing provisions of § 6A-9-501 . The notice of lien shall include the following:
    1. The name of the debtor, as governed by § 6A-9-503 ;
    2. The name of the director of the department of labor and training as the party claiming the lien; and
    3. A description of the property so encumbered as governed by § 6A-9-504 .
  4. The director shall be entitled to effectively file the lien and to amend the lien quarterly as additional payments are made or terminate it as necessary.
  5. No filing fee shall be charged for the filing of a lien authorized by this section.
  6. Where the employer is a corporation, the president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer of the corporation shall be severally personally liable, jointly with a corporation for any payments made to the injured employee by the fund, and the fund shall acquire a lien against the goods and chattels of the president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer to the extent of any payments so made.
  7. Where the employer is a limited-liability company, the managers and managing members shall be severally personally liable, jointly with the limited-liability company for any payments made to the injured employee by the fund and the fund shall acquire a lien against the goods and chattels of the manager and managing member to the extent of any payments so made.
  8. The liens and excise taxes levied against the noncomplying party pursuant to this section shall be in addition to any and all other fines, penalties and assessments, to which the party would otherwise be liable in particular the penalties mandated by § 28-36-15 .

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 509, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5; P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 86, § 5, and P.L. 2018, ch. 98, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Chapter 54 Municipal Employees

28-54-1. Medicare enrollment.

Every municipality, participating or nonparticipating in the municipal employees’ retirement system, may require its retirees, as a condition of receiving or continuing to receive retirement payments and health benefits, to enroll in Medicare as soon as he or she is eligible, notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, ordinance, interest arbitration award, or collective bargaining agreement to the contrary. Municipalities that require said enrollment shall have the right to negotiate any Medicare supplement or gap coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees, but shall not be required to provide any other healthcare benefits to any Medicare-eligible retiree or his or her spouse who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age, notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, ordinance, interest arbitration award, or collective bargaining agreement to the contrary. Municipality provided benefits that are provided to Medicare-eligible individuals shall be secondary to Medicare benefits. Nothing contained herein shall impair collectively bargained Medicare Supplement Insurance.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 2.

Chapter 55 The Rhode Island Jobs Match Enhancement Program

28-55-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as “The Rhode Island Jobs Match Enhancement Program.”

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 15, § 4.

28-55-2. Legislative findings.

The general assembly finds and declares that:

  1. Rhode Island’s statewide career pathways systems must be driven by local business and industry needs;
  2. Despite high unemployment, businesses report difficulties and frustration in locating employment candidates with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities they need;
  3. Locating, training and preparing candidates to fill job openings is an expense that few companies can afford;
  4. The state needs a focused interagency collaboration to provide easy access for businesses to find competent employees and job seekers to obtain necessary resources, training and skills development; and
  5. The state needs to build upon the efforts of the department of labor and training to facilitate employers’ access to high quality, skilled job seekers and reduce the number of unemployed individuals in Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 15, § 4.

28-55-3. The Rhode Island enhanced job match system.

On or before July 2, 2014, the department of labor and training shall implement the jobs match enhancement program using the current department of labor and training web based workforce and job system as a basis, with significant enhancements, as follows:

  1. It shall be easy for employers to participate in, update and receive responses from job seekers, addressing potential barriers to participation;
  2. It shall be understandable, accessible and productive for job seekers, including measures to ensure literacy-based accessibility;
  3. It shall allow for the prompt identification of workers who are partially, but not fully matched for job openings, resulting in timely skill gap remediation plans;
  4. It shall have the ability to address identified skill gaps through the provision of training and/or education;
  5. It shall notify the department of labor and training of the nature of the skill gaps which exist between job openings and job seekers, and shall have the ability to aggregate skill gap reports for the department;
  6. It shall be promoted and advertised to maximize business and employment use; and
  7. In an effort to ensure that employers’ hiring needs are being met, employers shall be encouraged to engage with the system and provide information pertaining to job openings and desired skill sets for potential new hires.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 15, § 4.

28-55-4. Reporting.

On or before October 1, 2013, the department of labor and training shall report to the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives on the progress toward implementing the jobs match enhancement program, along with an estimate of any additional costs related to the purchase of the enhancements listed in § 28-55-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 15, § 4.

28-55-5. Funding.

The implementation of enhancements to the department of labor and training’s web based workforce and job system shall be contingent upon available public and/or private financing.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 144, art. 15, § 4.

Chapter 56 Employee Social Media Privacy

28-56-1. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Social media account” means an electronic service or account, or electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online service or accounts, or internet website profiles or locations. For the purposes of this chapter, social media account does not include an account opened at an employer’s behest, or provided by an employer, or intended to be used primarily on behalf of the employer.
  2. “Applicant” means an applicant for employment.
  3. “Employee” means an individual who provides services or labor for an employer for wages or other remuneration.
  4. “Employer” includes the state, and all political subdivisions of the state, and any person in this state, employing individuals, and any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 188, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 207, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 188, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 207, § 3 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

28-56-2. Social media password requests prohibited.

No employer shall:

  1. Require, coerce, or request an employee or applicant to disclose the password or any other means for accessing a personal social media account;
  2. Require, coerce, or request an employee or applicant to access a personal social media account in the presence of the employer or representative;
  3. Require or coerce an employee or applicant to divulge any personal social media account information, except when reasonably believed to be relevant to an investigation of allegations of employee misconduct or workplace-related violation of applicable laws and regulations and when not otherwise prohibited by law or constitution; provided that the information is accessed and used solely to the extent necessary for purposes of that investigation or a related proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 188, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 207, § 3.

28-56-3. Social media access requests prohibited.

No employer shall compel an employee or applicant to add anyone, including the employer or their agent, to their list of contacts associated with a personal social media account or require, request, or cause an employee or applicant to alter settings that affect a third party’s ability to view the contents of a personal social media account.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 188, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 207, § 3.

28-56-4. Disciplinary actions prohibited.

No employer shall:

  1. Discharge, discipline, or otherwise penalize or threaten to discharge, discipline, or otherwise penalize any employee for an employee’s refusal to disclose or provide access to any information specified in § 28-56-2 , or for refusal to add the employer to his or her list of contacts associated with a personal social media account, or to alter the settings associated with a personal social media account, as specified in § 28-56-3 ; or
  2. Fail or refuse to hire any applicant as a result of the applicant’s refusal to disclose or provide access to any information specified in § 28-56-2 , or for refusal to add the employer or their agent to their list of contacts associated with a personal social media account, or to alter the settings associated with a personal social media account, as specified in § 28-56-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 188, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 207, § 3.

28-56-5. Exceptions.

  1. This chapter shall not apply to information about an applicant or employee that is publicly available.
  2. This chapter shall not prohibit or restrict an employer from complying with a duty to screen employees or applicants before hiring or to monitor or retain employee communications that is established by a self-regulatory organization as defined by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26), or under state or federal law or regulation to the extent necessary to supervise communications of regulated financial institutions insurance or securities licensees for banking insurance or securities related business purposes.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 188, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 207, § 3.

28-56-6. Penalties for violations.

In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may:

  1. Award to a prevailing applicant or employee declaratory relief, damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; and
  2. Award injunctive relief against any employer or agent of any employer that or who commits or proposes to commit a violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 188, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 207, § 3.

Chapter 57 Healthy and Safe Families and Workplaces Act

28-57-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Healthy and Safe Families and Workplaces Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on July 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on July 1, 2018.

28-57-2. Legislative purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to ensure that employees in Rhode Island can address their own health and safety needs, as well as the health and safety needs of their family members, by requiring employers to allow employees to earn a minimum level of paid leave time, including time to care for their family members, and allow for ease and uniformity of administration for the business community in providing paid leave for their employees.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-3. Definitions.

As used in the chapter, the following words and terms have the following meanings:

  1. “Care recipient” means a person for whom the employee is responsible for providing or arranging health- or safety-related care, including, but not limited to, helping the person obtain diagnostic, preventive, routine, or therapeutic health treatment or ensuring the person is safe following domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.
  2. “CCAP family childcare provider” means a childcare worker as defined in § 40-6.6-2(2) .
  3. “Child” means a person as defined in § 28-41-34(1) .
  4. “Department” means the department of labor and training.
  5. “Domestic partner” means a party to a civil union as defined in chapter 3.1 of title 15 or a person who meets the requirements in §§ 36-12-1(3)(i) through (3)(v) has the same meaning as that term is defined in § 8-8.2-20 .
  6. “Domestic violence” means certain crimes when committed by one family or household member against another as defined in § 12-29-2 .
  7. “Employee” means any person suffered or permitted to work by an employer, except for those not considered employees as defined in § 28-12-2 . Independent contractors, subcontractors, work study participants as described pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2753.23, apprenticeships and interns as defined under FLSA section 3(g) shall not be considered to be employees for the purpose of this act.
  8. “Employer” means any individual or entity that includes any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee as defined in § 28-12-2 , but does not include the federal government, and provided that in determining the number of employees performing work for an employer as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the total number of employees in that group shall be counted.
  9. “Family member” means a child, parent, spouse, mother-in-law, father-in-law, grandparents, grandchildren, or domestic partner, sibling, care recipient, or member of the employee’s household.
  10. “Healthcare professional” means any person licensed under federal or Rhode Island law to provide medical or emergency services, including, but not limited to: doctors, nurses, and emergency room personnel.
  11. “Paid sick leave time” or “paid sick and safe leave time” means time that is compensated at the same hourly rate and with the same benefits, including healthcare benefits, as the employee normally earns during hours worked and is provided by an employer to an employee for the purposes described in § 28-57-6 , but in no case shall the hourly wage paid leave be less than that provided under § 28-12-3 .
  12. “Parent” means a person as defined in § 28-41-34(5) or a person as defined in § 28-41-34(9) .
  13. “Seasonal employee” means a person as defined in 26 C.F.R. § 54.4980H-1(a)(38).
  14. “Sexual assault” means a crime as defined in § 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 or 11-37-6 .
  15. “Sibling” means a brother or a sister, whether related through half blood, whole blood, or adoption, a foster sibling, or a step-sibling.
  16. “Spouse” means a person as defined in § 28-41-34(7) .
  17. “Stalking” means a crime as described in §§ 11-59-2 and 11-52-4.2 .
  18. “Temporary employee” means any person working for, or obtaining employment pursuant to an agreement with any employment agency, placement service, or training school or center.
  19. “Unpaid sick time” is time that is used for the purposes described in § 28-57-6 .
  20. “Year” means a regular and consecutive twelve-month-period as determined by the employer; except that for the purposes of § 28-57-7 , “year” means a calendar year.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-4. Exemptions.

  1. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to conflict with the provisions of the Food Code or the Rules and Regulations pertaining to Reporting Infectious, Environmental and Occupational Diseases.
  2. Any employer with a paid leave time off policy or paid sick and safe leave policy who makes available at least twenty-four (24) hours during calendar year 2018, thirty-two (32) hours during calendar year 2019 and forty (40) hours per calendar year thereafter of paid time off or paid sick and safe leave time to employees or any employer who offers unlimited paid time off or paid sick and safe time is exempt from § 28-57-5(a) , (b), (c) and (e). Employers that provide at least twenty-four (24) hours during calendar year 2018, thirty-two (32) hours during calendar year 2019, and forty (40) hours per calendar year thereafter of paid sick or safe leave or paid time off that can be used for the purposes consistent with this act at the beginning of each benefit year do not need to track accrual, allow any carryover, or payout.
  3. Any employer that employs less than eighteen (18) employees as defined in this act is exempt from § 28-57-5 ; provided, however, that any such employer shall not take an adverse action against an employee of the employer solely based upon the employee’s use of up to twenty-four (24) hours during calendar year 2018, thirty-two (32) hours during calendar year 2019, and forty (40) hours per calendar year thereafter, subject to § 28-57-6 and § 28-57-10 .
  4. Any employer is not required to provide any paid sick and/or safe leave time to any employees who are employed by a municipality or the state.
  5. Any employer in the construction industry, as classified as code under the North American Industry Classification System, is not required to provide any paid sick and/or safe leave time to any employees who work under a collective bargaining agreement until July 1, 2018.
  6. Any employee licensed to practice nursing pursuant to chapter 34 of title 5 is not subject to the provisions of this chapter if the employee:
    1. Is employed by a healthcare facility;
    2. Is under no obligation to work a regular schedule;
    3. Works only when he or she indicates that he or she is available to work and has no obligation to work when he or she does not indicate availability; and
    4. Receives higher pay than that paid to an employee of the same healthcare facility performing the same job on a regular schedule.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-5. Accrual of paid sick and safe leave time.

  1. All employees employed by an employer of eighteen (18) or more employees in Rhode Island shall accrue a minimum of one hour of paid sick and safe leave time for every thirty five (35) hours worked up to a maximum of twenty-four (24) hours during the calendar year of 2018, thirty-two (32) hours during calendar year 2019 and up to a maximum of forty (40) hours per year thereafter, unless the employer chooses to provide a higher annual limit in both accrual and use. In determining the number of employees who are employed by an employer for compensation, all employees defined in § 28-57-3(7) shall be counted.
  2. Employees who are exempt from the overtime requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., will be assumed to work forty (40) hours in each work week for purposes of paid sick and safe leave time accrual unless their normal work week is less than forty (40) hours, in which case paid sick and safe leave time accrues based upon that normal work week.
  3. Paid sick and safe leave time as provided in this chapter shall begin to accrue at the commencement of employment or pursuant to the law’s effective date [July 1, 2018], whichever is later. An employer may provide all paid sick and safe leave time that an employee is expected to accrue in a year at the beginning of the year.
  4. An employer may require a waiting period for newly hired employees of up to ninety (90) days. During this waiting period, an employee shall accrue earned sick time pursuant to this section or the employer’s policy, if exempt under § 28-57-4(b) , but shall not be permitted to use the earned sick time until after he or she has completed the waiting period.
  5. Paid sick and safe leave time shall be carried over to the following calendar year; however, an employee’s use of paid sick and safe leave time provided under this chapter in each calendar year shall not exceed twenty-four (24) hours during calendar year 2018, and thirty-two (32) hours during calendar year 2019, and forty (40) hours per year thereafter. Alternatively, in lieu of carryover of unused earned paid sick and safe leave time from one year to the next, an employer may pay an employee for unused earned paid sick and safe leave time at the end of a year and provide the employee with an amount of paid sick and safe leave that meets or exceeds the requirements of this chapter that is available for the employee’s immediate use at the beginning of the subsequent year.
  6. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring financial or other reimbursement to an employee from an employer upon the employee’s termination, resignation, retirement, or other separation from employment for accrued paid sick and safe leave time that has not been used.
  7. If an employee is transferred to a separate division, entity, or location within the state, but remains employed by the same employer as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the employee is entitled to all paid sick and safe leave time accrued at the prior division, entity, or location and is entitled to use all paid sick and safe leave time as provided in this act. When there is a separation from employment and the employee is rehired within one hundred thirty-five (135) days of separation by the same employer, previously accrued paid sick and safe leave time that had not been used shall be reinstated. Further, the employee shall be entitled to use accrued paid sick and safe leave time and accrue additional sick and safe leave time at the re-commencement of employment.
  8. When a different employer succeeds or takes the place of an existing employer, all employees of the original employer who remain employed by the successor employer within the state are entitled to all earned paid sick and safe leave time they accrued when employed by the original employer, and are entitled to use earned paid sick and safe leave time previously accrued.
  9. At its discretion, an employer may loan sick and safe leave time to an employee in advance of accrual by such employee.
  10. Temporary employees shall be entitled to use accrued paid sick and safe leave time beginning on the one hundred eightieth (180) calendar day following commencement of their employment, unless otherwise permitted by the employer. On and after the one hundred eightieth (180) calendar day of employment, employees may use paid sick and safe leave time as it is accrued. During this waiting period, an employee shall accrue earned sick time pursuant to this chapter, but shall not be permitted to use the earned sick time until after he or she has completed the waiting period.
  11. Seasonal employees shall be entitled to use accrued paid sick and safe leave time beginning on the one hundred fiftieth (150) calendar day following commencement of their employment, unless otherwise permitted by the employer. On and after the one hundred fiftieth (150) calendar day of employment, employees may use paid sick and safe leave time as it is accrued. During this waiting period, an employee shall accrue earned sick time pursuant to this chapter, but shall not be permitted to use the earned sick time until after he or she has completed the waiting period.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-6. Use of paid sick and safe leave time.

  1. Paid sick and safe leave time shall be provided to an employee by an employer for:
    1. An employee’s mental or physical illness, injury, or health condition; an employee’s need for medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health condition; an employee’s need for preventive medical care;
    2. Care of a family member with a mental or physical illness, injury, or health condition; care of a family member who needs medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health condition; care of a family member who needs preventive medical care;
    3. Closure of the employee’s place of business by order of a public official due to a public health emergency or an employee’s need to care for a child whose school or place of care has been closed by order of a public official due to a public health emergency, or care for oneself or a family member when it has been determined by the health authorities having jurisdiction or by a healthcare provider that the employee’s or family member’s presence in the community may jeopardize the health of others because of their exposure to a communicable disease, whether or not the employee or family member has actually contracted the communicable disease; or
    4. Time off needed when the employee or a member of the employee’s family is a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.
  2. Paid sick and safe leave time shall be provided upon the request of an employee. Such request may be made orally, in writing, by electronic means, or by any other means acceptable to the employer. When possible, the request shall include the expected duration of the absence.
  3. When the use of paid sick and safe leave time is foreseeable, the employee shall provide notice of the need for such time to the employer in advance of the use of the sick and safe leave time and shall make a reasonable effort to schedule the use of sick and safe leave time in a manner that does not unduly disrupt the operations of the employer.
  4. An employer that requires notice of the need to use earned paid sick and safe leave time where the need is not foreseeable shall provide a written policy that contains procedures for the employee to provide notice. An employer that has not provided to the employee a copy of its written policy for providing such notice shall not deny earned paid sick and safe leave time to the employee based on noncompliance with such a policy.
  5. Unless otherwise in conflict with state or federal law or regulations, an employee may decide how much sick time to use; provided, however, that an employer may set a minimum increment for the use of sick time, not to exceed four (4) hours per day, provided such minimum increment is reasonable under the circumstances.
  6. For paid sick and safe leave time of more than three (3) consecutive work days, an employer may require reasonable documentation that the paid sick and safe leave time has been used for a purpose covered by subsection (a) of this section if the employer has notified the employee in writing of this requirement in advance of the employee’s use of paid sick and safe time. An employer may not require that the documentation explain the nature of the illness or the details of the domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking unless required by existing government regulation or law. Nothing in this provision shall be construed to conflict with existing government regulation or law.
    1. An employer may require written documentation for an employee’s use of earned sick time that occurs within two (2) weeks prior to an employee’s final scheduled day of work before termination of employment.
    2. Documentation signed by a healthcare professional indicating that paid sick leave time is necessary shall be considered reasonable documentation under subsection (a) of this section.
    3. One of the following, of the employee’s choosing, shall be considered reasonable documentation of an absence under subsection (a)(4) of this section:
      1. An employee’s written statement that the employee or the employee’s family member is a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking and that the leave taken was for one of the purposes of § 28-57-6(a)(4) ;
      2. A police report indicating that the employee or employee’s family member was a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking;
      3. A court document indicating that the employee or employee’s family member is involved in legal action related to domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking; or
      4. A signed statement from a victim and witness advocate affirming that the employee or employee’s family member is receiving services from a victim services organization or is involved in legal action related to domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.
  7. An employer’s requirements for verification may not result in an unreasonable burden or expense on the employee and may not exceed privacy or verification requirements otherwise established by law.
  8. Paid sick and safe leave cannot be used as an excuse to be late for work without an authorized purpose.
  9. If an employee is committing fraud or abuse by engaging in an activity that is not consistent with allowable purposes for paid sick and safe leave in this section, an employer may discipline the employee, up to and including termination of employment for misuse of sick leave.
  10. If an employee is exhibiting a clear pattern of taking leave on days just before or after a weekend, vacation, or holiday, an employer may discipline the employee for misuse of paid sick and safe leave, unless the employee provides reasonable documentation that the paid sick and safe leave time has been used for a purpose covered by subsection (a) of this section.
  11. An employer may not require, as a condition of providing earned paid sick and safe time under this chapter, that the employee search for or find a replacement worker to cover the hours during which the employee is using paid sick and safe leave time. However, if an employee is absent from work for any reason listed in § 28-57-6(a) and by mutual consent of the employer and the employee the employee works an equivalent number of additional hours or shifts during the same or the next pay period as the hours or shifts not worked due to reasons listed in § 28-57-6(a) , an employee shall not be required to use accrued and earned paid or unpaid sick time for the employee’s absence during that time period, and the employer shall not be required to pay for sick time taken during the time period.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-7. Family childcare providers.

CCAP family childcare providers shall accrue and may use paid sick and safe leave in the same manner as do employees under this chapter. The implementation, but not the amount, of paid sick and safe leave for CCAP family childcare providers shall be a subject of negotiation with the director of the department of administration under § 40-6.6-4 . The department of human services shall promulgate any necessary regulations to implement the requirement of paid sick and safe leave for CCAP family childcare providers. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to make CCAP family childcare providers employees of the state for any purpose, including for the purposes of eligibility for the state employee pension program or state employee health benefits.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-8. Uniformity.

No municipality shall establish, mandate, or otherwise require an employer to provide benefits in excess of those required under this chapter, including paid sick and safe leave to its employees, other than the paid sick and safe leave requirements provided by this chapter, or to apply sick and safe leave policies to statutorily exempt employees and workers.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-9. Regulations.

The department shall coordinate implementation and enforcement of this chapter and shall promulgate appropriate guidelines or regulations for such purposes. All regulations to be drafted by the department pursuant to this act shall conform with existing applicable regulations and statutes that govern chapter 12 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-10. Enforcement.

  1. Enforcement and notice requirements pursuant to this chapter shall be in accordance with enforcement and notice requirements of chapter 12 of this title.
  2. Any employee or former employee aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to the same protections and relief as under chapters 12 and 14 of this title.
  3. An employer who violates this chapter shall be liable for a civil penalty in an amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) for the first violation, and each subsequent violation shall be subject to the penalties under chapter 12 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-11. Confidentiality and nondisclosure.

An employer may not require disclosure of details relating to domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual contact, or stalking or the details of an employee’s or an employee’s family member’s health information as a condition of providing paid sick and safe leave time under this chapter. If an employer possesses health information or information pertaining to domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual contact, or stalking about an employee or employee’s family member, such information shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed except to the affected employee or with the permission of the affected employee unless required by existing regulation or statute.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-12. Greater sick and safe leave policies.

  1. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed in a manner to discourage or prohibit an employer from the adoption of a paid sick and safe leave time policy that provides greater rights or benefits than those provided pursuant to this chapter.
  2. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as diminishing the obligation of an employer to comply with any contract, collective bargaining agreement, employment benefit plan or other agreement that provides greater sick and safe leave time to an employee than required in this chapter.
  3. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as diminishing the rights of public employees regarding paid sick and safe leave or use of sick and safe leave time as provided in the general laws.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-13. Public education and outreach.

The department shall develop and implement a multilingual outreach program to inform employers, employees, parents, and persons who are under the care of a healthcare provider about the availability of paid sick and safe leave time under this chapter. This program shall include the distribution of notices and other written materials in English and in all languages spoken by more than five percent (5%) of Rhode Island’s population and any language deemed appropriate by the department to all child care and elder care providers, domestic violence shelters or victim services organizations, schools, hospitals, community health centers, and other healthcare providers.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-14. Allowable substitution of employers’ paid sick and safe leave time.

  1. Employers may have different paid leave policies for different groups of employees, provided that all policies meet the minimum requirements of this chapter.
  2. Employers that prefer not to track accrual of paid sick and safe leave time over the course of the benefit year may also use the following schedules for providing lump sums of sick leave or paid time off to their employees. Employers using these schedules will be in compliance even if an employee’s hours vary from week to week. For employees working an average of:
    1. Thirty-seven and one-half (37.5) to forty (40) hours per week, provide eight (8) hours per month for five (5) months;
    2. Thirty (30) hours per week, provide five (5) hours per month for eight (8) months;
    3. Twenty-four (24) hours per week, provide four (4) hours per month for ten (10) months;
    4. Twenty (20) hours per week, provide four (4) hours per month for nine (9) months;
    5. Sixteen (16) hours per week, provide three (3) hours per month for ten (10) months;
    6. Ten (10) hours per week, provide two (2) hours per month for ten (10) months;
    7. Five (5) hours per week, provide one hour per month for ten (10) months.
  3. In the case of an employer whose regular work day for full-time employees is less than eight (8) hours per day, if the employer provides five (5) days of paid sick and safe time leave consisting of the number of hours per day that constitute that full-time employee’s work day and provides them at the beginning of the year, the employer shall be in compliance with this subsection.
  4. Employers that provide forty (40) or more hours of paid time off or vacation to employees that also may be used as paid sick and safe leave, consistent with this section, shall not be required to provide additional sick leave to employees who use all their time for other purposes and have need of paid sick and safe leave later in the year, provided that the employers’ leave policies make clear that additional time will not be provided.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

28-57-14.1. Allowable substitution for construction industry multi-employer collective bargaining agreements.

  1. Employers in the construction industry as classified as code 23 under the North American Industry Classification System that are signatories to a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement authorized pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act shall be in compliance with the provisions of this chapter if their collective bargaining agreement provides for:
    1. Employee paid sick and safe leave benefits that are compensated at the wage hourly rate only;
    2. Accumulation of sick and safe leave benefits on an hourly or weekly basis that meets the minimum accrual standards set forth in § 28-57-5 ; and
    3. Employer participation in a designated federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act benefit trust fund to administer the paid sick and safe leave benefits required under this chapter.
  2. Administration of all other benefits shall be governed by the multi-employer collective bargaining agreements and the designated Employee Retirement Income Security Act benefit trust funds referenced therein.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 151, § 1, effective July 3, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 153, § 1, effective July 3, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 151, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 153, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

28-57-15. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation created under this chapter, or the application of any provision of this chapter to any person or circumstance shall be held invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of the chapter, rule or regulation and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. The invalidity of any section or sections or parts of any section of this chapter shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this chapter and to this end the provisions of the chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 357, § 1.

Chapter 58 Local Ownership Opportunity Act

28-58-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Local Ownership Opportunity Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on September 1, 2019.

P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on September 1, 2019.

28-58-2. Legislative purpose.

The purpose of this legislation is to preserve jobs and create new opportunities for economic growth and entrepreneurship in Rhode Island by providing opportunities for employees to purchase a business otherwise at risk of closure.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1.

28-58-3. Definitions.

  1. “Employer,” “plant closing,” “mass layoff,” “representative,” “employment loss,” “unit of local government,” and “part-time employee” means those terms as defined in 29 U.S.C. §  2101(a).
  2. “Employing business” means the business enterprise or entity for which the affected employees worked or were suffered or permitted to work at the time the notice defined in § 28-58-4 was issued.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1.

28-58-4. Notification to affected employees.

  1. Whenever an employer is required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), 29 U.S.C. Chapter 23, to provide advance notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, the director of the department of labor and training, or any designee thereof, shall provide to the affected employees or the representatives of the affected employees written notice consisting of, but not limited to, the following:
    1. Notice of the affected employees’ right to furnish a bid to purchase the employing business; and
    2. Information regarding the formation of a workers’ cooperative under chapter 6.2 of title 7.
  2. The department of labor and training, or any designee thereof, shall make available to employees information, materials, and resources on the creation of workers’ cooperatives as defined in chapter 6.2 of title 7.
  3. The department of labor and training shall provide access for business owners to information and materials on the creation of workers’ cooperatives under chapter 6.2 of title 7, and the conversion of a traditionally owned business to worker ownership.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1.

28-58-5. Sale not compelled.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as compelling or preventing a sale by the employing business.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1.

28-58-6. Regulations.

The department of labor and training shall coordinate implementation and enforcement of this chapter and may promulgate appropriate guidelines or regulations for such purposes.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1.

28-58-7. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation created under this chapter, or the application of any provision of this chapter to any person or circumstance shall be held invalid in any court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of the chapter, rule, or regulation and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. The invalidity of any section or sections or parts of any section of this chapter shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this chapter and to this end the provisions of the chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 64, § 1.

Chapter 59 Rhode Island Noncompetition Agreement Act

28-59-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Noncompetition Agreement Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 264, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 264, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 204, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on January 15, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 264, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on January 15, 2020.

28-59-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Business entity” means any person as defined in § 43-3-6 and includes a corporation, business trust, estate trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  2. “Earnings” means wages or compensation paid to an employee in the first forty (40) hours of work in a given week, not inclusive of hours paid at an overtime, Sunday, or holiday rate.
  3. “Employee” means an individual who works for hire, including an individual employed in a supervisory, managerial, or confidential position, but shall not include an independent contractor.
  4. “Employer” means any person, business entity, partnership, individual proprietorship, joint venture, firm, company, or other similar legal entity that employs one or more employees, and shall include the state and its instrumentalities and political subdivisions, public corporations, and charitable organizations.
  5. “Forfeiture agreement” means an agreement that imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship, regardless of whether the employee engaged in competitive activities, following cessation of the employment relationship. Forfeiture agreements do not include forfeiture for competition agreements.
  6. “Forfeiture for competition agreement” means an agreement that by its terms or through the manner in which it is enforced, imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship if the employee engages in competitive activities.
  7. “Low-wage employee” means an employee whose average annual earnings, as defined in subsection (2), are not more than two hundred fifty percent (250%) of the federal poverty level for individuals as established by the United States Department of Health and Human Services federal poverty guidelines.
  8. “Noncompetition agreement” means an agreement between an employer and an employee, or otherwise arising out of an existing or anticipated employment relationship, under which the employee or expected employee agrees that he or she will not engage in certain specified activities competitive with his or her employer after the employment relationship has ended. Noncompetition agreements include forfeiture for competition agreements, but do not include:
    1. Covenants not to solicit or hire employees of the employer;
    2. Covenants not to solicit or transact business with customers, clients, or vendors of the employer;
    3. Noncompetition agreements made in connection with the sale of a business entity or all or substantially all of the operating assets of a business entity or partnership, or otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a business entity or partnership, or division or subsidiary of any of the foregoing, when the party restricted by the noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of, or member or partner in, the business entity who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale or disposal;
    4. Noncompetition agreements originating outside of an employment relationship;
    5. Forfeiture agreements;
    6. Nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements;
    7. Invention assignment agreements;
    8. Noncompetition agreements made in connection with the cessation of or separation from employment if the employee is expressly granted seven (7) business days to rescind acceptance; or
    9. Agreements by which an employee agrees to not reapply for employment to the same employer after termination of the employee.
  9. “Trade secret” means information as defined in § 6-41-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 264, § 1.

28-59-3. Enforceability.

  1. A noncompetition agreement shall not be enforceable against the following types of workers:
    1. An employee who is classified as nonexempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201-219;
    2. Undergraduate or graduate students who participate in an internship or otherwise enter a short-term employment relationship with an employer, whether paid or unpaid, while enrolled at an educational institution;
    3. Employees age eighteen (18) or younger; or
    4. A low-wage employee.
  2. This section does not render void or unenforceable the remainder of a contract or agreement containing the unenforceable noncompetition agreement, nor does it preclude the imposition of a noncompetition restriction by a court, whether through preliminary or permanent injunctive relief or otherwise, as a remedy for a breach of another agreement or of a statutory or common law duty.
  3. Nothing in this section shall preclude an employer from entering into an agreement with an employee not to share any information, including after the employee is no longer employed by the employer, regarding the employer or the employment that is a trade secret.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 264, § 1.