Chapter 1 Persons Eligible to Marry

15-1-1. Equal access to marriage.

Any person who otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of chapters 15-1 and 15-2 may marry any other eligible person regardless of gender.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 5-1-1 ; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Law Reviews.

For article, Gay Marriage in Rhode Island: A Big Issue in a Small State, see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 291 (2007).

Comparative Legislation.

Persons eligible to marry:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-20 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Adoption, relationship created by, as within statute prohibiting marriage between parties in specified relationships. 151 A.L.R. 1146.

Invalidity ab initio of marriage between persons in prohibited degree of relationship. 117 A.L.R. 179.

Liability of one putative spouse to other for wrongfully inducing entry into or cohabitation under illegal, void, or nonexistent marriage. 72 A.L.R.2d 956.

Marriage between persons of the same sex. 81 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sexual intercourse between persons related by half blood as incest. 34 A.L.R.5th 723.

15-1-2. Marrying kindred forbidden.

No person shall marry his or her sibling, parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, stepparent, grandparents’ spouse, spouse’s child, spouse’s grandchild, sibling’s child or parent’s sibling.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-1-2 ; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Collateral References.

Liability of one putative spouse to other for wrongfully inducing entry into or cohabitation under illegal, void, or nonexistent marriage. 72 A.L.R.2d 956.

Marriage between persons of the same sex. 81 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sexual intercourse between persons related by half blood as incest. 34 A.L.R.5th 723.

15-1-3. Incestuous marriages void.

If any person intermarries within the degrees stated in § 15-1-2 , the marriage shall be null and void.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 3; impl. am. G.L. 1923, ch. 107, § 13; P.L. 1926, ch. 843, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 15-1-3 ; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Collateral References.

Death of party, right to attack validity of marriage after. 47 A.L.R.2d 1393.

Enforcement of antenuptial contract or settlement conditioned upon marriage, where marriage was subsequently declared void. 46 A.L.R.3d 1403.

Foreign marriage recognized as valid because valid by law of state where it was celebrated. 104 A.L.R. 1294.

Marriage between persons of the same sex. 81 A.L.R.5th 1.

Wills, effect of mistake as to legality of marriage relation on bequest. 17 A.L.R. 248.

15-1-4. Marriages of kindred allowed by Jewish religion.

The provisions of §§ 15-1-2 and 15-1-3 shall not extend to, or in any way affect, any marriage which shall be solemnized among the Jewish people, within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 5-1-4 ; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

15-1-5. Bigamous marriages void — Marriage of persons who are mentally incompetent.

A person is prohibited from marrying if such person is:

  1. A party to another marriage; or
  2. A party to a relationship that provides substantially the same rights, benefits and responsibilities as a marriage whether entered into in this state or another state or jurisdiction and such marriage or relationship has not been finally dissolved, unless the parties to the intended marriage will be the same as the parties to such other marriage or relationship. Any marriage entered in violation of this prohibition and any marriage where either of the parties is mentally incompetent at the time of the marriage, shall be absolutely void, and no life estate created by chapter 25 of title 33 shall be assigned to any surviving spouse in consequence of the marriage.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 5; P.L. 1927, ch. 1066, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 15-1-5 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 19; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 19; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Cross References.

Divorce decreed in cases of void or voidable marriages, § 15-5-1 .

Knowingly performing bigamous marriage, penalty, § 15-3-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Marriage Before Previous Divorce Becomes Final.

A marriage entered into after a petition for divorce from a previous spouse had been granted to one of the parties, but before the decision in such divorce proceedings became final was void; but where the parties continued to live together and cohabit after the removal of such impediment, there was a common law marriage. Holgate v. United Elec. Rys., 47 R.I. 337 , 133 A. 243, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1926).

Marriage in Good Faith.

This section had impliedly been modified by a statute providing for the legitimation of issue, now repealed, and the children of a bigamous marriage into which one of the parties had entered in good faith without knowledge of the married status of the other were legitimate. Bernier v. Bernier, 101 R.I. 697 , 227 A.2d 112, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 823 (1967).

Marriage While Former Spouse Living.

A marriage contracted while the former spouse of one of the parties was living was absolutely void and not merely voidable. Mathewson v. Mathewson, 18 R.I. 456 , 28 A. 801, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1894).

Collateral References.

Enforcement of antenuptial contract or settlement conditioned upon marriage, where marriage was subsequently declared void. 46 A.L.R.3d 1403.

Liability of one putative spouse to other for wrongfully inducing entry into or cohabitation under illegal, void, or nonexistent marriage. 72 A.L.R.2d 956.

Mental capacity to marry. 82 A.L.R.2d 1040.

Presumption as to validity of second marriage. 14 A.L.R.2d 7.

Presumption from lapse of time, of death of spouse, validity of marriage in reliance upon, celebrated while spouse by former marriage of one of the parties was living and undivorced. 93 A.L.R. 345, 144 A.L.R. 747.

15-1-6. Declaration of validity of marriage by divorced person.

Any marriage, which may have been deemed and held void because a former wife or husband of either of the parties to the marriage, divorced from the party by final decree, was living at the time of the marriage, may be declared valid and binding upon the parties by decree of the family court, if the marriage was in all other respects lawful. The decree may be entered at the discretion of the court upon the petition of either party to the marriage, or of any of the issue of the marriage, and after a hearing and notice to all persons known to have an interest in the marriage as the court may deem necessary, and the decree may declare that the issue of the marriage shall be deemed legitimate and that the widow of any party to the marriage shall be entitled to her life estate created by chapter 25 of title 33.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 5; P.L. 1927, ch. 1066, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 15-1-6 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

Collateral References.

Cohabitation of persons ceremonially married after learning of facts negativing dissolution of previous marriage of one, as affecting right to annulment. 4 A.L.R.2d 542.

Judicial declaration of validity or existence of common-law marriage. 92 A.L.R.2d 1102.

15-1-7. Marriage codification.

Marriage is the legally recognized union of two (2) people. Terms relating to the marital relationship or familial relationships shall be construed consistently with this section for all purposes throughout the law, whether in the context of statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil law.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

15-1-8. Recognition of relationships entered into in another state or jurisdiction.

If two (2) persons are within the jurisdiction of Rhode Island and have a legal union other than a marriage that provides substantially the same rights, benefits and responsibilities as a marriage and the union was validly entered into in another state or jurisdiction and the union is not prohibited by this chapter then they shall be afforded the same rights, benefits and responsibilities as a valid marriage in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

15-1-9. Applicability of state laws to marriages not recognized by federal law.

  1. Any provision of Rhode Island law that refers to, adopts, or relies upon provisions of federal law, including, but not limited to, those in title 44, shall apply to parties recognized as married under the laws of this state, as if federal laws recognized such marriages in the same manner as Rhode Island law.
  2. Notwithstanding the unavailability of federal financial participation, no person who is recognized as a spouse under the laws of this state shall be denied benefits that are otherwise available to spouses under Rhode Island law, including, but not limited to, those in chapters 40-8 to 40-8.10 inclusive, due to the provisions of 1 U.S.C. § 7 or any other federal non-recognition of spouses of the same sex.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Chapter 2 Marriage Licenses

15-2-1. License required — Proof of divorce — Obligation of clerk to issue license.

  1. Persons intending to be joined together in marriage in this state must first obtain a license from the clerk of the town or city in which:
    1. Either party to the proposed marriage resides; or
    2. The proposed marriage is to be performed, if both parties are nonresidents of this state.
  2. Before any license shall be issued to any person who, having been previously married or a party to another relationship that provides substantially the same rights, benefits and responsibilities as a marriage, has been divorced, the person shall present to the town or city clerk an authenticated copy of the decree granting the divorce or an authenticated copy of the final dissolution of the previous relationship.
  3. The town or city clerk shall issue a license to any person eligible to marry under the provisions of chapter 15-1.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 10; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 10; P.L. 1909, ch. 430, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1927, ch. 1064, § 1; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-1 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 112, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Cross References.

Divorce decree, time becomes final, § 15-5-23 .

Comparative Legislation.

Marriage licenses:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-24 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 19 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Common-Law Marriages.

The statutory provisions relating to marriage do not forbid common-law marriages and such marriages are valid. Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry, 20 F. 281, 1884 U.S. App. LEXIS 2197 (C.C.D.R.I. 1884); Holgate v. United Elec. Rys., 47 R.I. 337 , 133 A. 243, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1926).

Where parties lived together for a few months but it did not appear that they had ever obtained the reputation of being husband and wife, there was not sufficient proof to establish a common-law marriage even though the man spoke of the woman as his wife, in his will. Odd Fellows' Benefit Ass'n v. Carpenter, 17 R.I. 720 , 24 A. 578, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1892).

Common-law marriages have long been recognized in this state and the abrogation of a common-law right by statute requires that the legislative intent to do so be clearly expressed, and since there was no finding of such expression in chapters 2 and 3 of this title, the court concluded that common-law marriages are valid. Souza v. O'Hara, 121 R.I. 88 , 395 A.2d 1060, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 763 (1978).

Statutory provisions relative to the licensing and solemnization of marriages are directory and are unrelated to the status of common-law marriages. Souza v. O'Hara, 121 R.I. 88 , 395 A.2d 1060, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 763 (1978).

— Executory Agreement to Marry.

A mere executory agreement to marry does not become consummated by copulation unless the parties so intend. Peck v. Peck, 12 R.I. 485 , 1880 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1880).

Recording.

Since the registrar of vital statistics is a ministerial officer, possessing limited discretion, whose duties are specifically defined by the legislature, such officer is only required to record those marriages performed in accordance with the licensing and solemnization provisions of chapters 2 and 3 of title 15, and is under no legal duty to record common-law marriages. Souza v. O'Hara, 121 R.I. 88 , 395 A.2d 1060, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 763 (1978).

Collateral References.

Common-law marriage between parties previously divorced. 82 A.L.R.2d 688.

Judicial declaration of validity or existence of common-law marriage. 92 A.L.R.2d 1102.

Overcoming presumption as to marriage license. 34 A.L.R. 493, 77 A.L.R. 740.

Power of attorney to apply for or receive license for another. 135 A.L.R. 800.

15-2-1.1. Statewide electronic marriage license system.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 15-2-1 , at such time as the director of health adopts and implements a statewide electronic marriage license issuance and record registration system, the license may be obtained from the clerk in any city or town.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 200, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 258, § 3.

15-2-2. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 24; P.L. 1917, ch. 1531, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-2 ; Repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 28, effective April 14, 2004.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-2-2 concerned waiting period not required of female immigrants. The section was deemed obsolete because of the 1975 amendment to § 15-2-1 , which eliminated the formerly required waiting period.

15-2-3. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 191, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 91, § 1, effective July 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-2-3 concerned physical examinations, blood test regulations and HIV test offer.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 15-2-3 (G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 180; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-3 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 121, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 405, § 6), concerning physical examination and blood test requirements, was repealed by P.L. 1994, ch. 191, § 1, effective July 8, 1994.

15-2-3.1. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome warning law.

With each marriage license, the town or city clerk shall provide information describing the causes and effects of fetal alcohol syndrome.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 624, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 258, § 1.

15-2-4, 15-2-5. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 180; G.L. 1956, §§ 15-2-4 and 15-2-5; P.L. 1975, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 120); Repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 404, § 8, effective August 9, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 15-2-4 and 15-2-5 concerned free physical examinations and examination of residents marrying outside the state.

15-2-6. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-6 ; Repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 200, § 2, effective June 29, 2004; P.L. 2004, ch. 258, § 2, effective July 1, 2004.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-2-6 concerned confidentiality of physical examination and laboratory records pertaining to marriage licenses.

15-2-7. Form and contents of certificates, reports, and other returns.

The forms of certificates, reports, and other returns required by this chapter, or by regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter, shall include as a minimum the items recommended by the federal agency responsible for national vital statistics, subject to approval of and modification by the state director of health. Both parties shall subscribe to the truth of data in the application in the presence of the local registrar or his or her assistant.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 10; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 10; P.L. 1909, ch. 430, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1927, ch. 1064, § 1; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-7 ; R.P.L. 1957, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

15-2-8. Period of validity of license — Return if unused.

The license required by § 15-2-1 shall be valid for three (3) months after the date of issue, and if unused at the expiration of the three (3) months, the party or parties having possession of the license shall immediately return it to the town or city clerk from whom it was obtained.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1927, ch. 1064, § 1; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-8 .

15-2-9. License fee — Presentation of license to person performing ceremony.

For issuing the license the town or city clerk shall collect a fee of fourteen dollars ($14.00). The license shall be presented to the minister, elder, justice, warden, or other person who performs the marriage ceremony. The city or town shall retain six dollars ($6.00) of the fourteen dollars ($14.00) for its own use and in lieu of any reimbursement to which it may be entitled pursuant to § 45-13-7 . The city or town shall forward the eight dollars ($8.00) balance of the fourteen dollars ($14.00) to the general treasurer of the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 10; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 10; P.L. 1909, ch. 430, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1927, ch. 1064, § 1; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-9 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 230, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 414, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 65, art. 59, § 1.

15-2-9.1. Additional fee for family and children trust fund.

For each license the town or city clerk shall charge and receive an additional fee of ten dollars ($10.00), of which he or she shall retain two dollars ($2.00) and shall transmit eight dollars ($8.00) to the general treasurer for deposit to the credit of the family and children trust fund created by § 42-72-30 . Each clerk shall keep an accurate account of all fees charged and received under this section and shall transmit all sums due to the general treasurer at least monthly in the manner and with the forms which the general treasurer shall prescribe.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 220, § 2.

15-2-10. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 287, § 10; P.L. 1938, ch. 2580, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-10 ; P.L. 1964, ch. 29, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 91, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 200, § 2, effective June 29, 2004; P.L. 2004, ch. 258, § 2, effective July 1, 2004.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-2-10 concerned waiver of license requirements for physical examination and blood tests.

15-2-11. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 11; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 11; P.L. 1909, ch. 430, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 11; P.L. 1937, ch. 2504, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 11; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-11 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 63; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 41; P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 3; repealed by P.L. 2021, ch. 39, § 1, effective June 7, 2021; repealed by P.L. 2021, ch. 40, § 1, effective June 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-2-11 concerned consent and procedure required for marriage license to minors and persons under guardianship.

15-2-12. Recording of license information.

The several town and city clerks shall record, in separate books to be kept by them for that purpose, the information furnished to them and subscribed to as provided in §§ 15-2-1 15-2-10 , except as otherwise provided in these sections.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 14; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-12 .

15-2-13. Registrar in city of Providence.

In the city of Providence, the registrar of births, deaths, and marriages shall perform the duties devolved upon town and city clerks by the provisions of chapters 2 and 3 of this title, and all information provided by chapters 2 and 3 to be furnished to town and city clerks shall be furnished to the registrar in Providence.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 15; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 15-2-13 .

15-2-14. Minimum age for marriage license.

A marriage license shall only be granted to a person of full age. Attaining the age of eighteen (18) years shall be deemed full legal age pursuant to § 15-12-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 39, § 2, effective June 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 40, § 2, effective June 7, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 39, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 40, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 3 Solemnization of Marriages

15-3-1 — 15-3-4. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, §§ 6, 6*, 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, §§ 6, 6*, 7; P.L. 1909, ch. 430, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, §§ 6, 7; P.L. 1927, ch. 1005, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, §§ 6, 7; G.L. 1956, §§ 15-3-1 — 15-3-4; Repealed by P.L. 1981, ch. 363, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 15-3-1 — 15-3-4 concerned clergyman registrations.

15-3-5. Officials empowered to join persons in marriage.

Every ordained clergy or elder in good standing; every justice of the supreme court, superior court, family court, workers’ compensation court, district court or traffic tribunal; the clerk of the supreme court; every clerk, administrative clerk, general chief clerk, or administrator of the supreme court, superior court, family court, district court, or traffic tribunal; magistrates, special or general magistrates of the superior court, family court, traffic tribunal or district court; administrative clerks of the district court; administrators of the workers’ compensation court; every former justice or judge and former administrator of these courts; every former chief clerk of the district court; every former clerk, administrative clerk, or general chief clerk of a superior court; the secretary of the senate; elected clerks of the general assembly; any former secretary of the senate; any former elected clerk of the general assembly who retires after July 1, 2007; judges of the United States appointed pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution; bankruptcy judges appointed pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution; and United States magistrate judges appointed pursuant to federal law, may join persons in marriage in any city or town in this state; and every justice and every former justice of the municipal courts of the cities and towns in this state and of the police court of the town of Johnston and the administrator of the Johnston municipal court, while he or she is serving as an administrator, and every probate judge and every former probate judge may join persons in marriage in any city or town in this state, and wardens of the town of New Shoreham may join persons in marriage in New Shoreham. In addition to the foregoing, the governor shall designate, upon application, any person eighteen (18) years or older to solemnize a particular marriage on a particular date and in a particular city or town, and may for cause at any time revoke such designation. In the case of persons so designated by the governor, the secretary of state shall promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement and carry out the provisions of this section. The secretary of state shall issue a certificate of designation upon payment of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for applications delivered by mail, facsimile, or hand. All applications submitted electronically shall pay a fee of twenty dollars ($20.00). Upon payment, a certificate of designation shall be issued within twenty-one (21) days. The certificate shall expire upon completion of the solemnization. The fees collected under this section shall be deposited into the general fund.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 8; C.P.A. 1905, § 1228; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 8; P.L. 1922, ch. 2207, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 8; P.L. 1932, ch. 1896, § 1; P.L. 1933, ch. 2042, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 8; P.L. 1949, ch. 2290, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-5 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 290, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 326, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 327, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 382, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 363, § 2; P.L. 1987, ch. 489, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 561, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 607, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 132, § 5; P.L. 1991, ch. 205, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 103, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 199, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 249, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 451, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 42; P.L. 2004, ch. 444, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 85, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 89, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 351, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 484, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 512, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 84, § 1, effective January 1, 2022; P.L. 2021, ch. 85, § 1, effective January 1, 2022; P.L. 2021, ch. 86, § 1, effective June 25, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 87, § 1, effective June 25, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 321, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 351, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 484, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 512, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by four acts ( P.L. 2021, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 85, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 86, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 87, § 1 ) as passed by the 2021 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2021, ch. 84, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 85, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 86, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 87, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Delayed Effective Dates.

P.L. 2021, ch. 84, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2022.

P.L. 2021, ch. 85, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2022.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Family Court Act.

The family court act was intended to divest the superior court of its judicial powers over divorce and domestic relations, but its passage did not affect the ministerial power of joining persons in marriage, and the justices and clerks of the superior court have retained that power as set forth in this section, § 8-10-43 , only extending those powers to the family court. In re Opinion to Governor, 93 R.I. 211 , 172 A.2d 596, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1961).

15-3-6. Marriages after the manner of Friends, according to Jewish rites, or spiritual assembly of Baha’is.

Any marriage which may be had and solemnized among the people called Quakers, or Friends, in the manner and form used or practiced in their societies, or among persons professing the Jewish religion, according to their rites and ceremonies, or by a local spiritual assembly of the Baha’is according to the usage of the religious community, shall be good and valid in law; and wherever the words “minister” and “elder” are used in this chapter, they shall be held to include all of the persons connected with the Society of Friends, or Quakers, and with the Jewish religion, and with the Baha’i faith, who perform or have charge of the marriage ceremony according to their rites and ceremonies.

History of Section. G. L. 1896, ch. 191, § 9; G. L. 1909, ch. 243, § 9; G. L. 1923, ch. 287, § 9; G. L. 1938, ch. 415, § 9; G. L. 1956, § 15-3-6 ; P. L. 1970, ch. 72, § 1.

15-3-6.1. Protection of freedom of religion in marriage.

  1. Consistent with the guarantees of freedom of religion set forth by both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution, each religious institution has exclusive control over its own religious doctrine, policy, and teachings regarding who may marry within its faith, and on what terms, as long as such policies are consistent with §§ 15-1-2 , 15-1-3 , 15-1-4 , and 15-1-5 . No court or other state or local governmental body, entity, agency, or commission shall compel, prevent, or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s decisions about marriage eligibility within that particular faith’s tradition.
  2. Consistent with the guarantees of freedom of religion set forth by both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution, no regularly licensed or ordained clergyperson, minister, elder, priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of any church or religious denomination as described and authorized in §§ 15-3-5 and 15-3-6 to officiate at a civil marriage, is required to solemnize any marriage. A regularly licensed or ordained clergyperson, minister, elder, priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of any church or religious denomination shall be immune from any civil claim or cause of action based on a refusal to solemnize any marriage under this chapter. No state agency or local government may base a decision to penalize, withhold benefits from, or refuse to contract with any church or religious denomination on the refusal of a person associated with such church or religious denomination to solemnize a marriage under this chapter.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religions organization, association, or society, and any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization, association, or society, or a fraternal benefit or service organization that has among its stated purposes the promotion and support or protection of a religious organization, association, or society and that restricts membership to practicing members of that religious organization, association, or society, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to:
    1. The solemnization of a marriage or the celebration of a marriage, and such solemnization or celebration is in violation of its religious beliefs and faith; or
    2. The promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs or services, that violates the religious doctrine or teachings of religious organization, association, or society. Any refusal by an entity described above or an officer, employee, or member thereof acting in an official capacity on behalf of that entity to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action. This subsection shall not be construed to limit a religious organization, association, or society, or a fraternal benefit or service organization as described in this subsection, from selectively providing services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to some individuals with respect to solemnization or celebration of a marriage but not to others.
  4. Nothing in the marriage laws of this state shall be deemed or construed to limit the protections and exemptions provided to religious organizations under §§ 28-5-6(8)(ii) and 34-37-4.2(a) .
  5. A fraternal benefit or service organization that is operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization and a fraternal benefit or service organization that has among its stated purposes the promotion, support, or protection of a religious organization and that restricts its membership to practicing members of that religious organization shall not be required to admit any individual as a member or to provide benefits to any individual. A refusal by a fraternal benefit or service organization by a member, officer, or employee thereof acting in an official capacity on behalf of a society described herein, to admit an individual as a member or to provide benefits related to a marriage that is in violation of the religious doctrine or teachings of the religious organization to which its members are required to adhere, shall not create a civil claim or result in any government action to penalize; withhold benefits from the fraternal benefit or service organization; or discriminate against a society, or a member, officer, or employee described herein.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 49.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 4, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 4 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 71 provides that the amendments to this section by that act, other than the amendments to subsection (d), take effect on December 31, 2014.

Retroactive Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 528, § 71 provides that the amendments to § 15-3-6.1(d) by that act shall take effect upon passage [July 8, 2014] and be retroactive to January 1, 2014.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

15-3-7. Presentation of marriage license.

No minister, elder, justice, warden, or other person shall join any person in marriage until the persons to be married have presented to him or her the license named in chapter 2 of this title, and he or she has signed the certificate appended to the license.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 12; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-7 .

Collateral References.

Proxy marriage. 170 A.L.R. 947.

15-3-8. Witnesses to ceremony.

The solemnization of marriage shall be in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses besides the minister, elder, justice, or warden officiating.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 17; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-8 .

15-3-9. Statement of objections to marriage.

If any person has any lawful objection to the marriage of any two (2) persons, he or she may state the objection in writing, under his or her hand, to the minister, elder, justice, or warden about to solemnize the marriage, at which time the minister, elder, justice, or warden shall proceed no further in the marriage until the lawful objection has been removed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 18; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-9 .

15-3-10. Penalty for marriage without license or despite impediment.

Every minister, elder, justice, warden, or other person who joins persons in marriage, without first receiving the license required by chapter 2 of this title, containing the required information, or whenever the solemnization of the marriage has been lawfully objected to and the impediment is not removed, shall be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 19; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-10 .

15-3-11. Knowingly performing bigamous marriage.

Every person authorized by law to join persons in marriage, who joins in marriage any woman or man that he or she knows to have a husband or wife living, shall be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 21; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-11 .

Cross References.

Bigamous marriages void, § 15-1-5 .

Penalty for bigamy, § 11-6-1 .

15-3-12. Endorsement and return of license.

  1. Every minister, elder, justice, warden, or other person who joins any persons in marriage, shall:
  2. Endorse the “License and Certificate of Marriage” form, prescribed pursuant to § 15-2-7 , presented to him or her by the persons, as provided in § 15-3-7 , and certify that the persons have been joined in marriage by him or her in accordance with the laws of the state of Rhode Island; and
  3. Complete all the information on the “License and Certificate of Marriage” and file the form within seventy-two (72) hours following the date of the marriage with the clerk in the town or city from which the license was issued.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 13; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 13; P.L. 1927, ch. 1064, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-12 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 100, § 2; P.L. 1969, ch. 89, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 200, § 4; P.L. 2004, ch. 258, § 4.

Cross References.

Form of certificates, § 23-3-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Unauthorized Entry by Town Clerk.

An entry made by a town clerk in a manner other than that authorized by the statute may not be received as evidence of the time of marriage unless there is some evidence to show that such entry originated from information supplied by the family. Viall v. Smith, 6 R.I. 417 , 1860 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1860).

15-3-13. Filing of return of marriage.

The town or city clerk to whom the return of marriage provided for in § 15-3-12 is sent shall carefully file and preserve the return.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 16; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-13 .

Cross References.

Fees of town clerk, § 45-7-6 .

Recording of certificate, § 23-3-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Registrar of Vital Statistics.

Where the registrar of vital statistics is a ministerial officer, possessing limited discretion, whose duties are specifically defined by the Legislature, such officer is only required to record those marriages performed in accordance with the licensing and solemnization provisions of chapters 2 and 3 of title 15, and is under no legal duty to record common-law marriages. Souza v. O'Hara, 121 R.I. 88 , 395 A.2d 1060, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 763 (1978).

15-3-14. Neglect of duty by person performing ceremony.

Every minister, elder, justice, warden, or other person authorized to join persons in marriage, including those authorized to join in marriage according to the Jewish religion, who fails to perform any of the duties devolved upon him or her by this chapter, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) with the exception of the penalties for the violations contained in §§ 15-3-10 , 15-3-11 , 15-3-15 and 15-3-16 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 20; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-14 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 42.

15-3-15. Marriages valid despite irregularities — Penalty for marriage without compliance.

  1. No marriage solemnized before a person professing to have a license to join persons in marriage as required by this chapter, or professing to be a justice of the supreme, superior, or family court, or a warden of the town of New Shoreham, or solemnized in the Society of Friends, or among persons professing the Jewish religion or Baha’i faith according to their respective rites and ceremonies, shall be deemed or adjudged to be void, nor shall the validity of the marriage be in any way affected by want of jurisdiction or authority in the person or Society nor by reason of noncompliance with any of the requirements of this chapter, if the marriage is in other respects lawful and has been performed with a full belief on the part of the persons so married, or either of them, that they have been lawfully joined in marriage.
  2. But whoever gives, or procures to be given, any false information as to the requirements under §§ 15-2-1 15-2-10 , or whoever is married without duly proceeding as is required by chapters 1 — 3 of this title, shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 22; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1228; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-15 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 64.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Common-Law Marriages.

This section renders the requirements as to the formalities of a marriage directory only, and common-law marriages are valid in this state. Holgate v. United Elec. Rys., 47 R.I. 337 , 133 A. 243, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1926).

Collateral References.

Validity of solemnized marriage as affected by defective license or license wrongfully issued or obtained. 61 A.L.R.2d 847.

Validity of marriage as affected by lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it. 13 A.L.R.4th 1323.

15-3-16. Solemnization of marriage without authority.

Every person who solemnizes a marriage without being legally authorized to do so shall be fined five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 191, § 23; P.L. 1898, ch. 549, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 243, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 287, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 415, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 15-3-16 .

15-3-17. Court orders regarding invalid marriages.

If, as the result of a court decision pursuant to chapter 6 of title 11, chapters 1 — 3 of this title, or chapter 3 of title 23, any marriage which has occurred in Rhode Island is declared invalid, the court shall order the state registrar of vital records to mark “invalid” the original marriage record on file at the division of vital records and to note the invalidity of the marriage on all other files or references to the marriage.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 198, § 1.

Chapter 3.1 Civil Unions

15-3.1-1. Definitions.

  1. “Certificate of civil union” means a document that certifies that the persons named on the certificate have established a civil union in compliance with this chapter.
  2. “Civil union” means a legal union between two individuals of the same sex established pursuant to this chapter.
  3. “Party to a civil union” means a person who has established a civil union pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-2. Eligibility.

Persons shall be eligible to enter into a civil union only if both such persons are:

  1. At least eighteen (18) years of age;
  2. Of the same sex;
  3. Not a party to another civil union or a spouse in a marriage with any other person;
  4. Not in a family relationship within the degrees stated in Rhode Island general laws § 15-1-1 or § 15-1-2 ; and
  5. Neither person is mentally incompetent at the time of the civil union.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-3. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 6; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 6, effective August 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-3.1-3 concerned license requirements.

15-3.1-4. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 6; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 6, effective August 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-3.1-4 concerned certification of civil unions.

15-3.1-5. Conscience and religious organizations protected.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no religious or denominational organization, no organization operated for charitable or educational purpose which is supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, and no individual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that employment, shall be required:
    1. To provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization, certification, or celebration of any civil union; or
    2. To solemnize or certify any civil union; or
    3. To treat as valid any civil union;

      if such providing, solemnizing, certifying, or treating as valid would cause such organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.

  2. No organization or individual as described in subsection (a) above who fails or refuses to provide, solemnize, certify, or treat as valid, as described in subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) above, persons in a civil union, shall be subject to a fine, penalty, or other cause of action for such failure or refusal.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-6. Benefits, protections, and responsibilities.

A party to a civil union lawfully entered into pursuant to this chapter shall have all the rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law, whether derived from statutes, administrative rules, court decisions, the common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law as people joined together pursuant to chapter 15-3.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-7. References and inclusions.

A party to a civil union shall be included in any definition or use of any term that denotes the spousal relationship, whether or not gender specific, as those or related terms designating that relationship are used throughout the laws of the State of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-8. Reciprocity.

A civil union or registered domestic partnership that extends benefits and responsibilities without the status of marriage and is legally entered into in another jurisdiction shall be recognized in Rhode Island as a civil union; provided, that the relationship meets the eligibility requirements of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-9. Dissolution of civil unions.

The family court, as established by Rhode Island general laws § 8-10-3 , shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings regarding dissolution of civil unions. In all relevant respects, the dissolution of civil unions shall follow the procedures and be subject to the substantive rights and obligations outlined in chapter 15-5.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-10. Requirement of department of health — Civil unions.

The department of health, office of vital statistics shall draft and distribute applications for civil unions to every town and city within the state.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 501, § 8.

15-3.1-11. Severability.

If any part of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is adjudged invalid, the adjudication or application shall not affect the validity of this act as a whole or any other part.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 198, § 1.

15-3.1-12. Merger of civil union into marriage by action of the parties.

  1. On and after the effective date of this section, two (2) persons who are parties to a civil union entered into pursuant to this chapter may apply for and be issued a marriage license and have such marriage solemnized pursuant to chapters 15-1 to 15-3 of the general laws, provided such persons are otherwise eligible to marry under chapter 15-1 as amended herein, and the parties to the marriage will be the same as the parties to the civil union. After the solemnization of such marriage, and upon filing of the license and certificate of marriage with the clerk in the town or city from which the license was issued pursuant to § 15-2-1 , of the civil union of such persons shall be merged into the marriage by operation of law as of the date of the recording of the marriage certificate and shall be effective as of the date of the recording of the marriage certificate.
  2. Such parties may also apply to the clerk of the town or city in which their civil union is recorded to have their civil union legally designated and recorded as a marriage, without any additional requirements of payment of marriage licensing fees or solemnization contained in chapters 15-1 to 15-3 of the general laws, provided that such parties’ civil union was not previously dissolved or annulled. Upon application, the parties shall be issued a marriage certificate and the civil union of such persons shall be merged into the marriage by operation of law as of the date of the recording of the marriage certificate and shall be effective as of the date of the recording of the marriage certificate.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 5; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 5, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 5 enacted identical versions of this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

15-3.1-13. Recognized date of marriage.

For purposes of determining the legal rights and responsibilities involving individuals who previously entered into a civil union in this state, and whose civil union has merged into a marriage under this chapter, the date of the recording of the marriage certificate shall be the operative date by which legal rights and responsibilities are determined.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 5; P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 5, and P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 5 enacted identical versions of this section.

Severability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 4, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2013, ch. 5, § 7 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Chapter 4 Married Women’s Rights

15-4-1. Ownership of separate property.

The real estate, chattels real, and personal estate which are the property of any woman before marriage, or which may become the property of any woman after marriage, or which may be acquired by her own industry, including damages recovered in suits or proceedings for her benefit and compensation for her property taken for public use, and the proceeds of all such property, shall be and remain her sole and separate property free from control of her husband.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Rights of married women:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-36.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 209, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Action Against Husband.

A wife cannot maintain action against her husband for personal injuries caused by his negligence. Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291 , 117 A. 357, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1922) (abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal immunity for torts arising out of motor vehicle collisions).

A wife could not maintain an action against her husband to remove him from the home they had mutually established where she had voluntarily separated from her husband without consent or justification, even though the house was the sole property of the wife. Kelley v. Kelley, 51 R.I. 173 , 153 A. 314, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1931).

Notwithstanding the statute conferring upon a married woman separate property rights in causes of action after her marriage, a wife was not entitled to maintain an action against her husband for tortious acts allegedly committed before the marriage. Benevides v. Kelly, 90 R.I. 310 , 157 A.2d 821, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1960) (abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal immunity for torts arising out of motor vehicle collisions).

The Rhode Island Supreme Court abrogated the judicial doctrine of interspousal immunity at least as to claims arising out of motor vehicle collisions. Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299 , 388 A.2d 1, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 679 (1978), (overruling to this extent, Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291 , 117 A. 357, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1922) and Benevides v. Kelly, 90 R.I. 310 , 157 A.2d 821 (1960)).

Adverse Possession by Husband.

The occupancy of a husband is not adverse to the title of his wife for purposes of acquiring title by possession. Kelley v. Kelley, 51 R.I. 173 , 153 A. 314, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1931).

Attachment for Debt of Husband.

A husband does not have an attachable interest in real estate belonging to his wife. Greenwich Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 11 R.I. 124 , 1875 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1875).

Where the husband used funds of his wife to purchase property under an agreement to place property in the name of the wife, but delayed doing so for approximately a year, the wife could enjoin creditors of the husband from conveying property seized under execution, where the property was placed in the name of the wife prior to judgments. Garner v. Second Nat'l Bank, 151 U.S. 420, 14 S. Ct. 390, 38 L. Ed. 218, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2068 (1894).

Choses in Action.

A claim for board furnished by a married woman separated from her husband was the sole property of the wife. Berry v. Teel, 12 R.I. 267 , 1879 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1879).

This section gives a married woman the power to release a claim for personal injuries without the consent of her husband. Cooney v. Lincoln, 20 R.I. 183 , 37 A. 1031, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1897).

A debt due to a married woman, arising out of a contract under which she agreed with her brothers to take care of their mother, was property of the wife and could be sued for by her alone. Ash v. Isaacson, 59 R.I. 407 , 195 A. 700, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1937).

The word “property” in this section has been construed as having been used in a broad sense and to include a chose in action owned by a woman at the time of her marriage. Benevides v. Kelly, 90 R.I. 310 , 157 A.2d 821, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1960) (abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal immunity in actions for torts arising out of motor vehicle collisions).

A married woman has a separate property right in the cause of action which accrued to her by reason of her husband’s tortious act which occurred prior to her marriage to him. The cause of action did not abate by reason of her marriage. Benevides v. Kelly, 90 R.I. 310 , 157 A.2d 821, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1960) (abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal immunity in actions for torts arising out of motor vehicle collisions).

Estates by Entirety.

Nothing in this act limits the right of a married woman to take an estate by the entirety in land. Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452 , 25 A.2d 354, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1942).

A husband’s interest in an estate by the entirety was not subject during the time of the marriage to the levy and sale on execution based on judgment against the husband alone. Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452 , 25 A.2d 354, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1942).

Bankruptcy court did not violate § 15-4-1 of the Married Women’s Rights Act in valuing a Chapter 7 debtor’s contingent future expectancy interest in real estate at 100 percent where the basis for the valuation was the fact that real estate was subject to a tenancy by the entirety. In re Ryan, 282 B.R. 742, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16738 (D.R.I. 2002).

Probate Contests.

This section did not destroy the right of a husband to contest the probate of his wife’s will, even in cases where he has not the right to administer on intestacy. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590 , 30 A. 470, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1894).

Voting Rights.

Before the birth of issue a husband has not such an interest in his wife’s real estate as to qualify him as a property owner for voting purposes. In re Voting Laws, 12 R.I. 586 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1878).

An estate by the curtesy initiate is a sufficient interest to qualify a husband as a property owner for voting purposes. In re Voting Laws, 12 R.I. 586 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1878).

Collateral References.

Rights and incidents where real property purchased with wife’s funds is placed in spouses’ joint names. 43 A.L.R.2d 917.

15-4-2. Receipt of property and release of debts by married woman.

The sole and separate receipt, order, or discharge of the wife for the payment and delivery to her, or to any person upon her order, of her own property, or the rents and profits of her property, including money on deposit in any savings bank or institution for savings, or other banking institution, and for the payment of any debt or damage to her belonging from any person or corporation, whether secured by mortgage or otherwise, shall be a sufficient discharge for it; and she may, in her own name or by her own separate deed, discharge any such mortgage or security.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claim for Personal Injuries.

A wife was competent to release a claim for personal injuries without the joinder of her husband. Cooney v. Lincoln, 20 R.I. 183 , 37 A. 1031, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1897).

Minors.

This section does not apply to a married woman who is still a minor. In re O'Brien, 11 R.I. 419 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1877).

Collateral References.

Marriage as extinguishing contractual indebtedness between parties. 45 A.L.R.2d 722.

15-4-3. Power to contract.

A married woman may make any contract the same as if she were single and unmarried, and with the same rights and liabilities.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 3; P.L. 1896, ch. 335, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Capacity to Contract.

A married woman could, with her husband’s acquiescence, contract, in consideration of payments to her, to provide support in the marital home for another person. Ash v. Isaacson, 59 R.I. 407 , 195 A. 700, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1937).

— Bills and Notes.

A married woman who indorsed her husband’s promissory note was liable as an accommodation indorser. Phenix Nat'l Bank v. Raia, 68 R.I. 348 , 28 A.2d 20, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1942).

— Contracts With Husband.

A married woman could enter into a valid contract with her husband by terms of which she agreed to discontinue a petition for divorce. Darcey v. Darcey, 29 R.I. 384 , 71 A. 595, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1909).

Conflict of Laws.

After passage of this section courts could enforce the foreign contract of a married woman made before the passage of this section if the contract was valid by the law of the state where made. Case v. Dodge, 18 R.I. 661 , 29 A. 785, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1894).

Enforcement of Contracts.

This section renders a married woman liable in a suit on contractual debts without the joinder of her husband as defendant. Merriam v. White, 18 R.I. 727 , 30 A. 601, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1894).

An agreement between husband and wife may be enforced in an action at law. Heastan v. Heastan, 70 R.I. 466 , 40 A.2d 720, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 74 (1944).

Collateral References.

Acknowledgment of contract of married woman charging separate estate. 1 A.L.R. 1095.

Notice to salesman that purchase is made on wife’s credit as imputable to principal. 43 A.L.R. 752.

Recovery for services rendered by persons living in apparent relation of husband and wife without express agreement for compensation. 94 A.L.R.3d 552.

15-4-4. Conveyance of property to or from husband or other persons.

A married woman may sell and convey directly to, or may take directly from, her husband or any other person any estate or interest in any real or personal property in the same manner and with the same effect as if she were single and unmarried. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to support any transfer made between husband and wife in fraud of creditors.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-4 .

Cross References.

Voidable conveyances, § 6-16-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This statute was not unconstitutional as applied to land acquired after the effective date of the statute. Taft v. Cannon, 19 R.I. 488 , 36 A. 1134 (1896).

Conveyances by Husband.

A husband seised of real estate in fee simple can deed the real estate to himself and wife as joint tenants. Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R.I. 134 , 136 A. 241, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1927).

Tenancy by Entirety.

This section does not limit the right of a married woman to take an estate by the entirety in land. Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452 , 25 A.2d 354, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1942).

Collateral References.

Cloud on title, invalid conveyance by married woman to her husband as. 78 A.L.R. 282.

Community property, conveyance of interest in, by one spouse to other. 37 A.L.R. 282.

Delivery of deed without manual transfer or record. 129 A.L.R. 25, 87 A.L.R.2d 787.

Marital misconduct as affecting conveyance or transfer to wife. 29 A.L.R. 203.

Marriage as extinguishing contractual indebtedness between parties. 45 A.L.R.2d 722.

Oral contract to convey, may part performance of, be predicated upon possession or improvement by other spouse. 74 A.L.R. 218.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions in deed from wife to husband by which title was to revert in event of conditions affecting marital relations. 116 A.L.R. 1400.

15-4-5. Acknowledgment of deeds and letters of attorney.

The deed of a married woman conveying her separate interest in any lands, tenements, or hereditaments shall be acknowledged by her in the same manner as if she were single and unmarried. If any deed affecting her right of life estate created by chapter 25 of title 33 in any estate of her husband during his life is executed by attorney of the wife, the letter of attorney shall be acknowledged in the same manner as if she were single and unmarried.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-5 .

Cross References.

Acknowledgment of deeds, § 34-12-1 .

Collateral References.

Necessity of privy examination of married women. 1 A.L.R. 1080.

15-4-6. Release of interest.

A married woman, including a minor, may bar her right of life estate created by chapter 25 of title 33 in any estate of her husband by joining with him in the deed conveying the estate, and releasing her claim to life estate created by chapter 25 of title 33, or by releasing her right of life estate by her separate deed acknowledged in the same manner as provided in § 15-4-5 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 6; P.L. 1947, ch. 1914, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-6 .

Collateral References.

Annuity in lieu of dower, apportionment. 116 A.L.R. 148.

Constitutionality of statutes in relation to dower. 20 A.L.R. 1330.

Desertion or abandonment as affecting dower rights. 139 A.L.R. 488.

Divorce in another state or country as barring dower rights. 168 A.L.R. 793.

Executrix or administratrix, sale of property by widow as, as barring right to dower. 30 A.L.R. 944.

Income tax treatment of payment to spouse for relinguishment of inchoate marital rights in other’s property. 1 A.L.R.2d 1037.

Judgment, prior action in equity in which claim for dower might have been asserted as barring subsequent independent action for dower. 8 A.L.R. 717.

Misconduct of surviving spouse as affecting dower rights. 139 A.L.R. 486.

Mortgage, dower rights of wife who unites with husband in. 12 A.L.R. 1347, 65 A.L.R. 963.

Quitclaim deed as conveying dower right. 44 A.L.R. 1275, 162 A.L.R. 556.

Reformation of instrument as against wife claiming dower. 44 A.L.R. 118, 79 A.L.R.2d 1180.

Relinquishment of dower, acknowledgment, necessity of privy examination of married woman. 1 A.L.R. 1088.

Remarriage as affecting dower rights. 139 A.L.R. 500.

Separation agreement as affecting dower right. 35 A.L.R. 1511, 109 A.L.R. 1178, 34 A.L.R.2d 1043.

Widow of an heir, right to dower where heir dies before decedent’s estate is closed. 23 A.L.R.2d 961.

15-4-7. Testamentary power.

Any married woman of sane mind and not less than eighteen (18) years of age may dispose of her real or personal estate or any portion of her real or personal estate by last will and testament, executed in the manner in which other wills are required to be executed for disposition of like property.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-7 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 65.

Cross References.

Revocation of previous will by marriage, § 33-5-9 .

Collateral References.

Alzheimer’s disease as affecting testamentary capacity. 47 A.L.R.5th 523.

Divorce or annulment as affecting will previously executed by husband or wife. 71 A.L.R.3d 1297.

15-4-8. Rights of spouses in real estate.

The rights of a spouse in the real estate of his or her spouse, as created by chapter 25 of title 33, shall not be impaired by the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 8; P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-8 .

Collateral References.

Conveyance or mortgage by wife without joining husband as affecting curtesy. 14 A.L.R. 35.

Curtesy initiate, or inchoate right of curtesy, as subject to claims of husband’s creditors. 133 A.L.R. 633.

Estate by curtesy in land settled on or conveyed to wife by husband. 30 A.L.R. 1057.

Estates of inheritance subject to condition, defeasance, termination, or expiration, curtesy in. 25 A.L.R.2d 333.

Fee simple conditional, curtesy right of husband in lands held by wife in. 114 A.L.R. 615.

Married Women’s Acts, extent and effect of exception in, as to husband’s right by the curtesy. 29 A.L.R. 1338.

Misconduct of surviving husband as affecting marital rights in wife’s estate. 139 A.L.R. 486.

Separation agreement as affecting right to curtesy. 35 A.L.R. 1526, 34 A.L.R.2d 1044.

15-4-9. Trade or business — Partnership with husband.

A married woman may carry on any trade or business as if she were single and unmarried; but her husband shall not be liable for her debts, contracts, or torts from that trade or business. A husband and wife may be partners in a trading or any other type of partnership.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 9; P.L. 1944, ch. 1397, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-9 .

Collateral References.

Joint adventure, agreement between husband and wife as. 138 A.L.R. 989.

Validity and partnership agreement between husband and wife. 20 A.L.R. 1304, 38 A.L.R. 1264, 157 A.L.R. 652.

15-4-10. Power to act as fiduciary.

A married woman may be, give bond as, and exercise the powers: (1) of trustee, when appointed by deed; (2) of executrix, trustee, or guardian, when appointed under a will or by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (3) of administratrix or guardian, when appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the same manner and with the same rights and liabilities in all respects as if she were single and unmarried, and irrespective of the time of her marriage.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 11; P.L. 1902, ch. 961, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-10 .

Cross References.

Marriage of executrix or administratrix, § 33-8-11 .

15-4-11. Agent for husband — Husband as agent.

The wife may act as agent or attorney of her husband, and the husband may act as the agent or attorney of his wife.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Alleged joint owner’s reliance on R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-4-11 in support of his contention that he could commence an action on behalf of his wife was unavailing because the term “attorney” in that statute actually referred to a power of attorney and did not endow him with the authority to commence an action on behalf of his wife or otherwise represent her in court. Lynch v. First Horizon Home Loans, 154 A.3d 945, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2017).

Collateral References.

Medical services, wife as agent of husband to engage. 71 A.L.R. 659.

15-4-12. Liability for contracts or torts of husband or wife.

The husband shall not be liable by reason of the marital relation: (1) for any contract made or for any tort committed by his wife prior to their marriage; (2) for any contract made after marriage by his wife; (3) for torts committed by his wife after marriage, unless he participates in them or coerces her to do so. The wife or her property shall not be liable for the contracts or the torts of her husband.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-12 .

Cross References.

Witness in criminal case, § 12-17-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Joint Torts.

This section did not render the husband solely liable for his wife’s torts in which he participated. McElroy v. Capron, 24 R.I. 561 , 54 A. 44, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 120 (1902).

Medical Expenses.

This section deals only with voluntary contracts and does not pertain to necessaries. Exceptions to the general principle of nonliability for the legal obligations of a spouse have been carved out when dealing with obligations within family relationships. Liability for the necessarily furnished medical expenses furnished to a spouse is one such exception. Landmark Medical Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 2 (R.I. 1994).

Use of Automobile.

A husband who permits his wife to drive his automobile was not responsible for her negligent actions when driving it exclusively for her own purposes. Landry v. Richmond, 45 R.I. 504 , 124 A. 263, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1924) (decision prior to enactment of §§ 31-31-3 and 31-31-4 ).

Collateral References.

Account stated, authority of husband to bind wife by assent to. 2 A.L.R. 81.

Articles purchased by married woman for which husband is not liable. 114 A.L.R. 910.

Authority of wife to borrow money on husband’s credit. 55 A.L.R.2d 1215.

Detective employed by wife to shadow him, liability of husband for services of. 99 A.L.R.2d 264.

Divorce suit, liability of husband in independent action for services rendered by attorney to wife in. 25 A.L.R. 354, 42 A.L.R. 315.

Fees of real estate broker, liability of married woman or her estate for. 117 A.L.R. 752.

Funeral expenses of husband, wife’s liability for. 57 A.L.R. 400.

Funeral expenses of wife, husband’s liability for. 15 A.L.R. 852, 82 A.L.R.2d 873.

Insanity, husband’s liability for legal services in attempting to restore wife’s capacity after adjudication of. 26 A.L.R. 559.

Modern status of interspousal tort immunity in personal injury and wrongful death actions. 92 A.L.R.3d 901.

Necessaries, liability of husband or wife. 15 A.L.R. 833, 18 A.L.R. 1131, 24 A.L.R. 1483, 27 A.L.R. 554, 60 A.L.R. 1185, 87 A.L.R. 212.

Negligence of one parent contributing to injury or death of child as barring or reducing damages recoverable by other parent for losses suffered by other parent as result of injury or death of child. 26 A.L.R.4th 396.

Officers, liability of community for acts of husband or wife as public official. 10 A.L.R.2d 988.

Tort by one spouse in maintenance of household, liability of the other. 168 A.L.R. 937.

Torts of husband, wife’s liability for. 12 A.L.R. 1459.

Wife, independent tort of, liability of husband for. 27 A.L.R. 1218, 59 A.L.R. 1468.

15-4-13. Liability of property to attachment and levy — Liens.

The property secured to a married woman by this chapter shall be liable to attachment and levy for her debts, and to levy for judgment in any action of tort against her, as if she were single and unmarried; and nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair any lien or right of lien on her property or any remedy provided by law for the enforcement of the lien.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-13 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Estate by Entirety.

This section does not limit the right of a married woman to take an estate by entirety in land. Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452 , 25 A.2d 354, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1942).

A husband’s interest in an estate by the entirety was not subject during the time of the marriage to levy and sale on execution based on a judgment against the husband alone. Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452 , 25 A.2d 354, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1942).

Collateral References.

Cloud on title, execution sale of separate property of debtor’s wife as. 78 A.L.R. 275.

Landlord’s distress for rent on goods of tenant’s wife. 62 A.L.R. 1114.

Lien of vendee for amount paid on purchase price where contract of married woman to convey is invalid. 45 A.L.R. 360, 33 A.L.R.2d 1402.

Mechanics’ liens, ratification as making husband agent for wife in contracting for work performed or materials furnished, so as to permit enforcement of lien against her property. 4 A.L.R. 1052.

Remedy of mortgagee in mortgage of wife’s property by husband in which wife does not join, where proceeds are used to discharge valid lien. 43 A.L.R. 1406, 151 A.L.R. 407.

15-4-14. Proceeding by or against married woman.

  1. In all actions, suits, and proceedings by or against a married woman, she shall sue and be sued alone.
  2. In all actions for injuries to the person, a married woman may sue in her own name and may include in the suit a claim for medical and/or hospital and/or dental expenses incurred in her behalf either in her name or that of her husband.
  3. If the husband pays any or all of his wife’s bills, the party responsible for the injuries may reimburse him directly and will not be required to pay the bills again.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-14 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 176, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Action by Wife Alone.

A suit by a married woman to set aside release was properly brought without joinder of her husband. Corey v. Howard, 19 R.I. 723 , 37 A. 946, 1896 R.I. LEXIS 93 (1896).

Where a married woman provided board under an express contract entered into with her husband’s acquiescence whereby she was to receive payments, action for such payments in her name alone was proper. Ash v. Isaacson, 59 R.I. 407 , 195 A. 700, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1937).

Actions by and Against Husband.

A married woman may maintain an action against her husband for conversion of her personal property. Smith v. Smith, 20 R.I. 556 , 40 A. 417, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1898).

A wife could not maintain an action against her husband for personal injuries sustained by reason of his negligence. Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291 , 117 A. 357, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1922) (abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal immunity for torts arising out of motor vehicle collisions).

A wife could not maintain an action against her husband to remove him from a home they had mutually established where she had voluntarily separated from her husband without consent or justification. Kelley v. Kelley, 51 R.I. 173 , 153 A. 314, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1931).

The statute relating to married women’s rights has not abrogated the common-law rule in its entirety, but as to the extent that the rule enjoins suits by one spouse based on the negligence of the other spouse, it remains the law of this state. Benevides v. Kelly, 90 R.I. 310 , 157 A.2d 821, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1960) (abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal immunity in actions for torts arising out of motor vehicle collisions).

Joinder of Parties in Interest.

This section does not prevent the joinder of husband and wife where both are actual parties in interest. Gorman v. McHale, 24 R.I. 257 , 52 A. 1083, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1902).

A husband and wife could sue jointly to recover on a claim based on a joint account. Mowry v. Dean, 51 R.I. 156 , 152 A. 736, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1931).

Next Friend.

A bill in equity by a married woman by a next friend was improper. Taylor v. Slater, 18 R.I. 797 , 31 A. 165, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1895).

Several Claims.

Where a husband and wife had several but not joint claims, they must sue separately. Gencarelle v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 21 R.I. 216 , 44 A. 174, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1899).

Collateral References.

Medical expenses due to injury to wife as recoverable by her or by husband. 21 A.L.R.3d 1113.

Modern status of interspousal tort immunity in personal injury and wrongful death actions. 92 A.L.R.3d 901.

15-4-15. Effect of coverture on adverse possession cases.

In all causes of action or cases of adverse possession, no exception to the running of the statute of limitations shall be made in favor of a married woman because of her coverture.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-15 .

15-4-16. Property of absent or imprisoned husband.

Whenever a husband has abandoned his wife and been absent from the state for the period of one year or more, or whenever the husband is condemned to imprisonment for one year or more, the wife may petition the superior court, wherever sitting, setting forth these facts. Upon satisfactory proof of these facts on hearing, after any notice that the court shall have required to be given, the court may order that the petitioner may have the rents and income of the property, both real and personal, of the absentee or party imprisoned, and the rents and income shall be applied to the support of the petitioner and their minor children until further order of the court. Control and management shall be exercised through the intervention of a trustee appointed by the court; or, if the property is less than three hundred dollars ($300) in value, the whole or any part of the property may be set over to the petitioner absolutely.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 194, § 20; C.P.A. 1905, §§ 1220, 1227; G.L. 1909, ch. 246, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 290, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 417, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 15-4-16 .

Cross References.

Estates of absentees generally, §§ 33-20-1 33-20-11 .

Collateral References.

Seizure of property of absent husband for benefit of wife. 65 A.L.R. 886.

15-4-17. Abolition of interspousal immunity.

No cause of action shall be barred on the ground that the parties are married or were married at the time that the cause of action accrued. The common-law doctrine of interspousal immunity is explicitly and totally abrogated.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 124, § 1.

Chapter 5 Divorce and Separation

15-5-1. Marriages void or voidable — Civil death or presumption of death.

Divorces from the bond of marriage shall be decreed in case of any marriage originally void or voidable by law, and in case either party is for crime deemed to be or treated as if civilly dead, or, from absence or other circumstances, may be presumed to be actually dead.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-1 .

Cross References.

Civil death of life prisoners, § 13-6-1 .

Validity of marriage by divorced person, declaration, § 15-1-6 .

Void or voidable marriages, § 15-1-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Divorce and separation:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Allowance Pendente Lite.

A petition for the annulment of a marriage on the ground that it was originally void was entitled to an allowance pending determination of the suit, since such proceeding was by the statute classed as one for divorce. Leckney v. Leckney, 26 R.I. 441 , 59 A. 311, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1904).

Annulment in Equity.

The supreme court would not annul a marriage voidable on account of fraud since an ample remedy was provided by this statute. Selby v. Selby, 27 R.I. 172 , 61 A. 142, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1905).

Failure to Consummate Marriage.

A marriage was originally void where the wife did not intend at the time of marriage to have normal sexual relations with her husband, but where there was no impediment to such relations. Santos v. Santos, 80 R.I. 5 , 90 A.2d 771, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1952).

Sterility.

The acceptance of uncontroverted evidence of sterility as the basis for inference of sterility having existed at the time of conception which occurred two months prior to the medical examination establishing the fact of sterility, was deemed to require inference of sterility during the time of an earlier conception, where uncontroverted testimony of a bout with orchitis prior to the time of the earlier conception was before the court. Milliken v. Milliken, 120 R.I. 762 , 390 A.2d 934, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 724 (1978).

Waiver of Remedy.

A husband waived the right to have his marriage annulled on the ground of fraud by continuing to cohabit with his wife after learning the facts. Mace v. Mace, 67 R.I. 301 , 23 A.2d 185, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1941).

Collateral References.

Antenuptial knowledge relating to alleged grounds as barring right to annulment. 15 A.L.R.2d 706.

Antenuptial knowledge relating to alleged grounds as barring right to divorce. 15 A.L.R.2d 670.

Attorney’s right to continue divorce or separation suit against wishes of his client. 92 A.L.R.2d 1009.

Character or nature of crime contemplated by statute as substantive ground for divorce. 135 A.L.R. 851.

Children’s testimony as to grounds of divorce of parents. 2 A.L.R.2d 1329.

Cohabitation of persons ceremonially married after learning of facts negativing dissolution of previous marriage of one, as affecting right to annulment. 4 A.L.R.2d 542.

Comment note. Rule as regards competency of husband or wife to testify as to nonaccess. 49 A.L.R.3d 212.

Common-law marriage between parties previously divorced. 82 A.L.R.2d 688.

Concealment of or misrepresentation as to prior marital status as ground for annulment of marriage. 15 A.L.R.3d 759.

Concealment or misrepresentation relating to religion as ground for annulment. 44 A.L.R.3d 972.

Conclusiveness of judgment as to property accumulated by man and woman living together in illicit relations or under void marriage. 31 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Construction of statute making bigamy or prior lawful subsisting marriage to third person a ground for divorce. 3 A.L.R.3d 1108.

Conviction in another jurisdiction as within statute making conviction of crime a ground for divorce. 19 A.L.R.2d 1047.

Denial of divorce in sister state or foreign country as res judicata in another suit for divorce between the same parties. 4 A.L.R.2d 107.

Determination of property rights in presents in action for annulment. 75 A.L.R.2d 1365.

Effect of annulment of marriage on rights arising out of prior acts of or transactions between parties. 2 A.L.R.2d 637.

Incapacity for sexual intercourse as ground for annulment. 52 A.L.R.3d 589.

Judicial declaration of validity or existence of common-law marriage. 92 A.L.R.2d 1102.

Limitation of actions for annulment of marriage. 52 A.L.R.2d 1163.

Mental incompetency of defendant at time of action as precluding annulment of marriage. 97 A.L.R.2d 483.

Necessity and sufficiency of corroboration of plaintiff’s testimony concerning ground for annulment of marriage. 71 A.L.R.2d 620.

Pre-emptive effect of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) provisions (29 USCS §§ 1056(d)(3), 1144(a), 1144(b)(7)) with respect to orders entered in domestic relations proceedings. 116 A.L.R. Fed. 503.

Property rights arising from relationship of couple cohabiting without marriage. 69 A.L.R.5th 219.

Racial, religious, or political differences as ground for divorce, separation, or annulment. 25 A.L.R.2d 928.

Right to allowance of permanent alimony in connection with decree of annulment. 54 A.L.R.2d 1410.

Right to attack validity of marriage after death of party thereto. 47 A.L.R.2d 1393.

Spouse’s secret intention not to abide by written antenuptial agreement relating to financial matters as ground for annulment. 66 A.L.R.3d 1282.

Validity of marriage as affected by intention of the parties that it should be only a matter of form or jest. 14 A.L.R.2d 624.

What constitutes duress sufficient to warrant divorce or annulment of marriage. 16 A.L.R.2d 1430.

What constitutes impotency as ground for divorce. 65 A.L.R.2d 776.

What constitutes intoxication sufficient to warrant annulment of marriage. 57 A.L.R.2d 1250.

What constitutes mistake in the identity of one of the parties to warrant annulment of marriage. 50 A.L.R.3d 1295.

15-5-2. Additional grounds for divorce.

Divorces from the bond of marriage shall also be decreed for the following causes:

  1. Impotency;
  2. Adultery;
  3. Extreme cruelty;
  4. Willful desertion for five (5) years of either of the parties, or for willful desertion for a shorter period of time in the discretion of the court;
  5. Continued drunkenness;
  6. The habitual, excessive, and intemperate use of opium, morphine, or chloral;
  7. Neglect and refusal, for the period of at least one year next before the filing of the petition, on the part of the husband to provide necessaries for the subsistence of his wife, the husband being of sufficient ability; and
  8. Any other gross misbehavior and wickedness, in either of the parties, repugnant to and in violation of the marriage covenant.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 2; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-2 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 287, § 1.

Cross References.

Abandonment and nonsupport, criminal liability, §§ 11-2-1 , 11-2-2 .

Adultery defined, § 11-6-2 .

Law Reviews.

Meghan L. Kruger, Comment: Separation Anxiety: The Implications of Rhode Island’s Reluctance to Remove Fault from Divorce Proceedings, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 808 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Condonation of Offense.

The act of the petitioner in returning to her husband’s home for three days after swearing to petitions did not amount to condonation where no act of sexual intercourse occurred and the petitioner intended to leave and did leave as soon as citations were served on the husband. Sayles v. Sayles, 41 R.I. 170 , 103 A. 225 (1918).

Where after separation because of the husband’s acts of cruelty the parties resumed relations, but the husband’s conduct was unchanged and the wife again left him, the resumption of relations did not bar an action for divorce as the condonation was conditional and was forfeited by the further misconduct. Grant v. Grant, 44 R.I. 169 , 116 A. 481, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1922).

Continued Drunkenness.

The words “continued drunkenness” are used in their ordinary sense and signify gross and confirmed habits of intoxication. Gourlay v. Gourlay, 16 R.I. 705 , 19 A. 142, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1890); Bevan v. Bevan, 44 R.I. 12 , 114 A. 130, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1921).

Proof of continued drunkenness must be sufficiently clear to convince the court that habits of drunkenness were confirmed and continued. Gourlay v. Gourlay, 16 R.I. 705 , 19 A. 142, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1890); Bevan v. Bevan, 44 R.I. 12 , 114 A. 130, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1921).

An occasional abuse in the use of alcohol does not constitute continued drunkenness. Bevan v. Bevan, 44 R.I. 12 , 114 A. 130, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1921).

Intoxication on three Sundays out of four, and occasionally the preceding Saturday afternoons, for a period of four and one-half months did not constitute continued drunkenness. Wright v. Wright, 47 R.I. 114 , 131 A. 81, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1925).

Extreme Cruelty.

Similar acts or conduct under different circumstances may or may not amount to cruelty, as much depends on the intention of the parties, the results which follow, and the habits and customs which are common to husband and wife. Grant v. Grant, 44 R.I. 169 , 116 A. 481, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1922).

Acts by a husband designed to cause distress to his wife with the apparent expectation that he would be able to coerce her to live and act in every way according to his wish and will and the creation by the husband by his own wrongful acts of a situation where it was impossible for the wife to continue to live with him without real and serious danger to her health sustained a charge of extreme cruelty even without evidence of actual physical violence. Grant v. Grant, 44 R.I. 169 , 116 A. 481, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1922).

A course of conduct, wilfully and maliciously persisted in, which naturally caused in the wife a wretchedness of mind affecting her health and made it impossible to longer endure conjugal relations with her husband warranted a finding of extreme cruelty without evidence of physical violence. Borda v. Borda, 44 R.I. 337 , 117 A. 362, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1922).

Disregard, unconcern and neglect not resulting in impairment of the health of the injured party do not amount to extreme cruelty. McKeon v. McKeon, 54 R.I. 163 , 170 A. 922, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1934); Bastien v. Bastien, 57 R.I. 176 , 189 A. 37, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1937).

A wife’s statement reflecting on the paternity of her unborn child, as well as her admission of intimacy with another man, although calculated to cause mental anguish, did not amount to extreme cruelty without evidence that such mental anguish caused any impairment of health or would inevitably cause such impairment. Bastien v. Bastien, 57 R.I. 176 , 189 A. 37, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1937).

Extreme cruelty is limited to physical cruelty, but such cruelty is not confined to acts of physical violence or threats and may result from acts or course of conduct totally devoid of any element of physical injury or threat thereof, as the effect of such conduct and not the conduct itself constitutes the basis for the charge. Bastien v. Bastien, 57 R.I. 176 , 189 A. 37, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1937). See also Grant v. Grant, 44 R.I. 169 , 116 A. 481, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1922); Borda v. Borda, 44 R.I. 337 , 117 A. 362, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1922).

Mere refusal to indulge in normal sexual intercourse was not extreme cruelty. Santos v. Santos, 80 R.I. 5 , 90 A.2d 771, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1952).

To prove extreme cruelty without physical force but on mental grounds, the evidence must establish conduct or acts of cruelty which are intentional and result in the impairment of mental and physical health of the complaining party. Santos v. Santos, 80 R.I. 5 , 90 A.2d 771, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1952).

The supreme court will grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty either where the respondent spouse has been guilty of physical violence or where, when guiltless of physical violence, such spouse has pursued a willful course of conduct that has impaired the health of the offending spouse. Winslow v. Winslow, 90 R.I. 146 , 155 A.2d 852, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 127 (1959).

— Sufficiency of Evidence.

Sufficiency of evidence to prove extreme cruelty was a question of fact, and the trial justice’s finding would not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 68 R.I. 25 , 26 A.2d 536, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1942).

Extreme cruelty was not proved by vague and general evidence of cruelty without any resulting substantial injury. Jackson v. Jackson, 70 R.I. 333 , 38 A.2d 637, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1944).

A divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty when not resulting from physical violence will not be granted except upon clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner was without fault and that the alleged conduct or acts of cruelty were deliberate, intentional and calculated to cause, and which did in fact cause, an impairment of health of the petitioning party or which would inevitably result in such impairment if the course of conduct complained of continued. Miller v. Miller, 87 R.I. 145 , 139 A.2d 86, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1958).

The petitioner husband in his action for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty under which a petitioner cannot prevail unless he establishes by affirmative and convincing evidence that he is without fault, did not make such proof, where the evidence showed that he went out socially with another woman which aggravated his wife’s conduct toward him, she making his home life so unpleasant that he sought companionship elsewhere. Harwood v. Harwood, 94 R.I. 165 , 179 A.2d 317, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1962).

Gross Misbehavior and Wickedness.

Where the husband left his wife and lived for a year with another woman, it was not such gross misconduct as to justify divorce when it is considered that the statute requires a five-year period of desertion. Stevens v. Stevens, 8 R.I. 557 , 1867 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1867).

To make the conduct of a respondent a ground for divorce under the gross misbehavior and wickedness clause, such conduct should have some character of licentiousness or brutality allying it in its attributes with adultery or extreme cruelty. Stevens v. Stevens, 8 R.I. 557 , 1867 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1867); Walker v. Walker, 38 R.I. 362 , 95 A. 925, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1915); Rainey v. Rainey, 57 R.I. 426 , 190 A. 27, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1937).

Where the trial court held the husband guilty of misbehavior and wickedness repugnant to and inconsistent with the marriage covenant, it was incumbent upon the husband upon appeal to show that the inference of the trial court was unwarranted. Rainey v. Rainey, 57 R.I. 426 , 190 A. 27, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1937).

Mere suspicion that the wife sought sexual relationship with members of her own sex did not prove gross misbehavior and wickedness. Santos v. Santos, 80 R.I. 5 , 90 A.2d 771, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1952).

In case of misbehavior in association with another woman, there must be some character of licentiousness in order to prove gross misbehavior and wickedness. Thomas v. Thomas, 83 R.I. 251 , 115 A.2d 526, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1955).

Where, in a complaint and cross complaint, both parties allege gross misbehavior, the guilt of the parties will bar granting of the decree after introduction of evidence of such guilt. Botelho v. Botelho, 96 R.I. 379 , 192 A.2d 5, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1963).

Neglect and Refusal to Provide.

Where the period during which a husband failed to provide terminated 14 months prior to the filing of the petition, there was no ground for divorce. Hurvitz v. Hurvitz, 44 R.I. 478 , 119 A. 58, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1922).

The supreme court could not say that the trial justice was clearly wrong in denying a petition where the evidence of neglect to provide did not relate to the year next preceding the filing of a petition but to a time considerably before such period. Blatchford v. Blatchford, 67 R.I. 24 , 20 A.2d 539, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1941).

Neglect to provide must exist for one year prior to the filing of a petition. Lister v. Lister, 82 R.I. 93 , 106 A.2d 258, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1954).

Neglect by the husband for a period of 11 years to send funds for support for the couple’s six children, though he knew the wife’s residence and was gainfully employed, entitled the wife to divorce from bed and board. Nardolillo v. Nardolillo, 84 R.I. 250 , 123 A.2d 141, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1956).

— Ability to Provide.

A divorce cannot be obtained on the grounds of neglect or refusal to provide if the husband is not able to provide because of imprisonment. Hammond v. Hammond, 15 R.I. 40 , 23 A. 143, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1885).

The trial court could deny a petition on the ground of nonsupport where the respondent husband was seriously ill and the husband could not work for over three years preceding the filing of the petition. Scullin v. Scullin, 65 R.I. 91 , 13 A.2d 702, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1940).

Where a husband’s contributions were irregular and inadequate to support his wife and not in keeping with his ability to pay, it was error to find that the wife had not sustained the burden of showing that the husband had failed to support. Lacombe v. Lacombe, 78 R.I. 118 , 79 A.2d 760, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1951).

The ability of a husband to provide must be proved by evidence of both physical capacity and opportunity to earn during the year next preceding the filing of a petition. Blatchford v. Blatchford, 67 R.I. 24 , 20 A.2d 539, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1941).

Petitioner Guilty of Offense Meriting Divorce.

The extreme cruelty of the husband barred his right to divorce from his wife on the ground of adultery. Church v. Church, 16 R.I. 667 , 19 A. 244, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1890).

Where the husband deserted his wife and the wife later married again believing him to be dead, the wife was not entitled to a divorce where she cohabited with her second husband for two years after learning that her first husband was alive. Douglass v. Barber, 18 R.I. 459 , 28 A. 805, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1894).

Where there was evidence of misconduct on the part of the petitioner which was not denied by the petitioner, the petitioner failed to sustain burden of showing freedom from fault. Lannon v. Lannon, 86 R.I. 451 , 136 A.2d 608, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1957).

Pleading.

A divorce petition is sufficiently specific if it alleges the grounds in the language of the statute, except where the allegation is of gross misbehavior, in which case the petition must set forth the conduct of which complaint is made. Brown v. Brown, 2 R.I. 381 , 1853 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1853); Mumford v. Mumford, 13 R.I. 19 , 1881 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1881).

Willful Desertion.

Where a husband had taken no action to induce his wife to return and the evidence tended to show that he did not want her to return, the wife could not be said to have stayed away willfully. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 9 R.I. 57 , 1868 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1868).

Where a husband and wife had been living in the home of the wife’s parents and the husband was forced to leave to make room for other members of the family and he established a home in the cottage but the wife refused to live with him, the burden was on the wife to show that the home which he established was unsuitable in order to establish desertion on the part of the husband. Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 86 R.I. 62 , 133 A.2d 746, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1957).

In an action by a husband for divorce on the ground of willful desertion, evidence that the husband had consorted with another woman who was a fellow employee and had been seen with her on several occasions and that the parties had not lived separately and apart for five years was sufficient to support the trial court’s denial of the divorce. Menard v. Menard, 106 R.I. 709 , 263 A.2d 98, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 978 (1970).

A husband was entitled to a divorce under this section on the ground of willful desertion where he showed an actual cessation of cohabitation for the period specified, a willful intent of the absent spouse to desert, a desertion by the absent spouse against the will of the other, an absence of justification for the desertion, and since the desertion was for a shorter period of time than five years, the lack of any probable grounds for believing that the parties would ever reconcile. Douglas v. Douglas, 111 R.I. 760 , 306 A.2d 847, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1275 (1973).

— Consent to Separation.

Desertion time does not run while parties are by consent living apart pending the petition. Long v. Long, 52 R.I. 162 , 158 A. 771, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1932).

A cross petition based on separation constituted consent to separation, hence there was no willful desertion. Krawcyzk v. Krawcyzk, 80 R.I. 335 , 81 R.I. 335 , 102 A.2d 870, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1954).

— Period of Less Than Five Years.

Where there was no probable ground to believe that there would ever be a reconciliation, the trial justice could under discretion in this section grant divorce after only three years’ desertion. Long v. Long, 52 R.I. 162 , 158 A. 771, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1932).

The trial justice did not abuse discretion in denying a divorce on the ground of desertion for a period shorter than five years where the evidence did not establish a reason for desertion or intent to stay away permanently. Blatchford v. Blatchford, 67 R.I. 24 , 20 A.2d 539, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1941).

— Reconciliation.

When a wife without cause deserts her husband the first step toward reconciliation must be taken by her. Long v. Long, 52 R.I. 162 , 158 A. 771, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1932).

Collateral References.

Abuse by relatives of other spouse as cruelty constituting grounds for divorce. 3 A.L.R. 993.

Accusation of improper relations, obscene language used in, as cruelty constituting ground for divorce or separation. 143 A.L.R. 623.

Act or conduct during separation, cruelty predicated upon, as ground for divorce or separation. 129 A.L.R. 160.

Acts constituting grounds for divorce occurring after commencement of suit for divorce. 98 A.L.R.2d 1264.

Acts occurring after commencement of suit for divorce as ground for decree under original complaint. 98 A.L.R.2d 1264.

Acts or omissions of spouse causing other spouse to leave home as desertion by former. 19 A.L.R.2d 1428.

Admissibility in divorce action for adultery of wife’s statement that husband was not father of her child. 4 A.L.R.2d 567.

Adultery by deserted spouse after desertion, as ground of divorce in favor of other spouse. 25 A.L.R. 1051.

Adultery, sufficiency of allegation in suit for divorce. 2 A.L.R. 1621.

Antenuptial knowledge relating to alleged grounds of divorce as barring right to divorce. 15 A.L.R.2d 670.

Association or conduct of spouse with persons of opposite sex as cruelty or abusive treatment justifying divorce or separation. 157 A.L.R. 631.

Attorney’s right to continue divorce or separation suit against wishes of his client. 92 A.L.R.2d 1009.

Avoidance of procreation of children as ground for divorce. 4 A.L.R.2d 227.

Blood grouping test, weight and sufficiency to establish adultery. 46 A.L.R.2d 1027.

Children’s testimony as to grounds of divorce of parents. 2 A.L.R.2d 1329.

Cohabitation, individual acts of, between husband and wife as breaking continuity of desertion or separation, or as a condonation thereof. 155 A.L.R. 132.

Cohabitation under marriage contracted after divorce decree as adultery, where decree is later reversed or set aside. 63 A.L.R.2d 816.

Common-law marriage between parties previously divorced. 82 A.L.R.2d 688.

Concealed premarital unchastity or parenthood as ground of divorce. 64 A.L.R.2d 742.

Condonation of cruel treatment as defense to action for divorce or separation. 32 A.L.R.2d 107.

Criminal misconduct charging spouse with criminal misconduct as cruelty constituting ground for divorce. 72 A.L.R.2d 1197.

Delay in bringing suit as affecting right to divorce. 4 A.L.R.2d 1321.

Denial of divorce in sister state or foreign county as res judicata in another suit for divorce between the same parties. 4 A.L.R.2d 107.

Desertion as affected by element of remonstrance or resistance. 3 A.L.R. 503.

Desertion, divorce predicated upon conduct subsequent to a decree of separation. 25 A.L.R. 1047, 61 A.L.R. 1268.

Desertion, offer after lapse of statutory period of, to resume marital relations. 18 A.L.R. 630.

Desertion, refusal of one spouse to live with relatives of other as affecting ground of divorce or separation. 38 A.L.R. 338, 47 A.L.R. 687.

Desertion, time of pendency of former suit as part of period of. 80 A.L.R.2d 855.

Desertion, written separation agreement as bar to divorce on ground of. 34 A.L.R.2d 954.

Discretion as to denial of divorce or separation where statutory grounds are established. 74 A.L.R. 271.

Drugs, use of, as habitual intemperance within statute relating to substantive grounds for divorce. 29 A.L.R.2d 925.

Drunkenness, habitual intemperance, etc., what amounts to, within statute relating to substantive grounds for divorce. 120 A.L.R. 1176, 29 A.L.R.2d 925.

Drunkenness, habitual intemperance, or use of drugs as constituting cruelty as a ground for divorce. 76 A.L.R.2d 419.

Drunkenness to constitute ground for divorce, necessity that it continue until commencement of suit or later. 54 A.L.R. 331.

Forcing spouse to get rid of child by former marriage as cruelty constituting ground for divorce. 3 A.L.R. 803.

Homosexuality as ground for divorce. 96 A.L.R.5th 83.

Insanity as affecting right to divorce or separation on other grounds. 19 A.L.R.2d 144.

Insistence on sex relations as cruelty or indignity constituting ground for divorce. 88 A.L.R.2d 553.

Marital misconduct as cruelty within statute defining grounds of divorce. 51 A.L.R. 1118.

Mistreatment of children as ground for divorce. 82 A.L.R.2d 1361.

Necessity and sufficiency of corroboration of plaintiff’s testimony concerning adultery as ground for divorce. 15 A.L.R.2d 202.

Power of court to grant absolute divorce to both spouses upon showing of mutual fault. 13 A.L.R.3d 1364.

Revival of condoned adultery. 16 A.L.R.2d 585.

Rule as regards competency of husband or wife to testify as to nonaccess. 49 A.L.R.3d 212.

Separation agreement as bar to divorce on ground of desertion. 34 A.L.R.2d 954.

Separation due to husband’s refusal or inability to support wife as desertion by him. 150 A.L.R. 991.

Single act as basis of divorce or separation on ground of cruelty. 7 A.L.R.3d 761.

Sufficiency of allegations of desertion, abandonment, or living apart as ground for divorce, separation, or alimony. 57 A.L.R.2d 468.

Threats or attempts to commit suicide as cruelty or indignity constituting a ground for divorce. 86 A.L.R.2d 422.

Time of pendency of former suit for divorce, annulment, alimony, or maintenance as included in period of desertion. 80 A.L.R.2d 855.

Transvestism or transsexualism of spouse as justifying divorce. 82 A.L.R.3d 725.

Validity of marriage as affected by intention of the parties that it should be only a matter of form or jest. 14 A.L.R.2d 624.

What amounts to connivance by one spouse at other’s adultery. 17 A.L.R.2d 342.

What amounts to habitual intemperance, drunkenness, excessive drug use, and the like within statute relating to substantive grounds for divorce. 101 A.L.R.6th 455.

What constitutes duress sufficient to warrant divorce or annulment of marriage. 16 A.L.R.2d 1430.

What constitutes impotency as ground for divorce. 65 A.L.R.2d 776.

What constitutes intoxication sufficient to warrant annulment of marriage. 57 A.L.R.2d 1250.

Wife’s failure to follow husband to new domicile as constituting desertion or abandonment as ground for divorce. 29 A.L.R.2d 474.

15-5-3. Separation of parties as ground for dissolution — Appeal.

  1. Whenever, in the trial of any complaint for divorce from the bond of marriage or any complaint for dissolution of a marriage, it shall be alleged in the complaint that the parties have lived separate and apart from each other for the space of at least three (3) years, whether voluntarily or involuntary, the court shall, upon a finding that the allegation is true, enter a decision pending entry of final judgment of divorce, which may include provisions for alimony.
  2. Final judgment shall not be entered until the expiration of twenty (20) days after entry of the decision pending entry of final judgment or, if the time for taking an appeal has been extended pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Article I, Rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules, until the expiration of the extended period.
  3. Final judgment may be entered ex parte and in chamber on the suggestion of the prevailing party.
  4. If no final judgment is presented to the court for entry within one hundred eighty (180) days next after the expiration of twenty (20) days from the date of decision, a final judgment may be entered only in open court and on motion or written consent of the attorneys or parties.
  5. Notice of the filing of the motion shall not be required in cases in which the original complaint is unanswered.
  6. The taking of an appeal shall operate as a stay of the judgment during the pendency of the appeal. Upon motion and for good cause shown:
    1. The family court may, prior to the filing of a notice of appeal, order that the judgment become final and operative immediately; and
    2. The supreme court may, in the event an appeal is taken, vacate the automatic stay provided under this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-3 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 214, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 338, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 329, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 404, § 9; P.L. 2016, ch. 13, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 14, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 13, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 14, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2016, ch. 13, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect May 16, 2016, and shall apply to all actions for divorce pending at the time of or filed after the effective date.

P.L. 2016, ch. 14, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect May 16, 2016, and shall apply to all actions for divorce pending at the time of or filed after the effective date.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This statute does not deprive females of the equal protection of the law since it grants to husbands and wives alike the power to seek the dissolution of their matrimonial bonds upon proof that they have been living separate and apart from their respective spouses three years or more. Harwood v. Harwood, 120 R.I. 145 , 385 A.2d 1055, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 645 (1978).

This statute does not violate the Rhode Island Const., Art. VI, Sec. 2, which prohibits the delegation of legislative power to private parties unless accompanied by adequate legislative standards, since the statute simply sets forth as grounds for an absolute divorce the fact that the parties have been living separate and apart for three years, and the fact that the statute requires the Family Court to enter a decree terminating the marriage of the parties once it finds the criteria have been satisfied does not constitute a delegation of the police power. Harwood v. Harwood, 120 R.I. 145 , 385 A.2d 1055, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 645 (1978).

Alimony.

Alimony could not be awarded in granting a husband’s petition under this section where the wife was 49 years old, had a net income of $630 per year and free occupation of an apartment, whereas the husband was over 60 years old, earned from $27.00 to $30.00 per week, and suffered from a disease which would probably necessitate retirement at a much lower income. Meegan v. Meegan, 67 R.I. 205 , 21 A.2d 573, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1941).

Where, after the parties had lived apart for the required number of years under a separation agreement in which the wife released the husband from all obligation for her support for the remainder of her life, an order granting ten dollars a week alimony to the wife as part of a decree awarding a divorce to the husband ripened into a judgment with the passing of each week in the absence of an appeal therefrom. Pires v. Pires, 102 R.I. 23 , 227 A.2d 477, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 638 (1967).

Basis for Divorce.

The basis for divorce under this section is not the wrongdoing of one of the parties but is public policy, as a failure to reconcile justifies not compelling them to remain in a marital status. McKenna v. McKenna, 53 R.I. 373 , 166 A. 822, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1933).

Conduct of Petitioner.

Testimony of recrimination was admissible to aid the court in the exercise of its discretion but not as a defense, as divorce under this section does not depend on the previous conduct of the petitioner. Guillot v. Guillot, 42 R.I. 230 , 106 A. 801, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1919).

The good or bad conduct of the petitioner is not decisive. Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 236 , 172 A. 323, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1934).

Discretion was not abused in denying a divorce where the original separation was by the petitioner’s desertion, he had concealed his whereabouts during the entire period of separation, and there was suspicion of misconduct during such period. Nardolillo v. Nardolillo, 84 R.I. 250 , 123 A.2d 141, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1956).

Cross Petition.

The trial court had jurisdiction in proceeding under this section to grant a decree on the respondent’s cross petition with prayer for alimony, instead of on the original petition, since the court had authority to enter a decree for either party who petitions regardless of time. [See FCRP 42]. McKenna v. McKenna, 53 R.I. 373 , 166 A. 822, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1933).

Discretion of Court.

Where the parties had lived separate and apart for the required number of years, there was no hope of reconciliation, provision had been made for the children by mutual consent, and one of the parties wished to remarry, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing divorce. Dever v. Dever, 50 R.I. 179 , 146 A. 478, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1929).

Discretion is not abused by granting a divorce where there is no prospect of reconciliation. Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 236 , 172 A. 323, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1934); Root v. Root, 57 R.I. 436 , 190 A. 450, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 113 (1937).

The refusal to grant a petition for divorce under this section did not rest on the trial justice’s discretion where he based his decision solely on the ground that the preponderance of the evidence did not support a claim of living separate and apart. Reilly v. Reilly, 57 R.I. 432 , 190 A. 476, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 121 (1937).

Dismissal of Petition.

The dismissal of a petition under this section because necessary separation had not been proved was not res adjudicata and a second petition alleging the same ground could be brought. Guillot v. Guillot, 42 R.I. 230 , 106 A. 801, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1919).

Living Separate and Apart.

Evidence that the parties had actually lived separate and apart, even though in the same apartment building, was sufficient. Stewart v. Stewart, 45 R.I. 375 , 122 A. 778, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1923).

Not only must the parties live separate, but ordinary marriage relationships, including marital intercourse, must not continue. Reilly v. Reilly, 57 R.I. 432 , 190 A. 476, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 121 (1937).

The petitioner was not entitled to a divorce merely because the parties had not indulged in marital intercourse during the period mandated by this section where they lived in the same house and the husband had eaten some of his meals at home, since there was a holding out by the parties that they were living together in the usual manner of husband and wife. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 68 R.I. 438 , 28 A.2d 745, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1942).

In the husband’s action for absolute divorce the pendency of the wife’s action for divorce from bed and board brought during the required number of years of alleged living separate and apart, in the absence of any judicial act therein excluding the husband from the family domicile, did not preclude the separation from being voluntary. Rosario v. Rosario, 102 R.I. 175 , 229 A.2d 59, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 665 (1967).

This section requires not only that a couple live separate and apart for the three-year period but that the ordinary and usual relations that exist between married persons, including intercourse, must not continue. Stanzler v. Stanzler, 560 A.2d 342, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 121 (R.I. 1989).

— Mental Capacity of Parties.

The parties were not living separate and apart within the statute where during part of the period mandated by this section the respondent had been insane and confined to a mental institution. Camire v. Camire, 43 R.I. 489 , 113 A. 748, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1921).

Mandatory Upon Court.

Where the husband commenced a divorce action alleging that the parties had been living separate and apart for the period mandated by this section, and where the wife responded with a cross petition in which she requested a bed and board divorce on the grounds of desertion pursuant to § 15-5-9 , the mandatory nature of this section required the family court justice to deny the wife’s petition for a bed and board divorce and to enter a decree dissolving the marriage. Harwood v. Harwood, 120 R.I. 145 , 385 A.2d 1055, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 645 (1978).

Retroactive Application.

Since the legislature expressly stated that this section was to be applied retroactively to petitions pending before the court, where the plaintiff was denied his divorce under the old law, but had lived apart from his wife for at least three years in compliance with the present law, on appeal his divorce should be granted. Zaharakos v. Zaharakos, 118 R.I. 387 , 374 A.2d 101, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1977).

Review.

Where a decision of the trial court is based on the construction of the statute, the action of the court presents a question of law reviewable upon exception. Camire v. Camire, 43 R.I. 489 , 113 A. 748, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1921).

The discretion of the court under this section is subject to review if there has been a clear abuse thereof or if any construction of the statute has been made by the court. Dever v. Dever, 50 R.I. 179 , 146 A. 478, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1929).

Findings of fact by a trial justice will not be disturbed by the supreme court unless the findings clearly fail to do justice between the parties. Reilly v. Reilly, 57 R.I. 432 , 190 A. 476, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 121 (1937).

Since no express ruling was made by the family court on one of the grounds of divorce (i.e., living separately and apart for three years), and no objection was raised by the complaining party to the failure of the court to grant the party’s divorce on that specific ground (the divorce being granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences pursuant to § 15-5-3.1 ), that issue will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Lembo v. Lembo, 677 A.2d 414, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Acts occurring after commencement of suit for divorce as ground for decree under original complaint. 98 A.L.R.2d 1264.

Attorney’s right to continue divorce or separation suit against wishes of his client. 92 A.L.R.2d 1009.

Children’s testimony as to grounds of divorce of parents. 2 A.L.R.2d 1329.

“Cooling off period” or lapse of time prior to entry of decree in divorce suit. 62 A.L.R.2d 1262.

Delay in bringing suit as affecting right to divorce. 4 A.L.R.2d 1321.

Denial of divorce in sister state or foreign country as res judicata in another suit for divorce between the same parties. 4 A.L.R.2d 107.

Fault of spouse as affecting right to divorce under statute making separation a substantive ground of divorce. 14 A.L.R.3d 502.

Joinder of tort actions between spouses with proceeding for dissolution of marriage. 4 A.L.R.5th 972.

Power of court to grant absolute divorce to both spouses upon showing of mutual fault. 13 A.L.R.3d 1364.

Retrospective effect of statute prescribing grounds of divorce. 23 A.L.R.3d 626.

Separation for specified period, “recrimination” as available defense in suit for divorce based on. 14 A.L.R.3d 502.

Separation within statute making separation a substantive ground for divorce. 35 A.L.R.3d 1238.

Sufficiency of allegations of desertion, abandonment, or living apart as ground for divorce, separation, or alimony. 57 A.L.R.2d 468.

Vacating or setting aside divorce decree after remarriage of party. 17 A.L.R.4th 1153.

15-5-3.1. Divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences.

  1. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be decreed, irrespective of the fault of either party, on the ground of irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage.
  2. In any pleading or hearing for divorce under this section, allegations or evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible, except for the purpose of making a determination pursuant to §§ 15-5-16 and 15-5-16 .1, or where child custody is in issue and the evidence is relevant to establish that parental custody would be detrimental to the child, or at a hearing where it is determined by the court to be necessary to establish the existence of irreconcilable differences.
  3. Upon hearing of an action for divorce under this section, the acts of one party shall not negate the acts of the other nor bar the divorce decree.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 287, § 1; 1976, ch. 294, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 3.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 15-5-3.1 (G.L. 1956, § 15-5-3.1 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 287, § 1) was repealed by P.L. 1976, ch. 294, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Meghan L. Kruger, Comment: Separation Anxiety: The Implications of Rhode Island’s Reluctance to Remove Fault from Divorce Proceedings, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 808 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Child Custody.

The trial justice did not err in awarding a father sole custody of the children where there was conflicting testimony over whether he abandoned his wife and children or whether his wife told him to leave, where the trial justice explicitly stated that he did not find the wife credible with respect to her allegations of abuse, and where there was ample evidence to show that the husband was a good father. Berard v. Berard, 749 A.2d 577, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 2000).

Effect of Ground.

This ground removes the fault factor from a divorce proceeding and abolishes the necessity of presenting what may be the distasteful details of personal conduct by either party. Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1981).

Evidence.

Uncontradicted testimony of the petitioner that because she was financially unable to live elsewhere the parties were living in the same home but not as man and wife, together with testimony that the respondent was unemployed and refused to seek employment, that there were arguments over said failure and that he had threatened the petitioner, established in law that irreconcilable differences had arisen between the parties which caused an irremediable breakdown of the marriage, and the trial justice, having failed to reject or give any reason for disregarding such evidence, was bound by it and had erred in denying the petition. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 R.I. 575 , 388 A.2d 1170, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 698 (1978).

Ground Under This Section and § 15-5-9.

The only reasonable way to harmonize § 15-5-9 and this section is to hold that “irreconcilable differences” is a ground for both an absolute divorce and a bed-and-board divorce. Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1981).

Living in Same Home.

While the fact that the parties may be living in the same home may be an element to consider in determining whether irreconcilable differences exist which caused an irremediable breakdown of the marriage, that fact is not controlling but is to be considered along with other relevant evidence submitted. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 R.I. 575 , 388 A.2d 1170, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 698 (1978).

Sexual Relation With Attorney.

An attorney who engages in sexual relations with his or her divorce client jeopardizes the client’s rights. Any competent attorney practicing in the area of domestic-relations law must be aware that the sexual conduct of a divorce client may have significant bearing on that client’s ability to secure child custody and in the determination of the distribution of marital assets. The lawyer’s own interest in maintaining the sexual relationship creates an inherent conflict with the proper representation of the client. In re DiPippo, 678 A.2d 454, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 199 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Acts occurring after commencement of suit for divorce as ground for decree under original complaint. 98 A.L.R.2d 1264.

Attorney’s right to continue divorce or separation suit against wishes of his client. 92 A.L.R.2d 1009.

Avoidance of procreation of children as ground for divorce. 4 A.L.R.2d 227.

Children’s testimony as to grounds of divorce of parents. 2 A.L.R.2d 1329.

Comment note: in camera examination or interview of child in custody proceedings. 9 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2016).

Delay in bringing suit as affecting right to divorce. 4 A.L.R.2d 1321.

Denial of divorce in sister state or foreign county as res judicata in another suit for divorce between the same parties. 4 A.L.R.2d 107.

Fault as consideration in alimony, spousal support, or property division awards pursuant to no-fault divorce. 86 A.L.R.3d 1116.

Homosexuality as ground for divorce. 96 A.L.R.5th 83.

Power of court to grant absolute divorce to both spouses upon showing of mutual fault. 13 A.L.R.3d 1364.

Racial, religious, or political differences as ground for divorce, separation, or annulment. 25 A.L.R.2d 928.

Recrimination as defense to divorce sought on ground of incompatibility. 21 A.L.R.2d 1267.

Retrospective effect of statute prescribing grounds of divorce. 23 A.L.R.3d 626.

Transvestism or transsexualism of spouse as justifying divorce. 82 A.L.R.3d 725.

Vacating or setting aside divorce decree after remarriage of party. 17 A.L.R.4th 1153.

Validity, construction and effect of “no-fault” divorce statutes providing for dissolution of marriage upon finding that relationship is no longer viable. 55 A.L.R.3d 581.

What amounts to incompatibility or inability of parties to live together. 58 A.L.R.2d 1218.

What constitutes impotency as ground for divorce. 65 A.L.R.2d 776.

What constitutes “incompatibility” within statute specifying it as substantive ground for divorce. 97 A.L.R.3d 989.

15-5-4. Collusion of parties.

Whenever it appears that the absence, adultery, cruelty, desertion, or other cause of complaint was committed or occasioned by the collusion of the parties, and done or contrived with an intention to procure a divorce, no divorce shall be decreed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-4 .

Collateral References.

Adultery, what amounts to connivance by one spouse at other’s act. 17 A.L.R.2d 342.

Collusion as bar to divorce. 2 A.L.R. 699, 109 A.L.R. 832.

Participation in allegedly collusive or connived divorce proceedings as subjecting attorney to disciplinary action. 13 A.L.R.3d 1010.

What amounts to connivance by one spouse at other’s adultery. 17 A.L.R.2d 342.

15-5-5. Uncorroborated testimony of complainant.

Whenever the act or acts giving rise to the cause for divorce are of a nature that the complaining party could not ordinarily produce corroborating testimony, the court may, in its discretion, if it is satisfied of the existence of the cause in question, the proof in other respects being satisfactory, grant the divorce on the testimony of the complaining party alone.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 2; P.L. 1939, ch. 707, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-5 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discretion of Court.

Where the wife and two other witnesses testified that the husband admitted relations with another woman, but there was no other evidence thereof, it was proper for the trial court in the exercise of its discretion to deny the petition because of a lack of corroborating testimony. Day v. Day, 80 R.I. 343 , 81 R.I. 343 , 103 A.2d 63, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1954).

Respondent Incompetent to Testify.

The trial court should apply the rule of strict proof and weigh reasonable inferences from the petitioner’s conduct over a long period of time against his uncorroborated testimony where the respondent was mentally incompetent to testify in her own behalf. Mace v. Mace, 67 R.I. 301 , 23 A.2d 185, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1941).

15-5-6 — 15-5-8. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, §§ 5-7; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, §§ 5-7; P.L. 1917, ch. 1532, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, §§ 5-7; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, §§ 5-7; G.L. 1956, §§ 15-5-6 — 15-5-8; P.L. 1958, ch. 90, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 15-5-6 — 15-5-8 concerned dower and curtesy rights of divorced spouses. For abolition of dower and courtesy rights, see §§ 33-25-1 33-25-6 .

15-5-9. Divorce from bed and board.

Divorces from bed, board, and future cohabitation, until the parties are reconciled, may be granted for any of the causes for which by law a divorce from the bond of marriage may be decreed, and for other causes which may seem to require a divorce from bed and board; provided, the petitioner is a domiciled inhabitant of this state and has resided in this state for a length of time that, to the court in its discretion, seems to warrant the exercise of the powers in this section conferred. In case of a divorce from bed, board, and future cohabitation, the court may assign to the petitioner a separate maintenance out of the estate or property of the husband or wife, as the case may be, in a manner and of an amount as it may think necessary or proper.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 8; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 8; P.L. 1954, ch. 3308, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3692, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendment of Petition.

A petition for divorce a mensa et thoro which had been denied because neither adultery nor extreme cruelty had been proved could be amended by adding specifications of alleged misbehavior and wickedness where the evidence warranted divorce on such grounds. Walker v. Walker, 38 R.I. 362 , 95 A. 925, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1915).

The petitioner who was neither a resident or a domiciled inhabitant could not amend a petition for a limited divorce to ask for an absolute divorce, since the trial court had no jurisdiction of the original proceeding. David v. David, 47 R.I. 304 , 132 A. 879, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1926).

Claim for Allowances.

A claim could be maintained against the estate of a deceased husband for unpaid monthly maintenance instalments accrued under decree. Gilbert v. Hayward, 37 R.I. 303 , 92 A. 625, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1914).

A claim in probate court based on a decree for separate maintenance payable each month was a proceeding in law to enforce a debt and was governed by the 20-year statute of limitations. Gilbert v. Hayward, 37 R.I. 303 , 92 A. 625, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1914).

Effect of Divorce.

A divorce from bed and board does not put an end to the marriage relation but merely suspends certain of the marital rights and obligations. Tierney v. Tierney, 50 R.I. 105 , 145 A. 444, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1929).

Effect of Pendency of Divorce on Foreign Action.

The pendency of a bed and board divorce in this state is not a bar to the institution of a divorce action in a foreign state. Bouchard v. Bouchard, 119 R.I. 656 , 382 A.2d 810, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 602 (1978).

Grounds for Divorce.

Divorce a mensa et thoro could be granted where the conduct of the husband over a long period, though not amounting to adultery, had such a character of licentiousness that such conduct was like adultery in kind. Walker v. Walker, 38 R.I. 362 , 95 A. 925, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1915).

The provisions giving the court discretion to grant divorces from bed and board “for such other causes as may seem to require the same” refers to causes which, if not equal in enormity, yet are like in kind with the offenses that are causes for divorce. Walker v. Walker, 38 R.I. 362 , 95 A. 925, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1915). See also Battey v. Battey, 1 R.I. 212 , 1845 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1845).

Where the husband commenced a divorce amount as it may think necessary or proper. action alleging that the parties had been living separate and apart for the period mandated by § 15-5-3 , and where the wife responded with a cross-petition in which she requested a bed and board divorce on the grounds of desertion pursuant to this section, the mandatory nature of § 15-5-3 required the Family Court justice to deny the wife’s petition for a bed and board divorce and to enter a decree dissolving the marriage. Harwood v. Harwood, 120 R.I. 145 , 385 A.2d 1055, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 645 (1978).

The only reasonable way to harmonize this section and § 15-5-3.1 is to hold that “irreconcilable differences” is a ground for both an absolute divorce and a bed-and-board divorce. Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1981).

Jurisdiction.

There was no merit to the wife’s contention that since the husband owned property in the state and since he had been notified by citation that she was praying for an allowance out of it pursuant to this section, that the court acquired jurisdiction to decree an allowance to be satisfied solely by such property, without personal service on the husband, since the language of this section does not create a charge upon the estate or property of the husband. Accardi v. Accardi, 97 R.I. 336 , 197 A.2d 755, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1964).

Where the petitioner had not been granted a bed and board divorce, the statute that authorizes the family court to assign a separate maintenance to the petitioner does not apply. Castellucci v. Castellucci, 116 R.I. 918 , 352 A.2d 640, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1402 (1976).

Because an action seeking a divorce from bed and board was quasi in rem, a Rhode Island family court had jurisdiction to hear a petition where the petitioning spouse was a Rhode Island resident and to enter child custody orders where Rhode Island had become the children’s home state; due process concerns relating to the non-petitioning spouse’s minimum contacts with the state were not a concern in an action concerning the status of Rhode Island residents. Henderson v. Henderson, 818 A.2d 669, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2003).

Prerequisites to Separate Maintenance.

In order to grant a decree of separate maintenance the parties must no longer be cohabiting and there must be property or the means of acquiring property out of which a provision for petitioner’s maintenance can be made. Battey v. Battey, 1 R.I. 212 , 1845 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1845).

Reconciliation.

In a wife’s action for failure to pay an allowance wherein the husband contended that there had been a reconciliation, he had burden of proof. Le Blanc v. Le Blanc, 77 R.I. 306 , 75 A.2d 207, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1950).

Possibility of reconciliation was not a required element of a petition for divorce from bed and board as distinct from a petition for absolute divorce. Henderson v. Henderson, 818 A.2d 669, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2003).

The language “until the parties be reconciled” is precatory rather than mandatory. Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1981).

The possibility of reconciliation is not an absolute prerequisite to obtain a legal separation. Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1981).

Residence and Domicile.

The petitioner who was living with her husband on the date of the signing of the petition could not maintain an action for divorce from bed and board where on said date the domicile of the husband was outside the state, even though three days thereafter she separated from her husband and acquired a Rhode Island domicile. Walker v. Walker, 32 R.I. 28 , 78 A. 339, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1910).

The superior court had no jurisdiction to grant a divorce a mensa et thoro filed by a nonresident respondent in the husband’s action for absolute divorce. Crow v. Crow, 41 R.I. 258 , 103 A. 739, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1918).

The petitioner who was neither a resident or a domiciled inhabitant of the state was not entitled to a divorce from bed and board even though the defendant was a resident and domiciled inhabitant. David v. David, 47 R.I. 304 , 132 A. 879, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1926).

Evidence that a petitioner received his mail in Rhode Island and owned an automobile registered in his employer’s name at his employer’s Rhode Island address was not sufficient to establish a Rhode Island residence sufficient for this section. Parker v. Parker, 103 R.I. 435 , 238 A.2d 57, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 812 (1968).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of expert testimony regarding questions of domestic law. 66 A.L.R.5th 135.

Admissibility of social worker’s expert testimony on custody issue. 1 A.L.R.4th 837.

Applicability, to annulment actions, of residence requirements of divorce statutes. 32 A.L.R.2d 734.

Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for modification of decree for alimony or maintenance. 18 A.L.R.2d 10.

Children’s testimony as to grounds of divorce of parents. 2 A.L.R.2d 1329.

Child’s right to enforce provisions for his benefit in parents’ separation or property settlement agreement. 34 A.L.R.3d 1357.

Conflict of laws as to validity, effect, and construction of separation or property settlement agreements. 18 A.L.R.2d 760.

Construction and effect of provision in separation agreement that wife is to have portion of “income,” “total income,” “net income,” and the like. 79 A.L.R.2d 609.

Court’s establishment of trust to secure alimony or child support in divorce proceedings. 3 A.L.R.3d 1170.

Credit for payments on temporary alimony pending appeal, against liability for permanent alimony. 86 A.L.R.2d 696.

Decree in suit for “separation” as res judicata in subsequent suit for divorce or annulment. 90 A.L.R.2d 745.

Denial of divorce in sister state or foreign county as res judicata in another suit for divorce between the same parties. 4 A.L.R.2d 107.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as separate maintenance, alimony, or support for spouse without absolute divorce. 26 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded for alimony and child support combined. 27 A.L.R.4th 1038.

Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as temporary alimony. 26 A.L.R.4th 1218.

Husband’s death as affecting periodic payment provision of separation agreement. 5 A.L.R.4th 1153.

Husband’s right to alimony, maintenance, suit money, or attorney’s fees. 66 A.L.R.2d 880.

Misconduct or fault of wife as affecting temporary alimony. 2 A.L.R.2d 307.

Necessity and sufficiency of corroboration of complaining spouse’s testimony in separate maintenance action. 100 A.L.R.2d 612.

Pendency of prior action for absolute or limited divorce between same spouses in same jurisdiction as precluding subsequent action of like nature. 31 A.L.R.2d 442.

Power of court to award absolute divorce in favor of party who desires only limited decree, or vice versa. 14 A.L.R.3d 703.

Propriety and effect of undivided award for support of more than one person. 2 A.L.R.3d 596.

Reconciliation as affecting decree for limited divorce, separation, alimony, separate maintenance, or spousal support. 36 A.L.R.4th 502.

Review of discretion of court with respect to grant to husband of alimony, maintenance, suit money, or attorneys’ fees. 66 A.L.R.2d 888, 895.

“Split,” “divided,” or “alternate” custody of children. 92 A.L.R.2d 695.

Spouse’s acceptance of payments under alimony or property settlement or child support provisions of divorce judgment as precluding appeal therefrom. 29 A.L.R.3d 1184.

Spouse’s professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or property settlement. 4 A.L.R.4th 1294.

Sufficiency of allegations of desertion, abandonment, or living apart as ground for divorce, separation, or alimony. 57 A.L.R.2d 468.

Valid foreign divorce as affecting local order previously entered for separate maintenance. 49 A.L.R.3d 1266.

Validity and construction of provisions for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or support payments or child visitation or custody matters. 38 A.L.R.5th 69.

What constitutes contract between husband or wife and third person promotive of divorce or separation. 93 A.L.R.3d 523.

What voluntary acts of child, other than marriage or entry into military service, terminate parent’s obligation to support. 32 A.L.R.3d 1055.

Wife’s possession of independent means as affecting her right to alimony pendente lite. 60 A.L.R.3d 728.

Wife’s possession of independent means as affecting her right to child support pendente lite. 60 A.L.R.3d 832.

15-5-10. Disposal of certain real estate after filing of complaint.

At any time after the filing of a complaint for divorce from bed, board, and future cohabitation, and until a decree of reconciliation has been entered, the court, upon the petition of either party seized in his or her own right of real estate in Rhode Island, after notice to the opposing party, after a hearing on the petition, may, if the court finds that justice and the best interests of the party require, enter a decree permitting the party to sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the real estate free of the rights of life estates created by chapter 25 of title 33 of the opposing party. The decree shall contain a description of the real estate sufficient to identify it either by reference to a recorded plat or otherwise, and a certified copy of the decree shall be recorded in the records of land evidence of the city or town in which the real estate is located.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3692, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-10 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 373, § 11.

Collateral References.

Divorce or annulment as affecting will previously executed by husband or wife. 71 A.L.R.3d 1297.

15-5-11. Verification of complaint.

Every complaint shall be verified by the plaintiff, if of sound mind and of legal age to consent to marriage; otherwise, upon application to the court and after notice to the party in whose name the complaint is filed, the court may allow the complaint to be verified by a resident guardian or next friend.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 9; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-11 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 373, § 11.

Cross References.

Legal age to consent to marriage, § 15-12-1 .

Petitions follow course of equity, § 9-14-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Age of Consent.

The words “legal age to consent to marriage,” as used in this section meant the common law age of consent, 14 years for males and 12 years for females, because the statute requiring consent of parents and guardians to the marriage of minors was not the law when this section was enacted. Capwell v. Capwell, 21 R.I. 101 , 41 A. 1005, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1898).

Consent to Jurisdiction.

A petitioner for an absolute divorce would be precluded from questioning the jurisdiction of the court to grant the respondent’s motion for an absolute divorce. Borda v. Borda, 43 R.I. 384 , 113 A. 118, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1921).

Petition for Relief.

A failure to sign and verify a petition for relief without commencement of divorce proceedings did not affect the family court’s jurisdiction where it was filed in the amendment of an original petition for divorce that was properly signed and verified. Thayer v. Thayer, 107 R.I. 116 , 265 A.2d 436, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 746 (1970).

Petitioner.

Every person signing and swearing to the truth of a petition thereby then and there becomes ipso facto the petitioner. Walker v. Walker, 32 R.I. 28 , 78 A. 339, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1910).

15-5-12. Domicile and residence requirements.

  1. No complaint for divorce from the bond of marriage shall be granted unless the plaintiff has been a domiciled inhabitant of this state and has resided in this state for a period of one year next before the filing of the complaint; provided, that if the defendant has been a domiciled inhabitant of this state and has resided in this state for the period of one year next before the filing of the complaint, and is actually served with process, the requirement of this subsection as to domicile and residence on the part of the plaintiff is deemed satisfied and fulfilled. The residence and domicile of any person immediately prior to the commencement of his or her active service as a member of the armed forces or of the merchant marine of the United States, or immediately prior to his or her absence from the state in the performance of services in connection with military operations as defined in subsection (c) of this section, shall, for the purposes of this section, continue to be his or her residence and domicile during the time of his or her service and for a period of thirty (30) days after this. Testimony to prove domicile and residence may be received through the ex parte affidavit of one witness.
  2. Every word importing the masculine gender only shall be construed in this section to extend to and include females as well as males.
  3. The term “services in connection with military operations” shall be construed in this section to include persons serving with the American Red Cross, the Society of Friends, the Women’s Auxiliary Service Pilots, and the United Service Organizations.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 10; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 10; P.L. 1946, ch. 1682, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-12 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 214, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 373, § 11; P.L. 1996, ch. 145, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.
— Residency Requirements.

The residency requirements of this section restrict the fundamental right of interstate travel and are therefore unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of U.S. Const., Amend. 14 for failure of the state to demonstrate a compelling interest in the application of such requirements. Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12699 (D.R.I. 1973), vacated, 420 U.S. 904, 95 S. Ct. 819, 42 L. Ed. 2d 831, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 424 (1975).

Actual Residence.

An actress who spent most of the year on the road but spent vacations in Rhode Island with the declared intention of making her home in Rhode Island could nevertheless be found not to meet the residence requirement. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 45 R.I. 367 , 122 A. 529, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1923).

A petitioner who had been absent from the state during most of the required period preceding the petition did not meet the residence requirements, even though she had not abandoned her domicile within the state. Doerner v. Doerner, 46 R.I. 41 , 124 A. 728, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1924).

A petitioner who had been confined to a hospital outside the state for the required number of years [now one year] preceding the petition did not meet the residence requirement even though domiciled in Rhode Island. Flora v. Flora, 66 R.I. 70 , 17 A.2d 429, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1941).

To construe R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-12(a) as requiring that a plaintiff who files a divorce complaint remain a “domiciled inhabitant” until the decree is entered would produce an unjust result, so, once a complaint for divorce is properly filed in Family Court, the Family Court is not divested of subject-matter jurisdiction merely because the plaintiff has moved out of the state and changed his or her domicile, since to hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff who is dissatisfied with the course of the divorce proceeding in Rhode Island to forum shop his or her complaint in another jurisdiction, and whether the party relocates in good faith or otherwise matters naught; a change in domicile does not terminate the jurisdiction of the Family Court to hear and decide the case before the Court. Rogers v. Rogers, 18 A.3d 491, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 46 (R.I. 2011).

Wife who filed a complaint for divorce satisfied the residency requirement because, although the wife lived in France for 172 days while working as a project manager for the renovation of a vacation home, the wife was present in Rhode Island for several months before she filed for divorce, the wife had filed Rhode Island state tax returns, the wife was registered to vote in the state, the wife had a physical address in Rhode Island, and the wife owned a vehicle in the state. Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 2013).

Discontinuance of Petition.

A nonresident respondent cannot obtain relief on a cross petition after the resident petitioner has discontinued the petition. Valk v. Valk, 18 R.I. 639 , 29 A. 499, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1894) (decision prior to 1902 amendment).

Domicile of Wife.

In order that a marital domicile be not disturbed for light and transient causes, the wife to be justified in attempting to acquire in this state a domicile of her own, separate and apart from the marital domicile in another state must be able to show that the husband was guilty of such dereliction of his marital duty as would entitle her to have the marriage either partially or totally dissolved. Brown v. Brown, 94 R.I. 23 , 177 A.2d 380, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1962).

It was error for a trial court to dismiss a wife’s divorce complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, when the wife relocated to Pennsylvania after filing the wife’s complaint, because (1) it was undisputed that the trial court had jurisdiction over the complaint when the complaint was filed, due to the wife satisfying statutory residency requirements, and (2) the wife’s relocation to Pennsylvania after filing the complaint did not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction as R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-12(a) did not require that a party remain a domiciled inhabitant or resident of Rhode Island for the petition to be granted, but, rather, referred to the domicile and residence of the plaintiff at the time the divorce complaint was filed. Rogers v. Rogers, 18 A.3d 491, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 46 (R.I. 2011).

Domiciliary Intent.

The finding of the trial court that the petitioner was a domiciled inhabitant and had resided herefor the requisite number of years [now one year] was proper where the petitioner came into state with actual an bona fide intent to make it his permanent home, even though he was influenced by his desire to procure a divorce. Root v. Root, 57 R.I. 436 , 190 A. 450, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 113 (1937).

Military Service.

The proviso applying to the armed forces did not, with respect to the residence requirements, aid one who did not have his actual residence within the state immediately prior to entering the service. Coone v. Coone, 74 R.I. 232 , 59 A.2d 850, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1948).

A man’s own testimony is competent and proper evidence of what his intentions were as to acquiring a new domicile. Root v. Root, 57 R.I. 436 , 190 A. 450, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 113 (1937).

Proof of Residence or Domicile.

Testimony to prove residence was to be taken in the same manner as if to be used on the merits and an ex parte affidavit offered to prove residence was inadmissible. Townsend v. Townsend, 2 R.I. 150 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1852).

Res Judicata.

Where the respondent appeared and defended, denying jurisdiction on the ground of nonresidence of the petitioner, but the question of residence was decided in favor of the petitioner and a divorce granted, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to vacate the decision on the ground of a want of jurisdiction after the respondent took no step for review during the statutory period. Paine v. Paine, 43 R.I. 478 , 113 A. 658, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1921).

Residence of Respondent.

The residence of the respondent is sufficient to support a petition for an absolute divorce but not for a divorce from bed and board. David v. David, 47 R.I. 304 , 132 A. 879, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1926).

The court was without jurisdiction to consider a nonresident’s petition for a divorce from bed and board or to allow the amendment of the petition to a petition for an absolute divorce, even though the resident respondent made a general appearance and filed a counter petition for an absolute divorce. David v. David, 47 R.I. 304 , 132 A. 879, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1926).

Collateral References.

Armed forces, residence of person in, for purposes of divorce suit. 21 A.L.R.2d 1163.

Change of residence by plaintiff, pendente lite, as affecting jurisdiction of court to grant divorce. 7 A.L.R.2d 1414.

Corroboration of testimony of plaintiff as to fact of residence. 65 A.L.R. 185.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: assumption or denial of jurisdiction of action involving matrimonial disputes. 9 A.L.R.3d 545.

False allegation of plaintiff’s domicile or residence in the state as ground for vacation of default decree of divorce. 6 A.L.R.2d 596.

Joint bank account as subject to attachment, garnishment, or execution by creditor of one of the joint depositors. 11 A.L.R.3d 1465.

Jurisdiction of state court over divorce suit by resident of United States reservation. 46 A.L.R. 993.

Length or duration of domicile, as distinguished from fact of domicile at commencement of action for divorce as a jurisdictional matter. 2 A.L.R.2d 291.

Nature and location of one’s business or calling as element in determining domicile in divorce case. 36 A.L.R.2d 756.

Nonresidence of defendant or cross complainant in a suit for divorce as affecting power of court to grant divorce in his or her favor. 89 A.L.R. 1203.

Pleadings: lack or insufficiency of allegations of plaintiff’s residence or domicil in suit for divorce as ground for vacation of, or collateral attack on, divorce decree. 55 A.L.R.2d 1263.

Separate domicile of wife for purpose of jurisdiction over subject matter of suit by her for divorce or separation. 39 A.L.R. 710.

Validity and construction of statutory provision relating to jurisdiction of court for purpose of divorce for servicemen. 73 A.L.R.3d 431.

Validity of statute imposing durational residence requirements for divorce applicants. 57 A.L.R.3d 221.

What constitutes residence or domicile within state for purpose of jurisdiction in divorce. 106 A.L.R. 6, 159 A.L.R. 496, 51 A.L.R.3d 223.

15-5-13. Venue.

  1. All complaints for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board and complaints for relief without commencement of divorce proceedings shall be filed in the county in which the plaintiff is residing, unless the complaint is based upon the residence of the defendant, in which case the complaint shall be filed in Providence County or in the county in which the defendant resides.
  2. All complaints for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board and complaints for relief without commencement of divorce proceedings may be tried and heard in the county in which the plaintiff resides, unless the complaint is based upon the residence of the defendant, in which case the complaint may be heard and tried in Providence County or in the county in which the defendant resides. In the interest of convenience, the court may, with the consent of the chief judge of the family court or any associate justice designated by him or her and the parties, order any such actions transferred to another county.
  3. The chief judge of the family court, or his or her designee, in accordance with the provisions of the Family Court Act, § 8-10-14 , may order any complaint for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board and complaints for relief without commencement of divorce proceedings to be transferred to Providence County for trial on the merits should it be determined by the trial judge in the county in which the action was originally brought that the trial would require a minimum of three (3) court days for testimony. Any complaint, which is transferred under this section, shall have priority on the trial calendar in Providence County.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 11; P.L. 1906, ch. 1304, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 11; P.L. 1942, ch. 1252, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2493, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-13 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 373, § 11; P.L. 1982, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 219, § 1.

Cross References.

Superior court jurisdiction, § 8-2-13 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cross Petition.

A respondent who was resident of Washington county could file a cross petition in Providence county, where the nonresident petitioner filed, and the court could prevent the discontinuance of the original petition if necessary to prevent the impairment of the respondent’s rights. Borda v. Borda, 43 R.I. 384 , 113 A. 118, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1921).

Judge’s Rotation Among Counties.

Although an order to transfer a case to another county did not appear on the record, this section does not prevent a case from following a judge when he moves to another county on his usual rotation and when both of the parties implicitly consent to the change. Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608 , 375 A.2d 911, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1501 (1977).

Nonresident Petitioner.

A petition by nonresident against a respondent resident in Washington county was properly filed in Providence county. Borda v. Borda, 43 R.I. 384 , 113 A. 118, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1921).

Resident Petitioner.

The Providence county superior court did not have jurisdiction where the petitioner was a resident of Kent county. Salters v. Salters, 72 R.I. 81 , 48 A.2d 359, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1946).

Separate Petition by Respondent.

The filing by a nonresident of a petition in Providence county did not prevent the resident respondent from filing a separate petition in a county of residence, so long as the respondent had not filed a cross petition in Providence county. Borda v. Borda, 43 R.I. 384 , 113 A. 118, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1921).

A respondent who filed a cross petition in Providence county was thereby precluded from filing a separate petition in the county of her residence. Borda v. Borda, 43 R.I. 384 , 113 A. 118, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1921).

Collateral References.

Contractual provision limiting place or court in which action may be brought. 31 A.L.R.4th 404.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: assumption or denial of jurisdiction of action involving matrimonial disputes. 9 A.L.R.3d 545.

15-5-14. Return day of complaints — Notice — Issuance of process — Time of hearing.

The court may, by general rule:

  1. Determine the return day of complaints for divorce;
  2. Prescribe the notice to be given, within or without the state, on all complaints for divorce;
  3. May issue any process that may be necessary to carry into effect all powers conferred upon the court in relation to complaints and divorce; and
  4. Fix the times when all complaints for divorce shall be heard. These general rules shall be subject to special orders that the court may make in special cases.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-14 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 7; P.L. 1987, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 171, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 264, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 171, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 264, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Fee for serving citation, § 9-29-9 .

Collateral References.

Divorce: necessity of notice of application for temporary custody of child. 31 A.L.R.3d 1378.

Jurisdiction on constructive or substituted service, in divorce or alimony action, to reach property within state. 10 A.L.R.3d 212.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hearing as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees in divorce or other marital action. 10 A.L.R.3d 280.

Right of indigent to proceed in marital action without payment of costs. 52 A.L.R.3d 844.

15-5-14.1. Automatic orders in divorce cases.

  1. Upon the filing of a complaint for divorce, divorce from bed and board, legal separation, annulment, custody or visitation by the plaintiff and upon service of the petition and summons of the defendant or upon waiver and acceptance of service by the parties, the automatic orders shall be effective with regard to the plaintiff upon the signing of the complaint and with regard to the defendant upon service. A copy of the automatic order shall be served with the summons and complaint.
  2. Neither party shall sell, transfer, encumber, conceal, assign, remove or in any way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or without an order of the court, any property, individually or jointly held by the parties, except in the usual course of business or for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with this action. Nothing in this section shall be construed to create liability against or affect the validity of the title to real estate of any purchaser of real estate for value when the purchaser acts in good faith and without actual knowledge of the court’s order.
  3. Neither party shall incur any unreasonable debts including, but not limited to, further borrowing against any credit line secured by the family residence, further encumbrance of any assets, or unreasonably using credit cards or cash advances against credit or bank cards. Nothing in this section shall be construed to create liability against the creditor under the terms of the original agreement when the creditor acts in good faith and without actual knowledge of the court’s order.
  4. Neither party shall permanently remove the minor child or children from the state of Rhode Island without the written consent of the other party or an order of the court.
  5. Neither party shall cause the other party or the children of the marriage to be removed from any medical, hospital and/or dental insurance coverage, and each party shall maintain the existing medical, hospital, and dental insurance coverage in full force and effect.
  6. Neither party shall change the beneficiaries of any existing life insurance policies, and each party shall maintain the existing life insurance, automobile insurance, homeowner’s or renter’s insurance policies in full force and effect.
  7. If the parties are living together on the date of service of these orders, neither party may deny the other party use of the current primary residence of the parties, whether it be owned or rented property, without court order. This provision shall not apply if there is a prior, contradictory court order.
  8. If the parties share a child or children, a party vacating the family residence shall notify the other party or the other party’s attorney, in writing, within forty-eight (48) hours of such move, of an address where the relocated party can receive communication. This provision shall not apply if there is a prior, contradictory court order.
  9. If the parents of the children live apart during the dissolution proceeding, they shall assist their children in having contact with both parties, which is consistent with the habits of the family, personally, by telephone, and in writing unless there is a prior court order.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 262, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 280, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Violation of Automatic Stay.

As a former wife violated the automatic stay imposed by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-14.1(c) when she took out a home equity loan after the divorce action was filed, it was error to require the former husband to pay one-half of this loan. Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2009).

15-5-15. Orders as to notice.

Whenever any petition for divorce has been filed or is pending in the family court, and the court is of the opinion that sufficient notice of the pendency of the petition has not, from any cause, been given to the adverse party, the court may order notice or further notice to the adverse party to be given in the manner that the court may prescribe.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 13; C.P.A. 1905, § 1220; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-15 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 63, § 1.

Collateral References.

Divorce: necessity of notice of application for temporary custody of child. 31 A.L.R.3d 1378.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances. 35 A.L.R.3d 520.

Father’s criminal liability for desertion of or failure to support child where divorce decree awards custody to another. 73 A.L.R.2d 960.

Jurisdiction on constructive or substituted service, in divorce or alimony action, to reach property within state. 10 A.L.R.3d 212.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hearing as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees in divorce or other marital action. 10 A.L.R.3d 280.

Right of indigent to proceed in marital action without payment of costs. 52 A.L.R.3d 844.

15-5-16. Alimony and counsel fees — Custody of children.

  1. In granting any petition for divorce, divorce from bed and board, or relief without the commencement of divorce proceedings, the family court may order either of the parties to pay alimony or counsel fees, or both, to the other.
    1. In determining the amount of alimony or counsel fees, if any, to be paid, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider:
      1. The length of the marriage;
      2. The conduct of the parties during the marriage;
      3. The health, age, station, occupation, amount and source of income, vocational skills, and employability of the parties; and
      4. The state and the liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
    2. In addition, the court shall consider:
      1. The extent to which either party is unable to support herself or himself adequately because that party is the primary physical custodian of a child whose age, condition, or circumstances make it appropriate that the parent not seek employment outside the home, or seek only part-time or flexible-hour employment outside the home;
      2. The extent to which either party is unable to support herself or himself adequately with consideration given to:
        1. The extent to which a party was absent from employment while fulfilling homemaking responsibilities, and the extent to which any education, skills, or experience of that party have become outmoded and his or her earning capacity diminished;
        2. The time and expense required for the supported spouse to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop marketable skills and find appropriate employment;
        3. The probability, given a party’s age and skills, of completing education or training and becoming self-supporting;
        4. The standard of living during the marriage;
        5. The opportunity of either party for future acquisition of capital assets and income;
        6. The ability to pay of the supporting spouse, taking into account the supporting spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, debts, and standard of living;
        7. Any other factor which the court expressly finds to be just and proper.
    1. For the purposes of this section, “alimony” is construed as payments for the support or maintenance of either the husband or the wife.
    2. Alimony is designed to provide support for a spouse for a reasonable length of time to enable the recipient to become financially independent and self-sufficient. However, the court may award alimony for an indefinite period of time when it is appropriate in the discretion of the court based upon the factors set forth in subdivision (b)(2)(ii)(B). After a decree for alimony has been entered, the court may from time to time upon the petition of either party review and alter its decree relative to the amount and payment of the alimony, and may make any decree relative to it which it might have made in the original suit. The decree may be made retroactive in the court’s discretion to the date that the court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred; provided, the court shall set forth in its decision the specific findings of fact which show a substantial change in circumstances and upon which findings of facts the court has decided to make the decree retroactive. Nothing provided in this section shall affect the power of the court as subsequently provided by law to alter, amend, or annul any order of alimony previously entered. Upon the remarriage of the spouse who is receiving alimony, the obligation to pay alimony shall automatically terminate at once.
    1. In regulating the custody of the children, the court shall provide for the reasonable right of visitation by the natural parent not having custody of the children, except upon the showing of cause why the right should not be granted or as provided in subdivision 15-5-16(d)(4) . The court shall mandate compliance with its order by both the custodial parent and the children. In the event of noncompliance, the noncustodial parent may file a motion for contempt in family court. Upon a finding by the court that its order for visitation has not been complied with, the court shall exercise its discretion in providing a remedy, and define the noncustodial parent’s visitation in detail. However, if a second finding of noncompliance by the court is made, the court shall consider this to be grounds for a change of custody to the noncustodial parent.
    2. In regulating the custody and determining the best interests of children, the fact that a parent is receiving public assistance shall not be a factor in awarding custody.
    3. A judicial determination that the child has been physically or sexually abused by the natural parent shall constitute sufficient cause to deny the right of visitation. However, when the court enters an order denying visitation under this section, it shall review the case at least annually to determine what, if any, action the parent has taken to rehabilitate himself or herself and whether the denial of visitation continues to be in the child’s best interests.
    4. No person shall be granted custody of or visitation with a child if that person has been convicted under or pled nolo contendere to a violation of §§ 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 , or 11-37-8.1 or other comparable law of another jurisdiction, and the child was conceived as a result of that violation; unless after hearing the family court finds that the natural mother or legal guardian consents to visitation with the child, and the court determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child, then the court may order supervised visitation and counseling.
    5. The court may order a natural parent who has been denied the right of visitation due to physical or sexual abuse of his or her child to engage in counseling. The failure of the parent to engage in counseling, ordered by the court pursuant to this section, shall constitute sufficient cause to deny visitation.
  2. In all hearings regarding denial of visitation, the court shall make findings of fact.
  3. This chapter does not affect the right of the family court to award alimony or support pendente lite.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section and § 15-5-19 , the court, when making decisions regarding child custody and visitation, shall consider evidence of past or present domestic violence. Where domestic violence is proven, any grant of visitation shall be arranged so as to best protect the child and the abused parent from further harm.
    2. In addition to other factors that a court must consider in a proceeding in which the court has made a finding of domestic or family violence, the court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child and of the parent who is the victim of domestic or family violence. The court shall also consider the perpetrator’s history of causing physical harm, bodily injury or assault to another person.
    3. In a visitation or custody order, as a condition of the order, the court may:
      1. Order the perpetrator of domestic violence to attend and successfully complete, to the satisfaction of the court, a certified batterer’s intervention program;
      2. Order the perpetrator to attend a substance abuse program whenever deemed appropriate;
      3. Require that a bond be filed with the court in order to ensure the return and safety of the child;
      4. Order that the address and telephone number of the child be kept confidential;
      5. Order an exchange of the child to occur in a protected setting, or supervised by another person or agency; provided that, if the court allows a family or household member to supervise visitation, the court shall establish conditions to be followed during visitation;
      6. Order the perpetrator of domestic violence to abstain from possession or consumption of alcohol or controlled substances during the visitation; and
      7. Impose any other condition that is deemed necessary to provide for the safety of the child, the victim of domestic violence, or other family or household member.
    4. “Domestic violence” means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between spouses or people who have a child in common:
      1. Attempting to cause or causing physical harm;
      2. Placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm;
      3. Causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force, or duress.
    5. In every proceeding in which there is at issue the modification of an order for custody or visitation of a child, the finding that domestic or family violence has occurred since the last custody determination constitutes a prima facie finding of a change of circumstances.
    6. The fact that a parent is absent or relocates because of an act of domestic or family violence by the other parent shall not weigh against the relocating or absent parent in determining custody and visitation.
    7. A party’s absence, relocation, or failure to comply with custody and visitation orders shall not, by itself, be sufficient to justify a modification of a custody or visitation order if the reason for the absence, relocation, or failure to comply is the party’s activation to military service or deployment out of state.
  4. If there is no existing order establishing the terms of parental rights and responsibilities or parent-child contact and it appears that deployment or mobilization is imminent, upon motion by either parent, the court shall expedite a hearing to establish temporary parental rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact to ensure the deploying parent has access to the child, to ensure disclosure of information, to grant other rights and duties set forth herein, and to provide other appropriate relief. Any initial pleading filed to establish parental rights and responsibilities for or parent-child contact with a child of a deploying parent shall be so identified at the time of filing by stating in the text of the pleading the specific facts related to deployment.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 338, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 406, § 5; P.L. 1981, ch. 320, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 79, § 1; P.L.1991, ch. 225, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 302, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 28, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 248, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 209, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 501, § 9.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2013, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 501, § 9) as passed by the 2013 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all three acts..

P.L. 2013, ch. 190, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 200, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 15-5-16 (G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 14; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-16 ), concerning the custody and support of children, and allowances for prosecution of or defense against divorce petitions, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 1, and the present section substituted therefor. See also §§ 15-5-16.1 15-5-16.4 and § 15-5-19 .

Cross References.

Interstate family support, § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Wage assignment procedures, §§ 15-5-24 , 15-5-25 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Survey Section: Civil Procedure, see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 398 (1998).

2004 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Family Law, see 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 889 (2005).

Meghan L. Kruger, Comment: Separation Anxiety: The Implications of Rhode Island’s Reluctance to Remove Fault from Divorce Proceedings, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 808 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Alimony.

The modern concept of alimony is that it is a rehabilitative tool designed to provide support for an ex-spouse and is based on need. Fisk v. Fisk, 477 A.2d 956, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 568 (R.I. 1984).

The primary focus in considering alimony must be on the economic situation of the parties viewed in light of the financial exigencies of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to meet those needs. Fisk v. Fisk, 477 A.2d 956, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 568 (R.I. 1984).

Modern concepts of the marital relationship no longer support the view that alimony is an “extension of a husband’s common-law duty to support his wife.” Whited v. Whited, 478 A.2d 567, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 571 (R.I. 1984).

It is not the function of a trial justice in divorce cases to equalize the earning power of divorced parties. Rather, the function is to consider all of the elements in determining whether an award of alimony should be made. Cok v. Cok, 479 A.2d 1184, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 581 (R.I. 1984).

No single factor should control a trial justice’s decision when addressing the question of alimony. However, a primary focus must be on the economic situation of the parties viewed in light of the financial exigencies of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to meet those needs. Fisk v. Fisk, 537 A.2d 418, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 1988).

The power of the family court to grant alimony is statutory, and any action taken by the court must be expressly conferred by the statute governing the establishment and jurisdiction of that court. Ramsbottom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d 1098, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 1988).

Alimony in its modern form is no longer an extension of a husband’s common-law duty to support his wife but is a rehabilitative tool designed to provide support for an ex-spouse based on need. The award should be payable for a short and definite period that allows a recipient to become financially independent. Stanzler v. Stanzler, 560 A.2d 342, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 121 (R.I. 1989).

Alimony is designed to provide support for an ex-spouse based on need. It should be payable for a limited and definite period and it should be reasonably calculated to allow the recipient to become financially independent. Cloutier v. Cloutier, 567 A.2d 1131, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 1989).

Where the family court justice noted the extended length of a marriage, the parties’ good health, the difference between the two parties’ employability and standard of living, the “gross disparity” in their incomes, the husband’s conduct, and the wife’s significant contributions throughout their marriage, it was appropriate for the court to award alimony payments for three years longer than she had requested, particularly when she had been assigned mortgage payments, contrary to her request, and where the alimony payments declined in amount over the course of the term. Koziol v. Koziol, 720 A.2d 230, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 303 (R.I. 1998).

Because the trial justice found that alimony was designed to provide support for a spouse for a reasonable length of time to enable the recipient to become financially independent and self-sufficient, and then specifically found that the wife had sufficient assets and income that an award of alimony would not be justified, ordering the disclosure of additional information about the husband’s trusts would not have, in any way, changed that finding, and the trial justice did not err when he denied her request that the husband disclose information about his will, trusts, and other estate-planning documents. McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2013).

Trial justice did not abuse the justice’s discretion in an award of alimony; while the husband earned a substantial income, the justice found that the wife was employable based on her prior work history, earning capacity, health, and age. With respect to the method of payment of alimony, the justice’s award, which permitted the wife to remain in the marital home for a period of time while she sought employment and considered husband’s payments to maintain the home to be alimony, was within the justice’s discretion and was a reasonable method of satisfying the intent of rehabilitative alimony. Saltzman v. Saltzman, 218 A.3d 551, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 122 (R.I. 2019).

— Ability to Pay.

Support trusts of which the husband is beneficiary may be considered in determining his ability to pay alimony and child support. Pansey v. Pansey, 115 R.I. 97 , 340 A.2d 120, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1125 (1975).

— After Majority of Child.

Where, on majority of a child, the husband sought modification of a decree for support of a wife and child, the wife was entitled to a hearing on the merits as to the amount that should be decreed as alimony. Makant v. Makant, 163 A. 746, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 145 (R.I. 1933).

— Agreement of Parties.

An alimony agreement incorporated in a decree is subject to modification by the court even though payments are guaranteed by a trust fund established by the husband. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 53 R.I. 326 , 166 A. 686, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1933).

A wife was denied due process where the trial justice denied her motion without holding another hearing, and she was foreclosed from presenting evidence relevant to intent in a divorce settlement. Iannacone v. Iannacone, 121 R.I. 46 , 394 A.2d 1105, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 751 (1978).

A significant factor in determining what the parties intended in a divorce settlement is the identity of the person or persons benefited by the payment. Iannacone v. Iannacone, 121 R.I. 46 , 394 A.2d 1105, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 751 (1978).

— Determination of Amount.

Court could not base decree on expectation of contributions from husband’s relatives where relatives had no obligation to make such contributions. Boyden v. Boyden, 50 R.I. 326 , 147 A. 621, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1929).

The trial court did not err as a matter of law in awarding the wife alimony for a period of three and one-half years at a weekly rate of $327 since the wife was substantially unemployed and the husband had significant weekly earnings. Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 1996).

Trial court, through a magistrate, properly awarded the wife one-half of the husband’s net earnings, where it considered the criteria set out in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 in making such an award; it was found that the wife suffered from multiple sclerosis, which limited her work ability, that she cared for the parties’ two young children, and that the husband often worked overtime. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2003).

Trial justice abused discretion in summarily awarding alimony because no factual findings were made and the award violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(c) , mandating that an assignment of property was to be made before an award of alimony. Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2006).

Trial court’s alimony award to wife of $200 per week for three years was proper under circumstances in which the wife’s treating physician opined in an affidavit that the wife was not able to be gainfully employed at any time in the future; the trial court weighed this medical evidence against the testimony of multiple witnesses (including the wife herself), all of whom confirmed that she was healthy enough to regularly participate in several physically strenuous hobbies, including skiing and gardening. The trial court concluded that, in light of the wife’s share in the equitable distribution of the estate and her ongoing Social Security disability payments, $200 per week for three years was a sufficient rehabilitative award of alimony. Giammarco v. Giammarco, 959 A.2d 531, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2008).

— Enforcement of Decree.

See case notes to § 15-5-16.3 , Notes to Decisions.

— Evidence.

The granting of affirmative relief in the form of alimony and property division to the wife without permitting her to be cross-examined in respect to her extra-marital sexual conduct and without drawing the slightest inference against her even though she refused at trial to testify on self-incrimination grounds was prejudicial error requiring reversal. Pulawski v. Pulawski, 463 A.2d 151, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1015 (R.I. 1983).

Conduct which may be considered in awarding alimony is not limited to bad conduct or marital fault but also encompasses good conduct during the term of the marriage. Fisk v. Fisk, 477 A.2d 956, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 568 (R.I. 1984).

— — Award.

Since the parties were married for a 30-year period, during none of which the wife was employed, the wife suffered from mental illness, and lacked vocational skills and thus lacked the ability to generate an income, and the husband physically and verbally abused his wife and children throughout the course of the marriage and engaged in excessive drinking, the trial justice properly considered this evidence in light of the factors set forth in this section and appropriately awarded to the wife open-ended alimony. Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 166 (R.I. 1992).

Lump-sum alimony award of $ 60,000, made after the trial justice’s consideration of the appropriate factors in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 , was permissible. Shramek v. Shramek, 901 A.2d 593, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 133 (R.I. 2006).

The trial master did not abuse his discretion in awarding the wife one year of alimony, where he correctly determined that the wife needed temporary support while she finished her education and sought full-time employment and that the husband had the ability to pay. Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 192 (R.I. 1994).

The trial master’s award to the wife of two years of rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $100 per week was reasonable where it was shown that he considered expressly all the statutory factors. Murphy v. Murphy, 714 A.2d 576, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 225 (R.I. 1998).

— Fault.

It was error for the trial justice to deny alimony solely on the basis of fault without considering the financial needs of the parties. Fisk v. Fisk, 477 A.2d 956, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 568 (R.I. 1984).

The trial court did not err in denying wife alimony and counsel fees where both parties contributed equally to the breakdown of the marriage. Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 486 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S. Ct. 219, 93 L. Ed. 2d 147, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4041 (1986).

— Indefinite Period.

Alimony for an indefinite period may be awarded as long as the trial court considers all the factors set forth in this section. Wrobleski v. Wrobleski, 653 A.2d 732, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 1995).

— Modification of Decree.

In denying a husband’s petition to amend the final decree regarding alimony payments, the trial justice committed error by failing to state his reasons for rejecting the respondent’s testimony regarding his net worth. Siravo v. Siravo, 424 A.2d 1047, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1017 (R.I. 1981).

In this state as in other jurisdictions, a party seeking to modify the terms of an existing decree has the burden of proving the basis of need for modification by a fair preponderance of the evidence. McHenry v. McHenry, 424 A.2d 1067, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1023 (R.I. 1981).

In considering whether a party’s burden of proving the need for modification has been sustained, the court may take into account capital assets owned by the moving party as well as other sources of income. McHenry v. McHenry, 424 A.2d 1067, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1023 (R.I. 1981).

A trial justice might take into account, in determining whether a husband had established the need for modifying a support decree, the fact that the husband had voluntarily chosen to be employed without salary in a company controlled by him, the assets and potential of which were undisclosed. McHenry v. McHenry, 424 A.2d 1067, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1023 (R.I. 1981).

Where the court modifies a temporary relief order so as to include transportation expenses and indicates that the reason for the modification is that the spouse lacks access to assigned property pending appeal, which property would provide the assets necessary to buy a car, this constitutes an improper basis on which to base a modification of a support decree. The only basis sufficient to justify an award is a proper showing of a change in circumstances. Murphy v. Murphy, 471 A.2d 619, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 454 (R.I. 1984).

A bankruptcy discharge of debts, assumed by the husband as a condition of his former wife’s waiver of alimony, affected a substantial change in the relative circumstances of the two, entitling the wife to seek indemnification for debts. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 437 (R.I. 1985).

Once a judgment awarding alimony has been entered, a party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a “substantial change in circumstances” in order for the court to modify its judgment. Ramsbottom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d 1098, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 1988).

A necessary incident to the court’s power to grant alimony is the power to modify it. The court has the power to modify any judgment relative thereto that it might have made in the original suit. Ramsbottom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d 1098, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 1988).

Equating a finding of “cohabitation” with a “substantial change in circumstances” is clearly beyond the family court’s statutory authority to modify a judgment awarding alimony. Ramsbottom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d 1098, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 1988).

The family court has the power to modify any judgment relative thereto that it might have made in the original suit. However, any modification of a judgment awarding alimony must be based upon a substantial change in the circumstances of the respective parties. Goldman v. Goldman, 543 A.2d 1304, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 86 (R.I. 1988).

Public policy prohibits a finding that cohabitation, absent additional evidence, is equivalent to a substantial change in circumstances. Goldman v. Goldman, 543 A.2d 1304, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 86 (R.I. 1988).

The record supported a reduction of alimony payments from $45,000 to $30,000 per year, where despite defendant’s diminished earnings, his financial holdings and lifestyle suggested that he remained capable of paying alimony in the amount of $30,000 per year. Rogers v. Rogers, 588 A.2d 1354, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 1991).

If a property settlement agreement is not merged with the final divorce judgment, the agreement retains the characteristics of a contract, and modification can only be accomplished by the contracting parties. Therefore, the court had no authority to modify alimony in a nonmerged separation agreement, and the wife’s waiver of long-term alimony in favor of other compensation was a bargained-for risk and part of the negotiation process of the property distribution. Borden v. Borden, 649 A.2d 1028, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 263 (R.I. 1994).

— Rehabilitative Purposes.

The concept of “rehabilitative alimony,” which states that alimony is a rehabilitative tool designed to provide support based on need, modifies the common-law notion that when a marriage ends the husband has an indefinite duty to continue to support his former wife. Casey v. Casey, 494 A.2d 80, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1985).

Alimony is intended to be a rehabilitative tool that is based upon need and that will allow the recipient to become self-sufficient and should be payable for a relatively short and definite period that is reasonably calculated to allow the recipient to become financially independent. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 511 A.2d 961, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 499 (R.I. 1986).

Alimony is considered a rehabilitative tool designed to provide economic support for a dependent spouse and is based upon need. Ramsbottom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d 1098, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 1988).

The trial court was not clearly wrong in limiting the award for payments of alimony and college education expenses to a period of three years. This limitation was based on the petitioner’s own testimony that completion of the desired educational program could be accomplished within this period. Reed v. Reed, 668 A.2d 329, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 293 (R.I. 1995).

The trial justice acted within his discretion in declining to award alimony to a wife where he explicitly found that the husband had no present capacity to pay alimony based on his weekly needs and those of the children who were in his sole custody, and where the wife’s age and training provided her with the ability to find employment in a thriving economy. Berard v. Berard, 749 A.2d 577, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 2000).

Family court did not err in awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony where the record showed that the trial judge properly considered the facts and the statutory factors enumerated in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 , such as the wife’s financial needs and expenses, her limited ability to acquire assets, the 11-year duration of the marriage, and the fact that the wife was responsible for caring for the two children, who were still very young. Also the husband had the potential to acquire substantial assets before retiring from his position. Horton v. Horton, 891 A.2d 885, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2006).

In awarding a wife rehabilitative alimony for three years, the family court properly considered the amount of time that the parties had been married, the conclusion that the husband had not been faithful during the marriage, the contributions each party made towards the purchase and development of a vacation property, the couple’s lifestyle, the fact that the wife had ceased working in her profession, the income of the husband and his ability to acquire future income, and the wife’s ability to work. Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 2013).

— Remarriage.

This section leaves no room for interpretation and mandates that upon the remarriage of the spouse who is receiving alimony the obligation to pay alimony shall automatically terminate at once. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 674 A.2d 375, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 1996).

— Review.

The supreme court had no power in a proceeding analogous to habeas corpus to modify a support decree of the superior court. Ex parte Asadoorian, 48 R.I. 50 , 135 A. 322, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1926).

Although this section permits decrees for the support and custody of children to be modified, such a decree is sufficiently final to be appealable. Murphy v. Charlie's Home Improvement Co., 117 R.I. 324 , 366 A.2d 809, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1633 (1976).

— Temporary Allowances.

A petitioner for annulment of a marriage was entitled to an allowance pending determination of a suit. Leckney v. Leckney, 26 R.I. 441 , 59 A. 311, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1904).

The fact that a wife has property and income does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to order support pendente lite, even though it might not have power to order payment of counsel fees under such circumstances. Jennings v. Jennings, 78 R.I. 139 , 79 A.2d 920, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1951).

The court had jurisdiction to hear a motion for temporary support under this section where a wife’s petition for absolute divorce had been amended to one for relief without the commencement of divorce proceedings. Thayer v. Thayer, 107 R.I. 116 , 265 A.2d 436, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 746 (1970).

— — Support Pending Review.

The trial court, though denying divorce from bed and board, could order payment of support pending prosecution of exceptions. Rotondo v. Rotondo, 84 R.I. 476 , 125 A.2d 118, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1956).

— Termination of Obligation.

In general, unless otherwise agreed, the obligation to pay alimony is terminated on the death of either party. However, the death of the obligee does not relieve the obligor of his or her obligation for alimony that accrued before death. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 1989).

Conclusiveness of Decrees.

A decree as to the custody and support of children is conclusive until modified or annulled. Brown v. Smith, 19 R.I. 319 , 33 A. 466, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1895).

A decree of combined amount for the support of wife and children was effective until modified even after the children reached majority. Ciallella v. Ciallella, 80 R.I. 320 , 81 R.I. 320 , 103 A.2d 77, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1954).

A final judgment of divorce that merges a property-settlement agreement into that judgment supersedes any language in the agreement to the contrary. Once merged, the property-settlement agreement loses all vitality, and the judgment of divorce then controls the rights, privileges, and obligations of the respective parties. Goldman v. Goldman, 543 A.2d 1304, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 86 (R.I. 1988).

Contempt.

A person who has not been shown to have the ability to carry out the terms of a divorce decree requiring the payment of money may not be held in contempt for such noncompliance. Ross v. Ross, 511 A.2d 987, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1986).

Continuing Jurisdiction.

Even though the husband (an Ohio resident) was only in Rhode Island temporarily for his daughter’s wedding, personal service of the wife’s complaint upon him while in Rhode Island was sufficient; in the absence of a factor terminating jurisdiction, the husband was subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the courts of Rhode Island pursuant to subsection (c)(2). Armentrout v. Armentrout, 691 A.2d 559, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 1997).

Custody of Children.

The well-being of a child is a primary consideration in awarding custody, and a female child of tender years could be awarded to the mother despite any superior right of the father and despite fault on the part of the mother. McKim v. McKim, 12 R.I. 462 , 1879 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1879).

The controlling factor in determining custody of children is always the best interest of the child, although as a general guide the mother, if fit, should have custody of young children, especially girls. Loebenberg v. Loebenberg, 85 R.I. 115 , 127 A.2d 500, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1956).

When marital discord resulting in divorce or legal separation renders the principal of natural guardianship incapable of application as to both parents, the family court has jurisdiction to award custody of minor children to that parent who, in the judgment of the court, will most suitably serve the best interest of such children. In re Loudin, 101 R.I. 35 , 219 A.2d 915, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 347 (1966).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife sole custody of the minor children in light of the fact that the parties were unable to maintain an amicable relationship which would make joint custody feasible. Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 486 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S. Ct. 219, 93 L. Ed. 2d 147, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4041 (1986).

Where, after the mother had received notice of the father’s request for joint custody and visitation, she deliberately absented herself from the court’s jurisdiction so as to place the child beyond the power of the court, and then filed a verified response to the motion, the only effective action the family court justice could take was to transfer custody to the father, since the mother by her conduct had clearly indicated that she would not obey the order of the court and that she had waived her right to any further hearing concerning custody. Gallogly v. Smith, 642 A.2d 670, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 174 (R.I. 1994).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sole physical custody of the child to the mother since the evidence presented during trial revealed that the father had a problem with alcohol, physically abused the mother, and felt a great amount of animosity toward the mother. The father did not point to any evidence indicating the trial court abused its discretion in finding it was in the child’s best interest that sole physical custody be awarded to the mother. Maroney v. Maroney, 644 A.2d 827, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 204 (R.I. 1994).

Family court should not have determined without considering all the circumstances affecting the children’s best interests that one parent had necessarily failed to present a compelling reason for relocating from Rhode Island to Polynesia, where the desire to move had been that parent’s constant wish throughout the marriage and friction over that lifestyle had in fact destroyed the marriage; treating the original decree as an interim decision rather than a final order, the high court did not hold that the parent in Polynesia should necessarily have been awarded custody, only that such relocation did not automatically disqualify that parent for custody, since the parent in Polynesia, whom the family court had determined would best meet the children’s needs, should not have been required to satisfy the exacting compelling need standard. Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 162 (R.I. 2004).

Family court did not err in awarding the wife sole custody of the parties’ two minor children pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 because the record showed that the children had lived with their mother their entire lives, the mother had attended to the children’s medical and educational needs, the minor son had certain educational and medical needs that the husband refused to recognize and accept, which resulted in the burden of dealing with them solely on the wife. The trial justice furhter considered the required factors in order to determine the best interest of the children. Horton v. Horton, 891 A.2d 885, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2006).

— Continuing Jurisdiction.

The questions of custody and support of minor children of divorced parties, whether provided for in the final decree or otherwise, continue within the jurisdiction and control of the court, notwithstanding the absence of the other spouse from this jurisdiction. Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723 , 391 A.2d 79, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 728 (1978).

The question of the custody of minor children of divorced parties, whether provided for in a final decree or otherwise, continues within the jurisdiction and control of the trial court. However, a trial court should not exercise that jurisdiction without a showing that there has been some alteration or change in circumstances and conditions that existed at the time of the entry of the final decree. Kenney v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 428 (R.I. 1985).

A trial justice is vested with discretion in determining the need and amount of counsel fees. Fricke v. Fricke, 491 A.2d 990, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 493 (R.I. 1985).

— Enforcement of Decree.

The superior court could, as a means of enforcing its custody decree, enjoin a party from interfering with the management of the children. Budlong v. Budlong, 51 R.I. 113 , 152 A. 256, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1930).

— Evidence.

The weight to be given to the preference of a child in a custody dispute is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court; and although the expressed preference is not conclusive on the issue of what best promotes the child’s welfare, such a preference is competent and highly probative evidence on the particular issue. Kenney v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 428 (R.I. 1985).

— Modification of Awards.

An increase in a boy’s age from 8 to 12 years, standing alone, constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant the court to reopen the prior custody award. King v. King, 114 R.I. 329 , 333 A.2d 135, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1418 (1975).

The mere absence from a decree granting a change in custody of the term “change in circumstances” is of no legal significance whatsoever. Kenney v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 428 (R.I. 1985).

Family court acted within its discretion in refusing to modify custody from a mother having sole custody with the father having no visitation, due to hitting the children, because the father did not complete required domestic-violence counseling and drug testing; the dismissal of the father’s second-degree child abuse conviction had no effect on the custody order because the family court determining the father hit the children did not have to rise to the level of a criminal conviction. Catley v. Sampson, 66 A.3d 834, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2013).

Discontinuance of Petition.

A husband could not, by discontinuance of petition, defeat a respondent wife’s application for support pendente lite and counsel fees. Stevens v. Superior Court, 44 R.I. 282 , 117 A. 232, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1922).

A motion for discontinuance was properly denied where it would have impaired the validity of a subsequent interlocutory decree awarding custody of a child to the respondent. Lanigan v. Lanigan, 85 R.I. 100 , 126 A.2d 833, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1956).

Dismissal or Denial of Petition.

The dismissal of a petition for divorce will not hinder the collection of accrued allowances, so there is no reason to delay a dismissal ordered after appellate proceedings. Hurvitz v. Hurvitz, 44 R.I. 501 , 119 A. 497, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1923).

Where the superior court dismissed a petition for divorce, it had no jurisdiction to award custody of the minor children or provide for their support. White v. White, 70 R.I. 48 , 36 A.2d 661, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1944).

Where the superior court denied a petition for divorce from bed and board, it had no jurisdiction to award custody of the minor children or provide for their support, even though the court refused to dismiss the petition. Rivard v. Rivard, 70 R.I. 305 , 38 A.2d 771, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1944).

Litigation Costs.
— Appellate Proceedings.

The superior court was the proper court to allow counsel fees even when the bill of exceptions was pending in the supreme court. Hurvitz v. Hurvitz, 44 R.I. 243 , 116 A. 661, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1922).

Where he has the means, the husband may be required to pay counsel fees for his wife’s prosecution of or defense against appellate proceedings. Cornell v. Cornell, 53 R.I. 352 , 166 A. 815, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1933).

The denial of a motion for counsel fees “at this time” had not such finality as to form the basis for appellate review. Sherman v. Sherman, 178 A. 462, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 61 (R.I. 1935).

Counsel fees could be awarded to a wife for defending against exceptions to a decree of divorce. Di Nofrio v. Di Nofrio, 85 R.I. 21 , 125 A.2d 194, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 113 (1956).

An award of counsel fees to the wife to defend against a bill of exceptions taken by the husband to the award of a prior counsel fee to the wife was proper since the family court had jurisdiction to award counsel fees for services to be performed in the future. Sulyma v. Sulyma, 98 R.I. 22 , 199 A.2d 599, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1964).

Where the wife was granted counsel fees to defend against a bill of exceptions filed by her husband, the husband was not entitled to a return of such counsel fees when he withdrew the bill of exceptions where he had pending in the supreme court a review by certiorari of the same question raised by the bill of exceptions. Sulyma v. Sulyma, 98 R.I. 22 , 199 A.2d 599, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1964).

A statutory allowance to the wife for the purpose of enabling her to prosecute or defend against any petition for divorce or separate maintenance does not include counsel fees to prosecute an appeal from a denial of her motion to discontinue her petition for divorce. Luttge v. Luttge, 98 R.I. 211 , 200 A.2d 599, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 151 (1964).

This section does not authorize the family court to award counsel fees to a wife to defend against the husband’s appeal from a contempt judgment. Pires v. Pires, 102 R.I. 23 , 227 A.2d 477, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 638 (1967).

— Contempt Proceedings.

The court could, as a condition to allowing the husband to purge himself of contempt, require payment of a counsel fee that it could not otherwise have decreed. Ciallella v. Ciallella, 80 R.I. 320 , 81 R.I. 320 , 103 A.2d 77, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1954).

A husband was not liable for the attorney fees of wife’s counsel in a contempt proceeding where the court found the defendant not guilty. Harson v. Harson, 82 R.I. 71 , 105 A.2d 812, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1954).

An order by the trial justice requiring the husband to purge himself of contempt for refusal to pay counsel fees of his wife pending appeal was erroneous, but since the award of counsel fees was proper the husband was not entitled to repayment of such fees. Di Nofrio v. Di Nofrio, 85 R.I. 21 , 125 A.2d 194, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 113 (1956).

— Counsel Fees.

A requirement that the husband pay a $500 attorney fee to the wife’s attorney in a divorce proceeding was in the nature of support and was therefore nondischargeable in bankruptcy. In re Whitman, 29 B.R. 362, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6289 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983).

Counsel fee to former wife’s attorney was found to be in the nature of alimony or support. See Allen M. Kirshenbaum Law Offices v. Dutra (In re Dutra), 33 B.R. 773, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5214 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983).

By stating to the supreme court that she was not in need of counsel fee by reason of having paid the entire amount due and owing to her attorney, the wife in effect waived her request for counsel fee upon which the trial court award was based. Cok v. Cok, 479 A.2d 1184, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 581 (R.I. 1984).

Pursuant to this section, the Family Court has the authority to order one spouse to pay the counsel fees of the other spouse. Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 511 (R.I. 1986).

Family courts have the power to award counsel fees during the pendency of an appeal or after the death of a party. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 1989).

Before a trial justice is warranted in awarding counsel fees, he must find that the spouse charged with payment has a sufficient financial ability to pay such fees and that the spouse who seeks counsel fees is without property available for that purpose. Marocco v. Marocco, 571 A.2d 572, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 55 (R.I. 1990).

Although the family court master did not specifically incorporate the elements enumerated in this section in determining the amount of counsel fees, evidence sufficient to support the ruling was presented. Cobb v. Cobb, 636 A.2d 1332, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 1994).

Third party defendants failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused her discretion in awarding attorney fees since there was ample evidence to support the finding that they were aware of several orders prohibiting the transfer of any marital assets prior to their purchasing property from a party to a divorce action, and since they purposely obstructed the sale of rental property and failed to comply with an order to discharge a mortgage. Craveiro v. Craveiro, 773 A.2d 896, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 171 (R.I. 2001).

Trial court properly awarded a wife attorney’s fees because it was not clearly wrong in holding that the property settlement agreement required the husband to notify his wife personally and directly when he obtained new employment and that he failed to do so. Corbin v. Corbin, 152 A.3d 1146, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 15 (R.I. 2017).

Husband’s request for counsel fees was properly denied where it was abundantly clear from the record that the trial justice had in fact considered and expressly addressed the factors enumerated in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(b) , including the fact that the marriage was of a short duration, there were no children from the union, and the husband and his children from prior relationships lived rent-free in a house owned by his mother. Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 2018).

— — Ability to Pay.

Where there was no credible evidence in the record that the husband was able to pay the counsel fee sought or that he had sufficient estate out of which such a fee could be paid and that the wife is without property of her own available for such purpose, the family court lacked authority to grant counsel fees under this section. Toy v. Toy, 108 R.I. 484 , 276 A.2d 754, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1294 (1971).

It was unreasonable to order a husband to pay counsel fees when the record indicated that, after meeting expenses and paying the instant support order, the husband has nothing left. Paradiso v. Paradiso, 122 R.I. 1 , 404 A.2d 60, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2058 (1979).

The trial court made a specific finding that the wife was without funds to pay her counsel fees and that the husband had sufficient financial ability to pay them. Moreover, because the trial court presided over the proceedings, the court was in the best position to evaluate the reasonableness and fairness of the award of counsel fees to the wife in light of the particular circumstances of this case and therefore an award of $27,300 was within the court’s discretion. Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 1996).

Trial justice did not make any required findings with respect to a wife’s ability to pay her attorney’s fees. Without a finding as to the wife’s ability to pay for her legal representation during the course of the divorce proceedings, the appellate court was constrained to vacate the trial justice’s decision denying the wife’s request for attorney’s fees and remand the issue to the Family Court. Saltzman v. Saltzman, 218 A.3d 551, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 122 (R.I. 2019).

— — Available Property of Wife.

In a divorce proceeding, where the husband was ordered to pay a fee of $500 to his wife’s attorney, the wife’s ownership of $1,000 worth of securities held by the husband with the power of attorney in him did not make property of her own available within the meaning of a former statute which provided for an allowance to the wife, out of the estate of the husband, for the purpose of enabling her to prosecute or defend a petition for divorce or separate maintenance, if she had no property of her own available for such purpose. Berberian v. Berberian, 111 R.I. 394 , 303 A.2d 370, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1217 (1973).

In light of the probability that the marital domicile could have been used as an available asset to generate funds, that part of the judgment that ordered the husband to pay the cost of his wife’s attorney fees was vacated. Casey v. Casey, 494 A.2d 80, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1985).

The marital domicile, even though it is a nonliquid asset, is an appropriate asset to consider when determining the ability of a spouse to generate funds to pay counsel fees. Alves v. Alves, 644 A.2d 1291, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 218 (R.I. 1994).

— — Discretion of Court.

The court within the limits of judicial discretion has the power to fix attorney’s fees and, unless abused, an appellate court will not review the exercise of such discretion. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399 , 89 A.2d 368, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1952).

A trial justice is in a position to judge the value of services of counsel without outside evidence but may receive such evidence in his discretion. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399 , 89 A.2d 368, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1952).

Evidence, though meager, which showed that a husband was able to pay counsel fees and that his wife was without means to do so, justified an award of counsel fees by the trial justice since there was no abuse of discretion. Di Nofrio v. Di Nofrio, 85 R.I. 21 , 125 A.2d 194, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 113 (1956).

A trial justice is vested with discretion in determining the need and amount of counsel fees and unless such discretion is abused the supreme court will not disturb his decision. Smith v. Smith, 88 R.I. 17 , 143 A.2d 309, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1958).

Where the trial justice undertook to make his award of counsel fees sufficient to comprehend what he assumed would be the legal expense in defending proceeding in the supreme court, he abused his discretion. Smith v. Smith, 88 R.I. 17 , 143 A.2d 309, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1958).

In allowing a counsel fee to the wife’s attorney for services in obtaining an increase in the allowance for support of the minor child of the parties, it was an abuse of discretion for the family court to refuse to receive evidence on the ability of the husband to pay. Folgo v. Folgo, 107 R.I. 231 , 266 A.2d 52, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 764 (1970).

Trial court did not err in awarding wife’s counsel a $200 fee. Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 486 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S. Ct. 219, 93 L. Ed. 2d 147, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4041 (1986).

Trial court’s award, through a magistrate, that the husband pay the wife’s counsel fees and costs relating to a deposition was proper pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(b)(2)(ii)(G) where the court specifically noted the factors that it considered in making its determination and also noted the discretion it was afforded in making such an award; the court found that the husband had ignored that the wife had multiple sclerosis and it had also taken into account the parties’ respective abilities to pay the fees and costs. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2003).

— — Distinguished From Alimony.

This section’s definition of alimony, “payments for the support or maintenance of either the husband or the wife,” does not include payment of fees to a third-party attorney; furthermore, counsel fees are specifically distinguished from alimony by use of the disjunctive “or” in this section. Siravo v. Siravo, 424 A.2d 1047, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1017 (R.I. 1981).

— — Entitlement.

The court could not grant counsel fees to a wife unless she is prosecuting or defending against a petition for divorce or a separate maintenance. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 410 , 89 A.2d 375, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1952).

A wife is not entitled to counsel fees as a matter of right in a proceeding to enforce support payments after a decree of divorce even though the divorce was from bed, board, and future cohabitation. Harson v. Harson, 82 R.I. 71 , 105 A.2d 812, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1954).

In a proper case, the family court had jurisdiction by virtue of former § 15-5-16 to award counsel fees in actions to “provide for the education, maintenance, and support of children of all persons by it divorced.” Gower v. Gower, 101 R.I. 719 , 227 A.2d 191, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 826 (1967).

The court had no jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees to the wife on her petition for an increase in alimony payments and modification of custody of child. Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417 , 238 A.2d 373, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 809 (1968).

A mother was not entitled to attorney’s fees for defending against the father’s petition to amend a final decree of divorce by requesting physical custody of a son to be granted to him. King v. King, 114 R.I. 329 , 333 A.2d 135, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1418 (1975).

Where the wife filed a motion to adjudge the husband in contempt for failing to make temporary support payments, and where the husband was in default when the motion was filed but was current in his payments when a Family Court justice heard the motion and failed to find the husband in contempt, the wife was not entitled to an award of counsel fees, unless a willful disregard for the support order and an intention to evade his obligations to his child occasioned the husband’s delay in making his original payments. Tomaselli v. Tomaselli, 119 R.I. 571 , 381 A.2d 235, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 586 (1978).

The trial justice applies the same criteria as those set forth in this section to make an award of attorney’s fees. Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 166 (R.I. 1992).

— — Party’s Own Counsel.

While it was proper to order the husband to pay his former wife support arrearages and counsel fees from inherited funds, there is no authority which allows a trial court in a divorce proceeding to require a party to pay his own attorney. DiMattia v. DiMattia, 747 A.2d 1008, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2000).

— — Value of Services.

Statements of counsel were not sufficient basis for appraisal of value of legal services where the question of fees for services on appeal was being heard by a justice other than the justice who heard the case below. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 410 , 89 A.2d 375, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1952).

The plaintiff petitioned for counsel fees for defense of her cross petition in a divorce action and, where such motion was timely made, the plaintiff was entitled to produce evidence as to the value of services rendered and the exclusion of such evidence, and the denial of plaintiff’s offer of proof of value of services was error. Mendes v. Mendes, 111 R.I. 571 , 305 A.2d 97, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1248 (1973).

— Source of Allowance.

An allowance to enable a wife to defend against a petition had to come from the estate of the husband and would not be ordered from the estate of a next friend petitioning on behalf of the husband. Thayer v. Thayer, 9 R.I. 377 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1869).

— Transportation Costs.

For cases construing repealed § 15-5-16 , which provided for an allowance to the wife “for the purpose of enabling her to prosecute or defend against any such petition for divorce or separate maintenance, in case she has no property of her own available for such purpose,” insofar as it allowed transportation costs, see Adamo v. Adamo, 59 R.I. 6 , 193 A. 737, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1937); Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399 , 89 A.2d 368, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1952); Parker v. Parker, 89 R.I. 300 , 152 A.2d 526, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1959).

Parties to Proceedings.

The court before which an alimony petition was pending had power to bring in a corporation to which the husband had transferred property and to appoint a receiver for the corporation where the transfer to the corporation was for the fraudulent purpose of preventing the recovery of alimony. Warren v. Warren, 36 R.I. 167 , 89 A. 651, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1914).

Retroactive Decrees.

The reduction of payments under an allowance pendente lite cannot operate retroactively. Harvey v. Harvey, 45 R.I. 383 , 123 A. 82, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1924).

The allowance granted to a wife pendente lite cannot be altered, amended or annulled in regard to past payments unless there is a showing of fraud on the court. Rose v. Rose, 49 R.I. 64 , 139 A. 667, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1928).

An order that part of a weekly allowance be applied to reduce an accrued unpaid allowance was invalid as an attempted retroactive reduction of allowance. Parenti v. Parenti, 71 R.I. 18 , 41 A.2d 313, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1945).

Unpaid allowances for alimony and support under a divorce decree are in the nature of a final judgment and cannot be retroactively disturbed, and the court’s authority to modify a decree extends only to the executory portions thereof. Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723 , 391 A.2d 79, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 728 (1978).

Sexual Relation With Attorney.

An attorney who engages in sexual relations with his or her divorce client jeopardizes the client’s rights. Any competent attorney practicing in the area of domestic-relations law must be aware that the sexual conduct of a divorce client may have significant bearing on that client’s ability to secure child custody and in the determination of the distribution of marital assets. The lawyer’s own interest in maintaining the sexual relationship creates an inherent conflict with the proper representation of the client. In re DiPippo, 678 A.2d 454, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 199 (R.I. 1996).

Visitation Rights.

The family court’s power to grant visitation rights is statutory and since the visitation portion of the petition of an aunt and uncle seeking custody and the right to visit a niece was not an ancillary facet of either a divorce proceeding or a neglect and dependency proceeding, the court was without jurisdiction to grant visitation rights. Ryan v. De Mello, 116 R.I. 264 , 354 A.2d 734, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1274 (1976).

A trial judge’s findings that a child had been sexually assaulted by its father, that the child was still traumatized by the event, and that the father was unfit as a parent, justified terminating the father’s visitation rights. Seravo v. Seravo, 525 A.2d 922, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 494 (R.I. 1987).

Visitation rights are to be strongly favored and should not be denied absent extreme circumstances. Hervieux v. Hervieux, 603 A.2d 337, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 1992).

Trial court’s award of visitation to a father, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(d)(1) , where the father was required to either have the children for overnight visits or to pay the mother for babysitter costs, was an abuse of discretion where the court, through a magistrate, had failed to consider the best interests of the children which was the paramount consideration in making such an award; the magistrate had made the order based on what was the best interests of the wife rather than the impact of the visitation on the children. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2003).

Trial court properly determined the amount of visitation to grant a father pursuant to a motion to modify pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16 , and properly granted the father’s request for joint custody; the trial court found that a grant of more visitation would be too exhausting for the child and would interfere with school work, and properly found that the father would not be able to adequately cooperate with the mother on issues concerning the child. Croce v. Cawley, 828 A.2d 519, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 188 (R.I. 2003).

Visitation rights are to be strongly favored and will be denied only in an extreme situation in which the children’s physical, mental, or moral health would be endangered by contact with the parent in question. Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 234 (R.I. 2003).

In assessing the best interests of the child for visitation purposes, the court considers: (1) the parent’s wishes; (2) child’s preference; (3) the interaction and relationship of the child to the parents; (4) the child’s adjustment to the home, school and community; (5) the mental and physical health of the individuals involved; (6) the stability of the child’s home life; (7) the moral fitness of the parents; and (8) the willingness of each parent to facilitate a close relationship between the child and the other parent. Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 234 (R.I. 2003).

Any weight given to a child’s preference in a custody matter is committed to the sound discretion of the court after attempting to carry out a regimen of supervised visitation. Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 234 (R.I. 2003).

Furtherance of the best interests of the child can constitute a compelling state interest sufficient to override an unfettered constitutional right to travel. Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 234 (R.I. 2003).

There was no abuse of discretion in suspending a father’s visitation rights with his daughter where: (1) the suspension was ordered after an attempt to comply with ordered supervised visitation; (2) continued visitation would jeopardize the child’s mental and physical health; (3) the father had sexually abused the child; and (4) the child experienced severe trauma every time she had contact with the father. Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 234 (R.I. 2003).

Trial court’s refusal to release the passports of the mother and the child and the requirement that they live within 50 miles of Rhode Island were proper as the mother had a propensity to remove the child to distant locales, which provided a strong rationale for the court-imposed travel and residency restrictions as the removals often thwarted court-ordered visitations. Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 234 (R.I. 2003).

Family court did not abuse its discretion in denying unsupervised visitation because the mother failed to prove a sufficient change of circumstances from those that existed when visitation was first suspended. The mother’s own hearing testimony confirmed a complete lack of change of circumstances because she continued to deny that she had abused her daughters and admitted that she did not seek counseling for her violent behavior. Recard v. Polite, 935 A.2d 101, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2007).

Collateral References.

Accountability for goodwill of professional practice in actions arising from divorce or separation. 52 A.L.R.3d 1344.

Admissibility of expert testimony regarding questions of domestic law. 66 A.L.R.5th 135.

Admissibility of social worker’s expert testimony on custody issue. 1 A.L.R.4th 837.

Adulterous wife’s right to permanent alimony. 86 A.L.R.3d 97.

Age of parent as factor in awarding custody. 34 A.L.R.5th 57.

Alienation of child’s affections as affecting custody award. 32 A.L.R.2d 1005.

Alimony as affected by recipient spouse’s remarriage in absence of controlling specific statute. 47 A.L.R.5th 129.

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys’ liens. 49 A.L.R.5th 595.

Allocation or apportionment of previous combined award of alimony and child support. 78 A.L.R.2d 1110.

Allowance of permanent alimony to wife against whom divorce is granted. 34 A.L.R.2d 313.

Amount of attorneys’ compensation in absence of contract or statute fixing amount. 47 A.L.R.3d 475.

Amount of attorneys’ fees in matters involving domestic relations. 59 A.L.R.3d 152.

Annulment of later marriage as reviving prior husband’s obligation under alimony decree or separation agreement. 45 A.L.R.3d 1033.

Appointment of counsel for indigent husband and wife in action for divorce or separation. 85 A.L.R.3d 983.

Attempt to bastardize child as affecting right to custody of child. 4 A.L.R. 1119, 37 A.L.R. 531.

Attorney’s fee in proceeding to open or modify divorce decree as to custody or support of child not provided for in the decree. 71 A.L.R.2d 1410.

Attorneys’ fees, liability of husband in independent action for services rendered by attorney to wife in divorce suit. 25 A.L.R. 354, 42 A.L.R. 315.

Award of custody of child to parent against whom divorce is decreed. 23 A.L.R.3d 6.

Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for modification of decree for alimony or maintenance. 18 A.L.R.2d 10.

Child custody and visitation rights of person infected with AIDS. 86 A.L.R.4th 211.

Child custody provisions of divorce or separation decree as subject to modification on habeas corpus. 4 A.L.R.3d 1277.

Child’s custody and maintenance, jurisdiction acquired by court in divorce suit over, as excluding jurisdiction of other local courts, or as rendering its exercise improper. 146 A.L.R. 1153.

Child’s right to enforce provisions for his benefit in parents’ separation or property settlement agreement. 34 A.L.R.3d 1357.

Consideration of obligated spouse’s earnings from overtime or “second job” held in addition to regular full-time employment in fixing alimony or child support awards. 17 A.L.R.5th 143.

Consideration of obligor’s personal injury recovery or settlement in fixing alimony or child support. 59 A.L.R.5th 489.

Consideration of tax liability or consequences in determining alimony or property settlement provisions. 51 A.L.R.3d 461.

Construction and application of International Child Abduction Remedies Act (42 USCS §§ 11601 et seq.). 125 A.L.R. Fed. 217.

Construction and effect of clause in divorce decree providing for payment of former wife’s future medical expenses. 71 A.L.R.2d 1236.

Construction and effect of statutes mandating consideration of, or creating presumptions regarding, domestic violence in awarding custody of children. 51 A.L.R.5th 241.

Continuance of divorce suit by attorney to secure allowance of suit money against wishes of client. 92 A.L.R.2d 1009.

Contract or stipulation waiving wife’s right to counsel fees in event of suit for divorce or separation, validity, construction, and application. 3 A.L.R.3d 716.

Court’s authority to award temporary alimony or suit money in action for divorce, separate maintenance, or alimony where the existence of a valid marriage is contested. 34 A.L.R.4th 814.

Court’s establishment of trust to secure alimony or child support in divorce proceedings. 3 A.L.R.3d 1170.

Credit for payments on temporary alimony pending appeal, against liability for permanent alimony. 86 A.L.R.2d 696.

Custodial parent’s homosexual or lesbian relationship with third person as justifying modification of child custody order. 65 A.L.R.5th 591.

Custodial parent’s relocation as grounds for change of custody. 70 A.L.R.5th 377.

Custody or visitation of children. 160 A.L.R. 485.

Death of custodian appointed by divorce decree, right to custody of child as affected by. 39 A.L.R.2d 258.

Death of husband as affecting alimony. 39 A.L.R.2d 1406.

Death of mother of child whose custody has been awarded to a third person by divorce decree as reviving father’s common law right to custody. 128 A.L.R. 989.

Death of obligor spouse as affecting alimony. 79 A.L.R.4th 10.

Death of party to divorce suit before final decree as affecting liability for costs and attorneys’ fees. 104 A.L.R. 667, 158 A.L.R. 1205.

Decree in suit for “separation” as res judicata in subsequent suit for divorce or annulment. 90 A.L.R.2d 745.

Denial or restriction of visitation rights to parent charged with sexually abusing child. 1 A.L.R.5th 776.

Determination of paternity, legitimacy, or legitimation in action for divorce, separation, or annulment. 65 A.L.R.2d 1381.

Dismissal of divorce suit as affecting prior order for payment of attorneys’ fees. 11 A.L.R.2d 1424.

Divorce decree or settlement agreement as affecting divorced spouse’s right to recover as named beneficiary on former spouse’s individual retirement account. 99 A.L.R.5th 637.

Divorce decree purporting to award life insurance to husband as terminating wife-beneficiary’s rights notwithstanding failure to formally change beneficiary. 70 A.L.R.3d 348.

Divorce: Provision in decree that one party obtain or maintain life insurance for benefit of other party or child. 59 A.L.R.3d 9.

Divorce: Spouse’s right to order that other spouse pay expert witness fees. 4 A.L.R.5th 403.

Divorce: Withholding or denying visitation rights for failure to make alimony or support payments. 51 A.L.R.3d 520.

Divorced woman’s subsequent sexual relations or misconduct as warranting, alone or with other circumstances, modification of alimony decree. 98 A.L.R.3d 453.

Domestic divorce decree without adjudication as to alimony, rendered on personal service or equivalent, as precluding later alimony award. 43 A.L.R.2d 1387.

Earning capacity of husband as basis for determining alimony pendente lite. 6 A.L.R. 192, 139 A.L.R. 207.

Effect, in subsequent proceedings, of paternity findings or implications in divorce or annulment decree or in support or custody order made incidental thereto. 78 A.L.R.3d 846.

Effect of parent’s military service upon child custody. 21 A.L.R.6th 577.

Effect of remarriage of spouses to each other on permanent alimony provisions in final divorce decree. 52 A.L.R.3d 1334.

Effect of same-sex relationship on right to spousal support. 73 A.L.R.5th 599.

Enforcement of antenuptial contract or settlement conditioned upon marriage, where marriage was subsequently declared void. 46 A.L.R.3d 1403.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions. 54 A.L.R.2d 1422.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as permanent alimony following divorce. 28 A.L.R.4th 786.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded for alimony and child support combined. 27 A.L.R.4th 1038.

Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys’ fees in domestic relations cases. 17 A.L.R.5th 366.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of lump-sum alimony award. 49 A.L.R.5th 441.

Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as temporary alimony. 26 A.L.R.4th 1218.

Extraterritorial effect of modified decree as to custody of child. 20 A.L.R. 820, 72 A.L.R. 441, 116 A.L.R. 1299, 160 A.L.R. 400.

Family court jurisdiction to hear contract claims. 46 A.L.R.5th 735.

Father’s liability for support of child furnished after divorce decree which awarded custody to mother but made no provision for support. 91 A.L.R.3d 530.

Fault as consideration in alimony, spousal support, or property division awards pursuant to no-fault divorce. 86 A.L.R.3d 1116.

Financial condition of parties as affecting allowance of suit money. 35 A.L.R. 1099.

Habeas corpus proceeding for custody of child, jurisdiction of court in divorce suit to award custody as affected by orders in, or pendency of. 110 A.L.R. 745.

Husband’s liability for expenses incurred by wife in investigating his marital transgressions. 99 A.L.R.2d 264.

Husband’s right to alimony, maintenance, suit money, or attorney’s fees. 66 A.L.R.2d 880.

Husband’s right to set off wife’s debt against alimony or child support payments. 100 A.L.R.2d 925.

Induction into military service of one to whom custody of children has been awarded in divorce suit. 151 A.L.R. 1498, 155 A.L.R. 1477, 156 A.L.R. 1476, 158 A.L.R. 1490.

Initial award or denial of child custody to homosexual or lesbian parent. 62 A.L.R.5th 591.

Internal Revenue Code: construction of provisions relating to alimony or maintenance payments. 4 A.L.R.2d 252.

Investigation by welfare agency or the like, consideration of, in making award as between parents of custody of children. 35 A.L.R.2d 629.

Jurisdiction of court granting divorce to control custody of child, as affected by assumption of jurisdiction by juvenile court. 11 A.L.R. 147, 78 A.L.R. 317, 146 A.L.R. 1153.

Jurisdiction to award custody of child having legal domicile in another state. 4 A.L.R.2d 7.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support. 5 A.L.R.4th 1015.

Material facts existing at time of rendition of decree of divorce but not presented to court as ground for modification of provision as to custody of child. 9 A.L.R.2d 623.

Matters precluding right of former wife to counsel fees upon application, after absolute divorce, to modify order as to support or custody of child or children. 15 A.L.R.2d 1270.

Mental health of contesting parent as factor in award of child custody. 53 A.L.R.5th 375.

Misconduct of wife to whom divorce is decreed as affecting allowance of alimony, or amount allowed. 9 A.L.R.2d 1026.

Misconduct or fault of wife as affecting right to temporary alimony. 2 A.L.R.2d 307.

Modern status of maternal preference rule or presumption in child custody cases. 70 A.L.R.3d 262.

Mother’s status as “working mother” as factor in awarding child custody. 62 A.L.R.4th 259.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hearing as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees in divorce or other marital action. 10 A.L.R.3d 280.

Necessity of personal service within state upon nonresident spouse as prerequisite of court’s power to modify its decree as to alimony or child support in matrimonial action. 62 A.L.R.2d 544.

Noncustodial parent’s rights as respects education of child. 36 A.L.R.3d 1093.

Nonpayment of alimony, denial because of, right to participate in divorce proceedings. 62 A.L.R. 663.

Nonresidence as affecting one’s right to custody of child. 15 A.L.R.2d 432.

Order for payment of counsel fees to attorney for wife rather than to wife. 118 A.L.R. 1138.

Order in divorce or separation proceeding concerning removal of child from jurisdiction, and award of custody to a nonresident. 154 A.L.R. 552.

Parent’s physical disability or handicap as factor in custody award or proceedings. 3 A.L.R.4th 1044.

Parent’s use of drugs as factor in award of custody of children, visitation rights, or termination of parental rights. 20 A.L.R.5th 534.

Paternity, legitimacy, or legitimation as determined in action for divorce, separation, or annulment upon vacating or opening decree. 65 A.L.R.2d 1390.

Pension of husband as resource which court may consider in determining amount of alimony. 22 A.L.R.2d 1421.

Physical abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent’s right to child. 53 A.L.R.3d 605.

Pleading and burden of proof, in contempt proceedings, as to ability to comply with order for payment of alimony or child support. 53 A.L.R.2d 591.

Pleading or notice, power of court to award temporary alimony as affected by failure to make claim in. 152 A.L.R. 457.

Power of court, on its own motion, to modify provisions of divorce decree as to custody of children upon application for other relief. 16 A.L.R.2d 664.

Power of court to modify decree as to custody, as affected by absence of parent or child from jurisdiction. 70 A.L.R. 526.

Power of court to modify decree for alimony or support of spouse which was based on agreement of parties. 61 A.L.R.3d 520.

Power of court which denies divorce or legal separation to award custody or make provision for support of child. 7 A.L.R.3d 1096.

Primary caretaker role of respective parents as factor in awarding custody of child. 41 A.L.R.4th 1129.

Propriety and effect of undivided award for support of more than one person. 2 A.L.R.3d 596.

Propriety in divorce proceedings of awarding rehabilitative alimony. 97 A.L.R.3d 740.

Propriety of court conducting private interview with child in determining custody. 99 A.L.R.2d 954.

Propriety of equalizing income of spouses through alimony awards. 102 A.L.R.5th 395.

Propriety of reference in connection with fixing amount of alimony. 85 A.L.R.2d 801.

Propriety of separating children by awarding custody to different parents. 98 A.L.R.2d 926.

Provision for cessation or diminution of payments for wife’s support upon specified event. 4 A.L.R.2d 732.

Race as factor in custody award or proceedings. 10 A.L.R.4th 796.

Reconciliation as affecting decree for alimony or support money. 40 A.L.R. 1239, 35 A.L.R.2d 707.

Reconciliation of parties as affecting allowance of counsel fees previously made. 92 A.L.R.2d 1009.

Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases. 124 A.L.R.5th 203.

Religion as factor in visitation cases. 95 A.L.R.5th 533.

Remarriage of parent as ground for modification of divorce decree as to custody of child. 43 A.L.R.2d 363.

Restrictions on parent’s child visitation rights based on parent’s sexual conduct. 99 A.L.R.5th 475.

Retirement of husband as change of circumstances warranting modification of divorce decree — Conventional retirement at 65 years of age or older. 11 A.L.R.6th 125.

Retrospective increase in allowance for alimony, separate maintenance, or support. 52 A.L.R.3d 156.

Review of discretion of court with respect to grant to husband of alimony, maintenance, suit money, or attorneys’ fees. 66 A.L.R.2d 888, 895.

Right of former wife to counsel fees upon application for increase or decrease of alimony after absolute divorce. 15 A.L.R.2d 1252.

Right of husband to alimony, maintenance, suit money, or attorneys’ fees in suit for divorce. 66 A.L.R.2d 880.

Right of wife to allowance for expense money in action by or against husband, without divorce, for child custody. 82 A.L.R.2d 1088.

Right of wife to allowance of counsel fees in action for divorce or separation as affected by misconduct or lack of good faith of her attorney. 150 A.L.R. 1181.

Right to allowance of permanent alimony in connection with decree of annulment. 54 A.L.R.2d 1410.

Right to allowance of permanent alimony in connection with decree of annulment. 81 A.L.R.3d 281.

Right to appointment of counsel in contempt proceedings. 32 A.L.R.5th 31.

Right to custody of child as affected by death of custodian appointed by divorce decree. 39 A.L.R.2d 258.

Right to interest on unpaid alimony. 33 A.L.R.2d 1455.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey alimony decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey custody order either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1095.

Right to require psychiatric or mental examination for party seeking to obtain or retain custody of child. 99 A.L.R.3d 268.

Separation agreement void as against public policy, payments made under, as precluding allowance for suit money in subsequent divorce action. 109 A.L.R. 1178.

Service of notice to modify divorce decree as to child’s custody upon attorney who represented opposing party. 42 A.L.R.2d 1115.

Sexual abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent’s right to child. 58 A.L.R.3d 1074.

Smoking as factor in child custody and visitation cases. 36 A.L.R.5th 377.

“Split,” “divided,” or “alternate” custody of children. 92 A.L.R.2d 695.

Spouse’s acceptance of payments under alimony or property settlement or child support provisions of divorce judgment as precluding appeal therefrom. 29 A.L.R.3d 1184.

Spouse’s professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support or property settlement. 4 A.L.R.4th 1294.

Spouse’s right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments. 11 A.L.R.5th 259.

State court’s authority, in marital or child custody proceeding, to allocate federal income tax dependency exemption for child to noncustodial parent under § 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 USCS § 152(e)). 77 A.L.R.4th 786.

Sufficiency of allegations of desertion, abandonment, or living apart as ground for divorce, separation, or alimony. 57 A.L.R.2d 468.

Sufficiency of evidence to modify existing joint legal custody of children pursuant to consent order and/or divorce judgment — Conduct or condition of parents; evidentiary issues. 100 A.L.R.6th 1.

Sufficiency of evidence to modify existing joint legal custody of children pursuant to consent order and/or divorce judgement — General principles, jurisdictional issues, and general issues related to “best interests of child”. 99 A.L.R.6th 203.

Sufficiency of evidence to modify existing joint legal custody of children pursuant to consent order and/or divorce judgment — Primary custody, visitation, residence, and relocation. 102 A.L.R.6th 153.

Testamentary gift to children as including stepchild. 28 A.L.R.3d 1307.

Trial court’s jurisdiction as to alimony or maintenance pending appeal of matrimonial action. 19 A.L.R.2d 703.

Validity and construction of provisions for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or support payments or child visitation or custody matters. 38 A.L.R.5th 69.

Validity and enforceability of escalation clause in divorce decree relating to alimony and child support. 19 A.L.R.4th 830.

Validity of separation agreement as affected by provision for post-mortem or performance. 1 A.L.R.2d 1264.

Violation of custody provision of agreement or decree as affecting child support payment provision, and vice versa. 95 A.L.R.2d 118.

Violation of provision of agreement or decree as to custody of child as affecting provision as to payment for support of child, and vice versa. 95 A.L.R.2d 118.

Visitation rights of persons other than natural parents or grandparents. 1 A.L.R.4th 1270.

What constitutes contract between husband or wife and third person promotive of divorce or separation. 93 A.L.R.3d 523.

What constitutes order made pursuant to state domestic relations law for purposes of qualified domestic relations order exception to antialienation provision of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USCS § 1056(d)). 79 A.L.R.4th 1081.

When does state that issued previous custody determination have continuing jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A. 83 A.L.R.4th 742.

Who may institute civil contempt proceeding arising out of matrimonial action. 61 A.L.R.2d 1095.

Wife’s possession of independent means as affecting her right to alimony pendente lite. 60 A.L.R.3d 728.

Wife’s right to award of counsel fees in final judgment of trial or appellate court as affected by the fact that judgment was rendered against her. 32 A.L.R.3d 1227.

Wishes of child as factor in awarding custody. 4 A.L.R.3d 1396.

15-5-16.1. Assignment of property.

  1. In addition to or in lieu of an order to pay spousal support made pursuant to a complaint for divorce, the court may assign to either the husband or wife a portion of the estate of the other. In determining the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party shall consider the following:
    1. The length of the marriage;
    2. The conduct of the parties during the marriage;
    3. The contribution of each of the parties during the marriage in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of their respective estates;
    4. The contribution and services of either party as a homemaker;
    5. The health and age of the parties;
    6. The amount and sources of income of each of the parties;
    7. The occupation and employability of each of the parties;
    8. The opportunity of each party for future acquisition of capital assets and income;
    9. The contribution by one party to the education, training, licensure, business, or increased earning power of the other;
    10. The need of the custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects taking into account the best interests of the children of the marriage;
    11. Either party’s wasteful dissipation of assets or any transfer or encumbrance of assets made in contemplation of divorce without fair consideration; and
    12. Any factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
  2. The court may not assign property or an interest in property held in the name of one of the parties if the property was held by the party prior to the marriage, but may assign income which has been derived from the property during the term of the marriage, and the court may assign the appreciation of value from the date of the marriage of property or an interest in property which was held in the name of one party prior to the marriage which increased in value as a result of the efforts of either spouse during the marriage. The court also shall not assign property or an interest in property which has been transferred to one of the parties by inheritance before, during, or after the term of the marriage. The court shall not assign property or an interest in property which has been transferred to one of the parties by gift from a third party before, during, or after the term of the marriage.
  3. The assignment of property, if any, to be made shall precede the award of alimony, since the needs of each party will be affected by the assignment of property, and once made in a final decree shall be final, subject only to any right of appeal which the parties may have. Any assignment made by the family court shall be regarded as a judgment for debt so that suit may be brought or execution may issue on the debt for the property due and undelivered, or the amount due and unpaid to be shown by affidavits of the person entitled to the property and the attorney of record of the person, the executions to run against the goods and chattels of the husband and wife, as the case may be; and the court may make all necessary orders and decrees concerning the suits or executions.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 269, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 404, § 10; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 25.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 15-5-16.1 (P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 403, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 484, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 216, § 1), concerning assignment of property was repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 269, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Cross References.

Wage assignment procedures, § 15-5-24 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Survey Section: Family Law, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 508 (1998).

Caselaw Survey Section: Family Law, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 736 (1999).

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Property Law: Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 655 (2007).

Meghan L. Kruger, Comment: Separation Anxiety: The Implications of Rhode Island’s Reluctance to Remove Fault from Divorce Proceedings, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 808 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutionally vague. D'Agostino v. D'Agostino, 463 A.2d 200, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I. 1983).

In General.

The intent of property division is to provide a fair and just assignment of the marital assets. D'Agostino v. D'Agostino, 463 A.2d 200, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I. 1983).

Alimony and equitable distribution are different concepts and should not be blurred. Fisk v. Fisk, 477 A.2d 956, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 568 (R.I. 1984).

The needs of a spouse are not to be considered in assigning marital property. Sattari v. Sattari, 503 A.2d 125, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 385 (R.I. 1986).

Marital property assigned under this section is subject to the jurisdiction of the family court pursuant to § 8-10-3 when changed circumstances necessitate that the property be transferred from one parent to a new custodial parent for the benefit and use of a child of the broken marriage. Cok v. Cok, 533 A.2d 534, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 560 (R.I. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801, 109 S. Ct. 30, 102 L. Ed. 2d 10, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 3482 (1988).

In dividing property, a trial justice must decide which assets are marital property, consider the contribution of each party, and then distribute the property. Stanzler v. Stanzler, 560 A.2d 342, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 121 (R.I. 1989).

Property division does not require an equal division of the property, and is subject to the concept that nonmonetary, as well as monetary, contributions may enhance the marital partnership. Stanzler v. Stanzler, 560 A.2d 342, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 121 (R.I. 1989).

Where a father contributed little financially to a household after becoming disabled, a family court magistrate properly considered all the statutory factors for equitable distribution when the magistrate awarded 75 percent of the marital property to the wife. Andreozzi v. Andreozzi, 813 A.2d 78, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2003).

Although under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) , a spouse is not usually awarded more than the appreciation value on the other spouse’s separate property, the family court did not err in awarding the wife more than the appreciation on the husband’s separate Virginia property because the parties had stipulated on the record to the inclusion of the husband’s interest in the real estate as a marital asset, without limiting the inclusion to only the appreciation in value. Horton v. Horton, 891 A.2d 885, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2006).

Decision of the trial justice with respect to the equitable distribution of the marital estate and domicile was appropriate; although the husband’s infidelity was certainly relevant to the inquiry, it did not follow that it was to outweigh all other factors. Moreover, the trial justice acted within the justice’s discretion in the equitable distribution of the marital estate as the justice determined the assets of the marital estate, considered the statutory factors, and distributed the marital estate. Saltzman v. Saltzman, 218 A.3d 551, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 122 (R.I. 2019).

Actual Awards.

There was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in awarding the wife all of the husband’s equitable interest in the marital domicile, which was a significant, if not the entire, portion of his estate. Casey v. Casey, 494 A.2d 80, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 515 (R.I. 1985).

Although the wife was guilty of substantial misconduct during the course of the marriage, in light of the husband’s conduct, the lengthy 14-year marriage, the wife’s substantial contributions as homemaker, and the wife’s considerable contributions to the marital assets, the trial justice properly divided the marital assets equally between the two parties. Rochefort v. Rochefort, 494 A.2d 92, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 539 (R.I. 1985).

An award of the marital domicile to the wife and house acquired by the husband, after he had moved out of the marital domicile and the petition for divorce had been filed to the husband, was based solely on the trial justice’s consideration of relevant factors and not on any consideration of the parties’ unequal economic positions and was within the trial justice’s discretion in effecting a just and fair property division. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 509 A.2d 995, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 472 (R.I. 1986).

The trial court did not err in awarding the marital domicile to the husband without joining or notifying the wife’s mother of the proceeding, even though the mother’s name had been put on the deed in order for the parties to obtain bank approval of their loan and she had contributed part of the downpayment. Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 486 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S. Ct. 219, 93 L. Ed. 2d 147, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4041 (1986).

The general master did not err in awarding the wife 70 percent of the marital estate where the wife had been an exemplary homemaker, had contributed to her husband’s education, had assisted the husband as a nurse when he opened his podiatrist office, and the husband was fully responsible for the termination of the marriage by carrying on an extra marital affair with one of his employees while his wife was pregnant. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 619 A.2d 432, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 1993).

The family court judge was not arbitrary and capricious in his orders regarding the equitable distribution of the marital assets. He separated the marital from the nonmarital assets, evaluated those assets, and in distributing them considered all of the factors set forth in this section and the related case law. Lepore v. Lepore, 620 A.2d 1262, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1993).

A wife did not deserve more than 65% of the marital estate, because the husband was not solely responsible for the failure of their marriage, and the trial master’s award was generous and well considered, where the master weighed the evidence, considered the statutory factors, and found that although the wife suffered emotional and physical abuse by her husband, she was not faultless in the breakdown of the marriage. Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 192 (R.I. 1994).

The trial master’s award of 45 percent of the marital assets to the wife and 55 percent to the husband was equitable where his review of all the statutory factors was shown to have been thorough and reasonable. Murphy v. Murphy, 714 A.2d 576, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 225 (R.I. 1998).

A magistrate did not abuse his discretion by awarding a former wife 65% of the marital estate since he thoroughly and reasonably reviewed and considered all the necessary statutory factors and gave dispositive or controlling weight to no one single factor in arriving at the decision. DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2000).

A magistrate’s decision concerning personalty did not amount to clear error since, although he did not purport to expressly value each and every item, he did adequately apply the pertinent statutory factors in determining the equitable distribution of the marital estate as a whole. DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2000).

The magistrate’s finding and decision to assign a husband sole liability for credit card debt and the resulting property liens amounted to a double penalty, and therefore clear error, since he had already penalized the husband for mismanagement of the marital estate by making a 65% allocation of marital assets in favor of the wife. DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2000).

Trial court’s order that a husband pay the wife’s credit-card debt, which was made through a magistrate, was proper pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 where it was found that the amount represented taxes, registration fees, and repairs to the husband’s car; the court took into consideration that neither party was found to have committed compensable fault, that the wife had a serious illness, and that the husband had an ability to earn extra income. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2003).

In distributing marital property in a divorce case, the trial court erred in failing to award the former husband a credit for one half of the value of the parties’ investment account because the trial court’s division of the other property showed that it intended to divide the marital estate, excluding credit card debt incurred by the former husband, on an equal basis. Koutroumanos v. Tzeremes, 865 A.2d 1091, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 28 (R.I. 2005).

Trial justice abused discretion when, although properly finding that a husband’s business were marital assets, the wife was only awarded two percent of their net equity because the justice previously declared martial assets should be divided on a 60/40 basis in the wife’s favor and then arbitrarily, assigned her a two percent interest. Despite assigning the wife a two percent interest in the equity, she was declared responsible for 60 percent of business debt and the use of a bifurcated divorce procedure was inappropriate, as it allowed the husband to frustrate the equitable distribution of the marital estate. Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2006).

Trial justice abused discretion by failing to include, in a marital estate, the husband’s life insurance policies, because the husband admitted he owned them and his statement of assets and liabilities clearly reflected them. Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2006).

Family Court general magistrate did not err in awarding 60 percent of the marital estate to the wife in a divorce action where general magistrate thoroughly examined the factors set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-16.1(a) determining that the parties were married for 14 years and that during that time, the wife’s conduct was exemplary, while the husband’s was not and the husband was determined to have been responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. Vicario v. Vicario, 901 A.2d 603, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 128 (R.I. 2006).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife 80 percent of the marital assets where it had articulated the factors set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a) (1956), analyzed each of the factors, and the evidence supported the conclusion that the husband’s behavior, conduct, wasteful dissipation of assets, and failure to make meaningful contributions in the marriage demanded an unequal division of assets. Deangelis v. Deangelis, 923 A.2d 1274, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 2007).

The trial court properly relied on the factors set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 in awarding the husband 65% of the marital assets; the trial court found that the wife was totally at fault in the breakdown of the marriage, observed that the husband had made significant contribution towards the acquisition, preservation, and appreciation of marital assets, while the wife had contributed little in terms of acquisition, found that the wife had dissipated $23,661 worth of marital assets, despite an order of the court to the contrary, and found that there were no dependant children. Giammarco v. Giammarco, 959 A.2d 531, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2008).

Notwithstanding the age differential between the parties and the husband’s unsubstantiated testimony regarding his intent to retire, the trial justice reasonably found that the husband possessed a greater earning potential than the wife, as contemplated by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a)(7) and (8). The husband had been employed for the past 14 years at the same company, earning more than $90,000 a year, while the wife had worked sporadically during the past few years through a temporary staffing agency, earning less than $15 an hour; the husband also received Social Security benefits of approximately $1,800 a month, as well as $72 per month from a vested pension. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2009).

As a former wife violated the automatic stay imposed by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-14.1(c) when she took out a home equity loan after the divorce action was filed, it was error to require the former husband to pay one-half of this loan. Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2009).

Equal division of the marital estate, after a marriage that lasted nearly 18 years and produced three children, was not an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding the former wife’s abusive behavior towards the former husband during the marriage. Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2009).

Trial court did not err in holding that a former husband and former wife would be each responsible for any credit cards in the party’s name. Although the husband’s credit-card debt was incurred to pay household expenses when he was unemployed, the parties had agreed that he was responsible for producing income to support the family and that the wife was the principal homemaker. Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2009).

Trial justice properly considered the R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a) factors in dividing the marital estate 65 percent in favor of a wife as the family court considered the length of the marriage, the conduct of both parties, the wife’s health, the parties’ current income and future earning power, the contributions of each party as caregiver, homemaker, and breadwinner, and the husband’s egregious behavior in dissipating marital assets, failing to make payments as required by the temporary support order, and failing to exercise his right to visit his children. Chiappone v. Chiappone, 984 A.2d 32, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 138 (R.I. 2009).

Trial justice did not abuse her discretion in making an equitable distribution of the parties’ assets; contrary to the husband’s claim, the trial judge did consider the wife’s alleged reduction of the marital estate when she distributed the parties’ marital property, and the trial judge agreed with the husband that the tuition rebate resulting from a child’s withdrawal from college more properly should have gone to husband, but noted that the husband failed to provide the court with evidence of the amount he alleged the wife received and retained. The trial judge also considered the affect the wife’s filing of individual tax returns for two years had on the husband’s tax liability in distributing the marital assets, and addressed the issue through the assignment of partial responsibility to the wife for a loan that had been discharged when the wife filed for bankruptcy. Curry v. Curry, 987 A.2d 233, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 15 (R.I. 2010).

Former husband did not show error in the trial justice’s disproportionate distribution of the parties’ marital assets because the justice considered relevant statutory factors, including the husband’s misconduct and shocking dissipation of the parties’ marital assets. Smith v. Smith, 207 A.3d 447, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2019).

Family court properly divided the parties’ premarital and marital assets and debts because the wife was both the primary breadwinner and primary homemaker during the marriage, contributed to the husband’s acquisition of his MBA, paid off an $18,000 debt on a credit card in the husband’s name, the husband’s efforts to find employment since 2012 had been woefully inadequate, he provided no documentation of the loan or of the payments made to his parents, which forced the wife to retain counsel to defend against his mother’s collection suit, and any increase in value of the wife’s premarital pension assets or premarital bank accounts was passive and outside of the equitable distribution statute. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 249 A.3d 637, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 2021).

Appreciation of Value.

Because a wife failed to produce credible evidence proving that there was a mortgage on the husband’s California property at the time of the marriage, the Family Court properly valued the appreciated net value of the property in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) . Ryan-Gamron v. Gamron, 47 A.3d 333, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 2012).

Authority to Establish Lien.

The family court does have the authority and jurisdictional power to establish a lien against a party for the purpose of securing the performance of an award of alimony or child support. Brierly v. Brierly, 431 A.2d 410, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1177 (R.I. 1981).

Contribution by Spouses.

Property division is based on the joint contribution by the spouses to the marital enterprise and rests on the concept that nonmonetary as well as monetary contributions may enhance the marital partnership. Property division recognizes the essential supportive role played by a spouse who is not employed outside the home, acknowledging that as a homemaker and childrearer such spouse is entitled to a share of the family assets. Wordell v. Wordell, 470 A.2d 665, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 443 (R.I. 1984).

Trial justice did not overlook material evidence regarding the parties contributions under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a)(3) . Portions of the husband’s testimony supported the trial justice’s finding that the wife contributed to the marital residence: the wife deposited her paychecks into the parties’ joint checking account that was used to pay the mortgage, real estate taxes, and insurance at the residence; the wife perfomred chores in the house, assisted in various home improvement projects, and purchased interior window dressings and carpeting. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2009).

In this contested divorce proceeding, the judgment awarding the plaintiff one-half of the appreciation value of the marital domicile was affirmed because the value of the property increased during the life of the marriage due to the efforts of either spouse. Mezini v. Mezini, 268 A.3d 1171, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 2022).

Evidence.

A family court justice erred when she took into consideration the support needs of the parties in distributing marital assets. D'Agostino v. D'Agostino, 463 A.2d 200, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I. 1983).

The granting of affirmative relief in the form of alimony and property division to the wife without permitting her to be cross-examined in respect to her extra-marital sexual conduct and without drawing the slightest inference against her even though she refused at trial to testify on self-incrimination grounds was prejudicial error requiring reversal. Pulawski v. Pulawski, 463 A.2d 151, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1015 (R.I. 1983).

Where a divorce decree did not contain a complete adjudication of the parties’ rights to a certain parcel of real property based on their ownership interests in a company and a settlement agreement was ambiguous, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the husband based on res judicata. Ritter v. Mantissa Inv. Corp., 864 A.2d 601, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 12 (R.I. 2005).

In the property distribution segment of a divorce case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determination of the value of the parties’ marital assets by selecting the former wife’s appraisal of certain commercial property as establishing the property’s value without making findings of fact; by submitting an agreed statement of facts, the parties waived their opportunity and right to present independent evidence at trial as the facts were set forth in the parties’ joint statement and were a part of the record. Koutroumanos v. Tzeremes, 865 A.2d 1091, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 28 (R.I. 2005).

Property distribution in a divorce action was upheld where the trial justice did not exclude the wife’s two vehicles from the marital estate and properly considered the awards of the vehicles in light of the overall awards and the factors set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a) . The trial justice did consider the marriage’s brief duration, the conduct of the parties, the contributions of the parties to the marital home, and the fact that the wife retained the proceeds from the sale of her home. Shramek v. Shramek, 901 A.2d 593, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 133 (R.I. 2006).

Family court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit former wife to introduce evidence of her former husband’s alleged misconduct in rebuttal because the disputed evidence had previously been excluded when the wife sought to introduce it in her case-in-chief on the ground that she had not included the incident in her answer to an interrogatory; even if the evidence was relevant to the conduct of the parties during the marriage, a factor to be considered for purposes of equitable distribution under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a)(2) , the ruling was a sustainable exercise of the family court’s abundant discretion in evidentiary matters. Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 127 (R.I. 2006).

Family court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit former wife to introduce evidence of her premarital relationship with her former husband and of the conduct of both parties before their marriage because the conduct in question took place before the parties’ marriage; the clear language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a)(2) makes the conduct of spouses before a marriage irrelevant for the purpose of equitable distribution. Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 127 (R.I. 2006).

Trial justice did not overlook material evidence regarding the conduct of the parties under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a)(2) . The trial justice acknowledged the husband’s testimony regarding incidents in which the wife allegedly was physically abusive towards him, including the occasion in which the police were called to the house; however, in accordance with the trial judge’s credibility findings, the trial justice chose not to believe the husband’s testimony, and instead found that the wife was not physically abusive to him. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2009).

Husband’s argument that a trial justice failed to consider all the statutory factors contained within R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a) was entirely without merit. The trial justice made specific findings of fact with respect to each of the statutory factors before distributing the various marital assets; there was no requirement that a trial justice had to repeat his or her findings of fact each time he or she made a specific assignment of property. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2009).

Distribution of property was not erroneous because (1) there was no evidence that the ex-wife had retirement benefits; (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that the ex-husband dissipated $7,000 of marital assets as there was an approximate balance of $4,000 in an account at one time, but there were no longer any funds in the account, and the wife introduced a statement showing a vested balance of $3,131.66 in the husband’s pension plan, in which he testified that there was a current balance of $400; (3) the property awarded to the wife had no equity as the outstanding mortgage balance exceeded the property’s fair market value; and (4) there was no documentary evidence that the husband owed between $5,000 and $6,000 in credit-card debt. Vieira v. Hussein-Vieira, 150 A.3d 611, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 126 (R.I. 2016).

Marital Abode.

The trial justice’s decision to assign the marital domicile to the plaintiff was not error based on the plaintiff’s conduct and contributions during the marriage and the husband’s abusive conduct and limited participation in preserving the marital domicile. Conley v. Conley, 508 A.2d 676, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 457 (R.I. 1986).

An ex-wife was required to return to the family court if she desired to seek postdecree partition by the sale of the marital domicile which had been awarded to the husband for his permanent use in the divorce decree. Poisson v. Poisson, 517 A.2d 1037, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 549 (R.I. 1986).

A trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he appointed a commissioner to sell the marital domicile, where the atmosphere surrounding the dissolution of the marital assets left the trial judge no alternative because the parties were stubbornly resistant to any amicable solution. Fisk v. Fisk, 537 A.2d 418, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 1988).

The marital home is unquestionably marital property subject to fair and just assignment. Cloutier v. Cloutier, 567 A.2d 1131, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 1989).

The awarding of the marital home to a husband who had been granted sole custody of the children was upheld where the property had not been brought into the marriage by either spouse and had not been inherited, where the trial justice conducted a thorough review of all the factors in this section, and where the decision was based on the “best interests of the children” to prevent uprooting them from their home. Berard v. Berard, 749 A.2d 577, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 2000).

The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in awarding an equal share in the marital domicile to both parties since the residence was held in joint names and since each party contributed equally to the maintenance and upkeep of the property, even though the defendant’s parents contributed to the acquisition of the home. Olivieri v. Olivieri, 760 A.2d 1246, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 187 (R.I. 2000).

Inclusion of a former wife’s joint tenancy in real estate that was purchased shortly before her marriage as a marital asset was a sustainable exercise of the family court’s discretion to classify and assign marital assets because a premarital joint tenancy in real estate, particularly when purchased shortly before a marriage, is not encompassed within the exception in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) for an interest in property held in the name of one of the parties prior to a marriage. Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 127 (R.I. 2006).

Trial justice did not err in concluding that the parties’ marital residence was not a gift or in assigning the wife 60% of the property’s appreciation in value: (1) the husband originally purchased the property as a vacant lot during his previous marriage, using a loan from his former wife’s parents, which he had to repay; (2) the husband spent $145,000 of his own money, supplemented by a $15,000 gift from his father, to build the house; (3) only a small percentage of the real estate was traceable to a gift; (4) the appreciation in value of the residence was not exempt from assignment pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 ; and (5) the husband offered no evidence at trial indicating that the appreciation of property was caused entirely by market conditions and not by the contributions of either party. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2009).

Marital Debt.

Although R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 did not explicitly permit a trial court to assign marital debt, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that loans taken out by a wife to pay for the college educations of the parties’ children were not marital debt because the loans were signed by the wife without the husband’s consent and the husband had no knowledge of the loans until after they had been signed. Palin v. Palin, 41 A.3d 248, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2012).

Marital Settlement Agreements.

Marital settlement agreement was ambiguous, and an order directing that four properties be listed for sale was proper, because a paragraph containing handwritten changes was reasonably susceptible to two different meanings and the finding was supported by a provision directing the former husband to pay the former wife from the sale of real estate; the trial justice based his conclusion on the fact that several of the properties already had been foreclosed on, thus making it likely that the remaining properties could not generate the amount due to the former wife unless they were listed for sale immediately. Further, the trial justice was not clearly wrong when he found that the former husband’s interpretation of the ambiguous provision would have given him an unconscionable advantage over the former wife by affording the former husband an inordinate amount of control with respect to disposition of the property and, consequently, over his obligation to pay her $500,000. Paul v. Paul, 986 A.2d 989, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 7 (R.I. 2010).

Because the parties knowingly and voluntarily agreed to all terms of their divorce settlement agreement, including child custody and distribution of the marital assets, the family court did not err in finding that the agreement was fair and equitable to each of them. Smart v. Smart, 994 A.2d 80, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 51 (R.I. 2010).

Modification of Equitable Assignment.

When modifying a decree for equitable assignment, the trial justice may consider those assets that he took into account in the original trial on the merits of the divorce. Rogers v. Rogers, 588 A.2d 1354, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 1991).

Pensions.

As with all other marital assets, the nature and quality of a particular pension must be evaluated in light of the factors set forth in this section. Furia v. Furia, 638 A.2d 548, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 1994).

The trial court properly provided for an equal distribution of the husband’s Civil Service Retirement System benefits without deducting from the total amount of such benefits the amount he would have received in Social Security benefits had he not decided to opt out of the Social Security system. Schaffner v. Schaffner, 713 A.2d 1245, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 1998).

The trial court properly decided to defer distribution of the husband’s Civil Service Retirement System benefits because the present value method could not feasibly be utilized. Schaffner v. Schaffner, 713 A.2d 1245, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 1998).

The magistrate erred by refusing to treat an entire pension as part of the marital estate since the presumption remained unrefuted at trial that a pension-time repurchase by a wife was intended to benefit the marital estate; the record revealed no evidence of the wife’s use of nonmarital assets for the repurchase of the six years of premarital service. DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2000).

The trial justice neither changed nor amended an original qualified domestic relations order when he determined that the defendant was entitled to the increase in value to her share of the plaintiff’s retirement plan for a 17-month delay in distribution, since during that period of time the plaintiff had received the benefit of the use of her money. Gormly v. Gormly, 760 A.2d 1241, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 193 (R.I. 2000).

Family court erred in the equitable distribution of marital assets under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 , because it believed that it lacked discretion to determine the distribution method of a former husband’s police pension, earned pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28-22 , when, in fact, there was no single, mandated method under the circumstances. Hagopian v. Hagopian, 916 A.2d 761, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 14 (R.I. 2007).

Order requiring the husband to pay the wife the wife’s portion of the husband’s pension when the husband became eligible to retire, rather than when the husband actually retired, was proper where the trial justice observed the demeanor of parties and detected such high level of hostility as to convince the justice that a grave injustice, whereby the husband could deprive the wife of the wife’s share for five years, could occur if the husband unilaterally controlled the distribution date; in addition, the husband’s contentions, that the order would grant the wife more than 50% of the marital portion of his pension and the parties, who were 50, were not at or near the “usual” retirement age, did not warrant reversal. Hagopian v. Hagopian, 960 A.2d 250, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 109 (R.I. 2008).

— Education.

The enhanced earning capacity of one spouse from an advanced degree acquired during the marriage is not marital property subject to equitable distribution under this section. Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 1996).

Premarital Agreements.

Although this section provides guidelines for assignment of marital property upon a couple’s divorce or separation, if a premarital agreement is found valid and enforceable, the agreement controls. Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 260 (R.I. 1994).

The trial justice erred in concluding that this section should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties in a divorce action rather than the antenuptial agreement signed by them two days prior to the marriage, since there was no evidence of a written agreement amending or revoking the antenuptial agreement and nothing to prove the required elements under § 15-17-6 by clear and convincing evidence. Rubino v. Rubino, 765 A.2d 1222, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2001).

Because the boilerplate language used by counsel for both parties regarding equitable distribution could not overcome the unequivocal and specific attempts made by a former wife to enforce her rights under an antenuptial agreement, the trial justice was clearly wrong in finding as a fact that the wife had abandoned the agreement by accepting an advancement of $5,000. Rubino v. Rubino, 765 A.2d 1222, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2001).

In a divorce action, the family court erred in finding that a premarital agreement was not valid, as plaintiff failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the elements set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6 , as the fact that defendant failed to fully disclose the value of his assets did not compel a finding of involuntariness on the part of plaintiff, and the list of defendant’s assets contained in the agreement satisfied the requirements of the statute, and unconscionability alone was not sufficient to invalidate the agreement; however, the agreement did not preclude the family court from assigning the appreciation in value or an interest in defendant’s property that increased in value as a result of the efforts of either spouse during the marriage under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) . Marsocci v. Marsocci, 911 A.2d 690, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 191 (R.I. 2006).

In a dissolution of marriage action, the trial justice did not err in determining that the amount of the wife’s 401K account subject to equitable distribution was only that portion which she had contributed and not the appreciation in the account because the premarital agreement stated only that “all future contributions” would be treated as jointly owned by the parties. Boschetto v. Boschetto, 224 A.3d 824, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2020).

Procedure.

For the trial justice, equitable distribution is actually a three-step process. First, he must determine which assets are “marital property” and which are “nonmarital property.” Next, he must consider the factors enumerated in the statute (that is, contribution of each party). Finally, he must decide how the property will be divided. Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 481 A.2d 7, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 584 (R.I. 1984).

A trial justice’s assignment of property will not be overturned unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Stanzler v. Stanzler, 560 A.2d 342, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 121 (R.I. 1989).

Order of distribution of marital assets is vacated and the case is remanded for a rehearing, where the trial justice overlooks salient uncontradicted evidence in determining the amount of the assets to be distributed. Saback v. Saback, 593 A.2d 459, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 141 (R.I. 1991).

The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in awarding an equal share of the marital estate to both parties since he enumerated and discussed each factor under this provision, even if only briefly. Olivieri v. Olivieri, 760 A.2d 1246, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 187 (R.I. 2000).

The trial court did not err, nor abuse its discretion, in ordering an equitable distribution of marital assets, even though the court did not state with specificity the factors upon which it relied. Viti v. Viti, 773 A.2d 893, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 170 (R.I. 2001).

In a bifurcated divorce proceeding, the family court improperly valued marital assets as of the date of a purported agreement between the husband and wife that was not in writing or on the record and was therefore invalid under R.I. R. Prac. 1.4; because assets acquired at any time until the entry of a final divorce decree are marital property subject to equitable distribution, the proper terminal date was the date on which the family court entered an order that determined the equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 , more than a year after it granted their divorce, since that was the date on which all proceedings in the parties’ divorce were resolved and the divorce was final. Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 127 (R.I. 2006).

Trial court did not err in finding that the parties’ marriage was nine years under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a)(1) . The uncontroverted evidence indicated that the parties were married on November 8, 1996, and that the trial justice issued his bench decision on October 31, 2005, before entering a final divorce decree. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2009).

Property Not Subject to Distribution.

Wife’s disability pension payments were not marital assets where the sums she received prior to her retirement date were compensation for lost earnings due to her disability from breast cancer. Deangelis v. Deangelis, 923 A.2d 1274, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 2007).

A pain-and-suffering award of an injured spouse is compensation for or replacement of personal property, that spouse’s good health, which was acquired before the marriage. Therefore, that portion of a personal-injury settlement that is intended to compensate an injured spouse for his or her pain and suffering is nonmarital property, not subject to equitable distribution. Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1990).

That portion of the personal-injury settlement that compensates for future losses, losses incurred after entry of a final divorce, including future loss of wages, future medical expenses, and future loss of earning capacity, are separate personal property of the injured spouse, not subject to equitable distribution. Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1990).

Payments received by the wife during marriage from her mother, a German citizen, constituted an inheritance under German law and were not therefore marital assets subject to equitable distribution. Hurley v. Hurley, 610 A.2d 80, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 101 (R.I. 1992) (decided under prior law).

The trial master erred by considering the spouse’s disability pension from a city a marital asset and, therefore, erred by awarding the wife 65% of the monthly benefits, as the spouse’s fireman’s disability pension was statutorily exempt from attachment under § 9-26-5 . Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 192 (R.I. 1994).

Husband’s accounts which had the wife’s name added to them should not have been included in the marital estate since the husband did not intend to give the wife any possessory interest; thus, the trial court’s very generous $250,000 award based upon its calculation of $1.3 million in marital property had to be reconsidered given the brief one year marriage. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 233 (R.I. 2002).

Husband was not entitled to half the value of a car where the money used to purchase the car was a gift to the wife and it was purchased before the parties married; thus, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) , the car was not marital property subject to equitable distribution. Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 2018).

Money transferred to a joint account by the wife’s parents was nonmarital property where it was a gift to the wife alone, and there was no intent for the husband to have any interest in it. Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 2018).

Property Subject to Distribution.

The appreciation of a minority interest in a privately held corporation is not income. Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 481 A.2d 7, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 584 (R.I. 1984).

Property acquired after a petition for divorce is filed or property acquired after one spouse leaves the marital home is not specifically excluded by the statute and is subject to equitable distribution. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 509 A.2d 995, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 472 (R.I. 1986); Wordell v. Wordell, 470 A.2d 665, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 443 (R.I. 1984).

The acquisition of assets after the irremediable breakdown of a marriage or after a valid complaint for divorce is filed or at any time before final decree for divorce is granted, will not have any effect on the applicability of the equitable-distribution statute. Vanni v. Vanni, 535 A.2d 1268, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 1988).

Noneconomic contributions are as essential to a marriage as financial contributions in determining the appropriate division of marital property. Marocco v. Marocco, 571 A.2d 572, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 55 (R.I. 1990).

That portion of the personal injury settlement compensating for past loss of wages and past uninsured medical expenses incurred during the marriage, losses that have depleted funds of the marital estate, are marital property subject to equitable distribution. Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1990).

When a former spouse attempts to attach Social Security benefits, then the former spouse becomes more like a creditor than a dependent. Therefore, these Social Security benefits may be reached by a former spouse for alimony or child support but not for property division. Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1990).

Worker’s compensation payments that compensate for past loss of wages and past medical expenses incurred during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution. Those payments that compensate for disfigurement and/or loss of use of a limb and those payments that replace lost future wages and future medical expenses are separate personal property of the injured spouse, not subject to equitable distribution. Future wages and future medical expenses are losses incurred after entry of a final divorce. This analysis applies both to one-time lump-sum payments and to regular weekly payments. Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1990).

A lottery prize won by the husband before the court entered its final judgment of divorce was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. The fact that the husband won the lottery prize after the court issued an interlocutory order does not affect the applicability of this section. Giha v. Giha, 609 A.2d 945, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 133 (R.I. 1992).

Jewelry given by a former husband to his former wife before their marriage was improperly included in the marital estate subject to distribution upon their divorce because it was property held in the wife’s name before marriage under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) , except for rings that had been lost during the marriage and replaced with insurance proceeds and additional marital funds; the commingling of the insurance proceeds with marital funds caused the newly acquired, more expensive replacements to become part of the marital estate. Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 127 (R.I. 2006).

Interest in an oil well given to a former wife by her former husband before their marriage was improperly included in the marital estate and distributed as part of the equitable distribution award; the husband did not dispute that he gave the interest to the wife before the marriage, the record did not indicate that she was given less than full control over the interest, and the property was a valid premarital gift under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) . Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 127 (R.I. 2006).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning title to one of two timeshares to a wife that the husband bought during the marriage; the timeshare was a marital asset, the husband had submitted an uncontroverted valuation at trial, and the wife’s level of contribution to the timeshare, while relevant, was just one of the several R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a) factors that the trial court correctly considered before assigning the timeshares and other marital property. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2009).

Although a trial justice is not required to place a value on all marital property before he or she distributes it, where the trial justice assigned to the wife an in-kind, minority share of two companies, the trial justice erred in declining to value the companies before assigning them because those assets constituted such an enormous portion of the marital estate, and because the trial justice should have placed a value on the portions of the two companies that he assigned to each party to ensure that his distribution of the marital estate was truly equitable. McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2013).

Because the husband’s acquisition of the stock in a company was, as a matter of law, a sale, the stock constituted marital property. McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2013).

Money in the wife’s individual bank accounts was marital property where it was neither gifted nor loaned to the wife by her parents, it was necessarily acquired during the marriage as the wife had not opened the accounts until she obtained her green card, and it was clear that the wife’s income was the source of the money. Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 2018).

— Disability Pension.

A disability pension is subject to equitable distribution to the extent that it represents an employed spouse’s vested retirement pay earned during the marriage. Allard v. Allard, 708 A.2d 554, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 110 (R.I. 1998).

— Gift or Inheritance.

The legislature has mandated that only property acquired prior to a marriage is an exception to this section, and thus property acquired by one spouse by gift or inheritance is clearly subject to equitable distribution. Murphy v. Murphy, 471 A.2d 619, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 454 (R.I. 1984) (decided prior to 1982 amendment).

The 1982 amendment to this section, which provided “[t]he court also shall not assign property or an interest therein which has been transferred to one of the parties by inheritance before, during or after, the term of marriage,” should not be applied retrospectively. Murphy v. Murphy, 471 A.2d 619, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 454 (R.I. 1984).

Furnishings and the marital home in which they have been located throughout the marriage became joint marital property even though they were originally inherited from the father’s family. Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 511 (R.I. 1986).

When, during the course of a marriage, title to property for which one spouse has paid the purchase price is acquired in the names of both spouses, the transaction is presumed to be a gift or advancement for the benefit of the other spouse. Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 511 (R.I. 1986).

Payments received by the wife during marriage from her mother, a German citizen, constituted an inheritance under German law and were not therefore marital assets subject to equitable distribution. Hurley v. Hurley, 610 A.2d 80, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 101 (R.I. 1992) (decided under prior law).

Shares of stock allegedly acquired by gift lost their personal character through commingling with marital assets. Gervais v. Gervais, 688 A.2d 1303, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 1997).

Sale proceeds from shares of stock acquired as gifts to the husband were held to be part of the marital property since the transfer was affected by the husband’s execution of an interest-bearing promissory note: the shares were carefully valued to determine their exact market value, the interest paid on the promissory note was reported by the husband on his income tax returns, and no gift-tax returns were ever filed. Gervais v. Gervais, 688 A.2d 1303, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 1997).

While it is proper to order the husband to pay his former wife support arrearages and counsel fees from inherited funds, there is no authority which allows a trial court in a divorce proceeding to require a party to pay his own attorney. DiMattia v. DiMattia, 747 A.2d 1008, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 2000).

Trial court erred in finding that a securities account in a former husband’s name was a marital asset, because the uncontroverted evidence established that the source of the funds used to acquire the account was a gift to the husband from the wife’s parents. Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2009).

Exemption for gifts provided in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) applies to a gift packaged in a manner intended to avoid gift taxes. Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2009).

Trial court did not err in finding that 40.0033 percent of the limited partnership was not marital property because the husband acquired 20 percent of it before the marriage, and received a 20.0033 percent interest in the company as a gift from his father. McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2013).

Prospective Application.

The word “petition,” as used in this section, is applicable to a petition for divorce that is either pending at the time of the effective date of passage of this section (May 7, 1979) or to be brought thereafter. Frazier v. Frazier, 472 A.2d 1227, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 475 (R.I. 1984) (decided under statutory language existing prior to 1982 amendment).

Separate From Alimony Decision.

Consideration of the equitable distribution of property must be separate from and prior to any decision on alimony. Brum v. Brum, 468 A.2d 924, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1130 (R.I. 1983).

The trial justice did not improperly take the support needs of the parties into consideration in making his equitable distribution of property (i.e., awarding the wife the use and possession of the marital domicile), even though he suggested that the husband’s interests (equity) might be subject to a lien in satisfaction of his indebtedness to his wife for support and that this lien might be implemented and executed in a later partition proceeding. Carnevale v. Carnevale, 494 A.2d 1179, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 542 (R.I. 1985).

The support needs of the parties should only be considered relative to an alimony award and not to an assignment of marital property. Van Duinwyk v. Van Duinwyk, 511 A.2d 975, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 501 (R.I. 1986).

The assignment of marital assets is not based on need but rather on the partnership theory of marriage. Division of marital assets rests within the sound discretion of the trial court based upon consideration of all factors enumerated under this section, and an equitable assignment of the property should be made before reaching the issue of alimony. Therefore, because the trial court’s decision complied with these mandates, the award to the wife, who had worked several jobs in the early years of the marriage and then was a full-time homemaker, was justified. Wrobleski v. Wrobleski, 653 A.2d 732, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 1995).

Tax Implications.

Although a magistrate’s decision to take into account tax ramifications applicable to a property distribution is within his sound discretion, sufficient evidence first must be adduced at trial to guide the magistrate in the reasoned exercise of that discretion. DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2000).

Trial court did not err in failing to consider the tax ramifications for a former husband associated with the need to liquidate assets to pay his former wife her share of equitable distribution because the husband failed to submit any evidence to guide the trial court in assessing the tax implications of any property distribution and failed to outline any potential tax consequences. Koutroumanos v. Tzeremes, 865 A.2d 1091, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 28 (R.I. 2005).

Collateral References.

Accountability for goodwill of professional practice in actions arising from divorce or separation. 52 A.L.R.3d 1344.

Accrued vacation, holiday time, and sick leave as marital or separate property. 78 A.L.R.4th 1107.

Action based on reconveyance, upon promise of reconciliation, of property realized from divorce award or settlement. 99 A.L.R.3d 1248.

Annulment of later marriage as reviving prior husband’s obligation under alimony decree or separation agreement. 45 A.L.R.3d 1033.

Child’s right to enforce provisions for his benefit in parents’ separation or property settlement agreement. 34 A.L.R.3d 1357.

Conclusiveness of judgment as to property accumulated by man and woman living together in illicit relations or under void marriage. 31 A.L.R.2d 1255.

Conflict of laws as to validity, effect, and construction of separation or property settlement agreements. 18 A.L.R.2d 760.

Consideration of obligor’s personal injury recovery or settlement in fixing alimony or child support. 59 A.L.R.5th 489.

Consideration of tax liability or consequences in determining alimony or property settlement provisions. 51 A.L.R.3d 461.

Copyright, patent, or other intellectual property as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or divorce settlement. 80 A.L.R.5th 487.

Decree in suit for “separation” as res judicata in subsequent suit for divorce or annulment. 90 A.L.R.2d 745.

Determination of property rights in presents in action for annulment. 75 A.L.R.2d 1365.

Dissipation of marital assets prior to divorce as factor in division of property. 41 A.L.R.4th 416.

Division of lottery proceeds in divorce proceedings. 124 A.L.R.5th 537.

Divorce and Separation: Appreciation in Value of Separate Property During Marriage with Contribution by Either Spouse as Separate or Community Property (Doctrine of “Active Appreciation”). 39 A.L.R.6th 205.

Divorce and separation: attorney’s contingent fee contracts as marital property subject to distribution. 44 A.L.R.5th 671.

Divorce and separation: award of interest on deferred installment payments of marital asset distribution. 10 A.L.R.5th 191.

Divorce and separation: consideration of tax consequences in distribution of marital property. 9 A.L.R.5th 568.

Divorce and separation: goodwill in accounting practice as property subject to distribution on dissolution of marriage. 77 A.L.R.4th 645.

Divorce and separation: goodwill in law practice as property subject to distribution on dissolution of marriage. 79 A.L.R.4th 171.

Divorce and separation: goodwill in medical or dental practice as property subject to distribution on dissolution of marriage. 76 A.L.R.4th 1025.

Divorce and separation: workers’ compensation benefits as marital property subject to distribution. 30 A.L.R.5th 139.

Divorce: court’s authority to institute or increase spousal support award after discharge of prior property award in bankruptcy. 87 A.L.R.4th 353.

Divorce decree as res judicata in independent action involving property settlement agreement. 32 A.L.R.2d 1145.

Divorce decree purporting to award life insurance to husband as terminating wife — beneficiary’s rights notwithstanding failure to formally change beneficiary. 70 A.L.R.3d 348.

Divorce or annulment as affecting will previously executed by husband or wife. 71 A.L.R.3d 1297.

Divorce: propriety of using contempt proceeding to enforce property settlement award or order. 72 A.L.R.4th 298.

Divorce: Provision in decree that one party obtain or maintain life insurance for benefit of other party or child. 59 A.L.R.3d 9.

Enforcement of antenuptial contract or settlement conditioned upon marriage, where marriage was subsequently declared void. 46 A.L.R.3d 1403.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions. 54 A.L.R.2d 1422.

Equitable distribution doctrine. 41 A.L.R.4th 481.

Fault as consideration in alimony, spousal support, or property division awards pursuant to no-fault divorce. 86 A.L.R.3d 1116.

Inherited Property as Marital or Separate Property in Divorce Action. 38 A.L.R.6th 313.

Jurisdiction on constructive or substituted service, in divorce or alimony action, to reach property within state. 10 A.L.R.3d 212.

Mutual mistake as to tax consequences as ground for relief against property settlement. 39 A.L.R.3d 1376.

Obligation under property settlement agreement between spouses as dischargeable in bankruptcy. 74 A.L.R.2d 758.

Partnerships: evaluation of interest in law firm or medical partnership for purposes of division of property in divorce proceedings. 74 A.L.R.3d 621.

Pension or retirement benefits as subject to award or division by court in settlement of property rights between spouses. 94 A.L.R.3d 176.

Power of court to modify decree for alimony or support to spouse which was based on agreement of parties. 61 A.L.R.3d 520.

Power of divorce court to deal with real property located in another state. 34 A.L.R.3d 962.

Property claim: propriety of consideration of, and disposition as to, third persons’ property claims in divorce litigation. 63 A.L.R.3d 373.

Property rights arising from relationship of couple cohabiting without marriage. 69 A.L.R.5th 219.

Remarriage of woman after death of or divorce from former husband as revoking will executed during former marriage. 9 A.L.R.2d 510.

Remarriage pending appeal as precluding party from attacking property settlement of divorce decree. 55 A.L.R.3d 1299.

Rights and incidents where real property purchased with wife’s funds is placed in spouses’ joint names. 43 A.L.R.2d 917.

Separation agreement as barring rights of surviving spouse in other’s estate. 34 A.L.R.2d 1020.

Social Security Spousal Benefits in Equitable Property Division in Divorce Proceedings. 44 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2019).

Spouse’s acceptance of payments under alimony or property settlement or child support provisions of divorce judgment as precluding appeal therefrom. 29 A.L.R.3d 1184.

Spouse’s professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or property settlement. 3 A.L.R.6th 447.

Spouse’s right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments. 11 A.L.R.5th 259.

Validity and construction of provisions for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or support payments or child visitation or custody matters. 38 A.L.R.5th 69.

Valuation of goodwill in accounting practice for purposes of divorce court’s property distribution. 77 A.L.R.4th 609.

Valuation of goodwill in law practice for purposes of divorce court’s property distribution. 77 A.L.R.4th 683.

Valuation of goodwill in medical or dental practice for purposes of divorce court’s property distribution. 78 A.L.R.4th 853.

What constitutes contract between husband or wife and third person promotive of divorce or separation. 93 A.L.R.3d 523.

What constitutes order made pursuant to state domestic relations law for purposes of qualified domestic relations order exception to antialienation provision of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USCS § 1056(d)). 79 A.L.R.4th 1081.

15-5-16.1.1. Deferment of sale of home.

  1. As used in this section, the following words and terms have the following meanings unless the context indicates another or different meaning or intent:
    1. “Custodial parent” means a party awarded physical custody of a child.
    2. “Deferred sale of home order” means an order that temporarily delays the sale and awards the temporary exclusive use and possession of the family home to a custodial parent of minor children, or children for whom support is authorized under this chapter, whether or not the custodial parent has sole or joint custody, in order to minimize the adverse impact of divorce on the welfare of the children.
    3. “Resident parent” means a party who has requested or who has already been awarded a deferred sale of home order.
  2. In any case in which one of the parties has requested a deferred sale of home order pursuant to this section, the court shall first determine whether it is economically feasible to maintain the payments of any note secured by a mortgage or other liens, property taxes, or insurance for the home during the period the sale of the home is deferred. In making this determination, the court shall consider the resident parent’s income, the availability of spousal support, child support, or both spousal and child support, and any other sources of funds available to make those payments. The intent in requiring this determination is to avoid defaults on the payments of notes and resulting foreclosures, to avoid inadequate insurance coverage, to prevent deterioration of the condition of the family home, and to prevent any other circumstances which would jeopardize both parents’ equity in the home. After making the determination that it is economically feasible to consider ordering a deferred sale of the family home, the court in exercising its discretion to grant or deny a deferred sale of home order, shall consider whether it is in the best interest of the child or children.
  3. Upon a determination pursuant to subsection (b) of this section that a deferred sale of home order is indicated in order to minimize the adverse impact of divorce on the child, the court may make such an order. The order shall include the duration of the order, may include the legal description and assessor’s plat and lot number of the real property which is subject to the order, and may be recorded in the office of the registry of deeds of the city or town in which the real property is located.
  4. The court may make an order specifying the parties’ respective responsibilities for the payment of the costs of routine maintenance and capital improvements.
  5. Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, the following shall apply:
    1. A deferred sale of home order may be modified or terminated at any time at the discretion of the court.
    2. If the party awarded the deferred sale of home order remarries, or if there is otherwise a change in circumstances affecting the determinations made pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or affecting the economic status of the parties or the children on which the award is based, a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, is created that further deferral of the sale is no longer an equitable method of minimizing the adverse impact of the divorce on the children.
  6. In making an order pursuant to this section, the court shall reserve jurisdiction to determine any and all issues that arise with respect to the deferred sale of home order including, but not limited to, the maintenance of the home and the tax consequences to each party.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 268, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1.1(b) does not contemplate a make-it-fit approach to the decision as to whether to allow a temporary delay in the sale of the marital residence to minimize the adverse effect of divorce on the welfare of the children. Section 15-5-16.1.1(b) explicitly directs a trial justice first to determine feasibility and then, and only then, may he or she consider the best interests of the children. Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 89 (R.I. 2009).

15-5-16.2. Child support.

  1. In a proceeding for divorce, divorce from bed and board, a miscellaneous petition without the filing of divorce proceedings, or child support, the court shall order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to pay an amount based upon a formula and guidelines adopted by an administrative order of the family court. If, after calculating support based upon court established formula and guidelines, the court, in its discretion, finds the order would be inequitable to the child or either parent, the court shall make findings of fact and shall order either or both parents owing a duty of support to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for the child’s support after considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
    1. The financial resources of the child;
    2. The financial resources of the custodial parent;
    3. The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved;
    4. The physical and emotional condition of the child and his or her educational needs; and
    5. The financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent, provided, that in establishing a child support order, incarceration may not be treated as voluntary unemployment.
  2. The court may, if in its discretion it deems it necessary or advisable, order child support and education costs for children attending high school at the time of their eighteenth (18th) birthday and for ninety (90) days after graduation, but in no case beyond their nineteenth (19th) birthday.

    Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court, in its discretion, may order child support, in the case of a child with a severe physical or mental impairment still living with or under the care of a parent, beyond the child’s emancipation as defined above. The court shall consider the following factors when making its determination: (1) The nature and extent of the disability; (2) The cost of the extraordinary medical expenses; (3) The ability of the child to earn income; (4) The financial resources of the child; (5) The financial resources of the parents; (6) The inability of the primary caregiver of the child to sustain gainful employment on a full-time basis due to the care necessitated by the child. The onset of the disability must have occurred prior to the emancipation event. If a child support order for a child with a severe physical or mental impairment has been terminated, suspended, or expired, the court shall consider the factors in this paragraph and has the discretion to order child support for this child prospectively based upon established child support guidelines. The court may periodically review the case to determine if circumstances warrant the continuation of child support.

    1. The court may, if in its discretion it deems it necessary or advisable, appoint an attorney or a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of a minor or dependent child with respect to his or her support, custody, and visitation.
      1. In determining whether an appointment should be made, the court shall consider the extent to which a guardian ad litem may assist in providing information concerning the best interest of the child; the age of the child; the wishes of the parents, as well as their financial resources; the nature of the proceeding including the level of contentiousness, allegations of child abuse, or domestic violence and the risk of harm to the child if a guardian is not appointed; or conflicts of interest between the child and parents or siblings;
      2. The guardian ad litem shall be appointed from a list of persons properly credentialed pursuant to administrative orders of the chief judge of the family court;
      3. The court shall enter an order of appointment stating the specific assignment, the optional and mandatory duties of the guardian ad litem, the guardian’s access to the child and confidential information regarding the child, and a provision for payment of the costs and fees of the guardian ad litem;
      4. Communications made to a guardian, including those made by a child, are not privileged and may or may not be disclosed to the parties, the court, or to professionals providing services to the child or the family;
      5. The guardian ad litem shall meet with the child, conduct an investigation, and upon request of the court, shall prepare an oral or written report that contains the procedural background of the case, identification of all persons interviewed and other sources of information, a statement of the child’s emotional, medical, educational, and social service needs, the child’s wishes, and other factors relevant to the court’s determination regarding the best interests of the child;
      6. Any written report of the guardian ad litem shall be marked as a full exhibit in the proceedings, subject to cross-examination;
      7. If the guardian ad litem requests confidential healthcare information and consent is withheld, he or she shall apply to the court for leave to obtain such information after compliance with § 5-37.3-6.1 ;
      8. The guardian ad litem shall be given notice of and should appear at all proceedings in family court that affect the interests of the child;
      9. A person serving as a guardian ad litem under this section acts as the court’s agent and is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for acts performed within the scope of the duties of the guardian ad litem;
      10. The chief judge of the family court shall issue, through administrative orders, rules governing the appointment and performance of guardians ad litem in domestic proceedings.
    2. After a decree for support has been entered, the court may, from time to time upon the petition of either party, or by the state in accordance with subsection (c)(3) of this section, review and alter its decree relative to the amount of support and the payment of it, and may make any decree relative to it that it might have made in the original suit. The decree may be made retroactive in the court’s discretion only to the date that notice of a petition to modify was given to the adverse party if the court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred; provided, that the court shall set forth in its decision the specific findings of fact that show a substantial change in circumstances and upon which findings of facts the court has decided to make the decree retroactive. In modifying the order, incarceration may not be treated as voluntary unemployment that would prevent the motion from being heard or result in a denial of the motion. The child support order shall continue in full force and effect, by wage withholding, after the youngest child is emancipated, and shall be applied towards any arrearage due and owing, as indicated on the child-support computer system. Upon satisfaction of the arrears due and owing the child-support order shall be automatically suspended and wage withholding terminated without the necessity of returning to family court.
    3. When the department of human services, office of child support services, becomes aware of the fact, through an electronic data exchange of information with the department of corrections, or by any other means, that the noncustodial parent is or will be incarcerated for one hundred eighty (180) days or more, the department may automatically file a motion to modify or a motion for relief, to be heard before the court via a video conference hearing or other type of hearing. A specific request for the filing of this motion need not be made in writing or otherwise by the incarcerated, noncustodial parent, but the parent shall be notified of the hearing and provided a meaningful opportunity to respond. The court shall schedule a hearing to determine the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay, taking into consideration the assets and financial resources and any benefits the noncustodial parent may be receiving, the length of the sentence, and shall modify or suspend all child support orders, after setting forth in its decision specific findings of fact that show circumstances upon which the court has decided to modify or suspend all child support orders during the period of incarceration. Upon the obligor’s release, the department of human services, office of child support services, shall file a motion for support, and a hearing shall be scheduled to determine the obligor’s ability to begin paying child support pursuant to the child support guidelines in effect. This section does not apply to those individuals who are serving a sentence for criminal nonsupport in state or federal prison, or who are found to be in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and incarcerated for that reason.
    1. In a proceeding to enforce a child support order, or a spousal support order for a custodial parent having custody of a minor child, the court or its magistrate may assign to the obligee such tangible personal property of the obligor that will be sufficient to satisfy the child or spousal support arrearage owed. The court or its magistrate, after a hearing, shall establish the amount of the child or spousal support arrearage, and the nature and value of the tangible personal property. To effect the assignment, the court or its magistrate may order the obligor to execute and deliver the documents of title that may be necessary to complete the transfer of title to the property, and may order the obligor to deliver possession of the property to the obligee. Whenever the obligor fails to comply with the order assigning the property, the order of assignment shall be regarded as a judgment vesting title to the property in the obligor as fully and completely as if the obligor had executed and delivered the documents of title.
    2. Any order for child support issued by the family court shall contain a provision requiring either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to obtain health insurance coverage for the child when coverage is available to the parent or parents through their employment without cost or at a reasonable cost. “Reasonable cost” shall be defined in accordance with guidelines adopted by administrative order of the family court in conjunction with the child support guidelines.
    3. Any existing child support orders may be modified in accordance with this subsection unless the court makes specific written findings of fact that take into consideration the best interests of the child and conclude that a child support order or medical order would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case.
    4. In addition, the national medical support notice shall be issued with respect to all orders issued, enforced, or modified on or after October 1, 2002, in accordance with chapter 29 of title 15. The notice shall inform the employer of provisions in the child support order, for healthcare coverage for the child, and contain instructions on how to implement this coverage. In lieu of the court ordering the noncustodial parent to obtain or maintain healthcare coverage for the child, the court may order the noncustodial parent to contribute a weekly cash amount towards the medical premium for healthcare coverage paid by the state of Rhode Island and/or the custodial parent. The method to determine a reasonable weekly amount shall be addressed in the family court administrative order pertaining to the child support guidelines.
  3. In a proceeding to establish support, the court in its discretion may, after opportunity for a hearing, issue a temporary order for child support payable into the registry of the court and to be held pending entry of judgment. In the event of a final adjudication requiring no payment or payments in an amount less than those payments that have been made pursuant to a temporary order under this section, the defendant shall be entitled to a refund of all or a portion of the amounts paid.
  4. In any proceeding to establish support, or in any case in which an obligor owes past-due support, for a child or children receiving public assistance pursuant to chapter 5.1 of title 40, the court or its magistrate, upon a finding that an able-bodied absent parent obligor is unemployed, underemployed, or lacks sufficient income or resources from which to make payment of support equal to the public assistance payment for the child or children, or is unable to pay the arrearages in accordance with a payment plan, may order that parent to perform unpaid community service for at least twenty (20) hours per week through community service placements arranged and supervised by the department of human services or to participate in any work activities that the court deems appropriate. The performance of community service shall not be a basis for retroactive suspension of arrears due and owing.
    1. In any proceeding to establish support for a minor child whose adjudicated parent is a minor (minor-parent), the court or its magistrate may order a grandparent of the minor child to reimburse the department of human services in an amount not to exceed the total amount of cash assistance benefits paid to or for the minor child pursuant to chapter 5.1 of title 40 until the minor-parent reaches the age of eighteen (18), less any payment made to the department by the minor parent.
    2. The obligation of reimbursement for the minor child shall be the joint and several responsibility of the minor parent and the grandparent(s) until the minor parent reaches the age of eighteen (18); provided, that each joint obligor shall have a right of contribution against each joint obligor, which right shall be enforceable by an action in the family court.
    1. All support orders established or modified in the state on or after October 1, 1998, shall be recorded with the Rhode Island family court department of human services child-support-enforcement computer system, which maintains the official registry of support orders entered in accordance with applicable administrative orders issued by the Rhode Island family court. The support order shall be recorded whether or not services are being provided under the IV-D state plan.
    2. The obligee to a paternity or child support proceeding shall be required to file with the family court, upon the entry of the order, the appropriate form as provided by family court that includes the full name of the parties, residential and mailing address, telephone number, drivers license number, social security number, and the name, address, and telephone number of the employer. The form shall also include the full order amount and date and amount of arrearages if any, the name of the child(ren), their date of birth, address, social security number, and any other information as required by administrative order.
    3. After this, each party is required to file an amended form, whenever any of the information contained on the original form has been changed in any way, within ten (10) days of the change. The information shall be entered in the child-support-enforcement computer system within five (5) business days of receipt of the amended form.
      1. In any subsequent child-support-enforcement action between the parties, upon sufficient showing that diligent effort has been made to ascertain the location of such a party, the court may deem state due process requirements for notice and service of process to be met with respect to the party, upon service by first class mail or, where appropriate, by service as specified in the Rhode Island rules of procedure for domestic relations for the family court of Rhode Island, of written notice to the most recent residential or employer address of record. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1981, ch. 320, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 281, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 374, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 4; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 370, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 390, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 417, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 8; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 348, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 62, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 102, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 208, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 166, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 311, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 166, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 311, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Interstate family support, § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Wage assignment procedures, § 15-5-24 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ability to Pay.

Support trusts of which the husband is a beneficiary may be considered in determining his ability to pay alimony and child support. Pansey v. Pansey, 115 R.I. 97 , 340 A.2d 120, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1125 (1975).

A justice of the family court, in determining a father’s ability to pay for the support of his children or to meet other support obligations, may consider capital assets. Morry v. Morry, 426 A.2d 265, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1047 (R.I. 1981).

In addressing the issue of child support, the trial court must consider the financial resources of both parents. Sattari v. Sattari, 503 A.2d 125, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 385 (R.I. 1986).

Authority to Establish Lien.

The family court does have the authority and jurisdictional power to establish a lien against a party for the purpose of securing the performance of an award of alimony or child support. Brierly v. Brierly, 431 A.2d 410, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1177 (R.I. 1981).

— Specific Cases.

The trial court did not err in imposing an additional per-week child support order against the husband in the form of a lien on the marital domicile. Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 486 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S. Ct. 219, 93 L. Ed. 2d 147, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4041 (1986).

Award Upheld.

The general master did not abuse his discretion in his award of child support. See Gibbons v. Gibbons, 619 A.2d 432, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 1993).

Conclusiveness of Decree.

A decree as to custody and support of children is conclusive until modified or annulled. Brown v. Smith, 19 R.I. 319 , 33 A. 466, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1895).

Defense to Claim.
— Estoppel.

Where a wife could have sought child support under the terms of a “decree nisi” granting her divorce, but she did not, she was not allowed, ten years later, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, to claim alleged back-due child support payments under the terms of a former superceded interlocutory decree granted pending the final divorce. Silva v. Silva, 122 R.I. 178 , 404 A.2d 829, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2078 (1979).

— Laches.

Laches was allowed as a defense to a claim for child support payments as allowed by this section where an attempt was made after over four years to correct a final divorce decree retroactively by amendment to provide for such payments where it appeared that the petitioner failed to explain her inaction for what was a substantial period of time and where the respondent was prejudiced by such long inaction. Pukas v. Pukas, 104 R.I. 542 , 247 A.2d 427, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 682 (1968).

Plaintiff ’s action against defendant husband to pay money owed for the cost of education of the minor children was not barred by the doctrine of laches even though eleven years had elapsed between the time plaintiff first enrolled her child in private school and the time she brought the action. To sustain a defense of laches, defendant had to show that the delay was unreasonable and that the delay somehow prejudiced the defendant, neither of which were established in this case. Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 142 (R.I. 1993).

Determination of Amount.

Because the child-support guidelines adopted by the Family Court determine the amount of child support to be ordered based on gross income and the number of dependent children, it is necessary for the trial justice to make an approximate calculation of defendant’s gross income, taking into account deductions that would ordinarily be applied to his gross income, in order to reach the net-income figure represented by his workers’ compensation benefits. Chace v. Finlay, 576 A.2d 1233, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 129 (R.I. 1990).

This section, read in conjunction with Rhode Island Family Court Administrative Order No. 87-2, requires that the Family Court justice first review the prescribed child-support worksheet to determine the base level of a child-support order that the noncustodial parent would be ordered to pay. Only if the Family Court justice finds that the recommended child-support order would be inequitable to the child or to either parent, and makes findings of facts to the same, may he or she deviate from the calculated amount. Lembo v. Lembo, 624 A.2d 1089, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 138 (R.I. 1993).

Although both Administrative Order 87-02 of the Family Court and this section allow the Family Court to deviate from the worksheet guidelines after considering certain factors, provided the amount of support calculated in the prescribed worksheet is supported by a finding based on the facts that the recommended child support order would not be inequitable to the child or either parent, such discretion was abused since the award of child support was significantly disproportionate to that prescribed by the formula without any justification for the divergence from the guidelines. Mattera v. Mattera, 669 A.2d 538, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 1996).

The family court erred in determining child support without a child-support worksheet as required by an administrative order of the court and this section, necessitating a remand to the family court to consider this information. Lembo v. Lembo, 677 A.2d 414, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 1996).

Where a father, although disabled, spent hours participating in local government or collecting artifacts, a family court magistrate did not err in concluding that the father was capable of additional income when the magistrate determined the father’s child support obligations. Andreozzi v. Andreozzi, 813 A.2d 78, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2003).

Trial court, through a magistrate, abused its discretion in ordering that a husband pay an amount for child support that exceeded the child support guidelines by 20 percent, without having made specific findings of fact that justified such an excess award. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2003).

Trial justice abused discretion in determining a husband’s child support and spousal support obligations because the justice first terminated the husband’s obligation without a hearing or findings of fact about the husband’s ability to pay and then reinstated half the obligation, also without a hearing, any reference to the child support guidelines, or a showing of a change in circumstances. Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2006).

In calculating a father’s child support obligation, the magistrate erred by not including his locality adjustment pay in his income on grounds it was not taxable, as there was no exception for nontaxable income in the Rhode Island child-support guidelines, and such pay constituted “expense reimbursements or in-kind payments” that reduced the father’s living expenses. Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2011).

In calculating a father’s child support obligation, in accepting his claim that he had a loss from his rental property, the magistrate erred in ignoring abundant testimony about his net rental income and in relying on an old tax return showing a loss, although a newer one was available. Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2011).

In calculating a father’s child support obligation, instead of determining whether the mother’s day care costs were reasonable, the magistrate erred in holding that she was not entitled to reimbursement for past or future expenses based on the father’s claims that the mother’s provider was not reporting her income to the Internal Revenue Service and that the father’s wife and mother were willing to provide day care for free. Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2011).

In calculating a father’s child support obligation, the magistrate abused his discretion by confining his review to the father’s 2006 reported earnings, where evidence of his 2007 income was available for review. Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2011).

In calculating a father’s child support obligation, the magistrate abused his discretion in failing to include the father’s one-time bonus in his income, as required by R.I. Fam. Ct. Admin. Order No. 87-2. Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2011).

Although the trial justice predicated the child support order on the ex-husband’s earning capacity of $30,000 per year and the ex-wife’s current earnings of approximately $520 per week, the trial justice did not appear to have considered the child support guidelines in accordance with the dictates of this section and the family court administrative order; the record was devoid of any child support guidelines worksheet, as was required. Thus, it was necessary to remand the case to the family court for a determination of an appropriate order of child support. Vieira v. Hussein-Vieira, 150 A.3d 611, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 126 (R.I. 2016).

Trial justice conducted a “careful review” as required by the child support guidelines; although an S corporation’s net income and distributions were included on a father’s income tax return, the trial justice looked beyond that document and considered the abundance of testimony from the accountant for the S corporation. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Trial justice acted within his discretion in applying a “legitimate business purpose” analysis to find that an S corporation’s retained earnings could not be included in a father’s gross income for the purposes of determining his child support obligation because the S corporation’s retained earnings had been used for legitimate business reasons in the past and were in no way used to shield or manipulate the father’s income to reduce or avoid his child support obligation. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Trial justice did not err in excluding an S corporation’s undistributed pass-through income from a father’s gross income for calculating his child support obligation because the accountant for the S corporation was clear in his testimony that a bond requirement was not static and that the figure was completely dependent on the company’s total sales revenue, which was subject to considerable fluctuation in the construction industry. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Trial justice correctly excluded an S corporation’s distribution to a father, its sole shareholder, that was used to pay its tax liabilities because the distribution was used to pay taxes on the pass-through income that the father received from the S corporation; the pass-through income the father received and on which he paid taxes was actually retained by the S corporation for a legitimate business purpose and was not distributed to him. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Trial justice erred when he excluded moneys from a father’s gross income because the distributions that the father received from an S corporation to satisfy note payments should have been considered as part of his gross income under the child support guidelines; the father’s obligation to pay buyers for the purchase of their stock in the S corporation was personal in nature, and the father used distributions from the S corporation to meet that personal obligation. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Enforcement of Decree.

Orders for support continue to run until amended by subsequent orders of the court following a timely application for relief and proof of changed circumstances. Healey v. Healey, 591 A.2d 1216, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 1991).

Each support payment due and unpaid becomes the equivalent of a judgment against the defendant. Healey v. Healey, 591 A.2d 1216, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 1991).

— Perfection of Lien.

Since the husband failed to make support payments required by the family court’s interlocutory order, the wife could have reduced those arrearages to judgment and perfected her lien by recording it in the records of land evidence. Since the wife failed to take these affirmative steps, the property could be subjected to a tax lien foreclosure sale based on the husband’s debt to the Internal Revenue Service. United States v. Brynes, 848 F. Supp. 1096, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4089 (D.R.I. 1994).

Guardian Ad Litem.

Where the court-appointed guardian’s limited role was to interview the relevant participants and to conduct an investigation of the parties’ respective living arrangements, the trial justice was not obliged to act upon any recommendations contained in the guardian’s report. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 738 A.2d 1081, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 181 (R.I. 1999).

Interim Support.

Trial justice acted well within the bounds of his discretion when he ruled that ample funds were available to a mother to support herself and her child during the remainder of the divorce proceeding because the mother’s counsel conceded to the trial justice that the child did not require $16,000 per month in child support; counsel acknowledged that the mother had been using funds derived from the joint marital account to support herself and the child while the divorce proceedings were pending. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Because a mother’s argument that the trial justice erred in failing to order retroactive or interim child support was not properly raised below, it had been waived. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Jurisdiction of Court.

It is not unreasonable for the trial justice to require that he appear before the court again should he wish to dispose of any lump-sum settlement he may receive in commutation of his workers’ compensation benefits. Disposal of such assets could very likely affect the defendant’s ability to continue providing support to his children. Chace v. Finlay, 576 A.2d 1233, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 129 (R.I. 1990).

The family court did not have jurisdiction to enforce a property settlement agreement which required the defendant to contribute to the support and education of the children beyond the age of 19 where the agreement was incorporated by reference and merged into the final divorce decree. When the final decree of divorce was entered, the settlement agreement between the parties ceased to exist and the court’s ability to compel defendant to pay support was limited by this section, which confers jurisdiction on the court to order payment of child support and education costs for children until they reach age 18, or until age 19 in some limited circumstances. Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 142 (R.I. 1993).

Mother’s request to require the father to provide an accounting and to return possession of custodial property with respect to an account under the Uniform Transfers to Minor Act, which was initially established under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was denied where the family court lacked jurisdiction over such a request because the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over such a request, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-7-2(5) ; further, the fact that the daughter had reached the age of majority was another reason that the family court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.2(b) . Hovarth v. Craddock, 828 A.2d 1212, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 131 (R.I. 2003).

Modification of Decree.

The evidence did not show a relevant change of circumstances in that children were living in a home maintained by stepfather who had a smaller income than the father. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 79 R.I. 163 , 85 A.2d 565, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1952).

The court could decree extra allowance for medical expense of a child where illness was not within the usual and ordinary conditions of ill health but was an extraordinary condition where life was imperiled. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399 , 89 A.2d 368, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1952).

Where a father under support obligation remarried, evidence of his second wife’s income was admissible to show more fully the father’s ability to meet all his obligations. Renaud v. Renaud, 118 R.I. 365 , 373 A.2d 1198, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1469 (1977). See also Bellows v. Bellows, 119 R.I. 689 , 382 A.2d 816, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 604 (1978).

In order to justify an upward modification of a child support decree, it must be established by a fair preponderance of the legal evidence that the child’s needs for support were not met under the original decree, or, if met, that such needs have increased, and that in either event the father is financially capable of paying an amount in excess of that originally ordered. Bellows v. Bellows, 119 R.I. 689 , 382 A.2d 816, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 604 (1978); Hull v. Hull, 120 R.I. 77 , 384 A.2d 1065, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 632 (1978).

Where a father subject to a child support decree subsequently remarries, funds available to his second wife will not necessarily be excluded in considering a modification of the support decree where they show more fully the father’s ability to meet all his obligations. Bellows v. Bellows, 119 R.I. 689 , 382 A.2d 816, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 604 (1978). See also Renaud v. Renaud, 118 R.I. 365 , 373 A.2d 1198, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1469 (1977).

In order for the court to grant a petition to reduce support payments for the benefit of minor children, the petitioner must show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a change in circumstances or conditions has occurred subsequent to the entry of the prior order, specifically, evidence must be presented to show either an abatement of the needs of his children or an impairment of his own financial ability to provide for those needs. Peirson v. Peirson, 119 R.I. 701 , 382 A.2d 823, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 606 (1978).

The emancipation of some of the minor children is not sufficient alone to warrant a reduction in support where the needs of the remaining minor children are equal to or greater than they were at the time of the order which is sought to be modified. Peirson v. Peirson, 119 R.I. 701 , 382 A.2d 823, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 606 (1978).

In determining whether a father is personally capable of paying more than the amount of an original child support order, the trial justice must relate any intervening raise in salary or earnings to any legitimate accompanying increase in his expenses. Hull v. Hull, 120 R.I. 77 , 384 A.2d 1065, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 632 (1978).

Modification of an order requiring the defendant to maintain life insurance policies for the benefit of his children until both reach age 21 was necessary since there was no evidence to support the extension of such insurance in respect of his daughter beyond the age of 19, since she did not suffer from the same mental impairment as did his son. Olivieri v. Olivieri, 760 A.2d 1246, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 187 (R.I. 2000).

— Absence of Notice.

Failure to give a wife any notice of her husband’s ex parte application to suspend payments for the support of children ordered by the original decree rendered the suspension order void and defeated the family court’s jurisdiction. Lamarche v. Lamarche, 108 R.I. 213 , 273 A.2d 860, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1250 (1971); Lamarche v. Lamarche, 115 R.I. 472 , 348 A.2d 22, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1172 (1975).

— Moving Party.

A motion for increased allowance to a child need not be made by the child’s next friend but may be made by the parent awarded custody. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399 , 89 A.2d 368, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1952).

— Retroactive Modification.

An order that part of a weekly allowance be applied to reduce an accrued unpaid allowance was invalid as an attempted retroactive reduction of allowance. Parenti v. Parenti, 71 R.I. 18 , 41 A.2d 313, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1945).

Where a hearing on allowance for child support is protracted over a long period of time, the court may make an increase in allowance retroactive to the first day of the hearing. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399 , 89 A.2d 368, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1952).

Unpaid allowances for alimony and support under a divorce decree are in the nature of a final judgment and cannot be retroactively disturbed, and the court’s authority to modify a decree extends only to the executory portions thereof. Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723 , 391 A.2d 79, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 728 (1978).

Child support award entered after the parties agreed on temporary child support was not an impermissible modification because the award was an initial award. Bober v. Bober, 92 A.3d 152, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2014).

Property Settlement Agreement.

A property-settlement agreement that is not merged into a final divorce decree retains the characteristics of an independent contract. Therefore, the terms of an agreement, requiring the defendant to pay the college expenses for his children in addition to other child-support payments, were controlling. Molak v. Molak, 639 A.2d 57, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 1994).

Representation of Child.

It was error for the trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor child of the parties in proceedings on the wife’s petition for modification of custody order and increase of alimony. Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417 , 238 A.2d 373, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 809 (1968).

— Counsel Fees.

The superior court may award counsel fees for the sole benefit of a child in prosecuting a motion for an increased allowance. Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399 , 89 A.2d 368, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1952).

The court may award attorneys’ fees to the petitioner so the petitioner may prosecute a motion for an increase in support payments for a child. Calitri v. Calitri, 115 R.I. 465 , 347 A.2d 631, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1171 (1975).

Review.

In a proceeding to modify a divorce decree relating to the support of minor children, the findings of the trial justice cannot stand if based on misconceptions of law or if material evidence has been overlooked. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 79 R.I. 163 , 85 A.2d 565, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1952).

A support decree would not be disturbed on certiorari even though the husband was unemployed at the time of the decree. Browning v. Browning, 53 R.I. 112 , 164 A. 508, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1933).

Although this section permits decrees for the support and custody of children to be modified, such a decree is sufficiently final to be appealable. Murphy v. Charlie's Home Improvement Co., 117 R.I. 324 , 366 A.2d 809, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1633 (1976).

It is well settled in Rhode Island that when a trial justice considers a motion to modify a support decree, the resultant decision is entitled to great weight. The state supreme court will disturb such a decision only if it is convinced that it is based on findings that are clearly wrong. Morry v. Morry, 426 A.2d 265, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1047 (R.I. 1981).

Mother’s argument that the trial justice erred when he did not consider expenditures in calculating the father’s gross income for child support purposes had been waived on appeal in accordance with the well-established raise-or-waive rule because the “substantial financial perks”, legal fees, and line of credit were not properly raised at the child support hearing. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2019).

Setoff.

Even though the trial justice may at the time of hearing have had the authority to order a setoff against the future obligations, he was not clearly wrong in declining to do so. Morry v. Morry, 426 A.2d 265, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1047 (R.I. 1981).

While the adoption of § 15-5-16.1 cast doubt on the present ability of the trial court to order a setoff, the right to receive such an amount could have been considered a capital asset enhancing the father’s ability to pay at or near the time a mortgage executed by the mother in favor of the father became due and payable. Morry v. Morry, 426 A.2d 265, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1047 (R.I. 1981).

Support by Spouse Awarded Divorce.

The superior court could order the husband to pay support money for a child, where custody was awarded to the wife, although the husband was granted a divorce. Enos v. Enos, 44 R.I. 450 , 118 A. 676, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1922).

Termination of Support.

The common law duty of the father to support children is terminated by a decree awarding custody to the mother without provision for support payments. Brown v. Smith, 19 R.I. 319 , 33 A. 466, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1895).

On the death of a wife to whom custody of the child had been awarded, custody automatically reverted to the father, his duty under the support decree ended, and he resumed the common law duty of support. Mowry v. Smith, 82 R.I. 82 , 105 A.2d 815, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1954).

A father’s responsibility for the support of his children terminates once they reach the age of majority absent some exceptional circumstances or express agreement between the parties to the contrary. However, a family court decree ordering child support is not self-terminating but is valid and effective until amended or terminated by an order of the court. Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723 , 391 A.2d 79, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 728 (1978).

The statutory lowering of the age of majority from 21 to 18 years also had the effect of lowering to 18 the age at which a child is considered emancipated; thus, where a decree ordered support until the child was emancipated, support could terminate automatically upon the child’s eighteenth birthday, notwithstanding the child’s continued financial dependence upon her parents. Siravo v. Siravo, 424 A.2d 1047, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1017 (R.I. 1981).

Collateral References.

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys’ liens. 49 A.L.R.5th 595.

Allocation or apportionment of previous combined award of alimony and child support. 78 A.L.R.2d 1110.

Allowance in state of decedent’s domicile for children’s support as enforceable against decedent’s real estate, or proceeds thereof in other state. 13 A.L.R.2d 973.

Application of child-support guidelines to cases of joint-, split-, or similar shared-custody arrangements. 57 A.L.R.5th 389.

Basis for imputing income for purpose of determining child support where obligor spouse is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 76 A.L.R.5th 191.

Child’s custody and maintenance, jurisdiction acquired by court in divorce suit over, as excluding jurisdiction of other local courts, or as rendering its exercise improper. 146 A.L.R. 1153.

Child’s right to enforce provisions for his benefit in parents’ separation or property settlement agreement. 34 A.L.R.3d 1357.

Consideration of obligated spouse’s earnings from overtime or “second job” held in addition to regular full-time employment in fixing alimony or child support awards. 17 A.L.R.5th 143.

Consideration of obligor’s personal injury recovery or settlement in fixing alimony or child support. 59 A.L.R.5th 489.

Court’s establishment of trust to secure alimony or child support in divorce proceedings. 3 A.L.R.3d 1170.

Court’s power as to support and maintenance of children in marriage annulment proceedings. 63 A.L.R.2d 1029.

Death of parent as affecting decree for support of child. 18 A.L.R.2d 1126.

Decrease in income of obligor spouse following voluntary termination of employment as basis for modification of child support award. 39 A.L.R.5th 1.

Decree for periodical payments for support of children as lien or subject of declaration of lien. 59 A.L.R.2d 656.

Decree in suit for “separation” as res judicata in subsequent suit for divorce or annulment. 90 A.L.R.2d 745.

Duty to stepchild after divorce. 44 A.L.R.4th 520.

Education as element in allowance for benefit of child in decree of divorce or separation. 56 A.L.R.2d 1207.

Education of child, allowance in decree against parent for. 133 A.L.R. 902, 56 A.L.R.2d 1207.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded for alimony and child support combined. 27 A.L.R.4th 1038.

Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as child support. 27 A.L.R.4th 864.

Father’s duty to support child as affected by decree which awards general custody to him, but permits mother to have custody part of the time. 52 A.L.R. 286.

Father’s duty under divorce or separation decree to support child as affected by latter’s induction into military service. 20 A.L.R.2d 1414.

Father’s liability for expenses of child, support provisions of judicial decree or order as limit of. 7 A.L.R.2d 491.

Father’s liability for support of child furnished after divorce decree which awarded custody to mother but made no provision for support. 91 A.L.R.3d 530.

Husband’s right to set off wife’s debt against alimony or child support payments. 100 A.L.R.2d 925.

Illegitimate child, provision in divorce decree against mother’s husband, not the father of her illegitimate child, for its support. 90 A.L.R.2d 583.

Income of child from other source as excusing parent’s compliance with support provisions of divorce decree. 39 A.L.R.3d 1292.

Induction of minor in military service as affecting provision for support. 155 A.L.R. 1451, 156 A.L.R. 1448, 157 A.L.R. 1449, 20 A.L.R.2d 1414.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support. 5 A.L.R.4th 1015.

Loss of income due to incarceration as affecting child support obligation. 27 A.L.R.5th 540.

Marriage of minor child as terminating support provisions in divorce or similar decree. 58 A.L.R.2d 355.

Matters precluding right of former wife to counsel fees upon application, after absolute divorce, to modify order as to support or custody of child or children. 15 A.L.R.2d 1270.

Parent’s obligation to support adult child. 1 A.L.R.2d 910.

Parent’s obligation to support unmarried minor child who refuses to live with parent. 98 A.L.R.3d 334.

Past support of child during period of separation prior to commencement of divorce suit, right of wife in divorce suit to recover for expenses incurred in. 113 A.L.R. 1103.

Power of court in divorce or separation suit to provide for support of or aid to adult child, or to continue support after child attains majority. 162 A.L.R. 1084.

Power of court to modify decree for support of child which was based on agreement of parties. 61 A.L.R.3d 657.

Power of court which denied divorce, legal separation, or annulment, to award custody or make provisions for support of child. 7 A.L.R.3d 1096.

Power of divorce court, after child attained majority, to enforce by contempt proceedings payment of arrears of child support. 32 A.L.R.3d 888.

Propriety and effect of undivided award for support of more than one person. 2 A.L.R.3d 596.

Propriety of decree in proceedings between divorced parents to determine mother’s duty to pay support for children in custody of father. 98 A.L.R.3d 1146.

Responsibility of noncustodial divorced parent to pay for, or contribute to, costs of child’s college education. 99 A.L.R.3d 322.

Retrospective increase in allowance for alimony, separate maintenance, or support. 52 A.L.R.3d 156.

Right of putative father to visitation with child born out of wedlock. 58 A.L.R.5th 669.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child lived in custody of noncustodial parent, other than for visitation, where custodial parent’s approval was not in issue or was disputed by parties. 112 A.L.R.5th 185.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child spent in custody of noncustodial parent, other than for visitation or under court order, without custodial parent’s approval. 108 A.L.R.5th 359.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child lived with noncustodial parent, other than for visitation or by court order, with approval of custodial parent. 120 A.L.R.5th 229.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time children spent in custody of noncustodial parent pursuant to visitation or court order. 118 A.L.R.5th 385.

Right to credit on accrued support payments for time child is in father’s custody or for other voluntary expenditures. 47 A.L.R.3d 1031.

Right to credit on child support arrearages for gifts to child. 124 A.L.R.5th 441.

Right to credit on child-support arrearages for money given directly to child. 119 A.L.R.5th 445.

Right to credit on child support arrearages for time parties resided together after separation or divorce. 104 A.L.R.5th 605.

Right to credit on child support for continued payments to custodial parent for child who has reached majority or otherwise become emancipated. 4 A.L.R.6th 531.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to educational expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent. 2 A.L.R.6th 439.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to housing costs, utility bills, and other alleged household necessities made for child’s benefit while child is not living with obligor parent. 123 A.L.R.5th 565.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to travel expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent. 3 A.L.R.6th 641.

Right to credit on child support for health insurance, medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses paid for child’s benefit while child is not living with obligor parent. 1 A.L.R.6th 493.

Right to credit on child support payments for social security or other government dependency payments made for benefit of child. 77 A.L.R.3d 1315, 34 A.L.R.5th 447.

Specific performance of provisions of separation agreement other than those for support or alimony. 44 A.L.R.2d 1091.

Spouse’s right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments. 11 A.L.R.5th 259.

Support provisions of judicial decree or order as limit of father’s liability for expenses of child. 7 A.L.R.2d 491.

Support provisions of judicial decree or order as limit of parent’s liability for expenses of child. 35 A.L.R.5th 757.

Treatment of depreciation expenses claimed for tax or accounting purposes in determining ability to pay child or spousal support. 28 A.L.R.5th 46.

Trust income or assets as subject to claim against beneficiary for child support. 91 A.L.R.2d 262.

Validity and construction of provisions for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or support payments or child visitation or custody matters. 38 A.L.R.5th 69.

Validity and effect, as between former spouses, of agreement releasing parent from payment of child support provided for in an earlier divorce decree. 100 A.L.R.3d 1129.

Validity and enforceability of escalation clause in divorce decree relating to alimony and child support. 19 A.L.R.4th 830.

Violation of custody provision of agreement or decree as affecting child support payment provision, and vice versa. 95 A.L.R.2d 118.

What constitutes order made pursuant to state domestic relations law for purposes of qualified domestic relations order exception to antialienation provision of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USCS § 1056(d)). 79 A.L.R.4th 1081.

What voluntary acts of child, other than marriage or entry into military service, terminate parent’s obligation to support. 55 A.L.R.5th 557.

Wife’s possession of independent means as affecting her right to child support pendente lite. 60 A.L.R.3d 832.

15-5-16.2.1. Credit rating.

Credit bureaus are required to take into consideration a non-custodial parent’s child support obligations and his or her delinquencies in this regard, and these delinquencies shall be verified by either the court or by the bureau of family support.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 406, § 1.

15-5-16.2.2. Service of court papers at work.

No employer in this state is permitted to refuse or obstruct the service of family court process relating to child or spousal support upon an employee at the place of employment and the service shall not be grounds for dismissal of the employee. The employer may designate an area where the service may be effected.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 406, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 407, § 1.

15-5-16.2.3. Continuances — Compensation for lost wages.

In any matter related to child support or support for a custodial parent having custody of a minor child, except when a continuance is mutually agreed upon, the court may, in its discretion, order a party requesting a continuance to compensate the other party for wages lost as a result of court attendance.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 406, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 407, § 1.

15-5-16.2.4. Retroactive modification of child support.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 15-5-16.2 , the court, in its discretion, may modify a child support order retroactively only to the date that notice of a petition to modify was given to the adverse party if it finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred. The court shall set forth in its decision the specific findings of fact which show a substantial change in circumstances and upon which findings of fact the court has decided to make its order of modification retroactive. The court, in its discretion, may for good cause shown suspend payment of child support arrearages until there is a finding by the court of financial ability to make payment on arrearages; provided, that incarceration for nonpayment of child support shall not constitute good cause to suspend payment of child support or child support arrearages.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 477, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 287, § 1.

15-5-16.2.5. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 5; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 5; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 2, effective October 1, 2002. For present comparable provisions, see chapter 29 of this title.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-5-16.2.5 concerned notification to obligor’s employer of existence of order for health care insurance coverage.

15-5-16.3. Allowance regarded as judgment for debt.

Any allowance or order made by the family court pursuant to §§ 15-5-16 and 15-5-16 .2 shall be regarded as a judgment for debt so that suits may be brought or executions may issue on it for amounts due and unpaid, from time to time, to be shown by affidavits of the person entitled to the amounts due and the attorney of record of the person, the executions to run against the goods and chattels of the husband or wife, as the case may be; and the court may make all necessary orders and decrees concerning the suits or executions, and the court at any time may alter, amend, and annul for sufficient cause, after notice to the interested parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2.

Cross References.

Wage assignment procedures, § 15-5-24 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

A provision that upon submission of an affidavit by the wife alleging nonperformance by the husband or order for payment of support, alimony or counsel fee, an execution for the amount due and unpaid would issue against the husband’s goods and chattels and “for want thereof against his body”, violated due process as it allowed a summary deprivation of one’s property or liberty without affording an opportunity to show either his compliance with the court’s order or his inability to comply with its terms. Mills v. Howard, 109 R.I. 25 , 280 A.2d 101, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1020 (1971).

Enforcement of Decree.

An action of debt may be maintained for alimony accrued under a foreign decree. Wagner v. Wagner, 26 R.I. 27 , 57 A. 1058, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1904).

Accrued but unpaid installments of alimony or child support may be collected either by contempt proceedings, or by the issuance of an execution for failure to comply with a decree, or by an action at law as upon a judgment. Silva v. Silva, 122 R.I. 178 , 404 A.2d 829, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2078 (1979); Lippman v. Kay, 415 A.2d 738, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1675 (R.I. 1980).

Contempt proceedings and actions at law in the nature of debt on judgment are sufficiently dissimiliar that both suits may be maintained simultaneously to collect accrued installments for alimony or child support. Lippman v. Kay, 415 A.2d 738, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1675 (R.I. 1980).

— Contempt.

A wife was not barred from instituting contempt against her husband for a failure to pay support by pending actions at law to enforce the debt. Shaw v. Shaw, 81 R.I. 487 , 104 A.2d 754, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1954).

A husband was not guilty of contempt for delays in paying support where the delays were due to fluctuating payment of salary and the husband was currently paid up at the time of the hearing. Harson v. Harson, 82 R.I. 71 , 105 A.2d 812, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1954).

An award of the court is tantamount to a judgment and the provisions of the statute do not permit a trial justice to credit a respondent adjudged in contempt with support for the minor children in some manner not set forth in the decree. The only manner in which relief may be accorded by the trial justice is provided by the statute and no alternative mode is within the court’s jurisdiction. Klimasewski v. Klimasewski, 91 R.I. 308 , 162 A.2d 549, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1960).

Where the trial judge found that the respondent was justified in not paying any further alimony and child support because he fully expected that the petitioner would be remarried very shortly, the trial judge correctly held that respondent was not in contempt for nonpayment. Shonting v. Shonting, 118 R.I. 475 , 374 A.2d 797, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1485 (1977).

Where a father unilaterally reduced the support payments by $25.00 per week as each child either became emancipated or attained the age of majority, his liability for the support of the three children was not terminated by proper order of the court, and the family court justice was correct in finding the father in contempt for failure to make support payments for the benefit of the children. Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723 , 391 A.2d 79, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 728 (1978).

— Execution.
— — Alimony Pendente Lite.

A wife could have an execution on an order for alimony pendente lite under this section. Grattage v. Superior Court, 42 R.I. 546 , 109 A. 86, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1920).

An execution could issue, even after the dismissal of a wife’s petition for divorce, for unpaid alimony pendente lite where the alimony decree had not been modified. Grattage v. Superior Court, 42 R.I. 546 , 109 A. 86, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1920).

During divorce proceedings, the pendente lite allowance, being regarded as a judgment for a debt, can be executed on for any unpaid amounts. Rose v. Rose, 49 R.I. 64 , 139 A. 667, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1928).

— — Child Support.

This section permits child-support arrearages to be regarded as a judgment for debt and sued upon as such. Lippman v. Kay, 415 A.2d 738, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1675 (R.I. 1980).

Child-support arrearages are judgments for debt and may be sued upon as such. Grissom v. Pawtucket Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1065, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 1989).

Laches does not bar a former wife’s complaint seeking the recovery of child-support arrearages after the death of her former husband, where the husband’s executor fails to establish any inequity in permitting the enforcement of child-support payments. Grissom v. Pawtucket Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1065, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 1989).

Orders for support continue to run until amended by subsequent orders of the court following a timely application for relief and proof of changed circumstances. Healey v. Healey, 591 A.2d 1216, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 1991).

Each support payment due and unpaid becomes the equivalent of a judgment against the defendant. Healey v. Healey, 591 A.2d 1216, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 1991).

Family court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a commissioner to facilitate the marketing and sale of a father’s real property at a reasonable price because the father had a $ 20,000 child support arrearage and, in light of the father’s nonpayment of child support, the family court possessed the authority, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.3 , to order the sale of the father’s home to satisfy that obligation and was entitled to facilitate such a sale through the use of a commissioner, as was assented to by both parties. Krivitsky v. Krivitsky, 43 A.3d 23, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2012).

— — Commitment.

A person committed under execution for unpaid allowances was not imprisoned simply for debt but for noncompliance with the decree, so is not entitled to discharge on poor debtor’s oath. Mowry v. Bliss, 28 R.I. 114 , 65 A. 616, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1907).

A release by a wife as to allowance did not prevent the commitment of her husband on execution where the decree was not modified in accordance with the settlement and release. Ex parte Audet, 38 R.I. 43 , 94 A. 678, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1915).

— — Stay.

A justice of the superior court had power to stay an execution pending an appeal from a decree of another justice granting alimony and support. Boyden v. Boyden, 50 R.I. 326 , 147 A. 621, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1929).

The superior court had jurisdiction to stay an execution against the husband’s body for an accrued amount of unpaid allowance for the support of the wife and children pending suit. Parenti v. Parenti, 71 R.I. 18 , 41 A.2d 313, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1945).

An order staying an entire service of execution for an accrued unpaid allowance was too broad and could be quashed on certiorari. Parenti v. Parenti, 71 R.I. 18 , 41 A.2d 313, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1945).

Habeas Corpus.

Where the petitioner had been whisked away to prison without any hearing as to the extent of his unpaid obligation for payment of support, alimony and counsel fee or reason therefor, habeas corpus was an appropriate remedy to secure release of the husband. Mills v. Howard, 109 R.I. 25 , 280 A.2d 101, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1020 (1971).

Collateral References.

Garnishment of alimony as affected by statute or rule permitting garnishment before an obligation is due if payment is not dependent upon a contingency. 134 A.L.R. 859.

Garnishment or attachment of property to enforce order or decree for alimony or allowance in suit for divorce or separation. 56 A.L.R. 841.

Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, so as to Bar Recovery of Arrearages of Permanent Alimony or Child Support. 22 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2017).

15-5-16.4. Judgment assigning real property — Effect.

Whenever the assignment of real property is ordered by the family court pursuant to § 15-5-16.1 and the court directs that a deed, conveyance, or release of any real estate or interest in real estate shall be made, the judgment shall create an equitable right to its enforcement, subject to the provisions for recording of notice in chapter 13 of title 34, in the party entitled to the assignment by judgment; and if the judgment has not been complied with at the time the judgment of divorce becomes final and the judgment is subsequently recorded in the manner provided for in chapter 13 of title 34, then the judgment shall operate to vest title to the real estate or interest in the real estate in the party entitled to it by the judgment as fully and completely as if the deed, conveyance, or release had been duly executed by the party directed to make it.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2.

Cross References.

Wage assignment procedures, § 15-5-24 et seq.

Collateral References.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child lived in custody of noncustodial parent, other than for visitation, where custodial parent’s approval was not in issue or was disputed by parties. 112 A.L.R.5th 185.

15-5-16.5. Interest on arrearages.

Interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on any support debt due or owing, child or spousal support, shall be assessed unless the responsible party shall, for good cause shown, be relieved of the obligation to pay interest by the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 308, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 1.

Collateral References.

Right to interest on unpaid alimony. 33 A.L.R.2d 1455.

15-5-16.6. Security, bond, or guarantee to secure payment of overdue support.

  1. In a proceeding to enforce overdue support, as defined in subsection (b) of this section, the court or its magistrate, after a hearing and a finding of overdue support, may require an obligor parent to give security, post a bond, or give some other guarantee to secure payment of overdue support; the security, bond, or guarantee is to be in any amount, for any term, and upon any conditions that the court or magistrate shall deem necessary or advisable. The court may order that the security, bond, or other guarantee be deposited into the registry of the family court. The obligor parent shall be served with the notice of any proceeding under this section and the notice shall state the procedures to contest the action.
  2. For purposes of this section, “overdue support” means a delinquency pursuant to an obligation determined under a court order, or an order of an administrative process established under the law of any state, for:
    1. Support and maintenance of a minor child, which is owed to or on behalf of the child; or
    2. Support and maintenance of the obligor parent’s spouse or former spouse with whom the child is living.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 8.

15-5-16.7. Review of child support orders.

  1. For purposes of this section, a “child support order” means a child support order enforceable pursuant to the Rhode Island state plan for support enforcement as further defined in § 15-16-5(a) .
  2. Every three (3) years from the date the child support order was established or modified, and upon the request of either party, or upon the request of the state pursuant to § 15-5-16.2(c)(3) , the court shall review and, if appropriate, adjust the order in accordance with the child support guidelines if the amount of the child support award under the order differs from the amount that would be awarded in accordance with the guidelines. The adjustment of the order shall be made under this subsection without a requirement for proof or showing of a change in circumstances. In adjusting the order, incarceration may not be treated as voluntary unemployment that would prevent the motion from being heard or result in a denial of the motion. The periodic review of child support orders as provided in this subsection is in addition to the opportunity for review provided in § 15-5-16.2(c) .
  3. In the case of a request for a review before the three-year (3) period, upon the request of either party, or upon the request of the state pursuant to § 15-5-16.2(c)(3) , the amount of support may, in the court’s discretion, be modified if the court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred in accordance with § 15-5-16.2 . The court, in its discretion, may modify a child support order retroactively only to the date that notice of a petition to modify was given to the adverse party if the court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred; provided, that the court shall set forth in its decision the specific findings of fact that show a substantial change in circumstances and upon which findings of facts the court has decided to make the decree retroactive.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 177, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 263, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 166, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 311, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 166, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 311, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child lived with noncustodial parent, other than for visitation or by court order, with approval of custodial parent. 120 A.L.R.5th 229.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time children spent in custody of noncustodial parent pursuant to visitation or court order. 118 A.L.R.5th 385.

Right to credit on child-support arrearages for money given directly to child. 119 A.L.R.5th 445.

Right to credit on child support for continued payments to custodial parent for child who has reached majority or otherwise become emancipated. 4 A.L.R.6th 531.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to educational expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent. 2 A.L.R.6th 439.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to housing costs, utility bills, and other alleged household necessities made for child’s benefit while child is not living with obligor parent. 123 A.L.R.5th 565.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to travel expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent. 3 A.L.R.6th 641.

Right to credit on child support for health insurance, medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses paid for child’s benefit while child is not living with obligor parent. 1 A.L.R.6th 493.

15-5-17. Change of name.

Any woman, to whom a divorce from the bond of marriage is decreed, shall, upon request, be authorized by the decree to change her name, notwithstanding that there may be children born of the marriage, and subject to the same rights and liabilities as if her name had not been changed. This statute is in addition to, and not in abrogation of, the common law.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-17 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 434, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section is an optional name-change statute that aids the common law and avoids unnecessary, duplicative court proceedings, and does not require divorced people who wish to change their names to request that the divorce decrees encompass the name changes; to do so would impose upon them an undue burden on their common-law right to nonfraudulently change their names. Traugott v. Petit, 122 R.I. 60 , 404 A.2d 77, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2064 (1979).

Collateral References.

Right of married woman to use maiden surname. 67 A.L.R.3d 1266.

15-5-18. Interlocutory decrees and injunctions.

After the filing and during the pendency of any petition for divorce, the court may make any interlocutory decrees and grant any temporary injunctions that may be necessary until a hearing can be had before the court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-18 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discontinuance.

A husband could not, by discontinuance, defeat the right of the wife to support pendente lite and counsel fees. Stevens v. Superior Court, 44 R.I. 282 , 117 A. 232, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1922).

On notice of discontinuance by a husband, an interlocutory decree for support should be modified, if justice requires, to meet the changed conditions, and the court should take such action as would prevent an impairment of the wife’s right under the decree. Stevens v. Superior Court, 44 R.I. 282 , 117 A. 232, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1922).

A motion to discontinue was properly denied where the discontinuance would have impaired an interlocutory decree granting custody of a child to the respondent. Lanigan v. Lanigan, 85 R.I. 100 , 126 A.2d 833, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 125 (1956).

Dismissal of Divorce Petition.

The dismissal of a petition for divorce, in the absence of special circumstances, vacates all interlocutory orders and all proceedings that are ancillary to the main case. Ash v. Ash, 50 R.I. 1 , 144 A. 437, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1929).

The dismissal of a divorce petition had the effect of vacating an injunction in aid of the petition, whether the petition for an injunction was regarded as a separate proceeding or part of the divorce proceedings, as the injunction could have no standing except as auxiliary to the divorce petition. Ash v. Ash, 50 R.I. 1 , 144 A. 437, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1929).

General Equity Powers.

A court could, in order to protect a wife’s right to alimony, use injunctions and receiverships to place its hands on property within its jurisdiction and to prevent dissipation and diversion of the property. Warren v. Warren, 36 R.I. 167 , 89 A. 651, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1914).

The granting of a wife’s motion to amend her petition for absolute divorce to one for relief without commencement of divorce proceedings did not deprive the family court of jurisdiction to issue orders under this section. Thayer v. Thayer, 107 R.I. 116 , 265 A.2d 436, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 746 (1970).

Review.

An appeal would properly lie from an interlocutory decree for alimony. Warren v. Warren, 36 R.I. 167 , 89 A. 651, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1914).

The proper vehicle for reviewing an interlocutory divorce decree or for reviewing the denial of a motion to vacate such an interlocutory decree is by certiorari. Baton v. Baton, 109 R.I. 115 , 281 A.2d 295, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1032 (1971); Meinhold v. Meinhold, 119 R.I. 460 , 379 A.2d 1094, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2009 (1977).

An appeal will not lie from interlocutory decrees in divorce actions. Berberian v. Berberian, 109 R.I. 273 , 284 A.2d 72, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1053 (1971); Meinhold v. Meinhold, 119 R.I. 460 , 379 A.2d 1094, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2009 (1977).

Where the Family Court awarded the wife temporary support and other temporary relief and the husband was adjudged in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s decrees, and where there was also a basic jurisdictional conflict, the court exercised its discretion to issue the writ of certiorari despite its persistent reluctance to review interlocutory decrees or to permit matters to be brought before it in piecemeal fashion. Meinhold v. Meinhold, 119 R.I. 460 , 379 A.2d 1094, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2009 (1977).

Temporary Support Orders.

As a general rule, temporary orders regarding support or alimony payments terminate with the entry of the interlocutory decree or the rendition of the final decree of divorce, so that even though a temporary order of child support had been entered, the obligation of the husband to make weekly support payments came to an end with the entry of a “decree nisi” granting divorce to the wife. Silva v. Silva, 122 R.I. 178 , 404 A.2d 829, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2078 (1979).

Collateral References.

Appealability of interlocutory or pendente lite order for temporary child custody. 82 A.L.R.5th 389.

Injunction against suit in another state or county for divorce or separation. 54 A.L.R.2d 1240.

Interlocutory decree of divorce as affecting marital rights of one spouse in estate of the other. 76 A.L.R. 284.

15-5-19. Restraining orders — Treatment for harmed or menaced spouse — Custody of children — Allowances — Alimony and counsel fees.

  1. Whenever either party to a marriage is insane, or whenever a cause is in existence which is, or if continued, will be a cause for divorce, the family court, upon the original petition of one of the parties, or upon the filing of a complaint for divorce, may restrain either party from interfering with the personal liberty of the other, and may restrain either party from maliciously causing or attempting to cause bodily harm to the other, with or without a dangerous weapon, and may restrain either party from placing, by physical menace or threat of physical menace, the other in fear of imminent bodily injury; and upon a finding by the court that any party has been so harmed, menaced, or threatened the court may prescribe treatment including, but not limited to, out-patient counseling, and may regulate the custody and provide for the education, maintenance, and support of the children, if any, and may, in its discretion, order one of the parties to pay alimony and/or counsel fees to the other pursuant to § 15-5-16 , which allowance shall not be regarded as a judgment for debt until the court, which made the order for maintenance and support of the children, alimony for one or the other of the parties, and counsel fees, has adjudicated in appropriate proceedings what, if anything, is due under the order. Suits may be brought or executions may issue for amounts due and unpaid, the executions to run against the goods and chattels of the husband or wife, as the case may be; the court may make all necessary orders and decrees concerning the suits or executions and at any time may alter, amend, or annul for sufficient cause, after notice to the interested parties.
    1. Any violation of the protective orders mentioned in subsection (a) of this section shall subject the defendant to being found in contempt of court.
    2. The contempt order shall not be exclusive and shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies.
  2. Any violation of a restraining order under this chapter protecting a person against bodily harm and/or against threat of imminent bodily injury shall be a misdemeanor which shall be punished by a fine of no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. The penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties provided in § 12-29-5 . The district court has criminal jurisdiction over violations of restraining orders protecting the person of the complainant against bodily harm and/or against the threat of imminent bodily injury.
  3. In regulating the custody of the children, the court shall provide for the reasonable right of visitation by the natural parent not having custody of the children except upon the showing of cause as to why the right should not be granted. The court shall mandate compliance with its orders by both the custodial parent and the children. In the event of noncompliance, the non-custodial parent may file a motion for contempt in family court. Upon a finding by the court that its order for visitation has not been complied with, the court shall exercise its discretion in providing a remedy, and define the non-custodial parent’s visitation in detail. However, if a second finding of noncompliance by the court is made, the court shall consider this to be grounds for a change of custody to the non-custodial parent.
  4. In all hearings regarding denial of visitation, the court shall make findings of fact.
  5. This chapter does not affect the right of the family court to award alimony or support pendente lite.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 20; P.L. 1954, ch. 3309, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-19 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1978, ch. 138, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 338, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 406, § 6; P.L. 1981, ch. 320, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 433, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 5.

Cross References.

Interstate family support, § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Fault.

Where relief is sought without divorce, under the provisions of this statute a party seeking relief must show himself or herself to be without fault for it is the legislative intent to deny relief to a petitioner materially at fault. Gomes v. Gomes, 93 R.I. 87 , 171 A.2d 446, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1961).

A petition for miscellaneous relief without commencement of divorce proceedings will only be granted upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner has not engaged in any conduct which is or has been provocative of domestic discord. Smith v. Smith, 119 R.I. 642 , 382 A.2d 182, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 598 (1978).

Force of Decree.

A decree derives its efficacy from its entry by the court in the exercise of the judicial function. The fact that it was consented to does not in any way detract from its efficacy. It is to be given the same force and effect thereafter by everyone, including the court, as though it had been entered after a hearing. Burns v. Burns, 92 R.I. 278 , 168 A.2d 141, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1961).

Jurisdiction.

Where the petitioner brought an action under this section for rights of custody and visitation without commencing divorce, when the respondent wife and children were not in state at the time of filing and where the petitioner had previously appeared generally with an affirmative defense in a similar Florida action brought by the respondent, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Lynch v. Lynch, 93 R.I. 143 , 172 A.2d 335, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 91 (1961).

Where a wife, during the residence of herself and husband in Massachusetts, obtained in that state a decree of separate maintenance restraining the husband from interfering with her personal liberty and requiring him to pay her a fixed allowance for support and, while still a resident of that state but after the removal of the husband to Rhode Island, filed a petition in the family court of the husband’s residence asking that he be restrained from interfering with her personal liberty and required to pay her a periodic allowance for support, such family court had jurisdiction of the matter notwithstanding the decree in Massachusetts. Curley v. Curley, 102 R.I. 67 , 228 A.2d 111, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 646 (1967).

There was no error to permit a wife to amend her petition for absolute divorce to one for relief under this section. Thayer v. Thayer, 107 R.I. 116 , 265 A.2d 436, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 746 (1970).

Modification of Decree.

The party seeking modification of an existing decree granting an allowance has the burden of showing such a change in his circumstances since the entry as would reasonably call for a modification thereof. Burns v. Burns, 92 R.I. 278 , 168 A.2d 141, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1961).

Parties.

On a petition for relief without commencement of divorce proceedings, equitable rules apply and it is not necessary for a party to be the one commencing the proceedings as a result of a suit brought under the statute in order to avail himself of a just defense. Gomes v. Gomes, 93 R.I. 87 , 171 A.2d 446, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1961).

Review.

The appropriate procedure for review of a decree of the family court entered pursuant to this section is now by appeal rather than by bill of exceptions. In re Loudin, 101 R.I. 35 , 219 A.2d 915, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 347 (1966).

The review of the denial of motions by a divorce plaintiff for an order to take depositions of witnesses and for an allowance to cover the cost of taking the same was by certiorari rather than by appeal. Mendes v. Mendes, 103 R.I. 734 , 241 A.2d 297, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 856 (1968).

Termination.

An order for a separate maintenance (now alimony) entered by the court remains in full force and effect until such time as the family court, after a proper hearing or on a stipulation by the parties, changes that order. Phelan v. Phelan, 443 A.2d 1259, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 836 (R.I. 1982).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of expert testimony regarding questions of domestic law. 66 A.L.R.5th 135.

Admissibility of social worker’s expert testimony on custody issue. 1 A.L.R.4th 837.

Allowance of alimony in lump sum in action for separate maintenance without divorce. 61 A.L.R.2d 946.

Annulment of later marriage as reviving prior husband’s obligation under alimony decree or separation agreement. 45 A.L.R.3d 1033.

Child custody and visitation rights arising from same-sex relationship. 80 A.L.R.5th 1.

Child’s right to enforce provisions for his benefit in parents’ separation or property settlement agreement. 34 A.L.R.3d 1357.

Construction and effect of clause in divorce decree providing for payment of former wife’s future medical expenses. 71 A.L.R.2d 1236.

Construction and effect of provision in separation agreement that wife is to have portion of “income,” “total income,” “net income,” and the like. 79 A.L.R.2d 609.

Court’s authority to award temporary alimony or suit money in action for divorce, separate maintenance, or alimony where the existence of a valid marriage is contested. 34 A.L.R.4th 814.

Court’s establishment of trust to secure alimony or child support in divorce proceedings. 3 A.L.R.3d 1170.

Court’s power as to support and maintenance of children in marriage annulment proceedings. 63 A.L.R.2d 1029.

Credit for payments on temporary alimony pending appeal, against liability for permanent alimony. 86 A.L.R.2d 696.

Decree in suit for “separation” as res judicata in subsequent suit for divorce or annulment. 90 A.L.R.2d 745.

Default, contempt, or other misconduct of husband as affecting modification of decree for separate maintenance. 6 A.L.R.2d 835.

Determination of paternity, legitimacy, or legitimation in action for divorce, separation, or annulment. 65 A.L.R.2d 1381.

Determination of property rights in presents in action for annulment. 75 A.L.R.2d 1365.

Divorce: court’s authority to institute or increase spousal support award after discharge of prior property award in bankruptcy. 87 A.L.R.4th 353.

Divorce: necessity of notice of application for temporary custody of child. 31 A.L.R.3d 1378.

Divorced woman’s subsequent sexual relations or misconduct as warranting, alone or with other circumstances, modification of alimony decree. 98 A.L.R.3d 453.

Domestic divorce decree without adjudication as to alimony, rendered on personal service or equivalent, as precluding later alimony award. 43 A.L.R.2d 1387.

Enforcement of antenuptial contract or settlement conditioned upon marriage, where marriage was subsequently declared void. 46 A.L.R.3d 1403.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as separate maintenance, alimony, or support for spouse without absolute divorce. 26 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded for alimony and child support combined. 27 A.L.R.4th 1038.

Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as temporary alimony. 26 A.L.R.4th 1218.

Husband’s death as affecting periodic payment provision of separation agreement. 5 A.L.R.4th 1153.

Husband’s right to alimony, maintenance, suit money, or attorney’s fees. 66 A.L.R.2d 880.

Jurisdiction of equity courts to entertain independent suits for alimony or separate maintenance without divorce or judicial separation. 141 A.L.R. 399.

Jurisdiction on constructive or substituted service, in divorce or alimony action, to reach property within state. 10 A.L.R.3d 212.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support. 5 A.L.R.4th 1015.

Misconduct or fault of wife as affecting temporary alimony. 2 A.L.R.2d 307.

Necessity and sufficiency of corroboration of complaining spouse’s testimony in separate maintenance action. 100 A.L.R.2d 612.

Obligation under property settlement agreement between spouses as dischargeable in bankruptcy. 74 A.L.R.2d 758.

Paternity, legitimacy, or legitimation as determined in action for divorce, separation, or annulment upon vacating or opening decree. 65 A.L.R.2d 1390.

Power of court to award absolute divorce in favor of party who desires only limited decree, or vice versa. 14 A.L.R.3d 703.

Property rights of spouses adjudicated in action for separate maintenance without divorce. 74 A.L.R.2d 316.

Propriety and effect of undivided award for support of more than one person. 2 A.L.R.3d 596.

Propriety of reference in connection with fixing amount of alimony. 85 A.L.R.2d 801.

Propriety of separating children by awarding custody to different parents. 98 A.L.R.2d 926.

Reconciliation as affecting decree for limited divorce, separation, alimony, separate maintenance, or spousal support. 36 A.L.R.4th 502.

Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases. 22 A.L.R.4th 971.

Retrospective increase in allowance for alimony, separate maintenance, or support. 52 A.L.R.3d 156.

Review of discretion of court with respect to grant to husband of alimony, maintenance, suit money, or attorneys’ fees. 66 A.L.R.2d 888, 895.

Right of nonresident wife to maintain action for separate maintenance alone against resident husband. 36 A.L.R.2d 1369.

Right of wife to allowance for expense money in action by or against husband, without divorce, for child custody. 82 A.L.R.2d 1088.

Right to allowance of permanent alimony in connection with decree of annulment. 81 A.L.R.3d 281.

Right to require psychiatric or mental examination for party seeking to obtain or retain custody of child. 99 A.L.R.3d 268.

“Split,” “divided,” or “alternate” custody of children. 92 A.L.R.2d 695.

Spouse’s acceptance of payments under alimony or property settlement or child support provisions of divorce judgment as precluding appeal therefrom. 29 A.L.R.3d 1184.

Spouse’s professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or property settlement. 4 A.L.R.4th 1294.

Sufficiency of allegations of desertion, abandonment, or living apart as ground for divorce, separation, or alimony. 57 A.L.R.2d 468.

Valid foreign divorce as affecting local order previously entered for separate maintenance. 49 A.L.R.3d 1266.

Valid foreign divorce granted upon constructive service as precluding action by spouse for alimony, support, or maintenance. 28 A.L.R.2d 1378.

Validity and construction of provisions for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or support payments or child visitation or custody matters. 38 A.L.R.5th 69.

Validity, construction, and application of provision in separation agreement affecting distribution or payment of attorneys’ fees. 47 A.L.R.5th 207.

What constitutes contract between husband or wife and third person promotive of divorce or separation. 93 A.L.R.3d 523.

Wife’s possession of independent means as affecting her right to alimony pendente lite. 60 A.L.R.3d 728.

Wife’s possession of independent means as affecting her right to child support pendente lite. 60 A.L.R.3d 832.

Wishes of child as factor in awarding custody. 4 A.L.R.3d 1396.

15-5-19.1. Restraining orders — Notification of local authorities — Notice of penalty.

    1. The clerk of the family court may, if requested by the prevailing party’s attorney, immediately forward a certified copy of any restraining order issued pursuant to § 15-5-19 (a) to the police department of the municipality in which the prevailing party is domiciled, and the police department shall retain the restraining order on file for at least one year.
    2. The clerk shall also provide the prevailing party and/or his or her attorney with two (2) certified copies of any restraining order issued pursuant to § 15-5-19 .
  1. Each restraining order issued under this chapter, including a temporary ex parte order, shall be set out on a separate piece of paper and shall have the following statement printed in bold faced type or in capital letters:

    A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE GUILTY OF A MISDEMEANOR AND MAY BE PUNISHED BY A FINE OF AS MUCH AS ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000) OR BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS ONE YEAR AND MAY BE ORDERED TO ATTEND COUNSELING.

  2. The clerk of the family court may have a certified copy of any order issued under this chapter forwarded immediately to the law enforcement agency designated by the plaintiff. The clerk shall also provide the plaintiff with two (2) certified copies of any order issued under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 401, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 433, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 5; P.L. 1997, ch. 308, § 2.

15-5-20. Service on or notice to defendant.

No person shall be entitled to a divorce from the bond of marriage unless the defendant, in accordance with rules adopted by the court, has been personally served with process if within the state, or with personal notice duly authenticated if out of the state, or unless the defendant has entered an appearance in the cause; or unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the petitioner does not know the address nor the residence of the defendant and has not been able to ascertain either after reasonable and due inquiry and search for six (6) months, in which case the court, or in vacation a judge of the court, may authorize notice by publication of the pendency of the petition for divorce to be given in a manner provided by law; provided, that in cases where indigence has been established, the court may, as an alternative to publication and upon motion and in appropriate circumstance, authorize an alternate means of service of process in the manner provided by Rule 4 of the Family Court Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 17; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-20 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 332, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Avoidance of Service.

If the process server and the defendant are within speaking distance of each other, and such action is taken as to convince a reasonable person that personal service is being attempted, service cannot be avoided by physically refusing to accept the summons. Rosen v. Rosen, 122 R.I. 6 , 404 A.2d 472, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2067 (1979).

Completion and Return.

What was essential was the completion of service and the return, and the execution of the return of the service, prior to the actual service, by a duly authorized officer who accompanied the serving officer did not render improper an otherwise valid service of process. Rosen v. Rosen, 122 R.I. 6 , 404 A.2d 472, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2067 (1979).

Sufficient Service.

Placing a copy of the citation and a copy of the divorce petition in the husband’s pocket, rather than in his hands, constituted adequate service. Rosen v. Rosen, 122 R.I. 6 , 404 A.2d 472, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2067 (1979).

Where the officer actually was in physical contact with the husband and placed the service papers in his possession, the husband was not allowed to claim that service was insufficient by having taken those papers out of his pocket and thrown them away. Rosen v. Rosen, 122 R.I. 6 , 404 A.2d 472, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2067 (1979).

Collateral References.

Construction of phrase “usual place of abode,” or similar terms referring to abode, residence, or domicile, as used in statutes relating to service of process. 32 A.L.R.3d 112.

Power to grant annulment of marriage against nonresident on constructive service. 43 A.L.R.2d 1086.

15-5-21. Service by publication — Jurisdiction acquired.

After service of process on any petition, whether by citation or by publication, where the adverse party has no attorney of record and cannot be found for the service of citation or notice of any motion or any other matter arising in the course of the proceedings, the court may order service by publication and the service shall have the same effect as personal service within the state on the party; provided, that the service shall not, in the case of an adverse party who has not appeared either in person or by attorney, and the petition against him or her was served by publication, authorize the entry of any decree or order binding the party personally to pay any sum of money or to do any other affirmative act.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 17; P.L. 1939, ch. 707, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-21 .

Collateral References.

Power to grant annulment of marriage against nonresident on constructive services. 43 A.L.R.2d 1086.

15-5-22. Trial required — Collusion.

No divorce from the bond of marriage shall be granted solely upon default nor solely upon admissions by the pleadings, except upon trial before the court in open session; nor shall the divorce be granted where the court is satisfied that there has been any collusion or corrupt conduct by the parties, or either of them, in regard to the proceedings to obtain the divorce.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 18; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-22 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 25.

Cross References.

Oral testimony required, § 9-19-26 .

Collateral References.

Right of plaintiff, or of defendant who has filed counterclaim or cross complaint, in action for divorce or separation, to voluntary dismissal or nonsuit. 16 A.L.R.3d 283.

15-5-23. Final judgment — Remarriage.

  1. No judgment for a divorce shall become final and operative until three (3) months after the trial and decision. Final decree from the bond of marriage may be entered ex parte and in chambers on the suggestion of the prevailing party at any time within one hundred eighty (180) days next after the expiration of three (3) months from the date of decision. After the expiration of the one hundred eighty (180) days, final decrees may be entered only in open court and on motion or upon written consent of the attorneys or parties. Notice of the filing of the motion shall not be required in cases in which the original complaint is unanswered.
  2. After entry of the final judgment for a divorce from the bond of marriage, either party may marry again.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 195, § 19; P.L. 1902, ch. 971, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 247, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 291, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 416, § 19; P.L. 1939, ch. 707, § 3; P.L. 1940, ch. 945, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-5-23 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 338, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 13, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 14, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 13, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 14, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2016, ch. 13, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect May 16, 2016, and shall apply to all actions for divorce pending at the time of or filed after the effective date.

P.L. 2016, ch. 14, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect May 16, 2016, and shall apply to all actions for divorce pending at the time of or filed after the effective date.

Cross References.

Declaration of validity of subsequent marriage, § 15-1-6 .

Foreign divorces, recognition, § 15-6-1 et seq.

Report of proceedings to registrar of vital records, § 23-3-20 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Condonation Before Final Decree.

Where after the granting of a divorce but before the final decree the parties resumed marital relations, there was a condonation so that final decree could not be entered even with consent of the parties. Berger v. Berger, 44 R.I. 295 , 117 A. 361, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1922), overruled, Tobin v. Tobin, 70 R.I. 362 , 38 A.2d 756, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1944).

Death of Party.

The death of one of the parties abates the entire divorce action, including all ancillary or interlocutory decrees and orders. Keidel v. Keidel, 119 R.I. 726 , 383 A.2d 264, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 610 (1978).

Discontinuance of Divorce.

After the lapse of the six-month [now three-month] period, the guilty party may move that the prevailing party be required after a reasonable time, either to consent to the entry of a final decree or to withdraw the petition for divorce, and this option as to whether the marital status shall continue or be determined can be exercised by the prevailing party even if the guilty party does not force an election. Luttge v. Luttge, 97 R.I. 309 , 197 A.2d 500, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1964).

That the petitioner may be motivated solely by the desire to obtain financial benefit rather than a reconciliation is not in and of itself a ground which will justify a denial of the prevailing party’s motion to discontinue divorce after expiration of six months from trial and the decision therein before entry of the final decree. Luttge v. Luttge, 97 R.I. 309 , 197 A.2d 500, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1964).

Effect of Entry of Final Decree.

The entry of a final decree in a divorce case is equivalent to the entry of judgment therein. Thrift v. Thrift, 30 R.I. 357 , 75 A. 484, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1910).

A decision for divorce does not terminate the marriage of the parties and they remain in law husband and wife until the entry of the final decree. Pakuris v. Pakuris, 95 R.I. 305 , 186 A.2d 719, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1962).

Justice’s Decision Constituting Decree.

Although the final decree for divorce had not been actually signed or entered prior to the date of the respondent’s objection to the entry on grounds of misconduct, since the divorce proceedings follow the course of equity and it is considered that what should have been done had in fact been done, the prior oral decision constituted the final decree and the entry thereof, and, consequently, respondent was without standing in court at the time of the presentation of his objection, since the parties were no longer husband and wife. Levada v. Levada, 116 R.I. 600 , 359 A.2d 701, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1312 (1976).

Prerequisites to Entry of Final Decree.

It was reversible error for the court to enter a final decree without giving petitioner a reasonable time within which to decide whether to withdraw her petition or consent to final decree. Pickles v. Pickles, 70 R.I. 13 , 36 A.2d 110, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1944).

The prevailing party must continue to comply with the allegations of the petition for divorce, pertaining to his or her conduct up to the time of the entry of the final decree and any conduct which would bar a decision for divorce on the original petition presents grounds for contesting entry of the final decree. Pakuris v. Pakuris, 95 R.I. 305 , 186 A.2d 719, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1962).

The prevailing party in a divorce action cannot be compelled to enter a final decree and thereby to take a divorce against his wishes. Luttge v. Luttge, 97 R.I. 309 , 197 A.2d 500, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1964).

Proceedings During Waiting Period.

The provision for a waiting period before final decree does not extend the period during which new evidence of facts prior to entry of the decree may be introduced. Bajakian v. Bajakian, 57 R.I. 470 , 190 A. 461, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 118 (1937).

— Determination of Property Rights.

Since the purpose of the cooling-off period prescribed by this section is to provide an opportunity for reconciliation and condonation, an interlocutory decree does not finally or conclusively determine the property rights of the parties. Keidel v. Keidel, 119 R.I. 726 , 383 A.2d 264, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 610 (1978).

A severance of joint tenancy may be effectuated between the entry of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce when the commissioner has been appointed and the decree approving the commissioner’s sale or division of the couple’s real estate has been entered in the family court. Keidel v. Keidel, 119 R.I. 726 , 383 A.2d 264, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 610 (1978).

Where an interlocutory decree provided for the partition sale of the husband’s real estate pursuant to a divorce action, and where the husband died during the interlocutory period, the joint tenancy of the parties was not severed by the decree but remained in full force and effect throughout the interlocutory period up until the death of the husband at which time the property passed by right of survivorship. Keidel v. Keidel, 119 R.I. 726 , 383 A.2d 264, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 610 (1978).

The family court no longer has jurisdiction over property matters in a divorce action where an interlocutory judgment with a property distribution has been issued, the nisi period elapses, the plaintiff moves for entry of the final judgment, and then the plaintiff dies before the court takes any action. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 1989).

Purpose of Waiting Period.

One of the reasons required for the delay required by the statute in the entry of a final decree is to give the parties an opportunity for reconciliation. Berger v. Berger, 44 R.I. 295 , 117 A. 361, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1922), overruled, Tobin v. Tobin, 70 R.I. 362 , 38 A.2d 756, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1944).

This statute clearly indicates a legislative intent requiring, as a matter of public policy, the parties to be given an opportunity for reconciliation, the prevailing party to demean himself or herself as the case may be, as a faithful spouse until the entry of the final decree. Pakuris v. Pakuris, 95 R.I. 305 , 186 A.2d 719, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1962).

Remarriage Within Waiting Period.

A marriage entered into within the six-month [now three-month] period provided by this section was void, but continued cohabitation after a final divorce decree created a common law marriage. Holgate v. United Elec. Rys., 47 R.I. 337 , 133 A. 243, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1926).

Review in Supreme Court.

No appeal lies from a final decree of divorce. Fidler v. Fidler, 28 R.I. 102 , 65 A. 609, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1907). See also Thrift v. Thrift, 30 R.I. 357 , 75 A. 484, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1910).

Timeliness of Appeal.

Since the rule requiring the filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory, plaintiff’s notice of appeal from a divorce decree was untimely since it was not filed until more than three months after the entry of the decision and since no mention was made of excusable neglect. Bina v. Bina, 764 A.2d 191, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 207 (R.I. 2000).

Vacating Decree.

Where a final decree has been procured by fraud in which the respondent has not participated, and where the court has been induced by that fraud to take jurisdiction of a case of which it in fact had not jurisdiction, the decree will be vacated, even after the lapse of years, but great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the testimony. Johnston v. Johnston, 37 R.I. 362 , 92 A. 983, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1915).

A petition to vacate a divorce decree filed before a final decree is properly filed as incidental to and a part of the pending case, while petitions filed after final decree should be treated as independent petitions. Johnston v. Johnston, 37 R.I. 362 , 92 A. 983, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1915); Berger v. Berger, 44 R.I. 295 , 117 A. 361, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1922), overruled, Tobin v. Tobin, 70 R.I. 362 , 38 A.2d 756, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1944).

An uncontested divorce had become final and would not be vacated where the respondent who had been duly served did not move for a rehearing within six months [now three months] after the decision, even though the reason for the failure to defend was that the respondent was in Italy during wartime and unable to return. Scolardi v. Scolardi, 42 R.I. 456 , 108 A. 651, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1920).

Where after the granting of a divorce and before entry of a final decree an offense was condoned by the resumption of marital relations, a final decree fraudulently procured by the original respondent could be vacated. Berger v. Berger, 44 R.I. 295 , 117 A. 361, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1922), overruled, Tobin v. Tobin, 70 R.I. 362 , 38 A.2d 756, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1944).

Collateral References.

Agreement or release executed after entry of decree as affecting power of court to modify decree for alimony. 166 A.L.R. 370.

Alimony as affected by recipient spouse’s remarriage in absence of controlling specific statute. 47 A.L.R.5th 129.

Cohabitation under marriage contracted after divorce decree as adultery, where decree is later reversed or set aside. 63 A.L.R.2d 816.

“Cooling off period” or lapse of time prior to entry of decree in divorce suit. 62 A.L.R.2d 1262.

Divorce decree as res judicata or estoppel as to previous marital status, against or in favor of third persons. 20 A.L.R.2d 1163.

Final decree, power and duty of court as to entry of, at request of party against whom preliminary decree is rendered, in event of lack of request from prevailing party. 151 A.L.R. 849.

Grounds upon which entry of final decree of divorce may be contested after entry of interlocutory decree. 109 A.L.R. 1005, 174 A.L.R. 519.

Presumption as to validity of second marriage. 14 A.L.R.2d 7.

Remarriage as affecting right to appeal from divorce decree. 29 A.L.R.3d 1167.

Standing of strangers to divorce proceeding to attack validity of divorce decree. 12 A.L.R.2d 717.

Vacating or setting aside divorce decree after remarriage of party. 17 A.L.R.4th 1153.

15-5-24. Support — Wage assignment procedures.

  1. With respect to a support order issued, enforced, or modified on or after January 1, 1994, the income of an obligor shall be subject to immediate income withholding under chapter 16 of this title on the effective date of the order, regardless of whether support payments by the obligor are in arrears; provided, that the income of the obligor shall not be subject to immediate income withholding: (1) if a judge or magistrate of the family court finds that there is good cause not to require immediate income withholding, or (2) if the obligor and obligee (and the department in the case of an obligee subject to an assignment of support rights under § 40-6-9 ) enter into a written agreement or the family court enters an order which provides for an alternative agreement for the timely payment of support due under the support order. In no event shall the court order wage withholding payable to the obligee directly from any wage withholding agent.
  2. The obligor shall be given the notice by way of the pleadings or otherwise, that his or her income is subject to immediate income withholding as provided in subsection (a) of this section, that the maximum amount of income to be withheld may not exceed the limit permitted under § 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1673(b)), and that he or she may contest immediate income withholding, and assert any defenses, exceptions or exemptions to which he or she may be entitled, at a hearing before a judge or magistrate of the family court.
  3. An immediate income withholding order issued under this section shall be filed by the obligee or the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement with the clerk of the family court and shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 15-16-9 15-16-12 .
  4. A wage withholding made under this section shall be binding upon a wage withholding agent one week after service upon the wage withholding agent of the wage withholding by personal service or by registered or certified mail, until further order of the court. For purposes of this chapter, the term “employer” includes the state and federal governments and the political subdivisions of the state. The wage withholding agent shall remit to the clerk of the family court, or other designated remittee, within seven (7) days of the date of withholding, the amount withheld pursuant to the wage withholding and the wage withholding agent shall specify the date and amount of each withholding included in the remittance, the social security number of the obligor, the child support account number, the employee’s name and any other information as required if electronic transfer is utilized. The wage withholding agent may combine withheld amounts from two (2) or more obligors into a single payment, provided that the withholding agent separately identifies the individual obligors and the amount attributable to each obligor.
  5. The wage withholding agent may not use the wage withholding as a basis for the discharge of an employee or for any disciplinary action against the employee.
  6. The wage withholding agent must notify the clerk of the family court, in writing, of the termination of the obligor employee’s employment within ten (10) days of termination. Notice must include the name and address of the obligor employee’s new employer if known.
  7. A wage withholding under this section shall have priority over any attachment, execution, garnishment, or wage assignment unless otherwise ordered by the court. A wage withholding under this section shall not be subject to any specific or general statutory exemption or limitation prohibiting levy, execution, assignment, or attachment process or limiting the amount subject to assignment levied against the income of the obligor employee except as provided by federal law.
  8. The family court is authorized and directed to promulgate rules, regulations, and forms reasonably calculated to apprise the obligor of exemptions available to him or her under the law with respect to a family court wage withholding and the procedure for asserting these exemptions.
  9. A wage withholding agent may deduct two dollars ($2.00) from the obligor’s remaining income for each payment made pursuant to a wage withholding under this section to cover the wage withholding agent’s expenses involved in the wage withholdings.
  10. The obligor shall pay all costs involved in the wage withholdings.
  11. The justices or magistrate(s) of the family court shall enter, when appropriate, an order for payment of reasonable counsel fees for the prosecution of the wage withholdings.
  12. Any judgment or order of support issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction of any state shall have the same force and effect as if the judgment or order issued from the Rhode Island family court.
  13. For purposes of this section and §§ 15-5-25 and 15-5-26 , the following definitions apply:
    1. “Income” includes amounts paid or payable to an obligor as:
      1. Compensation paid or payable for personal services whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, whether taxable or not taxable, and specifically including periodic payments pursuant to pension or retirement programs or insurance policies of any type; and
      2. Benefit payments or other similar compensation paid or payable to the obligor by or through a department, agency, or political subdivision of the state or federal government, or by an insurance company, including unemployment compensation benefits, workers’ compensation benefits, and temporary disability benefits, except where garnishment or attachment of such benefit payments is prohibited by federal law.
    2. “Wage withholding agent” means any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association, trust, federal or state agency, department, or political subdivision, paying or obligated to pay income, as defined in this subsection, to an obligor of court ordered child support.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 421, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 199, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 419, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 478, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 8; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Wage-Assignment Order.
— Constitutionality.

A wage-assignment order pursuant to this section violates neither the equal-protection clause nor the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.Fricke v. Fricke, 491 A.2d 990, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 493 (R.I. 1985).

This section encompasses judgments containing child support orders as well as orders for support emanating from spousal support agreements recognized by § 8-10-3 . In addition, an order by the family court directing the assignment provided in this section can be made in proceedings subsequent to any initial spousal or child support order entered by the family court. Bowen v. Bowen, 675 A.2d 412, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 146 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys’ fees in domestic relations cases. 17 A.L.R.5th 366.

Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, so as to Bar Recovery of Arrearages of Permanent Alimony or Child Support. 22 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2017).

15-5-24.1. Visitation rights of grandparents.

The court may, upon miscellaneous petition of a grandparent whose child is deceased, grant reasonable visitation rights of the grandchild or grandchildren to the grandparent, whether or not any divorce or custody proceedings were ever commenced, and may issue all necessary orders to enforce visitation rights.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 104, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adoption.

An order of visitation made in favor of the grandparents will survive a subsequent adoption. This result is essential because, in effect, the adoption proceeding may not affect, limit, or constrain the right of visitation since the latter right arises by order of the court and can only be changed by an order of the court specifically directed to visitation. Puleo v. Forgue, 610 A.2d 124, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 173 (R.I. 1992).

— Notice.

Section 15-5-24.3 does not require that a grandparent who has been granted visitation under this section be provided with notice of an adoption proceeding by a surviving custodial parent and a stepparent. Puleo v. Forgue, 610 A.2d 124, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 173 (R.I. 1992).

Visitation Properly Denied.

Grandparent’s visitation petition was properly denied because (1) the grandparent admitted the grandchildren’s father was a fit custodial parent and did not rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the father’s decision to deny visitation was reasonable, (2) an investigator concluded the children had no interest in visiting, observed the children were happy and healthy with their father and stepmother, and recommended no further visitation, and (3) the father testified to the detrimental impact of visitation, the fact that neither he nor the children wished to continue visits, and improvement in the children’s behavior, school performance, and health since visits ceased, all showing the father acted in the children’s best interest. Mactavish-Thurber v. Gauvin, 202 A.3d 232, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2019).

Collateral References.

Grandparents’ visitation rights where child’s parents are deceased, or where status of parents is unspecified. 69 A.L.R.5th 1.

Grandparent’s visitation rights where child’s parents are living. 71 A.L.R.5th 99.

15-5-24.2. Visitation rights of grandparents whose child is denied or has failed to exercise rights.

In any divorce proceeding the family court may, upon petition of a grandparent whose grandchild is a child of the marriage, grant reasonable visitation rights of the grandchild to the grandparent. The court may issue all necessary orders to enforce visitation rights. Once a grandparent has been granted reasonable visitation rights, notice of any petition and/or order providing for a change in custody or visitation shall be provided to the grandparent.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 416, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 23.

Collateral References.

Grandparents’ visitation rights where child’s parents are deceased, or where status of parents is unspecified. 69 A.L.R.5th 1.

Grandparent’s visitation rights where child’s parents are living. 71 A.L.R.5th 99.

15-5-24.3. Visitation rights — Grandparents and siblings.

    1. The family court, upon miscellaneous petition of a grandparent for visitation rights with the petitioner’s grandchild, and upon notice to both parents of the child, and after a hearing on the petition, may grant reasonable rights of visitation of the grandchild to the petitioner.
    2. The court, in order to grant the petitioner reasonable rights of visitation, must find and set forth in writing the following findings of fact:
      1. That it is in the best interest of the grandchild as determined on a case-by-case basis that the petitioner is granted visitation rights with the grandchild.In considering whether it is in the child’s best interests, the court shall consider all the relevant factors including, but not limited to:
        1. The nature of the relationship between the child and the grandparent seeking visitation;
        2. The amount of time the grandparent and child spent together;
        3. The potential detriments and benefits to the child from granting visitation;
        4. The potential effect of granting visitation on the parent-child relationship;
        5. The preferences of the grandchild who is of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference; and
        6. The reasons that the parent(s) believe that it is not in their child’s best interests to have visitation with the grandparent(s);
      2. That the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have visitation rights with the grandchild;
      3. That the petitioner has repeatedly attempted to visit his or her grandchild during the thirty (30) days immediately preceding the date the petition was filed and was not allowed to visit the grandchild during the thirty-day (30) period as a direct result of the actions of either, or both, parents of the grandchild;
      4. That there is no other way the petitioner is able to visit his or her grandchild without court intervention; and
      5. That the petitioner, by clear and convincing evidence, has successfully rebutted the presumption that the parent’s decision to refuse the grandparent visitation with the grandchild was reasonable.
      6. The court may assess the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the parent(s) to the grandparent(s) if the petition for visitation is denied.
    1. The family court, upon miscellaneous petition of, or on behalf of, a sibling(s) for visitation rights with a minor brother(s), and/or step-brother(s), and/or sister(s), and/or step-sister(s) of the sibling(s) and upon notice to both parents of the minor, and after a hearing on the petition, may grant reasonable rights of visitation of the minor to a sibling(s).
    2. The court, in order to grant a sibling reasonable rights of visitation, must find and set forth in writing the following findings of fact:
      1. That it is in the best interest of the minor that a sibling(s) be granted visitation rights with the minor;
      2. That the sibling(s) is a fit and proper person to have visitation rights with the minor;
      3. That the sibling(s) was not allowed to visit the minor during the thirty-day (30) period immediately preceding the date the petition was filed as a direct result of the actions of either, or both, parents or guardians of the minor;
      4. That there is no other way the sibling(s) is able to visit the minor without court intervention; and
      5. That the sibling(s), by clear and convincing evidence, has successfully rebutted the presumption that the parental decision to refuse the visitation with the minor was reasonable.
  1. The court may issue all necessary orders relative to the visitation rights it has granted. Once a petition has been granted, notice of any petition seeking a change in custody or visitation shall be served on the petitioner.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 222, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 334, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 222, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 334, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adoption.
— Notice.

This section does not require that a grandparent who has been granted visitation under § 15-5-24.1 be provided with notice of an adoption proceeding by a surviving custodial parent and a stepparent. Puleo v. Forgue, 610 A.2d 124, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 173 (R.I. 1992).

Denied.

Where it was clear that the grandchild expressed a desire not to have visitation rights with the grandparents and that the peace and sense of security of the child would be preserved best without visitation, these rights were properly denied. Puleo v. Forgue, 634 A.2d 857, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 264 (R.I. 1993).

Grandparent’s visitation petition was properly denied because (1) the grandparent admitted the grandchildren’s father was a fit custodial parent and did not rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the father’s decision to deny visitation was reasonable, (2) an investigator concluded the children had no interest in visiting, observed the children were happy and healthy with their father and stepmother, and recommended no further visitation, and (3) the father testified to the detrimental impact of visitation, the fact that neither he nor the children wished to continue visits, and improvement in the children’s behavior, school performance, and health since visits ceased, all showing the father acted in the children’s best interest. Mactavish-Thurber v. Gauvin, 202 A.3d 232, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2019).

Collateral References.

Grandparents’ visitation rights where child’s parents are deceased, or where status of parents is unspecified. 69 A.L.R.5th 1.

Grandparent’s visitation rights where child’s parents are living. 71 A.L.R.5th 99.

15-5-24.4. Sibling visitation rights.

  1. The family court, upon miscellaneous petition of a brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister, stepbrother, stepsister, or on behalf of any of those persons by his or her legal guardian, for visitation rights for the petitioner’s sibling, half-sibling or stepsibling and upon notice to both parents of the child and notice to the child, and after a hearing on the petition, may grant reasonable rights of visitation of the sibling to the petitioner. The court, in order to grant reasonable rights of visitation, must find and set forth in writing the following findings of fact:
    1. That it is in the best interests of the child that the petitioner is granted visitation rights with the child;
    2. That the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have visitation rights with the child;
    3. That the petitioner has repeatedly attempted to visit his or her sibling, half-sibling or stepsibling during the thirty (30) days immediately preceding the date the petition was filed and was not allowed to visit the child during the thirty (30) day period as a direct result of the actions of either, or both, parents of the child;
    4. There is no other way that the petitioner is able to visit his or her sibling, half-sibling or stepsibling without court intervention; and
    5. That the petitioner, by clear and convincing evidence, has successfully rebutted the presumption that the parent’s decision to refuse the petitioner’s visitation with the child was reasonable.
  2. The court may issue all necessary orders relative to the visitation rights granted to the petitioner. Once the petitioner has been granted reasonable visitation rights, notice of any petition seeking a change in custody or visitation shall be served on the petitioner.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 200, § 1.

15-5-24.5. Court ordered visitation rights to certain persons convicted of first degree murder — Prohibited.

No court shall make an order providing visitation rights to a parent who has been convicted of murder in the first degree of the other parent of the child who is the subject of the order, unless that court first conducts a hearing in order to determine whether the child is of an appropriate age, maturity, intelligence and voluntarily consents to the visitation. No person shall cause, facilitate, or assist a child to visit a parent who has been convicted of murder in the first degree of the other parent of the child without the consent of the child’s custodian or legal guardian except as authorized by a court order.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 471, § 1.

15-5-25. Application for wage withholding — Obligor in arrears.

    1. In cases where a wage withholding has not been secured pursuant to § 15-5-24 , upon application of the child or of any person having a direct interest in the welfare of the child, or any person to whom support is owed pursuant to court order, the court, pursuant to this section and upon a showing that a support payment has not been made in full within fourteen (14) days of its due date, may order a wage withholding agent of the obligor:
      1. To withhold from the obligor’s income presently due, and from future income as it becomes due, amounts which shall satisfy the obligor’s previous arrearage in support payments, the obligor’s obligation to pay support as it accrues in the future, and any attorney’s fees that may be awarded in a proceeding under this section;
      2. To deduct from the balance of the obligor’s income a fee of two dollars ($2.00) to cover the employer’s expenses involved in withholding and transmitting the support payment;
      3. To remit the amount withheld under subsection (a) of this section to the clerk of the family court or other designated remittee entering the order, within seven (7) days of the date of withholding, and to specify the date and amount of each withholding included in the remittance, the social security number of the obligor, the child support account number, the employee’s name, and any other information as required if electronic transfer is utilized. The wage withholding agent may combine withheld amounts from two (2) or more obligors into a single payment, provided that the wage withholding agent separately identifies the individual obligors and the amount attributable to each obligor;
      4. To refrain from dismissing, disciplining, or in any way penalizing the obligor employee on account of the proceeding to collect support, on account of any order or orders entered by the court in the proceeding, and on account of wage withholding agent compliance with the order or orders; and
      5. To notify, in writing, the clerk of the family court entering the order of the termination of the obligor’s employment and the name and address, if known, of the obligor’s new employer within ten (10) days after termination of employment.
    2. The application may be filed as part of any proceeding brought for failure to make support payments or may be made independently of any other support enforcement action.
  1. Upon the filing of an application for wage withholding the court shall set a time for a hearing. The hearing shall be held within three (3) weeks of the date the application is filed with the court. No wage withholding shall become effective unless the obligor has been given notice, by way of the pleadings or otherwise, of the exemptions to which he or she may be entitled under the law and of the procedure for asserting these exemptions.
  2. The applicant shall then cause to be served on the wage withholding agent a copy of the application, a notice of hearing, and interrogatories to be completed and returned by the wage withholding agent to the court no later than three (3) days prior to the hearing. The interrogatories when completed shall show whether the obligor receives income from or is an employee of the employer, whether the obligor performs work and provides services or makes sales in this state, the present length of employment of the obligor with the wage withholding agent, the present pay period for the obligor, the average earnings of the obligor per pay period, and the name and address of the person, office, or division of the wage withholding agent responsible for the preparation of the obligor’s income payments.
  3. The applicant shall also cause to be served on the obligor a copy of the application and a notice of hearing.
  4. Service under this section shall be personally or by mailing by registered or certified mail the documents required to be served.
  5. Any order for wage withholding under this section shall have priority over any attachment, execution, garnishment, or wage assignment unless otherwise ordered by the court. This order shall not be subject to any specific or general statutory exemption or limitation prohibiting levy, execution, assignment, or attachment process or limiting the amount of executions issued against the income of the obligor except as provided by federal law.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 199, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 419, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 478, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 1.

Collateral References.

Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, so as to Bar Recovery of Arrearages of Permanent Alimony or Child Support. 22 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2017).

15-5-26. Duties and liabilities of employer under income assignment order or order for wage withholding.

  1. Any wage withholding agent failing to comply with any requirements in §§ 15-5-24 and 15-5-25 may be punished by the court for civil contempt. The court shall first afford the wage withholding agent a reasonable opportunity to purge itself of contempt.
  2. Any wage withholding agent who fails or refuses to deliver income pursuant to an order under §§ 15-5-24 and 15-5-25 , when the garnishing agent has had in its possession the income, shall be personally liable for the amount of the income which the wage withholding agent failed or refused to deliver, together with costs, interest, and reasonable attorney’s fees.
  3. Any wage withholding agent who dismisses, demotes, disciplines, or in any way penalizes an obligor on account of any proceeding to collect support, on account of any order or orders entered by the court in the proceeding, or on account of the wage withholding agent’s compliance with the order or orders, shall be liable to the obligor for all damages, together with costs, interest thereon, and reasonable attorney’s fees resulting from the action, and shall be subject to a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100). The wage withholding agent shall be required to make full restitution to the aggrieved obligor including reinstatements and back pay.
  4. A wage withholding agent may be enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction from continuing any action in violation of §§ 15-5-24 and 15-5-25 .
  5. Any proceeding against a wage withholding agent under this section must be commenced within ninety (90) days after a wage withholding agent’s act or failure to act upon which the proceeding is based.
  6. Compliance by a wage withholding agent with an order issued under §§ 15-5-24 and 15-5-25 operates as a discharge of the wage withholding agent’s liability to the obligor as to that portion of the obligor’s income so affected.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 199, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 143, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 1.

15-5-27. Order for wage withholding — Duration.

An order for wage withholding under §§ 15-5-24 and 15-5-25 shall remain in effect until modified or terminated by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 199, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 1.

15-5-28. Judgment or order as lien on property — Duration — Effect.

  1. A certified copy of any judgment or order which contains a provision adjudging a party to the action in contempt for failure to pay any support payment, or which states an arrearage due on any support payment or payments, may be recorded with the recorder of deeds in any city or town where real estate owned by the obligor may be found, and shall become a lien upon all real property of the obligor owned by the obligor in the city or town at the time of the recording. The division of taxation, child support enforcement shall not be required to pay a recording fee. The lien shall remain in full force and effect unless the lien is discharged by the obligee or his or her attorney or subsequent family court judgment or order as provided in this section.
  2. The certificate of the obligee, or his or her attorney duly signed and notarized, or a certified copy of a judgment or order of the family court which contains a provision that all arrearages have been paid in full, shall, when recorded, be a discharge in full of the land.
  3. If any amount of child support provided in a judgment or order has been directed to be paid to the clerk of the court or to any other office designated by the court pursuant to any other provision of law, and the directive is set forth in the copy of the docketed judgment or order, or in the docket or certified copy of an amended or supplemental order, the certificate shall not affect the lien unless also approved in writing by the clerk or other designated officer.
  4. A lien under this section shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 354, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Perfection of Lien.

Since the husband failed to make support payments required by the family court’s interlocutory order, the wife could have reduced those arrearages to judgment and perfected her lien by recording it in the records of land evidence. Since the wife failed to take these affirmative steps, the property could be subjected to a tax lien foreclosure sale based on the husband’s debt to the Internal Revenue Service. United States v. Brynes, 848 F. Supp. 1096, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4089 (D.R.I. 1994).

Collateral References.

Decree for periodical payments for support of children as lien or subject of declaration of lien. 59 A.L.R.2d 656.

Retirement of Husband as Change of Circumstances Warranting Modification of Divorce Decree — Early Retirement. 36 A.L.R.6th 1.

Retirement of husband as change of circumstances warranting modification of divorce decree — Prospective retirement. 110 A.L.R.5th 237.

Review of discretion as to declaration of lien for security of periodical payments for support or alimony. 59 A.L.R.2d 666.

15-5-29. Mediation proceedings involving custody and/or visitation.

  1. Where, in any petition for divorce, divorce from bed and board, or relief without the commencement of divorce proceedings, the family court may, as to issues of custody and visitation, direct the parties to participate in mediation in an effort to resolve their differences, the court may order the participation in mediation in a program established by the court.
  2. At its discretion, the court may:
    1. Order mediation under this section prior to trial and postpone trial of the case pending the outcome of the mediation, in which case the issues of custody and visitation shall be tried only upon failure to resolve the issues of custody by mediation;
    2. Order mediation under this section prior to trial and proceed to try the case as to issues other than custody and visitation while the parties are at the same time engaged in the mediation, in which the issue of custody shall be tried separately upon failure to resolve the issues; and
    3. Complete the trial of the case on all issues and order mediation under this section upon the conclusion of the trial, postponing entry of the decree pending outcome of the mediation, in which case the court may enter a temporary decree as to issues other than custody any visitation upon completion of the trial or may postpone entry of any decree until the expiration of the mediation period of agreement of the parties.
  3. Communications made by or to a mediator or between parties in the presence of the mediator as a part of mediation ordered under this section are privileged and are not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 422, § 1.

Chapter 6 Uniform Divorce Recognition Act

15-6-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Divorce Recognition Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2268, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 15-6-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Recognition of foreign divorce decrees:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-70 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 39.

15-6-2. Ex parte divorce in another state between parties resident in this state.

A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another jurisdiction in ex parte proceedings shall be of no force or effect in this state, if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time that the proceeding for the divorce was commenced.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2268, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-6-2 .

Cross References.

Full faith and credit, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1.

Collateral References.

Constructive service, valid foreign divorce granted upon, as precluding action by spouse for alimony, support, or maintenance. 28 A.L.R.2d 1378.

Domestic recognition of divorce decree obtained in foreign country and attacked for lack of domicil or jurisdiction of parties. 13 A.L.R.3d 1419.

Duty to recognize and give effect to decrees of divorce rendered in other states, or in foreign country, as affected by lack of domicile at divorce forum. 39 A.L.R. 603, 86 A.L.R. 1329, 143 A.L.R. 1294, 157 A.L.R. 1399, 163 A.L.R. 368, 1 A.L.R.2d 1385, 27 A.L.R.2d 1303.

Full faith and credit to decree of other state for alimony, as to past due instalments, as affected by power of court to modify such instalments. 41 A.L.R. 1419, 157 A.L.R. 170.

Recognition as to marital status of foreign divorce decree attacked on ground of lack of domicile, since Williams decision. 1 A.L.R.2d 1385, 28 A.L.R.2d 1303.

Recognition by foreign state of marriage which, though invalid where contracted, would have been valid if contracted within foreign state. 82 A.L.R.3d 1240.

Valid foreign divorce as affecting local order previously entered for separate maintenance. 49 A.L.R.3d 1266.

15-6-3. Prima facie evidence of continued domicile in state.

Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of matrimony in another jurisdiction: (1) was domiciled in this state within twelve (12) months prior to the commencement of the proceeding for divorce, and resumed residence in this state within eighteen (18) months after the date of his or her departure from this state, or (2) at all times after his or her departure from this state and until his or her return maintained a place of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was commenced.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2268, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-6-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

In a suit to enforce a property settlement agreement which was part of a Nevada divorce decree, the finding of the trial court that no fraud was practiced on the Nevada court and that the finding of the Nevada court that it had jurisdiction of the parties, both parties being represented by an attorney, was entitled to full faith and credit was not clearly wrong. Nevin v. Nevin, 88 R.I. 426 , 149 A.2d 722, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1959).

15-6-4. Uniformity of construction.

This chapter shall be interpreted and construed so as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2268, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 15-6-4 .

Chapter 7 Adoption of Children

15-7-1. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 1; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-1 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1982, ch. 318, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1986, ch. 254, § 4, effective June 19, 1986; P.L. 1986, ch. 274, § 4, effective July 1, 1986. For present provisions of law, see §§ 42-72.1-4 and 42-72.1-7 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-7-1 concerned unlicensed child placement services and penalties.

15-7-2. Report, investigation, and hearing on placement of child for adoption.

  1. Whenever a parent or parents places a child with a person or persons, other than a father, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent, or stepparent of the child for adoption purposes, the person or persons with whom the child has been placed for adoption shall, within fifteen (15) days of the placement, notify the department of children, youth, and families of the placement.
  2. The willful failure, neglect, or refusal of the person or persons with whom the child has been placed to make the report within fifteen (15) days shall be considered in violation of this chapter and prejudicial to the best interests of the child. The department shall, when it receives the notice or when it receives notice from any source that the person or persons with whom the child has been placed has failed, refused, or neglected to make the report within fifteen (15) days of placement, make any investigation that it deems necessary in the circumstances.
  3. The results of the investigation shall be then referred to the family court within sixty (60) days of the receipt by the department of the notice.
  4. The family court, after any notice that it deems proper to the parent or parents and the person or persons with whom the child has been placed, shall hold a hearing to determine whether the placement of the child is or is not for the best interest of the child.
  5. If the court finds that the placement is not for the best interest of the child, or is contrary to law, it shall order that the child be returned to its parent or parents or placed with the department or a licensed child placing agency or with whomsoever the court deems for the best interest of the child.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 4; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-2 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1962, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970.

Comparative Legislation.

Adoptions:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-61 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 210, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Negligent Misrepresentation.

The tort of negligent misrepresentation in the adoption context is recognized; in order to avoid liability, an adoption agency needs simply to refrain from making representations, or if it does begin making representations it must do so in a nonnegligent manner. However, adoption agencies are not guarantors or insurers of a child’s future health and traditional principles of negligence still will require that the child’s condition be reasonably predictable at the time of the adoption. Mallette v. Children's Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 185 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Adoption of child by same-sex partners. 27 A.L.R.5th 54.

Age of prospective adoptive parent as factor in adoption proceedings. 84 A.L.R.3d 665.

Attorney malpractice in connection with services related to adoption of child. 18 A.L.R.5th 892.

Marital status of prospective adopting parents as factor in adoption proceedings. 2 A.L.R.4th 555.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings. 34 A.L.R.4th 167.

Right, in child custody proceedings, to cross-examine investigating officer whose report is used by court in its decision. 59 A.L.R.3d 1337.

15-7-2.1. Pre-adoption report on child placed for adoption.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law or regulation, in those cases where a child is placed for adoption by the department of children, youth and families or a licensed child placement agency, the agency shall provide a pre-adoption report in writing to the prospective adoptive parents as early as practicable after the filing of a termination of parental rights or direct consent adoption petition and before a prospective adoptive parent agrees to accept the child for purposes of adoption. The pre-adoptive report shall include the following information that is reasonably available within the records of the department of children, youth and families or the licensed child placement agency that is placing a child for adoption:
    1. A current medical, dental, developmental and psychological history of the child, including an account of the child’s prenatal care, medical condition at birth, developmental milestones; any medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and diagnosis related to the child; any physical, sexual or emotional abuse or neglect suffered by the child; any developmental assessment and a record of any immunizations and health care received while the child was in foster or other care; the child’s enrollment and performance in school and any special educational needs and any adjudications of waywardness and/or delinquency.
    2. If the child has undergone any genetic testing, and the agency is aware of the results, those results must be disclosed in the report to the prospective adoptive parents.
    3. If the child has been tested for HIV, and the agency is aware of the results, those results must be disclosed in the report to the prospective adoptive parents.
    4. The age, race, religion, ethnicity and general physical appearance of biological parents.
    5. The educational levels of biological parents, including any known diagnosed learning disabilities.
    6. The relationship between biological parents; the age and sex of any other children born to the biological parents and if a parent is deceased, the cause of and the age at death.
    7. Nonidentifying medical, substance abuse and mental health histories of the biological parents and siblings; the medical and mental health histories shall include drugs and medications taken by the child’s biological mother during pregnancy, any known allergies, hereditary, genetic or metabolic diseases.
    8. The circumstances of any judicial order terminating the parental rights of a parent for abuse, neglect, abandonment, or other mistreatment of the child.
    9. The length of time the child has been in the care of the agency and the child’s placement history.
    10. Any information necessary to determine the child’s eligibility for state or federal benefits.
    11. No information provided under subsection (a) shall disclose the name, or last known address of the biological relatives.
  2. A report furnished under this section must be signed and dated by the individual who prepared the report.
  3. Any report regarding the child, furnished pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of this section may disclose the identity of providers of professional services to the child.
  4. The agency shall not be liable for the accuracy and completeness and shall be held harmless for information provided by the biological parents and others that it reasonably relies on to prepare the preadoption report.
  5. Any of the information listed in subsection (a), in the possession of the department of children, youth and families that is related to adoption proceedings completed prior to the effective date of this act [July 8, 2005] shall be supplied to the adoptive parents or an adoptee under this section, who is 18 years of age or over, upon request.
  6. If information listed in subsection (a) that was not available at the time the preadoption report was forwarded to the prospective adoptive parents becomes available prior to the adoption proceeding, the director shall prepare a supplemental written report detailing said information. If subsequent to the adoption, the biological parent or sibling contacts the agency for the purpose of sharing information about a genetic or hereditary illness, disease or condition that may affect the adoptee’s health, the agency shall make reasonable efforts to contact and forward the information in a manner that does not identify the birth relative, to an adoptee who is 18 or more years of age or to the adoptive parents of an adoptee who is less than 18 years of age.
  7. All information and documentation provided in accordance with subsection (a), is confidential and remains the property of the person/agency making the full disclosure until the adoption is final. If the prospective adoptive parent refuses or terminates the placement, all information and documentation provided regarding the child and his/her birth family shall be returned to the person/agency providing full disclosure. A prospective adoptive parent shall not disclose any confidential information, except as necessary to make a placement/adoption decision or to provide to professionals who are treating, assessing or educating the child.
  8. This section does not apply to a stepparent adoption, or the adoption of a child related to the petitioner by marriage, blood or adoption.
  9. Any adoptee under this section, who is 18 years of age or over shall be given the information in subsection (a)(1) upon written request.
  10. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit the voluntary exchange of identifying information between mutually consenting biological parents and adoptive parents and adoptees, 18 years of age or older.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 166, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 223, § 1.

15-7-3. Report, investigation, and hearing on child brought into state for adoption.

  1. Whenever any person or persons brings or causes to be brought a child, not related to him or her or them, into this state for the purpose of adoption, he or she or they shall make a report to the department of children, youth and families within fifteen (15) days of the entry of the child into this state.
  2. The willful failure, neglect, or refusal of the person or persons having brought or having caused the child to be brought into this state to make the report shall be considered a violation of this chapter and prejudicial to the best interest of the child. The department, upon receipt of the notice or when it receives notice from any source that the person or persons having brought or having caused the child to be brought into this state has or have willfully failed, refused, or neglected to make the report, shall make any investigation that it deems necessary in the circumstances and report the results of that investigation to the family court within sixty (60) days after receipt of the notice.
  3. The family court, after any notice that it deems proper to the parent or parents, and the person or persons having brought, or having caused to be brought, the child into this state, shall, after the filing of the report, hold a hearing to determine whether the proposed placement for adoption is or is not for the best interest of the child.
  4. If the court finds that the proposed placement for adoption is not for the best interest of the child, it shall order that the child be returned to its parent or parents or placed through the department or a licensed child placing agency or with whomsoever the court deems for the best interest of the child.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 4; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-3 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970.

Collateral References.

Age of prospective adoptive parent as factor in adoption proceedings. 84 A.L.R.3d 665.

Marital status of prospective adopting parents as factor in adoption proceedings. 2 A.L.R.4th 555.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings. 34 A.L.R.4th 167.

Right, in child custody proceedings, to cross-examine investigating officer whose report is used by court in its decision. 59 A.L.R.3d 1337.

15-7-4. Petition to adopt — Court having jurisdiction.

  1. Any person residing in Rhode Island may petition the family court for leave to adopt as his or her child any person younger than him or herself and under eighteen (18) years of age, and, if desired, for a change of the child’s name, but the prayer of the petition by a person having a husband or wife shall not be granted unless the husband or wife joins in the petition; provided, that upon good cause shown and a showing that the granting of the petition for adoption would be in the best interests of the minor child, the prayer of the petition may be granted although the spouse of the petitioner is not a party to the petition.
  2. The family court shall retain jurisdiction over any petition properly filed under subsection (a) when and if the petitioners become nonresidents after the petition is filed, but during the pendency of the action.
  3. Any person not a resident of Rhode Island may petition the family court for leave to adopt as his or her child any person younger than him or herself and under eighteen (18) years of age, and, if desired, for a change of the child’s name, if the child is at the time of the filing of the petition in the care and custody of a governmental child placing agency, or licensed Rhode Island child placing agency, but the prayer of the petition by a person having a husband or wife shall not be granted unless the husband or wife joins in the petition.
  4. Petitions for adoptions of persons eighteen (18) years or older shall be heard by the probate court of the city or town in which the petitioners live.
  5. The department shall grant an opportunity for a fair hearing, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) and chapter 35 of title 42 to an individual residing outside of Rhode Island who alleges that the department denied or delayed placement of a child for adoption.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 1907, ch. 1423, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1910, ch. 544, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1197, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1573, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 2; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-4 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 87, § 2.

Cross References.

Juvenile court jurisdiction, §§ 14-1-5 , 14-1-14 .

Probate court jurisdiction, § 8-9-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adoption of Older Persons.
— Judicial Discretion.

A probate judge is clothed with judicial discretion as he considers a petition where one adult seeks to adopt another. In re Jones, 122 R.I. 716 , 411 A.2d 910, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1452 (1980).

Effect of Statute.

The statute of adoption creates a relationship unknown to the common law. Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R.I. 45 , 97 A. 378, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1916); Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76 , 151 A. 131, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1930).

Out-Of-State Petitioners.

Family court lacked jurisdiction over an adoption petition filed by Massachusetts residents; the fact that the father was a resident of Rhode Island had no bearing on the family court’s jurisdiction and the adoption petition was a separate proceeding from a prior complaint for custody and allowances and the fact family court had continuing jurisdiction with respect to those issues did confer upon it jurisdiction over the adoption petition. In re Toryn C., 982 A.2d 592, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 123 (R.I. 2009).

Residence.

The terms “reside” and “residence” in an adoption statute have reference to domicile and not to the place of abode. Greene v. Willis, 47 R.I. 375 , 133 A. 651, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1926).

The domicile of the child follows the domicile of the father, and upon his death the domicile of the mother, and upon her death it remains with the mother until changed by order of the court. Greene v. Willis, 47 R.I. 375 , 133 A. 651, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1926).

The best interests of the child were served by permitting the Family Court to hear and consider the petition for adoption by the child’s deceased mother’s twin sister and her husband, who were non-Rhode Island residents. In re Jeramie N., 688 A.2d 825, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 29 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners. 61 A.L.R.6th 1.

Marital or sexual relationship between parties as affecting right to adopt. 42 A.L.R.4th 776.

Requirements as to residence or domicile of adoptee of adoptive parent for purposes of adoption. 33 A.L.R.3d 176.

15-7-5. Consent required.

  1. The parents of the child, or their survivor, shall, except as provided in this section, consent in writing to the adoption, or the petition shall be dismissed. If neither parent is living, the guardian of the person of the child, or, if there is no guardian, the next of kin, may give consent; or if there is no next of kin, the court may appoint some suitable person to act in the proceedings as next friend of the child, and to give or withhold the consent; provided, that if the child is of the age of fourteen (14) years or over, the adoption shall not be made without the child’s consent. In case the child to be adopted is eighteen (18) years or older, the consent of, or notice to, the child’s parents or other person in the child’s behalf shall not be required.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, when the petitioners are one of the natural parents of the child and his or her spouse or one of the grandparents of the child and the child is residing, at the time the petition is filed, with the petitioners, if the noncustodial parent refused to consent to the adoption, the court shall determine whether the noncustodial parent’s rights shall be terminated involuntarily. In making the determination, the court shall apply the grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 15-7-7 ; provided, that the petitioners need not demonstrate, and the court shall not require, efforts to encourage and strengthen the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent prior to terminating his or her parental rights.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, when the petitioners are one of the natural parents of the child and his or her spouse or one of the grandparents of the child and the child is residing, at the time the petition is filed, with the petitioners, and if the noncustodial parent refuses to consent to the adoption, then the court may grant the petition without a noncustodial parent’s consent if the petitioners prove by clear and convincing evidence any of the grounds set forth in § 15-7-7 (a)(1), (2), or (4). The standard of proof in these cases shall be by clear and convincing evidence and the court shall give primary consideration to the physical, psychological, mental, and intellectual needs of the child insofar as that consideration is not inconsistent with other provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1197, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 3; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-5 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 29, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adoption of Adult.
— Judicial Discretion.

A probate judge is clothed with judicial discretion as he considers a petition where one adult seeks to adopt another. In re Jones, 122 R.I. 716 , 411 A.2d 910, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1452 (1980).

Child Subsequently Legitimized.

Where a child born out of wedlock had been legitimized by a subsequent marriage of the parents and by a statutory proceeding under law of their domicile, the consent of the father to adoption was required. Sklaroff v. Stevens, 84 R.I. 1 , 120 A.2d 694, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1956).

Inter-Family Adoption.

Child’s mother could file a petition of adoption in combination with a spouse or a grandparent of the child to be adopted; the Family Court may grant the petition of a mother and a grandfather to adopt a child over the father’s objection if there are grounds to terminate the father’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 . In re Abby D., 839 A.2d 1222, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2004).

In filing an adoption petition with her spouse, the biological mother consented and supported the spouse’s desire to adopt his stepchild. In re Livia B.L., 151 A.3d 756, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 7 (R.I. 2017).

Standing.

The plaintiff was not a parent within the meaning of this section; therefore, he did not have standing to challenge the adoption procedures. Gushlaw v. Rohrbaugh, 697 A.2d 1097, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 235 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Comment Note: Natural parent’s indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — general principles. 82 A.L.R.5th 443.

Consent of natural parents as essential to adoption where parents are divorced. 47 A.L.R.2d 824.

Divorced parents, consent of, as essential to adoption. 47 A.L.R.2d 824.

Guardian, necessity of consent to adoption of child. 104 A.L.R. 1465.

Marital or sexual relationship between parties as affecting right to adopt. 42 A.L.R.4th 776.

Mistake or want of understanding as ground for revocation of consent to adoption or of agreement releasing infant to adoption placement agency. 74 A.L.R.3d 489.

Natural parent’s indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — factors other than employment status. 84 A.L.R.5th 191.

Natural parent’s indigence resulting from unemployment or underemployment as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption. 83 A.L.R.5th 375.

Necessity of consent of parent under statute providing for adoption of abandoned or deserted child. 35 A.L.R.2d 662.

Necessity of securing consent of parents of illegitimate child to its adoption. 51 A.L.R.2d 497.

Parent’s involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as permitting adoption without parental consent. 78 A.L.R.3d 712.

Right of natural parent to withdraw valid consent to adoption of child. 74 A.L.R.3d 421.

Rights of unwed father to obstruct adoption of his child by withholding consent. 61 A.L.R.5th 151.

Sufficiency of parent’s consent to adoption of child. 24 A.L.R.2d 1127.

Validity and construction of surrogate parenting agreement. 77 A.L.R.4th 70.

Validity of birth parent’s “blanket” consent to adoption which fails to identify adoptive parents. 15 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity of Surrogate Parenting Agreement. 19 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2017).

What constitutes “duress” in obtaining parent’s consent to adoption of child or surrender of child to adoption agency. 74 A.L.R.3d 527.

What constitutes undue influence in obtaining a parent’s consent to adoption of child. 50 A.L.R.3d 918.

Withdrawal of consent previously given by natural person or other person whose consent is necessary to adoption of child. 138 A.L.R. 1038, 156 A.L.R. 1011.

15-7-5.1. Contact preference form information.

Upon providing consent to an adoption, the biological parent(s) shall be informed that, consistent with § 23-3-15(g)(1) , an adoptee may obtain a non-certified copy of his/her unaltered, original certificate of birth upon his/her eighteenth birthday, and that the birth parent is allowed and authorized to file a contact preference form with the division of vital records as provided in § 23-3-15(g)(2) .

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 228, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 233, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 234, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 233, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 234, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-7-6. Waiver of parents’ right to consent — Guardianship of agency.

Any duly licensed child placement agency in this state, or governmental child placement agency, at the request of the natural parent or parents of a child under eighteen (18) years of age, may, not sooner than fifteen (15) days after the birth of the child, petition the family court for the termination of the rights of the natural parents of the child to consent to its adoption. After any notice to the natural parents that the court deems proper, a hearing shall be had prior to the hearing on the petition for adoption in the family court, and if the family court finds after examination of the parent or parents that the parent or parents freely join in the petition, and that the granting of the petition is for the best interests of the child, it shall decree that in the hearing on the adoption of the child the consent of the natural parents as provided above shall be unnecessary and that the agency shall be the sole party to give or withhold consent. The granting of the petition to give or withhold consent to the child placement agency shall also make the agency the guardian of the child for all purposes.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 3; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-6 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Cross References.

Dependent or neglected child, department of human services as party to adoption proceeding, § 14-1-35 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Guardian Ad Litem.

A guardian ad litem had standing to intervene in an adoption proceeding concerning the child after the parents’ rights had been terminated. In re Christina D., 525 A.2d 1306, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 495 (R.I. 1987).

Notice of Hearing.

Sections 15-7-6 15-7-9 require that notice of the hearing date of an adoption proceeding be given to a natural parent, or parents, only in cases where such parent has not consented to the adoption. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Collateral References.

Mistake or want of understanding as ground for revocation of consent to adoption or of agreement releasing infant to adoption placement agency. 74 A.L.R.3d 489.

Public authority or person other than parent having control of child, consent by, as necessary to valid adoption. 104 A.L.R. 1464.

Right of natural parent to withdraw valid consent to adoption of child. 74 A.L.R.3d 421.

What constitutes “duress” in obtaining parent’s consent to adoption of child or surrender of child to adoption agency. 74 A.L.R.3d 527.

15-7-7. Termination of parental rights.

  1. The court shall, upon a petition duly filed by a governmental child placement agency or licensed child placement agency, or by the birthmother or guardian of a child born under circumstances referenced in subsection (a)(2)(viii) of this section, after notice to the parent and a hearing on the petition, terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the child, including the right to notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child, if the court finds as a fact by clear and convincing evidence that:
    1. The parent has willfully neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for the child for a period of at least one year where financially able to do so. In determining whether the parent has willfully neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for the child, the court may disregard contributions to support that are of an infrequent and insubstantial nature; or
    2. The parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child; such as, but not limited to, the following:
      1. Institutionalization of the parent, including imprisonment, for a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time;
      2. Conduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive nature;
      3. The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the department of children, youth and families and the parent has a chronic substance abuse problem and the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to return to the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time, considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home. The fact that a parent has been unable to provide care for a child for a period of twelve (12) months due to substance abuse shall constitute prima facie evidence of a chronic substance abuse problem;
      4. The child has been placed with the department of children, youth and families and the court has previously involuntarily terminated parental rights to another child of the parent and the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services that would rehabilitate the parent and provided further that the court finds it is improbable that an additional period of services would result in reunification within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home;
      5. The parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, which circumstances shall be abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse;
      6. The parent has committed murder or voluntary manslaughter on another of his or her children or has committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury on that child or another of his or her children or has aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or voluntary manslaughter;
      7. The parent has exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously detrimental to the child, for a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time; or
      8. The parent has been convicted of sexual assault upon the birthmother and parenthood is a result of that sexual assault, which shall be established by proving that the child was conceived as a result of a conviction for any offense set forth in § 11-37-2 , § 11-37-6 , or § 11-37-8.1 . Conception as a result of sexual assault may be proved by DNA tests and upon conviction of the putative father, and after a fact-finding hearing establishing paternity, the father’s parental rights shall be terminated by order of the court. Termination of the parental rights of the father shall include the loss of all parental rights without limitation, including the adoption of the child. The father shall also have no right to any visitation with the minor child and shall have no right to any inheritance from a child conceived as a result of sexual assault as specified;
    3. The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the department of children, youth and families for at least twelve (12) months, and the parents were offered or received services to correct the situation that led to the child being placed; provided, that there is not a substantial probability that the child will be able to return safely to the parents’ care within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home; or
    4. The parent has abandoned or deserted the child. A lack of communication or contact with the child for at least a six-month (6) period shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment or desertion. In the event that parents of an infant have had no contact or communication with the infant for a period of six (6) months the department shall file a petition pursuant to this section and the family court shall conduct expedited hearings on the petition.
    1. In the event that the petition is filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(iii), or (a)(2)(vii) of this section, the court shall find as a fact that, prior to the granting of the petition, such parental conduct or conditions must have occurred or existed notwithstanding the reasonable efforts that shall be made by the agency prior to the filing of the petition to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship so that the child can safely return to the family. In the event that a petition is filed pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(v), (a)(2)(vi), or (a)(4) of this section, the department has no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family.
    2. Any duty or obligation on the part of a licensed or governmental child placing agency to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship shall cease upon the filing of a petition under this section. This provision shall not be construed and is not intended to limit or affect in any way the parents’ right to see or visit with the child during the pendency of a petition under this section.
    3. Upon the filing of a termination of parental rights petition, the agency has an affirmative duty to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for adoption or other permanent living arrangement for the child.
    1. In considering the termination of rights as pursuant to subsection (a), the court shall give primary consideration to the physical, psychological, mental, and intellectual needs of the child insofar as that consideration is not inconsistent with other provisions of this chapter.
    2. The consideration shall include the following: If a child has been placed in foster family care, voluntarily or involuntarily, the court shall determine whether the child has been integrated into the foster family to the extent that the child’s familial identity is with the foster family and whether the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the foster family; provided, that in considering integrating into a foster family, the court should consider:
      1. The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining that environment and continuity for the child; and
      2. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court determines that the child has sufficient capacity to express a reasonable preference.
  2. If the court finds that the parental rights of the parent should be terminated as specified in subsection (a), it shall by decree duly entered, appoint some suitable person to give or withhold consent in any subsequent adoption proceedings. In the case of petitions filed by licensed or governmental child placement agencies, the court shall appoint the agency to be the sole party to give or withhold consent to the adoption of the child and further vest the agency with all rights of guardianship over the child.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the introduction of expert testimony with respect to any illness, medical or psychological condition, trauma, incompetency, addiction to drugs, or alcoholism of any parent who has exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously detrimental to a child, to assist the court in evaluating the reason for the conduct or its probable duration.
  4. The record of the testimony of the parties adduced in any proceeding terminating parental rights to a child shall be entitled to the confidentiality provided for in § 8-10-21 and more specifically shall not be admissible in any civil, criminal, or other proceeding in any court against a person named a defendant or respondent for any purpose, except in subsequent proceedings involving the same child or proceedings involving the same respondent.
  5. In the event any child, the parental rights to whom have been finally terminated, has not been placed by the agency in the home of a person or persons with the intention of adopting the child within thirty (30) days from the date of the final termination decree, the family court shall review the status of the child and the agency shall file a report that documents the steps the agency is taking to find an adoptive family or other permanent living arrangement for the child, to place the child with an adoptive family, a fit and willing relative, a legal guardian, or in another planned permanent living arrangement, and to finalize the adoption or legal guardianship. At a minimum, this documentation shall include child specific recruitment efforts, such as the use of state, regional, and national adoption exchanges, including electronic exchange system.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 5; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-7 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 364, § 2; P.L. 1983, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 204, § 3; P.L. 1988, ch. 289, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 294, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 206, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 87, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 54, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 122, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 69, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 404, § 1, effective July 14, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 405, § 1, effective July 14, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 404, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 405, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

For note and comment, Reasonable Efforts Not So Reasonable: The Termination of the Parental Rights of a Developmentally Disabled Mother, see 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 763 (2005).

Survey Section: Family Law, see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 513 (1998).

Survey Section: Family Law, see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 589 (1998).

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

2005 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Family Law: In re Mackenzie C., 877 A.2d 674 (R.I. 2005), see 11 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 883 (2006).

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Family Law: In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 610 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Abandonment.

There was ample evidence in the record to support a finding of abandonment where substantial periods elapsed during which a father had no contact with his children, since the abandonment provision does not include the element of willfullness to show such abandonment. In re Craig G., 765 A.2d 1200, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2001).

Since it is the parent, not the children’s agency, who is responsible to substantially and repeatedly maintain contact with the children, there is no obligation on the part of the agency to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family where an abandonment is involved. In re Devone S., 777 A.2d 1268, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 2001).

A prima facie case of abandonment was established where the father of an eight-year-old boy had made only one request for visitation and had never contacted the children’s agency. In re Devone S., 777 A.2d 1268, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 2001).

Because the father, who was in prison, refused any contact with the child for over a year, the child was abandoned under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) . In re Dekarri P., 787 A.2d 1170, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 274 (R.I. 2001).

The father’s failure to visit or to have any contact with his son for a 13-month time span constituted prima facie evidence of abandonment under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) . In re Diamond I., 797 A.2d 1076, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 2002).

Where the trial court found that the father had not communicated with or seen his son for at least six months, such finding constituted prima facie evidence of abandonment or desertion pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) , even if the father stated that he had not formed the requisite intent to abandon his son; the court could find that the fact that the father was imprisoned did not excuse his failure because he could have moved to change the visitation or to have some form of contact. In re Damien M., 819 A.2d 213, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2003).

Father’s parental rights to his minor child were properly terminated on grounds of abandonment pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) , as the evidence in the record clearly supported the trial justice’s conclusion that the father had little or no contact with the child and had not really tried to have any contact with the child since his incarceration, and the father could not rely on his incarceration to rebut a finding of abandonment. In re Unique T., 822 A.2d 182, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 2003).

Termination of the parental rights of a father who was incarcerated for life was proper under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) , abandonment, since the father had not attempted to contact the two sons since the night he murdered their mother 12 years before. In re Shawn B., 864 A.2d 621, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2005).

Legally competent evidence supported a hearing justice’s decision to terminate a father’s parental rights to his child, where the hearing justice found by clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned and deserted the child. In re Danesha J., 889 A.2d 230, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 220 (R.I. 2005).

Father’s meager attempts to maintain contact with his child were insufficient to overcome more than 19 months of his indifference to her, during which he made four or five attempts to contact his child, and much less did they evince an intent to establish a parent-child relationship with the child; the evidence sufficiently supported a trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights. In re Serenity K., 891 A.2d 881, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2006).

Where a mother had not seen her children for 15 months, the petition filed by the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families to terminate her parental rights was properly granted because, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) , it proved abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Her lack of cooperation with offered services in no way excused her abandonment of her children for more than the statutory six-month period. In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2006).

Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) when the father was incarcerated under a six-year sentence, and thus was unable to care for his child for an extended period of time; the father made no attempts to contact his daughter or to provide her with any kind of support; and he did not contact his social worker about reunification after the social worker attempted to implement a parent case plan prior to sending the father a letter regarding his daughter’s proposed adoption. In re Alvia K., 909 A.2d 498, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 165 (R.I. 2006).

In the termination of a father’s parental rights, the trial court’s definition of abandonment that required a showing of willfulness was clearly erroneous because in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) , the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) needed only to present evidence of a lack of any meaningful contact between the father and his daughter for a period of at least six months to constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment. Nevertheless, the error was harmless in light that DCYF sustained its burden under § 15-7-7(a)(2) . In re Alvia K., 909 A.2d 498, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 165 (R.I. 2006).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) , because the father had not seen his child in four years, which was longer than the six-month statutory period required to establish abandonment under § 15-7-7(a)(4) ; the father’s incarceration was not an excuse for failing to maintain contact with the child for the statutory period. In re Brook Ann R., 994 A.2d 1241, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2010).

Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) failed to offer sufficient evidence for a termination of a father’s parental rights based on abandonment under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) as: (1) DCYF did not show that the father had not communicated with the child for more than six months; (2) the father was denied joint custody and visitation, but was allowed to refile a motion for visitation after the father had successfully completed a drug-treatment program; (3) the father had completed the drug-treatment program, but was again denied visitation subject to the completion of a parent-child evaluation upon the father’s release; and (4) the trial justice failed to make any findings as to whether the father’s efforts to seek visitation were in fact a good faith attempt to establish a relationship with the child sufficient to overcome the evidence of abandonment or desertion. In re Angelina T., 996 A.2d 623, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 2010).

Termination of father’s parental rights based on abandonment was supported by evidence that the father left Rhode Island for well over a year after the children were removed from the father’s care, the father did not contact the children during that time, and it was in the best interest of the children to obtain permanency and adoption was only viable means to that end. In re Daniel D., 9 A.3d 651, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 2010).

Father’s parental rights to two children were properly terminated on grounds of abandonment because the father had not visited with the children for nearly one year prior to trial and was not legally prevented from contacting the children. In re Isabella M., 66 A.3d 825, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 91 (R.I. 2013).

Trial court did not err in terminating father’s parental rights, based on abandonment, where sufficient factual findings and credibility determinations supported the decision; the trial court found that the father, who was incarcerated for periods of time, did not make any reasonable effort to see the child or to contact the child for years and any attempted contact by the father was halfhearted at best. A parent’s sporadic attempts to contact his or her child are inadequate to rebut a prima facie case of abandonment. In re Livia B.L., 151 A.3d 756, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 7 (R.I. 2017).

Family court correctly concluded that a father abandoned his son because the father had no contact with the son for more than two years and minimal contact with the Department of Children, Youth and Families concerning his son; neither the father’s incarceration nor the no-contact orders relieved the father of his obligation to remain in contact with his son, and the father’s incarceration was a direct result of inflicting physical abuse on the child. In re Malachii O., 152 A.3d 1153, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 2017).

In terminating a father’s parental rights with respect to his two sons, the trial justice did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father had abandoned his children for the six-month period referenced in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) . Despite the father having once inquired about his children through his fiancé in December 2013, the father failed to make further attempts to contact his children while he was incarcerated. In re Kyeshon J., 153 A.3d 499, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 19 (R.I. 2017).

Abuse.

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights for abuse. See In re Frances, 505 A.2d 1380, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 429 (R.I. 1986).

The scope of a trial court’s inquiry in parental termination proceedings under subsection (c) of this section is not limited to events occurring prior to the filing of the petition. In re Lori D., 510 A.2d 421, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 480 (R.I. 1986).

This section does not require reasonable efforts at reunification when the parents merely permit, rather than inflict themselves, horrific abuse upon children. In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 161 (R.I. 2000).

The state was not required to prove which parent actually inflicted extreme abuse upon a child, since allowing either parent to ignore or to stand by while such abuse and neglect occurred would be tantamount to the parents inflicting the abuse themselves for the purposes of a termination pursuant to this provision. In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 161 (R.I. 2000).

Adoption After Determination of Petition.

The statutory language of the third paragraph of subdivision (d) (now subsection (d)) clearly indicates that the legislature contemplated that the agency might place the child for adoption after the determination of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re David, 427 A.2d 795, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1055 (R.I. 1981).

Child’s mother could file a petition of adoption in combination with a spouse or a grandparent of the child to be adopted; the Family Court may grant the petition of a mother and a grandfather to adopt a child over the father’s objection if there are grounds to terminate the father’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 . In re Abby D., 839 A.2d 1222, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2004).

Adoption by Foster Parents.

Since foster parents do not have standing to adopt unless there has been a finding by the department of children and their families that such an adoption is in the best interest of the child, where the department does not make such a finding and, in fact, determines that it is in the child’s best interest to be reunited with his natural mother, the foster parents have no chance of success on the merits, and a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent such a reunification until there can be a hearing on a petition for adoption is not warranted. In re Joseph J., 465 A.2d 150, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1072 (R.I. 1983).

Appeals.

Notices of appeal filed by a child’s mother and father from a family court judgment terminating their parental rights and by the child’s aunt from the denial of her petition for open adoption were treated as though they were timely even though they were all filed prior to the actual entry of judgment; such treatment was routinely accorded to prematurely-filed notices of appeal by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252, 127 S. Ct. 1372, 167 L. Ed. 2d 159, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2680 (2007).

Appointment of Guardian.

This section does not require the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the children in all contested adoption cases, but leaves the question of a guardian in the discretion of the family court. In re Adoption of L., 118 R.I. 316 , 373 A.2d 799, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1462 (1977).

Since the physical and medical requirements of a special-needs child were not being met by his mother, who was mildly retarded and lacked not only the motivation but also the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, the court properly terminated the mother’s parental rights. In re John W., 682 A.2d 930, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 227 (R.I. 1996).

Parental rights terminated for cruel and abusive treatment (which could be described as “bizarre” and “obscene”) towards children. In re Raymond B., 678 A.2d 445, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 183 (R.I. 1996).

Best Interest of Child.

Trial justice committed no clear error in determining that the best interests of a child were met by terminating the parental rights of her cognitively limited mother and father; the trial justice properly saw much significance in the child’s bond with her half-sister and foster family, with whom she had lived since her birth more than six years before, and while not giving exclusive weight to that factor, the hearing justice appropriately considered the preservation of that bond in determining where the child’s best interests lay. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252, 127 S. Ct. 1372, 167 L. Ed. 2d 159, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2680 (2007).

Termination of the mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest where the evidence showed that the mother was unable to provide a safe environment for the child, who had been the victim of abuse at the hands of the father, and the child had developed a strong bond with the child’s foster parents, with whom the child had lived for five years and had overcome many of the problems the child had. In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d 159, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 2009).

In terminating respondents’ parental rights pursuant to this section, the family court justice appropriately considered the relevant factors before coming to the conclusion that the children’s best interests would be served by remaining in the care of their pre-adoptive family. In re Steven D., 93 A.3d 978, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2014).

Evidence supported the termination of a father’s parental rights to his daughters because the family court concluded that it was clearly in the best interest of the daughters that they be adopted by their foster families. In re Briann A.T., 146 A.3d 866, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2016).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child and adoption of the child by the foster family was in the best interest of the child due to the mother’s inability to care for the child then or in the foreseeable future. In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2019).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper because she was unfit as there was no evidence that the mother recognized the risk to the child of living in a home with a convicted sex offender, or that she had any ability whatsoever to ensure the safety of the child; and because it was in the best interests of the child as the child had resided in nonrelative foster care for almost two years, he was growing and reaching all developmental milestones, and he had bonded with his foster family. In re Domenic B., 260 A.3d 1108, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 92 (R.I. 2021).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was appropriate because the trial justice found sufficient evidence to support the conclusions that the father was unfit as a parent given the father’s mental health issues and erratic behavior and the father’s failure to fully engage in the services for reunification and that it was in the child’s best interest that the child be adopted by a foster family due to the father’s inability to care for the child then or in the foreseeable future. In re Elana W., 249 A.3d 287, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2021).

Trial court’s finding that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in her son’s best interest was supported by legally competent evidence because the trial court found that the son had bonded with his foster family, who could offer him permanency if the mother’s parental rights were terminated. The trial court further found that it was unlikely that the son could be placed with the mother within a reasonable amount of time, given the trial court’s other findings regarding the mother’s unfitness. In re Gelvin B., 251 A.3d 503, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 40 (R.I. 2021).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests because the child was ten weeks old when the child was removed from the care of the child’s parents after having been physically abused at the hands of the child’s father and the then five-year old child had bonded with the child’s pre-adoptive family who were willing to offer the child permanency. In re Lucas D., 272 A.3d 109, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2022).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the father’s child because the father was found to be an unfit parent due to the father’s failure to comply with the reunification case plans and because the child was in a pre-adoptive foster home and had bonded with that family. In re Rachelle L-B, 275 A.3d 92, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2022).

Construction With Other Laws.

Section 40-11-12.1(a) provides only that the government agency must file a motion for a hearing regarding a child’s placement, since the statutory requirement for the agency to request a permanency hearing is triggered by an initial placement of a child into their care. In re Christina V., 749 A.2d 1105, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 2000).

Because the termination of defendant’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a) did not terminate defendant’s parental obligations, namely his obligation to pay child support, the trial court erred in calculating the amount of child support defendant owed and in dismissing the information accusing defendant of violating R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-2-1.1 . State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 2002).

Custody of Department.

The requirements of subsection (1)(c) (now (a)(3)) prior to 1994 amendments that the children be formally committed to the Department of Children, Youth and Families for a full six-month period had been satisfied since the record showed formal commitment six months and 10 days before the termination-of-parental-rights petition was filed. In re Lori Ann D., 666 A.2d 403, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 244 (R.I. 1995).

Formal commitment following a hearing and finding of abuse, neglect or dependency is not a prerequisite for the commencement of the 12-month period under subdivision (a)(3). In re Delicia B., 762 A.2d 1201, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 217 (R.I. 2000).

The trial court was entitled to draw the conclusion that efforts made by a mother were insufficient and long delayed, and that the termination of her parental rights was in her son’s best interests since the child was removed from her care at age one, the child had been in the same pre-adoptive, non-relative foster care for six years, the respondent had made no effort to change her ways to regain custody until the child was five years old, and even then had never engaged in drug and alcohol treatment or counseling, and she had failed to produce verifiable proof that any real progress had been made. In re Anthony M., 773 A.2d 878, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 161 (R.I. 2001).

There were sufficient grounds to terminate a mother’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) where the parents failed to provide the children with a minimum degree of care, supervision or guardianship, inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the children, physical injury, including excessive corporal punishment, and created or allowed to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to the children, the mother did not contest that the children were in the custody of the Department of Children, Youth and Families for at least 12 months, or that, at the time of the trial, there was no substantial probability that the children would be able to return safely to their mother’s home within a reasonable period, and the mother did not make efforts to remover herself from physically and sexually abusive men. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 2003).

Trial court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights based on R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) because the children had been placed with the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) for over 12 months with no substantial likelihood of return to the mother’s care in a reasonable period of time, considering their age and need for a permanent home; the mother repeatedly failed to sign or participate in case plans that addressed the goal of reunification, and DCYF’s efforts toward reunification were sufficient. By trial, the mother’s stability and financial security had not improved, despite assistance, and her mental health problems had continued without successful treatment; in addition, termination was in the children’s best interests based on the mother’s lack of cooperation and based on the fact that they were well-adjusted to the home of their grandmother. In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 2007).

Father’s parental rights to a child were properly terminated, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) , because clear and convincing evidence showed (1) the child had been in an agency’s custody for at least 12 months, (2) the agency offered the father services designed to address the reasons the child was placed in the agency’s custody when the agency referred the father to recommended sexual-offender treatment, which the father declined, and this referral constituted reasonable efforts to reunify the father with the child, (3) there was not a substantial probability the child would be able to return to the father’s custody within a reasonable period of time due to an expert’s recommendation that such a return would be “high risk” unless the father received counseling to address the father’s sexual relationship with the child’s underage mother, and the father’s refusal to participate in such counseling, and (4) termination was in the child’s best interests, given the father’s refusal to comply with a precondition to the father’s reunification with the child. In re Julian D., 18 A.3d 477, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2011).

Desertion.

Where a child was left by his mother with a relative because she was unable to care for it and made arrangements for support payments for the child to be paid directly to such relative, this did not amount to a wilful desertion so as to make unnecessary the mother’s consent when such relative sought to adopt the child. Gillis v. Main, 96 R.I. 88 , 189 A.2d 808, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1963).

Drug Use.

Mother’s parental rights were appropriately terminated following a long history of drug and alcohol abuse and her failure at several treatment programs. In re Tinisha P., 697 A.2d 622, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 270 (R.I. 1997).

There was clear and convincing evidence supporting the decision of the trial court to terminate a mother’s parental rights since the mother had a history of chronic substance abuse and was unwilling or unable to successfully engage in treatment. In re Eric K., 756 A.2d 769, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 177 (R.I. 2000).

There was ample evidence to support a finding that children would not be able to return to the custody of their mother within a reasonable period of time since the mother had failed to comply with four case plans, she had failed to complete a substance abuse program, and the substance abuse condition was seriously detrimental to her three children and revealed her inability to properly care for them. In re Crystal C., 765 A.2d 842, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 28 (R.I. 2001).

Competent evidence supported a trial court’s finding that a father had a chronic substance abuse problem, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) , when the evidence showed: (1) two recent drug screen detecting the presence of marijuana in his system; (2) the father continued to use marijuana at least up until a year after his child’s birth; and (3) he consumed alcohol shortly before appearing for a psychological evaluation. In re Isabella C., 852 A.2d 550, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 2004).

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island defined “chronic” substance abuse with reference to diseases of long duration, or characterized by slowly progressive symptoms, deep-seated and obstinate, or threatening a long continuance. In re Shawn M., 898 A.2d 102, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 2006).

Clear and convincing record evidence existed in a parental termination proceeding, showing that a mother was unfit under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) , due to her chronic substance abuse problem where she had failed repeatedly in her efforts to stop her chronic cocaine use, to become sober, and to stay out of jail; she failed to be drug-tested twice weekly, she had been discharged from three rehabilitation programs for non-compliance and her last positive drug test occurred six days before trial. In re Shawn M., 898 A.2d 102, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 2006).

In a termination of parental rights action, the trial justice’s finding of chronic substance abuse was supported by clear and convincing evidence because the father began smoking marijuana when he was around eighteen years old and had a history of crystal methamphetamine use, he had seven marijuana convictions, and he used marijuana shortly before the beginning of his trial. In re Evelyn C., 68 A.3d 70, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 97 (R.I. 2013).

Due Process.

Because a mother was represented by counsel at her termination hearing, the trial court had no duty to ensure she received due process by making findings of fact as to the reasons for her absence. In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2006).

Although termination of one’s parental rights is a significant event in which a parent’s due process rights reasonably should be protected, it is nonetheless a civil proceeding, and as such, the protections afforded a criminal defendant, do not apply. As such, in a trial on a petition seeking the termination of parental rights, the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the drawing of adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify. In re Destiny D., 922 A.2d 168, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 61 (R.I. 2007).

Although parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest with respect to the care, custody, and management of their children, and are entitled to procedural due process before the termination of their parental rights, the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation relates only to criminal proceedings and is not available in such a proceeding. In re Destiny D., 922 A.2d 168, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 61 (R.I. 2007).

Where a mother appealed a family court’s termination of her parental rights under several sections of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 , she invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination after every question. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island had specifically stated that in he trial of a petition seeking the termination of parental rights, the invocation of the protection afforded under the Fifth Amendment in order to avoid testifying does not forbid the drawing of adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify. In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2013).

Family court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her four children because her concerns about the ability of her attorney to reasonably consult with her regarding her case while she was institutionalized and deemed incompetent were sufficiently addressed by the court, the trial justice adequately protected the mother’s due process rights by ensuring that she was represented at all times, including the additional protection of a guardian ad litem, while properly seeking a resolution in the best interests of the children, the Department of Children, Youth and Families discharged reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with her children, and the children were bonded with their foster homes and would be at risk for serious neglect if they were placed with the mother. In re Manuel P., 252 A.3d 1211, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 61 (R.I. 2021).

“Duly Filed” Petition.

For purposes of this section a “duly filed” petition is a petition by the Department of Children, Youth and Families or another state agency. An individual who is not a licensed or governmental child placement agency may not bring a petition to terminate a parent’s parental rights under this section without there being a pending adoption petition. In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 64 (R.I. 1992).

Subsection (1)(c) (now (a)(3)) does not require an out-of-home placement for a period of at least six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, it requires only that the child be in the care of a licensed or governmental child-placement agency. In re Antonio G., 657 A.2d 1052, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1995).

Encouragement of Parental Relationship.

An agency is precluded from seeking termination of parental rights on the grounds of permanent neglect if the agency fails to comply with the requirements of this section to make reasonable efforts “to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship”. In re La Freniere, 420 A.2d 82, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1849 (R.I. 1980) (decided prior to 1980 amendment).

This section requires a condition precedent to termination of parental rights that the department for children and families must prove by clear and convincing evidence; the department must prove that, regardless of the parent’s behavior, the department made efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. In re Kenneth, 439 A.2d 1366, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 784 (R.I. 1982).

In cases involving the termination of parental rights, the court must balance the interests of all the parties: the state, the parents and the minor child. In re Kenneth, 439 A.2d 1366, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 784 (R.I. 1982).

Efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship which are reasonable with respect to an average parent are not necessarily reasonable with respect to an intellectually limited parent. In re William, Susan, & Joseph, 448 A.2d 1250, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 992 (R.I. 1982).

In proceeding to terminate parental rights, the court found that the agency satisfied the requisite burden of proof by showing that the parent’s participation in reunification plans was more passive than active, in that although the mother obtained employment and a better apartment, and expressed a desire for increased visitation, she persisted in refusing to accept counseling and other support services, thus rendering the possibility of integration of the child in question into her home in the foreseeable future highly improbable because it had become very clear that the conduct and conditions that caused the child to go into foster care were utterly unlikely to change. In re Kathaleen, 460 A.2d 12, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 946 (R.I. 1983).

The trial justice correctly ruled that the department of children and their families (DCF) made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship before parental termination was sought where DCF attempted to alleviate a mother’s psychotic disorder by means of counseling and a regular course of drug therapy, and where DCF formulated a visitation plan between the mother and children after the removal of children from mother’s custody. In re Crystal, 476 A.2d 1030, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 513 (R.I. 1984).

In cases in which homelessness is found to be a primary factor preventing reunification of a family, it is rational for the Family Court to find that reasonable efforts have not been made unless and until Department for Children and Their Families (DCF) provides some type of housing assistance. In such cases housing assistance is the precise type of service contemplated by guideline No. 3; it is assistance designed to resolve or ameliorate the problems preventing discharge from foster care. In re Nicole G., 577 A.2d 248, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 1990).

The more reasoned approach is to allow the Family Court to order DCF to provide housing assistance prior to the filing of a termination petition as long as it first finds that a lack of adequate housing is the primary factor preventing reunification. In re Nicole G., 577 A.2d 248, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 1990).

Reasonable efforts is a subjective term that must be defined by the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In re Antonio G., 657 A.2d 1052, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1995).

Before granting a termination petition, the department of children, youth and families must convince the court by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, and that the parent is unfit. In re Ryan S., 728 A.2d 454, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 96 (R.I. 1999).

The department of children, youth and families proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship where it had developed four case plans for the parents designed to reunify the family, but where, after the completion of 16 weeks of an intensive program designed to address the parents’ child-rearing skills, the mother was able to learn the concepts only by rote memorization and had failed to establish any bond with her child. In re Dennis P., 749 A.2d 582, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 2000).

Reunification efforts were deemed reasonable where, even though a mother was not provided with domestic-abuse counseling, she did receive some assistance on that issue from counselors who were helping to treat her substance-abuse and mental-health problems and since, even though all parties agreed that the visitation schedule could have been better, the mother’s overall lack of progress in the treatment of her drug-abuse problems and resulting inability to attend visitation sessions prevented her from taking full advantage of those sessions. In re Nathan F., 762 A.2d 1193, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 2000).

Since a father had never seen his two year old child, demonstrating that he had no interest in establishing a relationship with her, there was no obligation on the part of the Department of Children, Youth and Families to seek reunification of the family. In re Ariel S., 765 A.2d 846, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 2001).

Pursuant to § 15-7-7(b)(1) there is no obligation on the Department of Children, Youth and Families to engage in reasonable efforts to reunify a family where a petition to terminate parental rights is filed pursuant to subsection (a)(4). In re Craig G., 765 A.2d 1200, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2001).

Contrary to respondent father’s assertion, the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families made reasonable efforts under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1) to reunify the father with his daughter by creating a case plan and scheduling visitation despite being hampered by the father’s incarceration. In re Shaylon J., 782 A.2d 1140, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 219 (R.I. 2001).

Family court justice did not commit clear error in terminating the parental rights of a father on grounds of abandonment and having previously had his rights terminated as to another child, despite agency’s failure to show efforts at reunification, because reunification efforts were not required where termination was sought on those grounds. In re Diamond I., 797 A.2d 1076, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 2002).

The agency made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the child; however, the mother failed to comply with the various reunification plans. In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 149 (R.I. 2002).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 does not require corrective services during the time that a putative parent’s biological relation to the child is in question. In re Chaselle S., 798 A.2d 892, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 124 (R.I. 2002).

Parental rights of a mother were properly terminated under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) as to six of her seven children where the record indicated that the state agency had made numerous reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children by offering her many services to remedy her relationship with her abusive husband pursuant to § 15-7-7(b)(1) . However, the record indicated that the mother failed to appear for many appointments, continued her contact with the husband despite a no-contact order due to his abuse of the children, and did not adhere to any of the plans or services offered to her. In re Jason L., 810 A.2d 765, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 214 (R.I. 2002).

In proceedings to terminate the parental rights of a cognitively limited mother and father, the trial court properly found that the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) made reasonable efforts toward reunification as required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1) ; DCYF prepared four case plans with reunification as their goal that included referrals to programs intended to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, including a program with services tailored for cognitively-impaired individuals, and one of the parent aides had experience with persons suffering from the same mental condition as the mother and father. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252, 127 S. Ct. 1372, 167 L. Ed. 2d 159, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2680 (2007).

Family court erred in terminating a mother’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) and (a)(2)(iii) because the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between the mother and her daughter before it filed the petition to terminate parental rights; it was wholly unreasonable for DCYF not to include any mental-health treatment in the mother’s case plans when her mental illness was one of the primary barriers to her reunification with the daughter. In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 2008).

The finding that the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship between the father and the son was supported by evidence that DCYF set up hour long, biweekly visits between the father and the son after paternity was established and encourage the father to participate in parenting and substance abuse programs to facilitate reunification. In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d 875, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2009).

Termination of parental rights decree was unsupported as it was bereft of a finding that the Department of Children, Youth and Families had made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, which was a necessary precondition of a finding of unfitness under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) . In re Angelina T., 996 A.2d 623, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 2010).

Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) proved by clear and convincing evidence that it was unlikely that the father’s daughter could have been returned to him within a reasonable amount of time because he failed to accomplish the majority of the tasks the service plan required him to complete before reunification could have been effectuated, and the DCYF granted the father a plethora of opportunities and services to enable him to reunite with his daughter, but he either did not take advantage of them or failed to use them to improve his situation. In re Evelyn C., 68 A.3d 70, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 97 (R.I. 2013).

Where a mother appealed a family court’s termination of her parental rights and she argued that the trial justice erred when he failed to address whether the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) had met its burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between her and her children before DCYF filed a petition to terminate parental rights, since her rights were properly terminated pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) and (v), DCYF was under no obligation to attempt reunification of the family. In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2013).

Evidence.

It was error for the trial judge to refuse to permit testimony concerning the parent’s living situation and other developments that had occurred during the three and one half years since the petition for termination had been filed. In re Ann Marie, 504 A.2d 464, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 399 (R.I. 1986).

Subsection (c) requires the state to prove that (1) the child has been in the care of a child-placement agency for six months; (2) reasonable efforts had been made to reunite the family; and (3) it is improbable in the foreseeable future that the child will be returned to the parents’ home because of conduct or conditions that are unlikely to change. In re Rene B., 544 A.2d 137, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 98 (R.I. 1988).

In a termination of parental rights case, a Family Court trial justice did not err in admitting into evidence a mother’s statements made to the police after she refused to testify at trial, and the admission of the statements did not violate the mother’s rights against self-incrimination, embodied in the Fifth Amendment. Because a parental rights termination proceeding was civil in nature, the mother was not afforded the same protections as a criminal defendant, though the trial justice determined that the mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made the statements; and the trial justice properly permitted a police sergeant to testify as to the content of the statement under R.I. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2), since the statements were obtained in connection with the criminal investigation relating to the death of a nephew while in the mother’s care. In re Destiny D., 922 A.2d 168, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 61 (R.I. 2007).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding in which no foundation had been laid for admission of the mother’s alcohol test results, the results were not admissible pursuant to the residual exception to the hearsay rule contained in R.I. R. Evid. 803 (24), as this was not one of the “exceptional cases” for which Rule 803(24) was reserved. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2011).

In a proceeding to terminate a mother’s and father’s parental rights, the mother’s due process right to be meaningfully heard was not denied when the trial court excluded her testimony that she was the aggressor in the criminal case for which the father was jailed, as such evidence would not advance her claim to the right to parent her child. In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d 446, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2012).

— Drug Treatment Records.

Because a mother’s drug use was a critical reason that the department sought termination of parental rights, the family court’s release of the drug treatment records under federal and state statutes was appropriate and helped to protect the best interests of the child. In re Cory C., 644 A.2d 309, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 210 (R.I. 1994).

— Sufficient.

A mother’s parental rights were properly terminated where the evidence showed that (1) the department of children and their families made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, (2) the mother was an unfit person, and (3) the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children. In re Frederick, 546 A.2d 160, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 1988).

Family Court justice properly decided to terminate a mother’s parental rights without requiring the department of children and their families to make efforts at reunifying her with her children, where the children suffered from acts of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect. In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 1989); In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 314 (R.I. 1997).

Evidence, which included proof that parents refused to continue attending meetings of an organization involved in group therapy for sexual-abuse victims and parents who sexually abuse children, supports a finding that the parents are not willing to work toward a change in the family conditions that led to the placement of their child with the department of children and their families. In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 1989).

In the light of the father’s incarceration and his plea of nolo contendere to manslaughter in the death of a young child, the length of his sentence and the fact that visitations were attempted by the Department of Children, Youth and Families, the family court properly found that the father was unfit to care for the child by reason of conduct and conditions seriously detrimental to the child and that the department had provided reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship as required by this section. In re Antonio G., 659 A.2d 672, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 161 (R.I. 1995).

The termination of the father’s parental rights was clearly in the best interests of his son since the father, serving a prison sentence for sexual assaults on other children, persisted in denying abuse of the son for two years, which prevented him from receiving sexual-abuse counseling at the prison; and the son, who was thriving with his foster family, wished to have nothing to do with his father. In re Alan W., 665 A.2d 877, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 236 (R.I. 1995).

In appeal from termination of parental rights, evidence that the mother made little effort to comply with the tasks or utilize the services offered by the Department of Children, Youth and Families supported the trial court’s findings and conclusions. In re Nikkia N., 665 A.2d 879, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 237 (R.I. 1995).

The trial court correctly terminated the mother’s parental rights since more than adequate evidence existed to support its findings. In re Lori Ann D., 666 A.2d 403, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 244 (R.I. 1995).

Adequate evidence existed for termination of parental rights of mother and putative father. In re Darryl P., 666 A.2d 414, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 248 (R.I. 1995).

Evidence was sufficient to justify terminating the parental rights since the mother was totally aligned with her husband, who had pled nolo contendere to molestation against the daughter and the mother minimalized the sexual abuse and was unable to protect her daughters from future abuse. In re Jennifer R., 667 A.2d 535, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 284 (R.I. 1995).

The trial justice did not abuse her discretion when she terminated a father’s parental rights, since the father was convicted of eight counts of first degree sexual assault and sentenced to eight life sentences, which meant that he would never be available to care for his children, and since he was convicted of nine counts of first degree child molestation, a crime which certainly involved conduct toward a “child of cruel and abusive nature,” as described in subsection (1)(b)(ii) (now (a)(2)(ii)). In re Richard M., 673 A.2d 67, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. 1996).

There was clear and convincing evidence from which to find and conclude that the parents of four minor children were unfit by reason of their cruel and abusive conduct toward their children, conduct which involved alcohol and drug use and which could be described as “cruel,” “bizarre” and “obscene”, consequently justifying the termination of their parental rights. In re Raymond B., 678 A.2d 445, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 183 (R.I. 1996).

Although some of the mother’s children still had deep affection for her, the court properly terminated the mother’s parental rights in view of her recalcitrant, self-centered attitude with respect to her chronic drug addiction and the expert testimony suggesting that the children were at high risk. In re Christopher H., 696 A.2d 940, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 196 (R.I. 1997) (decided under law as it existed prior to 1994 amendment).

The trial court did not err in terminating parental rights since the record showed the mother had consistently and categorically denied that she or her brothers had ever sexually abused her children, and since she was discharged from treatment because of her denial of sexual abuse and her lack of empathy for the children, who were still under treatment for the abuse. In re Raymond C., 751 A.2d 281, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2000).

The trial court did not err when it determined that reasonable efforts were made to reunify parents with their children; there was evidence that numerous case plans had been developed and many referrals made for the parents, but there were emotional and mental problems that did not lend themselves to rehabilitation in one set of parents, and a failure on the part of the biological father of one of the children to cooperate and sign releases of information that were essential preconditions for the receipt of an evaluation and further treatment. In re Lara F., 752 A.2d 472, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 120 (R.I. 2000).

The Department of Children, Youth and Families met its burden to establish a prima facie case of abandonment when a father had had no contact with his son since the day of the boy’s birth, a period considerably longer than six months, and had testified that before he was incarcerated he had gone on drinking binges rather than attempting to visit his child. In re Cody F., 766 A.2d 937, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 55 (R.I. 2001).

In terminating respondent father’s parental rights based on the father’s inability to care for his child due to the likely duration of his future incarceration, the family court did not focus solely on the father’s financial status and, contrary to the father’s assertion, the availability of the paternal grandmother to help care for the child did not qualify as parental care within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) . In re Shaylon J., 782 A.2d 1140, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 219 (R.I. 2001).

In the context of a termination of parental rights case, the question was not whether the mother was at fault for the situation she was in, but rather, whether termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the minor child; the evidence supported the decree terminating the mother’s parental rights and the decree was affirmed. In re Natasha M., 800 A.2d 430, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 158 (R.I. 2002).

There was sufficient evidence to support the family court justice’s findings that the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) complied with its statutory duties as imposed by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) by offering a variety of services to the mother to help her resolve the number of problems plaguing her family, including domestic violence, child protection, steady housing and employment, and general parenting skills; and that the mother’s halfhearted attempt at cooperating with the DCYF’s efforts was the main impediment to reunification. Jason L., 2002 R.I. LEXIS 218 (R.I. Nov. 22, 2002).

Parental rights were properly terminated based on the parent’s overall lack of interest in two children where the parent refused to allow the children to live with him, did not cooperate in parenting plans, had not visited the children overnight in two years, and did not provide a place for reunification. In re Robert S., 840 A.2d 1146, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2004).

Because the parents refused to engage in any services aimed at reunification and visitation and admitted to neglect, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) and § 15-7-7(a)(4) , there was sufficient evidence of unfitness to terminate their parental rights; the parents’ due process and self-incrimination rights under U.S. Const. amend. V and R.I. Const. art. 1, § 13 were not violated. In re Rosalie H., 889 A.2d 199, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 218 (R.I. 2005).

As the mother lacked the ability or the willingness to avail herself sufficiently of the services arranged for her and additional continuation of such services was unlikely to lead to reunification within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age and need for a permanent home, the mother’s parental rights were properly terminated under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) . In re Dakota G., 896 A.2d 730, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 2006).

Combination of a father’s past abusive conduct toward an older son, his unwillingness or inability to acknowledge his responsibility, and his failure to address his issues of anger in any meaningful way was sufficient to warrant the termination of his parental rights to a later born child. In re Corryn B., 914 A.2d 978, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 15 (R.I. 2007).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper, as the trial justice appropriately based the decision in part on evidence that the mother allowed the mother’s other child to suffer cruel and abusive treatment and covered up for the wrongdoer. In re Victoria L., 950 A.2d 1168, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 82 (R.I. 2008).

Because a father had long-standing alcohol and substance abuse issues, because the Department of Children, Youth and Families made reasonable efforts at reunification, and because the best interests of the child were properly considered, the father’s parental rights were properly terminated pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) , (a)(3). In re Pricillion R., 971 A.2d 599, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 65 (R.I. 2009).

Although a father regretted his actions, because the injuries suffered by his youngest child were the result of a violent, intentional act by the father, substantial evidence supported the trial justice’s finding of unfitness and termination of the father’s parental rights pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) . In re Peter S., 973 A.2d 46, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 70 (R.I. 2009).

As a trial court’s finding that a father abandoned his child was supported by extensive evidence that he had not contacted the child for many years, well in excess of the statutory six months required under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) ; thus, it properly terminated his parental rights. In re Tory S., 988 A.2d 151, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2010).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 was proper, as the trial judge was not clearly wrong when the trial judge concluded that the mother’s successful completion of a drug-treatment program 20 months after the children were removed from the mother’s care and eight months after the termination petition was insufficient to rebut a presumption of chronic substance abuse. In re Destiney L., 21 A.3d 279, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 2011).

Termination of the father’s parental rights to the daughter, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 , was supported by evidence that the father’s six-year-old son died as a result of injuries received when the father punched the son in the ribs and evidence that the daughter herself suffered abuse in the household in which the father was a constant presence. In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d 1273, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 144 (R.I. 2011).

Where a mother appealed a family court’s termination of her parental rights under several sections of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 and she argued that the trial justice committed reversible error because he permitted witnesses to testify about hearsay statements made by the children under R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-69 due to the passage of time, it was clear, without question, that the children’s hearsay statements were not necessary for the trial justice to determine that abuse had occurred or that a termination of parental rights was appropriate. In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2013).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a formerly incarcerated father’s parental rights to two children on a finding of unfitness because the father, a convicted sex offender, failed to complete sex-offender treatment, submit proof of a substance abuse evaluation, and attend anger management counseling. In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 138 (R.I. 2013).

Family court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her seven-year-old child because, inter alia, the mother had a lengthy and significant history of neglecting her children and permitting child abuse, along with substance abuse, mental health issues, and suffering domestic violence from the same violent partner and others, her parental rights had been voluntarily or involuntarily terminated as to four out of the other six children, there was no dispute between the parties that the Department of Children, Youth and Families had made reasonable efforts at reunification, and the child had never lived with the mother in an unsupervised setting and deserved to continue the remainder of her childhood in a safe and nurturing environment. In re Adele B., 229 A.3d 671, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 2020).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate as clear and convincing evidence supported the family court justice’s finding that the parents were unfit parents in that they either committed or allowed conduct toward their child of a cruel and abusive nature and because termination was in the child’s best interest based on the finding of unfitness. The parents were the child’s only caregivers, a doctor opined that different mechanisms inflicted the child’s injuries, and the parents were found to be untruthful about certain facts at various times. In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d 1040, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 2020).

Factors Considered in Determination of Petition.

This section requires a trial justice, considering a petition to terminate parental rights, to examine the conduct of the parents or the custodians in conjunction with that of the authorized agency. In re Armand, 433 A.2d 957, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1251 (R.I. 1981).

Although parental rights should not be terminated for the sole reason of conviction of a crime and incarceration, the fact of incarceration may be considered along with other factors in determining whether parental rights should be terminated. In re Frances, 505 A.2d 1380, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 429 (R.I. 1986).

The termination of parental rights was upheld where the trial justice appropriately considered the relevant criteria and considered all the evidence. In re Bryce T., 764 A.2d 718, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 21 (R.I. 2001).

Incarcerated father’s parental rights were properly terminated under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) where the court found that the father was incarcerated and that there was no substantial probability that he would be able to care for the child within a reasonable period of time, thereby rendering him an unfit parent. In re Faith H., 813 A.2d 55, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2003).

No error occurred when a family court terminated a mother’s parental rights, based in part on a finding under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) that her 12-year old son had been in state custody for 12 months without a substantial possibility of returning home safely within a reasonable time. With the exception of a 10-week period, the boy had been in state custody for the last six years of his life, he had a right to reasonable care and maintenance, to be free from abuse or neglect, to have the hope of spending the remainder of his or her childhood in a family setting in which he grew and thrived, and he did not have to wait for an indeterminate period of time to find out if his mother was able to successfully obtain and maintain a substance-free lifestyle. In re Shawn M., 898 A.2d 102, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 2006).

As the trial court implicitly found that the testimony of a Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) caseworker was credible regarding her efforts to reunify a father with his sons and his noncompliance with DCYF directives, and this finding was not clearly wrong, the father’s parental rights were properly terminated under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 . In re Caleb W., 990 A.2d 1225, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2010).

When termination of a father’s parental rights to a child was sought due, in part, to the father’s refusal to participate in recommended sexual-offender treatment, which was a precondition to the child’s return to the father, termination was proper because the father’s privilege against possible self-incrimination arising from the father’s participation in treatment did not trump the father’s responsibility to reunify with the child. In re Julian D., 18 A.3d 477, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2011).

— Incarceration.

The finding of parental unfitness based on the father’s imprisonment for an extended period of time was not erroneous, because the determination was not based exclusively on the father’s conviction and incarceration, but also on the length of the term the father could have to serve, a factor that made it unlikely the father would be able to care for the child within a reasonable period of time. In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d 875, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. 2009).

Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) failed to offer sufficient evidence for a termination of a father’s parental rights based on unfitness under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) as: (1) there was no testimony from a DCYF case worker, or any testimony of a case plan or the best interests of the child; and (2) while the father’s imprisonment could be considered, there was testimony that the father was to complete the father’s sentence six months after the hearing date, with a possible early release in weeks. In re Angelina T., 996 A.2d 623, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 2010).

In light of the length of a father’s prison sentence, his vague plans for his daughter pending his release, and the child’s age and development, the trial court properly terminated the father’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) based on clear and convincing evidence that his imprisonment rendered it improbable for him to care for the child for an extended period of time. In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d 446, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2012).

Father’s parental rights were properly terminated under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) because, even if the father were paroled at the father’s earliest eligibility date, the father could not take the child, as the father did not explain how the father would care for the child. In re Lyric P., 90 A.3d 132, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2014).

Termination of an incarcerated father’s parental rights was proper because, as it was unlikely the child could return to the father and the child had been in the custody of an agency for over one year, the requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) were met. In re Lyric P., 90 A.3d 132, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2014).

Family court erred in terminating a father’s parental rights with respect to his daughter because the decree that terminated the father’s parental rights rested primarily on his criminal conviction for first-degree murder and concomitant prison sentence, which were vacated before the instant appeal was heard and decided, the conviction and concomitant prison sentence were so intertwined with the family court decision that it was impossible to separate them from the remaining findings, and without the criminal conviction and lengthy incarceration, the family court did not have sufficient factual support to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father was an unfit parent. In re Izabella G., 140 A.3d 146, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 98 (R.I. 2016).

That a certified copy of a father’s conviction was not produced at trial was immaterial because neither unfitness nor abandonment required proof of conviction, and the conviction was corroborated by the testimony of the social caseworker and the father. In re Malachii O., 152 A.3d 1153, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 2017).

— Parental Unfitness.

The best interest of the child outweighs all other considerations once the parents have been adjudged unfit. In essence a finding of parental unfitness is the first necessary step. In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 409 (R.I. 1987).

Absent a finding of unfitness, the natural parents’ right to bear and raise their child in a less than perfect way remains superior to the rights of foster parents who may be exemplary nurturers. In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 409 (R.I. 1987).

Even though it may be in a child’s best interest to live with a family of comfortable means rather than a poorer family, this standard may not justify the state’s intervention into a family relationship absent a finding of parental unfitness. In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 409 (R.I. 1987).

Where mother’s mental illness and her inability or unwillingness to cooperate with recommended services rendered her unable to parent her child, and evidence at trial established that the department of children, youth and families’ efforts to reunify mother and son were reasonable and substantial, the trial justice properly terminated mother’s parental rights. In re Ryan S., 728 A.2d 454, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 96 (R.I. 1999).

The termination of a mother’s parental rights was affirmed where there was ample evidence to support the trial justice’s finding that a mother lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her, where it was improbable that any additional continuance would result in reunification of the family within a reasonable period, and where her parental rights to four other children previously had been involuntarily terminated because of an unsatisfactory demonstration of adequate parenting, substance abuse, unstable housing, mental health issues, volatile family relationships, and mild retardation. In re Dennis P., 749 A.2d 582, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 2000).

The trial court was not clearly wrong in finding that a mother who had overcome her substance abuse problems and solved the other problems that led her to neglect her children was an unfit parent insofar as one of those children was concerned, since there was clear and convincing evidence that if that child was not provided with intense and constant supervision he would become a danger to himself and others, and since there was also evidence that the mother would not be able to provide that kind of supervision. In re Alex B., 752 A.2d 484, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 140 (R.I. 2000).

The trial justice had clear and convincing evidence before him to support the termination of a mother’s parental rights since she had a long history of chronic substance abuse, was unable to successfully complete treatment, and still lived in an environment that promoted such relapses. In re Maya C., 764 A.2d 116, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2001).

The trial justice’s conclusion that both parents were unfit was upheld since the parents had chronic substance abuse problems and their respective prognoses indicated that they would be unable to resume custody of their children in the foreseeable future. In re Nathan F., 762 A.2d 1193, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 211 (R.I. 2000).

The trial justice properly found a mother unfit since she failed to follow through on sexual abuse counseling for her daughter who had been molested by an adult neighbor, she allowed the child to be in or near the neighbor’s apartment, her home was unsanitary and without food, and the mother suffered from serious mental illness and otherwise lacked the ability to properly supervise and parent her child. In re Jennifer G., 767 A.2d 682, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 73 (R.I. 2001).

A prima facie case of unfitness was established when the court was presented with a plethora of examples of conduct and circumstances that were found to be seriously detrimental to the best interests of the child since, even had the particular circumstances not been identified by this provision as evidence of unfitness, the list of conduct or conditions contained within the statute is non-exclusive. In re Devone S., 777 A.2d 1268, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 2001).

Parents were properly determined to be unfit since there was overwhelming evidence as to the collective cognitive and psychological deficiencies of both parents coupled with evidence regarding the highly specialized care required for their child. In re Samson P., 773 A.2d 889, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 162 (R.I. 2001).

Parent’s parental rights were properly terminated where the parent had emotional problems, mental illness, inappropriate parental skills, lack of basic competence to care for the children, and a continued need for specialized care; further, the Rhode Island department of children, youth and families had attempted on several occasions to address the parent’s specific mental limitations and properly engaged in reasonable efforts to strengthen and encourage the parent’s relationship with the children. In re William R., 839 A.2d 529, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 2 (R.I. 2004).

Determination that the father was unfit under R.I. Gen. Laws , § 15-7-7(a)(2) was supported by evidence that he was serving a lengthy sentence for raping the 14-year-old sister of his then live-in girlfriend and would not likely be able to care for either child for an extended period, had violent tendencies, was likely to reoffend, and had no relationship with either child. In re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 129 (R.I. 2005).

Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a cognitively limited mother and father were unfit under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(1)(2)(vii), (a)(3), to parent their child; although there was testimony that the mother and father loved the child and had been compliant with their DCYF case plans, there was also extensive testimony from numerous witnesses that they would probably never develop the skills necessary to safely parent the child, who was herself developmentally delayed, and that reunification could never have been achieved. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252, 127 S. Ct. 1372, 167 L. Ed. 2d 159, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2680 (2007).

Family court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to two children, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) , because the mother failed to complete numerous services in the case plans, including mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes, from numerous providers; the mother’s failure to maintain contact with the Department of Children, Youth and Families, failure to comply with case plans, and failure to maintain regular contact with the children rendered her unfit to parent. In re Dayvon G., 10 A.3d 448, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 121 (R.I. 2010).

As there was insufficient evidence that a father’s health conditions alone would meet the requirements for a finding of parental unfitness under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) , including that his conditions would prevent the children from being able to return safely to his care within a reasonable period of time, or that any services had been offered or received by him to address this possible barrier to reunification, the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2011).

Mother’s parental rights to two children were properly terminated on grounds of her being unfit because the children had been in the care of the Department of Children, Youth and Families since August 2008, the mother generally did not follow through with the majority of services to which she was referred, the mother had been homeless for most of the two-and-a-half-year period preceding trial, and the children’s return to the mother’s home within a reasonable period was improbable. In re Isabella M., 66 A.3d 825, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 91 (R.I. 2013).

In terminating respondents’ parental rights, the family court justice made sufficient findings of unfitness regarding the father. In re Steven D., 93 A.3d 978, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2014).

Family court properly terminated a father’s parental rights to his one-year old son because the father was found to be an unfit parent where his five-week old daughter died from her numerous injuries, including, inter alia, fractures, subdural hemorrhages, and severe retinal bleeding in both eyes, the father’s explanations were not consistent with the severity and the various stages of healing that the daughter’s injuries presented, he was the sole caretaker at the time of the daughter’s fatal injuries, and he and the mother never sought medical care for the daughter. In re Kristopher J., 115 A.3d 965, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 66 (R.I. 2015).

Father never provided any financial support to the child and made only inconsistent and limited attempts to visit the child, and the father’s repeated incarcerations made completion of the tasks outlined in the case plans, and ultimately reunification, far more difficult, plus he offered little in terms of future plans should he be reunified with the child; the trial justice’s findings of parental unfitness were affirmed. In re Jah-Nell B., 116 A.3d 784, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 86 (R.I. 2015).

Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights because he was an unfit parent where he was in jail for the brutal murder, dismemberment, and burning of the children’s mother while the children were in the house and it was in the children’s best interests to be placed with a maternal aunt and her family. In re Jake G., 126 A.3d 450, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 2015).

Family court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights to his daughters because it properly found that he was an unfit parent; the father refused to cooperate with the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), he had sporadic visits, and the consensus among DCYF service providers was that reunification presented a risk to the daughters’ well-being; a social worker’s testimony was accompanied by significant corroborating evidence establishing that the father was unfit. In re Briann A.T., 146 A.3d 866, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2016).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child was appropriate because the mother was unfit as she failed to address her parenting and substance abuse issues as well as her very real need for mental health treatment and medication management. The Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, but the mother was not able to ensure the child’s safety and well-being. In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2019).

Trial court’s finding of unfitness was supported by clear and convincing, legally competent evidence because it showed that the mother did not comply with her service plan when she was arrested the day before her first planned overnight visit with her son, she had an unsupervised visit with her son that was against a court order, and she did not fully engage with her therapist. In re Gelvin B., 251 A.3d 503, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 40 (R.I. 2021).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because all the evidence led to the conclusion that the mother’s child suffered abuse at the hands of the child’s father. Accordingly, the mother’s refusal to accept that fact coupled with the mother’s continued relationship with the father was competent evidence on which the trial justice could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother lacked protective capacity, committed or allowed to be committed cruel and abusive conduct toward the child, and was an unfit parent. In re Lucas D., 272 A.3d 109, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2022).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was appropriate because there was sufficient evidence that the father was unfit given the father’s failure to engage in the services provided by the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) and that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his child through achieving case plan goals. Furthermore, the termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child who was in a pre-adoptive foster home and had bonded with that family. In re Rachelle L-B, 275 A.3d 92, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2022).

Termination of a father’s parental rights to the father’s children was appropriate because the trial justice found the father unfit in that the children had been in the care of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) for a period in excess of 12 months and the father had failed to comply with several requirements and/or services that DCYF included in the service plans. Furthermore, the conditioned visitation in the service plans ordered by the family court was not a discretionary decision made by DCYF. In re Jae'La G., 276 A.3d 378, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 61 (R.I. 2022).

— Petitions Involving Both Parents.

A trial court presented with termination-of-parental-rights petitions involving both parents need not either grant or deny the petitions in tandem; rather, the trial court should consider and determine each petition on its own merits, allowing for the possibility that one petition will warrant termination and the other will not. In re Amanda C., 688 A.2d 863, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 1997).

Although a state agency could have done more to assist the parents with reunification, additional efforts and more services would have been futile in the face of the mother’s chronic mental illness and the father’s forfeiture of his parental rights; consequently, the trial court properly terminated their parental rights pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) . In re Raymond C., 864 A.2d 629, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 10 (R.I. 2005).

— Previous Terminations.

The language of subsection (a)(2)(iv) pertaining to a previous termination of parental rights to another child relates only to involuntary terminations, and the subsection does not apply when the prior termination was a voluntary termination by the parent. In re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 120 (R.I. 1997).

Although past actions alone are not sufficient to brand a parent unfit for life, abusive conduct toward one child must be seriously considered as a factor detrimental to a parent’s fitness with regard to another child. In re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 278 (R.I. 1998).

Although mother whose parental rights had previously been terminated for sexual abuse and neglect showed rehabilitation through recovery from substance abuse, participation in parenting classes and willingness to seek counseling, her continued failure to accept responsibility for her past actions supported the trial court’s finding that she was an unfit parent to a child born after the earlier terminations. In re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 278 (R.I. 1998).

Termination of parents’ right to their son was upheld where their cruel and abusive treatment of their first child, coupled with their lack of remorse and their refusal to accept responsibility for his abuse, caused the termination. In re Jared S., 787 A.2d 1225, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 9 (R.I. 2002).

Federal Law.

There is no inconsistency between the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-676, and subsection (b)(2) which does not require reasonable efforts to be made by the Department of Children and Their Families for reunification before filing a termination petition when a parent is unfit because of cruel or abusive conduct toward any child or because of conditions surrounding the child that are cruel or abusive, because the case plan required by federal guidelines before a termination petition is filed can be the plan for permanent placement of the child when reunification is either inappropriate or impossible. In re Frances, 505 A.2d 1380, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 429 (R.I. 1986).

Although increased visitation rights and the creation of an individualized, novel eight-week program might be deemed insufficient in light of the statutory duty of the Department for Children and Their Families (DCF) to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family, these efforts, when viewed in the light most favorable to DCF, constituted evidence that was sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss the termination petition. In re Lori D., 510 A.2d 421, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 480 (R.I. 1986).

Judicial Notice of Expert Reports.

A trial justice’s taking judicial notice of, and possible reliance upon, three expert reports that were filed in prior dependency hearings, but had not been admitted into evidence in the termination proceedings, is prejudicial error, where the parents had no opportunity to cross-examine the authors of the reports. In re Michael A., 552 A.2d 368, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 1989).

Jurisdiction.

The family court may only terminate parental rights or custody in limited statutorily-dictated circumstances. Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 1999).

Municipal probate courts lack the jurisdiction to decide petitions for guardianship opposed by a parent, which petitions may not be decided without the participation of the family court, as that court alone has the express statutory power to divest a parent of custody and/or parental rights, along with the expertise and resources essential to exercise such power. Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 1999).

Mental Illness.

Parental rights of father diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, who repeatedly failed to follow through with treatment, were terminated. In re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 278 (R.I. 1998).

Termination of mother’s parental rights was proper where the mother, despite receiving psychiatric and counseling services from numerous institutions and organizations, failed to achieve appropriate insight into her illness and refused to recognize her need for medication, preferring instead to remain in a devastating cycle of violent behavior followed by institutionalization or hospitalization; it was clearly in the children’s best interest that, after remaining in foster care for four and five years respectively, the children continued to live in the stable and safe environment offered by their adoptive parents. In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d 475, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2002).

Judgment terminating a father’s parental rights was proper where there was evidence that the father had a severe schizotypal personality disorder, the symptoms of which included self-defeating behavior and paranoid ideations, that this disorder adversely affected the father’s ability to parent the child, and that the prognosis for such disorders was poor; there was also evidence that the child had bonded with his foster family. In re Samuel Y., 896 A.2d 725, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 42 (R.I. 2006).

In termination proceedings, a family court’s finding of a mother’s unfitness, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(vii) , was proper because the mother frequently stopped taking medication for her bipolar disorder, was abusive towards service providers, and often acted out in front of the children; the mother’s erratic behavior and actions were detrimental to the children and the mother did not have the ability to provide stable and consistent care. In re Charles, 6 A.3d 1089, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2010).

Neglect.

A necessary implication of the language of the legislature in amending (1955 amendment) the pertinent provisions of this section is that there will be a forfeiture of the parental right to withhold consent to an adoption only when it is shown that such neglect occurred while the offending parent had the ability and the opportunity to discharge the duty to provide support. In re La Porte, 103 R.I. 232 , 236 A.2d 264, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 604 (1967).

Although support was left open in a father’s divorce decree, he was guilty of neglect where he failed to support his children for over one year, since the father’s duty to support is not relieved by awarding the mother custody absent an order relieving him of support. In re Adoption of L., 118 R.I. 316 , 373 A.2d 799, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1462 (1977).

The rule of Blatchford v. Blatchford, 67 R.I. 24 , 20 A.2d 539 (1941) that a parent cannot be found guilty of neglect till it be shown that he had the opportunity to provide support refers to the availability of a job which the parent is physically capable of performing; and a father’s argument that he was deprived of the “opportunity” to provide support by his divorce decree, which forbade him to molest or interfere with the mother, was meritless. In re Adoption of L., 118 R.I. 316 , 373 A.2d 799, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1462 (1977).

Next Friend.

A child could appeal an adoption decree by a father as next friend, even though another next friend had been appointed under this section, where the father had not consented to the adoption. Murray v. Barber, 16 R.I. 512 , 17 A. 553, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1889).

Notice.

Sections 15-7-6 15-7-9 require that notice of the hearing date of an adoption proceeding be given to a natural parent, or parents, only in cases where such parent has not consented to the adoption. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was improper as the family court did not provide the mother with appropriate notice under § 15-7-9 . After informing the family court that the mother’s whereabouts were unknown, the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families was required to file an affidavit stating that the mother could not be found and to set forth the last contacts with the mother, and the affidavit had to be filed in advance of a family court order of notice by publication, but no such affidavit was filed with the family court; therefore, the family court’s order of advertisement in a newspaper to alert the mother that her parental rights might be terminated if she failed to appear did not pass statutory muster. In re Joziah B., 207 A.3d 451, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 2019).

Order of Filings.

An adoption petition need not be filed prior to the court’s consideration of a termination of parental rights petition. In re Amanda C., 688 A.2d 863, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 1997).

Permanent Living Arrangements.

The trial court did not err when he terminated a mother’s parental rights since, under subsections (b)(3) and (g), there is no requirement that a child be placed in a permanent living arrangement before a parent’s rights may be terminated, and since the record was replete with legally competent evidence to support the findings of the court. In re Rachon W., 750 A.2d 963, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 2000).

Termination of a father’s parental rights pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(vii) , (3), was proper, as the father failed to comply with a case plan by failing to undergo a parenting evaluation and a substance abuse evaluation and by failing to obtain suitable house, as the father spent long periods incarcerated or living in shelters, and the agency undertook reasonable efforts to reunify him with his daughter. In re Diamond Y., 915 A.2d 1283, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 2007).

Privilege of Confidentiality Under § 9-17-24.

In proceedings for the termination of parental rights, the privilege afforded the health-care provider or recipient by § 9-17-24 must yield to the direct, specific mandate set forth in § 15-7-7 , which tells the reader in clear and simple language that in parental-termination proceedings, a parent may not invoke any privilege of confidentiality relating to the parent’s illness or any maladies mentioned in § 15-7-7 . In re Rene B., 544 A.2d 137, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 98 (R.I. 1988).

Proper Care and Maintenance.

The “proper care and maintenance” standards set by this section are not unconstitutionally vague. In re David, 427 A.2d 795, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1055 (R.I. 1981).

— Financially Able.

In interpreting the words financially able, the proper test is a consideration of the actual income, property, assets and earning ability as well as other attendant circumstances. In re J., 113 R.I. 710 , 326 A.2d 16, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1226 (1974).

A finding of the trial court that the natural father was financially unable to provide proper care and maintenance for his minor child was upheld where the record showed that the father was physically unable to work and was undergoing necessary vocational rehabilitation during the year immediately prior to the filing of adoption petition. In re Gregory, 118 R.I. 178 , 372 A.2d 1277, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1443 (1977).

— Mental Deficiency.

Because of the small likelihood of change in a mother’s mental condition from the time of an expert’s examination until trial, such expert’s testimony lost little of its probative force by virtue of its age; consequently, reliance on such evidence in terminating parental rights was not error. In re William, Susan, & Joseph, 448 A.2d 1250, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 992 (R.I. 1982).

Where a father’s mental retardation and chronic schizophrenia, established by uncontradicted evidence, were conditions that were not likely to improve in the foreseeable future, and where the record further contained competent medical opinion to the effect that the mental retardation coupled with the chronic mental illness rendered the father incompetent to raise his son, the Family Court justice was fully justified in ordering that the father’s parental rights be terminated. In re Gabriel G., 460 A.2d 441, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 945 (R.I. 1983).

Since mother suffered from a relatively mild form of mental retardation and the evaluators recommended certain available services to strengthen the mother’s parental relationship with the children, but the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) failed to refer the mother for any of the available services, the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to support a finding pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) . In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 2003).

Department of Children, Youth and Families, in petitioning for a termination of parental rights decree on mental-deficiency grounds, is required to demonstrate that it undertook reasonable efforts to address said mental-deficiency issues in the services it offered to the parent. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 2003).

Provision of Proper Services.

The trial court did not err in finding that the children’s agency provided a mother with proper services since five case plans were prepared to help the parents obtain the needed skills to effectively parent their disabled child, the mother failed to complete or follow through on various programs and services, and the agency repeatedly emphasized to the mother that her resistance to mental health treatment would have an adverse impact on her ability to reunite with her son. In re Samson P., 773 A.2d 889, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 162 (R.I. 2001).

Competent evidence showed an agency requesting termination of a father’s parental rights made reasonable efforts towards his reunification with his child, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) , where: (1) three of four case plans specified a permanency goal of the child’s reunification with her mother, which was a goal the father said he agreed with; (2) he initially refused to cooperate with the agency, and did not agree to participate in treatment and services until over six months after the case was initiated; (3) he was referred to a psychological evaluation, substance abuse counseling, a psychiatric evaluation, and parenting education; and (4) major impediments to the provision of services to him were his refusal to sign releases and his incarceration, which were both situations of his own making. In re Isabella C., 852 A.2d 550, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 2004).

Under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1) , the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families, did not have any responsibility to arrange visitation for the father while he was incarcerated for murdering the mother of their two sons, since the petition was filed on the basis of abandonment or cruel or abusive conduct. In re Shawn B., 864 A.2d 621, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2005).

Because the Department of Children, Youth and Families did not refer a mother to alternative services, it did not make reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her sons; however, because the state supreme court was evenly divided with regard to the termination of the mother’s rights to her daughter under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) , the judgment was affirmed. In re Manuel P., 889 A.2d 192, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 219 (R.I. 2005).

As the Department of Children, Youth and Families believed a mother’s alcohol abuse was a major barrier to reunification, but did not refer her to individual alcohol treatment or counseling before petitioning to terminate her parental rights, it did not make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children, and the family court thus erred in terminating her parental rights. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2011).

Even if a mother was in denial as to whether she had a substance abuse problem and may have provided inaccurate information to alcohol evaluators about her alcohol use, the Department of Children, Youth and Families was required to offer her services to attempt to help her overcome her denial. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2011).

Father’s parental rights were properly terminated, as the Department of Children, Youth and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify him and his child, as required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1) ; a caseworker created case plans every six months, but because the father wass sometimes homeless and often could not be reached, she was unable to engage in case planning with him. In re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 29 (R.I. 2012).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the Department of Children, Youth and Families was not required to provide additional substance abuse counseling to a father because he had already been receiving such counseling from other sources. In re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 29 (R.I. 2012).

Department of Children, Youth & Families made reasonable efforts to reunify a formerly incarcerated father with two children because the father’s case plans contained a number of requirements he failed to complete, including sex-offender counseling, anger management classes, a substance abuse evaluation, and other therapy to assist the father in taking responsibility for his treatment needs. In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 138 (R.I. 2013).

Purpose of Proceeding.

The purpose of a termination of parental rights proceeding based upon allegations of permanent neglect is to determine whether the parent has manifested, despite the child’s placement out of the home, the sense of responsibility, interest and affection essential to the reestablishment of parental care for the child. In re Armand, 433 A.2d 957, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1251 (R.I. 1981).

Questioning of Paternity.

Family court correctly interpreted R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) not to mean that case planning with the father had to go on for a 12-month period when the father was responsible for some or all of the delay by initially questioning the father’s paternity. In re Chaselle S., 2002 R.I. LEXIS 172 (R.I. 2002).

Reasonable Efforts to Reunify.

Agency made reasonable efforts to reunify a father and child, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1) , because (1) the agency had no such duty while the father denied paternity, (2) visits missed due to the child’s medical issues did not reflect the agency’s reasonable efforts, (3) the father admitted not asking the agency’s caseworker about the child, and (4) the record detailed services the agency offered. In re Lyric P., 90 A.3d 132, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2014).

Despite the department’s reunification efforts, the father’s visitation track record was replete with cancellations, absences, and extended gaps due to incarceration or lack of communication, the department’s visitation efforts were not inadequate, and the record supported the trial justice’s finding that the department provided reasonable efforts at reunification, and notwithstanding such efforts, there was not a reasonable probability that the child would be able to be reunified within a reasonable period of time. In re Jah-Nell B., 116 A.3d 784, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 86 (R.I. 2015).

Family court did not err in finding that the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) made reasonable efforts to correct the situation that led to the daughters’ removal from their father’s care because DCYF complied with its statutory obligation, but the father failed to comply with its recommendations, declined to follow through with any mental-health counseling, and refused to cooperate with DCYF’s case plans. In re Briann A.T., 146 A.3d 866, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 107 (R.I. 2016).

Trial court’s finding that the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with her son was supported by legally competent evidence because it showed that DCYF worked towards increasing the mother’s visitation and transitioning to unsupervised visitation. In re Gelvin B., 251 A.3d 503, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 40 (R.I. 2021).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was appropriate because there was sufficient evidence that the father was unfit given the father’s failure to engage in the services provided by the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) and that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his child by making numerous referrals to assist the father with substance abuse, parenting, and the child’s educational goals in achieving the goals of the case plan. In re Rachelle L-B, 275 A.3d 92, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2022).

Requirements on Parents of Children Under Agency Care.

This section imposes two requirements on a parent whose child is in the care of an authorized agency: (1) to maintain contact with the child and (2) to plan for the child’s future. In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 1989).

The mother’s inability to complete numerous case plans demonstrated her lack of judgment and maturity, and her persistent tendency to place her own interests above those of the child demonstrated that she had not made good-faith efforts to adjust her circumstances, conduct, or conditions. In re Antonio G., 657 A.2d 1052, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 134 (R.I. 1995).

When the welfare of a child is involved, the department and the court have the duty to request compliance with services offered and the completion of programs to be certain that the parents have, in fact, addressed their problems. In re Michael F., 665 A.2d 880, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 238 (R.I. 1995).

The 12 month period in the termination of parental rights statute is separate and distinct from that in the abused children statute in that a parent’s refusal to cooperate with mandatory, court-ordered services after an adjudication of neglect or abuse and a parent’s lack of cooperation with the department of children, youth and families before such an adjudication represent significantly different behaviors under the law, with the latter only being a factor that a court takes into consideration in resolving a petition for termination of parental rights, not the principal ground for such termination. In re Christina V., 749 A.2d 1105, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 2000).

Unjust Termination of Parental Rights.

Although behavior in contravention of a court order should not be condoned, it would be unjust to focus only on the issue of nonpayment of support in determining whether the right of a natural parent to his child should be involuntarily terminated. That right should be forfeited only in extreme circumstances. In re Oscar C., 598 A.2d 1093, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1991).

Natural father’s parental rights were unjustly terminated, despite his failure to make child-support payments, where the record was replete with evidence demonstrating his good-faith efforts to pay arrearages and his concern for the status of his relationship with his son. In re Oscar C., 598 A.2d 1093, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 155 (R.I. 1991).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of expert testimony regarding questions of domestic law. 66 A.L.R.5th 135.

Claims of Ineffective Counsel at Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings — Hearing and Post-Hearing Issues. 30 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2018).

Claims of Ineffective Counsel at Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings — Prehearing and Procedural Issues. 30 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Comment Note: Natural parent’s indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — general principles. 82 A.L.R.5th 443.

Legal malpractice in defense of parents at proceedings to terminate parental rights over dependent or neglected children. 18 A.L.R.5th 902.

Mental illness and the like of parents as ground for adoption of their children. 45 A.L.R.2d 1379.

Mistake or want of understanding as ground for revocation of consent to adoption or of agreement releasing infant to adoption placement agency. 74 A.L.R.3d 489.

Natural parent’s indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — factors other than employment status. 84 A.L.R.5th 191.

Natural parent’s indigence resulting from unemployment or underemployment as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption. 83 A.L.R.5th 375.

Parent’s involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding. 79 A.L.R.3d 417.

Parent’s involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as permitting adoption without parental consent. 78 A.L.R.3d 712.

Parent’s mental deficiency as factor in termination of parental rights — modern status. 1 A.L.R.5th 469.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Applicability of Americans With Disabilities Act. 119 A.L.R.5th 351.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Best interests analysis. 117 A.L.R.5th 349.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Effect on parenting ability and parental rights. 116 A.L.R.5th 559.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Evidentiary issues. 122 A.L.R.5th 385.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning guardian ad litem and counsel. 118 A.L.R.5th 561.

Parent’s mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 A.L.R.5th 349.

Parent’s mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Constitutional issues. 110 A.L.R.5th 579.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning rehabilitative and reunification services. 12 A.L.R.6th 417.

Parents’ Physical Illness or Physical Deficiency as Ground for Termination of Parental Rights — Applicability of Americans with Disabilities Act. 27 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Parent’s use of drugs as factor in award of custody of children, visitation rights, or termination of parental rights. 20 A.L.R.5th 534.

Physical abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent’s right to child. 53 A.L.R.3d 605.

Restricting access to judicial records of concluded adoption proceedings. 83 A.L.R.3d 800.

Restricting access to judicial records of pending adoption proceedings. 83 A.L.R.3d 824.

Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights. 92 A.L.R.5th 379.

Right to Effective Counsel at Termination of Parental Rights Proceeding and Standards of Review of Claim. 23 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2017).

Sexual abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent’s right to child. 58 A.L.R.3d 1074.

Smoking as factor in child custody and visitation cases. 36 A.L.R.5th 377.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish parent’s knowledge or allowance of child’s sexual abuse by another under statute permitting termination of parental rights for “allowing” or “knowingly allowing” such abuse to occur. 53 A.L.R.5th 499.

15-7-7.1. Court proceedings.

The court shall make findings of fact and conclude all hearings on petitions for termination of parental rights within one hundred eighty (180) days after notice to the natural parents has been effectuated. If the court is unable to conclude a hearing within one hundred eighty (180) days, it shall enter an order setting forth the facts which necessitate an extension of the time period.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 364, § 1.

15-7-7.2. Mediation of termination of parental rights.

The family court may establish a voluntary mediation program for termination of parental rights. Once established, the court may, with the consent of the parties, refer to mediation all or any portion of a matter relating to termination of parental rights.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 59, § 1.

15-7-8. Notice to parents — Notice when no parent living or when parent in mental institution.

  1. The notice required in § 15-7-7 shall be as follows: If a parent does not consent in writing to the adoption of his or her child, the court shall order a copy of the petition and order that copy to be served on him or her, personally, if found in the state; and if not, notice of the petition for adoption shall be published once in any newspaper that the court directs. Like notice shall also be published whenever a child has no parent living.
  2. Whenever a parent is confined in any asylum, hospital, or institution for mental illness, whether the asylum, hospital, or institution is situated within or out of the state, the court shall order a copy of the petition and order that copy, subsequently referred to as the notice, to be served on him or her personally, which notice, if to be served within the state, shall be served by an officer authorized by law to serve citations; but if the notice is to be served out of the state, it may be served by any disinterested person, who shall make return, upon oath, that he or she has made service of the notice, the manner in which, the time when, and the place where the service was made; provided, that before any officer or disinterested person makes service of the notice, he or she shall apply to the physician in charge of the asylum, hospital, or institution where the person upon whom the notice to be served is confined, and if the physician shall return, upon oath, on the back of the notice, that in his or her opinion service of the notice upon the person will be injurious to his or her mental health, the officer or person charged with the service shall leave a copy of the notice, with the physician’s return, with the keeper of the asylum, hospital, or institution and shall return the notice, with a statement of his or her actions regarding the notice, to the court without further service; and upon return being made in either case, the court, having first appointed a guardian ad litem for the parent, may proceed to act upon the petition and order.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 4; P.L. 1925, ch. 655, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 5; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-8 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 92, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 29.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Sections 15-7-6 to 15-7-9 require that notice of the hearing date of an adoption proceeding be given to a natural parent, or parents, only in cases where such parent has not consented to the adoption. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Collateral References.

Necessity of notice to parents or legal custodian before adoption of child. 24 A.L.R. 416, 76 A.L.R. 1077.

15-7-9. Notice to parent whose whereabouts unknown.

  1. When a petition concerning the adoption or termination of parental rights is filed which sets forth that the whereabouts of the parent or parents of the child are unknown, that fact shall be sworn to by the petitioners by affidavit which shall set forth the last contacts with the absent parent and any other information considered pertinent in determining the absent parent’s whereabouts.
  2. The court shall review the affidavit and, if it is determined that personal service cannot be effectuated, an order of notice shall be entered directing that notice be given to the parent by publication in any newspaper of general circulation that the court directs; which notice shall be published once and this notice may be combined and placed with other names that the court is attempting to notify.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 11; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-9 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 364, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 200, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Sections 15-7-6 15-7-9 require that notice of the hearing date of an adoption proceeding be given to a natural parent, or parents, only in cases where such parent has not consented to the adoption. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Failure to File Affidavit.

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was improper as the family court did not provide the mother with appropriate notice. After informing the family court that the mother’s whereabouts were unknown, the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families was required to file an affidavit stating that the mother could not be found and to set forth the last contacts with the mother, and the affidavit had to be filed in advance of a family court order of notice by publication, but no such affidavit was filed with the family court; therefore, the family court’s order of advertisement in a newspaper to alert the mother that her parental rights might be terminated if she failed to appear did not pass statutory muster. In re Joziah B., 207 A.3d 451, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 2019).

15-7-10. Consent of minor parents.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “minor” refers to an individual under the age of eighteen (18).
  2. No minor parent may give a binding consent to any adoption petition or to any termination of rights pursuant to § 15-7-6 except with the consent of one of the parents, guardian, or guardian ad litem of the minor parent; provided, that if the whereabouts of both of the parents of the minor parent are unknown, that fact shall be sworn to by the petitioners or an unauthorized officer or official of a duly licensed child placement agency or of a governmental child placement agency; after notice in accordance with § 15-7-9 and upon finding that the granting of the petition for adoption or the termination of rights is in the best interest of the child, the family court may grant the petition.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 6; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-10 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Collateral References.

Comment Note: Natural parent’s indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — general principles. 82 A.L.R.5th 443.

Mistake or want of understanding as ground for revocation of consent to adoption or of agreement releasing infant to adoption placement agency. 74 A.L.R.3d 489.

Parent’s involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as permitting adoption without parental consent. 78 A.L.R.3d 712.

Right of natural parent to withdraw valid consent to adoption of child. 74 A.L.R.3d 421.

Sufficiency of parent’s consent to adoption of child. 24 A.L.R.2d 1127.

Validity of birth parent’s “blanket” consent to adoption which fails to identify adoptive parents. 15 A.L.R.5th 1.

What constitutes “duress” in obtaining parent’s consent to adoption of child or surrender of child to adoption agency. 74 A.L.R.3d 527.

15-7-11. Investigation and report as to adoptive home.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition so presented and consented to for the adoption of a minor child, the court shall notify the department of children, youth and families. It shall then be the duty of the department to verify the allegations of the petition, and to make appropriate investigation to determine whether the proposed adoptive home is a suitable home for the child. The department shall, within sixty (60) days, submit to the court a full report in writing, with recommendation as to the granting of the petition and any other information regarding the child or the proposed home that the court shall require. In circumstances where the petition for adoption concerns a child who has been placed for adoption by a duly licensed, child-placement agency, the court may accept the home study report of the child-placement agency in lieu of the investigation and recommendation of the department of children, youth and families; provided, the child-placement agency includes in its home-study report any criminal record of the prospective adoptive parent. All costs relating to criminal background checks shall be the responsibility of the public or private entity conducting the home study;
  2. As part of the investigation or investigative home-study report, a request shall be made to the attorney general through the division of criminal identification to make available any criminal record of the prospective adoptive parent maintained by the division. The prospective adoptive parent, and any household member age 18 and older, shall apply to the bureau of criminal identification of the state police or the local police department, or the department of children, youth and families, for a nationwide criminal records check unless they have previously submitted to a nationwide criminal records check in accordance with § 14-1-34 and/or §§ 40-13.2-2 , 40-13.2-4 and/or 40-13.2-5 and/or §§ 16-48.1-4 and 16-48.1-5 . The attorney general shall immediately comply with the request of the department or child-placement agency, and the report of the attorney general shall be made part of the investigative home study submitted to court.
  3. Pursuant to § 40-13.2-4 , the director of DCYF will determine by rules and regulations those items of information appearing on a criminal records check that constitute disqualifying information because that information would indicate the prospective adoptive parent could endanger the health or welfare of a child or children. Upon the discovery of any disqualifying information with respect to a proposed prospective adoptive parent, the director shall inform the agency that disqualifying information has been discovered, without disclosing the nature of the disqualifying information.
  4. At the conclusion of any criminal records check required by this section, the fingerprint card of the person subject to the nationwide criminal records check shall be promptly destroyed.
  5. Provisions of this section may, in the discretion of the court, be waived in the case of a petition for the adoption of a child where the child is the natural child of one of the parties petitioning for the adoption and resides with the petitioning parties.
  6. Specific definitions and procedures for adoptive home studies are to be provided in regulations promulgated by the department of children, youth and families in accordance with the administrative procedures act. All investigative home studies submitted to the court shall be based on a minimum of two (2) home visits by the agency conducting the home study. All prospective siblings and any other household members shall be interviewed during a home visit. Agencies conducting the home study shall have a minimum of one home visit following completion of the home study process. A summary of the agency’s past and present contact with the prospective adoptive family shall be included in the home study. The agency shall include in the home study its recommendations for approval or disapproval of the adoption and the reasons for its conclusion.
  7. The following information shall be included in all home studies submitted to the court:
    1. Identifying information on all household members, including minor children and the current needs of each child;
    2. Information regarding the prospective adoptive parent’s motivation and reasons for the adoption;
    3. Current background information on the prospective adoptive parents, including written self-assessment;
    4. Child-care experience and parenting philosophy of the prospective adoptive parents;
    5. Information regarding past and present marriage and/or partnership relationships;
    6. Current medical and psychological conditions, including addiction to drugs or alcohol of any prospective adoptive parents, that may be seriously detrimental to the health and welfare of children;
    7. Description of the home and local community, including any health and safety concerns regarding the home;
    8. Information regarding the finances and employment of the prospective adoptive parents;
    9. Reference letters from at least three (3) individuals at least two (2) of whom are non-relatives;
    10. Results of background checks with DCYF and clearance checks regarding state and federal criminal records, without disclosing the nature of the disqualifying information, conducted on the prospective adoptive parents and any household member age 18 and older;
    11. Information related to the prospective adoptive parent’s willingness and ability to accept and cooperate with adoption support services, including their level of understanding regarding openness with birth family; and
    12. Information related to the match between prospective adoptive parents and the child, including attitudes and capabilities of prospective adoptive parents and the child’s characteristics and background.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 5; P.L. 1926, ch. 852, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 5; P.L. 1950, ch. 2416, § 1; G.L., ch. 420, § 7; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-11 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1974, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 230, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 459, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 147, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 154, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 147, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 154, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Time for Filing Report.

When the child welfare services division has made reasonable efforts to contact the natural mother of an adoptive child and she has had reasonable opportunity to reply, the agency is not required to defer filing the suitability report required by this section with the family court until a reply is received. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

The suitability reports required by this section of the child welfare services division are not controlled by § 15-7-12 and their filing with the family court need not be deferred for six months. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Collateral References.

Age of prospective adoptive parent as factor in adoption proceedings. 84 A.L.R.3d 665.

Marital status of prospective adopting parents as factor in adoption proceedings. 2 A.L.R.4th 555.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings. 34 A.L.R.4th 167.

Restricting access to judicial records of concluded adoption proceedings. 103 A.L.R.5th 255.

Right, in child custody proceedings, to cross-examine investigating officer whose report is used by court in its decision. 59 A.L.R.3d 1337.

Validity and enforcement of agreement by foster parents that they will not attempt to adopt foster child. 78 A.L.R.3d 770.

15-7-12. Trial period of residence.

No petition shall be granted until the child has lived for six (6) months in the proposed home; provided, that the period of residence may be waived and the petition granted by the court upon good cause shown, when satisfied that the proposed home and the child are suited to each other.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 5; P.L. 1926, ch. 852, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, §§ 5, 7; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-12 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Report.

This section has no application to the reports required of the child welfare services division under § 15-7-11 , and that agency is under no obligation to wait until an adoptive child has been in the foster home for six months before filing a suitability report with the family court. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Waiver.

Under this section and § 15-7-14 the family court may enter a final adoption decree, although the adoptive child has not lived with the adoptive parents for six months, and the court is not required to make a specific finding with regard to the waiver by it of the six month residence requirement. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

15-7-13. Consideration of religion of child or parents.

For the purposes of placement of a child in adoptive homes under this chapter, a child shall be placed in an adoptive home of any religious faith or persuasion that may be designated by the natural parent(s) so far as practicable. In the event that the natural parent(s) waive the right to designate the religion of his or her child, the right shall become vested in the governmental child placement agency or the duly licensed child placing agency to be exercised in the best interests of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 26; P.L. 1946, ch. 1772, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 13; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-13 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Cross References.

Religion considered in placement of child with institution, § 14-1-41 .

Collateral References.

Religion as factor in adoption proceedings. 48 A.L.R.3d 383.

15-7-14. Decree of adoption.

If, after investigation and upon a hearing, the court is satisfied as to the identity and relations of the persons, and that the petitioner or petitioners are of sufficient ability to bring up the child and furnish suitable nurture and education, having reference to the degree and condition of the child’s parents, and that it is fit and proper that the adoption should take effect, a decree shall be made setting forth the facts and ordering that from the date of decree the child shall, to all legal intents and purposes, be the child of the petitioner or petitioners.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 228, § 5; P.L. 1926, ch. 852, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 5; G.L., ch. 420, § 7; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-14 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Cross References.

Birth certificates, § 23-3-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Negligent Misrepresentation.

The tort of negligent misrepresentation in the adoption context is recognized; in order to avoid liability, an adoption agency needs simply to refrain from making representations, or if it does begin making representations it must do so in a nonnegligent manner. However, adoption agencies are not guarantors or insurers of a child’s future health and traditional principles of negligence still will require that the child’s condition be reasonably predictable at the time of the adoption. Mallette v. Children's Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 185 (R.I. 1995).

Setting Aside Decree.

A final decree of adoption entered pursuant to this section may be set aside under § 9-21-2 , but only after a showing of clear and convincing evidence, and in a proceeding alleging undue influence the evidence must show that the influence has been exerted to such a degree as to amount to force or coercion, destroying free agency, and it is not required that the consent of a natural parent to adoption be given free from the emotion, tensions and pressures inherent in the situation. In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Waiver of Residence Requirement.

This section does not require that the court make a specific finding of its waiver of the six month residence requirement in entering a final decree of adoption under § 15-7-12 . In re Adoption of Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443 , 287 A.2d 115, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1207 (1972).

Collateral References.

Adoption as precluding testamentary gift under natural relative’s will. 71 A.L.R.4th 374.

Age of prospective adoptive parent as factor in adoption proceedings. 84 A.L.R.3d 665.

Annulment or vacation of adopted decree by adopting parent or natural parent consenting to adoption. 2 A.L.R.2d 887.

Natural parent, inclusion in decree of provision as to right of, to visit child, or otherwise preserving rights of natural parent. 114 A.L.R. 271.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings. 34 A.L.R.4th 167.

Res judicata as applicable to decrees or judgments in adoption proceedings. 52 A.L.R.2d 406.

Right of adopted child to inherit from intestate natural grandparents. 60 A.L.R.3d 631.

15-7-14.1. Decree of open adoption.

  1. At the time an adoption decree is entered, the court entering the decree may grant post-adoption visitation, contact and/or conveyance of information privileges (subsequently referred to as “Post-adoption privileges”) under subsection (b) of this section to a birth parent who:
    1. Has consented to an adoption or voluntarily terminated the parent-child relationship; or,
    2. Has had his or her parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to section 15-7-7(2)(i), (iii), (iv), or (vii) and has properly filed a timely appeal of the termination which is pending and the child was not in a pre-adoptive home prior to the granting of the termination of parental rights petition by the family court.
  2. A court may grant post-adoption privileges if:
    1. The court determines that the best interests of the child would be served by granting post-adoption privileges;
    2. The court finds there is a significant emotional attachment between the child and the birth parent;
    3. The adoptive parents and the birth parents jointly negotiate and execute a post-adoption privileges agreement which is approved by and filed with the family court;
    4. The department of children, youth and families and the child’s court appointed special advocate or the guardian ad litem, if one has been appointed pursuant to § 40-11-12 , recommends that the post-adoption privileges agreement be approved by the court; or if the adoption petition is being sponsored by a licensed child placing agency other than the department of children, youth, and families, the licensed child placing agency sponsoring the adoption makes a recommendation that the post-adoption privileges agreement be approved by the court.
    5. Consent to the post-adoption privileges is obtained from the child, if the child is at least twelve (12) years of age; and
    6. The post-adoption privileges agreement is approved by the court.
  3. A post-adoption privileges agreement filed under subdivision (b)(4) of this section must contain the following provisions:
    1. An acknowledgement by the birth parents that the adoption is irrevocable, even if the adoptive parents do not abide by the post-adoption privileges agreement.
    2. An acknowledgement by the adoptive parents that the agreement grants the birth parents the right to seek to enforce the post-adoption privileges set forth in the agreement.
  4. A birth parent or an adoptive parent may file a petition with the court entering the adoption decree for the following purposes:
    1. To modify the post-adoption privileges agreement;
    2. To compel a birth parent or adoptive parent to comply with the post-adoption privileges agreement;
  5. The court may not award monetary damages as a result of the filing of a petition under subsection (d).
  6. The court may void or modify a post-adoption privileges agreement approved under this section at any time before or after the adoption if the court determines after a hearing that the best interests of the child require the voiding or modification of the agreement. Before the court: (1) Voids or modifies an agreement, or (2) Hears a motion to compel compliance with an agreement approved under this section, the court shall give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the licensed, child placement agency that sponsored the adoption and to the child’s court appointed special advocate (CASA) or court appointed guardian ad litem if one had been appointed prior to the finalization of adoption.
  7. A court may not revoke a decree of adoption because a birth parent or an adoptive parent fails to comply with a post-adoption privileges agreement approved by the court under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 408, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Family Law: In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 610 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Petition for the open adoption of a child by her paternal aunt was properly rejected whether or not the family court erred in terminating the parental rights of the child’s parents before considering the adoption petition because the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) had not recommended the approval of the adoption as required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-14.1(b)(4) ; without DCYF’s recommendation of approval, the family court would have been barred from considering the open petition adoption even if it had not already terminated the mother and father’s parental rights. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252, 127 S. Ct. 1372, 167 L. Ed. 2d 159, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2680 (2007).

Best Interests of Child.

In denying a petition for the open adoption of a six-year-old child by the child’s paternal aunt, a family court did not clearly err in finding that it would not have been in the child’s best interests to move from the home of her foster parents, where she had lived for her entire life with her half-sister, to the aunt’s home, or in noting that the child had bonded closely with her foster parents; the family court properly considered the child’s best interests as required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-14.1(b)(1) . In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252, 127 S. Ct. 1372, 167 L. Ed. 2d 159, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2680 (2007).

15-7-15. Decree of change of name.

If, in a petition for the adoption of a child, a change of the child’s name is requested, the court, upon decreeing the adoption, may also decree the change of name and grant a certificate for the name change.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 10; G.L., ch. 420, § 12; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-15 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Collateral References.

Change of child’s name in adoption proceeding. 53 A.L.R.2d 927.

15-7-16. Inheritance by and from adoptive kindred.

  1. A child lawfully adopted shall be deemed, for the purpose of inheritance by the child and his or her descendants from the parents by adoption and the lineal and collateral kindred of the parents by adoption, and for the purpose of inheritance by the parents by adoption, and the lineal and collateral kindred of the parents by adoption, from the child and his or her descendants, and for all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and children, except as provided in § 15-7-17 , the child of the parents by adoption the same as if he or she had been born to them in lawful wedlock. In the construction of any instrument, whether executed before or after May 8, 1956, a child so adopted and the descendants of the child shall be deemed within a limitation to the lawful heirs, issue, children, descendants, or the like, as the case may be, of the parent or parents by adoption, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the terms of the instrument or unless the particular estate so limited has vested in and as to the person or persons entitled to it on April 20, 1962; provided, that this sentence shall not apply in the construction of any instrument as to any child who is over the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of his or her adoption and who is adopted after the death of the maker of the instrument.
  2. When an adopted child is related by blood to the parent or parents by adoption, he or she and his or her descendants shall be entitled to inherit from and through the parent or parents only as an adopted child or descendants of an adopted child and not by virtue of the blood relationship.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 6; G.L., ch. 420, § 8; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3851, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-16 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adult Adoption.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-16(a) precluded the adopted daughters from being considered “issue,” as that term was used in the living trust, because they were over the age of eighteen at the time of their adoption. Therefore, the distribution of assets contemplated in the living trust failed in its entirety. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Hunt, 944 A.2d 846, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I.), cert. denied sub nom. Gay v. Hunt, 555 U.S. 1048, 129 S. Ct. 646, 172 L. Ed. 2d 614, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8767 (2008).

Children Adopted After Death of Testator.

Where a will left a bequest to a niece of the testatrix for life with remainder to the children of said niece, a child adopted by said niece after the death of the testatrix was not entitled to share in the remainder as a child of the niece. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hooker, 101 R.I. 12 , 219 A.2d 772, reh’g denied, 101 R.I. 769 , 222 A.2d 779 (1966), overruling Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644 , 35 A. 882, 34 L.R.A. 500 (1896), and the cases which follow it.

Where a will provided for a trust to be distributed to “children of my wife” there was no showing that the testator either by express language or by implication intended to exclude adopted children. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 284 , 243 A.2d 914, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 646 (1968).

Collateral Kindred.

Adopted niece was not among next of kin for the purpose of a will leaving the remainder to the testator’s next of kin even though the adoptive mother was an income beneficiary of the same bequest. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Humphrey, 32 R.I. 318 , 79 A. 829, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1911) (Decision prior to 1956 amendment).

An adopted child was not given the right to inherit from a natural child of the adopting parent. Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R.I. 45 , 97 A. 378, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1916) (Decision prior to 1956 amendment).

A child adopted by the father of the intestate was not a next of kin of the intestate entitled to notice of the pendency of proceedings for the appointment of an administrator. Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R.I. 45 , 97 A. 378, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1916) (Decision prior to 1956 amendment).

Construction of Wills.

The term “children or issue” as used in a will may include an adopted child if such is the intention of the testator. In re Truman, 27 R.I. 209 , 61 A. 598, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1905).

Word “children” in a will did not include an adopted child, regardless of this section, where it was not manifest from the language of the will and surrounding circumstances that the testator intended to include such child. Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76 , 151 A. 131, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1930) (Decision prior to 1956 amendment).

The word “issue” as used in a will may or may not include a child by adoption and whether it does include such child is determined by the intention of the testator as shown by a study of his entire will. Smith v. Bradford, 51 R.I. 289 , 154 A. 272, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1931) (Decision prior to 1956 amendment).

Foreign Adoption.

Child adopted in another state could inherit property in Rhode Island from its adoptive mother where the law of the other state was the same as that of Rhode Island. Melvin v. Martin, 18 R.I. 650 , 30 A. 467, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1894).

The provisions of this section were intended by the legislature to apply to cases involving children who were adopted by the adoptive parents in jurisdictions other than Rhode Island. Prince v. Nugent, 93 R.I. 149 , 172 A.2d 743, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1961).

Lapse of Legacy.

Adopted son was “issue” within the meaning of § 33-6-19 and could be substituted to prevent the lapse of a legacy where it was not inconsistent with the intent of the testator. Industrial Trust Co. v. Taylor, 69 R.I. 153 , 32 A.2d 269, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1943).

Liberal Construction.

Statutes which are intended to integrate adopted children into a family unit and thus promote the public interest in the preservation of the family are to be liberally construed in favor of the adopted child. Prince v. Nugent, 93 R.I. 149 , 172 A.2d 743, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1961).

The legislature intends the term “child,” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-16(a) , to mean son or daughter of a parent, regardless of age, and there is no distinction between the inheritance rights of a “child” adopted as a minor and “persons” adopted as adults. Tinney v. Tinney, 799 A.2d 235, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 131 (R.I. 2002).

Rule of Evidence.

Rule of construction set forth in this section was not retroactive substantive law which would impair property rights established before its enactment but was merely a rule of evidence concerning the burden of proof. Prince v. Nugent, 93 R.I. 149 , 172 A.2d 743, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1961).

Trust Deed.

Where no intent could be found to exclude adopted children from “children” or “issue” as worded in a deed of trust there was nothing of sufficient probative force to overcome the prima facie case arising from the application of the rule of construction in this statute. Prince v. Nugent, 93 R.I. 149 , 172 A.2d 743, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1961).

Where intent exists in the instrument, either express or implied, the rule of construction in this section may not be applied. This statute reverses the burden of proof as fixed by the decisions prior to its enactment. Prince v. Nugent, 93 R.I. 149 , 172 A.2d 743, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1961).

Collateral References.

Adopted child as within class named in deed or inter vivos trust instrument.

Adopted child as within class named in testamentary gift. 36 A.L.R.5th 395.

Adopted child’s right to inherit from grandparents. 60 A.L.R.3d 631.

Adoption by third person as excluding one who otherwise answers to the description of a testamentary beneficiary. 96 A.L.R.2d 639.

Allowance to adopted children out of funds of incompetent ward. 24 A.L.R.3d 887.

Child adopted by another as beneficiary of action or settlement for wrongful death of natural parent. 67 A.L.R.2d 745.

Conflict of laws as to adoption, as affecting descent and distribution of decedent’s estate. 87 A.L.R.2d 1240.

Conflict of laws as to legitimacy or legitimation or as to rights of illegitimates, as affecting descent and distribution of decedent’s estate. 87 A.L.R.2d 1274.

Contract to provide for adopted child by will, right of child to enforce. 2 A.L.R. 1197, 33 A.L.R. 739, 73 A.L.R. 1395.

Descent and distribution from stepparents to stepchildren or vice versa. 63 A.L.R.2d 303.

Extrinsic evidence as to intention of testator to include adopted person in words of relationship in will. 94 A.L.R. 121.

Inheritance from or through adopted person. 52 A.L.R.2d 1228.

Inheritance from or through adoptive parent. 18 A.L.R.2d 960.

“Issue,” adoption as barring child from participation in gift to. 117 A.L.R. 717.

Law governing effect, with respect to inheritance, of foreign contract to adopt. 80 A.L.R.2d 1128.

Modern status of law as to equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel. 97 A.L.R.3d 347.

Presumptive heir’s right to object to adoption. 16 A.L.R. 1020.

Right of adopted child to inherit from kindred of adoptive parent. 43 A.L.R.2d 1183.

Right of children of adopted child to inherit from adopting parent. 94 A.L.R.2d 1200.

Right of children of an adopted child to take share which the parent would have taken under a will if he had survived the testator. 8 A.L.R. 1012.

Validity and effect of preadoption agreement derogating from the status or rights of an adopted child as fixed by statute. 9 A.L.R. 1627.

Will, adopted child as within class in testamentary gift. 86 A.L.R.2d 12.

15-7-17. Rights of natural parents terminated — Inheritance by child from natural parents.

The parents of the child shall be deprived, by the decree, of all legal rights respecting the child, and the child shall be freed from all obligations of maintenance and obedience respecting his or her natural parents except that the granting of the petition for adoption will not deprive an adopted child of the right to inherit from and through his or her natural parents in the same manner as all other natural children; provided, that the right to inherit from and through natural parents of an adopted child born out of wedlock shall be as provided in § 33-1-8 ; and provided, further, that the decree of adoption shall in no way affect all legal rights of a natural parent respecting the child and all obligations of the child of maintenance and obedience respecting a natural parent if the natural parent is legally married to the adopting parent at the time of the decree of adoption. Notwithstanding the rights of an adopted child to inherit from or through his or her natural parents as provided in this section, or as provided in § 33-1-8 , any administrator, executor or trustee who without knowledge of said adopted child, otherwise carries out the administrators, executors, or trustees lawful responsibility shall not be liable to the adopted child for any damages resulting therefrom.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 7; G.L., ch. 420, § 9; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-17 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 92, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 195, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contact With Adoptive Parents.

A natural mother’s desire to contact her child’s adoptive parents with the hope of seeing the child does not constitute good cause for the lifting of the confidentiality curtain which envelopes a family court adoption proceeding. In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203 , 397 A.2d 511, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1008 (1981).

Effect of Parental Consent.

Decision of natural father not to contest adoption petition was conclusive upon him and upon all who might claim by, through, or under him, including the child’s paternal grandfather who consequently lacked standing to participate in the adoption proceeding or to seek rights of visitation. In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 847 (R.I. 1983).

Collateral References.

Adoption as affecting right of inheritance through or from natural parent or other natural kin. 37 A.L.R.2d 333.

Adoption as precluding testamentary gift under natural relative’s will. 71 A.L.R.4th 374.

Adoption by third person as excluding one who otherwise answers to the description of a testamentary beneficiary. 96 A.L.R.2d 639.

Child adopted by another as beneficiary of action or settlement for wrongful death of natural parent. 67 A.L.R.2d 745.

Conflict of laws as to adoption, as affecting descent and distribution of decedent’s estate. 87 A.L.R.2d 1240.

Conflict of laws as to legitimacy or legitimation or as to rights of illegitimates, as affecting descent and distribution of decedent’s estate. 87 A.L.R.2d 1274.

Law governing effect, with respect to inheritance, of foreign contract, to adopt. 80 A.L.R.2d 1128.

Postadoption visitation by natural parent. 78 A.L.R.4th 218.

15-7-18. Denial of petition — Order as to custody of child.

  1. Upon hearing before the family court on any petition for adoption, if it finds that the petition for adoption is not for the best interest of the child and denies the petition, the court shall have the power to order the child returned to the person, persons, or licensed agency legally entitled to custody.
  2. The failure of a person having the physical control of the child to place the child in accordance with the order of the family court shall constitute contempt which may be punished by the court by imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions until such time as he or she purges himself or herself.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 14; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-18 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Collateral References.

Conflict of laws as to contract to adopt. 81 A.L.R.2d 1128.

Liability of public or private agency or its employees to prospective adoptive parents in contract or tort for failure to complete arrangement for adoption. 8 A.L.R.5th 860.

Res judicata as applicable to decrees or judgments in adoption proceedings. 52 A.L.R.2d 406.

15-7-19. Appeal from the family court.

Appeals from decrees of the family court under the provisions of this chapter shall be in the same manner as provided in § 14-1-52 , and any child made the subject of a petition may, by next friend, appeal in like manner, but no bond shall be required of, or court costs awarded against, the child or next friend.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 8; C.P.A. 1905, § 1135; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 8; P.L. 1940, ch. 936, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 10; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-19 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 8; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

Cross References.

Appeals, § 14-1-52 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Next Friend.

A child could appeal an adoption decree by her father as next friend, even though another next friend had been appointed because of the father’s abandonment, where the father had not consented to adoption. Murray v. Barber, 16 R.I. 512 , 17 A. 553, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1889).

Persons Filing Conflicting Petition for Adoption.

A decree approving an adoption could not be appealed by persons who had filed a conflicting petition for adoption of the same child, even though the two petitions had been consolidated for hearing. Greene v. Willis, 47 R.I. 251 , 132 A. 545, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1926) (Decision prior to 1955 amendment).

Collateral References.

Annulment or vacation of adoption decree by adopting parent or natural parent consenting to adoption. 2 A.L.R.2d 887.

Res judicata as applicable to decrees or judgments in adoption proceedings. 52 A.L.R.2d 406.

Right of natural parent to withdraw valid consent to adoption of child. 74 A.L.R.3d 421.

Who, other than natural or adopting parents, or heirs of latter, may collaterally attack adoption decree. 92 A.L.R.2d 813.

15-7-20. Jurisdiction of child pending appeal.

During the pendency of an appeal the family court shall have jurisdiction with respect to the custody of the child and shall make any orders that may be for the best interest of the child. This jurisdiction shall continue after verdict or decision until the final determination of the appeal.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 8; P.L. 1940, ch. 935, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 10; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-20 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

15-7-21. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 192, § 9; C.P.A. 1905, § 1220; G.L. 1909, ch. 244, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 288, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 420, §§ 9, 11; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 62, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 278, § 1, effective August 6, 1996; P.L. 1996, ch. 305, § 1, effective August 7, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-7-21 concerned reversal of decree on application of parent not notified.

15-7-21.1. Challenge to decree.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a decree of adoption or a termination of a parent’s right to give or withhold consent for adoption shall not be subject to a challenge or petition to reverse unless the challenge or petition is filed in the family court within one hundred eighty (180) days after the decree or order is entered.
  2. In the event a challenge is brought within the one hundred eighty (180) day period by an individual whose parental relationship to an adoptee is terminated, or by any individual who is asserting a parental relationship to the adoptee, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the family court shall deny the challenge unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the decree or order is not in the best interest of the adoptee.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 278, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 305, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Vacation of Consent.

Because a father’s motion to vacate his consent to his child’s adoption was filed well beyond 180 days after the entry of the final decree of adoption, the motion was time-barred by R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-21.1(a) ; in any event, the father’s attempt to vacate the adoption suffered from a failure of proof. In re Trevor E., 985 A.2d 1014, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 129 (R.I. 2009).

15-7-22. Penalty for violations or false statements.

Every person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter, or who intentionally makes any false statements with reference to the matters contained in this chapter, shall, in addition to any specific penalties provided in this chapter, upon conviction of the first offense, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year and/or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), and of a second or subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding two (2) years and/or be fined an amount not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L., ch. 420, § 15; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-22 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 318, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 66.

15-7-23. Complaints.

The director of children, youth and families or any person appointed by him or her shall present all complaints under the provisions of this chapter to the family court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 420, § 16; P.L. 1955, ch. 3483, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-7-23 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970.

15-7-24. Attendance at hearing.

The child does not need to be in attendance at any court hearing; however, the court in its discretion may require attendance at any hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 132, § 1.

15-7-25. Reimbursement to adoptive parents.

The state shall make funds available through the department of children, youth and families for special reimbursement to adoptive parents in matters of placement of children with disabilities or hard to place children. These funds will be disbursed in accordance with the guidelines to be promulgated by the department of children, youth and families.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 88, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 66; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 20; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Denial of Assistance.

The state has an affirmative duty to fully explain all available assistance programs so that potential adoptive parents can make an informed decision. Where an adoptive mother is never made aware of the fact that even if she does not need a subsidy at the time of adoption she might still qualify for nominal assistance that would leave the door open for later recalculation, constitutes an extenuating circumstance which allows the reopening of the mother’s case following her initial denial of assistance. Ferdinand v. Department for Children & Their Families, 768 F. Supp. 401, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10175 (D.R.I. 1991).

Retroactive Payments.

The Eleventh Amendment bars retroactive adoption subsidy payments from state funds, even when the payments are matched by federal funds. Ferdinand v. Department for Children & Their Families, 768 F. Supp. 401, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10175 (D.R.I. 1991).

15-7-26. Notice to natural father.

  1. If the court, after examination, determines that the natural father has not joined in a petition either for the termination of parental rights or a petition for adoption or has not executed a waiver, then the court shall cause inquiry to be made of the mother, as the court in its discretion shall deem appropriate.
    1. If, after the inquiry, the natural father is identified to the satisfaction of the court, he shall be given notice in accordance with § 15-7-8 or in any other manner that the court may direct. Proof of giving the notice shall be filed with the court before a petition for termination of parental rights or a petition for adoption is granted. If the natural father fails to appear, or if appearing fails to claim any rights to the child, the court shall enter an order terminating his rights with reference to the child. If the natural father, or a man representing himself to be the natural father, claims rights to the child, the court shall proceed to determine his rights.
    2. If, after the inquiry, the court is able to identify the natural father but his whereabouts are unknown, or if the court is unable to identify the natural father, the court, on the basis of all information available, shall determine whether there is a reasonable probability that publication of notice of the proceeding will lead to the ascertainment of his identity or whereabouts. If so, the court may order publication in accordance with § 15-7-9 .

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 274, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 364, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 451, § 6.

Collateral References.

Necessity of securing consent of parents of illegitimate child to its adoption. 51 A.L.R.2d 497.

Chapter 7.1 Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance

15-7.1-1. Enactment of compact.

The interstate compact on adoption and medical assistance is enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other states legally joining this compact in the form substantially as follows:

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 259, § 1.

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON ADOPTION AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

Article I. Finding.

The states which are parties to this Compact find that:

  1. In order to obtain adoptive families for children with special needs, states must assure prospective adoptive parents of substantial assistance (usually on a continuing basis) in meeting the high costs of supporting and providing for the special needs and the services required by these children.
  2. The states have a fundamental interest in promoting adoption for children with special needs because the care, emotional stability, and general support and encouragement required by these children can be best, and often only, obtained in family homes with a normal parent-child relationship.
  3. The states obtain fiscal advantages from providing adoption assistance because the alternative is for the states to bear the higher cost of meeting all the needs of all children while in foster care.
  4. The necessary assurances of adoption assistance for children with special needs, in those instances where children and adoptive parents live in states other than the one undertaking to provide the assistance, include the establishment and maintenance of suitable substantive guarantees and workable procedures for interstate cooperation and payments to assist with the necessary costs of child maintenance, the procurement of services, and the provision of medical assistance.

    II. Purposes.

    The purposes of this Compact are to:

    (a) Strengthen protections for the interests of children with special needs on behalf of whom adoption assistance is committed to be paid, when these children are in or move to states other than the one committed to provide adoption assistance.

    (b) Provide substantive assurances and operating procedures which will promote the delivery of medical and other services to children on an interstate basis through programs of adoption assistance established by the laws of the states which are parties to this Compact.

Article III. Definitions.

As used in this Compact, unless the context clearly requires a different construction:

  1. “Child with special needs” means a minor who has not yet attained the age at which the state normally discontinues children’s services, or a child who has not yet reached the age of 21, where the state determines that the child’s mental or physical handicaps warrant the continuation of assistance beyond the age of majority, for whom the state has determined the following:
    1. That the child cannot or should not be returned to the home of his or her parents;
    2. That there exists with respect to the child a specific factor or condition (such as his or her ethnic background, age or membership in a minority or sibling group, or the presence of factors such as a medical condition or physical, mental, or emotional handicaps) because of which it is reasonable to conclude that the child cannot be placed with adoptive parents without providing adoption assistance;
    3. That, except where it would be against the best interests of the child because of such factors as the existence of significant emotional ties with prospective adoptive parents while in their care as a foster child, a reasonable but unsuccessful effort has been made to place the child with appropriate adoptive parents without providing adoption assistance.
  2. “Adoption assistance” means the payment or payments for the maintenance of a child which are made or committed to be made pursuant to the adoption assistance program established by the laws of a party state.
  3. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or a Territory or Possession of the United States.
  4. “Adoption assistance state” means the state that is signatory to adoption assistance agreement in a particular case.
  5. “Residence state” means the state in which the child is a resident by virtue of the residence of the adoptive parents.
  6. “Parents” means either the singular or plural of the word “parent”.

Article IV. Adoption Assistance.

  1. Each state shall determine the amounts of adoption assistance and other aid which it will give to children with special needs and their adoptive parents in accordance with its own laws and programs. The adoption assistance and other aid may be made subject to periodic reevaluation of eligibility by the adoption assistance state in accordance with its laws.
  2. The adoption assistance, medical assistance, and other services and benefits to which this Compact applies are those provided to children with special needs and their adoptive parents from the effective date of the adoption assistance agreement.
  3. Every case of adoption assistance shall include a written adoption assistance agreement between the adoptive parents and the appropriate agency of the state undertaking to provide the adoption assistance. Every such agreement shall contain provisions for the fixing of actual or potential interstate aspects of the assistance provided as follows:
    1. An express commitment that the assistance provided shall be payable without regard for the state of residence of the adoptive parents, both at the outset of the agreement period and at all times during its continuance;
    2. A provision setting forth with particularity the types of care and services toward which the adoption assistance state will make payments:
    3. A commitment to make medical assistance available to the child in accordance with Article V of this Compact;
    4. An express declaration that the agreement is for the benefit of the child, the adoptive parents and the state and that it is enforceable by any or all of them; and
    5. The date or dates upon which each payment or other benefit provided under the agreement is to commence, but in no event prior to the effective date of the adoption assistance agreement.
  4. Any services or benefits provided for a child by the residence state and the adoption assistance state may be facilitated by the party states on each other’s behalf. To this end, the personnel of the child welfare agencies of the party states will assist each other, as well as the beneficiaries of adoption assistance agreements, in assuring prompt and full access to all benefits expressly included in these agreements. It is further recognized and agreed that, in general, all children to whom adoption assistance agreements apply will be eligible for benefits under the child welfare, education, rehabilitation, mental health, and other programs of their state of residence on the same basis as other resident children.
  5. Adoption assistance payments on behalf of a child in another state shall be made on the same basis and in the same amounts as they would be made if the child were living in the state making the payments, except that the laws of the adoption assistance may provide for the payment of higher amounts.

Article V. Medical Assistance.

  1. Children for whom a party state is committed, in accordance with the terms of an adoption assistance agreement, to provide federally aided medical assistance under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., are eligible for this medical assistance during the entire period for which the agreement is in effect. Upon application, the adoptive parents of a child who is the subject of the adoption assistance agreement shall receive a medical assistance identification document made out in the child’s name. The identification shall be issued by the medical assistance program of the residence state and shall entitle the child to the same benefits pursuant to the same procedures, as any other child who is covered by the medical assistance program in the state, whether or not the adoptive parents are themselves eligible for medical assistance.
  2. The identification document shall bear no indication that an adoption assistance agreement with another state is the basis for its issuance. However, if the identification is issued pursuant to such an adoption assistance agreement, the records of the issuing state and the adoption assistance state shall show the fact, and shall contain a copy of the adoption assistance agreement and any amendment or replacement of the agreement, as well as all other pertinent information. The adoption assistance and medical assistance programs of the adoption assistance state shall be notified of the issuance of such identification.
  3. A state which has issued a medical assistance identification document pursuant to this Compact, which identification is valid and currently in force, shall accept, process and pay medical assistance claims as it would with any other medical assistance claims by eligible residents.
  4. The federally aided medical assistance provided by a party state pursuant to this Compact shall be in accordance with paragraphs (a) through (c) of this article. In addition, when a child who is covered by an adoption assistance agreement is living in another party state, payment or reimbursement for any medical services and benefits specified under the terms of the adoption assistance agreement, which are not available to the child under Title XIX medical assistance program of the residence state, shall be made by the adoption assistance state as required by its law. Any payments provided shall be of the same kind and at the same rates as provided for children who are living in the adoption assistance state. However, where the payment rate authorized for a covered service under the medical assistance program of the adoption assistance state exceeds the rate authorized by the residence state for that service, the adoption assistance state shall not be required to pay the additional amounts for the services or benefits covered by the residence state.
  5. A child referred to in paragraph (a) of this Article, whose residence is changed from one party state to another party state shall be eligible for federally aided medical assistance under the medical assistance program of the new state of residence.

Article VI. Compact Administration.

  1. In accordance with its own laws and procedures, each state which is a party to this Compact shall designate a Compact Administrator and those Deputy Compact Administrators as it deems necessary. The Compact Administrator shall coordinate all activities under this Compact within his or her state. The Compact Administrator shall also be the principal contact for officials and agencies within and without the state for the facilitation of interstate relations involving this Compact and the protection of benefits and services provided pursuant to this Compact. In this capacity, the Compact Administrator will be responsible for assisting child welfare agency personnel from other party states and adoptive families receiving adoption and medical assistance on an interstate basis.
  2. Acting jointly, the Compact Administrators shall develop uniform forms and administrative procedures for the interstate monitoring and delivery of adoption and medical assistance benefits and services pursuant to this Compact. The forms and procedures so developed may deal with such matters as:
    1. Documentation of continuing adoption assistance eligibility;
    2. Interstate payments and reimbursements; and
    3. Any and all other matters arising pursuant to this Compact.
    1. Some or all of the parties of this Compact may enter into supplementary agreements for the provision of or payment for additional medical benefits and services, as provided in Article V(d); for interstate service delivery, pursuant to Article IV(d); or for other related matters. Such supplementary agreements shall not be inconsistent with this Compact, nor shall they relieve the party states of any obligation to provide adoption and medical assistance in accordance with applicable state and federal law and the terms of this Compact.
    2. Administrative procedures or forms implementing the supplementary agreements referred to in paragraph (c)(1) of this Article may be developed by joint action of the Compact Administrators of those states which are party to such supplementary agreements.
  3. It shall be the responsibility of the Compact Administrator to ascertain whether and to what extent additional legislation may be necessary in his or her own state to carry out the provisions of this Article or Article IV or any supplementary agreements pursuant to this Compact.

Article VII. Joinder and Withdrawal.

  1. This Compact shall be open to joinder by any state. It shall enter into force as to a state when its duly constituted and empowered authority has executed it.
  2. In order that the provisions of this Compact may be accessible to and known by the general public, and so that they may be implemented as law in each of the party states, the authority which has executed the Compact in each party state shall cause the full text of the Compact and notice of its execution to be published in his or her state. The executing authority in any party state shall also provide copies of the Compact upon request.
  3. Withdrawal from this Compact shall be by written notice, sent by the authority which executed it, to the appropriate officials of all other party states, but no notice shall take effect until one year after it is given in accordance with the requirements of this paragraph.
  4. All adoption assistance agreements outstanding and to which a party state is a signatory at the time when its withdrawal from this Compact takes effect shall continue to have the effects given to them pursuant to this Compact until they expire or are terminated in accordance with their provisions. Until the expiration or termination, all beneficiaries of the agreements involved shall continue to have all the rights and obligations conferred or imposed by this Compact, and the withdrawing state shall continue to administer the Compact to the extent necessary to accord and implement fully the rights and protections preserved by it.

Article VIII. Construction and Severability.

The provisions of this Compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this Compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this Compact is declared to be contrary to the Constitution of the United States or of any party state, or where its applicability to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Compact and its applicability to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected by the invalidity. If this Compact shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party to it, the Compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

15-7.1-2. Compact administrator.

The director of the department of children, youth and families is authorized and empowered to designate an officer who shall be the compact administrator and who shall be authorized to carry out all of the powers and duties set forth in the compact.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 259, § 1.

15-7.1-3. Supplementary agreements.

The compact administrator is authorized and empowered to enter into supplementary agreements with appropriate officials of other states pursuant to the compact. In the event that the supplementary agreement requires or contemplates the provision of any service by this state, the supplementary agreement shall have no force or effect until approved by the head of the department or agency which will be charged with the rendering of the service.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 259, § 1.

15-7.1-4. Payments by state.

The compact administrator, subject to the approval of the chief state fiscal officer, may make or arrange for any payments necessary to discharge any financial obligations imposed upon this state by the compact or by any supplementary agreement entered into under the compact.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 259, § 1.

Chapter 7.2 Passive Voluntary Adoption Mutual Consent Registry Act

15-7.2-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Adoptee” means a person who has been adopted in the state of Rhode Island.
  2. “Adoption” means the judicial act of creating the relationship of parent and child where it did not exist previously.
  3. “Adoptive parent” means an adult who has become a parent of a child through adoption.
  4. “Adult” means a person twenty-one (21) years of age or older.
  5. “Agency” means any public or private organization licensed or authorized under the laws of this state to place children for adoption.
  6. “Birth parent” is:
    1. The person who is legally presumed under the laws of this state to be the father or mother of genetic origin of a child; and
    2. A putative father of the child if the birth mother alleges he is the father and the putative father, by written affidavit at any time or by surrender and release executed within one year of the relinquishment of the child by the birth mother or termination of parental rights of the birth mother, acknowledges being the child’s biological father.
  7. “Court” is family court seating in Providence county.
  8. “Genetic and social history” is a comprehensive report, when obtainable, on the birth parents, siblings to the birth parents, if any, other children of either birth parent, if any, and parents of the birth parents, and contains so much of the following information that is available:
    1. Medical history;
    2. Health status;
    3. Cause of and age at death;
    4. Height, weight, eye and hair color;
    5. Ethnic origins; and
    6. Religion, if any.
  9. “Health history” is a comprehensive report, when obtainable, of the child’s health status and medical history at the time of placement for adoption, including neonatal, psychological, developmental, physiological, and medical care history.
  10. “Passive voluntary adoption reunion registry” is a registry, which is not authorized to seek registrants out but is authorized only to accept voluntary registration from eligible parties as designated in this chapter.
  11. “Putative father” is a man who, under the laws of this state, is not legally presumed to be the father of genetic origin of a child, but who claims or is alleged to be the father of genetic origin of the child.
  12. “Registry” is a passive voluntary adoption reunion registry as established under this chapter.
  13. “Relevant parties” are only those parties eligible to register and to use a registry pursuant to § 15-7.2-7 .
  14. “Successor agency” is an agency which has the adoption records of another agency because of the merger of the agency and the successor agency or because a former agency has ceased doing business and has given its adoption records to the successor agency as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 166, § 1.

15-7.2-2. Policy.

It is the policy of this state that adoption is based upon the legal termination of parental rights and responsibilities of birth parents and the creation of the legal relationship of parents and child between an adoptee and the adoptive parents. These legal and social premises underlying adoption must be maintained. The state recognizes that some adults who are adopted as children have a strong desire to obtain identifying information about their birth parents while other adult adoptees have no such desire. The state further recognizes that some birth parents have a strong desire to obtain identifying information about their biological children who were adopted, while other birth parents have no such desire. The state fully recognizes the right to privacy and confidentiality of birth parents whose children were adopted, the adoptees, and the adoptive parents. The purpose of this chapter is to:

  1. Establish a passive voluntary adoption reunion registry where birth parents, adult adoptees, and surviving relatives of deceased birth parents and deceased adoptees as defined in this chapter may register their willingness of the release of identifying information to each other;
  2. Provide for the disclosure of identifying information to birth parents and their genetic offspring through the court if a birth parent or parents and the adult adoptee are registered;
  3. Provide for the transmission of non-identifying health and social and genetic history of the adult adoptees, birth parents, and other specified persons; and
  4. Provide a mechanism in the court to inform registrants of the functions and procedures of the registry at the time of registration.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

15-7.2-3. Adoption records to be permanently maintained.

  1. All records of any adoption finalized in this state shall be permanently maintained by the department of children, youth, and families or by the agency arranging the adoption.
  2. If an agency which handles adoptions ceases to do business, the agency shall transfer the adoption records to the department of children, youth, and families or to a successor agency, provided that the agency gives notice of the transfer to the department of children, youth, and families.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-4. Information — Confidential exceptions.

A person or agency shall not disclose any confidential information relating to an adoption except as provided by this chapter or pursuant to a court order.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-5. Information of registry confidential.

  1. Notwithstanding another provision of law, the information acquired by any voluntary adoption reunion registry shall not be disclosed under any freedom of information legislation or practice.
  2. A class action suit shall not be maintained in any court of this state to require the registry to disclose identifying information.
  3. Any registrant who discloses or causes to be disclosed identifying information about a biological parent or adult adoptee without that person’s express written consent shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-6. The court to maintain registry.

A passive voluntary adoption reunion registry shall be established and maintained by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-7. Persons eligible to register and to use registry.

An adult adoptee, each birth parent, any adult genetic sibling of any adoptee, an adoptive parent of a deceased adoptee, and any parent or adult sibling of a deceased birth parent or parents may register by submitting a signed affidavit to the appropriate registry. The affidavit shall contain the information listed in § 15-7.2-9 and a signed statement of the registrant’s willingness to be identified to the other relevant persons who register. The affidavit gives authority to the registry to release identifying information related to the registrant to the other relevant persons who register. Each registration shall be accompanied by the birth certificate of the registrant.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-8. Failure of a necessary registrant to file an affidavit.

  1. Except as provided in this chapter, if a birth parent or an adoptee fails to file an affidavit with the registry for any reason, including disability, but excluding death, identifying information shall not be disclosed to those relevant persons who do register. No registration shall be accepted unless the registry is satisfied as to the identity of the registrants.
  2. In the event of the death of the adoptee, the adoptive parent or parents of the deceased adoptee may register, may be considered the necessary registrant in lieu of the deceased adoptee, and identifying information may be disclosed to the relevant persons in the event of a verified match.
  3. In the event of the death of the birth parent or birth parents, the parent or adult sibling of a deceased birth parent may register, may be considered the necessary registrant in lieu of the deceased birth parent, and identifying information may be disclosed to the relevant persons in the event of a verified match.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-9. Content of affidavit — Notice of change in information.

  1. The affidavit required under § 15-7.2-7 shall contain:
    1. The current name and address of the registrant;
    2. Any previous name by which the registrant was known;
    3. The original or adopted names of the adopted child;
    4. The place and date of birth of the adopted child, if known;
    5. The name and address of the agency, if known; and
    6. The registrant’s relationship to this adoption.
  2. The registrant shall notify the registry of any change in name or address which occurs after the registrant registers. Upon registering, the registry shall inform the registrant that the registrant has the responsibility to notify the registry of a change in address. The registry is not required to search for a registrant who fails to notify the registry of a change of address.
  3. A registrant may cancel the registrant’s registration at any time by giving the registry written notice of the registrant’s desires to cancel.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-10. Processing affidavits.

  1. Upon receipt of the affidavit under § 15-7.2-7 , the court shall review its data base and determine whether there is a match by comparing the dates and place of birth of the adopted person.
  2. If a likely match appears, the chief judge of the family court or an associate justice designated by the chief judge shall examine the original birth certificate or adoption records to verify a match. Examination of adoption records for purposes other than verifying a match and release of information from the adoption record is strictly prohibited.
  3. If the registry determines there is a match, and if the necessary relevant persons have registered with the registry, notification of the match may be given by the registry to the registrants only as defined in § 15-7.2-8 .
  4. Notification of a match to the relevant parties shall be made through a direct and confidential contact at the address specified by the registrant. Subsequent to the notification of a match, and prior to the release of identifying information, the adult adoptee shall participate in not less than one hour of consultation designed specifically to assist in addressing the manifest issues that may be expected to transpire in these situations.
  5. Any eligible registrant may receive from the registry non-identifying genetic, social, and health history information as defined in this chapter, regardless of whether a verified match occurs.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-11. Registry information to be maintained permanently.

Any affidavits filed and other information collected by a registry shall be permanently maintained.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-12. Limits on releasing information.

  1. A registry shall release only information necessary for identifying a birth parent, adult adoptee or adult genetic sibling of an adult adoptee, and shall not release information of any kind pertaining to:
    1. The adoptive parents;
    2. The siblings to the adult adoptee who are children of the adoptive parents; and
    3. The income of anyone.
  2. In the event of a verified match and release of identifying information, the registry, upon the written request of the adult adoptee of the match, shall certify to the state registrar of vital records that the adult adoptee is a party to a verified match and is entitled to receive uncertified copies of his or her original birth certificate. The certification shall also state that no person other than the adult adoptee is entitled to receive copies of the original birth certificate. However, no uncertified copy of the original birth certificate may be released to the adult adoptee unless each party named on the original birth certificate has registered. Registration by a birth parent not named on the original birth certificate shall not be required for release of the uncertified copy of the original birth certificate.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 54, § 1.

15-7.2-13. Registration fee.

There shall be a twenty-five dollar ($25.00) fee imposed upon persons who register pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-14. Objections to release of information.

Any eligible registrant or any adoptive parent may file with the registry an objection to the release of identifying information. In the event of a verified match where an objection to the release of identifying information has been filed, the court shall hear the objection of the filing party prior to the release of identifying information and the court shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the parties to release the objected to identifying information.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-15. The court to promulgate rules and procedures.

The court shall promulgate any rules and procedures that are necessary to establish the operation of the registry consistent with the purpose of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 388, § 1.

15-7.2-16. Public information.

The Rhode Island department of health shall provide the public with information regarding the registry, including a link to the information posted by the court, on its website, and in the division of vital records defined in chapter 3 of title 23.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 420, § 1, effective July 14, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 421, § 1, effective July 14, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 420, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 421, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 8 Uniform Law on Paternity

15-8-1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-1 concerned obligations of the father.

Repealed Sections.

Former chapter 8 (G.L. 1896, ch. 81, §§ 1-5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14, 18; C.P.A. 1905, §§ 1111, 1224, 1225, 1236; G.L. 1909, ch. 95, §§ 1-5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14, 18; P.L. 1915, ch. 1215, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 107, §§ 1-5, 7-9, 12, 14, 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 107, §§ 1-3, 5-13; P.L. 1926, ch. 843, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 424, §§ 1-3, 5-9, 10-16, 29; P.L. 1944, ch. 1394, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2322, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3063, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 15-8-1 15-8-21 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 9; P.L. 1962, ch. 106, § 2; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1979, ch. 373, § 12), concerning bastardy proceedings, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 1 and ch. 373, § 13, and the present chapter was substituted therefor. Former sections 15-8-3 , 15-8-5 , and 15-8-6 (G.L. 1896, ch. 81, § 4; C.P.A. 1905, § 1111; G.L. 1909, ch. 95, § 4; P.L. 1915, ch. 1215, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 107, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 107, § 2; P.L. 1926, ch. 843, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 424, § 2; P.L. 1949, ch. 2322, § 1; P.L. 1953, ch. 3063, § 1) had been deemed obsolete and so were omitted from the 1969 reenactment.

15-8-2. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 320, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-2 concerned enforcement.

15-8-3. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 236, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-3 concerned presumption of paternity.

15-8-4. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-4 concerned limitation on recovery from the father.

15-8-5. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 194, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-5 concerned limitations on recovery from father’s estate.

15-8-6. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 67; P.L. 1996, ch. 199, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-6 concerned statute of limitations.

15-8-7. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 24; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-7 concerned jurisdiction and remedies.

15-8-8. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-8 concerned clear and convincing evidence.

15-8-8.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 328, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-8.1 concerned trial by court.

15-8-9. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-9 concerned venue.

15-8-10. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-10 concerned time of trial.

15-8-11. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 204, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 224, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 236, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 31; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-11 concerned parentage tests.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 15-8-11 (P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-8-11 ), concerning authority to order blood tests, was repealed by P.L. 1984, ch. 204, § 1, effective May 8, 1984. Section 2 of P.L. 1984, ch. 204, enacted the present section.

15-8-12 — 15-8-14. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; G.L. 1956, §§ 15-8-12 — 15-8-14; Repealed by P.L. 1984, ch. 204, § 1, effective May 8, 1984. For present comparable provisions of law, see § 15-8-11 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 15-8-12 — 15-8-14 concerned experts for and effects of blood tests.

15-8-15. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-15 concerned evidence relating to paternity.

15-8-16. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 31; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-16 concerned civil action.

15-8-17. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-17 concerned confidentiality of hearings and records.

15-8-18. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-18 concerned judgments.

Collateral References.

Modern status of maternal preference rule or presumption in child custody cases. 70 A.L.R.3d 262.

Right of putative father to custody of illegitimate child. 45 A.L.R.3d 216.

Right of putative father to visitation with child born out of wedlock. 58 A.L.R.5th 669.

Trust income or assets as subject to claim against beneficiary for child support. 91 A.L.R.2d 262.

15-8-18.1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 236, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-18.1 concerned entry of default and default judgment.

15-8-19. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-19 concerned judgments and enforcement.

15-8-20. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-20 concerned bond.

15-8-21. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-21 concerned settlement agreements.

15-8-22. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-22 concerned false declaration of identity.

15-8-23. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-23 concerned birth records.

15-8-24. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 67; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-24 concerned appeals.

15-8-25. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-25 concerned costs.

15-8-26. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 185, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-26 concerned action to declare mother and child relationship.

15-8-27. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 236, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-27 concerned voluntary acknowledgement and family court practice.

15-8-28. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 1, effective January 1, 2021; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-8-28 concerned the duty of parents to notify department.

Chapter 8.1 Uniform Parentage Act

Article 1 Definitions, Scope and General Provisions

15-8.1-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2, and P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 4, provides that this chapter takes effect on January 1, 2021.

P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 4, provides that this chapter takes effect on January 1, 2021.

15-8.1-102. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Acknowledged parent” means an individual who has established a parent-child relationship pursuant to article 3 of this chapter.
  2. “Adjudicated parent” means an individual who has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to be a parent of a child.
  3. “Alleged genetic parent” means an individual who is alleged to be, or alleges that the individual is, a genetic parent or possible genetic parent of a child whose parentage has not been adjudicated. The term includes an alleged genetic father and alleged genetic mother. The term does not include:
    1. A presumed parent;
    2. A person whose parental rights have been terminated or declared not to exist; or
    3. A donor.
  4. “Assisted reproduction” means a method of causing pregnancy other than through sexual intercourse and includes, but is not limited to:
    1. Intrauterine, intracervical, or vaginal insemination;
    2. Donation of gametes;
    3. Donation of embryos;
    4. In vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and
    5. Intracytoplasmic sperm injection.
  5. “Birth” includes stillbirth and fetal death.
  6. “Birth order” means those orders declaring parentage of a child, which may be obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction before or after birth of a child.
  7. “Child” means an individual of any age whose parentage may be determined pursuant to this chapter.
  8. “Determination of parentage” means establishment of a parent-child relationship by a judicial or administrative proceeding or signing of a valid acknowledgement of parentage pursuant to article 3 of this chapter.
  9. “Domestic assault” shall include any offense as set forth in § 12-29-2 .
  10. “Donor” means an individual who contributes a gamete or gametes or an embryo or embryos to another individual intended for assisted reproduction or gestation, whether or not for consideration. This term does not include:
    1. An individual who gives birth to a child conceived by assisted reproduction except as otherwise provided in article 8 of this chapter; or
    2. A parent pursuant to article 7 of this chapter or an intended parent pursuant to article 8 of this chapter.
  11. “Embryo” means a cell or group of cells containing a diploid complement of chromosomes or a group of such cells, not including a gamete, that has the potential to develop into a live born human being if transferred into the body of a person under conditions in which gestation may be reasonably expected to occur.
  12. “Gamete” means sperm, egg, or any part of a sperm or egg.
  13. “Gestational carrier” means an adult individual who is not an intended parent and who enters into a gestational carrier agreement to bear a child conceived using the gametes of another individual and not the gestational carrier’s own, except that an individual who carries a child for a family member using the gestational carrier’s own gametes and who fulfills the requirements of article 8 of this chapter is a gestational carrier.
  14. “Gestational carrier agreement” means a contract between an intended parent or parents and a gestational carrier intended to result in a live birth.
  15. “Intended parent” means an individual, whether married or unmarried, who manifests an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction or a gestational carrier agreement.
  16. “Marriage” means and includes civil union and any legal relationship that provides substantially the same rights, benefits, and responsibilities as marriage and is recognized as valid in the state or jurisdiction in which it was entered.
  17. “Parent” means an individual who has established parentage that meets the requirements of this chapter.
  18. “Parentage” means the legal relationship between a child and a parent as established under this chapter.
  19. “Presumed parent” means a person who is presumed to be the parent of a child under § 15-8.1-401 , unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding, a valid denial of parentage is made under article 3 of this chapter, or a court adjudicates the individual to be a parent.
  20. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  21. “Sexual assault” shall include sexual assault as provided in § 11-37-2 , child molestation as provided in §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3 , and indecent solicitation of a minor as provided in § 11-37-8.8 , and similar offenses in other jurisdictions.
  22. “Sexual exploitation” shall include sexual exploitation of a minor as provided in § 11-9-1 , sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult as provided in chapter 37 of title 11, and similar offenses in other jurisdictions.
  23. “Sign” means, with the intent to authenticate or adopt a record, to:
    1. Execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
    2. Attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
  24. “Signatory” means an individual who signs a record.
  25. “Spouse” includes a partner in a civil union or a partner in a legal relationship that provides substantially the same rights, benefits, and responsibilities as marriage and is recognized as valid in the state or jurisdiction in which it was entered.
  26. “Transfer” means a procedure for assisted reproduction by which an embryo or sperm is placed in the body of the individual who will give birth to the child.
  27. “Witnessed” means that at least one individual is authorized to sign and has signed a record to verify that the individual personally observed a signatory sign the record.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-103. Scope and application.

  1. This chapter applies to an adjudication and determination of parentage in the state of Rhode Island.
  2. The court shall apply the law of the state of Rhode Island to adjudicate parentage.
  3. This chapter does not create, enlarge, or diminish parental rights or responsibilities under other laws of the state of Rhode Island or the equitable powers of the courts, except as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-104. Parentage proceeding.

  1. A proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child shall be maintained in accordance with this chapter and with the family court rules of domestic relations procedure and/or the rules of juvenile proceedings, except that proceedings for orders of parentage, pursuant to § 15-8.1-804 , may be maintained in accordance with the superior court rules of civil procedure.
  2. If a complaint is brought by the office of child support services, the complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the parent whose rights have been assigned. In cases where the assignor is not a genetic parent or is a genetic parent who refuses to provide an affidavit, the affidavit may be submitted by the office of child support services, but the affidavit alone shall not support a default judgment on the issue of parentage.
  3. Original actions to adjudicate parentage may be commenced in the family court, except that proceedings for orders of parentage under § 15-8.1-804 , may be commenced in either the family court or the superior court.
  4. There shall be no right to a jury trial in an action to determine parentage.
  5. An individual who is a party to a parentage action shall disclose that individual’s social security number to the court. The social security number of an individual subject to a parentage adjudication shall be placed in the court records relating to the adjudication. The court shall disclose an individual’s social security number to the office of child support.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-105. Standing to maintain proceeding.

  1. Subject to other provisions of this chapter, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by:
    1. The child;
    2. The individual who gave birth to the child unless a court has adjudicated that the individual is not a parent or the individual is a gestational carrier who is not a parent under article 8 of this chapter;
    3. An individual whose parentage is to be adjudicated;
    4. An individual who is a parent under this chapter;
    5. The office of child support services; or
    6. A representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated, or a minor.
  2. A foster parent does not have standing under this chapter to establish parentage based solely on their status as a foster parent.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-106. Notice of proceeding.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, an individual filing a proceeding to adjudicate parentage pursuant to this chapter shall give notice of the proceeding to adjudicate parentage to the following:
    1. The individual who gave birth to the child unless a court has adjudicated that the individual is not a parent;
    2. An individual who is a parent of the child under this chapter;
    3. A presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated parent of the child;
    4. A person whose parentage of the child is to be adjudicated; and
    5. The office of child support services, in cases in which either party is a recipient of public assistance benefits from the department of human services and has assigned the right to child support, or in cases in which either party has requested the services of the office of child support services.
  2. An individual entitled to notice under subsection (a) of this section and the office of child support services, where the office is involved pursuant to subsection (a)(5) of this section, has a right to intervene in the proceeding.
  3. Lack of notice required under subsection (a) of this section shall not render a judgment void. Lack of notice shall not preclude an individual entitled to notice under subsection (a) of this section from bringing a proceeding pursuant to this chapter.
  4. Notice of complaints for orders of parentage under § 15-8.1-804 shall be as required in § 15-8.1-804 .
  5. Donors, as defined in § 15-8.1-102 , are not entitled to notice.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-107. Personal jurisdiction.

  1. An individual shall not be adjudicated a parent unless the court has personal jurisdiction over the individual.
  2. A court having jurisdiction to adjudicate parentage may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, or the guardian or conservator of the individual, if the conditions prescribed for actions regarding interstate child support, pursuant to § 15-23.1-201 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, are fulfilled.
  3. Lack of jurisdiction over one person does not preclude the court from making an adjudication of parentage binding on another individual over whom the court has personal jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-108. Venue.

Venue for a proceeding to adjudicate parentage shall be in the county in which:

  1. The child resides or is present or, for purposes of article 7 or 8 of this chapter, is or will be born;
  2. Any parent or intended parent resides;
  3. The respondent resides or is present if the child does not reside in this state;
  4. A proceeding for probate or administration of the parent or alleged parent’s estate has been commenced; or
  5. A child protection proceeding with respect to the child has been commenced.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-109. Joinder of proceedings.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be joined with a proceeding for parental rights and responsibilities, parent-child contact, child support, child protection, termination of parental rights, divorce, annulment, legal separation, guardianship, probate or administration of an estate or other appropriate proceeding, or a challenge or rescission of acknowledgment of parentage. Such proceedings shall be in the family court.
  2. A respondent may not join a proceeding set forth in subsection (a) of this section with a proceeding to adjudicate parentage brought as part of an interstate child support enforcement action under § 15-23.1-201 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-110. Orders.

  1. In a proceeding under this chapter, the court may issue an interim order for support of a child in accordance with the child support guidelines under § 15-5-16.2 and as established by the family court with respect to an individual who is:
    1. A presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated parent of the child;
    2. Petitioning to have parentage adjudicated;
    3. Identified as the genetic parent through genetic testing under article 6 of this chapter;
    4. An alleged genetic parent who has declined to submit to genetic testing;
    5. Shown by a preponderance of evidence to be a parent of the child;
    6. The individual who gave birth to the child, other than a gestational carrier; or
    7. A parent under this chapter.
  2. In a proceeding under this chapter, the court may make an interim order regarding parental rights and responsibilities on a temporary basis.
  3. Final orders concerning child support or parent rights and responsibilities shall be governed by title 15.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-111. Admission of parentage authorized.

  1. A respondent in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may admit parentage of a child when making an appearance or during a hearing in a proceeding involving the child or by filing a pleading to such effect. An admission of parentage pursuant to this section is different from an acknowledgment of parentage, as provided in article 3 of this chapter.
  2. If the court finds an admission to be consistent with the provisions of this chapter and rejects any objection filed by another party, the court may issue an order adjudicating the child to be the child of the individual admitting parentage.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-112. Order on default.

The court may issue an order adjudicating the parentage of an individual who is in default, provided that:

  1. The individual was served with notice of the proceeding; and
  2. The individual is found by the court to be the parent of the child based on a preponderance of the evidence.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-113. Order adjudicating parentage.

  1. In a proceeding under this chapter, the court shall issue a final order adjudicating whether a person alleged or claiming to be a parent is the parent of a child.
  2. A final order under subsection (a) of this section, shall identify the child by name and date of birth.
  3. On request of a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that the name of the child be changed.
  4. If the final order under subsection (a) of this section, is at variance with the child’s birth certificate, the department of health, division of vital statistics, shall issue an amended birth certificate.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-114. Binding effect of determination of parentage.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a determination of parentage shall be binding on:
    1. All signatories to an acknowledgment form of parentage or denial of parentage, as provided in article 3 of this chapter; and
    2. All parties to an adjudication by a court acting under circumstances that satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of § 15-8.1-107 .
  2. In a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the court is deemed to have made an adjudication of the parentage of a child if:
    1. The court acts under circumstances that satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of § 15-8.1-107 ; and
    2. The final order:
      1. Expressly identified a child as a “child of the marriage” or “issue of the marriage” or by similar words indicates that the parties are the parents of the child; or
      2. Provides for support of the child by the parent or parents.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a determination of parentage shall be a defense in a subsequent proceeding seeking to adjudicate parentage by a person who was not a party to the earlier proceeding.
  4. Appeal of adjudication.
    1. A party to an adjudication of parentage or a party who received notice under § 15-8.1-106 , may challenge the adjudication only by appeal or in a manner otherwise consistent with the rules governing a collateral attack on a judgment.
    2. An individual who has standing under § 15-8.1-105 , but who did not receive notice of the adjudication of parentage under § 15-8.1-106 , and was not a party to the adjudication, may challenge the adjudication within two (2) years after the effective date of the adjudication. The court, in its discretion, shall permit the proceeding only if it finds that it is in the best interests of the child. If the court permits the proceeding, the court shall adjudicate parentage under § 15-8.1-206 .
  5. An appeal of an acknowledgment by a nonsignatory shall be provided in article 3 of this chapter.
  6. A child shall not be bound by a determination of parentage under this chapter unless:
    1. The determination was based on an unrescinded acknowledgment of parentage and the acknowledgment is consistent with the results of genetic testing;
    2. The determination was based on a finding consistent with the results of genetic testing;
    3. The determination of parentage was made under article 7 or 8 of this chapter; or
    4. The child was a party or was represented by an attorney, guardian ad litem, or similar individual in the proceeding in which the child’s parentage was adjudicated.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-115. Full faith and credit.

This state shall give full faith and credit to a determination of parentage and to an acknowledgment of parentage from another state if the determination or acknowledgment is valid and effective in accordance with the law of the other state.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Article 2 Establishment of Parentage

15-8.1-201. Recognized parents.

A person may establish parentage by any of the following:

  1. Giving birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in article 8 of this chapter;
  2. Adoption of the child pursuant to chapter 7 of title 15;
  3. An effective voluntary acknowledgment of parentage under article 3 of this chapter;
  4. An adjudication of parentage under this chapter, including adjudications based on an admission of parentage under § 15-8.1-111 ;
  5. A presumption of parentage under article 4 of this chapter, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding or a valid denial of parentage is made under article 3 of this chapter;
  6. An adjudication of de facto parentage under article 5 of this chapter;
  7. An adjudication that an alleged genetic parent is a parent under article 6 of this chapter;
  8. Consent to assisted reproduction under article 7 of this chapter; or
  9. Establishment of parentage under article 8 of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-202. Nondiscrimination.

Every child has the same rights under law as any other child without regard to the marital status or gender of the parents or the circumstances of the birth of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-203. Consequences of establishment of parentage.

Unless parentage has been terminated by a court order or an exception has been stated explicitly in this chapter, parentage established under this chapter applies for all purposes, including the rights and duties of parentage under the law.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-204. Determination of maternity and paternity.

Provisions of this chapter relating to determination of paternity may apply to determination of maternity as needed to determine parentage consistent with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-205. No limitation on child.

Nothing in this chapter limits the right of a child to bring an action to adjudicate parentage.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-206. Adjudicating competing claims of parentage.

  1. In a proceeding to adjudicate competing claims of parentage or challenges to a child’s parentage by two (2) or more persons, the court shall adjudicate parentage in the best interests of the child, based on the following factors:
    1. The age of the child;
    2. The length of time during which each individual assumed the role of parent of the child;
    3. The nature of the relationship between the child and each individual;
    4. The harm to the child if the relationship between the child and each individual is not recognized;
    5. The basis for each individual’s claim to parentage of the child;
    6. Other considerations arising from the disruption of the relationship between the child and each individual or the likelihood of other harm to the child; and
    7. Other equitable factors that the court deems relevant to the child’s best interests.
  2. If a person challenges parentage based on the results of genetic testing, in addition to the factors listed in subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider:
    1. The facts surrounding the discovery the individual might not be the genetic parent of the child; and
    2. The length of time between that of the time the individual was placed on notice that the individual might not be a genetic parent and the commencement of the proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Thomas M. Wall, Comment: The Pitfalls of Polyamorous Parenting in Rhode Island: The Crime of Adultery and the Best Interests of the Child Under the Uniform Parentage Act, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 766 (2021).

Article 3 Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage

15-8.1-301. Acknowledgment of parentage.

  1. The following individuals may sign an acknowledgment of parentage to establish parentage of a child:
    1. An individual who gave birth to the child;
    2. An individual who is the alleged genetic parent of the child;
    3. An individual who is an intended parent of the child under § 15-8.1-703 ; and
    4. A presumed parent under article 4 of this chapter.
  2. The acknowledgment shall be signed by both the individual who gave birth to the child and by the individual seeking to establish a parent-child relationship and shall be witnessed and signed by at least one other individual and shall contain the following provisions:
    1. A statement that the child whose parentage is being acknowledged does not have a presumed parent other than the individual seeking to establish the parent-child relationship or has a presumed parent whose full name is stated and does not have another acknowledged, adjudicated or intended parent under articles 7 and 8 of this chapter other than the individual who gave birth to the child.
    2. A statement that the signatories understand that the acknowledgment is the equivalent of an adjudication of parentage of the child and that a challenge to the acknowledgment is permitted only under limited circumstances and is barred two (2) years after the effective date of the acknowledgment unless there is another presumed parent or genetic parent who could not reasonably have known about the birth of the child and commences a proceeding under this section within two (2) years after learning of the child’s birth.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-302. Acknowledgment of parentage void.

An acknowledgment of parentage shall be void if, at the time of signing:

  1. An individual other than the individual seeking to establish parentage is a presumed parent, unless a denial of parentage in a signed record has been filed with the state registrar for vital records; or
  2. An individual, other than the individual who gave birth, is an acknowledged or adjudicated parent, or an intended parent under article 7 or 8 of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-303. Denial of parentage.

  1. An individual presumed to be a parent or an alleged genetic parent may sign a denial of parentage only in the limited circumstances set forth in this section.
  2. A denial of parentage shall be valid only if:
    1. An acknowledgment of parentage by another individual has been filed pursuant to this chapter;
    2. The denial is in a record and is witnessed and signed by at least one other individual; and
    3. The presumed or alleged genetic parent executing the denial has not previously:
      1. Acknowledged parentage, unless the previous acknowledgment has been rescinded pursuant to § 15-8.1-307 , or successfully challenged the acknowledgment pursuant to § 15-8.1-308 ; or
      2. Been adjudicated to be the parent of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-304. Conditions for acknowledgment or denial of parentage.

  1. Completed forms for acknowledgment of parentage and denial of parentage shall be filed with the state registrar for vital records.
  2. An acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage may be signed before or after the birth of a child.
  3. An acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage takes effect on the date of the birth of the child or the filing of the document with the department of vital records, whichever occurs later.
  4. An acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage signed by a minor shall be valid provided it is otherwise in compliance with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-305. Equivalent to adjudication, no ratification required.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in §§ 15-8.1-307 and 15-8.1-308 , a valid acknowledgment of parentage under § 15-8.1-301 , filed with the department of vital records, is equivalent to an adjudication of parentage of a child and confers upon the acknowledged parent all of the rights and duties of a parent.
  2. Judicial or administrative ratification is neither permitted nor required for an unrescinded or unchallenged acknowledgment of parentage.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in §§ 15-8.1-307 and 15-8.1-308 , a valid denial of parentage under § 15-8.1-303 , filed with the department of vital records, in conjunction with a valid acknowledgment of parentage under § 15-8.1-301 , is equivalent to an adjudication of the nonparentage of the presumed parent or alleged genetic parent and discharges the presumed parent or alleged genetic parent from all rights and duties of a parent.
  4. A signatory of an acknowledgment of parentage may rescind or challenge the acknowledgment in accordance with §§ 15-8.1-307 through 15-8.1-309 .

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-306. Waiver of filing fee.

If an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage is filed at a hospital, contemporaneously with birth, the department of health shall not charge a filing fee.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-307. Timing of rescission.

  1. A signatory may rescind an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage under this chapter by commencing a court proceeding before the earlier of:
    1. Sixty (60) days after the effective date of the acknowledgment or denial, as provided in § 15-8.1-304 ; or
    2. The date of the first hearing before a court in a proceeding, to which the signatory is a party, to adjudicate an issue relating to the child, including a proceeding that establishes child support.
  2. If an acknowledgment of parentage is rescinded under this section, any associated denial of parentage becomes invalid, and the department of human services shall notify:
    1. The individual who gave birth to the child;
    2. Any individual who signed a denial of parentage of the child; and
    3. The department of vital records that the acknowledgment of parentage has been rescinded. Failure to provide notice as required by this section does not affect the validity of the rescission.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-308. Challenge to acknowledgment after expiration of period for rescission.

  1. After the period for rescission under § 15-8.1-307 has expired, a signatory of an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage may commence a proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment or denial only:
    1. On the basis of fraud, duress, coercion, threat of harm, or material mistake of fact; and
    2. Within two (2) years after the acknowledgment or denial is effective in accordance with § 15-8.1-304 .
  2. If an acknowledgment of parentage has been made in accordance with this chapter, an individual who is neither the child nor a signatory to the acknowledgment who seeks to challenge the validity of the acknowledgment and adjudicate parentage shall commence a proceeding within two (2) years after the effective date of the acknowledgment unless the individual did not know and could not reasonably have known of the individual’s potential parentage due to a material misrepresentation or concealment, in which case the proceeding shall be commenced within two (2) years after the discovery of the individual’s potential parentage. An individual under this section who seeks to challenge the validity of an acknowledgment and adjudicate parentage must have standing under § 15-8.1-105 . The court may permit the proceeding only if the court finds that the proceeding is in the best interests of the child. If the court permits the proceeding, the court shall adjudicate parentage under § 15-8.1-206 .
  3. An individual challenging an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage pursuant to this section has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
  4. A court proceeding in which the validity of an acknowledgment of parentage is challenged shall be consolidated with any other pending court actions regarding the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-309. Procedure for rescission or challenge.

  1. Every signatory to an acknowledgment of parentage and any related denial of parentage shall be made a party to a proceeding to judicially rescind an acknowledgment under § 15-8.1-307(a) or a challenge to the acknowledgment or denial under § 15-8.1-308 .
  2. For the purposes of a judicial rescission under § 15-8.1-307(a) or a challenge to an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage under § 15-8.1-308 , a signatory submits to personal jurisdiction of this state by signing the acknowledgment or denial, effective upon the filing of the document with the department of vital records pursuant to § 15-8.1-304 .
  3. Except for good cause shown, during the pendency of a proceeding to judicially rescind under § 15-8.1-307(a) or challenge an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage under § 15-8.1-308 , the court shall not suspend the legal responsibilities of a signatory arising from the acknowledgment, including the duty to pay child support.
  4. A proceeding to challenge an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage under § 15-8.1-308 shall be conducted as a proceeding to adjudicate parentage pursuant to article 1 of this chapter.
  5. At the conclusion of a proceeding to rescind or challenge an acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage, the court shall order the department of vital records to amend the birth record of the child, if appropriate.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-310. Forms for acknowledgment and denial of parentage.

  1. The department of vital records shall develop an acknowledgment of parentage form and denial of parentage form for execution of parentage under this chapter.
  2. The acknowledgment of parentage form shall provide notice of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights and responsibilities that arise from signing the acknowledgment and shall state that:
    1. There is no other presumed parent of the child or, if there is another presumed parent, shall state that parent’s full name;
    2. There is no other acknowledged parent, adjudicated parent, or individual who is an intended parent under articles 7 or 8 of this chapter other than the individual who gave birth to the child; and
    3. The signatories understand that the acknowledgment is the equivalent of a court adjudication of parentage of the child and that a challenge to the acknowledgment is permitted only under limited circumstances.
  3. A valid acknowledgment of parentage or denial of parentage is not affected by a later modification of the prescribed form.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-311. Release of information.

The department of health may release information relating to an acknowledgment of parentage under § 15-8.1-301 , as set forth in § 23-3-23 .

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-312. Adoption of rules.

The department of health shall promulgate rules and regulation to implement this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Article 4 Presumed Parentage

15-8.1-401. Presumption of parentage.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, an individual is presumed to be a parent of a child if:
    1. The individual and the individual who gave birth to the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage;
    2. The individual and the individual who gave birth to the child were married to each other and the child is born not later than three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, divorce, or dissolution;
    3. The individual and the individual who gave birth to the child married each other after the birth of the child and the individual at any time asserted parentage of the child and the individual agreed to be and is named as a parent of the child on the birth certificate of the child; or
    4. The individual resided in the same household with the child, and the individual and another parent of the child openly held out the child as that person’s own from the time the child was born or adopted and for a period of two (2) years thereafter, including periods of temporary absence, and assumed personal, financial or custodial responsibilities for the child.
  2. A presumption of parentage shall be rebuttable and may be overcome, and competing claims to parentage resolved only by court order under this chapter or a valid denial of parentage pursuant to article 3 of this chapter.
  3. A presumed parent shall be established as a legal parent by the execution of a valid voluntary acknowledgement of parentage under article 3, by an adjudication of parentage under this chapter or as otherwise provided in this article.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-402. Challenge to presumed parent.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a proceeding to challenge the parentage of an individual whose parentage is presumed under § 15-8.1-401 , shall be commenced within two (2) years after the birth of the child.
  2. A proceeding to challenge the parentage of an individual whose parentage is presumed under § 15-8.1-401 , may be commenced two (2) years or more after the birth of the child in the following circumstances:
    1. A presumed parent who is not the genetic parent of a child and who could not reasonably have known about the birth of the child may commence a proceeding under this section within two (2) years after learning of the child’s birth.
    2. An alleged genetic parent who did not know of the potential genetic parentage of a child and who could not reasonably have known on account of material misrepresentation or concealment may commence a proceeding under this section within two (2) years after discovering the potential genetic parentage. If the person is adjudicated to be the genetic parent of the child, the court may not disestablish a presumed parent.
    3. Regarding a presumption under § 15-8.1-401(a)(4) , another parent of the child may challenge a presumption of parentage if that parent openly held out the child as the presumptive parent’s child due to duress, coercion, or threat of harm. Evidence of duress, coercion, or threat of harm may include whether within the prior ten (10) years, the person presumed to be a parent pursuant to § 15-8.1-401(a)(4) , has been convicted of domestic assault, sexual assault, or sexual exploitation of the child or another parent of the child, was subject to a final abuse protection order pursuant to chapter 15 of title 15, because the person was found to have committed abuse against the child or another parent of the child, or was substantiated for abuse against the child or another parent of the child pursuant to § 11-9-5.3 .
  3. Challenges under this section shall be adjudicated pursuant to § 15-8.1-206 .

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 395, § 2, effective July 14, 2021.

15-8.1-403. Multiple presumptions or conflicting claims.

  1. If two (2) or more conflicting presumptions arise under this chapter, the court shall adjudicate parentage pursuant to § 15-8.1-206 .
  2. If in a proceeding to adjudicate a presumed parent’s parentage of a child, another individual, in addition to the individual who gave birth to the child, asserts a claim to parentage of the child, the court shall adjudicate parentage pursuant to § 15-8.1-206 .

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Article 5 De Facto Parentage

15-8.1-501. Adjudication.

    1. In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of an individual who claims to be a de facto parent of the child, if there is only one other individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child, the court shall adjudicate the individual who claims to be a de facto parent to be a parent of the child if the individual demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that:
      1. The individual resided with the child as a regular member of the child’s household for a significant period of time;
      2. The individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
      3. The individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation;
      4. The individual held out the child as the person’s child;
      5. The individual established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child which is parental in nature;
      6. The individual and another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship required under subsection (a)(1)(v) of this section; and
      7. Continuing the relationship between the individual and the child is in the best interests of the child.
    2. A parent of the child may use evidence of duress, coercion, or threat of harm to contest an allegation that the parent fostered or supported a bonded and dependent relationship as provided in subsection (a)(1)(vi) of this section.

      Such evidence may include whether within the prior ten (10) years, the individual seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent has been convicted of domestic assault, sexual assault, or sexual exploitation of the child or another parent of the child, was subject to a final abuse protection order pursuant to chapter 15 of title 15, because the individual was found to have committed abuse against the child or another parent of the child, or was substantiated for abuse against the child or another parent of the child pursuant to chapter 11 of title 40.

  1. In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of an individual who claims to be a de facto parent of the child, if there is more than one other individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child and the court determines that the requirements of subsection (a) of this section are met by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall adjudicate parentage under § 15-8.1-206 , subject to other applicable limitations in this chapter.
  2. The adjudication of an individual as a de facto parent under this chapter does not disestablish the parentage of any other parent.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Thomas M. Wall, Comment: The Pitfalls of Polyamorous Parenting in Rhode Island: The Crime of Adultery and the Best Interests of the Child Under the Uniform Parentage Act, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 766 (2021).

15-8.1-502. Complaint.

  1. An individual seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child shall file a complaint with the family court before the child reaches eighteen (18) years of age. Both the individual seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent and the child must be alive at the time of the filing. The complaint shall include a verified affidavit alleging facts to support the existence of a de facto parent relationship with the child. The complaint and affidavit shall be served on all parents and legal guardians of the child and any other party to the proceeding.
  2. An adverse party, parent, or legal guardian may file a pleading and verified affidavit in response to the petition that shall be served on all parties to the proceeding.
  3. The court shall determine on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits whether the person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent has presented prima facie evidence of the criteria for de facto parentage as provided in § 15-8.1-501(a) and, therefore, has standing to proceed with a parentage action. The court, in its sole discretion, may hold a hearing to determine disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing.
  4. The court may enter an interim order concerning contact between the child and an individual with standing seeking adjudication under this chapter as a de facto parent of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Thomas M. Wall, Comment: The Pitfalls of Polyamorous Parenting in Rhode Island: The Crime of Adultery and the Best Interests of the Child Under the Uniform Parentage Act, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 766 (2021).

Article 6 Genetic Parentage

15-8.1-601. Scope.

This chapter governs procedures and requirements of genetic testing and genetic testing results of an individual to determine parentage and adjudication of parentage based on genetic testing, whether the individual voluntarily submits to testing or is tested pursuant to an order of the court or an administrative agency.

Genetic testing shall not be used to challenge the parentage of an individual who is a parent under articles 7 or 8 of this chapter or to establish the parentage of an individual who is a donor.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-602. Requirements for genetic testing.

Genetic testing shall be of a type reasonably relied upon by scientific and medical experts in the field of genetic testing and performed in a testing laboratory accredited by a national association of blood banks or an accrediting body designated by the secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-603. Authority to order or deny genetic testing.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, in a proceeding pursuant to this chapter to determine parentage, the court shall order the child and any other individual to submit to genetic testing if a request for testing is supported by the sworn statement of a party:
    1. Alleging a reasonable possibility that the individual is the child’s genetic parent; or
    2. Denying genetic parentage of the child and stating facts establishing a reasonable possibility that the individual is not a genetic parent.
  2. Prior to a proceeding to establish genetic parentage and/or support in conformance with the state’s obligations under Title IV, Part D of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., if the alleged genetic parent in response to a complaint supported by a sworn affidavit, filed by the office of child support services, denies parentage, the office of child support services shall have the authority to administratively order the parties to undergo genetic testing as described above, without the necessity of making application to the court, and the parties shall attend and submit to genetic testing under penalty of default.
  3. The office of child support services may order genetic testing only if there is no presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated parent of a child other than the individual who gave birth to the child.
  4. The court or office of child support services shall not order in utero genetic testing.
  5. If two (2) or more individuals are subject to court-ordered genetic testing, the court may order that testing be completed concurrently or sequentially.
  6. Genetic testing of an individual who gave birth to a child is not a condition precedent to testing of the child and an individual whose genetic parentage of the child is being determined. If the individual who gave birth is unavailable or declines to submit to genetic testing, the court may order genetic testing of the child and each individual whose genetic parentage of the child is being adjudicated.
  7. In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of a child having an acknowledged, adjudicated, de facto, presumed parent or intended parent, the court may deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or deny admissibility of the test results at trial if it determines that:
    1. The conduct of the parties estops a party from denying parentage; or
    2. It would be an inequitable interference with the relationship between the child and an acknowledged, adjudicated, de facto, presumed, or intended parent, or would otherwise be contrary to the best interests of the child as provided in subsection (h) of this section.
  8. In determining whether to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing under this chapter or a request for admission of such test results at trial, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, including the following factors, if relevant:
    1. The length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the time that a parent was placed on notice that genetic parentage is at issue;
    2. The length of time during which the parent has assumed a parental role for the child;
    3. The facts surrounding discovery that genetic parentage is at issue;
    4. The nature of the relationship between the child and the parent;
    5. The age of the child;
    6. Any adverse effect on the child that may result if parentage is successfully disproved;
    7. The nature of the relationship between the child and any alleged parent;
    8. The extent to which the passage of time reduces the chances of establishing the parentage of another individual and a child support obligation in favor of the child; and
    9. Any additional factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the relationship between the child and the parent or the chance of an adverse effect on the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 395, § 3, effective July 14, 2021.

15-8.1-604. Genetic testing results.

  1. An individual shall be identified as a genetic parent of a child if the genetic testing of the individual complies with this chapter and the results of testing disclose that the individual has at least a ninety-nine percent (99%) probability of parentage as determined by the testing laboratory.
  2. Identification of a genetic parent through genetic testing does not establish parentage absent adjudication under this chapter and a court may rely on nongenetic evidence to determine parentage, including parentage by acknowledgment pursuant to article 3 of this chapter or by admission pursuant to § 15-8.1-111 , presumed parentage under article 4 of this chapter, de facto parentage under article 5 of this chapter, and parentage by intended parents under articles 7 or 8 of this chapter.
  3. An individual identified under subsection (a) of this section as a genetic parent of a child may rebut the genetic testing results only by other genetic testing satisfying the requirements of this chapter that:
    1. Excludes the individual as a genetic parent of the child; or
    2. Identifies an individual, other than the individual who gave birth to the child, as a possible genetic parent of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-605. Report of genetic testing.

  1. A report of genetic testing shall be in a record and signed under the penalty of perjury by a designee of the testing laboratory. A report made under the requirements of this chapter is self-authenticating.
  2. A party in possession of results of genetic testing shall provide such results to all other parties to the parentage action upon receipt of the results and not later than fifteen (15) days before any hearing at which the results may be admitted into evidence.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-606. Admissibility of results of genetic testing.

  1. Unless waived by the parties, a party intending to rely on the results of genetic testing shall do all of the following:
    1. Make the test results available to the other parties to the parentage action at least fifteen (15) days prior to any hearing at which the results may be admitted into evidence;
    2. Provide notice to the court and other parties to the proceeding of the intent to use the test results at the hearing; and
    3. Provide the other parties notice of this statutory section, including the need to object in a timely fashion.
  2. Any motion objecting to genetic test results shall be made in writing to the court and to the party intending to introduce the evidence at least seven (7) days prior to any hearing at which the results may be introduced into evidence. If no timely objection is made, the written results shall be admissible as evidence without the need for foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy.
  3. If a child has a presumed parent, acknowledged parent, de facto parent, or adjudicated parent, the results of genetic testing shall be admissible to adjudicate parentage only:
    1. With the consent of each individual who is a parent of the child under this chapter, unless the court finds that admission of the testing is in the best interests of the child as provided in § 15-8.1-603 (h); or
    2. Pursuant to an order of the court under § 15-8.1-603 .

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-607. Additional genetic testing.

The court shall order additional genetic testing upon the request of a party who contests the result of the initial testing. If the initial genetic testing identified an individual as a genetic parent of the child under § 15-8.1-604 , the court shall not order additional testing unless the party provides advance payment for the testing.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-608. Adjudication of parentage of child with alleged genetic parent.

    1. If genetic testing results, pursuant to § 15-8.1-604 , exclude an individual as the genetic parent of a child, the court shall find that individual is not a genetic parent of the child and may not adjudicate the individual as the child’s parent on the basis of genetic testing.
    2. If genetic testing results, pursuant to § 15-8.1-604 , identify an individual as the genetic parent of a child and the only other individual with a claim to parentage of the child is the individual who gave birth to the child, the court shall find that individual to be the genetic parent and may adjudicate the individual as the child’s parent if the alleged genetic parent:
      1. Is identified under § 15-8.1-604 as a genetic parent of the child and the identification is not successfully rebutted under § 15-8.1-604;
      2. Admits parentage in a pleading, when making an appearance, or during a hearing, the court accepts the admission, and the court determines the alleged genetic parent to be a parent of the child;
      3. Declines to submit to genetic testing ordered by the court or the office of child support services, in which case the court may adjudicate the alleged genetic parent to be a parent of the child even if the alleged genetic parent denies a genetic relationship with the child;
      4. Is in default after service of process and the court determines the alleged genetic parent to be a parent of the child; or
      5. Is neither identified nor excluded as a genetic parent by genetic testing and, based on other evidence, the court determines the alleged genetic parent to be a parent of the child.
    3. Subject to other limitations in this chapter, if in a proceeding involving an alleged genetic parent, at least one other individual in addition to the individual who gave birth to the child has a claim of parentage of the child, the court shall adjudicate parentage under § 15-8.1-206 .

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-609. Costs of genetic testing.

  1. The costs of initial genetic testing shall be paid:
    1. By the office of child support services in a proceeding in which the office is providing services, if the office requests such testing;
    2. As agreed by the parties or, if the parties cannot agree, by the individual who made the request for genetic testing; or
    3. As ordered by the court.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, an individual who challenges a presumption, acknowledgment, or admission of parentage shall bear the cost for any genetic testing requested by such individual.
  3. In cases in which the payment for the costs of initial genetic testing is advanced pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the office of child support services may seek reimbursement from the genetic parent whose parent-child relationship is established.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-610. Deceased individual.

For good cause shown, the court may order genetic testing of a deceased individual.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-611. Confidentiality of genetic testing.

  1. A report of genetic testing for parentage is exempt from public inspection and copying pursuant to chapter 2 of title 38 (“access to public records act”), and shall be kept confidential and released only as provided in this chapter.
  2. An individual shall not intentionally release a report of genetic testing or the genetic material of another individual for a purpose not relevant to a parentage proceeding without the written permission of the individual who furnished the genetic material. An individual who violates this section shall be imprisoned not more than one year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-612. Precluding establishment of parentage by perpetrator of sexual assault.

  1. In a proceeding in which a person is alleged to have committed a sexual assault that resulted in the birth of a child, the person giving birth may seek to preclude the establishment of the other person’s parentage.
  2. This section shall not apply if the person alleged to have committed a sexual assault has previously been adjudicated to be a parent of the child.
  3. A complaint under this section must be preceded by the arrest and charge of the person alleged to have committed a sexual assault in violation of §§ 11-37-2 or 11-37-8.1 on the plaintiff that resulted in the birth of the child.
  4. In a parentage proceeding, the person giving birth may file a complaint, making an allegation under subsection (a) of this section at any time within two (2) years of the alleged sexual assault that resulted in the birth of the child.
  5. During the pendency of proceedings on this complaint, the court may enter temporary orders regarding the defendant’s custody, contact and visitation with the child.
  6. The standard of proof that a child was conceived as a result of the person sexually assaulting the person who gave birth to the child may be proven by the plaintiff by clear and convincing evidence that the person was convicted of a sexual assault against the person giving birth and that the child was conceived as a result of the sexual assault.
  7. If the court finds that the burden of proof under subsection (f) of this section is met, the court shall enter an order:
    1. Adjudicating that the person alleged to have committed the sexual assault is not a parent of the child and not entitled to have any contact, custody or visitation with the child;
    2. Requiring the department of health amend the birth certificate to delete the name of the person precluded as a parent; and
    3. Requiring that the person convicted of committing a sexual assault pay child support or birth-related costs, or both, unless the person giving birth requests otherwise.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-613. Past liabilities.

  1. For the purpose of this article, an action to determine the existence of a genetic parent and child relationship is not barred until four (4) years after the child reaches the age of majority.
  2. A genetic parent’s liability for past education and necessary support and maintenance are limited to a period of six (6) years next, preceding the commencement of an action under this article.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Article 7 Parentage by Assisted Reproduction

15-8.1-701. Scope.

This article does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by sexual intercourse or assisted reproduction under a surrogacy agreement under article 8 of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-702. Parental status of donor.

  1. A donor is not a parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a person who provides a gamete or gametes or an embryo or embryos to be used for assisted reproduction for the person’s spouse is a parent of the resulting child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-703. Parentage of child of assisted reproduction.

An individual who consents under § 15-8.1-704 to assisted reproduction by another individual with the intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted reproduction is a parent of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-704. Consent to assisted reproduction.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, the consent described in § 15-8.1-703 , must be in a record signed by the individual giving birth to a child conceived by assisted reproduction and the individual who intends to be a parent of the child.
  2. In the absence of a record pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, before, on, or after the birth of the child, a court may adjudicate an individual as the parent of a child, if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    1. Prior to conception or birth of the child, the parties entered into an agreement that they both intended to be the parents of the child; or
    2. The parties resided with the child and assumed the duties and responsibilities of parentage.
  3. The court may order after hearing that the parties be listed on the birth certificate.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-705. Limitation on spouse’s dispute of parentage.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a spouse may commence a proceeding to challenge his or her parentage of a child born by assisted reproduction during the marriage within two (2) years after the birth of the child if the court finds that the spouse did not consent to the assisted reproduction before, on, or after the birth of the child or that the spouse withdrew consent pursuant to § 15-8.1-706 .
  2. A spouse or the individual who gave birth to the child may commence a proceeding to challenge the spouse’s parentage of a child born by assisted reproduction at any time if the court determines:
    1. The spouse neither provided a gamete for, nor consented to, the assisted reproduction;
    2. The spouse and the individual who gave birth to the child have not cohabited since the probable time of assisted reproduction; and
    3. The spouse never openly held out the child as his or her child.
  3. This section shall apply to a spouse’s dispute of parentage even if the marriage is declared invalid after assisted reproduction occurs.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-706. Effect of dissolution of marriage or withdrawal of consent.

  1. If a marriage is dissolved by final decree of divorce before transfer or implantation of gametes or embryos, the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse consented in a signed record, with notice to the other spouse and the individual giving birth, that, if assisted reproduction were to occur after a divorce, the former spouse would be a parent of the child.
  2. Consent of an individual to assisted reproduction, pursuant to § 15-8.1-704 , may be withdrawn by that person in a signed record, with notice to the individual giving birth and any other intended parent, before transfer or implantation of gametes or embryos. An individual who withdraws consent under this subsection is not a parent of the resulting child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-707. Parental status of a deceased individual.

  1. If an individual who intends to be a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction dies during the period between the transfer of a gamete or embryo and the birth of the child, the individual’s death does not preclude the establishment of the individual’s parentage of the child if the individual otherwise would be a parent of the child pursuant to this article.
    1. If an individual who consented in a record to assisted reproduction by the individual giving birth to the child dies before transfer or implantation of gametes or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction unless:
      1. The deceased individual consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after the death of the deceased individual, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child; or
      2. The deceased individual’s intent to be a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction after the individual’s death is established by a preponderance of the evidence.
    2. An individual is a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction under subsection (b)(1) of this section, only if:
      1. The embryo is in utero not later than thirty-six (36) months after the individual’s death; or
      2. The child is born not later than forty-five (45) months after the individual’s death.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-708. Parentage orders of children born of assisted reproduction.

  1. An individual consenting to assisted reproduction consistent with this article, an individual who is a parent pursuant to §§ 15-8.1-703 and 15-8.1-704 , or the individual giving birth, may commence a proceeding in the family court, before, on, or after birth of a resulting child, to obtain a parentage order or determination of parentage:
    1. Declaring that the intended parent or parents are the parent or parents of the resulting child and ordering that parental rights and responsibilities vest exclusively in the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child;
    2. Sealing the record from the public to protect the privacy of the child and the parties;
    3. Designating the contents of the birth certificate and directing the department of health to designate the intended parent or parents as the parent or parents of the child; or
    4. For any relief that the court determines necessary and proper.
  2. A proceeding under this section may be commenced before, on, or after the birth of the child.
  3. Neither the donor, the state, nor the department of health is a necessary party to a proceeding under this section.
  4. The family court shall forward a certified copy of the order issued pursuant to this section to the department of health and to the intended parents or their representative.
  5. The intended parent or parents and any resulting child shall have access to the court records relating to the proceeding at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-709. Laboratory error.

If due to a laboratory or clinical error, the child is not genetically related to either the intended parent or parents or any donor who donated to the intended parent or parents, the intended parent or parents are the parents of the child unless otherwise determined by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Article 8 Parentage by Gestational Carrier Agreement

15-8.1-801. Eligibility to enter gestational carrier agreement.

  1. In order to execute an agreement to act as a gestational carrier, an individual shall:
    1. Be at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
    2. Have completed a medical evaluation;
    3. Have completed a mental health consultation by a licensed professional who is independent of the facility or providers that undertake the assisted reproduction procedures;
    4. Have had independent legal representation of the individual’s own choosing, and paid for by the intended parent or parents regarding the terms of the gestational carrier agreement, and have been advised of the potential legal consequences of the gestational carrier agreement; and
    5. Not have contributed gametes that will ultimately result in an embryo that the gestational carrier will attempt to carry to term, unless the gestational carrier is entering into an agreement with a family member.
  2. Prior to executing a gestational carrier agreement, an individual or individuals intending to become a parent or parents, whether genetically related to the child or not, shall:
    1. Be at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
    2. Have completed a medical evaluation and a mental health consultation; and
    3. Have retained independent legal representation regarding the terms of the gestational carrier agreement and have been advised of the potential legal consequences of the gestational carrier agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-802. Gestational carrier agreement.

  1. A prospective gestational carrier, that individual’s spouse, if any, and the intended parent or parents may enter into a written agreement that:
    1. The prospective gestational carrier agrees to pregnancy by means of assisted reproduction;
    2. The prospective gestational carrier and that individual’s spouse, if any, have no rights and duties as the parents of a child conceived through assisted reproduction; and
    3. The intended parent or parents will be the parents of any resulting child.
  2. A gestational carrier agreement is enforceable only if it meets the following requirements:
    1. The agreement shall be in writing and signed by all parties;
    2. The agreement shall not require more than a one-year term to achieve pregnancy; and
    3. At least one of the intended parents shall be a resident of the United States.
    4. The agreement shall be executed before the commencement of any medical procedures, other than the medical evaluations required by § 15-8.1-801 and, in every instance, before transfer of embryos or gametes.
    5. The gestational carrier and the intended parent or parents shall meet the eligibility requirements of § 15-8.1-801 .
    6. If any party is married, the party’s spouse shall be a party to the agreement.
    7. The gestational carrier and the intended parent or parents shall be represented by independent legal counsel in all matters concerning the agreement and each counsel shall affirmatively so state in a written declaration attached to the agreement. The declarations shall state that the agreement meets the requirements of this chapter and shall be solely relied upon by health care providers and staff at the time of birth and by the department of health for birth registration and certification purposes in the absence of a court order to the contrary.
    8. The parties to the agreement shall sign a written acknowledgment of having received a copy of the agreement.
    9. The signing of the agreement shall be witnessed and signed by at least one other individual.
    10. The agreement shall expressly provide that the gestational carrier:
      1. Shall undergo assisted reproduction and attempt to carry and give birth to any resulting child;
      2. Has no claim to parentage of any resulting children and all rights of parentage shall vest in the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the children, regardless of whether a court order has been issued at the time of birth; and
      3. Shall acknowledge the exclusive parentage of the intended parent or parents of all resulting children.
    11. If the gestational carrier is married, the carrier’s spouse:
      1. Shall acknowledge and agree to abide by the obligations imposed on the gestational carrier by the terms of the gestational carrier agreement;
      2. Has no claim to parentage of any resulting children and all rights of parentage shall vest in the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the children, regardless of whether a court order has been issued at the time of birth; and
      3. Shall acknowledge the exclusive parentage of the intended parent or parents of all resulting children.
    12. The gestational carrier shall have the right to use the services of a health care provider or providers of the gestational carrier’s choosing to provide care during the pregnancy.
    13. The agreement should provide for the disposition of embryos, if any, in the event of termination of the agreement, the death of an intended parent or parents, or of the divorce of the intended parents before transfer or implantation.
    14. The intended parent or parents shall:
      1. Be the exclusive parent or parents and accept parental rights and responsibilities of all resulting children immediately upon birth regardless of the number, gender, or mental or physical condition of the child or children; and
      2. Assume responsibility for the financial support of all resulting children immediately upon the birth of the children.
  3. Except as provided in § 15-8.1-809 , a gestational carrier agreement may include provisions for payment of consideration and reasonable expenses to a prospective gestational carrier, provided they are negotiated in good faith between the parties.
  4. A gestational carrier agreement shall permit the individual acting as a gestational carrier to make all health and welfare decisions regarding the gestational carrier’s health and pregnancy, including, but not limited to, whether to consent to a caesarean section or multiple embryo transfer, and shall not enlarge or diminish the gestational carrier’s right to terminate the pregnancy. Except as otherwise provided by law, any written or verbal agreement purporting to waive or limit these rights is void as against public policy.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-803. Parental rights and responsibilities.

    1. If a gestational carrier agreement satisfies the requirements of this article, the intended parent or parents are the parent or parents of the resulting child and parental rights and responsibilities shall vest exclusively in the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child, and the resulting child is considered the child of the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child. Neither the gestational carrier nor the gestational carrier’s spouse, if any, is the parent of the resulting child.
    2. An individual who is determined to be a parent of the resulting child is obligated to support the child. The breach of the gestational carrier agreement by the intended parent or parents does not relieve the intended parent or parents of the obligation to support the resulting child.
    3. Notwithstanding subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section, if genetic testing indicates a genetic relationship between the gestational carrier and the child and the child was not conceived pursuant to a gestational carrier agreement with a family member, then parentage shall be determined by the family court pursuant to articles 1 through 6 of this chapter.
  1. If, due to a laboratory or clinical error, the resulting child is not genetically related to either the intended parent or parents or any donor who donated to the intended parent or parents, the intended parent or parents are considered the parent or parents of the child and not the gestational carrier and the carrier’s spouse, if any, subject to any other claim of parentage.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-804. Birth orders.

  1. Before the birth of a resulting child, a party to a gestational carrier agreement may commence a proceeding in the family court or the superior court to obtain a birth order declaring the parentage of a child. After the birth of a resulting child, the family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over a birth order.
  2. The birth order shall:
    1. Declare that at least one of the intended parents is a United States resident;
    2. Declare that the intended parent or parents are the parent or parents of the resulting child and that parental rights and responsibilities vest exclusively in the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child;
    3. Designate the contents of the birth certificate and direct the department of health to designate the intended parent or parents as the parent or parents of the child. The department of health may charge a reasonable fee for the issuance of a birth certificate;
    4. Seal the record from the public to protect the privacy of the child and the parents; and
    5. Provide any relief the court determines necessary and proper.
  3. Neither the state nor the department of health is a necessary party to a proceeding under subsection (a) of this section. Any party to the gestational carrier agreement not joining in the complaint must be served with notice of the proceeding.
  4. A complaint for an order of parentage under this section must be verified and include the following:
    1. A certification from the attorney representing the intended parent or parents and the attorney representing the person acting as a gestational carrier that the requirements of §§ 15-8.1-801 and 15-8.1-802 have been met; and
    2. A statement from all parties to the gestational carrier agreement that they entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily.
  5. Where the court finds that the requirements of §§ 15-8.1-801 and 15-8.1-802 have been satisfied, the order of parentage will include the following:
    1. Declaring, that upon the birth of the child born during the term of the gestational carrier agreement, the intended parent or parents is/are the legal parent or parents of the child;
    2. Declaring, that upon birth of the child born during the term of the gestational carrier agreement, the individual acting as the gestational carrier, and the spouse of the individual acting as the gestational carrier, if any, is not the legal parent of the child;
    3. Ordering the individual acting as a gestational carrier and the spouse of the individual acting as a gestational carrier, if any, to transfer the child to the intended parent or parents if this has not already occurred;
    4. Ordering the intended parent or parents to assume responsibility for the maintenance and support of the child immediately upon the birth of the child if this has not already occurred; and
    5. Designating the contents of the birth certificate and directing the department of health to designate the intended parent or parents as the parent or parents of the child.
  6. The court shall forward a certified copy of the order issued pursuant to this section to the department of health and the intended parents or their representative.
  7. The intended parent or parents and any resulting child shall have access to their court records at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-805. Jurisdiction.

Subject to the jurisdictional standards of chapter 10 of title 8, the court conducting a proceeding under this chapter has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of all matters arising out of the gestational carrier agreement until a child born to the gestational carrier during the period governed by the agreement attains the age of one hundred eighty (180) days.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-806. Termination of gestational carrier agreement.

  1. A party to a gestational carrier agreement may withdraw consent to any medical procedure and may terminate the gestational carrier agreement at any time prior to any embryo transfer or implantation by giving written notice of termination to all other parties.
  2. Upon termination of the gestational carrier agreement under subsection (a) of this section, and unless a gestational carrier agreement provides otherwise, the gestational carrier is entitled to keep all payments received and obtain all payments to which the gestational carrier is entitled through the date of termination. Except in a case involving fraud, neither a prospective gestational carrier nor the gestational carrier’s spouse, if any, is liable to the intended parent or parents for terminating a gestational carrier agreement under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-807. Effect of subsequent change of marital status.

Unless a gestational carrier agreement expressly provides otherwise:

  1. The marriage of a gestational carrier or of an intended parent after the agreement has been signed by all parties does not affect the validity of the agreement, the gestational carrier’s spouse’s consent or intended parent’s spouse’s consent to the agreement is not required, and the gestational carrier’s spouse or intended parent’s spouse is not a presumed parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction under the agreement; and
  2. The divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation of the gestational carrier or of an intended parent after the agreement has been signed by all parties does not affect the validity of the agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-808. Effect of noncompliance, standard of review, remedies.

  1. A gestational carrier agreement that does not substantially comply with the requirements of this article is not enforceable.
  2. In the event that a gestational carrier agreement does not substantially comply with the requirements of this article, the family court or the superior court shall determine parentage based on the intent of the parties, including evidence of the intent of the parties at the time of execution.
  3. Except as expressly provided in a gestational carrier agreement and in subsection (d) of this section, in the event of a breach of the gestational carrier agreement by the gestational carrier or the intended parent or parents, the gestational carrier or the intended parent or parents are entitled to all remedies available at law or in equity.
  4. If an individual alleges that the parentage of a child born to a gestational carrier is not the result of assisted reproduction, and this question is relevant to the determination of parentage, the court may order genetic testing.
  5. Specific performance is not an available remedy for a breach by the gestational carrier of any term in a gestational carrier agreement that requires the gestational carrier to be impregnated or to terminate a pregnancy. Specific performance is an available remedy for a breach by the gestational carrier of any term that prevents the intended parent or parents from exercising the full rights of parentage immediately upon the birth of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-809. Liability for payment of gestational carrier health care costs.

  1. The intended parent or parents are liable for the health care costs of the gestational carrier that are not paid by insurance. As used in this section, “health care costs” means the expenses of all health care provided for assisted reproduction, prenatal care, labor, and delivery.
  2. A gestational carrier agreement shall explicitly detail how the health care costs of the gestational carrier are paid. The breach of a gestational carrier agreement by a party to the agreement does not relieve the intended parent or parents of the liability for health care costs imposed by subsection (a) of this section.
  3. This section is not intended to supplant any health insurance coverage that is otherwise available to the gestational carrier or an intended parent for the coverage of health care costs. This section does not change the health insurance coverage of the gestational carrier or the responsibility of the insurance company to pay benefits under a policy that covers a gestational carrier.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Article 9 Information About Donor

15-8.1-901. Definitions.

As used in this article:

  1. “Identifying information” means:
    1. The full name of a donor;
    2. The date of birth of the donor; and
    3. The permanent and, if different, current address of the donor at the time of the donation.
  2. “Medical history” means information regarding any of the following:
    1. Present illness of a donor;
    2. Past illness of the donor; and
    3. Social, genetic, and family history pertaining to the health of the donor.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-902. Applicability.

This article applies only to gametes collected on or after the effective date of this act [January 1, 2021].

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-903. Collection of information about donor.

  1. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state shall collect from a donor the donor’s identifying information and medical history at the time of the donation.
  2. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state which receives gametes of a donor collected by another gamete bank or fertility clinic shall collect the name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the gamete bank or fertility clinic from which it received the gametes.
  3. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state shall disclose the information collected under subsections (a) and (b) of this section as provided under § 15-8.1-905 .

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-904. Declaration regarding identity disclosure.

  1. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state which collects gametes from a donor shall:
    1. Provide the donor with information in a record about the donor’s choice regarding identity disclosure; and
    2. Obtain a declaration from the donor regarding identity disclosure.
  2. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state shall give a donor the choice to sign a notarized declaration that either:
    1. States that the donor agrees to disclose the donor’s identity to a child conceived by assisted reproduction with the donor’s gametes on request once the child attains eighteen (18) years of age; or
    2. States that the donor does not agree presently to disclose the donor’s identity to the child.
  3. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state shall permit a donor who has signed a declaration under subsection (b)(2) of this section, to withdraw the declaration at any time by signing a declaration under subsection (b)(1) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-905. Disclosure of identifying information and medical history.

  1. On request of a child conceived by assisted reproduction who attains eighteen (18) years of age, a gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state which collected the gametes used in the assisted reproduction shall make a good-faith effort to provide the child with identifying information of the donor who provided the gametes, unless the donor signed and did not withdraw a declaration under § 15-8.1-904(b)(2) . If the donor signed and did not withdraw the declaration, the gamete bank or fertility clinic shall make a good-faith effort to notify the donor, who may elect under § 15-8.1-904(c) to withdraw the donor’s declaration.
  2. Regardless, whether a donor signed a declaration under § 15-8.1-904(b)(2) , on request by a child conceived by assisted reproduction who attains eighteen (18) years of age, or, if the child is a minor, by a parent or guardian of the child, a gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state which collected the gametes used in the assisted reproduction shall make a good-faith effort to provide the child or, if the child is a minor, the parent or guardian of the child, access to nonidentifying medical history of the donor.
  3. On request of a child conceived by assisted reproduction who attains eighteen (18) years of age, a gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state which received the gametes used in the assisted reproduction from another gamete bank or fertility clinic shall disclose the name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the gamete bank or fertility clinic from which it received the gametes.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-906. Recordkeeping.

  1. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state which collects gametes for use in assisted reproduction shall maintain identifying information and medical history about each gamete donor. The gamete bank or fertility clinic shall maintain records of gamete screening and testing and comply with reporting requirements, in accordance with federal law and applicable law of this state other than this article.
  2. A gamete bank or fertility clinic licensed in this state that receives gametes from another gamete bank or fertility clinic shall maintain the name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the gamete bank or fertility clinic from which it received the gametes.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Article 10 Applicability

15-8.1-1001. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this chapter, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-1002. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in 15 U.S.C. § 7003(b).

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-1003. Transitional provision.

This chapter applies to a pending proceeding to adjudicate parentage commenced before the effective date of this act [January 1, 2021] for an issue on which a judgment has not been entered.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

15-8.1-1004. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any individual or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2020, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 60, § 2.

Chapter 9 Support of Children [See Title 16 Chapter 97 — The Rhode Island Board of Education Act]

15-9-1. Duty of parent to pay support and maintenance to the agency or person having custody of the child.

  1. Whenever the department of children, youth and families shall pay for the support and maintenance of any child pursuant to §§ 42-72-13 and 42-72-14 , or whenever another department, agency, society, institution, or person having the charge, care, or custody of a child shall pay for the support and maintenance of the child, the court shall order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to pay an amount based upon a formula and guidelines adopted by an administrative order of the family court. If, after calculating support based upon court established formula and guidelines, the court, in its discretion, finds the proposed order would be inequitable to the child or either parent, the court shall make findings of fact and shall order either or both parents owing a duty of support to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for the child’s support after considering all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
    1. The financial resources of the child;
    2. The financial resources of the custodial parent;
    3. The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved;
    4. The physical and emotional condition of the child and his or her educational needs; and
    5. The financial resources and needs of the non-custodial parent.
  2. If it deems necessary or advisable, the court may order child support and education costs for children attending high school at the time of their eighteenth (18th) birthday and for ninety (90) days after graduation, but in no case beyond their nineteenth (19th) birthday. In addition, the court may order the support of a child with a severe physical or mental impairment to continue until the twenty-first (21st) birthday of the child.
  3. After a decree for support has been entered and upon the petition of either party, the court may review and alter its decree relative to the amount and payment of support. If the court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, the decree may be made retroactive to the date that notice of a petition to modify was given to the adverse party. In such a case the court shall set forth in its decision the specific findings of fact which show a substantial change in circumstances and why the decree should be made retroactive.
  4. Any order for child support issued by the family court shall contain a provision requiring either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to obtain health insurance coverage for the child when such coverage is available to the parent or parents through their employment without cost or at a reasonable cost. “Reasonable cost” shall be defined in accordance with guidelines adopted by administrative order of the family court in conjunction with the child support guidelines.
  5. Any existing child support orders may be modified in accordance with this section unless the court makes specific written findings of fact that take into consideration the best interests of the child and conclude that a child support order or medical order would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case.
  6. In addition, the national medical support notice shall be issued with respect to all orders issued, enforced, or modified on or after October 1, 2002, in accordance with chapter 29 of this title. The notice shall inform the employer of provisions in the child support order for health care coverage for the child and of the method to implement this coverage. In lieu of the court ordering the non-custodial parent to obtain or maintain health care coverage for the child, the court may order the non-custodial parent to contribute a weekly cash amount towards the medical premium for health care coverage paid by the state of Rhode Island and/or the custodial parent. The method to determine a reasonable weekly amount shall be addressed in a family court administrative order pertaining to the child support guidelines.
  7. All support orders established or modified in the state on or after October 1, 1998, shall be recorded with the Rhode Island family court/department of administration, division of taxation child support computer enforcement system. The system maintains the official registry of support orders entered in accordance with applicable administrative orders issued by the Rhode Island family court.
  8. In any subsequent child support enforcement action between the parties, upon sufficient showing that a diligent effort has been made to ascertain the location of such a party, the court may allow for notice and service of process to be made by first class mail or by service of written notice to the most recent residential or employer address of record, as specified in the Rhode Island rules of procedure for domestic relations for the Family Court of Rhode Island.
  9. The department of children, youth, and families shall not seek child support for services to the child which are special education services as defined under state and federal law and pursuant to the regulations of the board of regents for elementary and secondary education governing the special education of students with disabilities, section two, I., 1.0-4.11 and 34 C.F.R. Part 300.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 143, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 65, art. 38, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 595, art. 14, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

Former §§ 15-9-1 — 15-9-8 (P.L. 1908, ch. 1541, §§ 1-6; G.L. 1909, ch. 140, §§ 1-7; P.L. 1910, ch. 551, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 144, §§ 1-7; P.L. 1926, ch. 846, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 423, §§ 1-7; P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 36; P.L. 1950, ch. 2416, § 2; G.L. 1956, §§ 15-9-1 — 15-9-8; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 10; P.L. 1977, ch. 258, § 1), concerning the support of children, were repealed by P.L. 1981, ch. 143, § 1.

Cross References.

Abandonment and nonsupport, criminal responsibility, §§ 11-2-1 , 11-2-2 .

Criminal prosecutions, proceedings unaffected by, § 11-9-6 .

Cruelty to or neglect of child, penalty, § 11-9-5 .

Department of children, youth, and families, § 42-72-1 et seq.

Interstate family support, § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Parents as natural guardians of children, §§ 33-15-1 , 33-15-2 .

Comparative Legislation.

Support of children:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-215 et seq., 53-304 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 273, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Reimbursement for Public Assistance Benefits.

The state is entitled to recover from a noncustodial parent reimbursement for the full amount of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits paid to a custodial parent, because it is unreasonable to allow parents to impose their obligations of support on the public when they have the means to reimburse the state. Lallier v. Lallier, 591 A.2d 31, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 84 (R.I. 1991).

Collateral References.

Authority of court, upon entering default judgment, to make orders for child custody or support which were not specifically requested in pleadings of prevailing party. 5 A.L.R.5th 863.

Death of obligor parent as affecting decree for support of child. 14 A.L.R.5th 557.

Duty to stepchild after divorce. 44 A.L.R.4th 520.

Father’s criminal liability for desertion of or failure to support child where divorce decree awards custody to another. 73 A.L.R.2d 960.

Liability of parent for support of child institutionalized by juvenile court. 59 A.L.R.3d 636.

Long-arm statutes, obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident parent in filiation or support proceeding. 76 A.L.R.3d 708.

Maintenance of suit by child, independently of statute, against parent for support. 13 A.L.R.2d 1142.

Parent’s child support liability as affected by other parent’s fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control, or refusal to abort pregnancy. 2 A.L.R.5th 337.

Parent’s obligation to support adult child. 1 A.L.R.2d 910.

Parent’s obligation to support unmarried minor child who refuses to live with parent. 98 A.L.R.3d 334.

Rights and obligations resulting from human artificial insemination. 83 A.L.R.4th 295.

State or political subdivision, right to maintain action in another state for support and maintenance of defendant’s child, parent or dependent in plaintiff’s institution. 67 A.L.R.2d 771.

Validity, construction, and application of Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (18 USCA § 228). 147 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

15-9-2. Enforceability.

All duties of support and maintenance, including the duty to pay arrearages, are enforceable by a court proceeding under the provisions of chapter 23 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 143, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (18 USCA § 228). 147 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

15-9-3. Division of taxation within the department of administration as legal representative — Payment of costs.

  1. In any proceeding under this chapter the division of taxation within the department of administration shall represent the department of children, youth and families.
  2. The division of taxation within the department of administration shall remit to the general treasury the net collections after deducting all reasonable costs and expenses of any action or proceeding under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 143, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-9-4. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of it to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 143, § 2.

15-9-5. Duty of department to parent.

  1. Prior to filing a claim pursuant to § 15-9-1 , the department shall seek the cooperation of the person from whom reimbursement for support and maintenance may be sought.
  2. The department shall inform the person that he or she does not, for good cause, have to cooperate. The department shall explain to the person his or her rights and obligations, including good cause for refusal to cooperate, as set forth in 45 C.F.R. 232.41 et seq.
  3. The department shall promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures to implement this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 65, art. 38, § 2.

Chapter 10 Support of Parents

15-10-1. Penalty for unreasonable neglect of destitute parents.

  1. Any person, above the age of eighteen (18) years, who unreasonably neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her parent, whether father or mother, residing in this state, when his or her parent through misfortune, and without fault of his or her own, is destitute of means of sustenance and unable by reason of old age, infirmity, or illness to support and maintain himself or herself, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both a fine and imprisonment.
  2. No neglect or refusal shall be deemed unreasonable as to a child who, during his or her minority, was not reasonably supported by the parent, if the parent was charged with the duty to do so, nor as to any child who, being one of two (2) or more children, has made proper and reasonable contribution toward the support of his or her destitute parent.

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1510, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 292, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 419, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-10-1 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 26.

Cross References.

Interstate family support, § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Support of parents:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-215 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 273, § 20 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agreement to Support.
— Consideration for Conveyance.

An agreement by a son to support his parents was valuable consideration for conveyance where the parents were able to support themselves. Monti v. Graziano, 71 R.I. 393 , 46 A.2d 314, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1946).

Standing to Appeal.
— Appointment of Guardian.

The daughter of an insane ward upon whom the obligation to support would devolve were the ward to become indigent, could appeal the appointment of a guardian for her parent even though she was not a party to the guardianship proceeding. Ankney v. Pettine, 79 R.I. 471 , 90 A.2d 430, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1952).

— Denial of Removal of Guardian.

The son of a ward was entitled to appeal from a decree denying the removal of a guardian since he was subject to a penalty for failure to support the father should the guardian waste the assets of the father’s estate. Duff v. Leighton, 80 R.I. 360 , 97 A.2d 110, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1953).

Collateral References.

Adoption as affecting duty of support otherwise owed by child to natural parent. 114 A.L.R. 494.

Nature of care contemplated by statute imposing general duty to care for indigent relatives. 92 A.L.R.2d 348.

15-10-2. Orders for benefit of parents.

Before the trial, with the consent of the defendant, or at the trial, on entry of a plea of guilty, or after conviction, the court may, in its discretion, make any orders and require any conditions for the benefit of the destitute parent that the circumstances of the defendant may require.

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1510, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 292, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 419, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-10-2 .

Cross References.

Guardianship funds, support from, § 33-15-37 .

Interstate family support, § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statutory provision requiring reimbursement of public by child for financial assistance to aged parents, 75 A.L.R.3d 1159.

15-10-3. Director of human services as complainant.

The director of human services or any person designated and appointed to do so by the director may be the party complainant to any complaint and warrant brought to invoke the penalties provided for in this chapter, and the director or his or her designee and appointee shall be exempt from giving surety for costs in any such action.

History of Section. P.L. 1952, ch. 2984, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-10-3 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 93, § 2; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-10-4. Other parties as complainants — Jurisdiction and venue.

Complaints under the provisions of this chapter may be made by a destitute parent, children of a destitute parent, the director of public welfare of any city or town, or the director of any licensed private charity, in the district court of the judicial district, or police court of the city, or the family court of the area, in which either the parent or child is living.

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1510, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 292, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 419, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3383, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 15-10-4 .

Collateral References.

Statute imposing duty to maintain or aid indigent parent as supporting action by third person. 116 A.L.R. 1281.

15-10-5. Costs paid by state.

Whenever a complaint under this chapter shall be brought by a director of public welfare, the costs, if taxed to the complainant, shall be paid by the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1510, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 292, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 419, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 15-10-5 .

15-10-6. Prosecution of criminal actions.

All criminal actions for any violation of this chapter or any rule or regulation promulgated under this chapter pertaining to the department of human services shall be prosecuted by the attorney general or by any qualified member of the Rhode Island bar who shall be designated by the director and approved by the attorney general to institute and prosecute the action.

History of Section. P.L. 1952, ch. 2984, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-10-6 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970.

15-10-7. Right of contribution from other children.

Any child making more than his or her share of a proper and reasonable contribution toward the support of his or her destitute parents shall have a right of contribution from other children over the age of eighteen (18) years of the parents, who have been supported by the parents, in a civil action subject to any orders and conditions that the court deems that the circumstances of the defendant or defendants may require.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 419, § 5; P.L. 1954, ch. 3383, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 15-10-7 .

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statutory provision requiring reimbursement of public by child for financial assistance to aged parents. 75 A.L.R.3d 1159.

15-10-8. Support for certain patients of nursing facilities.

The uncompensated costs of care provided by a licensed nursing facility to any person may be recovered by the nursing facility from any child of that person who is above the age of eighteen (18) years, to the extent that the child previously received a transfer of any interests or assets from the person receiving such care, which transfer resulted in a period of Medicaid ineligibility imposed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c), as amended from time to time, on a person whose assets have been transferred for less than fair market value.

Recourse hereunder shall be limited to the fair market value of the interests or assets transferred at the time of transfer. For the purposes of this section “the costs of care” shall mean the costs of providing care, including nursing care, personal care, meals, transportation and any other costs, charges, and expenses incurred by the facility. Costs of care shall not exceed the customary rate the nursing facility charges to a patient who pays for his or her care directly rather than through a governmental or other third party payor. Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit or otherwise diminish any other causes of action possessed by any such nursing facility. The death of the person receiving nursing facility care shall not nullify or otherwise affect the liability of the person or persons charged with the costs of care hereunder.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 141, art. 5, § 1.

Chapter 11 Reciprocal Enforcement of Support [Repealed.]

15-11-1 — 15-11-42. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L 1979, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 177, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 263, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 5, P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 5, P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 5; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 5 effective January 1, 1997. For present comparable provisions, see § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 15-11-1 — 15-11-42 concerned reciprocal enforcement of support.

P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 23, P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 23, P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 23 and P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 23 provide that all matters commenced under this chapter and pending as of December 31, 1996 shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter in effect on December 31, 1996.

Chapter 11.1 Full Enforcement of Support Obligations

15-11.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Full Enforcement of Support Obligations Act”.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (18 USCA § 228). 147 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

15-11.1-2. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Administrator” means the tax administrator for the department of administration, division of taxation or his or her designee.
  2. “Board” means any bureau, board, or commission or other licensor that is affiliated with or is a part of the department of business regulation, and any other state agency, municipality, or licensor that issues a license authorizing a person to engage in a recreational activity, in a business, occupation, profession, industry, or authorizes a person to operate a motor vehicle.
  3. “Compliance with a court order of support” means that the support obligor has accrued no more than ninety (90) days worth of current support no more than ninety (90) days worth of periodic payments due pursuant to a written agreement with the department or as set forth in a court order and/or has obtained or maintained health insurance coverage if required by a court order of support.
  4. “CSE system” means the Rhode Island family court/department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement system, which system maintains the official record of support orders and arrearages of all support orders entered upon it in accordance with applicable administrative orders issued by the Rhode Island family court.
  5. “Court order of support” means any judgment or order for the support of dependent children now or subsequently recorded and maintained on the child support enforcement (CSE) system which has been issued by any court of the state or another state, including an order in a final decree of divorce or any judgment or order issued in accordance with an administrative procedure established by state law that affords substantial due process and is subject to judicial review.
  6. “Department” means the department of administration, division of taxation.
  7. “License” means any of the following: a license to operate a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle registration, a license, certification, registration, permit, approval, or other similar document evidencing admission to or granting authority to engage in a profession, occupation, business, industry, or recreational activity.
  8. “Licensee” means any individual holding any of the following: a license to operate a motor vehicle, motor vehicle registration, a license, certification, registration, permit, approval, or other similar document evidencing admission to or granting authority to engage in a profession, occupation, business, industry, or recreational activity.
  9. “Obligor” means any person required to make payments under the terms of a court order of support. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-3. Notice.

  1. The department may serve notice upon a support obligor who is not in compliance with a court order of support that informs the obligor of the department’s intention to submit the obligor’s name to any appropriate board, state agency, or department as a licensee who is not in compliance with a court order of support.
  2. The notice shall include the address and telephone number of the department’s support enforcement office that issues the notice and a statement of the need to obtain a release from that office as provided in § 15-11.1-7 . The department shall attach a copy or facsimile of the obligor’s court order of support to the notice. Service of the notice must be made by first class mail. The notice must inform the obligor that:
    1. The obligor may request a family court hearing to contest the issue of compliance;
    2. A request for a hearing must be made in writing and must be received by the department within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice;
    3. If the obligor requests a hearing within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice, the department shall stay action to certify the obligor to any board for noncompliance with a court order of support pending a decision after a hearing;
    4. If the obligor does not request a hearing within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice and is not in compliance with a court order of support, the department shall certify the obligor to the appropriate board, state agency, or department for noncompliance with a court order of support;
    5. If the department certifies the obligor to a board for noncompliance with a court order of support, the board, state agency, or department shall suspend the obligor’s license and refuse to issue or reissue a license until the obligor provides the board with a release from the department that states the obligor is in compliance with the obligor’s support order. A suspension by an agency or a refusal by an agency to reissue, renew, or otherwise extend the license or certificate of authority shall be deemed a final determination;
    6. If the obligor files a motion to modify support with the family court and duly serves the department with notice of the motion to modify, the department shall stay action to certify the obligor to any board for noncompliance with a court order of support; and
    7. The obligor may restore compliance with a court order of support by:
      1. Paying current support; and
      2. Paying all past due support or, if unable to pay all past due support and a periodic payment for past due support has not been ordered by the court, by making periodic payments in accordance with a written payment agreement with the department which agreement shall then be filed with the family court; and/or
      3. Meeting the obligor’s health insurance obligation. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-4. Family court compliance hearing.

  1. An obligor may request a hearing before a magistrate of the family court upon receipt of service of the notice described in § 15-11.1-3 . The request for a hearing must be made in writing and must be received by the department within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice. The department shall promptly file the obligor’s written request for a hearing with the clerk of the family court or his or her designee; the clerk shall then assign the matter for a hearing before a magistrate of the family court.
  2. The department shall notify the obligor in writing of the date, time, and place of the hearing assigned by the clerk. Service of the hearing notice must be made by first class mail.
  3. The issues that may be determined at the hearing are limited to whether the obligor is required to pay child support under a court or administrative order and whether the obligor is in compliance with a court order of support.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the obligor from filing other appropriate motions for relief, including but not limited to a motion to modify a support order, with the family court. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-5. Automatic stay pending compliance hearing.

If an obligor requests a timely hearing to contest the issue of compliance in accordance with § 15-11.1-4 , the department may not certify the name of the obligor to a board for noncompliance with a court order of support until the department receives a decision or order of the family court that finds the obligor is not in compliance with a court order of support.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-6. Certification of noncompliance.

  1. The department may certify in writing to any appropriate board that a support obligor is not in compliance with a court order of support if:
    1. The obligor does not timely request a hearing upon service of a notice issued under § 15-11.1-3 and is not in compliance with a court order of support thirty-one (31) days after service of the notice or mailing of the notice;
    2. The family court issues a decision or order after a hearing that finds the obligor is not in compliance with a court order of support, and the obligor has not appealed the decision within any applicable appeal period provided by law for appeals of a decision or order of a magistrate of the family court; or
    3. After a decision or order of the family court has been appealed, a decision or order of the Rhode Island supreme court which determines or affirms that the obligor is not in compliance with a court order of support.
  2. The department’s certification shall include a copy of the decision or order of the court, where applicable. The department shall send by first class mail a copy of any certification of noncompliance filed with a board to the obligor at the obligor’s most recent address of record. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 5; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-7. Suspension by board — Notice from board.

  1. Upon receipt of the certification of noncompliance from the department issued in accordance with § 15-11.1-6 , a board shall suspend the obligor’s license and refuse to issue or reissue a license until the obligor provides the board with a release from the department that states the obligor is in compliance with the obligor’s support order. When an obligor who is served notice under § 15-11.1-3 subsequently complies with the court order of support, the department shall within five (5) business days after compliance provide the obligor with written confirmation and a release that the obligor is in compliance with the order. A suspension by a board or a refusal by a board to reissue, renew, or otherwise extend the license or certificate of authority shall be deemed a final determination for the purposes of chapter 35 of title 42.
  2. A board shall notify an obligor certified by the department under § 15-11.1-6 , without undue delay, that the obligor’s application for the issuance or renewal of a license may not be granted or that the obligor’s license has been suspended because the obligor’s name has been certified by the department as a support obligor who is not in compliance with a court order of support.
  3. Within five (5) business days of receiving written confirmation that the obligor is in compliance with the court order of support, the board shall reinstate, reissue, renew or otherwise extend the obligor’s license or certificate of authority. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-8. Reporting.

  1. During each renewal period all boards subject to this chapter shall provide to the department specified information, according to standards established by the department, about applicants for licensure and all current licensees.
  2. All boards subject to this chapter shall provide the specified information for only those current licensees that are residents of this state.
  3. The information to be provided must include all of the following information to the extent that this information is maintained by the board about the licensee:
    1. Name;
    2. Address of record;
    3. Federal employer identification number or social security number;
    4. Type of license;
    5. Effective date of license or renewal;
    6. Expiration date of license; and
    7. Active or inactive status. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 24.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2000 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2000 amendment.

15-11.1-9. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; Repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 25, effective July 7, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-11.1-9 concerned report on the support collection program.

15-11.1-10. Rules and regulations.

The department of human services is authorized and directed to promulgate rules and regulations that it deems necessary to implement the provisions and purposes of this chapter; provided, that any rule or regulation affecting the duties and responsibilities of the family court shall be made with the concurrence of the chief judge of the family court.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-11. Cooperative agreements with boards.

The department and the various boards may enter into any agreements that may be necessary to carry out the requirements of this section, but only to the extent the department determines it is cost effective.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-11.1-12. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of it is for any reason judged invalid, that judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of the chapter, but shall be confined in its effect to the provision or application directly involved in the controversy giving rise to the judgment.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Chapter 12 Age of Majority

15-12-1. Persons of full age.

  1. Notwithstanding any general or public law or provision of the common law to the contrary, all persons who have attained the age of eighteen (18) years shall be deemed to be persons of full legal age.
  2. These persons shall have all the duties and obligations, rights, and privileges imposed or granted by law upon those persons who have previously attained the age of twenty-one (21) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 20, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Eighteen as age of majority:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1d.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 4, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Family Court Retained Jurisdiction.

In reducing the age of majority to 18, the legislature did not thereby implicitly lower the upper limit of the family court’s retained jurisdiction from 21 to 18. In re P., 451 A.2d 274, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1064 (R.I. 1982).

Jury Duty.

The minimum age for jurors, twenty-one, is valid, for a state can constitutionally prescribe specific age qualifications for jury members despite the fact that in doing so an individual may be old enough to vote but not old enough to sit on a jury. State v. Spivey, 114 R.I. 43 , 328 A.2d 414, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1059 (1974).

Majority Rights.

Majority is a status rather than a vested right. In re P., 451 A.2d 274, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1064 (R.I. 1982).

Minority Rights.

Minority is a status with no fixed, vested or accrued rights in future support. It is a status created by law and subject to change by legislative enactment. Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723 , 391 A.2d 79, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 728 (1978).

Statutes of Limitation.

Where the statute of limitations for personal injuries was extended from two to three years and shortly thereafter the age of majority was reduced from 21 to 18 years, the plaintiff argued that the two statutes should be read together so that she would have three years from the time the disability of minority was removed in which to commence her action, but the court held that the action accrued at the time of the injury, and, since that event occurred before either the effective date of the new statute of limitations or its retrospective application provision, the original two-year statute of limitations applied and plaintiff’s suit was untimely. Von Villas v. Williams, 117 R.I. 309 , 366 A.2d 545, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1630 (1976).

Support.

Although the statute lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18 years became effective after the original divorce decree providing support payments for the minor children, the trial justice was correct in terminating the support payments once the youngest child had attained the age of 18. Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723 , 391 A.2d 79, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 728 (1978).

Collateral References.

Majority, when deemed attained. 5 A.L.R.2d 1147.

Minor’s entry into home of parent as sufficient to sustain burglary charge. 17 A.L.R.5th 111.

Parent’s obligation to support adult child. 1 A.L.R.2d 910.

Statute protecting minors in a specified age range from rape or other sexual activity as applicable to defendant minor within protected age group. 18 A.L.R.5th 856.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting pre-existing status or rights. 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

15-12-2. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 20, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 68, effective May 27, 1988.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-12-2 concerned causes of action which have accrued to a person who has not attained the age of 21 but who has attained the age of 18 on or before March 24, 1972.

Chapter 13 Divorce or Separation Proceedings — Support for Children Receiving Public Assistance

15-13-1. Determination of children receiving public assistance.

The party commencing an action seeking a divorce from the bond of marriage or divorce from bed and board or an order pursuant to § 15-5-19 shall, at the time the proceeding is begun, append to the petition a statement containing the names of all children of the marriage and their ages and stating whether any of the children are at that time recipients of or applicants for public assistance.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 258, § 2.

Comparative Legislation.

Support of children:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-215 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 273, § 1 et seq.

Collateral References.

State or political subdivision, right to maintain action in another state for support and maintenance of defendant’s child, parent or dependent in plaintiff ’s institution. 67 A.L.R.2d 771.

15-13-2. Setting of support for children receiving public assistance.

  1. If the statement appended to the petition indicates that any child of the marriage is a recipient of or applicant for public assistance, a hearing shall be held as promptly as possible to determine the amount of support to which each child is entitled from the appropriate parent. The department of human services shall be given notice of the hearing and shall appear at the hearing for the purpose of assisting the court in fixing the amount of support. In the absence of the consent of the parties and agreement of the department of human services, the court shall not enter an order providing for support without conducting a hearing.
  2. In fixing the amount of support, which the parent shall be ordered to pay, the court shall take into account the following factors:
    1. All earnings, income, and resources of the parent including real and personal property;
    2. The earnings potential of the parent;
    3. The reasonable necessities of the parent;
    4. The needs of the child for whom support is sought;
    5. The existence and needs of other dependents of the parent; and
    6. Any other factors, which bear upon the needs of the child and the ability of the parent to provide financial support of those needs.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 258, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 69.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Collateral References.

Authority of court, upon entering default judgment, to make orders for child custody or support which were not specifically requested in pleadings of prevailing party. 5 A.L.R.5th 863.

Trust income or assets as subject to claim against beneficiary for child support. 91 A.L.R.2d 262.

15-13-3. Reconsideration of support orders.

  1. Every order entered by the family court providing for support of a child who at the time of entry of the order was not a recipient of or applicant for public assistance shall, in the event the child becomes the recipient of public assistance, be reconsidered de novo upon the petition of a parent or guardian of the child or the department of human services.
  2. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall hold a hearing for the purpose of determining the amount of support to which the child is entitled from the appropriate parent. In fixing the amount of support the court shall take into account the factors set forth in § 15-13-2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 258, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-13-3.1. Enforcement procedures.

  1. In any proceeding brought for failure to make support payments as ordered by the court, upon a showing that the payments are more than forty-five (45) days overdue, the family court may grant an order directing that an execution issue against the wages, debts, earnings, salary, income from trust funds, or profits of the parent responsible for support for the full amount of both the arrears payments and for the satisfaction of current support and maintenance payments until further order of the family court, notwithstanding any statutory limitation on executions issued against the wages, earnings, salary, or other income of the judgment debtor, and the execution shall have priority over any other executions.
  2. No employer shall discharge an employee because his or her wages are subject to execution in accordance with this section or shall discriminate in hiring because of a potential execution.
  3. An employer, in remitting wages levied upon a judgment or order of support, may make a two dollar ($2.00) deduction to defray his or her bookkeeping expenses for each paycheck levied upon out of the funds ordered for support.
  4. In any proceeding brought for failure to make support payments, upon a showing that the payments are more than forty-five (45) days overdue, the family court may grant an order directing that an execution issue against the interest of the responsible parent in and to any real estate or personal property within the jurisdiction of the family court whether that interest is held individually or jointly with others, and the execution shall have priority over any other executions or attachments except as prescribed by applicable federal or state statutes.
  5. The execution shall attach to all real and personal property of the responsible parent when it is recorded with the recorder of deeds for the city or town in which the real estate is located or with the appropriate office for a notice with respect to personal property. The department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement agency, shall not be required to pay a recording fee.
  6. Whenever an execution has been filed and there is in the possession of any person having notice of the execution any property which may be subject to the execution, the property shall not be paid over, released, sold, transferred, encumbered, or conveyed unless a release or waiver signed by the director has been delivered to the person in possession or the family court has ordered the release of the execution.
  7. Any person who fails to honor an execution shall be liable to the person entitled to receive the support payments in an amount equal to the debt, which is the basis of the execution, together with costs, interest, and reasonable attorney fees.
  8. Any judgment or order for support issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction of any other state, which passes legislation similar to this chapter and provides for reciprocity to this state, shall have the same force and effect as if the judgment or order originated from the Rhode Island courts.
  9. Interest at the rate of twelve (12%) per annum on any support debt due or owing may be assessed by operation of law unless the responsible parent shall, for good cause shown, be relieved of the obligation to pay the interest by the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Collateral References.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support. 5 A.L.R.4th 1015.

State or political subdivision, right to maintain action in another state for support and maintenance of defendant’s child, parent or dependent in plaintiff ’s institution. 67 A.L.R.2d 771.

15-13-3.2. Transfer of assets.

No person shall proceed to foreclose, sell, or otherwise transfer any property against which an execution granted and reordered pursuant to § 15-13-3.1 may run without first obtaining the approval of the family court. After this, any person to whom an execution has been granted may pursue any remedy available to the holder of an execution by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 191, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-13-3.3. Release of execution.

Any person or the director may release or discharge an execution upon receipt of any other security that the holder of the execution shall deem satisfactory.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 191, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-13-4. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of it to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 258, § 3.

Collateral References.

Emergency jurisdiction of court under §§ 3(a)(3)(ii) and 14(a) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 1738A(f), to protect interests of child notwithstanding existence of prior, valid custody decree rendered by another state. 80 A.L.R.5th 117.

Chapter 14 Child Custody [Repealed.]

15-14-1 — 15-14-26. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 280, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 1, effective July 17, 2003. For present comparable provisions, see § 15-14.1-1 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 15-14-1 — 15-14-26 concerned child custody.

Chapter 14.1 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

15-14.1-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Comparative Legislation.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-90 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 209B, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agreements.

Because the parties knowingly and voluntarily agreed to all terms of their divorce settlement agreement, including child custody and distribution of the marital assets, the family court did not err in finding that the agreement was fair and equitable to each of them. Smart v. Smart, 994 A.2d 80, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 51 (R.I. 2010).

Applicability in Case Arising Prior to Enactment.

Although the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act did not take effect in Rhode Island until July 1, 1978, the supreme court found its principles, as a clear expression of the public policy of this state, controlling, in a case arising prior to that date. Paolino v. Paolino, 420 A.2d 830, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1835 (R.I. 1980) (decided under prior law).

Collateral References.

Abandonment jurisdiction of court under §§ 3(a)(3)(i) and 14(a) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(C)(i) and 1738A(f), notwithstanding existence of prior valid custody decree rendered by second state. 78 A.L.R.5th 465.

Appealability of interlocutory or pendente lite order for temporary child custody. 82 A.L.R.5th 389.

Applicability of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) to temporary custody orders. 81 A.L.R.4th 1101.

Child custody and visitation rights of person infected with AIDS. 86 A.L.R.4th 211.

Construction and effect of statutes mandating consideration of, or creating presumptions regarding, domestic violence in awarding custody of children. 51 A.L.R.5th 241.

Construction and operation of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 100 A.L.R.5th 1.

Continuity of residence as factor in contest between parent and nonparent for custody of child who has been residing with nonparent—modern status. 15 A.L.R.5th 692.

Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2). 73 A.L.R.5th 185.

Default jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(4) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USC § 1732A(c)(2)(D). 6 A.L.R.5th 69.

Home state jurisdiction of court to modify foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1) and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(1). 72 A.L.R.5th 249.

Home state jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USC § 1738A(c)(2)(A). 6 A.L.R.5th 1.

Inconvenience of Forum as Ground for Declining Jurisdiction Under § 207 of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [UCCJEA]. 35 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2018).

Litigation of Custody Disputes Involving Use of Parenting Coordinators as Improper Delegation of Judicial Authority. 31 A.L.R.7th Art. 9 (2018).

Mental health of contesting parent as factor in award of child custody. 53 A.L.R.5th 375.

Parties’ misconduct as ground for declining jurisdiction under § 8 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 16 A.L.R.5th 650.

Rights and obligations resulting from human artificial insemination. 83 A.L.R.4th 295.

Significant connection jurisdiction of court to modify foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(1). 67 A.L.R.5th 1.

State court’s authority, in marital or child custody proceeding, to allocate federal income tax dependency exemption for child to noncustodial parent under § 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 USCS § 152(e)). 77 A.L.R.4th 786.

State Court’s Authority in Marital or Child Custody Proceeding to Allocate Federal Income Tax Dependency Exemption for Child to Noncustodial Parent Under § 152(e) of Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 152(e)). 29 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2018).

When does state that issued previous custody determination have continuing jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A. 83 A.L.R.4th 742.

Recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decree under § 13 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(a). 40 A.L.R.5th 227.

15-14.1-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings unless the context shall indicate another or different meaning or intent:

  1. “Abandoned” means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision;
  2. “Child” means an individual who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age;
  3. “Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual;
  4. “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under this chapter;
  5. “Commencement” means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding;
  6. “Court” means the family court of the State of Rhode Island unless another meaning is so indicated;
  7. “Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six (6) months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period;
  8. “Initial determination” means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child;
  9. “Issuing court” means the court that makes a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter;
  10. “Issuing state” means the state in which a child custody determination is made;
  11. “Modification” means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supercedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination;
  12. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity;
  13. “Person acting as a parent” means a person, other than a parent, who:
    1. Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six (6) consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one year immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and
    2. Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state.
  14. “Physical custody” means the physical care and supervision of a child;
  15. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
  16. “Tribe” means an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan Native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state;
  17. “Warrant” means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 13, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 13, effective June 23, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 13, and P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 13 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Home State.
— Time Period.

The six-month period provided for in subdivision (6) (now (5)) is a general rule of thumb as an appropriate period for a child to become integrated into a community rather than as a strict rule of construction as to which state has jurisdiction of a child custody dispute. (decided under prior law). Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 456 (R.I. 1985).

Collateral References.

What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). 78 A.L.R.4th 1028.

15-14.1-3. Proceedings governed by other law.

This chapter does not govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for a child.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-4. Application to Indian tribes.

  1. A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the “Indian Child Welfare Act,” 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., is not subject to this chapter to the extent that it is governed by the “Indian Child Welfare Act.”
  2. A court of this state shall treat a tribe as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying this chapter.
  3. A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this chapter must be recognized and enforced under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Collateral References.

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’s Application to Tribal Courts. 45 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2019).

Who Are “Qualified Expert Witnesses” Under Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e), (f) and State ICWA Statutes, Requiring Certain Testimony by Such Witnesses Before Foster Care Placement or Termination of Parental Rights May Be Ordered. 38 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2019).

15-14.1-5. International application.

  1. A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying this chapter.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a child custody determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this chapter must be recognized and enforced under this chapter.
  3. A court of this state need not apply this chapter if the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 96 A.L.R.3d 968.

15-14.1-6. Effect of child custody determination.

A child custody determination made by a court of this state that had jurisdiction under this chapter binds all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified in accordance with this chapter or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Collateral References.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances. 35 A.L.R.3d 520.

15-14.1-7. Priority.

If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this chapter is raised in a child custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party, must be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-8. Notice to persons outside state.

  1. Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outside this state may be given in a manner prescribed by the law of this state for service of process or by law of the state in which the service is made. Notice must be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice but may be by publication if other means are not effective.
  2. Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this state or by the law of the state in which the service is made.
  3. Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-9. Appearance and limited immunity.

  1. A party to a child custody proceeding, including a modification proceeding, or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding to enforce or register a child custody determination, is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state for another proceeding or purpose solely by reason of having participated, or of having been physically present for the purpose of participating in the proceeding.
  2. A person who is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis other than physical presence is not immune from service of process in this state. A party present in this state who is subject to the jurisdiction of another state is not immune from service of process allowable under the laws of that state.
  3. The immunity granted by subsection (a) of this section does not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this chapter committed by an individual while present in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-10. Communication between courts.

  1. A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter.
  2. The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.
  3. Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar procedural matters may occur without first informing the parties. A record need not be made of the communication.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a record must be made of the communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of the communication of and granted access to the record.
  5. For the purposes of this section, “record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the courts or an electronic recording of the communication between the courts.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-11. Taking testimony in another state.

  1. In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which the testimony is taken.
  2. A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate location for the disposition or testimony.
  3. Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-12. Cooperation between courts — Preservation of records.

  1. A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to:
    1. Hold an evidentiary hearing;
    2. Order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that state;
    3. Order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending proceeding;
    4. Forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and
    5. Order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.
  2. Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may hold a hearing or enter an order described in subsection (a) of this section.
  3. Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under subsections (a) and (b) of this section may be assessed against the parties according to the laws of this state.
  4. A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child custody proceeding until the child attains eighteen (18) years of age. Upon appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall forward a certified copy of those records.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-13. Initial child custody jurisdiction.

  1. Except as otherwise provided, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
    1. This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six (6) months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
    2. A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision (1) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum and:
      1. The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
      2. Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
    3. All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; or
    4. No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.
  3. Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Acquiring Jurisdiction.

To acquire jurisdiction solely upon the “home state” distinction made in this section, would contravene the act’s broad policy of minimizing jurisdictional disputes when none of the parties retains contacts with this state. (decided under prior law). Paolino v. Paolino, 420 A.2d 830, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1835 (R.I. 1980).

Physical presence of the parties, while desirable, is not essential to the exercise of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act nor may it be sufficient to cause the court to exercise jurisdiction. (decided under prior law). Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1166 (R.I. 1981).

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act does not base the power of a court to hear and decide a child-custody controversy upon in personam jurisdiction over both parents. (decided under prior law). Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1166 (R.I. 1981).

The six-month period provided for in § 15-14-3(6) (now (5)) is a general rule of thumb as an appropriate period for a child to become integrated into a community rather than as a strict rule of construction as to which state has jurisdiction of a child custody dispute. (decided under prior law). Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 456 (R.I. 1985).

Where the Family Court bases its initial grant of jurisdiction on claims by the father that the children were being subjected to physical and emotional abuse by their mother in Florida, these allegations, coupled with the physical presence of the children in Rhode Island, gives the court jurisdiction to decide custody and support issues. (decided under prior law). Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 1991).

Although the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain a child custody case, its exercise of that jurisdiction is improper, where the court’s action creates a situation that opens the door for jurisdictional conflict while prolonging resolution of a case that was settled in Florida over a decade earlier. (decided under prior law). Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 1991).

Since this section conflicted with the federal parental kidnapping prevention statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A, the latter controlled, and the state court lacked jurisdiction to modify a custody decree in a case in which both parties and the child had resided in another state for three years. (decided under prior law). Marshall v. Ziarko, 771 A.2d 910, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 104 (R.I. 2001).

Because an action seeking a divorce from bed and board was quasi in rem, a Rhode Island family court had jurisdiction to hear a petition where the petitioning spouse was a Rhode Island resident and to enter child custody orders where Rhode Island had become the children’s home state; due process concerns relating to the non-petitioning spouse’s minimum contacts with the state were not a concern in an action concerning the status of Rhode Island residents. (decided under prior law). Henderson v. Henderson, 818 A.2d 669, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2003).

Because Connecticut had been the child’s home state since the time of the judgment, that state had jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14.1-13 (a)(2) and Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-115k(a)(1); thus, Rhode Island lacked both exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and discretionary jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-14.1-13 and 15-14.1-14 to make custody or visitation determinations. Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2011).

— Emergency.

Unlike other jurisdictional bases, emergency jurisdiction can be exercised solely on the child’s presence in Rhode Island. (decided under prior law). Silva v. Tucker, 500 A.2d 947, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 587 (R.I. 1985).

In exercising emergency jurisdiction, a court is limited to protecting the child until a full-scope procedure can be conducted. (decided under prior law). Silva v. Tucker, 500 A.2d 947, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 587 (R.I. 1985).

When issuing a temporary emergency order, the court is not required to investigate the existence of jurisdictional factors mentioned in this section other than those in subdivision (a)(3)(ii), nor must it apply other provisions such as § 15-14-7 (simultaneous proceedings in other states) or § 15-14-9 (jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct). (decided under prior law). Silva v. Tucker, 500 A.2d 947, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 587 (R.I. 1985).

A parent’s self-serving statements are not alone sufficient to confer emergency jurisdiction under subsection (a)(3)(ii). (decided under prior law). Glynn v. Meslin, 532 A.2d 554, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 552 (R.I. 1987).

The family court properly exercised emergency jurisdiction under this section where the child was present in Rhode Island and the trial justice had more than parental allegations on which to base her jurisdiction, including testimony from the child that he was spanked and threatened by his stepfather in New York and was afraid to return to New York with his mother and stepfather. (decided under prior law). Duffy v. Reeves, 619 A.2d 1094, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 1993).

Where family court’s finding that no emergency existed was justified, the foreign court had jurisdiction, and its order was entitled to full faith and credit in this state. (decided under prior law). Woods v. Winsor, 637 A.2d 373, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 55 (R.I. 1994).

Emergency jurisdiction is merely temporary jurisdiction and continues only as long as the emergency exists or until a court that has jurisdiction to enter or modify a permanent custody order is apprised of the situation and accepts responsibility. (decided under prior law). Nadeau v. Nadeau, 716 A.2d 717, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 253 (R.I. 1998).

Although it was appropriate for Connecticut court to exercise emergency jurisdiction in response to mother’s allegations of child abuse, this jurisdiction continued only until the safety and well-being of the children were secured and thereafter the children’s home state of Rhode Island was entitled to conduct a full hearing and issue a permanent order with respect to visitation and custody. (decided under prior law). Nadeau v. Nadeau, 716 A.2d 717, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 253 (R.I. 1998).

The denial of a father’s motion to vacate a temporary custody order in favor of his daughter’s grandmother was upheld on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court since it was not clear that the emergency jurisdiction of the Family Court which had led to the order had ever abated and since, even if it had abated, the father, by filing his concurrent motion for legal custody of his child in Rhode Island had conferred personal jurisdiction in the Family Court over his petition seeking custody. (decided under prior law). Ogden v. Rath, 755 A.2d 795, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 162 (R.I. 2000).

Legislative Intent.

In an effort to stem the proliferation of jurisdiction in custody litigation, the legislature, by this act, seeks to avoid the relitigation of custody decisions and to facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees by spelling out jurisdictional prerequisites. (decided under prior law). Paolino v. Paolino, 420 A.2d 830, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1835 (R.I. 1980).

Modification of Foreign Decree.

When modification of a foreign custody decree is sought, before the Family Court can exercise its jurisdiction to modify that decree, it must first conclude that the court that rendered the decree no longer has jurisdiction pursuant to this section. (decided under prior law). Terrill v. Terrill, 431 A.2d 1194, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1169 (R.I. 1981).

If the Family Court determines that a foreign court continues to have the power to act regarding a child custody matter, it must further ascertain whether the foreign court has, for some reason, declined to exercise its jurisdiction. It is only after this preliminary determination has been made that the Family Court can consider whether it has jurisdiction over the controversy pursuant to this section. (decided under prior law). Terrill v. Terrill, 431 A.2d 1194, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1169 (R.I. 1981).

The dual concepts of comity and full faith and credit necessitate that the modification of a sister state’s custody decree should occur only where the party seeking modification can demonstrate a compelling emergency. (decided under prior law). Kretzer v. Kretzer, 506 A.2d 81, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 434 (R.I. 1986).

Nature of Custody Dispute Cases.

Custody dispute cases are essentially regarded as quasi in rem or status proceedings within the limitations set forth in this section. (decided under prior law). Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1166 (R.I. 1981).

Temporary Orders.

The trial court erred when it denied a father’s motion to vacate a temporary child custody order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Family Court Rules, since the Family Court had exercised its emergency jurisdiction in issuing the temporary order and that rule provision applies only to final orders. (decided under prior law). Ogden v. Rath, 755 A.2d 795, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 162 (R.I. 2000).

Collateral References.

Abandonment and emergency jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(3) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(C). 5 A.L.R.5th 788.

Abandonment jurisdiction of court under §§ 3(a)(3)(i) and 14(a) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(C)(i) and 1738A(f), notwithstanding existence of prior valid custody decree rendered by second state. 78 A.L.R.5th 465.

Construction and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’s Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction Provision — No Significant Connection/Substantial Evidence. 59 A.L.R.6th 161.

Construction and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’s Home State Jurisdiction Provision. 57 A.L.R.6th 163.

Construction and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’s Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction Provision — Other Than No Significant Connection/Substantial Evidence. 60 A.L.R.6th 193.

Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2). 73 A.L.R.5th 185.

Default jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(4) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1732A(c)(2)(D). 6 A.L.R.5th 69.

Home state jurisdiction of court to modify foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1) and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(1). 72 A.L.R.5th 249.

Home state jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(A). 6 A.L.R.5th 1.

Jurisdiction to award custody of child domiciled in state but physically outside of it. 9 A.L.R.2d 434.

Jurisdiction to award custody of child having legal domicile in another state. 4 A.L.R.2d 7.

Significant connection jurisdiction of court to modify foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(1). 67 A.L.R.5th 1.

Significant connection jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(2) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(B). 5 A.L.R.5th 550.

When does state that issued previous custody determination have continuing jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A. 83 A.L.R.4th 742.

15-14.1-14. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.

  1. Except as otherwise provided, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with this chapter has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
    1. A court of this state determines that neither the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
    2. A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
  2. A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction Erroneously Declined.

Family court’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act forum non conveniens analysis was insufficient because the court only found Rhode Island was less convenient without finding it was inconvenient or unjust to proceed in Rhode Island. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2016).

Jurisdiction With Other State.

Because Connecticut had been the child’s home state since the time of the judgment, that state had jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14.1-13 (a)(2) and Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-115k(a)(1); thus, Rhode Island lacked both exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and discretionary jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-14.1-13 and 15-14.1-14 to make custody or visitation determinations. Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2011).

Collateral References.

Construction and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’s Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction Provision — Other Than No Significant Connection/Substantial Evidence. 60 A.L.R.6th 193.

15-14.1-15. Jurisdiction to modify determination.

Except as otherwise provided, a court of this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination, and:

  1. The court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum; or
  2. A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Violation of Foreign Decree.

The fact that a mother had improperly removed her daughter from Missouri in violation of the Missouri decree temporarily awarding custody to the father would have mandated that the family court not exercise its jurisdiction to modify the decree. (decided under prior law). Terrill v. Terrill, 431 A.2d 1194, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1169 (R.I. 1981).

Collateral References.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances. 35 A.L.R.3d 520.

Matters precluding right of former wife to counsel fees upon application, after absolute divorce, to modify order as to support or custody of child or children. 15 A.L.R.2d 1270.

15-14.1-16. Temporary emergency jurisdiction.

  1. A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
  2. If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this chapter and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction, a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction. If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.
  3. If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this chapter, or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction, any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.
  4. A court of this state which has been asked to make a child custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Under the Rhode Island Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14.1-16 , a request for emergency child custody was evaluated under the law in effect at the time the request was made, former R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14.1-42 , as the proceedings commenced before July 17, 2003. Beauregard v. White, 972 A.2d 619, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 2009).

Continued Jurisdiction.

Trial court’s continued exercise of emergency jurisdiction under the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14-4(a)(3)(ii), now codified under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14.1-16 , was improper as a mother’s allegations of a father’s pedophilia and child pornography were unsubstantiated, and the mother’s child abuse claims had been rejected by the North Carolina court; under the UCCJA, North Carolina had jurisdiction as it was the children’s home state when the mother filed for divorce and no other state had jurisdiction then, and the trial court should have stayed the proceedings and communicated with the North Carolina court. Beauregard v. White, 972 A.2d 619, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 2009).

Emergency Jurisdiction.

Trial court’s invocation of emergency jurisdiction under former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14-4(a)(3)(ii), now codified under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-14.1-16 , was proper initially as a mother alleged that a father had abused the children and had downloaded child pornography from the Internet; a psychologist opined that relocating the children to North Carolina could result in irreparable harm to them as the older child indicated that the father had hit the child, and had shaken the younger child. Beauregard v. White, 972 A.2d 619, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 2009).

15-14.1-17. Notice — Opportunity to be heard — Joinder.

  1. Before a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with this chapter must be given to all persons entitled to notice under the law of this state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any person having physical custody of the child.
  2. This chapter does not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
  3. The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a child custody proceeding under this chapter are governed by the law of this state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-18. Simultaneous proceedings.

  1. Except as otherwise provided, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum.
  2. Except as otherwise provided, a court of this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to this chapter. If the court determined that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.
  3. In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the court may:
    1. Stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement;
    2. Enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or
    3. Proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Conflict of Laws, see 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 615 (1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction Assertable.

The fact that a mother had instituted child custody proceedings in Texas prior to the father’s filing of an action in Rhode Island did not bar Rhode Island from asserting jurisdiction, where the father did not have actual knowledge of the Texas proceedings until after he filed the Rhode Island action. (decided under prior law). Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 456 (R.I. 1985).

Jurisdiction Improperly Asserted.

Although the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain a child custody case, its exercise of that jurisdiction is improper, where the court’s action creates a situation that opens the door for jurisdictional conflict while prolonging resolution of a case that was settled in Florida over a decade earlier. (decided under prior law). Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 1991).

Collateral References.

Pending proceeding in another state as ground for declining jurisdiction under § 6(a) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(g). 20 A.L.R.5th 700.

What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). 78 A.L.R.4th 1028.

15-14.1-19. Inconvenient forum.

  1. A court of this state which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion, or request of another court.
  2. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
    1. Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
    2. The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
    3. The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
    4. The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
    5. Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
    6. The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
    7. The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
    8. The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.
  3. If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.
  4. A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Kaylin M. Pelletier, 2016 Survey, Cases: Family Law: Hogan v. McAndrew, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 816 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction Erroneously Declined.

It was an abuse of discretion for the family court to decline Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act jurisdiction in favor of Irish courts because, inter alia, the court improperly considered the respective courts’ abilities to consider the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present evidence without evidence of such abilities or procedures being presented. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2016).

Family court’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act forum non conveniens analysis was insufficient because the court only found Rhode Island was less convenient without finding it was inconvenient or unjust to proceed in Rhode Island. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2016).

Collateral References.

Inconvenience of forum as ground for declining jurisdiction under § 7 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 21 A.L.R.5th 396.

Inconvenience of Forum as Ground for Declining Jurisdiction Under § 207 of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [UCCJEA]. 35 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2018).

15-14.1-20. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct.

  1. Except as otherwise provided, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
    1. The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction;
    2. A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction determined that this state is a more appropriate forum; or
    3. No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in this chapter.
  2. If a court of this state declined to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction.
  3. If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, it shall assess against the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses, attorneys’ fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against this state unless authorized by law other than this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Violation of Foreign Custody Decree.

The fact that a mother had improperly removed her daughter from Missouri in violation of the Missouri decree temporarily awarding custody to the father would have mandated that the family court not exercise its jurisdiction to modify the decree. (decided under prior law). Terrill v. Terrill, 431 A.2d 1194, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1169 (R.I. 1981).

The trial court correctly declined jurisdiction under this section where a father had wrongfully taken his child from New York, the bulk of the evidence in the child custody dispute related to incidents that took place in New York, and custody proceedings had begun already in New York. (decided under prior law). Glynn v. Meslin, 532 A.2d 554, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 552 (R.I. 1987).

Collateral References.

Parties’ misconduct as ground for declining jurisdiction under § 8 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 16 A.L.R.5th 650.

15-14.1-21. Information to be submitted to court.

  1. Subject to any law providing for the confidentiality of procedures, addresses, and other identifying information in a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the child’s present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived during the last five (5) years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit must state whether the party:
    1. Has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the child and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the date of the child custody determination, if any;
    2. Knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; and
    3. Knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or visitation with, the child and, if so, the names and address of those persons.
  2. If the information required by subsection (a) of this section is not furnished, the court, upon motion of a party or its own motion, may stay the proceeding until the information is furnished.
  3. If the declaration as to any of the items described in subdivisions (a)(1) through (3) of this section is in the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court’s jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
  4. Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding.
  5. If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of identifying information, the information must be sealed and may not be disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety, or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-22. Appearance of parties and child.

  1. In a child custody proceeding in this state, the court may order a party to the proceeding who is in this state to appear before the court in person with or without the child. The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physical custody or control of the child to appear in person with the child.
  2. If a party to a child custody proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is outside this state, the court may order that a notice given pursuant to this chapter include a statement directing the party to appear in person with or without the child and informing the party that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse to the party.
  3. The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the child and of any person ordered to appear under this section.
  4. If a party to a child custody proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appear under subsection (b) of this section or desires to appear personally before the court with or without the child, the court may require another party to pay reasonable and necessary travel and other expenses of the party so appearing and of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-23. Additional definitions in this chapter.

  1. “Petitioner” means a person who seeks enforcement of an order for return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or enforcement of a child custody determination.
  2. “Respondent” means a person against whom a proceeding has been commenced for enforcement of an order for return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or enforcement of a child custody determination.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-24. Enforcement under Hague Convention.

A court of this state may enforce an order for the return of the child made under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as if it were a child custody determination.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of consent and acquiescence defenses under article 13 of Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. 5 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2015).

15-14.1-25. Duty to enforce.

  1. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this chapter or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this chapter and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this chapter.
  2. A court of this state may utilize any remedy available under other law of this state to enforce a child custody determination made by a court of another state. The remedies provided in this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the availability of other remedies to enforce a child custody determination.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Collateral Attack on Foreign Decree.

A father, who had notice of an Iowa custody proceeding and challenged the jurisdiction of that court unsuccessfully, could not collaterally attack the court’s jurisdiction in a later enforcement proceeding in Rhode Island. (decided under prior law). Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1166 (R.I. 1981).

Recognition of Foreign Decree.

Where an Iowa court had exercised jurisdiction substantially in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, a Rhode Island family court was bound to recognize and enforce the Iowa decree under the provisions of this section. (decided under prior law). Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1166 (R.I. 1981).

Collateral References.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances. 35 A.L.R.3d 520.

15-14.1-26. Temporary visitation.

  1. A court of this state which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination may issue a temporary order enforcing:
    1. A visitation schedule made by a court of another state; or
    2. The visitation provisions of a child custody determination of another state that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule.
  2. If a court of this state makes an order under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, it shall specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria specified in this chapter. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other court or the period expires.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-27. Registration of child custody determination.

  1. A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the appropriate court in this state:
    1. A letter or other document requesting registration;
    2. Two (2) copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and
    3. Except as otherwise provided, the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered.
  2. On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a) of this section, the registering court shall:
    1. Cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and
    2. Serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this section.
  3. The notice required by subdivision (b)(2) of this section must state that:
    1. A registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this state;
    2. A hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested within twenty (20) days after service of notice; and
    3. Failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted.
  4. A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a hearing within twenty (20) days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that:
    1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction;
    2. The child custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so; or
    3. The person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought.
  5. If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration and all persons served must be notified of the confirmation.
  6. Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Collateral References.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances. 35 A.L.R.3d 520.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey custody order either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1095.

15-14.1-28. Enforcement of registered determination.

  1. A court of this state may grant any relief normally available under the law of this state to enforce a registered child custody determination made by a court of another state.
  2. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, except in accordance with this chapter, a registered child custody determination of a court of another state.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-29. Simultaneous proceedings.

If a proceeding for enforcement under this chapter is commenced in a court of this state and the court determines that a proceeding to modify the determination is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction to modify the determination under this chapter, the enforcing court shall immediately communicate with the modifying court. The proceeding for enforcement continues unless the enforcing court, after consultation with the modifying court, stays or dismisses the proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-30. Expedited enforcement of child custody determination.

  1. A petition under this chapter must be verified. Certified copies of all orders sought to be enforced and of any order confirming registration must be attached to the petition. A copy of a certified copy of an order may be attached instead of the original.
  2. A petition for enforcement of a child custody determination must state:
    1. Whether the court that issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what the basis was;
    2. Whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under this chapter and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding;
    3. Whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding;
    4. The present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known;
    5. Whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child and attorneys’ fees is sought, including a request for assistance from law enforcement officials and, if so, the relief sought; and
    6. If the child custody determination has been registered and confirmed, the date and place of registration.
  3. Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing and may enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The hearing must be held on the next judicial day after service of the order unless that date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible. The court may extend the date of hearing at the request of the petitioner.
  4. An order issued under subsection (c) of this section must state the time and place of the hearing and advise the respondent that at the hearing the court may order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child and the payment of fees, costs, and expenses and may schedule a hearing to determine whether further relief is appropriate, unless the respondent appears and establishes that:
    1. The child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed and that:
      1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction;
      2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so;
      3. The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or
    2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed, but has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-31. Service of petition and order.

Except as otherwise provided, the petition and order must be served, by any method authorized by the law of this state, upon respondent and any person who has physical custody of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-32. Hearing and order.

  1. Unless the court issues a temporary emergency order, upon a finding that a petitioner is entitled to immediate physical custody of the child, the court shall order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child unless the respondent establishes that:
    1. The child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed and that:
      1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction;
      2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so; or
      3. The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or
    2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed but has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so.
  2. The court may award the fees, costs, and expenses and may grant additional relief, including a request for the assistance of law enforcement officials, and set a further hearing to determine whether additional relief is appropriate.
  3. If a party called to testify refuses to answer on the grounds that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.
  4. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses and a defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child may not be invoked in a proceeding under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-33. Warrant to take physical custody of child.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition seeking enforcement of a child custody determination, the petitioner may file a verified application for the issuance of a warrant to take physical custody of the child if the child is immediately likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state.
  2. If the court, upon the testimony of the petitioner or other witness, finds that the child is imminently likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state, it may issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child. The petition must be heard on the next judicial day after the warrant is executed unless that date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible. The application for the warrant must include the statements required by this chapter.
  3. A warrant to take physical custody of a child must:
    1. Recite the facts upon which a conclusion of imminent serious physical harm or removal from the jurisdiction is based;
    2. Direct law enforcement officers to take physical custody of the child immediately; and
    3. Provide for the placement of the child pending final relief.
  4. The respondent must be served with the petition, warrant, and order immediately after the child is taken into physical custody.
  5. A warrant to take physical custody of a child is enforceable throughout this state. If the court finds on the basis of the testimony of the petitioner or other witness that a less intrusive remedy is not effective, it may authorize law enforcement officers to enter private property to take physical custody of the child. If required by exigent circumstances of the case, the court may authorize law enforcement officers to make a forcible entry at any hour.
  6. The court may impose conditions upon placement of a child to ensure the appearance of the child and the child’s custodian.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-34. Costs, fees, and expenses.

  1. The court may award the prevailing party, including a state, necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorneys’ fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings.
  2. The court may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against a state unless authorized by law other than this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-35. Recognition and enforcement.

A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order issued by another state and consistent with this chapter which enforces a child custody determination by a court of another state unless the order has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-36. Appeals.

An appeal may be taken from a final order in a proceeding under this chapter in accordance with expedited appellate procedures in other civil cases. Unless the court enters a temporary emergency order, the enforcing court may not stay an order enforcing a child custody determination pending appeal.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-37. Role of prosecutor or public official.

  1. In a case arising under this chapter or involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the prosecutor or other appropriate public official may take any lawful action, including resorting to a proceeding under this chapter or any other available civil proceeding to locate a child, obtain the return of a child, or enforce a child custody determination if there is:
    1. An existing child custody determination;
    2. A request to do so from a court in a pending child custody proceeding;
    3. A reasonable belief that a criminal statute has been violated; or
    4. A reasonable belief that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained in violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
  2. A prosecutor or appropriate public official acting under this section acts on behalf of the court and may not represent any party.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of consent and acquiescence defenses under article 13 of Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. 5 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2015).

15-14.1-38. Role of law enforcement.

At the request of a prosecutor or other appropriate public official, a law enforcement officer may take any lawful action reasonably necessary to locate a child or a party and assist a prosecutor or appropriate public official.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-39. Costs and expenses.

If the respondent is not the prevailing party, the court may assess against the respondent all direct expenses and costs incurred by the prosecutor or other appropriate public official and law enforcement officers.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-40. Application and construction.

In applying and construing this chapter, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legislative Intent.

This act, in addressing the problem of the “interstate” child, evinces a legislative intent to minimize jurisdictional competition and conflict so that custody decisions are rendered in the state best able to protect the welfare of the child. (decided under prior law). Paolino v. Paolino, 420 A.2d 830, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1835 (R.I. 1980).

In an effort to stem the proliferation of jurisdiction in custody litigation, the legislature, by this act, seeks to avoid the relitigation of custody decisions and to facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees by spelling out jurisdictional prerequisites. (decided under prior law). Paolino v. Paolino, 420 A.2d 830, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1835 (R.I. 1980).

The legislature adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in response to continuing confusion concerning the applicability of the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution to interstate custody decrees and in an attempt to stem the proliferation of jurisdiction in custody litigation. (decided under prior law). Nadeau v. Nadeau, 716 A.2d 717, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 253 (R.I. 1998).

The act, which was intended to address the problem of the “interstate” child, evinces a legislative intent to minimize jurisdictional competition and conflict so that custody decisions are rendered in the state best able to protect the welfare of the child. (decided under prior law). Nadeau v. Nadeau, 716 A.2d 717, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 253 (R.I. 1998).

15-14.1-41. Severability clause.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

15-14.1-42. Transitional provision.

A motion or other request for relief made in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child custody determination which was commenced before the effective date of this chapter [July 17, 2003] is governed by the law in effect at the time the motion or other request was made.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 322, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed date in this section was inserted by the compiler.

Chapter 15 Domestic Abuse Prevention

15-15-1. Definitions.

The following words as used in this chapter have the following meanings:

  1. “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”
  2. “Courts” means the family court.
  3. “Cyberstalking” means transmitting any communication by computer to any person or causing any person to be contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or her family.
  4. “Domestic abuse” means:

    The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between present or former family members, parents, stepparents, a plaintiff parent’s minor child(ren) to which the defendant is not a blood relative or relative by marriage, adult plaintiffs who are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year and who are (either individually or together) parents of minor children, or persons who are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year in which at least one of the persons is a minor:

    1. Attempting to cause or causing physical harm;
    2. Placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm;
    3. Causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force, or duress; or
    4. Stalking or cyberstalking.
  5. “Harassing” means following a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person with the intent to seriously alarm, annoy, or bother the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, or be in fear of bodily injury.
  6. “Parents” mean persons who together are the legal parents of one or more children, regardless of their marital status or whether they have lived together at any time.
  7. “Present or former family member” means the spouse, former spouse, minor children, stepchildren, a plaintiff parent’s minor child(ren) to which the defendant is not a blood relative or relative by marriage, minor children of substantive dating partners, or persons who are related by blood or marriage.
  8. “Sexual exploitation” means the occurrence of any of the following acts by any person who knowingly or willfully encourages, aids, or coerces any child under the age of eighteen (18) years:
    1. Recruiting, employing, enticing, soliciting, isolating, harboring, transporting, providing, persuading, obtaining, or maintaining, or so attempting, any minor for the purposes of commercial sex acts or sexually explicit performances; or selling or purchasing a minor for the purposes of commercial sex acts.
      1. “Commercial sex act” means any sex act or sexually explicit performance on account of which anything of value is given, promised to, or received, directly or indirectly, by any person.
      2. “Sexually explicit performance” means an act or show, intended to arouse, satisfy the sexual desires of, or appeal to the prurient interests of patrons or viewers, whether public or private, live, photographed, recorded, or videotaped.
  9. “Stalking” means harassing another person or willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of bodily injury.
  10. “Substantive dating” or “engagement relationship” means a significant and personal/intimate relationship that shall be adjudged by the court’s consideration of the following factors:
    1. The length of time of the relationship;
    2. The type of relationship; and
    3. The frequency of interaction between the parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 375, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 259, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 27; P.L. 2006, ch. 324, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 652, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 79, art. 2, § 5; P.L. 2021, ch. 111, § 2, effective July 2, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 112, § 2, effective July 2, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 105, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 111, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 111, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 112, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Comparative Legislation.

Domestic abuse prevention:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 209A, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

In a protective order action filed separate and independent of the parties’ divorce proceedings, a hearing justice with the Family Court properly entered a restraining order upon a wife’s request against her husband, based on sufficient evidence provided by the testimony from both parties and independent of the fact that the hearing justice erroneously considered a guardian ad litem’s report. Thibaudeau v. Thibaudeau, 947 A.2d 243, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 2008).

Restraining Order.

Defendant’s conduct fell within the purview of domestic abuse because he was “harassing” (and thus “stalking”) plaintiff within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-1 . It was within the magistrate’s authority to issue a civil restraining order after determining that such an order was necessary to protect plaintiff from defendant’s harassment. Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, 92 A.3d 200, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 90 (R.I. 2014).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of evidence of battered child syndrome on issue of self-defense. 22 A.L.R.5th 787.

Battered children syndrome. 98 A.L.R.3d 306.

Battered parent syndrome. 43 A.L.R.4th 1203.

Battered wife or battered woman syndrome. 18 A.L.R.4th 1153.

Tort liability of public authority for failure to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parents’ custody. 60 A.L.R.4th 942.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Cyberstalking Laws. 26 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2017).

15-15-2. Filing of complaint.

  1. Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard, and determined in the family court of the county in which the plaintiff resides and shall be independent of divorce proceedings.
  2. Any proceedings under this chapter shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies.
  3. A party filing a complaint under this chapter may do so without payment of any filing fee, but shall be required to disclose any prior or pending actions for divorce or separation.
  4. If the plaintiff has left the residence or household to avoid abuse, he or she may bring the action in the court of previous residence or the court of present residence. There shall be no minimum residence requirements for the bringing of an action under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 389, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Findings

In a protective order action filed separate and independent of the parties’ divorce proceedings, a hearing justice with the Family Court properly entered a restraining order upon a wife’s request against her husband, based on sufficient evidence provided by the testimony from both parties and independent of the fact that the hearing justice erroneously considered a guardian ad litem’s report. Thibaudeau v. Thibaudeau, 947 A.2d 243, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 2008).

15-15-3. Protective orders — Penalty — Jurisdiction.

  1. A person, or a parent, custodian, or legal guardian on behalf of a minor child or the director of the department of children, youth and families (“DCYF”) or its designee for a child in the custody of DCYF, pursuant to §§ 40-11-7 and 40-11-7 .1, suffering from domestic abuse or sexual exploitation as defined in § 15-15-1 , may file a complaint in the family court requesting any order that will protect and support her or him from abuse or sexual exploitation, including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. Ordering that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting, sexually exploiting, or interfering with the plaintiff at home, on the street, or elsewhere, whether the defendant is an adult or a minor;
    2. Ordering the defendant to vacate the household immediately, and further providing in the order for the safety and welfare of all household animals and pets;
    3. Awarding the plaintiff custody of the minor children of the parties, if any;
    4. Ordering the defendant to surrender physical possession of all firearms in his or her possession, care, custody, or control and shall further order a person restrained not to purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, any firearms while the protective order is in effect. The defendant shall surrender said firearms within twenty-four (24) hours of notice of the protective order to the Rhode Island state police or local police department or to a federally licensed firearms dealer.
      1. A person ordered to surrender possession of any firearm(s) pursuant to this section shall, within seventy-two (72) hours after being served with the order, either:
        1. File with the court a receipt showing the firearm(s) was physically surrendered to the Rhode Island state police or local police department, or to a federally licensed firearms dealer; or
        2. Attest to the court that, at the time of the order, the person had no firearms in his or her immediate physical possession or control, or subject to their immediate physical possession or control, and that the person, at the time of the attestation, has no firearms in their immediate physical possession or control, or subject to their immediate physical possession or control.
      2. If a person restrained under this section transfers a firearm(s) to a federally licensed firearms dealer pursuant to this section, the person restrained under this section may instruct the federally licensed firearms dealer to sell the firearm(s) or to transfer ownership, in accordance with state and federal law, to a qualified named individual who is not a member of the person’s dwelling house, who is not related to the person by blood, marriage, or relationship as defined by § 15-15-1(7) , and who is not prohibited from possessing firearms under state or federal law. The owner of any firearm(s) sold shall receive any financial value received from its sale, less the cost associated with taking possession of, storing, and transferring of the firearm(s).
      3. Every individual to whom ownership of a firearm(s) is transferred pursuant to this subsection shall be prohibited from transferring or returning any firearm(s) to the person restrained under this section while the protective order remains in effect and shall be informed of this prohibition, Any knowing violation of this subsection is a felony that shall be punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than five (5) years, or both.
      4. An individual to whom ownership of a firearm(s) is transferred pursuant to this subsection shall return a firearm(s) to the person formerly restrained under this section only if the person formerly restrained under this section provides documentation issued by a court indicating that the restraining order issued pursuant to this section that prohibited the person from purchasing, carrying, transporting, or possessing firearms has expired and has not been extended;
    5. After notice to the respondent and a hearing, ordering either party to make payments for the support of a minor child or children of the parties as required by law for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days, unless the child support order is for a child or children receiving public assistance pursuant to chapter 5.1 of title 40. In these cases, legal counsel for the division of taxation, child support enforcement, shall be notified as a party in interest to appear for the purpose of establishing a child support order under a new or existing docket number previously assigned to the parties and not under the protective docket number. The child support order shall remain in effect until the court modifies or suspends the order.
  2. After notice to the respondent and a hearing, which shall be held within fifteen (15) days of surrendering said firearms, the court, in addition to any other restrictions, may, for any protective order issued after or renewed on or after July 1, 2017, continue the order of surrender, and shall further order a person restrained under this section not to purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, any firearms while the protective order is in effect.
  3. The family court shall provide a notice on all forms requesting a protective order that a person restrained under this section shall be ordered pursuant to § 11-47-5 to surrender possession of any firearms while the protective order is in effect. The form shall further provide that any person who has surrendered his or her firearms shall be afforded a hearing within fifteen (15) days of surrendering his or her firearms.
  4. Any firearm surrendered in accordance with this section to the Rhode Island state police or local police department shall be returned to the person formerly restrained under this section upon his or her request when:
    1. The person formerly restrained under this section produces documentation issued by a court indicating that the restraining order issued pursuant to this section that prohibited the person from purchasing, carrying, transporting, or possessing firearms has expired and has not been extended; and
    2. The law enforcement agency in possession of the firearms determined that the person formerly restrained under this section is not otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm under state or federal law.
    3. The person required to surrender their firearms pursuant to this section shall not be responsible for any costs of storage of any firearms surrendered pursuant to this section.
  5. The Rhode Island state police are authorized to develop rules and procedures pertaining to the storage and return of firearms surrendered to the Rhode Island state police or local police departments pursuant to this section. The Rhode Island state police may consult with the Rhode Island Police Chiefs’ Association in developing rules and procedures.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit, expand, or in any way modify orders issued under § 12-29-7 or § 15-5-19 .
  7. Nothing in this section shall limit a defendant’s right under existing law to petition the court at a later date for modification of the order.
  8. The court shall immediately notify the person suffering from domestic abuse whose complaint gave rise to the protective order, and the law enforcement agency where the person restrained under this section resides, of the hearing.
  9. The person suffering from domestic abuse, local law enforcement, and the person restrained under this section shall all have an opportunity to be present and to testify when the court considers the petition.
  10. At the hearing, the person restrained under this section shall have the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that, if his or her firearm rights were restored, he or she would not pose a danger to the person suffering from domestic abuse or to any other person.
    1. In determining whether to restore a person’s firearm rights, the court shall examine all relevant evidence, including, but not limited to: the complaint seeking a protective order; the criminal record of the person restrained under this section; the mental health history of the person restrained under this section; any evidence that the person restrained under this section has, since being served with the order, engaged in violent or threatening behavior against the person suffering from domestic abuse or any other person.
    2. If the court determines, after a review of all relevant evidence and after all parties have had an opportunity to be heard, that the person restrained under this section would not pose a danger to the person suffering from domestic abuse or to any other person if his or her firearm rights were restored, then the court may grant the petition and modify the protective order and lift the firearm prohibition.
    3. If the court lifts a person’s firearms prohibition pursuant to this subsection, the court shall issue the person written notice that he or she is no longer prohibited under this section from purchasing or possessing firearms while the protective order is in effect.
  11. The prohibition against possessing a firearm(s) due solely to the existence of a domestic violence restraining order issued under this section shall not apply with respect to sworn peace officers as defined in § 12-7-21 and active members of military service, including members of the reserve components thereof, who are required by law or departmental policy to carry departmental firearms while on duty or any person who is required by his or her employment to carry a firearm in the performance of his or her duties. Any individual exempted pursuant to this exception may possess a firearm only during the course of his or her employment. Any firearm required for employment must be stored at the place of employment when not being possessed for employment use; all other firearm(s) must be surrendered in accordance with this section.
  12. Upon motion by the plaintiff, his or her address shall be released only at the discretion of the family court judge.
    1. Any violation of the protective orders in subsection (a) of this section shall subject the defendant to being found in contempt of court.
    2. The contempt order shall not be exclusive and shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. Any relief granted by the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed three (3) years, at the expiration of which time the court may extend any order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for any additional time, that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse. The court may modify its order at any time upon motion of either party.
    1. Any violation of a protective order under this chapter of which the defendant has actual notice shall be a misdemeanor that shall be punished by a fine of no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
    2. The penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided by § 12-29-5 .
  13. Actual notice means that the defendant has received a copy of the order by service or by being handed a copy of the order by a police officer pursuant to § 15-15-5(d) .
    1. The district court shall have criminal jurisdiction over all adult violations of this chapter.
    2. The family court shall have jurisdiction over all juvenile violations of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 222, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 7; P.L. 2005, ch. 149, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 153, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 5; P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 5; P.L. 2019, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 46, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2017, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 5; P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 5) as passed by the 2017 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2017, ch. 105, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 111, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 5, and P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 5 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 42, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 46, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Brendan Horan, Comment: The Ball Is in Whose Court? Rhode Island's Need for an Integrated Domestic Violence Court, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 738 (2021).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority.

It was within the magistrate’s authority to issue a civil restraining order after determining that such an order was necessary to protect plaintiff from defendant’s harassment. Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, 92 A.3d 200, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 90 (R.I. 2014).

No-Contact Order.

Defendant’s conviction in the superior court under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5(c)(1)(ii) , based on a third violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 (a)(10), which included violations of a protective order, but which made no mention of no-contact orders, was vacated because defendant’s second conviction was under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3 (d)(1) for violating a no-contact order issued under.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-4 , and a conviction for a violation of a no-contact order was not an enumerated offense in R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 ; at best, defendant committed a misdemeanor violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3 , an offense cognizable in the district court. State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 2003).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Testimony of complainant establishing that defendant arrived at her home without permission and proceeded to bang and kick at her door constituted sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction for violation of a no-contact order. State v. Bruneau, 822 A.2d 911, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 2003).

In a protective order action filed separate and independent of the parties’ divorce proceedings, a hearing justice with the Family Court properly entered a restraining order upon a wife’s request against her husband, based on sufficient evidence provided by the testimony from both parties and independent of the fact that the hearing justice erroneously considered a guardian ad litem’s report. Thibaudeau v. Thibaudeau, 947 A.2d 243, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 2008).

15-15-4. Temporary orders — Ex parte proceedings.

    1. Upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, the court may enter any temporary orders that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse, including relief as provided in chapter 5 of this title.
    2. If it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and a hearing held on the matter, the court may enter any temporary order without notice that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff. Every order granted without notice shall expire by its terms within any time after entry, not to exceed twenty-one (21) days, that the court fixes, unless within the time fixed the order, by consent or for good cause shown and after hearing of argument by the parties or counsel, is extended for an additional period. In case a temporary order is granted without notice, the matter shall be set down for a hearing within a reasonable time and may be given precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character, and when the matter comes on for a hearing, the party who obtained the temporary order shall proceed with the complaint for an order pursuant to § 15-15-3 and, if he or she does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary order.
    1. When the court is unavailable after the close of business, a family court judge may grant relief to the plaintiff as provided in this chapter. At the discretion of the judge, the relief may be granted and communicated by telephone to an officer of the appropriate law enforcement agency who shall record the order on a form of order promulgated for such use by the chief judge of the family court and shall deliver a copy of the order on the next court day to the clerk of the court.
    2. In addition, when there is no family court in session at a location when a division of the district court is in session, the district court judge at the division is authorized to grant relief to the plaintiff under this chapter upon cause shown in an ex parte proceeding.
    3. No temporary order shall be granted pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown in plaintiff ’s written statement that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and a hearing held on the matter.
    4. Any temporary order granted pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection expires at close of the next business day unless a longer time is granted by the family court judge.
  1. Any order issued under this section and any documentation in support of it shall be filed immediately with the clerk of the family court. Filing shall have the effect of commencing proceedings under this chapter and invoking the other provisions of this chapter, but shall not be deemed necessary for an emergency order issued under this chapter to take effect.
  2. The clerk of the family court shall have a certified copy of any order issued under this chapter forwarded immediately to the law enforcement agency designated by the plaintiff. The clerk shall also provide the plaintiff with two (2) certified copies of any order issued under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 248, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 315, § 1.

15-15-4.1. Return of service/alternate service.

  1. The complaint and any order issued under this chapter shall be personally served upon the defendant by a member of the division of sheriffs except as provided in subsections (c), (d), and (f) of this section. Service shall be made without payment of any fee when service is made by a deputy sheriff. At the election of the plaintiff, service, pursuant to the subsection, may also be made by a certified constable authorized to serve process pursuant to § 9-5-10.1 . The constable shall be entitled to receive the fee allowed by law for the service of a family court summons. Where the defendant is a minor, the complaint and any order issued under this chapter shall also be personally served upon a parent or guardian of the minor.
  2. Return of service shall be forwarded by the deputy sheriff or certified constable to the clerk of court prior to the date set down for a hearing on the complaint. If service has not been made, the deputy sheriff or constable shall indicate on the summons the reason and the attempts made to serve the defendant.
  3. At the time the return of service is sent to the clerk of the court, the deputy sheriff or certified constable shall cause a copy of the return of service to be sent to the plaintiff and to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
  4. If, at the time of the hearing on the complaint, the court determines that after diligent effort the deputy sheriff or certified constable has been unable to serve the defendant personally, the judge may order an alternate method of service designed to give reasonable notice of the action to the defendant and taking into consideration the plaintiff’s ability to afford the means of service ordered. Alternative service shall include, but not be limited to: service by certified and regular mail at defendant’s last known address (excluding the residence which he or she has been ordered to vacate) or place of employment, leaving copies at the defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing at the defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode, or by publication in a newspaper for two (2) consecutive weeks. The court shall set a new date for the hearing on the complaint and shall extend the temporary order until that date.
  5. If the defendant appears in person before the court, the necessity for further service is waived and proof of service of that order is not necessary.
  6. If the defendant is served notice regarding the complaint and hearing, but does not appear at the hearing, the clerk of the family court will mail the defendant a copy of the resulting order.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 48; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 26; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 26.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 26, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 26 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

15-15-5. Duties of police officers.

  1. Whenever any police officer has reason to believe that a family member or parent has been abused, that officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including:
    1. Remaining on the scene as long as there is a danger to the physical safety of the person or until the person is able to leave the dwelling unit;
    2. Assisting the person in obtaining medical treatment necessitated by an assault, including obtaining transportation to an emergency medical treatment facility;
    3. Giving the person immediate and adequate notice of his or her rights under this chapter;
    4. Arresting the abusive person pursuant to the arrest provisions in § 12-29-3 ; and
    5. Reporting any physical injury to a minor child or a threat to physically injure a minor child within twenty-four (24) hours of his or her investigation to CANTS (Child abuse and neglect tracking system).
  2. Notice by the police officer to the victim shall be by handing the victim a copy of the following statement written in English, Portuguese, Spanish, Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, Vietnamese, and French, and by reading the statement to the person when possible:

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    “If your attacker is your spouse, former spouse, or person to whom you are related by blood or marriage, or if you are not married to your attacker but have a child in common, or if you and/or your attacker is a minor who have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year, you have the right to go to the family court and request:

    “(1) An order restraining your attacker from abusing you, your minor child, or a plaintiff parent’s minor child(ren) to which the defendant is not a blood relative or relative by marriage;

    “(2) An order awarding you exclusive use of your marital domicile;

    “(3) An order awarding you custody of your minor child.”

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    “If you are not married or related to your attacker, but have resided with him or her within the past three (3) years, or you are in or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship with your attacker within the past one year, you have the right to go to the district court and request:

    “(1) An order restraining your attacker from abusing you;

    “(2) An order directing your attacker to leave your household, unless he or she has the sole legal interest in the household.”

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    “If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to have the officer present obtain transportation to an emergency medical treatment facility.

    “If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you have the right to have the officer present remain at the scene until you and your children can leave or until your safety is otherwise ensured.

    “You have the right to file a criminal complaint with the responding officer or your local police department if the officer has not arrested the perpetrator.”

  3. A police officer shall ensure enforcement of the terms of a protective order issued pursuant to this chapter including, but not limited to, accompanying a family member or parent to his or her dwelling or residence in order to secure possession of the dwelling or residence.
  4. When service of the temporary order issued pursuant to § 15-15-4 has not been made and/or after a permanent order is entered, a police officer shall give notice of the order to the defendant by handing him or her a certified copy of the order. The officer shall indicate that he or she has given notice by writing on plaintiff ’s copy of the order and the police department’s copy of the order, the date and time of giving notice and the officer’s name and badge number. The officer shall indicate on the offense report that actual notice was given.

SPOUSE, FORMER SPOUSE, BLOOD RELATIVE, CHILDRENIN COMMON, MINORS IN SUBSTANTIVE DATINGOR ENGAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP, PLAINTIFF PARENT’SMINOR CHILD(REN) TO WHICH DEFENDANT IS NOT A BLOODRELATIVE OR RELATIVE BY MARRIAGE.

UNMARRIED/NOT RELATED COHABITANTS WITHINTHE PAST THREE YEARS, OR HAVE BEEN IN ASUBSTANTIVE DATING OR ENGAGEMENTRELATIONSHIP WITHIN THE PAST ONE YEAR

ADDITIONAL RIGHTS.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 375, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 248, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 70; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 63, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 68, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by four acts ( P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 63, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 68, § 2) as passed by the 2019 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2019, ch. 63, § 2, and P.L. 2019, ch. 68, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-15-6. Form of complaint.

  1. A form in substantially the following language shall suffice for the purpose of filing a complaint under this chapter:

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND FAMILY COURT COUNTY OF : Plaintiff : : VS. : F.C. NO. : : Defendant : COMPLAINT FOR PROTECTION FROM ABUSE Pursuant to Chapter 15 of this title, I request that the court enter an order protecting me from abuse. (1) My full name, present street address, city, and telephone number are as follows: (2) My former residence, which I have left to avoid abuse, is as follows (street address and city): (3) The full name, present street address, city, and telephone number of the person causing me abuse (the defendant) are as follows: (4) My relationship to the defendant is as follows: We (are) (were formerly) married to one another. I am the defendant’s (child) (parent). I am the blood relative or relative by marriage of the defendant; specifically, the defendant is my . I and the defendant are together the legal parents of one or more children in common. I and the defendant have had a substantive dating or engagement relationship. I am a parent of a minor child(ren) in my care or custody, to which defendant is not a blood relative or relative by marriage. (5) On or about , I suffered abuse when the defendant: Threatened or harmed me with a weapon; (type of weapon used: ) Attempted to cause me physical harm; Caused me physical harm; Placed me in fear of imminent physical harm; Caused me to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force, or duress. Specifically, the defendant (6) I ask that: The court order that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting, or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff at home, on the street or elsewhere. The court order the defendant to immediately leave the household which is located at The court award me temporary custody of the following minor child(ren)(the defendant and I are husband and wife): Names Date of Birth That I request that the above relief be ordered without notice because it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that I will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. I understand that the court will schedule a hearing no later than twenty-one (21) days after the order is entered on the question of continuing the temporary order. (7) I have not sought protection from abuse from any other judge of the family court arising out of the facts or circumstances alleged in this complaint. (8) That the court award me support for my minor children as required by law for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days. (Signature) (Date) Subscribed and sworn to before me in in the county of in the state of Rhode Island, this day of A.D. 20. Notary Public Note: If this complaint is filed by an attorney, the attorney’s certificate should appear as below: ATTORNEY CERTIFICATE Signed: Attorney for Plaintiff Address: Date: , 20 WHITE COPY — Court YELLOW COPY — Plaintiff PINK COPY — Defendant GOLDENROD COPY — Police Department (b) A form in substantially the following language shall suffice for the purpose of requesting temporary orders under this chapter: STATE OF RHODE ISLAND FAMILY COURT COUNTY OF : Plaintiff : : VS. : F.C. NO. : : Defendant : TEMPORARY ORDER PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 15 OF THIS TITLE GENERAL LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND Upon consideration of plaintiff’s complaint and having found that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before a notice can be served and a hearing had thereon it is ORDERED: That the defendant is restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting, or otherwise interfering with plaintiff and any minor children of the plaintiff at home, on the street, or elsewhere, to wit, That the defendant vacate forthwith the household located at That the plaintiff, being the [husband] [wife] of the defendant, be and [s]he hereby is awarded temporary custody of the minor child[ren], to wit, . That the defendant pay to the plaintiff for the support of the minor child(ren) the sum of $ per . That A hearing on the continuation of this ORDER will be held at the family court, County, at [A.M.] [P.M.] on . If the defendant wishes to be heard, [s]he will be heard at that time. If [s]he does not appear at that time, this ORDER shall remain in effect. This ORDER is effective forthwith, and will remain in effect until the time and date of the above-mentioned hearing. A copy of this ORDER shall be transmitted to the appropriate local law enforcement agency forthwith, and shall be served in-hand on the defendant herein. ENTERED as an order of court this day of , A.D. 20.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 221, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 59, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 66, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

In 2021, “and Providence Plantations” was deleted following “state of Rhode Island” in the form in this section at the direction of the Law Revision Director to reflect the 2020 amendments to the state constitution that changed the state’s name.

15-15-7. Notice of penalty.

Each protective order issued under this chapter, including a temporary ex parte order, shall have the following statement printed in bold faced type or in capital letters:

A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE GUILTY OF A MISDEMEANOR AND MAY BE PUNISHED BY A FINE OF AS MUCH AS ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000) AND/OR BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS ONE YEAR, AND MAY BE ORDERED TO ATTEND COUNSELING.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 223, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 2.

15-15-8. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 147, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 195, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 1, effective July 3, 2006. For present comparable provisions, see chapter 15.1 of this title.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-15-8 concerned enforcement of foreign protective orders.

Chapter 15.1 The Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act

15-15.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

Collateral References.

Validity and applicability of Title II of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261 to 2266. 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

15-15.1-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Court” means the family court.
  2. “Foreign protection order” means a protection order issued by a tribunal of another state.
  3. “Issuing state” means the state whose tribunal issues a protection order.
  4. “Mutual foreign protection order” means a foreign protection order that includes provisions in favor of both the protected individual seeking enforcement of the order and the respondent.
  5. “Protected individual” means an individual protected by a protection order.
  6. “Protection order” means an injunction or other order, issued by a tribunal under the domestic-violence, family-violence, or anti-stalking laws of the issuing state, to prevent an individual from engaging in violent or threatening acts against, harassment of, contact or communication with, or physical proximity to, another individual.
  7. “Respondent” means the individual against whom enforcement of protection order is sought.
  8. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band that has jurisdiction to issue protection orders.
  9. “Tribunal” means a court, agency, or other entity authorized by law to issue or modify a protection order.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

15-15.1-3. Judicial enforcement of order.

  1. A person authorized by the law of this state to seek enforcement of a protection order may seek enforcement of a valid foreign protection order in a tribunal of this state. The court shall enforce the terms of the order, including terms that provide relief that the court would lack power to provide but for this chapter. The court shall enforce the order, whether the order was obtained by independent action or in another proceeding, if it is an order issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of an individual seeking protection. In a proceeding to enforce a foreign protection order, the court shall follow the procedures of this state for the enforcement of protection orders.
  2. The court may not enforce a foreign protection order issued by a tribunal of a state that does not recognize the standing of a protected individual to seek enforcement of the order.
  3. The court shall enforce the provisions of a valid foreign protection order which govern custody and visitation, if the order was issued in accordance with the jurisdictional requirements governing the issuance of custody and visitation orders in the issuing state.
  4. A foreign protection order is valid if it:
    1. Identifies the protected individual and the respondent;
    2. Is currently in effect;
    3. Was issued by a tribunal that had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter under the law of the issuing state; and
    4. Was issued after the respondent was given reasonable notice and had an opportunity to be heard before the tribunal issued the order or, in the case of an order ex parte, the respondent was given notice and has had or will have an opportunity to be heard within a reasonable time after the order was issued, in a manner consistent with the rights of the respondent to due process.
  5. A foreign protection order valid on its face is prima facie evidence of its validity.
  6. Absence of any of the criteria for validity of a foreign protection order is an affirmative defense in an action seeking enforcement of the order.
  7. The court may enforce provisions of a mutual foreign protection order which favor a respondent only if:
    1. The respondent filed a written pleading seeking a protection order from the tribunal of the issuing state; and
    2. The tribunal of the issuing state made specific findings in favor of the respondent.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

15-15.1-4. Nonjudicial enforcement of order.

  1. A law enforcement officer of this state, upon determining that there is probable cause to believe that a valid foreign protection order exists and that the order has been violated, shall enforce the order as if it were the order of a tribunal of this state. Presentation of a protection order that identifies both the protected individual and the respondent and on its face, is currently in effect constitutes probable cause to believe that a valid foreign protection order exists. For the purposes of this section, the protection order may be inscribed on a tangible medium or may have been stored in an electronic or other medium if it is retrievable in perceivable form. Presentation of a certified copy of a protection order is not required for enforcement.
  2. If a foreign protection order is not presented, a law enforcement officer of this state may consider other information in determining whether there is probable cause to believe that a valid foreign protection order exists.
  3. If a law enforcement officer of the state determines that an otherwise valid foreign protection order cannot be enforced because the respondent has not been notified or served with the order, the officer shall inform the respondent of the order, make a reasonable effort to serve the order upon the respondent, and allow the respondent a reasonable opportunity to comply with the order before enforcing the order.
  4. Registration or filing of an order in this state is not required for the enforcement of a valid foreign protection order pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

15-15.1-4.1. Form of certification or confirmation.

A form in substantially the following language shall suffice for the purposes of filing of certificate or confirmation:

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND FAMILY COURT ,S. Ct.(Name) Petitioner vs. (Name) C.A. No. Respondent CERTIFICATION OF PROTECTION/RESTRAINING ORDER It is hereby certified that the attached is a true and correct copy of the order entered in the above-captioned action on (date) and that the original of the attached order was duly executed by the judicial authority whose signature appears thereon. The order expires on (date). The order is: [ ] a civil protection/restraining order. OR [ ] a criminal protection/restraining order, that recognizes the standing of the plaintiff to seek enforcement of the order. It is further certified that: (a) The issuing court determined that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter under the laws of (state or Indian tribe). (b) The respondent was given reasonable notice and had opportunity to be heard before this order was issued; or if the order was issued ex parte, the respondent was given notice and had opportunity to be heard after the order was issued, consistent with the rights of the respondent to due process. (c) The order was otherwise issued in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act, and the Violence Against Women Act, . 18 U.S.C. § 2265 For custody and visitation orders: (d) The order was otherwise issued in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act of this state/territory and is consistent with the provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. . 28 U.S.C. § 1738A The attached order shall be presumed to be valid and enforceable in this and other jurisdictions. Signature of Clerk of court or other authorized official:

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History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

15-15.1-5. Registration of order.

  1. Any individual may register a foreign protection order in this state. To register a foreign protection order, an individual shall:
    1. present a certified copy of the order to the appropriate law enforcement agency; or
    2. present a certified copy of the order to the department of attorney general and request that the order be registered with the appropriate law enforcement agency.
  2. Upon receipt of a foreign protection order the appropriate law enforcement agency shall register the order in accordance with this section. After the order is registered the appropriate law enforcement agency shall furnish to the individual registering the order a certified copy of the registered order.
  3. The appropriate law enforcement agency shall register an order upon presentation of a copy of a protective order which has been certified by the issuing state. A registered foreign protection order that is inaccurate or is not currently in effect must be corrected or removed from the registry in accordance with the law of this state.
  4. An individual registering a foreign protection order shall file an affidavit by the protected individual stating that, to the best of the protected individual’s knowledge, the order is currently in effect.
  5. A foreign protection order registered under this chapter may be entered in any existing state or federal registry of protection orders, in accordance with applicable law.
  6. A fee may not be charged for the registration of a foreign protection order.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

15-15.1-6. Immunity.

The state or a local governmental agency, or a law enforcement officer, prosecuting attorney, clerk of court, or any state or local governmental official acting in an official capacity, is immune from civil and criminal liability for an act or omission arising out of the registration or enforcement of a foreign protection order or the detention or arrest of an alleged violator of a foreign protection order if the act or omission was done in good faith in an effort to comply with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

15-15.1-7. Other remedies.

A protected individual who pursues remedies under this chapter is not precluded from pursuing other legal or equitable remedies against the respondent.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

Collateral References.

Housing Protections for Victims of Intimate Partner Violence Under Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12491. 43 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2019).

15-15.1-8. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this chapter, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

15-15.1-9. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 284, § 2.

Chapter 16 Income Withholding

15-16-1. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to enhance the enforcement of support obligations by providing a swift and effective procedure for the withholding of income derived in this state to enforce support orders issued in this state or other jurisdictions, and by providing a mechanism by which income withholding, to enforce the support orders issued in this state, may be sought in other jurisdictions. This chapter shall be applicable to support obligations established or enforceable in this state, including support obligations enforceable pursuant to the Rhode Island state plan for child and spousal support enforcement, as the plan may be adopted and amended by the Rhode Island department of human services in accordance with title IV, part D, § 454 of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654, and as more fully defined in § 15-16-2 . This chapter shall be construed liberally to effect this purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 84, § 8; P.L. 1994, ch. 209, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-2. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter, except as may otherwise be required by the context:

  1. “Agency” means either the court or agency of any other jurisdiction with income withholding functions similar to those of the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement defined in this chapter, including the issuance and enforcement of support orders.
  2. “Child” means any child, whether above or below the age of majority, with respect to whom a support order exists.
  3. “CSE system” means the Rhode Island family court/department of administration, division of taxation, child support computer enforcement system, which system maintains the official record of support orders and arrearages of all support orders entered upon it in accordance with applicable administrative orders issued by the Rhode Island family court.
  4. “Court” means the Rhode Island family court and, when the context requires, means either the court or agency of any other jurisdiction with functions similar to those defined in this chapter, including the issuance and enforcement of support orders.
  5. “Department” means the division of taxation, within the department of administration.
  6. “Income” shall include amounts paid or payable by a payor who is subject to the jurisdiction of this state to an obligor as:
    1. Compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, whether taxable or not taxable, and specifically including periodic payments pursuant to pension or retirement programs or insurance policies of any type; or
    2. Benefit payments or other similar compensation paid or payable to the obligor by or through a department, agency, or political subdivision of the state or federal government or by an insurance company, including unemployment compensation benefits, workers’ compensation benefits, and temporary disability benefits, except where garnishment or attachment of benefit payments is prohibited by federal law.
  7. “Income withholding order” means an order to withhold income of an obligor to pay support, arrearages, and fees, if any, authorized under this chapter, whether the order is issued by the department and filed with the clerk of the family court, or whether the order is issued by the family court as provided for in this chapter or whether the order is issued by a court or agency of another jurisdiction.
  8. “Jurisdiction” means any state or political subdivision, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
  9. “Magistrate ” means a magistrate of the family court pursuant to § 8-10-3.1 .
  10. “Obligee” means any person or entity entitled to receive support under an order of support and includes an agency of another jurisdiction to which a person has assigned his or her right to support.
  11. “Obligor” means any person required to make payments under the terms of a support order for a child, spouse, or former spouse.
  12. “State plan” means the Rhode Island state plan for child and spousal support established in accordance with title IV, part D, § 454 of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654, which plan includes, but is not limited to, the establishment and enforcement of support orders on behalf of a person, whether residing in this state or another jurisdiction, who is:
    1. Receiving public assistance pursuant to part A of title IV of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.;
    2. Receiving foster care maintenance payments pursuant to part E of title IV of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.; or
    3. Not receiving aid to families with dependent children nor foster care maintenance payments but who files an application for support enforcement services with the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement, or any authorized title IV, part D agency of another jurisdiction.
  13. “Support order” means a judgment, decree or order, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued by the family court, by the division of taxation within the department of administration under § 15-16-7 or by a court or agency of another jurisdiction, for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimbursement, and may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, attorney’s fees, and other relief.
  14. “Tribunal” means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage.
  15. “Withholding agent” means any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association, trust, federal or state agency, department, or political subdivision, paying or obligated to pay income, as defined in this chapter, to an obligor.
  16. “Remittee”, as used in this section, means the division of taxation, child support enforcement or its designee, authorized to receive wage withholding, including an agency designated by another state to receive income withholding pursuant to chapter 23.1 of title 15. Remittee does not include an individual obligee/custodial parent.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 6; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 7; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 4; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 33.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-3. Remedies additional.

The income withholding remedy provided in this chapter is in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other remedy available to enforce a support order issued in this state or in another jurisdiction. Relief under this chapter shall not be denied, delayed, or affected because of the availability of other remedies, nor shall relief under any other statute be delayed or denied because of the availability of this remedy.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1.

15-16-4. Income withholding agency.

The division of taxation within the department of administration is designated as the state income withholding agency for all income withholding orders issued or registered in Rhode Island and shall have all powers, duties, and responsibilities to establish and administer income withholding in accordance with this chapter, and is further authorized and directed to promulgate rules and regulations that it deems necessary to implement the provisions and purposes of this chapter; provided, that any rule or regulation affecting the duties and responsibilities of the family court shall be made with the concurrence of the chief judge of the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-5. Requirement of income withholding — Support orders issued in this state or other jurisdictions.

    1. In the case of each obligor against whom a support order: (i) has been issued or modified in this state; or (ii) has been issued or modified in another jurisdiction; or (iii) has been issued or modified in another jurisdiction and has been filed and registered with the department in accordance with § 15-16-13 , and in either case the order is being enforced under the state plan; so much of an obligor’s income must be withheld in an amount sufficient to comply with the order for current support when the obligor has failed to make payment of support as provided in this section or when the obligor or obligee has requested withholding in accordance with the requirements of this section.
    2. If an obligor owes a support arrearage in addition to the amount to be withheld to comply with the order for current support, the order to withhold income must include an amount equal to ten percent (10%) of the current support order, which amount shall be applied toward liquidation of support arrearages; provided, that the additional withholding to satisfy arrearages, when added to the amounts withheld to pay current support and to provide for the withholding agent’s fee provided in § 15-16-10 , may not exceed the limit permitted under § 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b).
    3. Upon petition by an obligor, the court in its discretion may reduce the amount required to be withheld in liquidation of support arrearages to a nominal or token amount, if the court finds that additional withholding would work an undue hardship on the obligor. The income withholding must occur without the need for any amendment to the support order involved or for any further action by the court or other entity which issued the order.
  1. With respect to a support order issued or modified in this state, an obligor shall become subject to income withholding and the income withholding may be initiated by the department:
    1. When the obligor has failed to make a support payment in full within fourteen (14) days of the due date for the support payment, notwithstanding that payment of the arrearage may be made subsequent to the obligor’s receipt of notice of income withholding or prior to the date of the hearing; or
    2. The date on which the obligor requests, in writing, that the income withholding begin, whichever is earliest.
  2. With respect to an order issued or modified in this state, the department may initiate income withholding:
    1. Utilizing and relying on the information officially recorded on the CSE system as to support orders and arrearages; or
    2. After receipt of a certified copy of the support order with all modification, together with the sworn statement of the obligee as to support arrearages and stating the name and address of the obligor and his or her employer or withholding agent.
  3. With respect to a support order issued or modified in another jurisdiction, income withholding shall be initiated by the department when the support order has been filed and registered in accordance with § 15-16-13 , and the department and/or the court shall apply the law of the other jurisdiction as to amount or duration of support arrearages necessary to commence income withholding. In all other respects, the provisions of this chapter and the laws of this state shall apply.
    1. The only basis for contesting income withholding initiated under this section is a mistake of fact. For purposes of this section, mistakes of fact shall be limited to the following:
      1. An error in the amount of current support or support arrearage;
      2. The mistaken identity of the obligor;
      3. An error in the amount of income to be withheld in payment of current support and arrearages; or
      4. The amount to be withheld exceeds the maximum amount permitted under § 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b).
    2. The burden shall be on the obligor to establish a defense of mistake of fact.
  4. The department shall provide the obligor with notice required in § 15-16-6 regarding the income withholding initiated under this section and the procedures the obligor should follow if he or she desires to contest the income withholding on the grounds that the income withholding is not proper because of mistakes of fact. The notice shall be sent by regular mail at the obligor’s most recent address of record.
  5. An obligor may contest the income withholding by filing or mailing a written statement with the department within fourteen (14) days of the mailing of the notice under § 15-16-6 , which statement shall specify the mistake or mistakes of fact claimed by the obligor.
  6. Payment by an obligor of the support arrearage stated in the notice to the obligor is not a valid defense to income withholding.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 478, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-5.1. Immediate income withholding — Support orders issued or modified on or after January 1, 1994.

    1. With respect to a support order issued, enforced, or modified on or after January 1, 1994, the income of an obligor shall be subject to immediate income withholding under this chapter on the effective date of the order, regardless of whether support payments by the obligor are in arrears; provided, that the income of the obligor shall not be subject to immediate income withholding:
      1. If a judge or magistrate of the family court finds that there is good cause not to require immediate income withholding; or
      2. If the obligor and obligee, and the department in the case of an obligee subject to an assignment of support rights under § 40-6-9 , enter into a written agreement or order which provides for an alternative arrangement for the timely payment of support due under the support order.
    2. In no event shall the court order wage withholding payable to the obligee directly from any wage withholding agent.
  1. The obligor shall be given advance notice, by way of the pleadings or otherwise, that his or her income is subject to immediate income withholding as provided in subsection (a) of this section, that the maximum amount of income to be withheld may not exceed the limit permitted under § 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b), and that he or she may contest immediate income withholding, and assert any defenses, exceptions, or exemptions to which he or she may be entitled at a hearing before a judge or magistrate of the family court.
  2. With the exception of those income withholding orders issued pursuant to § 15-23.1-501 , an immediate income withholding order issued under this section shall be filed by the department or the obligee with the clerk of the family court or, as appropriate, with the reciprocal office of the family court and shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 15-16-9 15-16-13 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 478, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 209, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 25; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 7; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-6. Notice to obligor.

The notice to the obligor required under § 15-16-5 shall inform the obligor:

  1. Of the amount of the support arrearage and the amount of income that has been withheld for payment of current support, arrearages, and any fees allowable under this chapter;
  2. That the provision for withholding of income applies to any current or subsequent employer or period of employment;
  3. Of the procedures available for contesting the withholding and that, in accordance with § 15-16-5 , the grounds for contesting the withholding are limited to mistakes of fact;
  4. Of the period within which the obligor must file a statement contesting withholding with the department;
  5. Of the opportunity to contest the income withholding at a hearing before a master of the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-7. Income withholding by withholding agency — Registry — Judicial review.

  1. If an obligor or obligee requests income withholding or if the obligor fails to timely file his or her statement contesting income withholding as required under § 15-16-5 , the income withholding shall become effective without the necessity for a hearing before a magistrate of the family court, and the department shall issue an income withholding order to the withholding agent with notice of the order to the obligor, in accordance with § 15-16-9 .
  2. The department shall maintain a central registry of all income withholding orders issued pursuant to this section and § 15-16-8 , and it shall enter these orders on the CSE system.
  3. An obligor aggrieved by the issuance of an income withholding order by the department under this section shall be entitled to judicial review de novo by the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 478, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 7.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-8. Contesting withholding.

An obligor may request a family court hearing in writing within fourteen (14) days of the date of the mailing of the notice described in § 15-16-6 . The family court shall notify the obligor by first class mail of the date, time, and place of the hearing within five (5) days of receipt of the written request for hearing. The only basis for contesting income withholding initiated under this section is mistake of fact as set forth in § 15-16-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-9. Income withholding order — Service — Effectiveness — Contents.

  1. An income withholding order under this chapter shall be binding upon a withholding agent one week after service, by personal service or by certified or registered mail, of a true copy of the income withholding order. The income withholding order shall be binding upon the withholding agent until further notice to the withholding agent in accordance with this chapter. Concurrently with the service of a true copy of the income withholding order upon a withholding agent, the department shall mail a true copy of the income withholding order by regular mail to the obligor.
  2. Any income withholding order under this chapter shall have priority over any prior attachment, execution, garnishment, or wage or income assignment against the income of the obligor. An income withholding order under this chapter shall not be subject to any specific or statutory exemption or limitation prohibiting levy, execution, assignment, or attachment process or limiting the amount subject to income withholding under this chapter, except the exemptions or limitations as provided by federal law.
  3. Every income withholding order issued pursuant to this chapter shall include the following:
    1. That the income withholding order shall be binding upon a withholding agent one week after the service upon the withholding agent;
    2. The total amount to be withheld from the obligor’s income for support and support arrearages;
    3. The amount of fees a withholding agent may withhold from the income of an obligor in addition to support and support arrearages;
    4. That the total amount to be withheld for support, support arrearages, and fees may not be in excess of the maximum amounts permitted under § 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b);
    5. That withholding is binding upon the withholding agent until notice by the department or the court;
    6. That the withholding agent is subject to the duties and liabilities as provided in § 15-16-10 .

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-10. Duties and liabilities of withholding agent.

  1. An income withholding agent shall remit to the clerk of the family court, or any other remittee as directed in the income withholding order, all amounts withheld from the income of an obligor within seven (7) days of the date the income was paid or payable to the obligor, and the income withholding agent shall specify the date and amount of each withholding included in the remittance, the social security number of the obligor, the child support account number, the employee’s name, and any other information as required if electronic transfer is utilized. The withholding agent may combine withheld amounts from two (2) or more obligors into a single payment, provided that the withholding agent separately identifies the individual obligors and the amount attributable to each obligor.
  2. An income withholding agent may deduct a fee of two dollars ($2.00) from the obligor’s remaining income for each payment made pursuant to an income withholding order under this chapter.
  3. The income withholding agent must notify the department, in writing, of the termination of the obligor’s employment within ten (10) days of the termination. Notice shall include the last known address of the obligor and the name and address of the obligor’s new employer, if known.
  4. Any withholding agent failing to comply with any of the requirements of this chapter may be punished by the family court or its magistrate for civil contempt. The court or its magistrate shall first afford the withholding agent a reasonable opportunity to purge itself of the contempt.
  5. Any withholding agent who fails or refuses to deliver income pursuant to an income withholding order issued under this chapter, when the withholding agent has had in its possession the income, shall be personally liable for the amount of the income which the withholding agent failed or refused to deliver, together with costs, interest, and reasonable attorney’s fees.
  6. Any withholding agent who dismisses, demotes, disciplines, refuses to hire, or in any way penalizes an obligor on account of any income withholding order issued under this chapter shall be liable to the obligor for all damages, together with costs, interest thereon, and reasonable attorney’s fees resulting from the action, and shall be subject to a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100). The withholding agent shall be required to make full restitution to the aggrieved obligor, including reinstatements and back pay.
  7. A withholding agent may be enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction from continuing any action in violation of this chapter.
  8. Compliance by a withholding agent with an income withholding order issued under this chapter operates as a discharge of the withholding agent’s liability to the obligor as to that portion of the obligor’s income affected.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 478, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 209, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 6; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 7; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 33.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-11. Duration — Modification or revocation of order.

  1. An income withholding order issued pursuant to this chapter shall remain in full force and effect until modified or revoked.
  2. The order may be modified or revoked by the court upon application and for good cause shown, provided that the payment by the obligor of all support arrearages shall not be the sole basis for modification or revocation of the income withholding order.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-12. Allocation of amounts withheld — Refunds — Distribution.

  1. In the event that there are two (2) or more income withholding orders against the same income of an obligor, the department shall allocate and distribute the amount remitted by the withholding agent between or among the separate income withholding orders giving priority to current support obligations as follows:
    1. Each obligee shall be allocated an amount in the proportion which each obligee’s current support order under income withholding bears relative to the total of all amounts for current support under income withholding orders; and
    2. Any remaining withheld income shall be allocated to each obligee in an amount proportional to which each obligee’s arrearage order under income withholding bears relative to the total of all amounts ordered to be paid on arrearages under income withholding orders.
  2. The department shall promptly refund to an obligor the amounts, if any, which may have been improperly withheld.
  3. The department shall promptly distribute amounts received under income withholding orders in accordance with § 457 of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 657.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 209, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-13. Registering support orders of another jurisdiction for purposes of income withholding.

    1. A party seeking to enforce a support order or an income-withholding order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another state may send the documents required for registering the order to a support enforcement agency of this state.
    2. Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and, if appropriate, use any administrative procedure authorized by the law of this state to enforce an income-withholding order. If the obligor does not contest administrative enforcement, the order need not be registered. If the obligor contests the validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the support enforcement agency shall register the order.
    3. At any hearing contesting proposed income withholding based on a support order registered under this section, the registered order, accompanying sworn or certified statement, and a certified copy of an income withholding order, if any, still in effect shall constitute prima facie proof, without further proof or foundation, that the support order is valid, that the amount of current support payments and arrearages is as stated, and that the obligee or agency would be entitled to income withholding under the law of the jurisdiction which issued the support order. Once a prima facie case has been established, the obligor may only raise the defense of mistake of fact as stated in § 15-16-5 .
  1. The following documentation is required for the registration of a support order of another jurisdiction:
    1. A letter of transmittal requesting registration and enforcement;
    2. Two (2) copies, including one certified copy, of all orders to be registered, including any modification of an order;
    3. A sworn statement by the party seeking registration or a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrearage;
    4. The name of the obligor and, if known:
      1. The obligor’s address and social security number;
      2. The name and address of the obligor’s employer and any other source of income of the obligor; and
      3. A description and the location of property of the obligor in this state not exempt from execution; and
    5. The name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the agency or person to whom support payments are to be remitted.
  2. On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of the documents and information, regardless of their form.
  3. A registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-14. Voluntary income withholding.

The obligor of a support order of another jurisdiction may obtain voluntary income withholding by filing with the department a request for withholding and a certified copy of the support order. The department shall issue an income withholding order under § 15-16-7 .

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-15. Initiation of income withholding with other jurisdictions.

  1. With respect to a state that has not adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), on behalf of any client for whom the department is already providing services, or on application of a resident of this state who is an obligee or obligor of a support order issued by this state, or of an agency to whom the obligee has assigned support rights, the department shall promptly request the agency of another jurisdiction in which the obligor of a support order derives income to enter the order for the purpose of obtaining income withholding against that income.
  2. The department shall compile and promptly transmit to the agency of the other jurisdiction all documentation required to enter a support order for this purpose.
  3. The department also shall immediately transmit to the agency of the other jurisdiction a certified copy of any subsequent modifications of the support order.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 6; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-16-16. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of it shall for any reason be judged invalid, that judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of the chapter, but shall be confined in its effect to the provision or application directly involved in the controversy giving rise to the judgment.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 163, § 1.

Chapter 17 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act

15-17-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Premarital agreement” means an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be effective upon marriage.
  2. “Property” means an interest, present or future, legal or equitable, vested or contingent, in real or personal property, including income and earnings.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

Collateral References.

Construction and Application of Uniform Premarital Agreement Act of 1983. 33 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2018).

Fairness or adequacy of premarital agreements. 53 A.L.R.4th 85.

Modern status of views as to validity of premarital agreements contemplating divorce or separation. 53 A.L.R.4th 22.

15-17-2. Formalities.

  1. A premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties.
  2. It is enforceable without consideration.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and enforcement of oral antenuptial agreements. 15 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2016).

15-17-3. Content.

  1. Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:
    1. The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;
    2. The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property;
    3. The disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
    4. The modification or elimination of spousal support;
    5. The making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement;
    6. The ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance policy;
    7. The choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and
    8. Any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, which are not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.
  2. The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

15-17-4. Effective upon marriage.

A premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

15-17-5. Amendment — Revocation.

  1. After marriage, a premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties.
  2. The amended agreement or the revocation is enforceable without consideration.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Statutes.

The trial justice erred in concluding that § 15-5-16.1 should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties in a divorce action rather than the antenuptial agreement signed by them two days prior to the marriage, since there was no evidence of a written agreement amending or revoking the antenuptial agreement and nothing to prove the required elements under § 15-17-6 by clear and convincing evidence. Rubino v. Rubino, 765 A.2d 1222, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2001).

15-17-6. Enforcement.

  1. A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that:
    1. That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; and
    2. The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, that party:
      1. Was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party;
      2. Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and
      3. Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
  2. The burden of proof as to each of the elements required in order to have a premarital agreement held to be unenforceable shall be on the party seeking to have the agreement declared unenforceable and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  3. If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
  4. An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of law.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The Rhode Island Legislature has expanded the equity jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Family Court with the intent to offer parties who have filed a petition for divorce, separation, or other relief in the Family Court, a comprehensive resolution of property, contractual, and equitable disputes that have arisen between them including the authority to hear and determine disputes arising out of antenuptial agreements. Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 2003).

Burden of Proof.

The party challenging the enforceability of a premarital agreement bears the burden of proving all the elements in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) by a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, under which the trier of fact must believe that the truth of the facts asserted by the proponent is highly probable. A finding of unconscionability does not provide a sufficient basis on which to refuse to enforce a premarital agreement because, under this chapter, proof of both involuntary execution and nondisclosure and/or waiver is required in addition to a finding of unconscionability. Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 260 (R.I. 1994).

The trial justice erred in concluding that § 15-5-16.1 should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties in a divorce action rather than the antenuptial agreement signed by them two days prior to the marriage, since there was no evidence of a written agreement amending or revoking the antenuptial agreement and nothing to prove the required elements under § 15-17-6 by clear and convincing evidence. Rubino v. Rubino, 765 A.2d 1222, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2001).

Because the boilerplate language used by counsel for both parties regarding equitable distribution could not overcome the unequivocal and specific attempts made by a former wife to enforce her rights under an antenuptial agreement, the trial justice was clearly wrong in finding as a fact that the wife had abandoned the agreement by accepting an advancement of $5,000. Rubino v. Rubino, 765 A.2d 1222, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2001).

Post-Divorce Actions.

The Rhode Island Family Court possessed jurisdiction to hear a husband’s breach of contract claim premised on his wife’s alleged breach of their prenuptial agreement under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3 ; therefore, husband’s post-divorce action, related to wife’s not alleging ante-nuptial agreement when she filed for divorce, was barred by res judicata in his subsequent action. Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 2003).

Premarital Agreements.

In a divorce action, the family court erred in finding that a premarital agreement was not valid, as plaintiff failed to establish the elements set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6 . Where defendant failed to fully disclose the value of his assets, the list of his assets contained in the agreement satisfied the requirements of the statute and unconscionability alone was not sufficient to invalidate the agreement; however, the agreement did not preclude the family court from assigning the appreciation in value or an interest in defendant’s property that increased in value as a result of the efforts of either spouse during the marriage under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(b) . Marsocci v. Marsocci, 911 A.2d 690, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 191 (R.I. 2006).

Collateral References.

Failure to Disclose Extent or Value of Property Owned As Ground for Avoiding Premarital Contract. 3 A.L.R.5th 394.

15-17-7. Enforcement — Void marriage.

If a marriage is determined to be void, an agreement that would otherwise have been a premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

15-17-8. Limitation of actions.

Any statute of limitations applicable to an action asserting a claim for relief under a premarital agreement is tolled during the marriage of the parties to the agreement. However, equitable defenses limiting the time for enforcement, including laches and estoppel, are available to either party.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

15-17-9. Applicability and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

15-17-10. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Premarital Agreement Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

15-17-11. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 449, § 1.

Chapter 18 Commission on Child Support

15-18-1. Legislative findings.

The general assembly finds and declares that:

  1. An increasingly large percentage of children in this state live in single parent households;
  2. Almost one-half (1/2) of single parent households have income below the poverty level;
  3. In excess of forty thousand (40,000) children in the state are receiving state aid through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program;
  4. Children in families where parents are separated or divorced are at greater risk of economic deprivation than in two (2) parent families.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 344, § 1.

15-18-2. Establishment — Purpose.

There is established a commission on child support to study all aspects of child support. The study shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

  1. The number of children eligible for and/or receiving child support;
  2. The amount of support being ordered paid by the courts and the actual amount being paid;
  3. The methods used in determining the amount of child support;
  4. The methods used in enforcing support orders.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 344, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-18-3. Membership.

  1. The commission shall consist of fifteen (15) members: three (3) of whom shall be members of the house of representatives, not more than two (2) from the same political party, to be appointed by the speaker; two (2) of whom shall be from the senate, not more than one from the same political party, to be appointed by the president of the senate; one of whom shall be the chief judge of the family court, or his or her designee; one of whom shall be the chairperson of the supreme court advisory committee on women in the courts; one of whom shall be a magistrate of the family court to be appointed by the chief judge of the family court; one of whom shall be the director of the department of human services or his or her designee; two (2) of whom shall be attorneys who are members of the family court bench bar committee to be appointed by the chairperson of the committee; one of whom shall be the chief counsel of the legal aid society; one of whom shall be a member of a child support advocacy group to be appointed by the governor; and two (2) members of the general public who, at their time of appointment, are custodial parents to be appointed by the governor. Members from the family court bench bar committee, members from the general public, and the member from the child support advocacy group shall serve two (2) year terms.
  2. Any vacancy on the commission shall be filled by the appointing authority in the same manner as the original appointment.
  3. The members shall annually elect, by majority vote, one of the members as chairperson, one of the members as vice-chairperson, and one of the members as secretary.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 344, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 9; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 13.

15-18-4. Technical assistance.

All departments and agencies of the state shall furnish any advice and information, documentary and otherwise, to the commission and its agents that is deemed necessary or desirable by the commission to facilitate the purposes of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 344, § 1.

15-18-5. Reports and recommendations.

The commission shall report to the general assembly at least every two (2) years its findings and the results of its studies, and shall make such recommendations to the general assembly as it deems advisable.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 344, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 34.

15-18-6. Place of meeting.

The speaker of the house shall provide adequate space in the state house for the use of the commission; provided, that the commission may conduct hearings and hold meetings elsewhere when doing so will better serve its purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 344, § 1.

Chapter 19 Child Support Security Deposit Act

15-19-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Child Support Security Deposit Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 462, § 1.

15-19-2. Order for deposit of assets to secure future support payments.

    1. Subject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, in any proceeding where the court has ordered either or both parents to pay any amount of the support of a minor child, upon an order to show cause or notice of motion, application, and declaration signed under penalty of perjury by the person to whom support has been ordered to have been paid stating that the parent or parents so ordered is in arrears in payment in a sum equal to the amount of sixty (60) days of payments, the court shall issue to the parent or parents ordered to pay support, following notice and opportunity for a hearing, an order requiring that the parent or parents deposit assets to secure future support payments with the family court clerk or any other trustee designated by the court. Upon request of any party the court may also issue an ex parte restraining order as specified in subsection (d) of this section. Upon deposit of any asset which is not readily convertible into money, the court may, not less than twenty (20) days after serving the obligor parent or parents with written notice and a hearing, order the sale of that asset or assets and the deposit of the proceeds with the person designated under this subsection. For purposes of the provisions of title 34, the date of the issuance of the order to deposit assets shall be construed as the date notice of levy on an interest in real property was served on the judgment debtor. When the asset ordered to be deposited is real property, the order shall be certified as judgment in accordance with the provisions of titles 8, 9, 10, and 34. A deposit of real property is made effective by recordation of a mortgage deed running to the family court clerk with the city or town recorder of deeds. The deposited real property and the rights, benefits, and liabilities attached to that property shall continue in the possession of the legal owner.
    2. Upon an obligor parent’s failure, within the time specified by the court, to make reasonable efforts to cure the default in child support payments or to comply with a court approved payment plan, if payments continue in the arrears, the family court clerk or trustee designated by the court shall, not less than twenty-five (25) days after providing the obligor parent or parents with a written notice served personally or with return receipt requested, unless a motion or order to show cause has been filed to stop the use or sale, use the money or sell or otherwise process the deposited assets for an amount sufficient to pay the arrearage and the amount ordered by the court for the support, maintenance, and education of the minor child currently due.
    3. Assets which have been deposited pursuant to an order issued in accordance with subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be construed as being assets subject to levy pursuant to the provisions of title 34. The sale of assets shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of title 34.
    4. The family court clerk or trustee designated by the court may deduct from the deposited money the sum of one dollar ($1.00) for each payment made pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection.
    5. An obligor parent alleged to be in arrears under this chapter may employ any of the following grounds as a defense to the motion filed pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection, or as a basis for filing a motion to stop a sale or use of assets under subdivision (2) of this subsection:
      1. Child support payments are not in arrears;
      2. There has been a change in the custody of the children;
      3. Illness or disability;
      4. Unemployment;
      5. Serious adverse impact on the immediate family of the obligor parent residing with the obligor parent that outweighs the impact of denial of the motion or stopping the sale on obligee;
      6. Serious impairment of the ability of the obligor parent to generate income; or
      7. Other emergency conditions.
    6. An obligor parent must rebut the presumptions that nonpayment of child support was willful, without good faith, and that the obligor had the ability to pay the support.
    7. An obligor parent may file a motion to stop the use of the money or the sale of the asset pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection within fifteen (15) days after service of notice on him or her pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection. The clerk of the court shall set the motion for a hearing not less than twenty (20) days after service on the person or county officer to whom support has been ordered to have been paid.
  1. The court shall issue an order pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a) upon a determination that one or more of the following conditions exists:
    1. The obligor parent is not receiving salary or wages subject to an assignment pursuant to § 15-5-16.2 ; and there is reason to believe that he or she has earned income from some source of employment;
    2. An assignment of a portion of salary or wages pursuant to § 15-5-16.2 would not be sufficient to meet the amount of the support obligation, for reasons other than a change of circumstances which would qualify for a reduction in the amount of child support ordered;
    3. The job history of the obligor parent shows that an assignment of a portion of salary or wages pursuant to § 15-5-16.2 would be difficult to enforce or would not be a practical means for securing the payment of the support obligation, due to circumstances including, but not limited to, multiple concurrent or consecutive employers.
  2. The designation of assets subject to an order pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be based upon concern for maximizing the liquidity and ready conversion into cash of the deposited asset. In all instances, the assets shall include a sum of money up to or equal in value to one year of support payments or six thousand dollars ($6,000), whichever is less, or any other assets, personal or real, designated by the court which equal in value up to one year of payments for support of the minor child, or any other amount in the discretion of the family court. In lieu of depositing cash or other assets as provided above, the obligor parent may, if approved by the court, provide a performance bond secured by any real property or other assets of the parent and equal in value to one year of payments.
  3. During the pendency of any proceeding pursuant to this chapter, and upon the application of either party in the manner provided by the provisions of title 34, the court may, without a hearing, issue ex parte orders restraining any person from transferring, encumbering, hypothecating, concealing, or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community, or separate, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life, and if the order is directed against a party, requiring him or her to notify the other party of any proposed extraordinary expenditures and to account to the court for all such extraordinary expenditures. The matter shall be made returnable not later than twenty (20) days, or if good cause appears to the court twenty-five (25) days, from the date of the order, at which time the ex parte order shall expire. Any order issued pursuant to this chapter shall state on its face the date of expiration of the order, which shall expire in one year or upon deposit of assets or money pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a), whichever occurs first. The court, at the hearing, shall determine for which property the obligor parent shall be required to report extraordinary expenditures and shall specify what is deemed an extraordinary expenditure for purposes of this subsection.
  4. The family court clerk or trustee designated by the court pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, who is responsible for any money or property and for any disbursements under this chapter, shall not be held liable for any action undertaken in good faith and in conformance with this chapter.
    1. The family court clerk or trustee designated by the court shall return all assets subject to court order under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) to the obligor parent or parents when both of the following occur:
      1. One year has elapsed since the court issued the order described under subdivision (1) of subsection (a); and
      2. The obligor parent or parents have made all support payments on time during that one year period.
    2. When the above criteria have been satisfied and when the deposited asset was real property, the family court clerk or trustee designated by the court shall prepare a release, and shall request the clerk of the court where the order to deposit assets was rendered to certify the release and record it in the office of the recorder of deeds in the city or town where the property is located.
  5. The family court clerk or trustee shall, if requested by the obligor parent, prepare a statement setting forth disbursements and receipts made under this chapter.
  6. If the family court clerk, trustee, or person designated under subsection (a) of this section incurs fees or costs under this chapter which are not compensated by the deduction under subdivision (3) of subsection (a), including, but not limited to, fees or costs incurred in any sale of assets pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and in the preparation of a statement pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, the court shall hear not less than twenty (20) days after service upon the obligor parent of the notice of motion or order to show cause by the family court clerk, trustee, or person designated under subsection (a) of this section incurring the fees or costs, and order the obligor parent or parents to pay reasonable fees and costs. Fees and costs ordered to be paid by the court under this subsection shall be in addition to any deposit made under subsection (a) of this section, but shall not exceed five percent (5%) of one year’s child support obligation or the total amount ordered deposited under subdivision (1) of subsection (a), whichever is less.
  7. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an extraordinary remedy for cases of bad faith failure to pay child support obligations.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 462, § 1.

Chapter 20 Child Support Notification

15-20-1. Notification to and by employer.

  1. With respect to any support order maintained and enforced under the Rhode Island Family Court/Department of Administration, division of taxation, Child Support Enforcement System (“CSE System”), the clerk of the family court and/or the department of administration, division of taxation shall notify the current employer of the obligor parent of the existence of such order. The director of the department shall, by regulation, prescribe the timing and the form of the notice and the information to be provided in the notice, and the form, timing, and content of all other notices required under this chapter.
  2. Within ten (10) days of the termination of an obligor parent employee, the employer shall notify the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement, of the termination of the employee, and the date of the termination. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 7.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 14 of article 29 of P.L. 1995, ch. 370, provides: “No employer shall discharge or take any disciplinary action against an employee based on the employer’s notification or obligation provisions contained in this article.”

Section 14 of P.L. 1995, ch. 374 provides: “No employer shall discharge or take any disciplinary action against an employee based on the employer’s notification or obligation provisions contained in this act.”

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-20-2. Duty of obligor parent to notify department.

  1. When the obligor parent changes employers, the obligor parent shall promptly notify his or her subsequent employer of his or her order for child support and/or health insurance and shall notify the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement, of his or her new employment, and the department shall transfer the assignment, garnishment, or the order for child support and/or health insurance to the subsequent employer.
  2. If an assignment, garnishment, or order for child support and/or health insurance is in effect under this section but cannot be executed because the obligor parent has no employer, the department shall send the assignment, garnishment, or order for child support or health insurance to any employer who later employs the obligor as soon as the new employment is ascertained; provided, that the obligor parent’s obligation on the order shall continue, regardless of employment or lack of it, unless suspended by order of the family court. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 7.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-20-3. Penalties.

Failure by an obligor parent to comply with the provisions of this section shall be a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

15-20-4. Duty of parent to notify department — Residence.

  1. When the obligor parent and/or custodial parent change residence it shall be the duty of this parent to notify the department of the change of residence within ten (10) days.
  2. This section applies to all cases brought pursuant to the Rhode Island state plan for child and spousal support, in conformance with title IV-D, part D of the Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.
  3. The procedures set forth in § 15-5-16.2(h) relative to notice shall apply to all cases recorded with the Rhode Island family court/department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement system where services are not being provided under the state plan.
  4. All notices and pleadings shall be mailed and/or served to the appropriate party at the most recent address of record.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 8.

Chapter 21 Child Support Lien Act

15-21-1. Arrearages — Collection procedures.

  1. The department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement, in accordance with Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., is authorized to institute collection procedures for all arrearages which accrue against child support payments owed pursuant to a court judgment or support order.
  2. These collection procedures shall include, but not be limited to, notification to employers that a wage assignment is in effect and not suspended; notification to obligors; demand letters; use of state and federal tax refund intercept programs; initiation of contempt proceedings; use of lien, levy, and foreclosure of lien as provided in this chapter; garnishment or attachment of or lien against property; trustee process; civil actions; and any other civil remedy including body attachment, where appropriate, available for the enforcement of judgments or for the enforcement of child support orders. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 10.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-2. Creation of lien.

  1. A child support obligation or reimbursement order which is enforceable by the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement, in accordance with Title IV Part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and which is unpaid in whole or in part shall, as of the date on which it was due, be a lien in favor of the obligee or assignee in an amount sufficient to satisfy unpaid child support, whether the amount due is a fixed sum or is accruing periodically. Once a child support lien arises, the lien shall incorporate any unpaid child support which may accrue in the future and shall not terminate except as provided in § 15-21-4(g) . The lien shall encumber all tangible and intangible property, whether real or personal, and rights to property, whether legal or equitable, belonging to the obligor including, but not limited to, the obligor’s interest in any jointly held property. An interest in personal property acquired by the obligor after the child support lien arises shall be subject to the lien. Without limiting the forgoing, “property” as used in this chapter shall also include insurance and workers’ compensation payments.
  2. In any case where a lien arises in jointly held property, a non-obligor joint party whose interest appears of record or is otherwise known to the department shall receive notice of intent to lien and may request an administrative hearing with the department to contest the scope of the property interests of the lien or may seek judicial review by motion to the family court. Service of the notice shall be made by first class mail. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 10; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 26; P.L. 2005, ch. 410, § 8.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-3. Notice.

    1. Notice.  When the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement, determines that child support is unpaid, it shall send written notice of intent to lien to the obligor by first class mail at his or her most recent address of record.
    2. The notice of intent shall specify the amount unpaid as of the date of the notice or other date certain and the obligor’s right to request a hearing by filing a written request with the department within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice. The notice shall identify the property, real or personal, which is subject to the lien. In addition, the notice shall:
      1. State that the obligor has the right to a hearing on the issue of whether, and how much, child support is unpaid, and that the obligor may request a hearing within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice. The notice shall explain the procedure for requesting a hearing. If the obligor requests a hearing, the administrator or his or her designee shall conduct the hearing expeditiously and the department shall not conduct further lien enforcement action until the director or his or her designee makes a final determination that the obligor is in arrears in the payment of a child support obligation.
      2. State that certain property and funds, whether in cash or in bank accounts, may be from a lien exempt by law. The notice shall include a list of appropriate exemptions.
      3. Inform the obligor of the right to claim that part or all of the funds subject to the lien that may be exempt by law and provide the obligor with the opportunity to have an immediate hearing on the exemption issue. The notice shall explain the procedure for requesting an exemption hearing, and provide the obligor thirty (30) days from the date of the notice of intent to lien in which to do so. Hearing procedures must include a method for requesting a hearing in person, by mail or by telephone.
  1. Exemption hearings.  The department shall schedule and conduct the exemption hearing promptly. The department shall issue a written decision making specific findings of an obligor’s exemption claim(s), and, if it finds part or all of the funds held by the financial institution or other similar organization to be exempt, shall promptly notify that institution or organization of its determination.
  2. Effect of notice.  The notice of intent to lien directed to any financial institution, or other similar institution or organization, shall operate as a hold on any and all accounts specified in the notice. Neither the obligor or non obligor joint owner shall be permitted to withdraw from those accounts until the earlier of:
    1. The date of the decision in obligor’s favor with regard to exemptions; or
    2. Until the administrative hearing and/or judicial process as described in this chapter, is completed and a determination is made.
  3. Recording of notice.  If the property subject to the lien is real property or personal property, the title to which is maintained as a public record, the department may record a copy of the notice of intent to lien in the recorder of deeds, division of motor vehicles, or other place where the title to the property is recorded. Any person taking title to the property subsequent to the recording does so subject to the interest of the department, as it may be determined. The notice of intent shall be recorded no more than ten (10) days prior to the mailing of the notice to the obligor under subsection (a) of this section. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 10; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-4. Notice of lien.

  1. To perfect a lien with respect to real property, the department shall file a notice of lien with the recorder of deeds for the city or town in which the property is located. The recorder of deeds shall index the notice of intent under the name of the obligor in the grantors index. The filing of a notice of intent of the lien or of a waiver or release of the lien shall be received and registered or recorded without payment of a fee.
  2. To perfect a child support lien with respect to personal property, the department shall file a notice of lien with the secretary of state’s office, the administrator of the division of motor vehicles, or any other office or agency within the state responsible for the filing or recording of liens. The filing of a notice of intent of the lien or of a waiver or release of the lien shall be received and registered or recorded without payment of a fee.
  3. If any obligor against whom a notice of intent to create a child support enforcement lien has been filed according to this section:
    1. Fails to request a hearing within the time frame provided;
    2. Fails to appear; or
    3. Neglects or refuses to pay the sum due after the expiration of thirty (30) days after a hearing is conducted by the department pursuant to § 15-21-3 , at which the determination is made the obligor parent is in arrears.
  4. The notice of intent as filed shall be deemed and operate as a lien which is perfected by the department by the filing of a notice of lien. The notice of lien shall specify the property to be attached and the amount of the arrearage due and shall be filed in the office or city or town where the notice of intent was originally filed.
  5. The lien shall have priority over all subsequent liens or other encumbrances, subject to the provisions of § 6A-9-322 and with the exception of any lien for taxes. A child support lien that has been perfected shall encumber after acquired personal property or proceeds.
  6. If the collection of any unpaid child support will be jeopardized by delay or exigent circumstances, as defined by rules promulgated by the director, the department may apply to the family court for an order to restrain the obligor parent from encumbering, moving, selling, or in any way transferring any real or personal property which may be subject to the provisions of this section.
  7. The lien shall expire upon either termination of a current child support obligation and payment in full of unpaid child support or release of the lien by the department. In any event, a lien under this chapter shall not expire until satisfied and discharged. Expiration of the lien shall not terminate the underlying order or judgment of child support. The department may issue a full or partial waiver or partial release or full discharge of any lien imposed under this section and shall file the waiver, release, or discharge without fee in the city or town or office where the original lien was filed within ten (10) days of the obligor’s compliance with this section. The waiver or release or partial release or full discharge shall be conclusive evidence that the lien upon the property covered by the waiver or release is extinguished. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1998, ch. 370, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 35.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-5. Levy of personal property.

  1. In any case where the department has perfected a lien pursuant to § 15-21-4 , the department may collect unpaid child support and levy upon all property as provided in this section. The department shall have the authority to issue an administrative notice of levy or administrative writ of execution to effectuate a levy under this chapter of the law. The term “levy” includes the power of seizure by any means authorized by law. The department may seize and sell any property that is subject to levy. Any person in possession of property upon which a lien has been imposed shall, upon demand, surrender the property to the department.
  2. A levy on property held by an organization with respect to a life insurance or endowment contract shall, without necessity for the surrender of the contract document, constitute a demand by the department for payment of the amount of the lien and the exercise of the right of the obligor to the advance of that amount. The organization shall pay the amount within ninety (90) days after service of notice of levy. The levy shall be deemed to be satisfied if the organization pays over to the department the full amount which the obligor could have had advanced to him or her, provided that the amount does not exceed the amount of the lien.
  3. Whenever any property upon which levy has been made is not sufficient to satisfy the claim of the state for which levy is made, the department may thereafter, as often as necessary, proceed to levy, with notice, upon any other personal property of the obligor liable to levy, until the amount due from him or her, together with expenses, is fully paid. In all cases, any support obligations shall be fully satisfied prior to payments for expenses.
  4. Upon demand by the department, a person who fails or refuses to surrender personal property subject to levy shall be liable in his or her own person and estate to the state in a sum equal to the value of the property not so surrendered, but not exceeding the amount of the lien, together with costs and interest, at the rate authorized for civil judgments, from the date of the levy. In addition, any person required to surrender property who fails or refuses to surrender the property without reasonable cause shall be liable for a penalty equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount recoverable. The interest or penalty incurred under this subsection shall be paid to the general fund and shall not be credited against the child support liability. Any non-obligor party aggrieved by a decision of the department may, within ten (10) days of receipt of notice of demand, request an administrative hearing with the department. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-6. Release from liability.

  1. Any person in possession of, or obligated with respect to, personal property who upon demand by the department surrenders the property or discharges the obligation to the department, or who pays a liability under this section, shall be discharged from any obligation or liability to the obligor arising from the surrender or payment.
  2. In the case of a levy on an organization with respect to a life insurance or endowment contract, which is satisfied pursuant to this section, the organization shall also be discharged from any obligation or liability to any beneficiary arising from the surrender of payment. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, 6; § P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-7. Foreclosure of lien against real property.

  1. If the department has perfected a lien on real property in accordance with § 15-21-4 , then it shall be lawful for the department or its assigns to sell the real property of any defaulting obligor and the benefit and equity of redemption of the defaulting obligor and his or her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, at public auction upon the premises or at any other place that may be designated for that purpose by the department or its assigns, by:
    1. Mailing written notice of the time and place of sale to the defaulting obligor, at his or her last known address, by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least twenty (20) days prior to publishing the notice;
    2. Publishing the notice at least once each week for three (3) successive weeks in a public newspaper published daily in the city or town in which the real property is situated; and if there is no public newspaper published daily in the city or town where the real property is situated, or if the real property is not situated in a city, then:
      1. If the real property is situated in the city of Central Falls, in a public newspaper published daily in the city of Pawtucket;
      2. If the real property is situated in the town of North Providence, in a public newspaper published daily in the city of Providence;
      3. If the real property is situated in any of the towns of Cumberland, Lincoln, Smithfield, or North Smithfield, in a public newspaper published daily in either the city of Pawtucket, Woonsocket, or Providence;
      4. If the real property is situated in the county of Providence elsewhere than in the above named cities and towns, in a public newspaper published daily in the city of Providence;
      5. If the real property is situated in the county of Newport, in a public newspaper published daily in the city of Newport; but if there is no such newspaper published, then in some public newspaper published anywhere in the county of Newport;
      6. If the real property is situated in any of the counties of Bristol, Kent, or Washington:
        1. In a public newspaper published daily in the city or town in which the real property is situated; or
        2. If there is no public newspaper published, then in a public newspaper published in the city or town in which the real property is situated, or in some public newspaper published daily in the county in which the real property is situated, or in a public newspaper published daily in the city of Providence; with powers to adjourn the sale from time to time, provided that publishing of the notice shall be continued, together with a notice of the adjournment or adjournments, at least once each week in the same newspaper; and
    3. By mailing written notice of the sale to any person or entity having an interest of record in the real property, who records not later than thirty (30) days prior to the date originally scheduled for the sale including, without limitation, the holder of any mortgage or deed of trust with respect to the real property, to the address of the person or entity provided for this purpose in the land evidence records or at any other address that the person or entity may have provided the department in writing, the notice to be given by regular or certified mail, return receipt requested, at least twenty (20) days prior to the date originally scheduled for the sale; and in his or her or their own name or names, or as the attorney or attorneys of the defaulting obligor (for that purpose by these presents duly authorized and appointed with full power of substitution and revocation) to make, execute, and deliver to the purchaser or purchasers at the sale a good and sufficient deed or deeds of the defaulted real property, in fee simple, and to receive the proceeds of the sale or sales, and from these proceeds to retain all sums secured by the lien in favor of the department as of the date of the sale together with all expenses incident to the sale or sales, or for making deeds under this chapter, and for fees of counsel and attorneys, and all costs or expenses incurred in the exercise of these powers, and all taxes, assessments, and premiums for insurance, if any, either paid by the department, or its assigns, or remaining unpaid upon the defaulted real property, rendering and paying the surplus of the proceeds of sale, if any, over and above the amounts to be retained as previously provided, together with a true and particular account of the sale or sales, expenses, and charges, to the defaulting obligor, or his or her heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns; which sale or sales made as previously provided shall forever be a perpetual bar against the defaulting obligor and his or her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, and all persons claiming the defaulted real property, so sold, by, through, or under him or her, them, or any of them.
  2. Any foreclosure sale held by the department pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, and the title conveyed to any purchaser or purchasers pursuant to the sale, shall be subject to any lien or encumbrance entitled to a priority over the lien of the department pursuant to § 15-21-4 . [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 10.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-8. Civil actions not precluded.

  1. In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any child support or to discharge any liability in respect to child support, whether or not a levy has been made, the department, in addition to other modes of relief, may file an action in the family court.
  2. The filing of a civil action shall not preclude the department from enforcing the child support order through the use of any administrative means permitted by federal or state law. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-9. Written notice to obligor.

At the time of perfecting a lien, executing a levy, or seizing any property, the department shall send written notice to the obligor by first class mail of the action taken.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-10. Judicial review.

Any person aggrieved by a determination of the department pursuant to this chapter may seek judicial review within thirty (30) days of the department’s decision on exemptions or within thirty (30) days of the department’s final determination by filing a motion with the court. Commencement of the review shall not, unless specifically ordered, stay enforcement of the child support collection procedures described in § 15-21-1 .

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

15-21-11. Full faith and credit of liens.

A lien procured by another jurisdiction, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, shall be accorded full faith and credit without the requirement of a hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 11.

Chapter 22 Exchange of Information in Support of Child Support Collection

15-22-1. Access to information.

  1. The department of human services, office of child support services, and/or any other state or federal agency taking action to establish paternity, establish or modify child support and/or medical orders, enforce child support and/or medical orders, or to locate an individual for these reasons, shall have access to and may request information from the individuals and the entities named in this section. The information shall be available to the department only for the purpose of and to the extent necessary for the administration of the child support enforcement program. No entity or individual who complies with this section shall be liable in any civil or criminal action or proceeding brought by an obligor or an obligee on account of compliance. Holders maintaining personal data are authorized to disclose to the department all personal data requested pursuant to this section, and the disclosures shall not violate the provisions of § 38-2-2 . Any entity or individual who, without reasonable cause, fails to reply to a request pursuant to this subsection or who, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with a request within twenty (20) days of receipt, shall be liable for a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) for each violation, to be assessed by the department or by the family court. The department may secure information to which it is entitled by any method including, but not limited to, requests by paper, facsimile, telephone, magnetic tape, or other electronic means.
    1. Information to which the department shall be entitled includes, but is not limited to, state income tax returns and all state income tax information, including address, filing status, and the number of dependents reported on any return filed by any obligor, any other information, the contents and nature of which shall be determined and approved by the tax administrator, and the federal tax data as permitted by federal law.
    2. The information included in this provision shall be data or tax returns in any form or format, including data available by electronic means which is directly related to the obligor.
  2. Unless otherwise limited by statute, the department shall be entitled to all criminal offender record information of the obligor which is necessary to locate the obligor or establish the obligor’s ability to pay including, but not limited to, national criminal information center (NCIC) records and bureau of criminal identification (BCI) records maintained by the department of the attorney general and the quarterly contribution reports of the department of labor and training.
  3. Unless otherwise limited by federal statute, the department may require electronic disclosure of information relating to the obligor including, but not limited to, the obligor’s location, employment, title to property, credit status, or professional affiliation to assist the department to determine the current whereabouts of an obligor from any source including, but not limited to, any state or municipal agency, utility company, including telephone, cell phone company, assessor’s offices, and housing authorities, employers, professional or trade associations and labor unions, professional or trade licensing boards, banks and other financial institutions, credit bureaus or agencies, or any other individual or entity which the department has reason to believe may have information that relates to or may assist in the location of the obligor. The failure of an individual or entity to provide the department, within the time and in the manner that the department may provide by regulation, with information relating to, or that may assist in locating, an obligor shall be punishable by a civil penalty to be assessed by the family court or the department of human services, office of child support services in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100) for each failure, and the individual or entity shall be required to provide the information.
  4. In requiring information about an obligor from a telephone company; including a cell phone company, the department shall be limited to obtaining the billing and/or residential address of the obligor. No location information, including, but not limited to, global positioning system data, that in whole or in part, is generated by or derived from the operation of such device shall be sought or received.
  5. The department may request from any employer or other source of income whom the department has reason to believe employs an obligor, or otherwise provides the obligor with regular periodic income, information concerning the dates and amounts of income paid, the last known address, social security number, and available health care benefits. The department shall not inquire of an employer or other source of income concerning the same obligor more than once every three months. Employers or other sources of income shall respond to the requests truthfully and in writing. No employer or other source of income who complies with this section shall be liable in any civil action or proceeding brought by the obligor on account of such compliance. Any employer or other source of income who, without good cause, fails to comply with a request as required by this section, within twenty (20) days of receipt of the request, shall be liable for a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) per day for each day of violation to be assessed by the family court or the department of administration, division of taxation, and shall be required to provide the information.
  6. The department shall use the information gathered pursuant to this chapter only for purposes of administering the child support enforcement program and shall not disclose the information, other than the name and address of the obligor, except in proceedings or other activities to locate or identify obligors, to evaluate the ability of obligors to pay child support, to establish, modify, or enforce child support orders, to collect child support, or in criminal prosecutions for failure to pay child support. Any employee of the department that uses or discloses the information in any other manner shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 6; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 12; P.L. 2013, ch. 169, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 231, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

P.L. 2013, ch. 169, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 231, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-22-2. Financial institution data matches.

The department of administration, division of taxation, shall enter into cooperative agreements with financial institutions further defined as any bank, savings association, federal or state credit union, benefit association, insurance company, safe deposit company, money-market mutual fund or similar entity authorized to do business in the state, to develop and operate a data match system using automated data exchanges to the maximum extent feasible on a quarterly basis, listing each noncustodial parent provided by the department in the exchange who maintains an account at the financial institution and who owes past due support in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500). The financial exchange shall include, but not be limited to, the name, address, date of birth and social security number or other taxpayer identification number, the asset description, account number and account balance and any and all information required pursuant to § 15-21-2 for the purpose of establishing an administrative lien. The financial institution shall not be liable to any person for any disclosure to the state agency, for encumbering or surrendering any assets held by the financial institution in response to a notice of lien or levy issued by the state pursuant to chapter 21 of this title, or for any other action taken in good faith to comply with the requirements of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 13.

15-22-3. Administrative subpoena.

  1. The department of administration, division of taxation, and any other state or federal agency taking action to establish paternity, establish or modify child support or medical orders, enforce child support orders or location of individuals for the above, shall be authorized to issue subpoenas as appropriate to the individuals and entities named in this chapter to secure financial and other information relating to the obligor for the purpose of and to the extent necessary for the administration of the child support enforcement program.
  2. Any entity or individual who fails to reply to an administrative subpoena shall be liable for a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) for the violation, to be assessed by the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement, or the Rhode Island family court, and shall be required to provide the information and/or comply with the request.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 13.

15-22-4. Personal data — Purposes for which disclosure permitted — Safeguards — Exceptions — Unauthorized inspection or disclosure — Penalties.

    1. Personal data collected and maintained by the agency created pursuant to title IV, part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., (subsequently referred to as the IV-D agency) shall not be a public record and access to this data shall be available only to employees of the IV-D agency and/or its contractors, and only to the extent reasonably necessary for the performance of the employees or contractors duties. The IV-D agency may disclose personal data for purposes connected with establishing paternity, establishing, modifying or enforcing child support and medical obligations pursuant to this chapter and title IV, part D of the Social Security Act. The IV-D agency may disclose personal data:
      1. To any state or federal public assistance program or to the IV-D agency of another state for purposes connected with the administration of the program or of the child support enforcement program, as authorized by title IV, part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services;
      2. To persons authorized to receive information from the Federal Parent Locator Service established pursuant to title IV, part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.;
      3. To the director of the department of human services or his or her agent for purposes directly connected with detecting and preventing fraud in any assistance program administered by the department;
      4. To the department of children, youth and families for purposes directly connected with an investigation or proceedings related to termination of parental rights, adoption, or foster care parental support actions;
      5. To a person authorized in writing by the parent or, in the case of the child, by the custodial parent or legal guardian of the child, to receive personal data;
      6. For purposes directly connected to obtaining health care coverage for a child receiving services pursuant to title IV, part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., to an employer or provider of health care coverage or to the obligor;
      7. In the case of personal data about an individual parent, to that parent or, in the case of personal data about the child, to the custodial parent or legal guardian of the child; or
      8. To any other individual, business or entity for the purposes of administering the child support enforcement program or otherwise provided by federal or state law.
    2. Before disclosing personal data pursuant to this section, the IV-D agency shall require the person or agency requesting the data to verify in writing, in a form provided by child support enforcement that the data is required for a purpose permitted by this section and that the data will be used solely for this purpose. The IV-D agency shall limit disclosure to the specific data required by the person or agency to carry out a purpose permitted by this chapter.
    1. The IV-D agency shall safeguard personal data if the IV-D agency is provided with reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence. A state agency, court, IV-D agency of another state, obligor, obligee, and any other persons or entities that the IV-D agency may specify may provide the IV-D agency with reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence in any manner that the IV-D agency may require. The IV-D agency shall continue to safeguard personal data until the time that the individual contacts this agency in writing to advise that his or her personal data need not be safeguarded. For the purposes of this section, a “history of domestic violence” means that an individual has been subjected to:
      1. Physical acts that resulted in, or threatened to result in, physical injury to the individual;
      2. Sexual abuse;
      3. Sexual activity involving a dependent child;
      4. Being forced as the caretaker relative of a dependent child to engage in nonconsensual sexual acts or activities;
      5. Threats of, or attempts at, physical or sexual abuse;
      6. Mental abuse; or
      7. Neglect or deprivation of medical care.
    2. If the IV-D agency is provided with reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence, the IV-D agency, its employees, and its contractors shall indicate this fact to the federal registry and shall not disclose any personal data that could otherwise be disclosed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section about the location of a parent or child, including residential address, telephone number, and name, address and telephone number of employer, and shall not disclose the social security number of a parent or child. However, the IV-D agency may disclose such personal data to:
      1. The Federal Parent Locator Service;
      2. A court or agency of a court that is authorized to receive information pursuant to court order from the Federal Parent Locator Service established pursuant to title IV, part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.;
      3. The department of human services;
      4. The department of children, youth and families for purposes directly connected with an investigation of proceedings related to termination of parental rights, adoption or parental support action; or
      5. A person authorized to receive personal data by the parent or, in the case of the child, by the custodial parent or legal guardian of the child.
    3. The IV-D agency may disclose the social security number of a child receiving IV-D services for purposes directly connected to obtaining health care coverage for the child to an employer or provider of health care coverage.
    4. If the IV-D agency is provided with reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence pursuant to this section, the IV-D agency shall notify the Federal Parent Locator Service established pursuant to title IV, part D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., that a risk of harm exists. A person or agency seeking disclosure of personal data which the IV-D agency is prohibited from disclosing because of reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence, but which could otherwise be disclosed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may file a petition with the family court pursuant to § 15-22-5 to request disclosure of the personal data. Upon written request by a court or agent of a court authorized to receive information from the Federal Parent Locator Service, the IV-D agency shall release personal data, which may include location information and social security numbers, to the court or agent, as required by title IV, part D of the Social Security Act; provided, that if the IV-D agency has been provided with reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence, the IV-D agency shall notify the court or agent that the IV-D agency has received this information and that, pursuant to section (b) of this section, before the IV-D agency may make any disclosure of personal data under this section, the court is required to determine whether the disclosure to any other person could be harmful to the parent or child and issue a court order to that effect.
    1. The IV-D agency shall have in effect safeguards to ensure the integrity, accuracy, and completeness of, access to, and use of data, including personal data and data in the automated system which shall include:
      1. Written policies concerning access to data by IV-D agency personnel and its contractors, and sharing of data with other individuals, businesses, or entities, which permit access to and use of data only to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of the child support enforcement program and which specify the data which may be used for particular program purpose, and the personnel permitted access to the data;
      2. Systems controls to ensure strict adherence to the policies;
      3. Routine monitoring of access to and use of the automated system, through methods such as audit trails, to guard against and promptly identify unauthorized access or use;
      4. Procedures to ensure that all personnel, including employees of the IV-D agency and its contractors, who may have or had access to or who may be or were required to use confidential program data and personal data, are informed of applicable requirements and penalties, including those in this section, § 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and are adequately trained in security procedures;
      5. Penalties, as provided in this section, for willful inspection or disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, personal data; and
      6. Any other safeguards that the commissioner of revenue and the secretary of the federal department of health and human services may specify in regulations.
    2. The willful inspection or disclosure of personal data, except as authorized by subsection (b) of this section, by any employee of the IV-D agency, its contractors, or any person obtaining unauthorized access to the data, including data stored in a computer system or computer files, while the data is in the custody of the division of taxation, child support enforcement, or in the custody of any employee of the IV-D agency or its contractors, is prohibited. Personal data may be inspected and shared by and between employees of the IV-D agency in the performance of their official duties as provided in this chapter. Authorized employees of the division of taxation, child support enforcement, may disclose personal data to any employee of a contractor of the IV-D agency to the extent necessary for performance of the contracted duties of the employee. Any violation of this section by an employee of the IV-D agency, its contractors or an officer, director or employee of its contractors, a person obtaining unauthorized access to personal data, or any other individual shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, with respect to each person concerning whom information has been disclosed or inspected. The determination by child support enforcement that an employee of the IV-D agency, or the determination of another agency head that an employee of any other agency, has made a disclosure or willful inspection of personal data that was not authorized by this section and not protected by the good faith provision of subsection (d) of this section shall be grounds for dismissal of that employee. A violation, as determined by child support enforcement, of this section by an officer, director, or employee of any contractor of the state, or any officer, director or employee of the state, shall also be cause for terminating any current contract between that contractor and the state and for prohibiting that contractor from entering into any future contract with the state.
  1. Any unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized inspection made in a good faith effort to comply with this section shall not be considered a violation of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 272, § 1.

15-22-5. Disclosure of personal data prohibited — Petition for disclosure — Motion to seal court files — Determination of harm — Limited disclosure.

  1. A person or agency, including the IV-D agency, seeking personal data which the IV-D agency is prohibited from disclosing because of a history of domestic violence but which could otherwise be disclosed pursuant to § 15-22-1(a) , or which the Federal Parent Locator Service established pursuant to title IV, part D of the Social Security Act is prohibited from disclosing because the secretary of the federal department of health and human services has been notified that there is reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence, may file a petition with the family court to request disclosure of the personal data. The petition shall specify the purposes for which the personal data is required. When a petition is filed under this section, or when the court receives notice from the IV-D agency through a motion to seal the file or otherwise, that the IV-D agency has been notified of a history of domestic violence pursuant to § 15-22-4 , the court shall determine whether disclosure of personal data could be harmful to the parent or child before releasing the data to any other person or agency. The parent may provide the information in writing and shall not be required to appear in person to contest the release of information. The court shall also notify the IV-D agency of any petition to disclose files pursuant to this section, and the IV-D agency shall provide the court with any reasonable evidence of a history of domestic violence when it has been provided to the IV-D agency pursuant to § 15-22-4 . The court may also request information directly from the Federal Parent Locator Service, from the IV-D agency of another state, and from any other source.
    1. In determining whether disclosure of personal data meets the definition of a history of domestic violence and could be harmful to the parent or child, the court shall consider any relevant information provided by the parent or child, any information provided by the IV-D agency or by the IV-D agency of another state, any evidence provided by the person seeking the personal data, whether the address of the parent or child has been impounded, and any other relevant evidence, including information contained in the records of the statewide domestic violence record keeping system. Documentary evidence transmitted to the court by facsimile, telecopier, or other means that do not provide an original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission. The court may permit a party or witness to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means.
    2. The court shall not enter an order to disclose personal data without reviewing all of the information that has been provided to the court and shall not draw an adverse inference from the failure of the parent to appear in person to contest disclosure of information.
    3. The court may, upon motion by any party, or the division of taxation, child support enforcement, or on its own, enter an order:
      1. Sealing the file and prohibiting any disclosure of confidential information by the court or its agents;
      2. Obliterating location information contained in the court file;
      3. Permitting disclosure by the court or its agents to a specific person or persons;
      4. Prohibiting disclosure by the court or its agents to a specific person or persons; or
      5. Removing any restrictions on disclosure by the court and its agents.
    4. An order permitting disclosure of personal data may specify the purposes for which the data may be used and may prohibit a person to whom the data is disclosed from making further disclosures to any other person. The court shall notify the IV-D agency of any order entered pursuant to this section. Any person or agency who violates an order issued pursuant to this section may be held in contempt of court and subject to the penalties provided in § 15-22-4(c)(2) .
    5. The court may disclose location information about a parent for the limited purpose of notifying the parent of a proceeding under this section or of any other proceeding in the probate and family court, provided that the information shall not be disclosed to another party unless the court issues an order pursuant to this section permitting the disclosure.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 410, § 9.

Chapter 23 Uniform Interstate Family Support Act [Repealed.]

15-23-1 — 15-23-53. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 129, § 7; P.L. 1996, ch. 131, § 7; P.L. 1996, ch. 132, § 7; P.L. 1996, ch. 133, § 7; Repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 14, effective July 3, 1997. For present comparable provisions, see § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 15-23-1 — 15-23-53 concerned the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

Chapter 23.1 Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

Article 1 General Provisions

15-23.1-100. Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as “The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act of 2006”.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 1.

15-23.1-101. Definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Child” means an individual, whether over or under the age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the individual’s parent or who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the parent.
  2. “Child support order” means a support order for a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state or foreign country.
  3. “Convention” means the convention on the international recovery of child support and other forms of family maintenance, concluded at the Hague on November 23, 2007.
  4. “Duty of support” means an obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse, or former spouse, including an unsatisfied obligation to provide support.
  5. “Foreign country” means a country, including a political subdivision thereof, other than the United States, that authorizes the issuance of support orders, and:
    1. Which has been declared under the law of the United States to be a foreign reciprocating country;
    2. Which has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this state as provided in § 15-23.1-308 ;
    3. Which has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under the chapter;
    4. In which the convention is in force with respect to the United States.
  6. “Foreign support order” means a support order of a foreign tribunal.
  7. “Foreign tribunal” means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country which is authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child. The term includes a competent authority under the convention.
  8. “Home state” means the state or foreign country in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is less than six (6) months old, the state or foreign country in which the child lived from birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the six (6) month or other period.
  9. “Income” includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to money from any source and any other property subject to withholding for support under the law of this state.
  10. “Income-withholding order” means an order or other legal process directed to an obligor’s employer or other debtor, as defined by § 15-16-1 et seq., to withhold support from the income of the obligor.
  11. “Initiating tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country from which a petition or comparable pleading is filed for forwarding to another state or foreign country.
  12. “Issuing foreign country” means the foreign country in which a tribunal issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child.
  13. “Issuing state” means the state in which a tribunal issues a support order or renders a judgment determining parentage of a child.
  14. “Issuing tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country that issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child.
  15. “Law” includes decisional and statutory law and rules and regulations having the force of law.
  16. “Obligee” means:
    1. An individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child has been issued;
    2. A foreign country, state or political subdivision of a state to which the rights under a duty of support or support order have been assigned or which has independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support;
    3. An individual seeking a judgment determining parentage of the individual’s child; or
    4. A person that is a creditor in a proceeding under article 7.
  17. “Obligor” means an individual, or the estate of a decedent that:
    1. Owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support;
    2. Is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of a child;
    3. Is liable under a support order; or
    4. Is a debtor in a proceeding under Article 7 of this chapter.
  18. “Outside this state” means a location in another state or a country other than the United States, whether or not the country is a foreign country.
  19. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  20. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  21. “Register” means to file in a tribunal of this state a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child issued in another state or foreign country.
  22. “Registering tribunal” means a tribunal in which a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child is registered.
  23. “Responding state” means a state in which a petition for support or to determine parentage of a child is filed or to which a petition is forwarded for filing from another state or foreign country.
  24. “Responding tribunal” means the authorized tribunal in a responding state or foreign country.
  25. “Spousal-support order” means a support order for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor.
  26. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian nation or tribe.
  27. “Support enforcement agency” means a public official, government entity or private agency authorized to:
    1. Seek enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the duty of support;
    2. Seek establishment or modification of child support;
    3. Request determination of parentage of a child;
    4. Attempt to locate of obligors or their assets; or
    5. Request determination of the controlling child support order.
  28. “Support order” means a judgment, decree, order, decision, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued in a state or foreign country for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, retroactive support, or reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support. The term may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, automatic adjustment, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other relief.
  29. “Tribunal” means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

Cross References.

Divorce proceedings, obligations arising from, §§ 15-5-16 , 15-5-16 .2, 15-5-19 .

Order of support on complaint, § 15-9-2 .

Parents, obligation to support, § 15-10-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Uniform reciprocal enforcement of support law:

Conn. Gen. Stat., § 46b-180 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 273A, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The reciprocal provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act did not violate Art. I, § 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution.Fraser v. Fraser, 415 A.2d 1304, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1658 (R.I. 1980).

Effect of Prior Support Order.

A support order entered pursuant to a divorce proceeding did not bar, under the doctrine of res judicata, a subsequent action for support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Tetreault v. Tetreault, 119 R.I. 611 , 381 A.2d 1049, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 592 (1978).

Minimum Contacts.

In a proceeding by a mother for support of herself and her child under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the family court trial justice quite properly ruled that the mother’s prior contacts with Rhode Island some years ago did not endow the family court with jurisdiction to consider the mother’s complaints. Carrillo v. Carrillo, 523 A.2d 439, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 440 (R.I. 1987).

Where a father’s student days at Brown University occurred before he and the mother separated and the subject matter of the litigation — child-support payments — was being administered by the Wisconsin judicial system, to consider his college years as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over unrelated actions arising in the future would make a mockery of the limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the fourteenth amendment. Carrillo v. Carrillo, 523 A.2d 439, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 440 (R.I. 1987).

Waiver.

In a proceeding by a mother for support of herself and her child under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the mother’s argument that the nonresident father waived the jurisdictional issue by filing an affidavit showing his present needs, ignored the provisions of the Family Court Rules of Procedure allowing alternative pleading, specifically Rule 12(b), which in its relevant parts states that no defense is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. Carrillo v. Carrillo, 523 A.2d 439, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 440 (R.I. 1987).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of state statutes providing for reciprocal enforcement of duty to support dependents. 42 A.L.R.2d 768.

Construction and application of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. 90 A.L.R.5th 1.

15-23.1-102. State tribunals and support enforcement agency.

  1. The Rhode Island family court, and, where specifically authorized by law, the Rhode Island division of taxation within the department of administration are the tribunals of this state.
  2. The Rhode Island family court, and, where specifically authorized by law, the Rhode Island division of taxation within the department of administration are the support enforcement agencies of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Common-Law Marriage.

In an action by an alleged common-law wife to compel support by her alleged common-law husband for two children alleged to be those of the parties, the family court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the alleged marriage and the paternity of the children. Sardonis v. Sardonis, 106 R.I. 469 , 261 A.2d 22, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 944 (1970).

Effect to Prior Support Order.

A support order entered pursuant to a divorce proceeding did not bar under the doctrine to res judicata a subsequent action for support under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Tetreault v. Tetreault, 119 R.I. 611 , 381 A.2d 1049, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 592 (1978).

Limitation on Right to Support.

A former statute was inapplicable as a base upon which to confer jurisdiction upon the family court, since the right to support was limited to proceedings instituted under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which was not the case here. Castellucci v. Castellucci, 116 R.I. 101 , 352 A.2d 640, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1248 (1976).

15-23.1-103. Remedies cumulative.

  1. Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the availability of remedies under other law or the recognition of a foreign support order on the basis of comity.
  2. This chapter does not:
    1. Provide the exclusive method of establishing or enforcing a support order under the law of this state; or
    2. Grant a tribunal of this state jurisdiction to render judgment or issue an order relating to child custody or visitation in a proceeding under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Prior Support Order.

A support order entered pursuant to a divorce proceeding did not bar, under the doctrine of res judicata, a subsequent action for support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Tetreault v. Tetreault, 119 R.I. 611 , 381 A.2d 1049, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 592 (1978).

The legislature contemplated the application of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act where a divorce action was pending or concluded between the parties, even where, pursuant to that divorce action, a provision for child support had been made. Tetreault v. Tetreault, 119 R.I. 611 , 381 A.2d 1049, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 592 (1978).

Marriage Entered in Good Faith.

Where the woman entered into marriage with the defendant in good faith, believing him divorced from his wife when in fact he was not, the child of such purported marriage was legitimate notwithstanding the void status of the marriage and support of such child by its father could be enforced under the reciprocal enforcement of support provisions. Bernier v. Bernier, 101 R.I. 697 , 227 A.2d 112, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 823 (1967).

Collateral References.

Power of divorce court, after child attained majority, to enforce by contempt proceedings payment of arrears of child support. 32 A.L.R.3d 888.

15-23.1-104. Application of this chapter to resident of foreign country and foreign support proceeding.

  1. A tribunal of this state shall apply this chapter to a support proceeding involving:
    1. A foreign support order;
    2. A foreign tribunal; or
    3. An obligee, obligor or a child residing in a foreign country.
  2. A tribunal of this state that is requested to recognize and enforce a support order on the basis of comity may apply the procedural and substantive provisions of this chapter.
  3. Article 7 of this chapter applies only to a support proceeding under the convention. In such a proceeding, if a provision of article 7 is inconsistent with articles 1 through 6, the provisions of article 7 controls.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Article 2 Jurisdiction

15-23.1-201. Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident.

  1. In proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual’s guardian or conservator if:
    1. The individual is personally served within this state pursuant to the Rules of Domestic Relations;
    2. The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent in a record, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;
    3. The individual resided with the child in this state;
    4. The individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses or support for the child;
    5. The child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual;
    6. The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
    7. The individual asserted parentage of a child by completing an affidavit of paternity in this state signed by both parents; or
    8. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state, and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
  2. The bases of personal jurisdiction set forth in subsection (a) or in any other law of this state may not be used to acquire personal jurisdiction for a tribunal of this state to modify a child support order of another state unless the requirements of § 15-23.1-611 or, in the case of a foreign support order, unless the requirements of § 15-23.1-615 are met.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Permissive Jurisdiction.

Because the case involved permissive jurisdiction, to the extent the ex-husband sought enforcement of the support provisions in the marital settlement agreement, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Family Court, where the trial justice was to determine, in her discretion, whether the court would accept its permissive jurisdiction. Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2011).

15-23.1-202. Duration of personal jurisdiction.

Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this state in a proceeding under this chapter or other law of this state relating to a support order continues as long as a tribunal of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order or continuing jurisdiction to enforce its order as provided by §§ 15-23.1-205 , 15-23.1-206 , and 15-23.1-211 .

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Permissive Jurisdiction.

Because the case involved permissive jurisdiction, to the extent the ex-husband sought enforcement of the support provisions in the marital settlement agreement, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Family Court, where the trial justice was to determine, in her discretion, whether the court would accept its permissive jurisdiction. Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2011).

15-23.1-203. Initiating and responding tribunal of state.

Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to a tribunal of another state and as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in another state or a foreign country.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-204. Simultaneous proceedings.

  1. A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country only if:
    1. The petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the other state or the foreign country for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state or the foreign country;
    2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the other state or the foreign country; and
    3. If relevant, the other state is the home state of the child.
  2. A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country if:
    1. The petition or comparable pleading in the other state or foreign country is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state;
    2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in this state; and
    3. If relevant, the other state is the home state or foreign country of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-205. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify child support order.

  1. A tribunal of this state that has issued a support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order if the order is the controlling order, and:
    1. At the time of the filing of a request for modification this state is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or
    2. Even if this state is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this state may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order.
  2. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state may not exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order if:
    1. All of the parties who are individuals file consent in a record with the tribunal of this state that a tribunal of another state that has jurisdiction over at least one of the parties who is an individual or that is located in the state of residence of the child may modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; or
    2. Its order is not the controlling order.
  3. If a tribunal of another state has issued a child support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or a law similar to this chapter which modifies a child-support order of a tribunal of this state, tribunals of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of the other state.
  4. A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child-support order may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to modify a support order issued in that state.
  5. A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-206. Continuing jurisdiction to enforce child support order.

  1. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child-support order consistent with the law of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce:
    1. The order, if the order is the controlling order, and has not been modified by a tribunal of another state that assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; or
    2. A money judgment for arrears of support and interest on the order accrued before a determination that an order of a tribunal of another state is the controlling order.
  2. A tribunal of this state having continuing jurisdiction over a support order may act as a responding tribunal to enforce the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2006, the compiler made a punctuation change at the end of the introductory language.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Permissive Jurisdiction.

Because the case involved permissive jurisdiction, to the extent the ex-husband sought enforcement of the support provisions in the marital settlement agreement, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Family Court, where the trial justice was to determine, in her discretion, whether the court would accept its permissive jurisdiction. Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 49 (R.I. 2011).

15-23.1-207. Determination of controlling child support order.

  1. If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and only one tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must be so recognized.
  2. If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and two (2) or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state, another state or a foreign country with regard to the same obligor and same child, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and the individual obligee shall apply the following rules and by order shall determine which order controls and must be recognized.
    1. If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that tribunal controls.
    2. If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter: (i) an order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child controls; but (ii) if an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recently issued controls.
    3. If none of the tribunals would have continuing exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the tribunal of this state shall issue a child support order, which controls.
  3. If two (2) or more child support orders have been issued for the same obligor and same child, upon request of a party who is an individual or that is a support enforcement agency, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and the obligee who is an individual shall determine which order controls under subsection (b) of this section. The request may be filed with a registration for enforcement or registration for modification pursuant to Article 6, or may be filed as a separate proceeding.
  4. A request to determine which is the controlling order must be accompanied by a copy of every child-support order in effect and the applicable record of payments. The requesting party shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.
  5. The tribunal that issued the controlling order under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section has continuing jurisdiction to the extent provided in § 15-23.1-205 or § 15-23.1-206 .
  6. A tribunal of this state that determines by order which is the controlling order under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (b) or subsection (c), or that issues a new controlling order under subdivision (3) of subsection (b) shall state in that order: (1) the basis upon which the tribunal made its determination; (2) the amount of prospective support, if any; and (3) the total amount of consolidated arrears and accrued interest, if any, under all of the orders after all payments made are credited as provided by § 15-23.1-209 .
  7. Within thirty (30) days after issuance of an order determining which is the controlling order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy of it with each tribunal that issued or registered an earlier order of child support. A party or support enforcement agency obtaining the order that fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the controlling order.
  8. An order that has been determined to be the controlling order, or a judgment for consolidated arrears of support and interest, if any, made pursuant to this section must be recognized in proceedings under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-208. Child-support orders for two or more obligees.

In responding to registrations or petitions for enforcement of two (2) or more child support orders in effect at the same time with regard to the same obligor and different individual obligees, at least one of which was issued by a tribunal of another state or a foreign country, a tribunal of this state shall enforce those orders in the same manner as if the orders had been issued by a tribunal of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-209. Credit for payments.

A tribunal of this state shall credit amounts collected for a particular period pursuant to any child-support order against the amounts owed for the same period under any other child-support order for support of the same child issued by a tribunal of this, another state or a foreign country.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-210. Application of chapter to nonresident subject to personal jurisdiction.

A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceeding under this chapter, under other law of this state relating to a support order, or recognizing a foreign support order may receive evidence from outside this state pursuant to § 15-23.1-316 , communicate with a tribunal outside this state pursuant to § 15-23.1-317 , and obtain discovery through a tribunal outside this state pursuant to § 15-23.1-318 . In all other respects, §§ 301 — 616 of this chapter do not apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 3; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 2.

15-23.1-211. Continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal-support order.

  1. A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal-support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal-support order throughout the existence of the support obligation.
  2. A tribunal of this state may not modify a spousal-support order issued by a tribunal of another state or a foreign country having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state or foreign country.
  3. A tribunal of this state that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal-support order may serve as:
    1. An initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce the spousal-support order issued in this state; or
    2. A responding tribunal to enforce or modify its own spousal-support order.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 3; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

Article 3 Civil Provisions of General Application

15-23.1-301. Proceedings under this chapter.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, this article applies to all proceedings under this chapter.
  2. An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may initiate a proceeding authorized under this chapter by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal, or by filing a petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state or a foreign country which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-302. Proceeding by minor parent.

A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative of a minor parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of the minor’s child.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-303. Application of law of this state.

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a responding tribunal of this state shall:

  1. Apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings; and
  2. Determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-304. Duties of initiating tribunal.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter, an initiating tribunal of this state shall forward the petition and its accompanying documents:
    1. To the responding tribunal or appropriate support enforcement agency in the responding state; or
    2. If the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state information agency of the responding state with a request that they be forwarded to the appropriate tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged.
  2. If requested by the responding tribunal, a tribunal of this state shall issue a certificate or other document and make findings required by the law of the responding state. If the responding tribunal is in a foreign country, upon request, the tribunal of this state shall specify the amount of support sought, convert that amount into the equivalent amount in the foreign currency under applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported, and provide any other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the responding foreign tribunal.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-305. Duties and powers of responding tribunal.

  1. When a responding tribunal of this state receives a petition or comparable pleading from an initiating tribunal or directly pursuant to § 15-23.1-301(b) it shall cause the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the petitioner where and when it was filed.
  2. A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent not prohibited by other law, may do one or more of the following:
    1. Establish or enforce a support order, modify a child support order, determine the controlling child support order, or to determine parentage of a child;
    2. Order an obligor to comply with a support order specifying the amount and the manner of compliance;
    3. Order income withholding;
    4. Determine the amount of any arrearages, and specify a method of payment;
    5. Enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both;
    6. Set aside property for satisfaction of the support order;
    7. Place liens and order execution on the obligor’s property;
    8. Order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the obligor’s current residential address, electronic-mail address, telephone number, employer, address of employment, and telephone number at the place of employment;
    9. Issue a body attachment for an obligor who has failed, after proper notice, to appear at a hearing ordered by the tribunal and enter the body attachment in any local and state computer systems for criminal warrants;
    10. Order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by specified methods;
    11. Award reasonable attorney’s fees and other fees and costs; and
    12. Grant any other available remedy.
  3. A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a support order issued under this chapter, or in the documents accompanying the order, the calculations on which the support order is based.
  4. A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a support order issued under this chapter upon compliance by a party with provisions for visitation.
  5. If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order under this chapter, the tribunal shall send a copy of the order by first class mail to the petitioner and the respondent and to the initiating tribunal, if any.
  6. If requested to enforce a support order, arrears, or judgment or modify a support order stated in a foreign currency, a responding tribunal of this state shall convert the amount stated in the foreign currency to the equivalent amount in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-306. Inappropriate tribunal.

If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal of this state, the tribunal shall forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate tribunal of this state or another state and notify the petitioner where and when the pleading was sent.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-307. Duties of support enforcement agency.

  1. A support enforcement agency of this state, upon request, shall provide services to a petitioner in a proceeding under this chapter.
  2. A support enforcement agency of this state that is providing services to the petitioner shall:
    1. Take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate tribunal of this state, another state or a foreign country to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent;
    2. Request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time, and place for a hearing;
    3. Make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant information, including information as to income and property of the parties;
    4. Within two (2) days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of notice in a record from an initiating, responding, or registering tribunal, send a copy of the notice to the petitioner;
    5. Within two (2) days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of in a record communication from the respondent, or the respondent’s attorney, send a copy of the communication to the petitioner; and
    6. Notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respondent cannot be obtained.
  3. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration of a child-support order in this state for enforcement or for modification shall make reasonable efforts:
    1. To ensure that the order to be registered is the controlling order; or
    2. If two (2) or more child-support orders exist and the identity of the controlling order has not been determined, to ensure that a request for such a determination is made in a tribunal having jurisdiction to do so.
  4. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration and enforcement of a support order, arrears, or judgment stated in a foreign currency shall convert the amounts stated in the foreign currency into the equivalent amounts in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.
  5. A support enforcement agency of this state shall issue or request a tribunal of this state to issue a child-support order and an income-withholding order that redirect payment of current support, arrears, and interest if requested to do so by a support enforcement agency of another state pursuant to section 319.
  6. This chapter does not create or negate a relationship of attorney and client or other fiduciary relationship between a support enforcement agency or the attorney for the agency and the individual being assisted by the agency.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-308. Duty of attorney general.

  1. If the attorney general determines that the support enforcement agency is neglecting or refusing to provide services to an individual, the attorney general may order the agency to perform its duties under this chapter or may provide those services directly to the individual.
  2. The attorney general may determine that a foreign country has established a reciprocal arrangement for child-support with this state and take appropriate action for notification of the determination.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-309. Private counsel.

An individual may employ private counsel to represent the individual in proceedings authorized by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15.

15-23.1-310. Duties of state information agency.

  1. The division of taxation within the department of administration is the state information agency under this chapter.
  2. The state information agency shall:
    1. Compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the tribunals in this state which have jurisdiction under this chapter and any support enforcement agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state information agency of every other state;
    2. Maintain a register of names and addresses of tribunals and support enforcement agencies received from other states;
    3. Forward to the appropriate tribunal in the county in this state in which the obligee who is an individual or the obligor resides, or in which the obligor’s property is believed to be located, all documents concerning a proceeding under this chapter received from another state or a foreign country; and
    4. Obtain information concerning the location of the obligor and the obligor’s property within this state not exempt from execution, by means such as postal verification and federal or state locator services, examination of telephone directories, requests for the obligor’s address from employers, and examination of governmental records, including, to the extent not prohibited by other law, those relating to real property, vital statistics, law enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, drivers’ licenses, and social security.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-311. Pleadings and accompanying documents.

  1. In a proceeding under this chapter, a petitioner seeking to establish a support order, to determine parentage of a child or to register and modify a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country must file a verified petition. Unless otherwise ordered under § 15-23.1-312 , the petition or accompanying documents must provide, so far as known, the name, residential address, and social security numbers of the obligor and the obligee or the parent and alleged parent, and the name, sex, residential address, social security number, and date of birth of each child for whose benefit support is sought or whose parentage is to be determined. Unless filed at the time of registration, the petition must be accompanied by a copy of any support order known to have been issued by another tribunal. The petition may include any other information that may assist in locating or identifying the respondent.
  2. The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and accompanying documents must conform substantially with the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support enforcement agency.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorneys’ Fees.

When the family court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, its power to award counsel fees could not be collaterally attacked on appeal from a finding of contempt for a failure to pay. Hartt v. Hartt, 121 R.I. 220 , 397 A.2d 518, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1766 (1979).

Absent express statutory authority, counsel fees are not awardable as part of the costs of litigation. Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 461 (R.I. 1985).

“Costs,” without more, will not be interpreted to include counsel fees. Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 461 (R.I. 1985).

15-23.1-312. Nondisclosure of information in exceptional circumstances.

If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of specific identifying information, that information must be sealed and may not be disclosed to the other party or the public. After a hearing in which a tribunal takes into consideration the health, safety, or liberty of the party or child, the tribunal may order disclosure of information that the tribunal determines to be in the interest of justice.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-313. Costs and fees.

  1. The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee or other costs.
  2. If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal of this state may assess against an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, other costs, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee’s witnesses. The tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the initiating or the responding state or foreign country, except as provided by other law. Attorney’s fees may be ordered as costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the attorney’s own name. Payment of support owed to the obligee has priority over fees, costs and expenses.
  3. The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees if it determines that a hearing was requested primarily for delay. In a proceeding under Article 6, §§ 15-23.1-601 15-23.1-614 , a hearing is presumed to have been requested primarily for delay if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced without change.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-314. Limited immunity of petitioner.

  1. Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding under this chapter before a responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services provided by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the petitioner in another proceeding.
  2. A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process while physically present in this state to participate in a proceeding under this chapter.
  3. The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under this chapter committed by a party while present in this state to participate in the proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-315. Non-parentage as defense.

A party whose parentage of a child has been previously determined by or pursuant to law may not plead non-parentage as a defense to a proceeding under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15.

15-23.1-316. Special rules of evidence and procedure.

  1. The physical presence of a nonresident party who is an individual in a tribunal of this state is not required for the establishment, enforcement, or modification of a support order or the rendition of a judgment determining parentage of a child.
  2. An affidavit, a document substantially complying with federal mandated forms, or a document incorporated by reference in any of them, which would not be excluded under the hearsay rule if given in person, is admissible in evidence if given under penalty of perjury by a party or witness residing outside this state.
  3. A copy of the record of child support payments certified as a true copy of the original by the custodian of the record may be forwarded to a responding tribunal. The copy is evidence of facts asserted in it, and is admissible to show whether payments were made.
  4. Copies of bills for testing for parentage of a child, and for prenatal and postnatal health care of the mother and child, furnished to the adverse party at least ten (10) days before trial, are admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges billed and that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.
  5. Documentary evidence transmitted from outside this state to a tribunal of this state by telephone, telecopier, or other electronic means that do not provide an original record may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.
  6. In a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of this state shall permit a party or witness residing outside this state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other location. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate with other tribunals in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
  7. If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.
  8. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses does not apply in a proceeding under this chapter.
  9. The defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child does not apply in a proceeding under this chapter.
  10. A voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, certified as a true copy, is admissible to establish parentage of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-317. Communications between tribunals.

A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal outside this state or political subdivision in a record, or by telephone, electronic mail or other means, to obtain information concerning the laws, the legal effect of a judgment, decree, or order of that tribunal, and the status of a proceeding. A tribunal of this state may furnish similar information by similar means to a tribunal outside this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-318. Assistance with discovery.

A tribunal of this state may:

  1. Request a tribunal outside this state to assist in obtaining discovery; and
  2. Upon request, compel a person over which it has jurisdiction to respond to a discovery order issued by a tribunal outside this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-319. Receipt and disbursement of payments.

  1. A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall disburse promptly any amounts received pursuant to a support order, as directed by the order. The agency or tribunal shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of another state or foreign country a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the amounts and dates of all payments received.
  2. If neither the obligor, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the child resides in this state, upon request from the support enforcement agency of this state or another state, the support enforcement agency of this state or a tribunal of this state shall:
    1. Direct that the support payment be made to the support enforcement agency in the state in which the obligee is receiving services; and
    2. Issue and send to the obligor’s employer a conforming income-withholding order or an administrative notice of change of payee, reflecting the redirected payments.
  3. The support enforcement agency of this state receiving redirected payments from another state pursuant to a law similar to subsection (b) shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of the other state a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the amount and dates of all payments received.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

Article 4 Establishment of Support Order or Determination of Parentage

15-23.1-401. Establishment of support order.

  1. If a support order entitled to recognition under this chapter has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this state with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue a support order if:
    1. The individual seeking the order resides outside this state; or
    2. The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located outside this state.
  2. The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order if the tribunal determined that such an order is appropriate and the individual ordered to pay is:
    1. a presumed father of the child;
    2. petitioning to have his paternity adjudicated;
    3. identified as the father of the child through genetic testing;
    4. an alleged father who has declined to submit to genetic testing;
    5. shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the father of the child;
    6. an acknowledged father as provided by applicable state law;
    7. the mother of the child; or
    8. an individual who has been ordered to pay child support in previous proceeding and the order has not been reversed or vacated.
  3. Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other orders pursuant to § 15-23.1-305 .

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Finding of Adequate Support.

Where a separation agreement, after reciting the desire of the parties to settle “ ‘all questions of allowance for the support of the wife, alimony, property rights . . . and also to make adequate provisions for the education, maintenance and support of the two . . . minor children of the parties . . . ,’ ” provided for the husband to convey to the wife their family home, give her all furniture and household furnishings, pay her $22,000 a year, and pay all medical, educational, camp, and clothing expenses of the children, evidence that the husband had complied with all the terms of this agreement was sufficient to support the court’s finding that he was adequately supporting the children and that support for the children was included in the $22,000 annual payment. Warren v. Warren, 106 R.I. 478 , 260 A.2d 916, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 946 (1970).

Collateral References.

Foreign filiation or support order in bastardy proceedings, requiring periodic payments, as extraterritorially enforceable. 16 A.L.R.2d 1098.

15-23.1-402. Proceeding to determine parentage.

A tribunal of this state authorized to determine parentage of a child may serve as a responding tribunal in a proceeding to determine parentage of a child brought under this act or a law or procedure substantially similar to this act.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Article 5 Enforcement of Support Without Registration

15-23.1-501. Employer’s receipt of income-withholding order of another state.

An income-withholding order issued in another state may be sent by or on behalf of the obligee, or by the support enforcement agency to the person defined as the obligor’s employer under the income-withholding law of this state without first filing a petition or comparable pleading or registering the order with a tribunal of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-502. Employer’s compliance with income-withholding order of another state.

  1. Upon receipt of an income-withholding order, the obligor’s employer shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the obligor.
  2. The employer shall treat an income-withholding order issued in another state which appears regular on its face as if it had been issued by a tribunal of this state.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section and § 15-23.1-503 , the employer shall withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the withholding order by complying with terms of the order, which specify:
    1. The duration and amount of periodic payments of current child support, stated as a sum certain;
    2. The person designated to receive payments and the address to which the payments are to be forwarded;
    3. Medical support, whether in the form of periodic cash payment, stated as a sum certain, or ordering the obligor to provide health insurance coverage for the child under a policy available through the obligor’s employment;
    4. The amount of periodic payments of fees and costs for a support enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal, and the obligee’s attorney, state [stated] as sums certain; and
    5. The amount of periodic payments of arrearages and interest on arrearages, stated as sums certain.
  4. An employer shall comply with the law of the state of the obligor’s principal place of employment for withholding from income with respect to:
    1. The employer’s fee for processing an income withholding order;
    2. The maximum amount permitted to be withheld from the obligor’s income; and
    3. The times within which the employer must implement the withholding order and forward the child support payment.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-503. Employer’s compliance with two or more income-withholding orders.

If an obligor’s employer receives two (2) or more income-withholding orders with respect to the earnings of the same obligor, the employer satisfies the terms of the orders if the employer complies with the law of the state of the obligor’s principal place of employment to establish the priorities for withholding and allocating income withheld for two (2) or more child support obligees.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-504. Immunity from civil liability.

An employer that complies with an income-withholding order issued in another state in accordance with this article is not subject to civil liability to any individual or agency with regard to the employer’s withholding of child support from the obligor’s income.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-505. Penalties for noncompliance.

An employer that willfully fails to comply with an income-withholding order issued in another state and received for enforcement is subject to the same penalties that may be imposed for noncompliance with an order issued by a tribunal of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-506. Contest by obligor.

  1. An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income-withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in this state by registering the order in a tribunal of this state and filing a contest to that order as provided in Article 6, or otherwise contesting the order in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state.
  2. The obligor shall give notice of the contest to:
    1. A support enforcement agency providing services to the obligee;
    2. Each employer that has directly received an income-withholding order relating to the obligor; and
    3. The person designated to receive payments in the income-withholding order or, if no person is designated, to the obligee.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-507. Administrative enforcement of orders.

  1. A party or support enforcement agency seeking to enforce a support order or an income-withholding order, or both, issued in another state or a foreign support order may send the documents required for registering the order to a support enforcement agency of this state.
  2. Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and, if appropriate, use any administrative procedure authorized by the law of this state to enforce a support order or an income-withholding order, or both. If the obligor does not contest administrative enforcement, the order need not be registered. If the obligor contests the validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the support enforcement agency shall register the order pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

Article 6 Registration, Enforcement and Modification of Support Order

Part 1 Registration and Enforcement of Support Order

15-23.1-601. Registration of order for enforcement.

A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state may be registered in this state or a foreign support order may be registered in this state for enforcement.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Spouse’s Liability.

When a husband living in Rhode Island moves to Nevada and is divorced by a default judgment and returns to Rhode Island, remarries and has a child, his divorce is valid, but his duty to pay support to his first wife is not diminished by the valid divorce. Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89 , 249 A.2d 407, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 722 (1969).

Collateral References.

Decree for alimony rendered in another state or country (or domestic decree based thereon) as subject to enforcement by equitable remedies or by contempt proceedings. 18 A.L.R.2d 862.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions. 54 A.L.R.2d 1422.

Father’s criminal liability for desertion of or failure to support child where divorce decree awards custody to another. 73 A.L.R.2d 960.

Foreign filiation or support order in bastardy proceedings, requiring periodic payments, as extraterritorially enforceable. 16 A.L.R.2d 1098.

Husband’s death as affecting periodic payment provision of separation agreement. 5 A.L.R.4th 1153.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support. 5 A.L.R.4th 1015.

Parent’s obligation to support unmarried minor child who refuses to live with parent. 98 A.L.R.3d 334.

Pleading and burden of proof, in contempt proceedings, as to ability to comply with order for payment of alimony or child support. 53 A.L.R.2d 591.

Power of divorce court, after child attained majority, to enforce by contempt proceedings payment of arrears of child support. 32 A.L.R.3d 888.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey alimony decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

15-23.1-602. Procedure to register order for enforcement.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 15-23.1-706 , a support order or income-withholding order of another state may be registered in this state or foreign support order by sending the following records to the appropriate tribunal in this state:
    1. A letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting registration and enforcement;
    2. Two (2) copies, including one certified copy, of the order to be registered, including any modification of the order;
    3. A sworn statement by the person requesting registration or a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrearage;
    4. The name of the obligor and, if known;
      1. The obligor’s address and social security number;
      2. The name and address of the obligor’s employer and any other source of income of the obligor; and
      3. A description and the location of property of the obligor in this state not exempt from execution; and
    5. Except as otherwise provided in section 15-23.1-312 , the name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the person to whom support payments are to be remitted.
  2. On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as an order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign support order, together with one copy of the documents and information, regardless of their form.
  3. A petition or comparable pleading seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively sought under other law of this state may be filed at the same time as the request for registration or later. The pleading must specify the grounds for the remedy sought.
  4. If two (2) or more orders are in effect, the person requesting registration shall:
    1. furnish to the tribunal a copy of every support order asserted to be in effect in addition to the documents specified in this section;
    2. specify the order alleged to be the controlling order, if any; and
    3. specify the amount of consolidated arrears, if any.
  5. A request for a determination of which is the controlling order may be filed separately or with a request for registration and enforcement or for registration and modification. The person requesting registration shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-603. Effect of registration for enforcement.

  1. A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.
  2. A registered support order issued in another state or a foreign country is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in this article, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered support order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-604. Choice of law.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the law of the issuing state or foreign country governs: (1) the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments under a registered support order; (2) the computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrearages under the support order; and (3) the existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the support order.
  2. In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this state or of the issuing state or foreign country, whichever is longer, applies.
  3. A responding tribunal of this state shall apply the procedures and remedies of this state to enforce current support and collect arrears and interest due on a support order of another state or foreign country registered in this state.
  4. After a tribunal of this or another state determines which is the controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrears, if any, a tribunal of this state shall prospectively apply the law of the state or foreign country issuing the controlling order, including its law on interest on arrears, on current and future support, and on consolidated arrears.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Part 2 Contest of Validity or Enforcement

15-23.1-605. Notice of registration of order.

  1. When a support order or income-withholding order issued in another state or foreign support order is registered, the registering tribunal of this state shall notify the nonregistering party. The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the registered order and the documents and relevant information accompanying the order.
  2. A notice must inform the non-registering party:
    1. That a registered order is enforceable as of the date of registration in the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this state;
    2. That a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order must be requested within twenty (20) days after notice unless the registered order is under § 15-23.1-707 ;
    3. That failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages, and precludes further contest of that order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted; and
    4. Of the amount of any alleged arrearages.
  3. If the registering party asserts that two (2) or more orders are in effect, a notice must also:
    1. Identify the two (2) or more orders and the order alleged by the registering party to be the controlling order and the consolidated arrears, if any;
    2. Notify the nonregistering party of the right to a determination of which is the controlling order;
    3. State that the procedures provided in subsection (b) apply to the determination of which is the controlling order; and
    4. State that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the order alleged to be the controlling order in a timely manner may result in confirmation that the order is the controlling order.
  4. Upon registration of an income-withholding order for enforcement, the support enforcement agency or the registering tribunal shall notify the obligor’s employer pursuant to the income-withholding law of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-606. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of registered support order.

  1. A non-registering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered order in this state shall request a hearing within the time required by section 605. The non-registering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to § 15-23.1-607 .
  2. If the non-registering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of law.
  3. If a non-registering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the matter for a hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of the hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-607. Contest of registration or enforcement.

  1. A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered support order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses:
    1. The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party;
    2. The order was obtained by fraud;
    3. The order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order;
    4. The issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;
    5. There is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought;
    6. Full or partial payment has been made;
    7. The statute of limitations under § 15-23.1-604 (Choice of law) precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages; or
    8. The alleged controlling order is not the controlling order.
  2. If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under subsection (a) of this section, a tribunal may stay enforcement of a registered support order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence, and issue other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered support order may be enforced by all remedies available under the law of this state.
  3. If the contesting party does not establish a defense under subsection (a) of this section to the validity or enforcement of a registered support order, the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-608. Confirmed order.

Confirmation of a registered support order, whether by operation of law or after notice and a hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

Part 3 Registration and Modification of Child-Support Order of Another State

15-23.1-609. Procedure to register child support order of another state for modification.

A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in another state shall register that order in this state in the same manner provided in §§ 15-23.1-601 15-23.1-608 , if the order has not been registered. A petition for modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or later. The pleading must specify the grounds for modification.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-610. Effect of registration for modification.

A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of another state registered for purposes of modification in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state, but the registered order may be modified only if the requirements of § 15-23.1-611 or 15-23.1-613 have been met.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-611. Modification of child support order of another state.

  1. If § 15-23.1-613 does not apply, upon petition a tribunal of this state may modify a child support order issued in another state which is registered in this state if after notice and hearing the tribunal finds that:
    1. The following requirements are met:
      1. Neither child, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the obligor resides in the issuing state;
      2. A petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and
      3. The respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or
    2. This state is the residence of the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties who are individuals have filed consent in a record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
  2. Modification of a registered child support order is subject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this state and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same manner.
  3. A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation of support. If two (2) or more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and child, the order that controls and must be so recognized under § 15-23.1-207 establishes the aspects of the support order which are non-modifiable.
  4. In a proceeding to modify a child-support order, the law of the state that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support. The obligor’s fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support by a tribunal of this state.
  5. On issuance of an order by a tribunal of this state modifying a child support order issued in another state, the tribunal of this state becomes the tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
  6. Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (e) and subsection 15-23.1-201(b) , a tribunal of this state retains jurisdiction to modify an order issued by a tribunal of this state if:
    1. One party resides in another state; and
    2. The other party resides outside the United States.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-612. Recognition of order modified in another state.

If a child support order issued by a tribunal of this state is modified by a tribunal of another state which assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, a tribunal of this state:

  1. May enforce its order that was modified only as to arrears and interest accruing before the modification;
  2. May provide other appropriate relief for violations of its order which occurred before the effective date of the modification; and
  3. Shall recognize the modifying order of the other state, upon registration, for the purpose of enforcement.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-613. Jurisdiction to modify support order of another state when individual parties reside in this state.

  1. If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state’s child support order in a proceeding to register that order.
  2. A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction under this section shall apply the provisions of Articles 1 and 2, §§ 15-23.1-101 15-23.1-209 , this Article, and the procedural and substantive law of this state to the enforcement or modification. Articles 3, 4, 5, §§ 15-23.1-301 15-23.1-507 , 7 and 8, §§ 15-23.1-701 15-23.1-802 , do not apply.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15.

15-23.1-614. Notice to issuing tribunal of modification.

Within thirty (30) days after issuance of a modified child support order, the party obtaining the modification shall file a certified copy of the order with the issuing tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order and in each tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been registered. A party who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity of enforceability of the modified order of the new tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15.

Part 4 Registration Enforcement and Modification of Foreign Child-Support Order

15-23.1-615. Jurisdiction to modify child-support order of foreign country.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 15-23.1-711 , if a foreign country lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its child-support order pursuant to its laws, a tribunal of this state may assume jurisdiction to modify the child-support order and bind all individuals subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal whether the consent to modification of a child-support order otherwise required of the individual pursuant to § 15-23.1-611 has been given or whether the individual seeking modification is a resident of this state or of the foreign country.
  2. An order issued by a tribunal of this state modifying a foreign child-support order pursuant to this section is the controlling order.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 3; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-616. Procedure to register child-support order of foreign country for modification.

A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a foreign child-support order not under the convention may register that order in this state under §§ 15-23.1-601 15-23.1-608 if the order has not been registered. A petition for modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or at another time. The petition must specify the grounds for modification.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Article 7 Support Proceeding Under Convention

15-23.1-701. Definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Application” means a request under the convention by an obligee or obligor, or on behalf of a child, made through a central authority for assistance from another central authority.
  2. “Central authority” means the entity designated by the United States or a foreign country described in subdivision 15-23.1-101(5)(iv) to perform the functions specified in the convention.
  3. “Convention support order” means a support order of a tribunal of a foreign country described in subdivision 15-23.1-101(5)(iv) .
  4. “Direct request” means a petition filed by an individual in a tribunal of this state in a proceeding involving an obligee, obligor, or child residing outside the United States.
  5. “Foreign central authority” means the entity designated by a foreign country described in subdivision 15-23.1-101(5)(iv) to perform the functions specified in the convention.
  6. “Foreign support agreement”:
    1. An agreement for support in a record that:
      1. Is enforceable as a support order in the country of origin;
      2. Has been:
        1. Formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument by a foreign tribunal; or
        2. Authenticated by, or concluded, registered, or filed with a foreign tribunal; and
      3. May be reviewed and modified by a foreign tribunal; and
    2. Includes a maintenance arrangement or authentic instrument under the convention.
  7. “United States central authority” means the secretary of the United States department of health and human services.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-702. Applicability.

This chapter applies only to a support proceeding under the convention. In such a proceeding, if a provision of this article is inconsistent with articles 1 through 6, this article controls.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

15-23.1-703. Relationship of the state of Rhode Island office of child support services.

The department of human services — office of child support services of this state is recognized as the agency designated by the United States central authority to perform specific functions under the convention.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 74, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 64, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 74, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-23.1-704. Initiation by the Rhode Island department of human services — Office of child support services.

  1. In a support proceeding under this chapter, the department of human services — office of child support services of this state shall:
    1. Transmit and receive applications; and
    2. Initiate or facilitate the institution of a proceeding regarding an application in a tribunal of this state.
  2. The following support proceedings are available to an obligee under the convention:
    1. Recognition or recognition and enforcement of a foreign support order;
    2. Enforcement of a support order issued or recognized in this state;
    3. Establishment of support order if there is no existing order, including, if necessary, determination of parentage of a child;
    4. Establishment of support order if recognition of a foreign support order is refused under § 15-23.1-708(b)(2) , (b)(4), or (b)(9);
    5. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and
    6. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.
  3. The following support proceedings are available under the convention to an obligor against which there is an existing support order:
    1. Recognition of an order suspending or limiting enforcement of an existing support order of a tribunal of this state;
    2. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and
    3. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.
  4. A tribunal of this state may not require security, bond, or deposit, however described, to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses in proceedings under the convention.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 74, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 64, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 74, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-23.1-705. Direct request.

  1. A petitioner may file a direct request seeking establishment or modification of a support order or determination of parentage of a child. In the proceeding, the law of this state applies.
  2. A petitioner may file a direct request seeking recognition and enforcement of a support order or support agreement. In the proceeding, §§ 15-23.1-706 15-23.1-713 apply.
  3. In a direct request for recognition and enforcement of a convention support order or foreign support agreement:
    1. A security, bond, or deposit is not required to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses; and
    2. An obligee or obligor that in the issuing country has benefited from free legal assistance is entitled to benefit, at least to the same extent, from any free legal assistance provided for by the law of this state under the same circumstances.
  4. A petitioner filing a direct request is not entitled to assistance from the department of human services — office of child support services.
  5. This chapter does not prevent the application of laws of this state that provide simplified, more expeditious rules regarding a direct request for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support order or foreign support agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 74, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 64, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 74, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-23.1-706. Registration of convention support order.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this article, a party who is an individual or a support enforcement agency seeking recognition of a convention support order shall register the order in this state as provided in article 6.
  2. Notwithstanding § 15-23.1-311 and subsection 15-23.1-602(a) , a request for registration of a convention support order must be accompanied by:
    1. A complete text of the support order or an abstract or extract of the support order drawn up by the issuing foreign tribunal, which may be in the form recommended by the Hague conference on private international law.
    2. A record stating that the support order is enforceable in the issuing country;
    3. If the respondent did not appear and was not represented in the proceedings in the issuing country, a record attesting, as appropriate, either that the respondent had proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard or that the respondent had proper notice of the support order and an opportunity to be heard in a challenge or appeal on fact or law before a tribunal;
    4. A record showing the amount of arrears, if any, and the date the amount was calculated;
    5. A record showing a requirement for automatic adjustment of the amount of support, if any, and the information necessary to make the appropriate calculations; and
    6. If necessary, a record showing the extent to which the applicant received free legal assistance in the issuing country.
  3. A request for registration of a convention support order may seek recognition and partial enforcement of the order.
  4. A tribunal of this state may vacate the registration of a convention support order without the filing of a contest under § 15-23.1-707 only if, acting on its own motion, the tribunal finds that recognition and enforcement of the order would be manifestly incompatible with public policy.
  5. The tribunal shall promptly notify the parties of the registration or the order vacating the registration of a convention support order.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

15-23.1-707. Contest of registered convention support order.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, sections 605 through 608 apply to a contest of a registered convention support order.
  2. A party contesting a registered convention support order shall file a contest not later than thirty (30) days after notice of the registration, but if the contesting party does not reside in the United States, the contest must be filed not later than sixty (60) days after the notice of the registration.
  3. If the nonregistering party fails to contest the registered convention support order by the time specified in subsection (b), the order is enforceable.
  4. A contest of a registered convention support order may be based only on grounds set forth in § 15-23.1-708 . The contesting party bears the burden of proof.
  5. In a contest of a registered convention support order, a tribunal of this state:
    1. Is bound by the findings of fact on which the foreign tribunal based its jurisdiction; and
    2. May not review the merits of the order.
  6. A tribunal of this state deciding a contest of a registered convention support order shall promptly notify the parties of its decision.
  7. A challenge or appeal, if any, does not stay the enforcement of a convention support order unless there are exceptional circumstances.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

15-23.1-708. Recognition and enforcement of registered convention support order.

  1. Except as otherwise provide in subsection (b), a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce a registered convention support order.
  2. The following grounds are the only grounds on which a tribunal of this state may refuse recognition and enforcement of a registered convention support order;
    1. Recognition and enforcement of the order is manifestly incompatible with public policy, including the failure of the issuing tribunal to observe minimum standards of due process, which include notice and an opportunity to be heard;
    2. The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction consistent with § 15-23.1-201 ;
    3. The order is not enforceable in the issuing country;
    4. The order was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter or procedure;
    5. A record transmitted in accordance with § 15-23.1-706 lacks authenticity;
    6. A proceeding between the same parties and having the same purpose is pending before a tribunal of this state and that proceeding was the first to be filed;
    7. The order is incompatible with a more recent support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose if the more recent support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under this chapter in this state;
    8. Payment, to the extent alleged arrears have been paid in whole or in part;
    9. In a case in which the respondent neither appeared nor was represented in the proceeding in the issuing foreign country:
      1. If the law or that a country provides for prior notice of proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard; or
      2. If the law of that country does not provide for prior notice of the proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the order and an opportunity to be heard in a challenge or appeal on fact or law before a tribunal; or
    10. The order was made in violation of § 15-23.1-711 .
  3. If a tribunal of this state does not recognize a convention support order under subsection (b)(2), (b)(4), or (b)(9):
    1. The tribunal may not dismiss the proceeding without allowing a reasonable time for party to request the establishment of a new convention support order; and
    2. The court shall take all appropriate measures to request a child-support order for the obligee if the application for recognition and enforcement was received under § 15-23.1-704 .

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-23.1-709. Partial enforcement.

If a tribunal of this state does not recognize and enforce a convention support order in its entirety, it shall enforce any severable part of the order. An application or direct request may seek recognition and partial enforcement of a Convention support order.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

15-23.1-710. Foreign support agreement. [Contingent effective date; see note.]

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce a foreign support agreement registered in this state.
  2. An application or direct request for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support agreement must be accompanied by:
    1. A complete text of the foreign support agreement; and
    2. A record stating that the foreign support agreement is enforceable as an order of support in the issuing country.
  3. A tribunal of this state may vacate the registration of a foreign support agreement only if, acting on its own motion; the tribunal finds that recognition and enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with public policy.
  4. In a contest of a foreign support agreement, a tribunal of this state may refuse recognition and enforcement of the agreement if it finds:
    1. Recognition and enforcement of the agreement is manifestly incompatible with public policy;
    2. The agreement was obtained by fraud or falsification;
    3. The agreement is incompatible with a support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose in this state, another state, or a foreign country if the support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under this chapter in this state; or
    4. The record submitted under subsection (b) lacks authenticity or integrity.
  5. A proceeding for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support agreement must be suspended during the pendency of a challenge to or appeal of the agreement before a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Contingent Effective Dates.

P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 4 and P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 4 provides that this section “shall take effect six (6) months after either congress amending 42 USC section 666(f) to allow or require states to adopt this version of the uniform interstate family support act, or six (6) months after the state obtaining a waiver of its state plan requirement under title IV-D of the social security act.”

15-23.1-711. Modification of convention child-support order. [Contingent effective date; see note.]

  1. A tribunal of this state may not modify a convention child-support order if the obligee remains a resident of the foreign country where the support order was issued unless:
    1. The obligee submits to the jurisdiction of a tribunal of this state, either expressly or by defending on the merits of the case without objecting to the jurisdiction at the first available opportunity; or
    2. The foreign tribunal lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its support order or issue a new support order.
  2. If a tribunal of this state does not modify a convention child-support order because the order is not recognized in this state, subsection 15-23.1-708(c) applies.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Contingent Effective Dates.

P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 4 and P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 4 provides that this section “shall take effect six (6) months after either congress amending 42 USC section 666(f) to allow or require states to adopt this version of the uniform interstate family support act, or six (6) months after the state obtaining a waiver of its state plan requirement under title IV-D of the social security act.”

15-23.1-712. Personal information; limit on use. [Contingent effective date; see note.]

Personal information gathered or transmitted under this chapter may be used only for the purposes for which it was gathered or transmitted.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Contingent Effective Dates.

P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 4 and P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 4 provides that this section “shall take effect six (6) months after either congress amending 42 USC section 666(f) to allow or require states to adopt this version of the uniform interstate family support act, or six (6) months after the state obtaining a waiver of its state plan requirement under title IV-D of the social security act.”

15-23.1-713. Record in original language; English translation. [Contingent effective date; see note.]

A record filed with a tribunal of this state under this chapter must be in the original language and, if not in English, must be accompanied by an English translation.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Contingent Effective Dates.

P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 4 and P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 4 provides that this section “shall take effect six (6) months after either congress amending 42 USC section 666(f) to allow or require states to adopt this version of the uniform interstate family support act, or six (6) months after the state obtaining a waiver of its state plan requirement under title IV-D of the social security act.”

Article 8 Interstate Rendition

15-23.1-801. Grounds for rendition.

  1. For purposes of this article “governor” includes an individual performing the functions of governor or the executive authority of a state covered by this chapter.
  2. The governor of this state may:
    1. Demand that the governor of another state surrender an individual found in the other state who is charged criminally in this state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee; or
    2. On the demand of the governor of another state, surrender an individual found in this state who is charged criminally in the other state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee.
  3. A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with this chapter applies to the demand even if the individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled from the demanding state.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

15-23.1-802. Conditions of rendition.

  1. Before demanding that the governor of another state surrender an individual charged criminally in this state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee, the governor of this state may require a prosecutor of this state to demonstrate that at least sixty (60) days previously the obligee had initiated proceedings for support pursuant to this chapter or that the proceeding would be of no avail.
  2. If, under this chapter or a law substantially similar to this chapter, the governor of another state demands that the governor of this state surrender an individual charged criminally in that state with having failed to provide for the support of a child or other individual to whom a duty of support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to investigate the demand and report whether a proceeding for support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears that a proceeding would be effective but has not been initiated, the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time to permit the initiation of a proceeding.
  3. If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the individual whose rendition is demanded prevails, the governor may decline to honor the demand. If the petitioner prevails and the individual whose rendition is demanded is subject to a support order, the governor may decline to honor the demand if the individual is complying with the support order.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2.

Article 9 Miscellaneous Provisions

15-23.1-901. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1.

15-23.1-902. Transitional provision.

This chapter applies to proceedings begun on or after the effective date of this act to establish a support order or determine parentage of a child or to register, recognize, enforce, or modify a prior support order, determination, or agreement, whenever issued or entered.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 3.

Repealed Sections.

Former section § 15-23.1-902 (P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15), providing the short title, was repealed by P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 4, and by P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 4, effective July 1, 2006.

15-23.1-903. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15.

15-23.1-904. Effective date.

This chapter, as amended, takes effect July 1, 2015.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2006, ch. 69, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 120, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 132, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

15-23.1-905. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; Repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 2, effective July 9, 2011.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-23.1-905 concerned jurisdiction.

15-23.1-906. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; P.L. 2000, ch. 266, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2006, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 455, § 1, effective July 7, 2006. For present comparable provisions, see § 15-30-1 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-23.1-906 concerned legal counsel.

15-23.1-907. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 15; Repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 243, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 263, § 2, effective July 9, 2011.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-23.1-907 concerned remedies of state or political subdivision furnishing support.

15-23.1-908. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 266, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2006, ch. 372, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 455, § 1, effective July 7, 2006. For present comparable provisions, see § 15-30-2 .

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 15-23.1-908 concerned the department of administration, division of taxation, and child support enforcement.

Chapter 24 Reporting of New Hires

15-24-1. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to enhance the enforcement of support obligations by requiring employers to report all new hires or rehires effective October 1, 1997, by establishing a state directory of new hires to be reported to a national directory of new hires, to establish procedures for reporting and penalties for failure to report, in accordance with title IV, part D, § 454 of the Federal Social Security Act, 42 USC § 654, and as defined in § 15-24-2 of this chapter. This chapter shall be construed liberally to effect this purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16.

15-24-2. General rule on reporting.

  1. On or before the effective date of employment, a new employee must complete a W-4 form as is required by both Rhode Island and federal law, § 3402(f)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 3402(f)(2)(A).
  2. Within fourteen (14) days of the employee’s effective date of employment or effective date of reinstatement, the employer must submit to the department of administration, division of taxation, or its designee, the information as provided in § 15-24-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16.

15-24-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Compensation” means payment owed by the employer for:
    1. Labor or services rendered by an employee; or
    2. Benefits including, but not limited to, vacation, holiday, and sick leave, and severance payments which are due an employee under an agreement with the employer or under a policy of the employer.
  2. “Date of hire” means the date of commencement of employment, but no later than the first day for which the employee is eligible for compensation.
  3. “Days” means calendar days.
  4. “Department” means the department of administration, division of taxation, or its designee.
  5. “Dependent” includes a spouse or child or any other person who is in need of or entitled to support from a person who is declared to be legally liable for the support of that dependent.
  6. “Employee” means a natural person who performs labor in this state and is employed by an employer in this state for compensation and for whom the employer withholds federal or state income tax from the employee’s compensation.
  7. “Employer” means a person or entity doing business in this state who engages an employee for compensation and for whom the employer withholds federal or state tax liabilities from the employee’s compensation.
  8. “Natural person” means an individual and not a corporation, government, business trust, estate, partnership, or other legal entity, however organized.
  9. “W-4 form,” also known as the Employers Withholding Allowance Certificate, the form issued by the Internal Revenue Service of the United States to record the federal income tax withholding allowance available to each employer.
  10. “Rehire” means the first day for which an employee is owed compensation by the employer following a termination of employment lasting a minimum of sixty (60) days. Termination of employment does not include temporary separations from employment such as unpaid leave of absence, or a temporary layoff.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16; P.L. 2012, ch. 27, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 41, § 1.

15-24-4. Employees obligation.

On or before the effective date of employment, an employee must complete the sections of the W-4 form pertaining to the employee’s name, address, date of birth, social security number, signature and date of signing, and submit the form to his or her employer. If an employee is being reinstated after a lapse in pay, the employee may, but is not required to, complete a new W-4 form.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16.

15-24-5. Employer’s reporting requirements.

  1. Beginning October 1, 1997, an employer who hires or rehires an employee on or after October 1, 1997, must report the hiring or rehiring of the employee to the department or its designee not later than fourteen (14) days after hire or rehire if reporting on a W-4 or its equivalent, or twice a month if reporting electronically or magnetically.
  2. The report submitted shall contain the following:
    1. The employer’s name, address, and federal identification number;
    2. The employee’s name, address, social security number;
    3. Information regarding whether the employer has employee dependent health care coverage available and the appropriate date on which the employee may qualify for the coverage; and
    4. The address to which income withholding orders and garnishments should be sent.
  3. Employers must report the information required under subsection (b) of this section by any of the following means:
    1. By mailing a copy of the W-4 form. If a copy of the W-4 form is delivered by the United States Postal Service to the department after its due date, the postmark date stamped on the envelope is deemed to be the date of submission, provided that the copy of the W-4 form was mailed in the United States, first class, postage prepaid, and properly addressed in accordance with instructions provided;
    2. By submitting a fax transmission of the W-4;
    3. By transmission by magnetic tape or electronically in the format and tape layout prescribed by the department, in the case of an employer transmitting reports magnetically or electronically, by two (2) monthly transmissions not less than twelve (12) days, nor more than fifteen (15) days apart; or
    4. any other means authorized by the department if the means will result in timely reporting and provided the employer obtains prior written approval to use those means. Use of alternative means of reporting shall not affect the obligation of the employer to submit the report within the time prescribed in this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16.

15-24-6. Transmission of wage withholding notices to employers.

Within two (2) business days after the date information regarding a newly-hired employee is entered into the state directory of new hires, the department shall forward a wage withholding order to the employer unless the employee’s income is not subject to withholding pursuant to § 15-5-24 .

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16.

15-24-7. Failure to comply.

Any employer who fails to report as required under this section may be liable for a civil penalty of twenty dollars ($20.00) for each violation, to be assessed by the department, and shall be required to provide the information. If it is demonstrated that the employer conspired with the employee to avoid reporting, a five hundred dollar ($500) a civil penalty may be assessed by the department. Liability shall be joint and several.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16; P.L. 1998, ch. 370, § 3.

15-24-8. Unauthorized disclosure of information.

Unauthorized disclosure of information caused by the department under these provisions, by any employee or agent of the state, is punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars ($100) per offense and is subject to administrative discipline of the employee.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16.

15-24-9. Department’s obligation.

The department must use information collected pursuant to this chapter to prevent tax evasion, fraud in financial assistance, benefits, or loan programs administrated by agencies including, but not limited to, the department of labor and training and the department of human services, and to assist the IV-D agency in locating absent parents and establishing, enforcing, and modifying child support orders.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 16.

Chapter 25 Credit Reporting

15-25-1. State information agency — Reports to consumer reporting agency.

  1. The department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement agency, designated as the state agency for purposes of providing consumer reporting agencies with information regarding the amount of overdue support owed by an obligor, is authorized to promulgate rules, regulations, and guidelines for the release of that information in accordance with this section. For purposes of this section, “overdue support” means a delinquency pursuant to an obligation determined under a court order, or an order of an administrative process established under the law of any state, for:
    1. support and maintenance of a minor child, which is owed to or on behalf of the child; or
    2. support and maintenance of the obligor’s spouse or former spouse with whom the child is living.
  2. For purposes of this section, “consumer reporting agency” means any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
  3. The department of administration shall provide to consumer reporting agencies information regarding the amount, if any, of overdue support owed by an obligor. The department shall not be required to provide information regarding overdue support in an individual case if the department determines that release of information is inappropriate.
  4. The department may charge consumer reporting agencies and credit bureaus a fee not to exceed the actual cost of providing the information.
  5. The department shall provide written notice to the absent parent ten (10) days prior to the proposed release of information to consumer reporting agencies. The notice shall state that the absent parent may contest the accuracy of information prior to release and shall state the procedures to contest the accuracy of the information.
  6. The department shall periodically inform the consumer reporting agencies if the overdue support has been paid in full or of the amended amount of overdue support.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 17.

15-25-2. Furnishing consumer reports to child support agency.

The department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement agency, is authorized to request consumer reports provided the agency certifies to the credit reporting agency in writing the following:

  1. The consumer credit report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individual’s capacity to pay child support or determining the appropriate level of such payments;
  2. The paternity of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with state laws which the obligation arises;
  3. The consumer has been given at least ten (10) days prior notice, by certified mail, to the last known address, that the report will be requested and be made available to the consumer; and
  4. The consumer credit report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for the purpose described in subdivision (1) of this section and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative or criminal proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 370, § 4.

Chapter 26 State Disbursement Unit for the Collection and Distribution of Child Support

15-26-1. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish and operate a centralized state collection and disbursement unit within the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement for the timely, automated collection and disbursement of support orders being enforced under § 454(4) of title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654(4), and in all cases not being enforced by the state in which the support order is initially issued in the state on or after October 1, 1998, and in which the income of the non-custodial parent is subject to income withholding.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 18; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 6.

15-26-2. Operation.

  1. The centralized state collection and disbursement unit shall be operated directly by the department of administration, division of taxation or its designee and in coordination with the automated system.
  2. The centralized state collection and disbursement unit shall use the automated procedures, electronic processes, including the electronic funds transfer (EFT) provisions as authorized by the tax administrator under § 44-1-31 , and computer driven technology to the maximum extent feasible, efficient and economical for the collection and disbursement of support payments, including procedures for receipt from parents, employers, and other states, and for disbursement to custodial parents and other obligees, the state agency, and the agencies of other states:
    1. For accurate identification of payments;
    2. To ensure prompt disbursement of the custodial parent’s share of any payment; and
    3. To furnish to any parent, upon request, timely information on the current status of support payments.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 18; P.L. 2002, ch. 225, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 501, § 11.

15-26-3. Timing of disbursement.

  1. The department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement or its designee shall distribute all amounts payable within two (2) business days after receipt from the employer or other source of periodic income if sufficient information identifying the payee is provided. “Business day” is defined as a day on which state offices are open for regular business.
  2. The department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement or its designee may delay the distribution of collections toward disputed arrearages until the resolution of those disputed arrearages in a timely hearing before the Rhode Island family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 18.

15-26-4. Change in payee.

In cases in which support is assigned to the state pursuant to § 40-6-9 and where there is an existing child support order made payable to the obligee, after notice to the obligor and obligee, the state collection and disbursement unit and/or any other state or federal agency taking action to establish or enforce a child support or medical order shall direct the obligor or other payer through a wage withholding order to change the payee to the appropriate instate or interstate government entity without the necessity of a court order or a hearing relative to the child support order.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 18; P.L. 2001, ch. 155, § 6.

Chapter 27 [Reserved.]

Chapter 28 Recognition and Enforcement of Interstate Authority

15-28-1. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to ensure that any and all administrative procedures available to the department of administration, division of taxation, child support enforcement under title 15, including, but not limited to, the ability to order genetic testing as provided in chapter 8, the ability to administratively subpoena records and to have access to information as provided in chapter 22, the ability to change the payee to the appropriate government entity as provided in § 15-26-4 , to order income withholding under title 15, to obtain administrative liens as provided in chapter 21, and to intercept insurance payment pursuant to chapter 57, shall be available to any and all state or federal agencies conducting activities to establish paternity, establish or modify child support and/or medical orders, enforce child support and/or medical orders or to locate individuals for the above purposes.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 21.

15-28-2. Penalty.

Any entity or individual who, without reasonable cause, fails to reply to a request pursuant to this chapter or who, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with a request within twenty (20) days of receipt shall be liable for a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) for each violation, to be assessed by the department or by the family court and the individual or entity shall be required to provide this information and/or comply with this request.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 170, § 21.

Chapter 29 Medical Support

15-29-1. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth procedures to enforce health care coverage provisions obtained pursuant to § 15-5-16.2(d)(2) through the use of the National Medical Support Notice, subsequently referred to as the “medical notice.” However, the medical notice is not to be issued when the court orders an individual to contribute a weekly cash amount towards the health care coverage provided by the custodial parent or the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-2. Effective date.

For purposes of this chapter, with respect to all medical orders issued, enforced or modified in title IV-D of the Social Security Act, cases on or after October 1, 2002, in accordance with § 15-5-16.2.5 (repealed effective October 1, 2002), the medical notice, which is a qualified medical support order, shall be issued to the employer in every case by regular mail or electronic notice.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-3. Duty of employer to respond to medical notices.

  1. The medical notice shall instruct the employer into which health care plans the children shall be enrolled and include all identifying information of the child support case. The medical notice shall comply in all respects with federal requirements.
  2. The employer must respond, within twenty (20) business days after the date of the medical notice, or sooner, if reasonable, indicating:
    1. That the employer does not maintain or contribute to plans providing dependant or family care coverage;
    2. That the employee is among a class of employees that are not eligible for family health care coverage under any group health plan maintained by the employee;
    3. That health care is not available because the employee is no longer employed; or
    4. That state or federal withholding limitations and/or prioritization prevent the withholding from the employee’s income of the amount required to obtain coverage.
  3. If family health care coverage is available, the employer is required to transfer the appropriate part of the medical notice to the plan administrator of each appropriate group health plan for which the children may be eligible.
  4. Upon notification from the plan administrator that the children are enrolled, the employer must either:
    1. Withhold from the employees income any contributions required within the limitations outlined in § 15-29-4 and transfer the contribution to the plan administrator; or
    2. Complete the appropriate employee response portion of the notice and advise the child support agency that enrollment cannot be completed because of prioritization or limitations on additional withholding of income.
  5. If there is a waiting period for enrollment based upon number of hours worked or passage of time, the employer must notify the plan administrator when the condition is met.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-4. Limitations on withholding.

  1. The employer may not withhold more under the medical notice than the lesser of:
    1. The amounts allowed by the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b);
    2. The amounts allowed by the state of the employee’s principal place of employment; or
    3. The amount allowed for health care coverage premiums by the child support order. The federal limit applies to the aggregate disposal weekly earnings (ADWE). ADWE is the net income left after making mandatory deductions such as state, federal and local taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes.
  2. Priority of Withholding.  If withholding is required for employee contributions to one or more health care coverage plans under the medical notice and for a support obligation under a separate notice, and available funds are insufficient for withholding for both cash and medical support contributions, the employer must withhold amounts for purposes of cash support and medical support contributions in accordance with the law, if any, of the state of the employee’s principal place of employment requiring prioritization between cash and medical support. If the principal place of employment is Rhode Island, cash support shall be a priority followed by medical support contributions.
  3. Duration of withholding.  Coverage of a dependent child shall continue until the child is no longer a dependent. The continuation coverage provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., may entitle the child to continuation coverage under the plan. The employer must continue to withhold employee contributions and may not discontinue or eliminate health care coverage for the children unless the employer is provided satisfactory evidence that:
    1. The court or administrative child support order referred to above is no longer in effect; or
    2. The children are or will be enrolled in comparable health care coverage which will take effect no longer than the effective date of dis-enrollment from the plan; or
    3. The employer eliminates family health care coverage for all of its employees.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-5. Employer sanctions.

An employer may be subject to a one hundred dollar ($100) fine or other penalties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., for discharging an employee from employment, refusing to employ, or taking disciplinary action against any employee because of medical child support withholding or for failing to withhold income or transmit the withheld amounts to the applicable plan(s) as the medical notice directs.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-6. Notice of termination of employment.

In any case in which the above employment terminates, the employer must promptly notify the division of taxation, child support enforcement agency of the termination within ten (10) days.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-7. Employee liability for contribution to the plan.

The employee is liable for any employee contributions that are required under the health care coverage plan for enrollment of the child(ren) and is subject to appropriate enforcement. The employee may contest the withholding under the medical notice based upon a mistake of fact. Should an employee contest the withholding under the medical notice, the employer must proceed to comply with the employer responsibilities in the medical notice until notified by the division of taxation, child support enforcement or other issuing agency to discontinue withholding. To contest the withholding, the employee should contact the division of taxation, child support enforcement or other issuing agency at the address and telephone number listed on the medical notice form.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-8. Plan administrator obligations regarding enrollment.

    1. The medical notice shall be forwarded by the employer to the plan administrator. The plan administrator is obligated to provide health care coverage of the child(ren) under the group health plan described in the medical notice within forty (40) business days of the date of the notice, or sooner if reasonable.
    2. The plan administrator must complete the plan administrator response and send it to the issuing agency.
    3. If there is health care coverage available for the child(ren), the plan administrator shall notify the non-custodial parent of the coverage available and the effective date of the coverage and complete any forms documents or information necessary to effectuate and submit claims for the coverage.
    4. If there is more than one option available for health care coverage, the plan administrator must provide a detailed summary plan description that describes all available coverages, including a default option coverage plan. The issuing child support agency must, in conjunction with the custodial parent, select one of the available options within twenty (20) days or the child(ren) will be enrolled in a default plan.
    5. If there has been no response from the issuing agency as to which option is selected, the plan administrator shall enroll the child(ren) in the default option coverage plan.
  1. The plan administrator shall notify the issuing agency if there is a waiting period for the participant. Upon expiration of the required waiting period for enrollment, the plan administrator shall enroll the child(ren) in the health coverage plan.
  2. If the plan administrator determines the medical notice does not constitute a qualified medical child support order, the reasons must be specified in the response.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-9. Plan administrator — Unlawful refusal to enroll.

  1. Enrollment of a child may not be denied for any of the following reasons:
    1. The child(ren) was born out of wedlock;
    2. The child is not claimed as a dependant on the participant’s federal income tax return;
    3. The child does not reside with the participant or in the plan’s service area; or
    4. The child is receiving benefits or is eligible to receive benefits under a state’s medical plan.
  2. If the health care coverage plan requires that the participant must be currently enrolled, the plan administrator must enroll both the participant and the child(ren).
  3. All enrollments are to be made without regard to open season restrictions.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

15-29-10. Payment of claims.

  1. The following individuals or entities are eligible to file claims under the health care coverage plan:
    1. A child covered by the medical order;
    2. The child’s custodial parent or legal guardian;
    3. The provider of services to the child(ren); or
    4. A state agency to which the child(ren) or parents rights have been assigned.
  2. The plan administrator shall pay for covered benefits or reimbursement directly to the party.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 314, § 3.

Chapter 30 Legal Representation in Child Support Cases

15-30-1. Legal counsel.

  1. Whether acting on its own behalf or on behalf of the obligee, obligor, or child, the department of human services, office of child support services, and its attorneys serve the public interest in ensuring that children are supported by their parents. The department does not represent the interests of any individual person, and its attorneys represent only the department. An attorney-client relationship is not created between department attorneys and any person or entity other than the department of human services, office of child support services, or when acting on behalf of the department of children, youth and families pursuant to § 15-9-3 or the department of human services pursuant to § 15-13-2 , or another state child support agency pursuant to § 15-23.1-1 et seq. The obligee, obligor, and child may obtain the services offered by the department but will not be legally represented by the attorneys for the department. Nothing herein shall preclude any party from retaining the services of a private attorney to legally represent their interests. The existence or appearance of a private attorney as counsel of record for the obligee, obligor, or child does not affect the department’s right to act or provide services. The department is not required to provide a private attorney nor reimburse either the obligee, obligor, guardian or child for the services of private counsel.
  2. The department has the power of attorney to act in the name of any obligee to endorse and cash any drafts, checks, money orders, or other negotiable instruments received by the department on behalf of a child.
  3. If the department is providing IV-D services, the department must be afforded notice and an opportunity to participate as an independent party in any proceeding, relating to paternity, to establishment, enforcement or modification of a support or medical obligation, whether initiated by the obligee, the obligor, or the child.
  4. The notice must reasonably inform the department of the issues to be determined in the proceeding, the names of the parties and the child, and the identity and location of the tribunal in which the issues will be determined. The notice is for informational purposes only and is not intended as a substitute for procedures necessary under the Rhode Island rules of civil procedure to establish personal jurisdiction over the parties and department. If the department is not given notice, an agreement, judgment, decree, or order is void as to any interest of the department that is or may be affected by the agreement, judgment, decree, or order.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 372, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 455, § 2.

15-30-2. Department of Human Services — Office of child support services — Powers and duties.

The department may take action to establish paternity, establish, enforce and modify child support orders under the provisions of appropriate sections under title 15 and in accordance with title IV-D of the Social Security Act and other appropriate state and federal statutes if the department:

  1. receives a referral on behalf of a child receiving benefits from the Family Independence Program;
  2. receives a referral on behalf of a child in the care of the department of children, youth and families pursuant to § 15-9-1 ;
  3. receives an interstate referral under the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; and
  4. receives an application for services from a custodial parent, noncustodial parent, guardian of a child, or from the child. Provided, however, that all applicants shall receive a rights and responsibilities statement, a disclosure of representation statement and sign an acknowledgement of nonrepresentation prior to services being rendered. The notice shall inform the individual of his or her right to retain private counsel and of any free legal services that are available.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 372, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 455, § 2.