NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Municipal Courts.

Municipal courts may be created by the general assembly, under the authority of this section and under Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1. Deming v. Nichols, 135 Tenn. 295, 186 S.W. 113, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1916).

While ordinarily the jurisdiction of municipal courts is limited to cases involving violations of municipal ordinances, it may be extended by the legislature to cases arising under state law. Moore v. State, 159 Tenn. 468, 19 S.W.2d 233, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1929).

2. Jurisdiction.

Because the offense occurred in Lawrence County, Tenneesee the Lawrence County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's misdemeanor charges; defendant, a resident of the State by his own admission, drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Lawrence County and then personally appeared in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to stand trial, thus vesting that court with personal jurisdiction. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Collateral References. Courts 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appellate Court — Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees.

The supreme court of Tennessee has inherent power, as a constituent part, to enforce its final judgments, and to protect them from interference, and such power is guaranteed by subdivisions (3), (4) and (6) of this section, and by § 16-3-202, authorizing the supreme court to issue all writs and process necessary to enforce its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Conner v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. 220, 154 S.W. 957, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1912); Chaffin v. Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 213 S.W.2d 32, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1948).

Where trial court and supreme court had previously sustained validity of annexation ordinance and annexation procedure and same complainants filed suit in chancery court seeking to enjoin collection of taxes in the annexed area and complaint in chancery suit contained basically the same averments as those in the previous proceedings, supreme court issued supersedeas and permanent injunction superseding any action taken or which might be taken in the chancery proceeding and enjoining and restraining complainants from interfering directly or indirectly with previous judgment of the supreme court. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

Supreme court has power and authority to take such action as it deems proper and appropriate to enforce its decrees and orders and to issue all necessary process to prevent interference therewith. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

2. Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees Generally.

The power to enforce final judgments is inherent in all courts as a constituent part and is recognized and guaranteed by statute. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

3. Substitute Service of Process.

Upon motion, supported by affidavit, trial judges may, in the exercise of sound discretion, order in lieu of publication, that the clerk mail a copy of the complaint and summons by return receipt registered mail to defendant's last known address and post a copy of the summons at three public places in the county; that the clerk make an entry on the rule docket so showing, and note thereon and file with the record the document returned, and such a method of substitute service will satisfy both federal and state due process requirements. Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1979).

4. Jurisdiction to Try Attorney.

Trial judge had jurisdiction to try appellant attorney for contempt under the interchange provisions; because the appellant's charges of contempt implicated two judges in the first judicial district as witnesses, all the judges of the first judicial district recused themselves from hearing the case, and accordingly, the presiding judge of the first judicial district requested a judge from the second judicial district to hear the contempt proceedings. Wilson v. Wilson (In re Cowan), 877 S.W.2d 271, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

5. Enforcing Order.

Juvenile defendant acted in a contentious and disruptive manner before the court, in violation of T.C.A. § 16-1-102(1), failed to follow the court's order to sit in the area benches, and resisted arrest when the court ordered that defendant be taken to a holding cell; because the court had the right and the responsibility to punish that conduct, there was no need to address defendant's constitutional concerns regarding T.C.A. § 39-16-602(b), and the jury's decision to find defendant guilty of assault and resisting arrest was proper. State v. Roberts, 106 S.W.3d 658, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2002).

Trial court did not err in granting a judgment to a former wife on alimony arrears, even though the trial court did not hold the former husband in contempt because the trial court had the power and discretion to enforce its orders in the way it deemed best, T.C.A. § 16-1-102, and a finding of contempt was not a mandatory requirement for the award of arrears; the mere fact the trial court relieved the husband of a contempt finding did not, ipso facto, relieve him of the judgment made by the court for the purpose of enforcing its order. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2013).

Because a father willfully refused to pay his share of his children's medical expenses despite his ability to do so, the trial court did not err in holding the father in contempt based on his failure to pay the medical expenses. Brunetz v. Brunetz, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2019).

6. Due Process

Judgment authorizing a city to demolish property owners'  house was reversed, where the procedure used by the city to demolish the house did not comply with due process. Hearing at which the trial court gave the city authority to demolish the house was a hearing on a contempt motion, but the owners of the house had no notice that the hearing would involve a request for permission to demolish the house. City of Franklin v. Hunter, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 2009).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 78, 79.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Powers.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts of justice. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Trial court had power to impose an order of contempt on three members of a compensation self-insured group trust in liquidation where the members continued to violate court orders to make periodic payments. State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d 602, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Group Trust & Trucking Servs., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1010 (Tenn. 2006).

Juvenile court had authority under T.C.A. § 29-9-104 to hold its court clerk in contempt of court and to incarcerate him to compel compliance with its lawful orders to produce court files to court referees. The finding that his noncompliance was willful under T.C.A. § 29-9-102(3) was supported by the evidence. In re Lineweaver, 343 S.W.3d 401, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 769 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010).

2. Limitation of Powers.

The power of the courts to punish for contempt is limited to the cases laid down in § 29-9-102. Scott v. State, 109 Tenn. 390, 71 S.W. 824, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1902).

3. Jurisdiction to Try Attorney.

Trial judge had jurisdiction to try appellant attorney for contempt under the interchange provisions; because the appellant's charges of contempt implicated two judges in the first judicial district as witnesses, all the judges of the first judicial district recused themselves from hearing the case, and accordingly, the presiding judge of the first judicial district requested a judge from the second judicial district to hear the contempt proceedings. Wilson v. Wilson (In re Cowan), 877 S.W.2d 271, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

4. No Contempt.

From a doctor's suit against a public hospital regarding his staff privileges being revoked, the doctor's lawyers should not have been held in civil contempt after they sought public records from the hospital while the doctor's interlocutory appeal regarding a discovery dispute was pending because the plain language of the order staying “all proceedings below” was not broad enough to apply to separate actions under T.C.A. § 10-7-505(a) seeking access to public records; the appellate court's stay order could reasonably have been interpreted to apply only to the pending legal and administrative proceedings between the doctor and the hospital. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2008).

5. Contempt.

Dismissal of a third count of contempt against the husband was inappropriate because he was given sufficient notice since the wife's contempt petition satisfied all three requirements of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b)(1). In part, the wife's petition for contempt clearly and accurately referenced the prior orders that prohibited the husband from contacting the wife or coming around her for any reason. Fox v. Fox, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010).

Trial court did not err in fining a mother $ 50 for failing to attend all the counseling sessions ordered in a decree of child support and child custody and in proceeding to decide the mother's motion for modification of a parenting plan and modification of child support despite her failure to comply with the counseling order. There was no harm shown to the children by the mother's failure to attend all the counseling sessions as ordered. Schreur v. Garner, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011).

In a property dispute wherein a trial court ruled a right-of-way “should remain open and unobstructed,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant in civil contempt for erecting a gate over the right-of-way because the fact that the order did not contain language explicitly prohibiting a “gate” did not make the order ambiguous or unsupported; the erection of a gate clearly constituted an “obstruction.” Gilreath v. Peters, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2011).

Although a trial court did not err in holding a husband in willful contempt, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 16-1-103 and 29-9-102, for violating a statutorily-mandated temporary injunction, the trial court did err in banning all contact between the husband and the parties'  child as punishment for the contemptuous behavior because the total suspension of the husband's visitation was not the least drastic measure available and was therefore unjustified. Slagle v. Slagle, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2012).

In a divorce matter, a trial court did not err in holding a husband in willful contempt, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 16-1-103 and 29-9-102, for violating the statutorily-mandated temporary injunction in T.C.A. § 36-4-106(d)(1)-(7) because the husband withdrew, transferred, and used, hundreds of thousands of dollars in marital assets to finance the “start-up costs” of a new business venture after the parties'  divorce was filed. Slagle v. Slagle, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2012).

Mother willfully violated the parenting plan by asking the child to repeat to her that his father and stepmother touched his privates, had the ability to comply with the plan, and her conduct constituted civil, not criminal, contempt. Cremeens v. Cremeens, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the father in civil contempt for failing to pay child support, as the evidence showed that the father had the ability to work and was able to meet other obligations. Cisneros v. Cisneros, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 938 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal dismissed, Cisneros v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Collateral References. Contempt 32-36.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Perjury Committed in Building Other Than Courthouse.

Circuit court had jurisdiction to try defendant for perjury committed while court was sitting in federal custom house during period in which courthouse was undergoing repairs, since this section of the Code authorized court to occupy rooms away from courthouse under such circumstances. Exum v. State, 90 Tenn. 501, 17 S.W. 107, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 32, 25 Am. St. Rep. 700, 15 L.R.A. 381 (1891).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 36.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 164, 166.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The failure to read and sign the minutes each morning in open court, and the signing of the same at chambers, or in another town or place, after the court has adjourned, is severely reprehended and deprecated, as likely to result in surreptitious entries and evil practices. Bass v. State, 65 Tenn. 579, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (1873).

Minutes are indigenous to courts of record, and when signed by a trial judge they become the highest evidence of what has been done in the court. Ray v. State, 577 S.W.2d 681, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

2. Nature of Statute.

The requirement of this section that the minutes of the court shall be signed by the judge is directory only. Jackson v. Jackson, 3 Shan. 18 (1878); State ex rel. Pierce v. Hardin, 163 Tenn. 471, 43 S.W.2d 924, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1931); Duboise v. State, 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (1956).

The provisions of this section are merely directory and not mandatory. Duboise v. State, 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (1956).

While this section has repeatedly been construed as being directory rather than mandatory, it is nevertheless right and proper that such directions not be ignored. Howard v. State, 217 Tenn. 556, 399 S.W.2d 738, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (1966).

3. Minutes.

The minutes, signed as required by this statute, and thus authenticated, are made the highest evidence of what was done in court; and, so far as they are records of judicial proceedings, they import absolute verity, and are conclusive unless attacked for fraud. Moore v. State, 50 Tenn. 493, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1871); Conway v. Brown, 52 Tenn. 237, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 255 (1871); Dyer v. State, 79 Tenn. 509, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1883); Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1942).

Contention of the defendant that the minutes of the court were not properly signed because trial judge only signed the minute book at the close of all the entries for the day was without merit as no more was required. Fuller v. State, 504 S.W.2d 385, 1973 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).

4. —Failure to Enter Judgment on Day Pronounced — Effect.

Although this section contemplates that a judgment be entered on the day it is pronounced, the statute is directory only; however, the failure to comply with it delays execution of the judgment. Welch v. State, 553 S.W.2d 917, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

5. —Failure to Sign — Effect.

The failure of a judge, through inadvertence or accident, to sign the minutes of the court for the day on which a judgment was recovered, does not invalidate the judgment, the provisions of the statute on this subject being directory. Jackson v. Jackson, 3 Shan. 18 (1878).

The minutes of records of courts are generally required to be authenticated by the signature of the judge, but failure of the judge to sign the record as directed by statute does not make the judgment a nullity; it is at most irregular and erroneous, but not void. Crum v. Fillers, 6 Tenn. App. 547, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Failure of trial judge to sign minutes which contained order convicting defendants or minutes overruling motion for new trial did not invalidate judgment of conviction. Duboise v. State, 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (1956).

Decree was not invalid because chancellor failed to sign minutes containing such decree. Cobb v. Brown, 42 Tenn. App. 595, 305 S.W.2d 241, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

6. —Presumption as to Signing.

It will be presumed that the chancellor performed his duty and signed the minutes. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

7. Bill of Exceptions — Death of Judge without Signing.

Unsigned bill of exceptions, if agreed to by counsel, may be considered by the supreme court, where the judge died pending a motion for a new trial, before the adjournment of the court and before the expiration of the time for signing the bill of exceptions. Sims v. State, 72 Tenn. 357, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1880).

8. General Sessions Court — Nature of Dockets.

Where the dockets provided for by Private Acts 1937, ch. 12 creating a court of general sessions for Davidson County were no more than those formerly kept by the justices of the peace whose judicial powers and functions the court took over and where there was no provision that such dockets should be read aloud each morning and verified by signature of the judge, such records did not approach the dignity and verity of the authenticated minutes of a court of record and such court was not a court of record. Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1942).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 51, 53, 54, 56-59, 61, 62.

Courts 113.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Transfer of Title.

A bid at a master's sale continues as a mere offer until the court rejects it or accepts it. But the purchaser does not become the owner of the legal title, unless the decree divests and vests title, or unless a deed is made by the master pursuant to a decree ordering him so to do, or unless, on being so ordered, the master fails to make the deed within a reasonable time, in which latter event, the title will vest in the purchaser by the mere lapse of such reasonable time. Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, 160 S.W. 844, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1913).

2. Confirmation.

Confirmation of report of sale constitutes and completes the contract in court sales of land. Eakin & Co. v. Herbert, 44 Tenn. 116, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1867); Myers v. Lindsay, 73 Tenn. 331, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 132 (1880).

Sale of personal property was complete without a confirmation by decree. Saunders & Aycock v. Stallings, 52 Tenn. 65, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (1871).

In case of real property confirmation completes the sale without formal divestiture and investiture in purchaser in whom there is all the beneficial interest regardless of the naked legal title being outstanding. Williams v. Clark, 51 S.W. 130, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 135 (1898); Killough v. Warren, 58 S.W. 898, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).

3. Failure of Master to Make Deed.

Decree directing reformation of deed and conveyance of property to complainant by clerk and master operated to invest title in complainant from the date of the decree even though clerk and master did not execute the deed. Behrn v. White, 108 Tenn. 392, 67 S.W. 810, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1902).

A sufficient time did not, as a matter of law, elapse between December, 1876, when a decree directed the master to make a deed for land purchased at judicial sale, and February, 1877, to vest the legal title in the purchaser without a deed, by lapse of time. Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, 160 S.W. 844, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1913).

4. Transfer of Interest before Receiving Sheriff's Deed.

A purchaser of land at a court sale may before he takes the sheriff's deed transfer in good faith such interest as he acquired under the purchase and no registration of such transfer is required. Spicer v. Kimes, 25 Tenn. App. 247, 156 S.W.2d 334, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

Where decree of court vested title in purchaser but before the deeds were executed by the clerk, the purchaser asked the court to make an order directing the clerk to execute the deeds to him and his wife, which order was entered on the minutes and the deeds were so executed, such procedure vested title in the purchaser and his wife as tenants by the entireties. Spicer v. Kimes, 25 Tenn. App. 247, 156 S.W.2d 334, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

5. Decree as Evidence.

Such a decree when proper and registered may be introduced as evidence, without production of other parts of the record. Whitmore v. Johnson's Heirs, 29 Tenn. 610, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1850).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Decree or Deed.

The decree or deed has the effect of a deed duly executed and acknowledged by the parties in interest. White v. O'Bryan, 148 Tenn. 18, 251 S.W. 785, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1922).

2. Final Divorce Decree.

Trial court did not err by failing to order a wife to file a quit claim on the marital residence awarded to the husband because the final divorce decree, pursuant to which the husband was awarded the marital residence, had the same force and effect as a conveyance by the party and had to be registered. Gentry v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Implied warranty of title and against encumbrances, where the court sale is made at the instance of the parties for the conversion of their interests into the money, or for like purposes. Staunton v. Harris, 56 Tenn. 579, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 178 (1872).

Where land is sold in constraint of law, in invitum, for the benefit of creditors, either under execution or under the decrees or orders of any competent court, the purchaser obtains no warranty of title or covenants against encumbrances, and can have no recourse on the creditor for any encumbrances, deficiency, or for failure of title, though he may recover for some encumbrances of the party as whose property the land was sold. Staunton v. Harris, 56 Tenn. 579, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 178 (1872); Childress v. Vance, 60 Tenn. 406, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (1873); Hously v. Lindsay, 57 Tenn. 651, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (1873); Foster v. Bradford, 1 Tenn. Ch. 400 (1873); Myers v. Lindsay, 73 Tenn. 331, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 132 (1880); Chandler v. Jobe, 73 Tenn. 591, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (1880); Williams v. Whitmore, 77 Tenn. 262, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1882); Mayor of Nashville v. Cowan, 78 Tenn. 209, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (1882); Irby v. Irby, 79 Tenn. 165, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1883); State v. Hill, 87 Tenn. 638, 11 S.W. 610, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1889); Hunt v. Memphis Gaslight Co., 95 Tenn. 136, 31 S.W. 1006, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1895); Brown v. Timmons, 110 Tenn. 148, 72 S.W. 958, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1903).

2. Sales for Partition.

3. —Decisions not Based on This Section.

In sales for petition authorized by statute where the buyer obtains a defective title and discovers the fact before the conveyance is executed he may recover his purchase money. Deaderick v. Smith, 25 Tenn. 138, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1845); Read v. Fite, 27 Tenn. 328, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1847); Foster v. Bradford, 1 Tenn. Ch. 400 (1873).

4. Warranties Binding on Parties.

Where the sale of land for a partition was made on the theory that the interests of the remaindermen were vested, whereas in fact they were contingent, the purchasers are not entitled to be relieved from their purchase on their contention that they were thereby deprived of the implied warranty of title, given by this section, where a sale for partition was made at the voluntary instance of the parties. Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239 S.W. 423, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1922).

Collateral References. Judicial Sales 50(1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

While T.C.A. § 16-1-116 applied generally to cases incorrectly filed in one court which may be transferred to another court, T.C.A. § 9-8-307 applied specifically to the transfer of claims from a court to the Tennessee Claims Commission; therefore, the more general statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, was inapplicable. Turner v. State, 184 S.W.3d 701, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

In a prison inmate's suit against the department of corrections challenging a disciplinary decision against him, dismissal of the inmate's suit was proper as T.C.A. § 41-21-803 expressly provided that the inmate's action be brought in the county in which the correctional facility was located, and he failed to do so; furthermore, the chancellor applied the correct legal standard, and her discretionary determination for not transferring the case to the proper venue was based upon and a consequence of the inmate's previous acts and omissions. Jones v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2007), overruled, Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

Prison inmate's certiorari petition seeking judicial review of a disciplinary proceeding, which petition was filed in a county other than that of the prison, was properly dismissed because the venue requirement of T.C.A. § 41-21-803 was jurisdictional, and the petition also had several procedural defects under T.C.A. § 27-8-104(a) and T.C.A. § 27-8-106, so that neither the interests of justice nor the principles of judicial economy would be served by transferring the case to the proper county. Clark v. S. Cent. Corr. Facility, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2007), overruled, Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

Prisoner's challenge to the actions of an administrative disciplinary board and prison officials at a privately operated prison was properly dismissed for improper venue as the more specific venue statute, T.C.A. § 41-21-803, controlled; the county where the prison was located was the only county in whose courts the suit could be filed. Rice v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007).

Appellate court denied defendant's request that his habeas corpus petition be treated as one for postconviction relief and that the appellate court order the Davidson county court to transfer the matter to the Maury county criminal court to proceed as if the petition was for postconviction relief, because without express authority, it would not order a transfer; the appellate court was not persuaded that T.C.A. § 16-1-116 applied, as postconviction proceedings were governed specifically by T.C.A. § 40-30-101 et seq., and habeas corpus actions were governed specifically by T.C.A. § 29-21-119. Carter v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007), aff'd, 279 S.W.3d 560, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. 2009).

In a family's medical malpractice suit against a doctor, his employer, and a hospital, as the family and the employer were in the same county (the hospital was not), and the cause of action arose out of medical treatment provided in that county, transfer of venue to that county under T.C.A. § 20-4-101(b) was proper; since the entire case could have been brought in that county initially, transfer there pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-1-116 was permissible. Pack v. Ross, 288 S.W.3d 870, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2008).

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a pro se state inmate filed his complaint in the incorrect venue pursuant to T.C.A. § 41-21-803, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. While the inmate had filed an affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis, as required by T.C.A. § 41-21-805, he failed to list any prior lawsuits or claims filed by him. Hayes v. State, 341 S.W.3d 293, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009), appeal dismissed, Hayes v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2010).

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a pro se state inmate filed his complaint in the incorrect venue pursuant to T.C.A. § 41-21-803, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition since the inmate had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and exhaustion was a prerequisite to filing an action. Hayes v. State, 341 S.W.3d 293, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009), appeal dismissed, Hayes v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2010).

Chancery court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing an employee's retaliatory discharge case rather than granting the public employer's motion to transfer because the employer raised a jurisdictional objection and, therefore, transfer was mandated. Young v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009), overruled in part, Sneed v. City of Red Bank, 459 S.W.3d 17, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2014), overruled, Young v. City of Lafollette, 479 S.W.3d 785, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2015).

In a case in which, under T.C.A. § 40-30-104, a habeas court lacked jurisdiction over a pro se inmate's petition as a petition for post-conviction relief because it was filed in the wrong court for post-conviction review, since the habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the post-conviction case, it could not direct a transfer to the appropriate court in the absence of statutory authority, and, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, did not authorize the transfer of habeas petitions. Jeffries v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2009).

Court of appeals considered the applicability of the Transfer Statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, in plaintiff's appeal of an order dismissing his claim under the Government Tort Liability Act as time barred pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-20-305(b) because the questions before the court of appeals, whether the general sessions court had authority to transfer plaintiff's case to the circuit court and whether plaintiff's claim was time barred, were the central issues before the circuit court; the Transfer Statute was not discussed in the circuit court, but the questions, the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and whether the claim was time barred, were raised. Haynes v. Rutherford County, 359 S.W.3d 585, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011).

Transfer Statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, is applicable to Government Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. § 29-20-101 et seq., claims; the Transfer Statute does not create a new substantive right or a new cause of action that could be asserted against the state or its political subdivisions, but the Transfer Statute merely authorizes the transfer of such a claim to a court empowered to hear the merits of the claim. Haynes v. Rutherford County, 359 S.W.3d 585, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011).

Trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim under the Government Tort Liability Act as time barred pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-20-305(b) because the case was properly transferred under the Transfer Statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116; at the time plaintiff filed in general sessions court, his claim could have been brought in the circuit court, and because the case was properly transferred to a court with jurisdiction, the filing of the action in the sessions court on tolled the running of the statute of limitations before the expiration of the limitations period, and the date of transfer related back to the date plaintiff's claim was originally filed. Haynes v. Rutherford County, 359 S.W.3d 585, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011).

Trial court properly transferred an inmate's action against a private correctional facility in accordance with T.C.A. § 16-1-116 because T.C.A. § 41-21-803 effectively localized actions brought by prisoners and the proper venue in the matter was in the county where the facility was located. Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2012), rev'd, 448 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

Trial court properly acted within its discretion in transferring a probate action to another county based on a skilled nursing facility's contention that the decedent resided in that county at the time of his death; the statute has been utilized to transfer actions to the proper court with jurisdiction rather than dismissing the action when the original court has been determined to lack jurisdiction because venue was localized. In re Estate of Salmons, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2018).

Order granting administration of an estate to an administratrix was not void but was voidable because the Campbell County Chancery Court had the statutory authority to enter such an order, and the voidable nature of the order was only demonstrated with the presentment of proof that the decedent was purportedly a resident of a different county at the time of his death; because the order was not void, administration of the estate could be validly transferred pursuant to the statute. In re Estate of Salmons, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2018).

2. Transfer Not In the Interest of Justice.

Because an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari from the denial of parole was filed well beyond the 60-day time limit of T.C.A. § 27-9-102, the interest of justice would not have been served by transferring his petition from Davidson County Circuit Court to Davidson County Chancery Court pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-1-116; the petition would have been treated as if it had been filed when it was filed in Circuit Court. Seagroves v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2010).

Trial court properly refused to transfer a dissolution proceeding regarding a nonprofit corporation to Davidson County since the trial court did not lack jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding and pending receivership, and it was not necessary to consider T.C.A. § 16-1-116. Pee Wee Wisdom Child Dev. Ctr. v. Cooper, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2012).

3. Civil Action.

Language of the statute does not carve out an exception for probate actions; thus, the statute is unambiguous in its application to any “civil action.” In re Estate of Salmons, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2018).

4. Transfer.

Chancery Court for Cumberland County, Tennessee, erred in attempting to invalidate a DeKalb County, Tennessee, lien because to the extent a limited liability company (LLC) sought to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County was not the proper venue; the chancery court was directed on remand to transfer the case to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address the LLC's action to quiet title to land in that county. Little Hurricane Props., LLC v. Cafaro, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Appointment of an administrator ad litem for the decedent did not constitute a suit in equity for transfer purposes under T.C.A. § 16-10-111, and for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-1-116, the case could not be transferred to chancery court because the circuit court had jurisdiction to award the damages requested. Owens v. Muenzel, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

Both conditions of the Transfer Statute were met; at the time that plaintiff originally filed this action, it could have been brought in the Campbell County Circuit Court, plus it was in the interest of justice for this action to be transferred to the court with subject matter jurisdiction. Bruce v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2019).

16-1-201. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-201 — 16-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-202. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-201 — 16-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-203. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-201 — 16-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-204. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-201 — 16-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-205. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-201 — 16-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-206. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-201 — 16-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Transfer by Court.

The supreme court had authority to transfer a case from one division of the state to another, in order to obtain an earlier hearing, when the court was not able to consider and decide the case before completing its sitting in the division from which the case was transferred, even though the parties did not consent thereto. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 168 Tenn. 126, 76 S.W.2d 314, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1934).

2. Emergency Causes.

There is no emergency warranting transfer of hearing on application of parties wishing to force sale of realty during financial distress of the community where the appellees are protected by injunction bond and the property is held by a receiver appointed by the court. Foster v. Harle, 165 Tenn. 616, 57 S.W.2d 452, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1933).

The exercise of the authority conferred by this section should be confined to “emergency causes,” or those where great or irreparable injury or wrong might result from a delay. State v. Meux, 166 Tenn. 286, 61 S.W.2d 974, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1933).

A quo warranto proceeding by a new road commission, created under a law impliedly repealing the former law, against the commission created under the former law to determine which of the two was entitled to administer the road law is not an “emergency cause” within the meaning of this section. State v. Meux, 166 Tenn. 286, 61 S.W.2d 974, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1933).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Transfer Not Required.

Because an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari from the denial of parole was filed well beyond the 60-day time limit of T.C.A. § 27-9-102, the interest of justice would not have been served by transferring his petition from Davidson County Circuit Court to Davidson County Chancery Court pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-1-116; the petition would have been treated as if it had been filed when it was filed in Circuit Court. Seagroves v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2010).

When a wife sought to enforce an Illinois judgment ordering the sale of a Tennessee marital home and child support, a circuit court was not required to transfer the case to chancery court, where a husband had prosecuted a divorce action against the wife, because (1) the wife's action was not a case previously filed and dismissed and then refiled, under Tenn. R. 11 Dist. Ch. Cir. Ct. 7.01, and (2) transfer was discretionary. Claborn v. Claborn, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

16-2-201 — 16-2-231. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-2-201 — 16-2-231 (Acts 1931 (2nd E.S.), ch. 38, § 1; 1935, ch. 125, § 1; 1935 Private, ch. 332, § 1; 1937, ch. 59, § 1; 1937, ch. 98, § 1; 1937, ch. 204, § 1; 1937, ch. 205, § 1; 1939, ch. 61, § 1; 1939, ch. 119, § 1; 1943, ch. 28, § 1; 1943, ch. 94, § 1; 1947, ch. 138, §§ 1-3; C. Supp. 1950, § 159; Acts 1951, ch. 12, § 1; 1951, ch. 17, § 1; 1951, ch. 28, § 1; 1951, ch. 73, § 12 (Williams, § 159); Acts 1953, ch. 2, § 1; 1953, ch. 18, § 1; 1953, ch. 206, § 1; 1955, ch. 19, §§ 1, 2; 1955, ch. 104, § 1; 1955, ch. 107, § 1; 1955, ch. 222, § 1; 1957, ch. 2, § 1; 1957, ch. 47, § 1; 1957, ch. 54, § 12; 1957, ch. 95, §§ 1, 2; 1957, ch. 205, § 1; 1957, ch. 226, § 1; 1957, ch. 249, § 1; 1957, ch. 280, §§ 1, 2; 1957, ch. 342, § 1; 1959, ch. 99, §§ 1, 2; 1959, ch. 208, §§ 1, 2; 1961, ch. 87, § 1; 1961, ch. 161, §§ 7, 8; 1961, ch. 257, § 1; 1961, ch. 315, § 1; 1963, ch. 262, §§ 1, 2; 1963, ch. 306, § 1; 1963, ch. 344, § 1; 1965, ch. 17, § 1; 1965, ch. 75, § 1; 1965, ch. 188, §§ 1-3; 1965, ch. 204, §§ 1-5; 1965, ch. 274, §§ 2, 3, 9; 1967, ch. 5, § 1; 1967, ch. 7, § 1; 1967, ch. 10, §§ 1-3; 1967, ch. 47, § 1; 1967, ch. 162, § 1; 1967, ch. 228, §§ 1-3, 13; 1967, ch. 247, § 1; 1967, ch. 248, §§ 1, 2, 8; 1968, ch. 433, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 457, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 467, § 1; 1968, ch. 496, § 1; 1968, ch. 616, § 1; 1969, ch. 265, § 1; 1969, ch. 276, §§ 1, 2; 1970, ch. 513, § 1; 1970, ch. 542, § 1; 1971, ch. 239, § 1; 1971, ch. 347, § 1; 1972, ch. 442, §§ 3, 4; 1972, ch. 462, §§ 2, 8; 1972, ch. 515, §§ 1, 2; 1972, ch. 520, § 10; 1972, ch. 593, § 1; 1972, ch. 863, § 8; 1973, ch. 390, § 1; 1974, ch. 526, § 9; 1974, ch. 686, §§ 1, 2; 1974, ch. 711, §§ 1, 2; 1974, ch. 718, §§ 1-3; 1974, ch. 783, §§ 1, 3-5, 8, 9; 1975, ch. 8, § 1; 1975, ch. 14, § 1; 1975, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1975, ch. 94, § 1; 1975, ch. 304, § 1; 1976, ch. 478, § 1; 1976, ch. 518, § 3(b); 1976, ch. 544, § 1; 1977 Private Acts, ch. 51, § 1; 1977, ch. 199, §§ 1, 2; 1977, ch. 216, § 1; 1977, ch. 418, §§ 2, 3, 10-12; 1977, ch. 444, §§ 2, 3; 1978, ch. 707, §§ 1, 2; 1978, ch. 798, §§ 1, 2; 1978, ch. 848, §§ 1, 10; 1979, ch. 150, § 1; 1979, ch. 238, § 1; 1979, ch. 427, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 557, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 803, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-207 — 16-236), concerning the enumeration of circuit and criminal divisions, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 15, which repealed this part except insofar as this part divided existing circuit, criminal or chancery courts into parts or divisions. It was the intent of the general assembly to create new judicial districts in accordance with § 16-2-506, but to retain and continue the existing parts or divisions of the courts as they are set out.

Attorney General Opinions. Laws applicable to the circuit and chancery courts of the 1st Judicial District are T.C.A. Ann. §§ 16-2-201 and 16-2-301 to the extent those statutes divided the courts into parts and divisions; and T.C.A. §§ 16-2-501et seq., OAG 05-072 (5/3/05).

Disclosing terms of consulting contracts for services rendered outside the state, OAG 05-073 (5/4/05).

Part 3
Chancery Divisions Enumerated

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Concurrence.

Less than three judges cannot reach a decision but such decision may be announced by only one member. Cowan v. Murch, 97 Tenn. 590, 37 S.W. 393, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 34 L.R.A. 538, (1896).

16-3-201. Jurisdiction.

1. The jurisdiction of the court is appellate only, under restrictions and regulations that from time to time are prescribed by law; but it may possess other jurisdiction that is now conferred by law upon the present supreme court.
2. The court has no original jurisdiction, but appeals and writs of error, or other proceedings for the correction of errors, lie from the inferior courts and court of appeals, within each division, to the supreme court as provided by this code.
3. The court also has jurisdiction over all interlocutory appeals arising out of matters over which the court has exclusive jurisdiction.
4. 1. The supreme court may, upon the motion of any party, assume jurisdiction over an undecided case in which a notice of appeal or an application for interlocutory or extraordinary appeal is filed before any intermediate state appellate court.
   2. Subdivision (d)(1) applies only to cases of unusual public importance in which there is a special need for expedited decision and that involve:
      1. State taxes;
      2. The right to hold or retain public office; or
      3. Issues of constitutional law.
   3. The supreme court may, upon its own motion, when there is a compelling public interest, assume jurisdiction over an undecided case in which a notice of appeal or an application for interlocutory or extraordinary appeal is filed with an intermediate state appellate court.
   4. The supreme court may by order take actions necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the authority vested by this section.
5. Appeals of actions under title 2, chapter 17 relative to election contests shall be to the court of appeals in accordance with the Tennessee rules of appellate procedure.

Code 1858, § 4496 (deriv. Acts 1822, ch. 13, § 4); Acts 1870, ch. 24, § 8; Shan., §§ 377, 6329; mod. Code 1932, §§ 634, 10631; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-304; Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 2; 1992, ch. 952, §§ 11, 12; 1994, ch. 573, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 1; 2016, ch. 755, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 4 provided that any action pending on July 1, 1989, shall be maintained under law prior to the 1989 amendment by that act until its final disposition.

Acts 1992, ch. 952, § 15 provided that the amendments by that act apply to all matters as to which a notice of appeal is filed from and after May 1, 1992.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment inserted “or an application for interlocutory or extraordinary appeal” in (d)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 755, § 2. April 12, 2016.

Cross-References. Constitutional jurisdiction and jurisdiction of supreme court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 705.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 16, 51, 138, 210, 222; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 18.

Law Reviews.

Regulation of the Bar in Tennessee (Walter P. Armstrong, Jr.), 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 723 (1986).

“Seeking Justice on Appeal,” 27 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 28 (1991).

Cited: Ashe v. Leech, 653 S.W.2d 398, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. 1983); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. McReynolds, 886 S.W.2d 233, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1995); Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. 1996); Holder v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Comm'n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Booher, 978 S.W.2d 953, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. 2000); Workman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 807, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 2000); Haley v. Univ. of Tennessee-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. 2006); Bailey v. County of Shelby, 188 S.W.3d 539, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. 2006); ACLU v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. 2006); Mills v. Shelby County Election Comm'n, 218 S.W.3d 33, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Jordan v. Knox County, 213 S.W.3d 751, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. 2007); Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. 2007); Hooker v. Haslam, 393 S.W.3d 156, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. July 27, 2012).

16-3-202. Process, receivers, and references.

The court may appoint receivers, order references and issue all writs and process necessary for the exercise and enforcement of its jurisdiction.

Code 1858, § 4503; Shan., § 6336; mod. Code 1932, § 10637; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-305.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 679.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 152.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

16-3-203. Powers over criminal defendants.

The court may recommit offenders in state cases, when it may appear necessary, and remand them to the inferior court from which their cases were brought to the supreme court, taking recognizances from the defendants, when the offense charged is bailable, with the security that the court judges proper.

Code 1858, § 4498 (deriv. Acts 1817, ch. 17, § 3); Shan., § 6331; Code 1932, § 10632; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-306.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Bail and Recognizance, § 4; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 18.

16-3-204. Bonds and recognizances.

1. The court may give judgment upon any and all bonds or recognizances, whether in civil or criminal cases, executed in the progress of the cause, under the general provisions of law, or by lawful order of the court, either in the inferior or supreme court, and enforce the same by execution or otherwise, as in the case of other judgments and decrees of the court.
2. Process of scire facias may, in all such cases, be issued as is proper in similar cases in the inferior courts, and, upon appearance of the defendant, and issue of fact made thereon, the court may order a jury to be summoned forthwith to determine the issue, and may give judgment thereon as the inferior courts of law might do in similar cases.

Code 1858, §§ 4499, 4500 (deriv. Acts 1817, ch. 199, § 3); Shan., §§ 6332, 6333; Code 1932, §§ 10633, 10634; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-307.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 18.

16-3-205. Supersedeas by judges.

The judges of the supreme court, or any one of them, on a proper case being made out, shall have the authority to grant the process of supersedeas to an execution, returnable to their own court, in the same manner the supreme court, while it is in session, can grant such process, also grant supersedeas to the execution of an interlocutory decree of an inferior court, in the cases provided for in § 27-1-103 [repealed].

Code 1858, §§ 4512, 4513 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 15; 1851-1852, ch. 181, § 4); Shan., §§ 6347, 6348; Code 1932, §§ 10649, 10650; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-308.

Compiler's Notes. Section 27-1-103, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1981, ch. 449, § 1(8). For present provisions, see T.R.A.P. 3, 7, 10, 13, 24, 36.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judges, § 15.

Cited: Clements v. Roberts, 144 Tenn. 129, 230 S.W. 30, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1921).

16-3-206. Vacating judgment.

In all cases in which the supreme court may give judgment or decree through inadvertence and oversight, when upon the face of the record no cause of action existed against the party, the court may, upon its own motion, vacate the judgment or decree.

Code 1858, § 4501 (deriv. Acts 1845-1846, ch. 135); Shan., § 6334; mod. Code 1932, § 10635; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-309.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 47; 19 Tenn. Juris., Motions and Summary Proceedings, § 9.

Cited: Fort v. Dixie Oil Co., 171 Tenn. 199, 101 S.W.2d 692, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1937).

16-3-207. Correction of apparent mistakes.

The court may, at any time after final judgment, correct mistakes apparent on the face of the record, as provided in § 20-11-106 [repealed].

Code 1858, § 4502 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 70, § 2); Shan., § 6335; Code 1932, § 10636; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-310.

Compiler's Notes. Section 20-11-106, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 106, § 1. Section Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 was intended to supersede § 20-11-106. The Committee Comment to that rule reads: “60.01: This Rule supersedes the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-1508 [repealed], 20-11-106 and 20-11-107, although it is generally consistent with the purpose of those statutes. The provisions of the Rule are somewhat more flexible than the statutory procedures.”

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 46; 19 Tenn. Juris., Motions and Summary Proceedings, § 9.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure — 1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 825.

Cited: Fort v. Dixie Oil Co., 171 Tenn. 199, 101 S.W.2d 692, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1937).

16-3-208. Appeals taken before term.

All appeals, and appeals in the nature of a writ of error, taken from the final judgment or decree of an inferior court, at any time before the sitting of the supreme court, shall stand for hearing at the first term, without notice to the opposite party.

Code 1858, § 4514 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 19); Shan., § 6349; Code 1932, § 10651; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-312.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 51, 58, 218.

Cited: Harmon v. Hart, 53 S.W. 310, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 74 (1899).

16-3-209. Appeal during term.

An appeal, appeal in the nature of a writ of error, or writ of error may be prosecuted from any final judgment or decree, rendered in an inferior court during the term of the supreme court, the record being filed in the court, and the opposite party, or the opposite party's counsel, notified five (5) days before the hearing.

Code 1858, § 4515 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 19); Shan., § 6350; Code 1932, § 10652; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-313.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 51-58, 218.

Cited: Tipton v. Tipton, 118 Tenn. 691, 104 S.W. 237, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1907).

16-3-210. Scheduling of districts.

The court may class the judicial districts to set the causes from each district for trial on certain weeks of the term, and make publication of the classes before the beginning of the term.

Code 1858, § 4505; Shan., § 6338; mod. Code 1932, § 10640; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-314.

16-3-211. Order of counties in districts.

The supreme court, except as otherwise provided, shall take up and try the cases from the different counties in a judicial district in the order in which the counties are named in the section of chapter 2 of this title that prescribes the times of holding court in the judicial district; and when the business of a county is taken up, it shall be argued before passing to the business of another county, unless postponed for satisfactory reasons to the court.

Acts 1868-1869, ch. 28, § 4; Shan., § 6339; mod. Code 1932, § 10641; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-315.

16-3-212. Special personnel for expedition of post-conviction proceedings in capital cases.

The supreme court is authorized to employ, reassign or contract with individuals utilizing special funds appropriated solely for the purpose of providing prompt and fair adjudication of post-conviction proceedings in capital sentence cases, including authority to assign the additional personnel the duties of personnel reassigned to the post-conviction cases. In no event shall the employment, contract or expenditures under this authority extend beyond a two-year period.

Acts 1993, ch. 472, § 4.

Cross-References. Appropriation of funds, § 16-3-806.

Part 3
Terms

Chapter 10
Circuit and Criminal Courts

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Circuit court has jurisdiction of suits in an equitable nature in absence of demurrer to jurisdiction as provided in § 16-10-111. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

In a driver's challenge to circuit court's declaration that she was a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO), denial of the driver's motion asking that the MVHO order be declared void was proper because circuit court had subject matter over the driver; proceedings to revoke or suspend driving privileges were civil in nature and not criminal, and such a civil case was properly heard in circuit court because circuit court was a court of general jurisdiction. State v. O'Neal, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2008).

Because the offense occurred in Lawrence County, Tenneesee the Lawrence County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's misdemeanor charges; defendant, a resident of the State by his own admission, drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Lawrence County and then personally appeared in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to stand trial, thus vesting that court with personal jurisdiction. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

2. Original Jurisdiction.

Where jurisdiction is not conferred on some other court, the circuit court has original jurisdiction. Staples v. Brown, 113 Tenn. 639, 85 S.W. 254, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1904); Johnson v. White, 171 Tenn. 536, 106 S.W.2d 222, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1937).

Concomitant with any given court's authority to adjudicate certain types of cases between parties properly subject to being haled into that court is the obligation to exercise that authority in all cases where the jurisdiction is not conferred upon another tribunal. Young v. Kittrell, 833 S.W.2d 505, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Trial court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a third party defendant's post-trial motion for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending the third party action where its judgment was not yet final and no appeal had been perfected when defendant made the request. Homelift of Nashville, Inc. v. Porta, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

3. Election Contests.

The circuit court takes jurisdiction to try a contest over the election of mayor of a city, under the provision of this section. Baker v. Mitchell, 105 Tenn. 610, 59 S.W. 137, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1900); Adcock v. Houk, 122 Tenn. 269, 122 S.W. 979, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1909); Taylor v. Carr, 125 Tenn. 235, 141 S.W. 745, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1911).

The provision of this section does not deprive the chancery court of its jurisdiction to restrain the exercise of unconstitutional powers, and chancery may restrain the removal of a county seat, for want of the requisite vote, for such suit is not a contested election case. Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S.W. 171, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1904).

Contest of an election to determine whether a county should take stock in a railroad was not an election contest falling within the jurisdiction of the circuit court under the provisions of this section but was an action which regularly should have been brought in chancery court. Catlett v. Knoxville, S. & E. R. Co., 120 Tenn. 699, 112 S.W. 559, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1908).

Cases involving annexation of corporate territory, county subscriptions to railroad companies and removal of county seats are not in the classification of contested elections so as to fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court but are under the class of cases where the chancery court restrains officers from the exercise of unconstitutional power. Adcock v. Houk, 122 Tenn. 269, 122 S.W. 979, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1909).

This statute is broad and comprehensive and affords a remedy in an election contest where it is not conferred upon any other tribunal. Johnson v. White, 171 Tenn. 536, 106 S.W.2d 222, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1937).

4. —Cumulative Jurisdiction of City Council.

A city council is not a “judicial tribunal,” within the meaning of this section, and the circuit court is not deprived of its original jurisdiction by giving a city council only cumulative jurisdiction of contested election. Taylor v. Carr, 125 Tenn. 235, 141 S.W. 745, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1911).

5. City Board of Censors.

Circuit court properly granted writ of certiorari to review action of board of censors of city of Memphis so as to try de novo and pass upon the merits of the controversy. Binford v. Carline, 9 Tenn. App. 364, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

6. Juvenile Court.

Circuit court has jurisdiction in an action of common-law certiorari to correct a pretrial action of juvenile court. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

7. Effect of Possible Transfer.

A possible transfer to criminal court is not sufficient grounds for negating the statutory general authority of the circuit court in favor of the specific, limited authority of the criminal court which does not arise until transfer. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

8. Judicial Immunity.

Court of general jurisdiction of Tennessee and its presiding judge cannot be sued for acts done in exercise of judicial function. Wood v. Circuit Court of Warren County, 331 F. Supp. 1245, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13389 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).

9. Construction with Other Sections.

This section deals with the general powers and jurisdiction of the circuit court and in no way modifies the provisions of § 16-10-106. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

10. Child Support Decrees.

Circuit court, under its powers to administer justice in all cases where jurisdiction was not conferred upon another tribunal, had jurisdiction to modify child support decree originally granted by subsequently abolished county court. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 664 S.W.2d 694, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

11. Action for Contribution.

An action for contribution is within the circuit court's general jurisdiction. Young v. Kittrell, 833 S.W.2d 505, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

12. Termination of Parental Rights And Adoption.

Trial court erred in separating grandparents'  termination and adoption actions and transferring only the termination portion of the proceedings to the juvenile court because once the grandparents filed their adoption and termination petition, the trial court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to the exclusion of all other courts, including the juvenile court. In re Tyler G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 87, 88, 91.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 456.

Disqualification of judge on ground of being a witness in the case. 22 A.L.R.3d 1198.

Res judicata as affected by limitation of jurisdiction of court which rendered judgment. 83 A.L.R.2d 977.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Statute.

The moment an offense was made a misdemeanor, it became an offense cognizable in the circuit and criminal courts by operation of this section. State v. O'Hara, 1 Shan. 457 (1875).

2. Illustrative Cases.

Where defendant was convicted of two counts of violation of the state vehicle registration law under T.C.A. § 55-3-102, a violation of the seatbelt law under T.C.A. § 55-9-603, and failure to display a driver's license in violation of T.C.A. § 55-50-351, the Warren County Circuit Court (Tennessee) had jurisdiction to hear and decide defendant's case based upon his commission of “crimes and misdemeanors” pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-10-102. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee had the jurisdiction to hear his appeal in accordance with T.C.A. § 16-5-108(a)(1). State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2009).

Defendant's act of driving a vehicle without current registration on a highway violated both T.C.A. §§ 55-3-102 and 55-4-104, and defendant was not entitled to be convicted under one statute in preference to the other. His sentence of 30 days in jail and a $ 50 fine was proper under T.C.A. § 40-35-111(e)(3), and the circuit court had jurisdiction of the crime under T.C.A. § 16-10-102. State v. Ralph, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. June 25, 2010).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss because defendant presented nothing to indicate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over defendant, who appeared before the trial court, or over the subject matter of the criminal case; the indictment alleged the commission of criminal offenses, and the trial court was empowered to adjudicate criminal cases. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Apr. 20, 2015).

Trial court had the authority to preside over defendant's criminal charges because defendant was charged with several crimes, including driving with a suspended license, and defendant's vehicle was in fact a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 55-50-504(a)(1); defendant's refusal to consent to the laws of the State did not exempt him from following them or defeat the jurisdiction of the courts if he committed a violation of state statute. State v. Webber, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 894 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016).

Construed together, T.C.A. §§ 39-13-203 and 40-1-108 limited the chancery court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution on the ground he met the criteria for intellectual disability because the grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court had to be express, and there was no such express grant in the intellectual disability statute. Payne v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Chancery court properly dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an inmate's declaratory judgment action because sovereign immunity barred his suit against the warden and state attorney general where he failed to state a claim against them in their individual capacities in the absence of a claim that the statute was unconstitutional, exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction over all crimes and misdemeanors was vested in circuit courts, the determination of whether defendant had an intellectual disability at the time of the offense was a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes, and there was no such express grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court in the intellectual disability statute. Chalmers v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 884 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

3. Jurisdiction.

Chancery court properly dismissed, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, defendant's complaint seeking a declaration that he was ineligible to be sentenced to death because the claims were barred by sovereign immunity where, in the absence of a claim that the intellectual disability statute was unconstitutional, defendant failed to state a claim against the warden and state attorney general in their individual capacity, the determination of whether defendant had an intellectual disability at the time of the offense was a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes, and there was no express grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court in intellectual disability statute. Sims v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 874 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Because the offense occurred in Lawrence County, Tennessee the Lawrence County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's misdemeanor charges; defendant, a resident of the State by his own admission, drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Lawrence County and then personally appeared in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to stand trial, thus vesting that court with personal jurisdiction. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 87, 88, 91.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 19.

Const. Law 65.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Where certain papers were offered for probate as will in county court and heirs at law appeared and contested the validity of the alleged will and the county court ordered that the fact of contest be certified to the circuit court and that the original papers be certified to the circuit court this was sufficient to vest the circuit court with jurisdiction. Druen v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S.W.2d 146, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

2. More than One Will Propounded.

More than one will may be propounded to a jury in a circuit court during the trial of issues of devisavit vel non. Lillard v. Tolliver, 154 Tenn. 304, 285 S.W. 576, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1926).

3. Interest to Contest.

A testatrix's husband had sufficient interest to contest will where they were beneficiaries under a prior will and testatrix left no other relatives by blood or marriage. Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 115 S.W.2d 237, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

4. Proponent Relying on Estoppel as to Sanity.

Proponent of will may rely on defense that contestant is estopped to contest on ground of insanity of testator, though proponent failed to plead estoppel specially, the contest being treated as legal action and not suit in equity. Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 115 S.W.2d 237, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

5. Ascertaining Fees.

In a will contest, the circuit court after a compromise judgment, may refer the cause to the clerk to ascertain fees of counsel of infant contestant. Roberts v. Vaughn, 142 Tenn. 361, 219 S.W. 1034, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 65, 9 A.L.R. 1528 (1920).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Exclusiveness of Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction to try an issue of devisavit vel non is exclusively in the circuit court, and the chancery court has no jurisdiction to try such issue. Section 16-11-102 does not confer this jurisdiction on the chancery court. The chancery court cannot even try the issue as an incident in a suit involving other matter of proper equitable congizance, but should direct the parties to take appropriate steps to secure such a trial in the circuit court. Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891); Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 18 S.W. 280, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 92, 30 Am. St. Rep. 875 (1892).

The jurisdiction of the circuit court is exclusive in the matter of the contest of wills; therefore a chancery court cannot entertain and try an issue of devisavit vel non although it is presented in connection with matters of equitable cognizance. Muse v. Sluder, 600 S.W.2d 237, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 299.

Courts 485, 487 (1, 5, 7, 10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Other Statutes.

A statute increasing the jurisdiction of justices of the peace (now general sessions court) does not operate to abridge the existing jurisdiction of the circuit court. Taylor, Cole & McLeod v. Pope, 45 Tenn. 413, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1868), overruled, A. J. Roach & Co. v. Turk, 56 Tenn. 708, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 196, 24 Am. Rep. 360 (1872).

Section 16-10-101 deals with the general powers and jurisdiction of the circuit court and in no way modifies the provisions of this section. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

2. Basis of Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the result of the case, but on the amount of the “debt or demand” constituting the foundation of the suit. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

Trial court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a third party defendant's post-trial motion for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending the third party action where its judgment was not yet final and no appeal had been perfected when defendant made the request. Homelift of Nashville, Inc. v. Porta, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

3. Establishment of Prima Facie Jurisdiction.

If the debt or demand set forth in the declaration exceeds $50.00 the court has prima facie jurisdiction. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

4. Issue as to Jurisdictional Amount.

Where the writ and declaration are for a sum sufficiently large to give the court jurisdiction, the judgment will be valid, though it be for a sum less than the jurisdictional sum, unless the defendant put the question of jurisdiction in issue by plea in abatement resting the point on the sum actually in dispute. Ross v. Jackson, 3 Tenn. 406, 1 Cooke, 1813 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1813); Martin v. Carter, 9 Tenn. 489, 1831 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1831); Covington v. Neilson, 14 Tenn. 474, 14 Tenn. 475, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1834). See Jourdan v. Barry, 5 Tenn. 102, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1817); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

If the value of the debt or demand is less than $50.00, although averred in the declaration to be over $50.00, a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the circuit court will lie. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

5. Mechanic's Liens.

The circuit court has no jurisdiction to enforce mechanic's lien where amount does not exceed $50.00. Phillips-Burtoff Mfg. Co. v. Campbell, 93 Tenn. 469, 25 S.W. 961, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1894).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Misjoinder of Actions.

Where a party filed suit for divorce in a court of law, therewith also seeking to have a deed from the state set aside, there was a manifest misjoinder of actions, and the same were appropriately severed, and, as that phase of the action relating to the deed involved matters peculiarly and exclusively with the jurisdiction of equity, subsequent proceedings at law on the question of the deed where properly enjoined, this section and § 16-10-109 being considered inapplicable. McGee v. Carter, 31 Tenn. App. 141, 212 S.W.2d 902, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

2. Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Circuit court erred in modifying chancery court's permanent parenting plan where the record was devoid of any evidence showing that entry of modified permanent parenting plan was necessary to effectuate mother's order of protection against father because although circuit court would have had jurisdiction under T.C.A. § 16-10-108 concurrent with chancery court, jurisdiction remained in chancery court unless and until jurisdiction was properly vested in another court. Swan v. Swan, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2008).

3. Jurisdiction.

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a father's petition for change of custody because the statute was not applicable; the allegations in the petition were not tantamount to allegations of dependency and neglect under the statute but were more in the nature of a disagreement over the long-term manner of addressing the children's psychological, behavioral, and educational issues. Holley v. Holley, 420 S.W.3d 756, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Mother was not entitled to relief from the circuit court's judgment entering a modified Permanent Parenting Plan (PPP) because the father appropriately filed his petition seeking modification of the PPP in the circuit court, which possessed continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of divorce decrees. Cox v. Lucas, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. May 29, 2019).

Collateral References.

Court's power to appoint additional trustees over number specified on trust instrument. 59 A.L.R.3d 1129.

Validity and construction of statutory provision relating to jurisdiction of court for purpose of divorce for servicemen. 73 A.L.R.3d 431.

Courts 472.1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sale of Lands.

Circuit court's jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the chancery and county courts for the sale of lands for partition and to pay debts of a decedent. Moore's Adm'rs v. Widow & Heirs, 30 Tenn. 512, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1851); Parker v. Britt, 51 Tenn. 243, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1871); Thompson v. Mebane, 51 Tenn. 370, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 177 (1871); Kindell v. Titus, 56 Tenn. 727, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 198 (1872); Connell v. Walker, 74 Tenn. 709, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (1881); Davis v. Davis, 87 Tenn. 200, 10 S.W. 363, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1889); Bashaw v. Temple, 115 Tenn. 596, 91 S.W. 202, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1906); Key v. Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S.W. 235, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1905); Puckett v. Wynns, 132 Tenn. 513, 178 S.W. 1184, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1915).

2. Matters Not Constituting Partition.

A petition of widow seeking to have substituted for unassigned dower and homestead title in fee to a portion of the realty was not a petition seeking partition. Gillespie v. Jackson, 153 Tenn. 150, 281 S.W. 929, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (1926).

3. Compelling Accounting.

The court has no jurisdiction to compel a personal representative to account at suit of a distributee. Dougherty v. Maxwell, 25 Tenn. 446, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1846).

The court has no jurisdiction to compel settlement of matters of equitable accounting against guardian at instance of ward. Taylor v. Keeton, 29 Tenn. 536, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1850).

4. Time of Making Allotment.

Court should not as a matter of practice attempt to determine questions relating to the allotment of homestead and dower until commissioners have been appointed and have reported their findings. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

Collateral References.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition. 37 A.L.R.3d 962.

Courts 472.1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction in General.

Where the jurisdiction is not demurred to, the plaintiff's suit of equitable cognizance will not be dismissed, but the circuit judge may, at his discretion, transfer the cause to the chancery court, or retain and determine it himself upon the principles of equity and according to the practice of the chancery court. Sewanee Mining Co. v. E. L. Best Co., 40 Tenn. 701, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (1859); Hall v. Jacocks, 52 Tenn. 84, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 237 (1871); Smith v. Leonard, 1 Shan. 604 (1876); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S.W.2d 361, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1934).

The circuit court has jurisdiction to enforce equitable remedies where no objection is made. Hunt v. Hoppe, 22 Tenn. App. 540, 124 S.W.2d 306, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

This section has no application where an action may be filed either in a court of law or a court of chancery and the rule then applies that the court first obtaining jurisdiction shall retain the same. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Champion, 202 Tenn. 205, 303 S.W.2d 731, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1957).

This section is not a denial of circuit court's jurisdiction of suits of an equitable nature but rather a recognition of such jurisdiction if not challenged by demurrer. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

This section pertains to original, not appellate, jurisdiction of the circuit court. Riden v. Snider, 832 S.W.2d 341, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 1992).

2. Specific Instances of Jurisdiction.

The circuit court has jurisdiction of a suit to invalidate the declared result of an election held to determine whether a county should subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company, where no objection was made by demurrer. Catlett v. Knoxville, S. & E. R. Co., 120 Tenn. 699, 112 S.W. 559, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1908).

Where there was no demurrer to jurisdiction, the circuit court had jurisdiction of a suit for the annulment of a marriage. Southern R. Co. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1939).

Where jurisdiction of circuit court to pass on issues raised on appeal to circuit court from county court's dismissal of petition by heir to determine validity of claim against decedent's estate was not questioned, circuit court had jurisdiction to pass on such issues. Brigham v. Southern Trust Co., 201 Tenn. 466, 300 S.W.2d 880, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (1957).

In personal injury action against master brought in circuit court where defendant raised issue that plaintiff had given its servant, who was primarily negligent, a release and plaintiff joined issue asserting that the instrument was a covenant not to sue, court had authority to construe instrument in view of its ultimate result and properly held that instrument was a covenant not to sue and that such covenant would bar suit against master who was only liable as a result of servant's negligence. Stewart v. Craig, 208 Tenn. 212, 344 S.W.2d 761, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 413 (1961).

Although physician had told person that she had a possible whiplash injury which might give trouble in the future, a release executed by her husband releasing defendant from “all known, unknown, foreseen, and unforeseen, bodily and personal injuries” and property damage caused by the accident, and the amount paid for such release only covered the cost of repairing the automobile and the loss of its use, plus the cost of a physical examination where the party did not realize the extent of the injuries at the time of the execution of such release, it was a question for the jury to determine whether such release was executed under a mutual mistake of material fact. Warren v. Crockett, 211 Tenn. 173, 364 S.W.2d 352, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (1962).

Independent suit seeking rescission of lease contract might be maintained in circuit court in absence of objection by demurrer, but a plea claiming recoupment was not such an action and could not be brought within the provisions of this section. Cummings & Co. v. Mascari, 55 Tenn. App. 512, 402 S.W.2d 719, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Tennessee circuit court possessed jurisdiction to enter an injunction in a child support case to restrain and enjoin an adoptive parent from further prosecution of a lawsuit which the parent filed in California because the petitioners which sought an injunction in the circuit court were requesting that the circuit court act as a court of equity. In re Justin H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 863 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2015).

3. Jurisdiction Upon Demurrer.

The circuit court possesses no equity jurisdiction, except such as is expressly conferred upon it by statute, and, to maintain its jurisdiction, where objection thereto is taken by demurrer, a state of facts must be shown to exist, falling within the provisions of the statute. Arrington v. Grissom, 41 Tenn. 522, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1860).

Upon demurrer to its jurisdiction on ground that suit is equitable in nature, circuit court has jurisdiction to pass on such demurrer and determine the nature of the suit. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

Suit for reformation of contract of insurance was of an equitable nature and could not be maintained as an action at law where objection was raised to jurisdiction of circuit court by demurrer. Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 54 Tenn. App. 279, 390 S.W.2d 680, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

4. Election as to Forum.

Where, in a proceeding by certiorari and supersedeas to quash a levy on exempt property, the defense was that the debtor had given the creditor a lien on the property by the note on which the judgment was rendered, and thereupon the debtor filed an amended petition, alleging that the provisions of the note giving a lien was inserted by the creditor, without his knowledge, the whole litigation should be tried in one forum, and the creditor was given his election to withdraw all objection to the jurisdiction of the law court over the matter of the amended petitions, or to suffer the levy to be quashed without prejudice to his remedy in equity. Mynatt v. Magill, 71 Tenn. 72, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1879).

5. Forms and Rules of Procedure.

A suit of an equitable nature is heard and determined in circuit court according to forms and rules of chancery pleading. Shelby County v. Bickford, 102 Tenn. 395, 52 S.W. 772, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1899).

Divorce cases, even though tried in the circuit court, are treated as chancery suits. Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

6. —Agreement of Parties — Effect.

A suit brought in the circuit court may, by agreement of the parties, be tried as a chancery cause in that court, and orders, references, and reports made as in chancery. Husky v. Maples, 42 Tenn. 25, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1865).

7. —Procedure after Transfer to Chancery.

The proceedings subsequent to the transfer of a case from the circuit court to the chancery court are according to the forms and rules of chancery pleading and practice; and, upon appeal, the hearing will be de novo upon the record as its component parts may appear, and there is no presumption, as in cases at law in the absence of a bill of exceptions, that the evidence below was sufficient to sustain the finding of the court. Shelby County v. Bickford, 102 Tenn. 395, 52 S.W. 772, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1899); Leiberman, Loveman & O'Brien v. Bowden, 121 Tenn. 496, 119 S.W. 64, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1908).

8. Equitable Defenses.

This section does not mean that, in a case of legal character, the circuit court may assume the functions of a court of equity, because some equitable defense is set up, or a case is developed in the proof, of which a court of equity might have exercised a concurrent jurisdiction, if that forum had been selected in the first instance. In such case, the same general principle would apply since, as well as before, this statute, that the tribunal first taking diction should retain it. Sewanee Mining Co. v. E. L. Best Co., 40 Tenn. 701, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (1859); Saudek v. Nashville & H. Tpk. Co., 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 473 (1877); Morgan v. Layne, 165 Tenn. 513, 56 S.W.2d 161, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1933).

Where the creditor has, upon a sufficient consideration, extended the time of payment to the principal, or refused payment from him when tendered, or has done anything else which, in equity, releases the surety, the surety may make the defense in a court of law, especially under this section. Gillespie v. Darwin, 53 Tenn. 21, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (1871); Lindsey v. Thompson, 60 Tenn. 463, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 535 (1873); Lindsey v. Thompson, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 272 (1873); Renegar v. Thompson, 69 Tenn. 457, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1878); Mumford v. Memphis & C.R.R., 70 Tenn. 393, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 31 Am. Rep. 616 (1879); West v. Gordon, 71 Tenn. 370, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1879); Ewing v. Sugg, 80 Tenn. 375, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 183 (1883); Bryan v. Henderson, 88 Tenn. 23, 12 S.W. 338, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1889); Saunders v. Lanier, 128 Tenn. 693, 164 S.W. 780, 1915C Am. Ann. Cas. 370, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1913).

While the circuit court is without jurisdiction to relieve against mutual mistake, yet where a defendant pleads in an action at law a release as accord and satisfaction and plaintiff files replication averring that the release was executed under mutual mistake of fact, and issue is taken on the replication, without demurrer to jurisdiction, the circuit court may grant relief on equitable principles. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S.W.2d 361, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1934).

This section applies only to equitable causes or suits of an equitable nature which are brought in the circuit court by mistake and does not mean that in a case of legal character the circuit court may assume the functions of a court of equity because some equitable defense is set up. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Champion, 202 Tenn. 205, 303 S.W.2d 731, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1957).

9. Discretionary Appeals in Equity Causes.

In determining when a discretionary appeal will lie from the circuit court in equity causes under § 27-3-105, such section must be construed with this section. Potter v. Sanderson, 199 Tenn. 337, 286 S.W.2d 873, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (1956).

10. Appeal to Circuit Court.

Suit commenced in general sessions court and appealed to circuit court could not be disposed of on equitable grounds where amount of claim exceeded equitable jurisdiction of general sessions court. Mazikowski v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Tenn. App. 128, 312 S.W.2d 867, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

Where, in suit commenced in general sessions court and appealed to circuit court, plaintiffs were not seeking equitable relief, defendant was entitled to only such defenses as are permissible in courts of law and circuit court could not dispose of the suit as an equity case. Mazikowski v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Tenn. App. 128, 312 S.W.2d 867, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

11. Suits of Equitable Nature.

Claim against an estate involving complicated accounting was a suit of an equitable nature and there was nothing in § 30-517 (now § 30-2-314) requiring it to be tried in the form of an action at law. Hewgley v. Trice, 51 Tenn. App. 452, 369 S.W.2d 741, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

In a suit involving complicated accounting so as to be equitable in nature there is no absolute right to trial by jury. Hewgley v. Trice, 51 Tenn. App. 452, 369 S.W.2d 741, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

It is fundamental that a suit for accounting, involving claims and counterclaims, where the accounts are complicated is a suit of an equitable nature. Hewgley v. Trice, 51 Tenn. App. 452, 369 S.W.2d 741, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

The jurisdiction to abate a public nuisance is in chancery, circuit, and criminal courts. The statute giving jurisdiction over equitable matters to “circuit courts” refers to courts of law as distinguished from courts of equity and includes criminal courts; therefore, action for a permanent injunction restraining use of property for prostitution was properly brought in criminal court. State ex rel. Webster v. Daugherty, 530 S.W.2d 81, 1975 Tenn. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).

A suit on a note is not inherently of an equitable nature, but when equitable defenses are raised by the answer, the matter is transformed into an equitable action. Continental Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 561 S.W.2d 460, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

Appointment of an administrator ad litem for the decedent did not constitute a suit in equity for transfer purposes under T.C.A. § 16-10-111, and for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-1-116, the case could not be transferred to chancery court because the circuit court had jurisdiction to award the damages requested. Owens v. Muenzel, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 10.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 290.

Equity 1-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Juvenile Court.

Under this section and § 16-10-101, one adjudged by the juvenile court of a county to be a delinquent child may obtain a review of his case by certiorari in the circuit court of that county. State v. Bockman, 139 Tenn. 422, 201 S.W. 741, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1917).

The means of procuring a review by the circuit court of a judgment of the juvenile court is by the statutory writ of certiorari and on review in the circuit court the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury, if desired, and may introduce competent evidence. Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (1953).

Under this section, the circuit court has appellate jurisdiction of decisions of the juvenile courts. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

Circuit court has jurisdiction in an action of common-law certiorari to correct a pretrial action of juvenile court. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

2. Special Assessments.

The levy of a special assessment by mayor and aldermen not being a judicial act or proceeding, such levy could not be reviewed for a mere mistake in judgment. Carriger v. Morristown, 148 Tenn. 585, 256 S.W. 883, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1923).

3. Authority of Criminal Courts of County.

By virtue of this section and §§ 40-408 (repealed) and 40-426 (repealed), the criminal courts of the county have authority to grant extraordinary relief in appeals from courts of inferior jurisdiction. Franks v. State, 565 S.W.2d 36, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

A possible transfer to criminal court is not sufficient grounds for negating the statutory general authority of the circuit court in favor of the specific, limited authority of the criminal court which does not arise until transfer. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

3.5. County Probate Court.

County probate court was not inferior to the circuit court and, consequently, appellate jurisdiction granted the circuit court at T.C.A. § 16-10-112 did not apply in an appeal of a ruling of the probate court sustaining the State's claim against a decedent's estate, and the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the probate court. In re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011), aff'd, In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. May 30, 2012).

4. Paternity Actions.

In cases to establish paternity brought under the bastardy statute, the circuit court had no jurisdiction unless the defendant made a timely demand for a jury trial under former § 36-2-106 (repealed), and the exclusive method of appellate review was that provided by former § 36-2-114 (repealed) which was to the court of appeals. State ex rel. Winberry v. Brooks, 670 S.W.2d 631, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

5. Bond on Appeal.

Patient's cash bond was sufficient to perfect an appeal from a general sessions court to a circuit court because the bond vested jurisdiction in the circuit court since T.C.A. § 27-5-103 expressed no limitation as to the type of bond required, so a surety bond in an unlimited amount did not solely provide the “good security” required by T.C.A. § 27-5-103(a). Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 899, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. July 21, 2014).

6. Authority of Lower Court.

Circuit court, acting within its appellate jurisdiction, properly dismissed an owner's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a neighbor and his predecessor consistently objected to both the general sessions and circuit courts'  exercise of jurisdiction over the boundary line dispute and the general sessions court was not statutorily empowered to hear boundary line disputes. Evans v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2015).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 456.

Courts 246.

16-10-201. Duty of judge to attend court — Adjournment by clerk.

It is the duty of the circuit judge to attend and hold court at the time appointed by law; but if for any reason the circuit judge fails to appear, the clerk of the court may open and adjourn the court from time to time to some future day or days, or, if the clerk thinks the rights and interests of litigants or the business of the court require it, may so open and adjourn the court to some future day or days subsequent to the time allowed by law in which to hold such court. If no judge attends by four o'clock p.m. (4:00 p.m.) on the day to which the clerk last adjourned the court, then the court shall be adjourned by the clerk to the court in course.

Code 1858, § 4220 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 5); Acts 1901, ch. 16, § 1; 1907, ch. 592, § 1; Shan., § 6058; mod. Code 1932, § 10313; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-515; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 17.

Cross-References. Adjournment by clerk, § 18-4-104.

Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.17.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Clerks of Court, § 12.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

16-10-202. Days court not held.

If, from any cause, the court is not held on any day after it has been opened, there shall be no discontinuance; but, as soon as the cause is removed, the court may proceed to business as before.

Code 1858, § 4222 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 5); Shan., § 6060; Code 1932, § 10315; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-516; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 18.

Cross-References. Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.17.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

16-10-203. Duration of court.

Each of the circuit courts shall continue until the business of the court is dispatched, unless the judge is sooner compelled to leave, in order to arrive in time at the next succeeding court of the judicial district.

Code 1858, § 4218 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 4); Shan., § 6056; Code 1932, § 10310; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-517; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 19.

Cross-References. Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 154 S.W. 969, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1913).

Collateral References. 14 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 27.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 151.

Courts 63.

16-10-204. Adjournment during trial.

In no case, after the trial of a cause is commenced, shall the judge adjourn the court until the cause is tried, except in cases where the jury cannot agree, or, from some other cause, a mistrial is ordered.

Code 1858, § 4219 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 4); Shan., § 6057; Code 1932, § 10311; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-518.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 154 S.W. 969, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1913).

16-10-205. Relief from firearm disabilities imposed on persons adjudicated as mental defective or judicially committed to mental institution.

1. A person who is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) because the person has been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution, as defined in § 16-10-213, may petition the circuit or criminal court that entered the judicial commitment or adjudication order for relief from the firearm disabilities imposed by the adjudication or judicial commitment; provided, that the person may not petition the court until three (3) years from the date of release from commitment or the date of the adjudication order, whichever is later.
2. A copy of the petition for relief shall also be served on the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the original judicial commitment or adjudication occurred. The district attorney general may appear, support, object to, or present evidence relevant to the relief sought by the petitioner.
3. The court shall receive and consider evidence in an open proceeding, including evidence offered by the petitioner, concerning:
   1. The circumstances that led to the imposition of the firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(4) and (g)(4);
   2. The petitioner's mental health records;
   3. The petitioner's criminal history;
   4. The petitioner's reputation; and
   5. Changes in the petitioner's condition or circumstances relevant to the relief sought.
4. The court shall grant the petition for relief if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence and enters into the record the following:
   1. The petitioner is no longer likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
   2. Granting the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
5. A record of the proceedings shall be made by a certified court reporter or by court-approved electronic means. Except in matters resulting in criminal adjudication, the means of recording is to be provided by the petitioner.
6. The petitioner may appeal a final order denying the requested relief, and the review on appeal, if granted, shall be de novo.
7. A person may file a petition for relief under this section no more than once every two (2) years.
8. Relief from a firearm disability granted under this section has no effect on the loss of civil rights, including firearm rights, for any reason other than the particular adjudication as a mental defective or judicial commitment to a mental institution from which relief is granted.
9. When the court issues an order granting a petition of relief under subsection (d), the court clerk shall, as soon as practicable but no later than thirty (30) days after issuance, forward a copy of the order to the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI). The TBI, upon receipt of the order, shall:
   1. Immediately forward a copy of the order to the department of safety;
   2. Update the National Instant Criminal Background Check System database and transmit the corrected records to the federal bureau of investigation; and
   3. Remove and destroy all records relating to the petition for relief from any database over which the TBI exercises control.
10. The TBI and the department of safety shall not use or permit the use of the records or information obtained or retained pursuant to this section for any purpose not specified in this section.

Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-10-205 (Acts 1899, ch. 40, § 1; Shan., § 6057a1; Code 1932, § 10312; Acts 1947, ch. 48, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-519), concerning extension of term, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 20. For section abolishing terms of court, see § 16-2-510.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 6. July 1, 2015.

16-10-206. Pleadings in absence of judge.

The nonattendance of a circuit court judge shall not prevent the parties from making up their pleadings in the appearance causes.

Code 1858, § 4224 (deriv. Acts 1809 (Sept.), ch. 49, § 3); Shan., § 6062; Code 1932, § 10317; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-520.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

16-10-207. Continuance in absence of judge.

None of the proceedings pending in the circuit or criminal courts shall be discontinued by the nonattendance of the judge, or the judge's death at any time, but, in such cases, all matters depending shall stand continued, if no designated judge appear to serve.

Code 1858, § 4223 (deriv. Acts 1794, ch. 1, § 8); Shan., § 6061; mod. Code 1932, § 10316; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-521; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 21.

Cross-References. Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.17.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

16-10-208 — 16-10-211. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former §§ 16-10-208 — 16-10-211 (Code 1858, § 4221 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 5); 1905, ch. 113, § 2; Shan., §§ 5745a2, 6059; Code 1932, §§ 9938, 10314; Acts 1943, ch. 7, §§ 1, 2; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 9945.5, 9945.6 (Williams, § 9945.5); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-522 — 16-525), concerning adjourned terms and process returnable to succeeding term, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 22. For provisions abolishing terms of court, see § 16-2-510.

16-10-212. Money paid into court — Power of disposition.

When money is paid into the circuit or law courts of this state to satisfy judgments rendered in the circuit or law court, or money is paid into the circuit or law courts by reason of other proceedings had in the courts, and the money belongs to or is the property of minors, life tenants, beneficiaries of the remainder interests or contingent beneficiaries of the remainder interests or persons adjudicated incompetent, the courts are vested with powers to dispose of or to enter such orders in regard to the money as courts of chancery now have. Nothing in this section shall be construed as to deprive the chancery courts of their jurisdiction in regard to such matters.

Acts 1955, ch. 140, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-526; Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “persons adjudicated incompetent” for “persons of unsound mind” in the middle of the first sentence.

Effective Dates. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 110. July 1, 2011.

16-10-213. Information to be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index and the department of safety by those circuit courts and criminal courts in which commitments to a mental institution are ordered.

1. As used in this section:
   1. “Adjudication as a mental defective or adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
      1. A determination by a court in this state that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease:
         1. Is a danger to such person or to others; or
         2. Lacks the ability to contract or manage such person's own affairs due to mental defect;
      2. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal proceeding; or
      3. A finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to §§ 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 850a, 876b;
   2. “Judicial commitment to a mental institution” means a judicially ordered involuntary admission to a private or state hospital or treatment resource in proceedings conducted pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7;
   3. “Mental institution” means a mental health facility, mental hospital, sanitarium, psychiatric facility and any other facility that provides diagnoses by a licensed professional of mental retardation or mental illness, including, but not limited to, a psychiatric ward in a general hospital; and
   4. “Treatment resource” means any public or private facility, service or program providing treatment or rehabilitation services for mental illness or serious emotional disturbance, including, but not limited to, detoxification centers, hospitals, community mental health centers, clinics or programs, halfway houses and rehabilitation centers.
2. Those circuit courts and criminal courts wherein commitments to a mental institution are ordered pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7 or persons are adjudicated as a mental defective shall enter a standing and continuing order instructing the clerk to collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication, information described in subsection (c) regarding individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution for the purposes of complying with the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-180.
3. The following information shall be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS Index and the department of safety, pursuant to subsection (b):
   1. Complete name and all aliases of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, including, but not limited to, any names that the individual may have had or currently has by reason of marriage or otherwise;
   2. Case or docket number of the judicial commitment or the adjudication as a mental defective;
   3. Date judicial commitment ordered or adjudication as a mental defective was made;
   4. Private or state hospital or treatment resource to which the individual was judicially committed;
   5. Date of birth of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, if such information has been provided to the clerk;
   6. Race and sex of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective; and
   7. Social security number of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective if available.
4. The information in subdivisions (c)(1)-(5), the confidentiality of which is protected by other statutes or regulations, shall be maintained as confidential and not subject to public inspection pursuant to applicable statutes or regulations, except for such use as may be necessary in the conduct of any proceedings pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 — 39-17-1354.

Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 1; 2013, ch. 300, § 3; 2018, ch. 799, §§ 2, 5.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication” for “collect and report January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of every year beginning January 1, 2010” in (b).

The 2018 amendment added (c)(6) and (7); and substituted “applicable statutes” for “such statutes” and substituted “pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 — 39-17-1354” for “pursuant to §§ 39-17-1316, 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354” at the end of (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 13. January 1, 2010.

Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

Acts 2018, ch. 799, § 7. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 16-10-213 does not conflict with the patient privacy protections of either  T.C.A. title 33 or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) privacy provisions.  OAG 10-56, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 56 (4/26/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

2. —Inherent and Statutory Jurisdiction.

The inherent jurisdiction of our chancery court is the jurisdiction of the high court of chancery of England, which was adopted by North Carolina as the jurisdiction of the chancery court of that state, and which was adopted in this state, upon its formation and organization, by its adoption of the laws of North Carolina, and in the creation of its chancery court; and the jurisdiction subsequently vested in such court by the legislature is called its statutory jurisdiction. J. W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 26, 25 L.R.A. (n.s.) 201 (1909).

The vesting of jurisdiction in the county court by statute does not deprive the chancery court of its inherent jurisdiction of administration of estates. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

3. Construction with Other Acts.

Chancery jurisdiction reserved by this section is not taken away by § 30-1313 (now § 30-2-710). Murgitroyde v. Cleary, 84 Tenn. 539, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 142 (1886).

4. Jurisdiction — Examples.

The chancery court may enforce payment of debts charged on a married woman's separate estate. Jordan v. Everett, 93 Tenn. 390, 24 S.W. 1128, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1894).

Inherent jurisdiction over the administration of estates is not taken away by the fact that a distributee or legatee may apply to the chancery court of the county of administration to compel the payment of his share or legacy. Goodman v. Palmer, 137 Tenn. 556, 195 S.W. 165, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (1917).

The chancery court may compel distribution of a decedent's estate before the expiration of the year allowed therefor, in a proper case. Chester v. Turner, 153 Tenn. 451, 284 S.W. 365, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1925).

Chancery court has jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of collateral notes until proper credit has been entered upon the notes they secure; and, such jurisdiction not turning upon amount involved, limitation of jurisdiction of chancery to sums exceeding $50.00 does not apply. Kenyon v. Russell, 5 Tenn. App. 401, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

In an action in which a husband's children from a prior marriage contended that a wife's last will was invalid because it breached a contract in which the wife and the husband agreed to make mutual wills, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because T.C.A. § 16-16-201(a) provided the court with subject matter jurisdiction to probate wills, T.C.A. § 32-4-109 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear will contests, T.C.A. § 29-14-102 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions, and T.C.A. §§ 16-11-101 and 16-11-102(a) provided the court with jurisdiction to hear actions for breach of oral or written contracts. In re Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2013).

Chancery court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a bail bond company's action for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment declaring proposed Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies unenforceable, unconstitutional, and in violation of the law because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the validity of local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

Because a bail bond company's underlying claim for injunctive relief regarding Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies could not be brought in chancery court, the chancery court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment aspect of the case either; the courts should not assume that subject matter jurisdiction existed based on the fact that the issue was not addressed. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

To allow the chancery court to review the validity or enjoin the enforcement of the local rules of the criminal court would interfere with the inherent power of the criminal court to administer its affairs and impose reasonable regulations regarding the making of bonds; the statutes and rules do not authorize chancery court review of the local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

5. —Possession of Automobile — Fraud.

Where a replevin action between plaintiff and defendant to determine the right to possession of an automobile given to each by a deceased person was instituted in the general sessions court and appealed to the circuit court whereon creditors of the deceased attempted to intervene to have the conveyances to plaintiff and defendant declared fraudulent and the auto declared part of the estate, this intervention could not be sustained since creditors were not judgment creditors nor had they proceeded by attachment. Therefore, the creditors were without interest in the replevin action; also the bill to have the conveyance declared fraudulent was bad since the circuit court had appellate jurisdiction only and could not grant the relief asked. Creditors remedy was in equity. Marlin v. Merrill, 25 Tenn. App. 328, 156 S.W.2d 814, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 4-6, 8-18, 21, 102, 104, 107, 120, 121, 134.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 490.

Equity 1-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The statute is constitutional. Ramsey v. Temple, 71 Tenn. 252, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1879); Jackson, Morris & Co. v. Nimmo, 71 Tenn. 597, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1879).

2. Adherence to Equitable Principles Requisite.

In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, chancery will not grant relief contrary to the settled principles and maxims of equity jurisprudence, although a court of law would do so. Lenoir v. Mining Co., 88 Tenn. 168, 14 S.W. 378, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1889).

Even though a legal remedy (replevin) be sought in chancery, the complainant must come with clean hands, as if equitable relief were sought. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 266 S.W. 313, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1924).

3. Construction and Interpretation.

Statement that when a chancery court has taken jurisdiction for one purpose it will take jurisdiction for all purposes means all purposes “incidental to jurisdiction of main subject.” Tucker v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 359, 287 S.W.2d 19, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1956).

If the main thing involved in the suit is not of such a nature that equity court has jurisdiction then the courts of equity will not take jurisdiction. Tucker v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 359, 287 S.W.2d 19, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1956).

When a court of chancery takes jurisdiction of a case under its inherent jurisdiction, it may decide all issues involved in the matter in order to prevent a multiplicity of actions. Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

4. —“All Civil Causes” — Construed.

The words “all civil causes of action” mean only those civil actions which could have originated in the circuit court, the purpose of the statute being to give litigants the option of bringing suits either in the circuit or the chancery court. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

5. —Concurrent Nature of Jurisdiction.

This section does not give the chancery court exclusive, but merely concurrent, jurisdiction of actions specified. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

When developers sued a bank in circuit court, which then sued the developers in chancery court, the cases were consolidated, the developers did not appeal the dismissal of the developers'  chancery court counterclaim, and the circuit court case was dismissed, res judicata barred further litigation because (1) a dismissal of the developers'  chancery court counterclaim was an adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, due to the chancery court's concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, and (2) the suits involved the same parties and events. Rainbow Ridge Resort, LLC v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 525 S.W.3d 252, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 992 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016), appeal denied, Rainbow Ridge Resort, LLC v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. May 28, 2017).

6. —Unliquidated Damages.

A court of equity has never had jurisdiction to assess unliquidated damages and the Act of 1887 which enlarged the jurisdiction of equity courts specifically exclude cases of unliquidated damages for injury to person or character and for injuries to property not resulting from a breach of contract. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain, 109 Tenn. 56, 70 S.W. 813, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1902).

Strictly, unliquidated damages are such as have not been ascertained or fixed by contract. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

Unliquidated damages proper. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v. Reams, 157 Tenn. 343, 8 S.W.2d 498, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (1928).

Suit maintainable in chancery for unliquidated damages for maliciously suing out an attachment, where it is brought on the bond. Nashville Union Stockyards, Inc. v. Grissim, 13 Tenn. App. 115, — S.W.2d —, 1930 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1930).

Suit for personal injuries which also sought to have release alleged to have been fraudulently procured set aside was improperly brought in chancery as the main purpose of the suit was for unliquidated damages and the equitable right to have the release set aside was merely incidental and could be disposed of in a court of law. Tucker v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 359, 287 S.W.2d 19, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1956).

Where the tort was not waived, a suit for unliquidated damages for injuries to property was not allowed in chancery court. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Hartsook, 487 S.W.2d 649, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. 1972).

Chancery court was able to fully adjudicate a matter because, to the extent that the damages sought were unliquidated damages above the exact amount of damages sought for an alleged misappropriation, the court, having taken jurisdiction over the liquidated portion of the damages, was able to fully adjudicate the matter. PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Ltd. P'ship v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2012).

To the extent that the damages sought may have been unliquidated, the chancery court, having taken jurisdiction over the portion of the damages arising in contract, was permitted to fully adjudicate the matter. Tennison Bros. v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2014).

Chancery court properly transferred a case to circuit court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Public Employee Political Freedom Act because, despite the appellate court's clear direction to brief the issue of whether the damages sought by the employee were of the kind that invoked the chancery court's jurisdiction, the employee chose not to brief the issue and her complaint did not sufficiently raise a claim for liquidated damages inasmuch as her alleged damages as a result of embarrassment and humiliation did not constitute liquidated damages, and nothing provided by the employee established her lost wages and benefits to a reasonable certainty that might render her damages liquidated. Thornton v. Coffee Cty. Bd. of Educ., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

7. —Statutory Limits.

While this statute has been liberally construed in favor of the extension of the chancery jurisdiction, the courts have declined to apply it to others which, while falling within the words of the statute, were so exceptional in character as to preclude the idea that they were within its intent. Shields v. Davis, 103 Tenn. 538, 53 S.W. 948, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1899); McCreary v. First Nat'l Bank, 109 Tenn. 128, 70 S.W. 821, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1902).

8. “Jurisdiction” defined.

“Jurisdiction” is the power constitutionally conferred upon a judge or magistrate to determine causes according to law and to carry his sentence into execution; and, since this section specifically excepts certain causes from the jurisdiction of the chancery court, a party cannot, even by express waiver or consent, confer upon that tribunal jurisdiction to hear the excepted causes. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913); Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S.W. 577, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 116, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1917B385 (1916).

9. —Courts First Acquiring Matter.

Where both chancery and circuit courts have jurisdiction, it is the rule that the court which first acquires the matter takes the exclusive jurisdiction to end the matter. Wilson v. Grantham, 739 S.W.2d 776, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3505 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

10. Jurisdiction — Examples.

Jurisdiction of an unlawful detainer action is in a justice of the peace (now general sessions court), the circuit court or the chancery court, and the court which first takes jurisdiction thereby acquires exclusive jurisdiction. Robinson v. Easter, 208 Tenn. 147, 344 S.W.2d 365, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1961).

Where insurance company invokes chancery jurisdiction seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent insured from enforcing arbitration provisions of policy, and insured counterclaims under the policy for damages caused by uninsured motorist, the chancery court has jurisdiction if insurer does not comply with arbitration provisions. Cavalier Ins. Corp. v. Osment, 538 S.W.2d 399, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. 1976).

Decedent's real property, which vested in the heirs immediately upon her death, was not part of her estate subject to be sold for payment of her obligations in the absence of proof that her personal property was insufficient to discharge those obligations. The property, therefore, was not affected by statutory provisions relating to the administration of decedents' estates. Since the property passed to the heirs, it was not within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The chancellor properly exercised jurisdiction over it. Clay v. Hall, 597 S.W.2d 737, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 914, 101 S. Ct. 310, 66 L. Ed. 2d 142, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3562 (1980).

Appointment of an administrator ad litem for the decedent did not constitute a suit in equity for transfer purposes under T.C.A. § 16-10-111, and for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-1-116, the case could not be transferred to chancery court because the circuit court had jurisdiction to award the damages requested. Owens v. Muenzel, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

11. —Action for Solid Waste Disposal Fee.

The chancery court was the proper forum for an action against resident for delinquent solid waste disposal fee. City of Bolivar v. Goodrum, 49 S.W.3d 290, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

12. —Contract.

A suit for damages for breach of contract to cut sawlogs is entertained by chancery. Dorris v. King, 54 S.W. 683, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 131 (1899).

Breach of contract not to engage in business sold. Frumin v. Chazen, 153 Tenn. 1, 282 S.W. 199, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1926).

Breach of contract. State ex rel. Hooten v. Hooten, 1 Tenn. App. 154, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

Suits for specific performance lie within the inherent jurisdiction of the chancery court. Wright v. Universal Tire, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 194, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

County probate court had jurisdiction over suit for specific performance of a contract to sell land in light of ch. 366, Private Acts of 1974, which conferred all of the jurisdiction of the county chancery court on the probate court. Wright v. Universal Tire, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 194, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

In an action in which a husband's children from a prior marriage contended that a wife's last will was invalid because it breached a contract in which the wife and the husband agreed to make mutual wills, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because T.C.A. § 16-16-201(a) provided the court with subject matter jurisdiction to probate wills, T.C.A. § 32-4-109 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear will contests, T.C.A. § 29-14-102 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions, and T.C.A. §§ 16-11-101 and 16-11-102(a) provided the court with jurisdiction to hear actions for breach of oral or written contracts. In re Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2013).

Trial court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to consider the next of kin's claims against the funeral homes where all plaintiffs, i.e., those who signed contracts and those who did not, sought equitable relief regarding the location and identification of loved ones'  remains, and asserting concurrent jurisdiction prevented a multiplicity of actions. Wofford v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home Inc., 528 S.W.3d 524, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

13. —Implied Contract.

Under this section the chancery court has jurisdiction of a suit by a receiver to recover compensation for his acts as receiver against the complainants and their sureties in the original suit in which a receiver was sought since there exists an implied contract on the part of the complainants in such original suit to compensate the receiver appointed at their solicitation. Taylor v. Smith, 172 Tenn. 247, 111 S.W.2d 1020, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1938).

14. —Warranty of Title.

Damages for breach of warranty of title. Williams v. Burg, 77 Tenn. 455, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1882); Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

15. —Note.

Where complainant filed a creditor's bill which he was not entitled to maintain, it was proper for the chancery court to render judgment on the note sued on. Sweetwater Bank & Trust Co. v. Howard, 13 Tenn. App. 592, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

16. —Bond.

Damages on bond of clerk for taking insufficient supersedeas bond, whereby property levied on was lost. Glenn v. Moore, 79 Tenn. 256, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1883); State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

Under this section the chancery court may have jurisdiction of a suit on a bond. State ex rel. Hooten v. Hooten, 1 Tenn. App. 154, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

Damages on injunction bond. Dafoe v. Starek, 9 Tenn. App. 668, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

17. —Ejectment.

Ejectment. Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883).

Under this section the chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court in ejectment actions. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

18. —Surveyor's Mistake.

Damages for mistake of public surveyor. State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

19. —Usury.

Suit against a national bank for usury may be in chancery. Bobo v. People's Nat'l Bank, 92 Tenn. 444, 21 S.W. 888, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1893), overruled, Meredith v. American Nat'l Bank, 127 Tenn. 90, 153 S.W. 479, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1912), overruled in part, Meredith v. American Nat'l Bank, 127 Tenn. 90, 153 S.W. 479, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1912).

20. —Detinue.

In view of the enlarged jurisdiction of the chancery court by this section, such court may entertain an action in detinue. Patton v. Hardison, 20 Tenn. App. 585, 101 S.W.2d 698, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

21. —Election Contest.

Contested elections, if trial not provided for in some other tribunal. Morris v. Nashville, 74 Tenn. 337, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 257 (1880).

Contest of sheriff's election. Shields v. Davis, 103 Tenn. 538, 53 S.W. 948, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1899).

Mayor's election contest. Baker v. Mitchell, 105 Tenn. 610, 59 S.W. 137, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1900).

22. —Quiet Possession.

Jurisdiction of bill to quiet the possession of land. Nason v. South Memphis Land Co., 138 Tenn. 21, 195 S.W. 761, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1917).

23. —Cloud from Title.

Jurisdiction to remove cloud from title. Bouldin v. Taylor, 152 Tenn. 97, 275 S.W. 340, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1924).

24. —Title in Partition.

Determination of conflicting titles in partition suits. Walsh v. Crook, 91 Tenn. 388, 19 S.W. 19, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1892).

25. —Damages as Incidental Relief.

While this statute does not confer on the chancery court jurisdiction of unliquidated damages growing out of injury or trespass to property, person, or character (except for damages for injuries to property resulting from a breach of contract), where the court has jurisdiction by injunction, or upon some recognized ground of equity, it may give damages as an incident to such jurisdiction. Horton v. Nashville, 72 Tenn. 39, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 40 Am. Rep. 1 (1879); State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

The statute expressly excepts from the jurisdiction of chancery the cases of injury to property involving unliquidated damages; and chancery can only take jurisdiction of such matter as an incident to equitable relief granted, and not where all equitable relief is refused. Union Planters' Bank & Trust Co. v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 649, 139 S.W. 715, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 69, 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 580 (1911); Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

A bill to enjoin a flume company from occupying the land of a riparian owner and for part damages therefor, having failed as to the injunctive relief, could not be retained for the purpose of awarding the damages. Tenn. Coal Iron & R.R. Co. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transp. Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W. 522, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1913); Cash v. Russell, 4 Tenn. Civ. App. (4 Higgins) 601 (1914).

The chancery court has no jurisdiction of the cross action of defendants seeking unliquidated damages against cross defendants, in an original action for possession of realty and for an injunction against defendants restraining them from interfering with new construction. Greeneville Cabinet Co. v. Hauff, 197 Tenn. 321, 273 S.W.2d 9, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (1954).

Although chancery has no jurisdiction of a suit seeking no relief other than a money recovery for injuries to realty and personalty by reason of a tort, it does have jurisdiction to award such damages as an incident to injunctive relief where there is only one party complainant seeking an injunction and, incidentally, damages sustained by reason of the tort which he seeks to have enjoined. Griffith v. Hurt, 200 Tenn. 133, 291 S.W.2d 271, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1956).

Bank and its employees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law in administrators'  action alleging that they failed to spend sufficient money on a deceased while acting as his court appointed guardians because the doctrine of res judicata barred their claims, which had already been litigated in a chancery court during final accounting proceedings; the chancery court is not necessarily precluded from hearing causes of action for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character. Miller v. Regions Bank, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009).

26. —Negligence of Attorney.

A bill in chancery against an attorney for negligence or failure of duty in collecting claims placed in his hands for collection, whereby they were lost, may be maintained. A. T. Bruce & Co. v. Baxter, 75 Tenn. 477, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1881).

27. —Conversion — Suit for Value.

Damages for conversion where the tort is waived and the value is sued for. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Moses, 83 Tenn. 300, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 52, 54 Am. Rep. 415 (1885).

28. —Fraud and Deceit.

Fraud and deceit. Shwab v. Walters, 147 Tenn. 638, 251 S.W. 42, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1923).

In an action between ex-spouses involving fraud in regard to paternity, because no objection to the chancery court's jurisdiction to award emotional distress damages was made, the chancery court properly considered the matter upon the principles of a court of law, T.C.A. § 16-11-102(b). Hodge v. Craig, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2010), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 382 S.W.3d 325, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

Chancery court retained subject matter jurisdiction to consider judgment creditors'  motion to revive the judgment because it had subject matter jurisdiction over the original action for money damages and injunctive relief based on claims of fraud and conversion, and the motion was an attempt to continue or extend the original action, not a new cause of action; expiration of the statute of limitations for actions on judgments did not deprive the chancery court of subject matter jurisdiction. Town & Country Jewelers Inc. v. Sheriff, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2018).

29. —Liens.

Furnisher's lien on a steamboat. Casey & Hedges Mfg. Co. v. Weatherly, 97 Tenn. 297, 37 S.W. 6, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1896).

30. —Penalty Against Bank.

Penalty against national bank. McCreary v. First Nat'l Bank, 109 Tenn. 128, 70 S.W. 821, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1902).

31. —Proceeds of Estate.

Recovery of proceeds of an estate converted. Carpenter v. Wright, 158 Tenn. 289, 13 S.W.2d 51, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1929).

32. —Forfeitures.

Forfeitures under antitrust law. State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S.W. 1033, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 48, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941 (1900).

33. —Money Lost Gaming.

Money lost at gaming or on wagering contracts. McGrew v. City Produce Exchange, 85 Tenn. 572, 4 S.W. 38, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 84, 4 Am. St. Rep. 771 (1887); Dunn v. Bell, 85 Tenn. 581, 4 S.W. 41, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1887); Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891).

34. —Mandamus.

Hawkins v. Kercheval, 78 Tenn. 535, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 220 (1882); Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891).

Chancery court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus the statute vests chancery courts with concurrent jurisdiction over all civil causes of action including petitions for writs of mandamus, T.C.A. § 29-25-101 separately grants chancellors the power to issue writs of mandamus, and the language of T.C.A. § 5-1-107 that duties made incumbent by law upon the county may be enforced by mandamus from the circuit court is permissive rather than exclusionary. State ex rel. Aina-Labinjo v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2013).

35. —Recoupment.

Recoupment may include damages suffered from any matter arising from plaintiff's demand for which defendant would be entitled to recover in cross action and may be claimed in chancery. Mack v. Hugger Bros. Const. Co., 153 Tenn. 260, 283 S.W. 448, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 27, 46 A.L.R. 389 (1926).

36. Lack of Jurisdiction — Examples.

Chancery court had no jurisdiction to enjoin unlawful detainer suit commenced before justice of the peace (now general sessions court) where only basis of suit in equity was complainant's claim of oral lease for one year and alleged lease, if valid, would have amounted to legal defense to the unlawful detainer action. Robinson v. Easter, 208 Tenn. 147, 344 S.W.2d 365, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1961).

37. —Tort of Fraud.

Allegations construed to make a cross bill one for misrepresentations made to one defendant by the agent of another defendant, making it one for the tort of fraud and deceit, of which the chancery court has no jurisdiction, so that the cross bill must be dismissed. Ellett v. Embury & Maury, 142 Tenn. 444, 217 S.W. 818, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1919).

38. —Tort of Malice.

Suit for damages for maliciously inducing party to break contract. Varno v. Tindall, 164 Tenn. 642, 51 S.W.2d 502, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1932).

39. —Negligence.

Injury to ferry and land. Rhea v. Hooper, 73 Tenn. 390, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1880).

Injury to eggs by negligence of warehouseman. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

40. —Trespass to Person and Property.

Chancery has no jurisdiction of an action of damages for trespass to person or property. Horton v. Nashville, 72 Tenn. 39, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 40 Am. Rep. 1 (1879); State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

41. —Condemnation of Land.

Condemnation of land for sale under justice's (now general sessions judge's) execution. Shields v. Davis, 103 Tenn. 538, 53 S.W. 948, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1899).

Chancery court had no jurisdiction to enjoin taking of sewer and water lines by municipality without just compensation or to entertain suit for unjust enrichment since adequate remedy is provided at law under reverse condemnation procedure in § 29-16-123. Zirkle v. Kingston, 217 Tenn. 210, 396 S.W.2d 356, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 535 (1965).

42. —Loss of Profits.

Loss of profits on sales. Sanford-Day Iron Works v. Enterprise Foundry & Machine Co., 138 Tenn. 437, 198 S.W. 258, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1917).

43. —Restraining Interference.

Restraining interference with right to exercise duties as public officer. State ex rel. Brumit v. Grindstaff, 144 Tenn. 554, 234 S.W. 510, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1921).

44. —Devisavit Vel Non.

Trial of issue of devisavit vel non. Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891).

Although this section provides that the chancery court can hear and determine certain cases in which jurisdiction lies in the circuit court where no objection to the jurisdiction has been taken by a plea, where the issue of jurisdiction was raised in the lower court it was improper for the chancellor to rule on the issue of devisavit vel non. Muse v. Sluder, 600 S.W.2d 237, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

44.5. —Dependency and Neglect Proceedings.

Chancery court erred in granting the parents'  petition for a writ of certiorari because the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a juvenile court's ex parte protective custody order where the chancery court was not a superior court to a juvenile court with regard to dependency and neglect proceedings and a writ of certiorari proceeding did not satisfy either of the types of cases for the chancery court's exercise of jurisdiction. In re Brody S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016).

45. —Transfer to Circuit Court.

Implicit in the provisions of T.C.A. § 16-11-102 is the positive inference that where a complaint has been filed in the chancery court that lies outside that court's subject matter jurisdiction, and objection has been made, the chancery court may not dismiss the complaint but must transfer it to the appropriate circuit court. Woods v. MTC Mgmt., 967 S.W.2d 800, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. 1998).

T.C.A. § 16-11-102 does not authorize a chancery court to transfer an improper appeal made from a general sessions judgment to a circuit court with the proper jurisdiction. Graves v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 45 S.W.3d 584, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

46. Jury Trial.

The parties are entitled to demand a jury in chancery where the case is cognizable under this section. Shepard & Gluck v. Thomas, 147 Tenn. 338, 246 S.W. 836, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1922).

In nonequitable cases tried before a chancery court, a party may demand, of right, a jury to try issues of fact, and the jury's verdict has the effect of a verdict at law. Hurt v. Earnhart, 539 S.W.2d 133, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

47. Jurisdiction — Objections.

The filing of an answer by the defendant is not a waiver of objections to the jurisdiction of chancery, where the action is one falling within the exceptions of this section. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

Implicit in the provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-11-102 is the positive inference that, where a jurisdictional objection has been made, a transfer pursuant to subsection (b) is mandated. Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. May 4, 1992).

48. Federal Courts — Jurisdiction.

This section does not efface the distinction between legal and equitable rights and remedies; and, if it did, it could not confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction in equity to try common law cases. United States v. Wilson, 118 U.S. 86, 6 S. Ct. 991, 30 L. Ed. 110, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1906 (1886); American Asso. v. Williams, 166 F. 17, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 4831 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1908).

49. Parties.

50. —Joinder.

Two or more persons may unite in a bill to enjoin a nuisance although their lands are separate and distinct from each other where it appears that the lands of all are affected in substantially the same way by the nuisance complained of. Griffith v. Hurt, 200 Tenn. 133, 291 S.W.2d 271, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1956).

There could be no joinder of parties as complainants for recovery of separate injuries inflicted by the same tort upon separate lands under bill seeking such damages and mandatory injunction for abatement of the condition causing such damages. Griffith v. Hurt, 200 Tenn. 133, 291 S.W.2d 271, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1956).

51. Estoppel of Challenge to Jurisdiction.

Having invoked the jurisdiction of the chancery court, plaintiff was estopped to seek to reverse its decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Clay v. Hall, 597 S.W.2d 737, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 914, 101 S. Ct. 310, 66 L. Ed. 2d 142, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3562 (1980).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 10, 11.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 490.

Res judicata as affected by limitation of jurisdiction of court which rendered judgment. 83 A.L.R.2d 977.

Courts 472.1, 472.3.

Equity 44.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

Under § 16-10-111 circuit court has jurisdiction of suits of an equitable nature in absence of demurrer to jurisdiction. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

2. —“Original Jurisdiction” — Meaning.

This section is construed as having reference to those equitable rights which result from fraud, accident, mistake, trusts, and the like, originally inherent in a court of equity, and not as denying such equitable remedies as are exclusively conferred upon the chancery court by the Code. Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

Term “original jurisdiction” refers to class of cases where the right of action itself is equitable, and not to those cases where equitable remedy is involved. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

3. —Ancillary Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of a chancery court is limited by the amount only in those cases of an equitable nature where the chancery court has exclusive original jurisdiction, and there was no intention to limit the jurisdiction of the chancery court by the amount in those cases where the court had exclusive ancillary jurisdiction in the enforcement of a claim or a demand. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

4. Fifty Dollar Minimum.

Where evidence was to the effect that the value of complainant's name in business was more than $50.00, complainant was not barred by this section from bringing suit to enjoin use of his name in shoe business. McDonald v. Julian, 48 Tenn. App. 427, 348 S.W.2d 749, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

5. —Exclusive Ancillary Jurisdiction.

The restriction and limitation of jurisdiction of chancery to sums exceeding $50.00 applies only when the jurisdiction turns wholly upon the amount involved. If the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought is exclusively conferred upon the chancery court, the limitation as to amount does not apply, there being no other remedy. Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882); Washburn v. Moore, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 268 (1912).

Where old board reelected defendant as recorder and new board elected petitioner the chancery court could not enjoin defendant from interfering with petitioner in exercising duties connected with his office pending determination of right to office. State ex rel. Brumit v. Grindstaff, 144 Tenn. 554, 234 S.W. 510, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1921).

Plaintiff elected as superintendent was entitled to issuance of an injunction by chancery court against interference in duties of office from defendant where issue of election contest was not involved. Hart v. Pierce, 169 Tenn. 411, 88 S.W.2d 798, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1935).

The $50.00 requirement for jurisdiction refers only to those cases in which chancery has exclusive original jurisdiction and does not apply to those cases where chancery has exclusive ancillary jurisdiction in enforcement of demand. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

The chancery court is limited by the amount of $50.00 only in those cases of an equitable nature where the chancery court has an exclusive original jurisdiction under this section, but is not limited to such amount in other cases of auxiliary or ancillary jurisdiction conferred by other statutes without regard to amount. Tritschler v. Cartwright, 46 Tenn. App. 662, 333 S.W.2d 6, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

6. —Amount Demanded.

The chancery court has no jurisdiction where the whole demand, without deduction by reason of setoff or payment, is under $50.00. McNew v. Toby, 25 Tenn. 27, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1845).

The amount sued for in chancery determines the jurisdiction, and not the amount found to be due on the hearing. Spurlock v. Fulks, 31 Tenn. 289, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1851); Brimingham v. Tapscott, 51 Tenn. 382, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 178 (1871); Wagstaff v. Braden, 60 Tenn. 304, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1872); Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882).

A bill to foreclose a mortgage which instrument recited that it secured a note for $45.00 and expense, including an attorney's fee of $10.00, involved a sum about $50.00. McAffrey v. Richards, 59 S.W. 1064, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 128 (1900).

In an action to recover for the breach of covenants in a deed, where the sum involved was less than $50.00 and it was insisted that an equity court could not take jurisdiction, held, that if the suit had been only for $50.00 the court could not take jurisdiction but since the bill also sought other relief for which complainant had no remedy at law, the equity court had jurisdiction. Kenyon v. Russell, 5 Tenn. App. 401, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Chancery court did not have jurisdiction of suit of railroad passengers against railroad to determine legal rights of passengers who had paid railroad excess amount for their intrastate tickets as evidenced by receipts issued by railroad for excess payment where individual amount involved as to each plaintiff was less than $50.00 though total amount of excess payments collected was in excess of $250,000 since separate rights were involved. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

7. —Rule Inapplicable — Examples.

The rule as to limit of amount is not applicable in an ejectment case. Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883); Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

A mandamus case is not subject to the rule as to the limit of amount. State ex rel. Hurt v. Alexander, 115 Tenn. 156, 90 S.W. 20, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1905).

Chancery has jurisdiction to set aside a fraudulent conveyance where the demand is under $50.00. Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

8. —Rule Applicable — Examples.

Chancery is without jurisdiction to enforce an equitable vendor's lien where the demand is under the amount of $50.00. Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882).

The chancery court has no jurisdiction in ordinary cases where the amount involved is less than $50.00. Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883).

Suit in chancery court to enjoin distress warrant for delinquent taxes and to annul the assessment as being void when such taxes plus penalty, interest and cost amounted to less than $50.00 was without the jurisdiction of the chancery court. Tritschler v. Cartwright, 46 Tenn. App. 662, 333 S.W.2d 6, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

9. Plea in Abatement.

Where the bill shows more than $50.00 to be due, and the defendant desires to raise the question that the court has no jurisdiction, because the amount in fact due is less than $50.00, he must do so by a plea in abatement, averring the amount in controversy to be less than $50.00, otherwise the question as to the jurisdiction is waived. Martin v. Carter, 9 Tenn. 489, 1831 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1831); Covington v. Neilson, 14 Tenn. 474, 14 Tenn. 475, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1834); Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883).

10. Waiver of Jurisdiction by Answer.

If, on the face of the bill, the debt or demand be less than $50.00, it should be dismissed; if more than $50.00, the court, prima facie, has jurisdiction; and, if the defendant submits by answering, he cannot resist a decree because the amount found to be due to complainant is less than $50.00. Spurlock v. Fulks, 31 Tenn. 289, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1851); Wagstaff v. Braden, 60 Tenn. 304, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1872); Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

11. Suits of Equitable Nature.

Suit for reformation of contract of insurance was of an equitable nature and could not be maintained as an action at law where objection was raised to jurisdiction of circuit court. Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 54 Tenn. App. 279, 390 S.W.2d 680, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

12. Determination of Tax Liability.

With respect to judicial determinations that have the effect, directly or indirectly, of determining liability for taxes that are collected by the department of revenue, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1804 overrides the jurisdiction that a chancery court would otherwise have under this section. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. 1991).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 88, 154-157, 159, 163-165, 167, 169, 170; 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 13, 14.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 490.

Equity 33.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with Other Acts.

This section and §§ 26-4-101, 26-4-102 should be read in connection with § 21-105 (repealed). Edwards v. Hawks, 189 Tenn. 17, 222 S.W.2d 28, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1949).

2. —Divorce Jurisdiction — Circuit Court.

Exclusive jurisdiction of chancery court in enforcing judgments against property subject to execution did not deprive circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction of proceeding by wife to enforce award of alimony and child support provisions of decree entered by circuit court in divorce proceeding, since § 36-822 (now § 36-5-103) provides that court which grants divorce decree may employ for the enforcement of the decree “such other lawful means as are usual and according to the course and practice of the court,” as divorce suit is to all intents and purposes a chancery proceeding. Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (1951) (decision under prior law).

3. Construction and Interpretation.

4. —“Under the Provisions of This Code” — Meaning.

Exercise of jurisdiction under this section is restricted by this concluding phrase, and is not to be exercised in every case that may arise. North v. Puckett, 164 Tenn. 100, 46 S.W.2d 73, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 81 A.L.R. 1107 (1932).

5. —Property Covered.

This section is broad and comprehensive, and seems to embrace all kinds of property that is not exempt with the one exception of money in the possession of the defendant. North v. Puckett, 164 Tenn. 100, 46 S.W.2d 73, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 81 A.L.R. 1107 (1932); Robertson v. Johnson, 27 Tenn. App. 59, 177 S.W.2d 860, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

6. Basis of Jurisdiction.

7. —Other Equitable Remedy.

That a judgment creditor might be able to obtain an equitable attachment of the debtor's property does not exclude such creditor from proceeding under this section without the necessity of attachment. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

8. —Execution Returned Nulla Bona.

Defense that no execution has been issued and returned nulla bona is to the jurisdiction, and must be made by motion to dismiss, demurrer, or by plea in abatement, but it is unnecessary that it should be made to appear that execution has been issued and returned nulla bona if it is shown by other proof that the judgment debtor is actually insolvent and has no property subject to execution. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

9. —Remedy at Law.

The jurisdiction rests upon the ground that the complainant has no remedy at law, and cannot reach his debtor's property by execution at law; and the statute aids him upon that ground alone. Putnam v. Bentley, 67 Tenn. 84, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1874); Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882); Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923); Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

Chancery cannot be resorted to when the assets sought to be reached are leviable at law, unless to remove an obstacle to legal enforcement, when there is no lien, fraud, trust, or equitable interest in the same. Bryan v. Zarecor, 112 Tenn. 503, 81 S.W. 1252, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1904).

Where defendant in an action at law is fraudulently disposing of his property, plaintiff may maintain a creditor's bill in aid of his lawsuit. Sweetwater Bank & Trust Co. v. Howard, 13 Tenn. App. 592, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

10. Jurisdiction — Examples.

11. —Debtor's Equitable Interest.

A judgment creditor, whose debtor has no property on which execution is leviable, may, by bill in chancery, subject the equitable interest of his debtor in land, by sale, to the satisfaction of his judgment. Cloud v. Hamilton & Sitler, 11 Tenn. 80, 11 Tenn. 81, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1832); Gray v. Faris, 15 Tenn. 154, 15 Tenn. 155, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1834); McNairy v. Eastland, 18 Tenn. 310 (1837).

Judgment creditor had a right to subject equity of debtor to the payment of her claim even though a like petition had already been filed by another creditor to reach the same equity and had been sustained by the court, the proof showing that the land was worth substantially more than all the liens against it prior to the filing of the petition by the judgment creditor. Robertson v. Johnson, 27 Tenn. App. 59, 177 S.W.2d 860, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

12. —Judgment under Fifty Dollars.

The chancery court may aid a judgment creditor whose judgment is less than $50.00 to reach the property of his debtor which is not subject to execution at law, where the debtor has no property subject to execution at law. Putnam v. Bentley, 67 Tenn. 84, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1874); State v. Covington, 72 Tenn. 51, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1879); Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882).

13. —Administrator's Bill.

Suit by administrator of estate which was judgment creditor to subject fund in chancery court belonging to debtor to satisfaction of judgment was authorized. Rutherford v. Parker, 29 Tenn. App. 179, 195 S.W.2d 328, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

14. —Creditor of Estate.

Under this section chancellor could properly decree that judgment creditor was entitled to whatever interest that would pass to a judgment debtor under the terms of a will then in the process of administration. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

Where complainant filed bill in chancery to subject property passing to a judgment debtor under the terms of a will and where chancellor decreed that complainant was entitled to the debtor's interest in the estate and enjoined the executors of the will from delivering or paying over any property or money to the creditor such decree and injunction did not invade the jurisdiction of the county court with reference to administration of the estate since all that was required of the executors was to hold the debtor's proceeds of the estate subject to the orders of the chancery court and there was nothing in the decree to prevent such executors from making settlement of the estate. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

15. —Unassigned Dower.

While not subject to execution, unassigned dower may be subjected under this statute. North v. Puckett, 164 Tenn. 100, 46 S.W.2d 73, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 81 A.L.R. 1107 (1932).

16. —Funds in Custodia Legis.

Funds in the hands of the clerk and master of the court, subject to orders of distribution, are in custodia legis, and are not subject to execution or attachment at law or to garnishment in aid of a creditor of a party entitled to a portion in the fund. Scott County Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S.W. 218, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1920).

Under the inherent jurisdiction of the chancery court, as well as by virtue of this statute, a creditor can bring a bill in equity to subject to the payment of his judgment his debtor's interest in a fund which has been paid into court. Scott County Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S.W. 218, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1920).

17. —Fraudulent Conveyances.

A lien attaches to property fraudulently conveyed upon the filing of a bill to set it aside, but such lien does not have complete vitality and become operative as to strangers to the suit until process has been served upon a material defendant. Bank of Delrose v. Mansfield, 4 Tenn. App. 488, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

18. —Equity in Real Estate.

Upon nulla bona return, chancery has jurisdiction to subject an equity in realty held in trust for the debtor. Fulghum v. Cotton, 74 Tenn. 590, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (1880); Schoolfield v. Cogdell, 120 Tenn. 618, 113 S.W. 375, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1908).

A judgment creditor, after a nulla bona return of an execution, may reach the equity of his debtor in real estate, by a bill in chancery against such debtor and the other persons holding a trust on such property. Harris v. Beasley, 123 Tenn. 605, 133 S.W. 1110, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1911), superseded by statute as stated in, Figlio v. Shelley Ford, Inc., — S.W.2d —, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 1988).

19. —Trustee of Bankrupt — Assignment of Homestead.

Trustee of bankrupt to whom homestead had never been assigned was entitled to file a bill in chancery for an assignment of homestead rather than by filing bill for discovery of assets, if a bill to compel discovery of homestead was not necessary. Edwards v. Hawks, 189 Tenn. 17, 222 S.W.2d 28, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1949).

20. Several Creditors — Same Equity.

Under this section a creditor has the right to subject the equity of a debtor in property to the payment of the creditor's claim and this is true even where another creditor of the debtor has filed a similar petition to reach the same equity and such petition has already been sustained. Robertson v. Johnson, 27 Tenn. App. 59, 177 S.W.2d 860, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

21. Defense — Sworn Answer of Executor.

Bill in chancery to subject interest of judgment debtor in estate to such judgment was not in the nature of a garnishment so as to bind complainant by the sworn answers of executors that the estate was not indebted to the creditor. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

22. Foreign Judgment Creditors.

The statute does not apply to creditors by judgment in other states with return of nulla bona there. No lien lis pendens is created by filing bill. Broughton v. Slusher, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 305 (1902).

23. Installment Payments.

When enforcing a money judgment, trial courts have the power to issue an installment payment order only upon motion of the judgment debtor or by agreement. Kuykendall v. Wheeler, 890 S.W.2d 785, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. 1994).

Collateral References. Equity 438.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

In suit to abate public nuisance and to revoke corporate charter, fact that criminal court had narrow statutory concurrent jurisdiction with chancery court with reference to abatement of public nuisances did not permit criminal court to retain jurisdiction of suit for purpose of revocation of corporate charter under maxim that equity having taken jurisdiction for one purpose will retain jurisdiction for all purposes. Pan-O-Ram Club, Inc. v. State, 217 Tenn. 137, 395 S.W.2d 803, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (1965).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statute Inapplicable.

2. —Enjoining Trespass.

This statute is inapplicable to a suit to enjoin a defendant from cutting timber and to recover for the value of the timber already cut and removed, involving an issue as to the title to a strip of land between adjoining owners, depending on the location of the boundary line. Union Tanning Co. v. Lowe, 148 Tenn. 407, 255 S.W. 712, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1923).

3. —Determination by Pleadings.

Purpose of a suit to establish or locate boundary lines of contiguous or adjoining tracts of land can be determined only from the pleadings. Union Tanning Co. v. Lowe, 148 Tenn. 407, 255 S.W. 712, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1923).

Where a boundary line dispute was the gravamen of the complaint, an action was a boundary line dispute, not an ejectment action, since, even though defendant's answer alleged title to part of the land by adverse possession, it did not contain a counterclaim. Burks v. Boles, 934 S.W.2d 653, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

4. Jurisdiction.

The determinations of oil and gas unit participation and disputed property boundaries was within the jurisdiction of the chancery court under this section and the jurisdiction of the oil and gas board under § 60-1-202, and the chancellor was not required, under the doctrine of primary jurisdictions, to defer to agency expertise. Freels v. Northrup, 678 S.W.2d 55, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. 1984) (chancellor did not defer to agency).

5. Bifurcated Cases.

It was proper for circuit court judge, acting sua sponte, to order that case be bifurcated, and that there be a trial in the chancery court as to boundary line dispute while retaining tort claims in the circuit court. Burnette v. Pickel, 858 S.W.2d 319, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. July 6, 1993).

6. Evidence.

Where suit was to determine boundaries, and was not in the nature of ejectment, plaintiff could establish his boundary upon the deeds of all parties to the action, and was not limited to recovery upon the strength of his own title alone. Cusick v. Cutshaw, 34 Tenn. App. 283, 237 S.W.2d 563, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

It was not necessary for complainants to prove ownership of land in question at time of filing suit where it was shown that they formerly owned the land and had conveyed by a warranty deed and that it was for the protection against liability under such warranty that they brought suit. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

In a boundary dispute complainant must prove that he is the true owner or that he has become entitled to possession of the disputed area of land by clear proof. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

Mere fact that defendant specifically asserted in his answer that the cause could be maintained as a suit in ejectment only but filed no cross bill could not deprive the complainants of the right expressly granted by statute to prove their case without a complete deraignment of title. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Complainants are entitled to establish a boundary line by reference to title papers of other parties as well as their own. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Where a deed contains an adequate particular description of the property conveyed, it will not be controlled by a recital therein of the quantity or number of acres unless it clearly appears that it was the intention to convey only a definite quantity. Williams v. Daniel, 545 S.W.2d 120, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

Where a sale of property is in gross and not by the acre and there is opportunity to examine the land and where there is no showing of fraud, the deed will stand as written, despite a mutual mistake as to the number of acres contained in the tract conveyed. Williams v. Daniel, 545 S.W.2d 120, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

A suit concerning a boundary line dispute was not a suit for ejectment and it was not necessary that plaintiff prove a complete deraignment of title from a state grant or a common source but was only required to prove clearly that he was the true owner of the land described in the complaint. Arrowood v. Williams, 586 S.W.2d 131, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

To prove clearly that the parties in a boundary dispute are the true owners, simply means that the complainant must prove that he is the true owner or that he had become entitled to the possession of land adjacent to the boundary which he undertakes to have established. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

In determining disputed boundaries, resort is to be had first to natural objects or landmarks, because of their very permanent character; next, to artificial monument or marks, then to the boundary lines of adjacent landowners, and then to courses and distances. This rule of construction is to aid in determining the intention of the parties to a deed which is to be determined, if possible, from the instrument in connection with the surrounding circumstances. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The reason why a monument or adjacent line is ordinarily given preference over courses and distances is that the parties so presumed to have examined the property have, in viewing the premises, taken note of the monument or line. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Where a plat showed a straight boundary line between two agreed points but an old fence line along the boundary had a slight bow in it, the artificial markers in the old fence line controlled over the straight line protracted on the subdivision plat, particularly where the evidence in the record establishes the bow in the old fence line could not be detected on a visual inspection of the premises and could only be ascertained through sophisticated surveying equipment which, was not available to surveyor at the time of preparation of the plat. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The complainant is not required to prove a complete deraignment of title from the state nor to prove a common source of title but is required to prove clearly that he is the true owner of the property described in the complaint. Franks v. Burks, 688 S.W.2d 435, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Finding in favor of the defendant property owners in a boundary dispute action under T.C.A. § 16-11-106(a) was proper because their survey was correct due to failure by plaintiff property owners'  surveyor to locate a landmark beech tree; it was determined that the predecessors were the most knowledgeable persons about the boundary lines. Lay v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2008).

In a boundary dispute under T.C.A. § 16-11-106, the evidence did not preponderate against a trial court's placement of a disputed fifteen-acre tract to the south of a certain line because the succession of deeds conveying the tract to the adjoining landowners and numerous surveys supported the location of the tract; no other credible evidence of old boundaries was introduced. Cass Rye & Assocs. v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2012).

In a boundary dispute, a landowner had superior title over neighbors because, even though a 1991 quitclaim deed conveyed the disputed parcel to the neighbors, the grantor of the disputed area had transferred his total interest to a different grantee, and as such, the 1991 quitclaim deed was held for naught. Moore v. Brock, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2013).

7. —Burden of Proof.

The burden of the plaintiff in a boundary line dispute is somewhat less than that borne by the plaintiff in an ejectment action, but, he must, nevertheless, establish title in the complainant and he must prove clearly that he is the true owner of the lands described in his bill. Nelson v. Walls Properties, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 409, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 1981).

Subsection (b) simply means that the complainant must prove that he is the true owner or that he had become entitled to the possession of land adjacent to the boundary which he undertakes to have established, that is, the disputed area of land, by clear proof, and the chancellor would be confined to a determination by the clear proof, if he rested his decision upon title, to decree title only to the particular disputed area. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

8. —Defective Deeds.

Plaintiff established title to property and correct boundary where defendant's deed descriptions were deemed defective and defendant did not establish adverse possession. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

9. Damages — “Mild” Rule.

Where in a boundary dispute there was a real question as to the location of the boundary and no question of any willful trespass the damages were properly determined according to the “mild” rule. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 27 Tenn. App. 468, 182 S.W.2d 4, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

10. Ejectment.

Where suit was actually one in ejectment although defendant led trial court into believing that it was a boundary line dispute and trial court erroneously treated cause as boundary line dispute, cause would be remanded to be proceeded to a conclusion as an ejectment suit and to afford complainant an opportunity to deraign title from a common source or grant from the state. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

11. —Additional Remedy.

Decree dismissing suit to enjoin defendants from cutting timber on land in which the defendant denied complainant's title to the land, on the ground that complainant did not deraign title, should not preclude complainant from suing in ejectment for the land, and the bill should be dismissed without prejudice. Union Tanning Co. v. Lowe, 148 Tenn. 407, 255 S.W. 712, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1923).

12. —Adverse Possession — Proof.

Where a boundary dispute begun under this section developed into an ejectment action and the defendant failed to establish an actual, open, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession for the required statutory time, he could not get title by adverse possession. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 27 Tenn. App. 468, 182 S.W.2d 4, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

Where boundary dispute begun under this section develops into an ejectment action and defendant fails to establish an actual open, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession for the required statutory time he cannot get title by adverse possession. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

Proof of record title and that plaintiff rode his horses and gave others permission to ride their horses on disputed parcel was sufficient to establish title in plaintiff and overcome claim of adverse possession. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

13. Oral Agreement.

Disputed boundary lines may be established by oral agreement as such agreements do not fall within the prohibition of the statute of frauds, and the parties will thereafter be estopped to question the line thus established even though it may afterwards be demonstrated that such line was erroneous. Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

14. Decree.

In a boundary dispute the decree of the chancellor is confined to the disputed area. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

15. Inaccuracies in Surveys.

Where surveys show inaccuracies in the metes and bounds in descriptions of large bodies of land, courses and distances yield to calls for natural objects and lines of adjacent owners. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

16. Limitations of Actions.

The seven-year limitation statute, § 28-2-102, applies in a boundary line dispute, even though the title was not derived from a state grant or a common source of title. Williams v. Daniel, 545 S.W.2d 120, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

17. Parties.

Where suit was brought by former owners who disposed of property by warranty deed for the purpose of avoiding possible future liability under covenant of warranty such right was independent of any rights the grantee may have had and it was not required that the grantee be made a party. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

One without title to real property has no justifiable interest in its boundaries. Nelson v. Walls Properties, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 409, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 1981).

18. Presumptions.

The object in all boundary questions is to find, as nearly as may be, certain evidences of what particular land was meant to be included for conveyance, and the natural presumption is that the conveyance is made after and with reference to an actual view of the premises by the parties to the instrument. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

19. Collateral Estoppel.

When a plaintiff had previously failed to prove his title to certain lands in an ejectment proceeding, he was collaterally estopped from bringing an action on the boundary lines of that same property. Nelson v. Walls Properties, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 409, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 1981).

20. Joint Possession.

Title in plaintiff was established where plaintiff showed he had record title and defendant failed to prove adverse possession because earlier parol agreement could not be used to establish color of title and because joint possession by the legal title holder and another is deemed to be possession of the holder of the legal title. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Collateral References. 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, §§ 99, 103; C.J.S. Courts § 490.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

General sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enroll a Mississippi judgment pursuant to T.C.A. § 26-6-104(a) of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and it did not have jurisdiction to allow an in rem proceeding pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-11-107. Therefore, its garnishment orders against a garnishee were set aside. Studsvik Logistics, LLC v. Royal Furniture Co., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2010).

2. —Exhaustion of Legal Remedies.

The exhaustion of the legal remedy against a judgment debtor in another state is shown by the fact that the property of such debtor in the state of his residence has been placed at the suit of creditors, in the possession of a receiver under a statute forbidding interference with it. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Matherwell Iron & Steel Co., 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S.W. 1002, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 75, 29 L.R.A. 164 (1895).

In action to enforce foreign judgment against nonresident by bill against property in this state, and averment that complainant had attempted to collect his claim, and had not succeeded, was not a sufficient showing that complainant had exhausted his legal remedies so as to warrant attachment under the statute. Brown v. Pace, 49 S.W. 355, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 123 (1898).

3. —Exhaustion of Foreign Remedies.

If foreign debtor has no property in state of his residence but does have property in Tennessee, equity is authorized to act in rem by virtue of Acts 1801, ch. 6, § 2 whereas prior to 1801 equity could only act in personam. Davis's Ex'rs v. Fulton, 1 Tenn. 121, 1805 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1805).

The supreme court has repeatedly applied this section in cases where suits were brought in chancery by nonresidents, who had exhausted their remedy in the foreign state, to subject specific property in this state, of a nonresident debtor, recognizing that this was the purpose of the statute. The statute confers on the chancery court jurisdiction to give relief under these conditions “and under no other.” Phillips v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 183 Tenn. 266, 191 S.W.2d 554, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 210 (1946).

4. —Judgment — Necessity.

Nonresident creditor without a judgment may under appropriate circumstances maintain a bill against a nonresident debtor in Tennessee under the general principles of equity jurisprudence. Hall v. Jordan, 190 Tenn. 1, 227 S.W.2d 35, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 411 (1950), superseded by statute as stated in, Toler by Lack v. City of Cookeville, 952 S.W.2d 831, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

5. —Debtor Becoming Resident of State — Statute Inapplicable.

This section was intended to give a remedy only against judgment debtors who were nonresidents at the time of the filing of the bill to subject property here; and where a judgment was rendered against the defendant when a nonresident of this state, and he afterwards removed to this state, this statute was not applicable when he became a resident here. Broughton v. Slusher, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 305 (1902).

6. Jurisdiction — Examples.

7. —Creditor and Debtor Nonresidents.

Where the debtor and creditor are nonresidents of this state and both residents of the same state, and the judgment creditor has exhausted his legal remedy in the state of their common residence, our chancery courts have jurisdiction, independent of the attachment laws, to aid such creditor to subject his debtor's “real or personal property” situate in this state to the payment of his debts. This rule is not affected by § 29-6-109. Taylor v. Badoux, 92 Tenn. 249, 21 S.W. 522, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1893); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Matherwell Iron & Steel Co., 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S.W. 1002, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 75, 29 L.R.A. 164 (1895).

8. —Judgment Confessed by Foreign Corporation.

A judgment confessed by a debtor corporation of another state, in favor of its creditor of that state, after a petition has been filed for its enforced dissolution, though, in such state, there is a statute making a judgment confessed by a corporation, after such a petition has been filed, void as against its receiver and creditors, is valid, and gives the creditor in whose favor so confessed a remedy, under this section, to the same extent and in the same manner, and with the same priority, as a citizen of Tennessee, notwithstanding such statute, which is not effective to defeat an attachment of property in this state for the satisfaction of such judgment. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Matherwell Iron & Steel Co., 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S.W. 1002, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 75, 29 L.R.A. 164 (1895); Hardee v. Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S.W. 475, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (1914).

9. —Equitable Appropriation of Funds in State.

Where a nonresident loaned money to another nonresident, on the borrower's promise to repay the loan out of funds then in, or to come into, the hands of persons of Tennessee, for the borrower, such promise amounted to an equitable appropriation of an appropriate portion of such funds, which equity could enforce in this state. Allison v. Pearce, 59 S.W. 192, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 77 (1900).

10. —Foreign Receivers — Right to Sue in State.

Where his suit is not inimical to the interest of local creditors, or of anyone who has acquired rights under a local statute, nor in contravention of the policy of the forum, an ordinary chancery receiver appointed by the court of another state is accorded the privilege of bringing a suit in this state, as a matter of comity. Hardee v. Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S.W. 475, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (1914).

11. —Justice's Judgment.

Judgment of a justice of the peace in another state is effective under this section, so as to entitle the judgment creditor to take advantage of its provisions where he has exhausted his legal remedy on such judgment in such other state. J. S. Menken Co. v. Brinkley, 94 Tenn. 721, 31 S.W. 92, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1895).

12. Personam Suits — Circuit Court.

This section does not bar suit in circuit court by foreign corporation against Florida resident on a judgment secured in Florida, since suit is in personam and not in rem. Phillips v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 183 Tenn. 266, 191 S.W.2d 554, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 210 (1946).

13. Priority of Liens.

Where creditor filed suit on its foreign judgment and amount of foreign judgment was deposited with Tennessee court prior to federal government's filing of tax lien against debtor, creditor had valid lien on money deposited with priority over government's lien. S & S Gasket Co. v. United States, 635 F.2d 568, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 11515 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1980).

Collateral References. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 877.

Judgment 933.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Process Service.

Persons of unsound mind must be served with process and appear by guardian or guardian ad litem. Quinn v. Quinn, 169 Tenn. 173, 83 S.W.2d 269, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1935).

2. Insurance Policies — Reformation.

Insurance policies, like other written instruments, may be reformed in equity in cases of mutual mistake. Dickens v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 170 Tenn. 403, 95 S.W.2d 910, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1936).

3. Conservatorship Proceeding.

In a conservatorship proceeding where the brother-in-law sought to be appointed conservator over the elderly widow, the record contained clear and convincing evidence that the brother-in-law was a party, along with the deceased, to a conveyance to the brother-in-law undertaken for the sole purpose of enabling the deceased and the widow to qualify for governmental assistance under TennCare to which they would not otherwise have been entitled; therefore, because of the fraudulent character of the conveyance and the brother-in-laws' role in it, the brother-in-law was not entitled to gain personally from the transfer of funds by being permitted to retain the money, and the trial court did not err by setting aside the transaction and ordering the brother-in-law to return the unspent remainder of the certificate of deposit. In re Conservatorship Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Chancery court erred in setting aside the probate court's order granting conservators'  motion to remove because it was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's actions or issue any rulings in the case, and thus, all of its orders were void and of no effect; once the conservators decided to file the conservatorship in the property court, any appeals had to be to the court of appeals. In re Conservatorship of Beasley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2015).

Collateral References. 56 C.J.S. Mental Health §§ 55 et seq., 165 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Venue.

It was proper to challenge, by plea in abatement, venue of action to remove testamentary guardian, which was brought in chancery court of county where testator died, in which his will was probated and letters of guardianship taken out, where the appointment was made while guardian and ward lived in another county, in which they continued to live at time of the suit. State ex rel. Logan v. Graper, 155 Tenn. 565, 4 S.W.2d 955, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1927).

2. Consent Decree.

A consent decree affecting the rights of an infant entered by his solicitor or by a duly authorized agent is voidable, and subject to be set aside if found to be prejudicial to his rights. Ledford v. Johnson City Foundry & Machine Co., 169 Tenn. 430, 88 S.W.2d 804, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1935).

3. Construction with Other Sections.

This section, to the extent that it is in conflict with any of the provisions of Acts 1951, ch. 202 (§§ 36-101 — 36-137) see now title 36, chapter 1, part 1 or Acts 1955, ch. 177 (§§ 37-242 — 37-259) (now §§ 37-1-101, 37-1-143 — 37-1-159) has been repealed. St. Peter's Orphan Asylum Asso. v. Riley, 43 Tenn. App. 683, 311 S.W.2d 336, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

4. Abandoned Children.

The chancery or circuit court has no jurisdiction to declare a child an “abandoned child” except in connection with a petition for adoption under the provisions of §§ 36-110 (now § 36-1-110), 37-243 (now § 37-1-144). St. Peter's Orphan Asylum Asso. v. Riley, 43 Tenn. App. 683, 311 S.W.2d 336, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

5. Custody of Minors.

Although the chancery court has inherent jurisdiction of the persons and estates of minors, the state has conferred upon juvenile courts the special exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody of a dependent or delinquent minor. State ex rel. Baker v. Turner, 562 S.W.2d 435, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

Collateral References. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 51; 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward §§ 11, 45-47; 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 6, 124.

Infants 33.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Custody of Minors.

Although the chancery court has inherent jurisdiction of the persons and estates of minors, the state has conferred upon juvenile courts the special exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody of a dependent or delinquent minor. State ex rel. Baker v. Turner, 562 S.W.2d 435, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

3. Jurisdiction.

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a wife's contempt petition where the petition sought to secure the husband's compliance with the marriage dissolution agreement that had been made an order of the court, and Tennessee courts were empowered to inflict punishments for contempt of court. Foster v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2019).

10. Actions on Judgments.

Chancery court retained subject matter jurisdiction to consider judgment creditors'  motion to revive the judgment because it had subject matter jurisdiction over the original action for money damages and injunctive relief based on claims of fraud and conversion, and the motion was an attempt to continue or extend the original action, not a new cause of action; expiration of the statute of limitations for actions on judgments did not deprive the chancery court of subject matter jurisdiction. Town & Country Jewelers Inc. v. Sheriff, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2018).

Collateral References. 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 5, 74.

Validity and construction of statutory provision relating to jurisdiction of court for purpose of divorce for servicemen. 73 A.L.R.3d 431.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with Other Acts.

A court of equity under this section has jurisdiction to set aside homestead and dower although this section and §§ 16-10-109, 16-16-107 and 30-902 (now § 30-2-202) do not, in express terms, include jurisdiction to set aside homestead. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

2. Sale of Decedent's Lands in Another State.

A court of equity has no jurisdiction to compel a decedent's heirs to convey his lands in another state to a special commissioner for the sale thereof in order to pay decedent's debts, although the estate be insolvent. Creditors must seek relief in the courts of the state where such lands are located. Robinson v. Johnson, 52 S.W. 704, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 28 (1899).

The Tennessee chancery court did not have jurisdiction to divest the title out of the third party and vest it in another since the real estate was located in another state and the court has no power to act upon foreign land. Estate of Trivette v. Trivette, 564 S.W.2d 672, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Dower.

Chancery has jurisdiction to allot dower, and, as incident thereto, to compel the production of title papers, and the discovery of any matters necessary to a proper ascertainment of the condition of the landed estate of the deceased husband in the possession of the heirs. Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17, 9 S.W. 198, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1888).

The primary duty of determining whether dower may be set aside and, if so, fixing the boundaries thereof, rests with the commissioners and secondarily, with the court in event exceptions are filed by any interested party. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

The court should not attempt to determine questions relating to the allotment of homestead and dower until commissioners have been appointed and have reported their findings. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

2. Homestead.

Statutes giving chancery court jurisdiction concurrent with county court do not in express terms include jurisdiction to set aside homestead, but same may be said for section defining jurisdiction of county courts however, both courts have jurisdiction from ancient times and practice has been both in county and chancery court to appoint commissioners to set aside homestead. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

3. Commissioner's Findings.

Court should not as a matter of practice attempt to determine questions relating to the allotment of homestead and dower until commissioners have been appointed and have reported their findings. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 63.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 490, 492.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition. 37 A.L.R.3d 962.

Partition 39.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Allegations in Bill — Sufficiency.

Bill for appointment of administrator in chancery was sufficient though not specifically alleging the residence of deceased and her debtors, where it could be inferred from the charges in the bill that such residences were in the county in which the bill was filed. Hall v. Calvert, 46 S.W. 1120 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897).

2. Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Generally both the county and chancery courts are vested with jurisdiction in the appointment and removal of personal representatives and administration of decedents' estates. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

3. Serious Disputes or Complications.

Although as a general rule both the county court and chancery court are vested with jurisdiction in the administration of decedents' estates, in instances of serious dispute or complication the chancery courts may assume jurisdiction of the administration of an estate although the county court has previously undertaken such administration. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 5, 63.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 490; 33, 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators §§ 72, 76, 725.

Ex and Ad 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. County Where Property Found.

2. —Assets of Estate.

Administrator appointed by county court was not entitled to file a proceeding in chancery court located in same county to recover assets of estate from defendant living in another county where it was not alleged that chattels or goods were located in county of suit. Harris v. Harris, 190 Tenn. 506, 230 S.W.2d 982, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (1950).

3. —Winding Up Foreign Corporations.

Chancery jurisdiction over property of a foreign corporation for winding up the same and distributing its assets here. Hadley v. Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co., 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 122 (1874); Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 502 (1877).

4. County Where Defendant Resides.

5. —Distributee Suing Administrator Wherever Found.

Any chancery court, within territorial limits of which the defendant is served with process, has jurisdiction of a bill filed by distributee of an estate against the administrator thereof, for a settlement of the administration and the recovery of the complainant's distributive share, although the bill shows that the estate, the administration, and the administrator are in another county, and no final settlement had been made, but all the other distributees had been settled with and paid. Parkes v. Parkes, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 647 (1878).

6. —Deed Reformation.

Where in a suit to reform a deed the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and three of the defendants named in such suit resided in the county where the suit was brought and the other nonresident defendants were served by publication the decree of the court allowing such reformation was immune from collateral attack. Globe & Republic Ins. Co. v. Shields, 170 Tenn. 485, 96 S.W.2d 947, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1936).

7. —Winding up Trusteeship under Deed of Trust.

The chancery court of this state has jurisdiction, at the suit of the maker of a deed of trust, who is a resident of another state, where the land conveyed was situated and the beneficiaries and trustees resided, to have a judgment, recovered in this state on a note embraced in the deed of trust, collected and appropriated to the payment of claims of the beneficiaries, and the surplus thereof paid to the complainant, and to have a settlement of accounts with the trustees, all other matters in the trust having been disposed of, and the bill being filed in the county in which the judgment debtor resided, or was when the bill was filed and he was served with process. Wilcox v. Morrison, 77 Tenn. 699, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1882).

8. County Where Land Located.

9. —Land Partly in More than One County.

The statutes contemplate a single tract of land lying partly in two or more counties, in which case jurisdiction of a court in either county is undoubted. French v. Buffatt, 161 Tenn. 500, 33 S.W.2d 92, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1930).

Where plaintiff owned a tract of land located in both Hamilton and Marion Counties, and defendant owned a smaller tract located in Marion County but whose description was contained in metes and bounds set forth in plaintiff's tract, a suit filed by plaintiff in Hamilton County chancery court for the purpose of preventing cutting of timber and a decree declaring deed to defendants to be champertous was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction though court had personal jurisdiction of defendants, since legislature in enacting § 20-4-103 and this section localized proceedings involving real estate. Carter v. Brown, 196 Tenn. 35, 263 S.W.2d 757, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (1953).

Where a tract of land lies partly in two counties, jurisdiction of a court in either county is undoubted. Medlock v. Ferrari, 602 S.W.2d 241, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

10. —Decedent's Estates — Lands in Another County.

In suits to administer estates of decedents, the court may decree the sale of lands in any county, under § 30-606 (now § 30-2-403). The question was reserved as to whether this rule applies to general creditors' bills in chancery to wind up insolvent corporations. French v. Buffatt, 161 Tenn. 500, 33 S.W.2d 92, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1930).

Jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose a vendor's lien would be in the county where the land lay even though the court of another county had jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased owner of the land. Patrick v. Hardin, 215 Tenn. 348, 385 S.W.2d 905, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (1964).

Where holder of notes secured by vendor's lien on land failed to file claim with administratrix of insolvent estate in accordance with § 30-704 (now § 30-5-104), action for money judgment was barred but suit to enforce vendor's lien could be brought in county where land lay. Patrick v. Hardin, 215 Tenn. 348, 385 S.W.2d 905, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (1964).

11. —Quiet Title.

Under a bill to quiet title and to have rights declared in the land, nonresident defendants may be brought in by publication, for personal service of process is dispensed with in such cases. Attachment of the land is unnecessary. The filing of the bill in such case creates a lis pendens, and the issuance of an injunction is sufficient. Ray v. Haag, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 249 (1901).

Where a nonresident defendant was before the court by publication, and the cause was at issue by pro confesso, and evidence taken before the pro confesso was read on the trial without objection, though the nonresident defendant never in fact appeared, objection to such evidence because taken before the pro confesso cannot be made for the first time in the appellate court, especially when there upon writ of error, because such writ waives all such objections. Ray v. Haag, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 249 (1901).

Proceeding seeking to enjoin foreclosure of trust deed on land, to enjoin transfer of note secured by such trust deed, to cancel trust deed and note and to recover for breach of contract for alleged failure to fulfill contract to construct dwelling on such land was a suit to clear title and venue was in county where land lay. Stinnett v. Tom-Ken Builders, Inc., 214 Tenn. 262, 379 S.W.2d 766, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1964).

Chancery Court for Cumberland County, Tennessee, erred in attempting to invalidate a DeKalb County, Tennessee, lien because to the extent a limited liability company (LLC) sought to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County was not the proper venue; the chancery court was directed on remand to transfer the case to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address the LLC's action to quiet title to land in that county. Little Hurricane Props., LLC v. Cafaro, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

12. —Bill to Confirm Exchange of Minor's Realty.

Bill to confirm exchange of realty belonging to minor must be brought in county where minor resides, or in county where land lies. Smartt v. Smartt, 1 Tenn. App. 68, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

13. —Resulting Trust in Land.

A bill against nonresidents to divest title to land and to enforce resulting trust relating to land is within the jurisdiction of the chancery court of the county in which the land lies. Robert v. Frogge, 149 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W. 782, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1924).

Since a bill to divest title to land and to enforce a resulting trust relating to land brings the property within the grasp of the court as effectively as if attachment had issued, a decree rendered thereon was binding on defendants proceeded against as nonresidents, in so far as the land was concerned. Robert v. Frogge, 149 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W. 782, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1924).

14. —Suit to Remove Clouds.

A suit to recover possession of land and to remove clouds upon complainant's title is a local action and is properly brought in the county where the land, or part of it, lies; and the recovery sought for the value of the timber cut and removed is merely incidental. Frankfort Land Co. v. Hughett, 137 Tenn. 32, 191 S.W. 530, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1916).

15. —Realty Converted Into Personalty.

Statute requiring that actions relating to real estate be filed in county where real estate is situated did not apply to house and lot treated as personal property under doctrine of equitable conversion, and fact that such house and lot were situated in county did not give county court jurisdiction over action against nonresident executor by virtue of service of process on clerk of county court. Pinkerton v. Fox, 23 Tenn. App. 159, 129 S.W.2d 514, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

16. —Supplemental Bill by Purchaser at Judicial Sale.

Where the chancery court acquires jurisdiction properly, and decrees lands to be sold in its county and lands in another county, the purchaser of the lands in the other county may file a supplemental bill in the case, if done before the payment of the purchase price or termination of the suit, making new parties who are nonresidents, and have the legal title divested out of them, or have his purchase rescinded for failure of title, though such new parties did not appear or make defense. Robertson v. Winchester, 85 Tenn. 171, 1 S.W. 781, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1886).

17. —Partition.

If any portion of the land sought to be sold for partition lies in the county of the chancery court, it has jurisdiction to sell the lands in any other county or counties within the state. Todd v. Cannon, 27 Tenn. 512, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (1847); Winchester v. Winchester, 38 Tenn. 460, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 213 (1858).

18. —Action Sounding in Tort.

Because third-party plaintiffs' claim against third-party defendant was one in tort, based on the tortious interference with a business relationship involving a land sale contract, and the alleged tortious conduct took place in Sullivan County, and at all times relevant to the claim, third-party defendant was a resident of Sullivan County, the proper venue for the claim was Sullivan County. Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Ayers, 861 S.W.2d 366, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

19. Enjoining Proceedings at Law.

20. —Court's Own Execution.

A court of chancery will entertain an original bill, in a proper case, to enjoin its own execution. Anderson v. Mullenix, 73 Tenn. 287, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1880).

21. —County to Which Execution Issued.

A bill to enjoin an execution may be filed in the county to which it has been issued and the officer is sufficient as a material defendant. Douglass v. Joyner, 60 Tenn. 32, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 471 (1872).

22. —County of Prosecution.

Where bills in two suits consolidated and tried by chancery court in Rutherford County alleged that certain notes had been procured by fraud, and prayed that injunction issue restraining defendants from further prosecution of notes in circuit court of Rutherford County and that an accounting by trustee of defendant bank be required and judgments rendered against trustee and bank, chancery court had jurisdiction of suits to enjoin even though defendants were residents of, and served in, Gibson County; but upon these facts it had no jurisdiction to entertain suits for accounting and judgment thereon, if objection was properly and seasonably made. Gregory v. Merchants State Bank, 23 Tenn. App. 567, 135 S.W.2d 465, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

In suit brought in chancery court of Rutherford County to enjoin defendant from further prosecution of note in circuit court of that county, and in which complainants demanded an accounting and judgment thereon, the statutory jurisdiction of the chancery court to issue such an injunction failed for defect of proof, and with this failure all of its power likewise failed except its power to give judgment for costs. Gregory v. Merchants State Bank, 23 Tenn. App. 567, 135 S.W.2d 465, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

23. Nonresidents and Unknowns.

Where insurance company, deposited sum in court with interpleader bill, claiming that the same might be claimed by a Tennessee resident or certain Texas residents, the money in question was never the property of the Texas residents but the property of the insurance company and therefore not an in rem proceeding such as would authorize jurisdiction over the Texas residents to be extent of the res. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Newland, 202 Tenn. 134, 303 S.W.2d 332, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (1957).

24 —Unknown Parties Defendant.

A bill will not lie against unknown parties at all, unless there is tangible property upon which to base jurisdiction, or unless the unknown party is identified by description, so that the publication may be directed to a sufficiently identified individual; but where the court has no control of property, and no means of identifying the unknown party, publication would rest on nothing, and would be simply nugatory. Creswell v. Smith, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 416 (1875).

25. —Partnership Settlement.

The chancery court of a county in which a partnership was formed and conducted has jurisdiction, under this statute, of a suit by resident partner against the other partner who is a nonresident, for a partnership settlement, or to ascertain a debt growing out of the partnership transactions; and to issue to other counties attachments, injunctions, or other necessary process. Wells v. Collins, 79 Tenn. 213, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1883).

If, in addition, the object of a bill for debt, growing out of partnership in county where formed and conducted, be to attach a judgment recovered by the nonresident defendant partner against a third person, and to have the benefit of any recovery in a suit commenced by him in the chancery court of another county for the collection of the judgment, the object may be attained by impounding the existing judgment and the expected recovery for its collection, without interfering with the prosecution of the suit; but if the injunction sued out be broader than it ought to be, it would not affect the jurisdiction of the court granting it, because it is subject to be modified on motion. Wells v. Collins, 79 Tenn. 213, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1883).

A bill to wind up an association, filed in Bedford County, and thereunder to sell its lands in Davidson County, was sustained where personal appearance was entered and the local jurisdiction of the court not challenged as set forth in § 16-616 (repealed). Johnson v. Evans, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 603 (1903).

26. —Reformation of Assignment of Life Policy.

Where the insured, in a life policy assigned it to his mother who thereafter died before his death, sued to reform the assignment to make it conform to an alleged actual agreement between them, to which suit the nonresident insurance company and the distributees of the mother, both residents and nonresidents, were made parties, such suit was to settle the interests of only those made parties, and was quasi in rem, and the court having jurisdiction of the res or policy, though it was in the actual possession of complainant, but in the power of the court at any moment to order its actual filing, had jurisdiction of the whole cause and could by its judgment bind the nonresident defendant distributees. Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S.W. 577, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 116, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1917B385 (1916).

27. —Suit Quasi in Rem.

A suit against a nonresident, without the service of process, upon seizure of property and publication, is necessarily a local action, and a suit quasi in rem; and it must be brought in the court that has jurisdiction of the property. Robert v. Frogge, 149 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W. 782, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1924).

28. Attachment.

29. —Purpose.

An attachment is levied against property of defendant. Terril v. Rogers, 4 Tenn. 203, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1817).

The object of the provision as to publication or judicial attachment was to give the court jurisdiction when the defendant could not, for any reason, be personally served with process. It was neither intended to, nor does it, deprive any other chancery court of the jurisdiction it may be able to acquire over the person by actual service of process on a defendant found within its county or jurisdictional district, as provided in § 16-11-203 (repealed). Parkes v. Parkes, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 647 (1878).

30. —Realty — When Attachment Unnecessary.

An attachment of real property is not required, when the filing of a proper bill creates a lien lis pendens. Ray v. Haag, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 249 (1901).

31. —Impossibility of Personal Service.

The attachment, under this statute, can only be issued in lieu of personal service of process; and the provision does not apply if process can be personally served. Simonton v. Porter, 60 Tenn. 213, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (1873).

32. —Claim by Nonresident Debtor.

Where a fund is already in court, brought there under an attachment against a nonresident debtor of the complainant, and the debtor put in a plea disclaiming the property or fund, but stating that it was the property of a nonresident firm of which he was a member, the complainant may file an amended and supplemental bill against the other members of the firm to ascertain the interest of his debtor in the fund, and a prayer that the fund already in court be held subject to the order of the court probably dispenses with a formal attachment thereof, and the court has jurisdiction. Morrow v. Fossick, 71 Tenn. 129, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1879).

33. —Foreign Corporation's Property Attached.

A foreign corporation, though doing business in this state, is a nonresident within the meaning of our attachment laws, and may be proceeded against by attachment of its property. Hadley v. Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co., 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 122 (1874).

34. Lands Situated in Another State.

Although a partition of lands lying without the state cannot be made, nor can they be sold under the decrees of the courts of this state, and, consequently, a partition of land lying in this state cannot be made by the courts of another state; a suit for specific performance may be maintained when the land lies out of the state, if the court has jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. Johnson v. Kimbro, 40 Tenn. 557, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 164 (1859); Topp v. White, 59 Tenn. 165, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1873); Miller v. Birdsong, 66 Tenn. 531, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1874).

Chancery has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit to try title to or to recover possession of land, or to enjoin a threatened trespass, where the land is situated in another state, so that, to enforce its decree, the process of the court would have to act upon the property, since such actions are local, and not transitory, while chancery acts in personam, and not in rem. Anderson-Tully Co. v. Thompson, 132 Tenn. 80, 177 S.W. 66, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (1915).

35. —Land Lying Partly in Another State.

Where the tract of land lies both in this state and in an adjoining state, the chancery court here cannot decree a sale of that part lying in the adjoining state, but if the holder of the legal title is before the court, he may, in a proper case, be compelled to convey the same to a resident administrator, and then the administrator may be directed to sell the same for the benefit of creditors, under the direction of the court. Miller v. Birdsong, 66 Tenn. 531, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1874).

36. Suit in Wrong County — Fee for Receiver Appointed.

Where suit to wind up an insolvent corporation was brought in wrong county, and receiver was appointed, the court had jurisdiction to allow such receiver a fee for the work done by him. Crosby Milling Co. v. Grant, 7 Tenn. App. 162, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

37. Abatement Plea.

The usual rule is that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter need not be pleaded in abatement, but where, under this section, the court has general original jurisdiction and the limitation on its power is only on its power to decree as to realty in another county, no question as to local jurisdiction of the court can be raised except by plea in abatement, demurrer or motion to dismiss. Section 16-11-114 is read into this section or along with it. Johnson v. Evans, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 603 (1903); Crosby Milling Co. v. Grant, 154 Tenn. 375, 289 S.W. 511, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1926).

Chancellor's jurisdiction where bill in nature of general creditor's bill, involving sale of land, none of which was located in county, was properly raised by plea in abatement, which plea was not waived by answer after plea overruled. Crosby Milling Co. v. Grant, 154 Tenn. 375, 289 S.W. 511, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1926).

Where a judgment creditor with nulla bona return filed a bill in Washington County to reach defendant's interest in realty lying in Knox County along with interest in realty in Washington County, a plea in abatement deprived the court of jurisdiction to sell the interest in the separate tract in Knox County. French v. Buffatt, 161 Tenn. 500, 33 S.W.2d 92, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1930).

Collateral References. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue §§ 1-39.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 15.

Venue 2.

16-11-201. Transfers between courts.

Any cause pending in the chancery court may be transferred, by consent of parties, to the chancery court of another county.

Code 1858, § 4308 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 4, § 10); Shan., § 6118; mod. Code 1932, § 10386; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-618.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 47.

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 502, 507.

72 C.J.S. Process § 32.

16-11-202. Relief from firearm disabilities imposed on persons adjudicated as mental defective or judicially committed to mental institution.

1. A person who is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) because the person has been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution, as defined in § 16-11-206, may petition the chancery court that entered the judicial commitment or adjudication order or the chancery court where the petitioner resides for relief from the firearm disabilities imposed by the adjudication or judicial commitment; provided, that the person may not petition the court until three (3) years from the date of release from commitment or the date of the adjudication order, whichever is later.
2. A copy of the petition for relief shall also be served on the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the original judicial commitment or adjudication occurred. The district attorney general may appear, support, object to, or present evidence relevant to the relief sought by the petitioner.
3. The court shall receive and consider evidence in an open proceeding, including evidence offered by the petitioner, concerning:
   1. The circumstances that led to the imposition of the firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4);
   2. The petitioner's mental health records;
   3. The petitioner's criminal history;
   4. The petitioner's reputation; and
   5. Changes in the petitioner's condition or circumstances relevant to the relief sought.
4. The court shall grant the petition for relief if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence and enters into the record the following:
   1. The petitioner is no longer likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
   2. Granting the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
5. A record of the proceedings, to be provided by the petitioner, shall be made by a certified court reporter or by court-approved electronic means.
6. The petitioner may appeal a final order denying the requested relief, and the review on appeal, if granted, shall be de novo.
7. A person may file a petition for relief under this section no more than once every two (2) years.
8. Relief from a firearm disability granted under this section has no effect on the loss of civil rights, including firearm rights, for any reason other than the particular adjudication as a mental defective or judicial commitment to a mental institution from which relief is granted.
9. When the court issues an order granting a petition of relief under subsection (d), the court clerk shall, as soon as practicable but no later than thirty (30) days after issuance, forward a copy of the order to the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI). The TBI, upon receipt of the order, shall:
   1. Immediately forward a copy of the order to the department of safety;
   2. Update the National Instant Criminal Background Check System database and transmit the corrected records to the federal bureau of investigation; and
   3. Remove and destroy all records relating to the petition for relief from any database over which the TBI exercises control.
10. The TBI and the department of safety shall not use or permit the use of the records or information obtained or retained pursuant to this section for any purpose not specified in this section.

Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-11-202 (Acts 1909, ch. 551, § 2; Shan., § 5745a5; Code 1932, § 9941; Acts 1941, ch. 47, §§ 1-4; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 9945.1-9945.4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-619 — 16-623), concerning adjourned terms, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 22. For provisions abolishing terms of court, see § 16-2-510.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 6. July 1, 2015.

16-11-203. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-11-203 (Code 1858, § 4305; Shan., § 6115; Code 1932, § 10383; T.C.A., (orig. ed.), § 16-624), concerning action in personam, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 753, § 1.

16-11-204. Counterpart summons.

Counterpart summons, accompanied by copies of the bill, may be issued to any other counties of the state for defendants not to be found in the county in which the suit is properly brought.

Code 1858, § 4306 (deriv. Acts 1789, ch. 57, § 1); Shan., § 6116; Code 1932, § 10384; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-625.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Banks and Banking, § 54; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 13, 27.

Cited: Wilkins v. Jetton, 8 Tenn. App. 641, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928); Minor v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 164 Tenn. 226, 47 S.W.2d 748, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1932).

16-11-205. Process to other counties in general.

If the suit is properly instituted, attachments, injunctions, and all other process known to the court, and necessary to attain the ends of justice, may be issued to any other county.

Code 1858, § 4307; Shan., § 6117; Code 1932, § 10385; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-626.

16-11-206. Information to be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index and the department of safety by those chancery courts in which commitments to a mental institution are ordered.

1. As used in this section:
   1. “Adjudication as a mental defective or adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
      1. A determination by a court in this state that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease:
         1. Is a danger to such person or to others; or
         2. Lacks the ability to contract or manage such person's own affairs due to mental defect;
      2. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal proceeding; or
      3. A finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to §§ 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 850a, 876b;
   2. “Judicial commitment to a mental institution” means a judicially ordered involuntary admission to a private or state hospital or treatment resource in proceedings conducted pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7;
   3. “Mental institution” means a mental health facility, mental hospital, sanitarium, psychiatric facility and any other facility that provides diagnoses by a licensed professional of mental retardation or mental illness, including, but not limited to, a psychiatric ward in a general hospital; and
   4. “Treatment resource” means any public or private facility, service or program providing treatment or rehabilitation services for mental illness or serious emotional disturbance, including, but not limited to, detoxification centers, hospitals, community mental health centers, clinics or programs, halfway houses and rehabilitation centers.
2. Those chancery courts wherein commitments to a mental institution are ordered pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or chapter 7 or persons are adjudicated as a mental defective shall enter a standing and continuing order instructing the clerk to collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication, information described in subsection (c) regarding individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution for the purposes of complying with the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-180.
3. The following information shall be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index and the department of safety, pursuant to subsection (b):
   1. Complete name and all aliases of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, including, but not limited to, any names that the individual may have had or currently has by reason of marriage or otherwise;
   2. Case or docket number of the judicial commitment or the adjudication as a mental defective;
   3. Date judicial commitment ordered or adjudication as a mental defective was made;
   4. Private or state hospital or treatment resource to which the individual was judicially committed;
   5. Date of birth of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, if such information has been provided to the clerk;
   6. Race and sex of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective; and
   7. Social security number of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective if available.
4. The information in subdivisions (c)(1)–(7), the confidentiality of which is protected by other statutes or regulations, shall be maintained as confidential and not subject to public inspection pursuant to such statutes or regulations, except for such use as may be necessary in the conduct of any proceeding pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 — 39-17-1354.

Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 2; 2013, ch. 300, § 4; 2019, ch. 262, §§ 5, 6.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication” for “collect and report January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of every year beginning January 1, 2010” in (b).

The 2019 amendment added (c)(6) and (c)(7); and, in (d), substituted “subdivisions (c)(1)-(7)” for “subdivisions (c)(1)-(5)”, and substituted “proceeding pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 - 39-17-1354” for “proceedings pursuant to §§ 39-17-1316, 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 13. January 1, 2010.

Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

Acts 2019, ch. 262, § 7. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Part 1
Establishment

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. County Court as a Constitutional Institution.

The county courts are wholly wanting in common law powers. Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Wilson County, 89 Tenn. 597, 15 S.W. 446, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1891); Shelby County v. Tennessee Centennial Exposition Co., 96 Tenn. 653, 36 S.W. 694, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 19, 33 L.R.A. 717 (1896).

County courts are constituted corporations and can exercise only such powers as may be entrusted to them by the legislature. Wright v. State, 171 Tenn. 628, 106 S.W.2d 866, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1937).

The county courts of Tennessee are recognized by the Constitution but they possess no judicial jurisdiction other than that conferred by statute. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

2. Powers — Derivation from Legislature.

The powers “entrusted to” the county courts emanate from the legislature alone; hence, when a power claimed for them is not so conferred, it must be held not to exist. Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Wilson County, 89 Tenn. 597, 15 S.W. 446, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1891); Shelby County v. Tennessee Centennial Exposition Co., 96 Tenn. 653, 36 S.W. 694, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 19, 33 L.R.A. 717 (1896).

3. Probate Jurisdiction.

The statutes make it clear that the county court is the probate court. The 1978 constitutional amendments superseded this court. Viewed realistically the probate court is just as much a part of our judicial system as the juvenile court. Probate judges are county officers. Marion County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Marion County Election Com., 594 S.W.2d 681, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. 1980).

Collateral References. Courts 182-185.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Subsequent Days.

“Subsequent days” is not to be construed to be limited to those immediately succeeding the first Monday. The necessity of exercise of functions on any day of the month is apparent. There may be special or adjourned sessions. S. M. Williamson & Co. v. Shelton, 158 Tenn. 166, 11 S.W.2d 882, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1928).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Commencement of Court at Proper Time — Showing.

Where the caption of the court, preceding an order appointing an administrator, recited that “court was opened and held … on the 2d day of July, 1907, when the following business was had and entered of record,” it was held that such order was not to be construed as stating that the regular session of the court was begun on that day (which was Tuesday, and not the first Monday in the month), and that it did not show want of jurisdiction. Dayton Coal & I. Co. v. Dodd, 188 F. 597, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4350, 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 456 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1911).

2. Judicial Notice of Terms.

Court of appeals took official notice of terms of county court as specified in this section. Plumb v. Plumb, 52 Tenn. App. 267, 372 S.W.2d 771, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Collateral References. Courts 63.